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dc.contributor.authorHiggins, Joeen_UK
dc.date.accessioned2017-07-14T23:05:33Z-
dc.date.available2017-07-14T23:05:33Z-
dc.date.issued2018-07-01en_UK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/25620-
dc.description.abstractIn a recent paper, Kyselo (2014) argues that an enactive approach to selfhood can overcome ‘the body-social problem’: “the question for philosophy of cognitive science about how bodily and social aspects figure in the individuation of the human individual self” (Kyselo 2014, p. 4; see also Kyselo and Di Paolo (2013)). Kyselo’s claim is that we should conceive of the human self as a socially enacted phenomenon that is bodily mediated. Whilst there is much to be praised about this claim, I will demonstrate in this paper that such a conception of self ultimately leads to a strained interpretation of how bodily and social processes are related. To this end, I will begin the paper by elucidating the body-social problem as it appears in modern cognitive science and then expounding Kyselo’s solution, which relies on a novel interpretation of Jonas’s (1966/2001) concept ofneedful freedom. In response to this solution, I will highlight two problems which Kyselo’s account cannot overcome in its current state. I will argue that a more satisfactory solution to the body-social problem involves a re-conception of the human body as irrevocably socially constituted and the human social world as irrevocably bodily constituted. On this view, even the most minimal sense of selfhood cannot privilege either bodily or social processes; instead, the two are ontologically entwined such that humans arebiosocial selves.en_UK
dc.language.isoenen_UK
dc.publisherSpringeren_UK
dc.relationHiggins J (2018) Biosocial selfhood: overcoming the ‘body-social problem’ within the individuation of the human self, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 17 (3), pp. 433-454. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-017-9514-2.en_UK
dc.rights© The Author(s) 2017 This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.en_UK
dc.subjectSelfhooden_UK
dc.subjectCognitive scienceen_UK
dc.subjectEmbodimenten_UK
dc.subjectEnsocialmenten_UK
dc.subjectBody-social problemen_UK
dc.subjectEnactivismen_UK
dc.titleBiosocial selfhood: overcoming the ‘body-social problem’ within the individuation of the human selfen_UK
dc.typeJournal Articleen_UK
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11097-017-9514-2en_UK
dc.citation.jtitlePhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciencesen_UK
dc.citation.issn1572-8676en_UK
dc.citation.issn1568-7759en_UK
dc.citation.volume17en_UK
dc.citation.issue3en_UK
dc.citation.spage433en_UK
dc.citation.epage454en_UK
dc.citation.publicationstatusPublisheden_UK
dc.citation.peerreviewedRefereeden_UK
dc.type.statusVoR - Version of Recorden_UK
dc.citation.date10/06/2017en_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationPhilosophyen_UK
dc.identifier.isi000434854800001en_UK
dc.identifier.scopusid2-s2.0-85020683997en_UK
dc.identifier.wtid523626en_UK
dc.date.accepted2017-06-10en_UK
dc.date.firstcompliantdepositdate2017-07-14en_UK
dc.description.refREF Compliant by Deposit in Stirling's Repositoryen_UK
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