THE LAST EDWARDSEAN:

EDWARDS AMASA PARK AND THE RHETORIC
OF IMPROVED CALVINISM

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ABSTRACT

THE LAST EDWARDSEAN: EDWARDS AMASA PARK AND THE RHETORIC OF IMPROVED CALVINISM

Edwards Amasa Park (1808-1900) of Andover championed Edwardsean Calvinism in the United States from the Jacksonian era until the very close of the nineteenth century by employing rhetorical strategies that lent his New England theology fresh apologetic usefulness. The thesis demonstrates that Park has been incorrectly identified as a Taylorite but, extending the argument of Joseph Conforti, ought to be viewed as re-casting his inherited Hopkinsian exercise scheme into a fresh historical synthesis influenced by contemporary patterns of thought. Park’s own training at Andover in the irenic divinity of Moses Stuart and Leonard Woods, his application as rhetorician of the work of Hugh Blair and George Campbell and his exposure in Germany to the Vermittlungstheologie of Friedrich Tholuck and Julius Müller gave specific definition to his own theological project. Additionally, the thesis argues that Park ought not to be viewed as a romantic idealist in the line of Horace Bushnell or as a proto-liberal in advance of the Andover liberals who succeeded him. Park retained a life-long commitment to a commingled epistemology and methodology derived from Lockean empiricism, Baconian induction, natural theology and Scottish common sense realism. As a formidable apologist for his revivalist inheritance identified with Jonathan Edwards and Samuel Hopkins, Edwards Amasa Park conserved the substance and prolonged the influence of his beloved New England theology by securing for it modes of expression well fitted to his nineteenth-century audience.
ABBREVIATIONS IN THE NOTES

ABR American Biblical Repository
AR Andover Review
ATR American Theological Review
BRPR Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review
BS Bibliotheca Sacra
CH Charles Hodge (1797-1878)
EAP Edwards Amasa Park (1808-1900)
HBS Henry Boynton Smith (1815-1877)
NE New Englander
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My father studied theology with Dr. Emmons. His father studied with Dr. Smalley, and his father with President Edwards. I therefore can claim a right to the Edwardean theology by what scientists would call the law of heredity.

—EDWARDS AMASA PARK, ‘ADDRESS AT THE ALUMNI DINNER’, 1881
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
DEFENDING THE CENTRE: EDWARDS A. PARK AND
THE CONSERVATION OF THE NEW ENGLAND THEOLOGY

Once recognised by no less a figure than Perry Miller as ‘a behemoth among the theologians’, to whom, ‘when he lifted up his head and trumpeted, American Protestantism listened with rapture’, Edwards Amasa Park’s doctrinal mammoth bones are now gathering dust in a remote exhibit hall. Once a force to be reckoned with by friends and adversaries alike, Park is today noticed in passing only by the random palaeo-historian. Reigning in the days of his power as the great champion of Edwardsean Calvinism—the consummate mid-century Congregationalist, a master teacher of preachers at Andover seminary, joined by name and by marriage to Jonathan Edwards and by blood to Edwards’s loyal disciples—Park now merits not much more than a passing footnote or an occasional essay in the nineteenth century’s grand story of the New England theology’s decisive shaping of evangelicalism among English-speaking peoples.

1 Perry Miller, The Life of the Mind in America from the Revolution to the Civil War (New York: Harper, Brace and World, 1965), p. 58. Miller also described Park here as among the ‘more astute’ in the nation, and compared the Andover theologian to two of the titanic figures of the American Renaissance—‘Whitman the self-appointed bard, even [Thoreau] the hermit of Walden Pond’, who would (in Miller’s view) ‘in their various fashions make substantially the same assertion’ as Park regarding the religious nature of the emerging American national character.
Born in 1808 and dying in 1900, Park was a public figure of note for almost seven decades, though his long professional career was often marked by contentious disputes over theological views, seminary politics and denominational creeds. Just as his nineteenth-century contemporaries regularly criticised him from his right or left for being either inadequately conservative or insufficiently liberal, Park has been similarly condemned by historians throughout the twentieth century as either a doctrinal relic who outlived his time or as a proto-liberal who lacked the courage to make good on his intuitions. Edwards Park has only infrequently been accorded the prominence in retrospect that came to him in abundance in his lifetime. A famed teacher of almost a thousand seminarians at the largest seminary in the land for over forty-five years, editor of the influential *Bibliotheca Sacra* for forty, distinguished theologian in the prominent Abbot chair for almost thirty-five—few at the time of Park’s death would have challenged his description by his eulogists as one who ‘since Edwards…has hardly been surpassed in acumen’,² who preached ‘the greatest sermon ever preached in Boston’,³ who as ‘a lecturer had no superior’, so that ‘students from other seminaries would come from far and near’ to hear him,⁴ who was ‘one of the greatest teachers of theology...this country has known’.⁵ Williston Walker, the premier historian of Congregationalism, asserted before Park’s death that his ‘conception of the New England theology became

part of the mental furniture of more theological students than any other Congregationalist has ever taught.\(^6\) At the end of Park’s life, there was little question of his greatness.

It may be, however, that Edwards Park’s lifework is as interesting now as it is neglected. He wrote in 1854, at the height of his significance as a theologian and public churchman, that his ‘Edwardean definitions were introduced not to subvert, but to conserve the substance of the old Calvinistic faith, and to prolong its influence over the minds of an intelligent community’.\(^7\) Park—first as rhetorician, then as theologian and editor—promulgated a ‘Calvinism in an improved form’, the New England theology, that in his view conserved the essential truth of his inherited Edwardsean Calvinism by finding for it new modes of expression that met the contemporary tests of reasonableness and perspicuity.\(^8\) Andover seminary had been founded at the start of the nineteenth century as a bastion of orthodoxy to contend against Harvard, and it was still intended to be such in the decades before the American Civil War when Park served as its champion apologist. In deploying his New England theology, Edwards Amasa Park became the acknowledged leader of the ‘sacred West Point of orthodoxy’.\(^9\)

Dominating Andover with a ‘massive and striking personality’, Park’s professional life in the Bartlet chair of sacred rhetoric and later in the Abbot chair of Christian theology consistently affirmed the primary test of genuine Edwardsean

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\(^7\) EAP, ‘The Fitness of the Church to a Constitution of Renewed Men’, in *Addresses of Rev. Drs. Park, Post and Bacon at the Anniversary of the American Congregational Union, May 1854* (New York: Clark, Austin and Smith, 1854), p. 41 [emphasis in original].


revivalism—that the wills of hearers be moved to action. Always attentive to the premise that the effectiveness of the preacher was a function of both content and presentation, Park employed creative rhetorical strategies to ensure that the preaching of ancient truths should be freshly persuasive. As a powerful revival preacher before his career at Andover and as a gifted theological disputant during it, Park defined a core New England theology that in its matter preserved essential biblical content and that in its practice was adapted to move the unregenerate—the very same project, after all, that had been the work of Jonathan Edwards and his heirs (with whom Park remained self-consciously identified), because this was the only kind of preaching that produced regeneration in the church.

Edwards Park’s close identification with revivalist Edwardsean Calvinism suggests that a brief overview of the theological character of the larger movement might provide a useful context for the particular consideration of Park’s own thought. Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) was the primary spokesperson for the widespread religious awakening which was first associated with his own parish in Northampton, Massachusetts, in 1734-1735 and which in the next decade enveloped much of New England. His own theological work was a complex restatement of traditional Reformed doctrines invigorated by a philosophical idealism that grew from his profound theocentric religious experience and by an Enlightenment-inspired confidence in reason, empiricism.

10 Edward Dwight Eaton to Owen Gates, 16 November 1928 (MS in Trask Library, Andover-Newton Theological School).
and Lockean sensationalism. Edwards’s insistence on genuine experiential religion constituted a rejection of the older view in New England of a covenanted commonwealth—one expressed by the Half-Way Covenant and by the principles of his grandfather, Solomon Stoddard (1643-1729)—and his resultant demand for a converted church membership in Northampton forced his own removal to the frontier at Stockbridge, Massachusetts, in 1750. There he produced the great theological works A Careful and Strict Enquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of that Freedom of Will, Which is supposed to be essential to Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Reward and Punishment, Praise and Blame (1754), where he argued that man’s will or moral choice is free because it is rooted in the unfettered exercise of one’s strongest motive, and The Great Christian Doctrine of Original Sin Defended (1758), where he observed that because human nature is entirely corrupted by sin, those exercises without divine regeneration are always sinful. The latter work was published after Edwards’s death in 1758, following a very brief period of service as president of Princeton College in New Jersey.

Thus, an evangelical theology that might broadly be described as Edwardsean was necessarily revivalistic and practical, in that it required the genuine conversion of the sinner, and Calvinistic, in that it affirmed the traditional tenets of the Reformed faith such as human depravity and divine election. These fundamental attributes would remain

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identifiable characteristics of Edwardseanism in the nineteenth century throughout Edwards Park’s lifetime. In essence, the theological parties within Congregationalism that developed in New England in the decades after Edwards’s death may be defined largely as they accepted or rejected these aspects of Edwards’s legacy. The ‘Old Calvinists’ wished to retain the social order of the traditional covenantal polity in New England, and, while they embraced orthodox doctrine and some were sympathetic to spiritual renewal, they generally rejected the upheaval and enthusiasm associated with the evangelical revival. This moderate party possessed many pious and distinguished men—including Jedidiah Morse (1761-1826), David Tappan (1752-1803) and Ezra Stiles (1727-1795)—but largely failed to produce a growing number of adherents. The more liberal party in eastern Massachusetts, known as ‘Arminians’ for want of a better term, shared a desire for social stability with the Old Calvinists but increasingly rejected orthodox doctrine in favour of a rationalistic theology that adopted a more positive view of human ability and applied a fresh standard of reasonableness to God’s dealings with man. The old idea that God had, for example, imputed the sin of Adam to his progeny failed this test—no individual ought to be held personally responsible for the sins of an ancient representative. Many of this group, like Charles Chauncey (1705-1787) and

16 See Sydney Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 403-404; E. Brooks Holifield, Theology in America: Christian Thought from the Age of the Puritans to the Civil War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), pp. 149-156. See also Joseph W. Phillips, Jedidiah Morse and New England Congregationalism (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1983), pp. 1-11; Edmund S. Morgan, The Gentle Puritan: A Life of Ezra Stiles, 1727-1795 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 166-179. Jedidiah Morse would play an important role in negotiating the compromise that led to the founding of Andover seminary: for biographical information and for details regarding Morse’s role at Andover, see Chapter Three, pp. 95-97. David Tappan was the Hollis professor of divinity at Harvard prior to the Unitarian Henry Ware, whose succession prompted the Andover compromise that Morse was to shepherd; see Phillips, Jedidiah Morse, pp. 138-139. Ezra Stiles was a minister in Newport, Rhode Island, and Portsmouth, New Hampshire, until he became president of Yale College in 1778, serving in that office until his death in New Haven in 1795.
Jonathan Mayhew (1720-1766), eventually moved toward Unitarianism and outright universalism by the early decades of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{17}

A third group self-consciously championed Edwards’s revivalistic Calvinism. Closely tied to Edwards personally by familial and ministerial relationships, the ‘New Divinity’ clerics were like him generally Congregationalist products of Yale College and residents of the Connecticut River valley.\textsuperscript{18} If Edwards himself had renovated traditional Calvinism in view of the philosophical developments of the eighteenth century, Edwards’s disciples were likewise engaged in adapting his legacy in the new social and intellectual setting of the post-revolutionary era in America. As small-town ministers righteously indignant over the growth of self-interest in a growing market economy, they extended Edwards’s teachings on the active nature of virtue into an all-encompassing definition of holiness as radical disinterested benevolence and of sin as self-love or selfishness.\textsuperscript{19} This benevolence was first personal, guiding one’s own moral choices, but it also unleashed unprecedented corporate energy in the founding of a constellation of activist organisations formed to abolish slavery, establish missions, promote temperance, found educational institutions, plant churches and undertake humanitarian reform.\textsuperscript{20} Edward Park’s own Andover seminary would be a part of this efflorescence. At the same time, concerned as was Edwards himself about the antinomian excesses that attended revival, the New Divinity clerics promulgated a high view of God’s law in detailing in their work his orderly moral government, and preached untiringly on the moral

\textsuperscript{17} See Holifield, \textit{Theology in America}, pp. 128-135.
\textsuperscript{18} See Chapter Two, pp. 56-67, for an extended treatment of the New Divinity party and their theological views.
\textsuperscript{20} See the discussion in Ahlstrom, \textit{Religious History}, pp. 422-428.
accountability of the human agent resident in every act of choice or ‘exercise’. They were convinced that Edwards’s revivalistic call for a converted church required a rejection of the old Puritan practice of preparation (much favoured still by the Old Calvinists), where by the gradual application of the ‘means of grace’—through prayer, the preaching of the word, and the sacraments—a sinner might wait on God for years until the Spirit moved the heart to full conviction. Edwards’s successors insisted on revival preaching that unqualifiedly announced the sinner’s immediate responsibility to repent.

To validate this revivelist imperative as thoroughly Edwardsean, the New Divinity men depended on a distinction made by Jonathan Edwards in Freedom of the Will. Edwards had distinguished between a natural inability (arising from a lack of physical strength or an insuperable natural barrier) and a moral inability (consisting of a want of an inclination or disposition). The New Divinity clerics claimed from this that every sinner had a natural ability to repent, since nothing prevented anyone hearing the gospel from receiving it apart from their own unwillingness. As Calvinists, the New Divinity party did not overlook the compelling fact that moral inability proceeded from innate depravity, but as Edwardsean revivalists they were certain that a moral indisposition could never provide an adequate excuse for failing to embrace righteousness. Importantly, it followed that universal natural ability warranted an

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unreserved proclamation of the gospel to every sinner—this was, after all, evangelical Calvinism.  

The leaders of the New Divinity party were personally tied to Jonathan Edwards. Joseph Bellamy (1719-1790) briefly trained for the ministry in Edwards’s home. His principal work, _True Religion Delineated_ (1750), contained a preface by Edwards himself praising its support for experimental piety. Bellamy’s theology extended Edwards’s own work on the permissiveness by which God allowed sin, and expanded hints from Edwards into a more complete description of God as a Moral Governor—each significant changes to traditional Calvinism. Samuel Hopkins (1721-1803) was the great systematiser whose codification of the New Divinity theology in his two-volume _System of Doctrines_ (1793) nearly made ‘Hopkinsianism’ synonymous with the entire movement. He studied for eight months with Edwards in his home in Northampton and, later, when Edwards removed to Stockbridge, he was serving as minister in Great Barrington and so became Edwards’s nearest clerical neighbour. Hopkins went beyond Bellamy’s work on the nature of sin to assert that sin was in fact the occasion of greater good in the universe. His rejection of the use of the means of grace by the unconverted developed into a startling proposal that a sinner’s application of the means only increased one’s guilt, since all the actions of the unrighteous before salvation can only be completely sinful.

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26 See the discussion of these features of Hopkinsianism in Chapter Two, pp. 71-73. Bellamy had argued earlier that ‘all unregenerate persons make MUCH of their duties, though such miserable poor things: and
Hopkins balanced the sovereignty of God with human accountability, insisting on ‘regeneration’ as the work of the Holy Spirit and a complementary ‘conversion’ as an exercise of the human will. In this manner Calvinist divine sovereignty and human depravity remained consistent with the moral urgency of Edwardsean revivalism. Such a balancing act remained a critical feature of the theology of later Hopkinsians like Edwards Park.

In one sense the closest of all to Edwards, his son, Jonathan Edwards, Jr, (1745-1801)—though less an original thinker than his mentors Bellamy and Hopkins—made important contributions to the New Divinity party as a polemicist and defender of his father and his father’s successors. He gave the fullest expression of the moral government theory of the atonement, building on the work of Bellamy and Stephen West (1735-1819). Importantly, this theory replaced for the New Divinity men the traditional Reformed view that Christ’s death was a substitution for the sinner’s own deserved penalty or that God imputed Adam’s sin to his posterity. They preferred to accentuate the work of God as a Moral Governor who displayed his care for the universe by demonstrating that his moral law operated in favour of public justice. By contrast to Edwards, Jr, Nathanael Emmons (1745-1840) was perhaps the most original and creative of the major New Divinity figures. Conducting his ministry for fifty-four years in rural

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Franklin, Massachusetts—where young Edwards Park would regularly travel from nearby Providence, Rhode Island, to hear him preach—Emmons’s views were confessedly Hopkinsian, but were developed toward their logical extremity and came to represent the most controversial summary of what came to be called the ‘exercise’ scheme. Hopkins had emphasised that moral conduct resided in the actions or ‘exercises’ of the human agent. Emmons’s theology preserved for the Deity an absolute Calvinist sovereignty in his strong statements establishing God’s sole causality in every event, but alongside this particularly direct divine efficiency was his insistence, too, that holiness and sin consisted only in the choices or free exercises of the moral agent. There was neither a passive condition of depravity nor any moral state or ‘taste’ that preceded one’s first active choice. A Hopkinsian ‘exerciser’ saw that the hint of a sinful disposition only provided an excuse for sinners—besides, how could there be sin before there was a single sinful act? ‘Emmonism’ as an extension of the Hopkinsian exercise scheme sought to establish the moral accountability of man without diminishing the supremacy of the authority of God.

It would be misleading to suggest that the New Divinity clerics agreed uniformly on every point of doctrine: in fact they insisted stubbornly on their own independence. Yet the degree of agreement was sufficiently substantial that it made sense then and now to identify the New Divinity party as a coherent group, and to trace their specific theological influence even outside New England and Congregationalism into

Presbyterian churches in the Middle Atlantic states, and as far away as Virginia, Tennessee and even Great Britain. They were Calvinists, in that they held to native depravity and God’s sovereignty, and revivalists, in that their preaching centred on an urgent call to immediate repentance. They were avowedly Edwardseans in at least a dual sense. First, Edwards was always the protean figure from whom their theology derived its authority. Although the New Divinity men in general (with the exception of Emmons) did not share Edwards’s ideality, and as a group adopted major modifications of Edwards’s traditional Calvinism in seeking to satisfy contemporary concerns for equity and reasonableness, they never hesitated to yield pride of place to Jonathan Edwards. Secondly, their labours were ultimately validated by that most Edwardsean of evidences—by the Second Great Awakening in New England at the close of the eighteenth century and the opening of the nineteenth, when, in Sydney Ahlstrom’s words, ‘the new revivals occurred, almost uniformly under the strictest preaching of the New Divinity’. If Edwards own theological identity was founded in the first awakening in New England, the New Divinity party’s identification with Edwards would be vindicated by the second.

Nevertheless, two significant elements within evangelical orthodoxy in early nineteenth-century New England would dispute that New Divinity theology in general or a dominant Hopkinsian exercise scheme in particular could properly be identified as Edwardsean. One group, whose institutional locus was the Theological Institute of Connecticut in East Windsor and who included Asa Burton (1752-1836), Bennet Tyler

31 See Holifield, Theology in America, p. 135.
32 See Ahlstrom, Religious History, pp. 415-428; the quotation is from p. 416.
(1783-1858) and Asahel Nettleton (1783-1844), asserted that the exercisers had departed from Edwards’s own views in neglecting the import of a traditional Calvinist understanding of innate depravity. This party of ‘tasters’ held that a sinful nature or ‘taste’ existed prior to any moral action, so that a sinful disposition or inclination lay behind any voluntary exercise and solely determined the will’s choice. It is true that the tasters and the exercisers shared much common ground: Burton’s own theological training, for example, was Hopkinsian. They generally agreed that the old view of the imputation of Adam’s sin ought to be superseded, that regeneration was a transformation of sinners initiated by God from outside themselves, and that the demand for a renewed membership in the church did not allow for the gradualism of the preparationist means of grace. However, the tasters held firmly to a traditional understanding of native depravity that was, in their view, more characteristic of Jonathan Edwards and one that was significantly at odds with Hopkinsian exercise.

The second challenge to the close identification of Hopkinsian expressions with revivalist Edwardsean Calvinism came from New Haven and Yale College. Timothy Dwight (1758-1817), grandson of Jonathan Edwards and president of Yale from 1795 until his death, and two of Dwight’s students, Nathaniel W. Taylor (1786-1858) and Lyman Beecher (1775-1863), Taylor’s energetic organiser, were the key figures in the

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33 The East Windsor party’s views are developed further in Chapter Six, pp. 247-252.
35 E. Brooks Holifield is uncharacteristically inaccurate in observing that Hopkins’s ‘own views remained closer to the faction later known as “tasters” because of their defense of the idea that a disposition or taste underlay both sinful and holy exercises of the heart’; see Holifield, Theology in America, p. 146. The exercisers, including Edwards Park, would at times allow that a sinful nature provided an occasion for sin, but denied that a passive nature could itself sin—only the active exercises of the moral agent could be said to constitute either sin or holiness. See also Noll, America’s God, p. 273 on Hopkins as an exerciser.
development of New Haven theology. Dwight himself is not easily classified as either an Old Calvinist or a New Divinity cleric, for he promoted the godliness of both revivalist experimental religion and orderly establishmentarian Federalism. As an advocate of Scottish common sense realism, he was certainly no Edwardsean idealist, and he set as a New Haven standard a high view of man’s intellectual and moral ability. It was Taylor who would apply considerable genius to the creation of a specific New Haven theology. Again, much ground was shared with the earlier New Divinity men, particularly the rejection of imputation, the notion of God’s moral government and a dependence on an Edwardsean understanding of natural ability. After all, both camps were sensitive to challenges from Unitarians that questioned the benevolence and equity of the Calvinist’s God. But Taylor’s adaptation of Edwardsean culture for his day moved further from Edwards than had the adaptations of his New Divinity predecessors. Taylor rejected Hopkins’s concept of sin as leading to the greatest good, or that the use of the means of grace only added to a sinner’s guilt, in part because of the apologetic hurdles they created. Building on Dwight’s common sense epistemology and its significantly higher estimate of human ability than earlier Calvinists had ventured, Taylor effectively established what Edwards had opposed in Freedom of the Will: a human will independent of motive or influence, applying reason to choice through the intellect prior to the operation of the will. Taylor’s New Haven theology had the effect of enshrining human action as the sole fulcrum of salvation and damnation. Rescuing self-love from the

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36 Chapter Two provides an extended discussion of Nathaniel W. Taylor and New Haven theology relative to Edwards Park; see pp. 73-88.
38 See Sweeney, Nathaniel Taylor, p. 70.
predations of the New Divinity clerics and defining man as a free and creative cause in and of himself, Taylorism had secured a form of revivalism that was well fitted to America’s energetic, acquisitive, democratic national culture. ③ If in so doing Taylor had moved further from Jonathan Edwards than had the New Divinity party in adapting revivalist Calvinism, he had at the same time only extended its natural trajectory by his innovations.

Like many nineteenth-century evangelical Calvinist theologians, Edwards Park shared the burden of finding strategies in the presentation of the gospel that overcame Calvinism’s manifest apologetic burdens. How would one lift the weight of God’s sovereign power that appeared to crush human initiative? Opponents of Calvinism were willing and able to depict determinism as a form of tyranny—an effective attack in the young American republic. William Ellery Channing (1780-1842) argued in 1819 that men ‘cannot bow before a being, however great and powerful, who governs tyrannically’. ④ Park would respond with a theological vocabulary drawn from Samuel Hopkins that made increasing room for human ability while enforcing human accountability. How might Calvinism meet the always potent charge of antinomianism—that the imputation of Christ’s obedience to the unregenerate had freed men from the obligations of God’s law? Park would follow his New Divinity forbears in upholding the moral government theory of the atonement and the continuing importance of systems of law because they were inherent in God’s moral nature. He would echo Hopkins and Nathanael Emmons—each one subjects in turn of Park’s biographical labours—in the


rejection of the means of grace and the need for immediate conversion as antidotes to licence and complacency. Park described the New England theology in 1852 as devoted to ‘the wisdom of demanding an immediate compliance with the law, and to the scientific refutation of all excuses for prolonged impenitence’. 41 He understood that only such urgency from the pulpit prevented, in Emmons’s words, ‘ministering a fatal opiate to the conscience of the sinner’. 42 Park would draw on many influences throughout his long career, but none would convert him from the revivalistic Edwardsean Calvinism expressed in the forms of Hopkins and Emmons that he championed from Andover Hill. Indeed, it was Edwards Park’s own prominence and his influence on evangelical Calvinism in the nineteenth century that ensured that the Hopkinsian exercise scheme would remain the dominant expression of Edwardseanism at Andover and by extension in all New England west of Boston.

