Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/23779
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dc.contributor.authorSullivan, Peteren_UK
dc.contributor.authorJohnston, Colinen_UK
dc.contributor.editorGlanzberg, Men_UK
dc.date.accessioned2017-12-05T23:33:56Z-
dc.date.available2017-12-05T23:33:56Zen_UK
dc.date.issued2018-07-19en_UK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/23779-
dc.description.abstractFirst paragraph: Our aim in this chapter is to outline a story that ought to be familiar and unsurprising, one that traces the fate of the correspondence theory of truth from its adoption by Russell in ‘On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood’ (1910) to its repudiation by Ramsey in ‘Facts and Propositions’ (1927). Central episodes in this story are indeed very familiar. But commonly held views of them, when placed one after the other, make for a story that is more surprising and less coherent than it should be: slightly misplaced emphasis at the beginning, regarding Russell’s reasons for adopting his new theories of judgement and truth, sets things off in a direction that leads to simple error in the middle, regarding Wittgenstein’s views in the Tractatus; this error then calls for a sudden and inexplicable plot-twist in the transition to the final chapter, regarding Ramsey’s position, which in consequence is bungled.en_UK
dc.language.isoenen_UK
dc.publisherOxford University Pressen_UK
dc.relationSullivan P & Johnston C (2018) Judgments, Facts, and Propositions: Theories of Truth in Russell, Wittgenstein, and Ramsey. In: Glanzberg M (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 150-192. https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-truth-9780199557929en_UK
dc.relation.ispartofseriesOxford Handbooksen_UK
dc.rightsThis item has been embargoed for a period. During the embargo please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author. You can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study. Judgments, Facts, and Propositions: Theories of Truth in Russell, Wittgenstein, and Ramsey, The Oxford Handbook of Truth edited by Glanzberg M , 2018, reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press: https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-truth-9780199557929en_UK
dc.titleJudgments, Facts, and Propositions: Theories of Truth in Russell, Wittgenstein, and Ramseyen_UK
dc.typePart of book or chapter of booken_UK
dc.rights.embargodate2020-07-20en_UK
dc.rights.embargoreason[PMS-CJ paper for OUP Truth Handbook.pdf] Until this work is formally published there will be an embargo on the full text of this work.en_UK
dc.citation.spage150en_UK
dc.citation.epage192en_UK
dc.citation.publicationstatusPublisheden_UK
dc.type.statusAM - Accepted Manuscripten_UK
dc.identifier.urlhttps://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-truth-9780199557929en_UK
dc.author.emailcolin.johnston@stir.ac.uken_UK
dc.citation.btitleThe Oxford Handbook of Truthen_UK
dc.citation.isbn9780199557929en_UK
dc.publisher.addressOxforden_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationPhilosophyen_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationPhilosophyen_UK
dc.identifier.wtid585698en_UK
dc.contributor.orcid0000-0003-0185-0886en_UK
dc.date.filedepositdate2016-07-14en_UK
dc.subject.tagHistory of Early Analytic Philosophyen_UK
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