Between domestic constraints and multilateral obligations - The reform of the *Bundeswehr* in the context of a normalised German foreign and security policy

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**Declaration**

I declare that the thesis has been composed by myself and that it embodies the results of my own research or advanced studies. Where appropriate, I have acknowledged the nature and extent of work out in collaboration with others included in the thesis.

Mark Eckhardt Nuyken  
Stirling, 25. January 2012
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Abstract

This thesis seeks to understand the developments in Germany’s foreign and security policy since the end of the Cold War. Primarily, this thesis will centre on the question of whether Germany can now, after being re-unified for more than 20 years, be considered a normal actor in international relations. Although this subject has been debated extensively, the effects a possible change in foreign policy behaviour has on related fields of policy, have largely been left aside. This thesis therefore sets out to understand if there has in fact been a change in Germany’s foreign and security policy and will then apply the findings on the institution most affected by this change, i.e. Germany’s armed forces the Bundeswehr.

It will therefore firstly discuss the perceived changes in German foreign policy since 1990 by analysing the academic debate on the process of normalisation and continuation. It will be argued that Germany has in fact become more normal and abandoned the constrained foreign policy of the Cold-War-era. The Bundeswehr will therefore have to be reformed accordingly to accommodate the new tasks set out by the changed foreign policy – most importantly peace-keeping and peace-enforcing out-of-area missions.

This thesis will therefore analyse the reform efforts made over the last 20 years and apply them to the Bundeswehr’s large deployments in Kosovo and Afghanistan to determine how effective the reforms have been. Finally, this thesis will be able to contribute to the discussion on Germany’s status of a normal player in international relations with the added perspective from the Bundeswehr’s point of view.
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Chapter 1 - Addressing the Bundeswehr Reform

“It [the Bundeswehr] is the visible expression of our resolve to safeguard peace and security and to defend our freedom resolutely. Over the last few years the Bundeswehr has accomplished a lot under difficult circumstances. Its commitment to international peace-keeping missions has contributed to Germany’s increasing standing in the world. At home the Bundeswehr helped countless citizens during natural disasters and saved lives. I hope and I wish that this White Paper give an impulse for a wide debate throughout society about Germany’s capabilities to successfully safeguard its security under the current conditions of the 21st century.” – Angela Merkel (BMVg, 2006: 3)

In the course of the last two decades Germany has changed considerably, more so than other Western European nations. This is due to the fact that arguably no other nation has been affected by the collapse of the Cold War system to the same extent as the Federal Republic. The most obvious change was the re-unification of the two separate German states (the Federal Republic of Germany in the west and the German Democratic Republic in the east) and the opening up of their borders to Eastern Europe in 1990. However joyful these events were, they had a most profound impact on the foreign and security policy of this new Germany. How does a state react to such a change in international politics and how can it adapt to this new security scenario that appeared literally over night? What are the difficulties in adapting? This thesis will concentrate on Germany’s efforts to amend its security policy to the new scenario and the implications for its

armed forces accordingly in order to answer the core question of this thesis, i.e. whether the reform of the Bundeswehr is an indication that Germany has begun to become a more active and assertive or even normal actor in international relations.

Although the term ‘normal’ can have several differing interpretations, for this thesis’ purpose it will be argued that normal actors in international relations act out of factors relating to their national interests and domestic ideologies, convictions and agendas, pushing the decision-makers towards a specific policy. At the same time, decision-makers are also pulled towards certain policies by external factors, such as external expectations, alliance obligations or an external threat to the national well-being. As will become clear in this chapter, there are different interpretations of Germany’s foreign and security policy, however, the majority of them centre around the question of how far the behaviour of the German state can be considered normal.

Besides highlighting the need for reform after the collapse of the bipolar world – i.e. the Cold War situation, in which the world was dominated by the two superpowers USA and USSR – in 1990, it will discuss the reforms as such and test the effectiveness by analysing the latest white paper on defence policy, the Weißbuch 2006. Seeing that the Government’s Weißbuch 2006 (White Paper 2006) is the most recent comprehensive document that introduces the latest reforms needed for the Bundeswehr to perform its functions in the post-Cold War scenario, it will be at the core of this thesis. By analysing the Weißbuch 2006, it will be possible to determine the factors that influence German security policy post
unification. It will also show the continuing necessity for reform with reference to the previous reforms over the 1990s, which the Weißbuch 2006 labels as inadequate.

This Weißbuch also defines the future tasks of the Bundeswehr and the reforms necessary for it to perform these tasks. As it also addresses the main factors contributing to the decision to reform the armed forces it will serve as a constant throughout this thesis against which the effectiveness of the reforms can be measured. However, as can be seen from Angela Merkel’s quote at the beginning of this chapter, she has issued this White Paper not only to outline the actual Bundeswehr reforms but also aimed for a wide debate on Germany’s security policy in general. This thesis will therefore also discuss to what extent such a debate has occurred and how this affects Germany’s ability to contribute to multilateral military missions.

This thesis’ analysis of the Bundeswehr reform will be conducted by firstly looking at the general debate on German foreign and security policy. This first chapter will therefore discuss the dominant approaches to the study of German foreign and security policy in order to place this thesis in an overall context. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the nature of Germany’s foreign and security policy – of which the Bundeswehr is an integral part – to better understand the changes that have occurred after the collapse of the bi-polar system. This first chapter will address the question of whether the German state continues on its tested, more passive path or if it has begun to behave more assertive and active. This is to say – as previously outlined – it will be discussed if Germany has moved from the Cold War era of superpower dominance and obedience to becoming a
more normal actor pursuing national interests and fulfilling the expectations of its allies.

The second chapter will then give an overview of the external changes happening around Germany. The 1990s saw considerable developments in international relations resulting from the end of the Cold War. This chapter will address these changes and show how they affected Germany and how Germany tried to adapt accordingly. How did Germany react to specific crises and how did these crises affect German policy making? What other internal or external factors influenced Germany during the 1990s? The answers to these questions will make it possible to then evaluate how well Germany adapted to the post-Cold War era and set the background for the actual need for Bundeswehr reform by briefly outlining the missions to which the German armed forces have contributed. The second chapter will also serve to illustrate the changing nature in German foreign politics, and to underline the theoretical discussion in chapter one.

Chapter three will discuss the actual reform process and outline difficulties of implementation as well as the reasons for the specific measures undertaken. The changed background set out in chapter two will serve as a starting point to armed forces reform. By first looking at the Bundeswehr during the Cold War, it will be possible to contrast the ‘old’ Bundeswehr and its main tasks with the ‘new’ Bundeswehr and its range field of operations. It will primarily discuss the shortcomings of its Cold War tasks and purposes as well as answer questions revolving around the armed forces’ structure. Why was the old Bundeswehr deemed to be out-
dated? How was the reform implemented? What effect did the reform have on the Bundeswehr’s capabilities and operational status?

Finally chapters four and five will test these measures by analysing the two major operations in which the Bundeswehr has been deployed in, namely KFOR (Kosovo Force) during the Kosovo Crisis in 1998/99 and the on-going ISAF (International Security and Assistance Force) operation in Afghanistan.

These two case studies will discuss the domestic debates surrounding the deployment of troops to these two theatres by looking primarily at the parliamentary debates of the time. What were the major arguments put forward in support and against deployment respectively and what were the concerns of decision makers? How did the general public react to deployment? Has the White Paper 2006 in fact launched the desired debate on German deployments? Answering these questions will shed light on how far Germany has in fact become accustomed to military actions and will therefore help to determine the extent to which Germany has normalised. These chapters will concentrate on the domestic debates and will omit foreign debates on purpose. As the core of this thesis centres on Germany’s reaction to the changed post-Cold War scenario rather than the international perception of this subject, it will omit international debates on purpose. Whereas Germany’s security has traditionally been achieved through its deep integration within the Western system of alliances, “its [inner] insecurity, uncertainty and even schizophrenia came from the ghosts of the past and the fact of division” (Garton Ash, 1994: 81). Any changes of
German foreign and security policy will therefore have their origins in domestic debates.

These case studies will test the hypothesis that Germany has in fact become a more normal international actor. As this thesis aims at analysing Germany’s increased international assertiveness in conjunction with the Bundeswehr reforms, case studies of the main military deployments provide valuable insight in the Bundeswehr’s ability to contribute to Germany’s changed foreign and security policy. In general, case studies are very useful to examine a subject descriptively from numerous angles which will serve the purpose of this thesis well, considering that the point of these case studies is to support the thesis’ main argument by outlining Germany’s increased military deployment rather than fully explaining the underlying rationale governing the decision-making process. Case studies are useful in answering questions such as “What happened?”, “How did it happen?” and “What was connected”, and since these questions are at the core of answering the research question set the use of case studies is best suited for this thesis (Thomas, 2011: 21).

It has to be noted, however, that case studies are open to criticism regarding the research procedures, i.e. what exact questions are being asked and what sources are being used to answer them. Therefore, case studies can be subject to the researcher’s own bias in that it can be argued that researchers will find “what he or she had set out to find” (Yin, 2012: 6). In order to limit this bias, this thesis will therefore primarily use primary sources while conducting the case studies. Although it can be argued that the selection of certain primary sources is subject to the researcher’s bias
as well, seeing that they are primary sources they still describe the case objectively in that no further bias has been introduced by third-party interpretation.

Finally, case studies’ findings cannot be applied to a wider context (Yin, 2012: 6). As they concentrate on very specific cases (in this thesis the Bundeswehr deployments in Kosovo and Afghanistan), it will not be possible to use the finding to answer more investigative questions if there is a general trend in the German public or even political culture that would explain such a shift. However, since this thesis’ main aim is to outline the developments in German foreign and security policy in conjunction with the Bundeswehr reform, rather than providing an in-depth explanation of the motives or underlying rationale, the descriptive nature of case studies will be sufficient for the purpose of this thesis.

The final chapter will summarise the findings which will the make it possible to answer the core research question of how far Germany has become a normal actor in international relations over the last twenty years.

Why Germany?

The reason why this thesis analyses the German armed forces reform is that Germany and its capabilities are important factors in the study of European security. As Europe’s largest economy and arguably its Musterknabe (favourite pupil), continuous German support for further development of common security policy will remain vital. Germany’s traditional role as a motor of continuing European integration as well as its commitment to the transatlantic relationship and NATO’s importance for European security adds weight to the case for Germany.
In addition to that Germany is in the unique position of having close traditional ties with both the United States of America, Germany’s most important ally and protector during the years of the Cold War, on the one hand and Russia, Germany’s most important supplier of energy resources, on the other. This position makes Germany an important negotiator between Europe and the United States and Russia. Germany therefore fulfils a bridging function between the US and Russia as well as within the European Union. As will be further discussed in chapter 2, Germany has been considered by previous US administrations to be a ‘partner in leadership’ (Baring, 1997: 173), highlighting that Germany’s allies have recognised its unique position.

On the other hand Germany has traditionally been very reluctant to contribute to military solutions if diplomacy had failed. As shall be discussed in the following chapters, even in the cases when Germany did contribute to a military, the internal debate made the decision-making process slow and tedious seeing that Germany’s troubled history forced decision-makers to be very cautious not to conjure up the old image of German militarism. At the same time, external pressures from allies as a result of Germany’s increased international standing and influence in international organisations after unification placed German politicians in a difficult situation. Germany’s handling of the Kosovo Crisis and its constraints on its contingents for KFOR are a very good example for this and will be discussed in detail in chapter 4. As a predominantly political and economic player, Germany has traditionally been a difficult and reluctant ally in matters of security.
Germany is therefore an interesting case as it is an important political and economic actor, deeply committed into the EU, NATO and the UN, with close relationships to both the West and the East, yet at the same time seemingly unwilling or unable to act in accordance to its political and economic weight.

Germany continues to be an interesting actor in European politics, although in the past it has primarily concentrated on social and economic politics rather than military operations with the underlying rationale that social order and economic stability would generate security which in turn would make military intervention unnecessary. However, Germany’s contributions to various international operations indicate a shift in this particular attitude. Consulting the numerous publications on German foreign and security policy after unification it becomes clear that this shift has not gone unnoticed in the academic world.

**Approaches to German Foreign and Security Policy**

Anyone embarking on the study of German foreign and security policy will quickly come across the main debate surrounding this subject, i.e. the debate on normalisation versus continuity. At the core of this lies the question if Germans have indeed adopted a more normal foreign and security or if they have in fact continued to follow the self-restrained policies of the Cold War period. Although there are numerous other theories they revolve around these two prominent lines of argument.

At least in academic circles the new ‘German Question’ is that of whether Germany’s policies are those of continuation, i.e. continuing the well-tested Cold War era policies of close western integration and co-
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operation within the western international system and organisations. The following are the main concerns regarding the new German status:

- Germany’s continuing role as Europe’s motor for further integration;
- Germany’s armed forces remaining under NATO command;
- Germany’s increasingly closer co-operation with its new eastern neighbours and
- The question of Germany continuing its diplomatic preference for solving conflicts in the international theatre? In this case Germany would emphasise holding true to its “story of success” while at the same time re-assuring its partners and allies of Germany’s continued commitment to European stability (Hellmann, 2001: 43-44).

While this point of view may be very persuasive it has been argued that Germany’s foreign and security policy has in fact changed considerably from 1990 onwards. Given that with unification Germany had arguably obtained its full sovereignty again, commentators have argued that it would now use this new sovereignty to further its own national interests, which would result in Germany becoming a more normal player. Although this train of thought appears valid it must be considered how much sovereignty Germany – or in fact states in general – retains in a more and more integrated European Union, a military alliance such as NATO and growing economic interdependence in a globalised world.

It is argued that Germany’s deep integration within the western international system was artificially upheld by the bi-polar system of the
Cold War, thus with its demise, Germany could act more freely internationally. As a result Germany would no longer have to justify its decisions to its partners, pursue a more pragmatic and increasingly self-confident foreign policy, guided by its national, rather than transatlantic or European, interests (Hacke, 2002. 7).

On the surface this interpretation makes sense, yet Germany remains a member of numerous organisations which limit its overall sovereignty. On this notion of sovereignty this thesis will therefore argue that Germany remains a semi-sovereign state not because of the limitations brought about by the artificial Cold War scenario, but rather because of Germany’s deep integration into organisations such as the EU and NATO. Furthermore, this limitation is not limited to Germany; rather it is experienced by its allied nations as well, thus making semi-sovereign nations the norm rather than the exception.

Since this debate on continuation and normalisation stands at the centre of the discourse on the developments of German foreign and security policy, the two sides need to be discussed in more detail, especially with regards to the need to reform the armed forces. A shift in the nature of German foreign policy also affects the Bundeswehr – therefore a discussion of this debate is essential.

Continuation of the well-proven

As pointed out above, the proponents of continuation point to Germany’s lasting preference for co-operation, integration and generally multilateral solutions when conducting its foreign and security policy as this
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had already served Germany well and had re-assured its allies that Germany would continue to be a reliable partner. This would further be enshrined by Germany’s collective memory of the war, especially in the cases of the ‘Bonn Republic’s’ decision makers, or the ‘affected generation’ (Hellmann, 2001: 47).

Hellmann’s ‘affected generation’, i.e. those politicians who had been affected by their experiences during the war, can therefore be seen as having developed a dominant political-military culture. Such a culture would need to comprise more than just a collection of free-floating ideas but rather constitutes a broad collective consciousness which is in turn institutionalised within the political system. This institutionalisation is the result of a gradual process within which the on-going interpretation of the past plays a central role (Berger, 1997: 41-42).

In the case of Germany, Berger points to the collective experience of total defeat in WW II, combined with the country’s partition which caused a fundamental change in German thinking. The prosecution of war criminals by the victorious allies, although only partially successful, deepened the feeling of having not only been defeated militarily, but also morally. It was therefore very difficult – however due to the Allies’ need for trained and experienced civil servants to govern post-war Germany not impossible – for anyone, who had collaborated with the old regime, to assume any political position in the new Federal Republic. Other members of the Axis, most notably Japan, did not undergo such a rigorous process, since members of the old Tojo government returned later as leading politicians, therefore not developing a similar culture of reconciliation (Berger, 1997: 46).
This collective experience of the affected generation has, according to Berger, has been at the very core of German political culture and can therefore explain the considerable domestic and international friction associated with the gradually increasing demands made on German security policy in the post-Cold War era. A more assertive German foreign policy in combination with a prevailing culture of policy constriction upheld by the affected generation would therefore be highly unlikely.

The collective experience and memory of Germany’s *Stunde Null* (Zero Hour) would therefore influence the affected generation to always seek international approval of its actions, culminating in the political mantras of “never again” (i.e. no more wars started by Germany) and “never alone” (i.e. no more German special paths or “Sonderwege”) (Erler, 2011: 1). Over the 1990s Germany therefore tended to avoid policies which could have been interpreted as unilateral or as another ‘Sonderweg’ by, for example, continuously emphasising the Franco-German relationship and further European integration or avoiding any implications of re-militarising German foreign and security policy. For example, after unification and with its regaining of full sovereignty, Germany could have integrated the former East German armed forces into the *Bundeswehr*, thus creating a force of some 670,000 troops in the centre of Europe. However, in 1990 Germany agreed to cut this number down to 370,000 troops to fulfil the conditions set out in the Two-plus-Four Treaty which regulated the German unification. Interestingly enough it was the NATO allies who prevented Germans from reducing that number even further, since they valued Germany’s “strong conventional contribution to NATO” (Hellmann, 1997: 32).
This preference for multilateral, non-militaristic approaches to international affairs, which had been deeply imbedded in the German political culture can still be found in Germany’s political discourses (Maull, 2004: 19), also affecting the next generation of politicians, those who have not been influenced directly by WW II. Considering the preference for multilateral solutions it has been argued that Germany has, in fact, not been a fully sovereign state, since most decisions would have to be run by Germany’s partners; Germany would therefore be in effect a ‘semi-sovereign’ state.

During the Cold War, West German politics were particularly penetrated by foreign influences. Since Germany was divided and reliant on the United States for both political and military support, Germany lacked direct control over aspects of what defines a sovereign state. This was further cemented by the Federal Republic placing its armed forces under NATO command and emphasising its commitment to the rejection of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, West Germany’s deep integration within the EC makes it harder for German politicians to formulate a policy with only West German national interests at the core. Semi-sovereignty is therefore an “external condition of West German politics” (Katzenstein, 1987: 9).

Katzenstein continues to stress that semi-sovereignty not only tames West German politics, but also its society. After 1945 the new German state lacked the traditional potential for conflict, since the landed aristocracy of Eastern Prussia were now part of the Eastern bloc and had no longer any influence on their traditional parts of society, i.e. the military, bureaucracy and conservatism. Remaining agricultural interest groups were pooled in
both the CDU and FDP of which the former also opened itself to Catholics and Protestants, thus bridging this traditional potential for conflict. Finally regional rivalries ended with the demise of Prussia (Katzenstein, 1987: 13).

Although the idea that West Germany was not fully sovereign can be found in other authors’ publications, Katzenstein’s argument that semi-sovereignty goes beyond the external aspects of sovereignty but in the case of West Germany rather extends into the internal workings of the state. Due to co-operative federalism (a federal system, in which federal states co-operate amongst each other but also with the Federal Government on numerous policies), catch-all parties (parties that expand over the traditional political ideologies to gather more wide-spread support) and coalition governments, among other things, bold policy initiatives are effectively suppressed, even when a new government is elected into power. Katzenstein, therefore, concludes that West Germany’s semi-sovereign nature would also in future only allow for incremental change, both domestically and in foreign policy (Katzenstein, 1987: 80-82).

Although Katzenstein’s analysis was published before unification, it is safe to say that it still bears significance in the study of Germany and of German foreign and security policy. However, as Paterson points out, Katzenstein’s analysis concentrates heavily on the internal workings of the Federal Republic (Paterson, 1996: 168). In accordance with Katzenstein, Paterson argues that the Bonn republic was constrained by the external semi-sovereignty of having the armed forces under NATO command and having to cope with the four-power-status. Germany’s close relationship with France added to the external semi-sovereignty.
Paterson takes the argument further with regards to the EU (and its predecessors) by arguing that the Ländер (Germany’s 16 federal states) contributed to Germany’s semi-sovereignty by inserting “themselves more deeply into the making of European policy”, thus effectively bypassing the Federal Government (Paterson, 1996: 169).

It has to be said, that whereas the above mentioned factors of semi-sovereignty are imposed on the Federal Government, with the exception of the Franco-German relationship, German policy makers have traditionally demonstrated little desire to take on a leadership role within the EU, a position the then Foreign Minister Kinkel (1993-1998) of the German Liberal Party (FDP- Freie Demokratische Partei) described as a ‘culture of constraint’ and Paterson calls a ‘leadership avoidance reflex’, which reflected the strong reliance on international organisations (Paterson, 1996: 170). This is not to say that Germany lacked influence rather that Germany paid much attention to ensuring that any new advance within the Community was perceived as a Franco-German initiative, rather than a German one, again trying to avoid even the suspicion of a German ‘Sonderweg’.

German unification could have ended Germany’s external semi-sovereignty; the internal workings of the Federal Republic did not experience any substantial change. Yet, German semi-sovereignty persists on two levels. First, Germany still acts in a semi-sovereign way deeply embedded in multilateral institutions with continuingly strong ties with France. The Franco-German axis has remained as stable as in pre-unification years for a long time; only recently signs have surfaced showing
considerable strain on this special relationship in the course of the financial crisis and the differing preferences in solving this crisis. Second, internal sovereignty is challenged by the increasing influence the EU has on its member states. Germany in particular has seen its Länder participate more fully in European politics (Paterson, 2005: 281).

The idea of semi-sovereignty is a good explanation of Germany’s preference for multilateral solutions, but it does not address the notion of anti-militarism which proponents of the continuation theory perceive in German foreign and security policy. In fact, proponents repeatedly describe Germany as a ‘civilian power’, a nation that attempts to civilise international relations by replacing “the military enforcement of rules (politics based on power) with the internationalisation of socially accepted norms (politics based on legitimacy)” (Harnisch & Maull, 2001: 4).

In order to implement this internationalisation of socially accepted norms, a civilian power would pursue six objectives.

- First, the monopolisation of force would constrain the use of force through a system of collective security.
- Second, deep integration within international organisations and general multilateralism, combined with a partial transfer of sovereignty would strengthen the rule of law.
- Third, a civilian power would be committed to the promotion of democratic procedures within and among states.
- Fourth, violence as a means of conflict management would be perceived as non-desirable, thus a restraint on violence would be promoted.
• Fifth, a civilian power would work towards establishing wide-ranging social justice in order to support legitimacy of the international order.

• Finally, interdependence would further the civilian power’s cause to civilise international relations.

The traditional civilian power would therefore be a power, which would promote and at times even initialise international action, be willing to shift autonomy and sovereignty to international institutions and would put short-term national interests behind the primary goal of realising a civilised international order (Harnisch and Maul, 2001: 4).

Why then can this concept of civilian power be so readily applied to the study of German foreign policy? Tewes makes a point in saying that a general civilisation of international relations has take place since World War II, especially across Europe and North America. Generally speaking, conflict solutions tend to follow a non-military approach with the use of violence as a last resort, decisions are taken to a large extent within multilateral institutions and international law has been gradually strengthened. However, Tewes argues that Germany and Japan constitute special cases, since both had experienced total defeat and were both only readmitted into the international community as redeemed nations (Tewes, 1997: 100).

Since the tamed nature of the German state, both constitutionally and socially, did not allow for the continuation of the Machtpolitik of the first half the 20th century, Germany adopted a policy of surrendering partial sovereignty to international institutions in return for a gradual re-integration
into the international community, a policy that allowed domestic actors to “reap the benefits of economic interdependence” (Tewes, 1997: 102). It has therefore, according to Tewes, always been in the interest of the Federal Republic to pursue the path of a civilian power.

Not only did Germany surrender parts of its sovereignty to international institutions, it also actively worked to strengthen and widen these institutions. The Federal Republic’s continuous role in Europe’s constitution-building process as well as in its pro-active Eastern policy emphasise the desire to civilise European politics with its neighbours (Risse, 2004: 27).

Although according to the ideal type, a civilian power would authorise the use of force only in conjunction with a legitimising ruling from an international institution, in recent years Germany has been engaged in operations which can be interpreted as the end of Germany being a civilian power. The greatest challenge for the civilian power approach took the form of Germany’s engagement in NATO’s Kosovo campaign of 1999, which had not been sanctioned by the United Nations. In his article “German foreign policy, Post-Kosovo: Still a ‘civilian power’ Maull argues that Germany has in fact remained a civilian power even though it had acted against the UN Security Council. Primarily, Maull emphasis that Germany’s approach to the crisis had always been characterised by firmly held beliefs, not material interests and a desire to be a reliable ally within both NATO and the EU (Maull, 2000a: 17). Multilateralism therefore remained at the core of German foreign policy.
Maull however concedes that the civilian power’s traditional aversion towards military force could no longer be sustained with regards to Germany after this crisis. He maintains that Germany had already embarked on a path of making more use of its military during the break-up of Yugoslavia when the tensions between the reluctance of using force and the firmly held beliefs became more and more severe. Germany did therefore not cease to be a civilian power; it rather implemented gradual modifications to its foreign policy. Furthermore, Maull points out, that the constitutional constraints on the use of German force is still very strong and open to interpretations, which in turn would leave a repetition of the Kosovo engagement open for challenges in the Constitutional Court (Maull, 2000a: 18). Similarly, although Germany has sent its troops to Afghanistan, this was not purely done out of power political reasons, rather out of considerations of civilising international relations (Risse, 2004: 29).

Maull therefore concludes that Germany remains a civilian power, because even after the military contributions to Kosovo and Afghanistan Germany is still committed to multilateral institutions and continues to be reluctant and constitutionally restrained from using its military without UN approval.

Taking into account the arguments for seeing Germany’s foreign policy as a continuation of the Cold War era, i.e. multilateral approaches to foreign policy and a very reluctant stand on military deployment, the reform of the Bundeswehr is necessary only to accommodate for the occasional deployment in a relatively secure area, but would mostly continue to concentrate in defensive operations. That would, however, not fully explain
the more profound reforms set out in the *Weißbuch 2006*, which aims at making the *Bundeswehr* in general more deployable, more sustainable during more robust operations and acquiring new transport capabilities and more deployable equipment to be capable to take on out-of-area missions in the first place (BMVg, 2006: 11-12).

**Becoming a ‘normal’ power?**

As the the *Weißbuch 2006* aims at a more deployable *Bundeswehr* it is necessary to consider the possibility that Germany has in fact embarked on a more normal foreign policy to accommodate its allies’ expectations to contribute to operations in accordance with its increased international weight. When discussing the concept of normalization, however, one needs to have a look at a more ‘traditional’ outlook on the term ‘normal’ as opposed to the one outlined earlier in this chapter.

Proponents of the normalisation process argue that German foreign and security policy has in fact become more normal over the last twenty years the term ‘normal’ referring to a more realist approach of international relations. According to realist ideology, a ‘normal’ state would endeavour to accumulate as much power as possible in order to improve its standing in the international arena. In the case of Germany, the new-found sovereignty after unification would allow the country to discard the artificial restraints of the Cold War and conduct its foreign and security policy as other – ‘normal’ – nations do. Arguing from this realist point of view, Mearsheimer argues that since the bipolar system had collapsed the new multi-polar environment would present ample opportunities “for bullying and ganging
up” (Mearsheimer, 1990: 32). Special emphasis needs to be paid to unified Germany in this scenario, since according to Mearsheimer Germany would make use of its newly found increase of power and dominate Europe in much the same way it had done in the 1930s. Furthermore, Germany would also aim at acquiring nuclear capabilities in order to safeguard itself from blackmail from other nuclear powers and “to raise its military status to a level commensurate with its economic status (Mearsheimer, 1990: 36). In essence, Germany would rid itself of its constraints it had placed upon itself during the Cold War and would evolve into a new hegemon in a very unstable multipolar Europe which would also see the resurface of nationalism.

Although also contributing to the normalization/continuation debate, Philip H. Gordon takes a more nuanced neo-realistic approach. Before discussing Germany’s post-unification foreign policy, Gordon briefly discusses West Germany’s traditional approach to this policy area. The Cold War saw a West German foreign policy which, according to Gordon, was characterised by four traits.

- First, the Federal Republic followed a “policy of responsibility”, which is to say that emphasis was placed on the importance of justice, responsibility and morality as a result of Germany’s troubled past. Examples of the influence of this policy could be seen in the deep integration into western alliance mechanisms, the compensations paid to victims of the Third Reich and the constitutional ban on wars of aggression. Since German governments were well aware that their foreign policy was being
observed not only by the international community, but also by the German general public, any actions that could be interpreted as a return to German “power politics” were avoided.

• Second, the “civilian policy” favours economic power over military power. Although West Germany had its own armed forces ever since 1955 which played an important role in NATO’s policy of deterrence, it was never intended as anything else but a territorial defence force. This intention was mirrored in the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) arguably banning German troops from participating in any military operation outside NATO territory.

• Third, the “parochial policy” describes the tendency of German politicians to limit West Germany’s role to Europe. Whereas Germany had been very active within Europe to promote the European Community (EC) or formulating its Ostpolitik, it played hardly any role in the Middle East peace process or any other process global importance.

• Finally, the “multilateral approach” emphasises the fact that West Germany made great use of the international organisations to pursue its national interests, rather than acting alone.

Although some outcomes were mostly satisfying German interests, like the above mentioned Ostpolitik, West German politicians always stressed the shared interests of their allies in order to gain the necessary support (Gordon, 1994: 226-228) by pointing to for example ‘European interests’, rather than ‘German interests’. Whereas other states might have used a multilateral approach as a ‘less expensive’ option in that it saves
resource by pooling them with the allies, for West German governments multilateralism allowed for a internationally widely supported foreign policy, which was extremely important for a nation still re-establishing as a respected member of the international community. The multilateral approach was therefore perceived as the only way for West Germany to conduct its foreign policy without raising suspicions abroad, a concern which is still traceable today. Multilateralism for West Germans decision-makers was thus more of a reflex to appease the neighbours than the result of rational considerations.

In his analysis of the foreign and security policy of the unified Germany, Gordon immediately clarifies that the basis on which foreign policy formulation is built will not change that much, however, he points out that the radical changes that took place in and around Germany will have their effects on the Federal Republic (Gordon, 1994: 228-229). Although German politicians took great care to highlight the continuation of Germany’s multilateral approach, Germany’s size, wealth and geopolitical position would make it more difficult to maintain a low profile in the post-Cold War world.

Among other examples for this development Gordon offers, the military deployment is possibly the best one. Gordon shows that within the short time of only three years, the German society has come to accept the need for increased military contributions to several operations. This did, however, not happen quickly as the intensity of the operations grew only very gradually from the symbolic and financial support for Operation Desert Storm to contributing to a number of international military operations,
ranging from AWACS missions over Serbia to humanitarian operations in Somalia and Cambodia. Taking into account that out-of-area missions had traditionally been seen as being banned by the constitution, an interpretation firmly held throughout the political spectrum, these steps are even more noteworthy (Gordon, 1994: 231).

Overall, Gordon summarises his arguments by saying that

“the new Germany is no longer so dependent for security on the United States, is directly affected by Europe’s most critical problems, and is led by a generation of leaders born late enough to bear no guilt for Nazi crimes. While Germany will remain acutely sensitive to how its foreign policy is perceived abroad, the pressures or obligations to play a reserved, parochial, or multilateral role will not be as strong in the future as they were in the past” (Gordon, 1994: 233).

Although his analysis is more differentiated than Mearsheimer’s, Gordon clearly expects unified Germany to evolve into a state with a “normal” foreign and security policy, a state that would also unilaterally pursue its own interests. Unlike Mearsheimer, however, Gordon does not see this as a threat to European stability. During the 1990s, many proponents of normalisation emphasised Germany’s embedded nature within its alliances, be it the EU, NATO or the UN, which in turn enabled Germans to conduct an easily calculable foreign policy (Bald, 2001: 222). This way of conducting foreign policy allowed German governments to reassure their allies by avoiding any German “Sonderwege” while at the same time pursuing and satisfying national interests through close cooperation. By conducting its foreign and security policy through institutionalised multilateral channels Germany has been able to combine the pursuit of interests with the need to reassure its partners.
This calculable foreign policy would at first concentrate on the role of the mediator between the transforming Eastern Europe and the West. Germany’s aim to stabilise its Eastern neighbours with the help of its Western partners would only be achieved if it formulated clear interests and take the initiative in seeing these interests fulfilled, especially considering the initial indifference of the USA under George W. Bush towards Europe (Baring, 2000: 266). Germany could therefore no longer afford to delegate responsibilities to its partners, while at the same time Germany would still be affected by its traditional Mittellage (central position) within Europe and would therefore need allies to advance its interests (Baring, 2000: 269).

In 1998 the process of normalisation was accelerated as Chancellor Schröder’s centre-left Social Democrat – Green Government embarked on a more confident foreign policy. This more confident foreign policy was the result of a generational change as the new government was made up of politicians who did not belong to Hellmann’s affected generation.\(^2\) Although Schröder’s rhetoric emphasised the need for continuation – the need for multilateral priorities and civilising international relations –, his policies of transatlantic co-operation and European integration were characterised by a sense of realpolitik. Especially in EU politics, Schröder realised that a deeper European integration would strengthen Germany’s position within the Union (Hacke, 2002: 7-8). At the same time, Europe would still need the United States to compensate for the missing European military capabilities – as seen during the Kosovo Conflict.

