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dc.contributor.authorWheeler, Michaelen_UK
dc.contributor.editorKendig, Cen_UK
dc.description.abstractFirst paragraph: Most work in cognitive science and naturalistic philosophy of mind is unashamedly internalist in outlook, in at least the following sense: the parts of the physical world where psychological states occur and where psychological processes happen are held to be located entirely inside the head. One’s first reaction to this sort of internalism about the mind might well be that it must be right. Indeed, given all those wonderful ‘pictures of the brain thinking’ that have been delivered over the past few years by contemporary neuroimaging techniques, where else could the material machinery of mind be? Enter the hypothesis of extended cognition (henceforth ExC). If ExC is true, there are actual (in this world) cases of intelligent thought and action, in which the material machinery that realizes the thinking and thoughts concerned is spatially distributed over brain, body and world, in such a way that the external (beyond-the-skull-and-skin) factors concerned are rightly accorded cognitive status. Here, ‘cognitive status’ is just a place-holder for ‘whatever status it is that we standardly grant the brain when explaining intelligent thought and action’.en_UK
dc.relationWheeler M (2015) A Tale of Two Dilemmas: Cognitive Kinds and the Extended Mind. In: Kendig C (ed.) Natural Kinds and Classification in Scientific Practice. History and Philosophy of Biology. London: Routledge, pp. 175-185.
dc.relation.ispartofseriesHistory and Philosophy of Biologyen_UK
dc.rightsThis item has been embargoed for a period. During the embargo please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author. You can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study. Published in Natural Kinds and Classification in Scientific Practice by Taylor & Francis. This is an electronic version of a book chapter published in Wheeler M (2016) Kendig C (ed.). Natural Kinds and Classification in Scientific Practice. History and Philosophy of Biology, London: Routledge, pp. 175-185. Natural Kinds and Classification in Scientific Practice can be found online at:
dc.titleA Tale of Two Dilemmas: Cognitive Kinds and the Extended Minden_UK
dc.typePart of book or chapter of booken_UK
dc.rights.embargoreason[wheeler_tale_two_dilemmas_STORRE.pdf] Publisher requires embargo of 18 months after formal publication.en_UK
dc.type.statusAM - Accepted Manuscripten_UK
dc.citation.btitleNatural Kinds and Classification in Scientific Practiceen_UK
rioxxterms.typeBook chapteren_UK
local.rioxx.authorWheeler, Michael|0000-0003-3638-1215en_UK
local.rioxx.projectInternal Project|University of Stirling|
local.rioxx.contributorKendig, C|en_UK
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