|Appears in Collections:||Law and Philosophy Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status:||Refereed|
|Title:||Against Individualistic Justifications of Property Rights|
Right of property
Intellectual property Philosophy
|Citation:||Cruft R (2006) Against Individualistic Justifications of Property Rights. Utilitas, 18 (2), pp. 154-172. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820806001968|
|Abstract:||In this article I argue that, despite the views of such theorists as Locke, Hart and Raz, most of a person's property rights cannot be individualistically justified. Instead most property rights, if justified at all, must be justified on non-individualistic (e.g. consequentialist) grounds. This, I suggest, implies that most property rights cannot be morally fundamental ‘human rights’.|
|Rights:||Published in Utilitas. Copyright: Cambridge University Press.; Utilitas, Volume 18, Issue 2, June 2006, pp. 154 - 172, published by Cambridge University Press. Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2006.; http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=439669|
|Against Individualistic Justifications of Property Rights.pdf||Fulltext - Published Version||100.17 kB||Adobe PDF||View/Open|
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