\(^2\) See (Hellmann, 2001: 46-47) The Bonn Republic was characterised by the affected generation, i.e. those directly affected by WWII, whereas the Berlin Republic saw the rise of politicians who were no longer directly affected by this experience therefore did not restrain themselves as much.
In addition to this, the Schröder Government paid much attention to emphasising Germany’s newly found confidence. German national interests were more openly prioritised over European interests. Schröder’s approach to international affairs was therefore twofold. First, German issues needed to be solved in Berlin and not elsewhere and secondly, Germany could no longer hide behind the cheque-book-diplomacy of the early post-unification years (Schröder, 2002: 8). This confident Germany would be a clear advocate of a strong Europe, emancipated from – but not entirely separated from – the United States, which, as already pointed out, were no longer primarily interested in Europe under George W. Bush (Schröder, 2011: 3).

This new approach to the transatlantic relationship came to the forefront during the controversies surrounding the war in Iraq in 2003. As a sign of a more normal foreign policy, the Schröder Government broke with Germany’s tradition and openly criticised the US policies, especially regarding the conflict in Iraq. Interestingly, this criticism was not only felt amongst the political elite, but rather it represented general public opinion towards the United States. Not only did the government therefore create a precedent in openly and directly criticising its most valuable partner, but it did so with wide public support, suggesting that the German society in general was comfortable with this new, ‘normal’ foreign policy (Neu, 2004: 23).

Although this confrontation will be discussed in more detail in chapter 2, proponents of the normalisation process point to this period of a confident Germany breaking with the United States for proof, that Germany no longer solely relies on its traditional partners but rather seeks new ones,
should the need arise. This new ‘German way’ could be perceived as a sign that its foreign policy is being re-aligned along much more national orientation (Rudolf, 2002: 16).

One might put this development down to the difficult relationship between Schröder and Bush, yet Angela Merkel seemed to continue this development – albeit in a more diplomatic guise. Merkel renewed the US-German “partnership in leadership” which had been offered to then German Chancellor Helmut Kohl by George Bush, Sr. after unification. However, at the same time Merkel was very vocal about her concerns regarding the Bush (George W. Bush) Administration, especially regarding the Guantanamo prison camp in which suspected terrorists are held prisoners, highlighting the apparent violations of human rights and her rejection of torture (Merkel, 2011: 1). This criticism, however, was much more constructive as Schröder’s as can be seen by Bush’s reaction highlighting Berlin’s productive role in international relations. Similarly, Merkel maintained good relations with Paris and London without limiting her room for political manoeuvres by too close alliances (Hacke, 2006: 31-32).

More recently, however, Germany has increased its standing on the European stage to that of an embedded hegemon, i.e. a dominating state within a clear political framework of international organisations. In the case of Germany it can be argued that over the last two decades Germany has shown signs that it is capable and willing to take on the leading role within Europe (Crawford, 2007: 34). This approach to the study of German foreign and security policy incorporates the arguments of continuation, as implied by the term ‘embedded’, while at the same time acknowledging the more
assertive behaviour German politicians have displayed over the last few years. Germany’s emphasis on multilateral solutions and the importance of international organisations remains unchanged. Rather than arguing that the means and channels through which Germany conducts its foreign policy have changed, both Crawford and Karp argue that the manner in which foreign policy has changed. The core questions they argue are not about Germany’s overall goals, but about “how Germany views its role in European institutions, how it uses its institutional power, how it expects to be rewarded and what rewards it is willing to offer others” (Karp, 2009: 15). This quote implies that Germany is still deeply embedded within the alliance mechanisms but politicians are more direct in formulating their preferences. The nature of German foreign policy of multilateralism has therefore not changed, but its tone has become more assertive more in line with that of a hegemon.

Although this concept is intriguing, it has to be noted that it does bear resemblance with the idea that states in general have over the last few years lost parts of their sovereignty to international organisations and the increasing interdependence which would be reflected in the ‘embedded’ attribute. With that in mind this supports this thesis’ argument that Germany with its integrated foreign policy has become more self-confident and more normal in that it pursues its national interests out of domestic impulses as well as external expectations and pressures.

Concentrating on the policy sector of German military reform Tom Dyson approaches the topic of the more normal German foreign and security policy by analysing the behaviour of policy leaders, most notably
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the Ministers of Defence. In his book “The Politics of German Defence and Security: Policy Leadership and Military Reform in the Post Cold-War Era” he maintains that many scholars neglect the importance of “material factors emanating from the domestic political context”, therefore insufficiently explaining policy change in Germany (Dyson, 2007: 5).

Dyson stresses the importance of the Ressortprinzip, the departmental or ministerial principle, and the role of leadership within the ministries as the defining factor of changes in German defence policy. Dyson identifies three distinct leadership roles, which in turn are linked leadership styles and strategies. First, policy entrepreneurship aims at radical policy change by pushing a preferred policy solution. The leader takes the role of an initiator of change, creating an atmosphere of constant crisis and thus legitimising the radical change through persuasion in order to gain support for the proposed policy change. Second, policy brokerage is most closely associated with incremental change by means of policy learning and the ability to include the opposition in the process. Finally, policy veto-playing involves preventing the formulation of policy change by blocking any new policy ideas or sideling the agents of new policy initiatives (Dyson, 2007: 7).

Comparing the two post-Cold War governments in Germany, i.e. the governments of the Federal Chancellors Helmut Kohl (1982 -1998) and Gerhard Schröder (1998 – 2005), Dyson maintains that the Kohl government place significant importance on defence and security. Kohl perceived this policy area as Germany’s historical obligation, as a means to repay the western allies for their support not only during the re-unification
process, but also during the Cold War as such. Schröder, on the other hand, placed a higher priority on the economy, which resulted in him making security and defence less often a ‘Kanzlersache’, thus changing the context for the defence and security policy subsystem (Dyson, 2007: 13).

The Ressortprinzip and therefore the individual departmental leader is of such significance, because the chancellor does not actually engage in the ‘day-to-day’ ministerial management, but rather sets out the strategic guidelines. Any changes and policy initiatives implemented in the field of security policy are therefore attributed to the defence ministers, since it is their responsibility to appoint their respective state secretaries and Generalinspekteure (chiefs of staff), thus having almost complete control over the Bundesverteidigungsministerium using the strategic culture as means to legitimise policy proposals (Dyson, 2007: 13-14).

Although Dyson’s analysis of the role of leadership with regards to Germany’s decision-making process is very interesting, for the purpose of this thesis it is too much concentrated on the role of individuals. Since the concept of normalisation in itself describes a trend in changing policies the analysis of certain individuals’ views and approaches would not suffice in determining the validity of this perceived trend.

To say that Germany has become or is becoming a ‘normal’ power in the traditional realist sense of the word, i.e. a country primarily concerned with power politics, would be simplistic at best. It is still very much a multilateral player utilising its standing to further its own agenda. In the increasingly unipolar environment of the post-Cold War era Germany adapts its policy choices accordingly. This should, however, not be
mistaken with policy normalisation in a strictly realist understanding. While both Schröder and Merkel have displayed a more confident and pragmatic approach to international politics, Germany is no longer “reflexively multilateralist, nor instrumentally self-serving” (Karp, 2009: 27). This shift from reflexive multilateralism to pragmatism, combined with a more assertive foreign policy within the frameworks of international organisation is therefore at the core of the current German normalisation argument. With the more assertive foreign policy in mind a more assertive Bundeswehr is needed for support.

If Germany acts more self-confident on the international stage it will be expected to contribute militarily in those cases where diplomacy fails. For this it needs armed forces capable to be deployed with relative ease and able to sustain a prolonged mission in difficult circumstances. Germany’s increased weight and the expectations of its allies force Germany to modernise its armed forces in order to accommodate these changes. As the Weißbuch 2006 clearly addresses these issues it is obvious that German decision makers have come to the same conclusion. This thesis will therefore follow the assumption that Germany has in fact become a more normal actor in international relations and needs to reform its armed forces accordingly.

Summary

In summary, the proponents of the idea of continuation point to the arguably unique characteristics of German politics. They argue that due to Germany’s preference for multilateralism as a result of its semi-sovereignty both internally and externally co-operation is very much part of German
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political culture which in turn means that multilateralism will remain central to Germany’s foreign and security policy. Any German *Sonderweg* would be perceived as a return to the power politics of the past which would in turn antagonise Germany’s partners and – probably more importantly – Germans themselves. Although ‘continuationalists’ acknowledge that Germany has become more assertive in its foreign policy, they maintain that Germany remains heavily influenced by its collective experience of WWII as well as its collective – positive – experiences of the post-War era.

As has been outlined earlier, the idea that German foreign and security policy aims at civilising international relations through diplomatic and sometimes economical means is readily applied. Considering Germany’s contributions to both KFOR and ISAF these fit the bill due to their humanitarian background and their multi-lateral approach.

Proponents of normalisation, on the other hand, point to the increasing display of confidence amongst German politicians – and the general public – to argue that Germany is in fact undergoing significant change. Although it is relatively easy to refute Mearsheimer’s fears of Germany returning to the power politics of old, especially the Schröder and Merkel Governments have left the traditional path of German reflexive multilateralism to further their agenda. Whereas Schröder’s rhetoric has been pointed to as proof of Germany pursuing its interests while at the same time emphasising its independence from its partners (Germany’s issues being dealt with in Berlin), Merkel is argued to display similar characteristics, albeit more nuanced. Although not being a truly ‘normal’ state from a realist point of view, Germany’s increasing self-confidence as
well as its increasing use of its influence within international organisations would suggest a more normal foreign policy.

It is this increasing self-confidence displayed by Germany’s leaders from different parties that points to a shift in German foreign and security policy towards becoming more normal in a realist way. This thesis will therefore adopt the realist perspective of normality, i.e. the pursuit of national interests being at the core of a nation’s decision-making, to determine the correlation between *Bundeswehr* reform and Germany’s foreign and security policy. Although it has been argued that Germany makes extensive use of multilateralism and international organisations it has become clear that these mechanisms have been initially employed to further German interests without it being stated so openly.

If the Berlin Republic’s foreign policy does in fact differ greatly from its predecessor’s policy, that would in turn impact on the armed forces as one tool of foreign and security policy. A more normal foreign policy would have to incorporate a more active defence policy and a more active role for the *Bundeswehr* to accommodate for Germany’s increased presence on the international stage. The *Weißbuch 2006* aims at preparing the *Bundeswehr* for its more active role to bring it in line with the new foreign policy outlook.

To test the hypothesis of Germany having embarked on a process of normalisation the following chapter will discuss Germany’s foreign policy post-unification to determine the degree of difference between the Bonn Republic and the Berlin Republic. When this hypothesis is proven, it will then be necessary to see how successful the *Weißbuch* is in achieving its set goals.
Chapter 2: The evolution of German foreign and security policy since 1990

“We Germans want nothing more than to live with all our neighbours in freedom and democracy as well as in union and peace. [...] Our policy shall be a good example. [...] On the eve of its unification Germany declares the following in front of the international community: We will assume our responsibilities both in Europe and in the world” – Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Genscher, 1997: 881)

As stated in the introduction, the need for armed forces reform needs to be established before the actual discussion can be undertaken. This chapter will therefore deal with the central question of why Germany started the reform process in the first place. In order to do this, an overview of German foreign and security policy after unification will be at the core of this chapter.

Generally, every country’s foreign and security policy is defined by its immediate surroundings. In the case of Germany, these immediate post World War II surroundings were difficult to say the least. Both German states sought close integration in their respective alliance systems in order to reassure their partners that no threat would emanate from Germany thus securing the partners’ support in rebuilding both countries.

The following Cold War made this close co-operation even more important for the survival of Germany – the blockade of West Berlin by the Soviet Union highlighted the need for security clearly – culminating in the accession of both German states into their respective military alliances.
These circumstances changed dramatically after unification in 1990. The traditional scenario of the bi-polar world, which had defined Germany’s post-war policies, gave way to changing world. Before a discussion of German foreign and security policy post unification can be undertaken, Germany’s situation during the Cold War needs to be addressed in brief. It will make clear the changes that took place within Germany, transforming it from a country reliant on allied support for its security to a country that played a significant role in European security. This chapter will deal primarily with German foreign and security policy of the 1990s which in turn impacts on the definition of military capabilities as an integral part thereof. By analysing Germany’s policies regarding the crises of the breakup of Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, it will become clear that by becoming a more active player Germany would need armed forces capable of supporting this particular role.

**The Cold War and West Germany**

The Cold War had a great impact on Germany and its foreign and security policy, quite understandably so, if one considers that the frontline of this conflict divided the country into two. This, paired with the experience of complete military and moral defeat in World War II, resulted in a nation searching for international rehabilitation. Starting from this *Stunde Null* (zero hour) of defeat, the West German state, which had been created under close observation by the victorious Allied Powers, strived for quick economic and political reconstruction as well as close integration in Western organisations. In the case of East Germany, close co-operation
with the Soviet Union and its satellite states was equally important to achieve.

Not only did West Germany relatively quickly join NATO in 1955, but it also performed an important role in the European integration process by co-founding the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and continuing to develop this further, first into the European Economic Community (EEC) which served as the predecessor of today’s European Union (EU) (Hancock & Kirsch, 2009: 43). Konrad Adenauer, the first Federal Chancellor of West Germany, was convinced that this Westintegration (integration in the western system of alliances) combined with Bündnistreue (allegiance to the alliance) served to re-establish West Germany within the international community as a trustworthy partner. However, he also believed that creating an economically strong West German state, well integrated within western institutions and alliances would radiate eastwards, in effect pulling East Germany out of the Communist bloc, thus resulting in a unified Germany (Hacke, 1997: 67-68).

This rationale clearly shows the rationale of the time firmly rooted in realism. Realism as a theory in the study of international relations assumes at its core that the international stage is defined by a state of anarchy in which the individual nation states are in constant competition and conflict with each other in a struggle for security and ultimately survival constantly rationally evaluating the costs and benefits of their actions (Burchill, 1996: 71). In the Case of West Germany, Westintegration and Bündnistreue ensured two things for West Germany.
First, it secured West Germany in the classical sense by being part of an alliance, thus increasing West Germany’s defensive capabilities practically overnight by adding US and other Western European forces to the cost – benefit equation should the Soviet Union attempt an attack on West Germany. Secondly, especially Westintegration enabled West Germany to conduct its foreign policy in close conjunction with its partners thus accumulating more influence in the international community than on its own. Had West Germany articulated clear interests towards its partners, this could have been interpreted as German realpolitik, which in turn would assume a new German attempt of dominance within Europe. However, by going through the channels of integration any German interests could be articulated as European interests thus minimising the partners’ suspicion towards West Germany. It can therefore be said that Westintegration and Bündnistreue served West Germany well, they both guaranteed security while at the same time allowed West Germany to accumulate influence. In a realist sense West Germany therefore succeeded in attaining security as well as having influence within the international community. These two commodities were extremely important if West Germany wanted to achieve its most important goal of unification.

This had been on the West German agenda from the very start as can be seen in the preamble of its constitution, the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) which originally stated that it was the task of all Germans to strive for unity and, more politically more explosive declaration, that the Grundgesetz applied to all Germans – East and West (Parlamentarischer Rat, 2002: Preamble). In effect, the “Founding Fathers” thus set in stone that the new
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Federal Republic of Germany would not recognise the authority of any East German state and assumed its right to represent the German people alone (Alleinvertretungsanspruch). This policy resulted in West Germany refusing to develop any diplomatic ties to any country, which itself had diplomatic relations to East Germany. According to this Hallstein Doctrine – named after the then State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Walter Hallstein – any diplomatic relation to East Berlin would be regarded an unfriendly act towards Bonn, which would then use the threat of sanctions to support the Alleinvertretungsanspruch. The quick economic recovery of West Germany helped considerably to maintain this policy (Schöllgen, 2001: 46). However, the Hallstein Doctrine was slowly abandoned as the status quo of a divided Europe became more widely accepted. In general it can be said that during the Cold War, West Germany pursued a policy of balancing its freedom, social welfare and economic growth against an increasingly difficult to obtain unification. Settling in this scenario West Germany more and more perceived itself as a “bulwark against the East, a refuge for freedom and prosperity, and a self-conscious successor state to past German regimes” (Hancock and Kirsch, 2009: 43). This idea of a bulwark can also be found in the West German defence policy and armed forces structure, which will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3. This idea of West Germany as a bulwark was further supported by the United States who soon projected its power to provide additional security to Western Europe and West Germany in particular. In summary, West German security depended on both its own military and the close co-operation with West Germany’s allies, most notably the U.S. to contain the clearly defined threat in the East.
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The East German state by contrast, perceived itself as a completely different kind of German state which had denounced any connections to previous German regimes. Under the overall rule of the Social Unity Party of Germany (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands – SED*) the state institutions were set up to mimic their Soviet antetype. It was the primary goal of East German politics to transform Germany into a socialist democracy with a centrally planned economy and very close military, diplomatic and trade co-operation with the Soviet Union (Hancock and Kirsch, 2009: 44). It goes without saying that this close link with the USSR and its dedication to socialism caused East Germany to label its western capitalist neighbour a threat to its national sovereignty, thus effectively setting the mutual distrust of both German states in stone.

Both German states were therefore deeply embedded in their respective alliances up to the point that conducting their own foreign policy was only partially possible. In the case of West Germany almost any decision in foreign policy depended on Washington’s approval; any dealings amongst the two German states would also need Moscow’s consent (Pulzer, 1999: 110). Germany was therefore not a sovereign nation, like the United States, France or the United Kingdom, but rather a semi-sovereign state that needed the close co-operation of its partners.

**Germany and the international community post 1990**

The need for co-operation was highlighted during the events of 1989/90 which lead to the unification of East and West Germany. The negotiations for German unification, the 2+4 talks, centred primarily around four main questions.
1. How should German unification be achieved with reference to the international community?

2. How could the approval of all four Allies for German full sovereignty be obtained?

3. How could the reservations within the international community regarding a re-unified Germany be overcome?

4. How could questions, that had been left unanswered since the end of World War II, be solved? (Auswärtiges Amt, 2011: Articles 1-8)

The nature of these questions demonstrate clearly the importance, foreign powers had for an essentially inner-German process (Hacke, 1997: 369). Especially the question three and four were – and still to some extent are – difficult to answer, since, as it will be shown in this thesis, Germany is just becoming accustomed to its sovereignty some 20 years after obtaining it.

Even prior to unification it had been made clear by U.S. President Bush’s offer of a ‘partnership in leadership’, that Germany was expected to take on a more active role in international affairs, an expectation that was further increased after 1990 due to Germany’s generally changed domestic and international situation.

Unification as such had numerous effects on Germany as a nation, especially in relation to its partners in Europe. First and foremost, Germany’s size increased drastically with unification with borders now stretching to Poland, thus raising questions about whether Polish territories formerly belonging to Germany – Eastern Prussia in particular – would soon
follow the territories of the former GDR into the enlarged Germany. Closely linked with the territorial gain, the growth of Germany’s population in conjunction with the differing sizes of the eastern and western economies meant that the Federal Republic was facing a dilemma. Although – in realist terms – a larger population translates into more power, this was counter-weighed by the financial costs of attempting to reform the new Länder economically. Finally, the eventual move of the capital from Bonn to Berlin conjured up old memories of Germany amongst its allies since Berlin had remained a synonym for previous German ambitions.

From a purely realist point of view these developments – growth in territory, population – combined with the return to the old German capital and the re-acquired full sovereignty gave rise to reservations regarding this arguably new, more powerful Germany’s future foreign policy.

However, the 1990s only saw a very reluctant move to a more active foreign policy, therefore expelling most of Germany’s neighbours’ fears. German policy makers took great care to maintain a certain continuity in their foreign policy, i.e. close co-operation with their partners and multilateral operations if needed. Germany did in fact play a significant role in resolving the major crises of the 1990s, like the wars in former Yugoslavia and Kosovo, however demands on Germany voiced by its partners to step up its efforts were a constant critique. This can be seen plainly in the military operations in both Kosovo and Afghanistan – both of which will be discussed in more detail in their respective case studies later on in this thesis.
From an outside view it seems clear that the last two questions posed during the 2+4 talks have not been resolved for German policy makers, since they still seem to be very much concerned with distancing themselves from Germany’s highly troubled past. Debates about whether Germany should get involved militarily in a certain conflict have in the past been centred on questions about how German troops would be received by the local population and more importantly how the international community would react to German military contribution. The discussion of the political debates surrounding out-of-area deployment in chapters 4 and 5 will concentrate on this particular point.

By contrast, Germany’s partners appear to be very comfortable with Germany assuming a more assertive foreign policy, in fact, as the case studies on the military operations will show. It is therefore safe to assume that Germany’s reluctance to conduct a more active foreign policy is based on domestic factors rather than external ones.

Although one might argue that the Gulf War of 1991 needs to be included in an analysis of Germany’s post-unification foreign and security policy, it will not be discussed here. The reason for this is that German behaviour then was still very much influenced by the Cold War attitude, which called for a more passive German foreign and security policy towards international crises and more crucially by alleged constitutional restraints.

In 1994, however, the Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) ruled that the Grundgesetz did not prohibit out-of-area deployment of German troops. This ruling therefore marked the end of legal quarrels concerning the interpretation of the Grundgesetz and made
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future *Bundeswehr* out-of-area deployments possible (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 1994: Paragraphs 1-6). As the case of the former Yugoslavia eventually saw the first full-scale deployment of German troops in peace-making and peace-keeping missions (the missions in Cambodia and Somalia were more of a humanitarian nature) it is a good starting point for the analysis of the German rationale behind engaging in peace-making and peace-keeping missions.

**Peace-keeping in Former Yugoslavia**

It is interesting to note that Tito, the long-time dictator of Yugoslavia, was convinced as early as 1953 that only a strong dictatorship could keep the different ethnic groups from “cutting each others’ throats” (Hacke, 1997: 399). Keeping this in mind, the outbreak of conflicts in this region is hardly surprising, considering that at the time, although Tito had already died in 1980, the last authority of Eastern Europe in the guise of the Soviet Union was developing a less authoritarian attitude towards its satellite states.

The conflict and eventual break-up of Yugoslavia had already begun in 1990 with the European Community, and later its successor the European Union, attempting to put an end to the hostilities exclusively through diplomatic means. The tensions among the Yugoslavian republics were all the more surprising to them, as Yugoslavia had always been considered to be a model of a multi-ethnical state. The West, therefore, did not seem to share Tito’s view that it was only a strong authority, which would keep the different groups in line. Not surprisingly, the EC announced on 23. June 1990 that it would not recognise any declaration of independence coming from any of the different Yugoslavian republics in an
attempt to maintain the multi-ethnical status quo. This appears to run against the notion that after the demise of communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe the establishment of self-determination throughout this region should be supported as well as possible. The creation of new states by this process was not an option. The West favoured a united Yugoslavia under the political leadership of Serbia (Hacke, 1997: 399-400). From this brief outline of the situation one can already see, that solving the Yugoslavrian problem would not be an easy task. For the first time after the end of World War II, armed conflict had returned to the European continent taking the governments of the European Community by surprise. The subsequent attempts to find a solution sometimes appearing to be put forward by confused decision-makers are proof of the helplessness in which Europe found herself with the Federal Republic being no exception.

True to its preference for diplomacy Germany and the EC mainly engaged in a policy of strongly worded statements advocating the status-quo in Yugoslavia and interestingly enough, rejecting the notion of transforming the multi-ethical state into a confederation of the different provinces which would have granted them the self-determination they wanted without the actual break-up of the Yugoslavian state. When war did break out in June 1991 it became clear that this strategy was not sufficient to keep the problem under control (Hoffmann, 2000: 258).

The EC, and Germany in particular, strongly believed that Belgrade could be stopped in pursuing its aggressive behaviour by using the recently developed crisis mechanisms of the CSCE, which, at first, took the form of financial and economic measures. Germany’s threat to cut all its aid to
Belgrade was substantial, considering the amount of financial aid Yugoslavia had received in 1990 from the German Government totalled around $550 million. The continuing diplomatic efforts undertaken by the EC had very little effect on the fighting and by the autumn of 1991, fourteen cease-fires negotiated by the EC had been broken (Haar, 2001: 71). With this rather poor record a new strategy needed to be found. It became more and more apparent that the EC would not be able to stop the fighting in the Balkans on its own.

Both Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher soon began to push for international recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in an attempt to bring other, more powerful institutions into the game. International recognition would turn that the civil war into an international war, which would be in breach with international law thus resulting in the engagement of the United Nations. What followed was the beginning of the first international controversy concerning Germany’s new ‘unilateralism’. After having discussed the issue with their European partners, a date, 15th January 1992, for formal recognition of the two republics was agreed on. Germany, however, appears to have rushed ahead of its partners allegedly recognising Croatia and Slovenia on 23rd December 1991. It is, however, interesting to see that Genscher rejects this outright. He argues that the German Government only informed the two republics in question about the EC’s intention to recognise them on the agreed date. Actual diplomatic relations were not started until the 15th January 1992 and therefore Germany was not in any breach with the EC agreement (Genscher, 1997: 962-963).
This interpretation of proceedings was, however, not shared by many contemporaries, thus giving rise to the claim of new German unilateralism. What was more damaging is the fact that Germany would not be willing to defend the two new nations it had helped to create. This is not to say that Germany ceased all efforts to end the conflict but rather to assume the role of the trustworthy but somewhat restricted ally and partner. Having realised that a diplomatic solution to the crisis could not be found, the EC continued its regime of economic sanctions but also started including humanitarian intervention and selective military actions against Serbia. Unclear about the how the Grundgesetz should be interpreted with regards to out-of-area deployment of German troops, the Kohl-Government nevertheless decided that it should participate in the UN missions. In July 1992 Germany assisted in the air transports to Sarajevo, in the naval enforcement of the embargo against Serbia and later in the AWACS missions to monitor the no-fly zones over Bosnia (Haar, 2001: 72). Bonn, however, expressed its reluctance to participate in any military intervention should these measures not be sufficient to stop the fighting. The decision to participate in the UN missions resulted in a heated domestic debate, as the dispute over the Grundgesetz’s interpretation was still not solved.

Each Bundeswehr assignment was heavily challenged by the opposition claiming that each violated the Grundgesetz. To solve the disagreement the Government saw no other possibility than to have a ruling from the Bundesverfassungsgericht. The junior coalition partner, the FDP, together with the opposition therefore challenged the Chancellor in the Court, which on 12th July 1994 ruled in Chancellor’s favour although also
stating that the Government had violated the rights of the Bundestag by not consulting it, which would need to be done in the future (Gros & Glaab, 1999: 268-269). This ruling ended the legal debate over the legality of German out-of-area involvement and made it into a political consideration.

Although the question of legality was now resolved, Germany did not contribute to the missions over Yugoslavia without much controversy. When in 1995 the UN requested Bundeswehr personnel to support and protect the already in Yugoslavia stationed UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) Bonn had immense difficulties to win the support of the opposition. Eventually it was agreed on to contribute medical personnel, surveillance aircraft, air transport, fourteen Tornados and various other troops of which none were ground troops. When, in late 1995, it came to contributing to IFOR (Implementation Force), which was to enforce the Dayton Peace Agreement, a similarly strong opposition voiced its concerns. Eventually, however, the Bundestag did support the mission and some 4,000 logistical, medical and airborne troops became part of IFOR (Haar, 2001: 75).

When wanting to attempt to understand the measures taken by the German Government over the Yugoslavia Crisis, one has to confront complex issues of German security traditions. As with the Gulf War, the time factor cannot be ignored either. The measures taken by Germany over Yugoslavia, at times, appear to lack a sense of continuity or even the notion of a grand strategy. As has been shown above, Germany firstly tried to calm the situation diplomatically in accordance with the EC (the misunderstanding over the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia shall be considered the exception to the rule). When it became clear, that this would
not diffuse the situation, Germany retreated slightly and the EC’s embargoes and economic sanctions were implemented. Finally, the need to use military force in order to pacify the region was recognised by the EC governments with Germany being the reluctant partner referencing historical and constitutional constraints. Even when the Bundesverfassungsgericht ruled in favour of out-of-area deployments German contributions were subject of heated parliamentary debates.

As already pointed out, the time factor is important when trying to understand Germany’s behaviour. In 1991, Germany had only recently been unified and most efforts were directed in that direction. The dissolution of the multi-ethnical Yugoslavia was not on the public’s mind, as the New Länder (formerly East Germany) needed urgent economic restructuring (Calic, 1996: 52-53). In addition to that, Germany had just regained its full sovereignty and given the historical fears of its neighbours it seems only logical that the Kohl-government did not want show a drastic change in foreign and security policy. The desire of wanting to be seen as a reliable partner in Europe is one of the major factors behind Germany’s policy towards Yugoslavia. Therefore, Germany first embarked on the diplomatic path, which had always been a safe path for German governments. After the recognition debacle it is interesting to see the retreat of Germany not taking another chance of having to confront claims of stepping out of EC policy line. However, this phase of the crisis sees German decision makers torn between two possible courses of action. Politicians were still in the process of formulating the foreign and security policy for the newly unified Germany, which would naturally lead to uncoordinated actions.
When it comes to the actual UN and later NATO missions over Yugoslavia, one can see an incremental shift within the German population to accept and shoulder more responsibility. Although this is to be greeted one has to ask the question of why this shift occurred. The primary reason for this would be the increased international pressure for Germany to take on a more active part. Although especially France was still slightly uncomfortable with the notion of having an active Germany at the heart of Europe again, both Paris and London made clear demands to Bonn. Given Germany’s ‘cheque-book diplomacy’ during the 1991 Gulf War its allies did not want to see a repetition of that policy. Germany’s BündnistäHigkeit (ability to contribute to the alliance) was on the line. In addition to this the public’s attitude towards Bundeswehr out-of-area changed considerably over that crisis. During the Gulf War the public was against getting the Bundeswehr involved in the conflict. By 1995, 78% of the German public supported the peace-keeping operations in Bosnia (Haar, 2001: 79). This shows that the Germans in general, and therefore by extension politicians, started to come to terms with the idea of deploying troops to maintain peace elsewhere. Yet, differing interpretations of the Grundgesetz made it increasingly difficult to prove Germany’s BündnistäHigkeit. It was only after the 1994 ruling that the question of out-of-area missions became a purely political one.

As a summary it is possible to say that Germany was taken by surprise by the events in Yugoslavia at a time when it was still formulating its new foreign and security policy. The German emphasis on diplomacy at the beginning of the crisis can be interpreted as a means to ensure its
partners of its continuing diplomatic and political reliability. After the failure of its diplomatic efforts, Germany saw itself pushed to contribute to peace-enforcing and peace-keeping missions. It would have to get in line in order to protect its *Bündnisfähigkeit*. This pressure was even intensified by the desire to put an end to the aggressions and thus restore stability in the Balkans. Whereas Germany could keep out of the Gulf War in 1991 it proved much harder, and eventually impossible, to ignore the process in Yugoslavia due to decreasing domestic constraints (growing public support) and increased multinational attention (increasing efforts from the EC and NATO).

**Overview of the Kosovo Crisis**

Although a more detailed account of the *Bundeswehr* mission in Kosovo and Germany’s contribution to KFOR will be given in chapter 4, it is necessary to have an overview of the crisis and Germany’s role in it to be able to demonstrate its growing commitment to European security. Chapter 4 will concentrate on the actual mission, its objectives and the means with which these objectives were meant to be achieved. It will also highlight the political debate as well as the public’s take on the mission. Here, this thesis will merely give an introduction to the international community’s efforts to solve this crisis diplomatically and Germany’s role in it.

The Kosovo Crisis had its origins in 1989, when the then autonomous province, mainly inhabited by Albanians, was stripped of that status by the Serbs. Being literally ignored by the West during the Dayton Peace negotiations, it remained under Serbian rule after the initial Yugoslavian Crisis had been resolved. With tensions mounting between the
Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians (especially the Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA) the Balkans erupted in violence once more in late-1997. Being unable to secure the support of the UN Security Council, NATO eventually took charge of diffusing the Balkans by threatening Belgrade, which had moved into Kosovo with heavy weapons, with air strikes (Maul 2000a: 2-3).

At the close of 1998, Germany was domestically pre-occupied with the federal elections, which would end the sixteen-year period of the Kohl Government, replacing it with the left-of-the-centre ‘Red-Green’ Coalition of Gerhard Schröder (SPD) and Joschka Fischer (Greens). The new Government was in the middle of having to decide whether to participate in the military operation for which NATO was already preparing before it was formally installed by the Federal President. The decision to contribute 14 ECR Tornados to the operation was therefore still taken by the old Government with the Red-Green Coalition agreeing reluctantly (Rudolf, 2000: 134).

