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|Appears in Collections:||Law and Philosophy Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status: ||Refereed|
|Title: ||Logical Non-Cognitivism|
|Author(s): ||Wright, Crispin|
|Contact Email: ||email@example.com|
|Issue Date: ||31-Oct-2018|
|Citation: ||Wright C (2018) Logical Non-Cognitivism. Philosophical Issues, 28 (1), pp. 425-450. https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12132.|
|Abstract: ||In this paper, I return to issues explored in Wright (2001) and (2004). The abstract for the latter begins with the sentences, The essay addresses the well‐known idea that there has to be a place for intuition, thought of as a kind of non‐ inferential rational insight, in the epistemology of basic logic if our knowledge of its principles is non‐ empirical and is to allow of any finite, non‐circular reconstruction. It is argued that the error in this idea consists in its overlooking the possibility that there is, properly speaking, no knowledge of the validity of principles of basic logic.|
|DOI Link: ||10.1111/phis.12132|
|Rights: ||This item has been embargoed for a period. During the embargo please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author. You can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Wright, C. (2018), LOGICAL NON‐COGNITIVISM. Philosophical Issues, 28: 425-450. doi:10.1111/phis.12132, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12132. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.|
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