Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/28207
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorHurtig, Kenten_UK
dc.date.accessioned2018-11-13T01:01:00Z-
dc.date.available2018-11-13T01:01:00Z-
dc.date.issued2019-12en_UK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/28207-
dc.description.abstractThis paper is concerned with the implication from value to fittingness. I shall argue that those committed to this implication face a serious explanatory challenge. This argument is not intended as a knock-down argument against FA but it will, I think, show that those who endorse the theory incur a particular explanatory burden: to explain how counterfactual (dis)favouring of actual (dis)value is possible. After making two important preliminary points (about one of the primary motivations behind the theory and what this implies, respectively) I briefly discuss an objection to FA made by Krister Bykvist a few years ago. The point of discussing this objection is to enable me to more easily present my own, and I believe stronger, version of that objection. The overall argument takes the form of, simply, a counterexample which can be constructed on the back of (an acceptance) of my two preliminary points. Throughout the paper I try to respond to various objections.en_UK
dc.language.isoenen_UK
dc.publisherPhilosophy Documentation Centeren_UK
dc.relationHurtig K (2019) The fitting attitudes analysis of value: an explanatory challenge. Philosophical Studies, 176 (12), pp. 3241-3249. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1172-xen_UK
dc.rights© The Author(s) 2018 This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.en_UK
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/en_UK
dc.subjectValueen_UK
dc.subjectFittingnessen_UK
dc.subjectNormativityen_UK
dc.subjectNon-actual evaluationen_UK
dc.titleThe fitting attitudes analysis of value: an explanatory challengeen_UK
dc.typeJournal Articleen_UK
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11098-018-1172-xen_UK
dc.citation.jtitlePhilosophical Studiesen_UK
dc.citation.issn2153-8379en_UK
dc.citation.issn0554-0739en_UK
dc.citation.volume176en_UK
dc.citation.issue12en_UK
dc.citation.spage3241en_UK
dc.citation.epage3249en_UK
dc.citation.publicationstatusPublisheden_UK
dc.citation.peerreviewedRefereeden_UK
dc.type.statusVoR - Version of Recorden_UK
dc.contributor.funderArts and Humanities Research Councilen_UK
dc.citation.date05/10/2018en_UK
dc.description.notesA correction to this article is available online at https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1188-2. A few errors were identified in the original publication of the article. The corrections are as follows: 1. The 'Abstract' section should read as below: According to the fitting attitudes (FA) analysis of value, value entails fittingness. In this paper, I shall argue that those committed to this implication face a serious explanatory challenge. This argument is not intended as a knock-down argument against FA but it will, I think, show that those who endorse the theory incur a particular explanatory burden: to explain how counterfactual (dis)favouring of actual (dis)value is possible. After making two important preliminary points (about one of the primary motivations behind the theory and what this implies, respectively), I briefly discuss an objection to FA made by Krister Bykvist a few years ago. The point of discussing this objection is to enable me to more easily present my own, and I believe stronger, version of that objection. The overall argument takes the form of, simply, a counterexample which can be constructed on the back of (an acceptance) of my two preliminary points. Throughout the paper, I try to respond to various objections. 2. On page 6, in the second paragraph, 'g' and 'g*' should be replaced by 'q and 'q*', respectively: Perhaps the FA theorist could respond as follows: In order to contemplate the solitary good of the happy egrets (again calling this q) we don’t need to single out any one particular (non-actual) world at which q obtains; we need only entertain the proposition that there is some world at which q obtains. Now consider some actual solitary good, q*. By hypothesis, no actual person can identify, and so no actual person can contemplate, q*. But why can’t a non-actual person do so? If contemplating g doesn’t require singling out some particular world at which q obtains, why should contemplating q* (or e, or any other actual solitary good or evil) require singling out some particular world?en_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationPhilosophyen_UK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000490595100007en_UK
dc.identifier.scopusid2-s2.0-85054685690en_UK
dc.identifier.wtid1051864en_UK
dc.contributor.orcid0000-0002-9067-2868en_UK
dc.date.accepted2018-10-05en_UK
dc.description.refREF Compliant by Deposit in Stirling's Repositoryen_UK
dc.date.filedepositdate2018-11-12en_UK
dc.relation.funderprojectThe Foundations and Scope of External Reasons for Action and Intentionen_UK
dc.relation.funderrefAH/G009252/1en_UK
Appears in Collections:Law and Philosophy Journal Articles

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
Hurtig2018_Article_CorrectionToTheFittingAttitude.pdfFulltext - Published Version200.15 kBAdobe PDFView/Open
Hurtig2019_Article_TheFittingAttitudesAnalysisOfV.pdfFulltext - Published Version354.53 kBAdobe PDFView/Open


This item is protected by original copyright



A file in this item is licensed under a Creative Commons License Creative Commons

Items in the Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

If you believe that any material held in STORRE infringes copyright, please contact library@stir.ac.uk providing details and we will remove the Work from public display in STORRE and investigate your claim.