After several attempts to solve this crisis diplomatically with the Serbian President Milosevic, one last effort was made in Rambouillet. These peace talks were characterised by the Serbs signalling their disinterest only leaving three Albanian delegations for the West to negotiate the eventual comprise with. Kosovo would remain autonomous under Yugoslav sovereignty with NATO troops, which would be allowed to enter any part of Yugoslavia should this prove to be necessary, supervising compliance (Ramet & Lyon, 2001: 87). As Belgrade rejected this agreement the only possibility left to the West was to resort to NATO military means in April 1999.
Although the NATO air campaign achieved its goals to stop the Serbs in Kosovo admittedly causing civilian casualties and taking longer than it had been anticipated, Germany encountered an intense domestic debate on whether to deploy ground troops under the NATO-lead KFOR contingent which was to enforce the Rambouillet agreement. The opposition voiced their concern about how German troops could be sent to Kosovo remembering the atrocious behaviour of the German troops during World War II in that region. The *Bundesregierung*, however, was convinced that Germany had an *obligation* to end the “systematic violation of human rights ...[and ...attempt to prevent the looming] humanitarian catastrophe” in Kosovo (Schröder) and to help stabilise the whole region by giving it a “European perspective” (Scharping). These justifications, supported by the on-going flow of refugees from Kosovo, created a situation, in which the opposition had difficulties criticising the Government’s decisions with only the PDS defending its anti-war stance vigorously (Ramet and Lyon, 2001: 88-91). Again, a more detail account on the political debate will be presented in chapter 4.

Considering Germany’s rather minor role in the actual military operation in attempting to stop the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and its moral obligation highlighted by the government, it is only logical that Germany would seek another way to contribute more heavily to the resolution of this crisis. The government’s twin-track approach to the situation saw the support and participation of NATO actions on the one hand and intensive diplomatic efforts to stabilise the region permanently on the other. In order to get UN support for any future operations in the Balkans, Russia needed
to be incorporated in any peace-process by limiting fears of NATO enlargement and emphasising Russia’s importance in “shaping a co-operative European security system” (Hyde-Price, 2003: 9).

Germany’s twin-track diplomacy also involved a number of multilateral institutions such as the EU, OSCE, G-8 and the UN to name but a few. Germany’s new Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer soon came to realise that long-term stabilisation of the region could only be achieved through multilateral channels, something that the ‘Fischer Plan’ incorporated. This plan aimed at stabilising the region not merely by military means but also saw the importance of political and economic support for the countries in question (Die Bundesregierung, 2011: Paragraphs 1-6). The prospect of future membership in the EU and G-8 support were the major aspects of this plan, which would not exclude the initial Serbian aggressor. By supporting and, indeed participating, in the NATO campaign, Germany did not only prove its Bündnisfähigkeit, but also ensured that its diplomatic effort was supported by the credentials connected to being a fully accepted ally (Maull, 2000b: 72). When the KFOR contingent, to which Germany contributed considerably, did eventually enter Kosovo, it did so with the clearly set aims set by the ‘Fischer Plan’ and the consensus of the international community.

Although some scholars have argued that the Kosovo Crisis did mark a change in German foreign and security policy, this is not entirely the case. In order to see the relatively high degree of continuity in the German policy, even after a change of government, one needs to examine the three major motives that lay behind Germany’s actions. Having done that, it will
be possible to see that the discontinuity was not as severe as claimed by some commentators.

The first underlying motive was clearly Germany’s concern about the stability in south-eastern Europe closely linked with the continuing credibility of the established international organisations, such as the UN, EU and NATO. Germany, more than other countries depends on international institutions due to its close integration in them. As pointed out in Chapter 1, Germany traditionally depended on these institutions and their corrosion would deprive the Federal Republic of the basis of its foreign policy. It is therefore only logical that Germany would seek to get the institutions involved as deeply as possible to solve this conflict. It can therefore be argued that by supporting both NATO and EU solutions, Germany was in fact protecting its traditional means to conduct foreign policy and to assert influence within a wider Europe.

The second major factor is also connected to the notion of multilateralism. Considering the reliance on international institutions, Germany would not want to be perceived as an unreliable partner, which in turn would undermine its significance on the international stage. The issues of *Bündnistreue*, *Bündnisfähigkeit* and the doctrine of ‘never alone’ were of immense importance, especially to a newly elected left-wing government, which did not want to irritate its allies by adopting a perceived German ‘Sonderweg’ (special path).

Although these factors are important when trying to understand Germany’s policies during the Kosovo Crisis, they are not entirely sufficient. In the case of international institutions it is surprising that the *Bundeswehr*
participated in NATO air strikes against Belgrade (after all, the capital of a sovereign country) without a UN mandate. The lack of international permission is striking as it could have served as a precedent case for NATO (or other international actors) to act outside international law in the future, thus diminishing the UN’s influence. Furthermore, Berlin’s twin-track approach to the crisis was a delicate balancing act, which could have easily gone wrong. By assuming some independence from the United States (and from NATO), Germany became vulnerable to cynical criticism from its allies of pursuing a *Sonderweg* and not complying with NATO policies (Rudolf, 2000: 139).

The desire to demonstrate Germany’s *Bündnisfähigkeit* cannot explain the policies sufficiently either. Although Germany contributed to the NATO air campaign, it was not willing to participate in any ground invasion, thus causing doubts within the alliance about its true commitment. In addition, the ‘never alone’ doctrine can hardly explain the overall cross-party consensus in the Bundestag and in the German public more generally. One can, therefore, say that neither ‘peer pressure’ nor the reliance on functioning international institutions help sufficiently to understand German policies during the Kosovo Crisis (Maull, 2000a: 11-12).

The third major factor underlying motive therefore needs to contain elements that go beyond rational calculations. During the intense political debates about the Kosovo Crisis Germany’s special obligations resulting from its troubled past especially in the Balkans had been referred to by a
number of parliamentarians. The humanitarian aspect of the crisis was the factor, which, together with the previous ones, tipped the scales towards military action. As Maull points out, “the memories of Dachau and Auschwitz [...] against the background of ethnic cleansing and genocide in the former Yugoslavia pulled Germany towards a desire to help end the slaughter and the terror in the Balkans.” (Maull, 2000a: 12). This together with the need to enforce the rule of law in the region formed the basis of German interests and policy choices.

These three major factors ‘peer pressure’, functioning international institutions and a set of norms and beliefs were factors which could be described as ‘international interests’ rather than speaking of but also encompassing ‘German interests’. Each country in the international community would share these interests with varying priorities. Each member of an alliance would want to be part of a stable system and would also want to be perceived as a reliable partner. Although in the case of Germany the desire to stop ethnic cleansing is comparatively strong, it is hard to see other countries remaining indifferent to such an event. There are, however, two elements of the crisis, in which Germany had considerable interest.

The first element was the concern about the potential flow of refugees into Germany. Considering the amount of potential refugees with relatives in Germany, it would become their primary destination. However, Germany could not afford another influx of refugees as the system was already stretched by the need to accommodate refugees from other

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4 For a more detailed account of these debates, see chapter 4
theatres. The second concern for German policy makers was that Germany would risk self-isolation and loss of influence within the alliance would it not contribute to the NATO campaign. A loss of influence could not have been in the German interest considering that NATO would potentially play a big role in European security and stability (Maull, 2000a: 13).

German policy choices during the Kosovo Crisis were therefore defined by ‘peer pressure’, reliance on stable international institutions and a set of deeply held beliefs in combination with purely German interests to keep the number of refugees as small as possible and the maintenance of influence within NATO and the EU.

Peacekeeping in Afghanistan & “Operation Enduring Freedom”\(^5\)

Before September 11, 2001 it would be safe to say that nobody could have anticipated the events that were to shock the world. By making use of commercial airliners a terrorist group succeeded in attacking the United States of America. The targets hit were also very well chosen. The World Trade Center was the symbol of Western commercial might whereas the Pentagon is the centre of US military power. For the first time the West was confronted with a new kind of situation, one in which the aggression did not originate from a state but rather from an elusive and fanatical terrorist organisation, which made immediate retaliation impossible. Furthermore, America’s system of insulation, which ensured that any conflict took place well away from US soil, was shattered with very simple means (Hamilton, 2003: 2).

\(^5\) Similarly to the Kosovo Crisis, a more in-depth account of the mission in Afghanistan will be given in Chapter 5
Following the attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. the amount of solidarity towards the United States was felt deeply throughout most parts of the world. In Germany, in particular, the public showed its solidarity in large gatherings, a notion which was recognised and appreciated in the United States. This atmosphere was summarised by Chancellor Schröder when he offered “unlimited solidarity” and argued that this was not only an attack on the US, but also rather an attack on the “civilised world, an attack on us all” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001e: 18293).

With this statement Schröder expressed a view, which was also shared by NATO members, and especially Secretary General Lord Robertson, as the fact that Article 5 of the Washington Treaty was invoked for the first time in NATO’s history after an astonishingly short period of debate. This was clearly helped by NATO having included terrorist acts in the types of aggression, which could trigger Article 5 at the Washington Summit in 1999. In short, a terrorist act was now seen as a “threat to the alliance members’ territorial integrity and equated with an armed attack.” (Katzenstein, 2002: 7). The invocation of Article 5 also gave NATO a say in the US anti-terror fight.

Although one might think that having NATO’s unlimited support in the quickly advancing war on terrorism in Afghanistan would be welcomed by the US administration, Washington had clear reservations of including NATO fully in this campaign. Initially President Bush was merely interested in the sharing of intelligence and limited over-fly and basing rights. NATO resources were only used to free more US troops from their surveillance tasks by deploying NATO naval forces to the Mediterranean and sending
AWACS to cover US airspace (Haftendorn, 2002: 3). The US favoured its “floating coalitions” with the countries around Afghanistan.

The war in Afghanistan was therefore primarily a US operation with some British and German Special Forces involved. It was not until the task of securing Afghanistan became relevant that NATO, and with it Germany, could take on a more active role in the war against terrorism. It was NATO’s task to supply the military capacities for the operation “Enduring Freedom” which had UN backing and was intended to support America’s war on terrorism. The German government was keen on contributing to this operation heavily thus backing Chancellor Schröder’s claim that there would be an “irrevocable” change in Germany’s position on defending human rights, freedom and the restoration of stability and security (Schröder, 2002: 8). Although the Chancellor seemed to be determined to prove this claim, the Bundestag and, more importantly, a small group of Red-Green MPs opposed the deployment of 3,900 German troops to Kabul thus threatening the breakup of the coalition (Katzenstein, 2002: 6). Schröder linked the question of deployment to a vote of no confidence, which he very narrowly won. Considering the rarity of such votes in Germany it can be said that Schröder was indeed very highly committed to contributing to “Enduring Freedom” and willing to punch the decision through regardless of the costs.

Germany’s behaviour in this first phase of the war on terrorism can be explained through a number of considerations. The first one would be that Germans have always seen the US as the nation that helped Germany regain its status in the world after 1945. It is therefore only logical that Germany wanted to repay its moral dept. Although this was surely one
argument it is by far not the most important one. The second consideration has much more weight. Having contributed to the NATO campaign over Kosovo and to KFOR earlier Germany had shed the notion of using military force in order to defend the state at home once and for all. Germans had come to terms with the idea that threats sometimes had to be tackled abroad. Not contributing to the anti-terror campaign would have caused bewilderment, to say the least, in several capitals. Germany is, after all, also in danger of being the target of a terrorist attack.

Another important consideration is also the fact that the attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. had been planned in Hamburg. Germany’s liberal legislation on immigration allowed the terrorists to easily misuse Germany as a planning platform not only for the 9/11 attacks but also for others. In the words of Klaus Jansen, Germany is a “Ruheraum” (place of rest) for terrorists (Katzenstein, 2002: 11). It is therefore safe to say that the government wanted to be seen to do everything possible to rectify the situation, a move that is mirrored domestically by the passing of the two counter-terrorism laws.

‘Between Iraq and a Hard Place’

As already discussed in above, Germany has apparently become more accustomed to the idea of using force in order to tackle instabilities, which might in the future turn into clear threats for Germany and/or Europe. German involvement in the Balkans and, since late 2001, in Afghanistan seemed to suggest that Germany was indeed preparing to leave its troubled past behind and begin to play an active role in Europe’s security. Yet, by

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6 Title of a 2003 programme for Channel 4 by impressionist Rory Bremner and the comedians John Bird and John Fortune portraying the West’s involvement with Iraq from the 1920s to the US invasion of 2003
the summer of 2002 it appeared that Germany would again assume its more traditional role of a passive bystander as others prepared to maintain European and Western security. Whereas the United States and Great Britain were convinced that Saddam Hussein’s regime threatened the West especially with its weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and its links to Osama Bin Laden’s terrorist network Al-Qaeda, Germany, among others, did not come to the same conclusion. The following diplomatic row over the disarmament of Iraq would soon result in a deep division of the United Nations, NATO and the EU, testing the transatlantic relationship to its very limits.

In opposing the forceful disarmament of Iraq the German Government took on a position popular with European public opinion, but highly unpopular with a number of allied governments, most notably those of the United States and Britain. The question of why Germany established its position the way it did will help to understand whether or not the German Government left the path it had followed during the crises in the Balkans and Afghanistan and was now pursuing a new “Sonderweg”, or if the criteria developed during those conflicts simply did not allow for a military intervention in the case of Iraq.

*Straining the Transatlantic Relationship*

Following the relatively quick dismantling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the subsequent establishment of ISAF marked the end of the first phase of the U.S. lead war on terrorism. Yet, whereas considerable unity among Western democracies could be observed in the case of the
The reform of the Bundeswehr in context of a normalised German foreign and security policy

Taliban, the second phase proved to be much more controversial. By early 2002 U.S. President George W. Bush identified his “axis of evil” in his State of the Union address, thus marking Iraq, Iran and North Korea as likely targets in the war on terrorism (Bush, 2002: 1). Although Iraq had been within America’s sights for some time, this was one of the clearest signs that the U.S. would no longer allow Saddam Hussein’s regime to continue their reign and harbouring international terrorists, posing a danger to the West. This bellicose rhetoric from Washington sat uncomfortably with some European governments, especially those of France and Germany, who would form the core of the war opposition. Though nobody doubted the inhumane nature of the Iraqi leadership, a pre-emptive military strike on a sovereign nation, as clearly favoured by the U.S. Administration was considered counterproductive. The forceful disarmament of Iraq would result in consequences, which the German government was unwilling to contribute to.

It was primarily argued that a war in the Middle East might result in an “uncontrollable escalation and mass casualties, as well as further estrangement between the Arab world and the West”. In the case of Iraq, there was an additional risk in invading it as “a cornered Iraqi dictator was unlikely to display any restraint in using hid chemical and biological weapons and would almost certainly strike out against Israel, attempting to turn the conflict into a war between the West and the Muslim world” (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2003: 100).

In addition to these concerns, a more substantial difference between the two camps began to show. While the United States saw the Iraq
question as a vital element in the war on terrorism due to its arsenal of WMDs, which could end up in the hands of terrorist networks given the links between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda the Bush Administration claimed existed, the war opposition did not follow this train of thought. In fact, it was widely argued that the war on terrorism would be at best side-tracked by an invasion of Iraq, at worst causing the feared escalation mentioned above, making it even harder to tackle terrorism effectively. From the European point of view terrorism cannot be halted by military means alone, although the case of Afghanistan seems to suggest just that. Yet, the defeat of the Taliban regime was merely the first aspect of the war, the second being the nation-building exercise undertaken by ISAF, attempting to establish a society, which could no longer be exploited by terrorist networks. Generally, Europeans focus their efforts at ridding terrorism of its roots whereas it appears that the United States concentrate on the present danger at hand, dealing with it as quickly as possible and leaving the long process of engaging the social and economic causes of terrorism for later. President Bush brought this clearly to the point stating that the United States would take decisive actions against states, which either harbour terrorist groups or allow them to plan attacks (May & Lingel, 2002: 3).

By the middle of 2002 the German government found itself in a difficult position. Although Chancellor Schröder had proclaimed his unconditional support for the United States shortly after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, little of this could be found in his rhetoric a few months later. His premature statement that the Federal Republic would not participate in a war against Iraq, even if a UN mandate could be
obtained, caused a serious deterioration of the U.S.-German relations in effect cancelling out any influence Germany might have had on the U.S. decision-making process (Katzenstein, 2002: 2). Believing that holding the chair of the UN Security Council at the time could be used to alter the U.S. approach, Schröder’s government continued to advocate a peaceful solution to the crisis by the continuation of the containment policy, which had been in place ever since the end of the 1991 Gulf War, and a re-implementation of weapons inspections carried out by the UN. A war against Iraq could only be legitimised, if WMDs could be found and if the Iraqi leadership refused to destroy them voluntarily. Without such evidence the regime’s alleged collaboration with terrorist networks or its involvement in the 9/11 attacks would by far not suffice for an invasion of a sovereign nation (Hamilton, 2003: 8).

Considering these two very different approaches it is hardly surprising that transatlantic relations were going through extremely difficult times. The prevailing rhetoric on both sides of the Atlantic did not help to defuse the situation. Schröder’s openly anti-American statements, branding the United States a nation of unilateralists who do not understand the dangers, which their approach could cause for the international community, only helped to further isolate the Federal Republic from the United States. As a consequence, the Bush Administration did nothing on their part to lessen the tensions between Washington and Berlin. Most controversially U.S. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld first split the European continent into the “Old Europe” and the “New Europe”, the former consisting of the war opposition (e.g. Germany, France, Belgium and Russia), while
the latter, according to Rumsfeld, is mainly made up of former Eastern bloc countries, which tended to support Washington’s Iraq policy, thus implying that U.S. relations would in future concentrate on the “New Europe” and neglect traditional partners. Following this announcement, Rumsfeld continued to place Germany on the same level as Cuba and Libya, two countries, which had been at odds with America for some time. According to Rumsfeld, only these three countries would in no way support the United States, including the re-structuring of Iraq after the change of regime (Spiegel Online, 2003a: 1).

The apparent lack of “Old European” co-operation was most clearly shown in the row of NATO protection for Turkey. Emphasising Turkey’s neighbouring position to Iraq, Washington and Ankara both called for NATO to officially prepare planning for possible defence from Iraqi aggression. Germany, France and Belgium on the other hand argued that such a move would only leave Baghdad to assume that a war was inevitable thus making a peaceful solution of the crisis impossible. The veto of the three nations directly contributed to a further deterioration of the transatlantic relationship, splitting NATO into two camps and causing debates about the future of the Alliance (Spiegel Online, 2003b: 1).

It has to be said, however, that Schröder’s policy was by no means supported by all of Germany’s political elites. After having had taken a similar line to that of Schröder’s SPD/Greens Coalition during the election campaign the Bundestag opposition spoke of a reckless policy undermining the German-American partnership, which had worked considerably well for over fifty years. Most notably, Angela Merkel’s article in the Washington
Post making it absolutely clear that Schröder was not speaking for all Germans. The CDU’s party leader argues that although the use of force should remain the ultimate means of dealing with dictators, it should never be ruled out prematurely. Doing otherwise, as Schröder had done, would weaken the pressure, which is needed for successfully enforcing the will of the international community on the Iraqi regime (Merkel, 2003: 1). Although German newspapers featured regular criticism of Schröder’s Iraq policy by the opposition, Angela Merkel’s article represents a rare phenomenon in German politics. Internal differences are normally dealt with in parliament and within Germany, no matter how much the Opposition disagrees with the Government. The article in the Washington Post did therefore not only cause a domestic stir due to its contents, but also because it broke with a taboo in German politics. This, however, shows the discontent of Germany’s opposition with Schröder’s course, which jeopardised the transatlantic relationship.

Continuing its opposition to an invasion of Iraq, the German government along its like-minded allies France and Russia was unable to dissuade the United States and the “Coalition of the Willing” to pursue their Iraq policy. Dismissing the military build-up in Kuwait, Saddam Hussein persisted to co-operate with the UN weapons inspectors thus missing his chance to disarm peacefully. When “Operation Iraqi Freedom” was launched in March 2003, the German government’s failure was all too clear. Considering the tensions that were created over Iraq the question of why the German Government acted the way it did comes to mind. Straining the transatlantic relations to such an extent can hardly be in Germany’s
interest, yet Chancellor Schröder seemed to think that the Federal Republic could not contribute to the war effort, though he must have been aware of the tensions his refusal to do so would cause. Other factors than purely maintaining good relations with the last superpower must therefore have entered his equation to follow a German “Sonderweg” from unconditional solidarity to open anti-Americanism.

**Violating the German Way?**

At first glance it may appear that the German policy during the Iraq Crisis had abandoned the path of actively contributing to European security, which Germans had become accustomed to during the 1990s. By rejecting military operations against Iraq Schröder positioned Germany very early on, even prematurely, in a way that made future policy adjustments almost impossible. Schröder’s position was certainly supported by the fact that a number of other European governments shared his beliefs, thus enabling him to discard allegations that he was isolating Germany in the international community. Whether Germany was indeed isolated or not is debatable, yet it is obvious that Schröder’s policy contributed to the deterioration of a much-valued relationship.

It has been argued that Schröder’s sudden move from unconditional solidarity with the American people to open rejection of military operations against Iraq within only a few months was primarily caused by the uncomfortable fact that his party had lost considerable ground to the CDU/CSU, which is especially crucial if there is a federal election coming up. Although the government’s crisis management during the summer
flooding, which effected parts of Central Europe and Eastern Germany, helped to limit the damage, polls indicated that Schröder would probably not gain a second term in office. Tapping into German concerns about the bellicose US line, Schröder’s election campaign was characterised by anti-American statements, promising that an SPD-led German government would attempt to restrain America’s “military adventurism” (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2003: 100). From a domestic point of view this strategy was successful as it ensured that the Red-Green Coalition remained in power defeating the CDU/CSU by securing votes that would have been lost to the only true anti-war party in Germany, the PDS. Although Schröder’s simplistic tactics secured him and his party another term in office, it left him vulnerable to allegations claiming that he had sacrificed Germany’s standing and influence in the international community for his personal ambitions. Yet, it is exactly these allegations that imply that Germany has not returned to the almost unconditional pacifism of the early 1990s, but rather that the German electorate was concerned about other issues related to the Iraq question.

As discussed earlier, the 1990s have seen a gradual change in German security policy away from pure national defence of German and NATO territory to taking on responsibilities in the wider spectrum of peacekeeping and most recently peace enforcing. It has also been shown that German contribution to such operations has always been subject to a number of criteria, ensuring that Germany could never again be accused of repeating its troubled history. Germany’s past contributions can all be explained by a certain amount of external pressure to get involved, moral
obligations to aid in stabilising a region and/or ending ethnic cleansing combined with the national interest of minimising the risk of refugees straining the German welfare system. Germany would also only contribute to an international effort by the UN or NATO, emphasising the need for multilateralism, thus ensuring that Germany would never take actions unilaterally again.

Taking the allegations put forward against Schröder after his narrow electoral victory into account it appears that by 2003 Germans have come to terms with the notion that force needs at times be deployed as the last resort to solve a problem. Yet in the case of Iraq it seems that Germans were reluctant to accept that the use of force was indeed justifiable considering that only one of the criteria outlined above, that of moral obligations, was met. It could be argued that Germany had an obligation of going against Saddam Hussein’s villainous regime in the same way it had contributed to tackling the regime of Milosevic in the Balkans. However, an unscrupulous dictator would not be sufficient for the justification of German contribution to a war against Iraq. With France and Russia Schröder was in the company of two relatively powerful and influential nations in the UN Security Council, which in turn limited the pressure of having to donate to the war effort. Most importantly the United States and their allies could not prove that Germany’s interests, most notably that of national security, were endangered by the Iraqi regime. In spite of the United States’ certainty that Iraq had developed WMDs and links to terrorist networks, thus arguably representing a threat to Germany, Schröder was unwilling to contribute to military actions, as the evidence offered by the U.S. Administration was
unconvincing at best. He argued that it would have to be the UN’s task to
determine the existence of WMDs in Iraq through the means of the
weapons inspectors and if the Iraqi regime was co-operating in the process,
thus following the UN Resolution 1441. Although this resolution demanded
that Iraq was to co-operate fully with the weapons inspectors or face
serious consequences, this did not automatically imply military actions. In
his five points on Iraq Schröder clearly states that the UN Security Council
could be the only authority to legitimise military operations against Iraq
(BMVg, 2003a: 1).

This declaration brings to the point the last concern many Germans
had during the Iraq crisis. International organisations, such as the UN,
appeared to be pushed aside by the United States, robbing Germany of its
traditional platform for formulating foreign and security policy. During the
Iraq crisis the United States continued the trend, which had already been
observed during the conflict in Afghanistan. Although NATO had evoked
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty shortly after 9/11, the Alliance did not
play a significant role in the Afghanistan campaign. Instead of making use
of their traditional allies, the Bush Administration preferred to rely on ad-hoc
alliances or “floating coalitions” in the region primarily for basing rights and
the establishment of staging grounds (Haftendorn, 2002: 3). Most
importantly, Washington declined almost any help from NATO, effectively
labelling this conflict the “don’t-call-us-we’ll-call-you-war” (Hamilton, 2003:
9). It has become clear that the Atlantic Alliance has lost credibility in
Washington due to the immense difference in military capabilities within
NATO. Whereas the U.S. is able to tackle a conflict on their own, this
cannot be said about Europe, as the crises in the Balkans have shown vividly. Though this reality is not new, it appears that Washington grows increasingly impatient with its European allies lacking sufficient military capabilities, believing that they are more hindrance than help, becoming an optional factor in U.S. strategy rather than a necessity. Neo-conservative elements are already talking about letting the Europeans “hold their coats, but not tie their hands” highlighting that multilateralism slows the United States down in following their national interest (May and Lingel, 2002: 9).

This trend has now clearly been extended to the United Nations, as continued discussions in the Security Council mean further political obstacles in the strategy of the last remaining superpower. For a country, such as Germany, which has rather successfully adopted a tradition of negotiations and dialogue, the apparent undermining of one of its major platforms must seem a daunting vision of losing influence in the international community. Although it may be tempting to place the entire blame for the troubles in the UN Security Council on Washington’s doorstep, the German government has to accept its fair share of the guilt. Neglecting the tradition of dialogue, Schröder apparently preferred to directly confront the U.S. Administration making negotiations extremely difficult for both sides. A more diplomatic approach to the American approach might have solved the problem without jeopardising the transatlantic relationship. Rather than relying on a few likeminded European governments for backing, Schröder could have attempted to work for a common European stance, thus collectively gaining more weight vis-à-vis the Bush Administration. Germany’s anti-war position could have easily
been explained with reference to Article 26 of the Grundgesetz, which clearly states that Germany may not contribute to a war of aggression, which an invasion of Iraq would be without convincing proof of WMDs and/or link to terrorist networks. Yet, “President Bush’s approach to the Iraq question made tempting and easy for Chancellor Schröder to evade Germany’s responsibilities” (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2003: 111). It is indeed telling that upon his first visit to Germany after the end of “Operation Iraqi Freedom” Colin Powell remarked that the serious row between Washington and Berlin were not only due to the different position the Germany had taken. Powell was surprised and disappointed at the way that the German government had done everything to work against the United States (Die Welt Online, 2003: 1). This had made a critical dialogue impossible robbing Germany of one of its most successful tools in international politics.

In addition to that, Germany appeared to have taken on an irritating character from the allied point of view. Considering how important a good working relationship with the other members of the Atlantic Alliance has consistently been for German decision, Schröder’s position during the Iraq Crisis gains another dimension. It appears that Schröder was prepared to jeopardise Germany’s Bündnistäfihigkeit, causing concern as to how reliable Germany would be in the future. This clearly represents a departure from the traditional German desire to be perceived as a highly reliable partner within NATO, a desire, which used to be of utmost importance to other German decision makers in the past, including Chancellor Schröder himself, as the Kosovo Crisis has unmistakably shown.
Summary

Over the 1990s Germany’s involvement in multilateral peace-making missions grew steadily, as did the complexity of the missions. One can see that the decisions to send German troops in harm’s way were never taken easily, yet both the Kohl and the Schröder governments followed this trend. However, German involvement intensified due to two major factors. First, internal convictions pushed German decision makers into action. A morally felt obligation to stop conflicts in former Yugoslavia surpassed doubts about sending German soldiers into an area which has had very bad experience with their counterparts during WWII. The desire to secure Europe’s periphery, and with that Europe itself including Germany, also was a strong motivation, as was the fear of waves of refugees pouring into Germany and straining the social system. In the case of Afghanistan, it has been argued that Germany’s security threatened by a terrorist network that was provably supported by the Taliban.

External pressure from Germany’s allies to contribute to the military campaigns helped the proponents of military action considerably. Both the EU and NATO repeatedly called for greater German intervention, using Germany’s Bündnistreue to draw in more German commitment. They also provided the multilateral framework in which Germany could more easily accommodate its own interests without appearing to embark on a new German Sonderweg. It is interesting to note that in the case of Iraq, Bündnistreue was not enough to persuade Germany to contribute to the invasion. This clearly shows, that commitment to the alliance needs be
accompanied by the conviction of “doing the right thing” before Germany contributes to military interventions.

The cases of Yugoslavia, Kosovo and Afghanistan show the rationale behind the German behaviour in those three cases. It is interesting to note that the considerations in each case are not all that dissimilar. In all three cases the external pressure on Germany from the international community to act was considerable. The nature of this pressure, however, changed slightly over the 1990s. In the Yugoslavia Crisis Germany confronted explicit pressure from abroad to get involved, whereas during Kosovo the explicitness lessened somewhat. Then the pressure was more applied from within by the desire to be seen as a reliable ally. *Bündnisfähigkeit* was also a very important factor during the Afghanistan campaign.

The second factor is less tangible. All three cases were approached with the notion that Germany had some moral obligation to get involved. On the Balkans, Germany was confronted with the dilemma of wanting to stop the aggressions and atrocities and at the same time having reservations about sending German troops into a region, which had already experienced German intervention. The moral obligation to put an end to the aggression was in the end stronger, thus giving another reason for German intervention in peace-keeping. Afghanistan, in contrast, was a conflict in which German troops would be used to pacify a nation outside Europe and in which the debates were conducted without any reference to World War II. The aim, however, was again to end instability which could be used by terrorists to
launch attacks on the West and to promote the liberal democratic values so important to Germany.

The final consideration for Germany to get involved in those theatres is national interests. On the Balkans, German interests were endangered due to the flow of refugees, which would have easily reached Germany had the international community not intervened. Afghanistan and its Taliban regime posed a threat to Germany due to the terrorist training grounds and the overall connection to terrorist networks. It is safe to say that the US is not the only target for terrorists and therefore Germany has an obligation to fight terrorism for its own safety.

The differences over the Iraq question caused a serious deterioration of the transatlantic relations. President Bush’s “axis of evil” set the U.S. agenda in the continuation of the war on terrorism, clearly marking Iraq, Iran and North Korea as very likely targets for American attention. The bellicose rhetoric coming from Washington caused considerable concern among the European population, which was especially crucial in Germany. Tapping into traditional German fears of instability and conflict, Chancellor Schröder managed to win a narrow victory in the federal elections. Although Schröder’s election strategy has been widely criticised for selling out German international influence for personal ambitions, the success implies that Germans indeed feared the U.S. approach to Iraq.

Over the 1990s Germany has gradually extended its contribution to peace-keeping and peace-enforcing efforts in a number of theatres. Yet, it has always done so under the preconditions of some international pressure, of the assumption that Germans had moral obligations to interfere with
ethnic cleansing or similar atrocities and of defending German interests. The case of Iraq only fulfilled one of these preconditions, that of the moral obligation to change a dictatorial regime, a precondition, which can be employed in several countries. International pressure was at a minimum as influential nations, such as France and Russia, shared Germany’s policy. Finally, the United States and their allies were unable to prove that Germany’s security was endangered by Saddam Hussein’s WMDs and/or links to terrorist networks thus failing to bring national interests into the equation. The most important factor, however, was that the United States grew increasingly impatient with their European allies perceiving them no longer as help but rather as hindrance allowing for allegations of unilateralism to surface. American unilateralism undermining international institutions would have meant a German loss of influence in the international community as Germany has traditionally utilised multilateral organisations for pursuing its foreign and security policy. Considering that almost none of the preconditions that justified German contributions to conflict management in the past were met during the Iraq crisis it shows that it does not represent an exception from the rule.

However, the diplomacy of the Iraq crisis does represent an exception as the German Government left the path of critical dialogue and negotiations and resolved to simple anti-Americanism. Chancellor Schröder made almost no effort to utilise means to gather diplomatic support from the EU. A common EU position in this particular crisis could have helped to limit the damage in the transatlantic relations. By not employing this means Schröder failed his own agenda as not all means were used to solve this
conflict peacefully. It was not Germany’s actual position that was surprising, as has been shown above. The surprising element in Germany’s policy was the lack of dialogue, which has always been an essential part in German foreign policy. This, combined with the endangering of Germany’s Bündnisfähigkeit, which has always played a vital part in German security policy, especially during the engagements in the Balkans and Afghanistan, represents a worrying departure from the traditional path. Although this policy was successful in helping Schröder securing a second term in office, its continuation fuelled by both Schröder’s need to act on his election promises and the U.S. Administration’s reluctance to co-operate more closely with other states resulted in the deterioration of the transatlantic relationship. Although both nations have by now undergone a change in government – Angela Merkel succeeded Gerhard Schröder and Barack Obama is the new man in the White House – the relationship remains strained. This is mainly accredited to the fact that Obama is much more supportive to the idea of multilateralism than his predecessor, which in turn represents a problem for Germany to live up to the growing multilateral expectations, thus posing a different problem for the German government.

As has been shown, Germany has become a more active player over the last twenty years, meaning that Germany would have to reform its armed forces to make them more compatible with the new challenges as well as being able to support Germany’s more active foreign policy in the case that diplomacy should fail. The crises discussed here clearly showed that if Germany wanted to play the role of a major European power that entailed contributing to European security in more ways than diplomatic
efforts and financial donations. The importance of *Bündnistreue* and *Bündnisfähigkeit*, i.e. the importance of being regarded as a good and reliable ally, demanded more military contributions and a move away from cheque-book-diplomacy.

