|Appears in Collections:||Law and Philosophy Book Chapters and Sections|
|Title:||'Remote Harms' and the Two Harm Principles|
|Author(s):||Duff, R A|
du, Bois-Pedain A
|Citation:||Duff RA & Marshall S (2014) 'Remote Harms' and the Two Harm Principles. In: Simester AP, Neumann U, du Bois-Pedain A (ed.). Liberal Criminal Theory: Essays for Andreas von Hirsch, Oxford: Hart, pp. 205-223.|
|Abstract:||Legal theorists discuss "the Harm Principle", but usually fail to distinguish two different principles: according to the "Harmful Conduct Principle", we have good reason to criminalise conduct if [and only if] that conduct wrongfully causes or risks causing harm to others; according to the "Harm Prevention Principle", we have good reason to criminalise conduct if [and only if] doing so will efficiently prevent harm to others. we show why it is important to distinguish the two principles, and how they generate two very different routes towards criminalisation.|
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