|Appears in Collections:||Law and Philosophy Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status:||Refereed|
|Title:||Modal Knowledge and Counterfactual Knowledge|
|Keywords:||Epistemology of Modality|
|Citation:||Roca-Royes S (2011) Modal Knowledge and Counterfactual Knowledge, Logique et Analyse, 54 (216), pp. 537-552.|
|Abstract:||The paper compares the suitability of two different epistemologies of counterfactuals—(EC) and (W)—to elucidate modal knowledge. I argue that, while both of them explain the data on our knowledge of counterfactuals, neither can subsume modal knowledge. (EC) would be available only to extreme haecceitists. Only (W)—Williamson’s epistemology—is compatible with all counterpossibles being true; something on which Williamson’s account relies. A first problem is that, in the absence of further data for (W) and against (EC), Williamson’s choice of (W) is objectionably biased. A second, deeper problem is that (W) cannot satisfactorily elucidate modal knowledge. Third, from a naturalistic perspective, the nature of this second problem favours (EC) against (W).|
|Rights:||The editor has granted permission for use of this article in this Repository. The article was first published in Logique et Analyse by National Centre for Logical Investigation.|
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