Although Germany had rather readily contributed to IFOR, KFOR and later ISAF, in the case of the US led invasion of Iraq, Germany did not follow suit. This episode demonstrated the need for the Schröder Government to be able to clearly justify the need for intervention to the electorate, which was the case both in former Yugoslavia and in Afghanistan. This episode also demonstrated Schröder’s increased self-confidence to openly criticise the US administration, something previous German governments would not have done in such an aggressive manner. Although previous German governments had their disagreements with the USA, the level of antagonism the Schröder Government helped to create was unprecedented. Germany therefore not only managed to get accustomed to the idea of having to contribute its armed forces to peace-enforcing missions, the German government in particular felt confident enough to challenge one of its most important partner.

With this new confidence the traditional purely defensive purpose of the *Bundeswehr* during the Cold War was no longer compatible and was therefore in need of substantial reform. The following chapter will discuss the extent of these reforms, thus showing that great effort has been put into the reforms in order to satisfy the multilateral expectations but also showing the shortcomings of the reform efforts. It will show the core of this thesis’s
hypothesis of ineffective reform due to the lack of a clear cut definition of purpose for the *Bundeswehr*.
Chapter 3: Reforming the Bundeswehr

“The unified and sovereign Germany must live up to its increased international responsibility if we want to make use of this opportunity to shape peaceful relations. […] After 40 years a culture of constraints has developed in the Federal Republic which has defined the rationale, the feelings and the instincts of the people profoundly. […] The process of getting used to this bigger international responsibility will have to be an organic process, which will take time to complete” – Volker Rühe (Rühe, 1993: 24-29)

The summary of German foreign policy decisions since 1990 given in chapter 2 demonstrates that since unification Germany has indeed stepped up its contribution to multilateral military operations as part of a generally more assertive foreign policy. However, in order to be able to contribute at all the Bundeswehr had to be made compatible with allied militaries and thus the shift to a more pro-active foreign policy inevitably affected the underlying purpose of Germany’s armed forces as well in as much as having to be able to fulfil an ever growing catalogue of tasks other than the traditional homeland defence. This chapter will therefore discuss the actual structural reform of the Bundeswehr with the purpose to highlight the extent to which the armed forces have changed in the last twenty years.

In order to be able to fulfil its Bündnistreue in the post-Cold War environment and to actively engage in multilateral military operations, one needs armed forces that can perform numerous tasks, ranging from intervention to humanitarian relief. As Chapter 2 already briefly mentioned, German foreign and security policy has been under scrutiny ever since the

7 „Das vereinte und souveräne Deutschland muß seiner gewachsenen außenpolitischen Verantwortung gerecht werden, wenn wir die Chance zur Friedensgestaltung nutzen wollen. […] In der Bundesrepublik ist jedoch nach 40 Jahren eine Kultur der Zurückhaltung entstanden, die das Denken, Fühlen und die Instinkte der Menschen tief geprägt hat. […] Das Hineinwachsen in eine größere internationale Verantwortung des wiedervereinten Deutschlands muß ein organischer Prozeß sein, der Zeit braucht”. – Volker Rühe
collapse of the bi-polar system during the years 1989/90 and with this the reform of the Bundeswehr was a constant feature on the agenda. The following years saw a considerable shift in the primary tasks of the Bundeswehr towards an army, capable of conducting peace-keeping and peace-enforcing missions outside the traditional NATO territory.

In order to be able to discuss the extent of the reform one needs to familiarise oneself with the Bundeswehr of old, i.e. the Bundeswehr aimed at defending West Germany from a Eastern Bloc aggression. This chapter will therefore start with analysing the old underlying organisational structure of the armed forces since this will make it possible to determine the capabilities the Bundeswehr possessed during the Cold War. By continuing with the analysis of the current structure the scope of change can be more easily ascertain. It will be shown that the Bundeswehr has undergone considerable change to be a more flexible and more easily deployable force by having endured the numerous reforms.

However interesting it would be, this chapter will not discuss the prelude of the creation of German armed forces merely ten years after the close of World War II in much detail, since this would imply entering fields as diverse as the Korean War, the Franco-German relationship and the political tensions throughout Europe during the early 1950s.

**The Bundeswehr during the Cold War**

The process of re-arming West Germany shortly after the end of WWII must be seen in the context of an increasingly difficult relationship between East and West and the beginning of the Cold War fuelled by the outbreak of the Korean War. This forced the US and its allies (mainly the
UK) to transfer troops from Europe to Korea leaving Western Europe vulnerable to Soviet expansionism. Additionally, the German government under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer saw the opportunity to further their policy of *Westintegration*. Re-arming Germany therefore served several purposes. Firstly, the re-armed German state would add to NATO’s military capabilities, thus contributing to the security of Western Europe in general and West Germany in particular through NATO’s system of collective security. Secondly, the new German armed forces would be under NATO control, thus limiting the threat of German militarism in the future. Thirdly, it granted additional sovereignty to the still young Federal Republic (Thoß, 2007: 13).

Although there were considerable advantages in re-arming Germany there was still much scepticism towards the German military, both abroad and at home. To counter this scepticism the new armed forces had to be very different from previous German armed forces like the *Reichswehr* and the *Wehrmacht*. The planning process for the new armed forces was therefore lengthy as compromises had to be found on numerous subjects. The Bundeswehr needed the military expertise of experienced officers to be as effective as possible, yet a large part of the old officers’ corps could hardly be described a supporters of democracy. The new armed forces should therefore be under strict parliamentary control to ensure the military’s loyalty towards the new democracy and the values it represents (Kutz, 2007: 76).

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8 *Reichswehr* and the *Wehrmacht* were the names given to the German military during the Wilhelminian Empire and WWII respectively.
This close scrutiny was imbedded within the new German constitution – the *Grundgesetz* – in order to ensure it would be at the core of any defence policy in the years to follow. Article 115 of the *Grundgesetz* outlines this very specifically, detailing that only the Bundestag can deploy the Bundeswehr under very specific circumstances (Parlamentarischer Rat, 2002: Article 115). This in conjunction with the Parliamentary ombudsman for the Bundeswehr and the usual financial oversight places the German armed forces under more scrutiny than its other counterparts.

With this compromise the German government managed to defuse the debate as this would provide the necessary expertise while at the same time preventing a return to German militarism. On 12th November 1955 the first 101 soldiers were sworn in to form the basis of the newly founded *Bundeswehr*. Although the first units as such were not commissioned for another two months the actual date provided the perfect symbolic background to the occasion, since it was the 200th birthday of Gerhard von Scharnhorst, the Prussian military reformer who rebuilt the Prussian army after the debacle of the Napoleonic Wars and whose principles of responsibility of the citizen within the state – and more importantly the military – were to form the foundation of the *Bundeswehr’s* creed (Feldmayer, 2005: 70).

With the commissioning of the first units the *Bundeswehr* needed its organisational structure as does any larger organisation. When talking about the German armed forces one needs emphasise one thing. The *Bundeswehr* did not have its own command structure but was completely integrated into NATO’s command hierarchy. This was a considerable yet
deliberate limitation to the Bundeswehr since it did not have the capabilities to plan operation on its own, but rather relied on plans made elsewhere. This had two major effects. First, the German armed forces have always been dependent on international co-operation regarding planning and conducting operations, which also limited the political decision makers in Bonn, thus setting in stone the now traditional multi-lateral approach in international politics. Second, key posts within the organisational structures of the German armed forces were filled with Anglo-American personnel thus strengthening NATO’s control over this new German army (Bald, 2005: 41).

The role of the Bundeswehr within the Atlantic Alliance was clear, i.e. to deter an attack by the Warsaw Pact with conventional means. In order to fulfil this major task a number of assumptions had to be considered when setting up the new armed forces. First and foremost was West Germany’s exposed geographical location vis-à-vis the Soviet area of influence. Combining this with the relatively small width of the West Germany and the close proximity of major cities to the German – German border resulted in the adaptation of Vorneverteidigung (forward defence) since the armed forces would not have much space to retreat to. To be successful with this strategy the Bundeswehr needed to be deployed broadly and en masse, with a high level of readiness. Some units, those stationed farther away from the border, could afford to lower their states of readiness, however they, too, had to be combat ready within short notice (Bundesminister der Verteidigung - Führungsstab der Streitkräfte, 1974: 8-9). Now that the basic Bundeswehr strategy during the Cold War has been set out, it is now
possible to analyse the means with which this strategy was meant to be supported, which leads directly to the underlying organisational structure.

As already pointed out, the Bundeswehr was deployed widely in order to deter a conventional attack all along the West German border. This however meant that the armed forces needed more personnel than it would with a concentrated deployment. To maintain a consistently high number of troops there was no alternative to the practice of conscription. A purely voluntary force would most likely be better trained and more experienced, however it would be highly unlikely that West Germany could come up with enough volunteers, even taking into account that the overall number necessary would be smaller, due to their higher professionalism. Furthermore, a volunteer would be more costly, which would leave fewer resources for modern equipment (Bundesminister der Verteidigung - Führungsstab der Streitkräfte, 1974: 3-4).

Conscription had one additional major advantage. It allowed for a relatively fast reinforcement of active units with citizens who had already completed their national service. It was planned that during uncertain times they would be called up again, possibly re-trained and then be capable to perform alongside their active counterparts.

The practice of ‘cadred’ units was widely used in units with, either equipment which could be easily stored and maintained, or charged with tasks which did not need intense training. The case of as light infantry battalion shall serve as an example here.
This battalion featured some 550 posts of which only 200 were occupied constantly. These 200 posts formed the cadre of the battalion and was responsible maintaining the equipment (mostly small arms) and conducting the basic training for new recruits. This practice was also applied to units whose primary tasks did not include combat operations such as logistic and transport battalions.

Other units could not be organised in this way since intensive training and/or complicated equipment did not allow for it. A tank battalion shows this perfectly since tanks are complicated to operate (at least more complicated than lorries or rifles) the crews need to be trained thoroughly. The same applies to the maintenance crews. The structure of a tank battalion reflects this; however, certain posts are, again, not occupied permanently. Their tasks can be summarised as being in the field of combat support (signalling personnel and medics) and logistics (drivers), therefore the aspect of difficult training does not apply; hence they are not part of the cadre.
Although a small part of the tank battalion is not permanently on site, it is not considered a cadred unit. The practice of cadred units enabled the Bundeswehr to maintain a large number of modern weapon systems and to man them with reservists should the need arise, thus reducing the personnel costs considerably (Bundesminister der Verteidigung - Führungsstab der Streitkräfte, 1974: 12).

The drawback of this system was that in order to uphold the general readiness of the armed forces the reservists needed to be called up on a regular basis for up to 14 days to keep them trained. Although this process concentrated on former conscripts who had finished their national service only 12 months earlier, it nevertheless represented a massive intrusion into the civilian lives of (young) men, since the Bundeswehr's call could come at any time. Since this procedure was not defined as part of a mobilising process it was considered a legitimate burden comparable to interrupting a holiday because of problems at the civilian workplace (Bundesminister der Verteidigung - Führungsstab der Streitkräfte, 1974: 12). From a strategic
point of view, however, this was the only way to ensure that the total number of troops the *Bundeswehr* could bring up to fulfil its tasks could be maintained at 1.2 million (Bundesminister der Verteidigung - Führungsstab der Streitkräfte, 1974: 14).

Now that the underling strategy of the *Bundeswehr* as a whole during the Cold War has been introduced one needs to analyse the structures of the individual branches of the armed forces, i.e. the army, navy and air force. Although the primary task of deterrence was common to all, they did have separate tasks which also defined the way they were structured and dictated the equipment they used.

*The Army*

The Army was in charge of conducting the forward territorial defence (*Vorneverteidigung*) of West Germany in conjunction with the allies. Whereas combat operations were a major part of this, the army was also responsible for maintaining operational freedom of NATO forces within West Germany; i.e. supporting the allies with equipment maintenance and supply (Bundesminister der Verteidigung - Führungsstab der Streitkräfte, 1974: 19).

Much like the whole of the *Bundeswehr*, the Army needed to be deployed widely and en masse in order to force a possible aggressor to undertake intensive preparations for the attack. This in turn would leave ample time for West Germans to mobilise their defensive forces and complete their preparations.
Once the conflict has started, the Army had to be able to defend against superior, mostly armoured forces. In order to do so, great emphasis was placed on armoured combat troops and forward reconnaissance as well as protection of weapon systems against low-flying aircrafts.

The Army as such was headed by the Army Office (Führungsstab des Heeres) which managed the two territorial commands (Territorialkommandos), three general commands (Generalkommandos) and the Command Hamburg / Schleswig-Holstein. Their primary task involved co-operating with the governments of the Länder in issues regarding defence, since the Länder would have been responsible in areas such as supporting the mobilisation or the evacuation of civilians. The commanding officers of the territorial commands and the Command Hamburg / Schleswig-Holstein were direct subordinates of NATO commanders and were mainly charged with logistical support of NATO troops (Bundesminister der Verteidigung - Führungsstab der Streitkräfte, 1974: 19-20).

The four commands managed eleven divisions, which in turn were made up of 36 brigades (16 tank brigades, 17 infantry brigades and 3 paratrooper brigades). All in all these brigades featured 82 tank battalions with some 2,700 tanks, 50 infantry battalions with 1,800 armoured personnel carriers and 33 artillery battalions with 594 self-propelled howitzers and more than 3,000 anti-tank missile systems (Bundesminister der Verteidigung - Führungsstab der Streitkräfte, 1974: 20-30).

These forces were to be supported by the individual homeland defence commands which were integrated within each general command.
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Their primary task was to secure the area behind the actual combat troops and to counteract any enemy activity in the guise of paratrooper or naval/marine operations. These troops would remain under national command since they would not be part of the actual defensive operations (Bundesminister der Verteidigung - Führungsstab der Streitkräfte, 1974: 29). The emphasis on anti-tank abilities combined with strong armoured forces clearly shows how important the strategy of conventional deterrence was to West Germans. As shown above the battalions with complicated equipment (i.e. tanks and artillery) were combat ready with little prior notice and even the cadred units were to be deployable soon thereafter.

*Figure 3: Structure of the Army*

**The Air Force**

The Air Force was assigned to supporting the Army in the defence of West Germany by conducting air reconnaissance, air lifts, air to air combat and air support for ground troops. Its sphere of operation was limited to Central Europe and parts of Northern Europe, emphasising the defensive
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character of the West German armed forces. In order to meet these demands the *Bundesluftwaffe* would have to be constantly kept technically up-to-date to optimise its conventional combat capabilities. It would also have to remain in a constantly high level of readiness to be ready to support the Army combat troops, which, as already pointed out, were also on standby.

The Air Fleet Command (*Luftflottenkommando*) headed the four Air Force Divisions which incorporated most of West Germany’s air combat squadrons. It was under direct NATO command which left West German commanders with little air force capabilities for themselves, highlighting again NATO’s control over the West German armed forces. Of the four divisions, two were trained reconnaissance and tactical bombing missions, supported by missile units, whereas the other two were responsible for anti-aircraft assignments, mostly with surface-to-air missiles.

The Department of the Air Force (*Luftwaffenamt*) was primarily responsible air force logistics, officer and NCO training and medical support. Its squadrons consisted of transport aircrafts and school planes. The Air Force Support Command (*Luftwaffenunterstützungskommando*) organised the supplies and equipment the Air Force needed. The Department of Air Force Equipment (*Materialamt der Luftwaffe*) was probably the most important department in this branch of the armed forces (aside from the actual combat units) since it determined the future equipment of the Air Force, ranging from aircrafts to tools.

In contrast to the Army, the Air Force hardly made any use of the practice of cadred units, since the equipment was too complicated and
therefore training needed to be much more intensive. Only few posts charged with forward air space reconnaissance were cadred, not comparable to the scale the Army used it (Bundesminister der Verteidigung - Führungsstab der Streitkräfte, 1974: 31-39).

Generally speaking, the Air Force was more clearly organised than the Army, which is quite understandable since it was also much smaller. All units necessary for combat operations were concentrated under the Air Fleet Command which in turn was under direct NATO command. This made the planning of combat operations easier and more efficient. The other two branches of the Air Force could concentrate on combat support, whereas one dealt with everything concerning training and the other worked on acquiring the equipment.

Figure 4: Structure of the Air Force
The task of the Navy was comparable to that of the Air Force in that it supported the Army in its primary task. Although the Navy’s support was less direct than that of the Air Force, it aimed at hindering the Warsaw Pact from launching an attack behind the frontlines. The Navy therefore kept the Army’s back clear. In combination with allied navies the Bundesmarine was to defend and secure the Baltic and the North Sea as well as the connection to the Atlantic Ocean. Just like the Air Force the Navy was limited to this relatively small yet strategically important area, again underlining the Bundeswehr’s defensive orientation. This means that the Navy needed to be operational at very short notice, maintain operational at high seas and be capable to conduct naval reconnaissance and surveillance missions. In order to do so it needed modern weapon systems, which were on par with those the Warsaw Pact used. The Navy placed a lot of emphasis on far-reaching on-board missile systems installed on destroyers and speedboats which made the Navy highly mobile and at the same time effective.

Similar to the air Force, the Navy featured three branches of which one, the Fleet Command (Flottenkommando), encompassed the majority of operational forces. Again, this branch remained under direct NATO command, whereas the other two branches, the Department of the Navy (Marineamt) and the Naval Support Command (Marineunterstützungskommando), which were not part of defensive operations, remained under national command.
The Fleet Command headed nine divisions, each responsible for one specific part of naval operations, i.e. submarine division, destroyer division or logistical division. The Department of the Navy was responsible for organising naval training and analysing the need for new or different equipment. It also included the naval medical services. The Naval Support Command was primarily responsible for the logistics of supplying the Navy with ammunition and other supplies as well as maintaining and repairing weapon systems.

Even more so than the Air Force, the Navy had no use for cadred units, since this would have implied maintaining large and complicated weapon systems and needing a large number of former conscripts to man them. Only units responsible for guard duties had elements which could be cadred (Bundesminister der Verteidigung - Führungsstab der Streitkräfte, 1974: 40-47).

The organisational structure of the Navy was very similar to that of the Air Force. All combat units were placed under one commanding entity which in turn was under direct NATO command. Planning and conducting naval operations was therefore in one hand, thus streamlining the whole process. The other two branches of the Navy concentrated on their respective tasks which minimised overcutting to a great extent.
Whereas the *Bundeswehr* as such has always been subjected to changes, they were by no means substantial. These changes concentrated on adjustments in total numbers or acquiring new equipment. The Germans found it extremely difficult to alter the *Bundeswehr* in such a way that it would be capable to address its tasks. In fact, for a long time German decision makers could not decide as to what these tasks would be. Should the *Bundeswehr* remain an organisation aimed at the territorial defence of Western Europe from its enemies – whoever they might be since the Warsaw Pact had ceased to exist – , or should German soldiers take on similar tasks as their European colleagues in out-of-area deployments? As already pointed out in Chapter 2, the *Bundeswehr* has chosen the second path. The discussions and arguments leading to this status quo shall not be part of this chapter. It will rather analyse today’s structure to determine as to how well the *Bundeswehr* is organised to take on the ever more complicated missions set out by the Government.
The **Bundeswehr today**

The collapse of the bi-polar system of the Cold War left Western armed forces – and the *Bundeswehr* in particular – in a difficult situation in which they had to re-define their *raison d’être*. Over the 1990s, the *Bundeswehr* adopted numerous changes to better cope with the new situation, most importantly the out-of-area deployments. These changes, however, concentrated on the reduction of the total number of troops and the division of the *Bundeswehr* into the *Krisenreaktionskräfte* (quick reaction forces), which were better equipped and trained and the *Hauptverteidigungskräfte* (defensive forces) which consisted mainly of conscripts.

*The reform of the Bundeswehr during the 1990s*

As already pointed out, with the end of the bi-polar system German decision makers and the armed forces in particular had to adjust to a completely new scenario. During the 1990s the *Bundeswehr* reform concentrated on adjusting the overall number of troops to the new tasks of the armed forces. These consisted of collective defence within the framework of NATO, crisis-management and supplying aid during natural disasters (such as the flood of the river Oder in 1998). The two major tasks of collective defence and crisis management lead to the division of the armed forces into two categories: the main defence force (*Hauptverteidigungskräfte* – HVK) and the crisis reaction force (*Krisenreaktionskräfte* – KRK). Whereas the HVK mainly consisted of conscripts who were trained for the classical defensive scenario, the KRK...
featured a much higher concentration of professional soldiers trained for quick crisis reaction on the European continent (Fleckenstein, 2000: 14).

Apart from creating the two categories within the Bundeswehr, the reform during the 1990s centred around the overall reduction of roughly 32,000 troops and the closure of 19 barracks. Much attention was paid to acquiring new and modifying old equipment according to the new security scenario. The emphasis was placed on acquiring the combat helicopter “Tiger”, the self-propelled howitzer “Panzerhaubitze 2000” as well as an armoured transport vehicle for the army whereas the air force was to be equipped with a new fighter aircraft and a new heavy cargo plane. The heavy battle tank “Leopard II” was to be improved just as the “Patriot” missile system (von Krause, 1997: 19-22). Although investing in new equipment is a necessary step in reforming armed forces to adjust them to a completely changed scenario, the Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (BMVg) had not yet made the appropriate conclusions. Weapon systems such as the ones mentioned above are very helpful in a traditional conflict, yet can hardly be used in peace-keeping or peace-making operations during out-of-area missions. Their sheer size and weight makes them difficult to transport and to operate in difficult terrain (such as the Balkans or, more recently, in Afghanistan). Overall it is fair to say that the 1990s saw a slight adjustment of the armed forces rather than a profound reform. By 2003, however, Germany was ready to accept a more far-reaching reform.
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*The Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien 2003*

In 1998 the red-green government of Chancellor Schröder took office and the new Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping set out to overhaul the armed forces. Although he headed the BMVg for only a short time – he resigned shortly after the Kosovo crisis due to a series of public blunders – his successor Peter Struck continued the new course. The *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien* (Security Political Guidelines) which Struck issued in 2003 represent a stark deviation from previous guidelines.

Struck identifies core tasks that the Federal Republic and with it the *Bundeswehr* will most likely face in future. These core tasks no longer include the classical territorial defence but rather concentrate on peace-keeping and peace-enforcing interventions outside NATO territory. His definition of defence is wider than that of his predecessors but by arguing that those deployments abroad contribute to Germany’s security he prevents a constitutional discussion, since according to Article 87 of the *Grundgesetz* (Basic Law) the Federal Republic may only maintain armed forces for defensive purposes. He famously confirmed this wide definition with his statement that Germany was defended at the Hindu Kusch, thus justifying the *Bundeswehr* contingent in Afghanistan.

The threat of a conventional attack is no longer the most likely scenario in which the armed forces will find themselves. Capabilities needed to take on such a scenario (e.g. large armoured forces) are no longer needed but should be able to be re-activated in a short time should the need arise (BMVg, 2003b: 4-5). In his view conscription remains a vital part of this and will therefore be continued.
Although the conventional attack is highly unlikely, this does not mean that Germany and its allies no longer face any threats. The guidelines identify numerous dangers of which international terrorism is only one. Tensions in south-east Europe will not disappear any time soon and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains on the agenda. Although proliferation is not a classical task for armed forces, the protection of citizens and the neutralisation of such weapons is.

Alongside terrorism, ethnic conflicts and weapons of mass destruction Struck identifies risks not commonly associated with the military. Germany’s export-orientated economy relies on safe sea routes and in a society reliant on information, this information needs to be protected from IT-attacks.

These threats differ considerably from the traditional danger thus imposing very different requirements on the armed forces. Today’s Bundeswehr needs to be able to react quickly to any of the threats outlined above in conjunction with Germany’s allies and along Struck’s wider definition of defence in any part of the world (BMVg, 2003b: 16-20). The Bundeswehr needs to acquire capabilities, such as large air-cargo capacity to ensure deployment and supply of troops once they are deployed. Other capabilities which are no longer necessary will need to be reduced or adapted to fit the new challenges by altering and modernising the equipment and weapon systems.

Since this is very cost intensive, Struck aims at making spending more effective by minimising ‘double capacities’, i.e. specialising in certain abilities that the Bundeswehr can contribute to NATO operations. Why
should the Bundeswehr spend resources in a field of expertise in which another ally is much more experienced? This aspect of streamlining spending within the Bundeswehr can be found throughout the guidelines. Struck places great emphasis on co-operation, be it amongst the allies but also between the Bundeswehr and the civilian economy (BMVg, 2003b: 15). This co-operation ranges from armament contracts to the daily supply of the armed forces with food and uniforms. Most support tasks today are no longer conducted by the Bundeswehr administration but rather civilian companies which, due to their nature, are interested in performing as cost-efficient as possibly.

The Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien are general guidelines which do not go into much detail on how to achieve the set goals. They are important since they define a new scenario for the armed forces and identify a status quo which the Bundeswehr is supposed to take on at some point in the future. It is therefore now necessary to analyse the condition the Bundeswehr is in today to see how far it still has to go.

The reform of the Bundeswehr since 2003

The Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien released by Peter Struck represented a clear departure from the traditional German defence policy as outlined above. In 2006 the German Government issued the White Paper 2006 on Germany’s security policy and the future of the Bundeswehr, which gave a more specific account on the future tasks and the structure of the German armed forces. In accordance with the guidelines, the White Paper identifies six core tasks for the Bundeswehr.
• international conflict prevention and crisis management including fighting international terrorism,
• supporting NATO and EU partners,
• defence of Germany and the welfare of its population,
• rescue and evacuation,
• partnership and co-operation and
• substantial aid operations (BMVg, 2006: 67)

Although territorial defence remains a core task, it no longer enjoys priority as it did during the Cold War. Conflict prevention and crisis management have been identified as the main tasks of a new and reformed Bundeswehr meaning that equipment, training and structure need to follow suit. As outlined above most of the Bundeswehr’s equipment was aimed at territorial defence and not international crisis management. The battle tank “Leopard II” might be a very good tank, yet it is unsuitable for use in patrols in urban or mountainous environments. However, crisis management operations most of the time take place in these surroundings. The White Paper therefore demands a substantial shift in the procurement of new equipment. It sets its priorities in acquiring sufficient protection of the troops during operations, worldwide reconnaissance, troop control during multinational operations, anti-missile capabilities as well as strategic deployability (BMVg, 2006: 82). This way the Bundeswehr could perform more effectively in asymmetrical conflicts, since the troops were better protected in urban environments, would have more information due to better reconnaissance and would be less prone to missile attacks inside the bases. Furthermore, the Bundeswehr would no longer be dependent on
leasing large enough cargo planes and could better co-ordinate with other alliance contingents.

It has to be said, however, that acquiring these capabilities is an expensive undertaking which means that projects which do not contribute to this transformation process, such as modernising the infrastructure in the barracks, will not be high on the Ministry’s to-do-list, a fact the White Paper emphasis as well (BMVg, 2006: 82). The need to spend the limited resources more effectively has become greater ever since the end of the Cold War, which led to a number of economic measures within the Bundeswehr which will be outlined later.

In the case of troop training the White Paper acknowledges the need to familiarise the troops with the complex tasks set before them. In addition to the obvious skills today’s soldiers will need additional skills ranging from intercultural training to get familiarised with the cultural and religious traditions in a specific country to analytical skills needed as mediator, guard or helper. Although the Bundeswehr has a long tradition of political education as a result of the horrors committed be German soldiers during World War II, it has become more important today. Every soldier needs to be aware of the political situation in the specific crisis scenario in order to make the right decisions (BMVg, 2006: 75). The Bundeswehr not only needs to equip its troops with the proper gear but also with more skills beyond the traditional “soldier skills”.

Based on the new prioritisation of the tasks the White Paper sets out the new structure of the Bundeswehr. As pointed out different capabilities are needed and some have become out-dated. The following part will
therefore analyse the structure the *Bundeswehr* is to take on and see, in how far the structure follows the altered capacities.

**The new Army**

During the Cold War the Army was aimed at deterring a large conventional attack from the east. In order to fulfil its primary task, it relied heavily on two key characteristics; man power, mostly covered by conscripts, and a large number of tanks. As already pointed out, the new tasks set on the *Bundeswehr* require new capabilities and therefore a new structure.

The Army remains the predominant branch when it comes to land operations, also in conjunction with other allied forces. In contrast to the days of the Cold War, the army needs to be very mobile since it is no longer restricted to territorial defence but is rather meant to be deployed globally. Territorial defence has lost importance to such an extent that the original two territorial commands have been merged in one Army Central Command (*Heeresführungskommando*). This central command is responsible for the readiness of all army divisions as well as the German contingents to the German-Franco Brigade and multi-national Corps headquarters (BMVg, 2006: 108). This way all operational decisions are taken in one central place. The Central Command also heads the Division Special Operations (*Division Spezielle Operationen*) which are charged with high intensity combat missions such as hostage rescue, but also reconnaissance missions behind enemy lines. The second specialised division under Central Command’s responsibility is the Division Airborne Operations
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(*Division Luftbewegliche Operationen*). This division encompasses all army capabilities needed for operations such as helicopter support or transport. The Central Command can thus react more effectively to new situations by quickly sending reinforcements should the need arise. For the less intensive operations, Central Command can utilise its two tank divisions and one armoured infantry division (BMVg, 2006: 108).

Beside Central Command, the Department of the Army (*Heeresamt*) provides all the necessary training to the troops. All the army schools and academies are headed by the office, which ensures a consistent set of teaching standards. It also makes changes to training a lot easier since, again, only one institution is responsible.

![Figure 6: Reformed Structure of the Army](image)

**The new Air Force**

As with the Army, the role of the Air Force has changed over the years. The roles of providing air support for the Army as well as air
transport have become more important in out-of-area scenarios. More controversially, the Air Force has also been assigned the task of protecting the population from airborne terrorist attacks. The controversial *Luftsicherungsgesetz* (Air Security Law) aims at legitimising eliminating hijacked civilian planes before they can be crashed into the terrorists' targets, thus prohibiting a German 9/11.

In order to carry out these tasks (primarily the one of providing air support and air transport for the *Bundeswehr* and allied forces), it needs to be able to react quickly and flexibly to any scenario over long distances. From a structural point of view the Air Force today is not that different from the Army. Generally speaking the Air Force is divided into one branch dealing with operational issues, i.e. the Air Force Central Command (*Luftwaffenführungskommando*) and one branch responsible for training and logistics, i.e. the Department of the Air Force (*Luftwaffenamt*).

The *Luftwaffenführungskommando* heads all three operational air force divisions with one SAM squadron each as well as the Air Transport Command, which in the near future will be integrated in a European Air Transport Command (BMVg, 2006: 109). Today, the Air Force features seven combat squadrons (both fighters and bombers) in accordance with the new less defensive tasks of the Air Force.

The *Luftwaffenamt* heads all of the training facilities, the maintenance and logistics units as well as specialised medical personnel.
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**Figure 7: Reformed Structure of the Air Force**

*The new Navy*

The tasks of the Navy have undergone considerable transformation from the originally defensive role of securing Germany’s coast lines to, what the BMVg calls a “Expeditionary Navy” (BMVg, 2006: 112). The Navy is now capable of maintaining a presence anywhere for a substantial time. This is necessary since the protection of coastal lines is no longer the only assignment the Navy is charged with. Today’s responsibilities range from
enforcing embargos over humanitarian aid and evacuations to securing maritime trade routes (which are highly important for Germany as an export nation) and combating terrorists. This also means that the Navy needs to be able to work very closely with allies, which makes a streamlined chain of command even more important.

Similarly to the Army and the Air Force, the Navy features two main branches, the Navy Central Command (Flottenkommando) and the Department of the Navy (Marineamt). The Central Command is responsible for all current naval operations and is therefore the commanding institution for all operational naval forces. These consist of two operational fleets, the two naval air squadrons and a specialised naval medical service.

The Office of the Navy is primarily responsible for all training and maintenance tasks (BMVg, 2006: 113).
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In the attempt to streamline the *Bundeswehr*, several tasks which were traditionally integrated in one of the three branches of the armed forces were “out-sourced” and today form separate branches all together. The three traditional branches concentrate on the actual operational business and leave the bulk of the operational support and supply to the new branches, i.e. the Joint Support Service (*Streitkräftebasis*) and the Central Medical Service (*Zentraler Sanitätsdienst*), which shall be examined in the following part.

**The Joint Support Service**

The *Streitkräftebasis* is responsible for all the support tasks that the other branches rely on during operations. These include:

- Training and scientific research and studies
• Liaison tasks for out-of-area missions as well as for dealing with natural disasters

• Co-ordinating operations both at home and abroad

• Logistical support, disposal of explosives as well as NBC material

• Military intelligence

• Military policing

• Personnel management for officers and NCOs (including reservists)

• Support for elite sport

All of these tasks used to be taken on by the respective branch of the armed forces. However, combining them in one branch made them more efficient, since effects of synergy were used more widely thus allowing the traditional branches to concentrate on their more difficult tasks.

Generally speaking, the Streitkräftebasis follows the same structural pattern as the other branches, with one department coordinating all the training and the other responsible for actual operations. The Central Command (Streitkräfteunterstützungskommando) heads the four Regional Defence Commands (Wehrbereichskommando) which in turn head all logistical, military police and NBC units.

