|Appears in Collections:||Law and Philosophy Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status:||Refereed|
|Title:||Conceivability and De Re Modal Knowledge|
Epistemology of Modality
De Re Modality
|Citation:||Roca-Royes S (2011) Conceivability and De Re Modal Knowledge. Nous, 45 (1), pp. 22-49. http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/117997227/home; https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00757.x|
|Abstract:||The paper presents a dilemma for both epistemic and non-epistemic versions of conceivability-based accounts of modal knowledge. On the one horn, non-epistemic accounts do not elucidate the essentialist knowledge they would be committed to. On the other, epistemic accounts do not elucidate everyday life de re modal knowledge. In neither case, therefore, do conceivability accounts elucidate de re modal knowledge.|
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