If the scope of inquiry is enlarged from the sphere of Edwardsean Calvinism, it may also be seen that Edwards Park was attuned to the broad coalescence around spiritual experience and an ecumenical reduction of credal essentials that was characteristic of much of nineteenth-century evangelicalism. He rejected formalism and promoted a catholic spirit, particularly in his editorship of the Bibliotheca Sacra. In a discourse delivered in 1844 to the Congregational ministers of Massachusetts, Park recognised that ‘how strongly soever [sic] we may be tempted to make a mere shibboleth the condition of Christian fellowship, we must remember that a new country is no place for such sectarianism’. It is essential ‘to commune with our brethren who agree with us in

“substance of doctrine,” although they may differ from us in theories and forms. We stand on a platform long enough and broad enough to hold all the persons and schools that love our Lord Jesus Christ.⁴³ Park advanced an inclusive and irenic spirit that was particularly characteristic of Andover seminary and around which he hoped the whole of orthodoxy might rally.

Edwards Park outlived his personal influence at the seminary he loved. A generation of his own students entered Andover’s faculty after the American Civil War with a very different set of presuppositions from their old mentor. This group of Andover liberals believed they were the ones who looked to the future: Park was already part of the past. But Park’s successors were premature in their judgment that, if it ‘seemed to be Professor Park’s ambition to become the final exponent of the New England theology….it may be said that he did finish it; and it was buried with him’.⁴⁴ Edwards Amasa Park’s work as a rhetorician, theologian and churchman properly invites new investigation. His creation of a distinct New England theology freshly defined a primary strand of evangelical orthodoxy at the mid-point of the nineteenth century. Park would borrow from a wide array of sources—from Nathaniel W. Taylor’s New Haven theology, from German idealism and the Vermittlungstheologie of Friedrich Tholuck and Julius Müller, from the New Rhetoric of Hugh Blair and George Campbell, and from a foundational commitment to commingled natural theology, Baconian induction and Scottish common sense realism⁴⁵—in order to preserve the relevance of that orthodoxy

⁴³ EAP, A Discourse Delivered in Boston before the Pastoral Association of Congregational Ministers in Massachusetts, May 28, 1844 (Andover: Allen, Morrill and Wardwell, 1844), pp. 8-9.
⁴⁵ The nature and impact of these varied influences are developed in Chapter Three, pp. 104-131.
by finding fresh expression for it in light of the thought of his own day. It is useful, then, to consider Park first through the shifting perspectives of the critical interpretation of his work in order to establish a broad context for fresh analysis. Such scrutiny provides an indication of the particular issues concerning his theological enterprise that are critical to a thoroughgoing re-evaluation of Park’s significance in the stream of nineteenth-century evangelicalism.

The first comprehensive analysis of a New England theology that encompassed the work of Jonathan Edwards, his New Divinity heirs, and New Haven theology was George Nye Boardman’s A History of the New England Theology (1899). A student of Park’s (Andover, class of 1852, and later a resident licentiate) and at the time of publication professor emeritus of systematic theology at the Congregationalists’ Chicago seminary, Boardman was sympathetic to Park and appreciative of his reputation. Boardman identified personally with Park’s theology, and was certainly no devotee of the liberal Protestantism then in vogue. Jonathan Edwards, naturally, was in Boardman’s view the fount of all subsequent New England developments. Edwards was writing, in Boardman’s words, ‘in response to the demands of his day without any presentiment of the fact that he was opening the way for Hopkinsianism and yet other and later doctrinal schemes’. Given this simple developmental model, Boardman identified four successive phases of New England theology: ‘Edwardeanism’, ‘Hopkinsianism’, ‘Emmonsism’, and ‘Taylorism’. Such a structure required Boardman to end his analysis

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47 Boardman, History, p. 49.
with New Haven theology, observing that ‘nothing new has been added’ since 1830.\textsuperscript{48} Thus, Boardman had established an historical sequence with a clear endpoint that functionally excluded his former teacher—a pattern that many were later to follow.

Boardman did not entirely ignore Park: the Andover divine appears briefly, for example, in a discussion of the conclusion drawn by Hopkins and confirmed by Emmons that sin consists only in the quality of the exercises of the moral agent, where Boardman acknowledges that ‘one of the most strenuous supporters of the active nature of sin is Professor Park’.\textsuperscript{49} Boardman alluded occasionally in his text to first-person familiarity with Park’s lectures.\textsuperscript{50} Yet, in Boardman’s treatment of New Haven theology as the final phase of New England theology, it is Nathaniel W. Taylor and not Edwards Park who is presented as putting a sharper edge on the earlier work of the New Divinity men. Boardman argues that Taylor sought to oppose the challenges to revivalistic Calvinism from the Unitarians more successfully than had Andover’s Leonard Woods (1774-1854), Park’s predecessor in the Abbot chair—whom Boardman describes as ‘a Hopkinsian, but irenic in temper’. Boardman recognised that Taylor’s particular departures from Hopkinsian divinity included a rejection of sin as the means to the greatest good, a rehabilitation of self-love and the means of grace and a clarification that free moral agency was an ‘elective preference with full power to prefer the contrary’.\textsuperscript{51} Thus, Edwards Park is presented in Boardman’s survey either as conforming to Hopkinsian motifs that pre-date Taylor’s refinements or as following Taylor’s New Haven system.

\textsuperscript{48} Boardman, \textit{History}, pp. 10, 3.
\textsuperscript{49} Boardman, \textit{History}, p. 95.
\textsuperscript{50} Regarding Park’s lectures, for example, see the reference concerning the influence of Jonathan Edwards: ‘Professor Park once said to his class, that he should say [New England theology] began with Edwards’s \textit{Treatise on Virtue}; Boardman, \textit{History}, p. 33.
\textsuperscript{51} Boardman, \textit{History}, pp. 252, 258.
chronologically without adding anything substantial to it. Neither scenario is particularly well suited to articulating a place of significance for Park.

Long considered the scholarly work of the twentieth century that exhibits the greatest textual familiarity with its subject, Frank Hugh Foster’s *A Genetic History of New England Theology* (1907) suffered in the midst of its composition from the author’s loss of faith in the very theology he sought to detail. A favourite pupil of Park’s at Andover and later Park’s own choice—frustrated in the end—to succeed him in the Abbot chair in 1881, Foster’s conversion to the liberal Protestantism of the ‘new theology’ constituted a rejection of the entire project of Edwardsean Calvinism. Foster admits in his Preface that with ‘the progress of the work my point of view and my feelings have changed together’, so that the ‘final historical review of the whole period has made me a critic of the school and its work’. Foster acknowledges his ‘indebtedness to the late… Edwards A. Park, of Andover, for much help of a historical character’, but it is clear that Foster had come to see that a presentation of New England theology merely detailed a theological dead-end. Foster had lost his affection not for Edwards Park, but for his old mentor’s rationalistic theology. Because Park’s work, in Foster’s view, ‘summed up in the most perfect form the long line of… theological discoveries and ratiocinations’, Park was given pride of place as the subject of the closing chapter in Foster’s *Genetic History*: ‘the relation of the material contents of his system to that of his

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53 Foster, *Genetic History*, pp. vi, vii. Foster’s ‘Preface’ gives no credit to Boardman’s earlier survey, remarking that ‘There have been no predecessors in this particular line of study of our theology from whom I could draw’: Foster, *Genetic History*, p. v.
predecessors makes such an arrangement imperative upon the historian’. But Foster’s praise of Park’s achievement has two significant catches. First, Park’s system is in thrall to Taylor, who ‘captivated [Park’s] imagination by boldness of speculation and led his judgement into substantial agreement’. Although Foster is clear that Park and Taylor did not agree on every point—they ‘did not meet…squarely upon the doctrine of the will’, in which Park ‘held a position more Edwardean than Taylor’s’—Park’s achievement finally depends on Taylor. It is Taylor’s bold speculations that battered the constraints of hide-bound Westminster Calvinism to achieve an unfettered celebration of human freedom and dignity: ‘It will be noted here that the fundamental thought underlying all the discussion [of Taylor] is the new idea of freedom. God has given man the power of acting as a true first cause,’ and as such man is ‘beyond the reach of true power, even the divine power, as a determining cause of his volitions’. Nathaniel W. Taylor and not Edwards A. Park is the hero in this tale of ascent from bondage to liberty.

In the second place, Park’s achievement is limited, according to Foster, by his own failure to see that this cardinal principle of freedom required a more substantial adaptation than he was willing or able to undertake—and this is precisely where Taylor succeeded. Thus, if Park’s is ‘the greatest of the New England systems’ for its ‘logical concatenation and power, for argumentative force, for comprehensiveness’ and is, for Foster, ‘unsurpassed, if not unequalled, in the history of Protestant dogmatics’, it is still only ‘the best that can be done with the elements which had been delivered to him’. Park’s antique Calvinism and its ‘paralyzing load of a doctrine of inability’ required that

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54 Foster, *Genetic History*, pp. 471, 472.
55 Foster, *Genetic History*, pp. 473, 483.
56 Foster, *Genetic History*, p. 372.
his system remain in ‘strife [with] the idea of liberty’. Foster, far from judging the Edwardseans for their doctrinal departures from Edwards, praises their halting efforts to reject Calvinism in order to climb to freedom, and in this it was Taylor who as Elisha to Edwards’s Elijah possessed a double measure of the ruling spirit of innovation. If Edwards’s later works were most marked by ‘daring and keen speculation’, it was Taylor who employed that same ‘temper of mind’ and ‘perfect independence’—who ‘had, in fact, only brought out more clearly than they the positions toward which Hopkins, Emmons, and Dwight were historically tending’. But the ‘full meaning of [Taylor’s] teaching’ depended on his greatest discovery, one beyond even Edwards’s reach—‘his new conception of the will, upon the new and real freedom which he had at last succeeded in giving it’. Hence, for all the recognition that Park receives from Foster, the net effect is finally not very different from that of Boardman. To the extent that Park does not agree with Taylor, his disagreement can be dismissed as Park remaining stalled at an earlier stage of development. Alternatively, to the extent that Park affirms what Taylor affirms, Park adds value as a systematiser, but his original contributions are of little additional importance to the drama.

Foster’s praise for Park’s accomplishments was by no means confined to the *Genetic History*. He wrote elsewhere that the ‘New England system received its fullest, most comprehensive, and most representative expression’ in Park’s lectures. Park himself was its ‘consummate master and the greatest representative’. There is ‘scarcely a great thought, and certainly no great contribution to the growing system in any of his

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57 Foster, *Genetic History*, pp. 539-540.
58 Foster, *Genetic History*, pp. 102, 370.
predecessors, which he did not take up and give its due place and influence in his own theology’. In ‘Park the whole school is represented by lineal descent and in consequence of the loving study of unnumbered hours’. Although Foster as a former protégé is clearly fulsome in his praise, the tenor of his discussion is in certain respects similar to other critiques from liberal Protestants who like Foster adopted the new theology. The most generous treatments give oblique praise to Park as a New England Moses—a great teacher of Israel, a prophet who looked into Canaan from a distance, but one who ultimately failed to lead the people into the liberty of the Promised Land of the new theology. Foster himself asserts that the entire ‘New England school…saw a light gleaming in the distance…but none of them, not even Park, saw that light dispel the darkness that was spread by the deterministic philosophy of the Reformation’. George A. Gordon, the liberal theologian who served as minister of Boston’s Old South Church from 1884 to 1927, took this approach in describing Park’s famous Convention sermon, ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ (1850), as unique in ‘its transcendent power’, but ultimately an opportunity wasted by Park. If he ‘had allowed his thought in that great discourse to control and shape his entire teaching, instead of being the last of the old order of theologians he would have become the first of the new’.

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61 Frank Hugh Foster, ‘Professor Park’s Theological System’, BS 61 (1904), p. 527.
62 Foster’s treatment of Park reminds one of G. K. Chesterton’s description of the view of certain critics of St Francis: ‘His religion can be regarded as a superstition, but an inevitable superstition, from which not even genius could wholly free itself’; see G. K. Chesterton, Saint Francis of Assisi (New York: Doubleday, 1990), p. 10.
63 Foster, ‘Professor Park’s Theological System’, p. 527.
64 See EAP, ‘Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’, BS 7 (1850), pp. 533-569. The sermon is also called the ‘Convention sermon’ because it was preached by Park in 1850 at the Brattle Street Church in Boston on the occasion of the annual meeting of the Convention of Congregational Ministers. ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ is the subject of Chapter Four, pp. 133-174.
If he had ‘turned the intellect upon the deposit of faith stored up in the Christian heart, stored in the Christian consciousness’, Park would have ‘cleansed the Augean stables of the medieval understanding’ and ‘stood for the dawn of a new day in American theology’. The ‘promise of all this burned bright in the eloquence of that sermon’, but the ‘promise was unfulfilled by Park’. To the liberal mind, Park had failed to take a hand in securing the future.

Generally, it is Horace Bushnell (1802-1876) who is celebrated as the successful proto-liberal who gives intimations of liberal Protestantism’s dramatic escape from Geneva at the nineteenth century’s end. New theologian John W. Buckham described Bushnell as ‘in some respects almost as truly the father of the later constructive developments in American theology as was Jonathan Edwards of the earlier. Each was an original, creative mind.’ Foster in his later work calls Bushnell ‘the originator of the whole movement’. Gordon argued that the older New England theologians had merely ‘absorbed from childhood the Calvinistic scheme’. Jonathan Edwards, ‘the elder and younger, Joseph Bellamy, Samuel Hopkins, Nathanael Emmons, Nathaniel William Taylor, and Edwards A. Park—the great masters of the school—were as one here. Horace Bushnell is the pioneer of a new movement.’ Bushnell’s emergence as the protean figure in the new theology’s own conception of its history is emblematic of a

65 George A. Gordon, The Congregationalist, 13 June 1903, p. 840.
66 Foster may have betrayed his former affection for New England theology in identifying N. W. Taylor as his hero and by inserting his review of Bushnell into a chapter entitled ‘The Later New Haven Theology’ [numbered XIV], though he does subsequently describe Bushnell (in the chapter on Edwards Park) as ‘the greatest thinker upon the atonement among [Park’s] contemporaries’; Foster, Genetic History, p. 511. Chapter XIV of the Genetic History is found on pp. 401-429; the discussion of Bushnell occupies pp. 401-422. Chapter XVII on Park is found on pp. 471-540.
67 Buckham, Progressive Religious Thought, p. 6. See note 81 for biographical information on Buckham.
shift toward organic, developmental, and incarnational terms to define the emerging new Christology. This tectonic movement condemned the historical stock of Jonathan Edwards (except perhaps at Princeton) and later Edwardsean Calvinists—and Edwards Park with them—to almost three decades of irrelevance until Passchendaele and the Somme exploded much of the plausibility of the new theology itself. Andover seminary itself played a special role in these large-scale theological developments.⁷⁰ Many of themes that came to define liberal Protestantism in the shape of the new theology were anticipated in the work of the younger Andover faculty—many of whom were Edwards Park’s own students—in the years following the American Civil War.⁷¹ These ‘Andover liberals’ believed in progress and science, but rejected Enlightenment forms as excessively rationalistic and mechanistic.⁷² They increasingly favoured theological expressions that were organic and developmental, and they emphasised the primacy of religious experience. They found in modern evolutionary theory a model for a ‘progressive orthodoxy’ in theology that might embrace both Schleiermacher and Darwin.⁷³ The founding of the Andover Review in 1884 provided an outlet for their views. Although they were not radicals themselves, and could not be said to have constituted an enduring school of theology, these Andover divines anticipated much that

⁷¹ See Chapter Six, pp. 258-269, for an extended discussion of the younger ‘Andover liberals’.
would come to define liberal Protestantism in the last two decades of the nineteenth century and they did so in the face of opposition from their old teacher, Edwards Park.74

The new theologians crafted a thoroughgoing rejection of the dogmatic system with which Park was identified—and so of Park—by positioning their work as ‘a progressive science, in light of the principles of development’.75 In such works as Theodore T. Munger’s The Freedom of Faith (1883)76, William N. Clarke’s Outline of Christian Theology (1898)77, Levi L. Paine’s The Evolution of Trinitarianism (1900)78, Henry C. King’s Reconstruction in Theology (1901)79, George B. Foster’s The Finality of

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74 George A. Gordon recognized that the Andover liberals were fundamentally at odds with Park’s system: ‘men who afterwards became scholars of national fame, and who grieved their teacher by undermining…the forts he had constructed’ were the ones ‘who have entered into his labours’; Gordon, The Congregationalist, 13 June 1903, p. 840. Similarly, before his Life of Edwards (1889) appeared, Alexander V. G. Allen, Andover class of 1865, wrote to Park: ‘I fear you may think I am a degenerate pupil or may hardly care to own me as a disciple, but however that may be, I shall not cease to acknowledge my obligations’; Allen to EAP, 3 December 1883 (MS in Yale University Library), cited in Donald L. Weber, ‘The Image of Jonathan Edwards in American Culture’ (unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Columbia University, 1978), p. 161, n. 1. Boardman, Andover class of 1852, also recognized the new theology’s essential discontinuity with Edwardsean Calvinism; see Boardman, History, pp. 302-303: ‘The new theology makes salvation nobility of character….The new theology knows nothing of pardon of sin, remission of penalty, justification through the righteousness of another, its salvation is improvement through discipline. In spirit and doctrine this scheme is totally at war with Edwardeanism.’

75 Buckham, Progressive Religious Thought, p. 3.

76 Theodore Thornton Munger (1830-1910) graduated from Yale in 1847 and from its Divinity School in 1855, subsequently pursuing postgraduate study at Andover seminary for a brief period before assuming a series of pastoratees in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, California and Connecticut. Munger’s The Freedom of Faith (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1883) is generally considered his most important publication.

77 William Newton Clarke (1841-1912) was educated at Colgate University (then Madison College) and Hamilton Seminary (N.Y.), before serving various Baptist congregations in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Canada and New York. His major academic post was held at Colgate Seminary, where he served as professor of theology from 1890 to 1908. Clarke’s An Outline of Christian Theology (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1898) was the most influential theology text at the turn of the century.

78 Levi Leonard Paine (1832-1902) served as professor of church history at Bangor Theological Seminary from 1870 to 1902. The subject of his inaugural address at Bangor was ‘The principle of development inherent in Christianity, and the advantages derived from the study of Christianity as a developing historical religion’; see Calvin M. Clarke, History of Bangor Theological Seminary (Boston: The Pilgrim Press, 1916), p. 207. Paine’s central work was A Critical History of the Evolution of Trinitarianism and its Outcome in the New Christology (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1900).

79 Henry Churchill King (1858-1934) received degrees from Oberlin and Harvard Divinity School. He taught at Oberlin from 1884, was appointed professor of systematic theology in 1897 and president in 1902. King’s studies in Germany in 1893-1894 under Albrecht Ritschl were reflected in his publication of Reconstruction in Theology (New York: Macmillan, 1901).
the Christian Religion (1906), John W. Buckham’s Progressive Religious Thought in America (1919), George A. Gordon’s The New Orthodoxy and the Old (1893), The Christ of To-day (1895), and Humanism in New England Theology (1920), and Frank Hugh Foster’s own Christian Life and Theology (1900) and The Modern Movement in American Theology (1939), the new theologians moved on a broad front to reject, in

80 George Burman Foster (1857-1918) served as minister of Baptist churches in West Virginia and New York before settling on an academic career. Following studies in Germany (including a period at Göttingen under Ritschl) and a teaching appointment at McMaster University in Toronto, he accepted President William Rainey Harper’s invitation in 1895 to join the University of Chicago as professor of systematic theology. Foster’s principal work was The Finality of the Christian Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1906).

81 John Wright Buckham (1864-1945) graduated from the University of Vermont in 1885 and from Andover seminary in 1888, following which he assumed pastorates in New Hampshire and Massachusetts. In 1903 he accepted the chair of Christian theology at the Pacific School of Religion in Berkeley and served in that capacity until his retirement in 1937. Progressive Religious Thought in America was published in 1919 to celebrate the tercentenary of the Plymouth Colony; see the bibliographical information at note 44.

82 George Angier Gordon, The New Orthodoxy and the Old (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1893) and The Christ of To-day (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1895); see the bibliographical information for Humanism in New England Theology at note 69. Gordon (1853-1929) was a Scot who emigrated to the United States in 1871, taking ordination as a Presbyterian but later attending the Congregationalists’ Bangor Theological Seminary. At Bangor, Gordon studied under a fellow Scot, William Macleod Barbour (1827-1899), Andover, class of 1861 (and ‘a favorite pupil of Prof. E. A. Park’, according to Frank Hugh Foster [see Foster, Modern Movement, p. 106]). After enrolling at Harvard and filling a Congregational pastorate in Greenwich, Connecticut, Gordon served for forty-three years as minister of Old South Church in Boston. While an outspoken proponent of liberal Protestantism, he was neither a Universalist nor a Unitarian, maintaining a high Christology that derived from his admiration for Origen [see Henry Warner Bowden, ‘George Angier Gordon’, in John A. Garraty and Mark C. Carnes, eds, American National Biography, 24 vols (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), vol. 9, pp. 285-286].

83 Frank Hugh Foster (1851-1935) earned degrees at Harvard in 1873, Andover seminary in 1877, and the University of Leipzig in 1882. He held academic posts at Middlebury College, Oberlin, Pacific Seminary, Lake Erie College (Ohio), and Oberlin Graduate School of Theology; among his works was Christian Life and Theology: or, The Contribution of Christian Experience to the System of Evangelical Doctrine (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1900); see also the bibliographical information for Modern Movement at note 68.

Buckham’s words, ‘the rationalism of the New England theology’ and replace ‘it with a theology of experience, in which intuition and unity take the place of dogma and system’. Clearly, in the period of the new theology’s ascendancy and in its celebration of Bushnell, Darwin, Coleridge and Schleiermacher, there was little room for Edwards Amasa Park.

This rejection of rationalism accomplished, in Buckham’s words, the ‘recovery of Christ as the central light and potency of Christianity’, whereas the New England theology, in ‘its bondage to Calvinism, had allowed the real Christ to fade out of Christianity, leaving a frame without a picture’. The centre of the new system was ‘the re-discovered consciousness of Christ’, so that, for ‘the first time in American Christianity the incarnation had been restored to its proper place in theology’. Frank Hugh Foster’s admiration for Edwards Park and the New England theology was restrained by his conviction that ‘the new theology is…more vital because it is founded upon a better understanding of the eternal facts of genuine Christian experience’. Gordon acknowledged that ‘for skill and power in deductive argument Professor Park has never been surpassed by any thinker in our history’. But his ‘weakness was that of his…entire New England school’, and that ‘New England divinity has perished…because it was a form of humanism wanting in depth and wanting in worth’. When Gordon

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85 Buckham, Progressive Religious Thought, p. 12.

86 For a general discussion, see Dorrien, The Making of American Liberal Theology, pp. 261-304.

87 Buckham, Progressive Religious Thought, pp. 25-26, 154, 311. The new theologians did not consider the Andover liberals to have been liberal enough; see, for example, Frank Hugh Foster on Egbert Smyth: ‘But Professor Smyth was…essentially disqualified from the task [of rejuvenating Andover] by his great and incurable conservatism, both of temper and of thought’ (Foster, Modern Movement, p. 25).

88 Foster, Modern Movement, p. 215.
inspected the theological landscape, ‘nowhere do we find men of modern training and respectable intellect holding the New England theology’.\(^8^9\) When Park died near the start of the new century, the new theologians summarily interred Park’s lifework and reputation with him, with praise but with little evidence of regret.