The Department of the Armed Forces (Streitkräfteamt) is responsible for the academies and schools that train the troops, but also for the military side of the transformation of the Bundeswehr as a whole.

Yet, since the tasks are so far reaching, and the Streitkräftebasis is the branch that coordinates the other branches during operations, the Streitkräftebasis features more institutions. The Armed Forces Central
Command (Einsatzführungskommando der Bundeswehr), the Operational Command for Task Forces (Kommando Operative Führung Eingreifkräfte) and the Operational Special Forces Command (Kommando Führung Operationen von Spezialkräften) are all charged with the co-ordination of out-of-area missions, with varying levels of combat intensity, ranging from peace-keeping missions over peace-enforcing-missions to special operations.
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The Central Medical Service

The Central Medical Service is the only branch whose primary tasks were not affected by the collapse of the bi-polar system in 1990. Before the reform, however, medical units were attached to their respective umbrella unit, i.e. an infantry battalion would have its own company of medical staff,
which would be under the command of the battalion’s commanding officer. Although this arrangement had its benefits for the battalion in question, it did not allow for a consistent quality of medical services throughout the *Bundeswehr*. With out-of-area missions having become the norm rather than the exception, a high quality medical service is vital to assure servicemen and women (BMVg, 2006: 118). By concentrating all of the medical expertise in one branch of the armed forces (with the exception of the two specialised medical services for the Air Force and the Navy), the aim is to streamline the medical service and thus make it more efficient.

With regards to its structure, the Medical Service follows the already familiar pattern of being divided into two sections, responsible for the operational issues as well as training and research respectively. The Medical Service’s Central Command (*Sanitätsführungskommando*) heads four medical commands, each responsible for their armed forces hospitals, medical centres and mobile surgery regiments. The Department of the Central Medical Service (*Sanitätsamt der Bundesswehr*) is in charge of training medical staff both for deployments and for professional development, but also of conducting medical research.
Although re-structuring the *Bundeswehr* was a first step towards making it run more efficiently, it still needs considerable investment in new equipment more in accordance with the new tasks of the *Bundeswehr*. As already pointed out above, the equipment that was very useful for territorial defence is often not mobile enough to be used in faraway places such as Afghanistan. The White Paper 2006 identifies numerous systems, such as new armoured vehicles and helicopters for the Army or new fighter aircrafts and SAM systems for the Air Force, which will be acquired in the near future, which are meant to aid the troops in their often hazardous missions. All these things, however, cost money which is thinly spread in times of decreasing military budgets. The *Bundeswehr* therefore needs to save money by using the funds available as economically as possible. In order to do just that, the *Bundeswehr* has also undergone considerable economic reform.
The economical restructuring of the Bundeswehr

The economic restructuring of the Bundeswehr was introduced by
the Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien in 2003. One aspect of these
guidelines is to make the Bundeswehr as a whole more cost
efficient in
order to free resources which in turn can then be invested more effectively
(e.g. new equipment, as noted above). Struck’s guidelines continue the
process which was initiated by Rudolph Scharping, Struck’s predecessor.
On the basis of the Weizsäcker Commission, a commission installed to
make sound recommendations on the reform of the armed forces headed
by former Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker, Scharping presented
his plans of reform in 2000. At the core of his plans was yet another
reduction of both overall troops and number of bases. Scharping also
introduced the new branch of the Streitkräftebasis – SKB (Joint Support
Service). This branch was responsible for all tasks concerning logistics,
training and reconnaissance. Traditionally each branch of the armed forces
maintained units charged with those tasks (see illustrations 3-5). These
capabilities were thus “outsourced” into the SKB therefore making
maintaining the Bundeswehr more cost-efficient. Scharping also founded
the Gesellschaft für Entwicklung, Beschaffung und Betrieb – g.e.b.b.
(Corporation for Development, Procurement and Operation) which was
responsible for “revamping the Bundeswehr’s service sector” (Riecke, 2002:
50-51). This goal was to be achieved by outsourcing the services like the
civilian vehicle pool (BundeswehrFuhrparkService GmbH – BwFPS GmbH),
clothing and personal equipment into separate companies (LH Bundeswehr
Bekleidungsgesellschaft mbH – LHBw mbH). With the presentation of his
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Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien, Struck built on this basis and expanded them.

The guidelines clearly state that available resources are the basis, on which future planning rests. It therefore of utmost importance that in the light of decreasing budgets resources are spent efficiently. Struck criticises the fact that the defence budget is characterised by a high spending on personnel costs and equipment maintenance and a negligence in the field of investment. The Bundeswehr therefore does not have the budgetary prerequisites to start the profound reform process that is needed in order to take on the tasks set out, since the budget is designed to secure the status quo, rather than allowing for reform.

In order to free resources, Struck allocates available funds to maintaining and improving core military capabilities, thus emphasising the need to co-operate more closely with the civilian economy. Civilian businesses, such as the LHBw or the BwFPS take over (or in their case intensify) duties traditionally associated with the armed forces, such as motor pool and clothing. It has to be noted however, that this arrangement puts the German economy in a difficult position, since it will have to adapt to the new tasks as well. Struck also stresses the importance of international arms co-operation, since Germany is not the only country that faces similar problems (BMVg, 2003b).

The White Paper 2006 touches on the budgetary aspect of the reform only very briefly, yet it too acknowledges the need to continue on the way Rudolf Scharping and Peter Struck set out on. Since the overall budgetary situation has not changed since 2003 (i.e. insufficient funds for
the planned reforms), the White Paper adds the reduction of bureaucracy as well as a revised concept for new equipment to the close co-operation with civilian companies already in place. This way the Bundeswehr is meant to be able to concentrate on its core tasks and that the civilian economy is to take over the service sector, especially in those parts where companies were able to offer the same services much more cost-efficiently (BMVg, 2006: 73-74).

Although the basic idea behind that move seems to be good, one needs to ask the question, whether it can possibly work. The next section will therefore analyse how successful the public private partnership (PPP) has been over the last couple of years. Since PPP has now been introduced in many administrative tasks within the Bundeswehr, this analysis will concentrate on the companies mentioned above, i.e. the LHBw and the BwFPS.

At this point one should point out that making use of civilian expertise is not at all a new idea to the Bundeswehr. Local craftsmen and businesses have had contracts with the local barracks to supply services from construction works and repairs to catering, which is why the closure of barracks is always accompanied by local authorities fighting to keep “their” base running.

The Bundeswehr Fuhrpark Service GmbH, a joint venture of the Ministry of Defence and German Rail (Deutsche Bahn – DB), for example has co-ordinated and maintained all commercially available vehicles such as cars, people-carriers, vans and HGVs since 2002. Within only two years this private partner was able to acquire some 15,000 new vehicles with an
overall value of ca. 300 million Euros, an investment the Bundeswehr could have never afforded with its decreasing budget. Before it was established, the average age of civilian vehicles in the Bundeswehr was 9.2 years. One might argue that older cars are simply not as comfortable as newer ones and that age is insignificant factor in running the armed forces more efficiently. Yet older cars tend to use more fuel, are less environmentally friendly and, most importantly, need more maintenance, which again costs money and man power. Surveys showed that before 2002 cars could not be used for up to 36 days every year because they were undergoing repairs; the situation for HGVs was even worse. BwFPS managed to reduce the average age of civilian cars and HGVs to around one year with the result that cars are unavailable only for up to two days every year. On top of that fuel costs were reduced from 0.38 Euros to 0.31 Euros, which constitutes a cut of almost 20% (Rüttler, 2007: 162).

In addition to that, BwFPS re-organised the general use of cars within the Bundeswehr. Whereas each unit used to have their own vehicles they BwFPS introduced a system by which units lease their civilian vehicles either for a short period or on long term. The idea is that vehicles are used more efficiently thus avoiding long periods of stand-still. If any unit requires more vehicles because they are on an extended exercise, they can lease further vehicles from any of the 130 service centres throughout Germany. Although this system seems overly complicated to any soldier who is used to the old system of just getting into the vehicle parked outside, there are large benefits to be had. By 2007 it had become clear that vehicles were being used much more efficiently and much more economically, since each
lease comes out of the unit’s allowance. This in turn has led to a higher level of economical awareness throughout the Bundeswehr, since soldiers are directly confronted with the costs of their actions. This awareness does not stop with requesting a vehicle but also extends into other day-to-day situations.

The second example of PPP in this analysis shall be the LH Bundeswehr Bekleidungsgesellschaft mbH (LHBw), which has taken on the difficult task of supplying around 20,000 new recruits with some 130 items of personal equipment every three months. When it started it took over the equipment stocked in the Bundeswehr’s own stores and re-distributed the gear, so that it can be more easily issued when and where it is needed. It then set on reducing the purchase price of equipment as well as setting up an easily accessible replacement service for the soldiers, so that broken or lost kit can be replaced relatively quickly.

When comparing expenditures from before 2002, LHBw managed to reduce the purchasing price of new equipment by around 16%. It also managed to reduce storage capacities considerably due to the re-organisation of how gear is being issued, i.e. move the gear to where it is needed instead of storing it at one place in the case that kit needs to be issued just there. This process also made a reduction among the work force possible, thus freeing money from maintaining less real estate (warehouses) and from lower personnel costs (Rüttler, 2007: 164).

These two joint ventures, the BwFPS and the LHBw, managed to restructure cost-intensive areas within the organisation of the Bundeswehr, thus reducing the strain these fields have on the defence budget.
Resources saved here can then be used elsewhere. Since investment has been identified by both the *Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien 2003* and the White Paper 2006 as having been neglected in past years, it remains to be seen, if this aspect of the budget has indeed seen some improvement.

**Ending Conscription**

Conscription has been an integral part of the *Bundeswehr* ever since its creation in 1955. As has been pointed out, the purpose of conscription was primarily to ensure West Germany’s capability to defend against a large-scale attack with conventional means, i.e. conscription guaranteed a sufficient supply of manpower for the cadred units predominantly found in the Army. With this in mind conscription should have come to an end after the collapse of the bi-polar system in 1989/90 and in fact many European armed forces did turn their backs on this particular practice. Germany, however, was not one of them.

Since security considerations could no longer convincingly sustain conscription – after all Germany was now surrounded by friends and allies – other reasons for the continuation of conscription than the need to maintain high numbers of troops would have to play a role. Firstly, strategically it was argued that given Germany’s *Zentrallage* (central position) within Europe called for German armed forces capable of “national and collective defence of the alliance” (Longhurst, 2003: 159). Just because Germany’s and Europe’s security was not under threat for the foreseeable future did not convince Germans that the need for a large defensive force would not arise at all. Conscription could therefore be seen as insurance against a possible,

The second reason behind the continuation can be found in Germany’s history. It was argued that by linking the Bundeswehr closely to society through drafting young men, the Bundeswehr would be under constant public scrutiny, thus preventing a situation of the armed forces becoming alienated from society as ‘a state within the state’ as the Wehrmacht had been. Conscription was therefore a means to control the Bundeswehr to avoid undemocratic tendencies within the armed forces (Longhurst, 2003: 159).

The close link between Bundeswehr and German society also ensured that Germany would maintain its culture of restraint when it came to the military. Conscription would force decision makers to refrain from deploying the Bundeswehr too readily, since any deployment that included conscripts would affect a wider part of society, thus making decision makers more accountable (Longhurst, 2003: 160). Considering that conscripts have been barred from out-of-area deployment, most significantly Kosovo and Afghanistan, this argument has become less compelling.

The final argument put forward by proponents of conscription is that conscription is in fact a very good tool of recruitment. Conscription introduces men from all parts of society to the Bundeswehr, from which a sizeable number would choose to volunteer after their service. Conscription therefore ensured that soldiers would not just be recruited from the less well-educated or unemployed but would also attract the better educated
citizens. In essence, conscription maintained an ‘intelligent armed force’ (BMVg, 2009a: 71).

In addition to these mainly militarily orientated arguments one has to keep in mind that although conscription ensured a steady flow of new personnel for the Bundeswehr it also supplied Germany’s social services with relatively cheap labour in the form of Zivildienstleistende (conscientious objectors). The end of conscription would therefore affect the social services as well in that they would have to make do without some 70,000 ‘Zivis’ every year (Longhurst, 2003: 162).

Ending the practice of conscription has therefore always been a very contentious subject since the end of the Cold War. Although the security argument was no longer as persuasive, the other arguments seemed to ensure an indefinite continuation of conscription. This changed, however, shortly after the Bundestag election of 2009. After having reduced the length of the national service from 9 to 6 months – a length of time which hardly allowed for any meaningful training – the new defence minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg (CSU) openly discussed the discontinuation of conscription from June 2011 onwards. It is important to note that the practice will only be discontinued and not abolished. The discontinuation could be more easily reversed should the future need for conscription arise (Spiegel Online, 2010: 1). Abolition would also mean constitutional change, which is traditionally very hard to achieve in Germany.

This relatively surprising turn was part of Guttenberg’s approach to make the Bundeswehr more efficient to ensure Germany’s continuous capabilities to contribute to on-going multilateral operations. In his view it
was unacceptable that the Bundeswehr was over-stretched with only some 8,000 troops deployed (zu Guttenberg, 2010b: 13). In short, the Bundeswehr did not have the appropriate personnel structures to guarantee sufficient troops for the operations. Considering the number of instructors necessary to train drafted recruits – none of which would be deployed abroad making them unusable in the Bundeswehr’s primary tasks – discontinuing conscription would free more personnel. Zu Guttenberg’s reform would therefore centre on optimising the personnel management.

If conscription was discontinued, a drop in recruits would naturally follow, which in turn would lead to new personnel shortages. To prevent this zu Guttenberg aimed at making the service in the armed forces more attractive. This would not be limited to better pay, but would also include fewer transfers to minimise negative impacts on the families and better compensations for killed or wounded soldiers (zu Guttenberg, 2010a: 24).

Although zu Guttenberg’s proposals caused a controversial debate amongst Germany’s politicians the practice of conscription was discontinued from the 01.01.2011, meaning that six months later the Bundeswehr would become an all-volunteer armed force. However, this process left the Bundeswehr with the problem, of how to attract young people to join up as the surrounding conditions had not been finalised by January 2011. The result of this was that even if someone had been interested in joining the Bundeswehr, the recruiting offices were unable to provide proper information as the new framework had not been decided upon (Witte, 2011: 2).
The transition to an all-volunteer force would most likely been easier for the Bundeswehr, had zu Guttenberg not been forced to resign over allegations of plagiarism in his PhD thesis. As it was, he left the Bundeswehr in the middle of its most significant transformation in its history with the actual reform still in its planning stage. Considering it took Germany 20 years to come to terms with the idea that conscription was an out-dated practice, its discontinuation came too suddenly, without proper preparation and effectively left the Bundeswehr struggling for new recruits.

Summary

The reform of the Bundeswehr has been a long process and it is still on-going. During the Cold War, West Germany’s armed forces were strictly aimed at deterring any conventional attack from the Soviet Union and its allies. The Bundeswehr relied heavily on large numbers of battle tanks and other heavy equipment as well as on a large number of troops made available by conscription. In the case of an attack on West Germany, most army units were capable to grow considerably in numbers because many posts within the units would then have been occupied by cadred personnel, i.e. reservists who had already completed their national service. Since their training might have years in the past, cadred units were primarily found in army units which needed no or only little specialised training (such as the infantry).

The end of the Cold War changed this doctrine, since now Germany became more and more involved in out-of-area missions for which the old structure and strategic concept proved to be inappropriate. By 2006 the Bundeswehr had undergone considerable change in both structure and the
accompanying strategic concept; away from strict territorial defence towards an expeditionary force. Today’s structure of the Bundeswehr is more streamlined to enable faster decision-making as well as integrating it better into international missions. With the establishment of two new branches of the armed forces, the Central Medical Service and the SKB, all of the supporting tasks, i.e. logistics, administration and medical service, the Army, Navy and Air Force can now concentrate on their core tasks.

However, the Bundeswehr, as other European armed forces, is still battling financial problems in the light of continuously decreasing defence budgets. The economic restructuring has proven to be quite successful in saving resources and has helped to make the Bundeswehr more efficient. However, the emphasis on public private partnership also has its drawbacks in the day-to-day business within the units. It also raises some questions when it comes to out-of-area missions. Will a business, which runs the barrack’s canteen at home, also do this in places like Afghanistan? If not, how can the Bundeswehr keep its soldiers trained in these tasks, if they never perform them at home? The same can be asked about vehicle maintenance and transportation.

In summary, whereas the Bundeswehr used to be a highly territorial defence force, it has been transformed into a more mobile and ultimately a more professional force. German decision-makers therefore have a much more diverse tool at their disposal which they can use to contribute more actively in multilateral operations.

However, although the discontinuation of conscription is a logical step if the Bundeswehr is meant to effectively contribute to out-of-area
operations there are still some problems with this. The decision to discontinue conscription by January 2011 is open for criticism as the likely drop in numbers of recruits has not been addressed accordingly. It will remain to be seen if Germany can maintain its commitment to multilateral operations should the Bundeswehr fail to recruit the 16,000 volunteers per year necessary to maintain the overall troop numbers. Should this scenario become reality, Germany will have to re-think its concept for its reservists in order to close the resulting gaps.

In the following two chapters, this thesis will examine as to how well the Bundeswehr can make use of this structural reform. They will also discuss the strategies adopted to tackle the respective crises which will in turn enable this thesis to test its core hypothesis that the lack of a clearly defined purpose makes the Bundeswehr less effective in its missions. The out-of-area missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan have been difficult from the very start and are therefore well suited as case studies to test the Bundeswehr’s capabilities as a mobile task force.
Chapter 4 – The Bundeswehr in Kosovo

“But I have two principles: Never again war, never again Auschwitz; never again genocide, never again fascism. For me, both belong together, my friends, and that is why I joined the Green Party. […] You may think that everything this government has done and everything NATO is doing is wrong. But I would like to know what you – from a political left perspective – would call the ethnic warfare in Yugoslavia since 1992 and the current racial policies. I’m telling you, with the end of the Cold War, ethnic warfare and racism have returned, which Europe must not tolerate.” – Joschka Fischer (Fischer, 2011: 3)

Having discussed the reform of the Bundeswehr in the last chapter, one now needs to see how well Germany has used its armed forces in conjunction with its allies. The Bundeswehr has been used in some incidents, yet mostly as peace-keeping force in places like Bosnia or Somalia. Although these missions put strain on the armed forces in fields such as logistics, the troops conducted their missions in relatively safe environments or were pulled out at the first sign of trouble.

The Kosovo war and the peace-keeping mission in the subsequent years added a new quality in German security policy. As already pointed out in chapter 2, for the first time German troops were sent into combat after 1945, accompanied by a heated debate about whether or not this was in fact a justifiable course of action.

Although the already deployed NATO contingents brought an end to the hostilities of the early 1990s in the Balkans, the region would soon be

back on the European security agenda. The Kosovo Crisis had its origins in 1989, when the then autonomous province, mainly inhabited by Albanians, was stripped of that status by the Serbs. Being literally ignored by the West during the Dayton Peace negotiations, it remained under Serbian rule after the initial Yugoslavian Crisis had been resolved. With tensions mounting between the Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians (especially the Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA) the Balkans erupted in violence once more in late-1997. Being unable to secure the support of the UN Security Council, NATO eventually took charge of diffusing the Balkans by threatening Belgrade, which had moved into Kosovo with heavy weapons, with air strikes (Mau1, 2000a: 2-4).

A good starting point to do just that is to determine KFOR's objectives as set out by NATO. This will make it then possible to determine what kind of military personnel, equipment needed to be deployed in order to meet the objectives. This chapter will then move on to examine the situation in Kosovo, i.e. the location and duration of deployment, since this would affect the efficiency of peace-keeping in that isolated bases staffed with over-worked troops would make controlling the area much harder. Next, this chapter will study the financial commitment to the mission, since this also determines the capabilities of the peace-keeping force. The final part of this chapter will look at the developments in the actual mission as to how the priorities changed over the last ten years and how that affected German commitment.
The context of the Kosovo Crisis

At the close of 1998, Germany was domestically pre-occupied with the federal elections, which would end the sixteen-year period of the Kohl Government, replacing it with the left-of-the-centre ‘Red-Green’ Coalition of Gerhard Schröder (SPD) and Joschka Fischer (Greens). The new Government was in the middle of having to decide whether to participate in the military operation for which NATO was already preparing before it was formally installed by the Federal President. The decision to contribute 14 ECR Tornados to the operation was therefore still taken by the old Government with the Red-Green Coalition agreeing reluctantly (Rudolf, 2000: 134).

After several attempts to solve this crisis diplomatically with the Serbian President Milosevic, one last effort was made in Rambouillet in February 1999. These peace talks were characterised by the Serbs signalling their disinterest only leaving three Albanian delegations for the West to negotiate the eventual comprise with. Kosovo would remain autonomous under Yugoslav sovereignty with NATO troops, which would be allowed to enter any part of Yugoslavia should this prove to be necessary, supervising compliance (Ramet and Lyon, 2001: 87). As Belgrade rejected this agreement the only possibility left to the West was to resort to NATO military means in April 1999.

Objectives and German military deployment in the Kosovo Crisis

At the close of 1998 when the Kosovo Crisis became imminent, Germany was domestically pre-occupied with the federal elections, which
would end the sixteen-year period of the Kohl Government, replacing it with the left-of-the-centre ‘Red-Green’ Coalition of Gerhard Schröder (SPD) and Joschka Fischer (Greens). The new government was in the middle of having to decide whether to participate in the military operation for which NATO was already preparing before the new government was formally installed by the Federal President.

NATO’s political and military objectives were clear cut. On the political front, NATO was committed to a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo Crisis and that the violence there was to be halted. The military aspect of NATO’s strategy was to complement the political goals. Therefore NATO’s military objective was to end the attacks against the population of Kosovo and to provide the basis of an interim political settlement (NATO, 2009f: 1). However, since diplomatic efforts failed, NATO made use of the final resort and enforced its commitment to ending the Serbian attacks by starting the air campaign “Allied Force” in March 1999.

In the run-up to operation “Allied Force” the German Government decided relatively early, that it would contribute forces to this NATO campaign. On 12th October 1998 the Government – the Bundesregierung – put forward a motion to Parliament – the Bundestag – to assign Bundeswehr troops. Citing the decision of the North Atlantic Council of 10th October 1998, the government identified that Yugoslavia had not complied with the UN Resolution 1199, in that it continued its aggression towards the Kosovo population which in turn causes a severe threat to peace and security in this region (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998b: 1).
German troops were, however, not intended to participate in actual combat. This becomes very clear when analysing the type of deployments the Bundesregierung envisaged. The Air Force was to assign imagery intelligence (IMINT) and electronic combat reconnaissance (ECR) aircrafts, which would be responsible to identify targets for air strikes and radar emplacements respectively along with the necessary logistical support units. Similar forces were assigned by the Navy, which were to support the Air Force units. All together this amounted to some 500 soldiers (none of which were conscripts) and 14 aircrafts. Germany also included its Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) in the overall contribution. These forces were not to be stationed in Kosovo itself, but rather conducted their missions from bases in Italy. Forces stationed in the Balkans under SFOR command could also be called upon, should the need arise, as long as the SFOR mission was not endangered in any case. Since this was only meant as a temporary assignment, the Bundesregierung argued that the financial burden could be covered by provisions set aside in the defence budget for quick response operations. It is interesting to note at this point that these forces could be made use of by NATO in order to fulfil its objectives, even if the UN Security Council did not pass a resolution legitimising such a use of force (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998a: 3-4). One should also note that the government clearly states that these forces were at the disposal of the North Atlantic Council, thus no longer under direct national command.

On 16th October 1998, the Bundestag approved the government’s motion with a large majority (500 Yes, 62 No, 18 Abstentions). Although the debate was highly controversial – it shall be examined more closely at a
later time – the result shows a shift towards a more active interpretation of Bündnistreue, as discussed in chapter 2. One might argue at this point, however, considering the type of contribution Germany made during the first combat mission of the Bundeswehr, that its part in the operation was negligible. Germany contributed only 14 aircrafts equipped for reconnaissance and around 500 troops to operate and maintain them. Compared with the deployment of other NATO members (some 7,500 US troops and some 6,000 UK troops), the German deployment is dwarfed (Youngs et al., 1999: 69-70). Yet as the then Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel (FDP) argued, these were the types of aircraft NATO had requested and relied on, due to the high level of expertise in this field present in the German Air Force. Germany’s contribution therefore increases the security of its allies by supplying vital intelligence (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998h: 23129). Since the new Schröder Government had not yet been installed, the decision to contribute the 14 ECR Tornados to the operation was therefore still taken by the old Government with the Red-Green Coalition agreeing reluctantly (Rudolf, 2000: 134).

Initially Operation Allied Force concentrated on air defences deployed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, after which the campaign was intensified by targeting the infrastructure. Precision-guided weapons systems were meant to keep civilian casualties to a minimum and target selection was reviewed on multiple levels of command to ensure that they were militarily justified and complied with international law. After 78 days and some 38,000 sorties the Serbian forces withdrew from Kosovo, bringing an end to the air campaign (NATO, 2009g: 1).
Beside Operation Allied Force, NATO also set up a military task force to assist and – in the case of danger extract – the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo. This unarmed 2,000 personnel strong mission (200 of which were German) was to verify Serbian compliance with the UN Security Council’s resolutions 1160/98 and 1199/98, each calling for a halt of aggression within Kosovo and a retreat of military and paramilitary personnel from the province. In addition to the forces necessary for the air campaign, NATO committed itself to the protection of the OSCE mission, which in turn put additional strain on NATO’s members. In the case of Germany, this meant that since it had already contributed to the OSCE mission, it also had to contribute to the relevant security force to be able to continue to emphasise its Bündnistreue. On 18th November 1998 the government motioned the Bundestag to assign some 250 troops to NATO’s “Extraction Force”. This contingent was to be comprised primarily by medical and logistical (air and sea logistics) professional – i.e. non-conscript – personnel stationed in Macedonia. Similar to the forces assigned to Operation Allied Force, the Extraction Force would be able to make use of logistics and support already in place for the air campaign, as well as reinforcements from SFOR, should the need arise (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998d: 3).

On the financial side, the government estimated that this operation would cost around 22 million D-Marks, which was not yet covered by the defence budget (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998c: 3). On 19th November 1998 the Bundestag agreed to the motion of the Government, again with a comfortable majority (553 Yes, 35 No, 7 Abstentions).
Considering Germany’s rather minor role in the actual military operation in attempting to stop the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, it is not surprising that Germany would utilise its diplomatic channels to seek another way to contribute more heavily to the resolution of this crisis. The government’s twin-track approach to the situation saw the support and participation of NATO actions on the one hand and intensive diplomatic efforts to stabilise the region permanently on the other. In order to get UN support for any future operations in the Balkans, Russia needed to be incorporated in any peace-process by limiting fears of NATO enlargement and emphasising Russia’s importance in “shaping a co-operative European security system” (Hyde-Price, 2003: 9).

Germany’s twin-track diplomacy also involved a number of multilateral institutions such as the EU, OSCE (as noted above, Germany contributed to the emergency Extraction Force), G-8 and the UN to name but a few. Germany’s new Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer soon came to realise that long-term stabilisation of the region could only be achieved through multilateral channels, something that the ‘Fischer Plan’ incorporated. This plan aimed at stabilising the region not merely by military means but also saw the importance of political and economic support for the countries in question. The prospect of future membership in the EU and G-8 support were the major aspects of this plan, which would not exclude the initial Serbian aggressor. By supporting and, indeed participating, in the NATO campaign, Germany did not only prove its Bündnisfähigkeit, but also ensured that its diplomatic effort was supported by the credentials connected to being a fully accepted ally (Maull, 2000b: 72). When NATO’s
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Kosovo Force (KFOR) eventually entered Kosovo, it did so with the clearly set aims set by the ‘Fischer Plan’ and the consensus of the international community.

Whereas Operation Allied Force and the OSCE mission were aimed at stopping Serbian aggression in the Province of Kosovo, KFOR’s purpose was to enforce the Rambouillet Treaty, i.e. prohibit a humanitarian catastrophe, set the preconditions for a peaceful co-existence in the region, protect the human rights of the population and ease the return of refugees (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999a: 1). Contrary to Operation Allied Force, which was a clear cut combat operation, KFOR’s emphasis was on peace-keeping, which is not to say that KFOR would not be able to perform as a peace enforcer either.

On 22nd February 1999 the Bundesregierung motioned to the Bundestag to contribute to NATO operations enforcing the Rambouillet Treaty, outlining the precise nature of the contribution. The Government proposed to initially deploy some 4,500 troops in Kosovo in addition to the troops already on the ground in the area (i.e. troops originally assigned to Operation Allied Force and the OSCE Extraction Force). Of these 4,500 troops the majority would be army personnel responsible for the actual peace-enforcing on the ground. Considering the nature of the personnel devoted to KFOR, it becomes clear that the German government was not taking the Kosovo Crisis lightly. The Army was to contribute armoured forces as well as armoured infantry, armoured reconnaissance and light infantry units in addition to light aircraft groups, drone reconnaissance and logistics. The Air Force would continue to provide reconnaissance
(including AWACS coverage) and air transport, whereas the Navy provided for sea/air reconnaissance in support of the Air Force.

Again, the government placed its troops (all non-conscripts) under NATO command for the duration of this mission. The costs of Germany’s initial KFOR commitment of some 620 million D-Marks for 12 months would not be covered by the defence budget, since its 400 million D-Marks reserved for unforeseeable defence expenditures had already been used up. In order to be able to pay for its contingent the reserves of the federal budget were made available (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999b: 3).

KFOR’s mission, and that of the German contingent, would be to bring to an end hostilities and suppression within Kosovo, ensure the safety of the population and the returning refugees, support international organisations in their task to develop sustainable democratic structures, disarm the Kosovo and ensure unrestricted access for aid organisations. Comparing these rather complex objectives of KFOR to the German contingent, one can see that the Bundesregierung placed the emphasis on securing Kosovo, a task the assigned combat troops were suitable for. In accordance with the German reserved position towards the use of force, the troops were restricted in their armed intervention to incidences concerning themselves, personnel from allied contingents (including international police forces) as well as international aid organisations (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999c: 2).

As already pointed out, the initial financial burdens for the above mentioned missions were considerable. The costs for Germany’s contingent within the OSCE Extraction Force amounted to some 22 million D-Marks
per year, whereas KFOR initially was even more expensive with 620 million D-Marks per annum. Although one might argue that these numbers appear relatively low, one has to remember that the German defence budget of 1999 only amounted to some 48 billion D-Marks. Out of those 48 billion, almost 50% were taken up by personnel costs, which only leave some 24 billion for procurement, investment, development and other expenditures, such as peace-keeping mission (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2006: 1). One also has to remember, that Germany was already heavily involved in Bosnia, which again depletes the already meagre budget.

During the course of KFOR deployment, the initial 620 million D-Marks shrank to some 158 million Euros (ca. 304 million D-Marks) in 2009 due to a constant reduction in the total number of troops stationed in Kosovo (Deutscher Bundestag, 2008b: 2). Since KFOR’s mission to stabilise the province were proving to be bear fruit, there was no need to sustain the initial 5,000 troops. Currently, the German contingent to KFOR consists of some 2,100 soldiers (Bötel, 2009: 3). It has to be said, however, that the Kosovo Crisis was not resolved quickly, but rather took its time. It is therefore necessary to discuss the developments within Kosovo since KFOR took over, in order to come to an evaluation of KFOR’s overall success.

**KFOR Developments**

Although the fighting between Serbian militia and Kosovo Albanians ended with the arrival of KFOR, it is safe to say that Kosovo remained far from a peaceful and stable region. KFOR got off to a good start, securing the area and stabilising Kosovo, making it possible for the refugees to
return to their homes. Apart from the occasional skirmish between KFOR and Serbs, all seemed to be going well. Violence re-erupted across Kosovo in March 2004, however, as a result of a rumour that two Albanian boys had been drowned by Serbs in the town of Mitrovica. Although the civilian UN administration - Unmik - denied the accusations, the Albanian media used this incidence to foster hostilities amongst the Albanians. In addition to the considerable casualties (31 dead, 600 injured) the riots resulted in ransacked cemeteries, and hundreds of destroyed Serbian houses and churches within the course of one week (Spiegel Online, 2009e: 1).

However damaging a blow this was to Serbian-Albanian co-existence in Kosovo, it was even more damaging to the political process. Unmik was in the process of determining if Kosovo had indeed made enough progress to guarantee a peaceful co-existence between the 2 million Albanians and the 100,000 Serbs. Depending on this, negotiations between Belgrade and the Kosovo’s capital Pristina were to commence deciding on the international status of Kosovo. Not surprisingly, this process was severely set back by the riots.

What is more, KFOR’s credibility suffered severely as well. Considering the preceding calm, NATO had planned to reduce its presence from some 18,500 to 12,500 troops (the Bundeswehr contingent was to be reduced by 700 to 2,500 troops), because Kosovo had become much more peaceful (Beste and Szandar, 2004: 32). KFOR had considerable difficulties curtailing the violence; this was especially the case for the German contingent. The troops were restricted in using force – as pointed out before
- to stop the rioters. Instead they concentrated on securing vital installations within the German sector.

This clearly showed both NATO and Unmik that a small spark could re-ignite the powder keg endangering the achievements of KFOR. Although eventually Kosovo calmed down afterwards, NATO had become much more careful in evaluating the situation in the region. However, KFOR continued to shrink in total numbers in spite of the events of early 2004. By late 2005 the Parliament in Pristina had decided that it would pursue its independence from Serbia, a motion supported by the UN Security Council (Spiegel Online, 2009f: 1). This declaration caused considerable tensions between Pristina and Belgrade, yet this situation did not erupt into open violence.

