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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/18517
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dc.contributor.authorMillar, Alanen_UK
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-25T09:28:56Z-
dc.date.available2018-01-25T09:28:56Zen_UK
dc.date.issued2011-10en_UK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/18517-
dc.description.abstractIt is argued that seeing that P is a mode of knowing that P that is to be explained in terms of the exercise of visual-perceptual recognitional abilities. The nature of those abilities is described. The justification for believing that P, when one sees that P, is provided by the fact that one sees that P. Access to this fact is explained in terms of an ability to recognize of seen objects that one is seeing them. Reasons for resistance to such an account are considered. The distinction between merely reasonable belief and well-founded belief is emphasised.en_UK
dc.language.isoenen_UK
dc.publisherWiley-Blackwellen_UK
dc.relationMillar A (2011) How Visual Perception Yields Reasons for Belief. Philosophical Issues, 21 (1), pp. 332-351. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2011.00207.xen_UK
dc.rightsThe publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository. Please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author. You can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study.en_UK
dc.rights.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/under-embargo-all-rights-reserveden_UK
dc.subjectperceptual knowledgeen_UK
dc.subjectperceptual-recognitional abilities, justification arising from perceptionen_UK
dc.subjectreasons for belief arising from perceptionen_UK
dc.titleHow Visual Perception Yields Reasons for Beliefen_UK
dc.typeJournal Articleen_UK
dc.rights.embargodate3000-01-01en_UK
dc.rights.embargoreason[Philosophical Issues 2011.pdf] The publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository therefore there is an embargo on the full text of the work.en_UK
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1533-6077.2011.00207.xen_UK
dc.citation.jtitlePhilosophical Issuesen_UK
dc.citation.issn1758-2237en_UK
dc.citation.issn1533-6077en_UK
dc.citation.volume21en_UK
dc.citation.issue1en_UK
dc.citation.spage332en_UK
dc.citation.epage351en_UK
dc.citation.publicationstatusPublisheden_UK
dc.citation.peerreviewedRefereeden_UK
dc.type.statusVoR - Version of Recorden_UK
dc.author.emailalan.millar@stir.ac.uken_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationPhilosophyen_UK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000297003400013en_UK
dc.identifier.scopusid2-s2.0-84861726294en_UK
dc.identifier.wtid729566en_UK
dcterms.dateAccepted2011-10-31en_UK
dc.date.filedepositdate2014-01-31en_UK
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_UK
rioxxterms.versionVoRen_UK
local.rioxx.authorMillar, Alan|en_UK
local.rioxx.projectInternal Project|University of Stirling|https://isni.org/isni/0000000122484331en_UK
local.rioxx.freetoreaddate3000-01-01en_UK
local.rioxx.licencehttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/under-embargo-all-rights-reserved||en_UK
local.rioxx.filenamePhilosophical Issues 2011.pdfen_UK
local.rioxx.filecount1en_UK
local.rioxx.source1533-6077en_UK
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