It was no Congregationalist son of old Massachusetts who took a hand in resurrecting serious consideration of New England theology, but a theologian of Armenian descent born in Turkey who taught at a mainline seminary in Chicago. In the same period as Perry Miller’s work at Harvard to rehabilitate the theological reputation of Jonathan Edwards, Joseph Haroutunian’s *Piety versus Moralism: The Passing of the New England Theology* (1932)—originally his doctoral dissertation at Columbia under Herbert Schneider—intended to enlist Edwards’s theocentric vision in the revitalization of Protestantism.\(^9^0\) Critical of both the progressive liberalism of the new theology and aspects of the emergent neo-orthodoxy, Haroutunian saw the study of Edwards as an opportunity to undertake, as Edwards had in his own time, a repristinisation of Reformed theology that would revitalise the church in the twentieth century.\(^9^1\)

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slipstream of Edwards’s own re-evaluation was Haroutunian’s analysis of Edwards’s theological heirs. Henry F. May later commented that *Piety versus Moralism* had ‘restored meaning to the long-neglected family fights of New England divines’. However, if Haroutunian began the process that would recover Edwards’s followers as legitimate subjects for academic study, the picture he drew of them was hardly flattering. Haroutunian lamented the steep descent from Edwards’s God-focused passion to his disciples’ tepid and moralistic legalism. Beginning with Samuel Hopkins and culminating in the theology of Nathaniel W. Taylor, Haroutunian is unrelenting in detailing a collapse that left the best of Edwards and his vital Calvinism behind. After Edwards had ‘revitalized religion for at least part of New England’ by making ‘Calvinist piety a matter which concerned primarily the relation of the individual soul to God’, his ‘disciples and later champions’, lacking ‘either his profound piety, or intellectual vigor, or both…reverted to governmental and legalistic conceptions of Calvinism’. This process ‘culminated in the work of Nathaniel W. Taylor of Yale College, based upon a morality and philosophy profoundly other than those which motivated the theology of Edwards’. Following Taylor, the ‘New England Theology adopted the style set by him and became progressively “liberal”’. Thus, famously, ‘seen from the perspective of the theology of Edwards, the history of the New England Theology is the history of a degradation’.

Haroutunian hoped that ‘a new understanding of Edwardianism’ would serve as an ‘illustration of that perennial conflict between theocentric piety and humanitarian

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92 May, ‘Recovery of American Religious History’, p. 85. May does suggest here that *Piety versus Moralism* was written from a ‘neo-orthodox’ perspective.

morality’. If late Edwardsean Calvinism had defected from Edwards’s genuine Calvinism in responding to the pressures of ‘new dogmas relevant to human dignity and “free moral agency”’, its advocates had unwittingly become ‘respectable moderns’—the ‘faith of the fathers [was] ruined by the faith of their children’. Rather than seeing that the New England theology was discontinuous with the humanitarian optimism of the liberal new theology, as Gordon, Foster and their fellows had asserted, Haroutunian represents Edwards’s heirs as the natural fathers of liberal Protestantism—but all were unnatural children to Jonathan Edwards. He closes Piety versus Moralism satirically, describing the ‘Good and intelligent Christians’ who were busy ‘proclaiming the fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of men, and the moral ideal set up by the “gentle Jesus”; telling men of the dignity and value of the human soul, its potential likeness to the perfectly good God, and its ultimate destiny in heaven’. These men ‘were great optimists’—but Haroutunian knew more.

The decline Haroutunian describes has no room for Edwards Amasa Park. Haroutunian relegates Park to a single citation in his ‘Prelude’ and that merely in the context of sharp criticism of Frank Hugh Foster and the Genetic History. In such a dismissal, Haroutunian in effect repeats the dominant critical view of Park: to the extent that Park is identified with Taylor, his awkward historical position following Taylor renders Park superfluous. If Andover Calvinism is merely a longer-lasting variant of New Haven theology, it has little to add—perhaps a footnote’s worth—to the linear progression from Edwards to Taylor. Whether the line of Edwardseanism is interpreted

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94 Haroutunian, Piety versus Moralism p. xxiv.
95 Haroutunian, Piety versus Moralism pp. 281-282.
96 See Haroutunian, Piety versus Moralism p. xxiii.
descriptively as steadily ascending (Foster) or rapidly descending (Haroutunian), in each case the importance of Park remains obscured by the relative significance of Taylor. Although these two most influential analyses of Edwardseanism in the first half of the twentieth century—Foster’s *Genetic History* and Haroutunian’s *Piety versus Moralism*—were radically different in their architectonic design and underlying presumptions, each effectively marginalised Edwards Park. The consequence for Park’s work was particularly potent in the case of *Piety versus Moralism* since Haroutunian’s volume provided the primary armature for the subsequent study of Edwardsean Calvinism over the next five decades.

Special mention needs to be made of Frank Hugh Foster’s biography of Park, published in 1936—four years after *Piety versus Moralism* and one year after Foster’s death. Printed in the midst of the decade’s rising tide of interest in things Edwardsean, *The Life of Edwards Amasa Park* is largely disappointing as a biography. It is primarily a compilation of extracts from Richard Salter Storrs’s funeral address for Park, from a biographical sketch edited by G. R. W. Scott for the pamphlet, ‘Professor Park and His Pupils’ (1899), and from a notebook available to Foster (now lost) of autobiographical fragments in Park’s own hand. Similarly, as a study of Park’s theology, the biography

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97 Foster’s *Life of Edwards Amasa Park* was published in 1936; Foster died in Oberlin on 20 October 1935.
98 Storrs’s funeral address was published as Richard Salter Storrs, *Edwards Amasa Park, Memorial Address* (Boston: Samuel Usher, 1900). The address was prepared in advance, for Storrs never had the chance to deliver it, dying just hours before Park; see ‘Professor Edwards A. Park’, *The Congregationalist*, 7 June 1900, pp. 831-832, and ‘Professor Park and Dr. Storrs’, *The Congregationalist*, 14 June 1900, p. 865. The pamphlet edited by Dr G. R. W. Scott, ‘Professor Park and His Pupils’, was also published as part of a larger bound collection in D. L. Furber, ed., *Professor Park and His Pupils: A Biographical Sketch with Letters Received on His Ninetieth Birthday, His Personal Religious Creed, and Other Papers; Introduction by the Rev. R. S. Storrs, D.D., LL.D.* (Boston: Samuel Usher, 1899); the bound collection includes the material in ‘Professor Park’s Ninetieth Anniversary, with Letters from Pupils and Friends’, *BS* 61 (1899), pp. 301-326.
99 On the autobiographical fragments, see Foster, *Life of Edwards Amasa Park*, p. 31.
could hardly offer anything that had not already been duly considered in Foster’s *Genetic History*. Perhaps the most interesting grace note that the biography affords is the rationale for its publication offered in the foreword by Oberlin’s Walter Marshall Horton. Acknowledging ‘a considerable revival of interest in the history of the New England Theology’ in general and in Jonathan Edwards, the ‘founder of the school’, in particular, it was timely, in Horton’s view, to remedy the fact that there was ‘one great and tragic figure who has for the most part been quite undeservedly overlooked: Edwards Park’. Although it was unfortunate that Park had ‘lingered on after his defeat’ at the seminary by the Andover liberals, it was a signal fact of his long life that he had ‘never yielded to the rising tide of liberalism’. Thus Horton—with President Henry Churchill King a part of the success of liberal Protestantism at Oberlin from King’s appointment in 1902—could praise Park and justify the attention now paid to him because Park had resisted liberalism.\(^{100}\) It is likely that this approbation would not have been delivered at all had not the prospects of liberal Protestantism itself fallen to the point in 1936 where even mummified New England theologians achieved relevance.

Not every liberal was as generous as Horton. Daniel D. Williams’s *The Andover Liberals* (1941) unrepentantly details the triumph of the forces for progress—the Andover liberals—over those of reaction, including Edwards Park. Williams described Park’s defence of Andover’s ‘Calvinist tradition’ as standing ‘against the main current’ of the nineteenth century, and it is precisely at the retirement in 1881 of Park, ‘the last great representative of the New England theology’, that ‘Andover became the champion of an

evangelical religious liberalism’. Williams recognises that Park was at least potentially on the edge of the positive changes at Andover, for he echoes George A. Gordon in his assessment of ‘The Theology of the Intellect and the Theology of the Feelings’ by suggesting that Park’s sermon ‘might well have been the opening word in a crusade for a new theology’. In making ‘moral sentiment the criterion for judging all theologies’, Park had displayed his ‘sensitiveness to the “humane spirit” which Channing had breathed into theology’. Thus the Convention sermon ‘might have laid the ground-work for a new theology of experience which could survive the protest against the harshness of Calvinism and withstand the shifting of cosmological views brought about by science’. But Park failed to progress, apart from accepting Taylor’s modifications, and it fell to the later generation of students taught by Park at Andover, as has been seen, to define ‘Progressive Orthodoxy’. Park spent his retirement, in Williams’s words, ‘denouncing the apostasy of the new faculty’. Williams’s verdict became the standard analysis of Park from a liberal perspective: Edwards Park had rejected the future and chosen to defend outdated creeds.

The study of Edwards Park in the modern era began with three closely-spaced but decidedly different doctoral dissertations. Kenneth E. Rowe’s dissertation in 1969 at Drew University applied the sensibility of Piety versus Moralism to a lengthy analysis of

101 Williams, Andover Liberals, p. 1.
102 Williams, Andover Liberals, pp. 19-21.
103 Williams remarks that Park ‘studied under Taylor at New Haven’ and ‘followed Taylor in striving to vindicate the benevolent character of God’; see Williams, Andover Liberals, p. 21.
105 Williams, Andover Liberals, p. 29.
Park’s theological positions. For example, Rowe criticizes Park’s epistemological reliance on Scottish common sense realism as producing an inevitably anthropocentric theology, citing favourably the remark of Union Seminary’s Henry B. Smith that the result of such ‘mental philosophy’ is that ‘Man becomes the measure of all things’. After an extensive inspection of Park’s statements concerning the atonement, imputation, natural ability and moral agency, Rowe concludes that ‘it is difficult to see how Park’s understanding of faith and justification is anything short of rationalistic works-righteousness. His doctrine of personal moral agency inevitably turns faith into a rational and moral act of man’s own design.’ Jonathan Edwards’s great vision of corporate unity in Christ had been ‘replaced by individualism’. After almost four hundred pages of references to Park’s writings, Rowe’s conclusion is unsympathetic—New England theology is ‘frankly provincial’. Even if Park’s theology had the virtue of being ‘consistent, it was no longer Christ-centered’. All in all, the spirit of Joseph Haroutunian had returned like Marley’s ghost to deliver in 1969 the judgement it had neglected to provide in 1932.

The second dissertation was a product of Harvard Divinity School, and it assumed that Park ought to be evaluated solely by his contribution to the progressive revelation that fortuitously produced theological liberalism. Harold Y. Vanderpool described his work as an effort to discover whether Andover was ‘intellectually static and closed, or innovative’—whether ‘they watched over a vast theological wasteland or at best may

have represented a prelude to the later liberal era’. 109 Jonathan Edwards, Samuel Hopkins and Nathanael Emmons had hinted at progress to come because they ‘accepted the proposition that the Christian faith could be compatible with reason’. This ‘new reliance on reason’ gave great hope that New England theologians would come to understand the entire sufficiency of natural theology. 110 Unfortunately, in Vanderpool’s view, Leonard Woods and Moses Stuart (1780-1832), Park’s predecessors on the Andover faculty, allowed their loyalty to orthodoxy to lead them into a ‘biblical authoritarianism’ that ‘clipped the wings of discursive reason’. 111 Happily, Edwards Amasa Park came to rescue Andover by a deft combination of a reliance on natural theology that ‘assumed that the existence and character of the Deity could be extracted from the natural world without the aid of scripture’, and ‘semi-romantic’, affective ‘appeals to human emotion’ formalised in the Convention sermon. In such a double action, Park’s combination of pure reason and sentimental moralism ‘bridged the gap between his New England heritage and the romantic and sentimental message of Horace Bushnell and Henry Ward Beecher’. In this, he was a ‘transitional figure’. 112 Reason had been rescued from biblical authoritarianism and emotion now marked the way to ‘humanitarian moralism’. Vanderpool signalled this dual triumph by concluding that, in Park, ‘liberal Edwardeanism had come to power at Andover’ to provide ‘a mature evangelical solution to the demand for a traditional, reasonable, scriptural and moral theology’. Even if the

Andover liberals failed to appreciate Park in his old age, ‘he was their mentor’. For Vanderpool, Park’s story exists only within a very narrow focus—as part of the triumph of liberalism at Andover: Park is now the very man the Andover liberals assumed he had failed to become.

The third dissertation, by Anthony C. Cecil at Yale University in 1971, is a competent, workmanlike survey of Park’s life and published work conducted in the irenic spirit of Sydney Ahlstrom, Cecil’s advisor at Yale. Ahlstrom’s own treatment of Edwards’s theological heirs in his *A Religious History of the American People* (1972) is generous: ‘the successors of Edwards…are his legitimate offspring’—Joseph Bellamy, Samuel Hopkins, Jonathan Edwards, Jr, and Nathanael Emmons. If the New Divinity men were overly concerned ‘with doctrine and metaphysics’ and possessed a ‘fondness for controversy [and] acrimonious ways [that] tended to hinder’ their efforts, they nevertheless ‘succeeded in doing what almost no one else in the Reformed tradition was then doing creatively: they maintained a dogmatic tradition and steadily developed it in the face of…challenges to theological rigor’. They ‘executed their task with brilliance’ and ‘their steadfastness’ was vindicated by the Second Great Awakening. But Ahlstrom is almost silent on Edwards Park, as if the critical path of New England theology ran directly from Edwards through the New Divinity clerics to Timothy Dwight, Bennet Tyler, Asahel Nettleton, Lyman Beecher and Nathaniel W. Taylor without

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stopping for Edwards Park. When Ahlstrom takes up an entirely different New England line of heredity for Ralph Waldo Emerson, Theodore Parker and Horace Bushnell, he pauses for only the briefest allusion to Park’s Convention sermon.\textsuperscript{116} In this sense, Cecil—like Rowe for Haroutunian—ploughs the furrow untumed by Ahlstrom.

In the same way that Ahlstrom appreciated that the New Divinity men were engaged in the dynamic process of maintaining a specific theological tradition in conditions that had changed significantly from the point of that tradition’s founding, Cecil understood ‘the seriousness of the apologetic dilemma [Park] faced and the boldness…with which he modified his Edwardsean heritage to meet that dilemma’. Park’s efforts to mediate between ‘romantic and rationalistic’ and ‘liberal and conservative elements’ during his time at Andover are, for Cecil, ‘a highly revealing window upon an age of revolutionary change in American religious thought’.\textsuperscript{117} The difficulty with Cecil’s work is that he is finally ambivalent in his judgements about Park’s theology, as if he is unsure where to find the real Park. For example, though Park’s ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ is clearly the central focus for any analysis of how Park conducted his project of reconciliation, Cecil is unable to describe the critical balance between the sermon’s two principal constituent elements: ‘In the final analysis…one is left with ambivalence and paradox when one focuses upon Park’s Convention sermon of 1850 and tries to sort out the relations of head and heart’.\textsuperscript{118} In the critical matter of Park’s relationship to Taylor, Cecil is even less definitive: Park’s governmental view of the atonement ‘seemed closer to the thought of Taylor than to that

\textsuperscript{116} See Ahlstrom, Religious History, p. 613.
\textsuperscript{117} Cecil, Theological Development of Edwards Amasa Park, pp. 276, 279.
\textsuperscript{118} Cecil, Theological Development of Edwards Amasa Park, p. 107.
of Edwards’, and ‘yet [Park] was able to discern movement toward governmental motifs not only in early Edwardsean disciples but in the master himself’. Clearly, it was a great handicap to Cecil in ascertaining the relative position of Park that he demonstrated only a slight awareness of the views of Edwards’s New Divinity disciples—as indicated in this particular instance by his apparent lack of recognition that ‘governmental motifs’ were the very warp and woof of the New Divinity modifications to a traditional substitutionary atonement. Examples of this type could be multiplied indefinitely. When Cecil discusses Park’s exposure in Germany in 1843 to Julius Müller’s ‘understanding that sin is a free act on the part of each individual’, he assumes that ‘Park’s own concept of sin as act rather than state borrowed much supporting elaboration’ from Müller, without recognising that Park from his youth could have lectured extensively on this basic principle of the Hopkinsian exercise line—perhaps even in the very presence of Nathanael Emmons himself. In the end, Cecil provides a vast amount of helpful material about Park—and a vast amount of bibliographical aids to those who would add to that material—but he offers no clear resolution of the many themes that might converge to give sharp definition to Park himself.

As scholarship about Jonathan Edwards and Edwardsean culture grew from a stream to a flood in the last quarter of the twentieth century, work on Edwards Park remained confined to the occasional eddy or minor tributary. The Edwards industry moved forward in a number of different ways: with the increased rate of production of

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the definitive Yale University Press series of *The Works of Jonathan Edwards*, with the periodic appearance of collections of essays that typically followed significant academic conferences, with monographs of high quality on leading theological figures of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and with interpretative works covering the same period from very gifted historians. When these volumes refer to Park at all, they tend

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to place him into already well-established patterns. The first option is to describe Park as simply a Taylorite. Douglas A. Sweeney, in his admirable recent study of Nathaniel W. Taylor, describes Park as ‘won over to New Haven Theology’ by the time he assumed the Abbot chair in 1847, though in this view Sweeney relies—not unsurprisingly—primarily on Frank Hugh Foster. Bruce Kuklick’s influential *Churchmen and Philosophers* (1985) had anticipated Sweeney, asserting that ‘only Taylor’s position, for Park, circumvented the accusation…that Calvinism was fatalistic’. Park, believing ‘that the Hopkinsian tradition proceeded from Hopkins to Emmons to Taylor’, essentially ‘homogenized the theological past and saw Taylor everywhere’. One difficulty with this viewpoint is its failure to recognise that, because Park and Taylor were working on essentially the same apologetic project, Park was not averse to borrowing from Taylor when it was useful to him. But such formal similarities ought to be balanced against the significant areas where Park patently rejected Taylor’s positions. Park’s foundational identity lay in the exercise scheme of Samuel Hopkins and Nathanael Emmons: at any point that Taylor contradicted this inherited line, Park did not hesitate to reject the New Haven departure.

Alternatively, D. G. Hart’s 1987 essay, ‘The Critical Period for Protestant Thought in America’, in effect categorises Park as a hesitant proto-liberal when he links Park’s Convention sermon with Horace Bushnell simply because, in Hart’s view, implicit in it are ‘German ideas….rooted in its appropriation of Bushnell’. Hart’s circular

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125 Sweeney, *Nathaniel Taylor*, p. 147. Sweeney, oddly, describes this as a ‘revisionist’ position in his ‘Notes’ (p. 242), and cites Foster, Cecil (who relies on Foster), and Bruce Kuklick (see also Kuklick, *Churchmen and Philosophers*, pp. 211-214).
127 The theological relationship of Park and Taylor is developed in detail in Chapter Two, pp. 83-89.
argument even recycles George A. Gordon’s comment that Park might have ‘stood for the dawn of a new day’ in American theology, and Hart himself asks ‘why Park shied away from the implications of his sermon’ so that he was ‘prevented…from harmonizing piety and learning in a way that would satisfy…the next generation’. Although Hart understands that Park was in fact deeply rooted in Edwardsean Calvinism and Scottish realism, ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ is represented in the essay as source material for the future liberalisation of Andover and then of larger Protestantism.\textsuperscript{128} It is important to realise that Park and Bushnell were in fact far more different from each other than they were alike, despite the affective elements in the Convention sermon. Bushnell’s metaphorical theory of language was a rejection of the very project of theology in which Park was engaged. At the same time, ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ must be seen as one part of Park’s on-going development of specific rhetorical strategies—a methodological focus of Park’s that begins at least as early as 1837—so that it is misleading to see the Convention sermon of 1850 as simply an accommodation to Bushnell.\textsuperscript{129} Despite some formal similarities, Park cannot be represented fairly as a proponent of Bushnell’s anti-propositional theory of language nor in a larger sense as a herald of liberal Protestantism.

Mark Noll’s magisterial \textit{America’s God} (2002) is perhaps the most comprehensive survey to date of American theological history to the Civil War, but


\textsuperscript{129} The relationship of Bushnell and Park in relation to the Convention sermon is developed in Chapter Four, pp. 140-148, 162-164.
readers who would be interested in an extended discussion of Park’s place in Noll’s complex story will have to look elsewhere. Edwards Park is again notable for his absence. Park appears just once in the text, once as a name in a table, once supplying a quotation for the frontispiece of a chapter, once in the notes as a resource regarding Hopkins, and once again in the notes regarding his debates with Charles Hodge over the Convention sermon.130 Thus, even at this highest level of contemporary scholarship, the old interpretative pattern as regards Edwards Park repeats itself: Park is again either a Taylorite, a hesitant proto-liberal or conspicuous by his absence.

One recent scholar has provided a fresh approach to the study of Edwards Park. Joseph Conforti has suggested that Park’s work must be understood in the context of a nuanced apologetic strategy that marshalled all Park’s skills as a historian, biographer, disputant and exegete to create and then to defend a distinct ‘Edwardsian tradition’ derived from Edwards ‘and the New Divinity’. Park’s creation—the New England theology—offered a ‘defense of Calvinism consistent with human accountability, and thus with the tone and character of nineteenth-century evangelical culture’.131 Park produced historical discourses with elaborate textual exegesis and lengthy biographical studies that when woven together composed a smooth but dense narrative that legitimised, in Park’s own words, his ‘Calvinism in an improved form’.132 The theological content, in Conforti’s view, proceeded primarily from Samuel Hopkins—Park

only ‘adapted elements and arguments of Taylorism’ to suit his own purposes.\textsuperscript{133} Although Conforti neglects the importance of Park’s early rhetorical work years before the Convention sermon, he is not incorrect when he observes that ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ became Park’s ‘apologetic workhorse’, demonstrating the analytical tools required to craft his particular story-line.\textsuperscript{134} The critical aspect of Conforti’s thesis is that Park is neither an inconveniently placed Taylorite nor a frustrated proto-liberal. Conforti suggests that Park ought to be seen as a theologian who labours with skill and creativity to convert his cherished Edwardsean heritage into a coherent form that is useful, plausible, and defensible over much of the antebellum period and beyond—Edwards Park rightfully re-appears as the protagonist of his own story.

Conforti’s thesis agrees with Park’s own assertion that his ‘Edwardean definitions’ were aspects of a project of conservation intended to retain the sway of Calvinism. If Park were to train preachers who addressed ‘the mind of an intelligent community’, they required an intelligible gospel. In Park’s view, the ‘people, intent on having a creed that may be preached to them…have emboldened and even required their ministers to make the Edwardean analyses’, so that they may ‘portray fully and boldly the ancient faith in a form more consonant with its ruling spirit, and with the idioms of our speech’. This, Park suggests, is ‘sound conservatism. Not a conservatism of words that have changed their meaning—not a conservation of jargon’, but ‘a conservation of the truth, the essence of the same truth to which the sensibilities of good and plain men ever clinging’. If the old truths are to be preserved in fresh and persuasive preaching, Park asserts

\textsuperscript{133} Conforti, ‘Creation and Collapse’, p. 113. Conforti is certainly correct in this view; see the extended discussion in Chapter Two, pp. 83-89.
\textsuperscript{134} Conforti, ‘Creation and Collapse’, p. 133.
that such proclamation must of necessity draw on new forms and new language that appeal to the contemporary ‘sensibilities’ of its audience.\textsuperscript{135} Park would fashion rhetorical and exegetical tools that allowed him to craft a specific historical form—the New England theology—that conserved an essential Edwardsean Calvinism by assuring its resonance with its intended audience.

This extended analysis of Park’s historical profile suggests that, since current scholarship tends to repeat older patterns of interpretation, a thorough re-examination of his work might be timely. One particular aspect of such a study requires brief notice. It is often observed of Edwards Park in the secondary literature that he produced no systematic theology of his own.\textsuperscript{136} It might be assumed, then, that such a gap would necessarily compromise any reconstruction of Park’s thought. Fortunately, Park’s own students at Andover have without premeditation generously filled this need. Every seminarian who undertook the three-year programme at Andover from 1847 until the early 1870s sat under Park’s instruction in biblical theology in the Abbot chair for their entire second year. Thus, extant student notebooks currently in the collections of various libraries around the United States each yield a close transcript of Park’s systematic lectures on theology for a particular academic year.\textsuperscript{137} Additionally, a few notebooks

\textsuperscript{135} EAP, ‘The Fitness of the Church’, p. 41 [emphasis in original].
\textsuperscript{136} See Sweeney, Nathaniel Taylor, p. 243, n. 11, as an example.
\textsuperscript{137} Some thirty student notebooks representing a total of almost sixty volumes of lecture material have been identified; see Cecil, Theological Development of Edwards Amasa Park, pp. 292-294. Those of particular clarity and usefulness include William Ladd Ropes, ‘Park’s Lectures in Theology’ (1850-1851), 3 vols (MSS in Trask Library, Andover-Newton Theological School); Edward Chipman Guild, ‘Lecture Notes on Systematic Theology’ (1855-1856), 4 vols (MSS in Andover-Harvard Theological Library [Archives reference: ‘bMS 466/1-2 Edwards Amasa Park, 1808-1900’], Harvard University); David Dana Marsh, ‘Notes on Theology’ (1866-1867), 1 vol. (MS in Trask Library, Andover-Newton Theological School); Edmund Kimball Alden, ‘Park’s Lectures’ (1846-1847), 1 vol. (MS in Oberlin College Library); Smith
exist from Park’s earlier tenure in the Bartlet chair of sacred rhetoric. Thus, the means to analyze the development of Park’s rhetorical and theological material are readily to hand, and at only one remove from the master himself.

