|Appears in Collections:||Law and Philosophy Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status:||Refereed|
|Title:||Perceptual Knowledge and Well-Founded Belief|
|Citation:||Millar A (2016) Perceptual Knowledge and Well-Founded Belief. Episteme, 13 (1), pp. 43-59. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.54|
|Abstract:||Should a philosophical account of perceptual knowledge accord a justicatory role to sensory experiences? This discussion raises problems for an afrmative answer and sets out an alternative account on which justied belief is conceived as well- founded belief and well-foundedness is taken to depend on knowledge. A key part of the discussion draws on a conception of perceptual-recognitional abilities to account for how perception gives rise both to perceptual knowledge and to well-founded belief.|
|Rights:||The publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository. Please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author. You can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study.|
|PerceptualKnowledgeWell-Founded Belief (Published).pdf||Fulltext - Published Version||323.23 kB||Adobe PDF||Under Embargo until 2999-12-10 Request a copy|
Note: If any of the files in this item are currently embargoed, you can request a copy directly from the author by clicking the padlock icon above. However, this facility is dependent on the depositor still being contactable at their original email address.
This item is protected by original copyright
Items in the Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
The metadata of the records in the Repository are available under the CC0 public domain dedication: No Rights Reserved https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/
If you believe that any material held in STORRE infringes copyright, please contact email@example.com providing details and we will remove the Work from public display in STORRE and investigate your claim.