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dc.contributor.authorWay, Jonathanen_UK
dc.description.abstractFirst paragraph: It seems that many of our attitudes are transparent, in the following sense: we can come to know that we have an attitude M by considering a question about the content of M. This is clearest in the case of belief, as is illustrated by the following oft-quoted passage of Gareth Evans’s, making a self-ascription of belief, one’s eyes are, so to speak, or occasionally literally, directed outward – upon the world. If someone asks me ‘Do you think there is going to be a third world war?’, I must attend, in answering him, to precisely the same outward phenomena as I would attend to if I were answering the question ‘Will there be a third world war?’ (Evans 1982: 225) But it is also true, to varying degrees, of other attitudes as well. As Dorit Bar-On points out, If asked whether I am hoping or wishing that p, whether I prefer x to y, whether I am angry at or afraid of z, and so on, my attention would be directed at p, x and y, z, etc. For example, to say how I feel about an upcoming holiday, I would consider whether the holiday is likely to be fun. Asked whether I find my neighbour annoying, I would ponder her actions and render a verdict. (Bar-On 2004: 106) This remarkable fact – that we appear to be able to answer questions directed at one subject matter by considering questions directed at another – has played a leading role in several recent accounts of self-knowledge. Thus Richard Moran claims (2001: 150) that transparency is ‘the fundamental feature of self-knowledge’, and argues at length that it is transparency that marks the difference between those attitudes which can be objects of ‘ordinary’ self-knowledge and those attitudes which can be known, if at all, only through the kind of evidence which is equally available to a third-person.1 And Moran and others also claim that understanding transparency is the key to understanding those features of ordinary self-knowledge – such as immediacy, authority, and its relation to rationality – which have traditionally seemed problematic to philosophers.2en_UK
dc.publisherOxford University Press / The Analysis Trust (previously Wiley-Blackwell)en_UK
dc.relationWay J (2007) Self-knowledge and the Limits of Transparency. Analysis, 67 (3), pp. 223-230.;
dc.rightsPublished in Analysis by Oxford University Press / The Analysis Trust.; This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Analysis following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version, Analysis, Volume 67, Issue 3, pp. 223 - 230 is available online at:
dc.subjectSelf-knowledge, Theory ofen_UK
dc.titleSelf-knowledge and the Limits of Transparencyen_UK
dc.typeJournal Articleen_UK
dc.rights.embargoreason[Transparency.pdf] Publisher conditions require a 24 month embargo.en_UK
dc.type.statusAM - Accepted Manuscripten_UK
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_UK
local.rioxx.authorWay, Jonathan|en_UK
local.rioxx.projectInternal Project|University of Stirling|
Appears in Collections:Law and Philosophy Journal Articles

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