At the same time, other primary sources for the study of Edwards Park abound, in part because of the great volume of published output flowing from his pen throughout his long and busy career. Park generally produced each year at least one, and often two or more, articles in the Bibliotheca Sacra during his forty-year editorship. Additionally, while editor he wrote some four hundred book reviews on a vast range of topics. Moreover, as befitted the prominence of the Abbot chair at Andover, Park published many biographical sketches in contemporary theological encyclopaedias, offered countless ordination sermons, funeral orations, addresses at important public, collegiate and denominational functions (many of which found their way to press), and contributed numerous introductory essays for the printed works of other theologians and ministers. He preached frequently outside the seminary chapel, reporting to the Phillips Academy trustees in 1857 that ‘I have also preached in some other pulpit [than the seminary chapel] almost every Sabbath of the year’, and his published sermons were widely distributed. As a biographer of his Edwardsean predecessors, he produced substantial

Norton, ‘Park’s Lectures on Systematic Theology’ (1856-1857), 4 vols (MSS in Oberlin College Library); Joshua Wyman Wellman, ‘Lectures on Theology’ (1847-1850), 3 vols (MSS in Congregational Library, Boston).


139 See Cecil, Theological Development of Edwards Amasa Park, p. 308.

140 See the extensive lists in Cecil, Theological Development of Edwards Amasa Park, pp. 297-314.

141 EAP, ‘Report to the Board of Trustees of Phillips Academy for 1857’ (MS in the Archives of Phillips Academy).
(and still useful) volumes on the lives of Samuel Hopkins and Nathanael Emmons. ¹⁴² Thus, if there exists a paucity of material on Edwards Park in our current historical scholarship, it cannot be said that the fault is due to a lack of available primary sources.

The next chapter in the thesis after these introductory remarks examines in greater detail the relationship of Edwards Amasa Park’s theology to Jonathan Edwards and the New Divinity clerics that followed in Edwards’s train, in part so that Park’s correlation to them and to Nathaniel W. Taylor can be carefully assessed. Chapter Three evaluates the extent to which the currents of influence acting on Park—the new belles-lettres rhetoric, his predecessors at Andover seminary, Scottish common sense realism, German idealism and historicism—shaped his own work. Chapter Four undertakes a detailed analysis of Park’s most famous sermon, ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ (1850), with particular attention to the rhetorical methodology suggested by it and by Park’s earlier articles in the American Biblical Repository. Chapter Five examines the various expressions of the New England theology that Park carefully crafted towards specific apologetic ends, using in part the rhetorical tools he delineated in ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’. Chapter Six discusses the challenge to Park’s distinct theological edifice from competing contemporary historical narratives. Chapter Seven presents concluding observations that suggest Park’s intrinsic importance to the shaping of nineteenth-century transatlantic evangelicalism. On the whole, Edwards Amasa Park crafted a fresh and resilient form for Edwardsean Calvinism that, in assuring by its adaptability its continuing relevance almost to the First World War, preserved the

influence of Jonathan Edwards and Park’s other venerated theological forefathers for succeeding generations.
Edwards Amasa Park did not first encounter the great Edwardsean divines as relics entombed in dusty tomes but as giants who bestrode the land of his boyhood. Park described himself as ‘at ten years of age somewhat of a theologian, and a rigid Calvinist’ who ‘had a great reverence for Dr. Emmons and Dr. Hopkins’.¹ According to Park’s friend and eulogist, Richard Salter Storrs, the Park household was as ‘intense a theological atmosphere as probably was encountered in the world’, where the subjects ‘of God’s sovereignty, of His decrees, and of...harmonizing with these the obligation of man, were the supreme, almost the sole, topics of reflection and talk’.² Park’s father, Calvin, had studied with Nathanael Emmons after his own graduation from Brown, and the family listened to Emmons’s sermons on occasional Sunday trips to nearby Franklin, Massachusetts. Emmons in turn was not an infrequent guest at the Park home in Providence, and he gave the charge when Calvin Park was ordained in 1815.³ Thus,

³ See EAP, ‘Miscellaneous Reflections of a Visitor upon the Character of Dr. Emmons’, in Jacob Ide, ed., The Works of Nathanael Emmons, Including a ‘Memoir of Nathanael Emmons, with Sketches of His
Edwards Park imbibed his formative theological training directly or at just one remove from the great New Divinity clerics themselves, and it was to a re-pristinisation of their New England theology that Park would devote the prime of his academic career. In light of the general overview in Chapter One of Edwardsean Calvinism, it may be helpful to investigate in greater detail Park’s more immediate context, the New Divinity theology—what Joseph Conforti has called ‘the first indigenous American school of Calvinism’—in order to understand the specific ways in which Park’s own thought was moulded by this particular environment.

The New Divinity school took as its charter the extension of Jonathan Edwards’s thought into the period that followed the Great Awakening, defending the Calvinistic revivalism Edwards had championed since the publication of *A Faithful Narrative of the Surprizing Work of God in 1737*.\(^5\) Joseph Bellamy (1719-1790) and Samuel Hopkins (1721-1803), and later Jonathan Edwards, Jr, (1745-1801) and Nathanael Emmons (1745-1840) served in two successive stages as the leading lights of these evangelical Calvinists.\(^6\) But many other ministers also played significant roles in the often

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contentious debates on church polity and theology that shaped the distinctive elements of
the New Divinity school—John Smalley (1738-1808), Stephen West (1735-1818), Levi
Hart (1736-1808), Benjamin Turnbull (1735-1820), Nathan Strong (1748-1816), Samuel
Spring (1746-1819) and Charles Backus (1749-1803), among others. Most were linked to
each other in an intricate series of tutorial relationships founded in personal ‘schools of
the prophets’. Jonathan Edwards himself had instructed Bellamy and Hopkins; Bellamy
and Hopkins taught Jonathan Edwards, Jr; Bellamy taught Hart, Hart taught Backus;
Bellamy, Hopkins and West taught Spring; Bellamy taught Smalley, Smalley taught
Emmons, and Emmons alone instructed more than ninety candidates for the ministry.7

From the late 1760s, the theological party of Bellamy, Hopkins and their
colleagues became known collectively as the ‘New Divinity’ movement.8 Starting as a
regional minority with little social pedigree, originating in rural sections of western
Massachusetts and Connecticut, this party became the dominant element in New England
Congregationalism during the early national period. Hopkins himself observed in 1795,
that, though the movement had begun with only a handful of ministers immediately
following the Awakening, ‘these sentiments have so spread since that time…that there
are now more than one hundred in the ministry who espouse the same sentiments in the
United States of America’, and the number is ‘fast increasing’.9 By 1813 even their
opponents were forced to acknowledge that Hopkins’s ‘System of Divinity is the basis of

7 See the Appendix in Conforti, Samuel Hopkins, pp. 227-232, for a list of the principal New Divinity men.
8 In fact, the term ‘New Divinity’ was first used in 1765 not as an approbation but as a criticism of
Hopkins’s perceived innovations; see Conforti, Samuel Hopkins, p. 71.
of the First Congregational Church in Newport, Written by Himself; Interspersed With Notes Extracted
From His Private Diary (Hartford: Hudson and Goodwin, 1805), p. 102.
the popular theology of New England’. It has been seen that their views were contested by a wide range of theological parties in New England, so that the New Divinity faction developed in an environment of heated debates over theology and polity.

The New Divinity men jealously guarded their close connection to Jonathan Edwards. Bellamy and Hopkins particularly—Edwards’s frequent houseguests and closest confidants—were much concerned after their mentor’s death with keeping his writings in the public eye. They, and indeed the whole New Divinity party, were avowedly Edwardsans, frequently sounding like Edwards redivivus. If Edwards argued, for example, that ‘God should punish all sin with infinite punishment; because all sin, as it is against God, is infinitely heinous’, Bellamy agreed that ‘the least sin is an infinite evil, and deserves an infinite punishment’. If, for Edwards, sin is ‘an infinite aggravation, viz. that it is against an infinite object’, Edwards, Jr, observed that ‘sin truly deserves an endless punishment, as it is committed against an infinitely glorious

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10 William Bentley, The Diary of William Bentley, 4 vols (Salem, Massachusetts: The Essex Institute, 1905-1914), vol. IV, p. 302, cited in Conforti, Samuel Hopkins, p. 5. Hopkins’s codification of the New Divinity theology in his System of Doctrines (1793) prompted the widespread use of the term ‘Hopkinsian’ (more rarely, ‘Hopkintonian’ [sic]) as a synonym for the New Divinity theology (see the discussion of the two terms in Enoch Pond, ‘Hopkinsianism’, BS 19 (1862), p. 633 [for bibliographic information on System of Doctrines, see note 17, below].

11 See the discussion in Chapter One, pp. 10-21.

12 Edwards, Jr, was twelve years old at his father’s death in March 1758. Bellamy and Hopkins had already begun their ministerial careers.


object’.\textsuperscript{16} Hopkins, characteristically, codified the party platform: ‘the crime [against God] is…boundless or infinite [and God] has proclaimed the infinitude of it, by threatening it with infinite evil, even endless misery’.\textsuperscript{17} ‘President’ Edwards was ever the authoritative head from whom his New Divinity disciples sprang.

This is not to suggest, however, that the New Divinity clerics were agreed on every point or simply parroted Edwards. Although these theologians shared common themes to a remarkable degree, there were differences among them. Joseph Bellamy—publishing a portion of his own work before Edwards’s death—was in some matters closer to Edwards’s formulations than to Samuel Hopkins’s later extrapolations. For example, Edwards consistently stressed the \textit{permissiveness} of the decree of reprobation: ‘The first arising or existing of that evil disposition in the heart of Adam was by God’s permission; who could have prevented it, if he had pleased.’\textsuperscript{18} Bellamy agreed, asking rhetorically, if God ‘could easily have prevented sin and misery… .Why did he not?’ It was ‘because in his infinite wisdom he did not consider it best on the whole….God’s permitting sin consists merely in not hindering it’.\textsuperscript{19} Bellamy concurred with Edwards’s view of God merely permitting sin to take place, but Hopkins—writing just a year after

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Edwards’s passing in 1758—did not agree that this conclusion adequately addressed the absolute sovereignty by which God ordered the affairs of men. Hopkins made the utilitarian argument that God did not merely permit sin, but ‘willingly suffered that it should take place…for the sake of the great Good it will be the occasion of producing’. In fact, the universe was ‘a much better world, than it would have been, had not Sin and Misery entered into it’. Sin was still morally evil from the standpoint of humanity—this was not licence to sin—but God’s sovereign control ‘over-ruled’ sin so that its ‘consequences’ became good. In this manner Hopkins, far from shying away from the harshest implications of sovereignty, countenanced a more severe form of Calvinism than had Edwards or Bellamy. God appeared to take a more direct role in sin than merely permitting it to occur, even if his benevolence ensured that a greater good appeared in the long run.

It has been seen in Chapter One that Hopkins’s preservation of God’s sovereignty was later extended by Nathanael Emmons in his doctrine regarding the sole causality of God in every exercise of man—good and evil. Emmons asserted that ‘God governs the moral as well as the natural world, and both by a positive agency, and not a bare permission’. God ‘makes all his creatures, as well as all his works, answer the ends for which they were created’. Emmons had moved a significant distance from Bellamy’s ‘permission’ to a ‘positive agency’. Nevertheless, it was not required that the New

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21 See the discussion in Chapter One, pp. 15-17; see also the discussion of Emmons in Ahlstrom, *Religious History*, pp. 410-412.
Divinity men agree at every particular point—their theological opponents found them a sufficiently united front.

The New Divinity movement developed within a very specific context—evangelical, revivalist Edwardsean Calvinism in western New England. But this setting was not the sole milieu in which these theologians worked, for New England was itself just one part of a transatlantic community of discourse. The New Divinity men may have been of lesser social standing than some, but it did not follow that they were isolated rustics. Joseph Bellamy, for example, was one of only sixteen American ministers in the eighteenth century to have received an honorary doctorate from a European university, receiving a D.D. from Aberdeen in 1768. Both Bellamy and Samuel Hopkins were at different times serious candidates for a professorship of divinity at Princeton. Hopkins like Jonathan Edwards corresponded regularly with divines in Scotland and England such as John Erskine, John Ryland and Andrew Fuller. The New Divinity clerics were actively engaged in a revivalist culture that extended well beyond their immediate region.

One particular feature of the New Divinity modifications to Edwards’s Calvinism is illustrative of this larger context. It has been seen that the New Divinity men

23 A similar dynamic is illustrated in Hopkins’s treatment of original sin in his *System of Doctrines* (1793). Since the ‘sin which takes place in the posterity of Adam, is not properly distinguished into original sin and actual sin, because it is really all actual, and there really is, strictly speaking, no other sin but actual sin’, ‘the total depravity and sinfulness of mankind is their own sin’. The younger Edwards found Hopkins’s reformulation of Edwards’s principle of unity in Adam so hyper-Calvinist that he suggested in a letter to Hopkins that he had gone ‘too far’ in suggesting ‘that Adam’s sin is the sin of all posterity and that they consent to that sin’; see Hopkins, *System* vol. I, pp. 224, 322, and Edwards, Jr, to Hopkins, 29 October 1793 (MS in Yale University Library), cited in Conforti, *Samuel Hopkins*, pp. 166-167.


emphasised the notion of God as a Moral Governor. This amendment of traditional Calvinism was a part of a large-scale shift in Europe and America towards the conception of God as a fair and just deity, one to be regarded neither as an offended party seeking satisfaction for sin nor as a wrathful creditor seeking payment of a just debt. In effect, the optimistic spirit that was characteristic of the Enlightenment re-cast God in the moral government model of the atonement as the archetype of rational benevolence. If, as Frances Hutcheson (1694-1746) suggested, ‘there is in human Nature a disinterested ultimate Desire of the Happiness of others’, then our innate moral sense requires that the standard of moral goodness be the promotion of happiness in others: ‘our Moral Sense determines us to approve Actions as virtuous, which...proceed partly at least from such a Desire’. If this is demonstrably true for human beings, would not God as Moral Governor be his own best example to the governed, and rule with equity to increase the happiness of his subjects? Joseph Bellamy observed that ‘all the laws of this great and good Governor are suited in their own nature to advance all his subjects to the highest perfection they are capable of’.

During the years of the Revolutionary War and the young republic in the United States, a citizenship particularly sensitive to the rule of law might expect a Moral Governor to act with a high standard of fairness and justice. Political theorists followed

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26 See the discussion in Chapter One, pp. 15-16.
29 Frances Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, 4th ed. (London: R. Ware, 1738), p. 152 [emphasis in original].
30 Bellamy, True Religion, p. 31.
the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and the German historian Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694) in grounding law in the order of nature and reason: after all, the Declaration of Independence itself looked to ‘the Laws of Nature’ as well as to ‘Nature’s God’. The goal of the rule of law would not be wrathful retribution but the prevention of crime or the reformation of criminals. The best interests of the community were served when the law looked to the preservation of order and the promotion of justice. The utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), living within Nathanael Emmons’s life-span, argued that ‘General prevention ought to be the chief end of punishment, as it is its real justification’. The Italian political philosopher Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794) observed that ‘punishments that exceed what is necessary for protection of the deposit of public security are by their nature unjust’. Moreover, Bentham argued that ‘the Divine Will cannot require anything inconsistent with general utility’. If ‘we presume that God wills anything, we must suppose that he has a reason for so doing, a reason worthy of himself’. Such a motive ‘can only be the greatest happiness of his creatures’. Beccaria supposed how ‘fortunate humanity would be if laws were for the first time being decreed for it’ by ‘monarchs who are beneficent, who encourage peaceful virtues…who are fathers to their peoples, crowned citizens, the increase of whose authority constitutes the happiness of

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32 Jeremy Bentham, The Rationale of Punishment (London: Robert Haward, 1830), p. 20. This volume was published as a re-translation into English of Dumont’s 1811 translation of Bentham’s dissertation into French; Bentham completed the dissertation in the late 1770s.
34 Bentham, The Rationale of Punishment, p. 72.
subjects’. In the new conception of God as Moral Governor, the Deity in effect becomes Beccaria’s enlightened monarch.

The reasoned application of law suppressed the ‘capriciousness of the legislator’, to use Montesquieu’s phrase. Indeed, the moral government theory of the atonement might solve the entire puzzle of God’s sovereign election of particular sinners for salvation—the sine qua non of Calvinism—by eliminating the arbitrariness that seemed its most indefensible quality. God was no longer capricious but intelligible and reasonable, in that he now ruled his universe by the principles of moral law. To Bellamy, his ‘public conduct as moral Governor of the world, has more evidently discovered the very temper of his heart, and shows how he loves right and hates wrong, to an infinite degree’. By his laws ‘he manifests how he loves moral good and hates moral evil’. In fact, the Moral Governor is now as beholden as any man to the authority of natural law, since, with Emmons, ‘may we suppose that his sovereignty allows him to do injustice, or treat any moral agents contrary to the eternal rule of right?…His sovereignty is limited by his justice’. The sovereign now bends to his own law in order to demonstrate that its administration is equitable.

For the New Divinity theologians, Christ’s death no longer had the primary purpose of soothing God’s righteous anger, but became the occasion by which the Moral Governor demonstrated, in Bellamy’s words, that his ‘public government of the world’

37 Bellamy, True Religion, p. 27.
appeared ‘in the most evident manner to be an infinite enemy of the least sin’. Christ’s suffering was a public demonstration of the Moral Governor’s administration of law, but it had pointedly not cancelled any debts, or transferred any righteousness or relieved any one of their native criminality. Punishment was still required, Bellamy suggests, for without punishment God would set ‘aside his law…without any salvo to his honor’. If God failed to demonstrate his justice publicly, ‘his visible conduct would have been directly contrary to the moral temper of his heart’ and in so doing he ‘would have dishonored his law, rendered his authority weak and contemptible, and opened a wide door for the encouragement of rebellion, throughout all his dominions’. If God were ‘to give up the law in favor of his rebellious creature, [it] must therefore be the same, in effect, for God to give up his own divinity’. Edwards, Jr, is certain that, ‘if we allow that sin is a crime or moral evil, it deserves punishment [for] the purpose of supporting the dignity of the law and government, and so, of securing the general good’. Punishment must be certain, but its object is no longer the criminal, rather the preservation of orderly government for the benefit of all. Clearly, the moral government theory of the atonement represented a significant modification of historic Calvinism: powerful international currents had reached even the rolling hills of the Berkshires and the Connecticut River valley.

The immediate imperative driving specific changes in Edwardsean Calvinism came from threats close to home. Lately given fresh impress by the Unitarians in eastern

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Massachusetts, the old antinomian charge that Calvinism’s apparent fatalism led to moral laxity had to be routed comprehensively. It has been seen that the one essential term in the fresh calculus of the New Divinity party was the requirement that their system should never compromise moral accountability.\textsuperscript{43} This guiding principle dictated the practices of the New Divinity men. They seized upon Edwards’s description of natural ability because it preserved the accountability of the moral agent. Bellamy observed that ‘the law is exactly upon a level with our natural capacities: it only requires us to love God with all our heart’\textsuperscript{44}. They rejected the old Puritan scheme of preparation, of waiting on the means of grace, because in the delay the sinner simply avoided the obligation to repent immediately and obey God: to Edwards, Jr, it was remarkable ‘how stupefying and hardening is the doctrine which teaches that it is not the duty of the unregenerate to repent immediately’\textsuperscript{45}. If the imputation of Adam’s sin to his descendants appeared to relieve his posterity of moral responsibility—because no one should be held accountable for a depravity that comes from someone else’s sin long ago—then the old notion of imputation must be jettisoned: Hopkins argued that ‘the sinfulness of mankind being connected with the sin of Adam…does not in any respect, or in the least degree, make it less their own sin, or render them less answerable and blameworthy for it’\textsuperscript{46}. If the old substitutionary model of the atonement looked like an escape from justice for the guilty—because if Christ had covered their sins the criminals were no longer liable for punishment—then a governmental arrangement must be found that upholds God’s public administration of his law. In each of these cases preserving the accountability of the

\textsuperscript{43} See the discussion in Chapter One, pp. 13-15.
\textsuperscript{44} Bellamy, \textit{True Religion}, p. 99.
\textsuperscript{46} Hopkins, \textit{System}, vol. I, p. 335.
moral agent is paramount. If at the same time the governmental system met the contemporary test of fairness and reasonableness, so much the better.

It is, interesting, still, to inquire whether this new system was one that Jonathan Edwards might have endorsed. He had, after all, supplied the ‘Preface’ to Bellamy’s True Religion Delineated, and was a veteran of the battles on behalf of evangelical Calvinism. But Edwards had been able to execute his own project of mediation between the Enlightenment and received Calvinism without major modifications to his traditional Augustinian assumptions. In Freedom of the Will, he built a framework for free moral agency within divine sovereignty, and unabashedly confirmed its consistency with historic Reformed theology. In Original Sin and elsewhere he confirmed total depravity, a satisfaction view of the atonement, the imputation of Adam’s sin, the substitutionary mediatorial work of Christ and the doctrine of election. It is true that Edwards posited a fresh doctrine of continuous creation out of his high view of God’s providence, and argued in a singular fashion from that doctrine for an immediate identity in Adam for every believer. But if these latter doctrines restated older arguments in new idealist forms, Edwards’s ideality was always first a function of his theocentric vision.

47 Edwards’s ‘Preface’ to Bellamy’s work runs to slightly fewer than four pages in the Yale edition of Edwards’s Works [see Jonathan Edwards in C. C. Goen, ed., The Great Awakening, The Works of Jonathan Edwards, vol. 4 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 569-572], the bulk of which is devoted to defending the experimental religion of the Awakening. His endorsement of Bellamy’s work occupies the final page. Edwards was in the midst of being removed from his Northampton pulpit, writing the ‘Preface’ at Bellamy’s request shortly after preaching his farewell sermon. It is an open question whether under such circumstances Edwards could be said to have endorsed every detail of his protégé’s work. Bellamy’s principal purpose was to affirm the revivalism that was closely identified with Edwards, but which was also the precise ground of Edwards’s dispute with his Northampton congregation. It is difficult to see that Edwards would have supplied the Preface in other than an affirming spirit; see the discussion in Goen, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, in Edwards, The Great Awakening, pp. 87-89.


Thus, to the extent that the New Divinity work was at least in part a function of a new secular moralism, it compromised Edwards’s vision of a God-centred theology.

Edwards Park’s own theological inheritance was pre-eminently the New Divinity ‘improvements’ on Jonathan Edwards. In lectures at Andover and in thousands of pages of work either published in the Bibliotheca Sacra or in stand-alone volumes, Park rings the New Divinity changes with accuracy and precision. For example, Park rejected the old substitutionary model of the atonement as a satisfaction of God’s distributive justice, because it seemed that if men had a claim on God due to another’s obedience, God’s sovereignty and the honour of his law were compromised. For Park, ‘the atonement of Christ does not consist in his so far satisfying the demands of the law so as to render it legally obligatory on God to save men…but in rendering it consistent with the honor of God to save men’. 50 Joseph Bellamy had concluded that ‘the Father maintains the honor of the Godhead, and of his government, and displays his grace, [when] he ordains that sin be punished’. 51 Park agreed that the ‘interests of the Universe demand the punishment of sinners or something equivalent’. 52 Jonathan Edwards, Jr, had rejected the ‘scheme of forgiveness on bare repentance,’ because ‘it overthrows all moral government’. 53 Park observed that the necessity of punishment ‘prohibits that a man be pardoned simply on the ground of Repentance. God’s distributive justice leads him to connect sin with what

50 EAP, ‘Notebook on the Atonement’ (circa 1850-1851), 1 vol. (MS in Trask Library, Andover-Newton Theological School) [n.p.]; see also William Ladd Ropes, ‘Park’s Lectures in Theology’ (1850-1851), 3 vols (MSS in Trask Library, Andover-Newton Theological School), vol. I, pp. 296-297, and p. 298: ‘the atonement of Christ does not consist in his so far satisfying the Distributive Justice of God so as to render it obligatory on him to save those for whom Christ died, but only so far as to make it consistent for him to save those for whom he died’ [emphasis in original].
sin deserves, i.e., with punishment.’ It ‘cannot be given up’.\textsuperscript{54} God was right to defend his regime.

