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Appears in Collections:Law and Philosophy Journal Articles
Peer Review Status: Refereed
Title: McDowell and Idealism
Author(s): Haddock, Adrian
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Issue Date: Feb-2008
Citation: Haddock A (2008) McDowell and Idealism, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 51 (1), pp. 79-96.
Abstract: John McDowell espouses a certain conception of the thinking subject: as a living, embodied, finite being, with a capacity for experience that can take in the world, and stand in relations of warrant to subjects’ beliefs. McDowell presents this conception of the subject as requiring a related conception of the world: as not located outside the conceptual sphere. In this latter conception, idealism and common-sense realism are supposed to coincide. But I suggest that McDowell’s conception of the subject scuppers this intended coincidence. The upshot is a dilemma: McDowell can retain his conception of the subject, but lose the coincidence; or he can keep the coincidence, but abandon his conception of the subject.
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Rights: Published in Inquiry by Taylor & Francis (Routledge).

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