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|Appears in Collections:||Law and Philosophy Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status: ||Refereed|
|Title: ||Frege on Sense Identity, Basic Law V, and Analysis|
|Author(s): ||Ebert, Philip|
|Contact Email: ||email@example.com|
|Issue Date: ||Feb-2016|
|Citation: ||Ebert P (2016) Frege on Sense Identity, Basic Law V, and Analysis, Philosophia Mathematica, 24 (1), pp. 9-29.|
|Abstract: ||The paper challenges a widely held interpretation of Frege's conception of logic on which the constituent clauses of basic law V have the same sense. I argue against this interpretation by first carefully looking at the development of Frege's thoughts in Grundlagen with respect to the status of abstraction principles. In doing so, I put forth a new interpretation of Grundlagen §64 and Frege's idea of ‘recarving of content’. I then argue that there is strong evidence in Grundgesetze that Frege did not hold the relevant sense-identity claim regarding basic law V.|
|DOI Link: ||http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkv032|
|Rights: ||This item has been embargoed for a period. During the embargo please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author. You can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study.
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Philosophia Mathematica by Oxford University Press following peer review. The version of record Ebert PA, 'Frege on Sense Identity, Basic Law V, and Analysis', Philosophia Mathematica (2015) doi: 10.1093/philmat/nkv032 is available online at: http:dx.doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkv032|
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