If one consequence of God’s moral government was, in Nathanael Emmons’s words, that ‘the atonement of Christ has laid God under no obligation to save one of mankind’, it conversely left God ‘at liberty to save a part, or the whole, of the human race…consistent with his amiable and glorious character’.\textsuperscript{55} Park asserted that a ‘General Atonement does not mean that Christ secures the actual salvation of all men; but that he makes the salvation of all men possible’.\textsuperscript{56} Bellamy had suggested that Christ is ‘sufficient to open a door for God through him to be reconcileable [SIC] to the whole world’.\textsuperscript{57} In Park’s words, now that Christ ‘has died, all can be saved if they do repent’.\textsuperscript{58} Samuel Hopkins had argued that, since ‘the Redeemer has made an atonement sufficient to expiate the sins of the whole world; and in this sense has tasted death for every man’ so ‘“whosoever believeth” in him may be saved’.\textsuperscript{59} Such a doctrine of a general atonement, in Park’s mind, gave ‘a more glorious display of divine grace than the doctrine of limited atonement’.\textsuperscript{60} Even Calvinists now need not shrink from the universal proclamation of the gospel.

The natural ability of every sinner to repent drove this open-handed evangelism of the Edwardsean Calvinists. The demand of God’s law on the sinner ‘to make himself a new heart’ (in Nathanael Emmons’s words) was the armature around which was sculpted

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\item \cite{EAP} Ropes, ‘Lectures’, vol. I, p. 310.
\item Emmons, \textit{Works}, vol. II, pp. 796, 801.
\item \cite{EAP} Ropes, ‘Lectures’, vol. I, p. 313 [emphasis in the original].
\item Bellamy, \textit{True Religion}, p. 313.
\item EAP, ‘Atonement’ [n.p.]; see also \cite{EAP} Ropes, ‘Lectures’, vol. I, p. 313.
\item EAP, ‘Atonement’ [n.p.].
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the moral accountability of the human agent.\textsuperscript{61} Park asserted that ‘our doctrine is that the atonement has made it naturally…possible for every human being, if he would repent (and he has the natural power) [to] be saved’.\textsuperscript{62} As Hopkins had suggested, since ‘the sinner is under no kind or degree of impotency or difficulty which is in the way of his repentance’, all that is required is that the preacher make clear to the sinner that he is obliged to ‘immediately repent…and return to God through Jesus Christ’.\textsuperscript{63} Disastrously, however, this natural ability is coupled with a stubborn moral inability that ensures, for Park, that man’s ‘nature is such before regeneration that he will sin and only sin’. Those ‘feelings, appetites, desires, emotions and affections are such as to induce men to sin and only sin’.\textsuperscript{64} Jonathan Edwards himself had written that ‘man has it in his power, in the voluntary actions of his life, universally and steadfastly and faithfully to obey God’s commands, and cleave to and follow Christ through all difficulties and trials; though it be certain that without love to God and faith in Jesus Christ, no man will do it’.\textsuperscript{65} Emmons had asserted that sinners have ‘all the natural power they need, in order to embrace the gospel [but] have no heart or disposition to embrace it’. They ‘want nothing but moral power’.\textsuperscript{66} Edwards Park believed that we are ‘morally unable to choose anything good’, and ‘never shall use the natural power which we possess for resisting our corrupt nature, without the aid of the Spirit’.\textsuperscript{67} The New Divinity clerics had blended native depravity

\textsuperscript{62}EAP, ‘Atonement’ [n.p.] [emphasis in original].
\textsuperscript{63}Hopkins, \textit{Works}, vol. III, p. 296.
\textsuperscript{65}Miscellany 572 in Edwards, \textit{Miscellanies}, vol. 18, p. 112.
\textsuperscript{66}Emmons, \textit{Works}, vol. II, p. 383. See also [EAP.] David Dana Marsh, ‘Notes on Theology’ (1866-1867), 1 vol. (MS in Trask Library, Andover-Newton Theological School), p. 372: ‘All moral inability which a man labors under he has natural power to [remove], also [the] necessity.’
with natural ability in an alloy well fitted to the propagation of the gospel. Park adopted its characteristic language because in his view it best preserved God’s sovereignty and the rightful demands of his law with man’s moral responsibility and freedom of action.

It is clear that Edwards Park’s theology developed from the specific modifications of Jonathan Edwards’s thought represented by the New Divinity party. His own identification with the New Divinity improvements, however, was focused particularly on the work of the two men who dominated his youthful conversations at home in Providence—Hopkins and Emmons. It has been seen that Samuel Hopkins codified the dominant exercise line in New Divinity thought.68 If inherited moral inability—the traditional Calvinist view of innate depravity as a ‘taste’ or ‘disposition’ to sin—seemed to compromise natural ability and neutralise the demands of God’s law, then it must be absolutely clear that one’s actions—‘exercises’—were the entire basis of one’s moral standing.69 Emmons—the Park family friend and exerciser extraordinaire—captured the Hopkinsian line aphoristically as ‘all sin consists in sinning’.70 Hopkins is correspondingly categorical: ‘all sin consists in the nature and quality of the exercises which take place in a moral agent, and not in any thing that goes before, or follows after them’.71 Hopkinsianism is identified with ‘exercise’ and natural ability because each of these features mutually reinforces the accountability of the moral agent.

Edwards Amasa Park was by birth and training a Hopkinsian. Park’s published work and lectures at Andover consistently display the signal characteristics of the

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68 See the discussion in Chapter One, pp. 15-16.
Hopkinsian scheme. For example, Hopkins had famously described sin as an occasion for the greater good of the universe. Park observed during his lectures that sin is ‘not the means to good, but all that God does in relation to sin is for the best, and, in the circumstances in which he does it, is the means of the greatest good’.\(^{72}\) True virtue for Hopkins was a radical self-denial that followed regeneration, ‘consist[ing] in UNIVERSAL BENEVOLENCE’ or ‘in DISINTERESTED AFFECTION’.\(^{73}\) By contrast, self-love ‘is the source of all profanity and impiety in the world; and of all pride and ambition among men’.\(^{74}\) Emmons argued that ‘the transgression of the law…must essentially consist in something which is directly opposite to…pure, holy love’, and there is ‘nothing in nature more directly opposed to disinterested love than interested love, or selfishness’. Since ‘selfishness is the only thing that the law forbids…the transgression of the law wholly consists in selfishness’.\(^{75}\) Park told his Andover seminarians that ‘every man does choose to act for the Glory of God, or else for the self’, and that ‘Holiness is a hatred of selfishness, or a preference for something else beside the highest good of the universe’.\(^{76}\) Throughout Park’s long decades of service at Andover, he propagated and extended the Hopkinsian exercise scheme as what he called ‘the New England theology’.\(^{77}\) Park had understood and subscribed to these arguments since he was a boy.


\(^{73}\) Hopkins, System vol. I, p. 555.


\(^{75}\) Emmons, Works vol. II, pp. 616, 681.


Park’s affinity for the Hopkinsian enterprise, then, grew from roots deeper than mere linguistic and methodological similarities. He was consciously an heir in a distinguished New Divinity line that ran directly through his own family: Edwards had instructed Bellamy and Hopkins, Bellamy taught John Smalley, Smalley taught Emmons, Emmons instructed Calvin Park, and Calvin Park taught his son Edwards. Park understood that the New Divinity men formulated improvements to Jonathan Edwards’s more traditional Calvinism because such alterations better promoted the spiritual antidote of Edwardsean revivalism for the cycles of moral declension in New England. A third generation of Edwardseans like Park subscribed to the Hopkinsian exercise view that virtue and sin were to be found exclusively in the active choices of the moral agent because they too were alert to the debilitating antinomian reputation of Calvinism. Natural ability retooled Calvinism in recovering the moral accountability of the human agent. Hopkinsianism balanced the older features of Calvinism—divine sovereignty and total depravity—with an increased visibility for human energy. In Park’s view, such a ‘self-consistent’ message best served nineteenth-century Calvinists in the proclamation of the gospel.

The New Divinity movement was the immediate context for Edwards Park’s theological development. But it has been seen that there were other expressions of Edwardsean Calvinism in New England than the Hopkinsian scheme with which Park dominated Andover seminary. The most important of these was the New Haven theology

78 See the Appendix in Conforti, Samuel Hopkins, pp. 227-232. John Smalley (1738-1808) was, like Bellamy, Hopkins and Emmons, a Connecticut-born graduate of Yale.
at Yale College, both because of its influence early in Park’s professional career and because Park’s close identification with it has been so frequently asserted in recent historical scholarship.81 If titans like Hopkins and Emmons had dominated Park’s boyhood, there were soon to be other powers in the land.

Nathaniel W. Taylor’s New Haven theology was a prominent variation of revivalist Edwardseanism in the nineteenth century.82 Taylor, born in 1786, spent his formative years and early adulthood under the guiding hand of Timothy Dwight, the President of Yale. Dwight oversaw Taylor’s conversion as a junior at Yale College, served as his post-baccalaureate mentor in theology, and hired him for the coveted post of amanuensis (a reader for the notoriously poor-sighted President). After ten years at New Haven’s First Church, Taylor was the first professor chosen when Yale Divinity School opened, serving from 1822 until his death in 1858. Taylor’s systematic work, Lectures on the Moral Government of God, was published posthumously, but its title is enough to

81 See the discussion of other forms of Edwardsean Calvinism, including Taylorism, and of Park’s historical reputation in Chapter One, pp. 18-21, 27-28.
suggest that he shared much with his New Divinity predecessors. God administered ‘an equitable moral government over men, under an atonement’. As the ‘governor of moral beings’, God ‘must show by his acts that he disapproves of and hates sin’, since ‘both law and justice necessarily involve in the case of transgressions the inevitable execution of the legal penalty’.\(^{83}\) According to ‘principles of exact equity’, the traditional view of imputation cannot be sustained, for ‘were it not for the supposed mystical union, the supposed imputation of sins and of righteousness could have no basis’. Both decrees of imputation are ‘without a pretence, wholly arbitrary, without a reason or a shadow of a reason’, for imputing the sin of one to another ‘would contravene the essential nature and principles of a perfect moral government’.\(^{84}\) What ‘the atonement does, and all that the atonement does, is to render it consistent with justice to pardon the sinner, by fully sustaining…the justice of the lawgiver’.\(^{85}\) Clearly, Taylor shares with the New Divinity divines a commitment to a Moral Governor who ruled by principles of equity and reasonableness.

But, as has been shown, Taylor broke his own ground in following an intellectualist model in conversion inspired by Scottish realism, where the will takes on a radical independence of operation.\(^{86}\) Christ has not actually secured the salvation of any, but has ‘proposed a system of influences’, whereby men choose according to right or wrong ‘principles’. Man as a ‘moral agent…has a constitutional susceptibility to the good [though he] may yet actually choose the unsatisfying objects of the world’. The moral

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\(^{86}\) See the extended discussion of the intellectualist model in Chapter Three, pp. 126-131.
agent deliberates as the means of regeneration are applied, and the truth of the gospel ‘must be perceived or used by the mind, as a means to the end in question, viz. to a change of spiritual affections’. Sinners ‘can love God, even without the grace of the Spirit, and certainly, with it’. Conversion, then, can really be no more than the intellect’s decision to instruct the will to follow God, after an evaluation of the alternative courses suggested by competing influences. Obviously, the Holy Spirit is a powerful and helpful encouragement, for the work of the Spirit is ‘that influence or operation by which he brings the sinner, in the free, unconstrained use of his own moral power, to fix his heart on Christ’, but it is finally the ‘sinner, in the free exercise of his own adequate powers, [who] loves, believes, and obeys God’. The Holy Spirit can be only one element in this ‘system of influences’: if Taylor’s moral government is to function properly, mankind must be able to obey divine law without the interposition of divine grace. Clearly, Taylor had left the older Edwardsean model of volition behind.

The New Divinity clerics believed that the unconverted produce only sinful exercises because their sole influence was a rebellious selfishness. Taylor disagreed that all sin was in fact rooted in selfishness, since ‘man, as a moral agent, can be actuated by a simple desire for happiness’, which in turn can ‘prepare the way for that act of choice, in which God is chosen as the portion of the soul’. Taylor cites the authority of Dwight that ‘in aiming at our own happiness, there is no necessary selfishness’. Self-interest is not

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87 Taylor, Lectures, vol. II, p. 252; Taylor, Review of Dr. Tyler’s strictures upon an article in the Christian Spectator, on the means of regeneration, unsigned review in Christian Spectator, March 1830 (New Haven: Baldwin and Treadway, 1830), pp. 19-20, 4 [emphasis in original].
89 See also the extended discussion of Edwards’s volitional model in Chapter Three, pp. 126-131.
90 Taylor, Review of Dr. Tyler’s strictures, p. 26 [emphasis in original].
sin, but rather a powerful inducement to choose wisely. Immoral exercises can only follow from the free choices of the deliberating intellect, which is essentially indifferent as it is entirely self-determining.

Why, then, do people sin? It is futile to blame human nature, or an in-built disposition or taste, for, Taylor suggests (as does Edwards Park), ‘if nature is sinful, then as the cause must precede the effect, you charge…the absurdity that there is sin, before sin’. The most that can be said is that ‘in all the appropriate circumstances of their being, [men] will sin and only sin’. ‘What is this moral depravity for which man deserves the wrath of God?’, Taylor asks. It is ‘man’s own act consisting in a free choice of some object other than God as his chief good;—or a free preference of the world and of worldly good, to the will and glory of God’. For Taylor, ‘that sin or guilt pertains exclusively to voluntary action is the true principle of orthodoxy’. Indeed, ‘the mere certainty of human action forces no one, compels no one. It leaves freedom, the power of choice, power to the opposite action, unimpaired’—thus Taylor’s maxim of certainty, with power to the contrary. It is certain that men will sin, but not necessary that they do so, as if their wills were determined. Men possess an absolute freedom to choose one thing or its opposite—indeed that is the definition of freedom.

This principle of liberty leads to a surprising but in one sense obvious conclusion: sin is a necessary feature of God’s moral government. If it was required by equity and public justice that moral accountability be preserved through the inviolable self-

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92 Taylor, ‘Concio ad Clerum’ [emphasis in original], quoted in Whittemore, Transformation, p. 264.
determination of moral agents, then, ‘foreseeing the certainty of sin, [God] could not will or purpose actually to prevent it; but, on the contrary, must, rather than prevent it by destroying moral agency…have purposed its actual existence’. If this seemed an offensive conclusion, Taylor retorted, ‘Indeed, why is it incredible that God should not be able, by motive, to prevent beings from sinning, who possess power to sin under all possible motives which he can employ to prevent them [?]’. If the ‘objector should still insist, that a God of infinite wisdom and power might have devised and adopted a moral system which could have excluded all evil, then I ask, what moral system? Can he specify it?’.

This was self-determination with a vengeance, for God’s holiness had been checked by man’s freedom. Had Taylor gone too far? Dwight had argued that God’s inability to ‘prevent the existence of sin cannot be maintained’, and even Taylor equivocated, observing, ‘I do not say that there is an impossibility that God should prevent all sin under a moral system…but I affirm simply there may be.

The New Divinity had used the natural ability and moral ability distinction to carve out accountability for the moral agent, but Taylor could not see that the terms served a purpose any longer, for ‘the natural ability of man to obey God, as defined by Edwards and others…is an essential nothing’. If one were morally unable to act righteously, what genuine liberty can ‘natural ability’ possibly suggest, except by a semantic fiction? In fact, the premise is false, since a moral inability ‘furnishes not the

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95 Taylor, Lectures, p. 307 [emphasis in the original].
slightest evidence, that when one wills morally wrong, he has not in the proper and true sense of language, power or ability to will morally right in the next moment’. ⁹⁶

If it should be said that the sinner, though a free moral agent, is the subject of a moral inability; then we ask, what is a moral inability? Is it an ability that involves the want of any one of the powers or properties of a moral agent? If so, it is a natural inability, and the distinction between natural and moral inability is after all a distinction in words, and not in things. On the other hand, if a moral inability doesn’t involve the want of any powers or properties of moral agency, then the sinner is, in respect to those powers, fully and perfectly able to perform his duty.⁹⁷

Taylor notes that the scriptures themselves always ‘proceed on the assumption of moral ability or power to obey God…there is not a passage in the sacred volume which teaches or implies any inability of man to act morally right’.⁹⁸ Taylor was convinced that Edwards had failed to show that freedom was consistent with motives that led to a necessity of sin: Edwards’s mind was ‘all confusion on the subject’. Liberty for moral agents depended not on ‘a distinction in words’, but on a ‘liberty of indifference’—the power of unconstrained choice to do one thing or another.⁹⁹

This new anthropology necessitated a recovery of the old means of salvation. If the moral agent was to change his character without divine interposition, a regular supply of means was once again required—prayer, scripture, and pulpit instruction now became the elements that the intellect pondered in its deliberations. While it would certainly overstate the case to see in this recovery of means a re-establishment of Old Calvinism—

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⁹⁷ Taylor, Review of Dr. Tyler’s strictures, p. 6 [emphasis in the original].
⁹⁹ Taylor quoted in Mead, Nathaniel William Taylor, p. 28. See the discussion in Bruce Kuklick, Churchmen and Philosophers: From Jonathan Edwards to John Dewey (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 98-100. Kuklick remarks that Taylor’s ‘spontaneous inner freedom, a “power to the contrary” would have been “unintelligible” to Edwards [p. 99].
since the means were now applied to a specimen radically different from what was previously conceived, one no longer subject to innate depravity or real moral inability—there is an important sense in which the work of the revival preacher shifted back to the delivery of the means of grace. This phenomenon is most evident in the ministry of Taylor’s contemporary, Charles Grandison Finney (1792-1875).

If Jonathan Edwards’s public career began in 1737 with A Faithful Narrative of the Surprizing Work of God, Charles Finney opened his Lectures on Revivals of Religion in 1835 by asserting that revivals were eminently unsurprising, because ‘a revival is not a miracle, or dependent on a miracle, in any sense. It is a purely philosophical [that is, scientific] result of the right use of the constituted means—as much so as any other effect produced by the application of means.’

What are the laws of nature according to which it is supposed that grain yields a crop? They are nothing but the constituted manner of the operations of God. In the Bible, the Word of God is compared to grain, and preaching is compared to sowing the seed, and the results to the springing up and growth of a crop. A revival is as naturally a result of the appropriate means as a crop is of the use of appropriate means.

Although the images are natural, surely here is the very triumph of mechanism. Divorced now from any connection to Puritan preparation, revival depends only on the sovereignty of means, so that conversions become as dependable as the perpetual cycles of  

agriculture. In fact, ‘probably the law connecting cause and effect is more undeviating in spiritual than in natural things’. If ‘there has long been an idea prevalent’ that revivals are inexplicable divine events, Finney argues that ‘No doctrine is more dangerous than this to the prosperity of the church, and nothing more absurd’.102 The fresh forms of means on offer to the unconverted—the ‘new measures’ adapted from the Methodists, the anxious bench, the protracted meetings, the naming of sinners—are simply improvements in manufacturing efficiency, in what W. R. Ward calls the ‘technology of revival’.103

New Haven theology is, in its insistence on man’s ‘free exercise of his own adequate powers’, the theological analogue to the secular Jacksonian impulse of Taylor’s day. The energetic hurly-burly of expanding democratic egalitarianism could hardly have comprehended or embraced the human passivity attributed to fatalistic Calvinism.104 The expanding economic sphere was atomistic and competitive, breaking down embedded hierarchical structures—and what structures had been more embedded or hierarchical than the system of Westminster Calvinism? Taylor’s delineation of moral government was itself a commercial view of soteriology. If the Moral Governor had in view the maximum happiness of his subjects, and if his subjects had the innate deliberative capacity to value their preferences in terms of gain and loss, virtuous expediency led reasonable beings to choose and so acquire salvation.105 Granted, a long train of evangelical revivalists from George Whitefield on had actively promoted voluntary

102 Finney, Lectures on Revivals of Religion, pp. 29, 30.
associations in the accomplishment of social and spiritual good, counter to the tendency of conversionist revivalism toward heightened individualism. Nonetheless, it was natural that individualistic democratic evangelism should be shaped by individualistic democratic liberalism. One point of historical interest is the exponentially powerful conjunction of force—Enlightenment rationalism, democratic republicanism, Whig progressivism, Jacksonian economic egalitarianism—that was required to move so massive an object as New England’s Reformed orthodoxy so far along an arc from Westminster Calvinism in so short a time.

It is also of great interest that Edwards’s compatibilist solution to the dilemma of free will and divine sovereignty—that necessity was not at all repugnant to free moral agency—did not prove useful to his theological successors in its original form. His metaphysics were too subtle, and were readily overwhelmed by the sheer weight of conscious evidence in favour of the freedom of moral agents. Edwards’s distinction between natural inability and moral inability was finally unconvincing. Unfettered human action was the irresistible force of this Age of Second Causes, and it had the power to work backward to de-fang moral inability. If evangelical Calvinism was to prosper in a democratic age, it had to assume a shape that mirrored the dominant secular assumptions. The New Haven theology accomplished the liberalising of Calvinist orthodoxy because it was well fitted to the epistemology and anthropology of its age, and so was able to rehabilitate self-love into a conflation of full natural and moral ability. The New Divinity had proposed an evangelical Calvinism that affirmed moral accountability and promoted

a disinterested social benevolence that rejected anarchical selfishness, but it depended on a lingering conviction about depravity and its impact on the intellect that was quickly becoming a quaint antique. If the Jacksonian era had certified that the public good can be secured by the acquisitive citizen, the same could be said of the greater good of God’s moral government. Taylor and Finney understood that man’s ultimate act of self-interest is the election to save oneself for heaven.

Edwards Park listened to Taylor’s lectures at Yale Divinity School while living in New Haven in the winter of 1834-1835. It cannot be denied that Taylor and his New Haven theology cast a long shadow in antebellum Edwardsean culture and the younger Park could hardly have failed to be impressed by the older, more accomplished Taylor. Park, for example, later in his career devoted substantial amounts of lecture time at Andover to the speculation by Taylor that God could not prevent sin in the best moral system, though Park is careful (like Taylor) to couch the discussion in explicitly hypothetical terms: ‘It is not the doctrine of the New Haven school that God cannot prevent sin in the moral system…but merely that perhaps he cannot prevent sin in a moral system. This is not a theory but an hypothesis.’ Park illustrates a willingness to adopt features of Taylorism where they advance Park’s own apologetic project, which was after all very similar to Taylor’s: to defend Calvinism from charges by Unitarians and others of unreasonableness, fatalism and antinomianism. Thus, Park finds use in Taylor’s famed certainty, with power to the contrary because it aims at exactly what Park

107 See Foster, Life of Edwards Amasa Park, pp. 59-60.
aims at—preserving God’s sovereignty without fatalism (*certainty*, not necessity) and validating human freedom (*power to the contrary*) if it is soldered to moral accountability. Little of this is very far from the Hopkins-Emmons exercise line, except that Park is certainly more careful than Taylor to preserve the implications of native depravity and so retain a modicum of Edwards’s old moral inability. Thus, when interpreters of Park see him employing at Andover a signal feature of New Haven theology like ‘certainty, with power to the contrary’, they assume he must have succumbed to Taylorism in the winter of 1834-1835 in New Haven. In fact, Park consistently rejected as many elements of Taylorism as he accepted, and he rejected them both immediately following his visit to Yale and throughout his long career until he retired from Andover in 1881. Park heard medical lectures in New York City that same winter, but he did not return to Massachusetts a physician.

