|Appears in Collections:||Law and Philosophy Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status:||Refereed|
|Title:||The scope of perceptual knowledge|
Knowledge, Theory of
Senses and sensation
Belief and doubt
|Citation:||Millar A (2000) The scope of perceptual knowledge, Philosophy, 75 (1), pp. 73-88. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819100000061.|
|Abstract:||Plausibly perceptual knowledge satisfies the following: (1) It is knowledge about things from the way they appear. (2) It can embrace more than the way things appear. (3) It is phenomenologically immediate and thus, in one sense, non-inferential. (2) and (3) place a significant constraint on adequate elucidations of (1). Knowledge about an object, from the way it looks, which embraces more than the way it looks, should not turn out to be inferential in the relevant sense. The paper shows how this constraint can be met, drawing upon a conception of a discriminative capacity. The discussion touches on literature dealing with observation in science, knowledge of other minds, and the possibility of moral knowledge.|
|Rights:||Philosophy. Copyright: Cambridge University Press.|
|scope-of-perceptual-knowledge.pdf||Fulltext - Published Version||110.32 kB||Adobe PDF||View/Open|
This item is protected by original copyright
Items in the Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
If you believe that any material held in STORRE infringes copyright, please contact firstname.lastname@example.org providing details and we will remove the Work from public display in STORRE and investigate your claim.