Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorWheeler, Michaelen_UK
dc.contributor.editorFeldges, Ten_UK
dc.contributor.editorGray, JNWen_UK
dc.contributor.editorBurwood, Sen_UK
dc.description.abstractFirst paragraph: Let me put up my hand straight away: I am a naturalist about cognition. What does this mean? First things first: I take ‘cognition’ to be a catch-all term encompassing the various states and processes that we typically identify as psychological phenomena (the states and processes of memory, perception, reasoning, and so on). The guiding thought of naturalism is that philosophy should be continuous with empirical science. So the naturalist about cognition (that’s me) thinks that the philosophical understanding of cognition (of the states and processes of memory, perception, reasoning, and so on) should be continuous with cognitive science. I take the naturalist notion of continuity with empirical science to be determined by the following principle of conflict resolution (Wheeler 2013): if and when there is a genuine clash between philosophy and some eminently well-supported (by the data) empirical science, then that is a good reason for the philosopher to at least revisit her claims, with a view to withdrawal or revision. The envisaged clash, on its own anyway, puts no such pressure upon the scientist. So where phenomenology (as a branch of philosophy) and well-supported cognitive science conflict, it is the phenomenologist, and not the cognitive scientist, who should revisit her claims.en_UK
dc.publisherCambridge Scholars Publishingen_UK
dc.relationWheeler M (2014) The Rest is Science: What Does Phenomenology Tell Us About Cognition?. In: Feldges T, Gray J & Burwood S (eds.) Subjectivity and the Social World. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp. 23-38.
dc.rightsThe publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository. Please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author. You can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study.en_UK
dc.titleThe Rest is Science: What Does Phenomenology Tell Us About Cognition?en_UK
dc.typePart of book or chapter of booken_UK
dc.rights.embargoreason[wheeler_rest_is_science_STORRE.pdf] The publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository therefore there is an embargo on the full text of the work.en_UK
dc.type.statusAM - Accepted Manuscripten_UK
dc.citation.btitleSubjectivity and the Social Worlden_UK
rioxxterms.typeBook chapteren_UK
local.rioxx.authorWheeler, Michael|0000-0003-3638-1215en_UK
local.rioxx.projectInternal Project|University of Stirling|
local.rioxx.contributorFeldges, T|en_UK
local.rioxx.contributorGray, JNW|en_UK
local.rioxx.contributorBurwood, S|en_UK
Appears in Collections:Literature and Languages Book Chapters and Sections

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
wheeler_rest_is_science_STORRE.pdfFulltext - Accepted Version412.83 kBAdobe PDFUnder Embargo until 3000-12-01    Request a copy

This item is protected by original copyright

Items in the Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

The metadata of the records in the Repository are available under the CC0 public domain dedication: No Rights Reserved

If you believe that any material held in STORRE infringes copyright, please contact providing details and we will remove the Work from public display in STORRE and investigate your claim.