Park’s inaugural lecture in the Bartlet chair of sacred rhetoric, given at Andover in 1836, explicitly denied the truth of signal features of Taylor’s New Haven theology. Park declared that only a preacher who ‘misunderstands the first principles of moral agency…will exhort his hearers…to use the means of repentance’. The unregenerate will ‘form the fixed resolution of repenting at some future time’ and so be ‘glad to enjoy for a season the sin which they are not urged to leave’. This is a straightforward Hopkinsian rejection of the use of means. Also, an ‘indefinite preacher’ who presents God as only ‘kindness and mercy’ is asking sinners to love ‘themselves’. But love to self is ‘love to an idol’ and cannot produce ‘conversions to the truth’. In this way Park rejects the

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109 See, for example, [EAP,] Guild, ‘Notes’, vol. III, p. 186.
contention that any good exercises come from selfishness—a fundamental contention of Taylorism. Later in his address, Park asserts that we ‘may believe in the doctrine of human ability, but when it is preached in exclusion of the doctrine of human dependence, we need not believe it’. Park the Edwardsean here rejects the self-determining power of the will: Park would tell his seminarians that Jonathan Edwards’s ‘design…was to prove the doctrine of total depravity…as against the Arminian notion that man’s will was in equilibrium’. Importantly, Park—only months from sitting under Taylor in New Haven—rejects characteristic features of Taylorism: the restoration of the use of means, the rehabilitation of self-love, and the essential independence of the human will as it is poised on the brink of choice.

The older volitional model that Park takes from Edwards cannot appear to be necessitarian (e.g., motives cause actions), but it is critical that freedom of the will does not edge over into a self-determining power (as Taylor suggests) and so represent just what Edwards famously opposes in Freedom of the Will. Park tells his Andover seminarians that ‘in the improper sense, power to the contrary is the uncertainty how one will act…what one will choose. In this sense, Pres[ident] Edwards believes we have no power to the contrary.’ If self-determining power is defined as ‘a power to act without any influence of motives—This is denied’. Moreover, native depravity makes it certain that the moral agent will freely choose sin at the first opportunity. Park asserts that ‘It will not do to say “power to the contrary” and then leave it, for it will be understood to mean “moral power to the contrary” wh[ich] is not the meaning and is false….impenitent

111 EAP, ‘Connection between Theological Study and Pulpit Eloquence’, pp. 183, 188.
men certainly will not repent’, though they have ‘the natural power to repent’. Park argues that ‘Man has no independent power to love or serve God’. On this one point, in his view, ‘what is called New England Theology—which is not a partisan theology, but is the truth—has been much misunderstood…. Its opponents declare it to contend that the natural power which man has is an independent power—as if he did not receive it from God’. Thus, Park can employ Taylor’s aphorism ‘Certainty, with power to the contrary’ if the terms are properly understood: Certainty (avoiding the fatalistic foreshadowing implied by ‘necessity’, but also implying that man is utterly dependent on grace if he is to do anything other than sin at every opportunity), with power to the contrary (as long as it is clear that the moral agent is responsible for choices occasioned by motives, and one does not imply that man possesses a self-determining will). Under these strict limitations Park can make use of Taylor’s phrase, but when he uses it he does not mean by it what Taylor means.

Park remained aligned with Jonathan Edwards’s celebrated assertion in *Freedom of the Will* that ‘the will always is as the greatest apparent good’. He could not remain consciously Edwardsean and forsake the volitional model of the will for Taylor’s. If historians have generally placed Park in Taylor’s shadow, in some ways Park is handicapped in displaying his own distinctives when he shares so much intellectual and theological equipment with Taylor. There is nothing in Park’s inherited Hopkinsian exercise scheme that he has to abandon to employ helpful elements of Taylorism. For example, Park’s acceptance of the theoretical possibility (the terms in which Taylor...
himself promotes his speculation) that God cannot prevent sin in the best moral system is surely related to the fact that the concept is an extension of earlier New Divinity features like Bellamy’s view of the permissiveness of the decree of sin and Hopkins’s understanding of sin promoting the greater good of the universe. Taylor’s speculation on the matter is designed to preserve the freedom of moral agents—which is precisely one central aspect of the exercise line. Park need not convert to Taylorism to make use of Taylor within the bounds already established by Hopkins.

But, as has been shown, there are essential features of Taylorism that contradict Hopkinsianism, and these Park will not countenance. For example, Park told his students at Andover in 1856, after surveying utilitarian theories of virtue, that,

Virtue is not properly defined by saying it is the direct tendency of a voluntary act of a moral being to produce his own happiness. This is a distinct theory—has been called the New Haven theory. The former theories had regard to the happiness of the universe—This theory looks chiefly to one’s own happiness—if the act tends to produce the agent’s happiness, then [it is] right—if not, then wrong. All objections to [the] preceding [utilitarian] theories applies to this [one] with augmented force. If a being act for his highest happiness, he is selfish.118

Park differs from Taylor precisely where Taylor departs from Hopkinsianism. This is clear when Park does not allow Taylor’s vindication of self-love to stand. This is true also in Park’s continued rejection of the use of the means of grace—one of the signal flags of Hopkinsianism, and related to the lack of righteousness in the self-regard of sinners. It is misleading to call Park a Taylorite because he adopts features of Taylorism that are consistent with an Hopkins-Emmons exercise line, when at the same time he

invariably rejects features that are plainly inconsistent. Edwards Park is a Taylorite only to the degree that Nathaniel Taylor is a Hopkinsian.

It would have been strange behaviour indeed for a Taylorite converted in 1834 to publish in 1836 an explicit refutation of specific tenets of New Haven theology in his inaugural lecture for the Bartlet chair at Andover, or in the 1850s to produce lengthy volumes devoted to detailing the life and thought of Hopkins and of Emmons.\footnote{See EAP, Memoir of the Life and Character of Samuel Hopkins, D.D., 2nd edition (Boston: Doctrinal Tract and Book Society, 1854), pp. 9-264; EAP, Memoir of Nathanael Emmons, with Sketches of His Friends and Pupils (Boston: Congregational Board of Publication, 1861), pp. 1-468.} In fact, the proper starting point in an assessment of Park’s theological development must be his foundational commitment to the dominant Hopkinsian scheme within the larger sphere of New Divinity improvements to Jonathan Edwards. In lectures at Andover seminary over four decades and in reams of printed material, Park applied the logic and the vocabulary of the great exercisers, Hopkins and Emmons, in promoting revival because he was convinced that it was their formulations that had proven to be apologetically effective. In applying Jonathan Edwards’s distinction between natural and moral inability from Freedom of the Will, they had secured a working balance for evangelical Calvinism between God’s sovereign role in spiritual renewal and man’s ever-present moral obligation to respond to the demands of God’s law. In meeting at the same time a contemporary test of reasonableness, the Hopkinsian arguments had successfully extended the vital work of Edwards into the new conditions of the young American republic. Moreover, they had done so without abandoning Edwardsean principles of volition and virtue as had Nathaniel W. Taylor and his self-determining will that was free to pursue its own interests. While Edwards Park was ever ready to adapt new insights to
his defence of his New England theology, even from New Haven, his allegiance to his Hopkinsian inheritance remained steadfast from his father’s home in Providence throughout his long life on Andover Hill.
CHAPTER THREE

FRAMING THE NEW ENGLAND THEOLOGY:

INTELLECTUAL INFLUENCES ON PARK’S DEVELOPMENT

The hard, pure vein of Edwards Amasa Park’s inherited Hopkinsianism travelled through diverse intellectual strata as it neared the ‘Calvinism in an improved form’ that Park had defined by mid-century.¹ His conventional early studies as an undergraduate at Brown, his envelopment at Andover seminary in the irenic New Divinity of Moses Stuart and Leonard Woods, his appreciation for the New Rhetoric of Hugh Blair and George Campbell while in the Bartlet chair and his exposure in Germany early in his career to the Vermittlungstheologie of Friedrich Tholuck and Julius Müller—all lent specific definition to Park’s own theological development. At the same time, Park retained an unquestioning commitment to a commingled epistemology and methodology derived from Lockean empiricism, Baconian induction, natural theology and Scottish common sense realism. The final form of the New England theology that Park would later defend in heated exchanges on both his left and his right was a durable New Divinity extrusion crafted from the exercise line of Hopkins and Emmons with tools fashioned from an armoury of intellectual resources.

Given Calvin Park’s long association with Brown University and the family’s residence in Providence, Rhode Island, it was perhaps inevitable that his son Edwards would enter Brown in the fall of 1822, just fourteen years of age. Although Brown was founded by Baptists and was only a stone’s throw from the first Baptist church in America, Congregationalists and other denominations were well represented in its governing bodies and on its faculty. Harvard had become dangerously Unitarian by 1805, and though Unitarian influences were not unknown at Brown (its president in Park’s time, Asa Messer [1769-1836], was dismissed for his Unitarian tendencies just after Park’s graduation), Brown was considered safely orthodox. In any case, to a student there was little difference between the curricula at the two colleges. At the time of Edwards’s matriculation, Brown’s admissions requirements included Latin composition and recitation, familiarity with the Greek New Testament and a facility for arithmetic.

The curriculum itself demanded continued proficiency in Latin, including readings from Virgil, Cicero, Sallust and Horace. Apart from an extensive study of Homer, Park’s preparation in Greek was designed for use in theological study, as it lacked Plato and the

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2 Calvin Park (1774-1847) graduated from Brown and—after a period of study with Samuel Austin in Worcester and Nathanael Emmons in Franklin—in 1804 became professor of ‘learned languages’ there. He transferred to the chair of ‘moral philosophy and metaphysics’ in 1811, but left Brown in 1825 as a result of conflict with President Messer to become minister of the Congregational Church in Stoughton, Massachusetts. Park père served the church in Stoughton until 1839; see Frank Hugh Foster, The Life of Edwards Amasa Park (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1936), pp. 25-28.


4 Edwards Park played a leading, if unwanted, role in Messer’s dismissal; see Bronson, History of Brown University, pp. 186-192, and Foster, Life of Edwards Amasa Park, pp. 45-49. Late in his life Park wrote of Messer: ‘I always thought that he hated orthodoxy and hated the orthodox. Still, he was very desirous of having the college appear to be orthodox. He often said that heterodoxy will upset “our apple-cart”. It is rather singular that a man so shrewd as he should make so many blunders.’; see EAP to Dr Stockbridge [Secretary to the Brown University Board], 13 October 1888 (MS in the Hay Library, Brown University).
tragedies. Logic, grammar, rhetoric, elocution and metaphysics (largely Scottish) filled a
great deal of the curriculum. There was less rigour in history and political theory, or in
mathematics and the natural sciences, and no modern languages were required.5

Large swathes of coursework were devoted to the Scottish common sense
realists—particularly Thomas Reid (1710-1796) and Dugald Stewart (1753-1828).6
Stewart’s Philosophy of the Mind (1792) occupied parts of both the junior and senior
years.7 Park repeatedly withdrew from the college library Reid’s Works and the common
sense text, Elements of Logick (1816), by Harvard’s Levi Hedge (1766-1844). Park’s
junior oration in 1825, ‘Theoretic Errors of Eminent Philosophers’, was a criticism of
medieval scholasticism from a perspective quite like Thomas Reid’s.8 The Scottish
proponents of the ‘New Rhetoric’,9 Hugh Blair of Edinburgh (1718-1800) and George
Campbell of Aberdeen (1719-1796), were also a significant presence in the Brown
curriculum: their emphasis on deriving figurative language from the expressive speech of
ordinary people and not from conventional rules and tropes suggested a new practicality
for rhetorical expression.10 Under the influence of the earlier French belletrists, they
rejected ornamental neo-classicism and sought to systematise the practice of persuasive
communication. Blair’s Lectures on Rhetoric (1783) and Campbell’s Philosophy of

6 See the extended discussion later in this chapter on Scottish common sense realism, pp. 121-126.
7 After Park’s death it was recalled that Stewart’s Philosophy of the Mind was Park’s favourite book at
Brown; see Alexander McKenzie, Memoir of Professor Edwards Amasa Park (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
8 See Foster, Life of Edwards Amasa Park, pp. 42-43. As Foster indicates, Park himself added an
endorsement to the text of the oration in 1858, commenting that ‘at the time of this writing I was sixteen
years, three months, and twenty-two days old. I have made no improvement since’.
9 See the extended discussion later in this chapter on the New Rhetoric, pp. 104-110.
10 See Hugh Blair, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, ed. Harold F. Harding, 2 vols (Carbondale,
Rhetoric (1776) occupied significant portions of the final three years of the Brown curriculum.

Additionally, eighteenth-century British works of apologetics by Henry Home, Lord Kames (1696-1782), Samuel Clarke (1675-1729), Joseph Butler (1692-1752) and William Paley (1743-1805) were a significant complement to the volumes of Scottish realism. Kames’s Elements of Criticism, Paley’s Moral and Political Philosophy, Natural Theology, and Evidences of Christianity, Butler’s Analogy and ‘Clarke on the Attributes’ dominated Park’s senior year. If the intellectual reference points for Calvin Park had been the Bible, Locke, Paley, Butler, Reid, Stewart, Edwards, Hopkins and Emmons, it was essentially this same constellation—local Edwardsean New Divinity theology joined to British apologetics and Scottish common sense epistemology—that proved to be the early intellectual resources for his second son, Edwards.

It is worth noting that the curriculum shaping students at Unitarian Harvard at this time was almost identical to that of Orthodox Brown. If Old Calvinists and New Divinity men were agreed that Unitarianism was their common enemy, all the theological parties shared quite the same intellectual framework. Just forty miles northeast of Providence, young Waldo Emerson (only later given to using his first name, Ralph) had graduated from Harvard the spring before Edwards Park matriculated as a freshman at Brown. Emerson had been reading the very same Iliad, the New Testament in Greek, and Livy, Horace, Cicero and Juvenal in Latin. His Harvard curriculum gave somewhat more

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11 Park withdrew ‘Clarke on the Attributes’ (Clarke’s Boyle Lectures of 1704) from the Brown library three times in the fall of 1825. On the Brown curriculum and Park’s library record, see the Outline, ‘Information about Edwards Amasa Park, Class of 1826’ (MS in the Hay Library, Brown University), pp. 1-5. The material was prepared by the Brown library staff to fulfil the request for information from Frank Hugh Foster at the time of his composition of Park’s biography, circa 1934.

12 See Foster, Life of Edwards Amasa Park, p. 27.
scope to mathematics and natural science than would Park’s at Brown, taking in algebra and geometry, and encompassing physics, astronomy and chemistry. Emerson studied Roman history as a freshman and later American constitutional history, examining the Federalist Papers as a senior. The English curriculum, like Brown’s, emphasised rhetoric and elocution, employing Blair’s Lectures on Rhetoric among other texts. In philosophy Emerson studied Stewart and Reid: Scottish realism had found a home at Harvard as well. Levi Hedge used his position as the first professor of philosophy at the divinity school to establish Scottish thought at Harvard. His realist text, Elements of Logick (1816), was widely used in collegiate education, including (as has been seen) at Brown. It might be expected, too, that Emerson’s religious education at Harvard would include the defences of Christianity by Paley and Butler, particularly the Analogy. Park had studied Samuel Clarke intensively in the year after his graduation from Brown, and Emerson studied Reid, Stewart and their fellow Scot, Thomas Brown (1778-1820), almost continuously for two years after his graduation from Harvard.

A heightened respect for the role of reason informed these surprisingly broad intellectual continuities across New England. Emerson would soon find that British rationalism and Scottish realism provided too little nourishment to support his rapt contemplation of the Oversoul. For Park, however, the test of reasonableness would

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13 Levi Hedge was the father of Frederic Henry Hedge (1805-1890), an early friend of Waldo Emerson and later a charter member of the Transcendental Club. The younger Hedge’s article in the Christian Examiner in 1833 had opened up to his fellow Transcendentalists the revolution they discovered in Coleridge and Kant; see F. H. Hedge, ‘Coleridge’s Literary Character’, Christian Examiner 15 (1833), pp. 119-125. It should be noted that Hedge did not follow Emerson in radical Transcendentalism’s rejection of Unitarianism.


become a defining element of his apologetic instruction to Andover seminarians and of his historical reconstruction of the New England theology. He embraced the New Divinity doctrine because it ‘reconciles us to the government of God as reasonable’.\textsuperscript{16} For example, if a traditional view of total depravity suggested that sinners do not have the power to obey what God commands, Park asserted that ‘it is utterly immaterial who requires [the impossible] of us. We have a moral instinct which pronounces such a requisition utterly absurd. It cannot be.’ One might as well ‘require us to believe that two plus two is equal to twenty’. It is axiomatic that ‘we are able to do all that we are under an obligation to do’—this is ‘a self-evident truth involved in the very nature of moral obligation and moral government’.\textsuperscript{17} In applying the dictates of reason in such a fashion to the perceived shortcomings of Westminster Calvinism, Park differed little from the Unitarians methodologically. They may have disagreed over the scope of what constituted a necessary departure from Westminster, but their parallel efforts to establish a sensible theology testified to the great degree to which they shared similar assumptions.

Nonetheless, despite sharing much common ground epistemologically, Park’s Andover was founded by a union of two different parties of Trinitarian ministers in Massachusetts anxious to repudiate Harvard’s heterodoxy—a deviation made manifest by the appointment of Henry Ware (1764-1845) to the Hollis chair of divinity in 1805. America’s first independent, postgraduate theological school, the ‘Theological Institute of Phillips Academy at Andover’ opened in 1808 as a joint project of ministers and philanthropists located in Newburyport and Andover. Each town had originally possessed


\textsuperscript{17} [EAP.] Guild, ‘Notes’, vol. III, pp. 144-147.
a nucleus of financial support for a new seminary, but Newburyport held for
Hopkinsianism and Andover for Old Calvinism. However, elements within each faction
recognised that cooperation might lead to a stronger, single institution. The key
negotiators in this horseback diplomacy were Jedidiah Morse (1761-1826) and Samuel
Spring (1746-1819). Morse, geographer extraordinaire and clergyman, represented the
conservative faction of Massachusetts orthodoxy. Certainly no Hopkinsian, as minister of
First Church, Charlestown, he observed the Half-Way Covenant and practised the means
of grace deep in Unitarian territory. Nonetheless, Morse founded the Panoplist magazine
in 1805 to foster unity between the orthodox parties, and folded it into the Hopkinsian
Massachusetts Missionary Magazine in 1808 in an ienic gesture similar to his support
for the opening of Andover seminary that same year.\(^{18}\) Spring—a graduate of Princeton, a
student of Samuel Hopkins, and brother-in-law to Nathanael Emmons—was well placed
to shuttle between the Hopkinsians in Newburyport and the Old Calvinists in Andover.\(^{19}\)
Constrained by the threat of burgeoning Unitarianism, the parties agreed to join forces in
opening a single seminary on Andover Hill.

The doctrinal fruit of their compromise was the seminary’s Associate Creed, an
amalgam of the Westminster Shorter Catechism and New Divinity ‘improvements’ that
was carefully calculated to minimise offence to either party and which the faculty were
required to endorse every five years. Its wording was finely calibrated: if Adam was
described as ‘the federal head and representative of the human race’, his sin was

\(^{18}\) See Joseph W. Phillips, Jedidiah Morse and New England Congregationalism (New Brunswick, New

\(^{19}\) See the discussion of the founding of Andover seminary in Mark A. Noll, America’s God: From
262.
expressly not imputed to mankind—rather, in suitable New Divinity terms, ‘in consequence of his disobedience, all his descendants are constituted sinners’. The creed did not refer to the entire corruption of human nature in Westminster’s terms, but agreed that ‘by nature every man is personally depraved’ so ‘that, previously to the renewing agency of the Divine Spirit, all his moral actions are adverse to the character and glory of God’. If man is ‘morally incapable of recovering the image of God’—a nod to Old Calvinist depravity—it is also true that ‘nothing but the sinner’s aversion to holiness prevents his salvation’—a sop to New Divinity natural ability and its absolute requirement of immediate repentance. The very legal structure of the seminary set opposing forces in dynamic tension, as the Old Calvinist board of Academy trustees was balanced by a Hopkinsian ‘Board of Visitors’ charged to enforce subscription to the creed. The first faculty appointments suggested a genuine desire for a working compromise, with the Andover Founders appointing the moderate Hopkinsian Leonard Woods (1774-1854) and Newburyport’s Associate Founders appointing the Old Calvinist Eliphalet Pearson (1752-1826), formerly from Harvard and the first principal of the seminary’s sister institution in Andover, Phillips Academy. By 1819 over one hundred seminarians would be enrolled at Andover, and by 1850 almost fifteen-hundred had attended, making Andover the largest seminary in the United States. After graduating

20 References to the Associate Creed are from Leonard Woods, History of Andover Seminary (Boston: James R. Osgood and Company, 1885), p. 248; see also Leonard Bacon, A Commemorative Discourse, on the Completion of Fifty Years from the Founding of the Theological Seminary at Andover (Andover: W. R. Draper, 1858), pp. 30-37, and EAP, The Associate Creed of Andover Theological Seminary (Boston: Franklin Press, 1883), pp. 94-97.

21 See Bacon, Commemorative Discourse, pp. 95-101. Ownership of the seminary remained in the hands of the trustees of Phillips Academy, since the superiority of the Unitarians in the Massachusetts state legislature made the hope of a new charter for a Trinitarian institution impossible in 1807.

22 See the discussion in Henry K. Rowe, History of Andover Theological Seminary (Boston: Thomas Todd Company, 1933), pp. 2-25. The Congregationalists also founded Bangor Theological Seminary in 1816 (it
from Brown in 1826 and then completing a year as a principal of a classical school and a second year studying theology with his father, Edwards Park attended Andover as a seminarian from 1828 to 1831. Following brief periods as a revivalist minister in Braintree, Massachusetts, and as the professor of mental and moral philosophy at Amherst College, Park served the balance of his long career on the Andover faculty—first in the Bartlet chair of rhetoric from 1836 to 1847, and subsequently in the Abbot chair of theology from 1847 until his retirement from the seminary in 1881.

The career of Moses Stuart (1780-1852), the United States’s foremost biblical scholar in the early era of seminary instruction, suggests that a measure of theological latitude was granted within Andover orthodoxy. Stuart succeeded Pearson in 1810 as professor of sacred literature after four years of successful revival preaching at New Haven’s First Church. Stuart almost immediately brought German scholarship to bear on exegetical questions, having mastered German by 1813 through his study of the philological works of Johann Eichhorn (1752-1827). Stuart believed that higher criticism judiciously employed could be useful to a conservative apologetic defence of the Bible, in the manner, for example, of the Hebrew grammar of Heinrich Gesenius (1786-1842), professor of theology at the pietist University of Halle. Stuart might consider Moses to be the compiler of Elohim and Yahweh source material on one hand, but remain unmoved by arguments for Deutero-Isaiah or against the historicity of Daniel on the other. In fact, Stuart’s position was that familiarity with biblical languages in the original

moved from Hampden, Maine, to Bangor in 1819), and Yale divinity school in 1822; see Noll, America’s God, p. 254.

Foster notes that Park was particularly interested that year in ‘Dr. Samuel Clarke’s asserted demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God’; see Foster, Life of Edwards Amasa Park, p. 53.

