|Appears in Collections:||Accounting and Finance Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status:||Refereed|
|Title:||IP-for-IP or Cash-for-IP? R&D Competition and the Market for Technology|
|Citation:||Herbst P & Jahn E (2017) IP-for-IP or Cash-for-IP? R&D Competition and the Market for Technology, Review of Industrial Organization, 51 (1), pp. 75-101. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-016-9542-z.|
|Abstract:||We analyze how firms might benefit from trading restrictions in the market for technology. We show that restricting trade to reciprocal exchange (“IP-for-IP” barter instead of cash transactions), as in cross-licensing agreements, alters the allocation of R&D resources and reduces overinvestment in R&D. The tighter are the trading restrictions, the higher are the costs that are due to forgone gains from trade. Our analysis of the trade-offs involved shows that firms benefit from IP-for-IP restrictions, compared to both free trade and no trade environments, in industries where: (1) firms differ in their capabilities to commercialize IP; and (2) patent complementarities exist.|
|Rights:||© The Author(s) 2016 This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.|
|HerbstJahn_RevIndOrgan_2017.pdf||Fulltext - Published Version||674.9 kB||Adobe PDF||View/Open|
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