|Appears in Collections:||Law and Philosophy Conference Papers and Proceedings|
|Peer Review Status:||Unrefereed|
|Title:||Mind-Independence and Modal Empiricism|
|Citation:||Roca-Royes S (2007) Mind-Independence and Modal Empiricism In: Penco C, Vignolo M, Ottonelli V, Amoretti C (ed.) Proceedings of the 4th Latin Meeting in Analytic Philosophy (LMAP-2007), Genoa, Italy, September 20-22, 2007, CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Latin Meeting in Analytic Philosophy, 20.9.2007 - 22.9.2007, Genoa, pp. 117-135.|
|Series/Report no.:||CEUR-WS Proceedings, 278|
|Conference Name:||Latin Meeting in Analytic Philosophy|
|Abstract:||The paper focuses on the Epistemic Challenge for mind-independent accounts of modality. The challenge can be formulated as an inconsistency problem among three premises and, therefore, any strategy to meet the challenge will require the negation of (at least) one of its premises. The aim of the paper is not to offer a positive solution to the challenge, but rather to argue for the claim that to follow a hybrid strategy is probably the best way to meet it. With some qualifications, reasons are given as to why empiricism should be the way to meet the challenge as far as de re modality is concerned, whereas rationalism might be the correct way of addressing it for the case of de dicto modality.|
|Rights:||Author retains copyright|
|Mind_Independence_Empiricism.pdf||261.93 kB||Adobe PDF||View/Open|
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