|Appears in Collections:||Law and Philosophy Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status:||Unrefereed|
|Title:||Reasons for Belief, Perception, and Reflective Knowledge (Inaugural Address)|
reasons for belief, normative and motivating
|Citation:||Millar A (2014) Reasons for Belief, Perception, and Reflective Knowledge (Inaugural Address). Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 88 (1), pp. 1-19. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2014.00230.x|
|Abstract:||A conception of the relation between reasons for belief, justified belief, and knowledge is outlined on which (1) a belief is justified, in the sense of well founded, only if there is an adequate (normative) reason to believe it, (2) (normative) reasons to believe something are constituted by truths, and (3) a reason to believe something justifies one in believing it only if it is constituted by a truth or truths that one knows. It is argued that, contrary to initial appearances, perceptual justification does not pose a problem for this view. The discussion touches upon the relation between believing for reasons and reflective knowledge.|
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