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  <title>STORRE Collection: Electronic copies of Accounting and Finance book chapters and sections.</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/1893/1160" />
  <subtitle>Electronic copies of Accounting and Finance book chapters and sections.</subtitle>
  <id>http://hdl.handle.net/1893/1160</id>
  <updated>2026-10-05T13:27:53Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-10-05T13:27:53Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>Creation and Consumption Experience of Cultural Value in Contemporary Art</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/1893/34964" />
    <author>
      <name>Fillis, Ian</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Lee, Boram</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Fraser, Ian</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/1893/34964</id>
    <updated>2023-03-24T01:11:17Z</updated>
    <published>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Creation and Consumption Experience of Cultural Value in Contemporary Art
Author(s): Fillis, Ian; Lee, Boram; Fraser, Ian
Editor(s): Jung, Yuha; Vakharia, Neville; Vecco, Marilena
Abstract: This article utilizes marketing theory to improve insight into the value relating to visual art creation and consumption by advancing understanding of its roles in the creation of the cultural value associated with contemporary art. This theoretical analysis enables construction of a conceptual model of value creation. The authors inform this by drawing on their qualitative research data on the cultural value of a contemporary art exhibition. Creation and sharing of value, including networks and discourses of value, are central to this agenda. Aesthetic experience and symbolic consumption are as influential or more so than instrumental measures of value. This can be visualized in a circle of value involving culture, marketing, and consumption, which shape meaning. A competency spectrum can be used to explain how and why each stakeholder behaves differently with respect to the cultural value present.</summary>
    <dc:date>2023-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Regulation of the gender composition of company boards in Europe: Experience and prospects</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/1893/27578" />
    <author>
      <name>Campbell, Kevin</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Bohdanowicz, Leszek</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/1893/27578</id>
    <updated>2025-10-01T01:30:48Z</updated>
    <published>2018-04-17T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Regulation of the gender composition of company boards in Europe: Experience and prospects
Author(s): Campbell, Kevin; Bohdanowicz, Leszek
Editor(s): Aluchna, M; Aras, G
Abstract: First paragraph: The desire to increase the share of women on corporate boards in Europe has led to the incorporation of voluntary targets into corporate governance codes of best practice in some European countries and the introduction of board gender quota laws in others. Taking affirmative action by imposing a quota can create a critical mass of women on boards that is sufficient to sustain greater numerical equality once the quota is removed (Kogut et al., 2014). A quota law for company boards, set at 40% for each gender, was first proposed in Norway in 2002, to the surprise of many (Bøhren and Staubo, 2016). At the time women held only 9% of board seats  (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012). Passed by the Norwegian Parliament one year later, the quota became mandatory in 2008 and sparked public debate in other countries about the possibility of using quotas to increase the representation of women on corporate boards. The European Commission, with the support of the European Parliament and a number of Member States, decided in 2012 that legislative action was necessary to improve gender balance on corporate boards and put forward the proposal for a Directive that sets a 40% target for the presence of the underrepresented gender among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges by 2020.</summary>
    <dc:date>2018-04-17T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Why individual and professional investors want dividends</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/1893/1193" />
    <author>
      <name>Dong, Ming</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Robinson, Chris</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Veld, Chris</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/1893/1193</id>
    <updated>2025-10-01T03:31:32Z</updated>
    <published>2009-06-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Why individual and professional investors want dividends
Author(s): Dong, Ming; Robinson, Chris; Veld, Chris
Editor(s): Baker, H Kent
Abstract: First paragraph: The finance literature abounds with theories of why investors want, do not want or should not want corporations to pay dividends. Researchers from Lintner (1956) to Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely (2005) ask managers why they pay dividends in an attempt to infer why investors want dividends. Other surveys asking managers about dividends include Baker, Farrelly and Edelman (1985), Baker, Powell, and Veit (2002), De Jong, van Dijk and Veld (2003), and Frankfurter, Kosedag, Chiang, Collison, Power, Schmidt, So and Topalov (2004).</summary>
    <dc:date>2009-06-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Intellectual capital disclosure: what benefits, what costs, is it voluntary?</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/1893/26035" />
    <author>
      <name>Smith, Sarah Jane</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/1893/26035</id>
    <updated>2025-10-08T05:00:58Z</updated>
    <published>2017-10-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Intellectual capital disclosure: what benefits, what costs, is it voluntary?
Author(s): Smith, Sarah Jane
Editor(s): Dumay J, J; Ricceri, F; Guthrie, J; Nielsen, C
Abstract: Intellectual Capital (IC) is embedded within a spectrum of corporate activities. Under current international financial reporting regulations, many elements of IC are not recognised in the financial statements, and are not subject to extensive mandatory narrative reporting requirements. However, the narrative reporting context is constantly changing and, beyond the regulatory environment, the opportunity to voluntarily disclose IC does exists, within the narrative sections of the corporate annual report and other channels of corporate communication. This chapter explores the costs, benefits, restrictions, and alternative perspectives to IC disclosure through a synthesis of evidence obtained from a direct survey investigation of, and follow up interviews with, key specialists in UK listed companies. An analysis of this evidence with interpretative commentary, particularly in relation to recent developments in the narrative reporting arena, provides a platform from which practitioners and academics alike may deliberate the IC disclosure decision.</summary>
    <dc:date>2017-10-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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