Some two years later, on 17th February 2008, the Pristina Parliament declared its independence from Serbia. Surprisingly, this did not cause the long expected violence in Kosovo. However, in Serbia nationalists protested sometimes violently against Kosovo’s independence and attacked numerous western embassies. From the very start it transpired that Kosovo would not be recognised by a number of states, including Serbia – for obvious reasons –, Russia, but also countries with minorities striving for their own independence like Spain or Cyprus (Falksohn and Flottau, 2008: 125).

Although Kosovo has now achieved its independence, it still depends heavily on the West to provide any sort of state authority. Kosovo does not possess its own police force, armed forces or even its own judges. In effect, Kosovo remains a ‘protectorate’ of the West, since they provide for almost
every state institution (Kreiler, 2009: 1). Although it can be argued that the overall situation in Kosovo will improve from now on, it remains clear that KFOR, and indeed the Bundeswehr contingent, will still be in demand to support Kosovo in its newly found independence.

The Political Debate on the Kosovo Crisis

Considering that this crisis was the first to see German troops participate in actual armed conflict since the end of WWII, it is not surprising that the political debate was a heated one. When analysing the Bundestag debates on the subject it quickly becomes clear that it revolved around three major issues: obligation to both NATO and the EU, the lawfulness of the operations and Germany’s past in the Balkans.

Analysing the debates surrounding the first combat deployment of German armed troops it has to be kept in mind that different from other armed forces, the Bundeswehr not only needs the government’s support but also the approval of the Bundestag (Parlamentarischer Rat, 2002: Article 115). Parliamentary debates therefore not only show the parliamentarians’ differing opinions which can then be largely ignored by the government, but are vital in the decision-making process of deploying troops abroad. Due to this central role these debates play in the process, it is important to analyse them.

When analysing the Bundestag debates on Kosovo one has to keep in mind the developments during the Kosovo crisis. Therefore the three main developments – as outlined earlier on in this chapter – and the parties’ individual reactions to these developments will be focused on here; first the decision to contribute to a possible NATO air operation (Operation “Allied
The reform of the *Bundeswehr* in context of a normalised German foreign and security policy

Force”), second the contribution to the security force for the OCSE inspectors and finally the stationing armed forces for humanitarian purposes in the area.

While discussing the contribution to a possible NATO aerial operation above Kosovo it becomes clear quickly that although German troops were already accustomed to peace-keeping – most notably as a contingent to SFOR – contributing to a possible combat operation was a different matter for parliament. Perhaps not surprisingly the right-of-the-centre CDU/CSU and the liberal FDP were most prepared to send the troops into combat as shall be outlined below.

*The CDU/CSU argumentation*

From the very start, the CDU/CSU made it clear that they would support NATO in its military campaign against Milosevic’s regime. Speaking as the outgoing Minister of Defence, Volker Rühe outlined what became the core of their argumentation.

Concentrating on the German *Bündnistreu*, i.e. Germany’s obligation to co-operate within the Alliance, he argued that Germany’s NATO partners were expecting the *Bundestag* to support the Alliance and form a unified front. This would also be “a clear sign of Germany’s solidarity”¹⁰ (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998k: 23134). Furthermore, any of Milosevic’s concession to the West had been achieved through the threat of force and it was therefore necessary to maintain it in order to prevent a continuation of the humanitarian disaster.

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¹⁰：“Dieser Beitrag ist militärisch notwendig und bedeutend. Er ist aber mehr als das: Er ist Ausdruck der Solidarität Deutschlands im Bündnis.”
As the debate continued in the Bundestag further arguments were voiced in support of NATO. More often, references to history surfaced, however not to German history what might have been expected but rather to the history of the Balkans. Christian Schwarz-Schilling was most vocal in this part arguing that a second Srebrenica was not to be allowed in Kosovo (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998v: 430).

On more judicial note party chairman Wolfgang Schäuble took on the role of defending NATO operations against claims voiced in the Bundestag that they were against international law. Although a UN mandate would help to legitimise NATO operations greatly, it was not obligatory since the overall goal was to secure and stabilise the region, which again is in accordance with the UN Charter. And since the UN Secretary General himself had talked of genocide, Schäuble argued that this in itself gives NATO the UN’s approval for military action (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999m: 2626).

As a final point in the CDU/CSU’s line of argument one needs to address the aspect of ‘ultima ratio’, i.e. the last resort. Throughout the debate members of the CDU/CSU argued that Milosevic was solely responsible for NATO having to resort to force since no other means would make him stop his campaign in Kosovo. After NATO had started its aerial campaign, Wolfgang Schäuble points out that the international community had no other option left than to apply the ‘ultima ratio’. This clear decision was necessary to maintain the West’s credibility in that “patience was not confused with fickleness”11 (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999g: 2575-2576).

11 “Aber es ist gut, notwendig und unausweichlich, daß am Ende Langmut nicht mit Wankelmut verwechselt werden durfte.”
In summary, the CDU/CSU’s line of argument focused primarily on Germany’s *Bündnistreu* and the resulting obligations to support NATO. In wanting to prevent a second Srebrenica they placed great importance on Germany’s responsibility to make up for past mistakes, not out of Germany’s WWII history but out of the rationale of not wanting to allow new atrocities. Although NATO acted without a UN mandate the CDU/CSU placed greater importance on the ends rather on the means and stabilising and bringing peace to the Balkans was an end in accordance with the UN Charter. Finally, NATO operations were only the last resort, but when Milosevic did not react to any other approach military action was the only way to end the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo with the West’s credibility intact.

**The FDP argumentation**

As the junior partner in the outgoing government at the beginning of the Kosovo crisis, the FDP’s position was very close to that of the CDU/CSU. In his opening statement the outgoing Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel (FDP) summarised the current situation. Arguing that Serbian President Milosevic would only be brought back to the negotiating table through the threat of force, he made a strong case for the combat operations.

Referring to Germany’s history, Kinkel argued that not in the past Germany had been liberated from tyranny by the use of external force and that judging from experiences made during the war in Bosnia, force would
be needed to bring an end to the Kosovo crisis (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998n: 23129-23131).

Taking another approach to legitimising contributing German personnel to NATO operations, party chairman Wolfgang Gerhardt pointed to the good reputation German soldiers enjoyed amongst their allies; this way he clearly aimed at weakening arguments that pointed to any atrocities German soldiers committed in the Balkans during WWII. Gerhardt also emphasised that for the FDP ending the current crisis – and with this protecting and upholding international law as well as human rights – was absolutely paramount, even if that meant doing it without a UN mandate (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998q: 23143).

In this debate Gerhardt took on a relatively tough stance regarding Milosevic’s regime which in turn made him a very clear supporter for NATO. Under no circumstances would he allow a “despot to ridicule Western democracies”¹² and ignore the lessons learned from the 20th century (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999f: 2426-2427).

Although speaking as party chairman, Wolfgang Gerhardt did not represent his party’s views fully, since numerous FDP members took a slightly less aggressive stance. The party’s foreign policy spokesman Ulrich Irmer placed more emphasis on Germany’s responsibility to work for peace in Europe in close conjunction with both the EU and NATO. Germany would be well advised to co-operate with its allies and not follow a new Sonderweg (special path). However, at the same time this development is not meant to be regarded as a militarisation of German foreign policy and

¹² „Niemals dürfen sie [freiheitlich verfasste Gesellschaften] Despoten erlauben, sie lächerlich zu machen, weil sie Skrupel haben“
that in fact a peaceful solution would be much preferred (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998s: 363). On the discussion regarding the missing UN mandate for legitimate military action, Irmer argued that a closer co-operation between NATO members and Russia would enable the UN Security Council to pass the much needed resolution, thus legitimising NATO operations (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999o: 3397).

The FDP therefore supported NATO operations and with this German contributions since these operations would help end the crisis in Kosovo. Milosevic only reacted to the threat of force and therefore NATO had to maintain this threat. Since force would defend international law and human rights, a UN mandate would have been preferred but was not entirely necessary. In contrast to the CDU/CSU however, members of the FDP argued that by bringing Russia back the negotiating table, this mandate could still be obtained. Similarly to the CDU/CSU, the FDP made only few references to German history but rather concentrated on the highlighting the experiences the international community had made in the past with Milosevic. Their main arguments therefore centred on protecting human rights and international law, rather than Bündnistreu or Germany’s troubled past with regards to military operations.

The SPD argumentation

Considering that both the FDP and the CDU/CSU had been supporters of the peace-keeping mission in Bosnia and the German contribution to SFOR, their policies towards resolving the crisis are not entirely new. However, the SPD argued along very similar lines.
Considering the severe opposition the SPD posed against the set-up of SFOR and Germany’s contribution to this mission, this support for NATO operations in Kosovo constituted a serious shift in the party’s foreign policy outlook. Speaking still as the Prime Minister of Lower Saxony and not yet as Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder (SPD) emphasised the need to stop the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo and to come to a political solution to the conflict. Supporting the preparation of NATO’s air operations was undisputable since the West could not stand by while human rights are being violated systematically, as it had done during Bosnia. Schröder therefore introduced a different obligation – not only to NATO but also to upholding democratic values – for Germany into the equation. He also highlighted Germany’s interest in a stable Balkans, pointing to the destabilising effect the refugees – some 300,000 at the time – had in the region (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998g: 23136).

He refused the validity of the argument that German soldiers should not be allowed to operate in the Balkans out of historical reasons. On the contrary, history demands that a democratic Germany would not ignore violations in that part of Europe (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998j: 23137). Schröder also makes it very clear that the lack of a clear UN mandate legitimising a military operation in Kosovo does not make NATO actions illegal, since NATO clearly refers to the UN resolution 1199 and Milosevic’s failure to comply with it. Seeing that for Schröder the sole authority for legitimising the use of force remains with the United Nations, NATO’s reference to the UN resolution to legitimise air strikes acts as a sufficient legal framework (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998m: 23137).
Similar to Schröder, the new Defence Minister Rudolph Schaar ping argued vehemently for NATO support to end the humanitarian crisis in the Balkans. In contrast to Schröder, however, Schar ping represented the more pragmatic members of his party by repeatedly pointing to the Serbian military build-up in the region and quoting the resulting refugee figures. This for Schar ping clearly showed that Milosevic would not respect any treaty he might sign (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999j: 2608). In addition to that, Schar ping was very much concerned with Germany’s Bündnisteue, especially towards NATO, highlighting the BMVg’s traditionally very pro-NATO stance.

Finally, the SPD’s then party chairman Peter Struck concentrated on the judicial questions regarding any NATO operations. He argued that such actions were legitimised, since they upheld international law and human rights. The missing UN mandate would have legitimised NATO actions further, but this would not prove to be necessary. Furthermore, the only reason that the UN Security Council had not been able to pass a resolution authorising NATO was that two UNSC members had chosen to veto it out of unrelated reasons (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999i: 2580). The respect for human rights would outweigh the respect for the veto of those two member states.

Overall, the SPD changed its foreign policy outlook dramatically from the previous years, when it was strictly opposed to contributing German troops to peace-keeping efforts in the Balkans. During the Kosovo crisis, the Schröder SPD argued in support for NATO’s operations mostly on humanitarian grounds. Helping to stabilise the region became paramount,
with issues such as *Bündnistreue* playing their part in the equation as well. With regards to the legitimacy of military action, the SPD questioned the UNSC’s decision on the ground that the two vetoes did not outweigh the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo.

**The Greens’ argumentation**

For the Greens the Kosovo Crisis was even more controversial considering their roots in the peace movement of the 1960s and 1970s. The question of military action in Kosovo tested the Green’s party cohesion, effectively splitting the party into two opposing camps: the “*Realos*” or realists led by Joschka Fischer who argued for intervention pointing to Germany’s international obligations and the “*Fundis*” or fundamentalists, mostly made up of the parties grass roots and traditionally green MPs such as Hans-Christian Ströbele, emphasising the pacifist tradition of the Green party and the anti-military tradition in German foreign policy. As it will become clear, both sides effectively used the same arguments but differed greatly in their interpretations.

The in-coming Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (Greens) argued along similar lines as his coalition partner the SPD placing emphasis on the moral and historical commitments, i.e. the need to halt the danger of an escalating war in Europe’s periphery and, referring to history – more the lessons learned from Bosnia, seldom Germany’s own past – Germany’s obligation to stop the genocide (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998p: 23142). Humanitarian considerations were at the very core of Fischer’s line of argument. However, in contrast to the previously discussed parties, from
The very start Fischer placed more importance on the role of non-military actors after the fighting had ended. NATO was necessary to end the crisis, but would have a limited role in its aftermath. Fischer much more preferred solutions centring on institutions such as the EU or the OSCE to perform this ‘civilian peace-keeping’ (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998r: 359).

Only when NATO started its aerial campaign did Fischer talk of Germany’s *Bündnistreu.* Arguing that Western core principles were being violated, Germany was right to act in conjunction with the international community, even if that meant resorting to military means as the ‘ultima ratio’ to prevent a second Bosnia. However, since this conflict took place in Europe, it was upon Europe to solve it, which again showed Fischer’s preference for the EU and the OSCE (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999h: 2584-2585).

The Greens’ party chairman Rezzo Schlauch neatly summed up the ‘*Realo*’ position during the Kosovo crisis when he argued that the traditional Green slogan of “No more war” should be changed into “No more genocide”, since that would leave the option for military intervention as a last resort to prevent genocide open (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999n: 2634).

Changing that slogan – and acting accordingly – was, however, not an option for the ‘*Fundies*’. They concentrated on the lack of legitimacy for military intervention due to the missing UN mandate and the traditionally peaceful German foreign policy.

Speaking for the fundamentalist wing of the party Ludger Volmer criticises his party chairman for confusing legitimacy and legality of any NATO action (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998e: 23151). Pointing to the lack of
a clear UN mandate for NATO to take action, he argues that NATO would create a precedent for others to ignore the United Nations as well, thus undermining its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Following the policy of deterrence would also close all diplomatic options, which were not explored to the last extent, since economic sanctions were not enforced rigorously enough and other option not even considered such as keeping Yugoslavia from participating in the 1998 Football World Cup since this would have been a very severe insult to the “megalomaniac dictator” (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998f: 23152).

Hans-Christian Ströbele argued along similar lines in that the NATO presence in the Balkans made it difficult for the Serbian leadership to agree to any peace treaty. A UN peace-keeping force would have been much more acceptable and would not have made a diplomatic solution more difficult (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999e: 1712).

After the start of NATO’s campaign Ströbele argued that although ignoring the situation in Kosovo was unacceptable, bombs do not solve the problem either – in fact the situation only worsened considering that more people were being killed and more refugees fled the region. Germany in particular should not be part of the operations considering the German atrocities in the region during WWII (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999k: 2612). Ströbele had clearly come to different conclusion with regards to German history than the members of the previously discussed factions in that he did not see Germany’s historic obligation to oppose violations of human rights and international law but rather concluded that Germany’s historic obligation was to prevent any wars with any peaceful means.
In essence this difference in conclusion caused the split within the Greens. Whereas the ‘Realos’ argued for the necessity of NATO’s humanitarian intervention as a last resort with Europeans stepping in afterwards to secure the peace, the ‘Fundis’ rejected any use of force out of the historical context.

**The PDS argumentation**

In the PDS the Green ‘Fundis’ had a staunch supporter in their argumentation against German contribution for a NATO intervention. The PDS’s party chairman, Gregor Gysi, placed the blame for the situation in Kosovo not only on Milosevic but also on the international community, arguing that since the Kosovo had lost its autonomy in 1989 it had been left on its own to deal with this situation, thus resulting in a state similar to that in Northern Ireland, the Basque Country or indeed Chechnya in that a militia has taken up the fight for independence (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998i: 23145).

Pointing to the humanitarian arguments put forward by the proponents of military action Gysi argues that military action cannot help ease the situation, only make it worse, since even the threat of force cause humanitarian aid organisations to leave the country. NATO action would only exacerbate an already bad situation since it would hinder aid organisations to help the people in the region. Deploying the Bundeswehr abroad did therefore not only contribute to worsening the situation, the PDS also opposed this because of historical reasons and out of concern that German foreign policy would be – again as prior to WWII – militarised. As a
core concern however, Gysi points to the lack of a UN mandate, the most important issue in this debate for this qualified lawyer (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998l: 23146).

As NATO acted without a legitimising UN mandate, this self-mandating process could cause a precedent for undermining the UN’s authority and with this the overall post-war world order. According to MP Uwe-Jens Heuer, the principle of “power before law” was irrevocably established in international relations (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998o: 23160).

Whereas previously examined factions had also at times criticised NATO for acting without the UN’s backing, the PDS argued that since only the UN can legitimise the use of force under very strict circumstances – none of which were given in Kosovo – NATO was infringing on another nation’s sovereignty and was therefore conducting a war of aggression. In this case Germany would not be allowed to contribute any troops, as the Grundgesetz only allows for the Bundeswehr to be deployed for defensive purposes. The advocates of military action were therefore not only in breach of international law but also in breach of the constitution (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998u: 364).

Even if Milosevic were to sign a peace treaty, this treaty would not be legally binding. As had been pointed out by numerous MPs, the purpose of the NATO build-up and operations was to force Milosevic to sign a peace treaty. By referring to civil law, Gysi explains that contracts made under the threat of force lose their legality and the same is true for international law (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999d: 1708).
On a less legal note, Gysi also addressed the humanitarian arguments put forward in the Bundestag debates. Since NATO actions had been justified by pointing to the on-going genocide in Kosovo, Gysi argued that NATO overlooked humanitarian violations within its own ranks – after all NATO member “Turkey had been organising a humanitarian catastrophe within its own borders for decades”13 (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999I: 2588). NATO therefore lacked the credibility due to its perceived double standards in this matter.

Also NATO would not contain this crisis, rather its involvement would destabilise the region as a whole. Countries such as Albania and Macedonia would be brought into the conflict since NATO would station its Extraction Force and other military personnel to help the OSCE verify the retreat of Serbian forces there, making those two countries vulnerable for Serbian attacks. Even though this verification mission was to be conducted with unarmed NATO aircrafts – a fact especially Joschka Fischer pointed out repeatedly – the PDS voiced severe concern about pulling the neighbouring countries into the essentially domestic conflict (Deutscher Bundestag, 1998I: 364).

In summary, the PDS’s position on the crisis in Kosovo centred very much on legal considerations, such as the missing UN backing as well as the Government’s breach of the Grundgesetz. The party did not follow the argument that NATO was acting out of humanitarian motives, since it had overlooked humanitarian violations within its own ranks for decades. For the PDS, NATO was therefore severely lacking credibility. As a final point they

13 “Die Türkei ist Mitglied der NATO und macht jetzt bei der Abwendung einer humanitären Katastrophe mit, während sie seit Jahrzehnten eine schlimme humanitäre Katastrophe im eigenen Land organisiert.”
were concerned with pulling in uninvolved countries such as Macedonia and Albania by stationing any military personnel there.

It has to be said at this point that although the debates in the Bundestag were unusually heated and centred on political, moral, legal and historical considerations, the debate amongst the general public was less controversial.

**The public debate on Kosovo**

As has been shown at the beginning of this chapter NATO’s combat operation ‘Allied Force’, was primarily an aerial campaign which took advantage of NATO’s air supremacy over Yugoslavia. The benefit of restricting the combat missions to air strikes was that it entailed the smallest possible risk for NATO personnel, thus keeping the casualties in its ranks low, while at the same time be able to use the aircrafts’ laser-guided missiles to minimise civilian casualties. Therefore by trying to keep the overall numbers of casualties down, national governments aimed at keeping the public support for the operation high.

This rationale also worked in Germany with the vast majority of the German population supporting the air campaign against Serbia in April 1999 (61%) as well as NATO’s position to continue the campaign until Milosevic has agreed to a ceasefire (57%) – the support for NATO’s position was even higher in former West Germany (65%). However, the already debated extension of the operation Allied Force to include ground forces was very much rejected by the public (68%) (Hilmer et al., 2011a: 1-3). German ground troops would most likely result in casualties which the German population is even less prepared for than other nationalities. The
zero-casualty objective issued by NATO (Boyer, 2002: 39) and the concentration on an air campaign was incremental for this relatively strong support.

The drawback for NATO of restricting itself to this single strategy was that it was effectively perceived as not being completely committed to protecting the Kosovo-Albanians since it would refuse to put its own troops (especially ground troops) into harm’s way. As Boyer points out, this ‘casualty-aversion syndrome’ reduced the overall effectiveness of Operation Allied Force as the desire to minimise losses ruled heavily protected Serbian military installations out as targets for air strikes (Boyer, 2002: 39).

Although the figures of public support seem to be relatively surprising given the traditional anti-war stance in the German society, it can be explained with the same main point already highlighted in the parliamentary debates, i.e. the need to prevent genocide on Europe’s doorstep. This was further supported by the fact that 68% of the population blamed the Serbian government for the escalation of the conflict (Hilmer et al., 2011a: 4).

The longer operation Allied Force went on, this support declined within only three months with only 51% supporting the campaign in May 1999 (Hilmer et al., 2011c: 1) and in June support dropped to only 47% (Hilmer et al., 2011b: 10). One could argue that the traditional anti-war stance had taken hold again and that the German population was beginning to reject the bombing campaign out of pacifist motives. However, the continuous media broadcasts showing not only air strikes on military targets but also Serbian civilian casualties is a more persuasive reason for this change in support.
Although support for Operation Allied Force was diminishing amongst the population this does not mean that Germany saw many anti-war demonstrations. Rather, the longer NATO’s operation went on the less interested did the German public become. Most Germans took on the role of spectators who followed the war from the comfort of their homes but did no longer get engaged in the matter. It can therefore be said that the German population developed a certain benign indifference towards the Bundeswehr. However difficult this is for the soldiers involved, the overall lack of a public debate shows that the German public too had come to realise the need for international intervention in Kosovo (Clement, 2010: 4-5).

Although this benign indifference is helpful in determining the acceptance of out-of-area operations amongst the general public, it has severe effects on the soldiers. Only around 10% of soldiers feel they are supported in their jobs by the public while only some 4% feel supported by the politicians who sent them on the operation in the first place (Strohmeier, 2007: 47-51). This shows that although Germans seemed to have come to terms with the need for international interventions in general, they did not engage in a public debate about what the first combat operation of German troops post WWII actually meant. This lack of debate also had consequences for the military operation in Kosovo itself.

In the case of Germany, the consequences for the military highlighted a factor which was almost irrelevant to its allies. The question was whether the Bundeswehr would be able to take on the following task of contributing to the peace-keeping force that would have to stabilise the
region after the aerial campaign had been concluded. Although the Bundeswehr had already gathered some experience in this field in Bosnia, the extremely tense situation in Kosovo would add another difficulty to the general mix of peace-keeping missions.

In the light of preparing for KFOR and assessing its overall objectives it quickly became clear that the Bundeswehr lacked the training in some core elements. Peace-keeping missions would demand a different set of skills as the traditional territorial defence. In essence, troops now had to be able to prevent the use of force whereas they originally been trained to execute force in a defensive scenario (Clement, 2004: 2). In order to compensate for these missing skills, the Bundeswehr adopted new training courses to better prepare the troops for this new scenario they would encounter in Kosovo. These courses incorporated local cultural studies as well as local history and customs to provide a better understanding of the local population. The military part of these new training programs concentrated very much on de-escalating a tense situation and, should that prove impossible, resorting to the use of force. This was uncharted territory for the Bundeswehr and therefore the effectiveness of these training courses were untested and would have to be evaluated during the actual mission (Clement, 2010: 8). This situation can hardly be called ideal.

Not only were the actual troops relatively unprepared for the mission, the Bundeswehr also faced considerable problems in organisational terms. As has been outlined in Chapter 3, the Bundeswehr had already undergone profound reform since 1990 and by 1999 it had been divided into two main components; the Krisenreaktionskräfte (KRK) and the
**Hauptverteidigungskräfte** (HVK), of which the first was specifically designed to tackle out-of-area missions whereas the latter would support the KRK logistically as well as maintain a defensive readiness (territorial defence was still the primary task of the Bundeswehr – see Chapter 3).

In the case of Kosovo, the KRK was the component that would be charged with contributing to KFOR as well as maintaining its presence in Germany’s other already running peace-keeping mission in Bosnia SFOR. Considering the KRK was only some 50,000 troops strong and the overall contingent for both missions in the Balkans totalled some 12,000, the KRK was very close to being overstretched. It has to be noted here, that the total number of troops for any mission needs to be multiplied by three, since while one contingent is involved with the current mission, another contingent is already preparing to take over and the last contingent is in the follow-up process or simply regenerating. In the case of specialist personnel, such as engineers and medical staff, the Bundeswehr was severely overstretched resulting in these specialists having to cope with the biggest strain. However, not only the KRK was experiencing difficulties but also the HVK was having problems supporting the contingents as the actual amount of support had been underestimated while setting up this structure.

Needless to say that the HVK had to shift its priorities in order to keep up with the demand which resulted in neglect of other tasks, primarily in training (Clement, 2010: 8).

Finally, the Bundeswehr displayed some shortcomings in organising the first contingents for KFOR. General Klaus Reinhardt, NATO’s commanding officer of the second KFOR contingent (KFOR II), made his
fair share of experiences when preparing for his takeover of KFOR command. KFOR I had set up its headquarter in temporary accommodations, which had served it well. But since KFOR II would operate during the winter, Reinhardt was very much concerned to acquire something sturdier. Also, Reinhardt had to cope with the fact that he would have to organise his own command and control equipment since the British troops responsible for this during KFOR I would return home and, more importantly, take their equipment with them (Reinhardt, 2002: 31).

Although he succeeded in acquiring the above mentioned equipment, he still lacked much needed transportation, especially helicopters and a plane to travel to Germany or NATO for strategic meetings. He argues that this seriously damaged his effectiveness as a military commander as getting to these meetings took much longer than necessary, thus wasting time. And since both his predecessor and his successors were all provided with a plane by their respective governments, Reinhardt’s situation caused some irritation amongst the NATO partners (Reinhardt, 2002: 33). Considering this was the most senior officer in Kosovo, the situation for lower ranks was most likely even worse.

However, this only highlights one of Reinhardt’s main points of criticism during the preparation of KFOR II, that he was not fully supported by the political decision-makers in Bonn. When consulting Rudolf Scharping regarding the political future of the Kosovo, he was told to concentrate on the military leadership of his troops and not get involved in politics. Considering the complex goals of KFOR (see beginning of this chapter), this piece of advice would be difficult at best to follow and more importantly
would keep KFOR II from supporting any long-time political developments, thus limiting its effectiveness (Reinhardt, 2002: 35). This episode, however, nurtures the feeling of many soldiers that the politicians send them on a mission without really offering the necessary support which would translate into adequate equipment and operational planning.

In summary, it has become clear that NATO’s politically motivated strategy to keep casualties to a minimum though successful, diminished the effectiveness of the air strikes. However, the core military debate in Germany centred on the main question whether the Bundeswehr would be able to fulfil its tasks. The Bundeswehr had to overcome considerable difficulties in structure, equipment and organisation to be able to contribute to KFOR and, as can be seen in the changes made with the armed forces afterwards, has learned from these experiences.

**Summary**

KFOR’s mission was to stabilise and secure Kosovo, to allow refugees to return to their homes. Furthermore, it should help to establish a peaceful co-existence between the Albanian majority and the Serbian minority. Depending on the definition of ‘secure’ and ‘stable’ one can argue that KFOR succeeded. The Serbian attacks against the Kosovo Albanians were stopped by Operation Allied Force and KFOR’s presence has prohibited any further atrocities. In fact, in can be argued that Kosovo’s independence guarantees security and stability for future generations since it eliminates the cause of ethnic conflict within the single state of Serbia. In this light, KFOR will be able to reduce its numbers rather quickly.
However, the incidents during 2004 clearly show that Kosovo is still not a stable region. Considering the relatively small cause that lead to large scale riots, one can see that tensions still run deep amongst the population. Seeing it from this perspective, KFOR has not succeeded in securing Kosovo and more importantly has not been able to provide for a peaceful co-existence between Serbs and Albanians. However, as of 2010, pulling KFOR out of Kosovo has not appeared on any agenda, KFOR will remain in Kosovo giving it ample opportunity to complete its mission.

The mission in Kosovo has shown that although parliamentarians in general have come to terms with the idea of Germany being a more assertive player in international relations, this change in attitude did not come easily with the reasons for this change differing amongst the individual parties, ranging from the importance of Bündnistreue to Germany’s special responsibilities to stop genocide in Europe. The different reasons for the parliamentary support of the mission thus resulted in a very strict Bundestag mandate compromising on the different politicians’ perceptions, limiting the Bundeswehr in its ability to react to unforeseen developments and thus inhibiting its efficiency. Furthermore, considering that the interpretations of the Bundeswehr tasks within KFOR differed amongst parliamentarians the Bundeswehr was lacking important equipment necessary to fulfil the eventual tasks, as exemplified by the shortage of command and control equipment.

Similarly, the general public supported the government in this course, at least initially. Both operation Allied Force and NATO’s uncompromising position towards the Serbian leadership resonated well
amongst the German population. With the continuation of hostilities and the growing number of reports about civilian casualties in spite of high-tech missiles the mood shifted resulting in a loss of support for the mission. And although the air campaign was at first strongly supported, a possible deployment of ground forces was rejected from the start. This clearly shows that Germans saw the need for intervention yet at the same time were not prepared to take the risks that go hand in hand with military operations. This was not a purely ‘civilian’ point of view as NATO Command itself was very much interested to stick to aerial bombardment as long as possible to minimise the risk of NATO casualties. Although this was very understandable it limited the options for the military planners.

What the mission in Kosovo also highlighted was that once the initial combat operations had been completed and the population had gotten accustomed to the idea of German planes contributing to a combat operation, the general public developed a benign indifference towards the operation and the *Bundeswehr* in general. Although this is rather alarming in itself it becomes worse as this benign indifference is also transferred to the public’s representatives in the *Bundestag* which then can have an impact on funding and adequate equipment. Since members of the armed forces openly criticise this lack of support it shows that this is of serious concern for them.

Germany’s contribution to KFOR was thus inhibited in its effectiveness by a mandate which basically represented the lowest common denominator of the different positions on the subject. Added to this the benign indifference ensured that operational problems were not
addressed adequately by decision makers in the Bundestag. The effect of this limited Bundeswehr efficiency was that although KFOR has been perceived as an overall success, Germany’s Bündnisfähigkeit was in fact damaged. How reliable a partner is Germany if it inhibits its armed forces to conduct the mission as efficiently as possible?

Whereas Kosovo was still a moderately unproblematic operation the Bundeswehr would soon be presented with a new mission, which since 2002 has taken away some of the attention from KFOR. With the ousting of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the international reconstruction effort the Bundeswehr has been sent to a more distant and also more dangerous area. The following chapter will therefore analyse Germany’s contribution to ISAF to see how the reformed Bundeswehr fares under more dangerous circumstances.
Chapter 5 – The Bundeswehr in Afghanistan

“Some time ago I spoke of „Defence at the Hindu Kus ch“. In fact, today defence does not only incorporate defending the national borders whereas territorial defence must remain possible. What we need is defence appropriate for these times, […] That is why our military commitment in Afghanistan is not only indispensable because we help the people in that oppressed country to have a perspective for their future after decades of war. Rather it is in our very own security interest to deprive international terrorism, which threatens all of us directly, of its important hiding places and training grounds”\textsuperscript{14}. – Peter Struck (Struck, 2003: 5)

The Kosovo Crisis was the first out-of-area mission for the Bundeswehr which featured actual combat operations. It was therefore a significant point in the development of the Bundeswehr from the traditionally defensive force to a tool for armed intervention. However, only three years after Kosovo, the Bundeswehr was sent outside the boundaries of Europe initially as support for the nation building of Afghanistan in 2002.

This chapter will study the Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan under the same criteria set out in the previous chapter, i.e. the actual mission objectives, the number and nature of troops deployed, the nature of the equipment deployed, the command structure of the mission and the financial commitment by the Federal Government. It will also give a summary of the developments during its already eight years of duration and conclude with a brief evaluation of the mission. In doing so, it will be

possible to determine as to how well the *Bundeswehr* has been prepared for its first non-European intervention.

It has to be noted at this point, that this chapter will concentrate on Germany’s contribution to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), since the *Bundeswehr*’s involvement in the US-led Operation “Enduring Freedom” (OEF), which aims at combating international terrorism in general, is limited to naval patrols at the Horn of Africa.

**The Context of ISAF**

Any study of ISAF and Germany’s contribution to this mission will have to start with the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. Islamic terrorists succeeded in taking over four commercial airplanes and crashed two of them into the Twin Towers, one into the Pentagon and one missed its target and crashed into a field in Maryland with a combined death toll of some 3,000. These attacks shocked the world and caused widespread support and solidarity with the United States, who immediately set out to identify those responsible for this attack.

Not long thereafter, the terrorist organisation Al-Qaeda and its head Osama Bin Laden were blamed for 9/11. Since both the organisation and its leader were harboured by in Afghanistan, preparations were made primarily by the United States to free this country from its Taliban regime. By late 2001 US forces in conjunction with the Afghan Northern Alliance – a sizable group which had traditionally been opposed to the Taliban regime – succeeded in ousting the Taliban (NATO, 2009a: 1). This opened the path
for the international community to engage in rebuilding Afghanistan with the overall goal to rid Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups from this safe haven.