See Foster, Life of Edwards Amasa Park, pp. 67-87.
was the best antidote to heterodoxy: the errors of German liberals and American Unitarians did not proceed from the biblical text but from their own misguided commitments to ideality in the first case and to excessive rationalism in the second.25

Following the New Divinity line to which Park would also closely adhere and much to the chagrin of Old Calvinists, Stuart denied the traditional doctrine of imputation, asserting in his explication of Romans 5:12-19 that ‘no necessity is laid upon us...of understanding the apostle [Paul] to assert that men involuntarily, or without concurrence of their own free will, become sinners’. Surely ‘men may become sinners in consequence of the act of another’, and yet are ‘altogether voluntary in becoming so’. Thus, ‘actual sin is the voluntary non-conformity of an intelligent, rational, moral, free agent’.26 Simple fairness dictates that ‘the supposition of men’s own personal sins not being reckoned to them, while they perish by the imputation of another’s sin,’ is ‘a position so revolting with respect to the justice, and goodness, and impartiality of the Sovereign Judge’, that ‘it should not be made out!’.27 No less a conservative scholar than Charles Hodge, while challenging Stuart’s treatment of original sin, praised Stuart as ‘one of the greatest benefactors of the Church in this country’ and ‘the great American reformer of biblical study’.28 If Stuart had fallen short of Princeton’s appreciation of the

26 Moses Stuart, Commentary on Romans (Andover: Flagg & Gould, 1832), pp. 236-237, 542 [emphasis in original].
27 Stuart, Commentary on Romans, p. 219 [emphasis in original].
28 See CH, ‘Dr. Stuart’s Commentary on Romans’, BRPR 5 (1833), p. 382.
analogous relationship in Romans of Christ’s and Adam’s work of imputation (one of
merit, the other of demerit), there was nonetheless much to commend in Stuart. ²⁹

Edwards Park would tell his own seminary students that Stuart’s published
defence of orthodoxy against the Unitarians was the ‘best treatise on the Trinitarian
side’. ³⁰ For Andover students like Park and Park’s future faculty colleagues, Calvin
Stowe (1802-1886) and Bela Bates Edwards (1802-1852)—both noted philologists—³¹—
Stuart pioneered an appreciation for German biblical scholarship by modelling a
commitment to critical linguistic exegesis in the conservative context of vital piety and
New Divinity improvements. ³² Stuart anticipated Park’s own essentially methodological
appropriation of German ideas. When Park spoke at Stuart’s funeral in 1852 he told a
story that validated Stuart’s study of German to further his defence of Calvinism against
Unitarianism. Stuart had come under harsh criticism, but Ebenezer Porter (1772-1834),
Park’s own teacher, told Stuart that he ‘could not have written’ his apologetic works
without his ‘German aid….You are in the right in this matter’. ³³ Park understood from
Stuart that it was possible—indeed, necessary—to incorporate German scholarship where
it aided evangelical theology and to avoid German philosophy if its idealism tended
toward pantheism and immaterialism.

²⁹ See Stephen J. Stein, ‘Stuart and Hodge on Romans 5:12-21: An Exegetical Controversy about Original
³¹ Another of Stuart’s students at Andover, Edward Robinson (1794-1863) of Union Seminary (New York),
became perhaps the most distinguished American biblical scholar following Stuart’s death. He founded
the American Biblical Repository in 1831 and the Bibliotheca Sacra in 1843, using the model of European
scholarly quarterlies, though he would fold the two together and pass the editorial burden to Edwards Park
in 1844; see Rowe, *History of Andover Theological Seminary*, pp. 154-155. Park would edit or co-edit the
Bibliotheca Sacra until its removal to Oberlin in 1884.
³² Stuart would publish eleven articles in Park’s Bibliotheca Sacra; see Giltner, *Moses Stuart*, p. 133 on the
Bibliotheca Sacra.
³³ EAP. *A Discourse Delivered at the Funeral of Professor Moses Stuart* (Boston: Tappan and Whittemore,
1852), pp. 29-30.
Andover’s breadth of orthodoxy became part of its institutional identity, and consequently part of Edwards Amasa Park’s theological work. Leonard Bacon (1820-1881)—Yale and Andover graduate, successor to Moses Stuart and Nathaniel Taylor at New Haven’s First Church, and a devotee of New Haven theology—reflected on Andover’s distinctive characteristics in offering the commemorative address in 1858 on the occasion of the seminary’s fiftieth anniversary. While Bacon was himself committed to a highly modified Edwardseanism and would hardly have welcomed a triumph of Old Calvinism, he certainly was accurate in acknowledging Andover’s original ‘principle of concession and co-operation between theological parties’—even if the ‘principle’ had been occasioned more by the threat of Unitarianism than by an unconditioned commitment to toleration. In Bacon’s view, the Associate Creed served to ‘exclude the possibility of imposing on their Professors, any of the traditionary [Sic] and antinomianizing theories of evangelical doctrine against which New England Calvinism protested’, but it also required ‘no man to profess or accept any of those extreme deductions which have been made by certain “consistent Calvinists”’ who promoted ‘the fag ends of Hopkinsianism’—no willingness to be damned for God’s glory, for example.34

Bacon quotes Leonard Woods to the effect that the Associate Creed ‘was in fact formed as a matter of compromise between men who agreed on the great doctrines of Christianity, but differed in their modes of thinking on minor points’. Bacon asserts that the signal feature of Andover was its non-sectarianism, since it stood ‘not for the special interest of any one locality or district, nor for the special system of any theological

34 Bacon, Commemorative Discourse, pp. 4, 31.
discoverer’, but for ‘the common interest of the churches, and for the common orthodoxy of Massachusetts and New England’. Andover was ‘pledged at the outset to a large and tolerant orthodoxy’.\textsuperscript{35} The net effect of this spirit of compromise was ‘a moderate Hopkinsianism’ that discomfited only ‘the extremists on both sides’, and proved to be ‘substantially the New England orthodoxy of the present day’. In fact, ‘the theology of the Abbot Professorship today’ [i.e., 1858] ‘is the theology of the Andover creed’, to wit, not ‘Calvinism with its fag ends, but Hopkinsianism with the fag ends trimmed or out of sight’.\textsuperscript{36} Edwards Park, the very same holder of the Abbot chair and undoubtedly the seminary’s next great man in the generation of professors after Stuart and Woods, was in and of himself manifest evidence of the success of the Hopkinsian party at Andover. Park’s and Andover’s theological identities were largely bound together.

Park was animated by the Andoverian spirit of moderation and reconciliation, and his own career as a rhetorician and theologian could be somewhat crudely described as trimming—and occasionally hiding—the fag ends of Hopkinsianism or smoothing the rough edges of Edwardsean Calvinism into a streamlined tradition of New England theology. It would become characteristic of Park that he found a broad agreement between theologians of diverse schools when apparently conflicting doctrines were carefully examined: that is, when modes of expression were clarified. Many theological disputes arise ‘from so innocent a cause as different temperaments of individuals’, or ‘from an honest misunderstanding of terms’.\textsuperscript{37} In this spirit, at least, Park followed Leonard Woods, who argued for a common ‘Puritan theology’ that encompassed both

\textsuperscript{35} Bacon, \textit{Commemorative Discourse}, pp. 32, 34.
\textsuperscript{36} Bacon, \textit{Commemorative Discourse}, p. 39.
Old Calvinism and the New Divinity, deviations from which consisted ‘chiefly in phraseology’.38 True to his word, Park’s theological journal founded in 184339, the Bibliotheca Sacra, was a remarkably non-sectarian enterprise, publishing articles by Methodist, Presbyterian, Episcopal, Lutheran and even Unitarian theologians.40 In a note to its subscribers in 1857 Park averred that ‘it has ever been, and still is, the plan of Bibliotheca Sacra, to insert the communications of different schools and different sects’. The journal ‘is not sectarian or partisan; it is the organ of no School or Clique; it is a “Library” of Essays, which represent the views of differing theologians’. It is a “Repository” of tracts, which are either true or adapted to call out the truth’.41 Following Stuart, Park’s own interest in German scholarship meant that the Bibliotheca Sacra would contain a department of ‘German theological intelligence’ for thirty-seven years.42 In the very first year of his tenure as editor, the journal contained lengthy sections of Park’s translations of German theological lectures.43 One of Park’s earliest published works, Selections from German Literature (1839)—co-edited with Bela Bates Edwards—provided translations of German theologians August Tholuck, Leopold Rückert, Frederic Köster, Johann Lange and Karl Ullmann.44

39 See note 31 regarding the founding of the Bibliotheca Sacra.
40 Park’s ecumenism did not extend as far as Roman Catholicism; see EAP, ‘The Intellectual and Moral Influence of Romanism’, BS 2 (1845), pp. 451-488. This was the Dudleian Lecture at Harvard University for 1845.
42 See Foster, Life of Edwards Amasa Park, p. 130.
Park’s larger editorial project was modelled on the journal of the German mediating theologians, the Theologische Studien und Kritiken, which combined articles on traditional Protestantism with a wide range of material on science, philosophy and theological scholarship—extending the practice of Wissenschaft, the critical scholarship triumphant everywhere in the German academy. As Park disseminated his own examples of German scholarship in translation, it was clear that, as in Stuart’s day, Andover remained willing to entertain a range of doctrinal positions and methods within its Trinitarian orthodoxy. Founded in 1808 as a compromise, as a union of parties willing to find common theological ground and overlook differences of terminology, Andover endowed its greatest professor, Edwards Amasa Park, with an inclination to look below the apparent contradictions of terms and behind contrasting modes of representation to see the enduring core of evangelical truth embraced by men of good will.

Edwards Park was appointed Bartlet professor of sacred rhetoric at Andover in 1836 (eleven years before he succeeded Leonard Woods in the Abbot chair of theology) as a bright young graduate with a reputation for powerful preaching who would replace the aging first generation of faculty, and help build attendance and financial support for the seminary by speaking in churches and recruiting in colleges. Engaged at a seminary to train ministers, Park understood that the end to which all good revival preaching must point was the conversion of souls—moving the wills of the congregation to action.

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46 See EAP, ‘Report to the Board of Trustees of Phillips Academy for 1857’ [n.p.].
Park’s mentor and predecessor in the Bartlet chair, Ebenezer Porter, stressed in his widely-read *Letters on Religious Revivals* (1832-1833) that the preaching of doctrine to the unconverted must be concerned primarily with practical effects.\(^47\) In his posthumous *Lectures on Eloquence and Style* (1836), Porter argued that ‘the end of eloquence…is to move men to action…by exhibiting light to convince their understanding and motives to influence the heart’.\(^48\) He believed that ‘a sermon, to be instructive, must be perspicuous in method and language’.\(^49\) In establishing these principles for sacred rhetoric, Porter was a conduit for Park of the New Rhetoric of the Scots George Campbell and Hugh Blair.

Campbell had asserted that the rhetorician’s ‘style ought to be perspicuous’ and that the aim of a discourse is to ‘move the will’ by ‘an artful mixture of that which proposes to convince the judgement, and that which interests the passions’.\(^50\) Porter used Campbell’s definition for rhetoric at Andover: ‘I am best satisfied with that of Dr. Campbell, viz. “In its largest acceptation, it is that art or talent by which the discourse is adapted to its end.”’\(^51\) Park taught his own class in 1840 that rhetorical rules are fundamentally ‘the principles by which a discourse may be fitted to the end in view. Eloquence is the adaptation to an end.’ Park recommended studying ‘Stewart’s *Philosophy*’ as well as ‘Blair’s *Rhetoric*’ so that rhetorical principles would be informed


by ‘the study of the human mind’. Blair in that work defined eloquence as ‘the Art of being persuasive and commanding; the Art, not of pleasing the fancy merely, but of speaking both to the understanding and the heart’. Conviction ‘affects the understanding only; persuasion the will and the practice. It is the business of the philosopher to convince me of truth; it is the business of the orator to persuade me to act agreeably to it, by engaging my affections on its side.’ Clearly, Park through Porter was absorbing the fruit of the Scottish Enlightenment’s New Rhetoric and adapting it to the practice of training revivalist preachers. As Park insisted in training young seminarians who would soon be called to preach to a congregation—‘The object of pulpit eloquence is to move men to immediate action’. 54

It has been seen earlier in the chapter that the work of each of these Scottish rhetoricians made up significant portions of Park’s curriculum at Brown, particularly Blair’s Lectures on Rhetoric (1783) and Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776). The New Rhetoric followed earlier French belletrists René Rapin (1621-1687), Bernard Lamy (1640-1715), François Fénelon (1651-1715) and Charles Rollin (1661-1741) in modifying the role of the classical canon of Inventio. Rather than establishing truth through a sequence of logical proofs, invention now supplied the means by which already well-established truths were made intelligible to an audience. The rhetorician attended primarily to perspicuity and propriety, since a speech’s ultimate effectiveness could only properly be measured by the breadth of its impact on the experience of its hearers. The

54 [EAP,] Learned, ‘Notes’, pp. 209-210 [emphasis in original].
55 See George Campbell, Philosophy of Rhetoric (London: W. Strahan, 1776).
belletrists were engaged, then, not in establishing the proper design of their speech in isolation, but in promoting the receptive competence of their audience through the many means by which it might be assured. Thus it was natural that the Scottish rhetoricians in turn asserted that effective communication was that which best fitted the unique characteristics of the audience. Public discourse became essentially ‘managerial’ as opposed to ‘epistemic’, emphasising aesthetics and taste because they helped define the receptive judgment of the audience. The New Rhetoric of Blair and Campbell, informed by the shift in Inventio first described by French belletrists half a century earlier, distinguished between acquiring new knowledge through logical reasoning and the persuasive communication of content to others. Importantly, the New Rhetoric depended fundamentally on stylistic management. Edwards Park taught his students that, whatever the setting, the rhetorician depended on arrangement and design ‘to increase our influence over hearers’. In this way the audience becomes the essential context for persuasive speech.

Blair, like Campbell, was a quintessential Scottish moderate who served as both minister of the High Kirk of St Giles in Edinburgh and as Regius professor of rhetoric and belles lettres at the University. He rejected trope-based rhetoric and rule-governed poetics as tedious and pedantic, favouring in his Lectures an address to both the reason and the emotions of the audience. Virtuous behaviour would be promoted only if rational argument were combined with affective appeal. Nonetheless, conviction was essential, for ‘in order to persuade a man of sense, you must first convince him; which is only to be

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56 These helpful terms are from Barbara Warnick, The Sixth Canon: Belletristic Rhetorical Theory and Its French Antecedents (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1993), pp. 25, 128; see also pp. 1-13.
done, by satisfying his understanding of the reasonableness of what you propose to him’. No persuasion ‘is likely to be stable, which is not founded on conviction’.

Rhetoric, then, must move the feelings by affective appeal and pass the test of reasonableness to compel the intellect. Edwards Park would later detail precisely this working balance of the objective and subjective as ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ in his Convention sermon of 1850.

Blair’s contemporary, George Campbell, in his Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776) and Lectures on Systematic Theology and Pulpit Eloquence (published posthumously in 1807) agreed that effective preaching must be measured by its effect on the audience. Campbell followed the Baconian injunction in De augmentis scientiarum—which supplied the motto for the title page of his Rhetoric—to incorporate new truths into older knowledge. For Campbell, as for Henry Home, Lord Kames, in his Elements of Criticism (1762), this involved ensuring that the emerging eighteenth-century science of the mind would have a correspondence with the classical ends of rhetoric. Campbell moved beyond classical categories—the demonstrative, the deliberative and the forensic—to enumerate how specific powers of the mind might be affected by eloquence: ‘to enlighten the understanding, to please the imagination, to move the passions, or to influence the will’. Campbell’s system does not reject the classical rhetoricians—he cites Cicero and Quintilian—but uses their insights toward new ends, and so, in his view, completes one’s

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59 See the extended discussion of the Convention sermon (1850) in this regard in Chapter Four, pp. 155-162.
62 Campbell, Lectures on Systematic Theology and Pulpit Eloquence, p. 130.
understanding of them.\textsuperscript{63} If the mind, as Campbell believed, was inherently attracted to the true and the good, the task of rhetoric was first to establish the truth of a proposition and then to move the passions to accept its goodness.\textsuperscript{64}

The young Edwards Park would clearly have much to aspire to in studying Blair and Campbell at Brown and later applying their principles at Andover. The burden of rhetoric—convicting the will by engaging the heart and the mind—was manifestly the duty of the Edwardsean preacher in the sphere of religion. In fact, Park’s views of rhetoric were dominated by the New Rhetoric of Blair and Campbell. His lectures from the Bartlet chair at Andover only rarely refer to classical sources. Park’s notion of progress in learning drawn from the Enlightenment is evident: ‘The eloquence of the ancients would be very unsuited to the present times….Their eloquence was more striking,—more tumultuous, but not…so intellectual,—so well fitted to persuade the mind.’ \textsuperscript{65} Park reminded his Andover students that ‘plausibility is important in preaching’. It is not enough that a minister supply ‘a mere preponderance of possibilities, but such an abundance of proof that the mind shall be decidedly swayed’. Should a ‘reasonable, philosophical mind (such as would be admitted to be a standard for other minds) be satisfied?’\textsuperscript{66} Park’s rhetorical training established the operative principle that effective

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{64}{See Howell, \textit{Eighteenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric}, pp. 577-612.}
\footnote{65}{[EAP,] Learned, ‘Notes’, p. 102. Hugh Blair had argued ‘against a blind and implicit veneration for the Ancients, in every thing….Whatever superiority the Ancients may have had in point of genius, yet in all arts, where the natural progress of knowledge has had room to produce any considerable effects, the Moderns cannot but have some advantage’; Blair, \textit{Lectures} vol. II, p. 252.}
\footnote{66}{[EAP,] Learned, ‘Notes’, pp. 114-115.}
\end{footnotes}
speech must meet a test of reasonableness applied by its hearers if a discourse was to hold sway and achieve the practical effect of moving the will.

A very different set of influences on Edwards Park from those of Aberdeen and Edinburgh came from Berlin and Halle. Park quickly followed the pattern established by his teacher at Andover, Moses Stuart, as he enthusiastically pursued contemporary German scholarship from the very start of his academic career. As early as 1839 Park published with his faculty colleague, Bela Bates Edwards, a collection of sermons from the German mediating theologians that ran to almost five hundred pages. The introduction to the volume describes the Germans as ‘purveyors of mind’, carrying ‘on the commerce of intellect’: while pragmatic Americans ‘are making ships, they are manufacturing theories’. The sermons were offered in a spirit of appreciation for German thought, for the ‘translators have cherished the hope that something might be done to break down the wall of national prejudice’. There is ‘a strong tendency in the inhabitants of one land to exalt certain terms, which their fathers used, into tests of orthodoxy, and to circumscribe the teachings of the Bible within a few national shibboleths’. It is important, then, ‘looking away from our own land’ to see ‘phrases that truth assumes elsewhere’. Clearly, Park had a substantial interest and affection for Germany and fluency with the German language well before he travelled to Europe for the sake of his health during

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1842 and 1843.\textsuperscript{69} Andover—personified in Stuart and Park—was willing to take a broad view of the resources available to advance orthodoxy.

The German ‘mediating’ project—\textit{Vermittlungstheologie}—had its theological origins in Friedrich Schleiermacher’s (1768-1834) refusal to follow Kant’s absolute separation between the realm of scientific reason and the realm of religion and morality. Religion could not depend merely on moral criteria—it had to be rooted in genuine, felt experience (\textit{Gefühl}) as accessed by intuition (\textit{Anschauung}). The \textit{substance} of truth admitted to change and development over time, so that only the disposition to seek truth was permanent. Schleiermacher’s efforts to reconcile the claims of systematic knowledge and religion led to a description of his theological method as ‘mediating’. This same term was applied to those who followed Schleiermacher but who did not share all his presuppositions.\textsuperscript{70} Might there be a path in the midst of Romantic idealism and critical scholarship that preserved Trinitarian orthodoxy and an evangelical spirit? This was a critical question for Edwards Park’s evaluation of the German mediating theologians: caught in the ‘contest between Rationalism and Super-naturalism’, would they retain ‘erudition, enthusiasm and [the] glow of piety’?\textsuperscript{71}

The pious, non-dogmatic character of the \textit{Vermittlungstheologie} of Isaak Dorner (1809-1884), Ernst Hengstenberg (1802-1869), Johann Neander (1789-1850), Julius Müller (1801-1878) and Friedrich A. G. Tholuck (1799-1877) was observed personally by numerous American theological students who like Edwards Park studied in Germany

\textsuperscript{69} See Foster, \textit{Life of Edwards Amasa Park}, pp. 107-130.

in the antebellum period. While there was much about these German theologians that the Americans would have recognised—their evangelical pietism, for one—in their philosophical idealism they possessed theoretical underpinnings quite foreign to most of the visiting Americans. Vermittlungstheologie sought a balance between the high culture claims of Wissenschaft and traditional faith, in order to establish that the new ideal of Wissenschaftlichkeit was not necessarily a solvent to orthodoxy. Although Wissenschaftlichkeit had energized the liberal, critical scholarship of the likes of W. M. L. de Wette (1780-1849), David Friedrich Strauss (1808-1874) and Ferdinand Christian Baur (1792-1860), it also informed a broad conservative front that included Neander and Hengstenberg at Berlin, Tholuck and Karl Ullmann (1796-1865) at Halle and Müller at Marburg. Thus, Schleiermacher, for one, would be criticised in Germany not for his theology as such, but for the fact that his conclusions were devoid of serious critical examination. Müller, first at Marburg and later at Halle, defended conservative Lutheranism against the Hegelianism of the Tübingen School. Neander combined a wide scholarship and Christocentric piety with a Romantic view of church history as a progressive Incarnation. Hengstenberg applied a sophisticated higher critical hermeneutic within a context of reason, doctrine and devotion that for the Americans would most resemble the scholarship of Moses Stuart.

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Edwards Park made three trips to Germany, but the first (in 1842 and 1843) held the greatest intellectual significance.\textsuperscript{74} Philip Schaff (1819-1893), later a lecturer at Andover and then professor at Mercersburg, Pennsylvania, was one of two Privatdozenten hired to introduce Park to the work of Schleiermacher and Hegel when Park visited Heidelberg in 1843.\textsuperscript{75} Subsequently, Park studied in Berlin with Neander and Hengstenberg, and at Halle with Tholuck and Müller. He was thus exposed broadly to the most notable of Germany’s mediating theologians in their exercise of Wissenschaf\textsuperscript{t}. Friedrich Tholuck, in particular, played an important role in American theology, instructing almost an entire generation of American theologians. He numbered among his students Edward Robinson of Union Seminary (New York), Charles Hodge, J. A. Alexander and J. W. Alexander of Princeton, John Nevin and Philip Schaff of Mercersburg, and Edwards Park of Andover. Moses Stuart had acknowledged Tholuck’s influence on his own Commentary on Romans.\textsuperscript{76} Tholuck sought to integrate human feeling into biblical studies, eschewing creeds and belittling argument over minor points of doctrine. Tholuck said of the Apostle Paul, in a section of his study of Paul translated by Park in 1840, that ‘Religion was exhibited to him, not merely as a matter of idle

\textsuperscript{74} Regarding Park’s first trip to Germany, see Foster, Life of Edwards Amasa Park, pp. 113-127.
\textsuperscript{75} Philip Schaff was a lecturer in ecclesiastical history at Andover from 1862 to 1863, between the departure of W. G. T. Shedd and the appointment of Egbert Smyth; see Charles C. Carpenter, ed., General Catalogue of the Theological Seminary, Andover, Massachusetts, 1808-1908 (Boston: Thomas Todd, 1908), p. 23.
\textsuperscript{76} See Giltner, Moses Stuart, p. 105.
speculation, but as a concern of the life. Park made much of his time in Germany with Tholuck, spending long hours walking and conversing with him.

Tholuck had been introduced to the Pietist circle in Berlin around Baron H. E. von Kottwitz (1757-1843)—a group that included no less than Neander, Hengstenberg and August Twisten (1789-1876)—when he transferred from the University of Breslau in 1820. His professorial career began in Berlin until, after a trip funded by the Prussian government to study in libraries in England and Holland, he was appointed professor of theology at Halle in 1826. A prominent leader of the Evangelical Alliance, his theology was an irenic Trinitarian orthodoxy that stressed Christian experience and resisted rigid dogmatism. Park had believed before his trip to Germany, as he remarked in ‘The Duties of a Theologian’ (1839), that a theologian ought to have a ‘regard for past opinion’ and an ‘ability to discriminate between essential doctrines and refined speculation’, and he found reinforcement for his views in the person of Tholuck.

