|Appears in Collections:||Law and Philosophy Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status:||Refereed|
|Title:||Understanding Undermining Defeat|
|Citation:||Melis G (2014) Understanding Undermining Defeat, Philosophical Studies, 170 (3), pp. 433-442.|
|Abstract:||Taking the inspiration from some points made by Scott Sturgeon and Albert Casullo, I articulate a view according to which an important difference between undermining and overriding defeaters is that the former require the subject to engage in some higher-order epistemic thinking, while the latter don’t. With the help of some examples, I argue that underminers push the cognizer to reflect on the way she formed a belief by challenging the epistemic worthiness of either the source of justification or the specific justificatory process. By contrast, overriders needn’t pose any such challenge. I also consider some problems for the proposed view, and I put forward some possible solutions. Finally, I provide some details on how undermining defeat works in different cases.|
|Rights:||This is the accepted version of an article whose final and definitive form is published in Philosophical Studies. Philosophical Studies is available online at: link.springer.com. The article is available at the following permanent link: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0238-z. Please cite the published version only|
|Understanding Undermining Defeat (final).pdf||181.92 kB||Adobe PDF||View/Open|
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