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Appears in Collections:Law and Philosophy Journal Articles
Peer Review Status: Refereed
Title: Legal and Moral Responsibility
Author(s): Duff, R A
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Issue Date: Dec-2009
Date Deposited: 14-Oct-2010
Citation: Duff RA (2009) Legal and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy Compass, 4 (6), pp. 978-986.;
Abstract: The paper begins with the plausible view that criminal responsibility should track moral responsibility, and explains its plausibility. A necessary distinction is then drawn between liability and answerability as two dimensions of responsibility, and is shown to underpin the distinction in criminal law between offences and defences. This enables us to distinguish strict liability from strict answerability, and to see that whilst strict criminal liability seems inconsistent with the principle that criminal responsibility should track moral responsibility, strict criminal answerability is not. We must ask, therefore, whether, when and why strict criminal responsibility is unacceptable.
DOI Link: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00257.x
Rights: Rights according to the Exclusive Licence Form:; Duff, A. (2009), Legal and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy Compass, 4: 978–986. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00257.x Published in Philosophy Compass by Wiley-Blackwell.; The definitive version is available at

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