During the Petersberg Conference of December 2001 – named after a hill near Bonn on which the German government maintains a conference centre – the largest ethnic groups of Afghanistan and representatives from Western states agreed on ‘provisional regulations in Afghanistan up to the re-establishment of a permanent government’ (Presse- und Informationszentrum Einsatzführungskommando der Bundeswehr, 2009b: 2). This agreement forms the basis of the United Nations Resolution 1386, which authorises the establishment of an ‘International Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment’ (United Nations, 2001: 2). The Bundeswehr has been part of ISAF from the very start stationing some 1,200 troops in Kabul under ISAF command (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001c: 4). With the further development of ISAF, the German contingent took over responsibility for Northern Afghanistan (Regional Command North – RC North) and established its bases in Feyzabad, Kunduz and Mazar-e Sharif.

**Objectives of ISAF**

As already pointed out, the UN Security Council’s resolution 1386 defines the overall objective for ISAF, i.e. to assist the Afghan Interim Authority (later the Afghan government) in the establishment of a secure and stable environment. Although this appears to be a rather straightforward mission objective, it in fact breaks down to a series of objectives. In
order to achieve security in Afghanistan ISAF is tasked training and supporting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) – comprised by both the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). Training in conducted using ISAF’s Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs), which are embedded in ANA units. The OMLTs join those units once they have undergone basic training at the Kabul Military Training Centre (KMTC). This way, a large number of troops can be trained and brought to operational readiness in a relatively short period of time (NATO, 2009e: 2).

Similarly, the ANP is supported by ISAF primarily on the tactical and planning level to better be suited for taking on policing tasks on its own. Most importantly, the ANP in conjunction with ISAF is involved in the disarming illegally armed groups (DIAGs) and in engaging in counter-narcotics operations, thus attempting to make Afghanistan more secure.

Security is also the main concern of ISAF’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). These joint civilian and military teams provide much needed reconstruction and development (R&D) throughout their allocated areas, with the civilian part being responsible for the actual R&D, while the military secures the civilian effort (NATO, 2009e: 4). R&D however, encompasses more than just building schools and wells (although that is an important aspect of it); it also incorporates political / diplomatic, economic, humanitarian and social work thus assisting the central Afghan Government to address more readily the population’s needs. In summary, the PRTs overall tasks include but are not limited to the building of irrigation ditches, pipelines, reservoirs, building and repairing infrastructure to improve
mobility and communication and medical services for the local population (NATO, 2009e: 4).

ISAF’s approach to achieving the overall objective of securing and stabilising Afghanistan is therefore a two track approach. On the one hand ISAF trains and assists the ANSF to provide security from remnant Taliban fighters or insurgents while at the same time attempting to win over the population by improving its overall situation.

**German Military Deployment in Afghanistan**

German deployment in Afghanistan has been subjected to considerable change since the first *Bundeswehr* troops set foot in Kabul in December 2001. The mandate has been widened over the years to account for the developments in Afghanistan but also to enable the *Bundeswehr* to shoulder new tasks in the region.

Initially Germany sent 1,200 troops to Kabul to help the Afghan Interim Authority and UN personnel work in a safe environment. Their mandate clearly set out the tasks of the *Bundeswehr* in Kabul which encompassed the actual logistical effort to get to and out of Afghanistan (including preparations for self evacuation in case of an emergency), self protection as well as securing Kabul and its immediately surrounding area. For this, the initial contingent was made up from mostly infantry forces, supported by helicopters, logistical forces (including air transport) as well as liaison personnel for the international headquarters and regional organisations. The forces were authorised to make use of military force, to fulfil the mission set out in the UNSR’s resolution 1386. This did not infringe
on their right to act in self-defence or in conducting armed help for third parties (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001b: 3-4).

German forces were restricted to the area in and around the city of Kabul. German forces were allowed into other areas only under very specific circumstances, including talks for co-ordinating efforts with locals and for logistical reasons. The overall financial burden for this operation was estimated to be some 340 million Euros for the first six months. Compared to the initial costs of the Kosovo Crisis, this is remarkably high, showing the greater difficulties of logistics, i.e getting everything to Kabul (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001a: 4).

In June 2002, the Federal Government pressed for a continuation of Germany’s contribution to ISAF. Although the actual framework of the first mandate was not changed considerably, it is interesting to note that the limit of troop numbers was to be put up by another 200, albeit be it only as a temporary measure. The Government needed those extra troops to secure the Afghan Emergency Loya Jirga, an assembly which would establish the interim government. The Federal Government had already sent an additional 80 troops for this purpose without the consent of the Bundestag, which was expected to approve at a later time (Deutscher Bundestag, 2002a: 1). This clearly shows that firm security had not yet been established to such an extent that Afghan officials could gather without the fear of terrorist attacks. On the financial front, the overall costs were to be around 96 million Euros, a clear drop in costs once the troops and their equipment were in place (Deutscher Bundestag, 2002b: 1).
With the United Nations Security Council’s resolution 1510 (2003), ISAF was authorised to expand its area of influence to the whole of Afghanistan stressing “the importance of extending central government authority to all parts of Afghanistan, of comprehensive disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of all armed factions, and of security sector reform including reconstitution of the new Afghan National Army and Police” (United Nations, 2003: 1). In effect, ISAF was still charged with the same tasks as set out above, yet now the whole of Afghanistan was its responsibility.

In line with this, the Federal Government secured the agreement of the Bundestag to take over the PRT Kunduz in Northern Afghanistan in addition to the on-going commitment in Kabul. This also meant that the Bundeswehr would need more personnel if it were to take on this new task. It is therefore not surprising that the Bundesregierung increased the overall number of troops to 2,250, almost twice as many as had been stationed initially in Kabul. Interestingly enough though only some 450 of those 2,250 were assigned to the PRT Kunduz, which in turn means that the contingent in Kabul was strengthened by some 600 troops through the backdoor, a build-up that would cost some 233.6 million Euros for the next twelve months (Deutscher Bundestag, 2003b: 2).

2003 also saw a change in command since NATO assumed leadership over ISAF and brought to an end the six-month national rotation of command. This way ISAF became more effective since the search for a new lead nation every six months, combined with setting up a new headquarter each time, was abandoned with NATO becoming responsible
for all issues related to command, co-ordination and planning. This also had another positive side effect since now smaller states which were less likely to assume the role of lead nation were enabled to play a more dominant role in the new multilateral headquarters (NATO, 2009e: 6).

This change of command is also reflected in the Bundesregierung’s motion of 2003 to continue operations in Afghanistan. It clearly states that ISAF is now under the command of NATO, which in turn means that the Bundeswehr contingent is under NATO command as well, a situation the German military is very well accustomed to (Deutscher Bundestag, 2003a: 3).

In 2005 the Federal Government motioned to increase the overall number of troops, this time to a total of 3,000 to be stationed both in Kunduz and Kabul. Their mandate also included a clause which would allow the government to station them in other areas temporarily for the purpose of expanding ISAF’s area of influence. The Bundesregierung estimated the overall costs of the ISAF contribution to be some 318.8 million Euros, which were already covered in the budget (Deutscher Bundestag, 2005c: 3). The same motion also highlights Germany’s approach to the increasingly disturbing problem of drug production in Afghanistan. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC) “Opium Survey” of 2004, the continuation of excessive opium poppy cultivation posed a grave threat to the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. Although ISAF’s mission objectives include counter-narcotics (see above), the Bundesregierung emphasises that combating opium production in Afghanistan is not part of the Bundeswehr mandate. It is rather the Bundeswehr’s objective to provide
a secure environment in which Afghan counter-narcotic forces can be trained which will then engage this problem themselves (Deutscher Bundestag, 2005a: 8). It can be argued that the Bundesregierung did not want to provoke repercussions from the drug producing parties in Afghanistan, which would have endangered the German troops on the ground. Although by helping in training the ANSF in counter-narcotics the Bundeswehr acted in accordance with the overall ISAF mandate, this issue caused a rift amongst the international community since some nations, like the Great Britain, took a much more active stance on this.

By 2007, the Bundeswehr’s centre of operation was concentrated even further in Northern Afghanistan by assuming command over additional bases for new PRTs in Faisabad and Mazar-e Sharif, the latter also becoming the base for the six RECCE Tornado aircrafts and their maintenance crew of some 500. NATO had requested additional reconnaissance capacities for Afghanistan to improve the alliance’s overall picture of ongoing operations. Their task is to monitor ISAF patrols, operation areas of PRTs as well as identify enemy emplacements and movements (BMVg, 2008: 1-2). In 2007 these Tornados are therefore the only German units operating not only in the north, which lead to some heated discussions in the Bundestag, which will be examined in the following chapter.

In addition to providing a base for the RECCE Tornados, Mazar-e Sharif is also home to the Deployment Squadron Mazar-e Sharif (Einsatzgeschwader – EinsG MeS). This unit has a number of responsibilities some which are logistical support for ISAF, medical
evacuation (MedEvac), handling passenger and cargo traffic, monitoring the 11km air control zone around Mazar-e Sharif with German and Afghan air traffic controllers as well as providing runway emergency maintenance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) (BMVg, 2009b: 2).

In order to be able to provide these additional capabilities, the German contingent would have to be enlarged yet again from 3000 by 500 to 3500 in total. Since those extra 500 troops are primarily assigned to the EinsG MeS in Mazar-e Sharif, the PRT in Kunduz was not reinforced and the PRT in Faisalabad was staffed with troops made available by limiting contributions to Kabul to a bare minimum. Again, this new build-up is also reflected in the financial costs of the contribution, which had arrived at some 487 million Euros in 2007 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2007: 1-3).

However controversial the Bundesregierung’s decision to provide the RECCE Tornados to ISAF was, in 2008 the then Minister of Defence Dr. Franz Josef Jung announced that the Bundeswehr was to take over NATO’s Quick Reaction Force (QRF) from Norway. This special force was to be designed to take on operations all over Afghanistan – similar to the Tornados – including patrols, security operations, evacuations, combat search and rescue and combat operations in conjunction with the ANSF. It was also intended as a tactical reserve should they be needed during any ongoing ISAF operation (Deutscher Bundestag, 2008c: 2). In effect, QRF is a highly mobile combat force for quick operation throughout Afghanistan. Again, the debates revolving around this topic were very controversial and shall be discussed in the subsequent chapter.
Considering the combat orientated nature of the QRF’s missions, it is hardly surprising that the Bundesregierung assigned troops from combat units to the force, namely making use of mechanised infantry, paratroopers and up to eight members of the special forces. Their equipment encompassed armoured vehicles of various types, depending on the actual mission parameters as well as access to the six helicopters stationed in Mazar-e Sharif (Deutscher Bundestag, 2008d: 2).

Apart from assuming the responsibility of QRF, the 2008 Bundestag mandate featured another major change; that of overall troop numbers, which were again raised by a considerable figure. Whereas in 2007 some 3,500 German soldiers served in Afghanistan, one year later that number was increased by another 1,000 to 4,500. This was deemed necessary due to the additional tasks taken on by the Bundeswehr, including QRF but more importantly because of an increased need to train more ANSF in the run-up to the 2009 presidential election. Again, the enlarged budgetary commitment to ISAF of some 688.1 million Euros reflect that troop build-up (Deutscher Bundestag, 2008a: 4-6).

**ISAF’s Command Structure**

Since Germany’s contribution to ISAF is under the command of NATO, it is now necessary to analyse the structure the Alliance has set up for ISAF. It has to be said here, that the structure discussed here is not the original structure which was in place in 2003, when NATO assumed command over the mission. Originally NATO used a structure similar to its Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. Although this worked well at the beginning, this structure could no longer cope with a mission that has grown from an
initial strength of 19,600 to more than 60,000 troops today (NATO, 2009b: 1).

NATO directs ISAF from its Allied Command Operations (ACO), based within Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Brussels, which provides the overall command for ISAF. Its subordinate office is the Allied Joint Force Command (JFC) in Brunssum, The Netherlands, which is responsible for the day-to-day operational planning as well as providing for force commanders and headquarters. The higher operational headquarters, ISAF HQ, situated in Kabul, is headed by a 4-star US general (COMISAF), who focuses on the strategic political-military aspect of ISAF, co-ordinating ISAF operations with the Afghan authorities or other international organisations as well as also taking on the role of the Commander of US Forces in Afghanistan (NATO, 2009b: 1). This allows for a closer co-ordination between ISAF and the US-led “Operation: Enduring Freedom” (OEF). Although due to the double role of the COMISAF, this role will always be filled with an US commander, the headquarter as such draws its staff from both NATO members and nations contributing to ISAF (NATO, 2009c: 1).

The COMISAF is a direct superior to the commander of the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A), the Special Operations Forces (SOF) and the commander of ISAF Joint Command (IJC)

It is IJC which is responsible for executing all the tactical operations throughout Afghanistan on a day-to-day basis. Its commander (COMIJC) is also responsible for the five individual Regional Commands (RCs), the
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subordinate PRTs and for co-ordinating ISAF and ANSF operations (NATO, 2009b: 1).

The PRTs as such are structured to provide a command and control headquarter (C2) as well as a forward support base (FSB) to serve as a logistics and medical hub for the PRTs in the respective region (NATO, 2009d. 1). This also means that apart from the actual forces necessary to fulfil ISAF’s core tasks, any lead nation of a PRT would also have to supply the troops to operate their FSB.

![Figure 11: ISAF Command Structure](image)

Although ISAF’s command structure is relatively straight forward considering the size of the operation, it does not explicitly show any national...
how national considerations are incorporated. These considerations will on
the most part not actually influence NATO’s ISAF policy, yet they will
revolve around which units in particular to send and which commanders to
use.

In the case of Germany, these considerations are made within
branch of the Armed Forces Support (SKB – see chapter 3). More
specifically, the Bundeswehr set up its own ‘mission control’, the
Einsatzzführungskommando (EinsFüKdoBw) near the city of Potsdam in
2001. This Mission Command Centre co-ordinates the planning with the
units in question and other national headquarters and monitors the
execution of all of the Bundeswehr’s missions. It processes all the requests
from the individual contingents ranging from personnel to equipment
questions (Presse- und Informationszentrum Einsatzzführungskommando
der Bundeswehr, 2009a: 6). Taking the chain of command illustrated below
into account, it becomes clear that national military decisions only take
influence on a relatively low level of the ISAF command structure. The
national contingent receives its orders from both the EinsFüKdoBw and the
multinational headquarters, in the case of ISAF, IJC, whereas the
EinsFüKdoBw is primarily concerned with providing the contingent with
what they need to fulfil the orders coming from IJC (Presse- und
Informationszentrum Einsatzzführungskommando der Bundeswehr, 2009a:
7).
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Figure 12: Germany’s national Mission Command Structure

**Developments in Afghanistan**

As seen during the discussion of the German deployment, the *Bundeswehr’s* contingent has been increased steadily from the original 1,200 to 4,500 troops. Also, the area of deployment has shifted from the city of Kabul to the bases in Kunduz, Faisabad and Mazar-e Sharif in the north of Afghanistan. These shifts, however, cannot be adequately explained without discussing the overall developments in the country.

From the beginning, the *Bundeswehr* contribution to the stability of Afghanistan had been labelled as dangerous, yet necessary to the security of Germany. The then Minister of Defence Peter Struck famously claimed that Germany is also defended at the Hindu Kusch, thus describing this operation more as an act of national defence rather than an act of intervention (Weiland, 2002: 2).

However, after scarcely three months, the general public became aware as to how dangerous ISAF can be for the *Bundeswehr*, when in March 2002 two German soldiers were killed and more injured while
attempting to disarm an old Russian missile. Although it had been claimed that this was an accident at first, evidence soon surfaced that Taliban insurgents had rigged the missile (Spiegel Online, 2009b: 1). In this incidence, ISAF in general and the German contribution to it in particular took a heavy blow in their public support after only a very short time, because it had become clear that Afghanistan would be far more dangerous than had been anticipated.

The Taliban and their al-Qaeda allies would not surrender easily and continued attacking ISAF forces, without distinguishing between the contributing nations. This effectively meant that Bundeswehr troops were just as in danger as their US or British counterparts, a fact that was reported on widely (Spiegel Online, 2009d: 1). The Bundesregierung reassured the public regularly that the north of Afghanistan is comparatively safe, thus setting the whole Bundeswehr mission into perspective with what other nations were enduring. However, although between 2002 and 2007 the 21 German soldiers killed in Afghanistan cannot be compared to the number of casualties from the United States or the UK, they were enough to raise questions regarding the ISAF contribution within Germany (Spiegel Online, 2009c: 1).

This inequality in carrying the burden of stabilising Afghanistan caused severe discontent amongst other ISAF nations, most notably those assigned to the much more violent south, where the Taliban had established a strong foothold. When ISAF HQ started planning to assign German troops to the south in 2006 – since German troops were by that time under direct NATO command, this was militarily possible – German
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Minister of Defence Franz Josef Jung soon mirrored the general bewilderment in Berlin. The *Bundeswehr* had just taken responsibility for RC(N), surely NATO could not expect more. In addition to that, the *Bundestag* mandate passed in 2005 also stated that German Troops could be used temporarily in other areas than the north (Deutscher Bundestag, 2005b: 3). Legally, NATO had all the rights to re-assign at least some of the German troops and still be in compliance with Berlin’s mandate. When information about these plans leaked to the opposition in the *Bundestag* the continuation of the *Bundeswehr* mission in Afghanistan was endangered (Wittrock, 2009: 2). Interestingly, the *Bundestag’s* mandate for 2007 included the deployment of the RECCE Tornado aircrafts which was later followed by Germany taking over NATO’s QRF from Norway. Since both the Tornados and the QRF are used across Afghanistan this can be interpreted as a bargain struck by the *Bundesregierung* to keep its troops in the comparatively safe north.

These external factors helped to make the *Bundeswehr’s* commitment the most controversial one in its history, self-made scandals contributed to this considerably. In late 2006, photographs of soldiers taken in 2003 desecrating remains they had found while on patrol, caused widespread disgust and even more concern for the safety of the soldiers currently stationed in Afghanistan. These photos, which were also widely broadcast in the Arab world, severely damaged the image of the *Bundeswehr* as an organisation wanting to help the Afghan people (Spiegel Online, 2009h: 1-2).
This image was again damaged in 2009, when the commander of the PRT in Kunduz ordered an air strike against two tanker lorries which had been stolen by the Taliban. During this attack up to 140 people were killed, most of them civilians. The exact number of dead varied from no civilian casualties – claimed by the German government – to over 170 as claimed by Afghan locals. The following investigation soon showed that the commander had not followed NATO rules and ordered the air strike with insufficient intelligence (Gebauer, 2009: 1-2).

More importantly however, the by then former Minister of Defence Jung – after the general election he had become Labour Minister – came under attack for having deceived the Bundestag and the public about the true number of casualties by withholding reports while still being in office. Even his successor in the BMVg, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg was unaware of these procedures. Since he had claimed that the attack was militarily sound only days before, he was taken under attack just as well. By late November, Jung resigned from the Cabinet, but his ‘information blunder’ had already damaged the Bundeswehr both at home and abroad (Spiegel Online, 2009g: 1).

The Political Debate on Afghanistan

When taking into consideration the political debate on Afghanistan, one has to keep in mind that this mission is a direct result of the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington D.C. It is therefore necessary to not only look at the parliamentary debates on the actual ISAF mission, but also include the debates during the run-up. It is after all the reactions to 9/11...
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which set the stage for the following discourse and Germany’s role in Afghanistan as part of the war on terror.

Similarly to the debates on Kosovo, the debates on the Bundeswehr deployment need to be examined due to their core importance within the decision-making process. However, with these debates are especially significant due to Chancellor Schröder’s decision to link the vote of Bundeswehr deployment to a parliamentary vote of no confidence (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001d: 1), in order to keep his traditionally anti-militaristic Green coalition partner in line along with some of his own party members that did not support a Bundeswehr deployment in Afghanistan.

The SPD’s argumentation

Speaking on September 12, 2001, Chancellor Schröder lost no time in declaring Germany’s “unrestricted solidarity with the American people”, thus setting the tone for the up-coming debate on Germany’s role. Included in this declaration was the promise to grant the United States any help they would ask for. The reasoning behind these bold statements for Schröder was that the previous day terrorists had not only attacked the United States but rather the “whole civilised world” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001k: 18293).

On a similar note, the SPD’s party whip Peter Struck saw the attacks as a “declaration of war on the civilised world” which had to be answered in unity with the Americans, since on that day we were, as he put it “all Americans” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001j: 18295). As a first reaction this shows that the SPD as the senior partner in the Red/Green Coalition emphasised the government’s strong commitment to the transatlantic
relationship, even though they did not know what future problems could result from these early strong statements.

Following the arguments of being collectively attacked by a terrorist group, Schröder underlined the close relationship between Germany and the United States, pointing to America's continuous solidarity with Europe and Germany in particular since 1945. After all, it was the Americans who had played a substantial role in defeating Nazi Germany, in protecting West Germany during the Cold War and finally during the re-unification process.

Although this historic argument was important to Schröder he quickly continues to argue that gratitude cannot be the sole motivator for German policy after 9/11. More importantly, Germany would jeopardise its future standing in a free world by being isolated in not supporting the fight against terrorism (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001o: 18301-18302). Seeing that the United Nations had classified the attacks as threat to world peace and NATO had invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Germany's obliged to act in conjunction with the international community, especially since there would be no doubt about the lawfulness of international actions, as there had been during the Kosovo Crisis.

Therefore, Schröder points out that any contribution Germany would be asked to make could include a military element, which he was willing to submit as long as it was in accordance with the Grundgesetz and the Bundestag. Germany would be willing to take risks, but not embark on adventures. However, to concentrate solely on military operations would fall short of combating the source of terrorism, a task that would require a
global concept depending on political, economic and cultural co-operation on international level (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001s: 18302).

Peter Struck argued that Germany would need to act decisively and not just be a spectator in this up-coming fight. In fact, it would be in Germany’s own interest to take an active part, since terrorism would not pass Europe or indeed Germany. To act against terrorism would therefore be in Germany’s security interest (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001v: 18307). Since Article 5 had been invoked, Germany was bound to support its allies or risk becoming isolated in the future. Considering that the United Nations had already paved the way for lawful intervention, Struck called for a decisive strike against the terrorist networks, which would include but not be limited to military means with the United Nations in the centre (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001n: 18308).

However important the fight abroad was, fighting terrorism would also have to take place at home, discovering terrorist cells in German cities while at the same time securing the large number of Muslims living in Germany from becoming a target of general suspicion. The fight on terror would therefore include elements of both foreign and domestic politics while keeping in mind the democratic values always careful not to bury “freedom and democracy, human rights and the respect for the opposite religion under the ruins of the World Trade Center”15 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001p: 18309).

This point is underlined by the SPD’s spokesman for foreign affairs Gernot Erler who pointed out that the new anti-terror alliance, which was

15 “Freiheit und Demokratie, Menschenwürde und die Achtung vor der jeweils anderen Religion dürfen nicht unter den Trümmern des World Trade Centers begraben werden”
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forming on a global scale, would not become an alliance of war rather an alliance employing political, diplomatic, economic and cultural means. This would be very important and could not be emphasised enough since it would be imperative for the struggle against terrorism not to escalate. If the “triumph of violence” was to endure and to spread, new attacks would be inevitable. Distinctly from both Schröder and Struck, Erler was much more concerned with avoiding a war, placing more importance on diplomatic channels (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001r: 18317-18318).

In contrast to Gernot Erler, the then Defence Minister Rudolph Scharping was again much more in line with the heads of the party. In the face of terrorism, Germany would not be able to restrict itself to verbal contributions but was rather expected to contribute actively. This would be in Germany’s best interest, otherwise its security and Bündnisfähigkeit would be at risk as well as 50 years of successful German foreign policy. During those 50 years, Germany also had the continuous support of the USA, giving Germany the chance to re-pay that debt (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001m: 18325).

Although he acknowledged that fighting terrorism is predominantly a foreign and defence affairs issue, Home Secretary Otto Schily was from the start very much concerned with how to fight terrorists hiding amongst the many immigrants in Germany. A close co-operation of both the police and the military would help in this operation yet most importantly he refused to grant the Bundeswehr any more rights especially in terms of policing and guarding important installations. The Grundgesetz provided the armed forces with enough means, especially in the guise of administrative co-
operation with the local authorities. The *Bundeswehr* would therefore not be posted throughout Germany, its role would rather be to help out if the local authorities needed its special abilities, such as decontamination (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001q: 18331).

In the course of the developments in the autumn 2001, with the US military operation in conjunction with the Afghan Northern Alliance, the need for continuous involvement in Afghanistan became apparent. In the case of Germany, that would mean contributing troops as well as humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. In effect, the troops would secure the humanitarian relief effort, which as Gernot Erler pointed out could not be seriously objected. Also, considering that the *Budeswehr* had well trained and respected personnel especially in the field of NBC defence and special forces which had been specifically called for by the US, Germany could play a significant part in securing Afghanistan (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001ƒ: 19289-19290).

In summary, the SPD’s position during the early stages of the Afghanistan mission was heavily influenced by solidarity towards the United States, out of historic reasons of gratitude but also because of Germany’s desire to maintain its *Bündnisfähigkeit*. Any military actions that Germany would have to contribute to were in accordance with international law, since the UN had declared 9/11 an attack on a sovereign state. And since this had not only been an attack on the United States but rather on Western culture as a whole, Germany itself could legally act in self-defence. The SPD placed a lot of importance on multilateral approaches and on the United Nations as a co-ordinating body, thus emphasising a continuation of traditional German foreign policy in order to deal with this new situation.
Since terrorism also affects domestic policy, especially in Germany with its large minority of Muslims, the Social Democrats took great care to distance themselves from the perceived clash of cultures which could have alienated a significant portion of the population. Finally, the SPD’s position on using the Bundeswehr for internal security was to keep internal security in the hands of the police and the security agencies and not grant the armed forces new rights to act within Germany. Any possible help the Bundeswehr could give to the police would be covered by the existing regulations on administrative assistance.

*The Greens’ argumentation*

Similarly to the Kosovo Crisis, the Greens saw themselves confronted with the possibility of having to use military force while at the same time keeping true to their party roots from the peace movement. However, since not only the United States but open societies and democracy in general were attacked they expressed their deep solidarity with the American people (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001f: 18296).

This solidarity was not purely based on Germany’s responsibilities as an alliance partner but also from the historically close ties to the United States. Not only did the Greens recognise the need for limited military action from a very early state, but they also expressed the view that by not supporting the United States in their struggle, the newly found American preference for a multilateral approach in international affairs would be short lived. By having the United States take on multilateralism, international institutions such as NATO and the United Nations could be strengthened
significantly which had been an important aim at the core of German foreign policy (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001: 18313).

However, even though a large majority of the Greens supported limited military operations to bring those responsible for 9/11 to justice, the fight against terrorism should not be limited to military means alone. In order to fight terrorism effectively party chairman Angelika Beer called for an integrated political approach in conjunction with the limited military operations. The reason for this was that military force alone would not be able to tackle terrorism at its source but only treat the symptoms. It would therefore be necessary to extend our understanding of security to include foreign aid policy as well as the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001: 18413).

In accordance with their senior coalition partner, the Greens were also strongly opposed to granting the Bundeswehr more rights and make it part of the internal security apparatus. The only way the Bundeswehr could be deployed internally would be if it had specific capabilities which could not be found in other security agencies, such as aerial surveillance or the use of biological decontamination. Considering the limits set by the Grundgesetz to safeguard the Federal Republic from an overly powerful military Wolfgang Wieland argued that the Bundeswehr could only be deployed within Germany in a state of defence or a specific case of emergency (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001: 19018-19019). Since neither case applied, the Bundeswehr could not be deployed within Germany without changing the constitution.
In the light of wanting to support the United States in their new multilateral approach and wanting to secure Germany’s *Bündnisfähigkeit* the Greens also by large supported the initial deployment of troops to Kabul. Although they still favoured a humanitarian effort to help the population in post-Taliban Afghanistan, party whip Kerstin Müller acknowledged that this effort would have to be secured with military means (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001: 19868). Since no German troops would at the time be part of any combat operation, this humanitarian approach made it easier to sell this deployment to the pacifist party base. Similar to the argumentation during the Kosovo Crisis the Greens were thus able to consolidate the uncomfortable choices of a government coalition partner with their original ideals.

The Greens therefore took on a similar view on the initial stage of the war on terror and Germany’s role in it. Like the SPD they ensured the United States their support and considered the attacks of 9/11 an attack on democracy and western values in general. Not supporting the US would greatly damage Germany’s *Bündnisfähigkeit* and its standing in the international community. Different from the SPD, however, the Greens saw a chance to help the United States come to appreciate the benefits of a multilateral approach and by doing so strengthen international institutions such as NATO and the United Nations.

In order to sell possible military missions abroad to their party base, the Greens emphasised the humanitarian aspect of those missions and the need to secure them with the help of military personnel. Military missions within Germany, however, were out of the question, since that would mean
altering the Grundgesetz, something the Greens were not prepared to do since that would help to militarise German security policy.

*The CDU/CSU's argumentation*

The 9/11 attacks caused the CDU/CSU to react in very much the same way as the Red/Green Coalition, in that those attacks constituted a direct attack on the basic values of democracy and freedom and would therefore require a decisive reaction. Since there was no doubt that the United States would take actions accordingly, Germany would be obligated to provide any support. Considering the historical ties to the United States and their help in the post-war reconstruction of Germany as well as their part in the re-unification process, party whip Friedrich Merz argued that no country was more strongly required to stand by the United States' side than Germany (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001h: 18294).

Beside the historical gratitude towards the United States the CDU/CSU placed great emphasis on Germany’s Bündnisfähigkeit and the obligations arising from Germany’s membership in NATO. Germany would therefore have to take an active part in the upcoming struggle against terrorism and to burden the fair share of the responsibility in conjunction with other European democracies. As Volker Rühe pointed out, this would include implementing the European Security Policy, which again would demand much on Germany given its central position and role in Europe (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001#: 18398).

In order to effectively combat terrorism, Germany’s security policy would have to be revised to incorporate a greater emphasis on the
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gathering of intelligence and the prevention of terrorist acts. In order to do this the intelligence service throughout Europe would need to co-operate more closely and have access to better funds, equipment and personnel. Considering that the 9/11 attacks were planned in Hamburg, Germany had a particular responsibility to eliminate the possibilities for terrorist cells to misuse open societies for their training, recruiting and preparation (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001t: 18306). This widened understanding of security would also have to include a revised development policy as part of a provident and effective security policy, by removing economical concern, social contrasts and unacceptable political circumstances as causes of terrorism (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001x: 18420).

Although the CDU/CSU generally supported the government and its support for the United States as well as its concern for Germany’s *Bündnisfähigkeit* they were very much concerned with the state of the Bundeswehr, especially its equipment and funding. Since the *Bundeswehr* was grossly underfunded the CDU/CSU argued that Germany’s inability to contribute effectively to military operations undermined its *Bündnisfähigkeit* (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001 : 19009). The improvement of the *Bundeswehr’s* situation would also be necessary to enable it to take on an active part in providing internal security for Germany. Since the rise of terrorism had eroded the boundaries between internal and external security, the armed forces would help greatly in helping to safeguard Germany’s domestic security. It would therefore be necessary to change the *Grundgesetz* in order to clarify the legal questions of deploying the *Bundeswehr* internally. This is not to say that the CDU/CSU was planning to
substitute the police or border patrols but rather to compliment them with the Bundeswehr’s capabilities in handling very specific scenarios. Although the Grundgesetz allows for administrative assistance by the armed forces, the CDU/CSU was very much concerned with limiting the need for interpreting the legal gray area every time the Bundesländer ask for administrative affairs (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001): 18686).

Overall, the CDU/CSU’ argumentation centred on the question of Bündnisfähigkeit and Germany’s responsibility to support the United States out of historical considerations and alliance responsibilities. Although they acknowledge the need for a more diverse security policy which would include a more assertive development policy, they place the emphasis in the fight against terrorism on the military. Because of this, the state of the Bundeswehr and its ability to perform in conjunction with its allies in out-of-area missions was central to the CDU/CSU’s line of argument.

The FDP’s argumentation

The FDP took on a similar view to the previously discussed parties regarding the nature of the 9/11 attacks, in that they constituted an attack on “the values, civilisation and lives of people living in free societies”\(^{16}\) of the western world (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001g: 18295). It was therefore logical for the FDP to offer the United States the necessary support in bringing the people responsible to justice. Closely related to this reasoning was the FDP’s argument that the Federal Republic owed its support to the USA due to their continuous support for the last forty years. Although the

\(^{16}\) "Die heißt, dass der gestrige Anschlag auch ein Anschlag auf unsere Zivilisation, auf unsere Werte, auf unser Leben, auf alle Menschen war, die in freihetlichen Gesellschaften leben.”
FDP, like the other parties represented in the Bundestag, realised that military action would be inevitable in the fight against terrorism they placed much emphasis on political solutions to the problem. This would be a more suitable role for Germany considering the precarious situation of the armed forces which according to party whip Guido Westerwelle would be in no state to contribute effectively to an international operation in its current state of re-construction. The Bundeswehr’s abilities which were seen to be limited due to chronic underfunding would seriously impair its effectiveness within the alliance thus also limiting Germany’s Bündnisfähigkeit (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001y: 18401). By losing its ability to work effectively within the alliance, Germany would lose both its trusted means to conduct its foreign and security policy as well as lose its impact on the decision-making process, something the FDP has always felt very strongly about. This was a particularly relevant point since – as Westerwelle argued – the question was whether the Americans had taken on the lead role or if decisions were still being made within NATO (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001,: 19293). If the first case were true that would prove that the United States’ new found multilateralism had been short lived and that Germany had already lost its say in the decision-making process.

