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Appears in Collections:Law and Philosophy Journal Articles
Peer Review Status: Refereed
Title: Not every truth has a truthmaker
Author(s): Milne, Peter
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Issue Date: Jul-2005
Citation: Milne P (2005) Not every truth has a truthmaker, Analysis, 65 (287), pp. 221-224.
Abstract: First paragraph: Truthmaker theory maintains that for every truth there is something, some thing, some entity, that makes it true. Balking at the prospect that logical truths are made true by any particular thing, a consequence that may in fact be hard to avoid (see Restall 1996, Read 2000), this principle of truthmaking is sometimes restricted to (logically) contingent truths. I aim to show that even in its restricted form, the principle is provably false.
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