Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/23604
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dc.contributor.authorWheeler, Michaelen_UK
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-17T23:19:05Z-
dc.date.available2017-01-17T23:19:05Z-
dc.date.issued2015-03en_UK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/23604-
dc.description.abstractAccording to the hypothesis of extended phenomenal consciousness (ExPC), although the material vehicles that realize phenomenal consciousness include neural elements, they are not restricted to such elements. There will be cases in which those material vehicles additionally include not only non-neural bodily elements, but also elements located beyond the skull and skin. In this paper, I examine two arguments for ExPC, one due to Noë and the other due to Kiverstein and Farina. Both of these arguments conclude that ExPC is true on the basis of an analysis of sensory substitution, the phenomenon in which technological augmentation enables one sensory modality, for instance touch, to support the kind of environmental access and interaction ordinarily supported by a different sensory modality, for instance vision. I develop considerations which reveal that, as they stand, both of these arguments fall short. If the phenomenon of sensory substitution provides evidence for the truth of ExPC, it is not because of the specific arguments offered by these authors.en_UK
dc.language.isoenen_UK
dc.publisherImprint Academicen_UK
dc.relationWheeler M (2015) Not What it’s Like but Where it’s Like: Phenomenal Consciousness, Sensory Substitution and the Extended Mind. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 22 (3-4), pp. 129-147. http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2015/00000022/F0020003/art00008en_UK
dc.rightsThis item has been embargoed for a period. During the embargo please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author. You can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study. Publisher policy allows this work to be made available in this repository. Published in Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2015, Volume 22, Numbers 3-4, pp. 129-147 by Imprint Academic. The original publication is available at: http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2015/00000022/F0020003/art00008en_UK
dc.titleNot What it’s Like but Where it’s Like: Phenomenal Consciousness, Sensory Substitution and the Extended Minden_UK
dc.typeJournal Articleen_UK
dc.rights.embargodate2017-01-02en_UK
dc.rights.embargoreason[wheeler_where_its_like_STORRE.pdf] Publisher requires embargo of 24 months after formal publication.en_UK
dc.citation.jtitleJournal of Consciousness Studiesen_UK
dc.citation.issn1355-8250en_UK
dc.citation.volume22en_UK
dc.citation.issue3-4en_UK
dc.citation.spage129en_UK
dc.citation.epage147en_UK
dc.citation.publicationstatusPublisheden_UK
dc.citation.peerreviewedRefereeden_UK
dc.type.statusAM - Accepted Manuscripten_UK
dc.identifier.urlhttp://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2015/00000022/F0020003/art00008en_UK
dc.author.emailm.w.wheeler@stir.ac.uken_UK
dc.citation.date01/01/2015en_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationPhilosophyen_UK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000352757300008en_UK
dc.identifier.scopusid2-s2.0-84941108431en_UK
dc.identifier.wtid562163en_UK
dc.date.filedepositdate2016-06-29en_UK
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