|Appears in Collections:||Economics Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status:||Refereed|
|Title:||Networked innovation and coalition formation: the effect of group-based social preferences (Forthcoming/Available Online)|
open-source software (OSS)
public knowledge goods
|Citation:||Dedeurwaerdere T, Melindi-Ghidi P & Sas W (2017) Networked innovation and coalition formation: the effect of group-based social preferences (Forthcoming/Available Online), Economics of Innovation and New Technology.|
|Abstract:||In this paper, we study the production and dissemination of public knowledge goods, such as technological knowledge, generated by a network of voluntarily cooperating innovators. We develop a private-collective model of public knowledge production in networked innovation systems, where group-based social preferences have an impact on the coalition formation of developers. Our model builds on the large empirical literature on voluntary production of pooled public knowledge goods, including source code in communities of software developers or data provided to open access data repositories. Our analysis shows under which conditions social preferences, such as ‘group belonging’ or ‘peer approval’, influence the stable coalition size, as such rationalising several stylized facts emerging from large-scale surveys of open-source software developers, previously unaccounted for. Furthermore, heterogeneity of social preferences is added to the model to study the formation of stable but mixed coalitions.|
|Rights:||This item has been embargoed for a period. During the embargo please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author. You can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study. This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis Group in Economics of Innovation and New Technology on 29 Sep 2017, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/10438599.2017.1378163|
|Coalition_opensource_FINAL REVISION.pdf||431.91 kB||Adobe PDF||Under Embargo until 2019-03-30 Request a copy|
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