Considering the limits on the Bundeswehr’s capabilities it is therefore not surprising that the FDP argued for a rather limited role for the armed forces in that they would be needed to secure the political process in due time. Since diplomacy could potentially prove not to be enough when dealing with terrorists or their sympathisers, the military would need to play
a supporting role and back up the diplomatic effort (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001: 18323).

Following the arguments of limiting the role of the Bundeswehr in counter-terrorism, the FDP was strongly opposed to deploying the armed forces within Germany as this would be highly unconstitutional as well as infringing on the roles of the traditional security agencies such as the police or the intelligence services. Even if the constitution allowed for such a decision, the Bundeswehr would not be capable to take on this additional task in its current situation of being in the middle of the re-structuring process while at the same time be notoriously underfunded (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001: 19017).

However, despite having pointed out the precarious situation of the armed forces and the resulting limits to their abilities in the fight against terrorism, the FDP envisaged a strong role for the Bundeswehr during the upcoming peace-keeping effort in Afghanistan with the emphasis on humanitarian relief with close co-operation with the Afghan people. This would mean that the Bundeswehr would have to support the newly established Afghan authorities, but also that the original area of deployment, i.e. the city of Kabul, would most likely not be enough (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001…: 20837). Thus, the FDP made it clear that future mandates would need to be widened to include more remote parts of Afghanistan and, more importantly, the financial situation of the armed forces would need to be improved considerably for Germany to be able to effectively contribute to the security of Afghanistan.
The FDP therefore took on a similar stance on the war on terror as the previously discussed parties. The 9/11 attacks were considered attacks also against Germany and German values and the United States deserved Germany’s support as a result of the continuous support they had demonstrated for the previous fifty years. However, the FDP argued that the role of the Bundeswehr would have to be a limited one, not because of moral or pacifist considerations, but because it was severely underfunded and undergoing a difficult re-structuring process. Therefore, it would not be well enough equipped and prepared for a wide military operation. The Bundeswehr could for the same reason also not be deployed domestically, since that would put another strain on the already strained institution, even if the Grundgesetz would allow for such a course of action. Seeing that refusing to contribute to any international operation would seriously damage Germany’s Bündnisfähigkeit, the humanitarian and almost advisory emphasis of the Afghanistan operation in close co-operation with the local authorities would help secure Germany’s international status as well as take into consideration the limits placed on a the military by increasingly severe financial cut-backs.

*The PDS’ argumentation*

Similar to their arguments during the Kosovo Crisis, the PDS argued against any military action from the very start. Although they condemned the 9/11 attacks as attacks against civilian societies, culture and humanity
they argued for a more civilised approach by the so-called civilised world\textsuperscript{17} (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001i: 18296).

Dealing with the threat of terrorism would therefore require a much more sophisticated approach than a mere military operation. Any military reply would most certainly result civilian casualties or even the possibility of civilian casualties, which in turn would cause growing resentment of the West within the Muslim world. Military action would therefore play right into the terrorists’ hands and make recruitment considerably easier, thus actually decreasing Germany’s security instead of increasing it (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001w: 18404). The use of the Bundeswehr was therefore not an option for the PDS, neither abroad, and most certainly not at home.

Although the rejection of military was very clear amongst the PDS, this is not to say that they would not want to fulfil Germany’s international obligations. However, the PDS’ emphasis was very early placed on the acting within the boundaries of international law and under the co-ordinating organisation of the United Nations. Aside from the legitimising effect this would have on proposed aid-efforts, a non-military UN operation would not infringe on the work of already active NGO aid organisations. In the event of military action, these NGOs would no longer be able to perform effectively, which would again increase the civilian population’s misery. An UN-lead police mission would be much better suited for providing security while the NGOs could help the population (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001~: 18696).

However, in order to be successful that way, Germany would have to step up its diplomatic efforts as well as its foreign aid programmes.

\textsuperscript{17} „In diesen Tagen wird sich zeigen, wie zivilisiert die zivilisierte Welt wirklich ist.”
significantly. Seeing that the Red/Green Government had lowered its spending in the field of foreign aid and had increased military spending, the PDS called for a change in policy towards aid and diplomacy and away from military adventures (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001z: 18404).

The PDS therefore took on a very different point of view from the other Bundestag parties in that it severely opposed any military means in tackling the threat of terrorism. Although they condemned the 9/11 attacks, a military response would only result in violence spiralling out of control. As an alternative the PDS favoured a more diplomatic approach, increasing aid programmes which would be secured by an international police force in order to deal with the underlying causes of terrorism.

The Public Debate on Afghanistan

While the Kosovo deployment of the Bundeswehr was generally greeted with the general public’s benign indifference (as outlined in chapter 4) the public’s attitude towards the up-coming operation witnessed a different development. Similarly to the Kosovo deployment, the initial support for a Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan was high, with an overall approval rate of 65%. Again, as with the initial support for KFOR, support was even higher in the Western parts of Germany with 71% whereas the majority of people in the east (57%) opposed the military intervention (Hilmer & Schlinkert, 2001: 14).

Considering the relative secure area of deployment for the German troops – first Kabul, later the traditionally largely anti-Taliban Northern Afghanistan – it seemed that the Afghanistan mission would soon follow KFOR and drop under the general public’s radar. Although the Bundeswehr
The reform of the *Bundeswehr* in context of a normalised German foreign and security policy had to face serious problems – ranging from accidents with missiles to scandalous behaviour of individual soldiers (see above) – only when the security situation for the German troops deteriorated did the public mood change. By August 2007 64% of the population favoured a quick withdrawal from Afghanistan thus showing a clear shift in the support for the mission (Hilmer & Schlinkert, 2007: 2). These statistics have not changed much over the last three years as can be seen in the following graph.

Figure 13: Poll of ISAF support 2009 (Infratest dimap, 2009: 6).

Support continued to fall as by May 2010 over two thirds (70%) of the population rejected the ISAF mission outright (Hilmer & Schlinkert, 2010: 19).

The question to be asked here is what had happened to change the overall support from initially 71% to only some 30% in 2010. As has been already discussed in this chapter’s section on the developments in
Afghanistan, the mission became ever more costly, both purely financially but also the number of German casualties rose significantly.

The latter point is a very important factor when attempting to understand the diminishing support for Germany’s involvement in ISAF. Since this mission in Afghanistan is the first prolonged ground combat operation for the *Bundeswehr*, German casualties become a very pressing issue. This is highlighted by the fact, that senior politicians (including often the Chancellor and the Defence Minister) attend every memorial service for soldiers killed during their deployment.

Even more important than that has been a general lack of good communication about the mission in Afghanistan. As pointed out previously in this chapter, mission parameters changed from purely humanitarian mission to combat mission. This lead to a certain ambivalence towards the overall current ISAF goals. Karp’s example of soldiers asking for clarification about the mission not from the government but from think-tanks emphasises this point nicely (Karp, 2009: 22).

The *Bundesregierung* takes great care to portrait this deployment as a humanitarian mission, as these are much easier to justify. It is therefore not surprising that its information policy has tended to be to provide as little information on actual combat operations as possible. Even members of the *Bundestag*’s defence committee have criticised that they have not debriefed adequately. Reports of German troops taking part in large combat operations damage the picture of a purely humanitarian mission (Weiland, 2008: 1-2).
This refusal by the government to accept the true nature of the mission, i.e. a combat operation with humanitarian elements, could also be found in the official governmental language. Officials went to great lengths to coin the ISAF operation a war. Although Afghanistan is not a war in the traditional sense, i.e. armed forces of sovereign nations facing each other, in the light of growing casualties it became more and more difficult to talk of just a ‘conflict’. Only by 2009, seven years into the mission, did senior politicians actually acknowledge that Afghanistan was experiencing a war (Spiegel Online, 2009a: 1).

It can be argued that the lack of transparency regarding the Bundeswehr deployment in Afghanistan added to the growing overall public rejection of the mission. Not only did the Bundesregierung send troops into a mission without clearly stating the goals, but it also glossed over the true nature of it by highlighting the humanitarian aspect of ISAF over the combat element. One could argue that the desire to control the flow of information is not surprising, especially when dealing with an on-going military operation. However, as pointed out earlier this information policy has already ended Defence Minister Jung’s career.

Trying to clarify the purpose of the mission, former Federal President Horst Köhler even indicated that German troops not only defended Germany’s freedom at the Hindu Kusch, but also Germany’s economic interests. Although one could argue that since according to the Weißbuch 2006 the Bundeswehr also defends the welfare of the German people, economic interests are part of this welfare. And considering that Köhler emphasised the economic side effects of combatting terrorism – secure
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trade routes and security to trade in general – (Fischer & Medick, 2010: 1), it is telling that the resulting public and political outcry forced him to eventually resign. Although Köhler’s remarks were provocative, they summarised points made in official governmental publications. However, they did not fit the government’s official depiction of the mission, leading to the growing pressure on Köhler.

Overall it can be said that the public debate on Afghanistan centres on the lack of information. What exactly are the *Bundeswehr’s* tasks currently? How are they fulfilled? And why is Germany contributing to ISAF in the first place?

**Summary**

It has become clear that ISAF’s mission and that of the *Bundeswehr* is a very complex one, incorporating both military goals and civilian reconstruction efforts. For that ISAF has been structured into several PRTs. It is these PRTs which are primarily responsible for the reconstruction of Afghanistan’s infrastructure as well as training and equipping the ANSF, while at the same time providing a secure environment in which both ISAF and UN personnel can work. Taking all of these factors into account, it seems that the number of tasks is very high to begin with for a primarily militarily orientated intervention force. However, although numerous civilian organisations are currently involved in the reconstruction effort, their number decreases steadily due to the on-going and in some areas increasing level of violence. This suggests, that ISAF has taken too many responsibilities, none of which they fulfil entirely. Since security is the key to keeping additional organisations in the country, this would have to be
ISAF’s most paramount interest. However, it remains unlikely that contributing nations will deploy additional troops considering the waning support for the Afghanistan mission at home.

This is not to say that ISAF is a complete failure. Its command structure allows for relatively quick decision making due to its clear cut allocation of responsibilities. What is more, national military considerations are kept outside the strategic decision making process on the ground and is limited to administrative aspects concerning the PRTs. This helps in formulating a consistent strategy for Afghanistan, without national interference from the side. Any national objections will have to go through NATO, which then in turn can take appropriate measures.

In the case of the German contribution it has become clear that the contingent has grown in size of the last seven years. This can primarily be explained by the additional tasks the Bundeswehr has taken on. It is noteworthy however, that these tasks were almost forced upon the Bundeswehr by its partners, as ISAF’s call for German troops for the south of Afghanistan shows. Both the deployment of the RECCE Tornados and the responsibility of the QRF can be interpreted as a means to silence these calls from NATO. In the light of yet another US troop surge by the Obama administration it will be interesting to see how the German government reacts.

More than Kosovo, Afghanistan has been and continues to be a great challenge for the Bundeswehr. It has taken on the responsibility for the Northern regions and at first succeeded in achieving a moderate amount of stability. However, the armed forces encountered difficulties with
the logistics and perhaps more importantly with the co-operation with other nations on the ground.

The military also experienced difficulties when it comes to its dealings with the political establishment. While the major parties did acknowledge the need to use the Bundeswehr as one part of the War on Terror, complimented by political and economical assistance to the countries in question, politicians were hard pressed to formulate an appropriate strategy for the armed forces to follow. Although the Bundeswehr was to be deployed, financial constraints continued to limit its effectiveness. Also, the Bundestag’s emphasis on deploying the Bundeswehr solely for non-combat purpose with a very limited mandate did not contribute to Germany’s perceived Bündnisfähigkeit, since that again limited the troops’ scope of actions in the field.

This limited mandate however, helped the government to portrait the mission as a purely humanitarian intervention, thus attempting to secure the public’s support. Considering Schröder linked the initial vote of Bundeswehr deployment to y vote of no confidence thus effectively forcing the coalition to vote his way if they did not want to face the risks of new Bundestag elections this clearly shows how unpopular this deployment was from the very start and, more importantly, how important Bündnistreue was for Schröder.

Although the humanitarian approach to the mission worked initially, the lack of information both for the public and more junior politicians increased concerns that the Bundeswehr was out of its depth. In contrast to the Kosovo deployment – when support diminished out of benign
indifference – support for Afghanistan shrank because of a growing number of German casualties and an information policy that attempted to gloss over the fact that the mission in Afghanistan had turned from a humanitarian intervention into war.

Again, similarly to KFOR, Germany’s Bündnisfähigkeit was damaged. Whereas during Kosovo, the main problem was the very limiting mandate which inhibited the Bundeswehr’s abilities to react, Afghanistan saw the additional problem that the Bundesregierung appeared to be incapable to acknowledge the true nature of the operation. The humanitarian intervention had turned into a ‘war-like’ operation without decision-makers taking the appropriate steps to accommodate this development. Only recently has the government acknowledged the changing situation which has been too late as the Bundeswehr’s area of deployment no longer is the secure area it used to be. Furthermore, seeing that more and more US troops now operate in Northern Afghanistan it can be argued that Germany’s allies no longer trust the Bundeswehr to be capable to operating effectively thus dealing another blow to Germany’s Bündnisfähigkeit.
Chapter 6 – How normal is Germany? Concluding remarks

German foreign and security policy has undergone some considerable changes over the last twenty years, giving substance to the assumption that Germany no longer behaves like an artificially constrained nation bound by the limitations of the bi-polar scenario. With unification in 1990 Germany arguably regained its full sovereignty and was expected by its partners to contribute to stability and security, a development which was made clear by US President George Bush who almost immediately offered Germany the partnership in leadership. This clearly highlighted the allies’ expectations that now Germany would start to take on the responsibilities of a state of Germany’s size, power and international standing. When Germany did not step up to this expectation during the Operation Desert Storm, it was criticised for its cheque book diplomacy of financially aiding the coalition, yet not sending any troops to Kuwait. Whereas Germany had relied heavily on its allies – most notably the United States – to secure Europe during the Cold War, this would no longer be an option in the following years.

From an academic point, this change in general circumstances posed one very important question. Would Germany continue to conduct its foreign and security policy in its almost pacifistic multilateral manner or would Germany shed itself of its restraints and become a ‘normal’ European power comfortable with the use of ‘hard power’? Proponents of both approaches make valid points with the proponents of continuation pointing towards Germany’s continued preference of using multilateral solutions and
institutions to further Germany’s interests. The importance of the UN, NATO and the EU for Germany as well as Germany’s traditionally close relationship with other major European powers – France especially – can be identified throughout the 1990s. These preferences appeared to be hard-wired into the ‘affected generation’, i.e. that generation which had been affected either directly or indirectly by WWII. Most notably in the area of defence policy, this generation was reluctant to play an active role – a mindset which only gradually changed.

The collapse of this bi-polar system, therefore, changed the overall situation for Germany more than any other Western European state. Over the course of the 1990s a gradual shift in German foreign and security policy towards a more assertive and active policy, most notably in the field of contributions to multilateral military operations can be identified. However, although Germany was and still is a strong supporter of multilateralism, its allies and partners have found it difficult at best to get Germany to contribute to important missions, such as Kosovo and Afghanistan. Considering Germany’s on-going reluctance to contribute to these missions in spite of being aware that its allies expected a more assertive stance, Germans needed the external pressures to overcome this traditional objection to military means.

The ‘confident generation’ took a slightly different approach to Germany’s history and in fact Germany’s responsibilities in the world. Whereas Germany’s history should under no circumstances be forgotten or ignored, it should not stand in the way of German interests. Both frequency and intensity of Bundeswehr deployments increased since Gerhard
Schröder’s Red-Green government took over in 1998. German troops were involved in combat operations during the Kosovo Crisis and have been deployed in peace-keeping missions for KFOR and later in Afghanistan for ISAF. With reference to these two missions, as well as Germany’s refusal to join the United States and their allies in the war in Iraq, proponents of the normalisation approach argue that at the beginning of the 21st century Germany has become a more normal state in that it has become more accustomed the idea of the use of force. However, to say that Germans are comfortable with the idea would be extremely exaggerated, considering the heated debates surrounding Bundeswehr deployments.

These developments support this thesis’ core presumption that Germany has in fact become a more normal state with regards to its foreign and security policy. This ‘normality’, however differs from the traditional realist interpretation of a normal state in that it does not rely so heavily on hard politics or realpolitik. Rather this amended concept of normality incorporates characteristics – i.e. the dominant preference for multilateralism found throughout German foreign policy and the corresponding importance placed on international institutions such as the UN or the EU – normally not associated with the classical idea of normality. From a traditional realist point of view this would not be considered normal for a state as multilateralism and co-operation also entails reaching compromises on certain issues thus limiting a state’s sovereignty in that specific issue.

In the case of Germany, however, multilateralism enabled the German government to pursue its foreign more effectively than had it
adopted traditional realist thinking. Through *Westintegration* and *Bündnistreu* West Germany managed to conduct its foreign policy and achieve its national interests (mostly security from the Soviet threat) while at the same time appeasing its partners in the West some of whom remained sceptical towards German ambitions and thus become re-integrated into the international community. While the dependence on multilateralism outside NATO can be seen as abnormal during the Cold War the developments towards a globalised world and the growing integration within the EU infringed on the sovereignty of every nation. Although Germany is still a semi-sovereign nation this aspect of semi-sovereignty has spread to other nations as well. Germany is therefore no different anymore.

This normality regarding Germany’s foreign and security policy would then have implications on its armed forces in that they would have to follow this trend of normalisation. Looking at the numerous reform attempts undertaken in previous years it becomes clear that the 1990s' reforms centred mainly on relatively superficial modifications such as overall numbers and the length of the compulsory service. As the 1990s saw new kinds of military operations – most importantly peace-keeping and peace-enforcing operations – the *Bundeswehr* soon featured an out-dated catalogue of primary tasks. By continuing to concentrate on homeland defence the *Bundeswehr* was not capable to effectively contribute to multilateral operations (NATO) and was risking its overall *Bündnisfähigkeit*. Only when in 2003 the actual purpose of the *Bundeswehr* changed – homeland defence gave way to international interventions as the primary
purpose – did the German government address the need to adapt its armed forces to contemporary issues.

At the core of this thesis was therefore the analysis of German military development since re-unification, including an analysis of Germany’s setup prior to this event to put the scope of the developments into perspective. Drawing on the already extensive literature on this subject it soon became apparent that Germany has been slow in implementing changes in its military over the last twenty years.

**Normalising the Bundeswehr**

However, the extend of the Bundeswehr reforms of the 1990s and early 2000s necessary to be better equipped for international out-of-area deployments shows a steady yet slow development towards a more active part in multilateral operations. Shortly after unification Germany argued that it could not contribute to out-of-area missions due to the restrictive nature of the Grundgesetz. The overall accepted interpretation only allowed Germany to use its military for defensive purposes on NATO territory and not outside it. In 1994, the constitutional court ruled that this interpretation was in fact incorrect, thus eradicating any legal boundaries for German foreign and security policy, making it much easier for Germany’s allies to apply pressure in this field. As chapter two has discussed, Germany slowly accepted more responsibilities especially in the Balkans and later in Afghanistan, yet only after external pressure from its allies had been applied.

It soon became clear that the armed forces designed to defend West Germany from an assault from the east during the Cold War had to be
reformed in order to be able to take on the new tasks of peace-keeping and peace-enforcing outside NATO territory.

Chapter three analysed the actual reform efforts made by governments throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Although the reforms undertaken during the 1990s were primarily concerned with reducing the overall costs of maintaining the armed forces by reducing the overall number of troops some structural amendments had been made. Most importantly, the Bundeswehr was divided into the Hauptverteidigungskräfte and the Krisenreaktionskräfte to quickly create a force which can be used in multilateral peace-keeping missions. This reform, however, effectively generated a two-class Bundeswehr with the well-equipped and trained KRK and the conscript-reliant HVK. From 2003 onwards the Bundeswehr was reformed more substantially. Not only did Defence Ministers Scharping and Struck address structural reforms, but they also addressed the economic restructuring of the Bundeswehr, thus making maintaining and equipping the armed forces more efficient. The Weißbuch 2006 picked up from that and expanded on Struck’s defence-political guidelines. Judging from the reform efforts undertaken since 2003 and taking into account the discontinuation of conscription in 2011 the Bundeswehr has completed its transition from a stationary force for homeland defence to a relatively mobile and versatile armed force.

Yet, as chapter three also explained, especially the issues of funding, procurement of new equipment and the controversial practice of conscription have continued to inhibit the Bundeswehr’s overall capabilities to effectively contribute to multilateral operations. Although the economic
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Restructuring of the *Bundeswehr* has freed up some funds it remains seriously underfunded. Resolving these issues would require great political will to re-allocate funds in the federal budget, which would result in painful cuts in areas such as the welfare state with all of its consequences for domestic politics.

The debate about the abolishing of conscription underlines this shortcoming as maintaining conscription is necessary for armed forces geared towards homeland defence whereas the discontinuation would steer the *Bundeswehr* towards a more professional and deployable army. The discussion of the end of conscription is therefore a good example which clearly shows that decision makers did not agree on what they actually want the *Bundeswehr* to do. In fact one can argue that by debating conscription for some 20 years, politicians have been counter-productive as they traditionally neglected the military constraints imposed by conscription while attempting to modernise the *Bundeswehr*. Even the decision to discontinue conscription by January 2011 is open for criticism as the likely drop in numbers of recruits has not been addressed accordingly. It will remain to be seen if Germany can maintain its commitment to multilateral operations should the *Bundeswehr* fail to recruit the 16,000 volunteers per year necessary to maintain the overall troop numbers. Should this scenario become reality, Germany will have to re-think its concept for its reservists in order to close the resulting gaps.

**Shortcomings of the *Bundeswehr* reform**

However, as has been shown in chapters four and five, the reforms did not create a *Bundeswehr* capable of effectively contributing to
international operations. The precise tasks of the *Bundeswehr* were never clearly defined resulting in an ineffective reform effort. Although the *Weißbuch 2006* outlines general goals – peace, prosperity and European security – these goals are left open for interpretation. The lack of a clear strategy means that today the *Bundeswehr* may be more modern and compatible with its allied forces, yet at the same time confusions about the purpose of the *Bundeswehr* have mounted. With which means is the *Bundeswehr* to fulfil its goals of safeguarding Germany’s and contribute to Europe’s security? Under which circumstances is German security under threat? Overall, the ‘whens’ and ‘hows’ are left ambivalent.

It has, however, become clear that these reforms continued to fall short since the *Bundeswehr*’s capabilities were repeatedly questioned every time a new mission was discussed in the *Bundestag*. Although the *Bundeswehr* is tasked for example with maintaining security in Europe the *Weißbuch 2006* does not identify criteria for deployment; the effect of this being a different interpretation of the *Bundeswehr*’s tasks and resulting necessary capabilities. Whereas the majority of the parliamentarians argued for deployment (with the exception of the PDS) the actual nature of the military contribution was subject to debate – humanitarian relief, air campaign, ground campaign.

Chapter four shows that although the *Bundeswehr* has been undergoing reforms it has not been kept out of missions. The crisis in Kosovo and the subsequent peace-keeping mission was the first actual combat mission for the *Bundeswehr* and proved to be highly controversial at the time. As has already been pointed out, opponents to the mission
argued that Germany had a moral obligation not to contribute, due to Germany’s history in the Balkans. Furthermore, since the United Nations had failed to agree on a resolution, the Kosovo war was not covered by international law. The proponents, however, also resorted to the history argument, only interpreting this differently. Due to its history, Germany had a moral obligation to stop the on-going genocide in Kosovo.

These concerns were supported by concerns about the state of the Bundeswehr, its capabilities and structure, as well as its equipment as inhibiting factors showing that the Bundeswehr was simply not up for the job at hand. This in combination with the desire to maintain Germany’s Bündnisfähigkeit proved to become the main factors in the decision to contribute to KFOR. During the actual peace-keeping mission the Bundeswehr soon took on the role of the lead nation for the Multinational Brigade South, emphasising Germany’s desire to take on more responsibilities. Yet, although this represented the overall political will, the actual support for the mission with adequate equipment as well as political support left much for the commanders on the ground to desire for (see General Reinhardt’s difficulties in preparing his command over KFOR).

The Kosovo Crisis therefore represented an important event for German foreign and security policy since it forced Germany to out of the prevailing Cold War thinking of concentrating on homeland defence. Although it can be argued that Germany had been on track of discarding that kind of thinking, Kosovo defiantly accelerated the process. Yet, seeing that the term Bündnisfähigkeit featured heavily in the Bundestag debates, it becomes clear that the Federal Government was in fact afraid to be
shamed into compliance by its allies. Also, as already pointed out, the actual interpretations on what the Bundeswehr was meant to do, differed thus contributing to confusions on what the actual Bundestag mandate should include.

While Kosovo was important for German foreign and security policy due to it being the first actual combat mission, Afghanistan proved to be even more challenging due to the distance and more recently the asymmetrical warfare employed by the Taliban. Again, the Bundestag debates after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. centred primarily on the question of Bündnisfähigkeit, mostly in conjunction with Germany’s historical obligation to support the United States and its national interest of overall security from terrorism. Similar to Kosovo, however, as chapter five has shown, although the Bundeswehr has been deployed to contribute to the international effort to stabilise Afghanistan, the lack of political support in the form of restrictive mandates as well as inadequate equipment and funding inhibited the armed forces’ effectiveness in Afghanistan. The ISAF mission has become more and more difficult for the Federal Government in the light of increased fighting and German casualties combined with increasing demands from its allies to contribute more to the stabilisation effort. The deployment the six RECCE Tornados to Afghanistan was an attempt at appeasing NATO and keeping Germany from having to send more ground troops into an increasingly unpopular conflict.

Again though, similar to the Kosovo conflict, the Bundestag debates show a differing interpretation on the Bundeswehr’s tasks in Afghanistan.
Although the government attempted to portrait the mission as a humanitarian mission, it soon turned into a combat operation. In the light of this development the government only slowly changed its stand on the mission and acknowledged the ‘war-like’ situation in Afghanistan. However, this change in perception has not yet resulted in a clear change in the mandate, as this would result in more heated debates as politicians continue to have differing interpretations of the Bundeswehr’s tasks.

In conclusion, this thesis has shown that Germany has come some way in playing a more active part in multilateral military operations. It has moved away from its position that the Bundeswehr can only be deployed within NATO territory and has accepted the need for global deployment of the Bundeswehr. This development supports the claim, that Germany has become a more normal power, capable to take on its responsibilities in international politics.

However, it has also been shown that these changes did neither occur swiftly, nor did they occur completely voluntarily. The importance politicians place on Germany’s Bündnistäglichkeit demonstrates that Germany still sees itself as a strong supporter of multilateral operations, while at the same time it struggles to contribute to military operations effectively. This struggle is further supported by the apparent lack of will to adequately define the Bundeswehr’s tasks, so that it can better act in multinational deployments. Although the Bundeswehr has undergone considerable change over the last twenty years, there are still a number of issues that need to be addressed.
First, the *Bundeswehr* needs better and more suitable equipment to better perform its tasks in out-of-area missions. Although this is an issue with other nations’ armed forces as well, considering the *Bundeswehr*’s chronic underfunding, it is more of an issue here. It is unlikely however, that the defence budget will be increased in the near future, considering the numerous domestic problems that Germany (as do other European states) faces today – such as an over-stretched social system and economic and fiscal problems as a result of the latest financial crisis and the following crisis in the Euro zone.

Second, and probably more important, Germans need to engage in a more fundamental debate about the purpose of their armed forces to develop a strategic understanding of military intervention. In the preamble of the *Weißbuch 2006* Angela Merkel expresses her hope that this document will start this debate, yet core questions such as what exactly the *Bundeswehr* is meant to do and under what circumstances are left unanswered. Although both the *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinie 2003* and the *Weißbuch 2006* outline a general purpose – in essence securing European peace and security – they remain extremely vague and open to interpretation. This vague outline can be accredited to Germany’s past and the resulting traditional reserve towards military issues and the politicians desire to keep some room for manoeuvres. However, until Germans have not clearly set out their strategy with regards to military contributions this will continue to impact their foreign policy as allies will not be able to clearly anticipate Germany’s reaction to new crises.
Although this lack of clear German military strategy is an inhibiting factor for Germany’s foreign and security policy it is a result of domestic rather than external considerations. With this in mind every other state has to cope with its own domestic inhibitors for its foreign and security policy, be it financial restraints, a highly sceptical public or other factors. In that respect Germany does no longer differ greatly from its allies and has over the last twenty years in fact become a normal state.

However, these inhibiting factors have a profound effect on Germany’s *Bündnistäfigkeit* as *Bundeswehr* contributions will continue to be highly controversial and mandates will continue to represent the lowest common denominator of the political parties, thus limiting the *Bundeswehr*’s efficiency in the field. Considering the lack of a clearly outlined catalogue of tasks this denominator is subject to current (domestic) affairs as can be seen during the debates on a *Bundeswehr* contribution to Iraqi Freedom when it has been argued that Chancellor Schröder made use of the public’s rejection of the war to get re-elected (see chapter 2). It can therefore be said that *Bundeswehr* contribution to future operations remains uncertain and will be dependent on the current political climate in Germany.

**An outlook**

It has been argued that Germany’s foreign and security policy and with this the outset of the armed forces have become more normal, while at the same time considerable shortcomings have been identified. These shortcomings, especially the lack of clear definitions regarding Germany’s security policy and tasks for the *Bundeswehr*, will continue to inhibit Germany’s *Bündnistäfigkeit*. Considering Germany’s reaction to the Arab
Spring in 2011, and the crisis in Libya in particular, this is a problem that needs to be addressed soon.

Germany’s abstention in the UN Security Council and the subsequent refusal to contribute to NATO’s military operation to support the Libyan rebels was heavily criticised by its partners, seriously questioning Germany’s Bündnistreue and Bündnisfähigkeit. The question, therefore, is whether Germany has taken a step back in its rejection of military means or if this step can be explained using this thesis’ findings.

The case of Libya was a difficult one for the German government considering that it ticked the right boxes – a humanitarian crisis, the fight against a dictatorial regime, and the threat for European security in the guise of possible refugees attempting to enter the EU – which normally would have resulted in a Bundeswehr deployment of some kind. The reason for not contributing to NATO’s operation can be found in the already over-stretched Bundeswehr itself. As its contribution to both KFOR and ISAF are still significant – Germany is still the biggest contributor to KFOR and the third largest to ISAF – taking on another large operation would not have been possible. This is especially the case, when said armed forces, which would have to perform in this new operation, are still undergoing reform and have to tackle the discontinuation of conscription. Taking the findings of this thesis it becomes clear that a Bundeswehr deployment in Libya was not possible, even though the reasons behind the mission ticked all the right boxes. Furthermore, considering the dwindling support for the ISAF operation another obvious combat mission would have sparked at least some public discontent.
Although this is an understandable reason for not contributing to NATO’s support effort the abstention in the UN Security Council is more difficult to explain. However, in the light of not being capable to contribute, a supportive vote in the UNSC would have most likely resulted in NATO asking for German contributions seeing that Germany supported military action in the UN at which time the German government would have had to disclose its shortage of military means. It can therefore be argued that the abstention was an attempt to prevent a situation in which the German government would have to refuse NATO’s demand for contribution, which would have seriously damaged its standing within the alliance.

**Germany: more normal but not normal enough**

Germany’s lack of a clear policy therefore puts Germany’s partners in a difficult situation as possible interventions must take into considerations that Germany will not contribute. Although future interventions will most likely go ahead with or without German contributions, seeing that these interventions will be planned by NATO or possibly the EU, a German refusal to contribute could delay the intervention, or as was the case in Libya put into question Germany’s Bündnisfähigkeit. More importantly, considering Germany’s political weight, especially within the EU, this could have an impact on other member states’ decision to participate, which would result in a demise of legitimacy for the intervention at the least. It would also force other nations towards unilateral operations, thus undermining multilateralism as one of the foundations of Germany’s foreign policy.
To prevent this Germany will need to clearly define the circumstances under which the Bundeswehr will be deployed in order to facilitate a more effective multilateralism. Considering the EU’s desire to formulate its own foreign and security along with its common defence policy, this might be necessary earlier than expected. If one of the largest EU member states is unclear about its own defence policy, how can it contribute to formulate one which is acceptable and workable for 27 member states? A clear definition of the Bundeswehr tasks will therefore result in a better Bündnisfähigkeit and an overall more effective multilateralism, which in a globalised and integrated world has become the normal way to conduct foreign and security policy.

Germany has made advances in becoming a more normal actor in foreign policy, but especially in the field of military contributions to multilateral operations, more work needs to be done. An open debate about Germany’s role in the world and the role of the Bundeswehr needs to take place within Germany. The reforms of the armed forces have created a more mobile and effective Bundeswehr, yet it is Germany’s difficulties in coming to a clear definition on when, how and where the Bundeswehr is meant to be deployed which prevents Germany from becoming a truly normal power in the post-Westphalian world.
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