Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/11052
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dc.contributor.authorMilne, Peter-
dc.date.accessioned2013-02-24T23:26:28Z-
dc.date.issued2012-09-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/11052-
dc.description.abstractStarting from John MacFarlane's recent survey of answers to the question 'What is assertion?', I defend an account of assertion that draws on elements of MacFarlane's and Robert Brandom's commitment accounts, Timothy Williamson's knowledge norm account, and my own previous work on the normative status of logic. I defend the knowledge norm from recent attacks. Indicative conditionals, however, pose a problem when read along the lines of Ernest Adams' account, an account supported by much work in the psychology of reasoning. Furthermore, there seems to be no place for degrees of belief in the accounts of belief and assertion given here. Degrees of belief do have a role in decision-making, but, again, there is much evidence that the orthodox theory of subjective utility maximization is not a good description of what we do in decision-making and, arguably, neither is it a good normative guide to how we ought to make decisions.en_UK
dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisherWiley-Blackwell-
dc.relationMilne P (2012) Belief, Degrees of Belief, and Assertion, Dialectica, 66 (3), pp. 331-349.-
dc.rightsThe publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository. Please use the Request a Copy feature at the foot of the Repository record to request a copy directly from the author. You can only request a copy if you wish to use this work for your own research or private study.-
dc.subjectBeliefen_UK
dc.subjectdegrees of beliefen_UK
dc.subjectassertionen_UK
dc.subjectindicative conditionalsen_UK
dc.titleBelief, Degrees of Belief, and Assertionen_UK
dc.typeJournal Articleen_UK
dc.rights.embargodate2999-12-31T00:00:00Z-
dc.rights.embargoreasonThe publisher does not allow this work to be made publicly available in this Repository therefore there is an embargo on the full text of the work.-
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2012.01309.x-
dc.citation.jtitleDialectica-
dc.citation.issn0012-2017-
dc.citation.volume66-
dc.citation.issue3-
dc.citation.spage331-
dc.citation.epage349-
dc.citation.publicationstatusPublished-
dc.citation.peerreviewedRefereed-
dc.type.statusPublisher version (final published refereed version)-
dc.author.emailpeter.milne@stir.ac.uk-
dc.citation.date25/09/2012-
dc.contributor.affiliationPhilosophy-
dc.rights.embargoterms2999-12-31-
dc.rights.embargoliftdate2999-12-31-
dc.identifier.isi000309183700003-
Appears in Collections:Law and Philosophy Journal Articles

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