|Appears in Collections:||Law and Philosophy Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status:||Unrefereed|
|Title:||Meaning, Justification, and 'Primitive Normativity'|
|Citation:||Haddock A (2011) Meaning, Justification, and 'Primitive Normativity', Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 86 (1), pp. 147-174.|
|Abstract:||I critically discuss two claims which Hannah Ginsborg makes on behalf of her account of meaning in terms of ‘primitive normativity'(2011; 2012): first, that it avoids the sceptical regress articulated by Kripke's Wittgenstein; second, that it makes sense of the thought-central to Kripke's Wittgenstein-that ‘meaning is normative', in a way which shows this thought not only to be immune from recent criticisms but also to undermine reductively naturalistic theories of content. In the course of the discussion, I consider and attempt to shed light on a number of issues: the structure of the sceptical regress; the content of the thought that ‘meaning is normative', and its force against reductive theories; the connection between meaning and justification; and the notion of ‘primitive normativity'.|
|Rights:||The publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository. Please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author. You can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study.|
|Meaning, Justification, and Primtive Normativity.pdf||321.22 kB||Adobe PDF||Under Permanent Embargo Request a copy|
Note: If any of the files in this item are currently embargoed, you can request a copy directly from the author by clicking the padlock icon above. However, this facility is dependent on the depositor still being contactable at their original email address.
This item is protected by original copyright
Items in the Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
If you believe that any material held in STORRE infringes copyright, please contact firstname.lastname@example.org providing details and we will remove the Work from public display in STORRE and investigate your claim.