The extent to which the currents of Romanticism drawn from German idealism became a significant element in a theologian’s work reveals something of the range of philosophical perspectives across American orthodoxy in the 1830s and 1840s. It is possible to place Edwards Park on a larger spectrum defined broadly by the relative embrace or rejection of particular aspects of German thought. For example, it was not

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79 See EAP, Sketch of the Life and Character of Professor Tholuck (Edinburgh: Thomas Clark, 1840), p. 5. Tholuck replaced de Wette at Berlin.
80 See Conser, Church and Confession, pp. 35, 184.
unusual for American theologians who had been exposed to European idealist thought to challenge the broadly-held assumptions of common sense realism. James Marsh (1794-1842), president of the University of Vermont, drew refreshment from the new tide of Romanticism flowing from Germany and found that the cultivation of direct religious experience through ‘self-inspection’ was more consistent with divine revelation than the mechanism of Baconian induction.\textsuperscript{82} His influential essay introducing the American edition of Coleridge’s \textit{Aids to Reflection} (1829) asserted that ‘so long as we hold the doctrine of Locke and the Scotch metaphysicians respecting power, cause and effect, motives, and the freedom of the will’, we can ‘make no essential distinction between that which is \textit{natural}, and that which is \textit{spiritual}’.\textsuperscript{83} John W. Nevin (1803-1886) of Mercersburg discovered in German scholarship (particularly in his study of Neander’s church history) a theology that was more sacramental than moralistic, more organic than mechanistic, and more idealist than empiricist.\textsuperscript{84}

Similarly, Union Seminary’s Henry B. Smith found in Germany a Christocentric theology that fenced subjective experience within objective truth, but which at the same time disciplined philosophical speculation by the demands of spiritual vitality. Smith

\textsuperscript{82} See the discussion of James Marsh in Chapter Four, pp. 138-139.
studied in Germany for three years from 1838 to 1840, just a few years before Park, and like Park spent a substantial amount of time with Tholuck at Halle. In reviewing Domer’s *History of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ* for the *Bibothecca Sacra* in 1849, Smith agreed with the author that ‘both the historical and the ideal, the divine and human, are absolutely one in [Christ’s] perfected person’. Faith and philosophy—subjective experience and objective doctrinal theology—found common ground in the revelation of the person of Christ the Mediator. Smith would promote this Christological unity in an address at Andover just a year before Park’s Convention sermon.

Princeton’s Charles Hodge, by contrast, ultimately came to reject organic models in theology and the primacy of affective spiritual experience suggested by the growing Romantic cultural mood. Hodge could not accept that, in his words, ‘all religion is gradual, habitual, acquired as habits are formed’. Hodge’s ally at Princeton, Lyman

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85 Smith and Park traveled together in Europe later in their careers; see HBS to Elizabeth L. Smith, 15 June 1870: ‘Yesterday, at Corfu, I parted company with Professor Park, much to my regret, after months of being together, in season and out of season, day and night. He has been a true friend, always a kind as well as a most interesting companion; he goes to Rome…’; Elizabeth L. Smith, ed., *Henry Boynton Smith: His Life and Work* (New York: A. C. Armstrong and Son, 1881), p. 347


88 See the extended discussion in Chapter Four of Smith’s Andover address, pp. 148-152; see also HBS, ‘The Relations of Faith and Philosophy: An Address Before the Porter Rhetorical Society of Andover Theological Seminary, at its Anniversary, September 4, 1849’, BS 6 (1849), pp. 673-709.

Atwater (1813-1883), argued in the Princeton Review that the notion of change bore ‘no relation to the Infinite and Absolute, who is evermore perfect, and is, therefore, ex vi termini, incapable of development’. The perfection attributed to God is also ascribed to the word of God, so that the ‘sum and substance of all Christian doctrine is found in the sacred volume’.90 Princeton’s commitment to the fixity of the biblical revelation allowed no room for an organic, developmental model.91 Indeed, if the logical end of German idealism was pantheism, the Princetonians gathered around Hodge were ready to call such speculation ‘German insanity’.92 Hodge gradually hardened his own view of the German mediating theologians. Having reviewed his teacher, Tholuck, sympathetically in the Biblical Repertory immediately following his studies in Europe in the 1830s, Hodge was ready—at least by the time of his Systematic Theology, published in 1872 but composed over earlier decades—to describe Tholuck’s work as ‘an attempt to combine conclusions of modern speculation with Christian doctrine. It is an attempt to mix incongruous elements which refuse to enter into combination.’93 For the unreconstructed Old Calvinist Daniel Dana, the matter was even simpler: ‘If there is a spot in the globe which has been a radiation point of darkness and error…it is Germany’.94

Park took a more positive view. He wrote in 1839 that if ‘Americans have defended the evangelical system after a simple view of it’, this is a product of their

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91 See the extended discussion in Chapter Six, pp. 225-227, on Hodge’s view that a German-inspired notion of development proved a threat to the inspiration of scripture.
94 Daniel Dana, The Faith of Former Times (Boston: Crocker and Brewster, 1848), p. 15.
founding it on ‘the principles of common sense, and the plain meaning of the Bible’. The Germans have ‘taken a more complex view’, but it is ‘needless to raise a panic because one man professes this mode and another that of explaining the one faith’. If a person is ‘large-hearted and fair-minded’, free ‘of national partialities, and open…to the influence of a piety that has grown up on an uncongenial soil’, one shall ‘see that the spirit of the Gospel is essentially the same, with whatever robes it may be invested’. For example, Park is remarkably generous with Tholuck, recognising that, even if ‘he is a decided opponent of Locke, Reid, Stewart and Brown’, he is not ‘entirely sympathetic with either Kant, Schelling, Fichte or Hegel’. If Tholuck is ‘perhaps an eclectic transcendentalist’ and possibly ‘pantheistic…the spirit of his theology is eminently evangelical’. Park observes: ‘The best comment…that can be made on the preaching of Dr. Tholuck is this; it is often instrumental, through the divine blessing, in effecting the radical transformation of character, without which no man can see the Lord’.

Nonetheless, Park was not willing to take in the whole of German ideality himself unless an idea would prove useful in his defence of Edwardsean Calvinism. He told his Andover seminarians in 1855 that ‘in Germany…the controversy between the right and left wing of the Hegelian party’ should be judged on their positions regarding the liberty of the will. The right wing ‘wh[ich] is evangelical contend for free will, and

the left wing—Feuerbach…etc. contend for absolute necessity’. German thought would be judged by Edwardsean principles, and not the reverse. Similarly, guarding his Scottish metaphysics, Park objected to the fact that Kant’s rejection of our ability to know anything of the noumenal required that one should have ‘no innate idea of God’, so that his existence ‘must be proved’.

Since common sense realism affirmed that the mind apprehended real knowledge of the world as it was, Park stood with the Scots in dismissing Kant’s rejection of innate ideas. Park argues that ‘German theology is deficient’ in its understanding of natural theology, since ‘even the systems of German ethics are treatises on biblical theology, rather than the dictates of our moral sense’—that is, our real, innate moral sense establishes ethics a priori, rather than requiring that they be proved a posteriori as a deduction from biblical facts. It is clear that Park, like Henry B. Smith, occupied a middle position between Marsh and Nevin on one hand and Dana and Hodge on the other. He did not reject German scholarship out of hand, and appropriated its methodological elements where Wissenschaftlichkeit advanced evangelical piety, but Park did not swallow whole the anti-rationalist or pantheistic assumptions of full-fledged German idealism.

One particular methodological aspect of German thought provided Park with important tools for his crafting of a New England theology. The triumph in the nineteenth century of historicism—the largely German Historismus—required that reality be perceived historically. Replacing the once dominant paradigm of the Enlightenment that

Reason existed independent of time with a new universality grounded in the study of the concrete and particular past, historicism (in Ernst Troeltsch’s view) ‘made all present conditions intelligible by tracing the history of their development’, with the effect ‘that all thinking is obliged to become in some measure historical’.\(^\text{101}\) Neander asserted that the reigning thought of the day was no longer the static institutional model of J. L. von Mosheim (1694-1755), but \textit{Entwicklung}—‘development’.\(^\text{102}\) It would be accurate to observe that the German historicist mode of understanding was more influential in the United States in the nineteenth century than German philosophical idealism.\(^\text{103}\) The career of W. G. T. Shedd (1820-1899), for example, showed that Old School Presbyterianism and an explicitly organic, developmental view of church history could each safely co-exist within conservative orthodoxy. If Park’s German studies did not lead him to accept without reservation Romantic idealism (though subsequent events would prove that he was at least susceptible to the affective element associated with intuitive sensibilities), they certainly provided confirmation of a historicist perspective that Park could apply directly to the delineation of a coherent New England theology.\(^\text{104}\) Park would explicitly describe New England theology, in a summary article in the \textit{Bibliotheca Sacra} in 1852, as ‘a luminous and harmonious development of ideas which had been confused’.\(^\text{105}\) The methodological aspects of German historicism—\textit{Entwicklung}—supplied a useful model


\(^{102}\) See Rowe, ‘Nestor of Orthodoxy’, p. 42.

\(^{103}\) See Herbst, \textit{German Historical School}, pp. 70-77.

\(^{104}\) Bruce Kuklick’s judgment is accurate when he comments that ‘Park himself adopted little from the Germans, insisting instead that orthodox Congregationalism be \textit{au courant} with contemporary trends….Although Park did not advocate an organic Christology, his contacts with the Germans assured the pre-eminence of historical interests’; see Kuklick, \textit{Churchmen and Philosophers}, p. 206.

\(^{105}\) EAP, ‘New England Theology’, p. 184 [emphasis added].
for Andover’s tradition-builder, while radical, transcendental pantheism remained a philosophical curiosity in the United States everywhere outside Emerson’s Concord.\textsuperscript{106}

Park’s evaluation of Kantian epistemology proceeded from his unquestioned acceptance of Scottish common sense realism, and its assertion of the broad sufficiency of man’s rational judgement, of what Thomas Reid called a native ability to ‘pass sentence on whatever is true or false’.\textsuperscript{107} With the assistance of his protégé and populariser, Dugald Stewart, Reid had asserted that the data of sense experience was trustworthy, so that the judgements of consciousness are certain. Flowing from the influence of the third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713) and Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746), Reid accepted that humans possess a moral sense that is able to reach valid determinations of right and wrong. Scottish realism was inherently affirmative, insisting on the reality of consciousness and morality.\textsuperscript{108} Rejecting the scepticism of David Hume (1711-1776), Stewart asserted that, ‘as our knowledge of the material world rests on facts ascertained by observation, so all our knowledge of the human mind rests ultimately on facts for which we have the evidence of our own consciousness’. Since that

\textsuperscript{106} Park remarked that the English and Americans remained ‘undoubting believers in the sensible world. In rejecting its existence, Berkeley has hardly a living disciple. In demolishing his system Dr. Reid performed a work of supererogation.’; [B. B.] Edwards and [E. A.] Park, \textit{Selections from German Literature}, p. 3.


consciousness has ‘been in all ages the same’, then the ‘universality of moral perceptions [is] an essential part of the human constitution’. ¹⁰⁹ Reid’s epistemological scheme would extend the idea of an innate capacity for apprehending moral truths to a rational ability to apprehend all truths. ¹¹⁰

Edwards Park was a life-long devotee of Scottish common sense realism: as has been noted, his junior oration at Brown was a celebration of Thomas Reid, the founder of the school. Park told his Andover seminarians in 1851 that of all the ‘philosophies to be read in connection with theology, on the whole, Reid’s is the best’. ¹¹¹ Commenting on Reid’s Essays on the Intellectual and Moral Powers of Man (1785) in class, Park described Reid’s work as ‘the classical standard of our intellectual philosophy’. ¹¹² Park’s incorporation of Blair and Campbell as the foundation for his own rhetorical views was closely linked to his acceptance of Scottish common sense realism. Park told his seminarians that it is impossible to separate ‘the office of the philosopher from that of the rhetorician’: both inquire ‘constantly after causes’. He averred that the first principle of rhetoric—that ‘a discourse…be fitted to the end in view’—depended on the ‘study of the human mind’. If this were so, ‘perhaps as much [may] be learned on this subject from Stewart’s Philosophy as from Blair’s Rhetoric’. ¹¹³ In his lectures in 1856, Park called ‘Locke, Reid, Brown, Stewart, Beattie, Cousin…men who stand as representatives of the

¹¹¹ [EAP,] John Bulkley Perry, ‘Notes on Park’s Lectures in Theology’ (1851-1852), 1 vol. (MS in the Archives of the University of Vermont Library), pp. 1-2.
¹¹³ [EAP,] Learned, ‘Notes’, p. 124.
philosophy of modern times’. Park’s affinity for common sense realism also proceeded from his recognition that the New Divinity theologians at least from the time of Timothy Dwight (1758-1817) ‘were adept in the philosophy of Reid, Oswald, Campbell, Beattie, Stewart’. Park is even willing to suggest that ‘so far as the theology of New England is a distinctive system…it is the theology of the Bible explained by common sense’. It is ‘the theology which all good men adopt when they act in the capacity of men, in distinction from mere scholars or polemics’. Park’s adherence to common sense informs his affirmation that all reasonable men will be able to apprehend the substratum of religious truth that rests below sectarian and doctrinal controversy.

Where common sense insights operated in the realm of theology, Park recognised ‘natural theology’ to consist of ‘the dictates of our moral sense’. He argued that natural theology provided the context within which special revelation operated: ‘Many seem to overlook the importance of Natural Theology as a preliminary to Christian Revelation. They seem to be sawing off the limb on which they stand.’ Since the ‘existence of God [is] not a priori demonstrable’—that is, we have no first principles that establish his existence before our first experience of him in the natural world—natural theology ‘forms the basis on which the written revelation rests’. There are no ‘premises’ about God that

114 [EAP,] Guild, ‘Notes’, vol. III, p. 184 [note: this is the second of two consecutive pages numbered ‘184’]. Park includes here John Locke (1632-1704), James Beattie (1735-1803) and Victor Cousin (1792-1867), eclectic French populariser of German ideality.
118 [EAP,] Learned, ‘Notes’, p. 121, note.
120 [EAP,] ‘Natural Theology’, p. 276.
exist ‘preceding all observation’.\footnote{121} If ‘some always underrate’ the importance of natural theology, it is because they fail to see that it ‘stands under the Bible, it upholds it, it makes it probable’.\footnote{122} The Bible ‘as an historical book presupposes Natural Theology’.\footnote{123} In fact, the Bible ‘as a work forms a part of Natural Theology’ because we cannot ‘begin theology with the Bible’. Without natural theology, Park asks ‘How do we know that the Bible is true?’\footnote{124}

We must gain our data first from our innate moral sense, before we can establish biblical truth—deduction must be preceded by induction. Park asserts that ‘logically the question of virtue precedes the question of God’, because we possess ‘an intuitive sense of virtuousness as distinct from the idea of conformity to the Divine will’.\footnote{125} This is not to say at all that our moral sense will somehow miss that there is a God, for we do have ‘an instinctive expectation of conscience in favour of the existence of God’.\footnote{126} Natural theology assists our search for God because it provides an a posteriori ‘system of truths so sublime and so wonderfully adapted to the wants of man, [it] must have had an Author above man’.\footnote{127} Park cites Reid’s observation that ‘the fitness of means to ends obliges us to believe in a designing cause’.\footnote{128} Thomas Brown demonstrated the psychological impossibility of not believing in an intelligent creator when one is faced with so much evidence of ‘adaptation of parts to parts’.\footnote{129} Park insists at the same time that natural

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\footnotetext{123}{EAP,} Guild, ‘Notes’, vol. I, p. 52.
\footnotetext{127}{EAP,} Ropes, ‘Natural Theology’, p. 181.
\footnotetext{128}{EAP,} ‘Natural Theology’, p. 266.
\end{footnotes}
theology is subject to critical limitations. It is incapable of discovering essential aspects
of God’s character and his spiritual economy: ‘Some important truths of religion we
cannot learn without a revelation, e.g., the atonement, the salvation of the pious.’ In the
logical order of a proof of knowledge about God, then, for Park, ‘the Bible, as a positive
revelation, must be added to natural instruction….Faith must combine with reason’. Park insists that ‘the Christian preacher is an interpreter both of nature and of revelation.
One spirit reigns in both.’

Faith’s cooperation with reason meant that theology took on the characteristics of
‘a progressive science’, particularly for those who ‘cherish a liberal faith in the possibility
of improving our standard theological systems’. Although it was important that the
theologian hold ‘a rational regard for past opinion’, one must avoid a morbid
antiquarianism, for the Church Fathers had ‘lived before the rational processes of
induction and the fundamental laws of belief had been very distinctly explained’.
Systematic theology is now ‘as regular and well established a science as chemistry or
astronomy’. For Park—again demonstrating a view of progress characteristic of the
Enlightenment—since ‘every age may begin with the results of the age preceding’ and
‘as the tendencies of the intellect are ever upward…we cannot but hope’ that theology

131 EAP, ‘The Fitness of the Church to the Constitution of Renewed Men’ [Delivered May 10, 1854, in
Brooklyn, N.Y., before the American Congregational Union], in Addresses of Rev. Drs. Park, Post, &
Bacon, at the Anniversary of the American Congregational Union, May, 1854 (New York: Clark, Austin
and Smith, 1854), p. 7.
Manning, as Associate Pastor of the Old South Church in Boston, Mass., March 11, 1857’, in Discourses
on Some Theological Doctrines as Related to the Religious Character (Andover: Warren F. Draper, 1885),
p. 94.
will ‘yet be explored with new vigor and success’. The system of natural theology—in Park’s description, ‘a complete science’—has made progress in terms as demonstrable as the achievements in natural philosophy and with ‘conclusions…sustained by our moral sense’. Park is free to pursue a developmental model for New England theology that constitutes a rising series of improvements in the Edwardsean spirit.

Edwards Park’s broad acceptance of Scottish realism penetrated much of his thought and practice, but it was fenced out of one critical area of Park’s theology. Where common sense realism’s intellectualist psychology differed significantly from the voluntarist model of Jonathan Edwards—to whom Park pledged allegiance more fervently than to any Scot—Park did not follow its conclusions. The intellectualist scheme inserted the will between the motive and the act, and so was significantly at odds with Edwardsean Calvinism (except in its New Haven variant under Nathaniel W. Taylor). Edwards had conceived of a simpler model, where the will was simply the active voice of volition. The will always corresponded to what appeared to it to be ‘the greatest apparent good’, so that the will followed a connected (but not efficiently caused) chain of volitions, motives and influences. God’s sovereign efficiency assured that the entire sequence followed certainly from another, but without any of the links in the chain being necessarily joined causally. The intellectualist view, that the will could either attend or not to a motive presented to it or choose to act or not as it preferred, looked

136 [EAP,] ‘Natural Theology’, pp. 258, 269.
137 See the discussion in Chapter Two, pp. 73-89, on Nathaniel W. Taylor and New Haven theology.
suspiciously like the self-determining power of the will that Jonathan Edwards had roundly rejected.\textsuperscript{139}

The intellectualist model in Scottish realism grew from roots in Scottish jurisprudence, and its development makes clear the extent to which it represented a departure from Edwardsean voluntarism. The pivotal figure here is Henry Home, Lord Kames (1696-1782), Reid’s patron. A judge and legal scholar, Kames insisted upon the reliability of the testimony of sense: ‘There is nothing to which all mankind are more necessarily determined than to put confidence in our senses’.\textsuperscript{140} Reid himself came to associate knowledge with belief based on ‘good evidence’, and used a doctrine of evidence drawn from Scottish legal practice. Evidence was measured by the degree of conviction of a competent judge, so that the matter of judicial competence became central to jurisprudence and, by extension, to epistemology. In setting what would become the terms of a particular case, a judge was required to specify which matters would be held to be sufficiently established without evidence—his presumptions. These include the \textit{presumptio juris}, those facts which the written law assumes to be true but which are not stated explicitly.\textsuperscript{141} As Reid formulated his first principles, he was in effect establishing truths of common knowledge that were analogous to the presumption of matters implicit in the law—the truths embedded in the laws of the human constitution. Similarly, in Reid’s faculty psychology the various faculties (external perception, taste, reasoning, memory, consciousness, conscience) operate in the way witnesses operate in a

\textsuperscript{139} See the discussion in Kuklick, \textit{American Philosophy}, pp. 20-24, 53-57.

\textsuperscript{140} Henry Home (Lord Kames), \textit{Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion}, 3\textsuperscript{rd} ed. (Edinburgh: J. Bell, 1779 [orig. ed. 1751]), p. 239.

courtroom—they supply the faculty of judgment with evidence, upon which judgement operates using ‘common sense’. This point of deliberation is precisely where the intellectualist mode placed the human will in matters of salvation—in equipoise, deliberating over the claims of the gospel.

In the usage of Reid, ‘common’ sense was not common in that it was identical to everyday folk wisdom (what Joseph Priestley—in criticising Reid’s use of the term—called ‘that capacity of judging of common things that persons of middling capacities are capable of’\(^\text{142}\)), but was an ‘internal’ sense which was regarded as the common bond or centre of the senses, so that the various impressions received could be reduced to the unity of a common personal consciousness. This is consistent with Aristotle’s use of ἑὶ ὃ ὑμεῖς ἔχοντες ὑμῖν to denote the faculty in which the various reports of the several senses are reduced to the unity of a common perception.\(^\text{143}\) Thus, according to Park, the traditional Calvinist view of depravity ‘is contrary to itself, and involves us in the most fatal scepticism’, because ‘we hear so much of the weakness of human reason…and the folly of him who puts any trust in his inferences from nature, that we sometimes tremble, lest men refuse to believe anything’.\(^\text{144}\) By contrast, Reid’s formulation depends on the reliability of judgment—every man is his own judiciary, capable of weighing the evidence of sense and reaching a true conclusion. For Reid, conscience became primarily an intellectualistic moral faculty—and this essential characteristic of Scottish common


\(^{144}\) [EAP,] ‘Natural Theology’, pp. 249, 245.
sense realism bore heavily on theological developments in nineteenth-century transatlantic evangelicalism.

The wide acceptance of Scottish common sense realism in the first half of the nineteenth century dictated that intellectualism—the independent deliberation of the will poised between motives—would increasingly become the characteristic epistemological scheme for evangelicalism’s morphology of conversion.145 Every one was now competent to judge the merits of Christ’s offer of salvation. It was no great leap from a realist epistemology to a reliance on human effort in salvation and to a belief that conversion is a matter of rational argument and moral persuasion. Enlightened Christianity came both to emphasise human action in conversion (through the application of the deliberating intellect to the critical instrumentality of faith), and to promote, subsequent to conversion, an increasingly simplified ethical and legalistic moralism for the regenerate. This was true not only of most evangelicals in America, but also in England, for example, where the elaborate systematic divinity of a John Gill gave way to

the simplified, conversionist evangelical Calvinism of Andrew Fuller. Moral intuition led to the operative principle that sin and virtue involved voluntarism. Park insisted that ‘the speculations of our Edwardean divines on moral agency are a proof of their having adopted the maxim of common sense, that all sin consists in sinning’, because ‘moral agency [is] essential to good or ill desert’. Park’s lectures at Andover show that he adopted the common sense view that ‘consciousness teaches that whenever we choose, we are able to refuse, and whenever we refuse we are able to choose’. The observations of consciousness produced reliable data in favour of the will’s freedom.

Yet, at the same time, Park regularly taught his seminarians the older Edwardsean view that a ‘the will is always as the greatest good’. He argued that the position of ‘Arminius and Dr. Reid…that man does act without any influence of motives’ ought to be ‘denied’: such a view assumed a ‘self-determining power’ that Jonathan Edwards had rejected. It has been seen in Chapter Two that Park retained his loyalty to Edwards’s older volitional model of the will over against an intellectualist representation that asserted the absolute freedom of the human agent. It is true that Edwardsean voluntarism could not be allowed to edge over into necessity (motives cause actions),

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146 See the discussion in David Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A History from the 1730s to the 1980s (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 1992), pp. 20-74.
149 It is interesting that Park charged Princeton with inconsistency in its avowal of depravity’s binding impact on the will on the strength of Princeton’s own common sense commitments. He cited in a review of Archibald Alexander’s (1772-1851) Outlines of Moral Science (1852) the author’s own emphatic common sense observation that ‘we should admit the self-determining power of the will, whether we understand its nature or not; for we lay it down as a first principle—from which we can no more depart than from the consciousness of existence—that MAN IS FREE’; see EAP, ‘Dr. Alexander’s Moral Science’, BS 10 (1853), p. 399.
152 See the discussion in Chapter Two, pp. 86-87.
because this would appear too deterministic, but it was also critical that the will’s freedom should not edge over into an independent power. In Park’s view, the extreme freedom of the intellectualist position was not required to preserve moral accountability: Park’s inherited Hopkinsianism accomplished precisely what was required. Natural ability—what Park called the ‘far-famed “natural ability” of the Edwardean school’—assured that the moral agent was entirely free to perform what God required of him and so established his entire responsibility for his moral choices. Park taught at Andover that ‘Pres. Edwards’s theory of the will is that man has now all the freedom which he ever had or can be conceived to have’. A vicious moral inability that was the consequence of Adam’s fall dictated that men would inevitably choose to sin at their first opportunity, but this in no way required them to sin or somehow bound their wills: ‘Man will not repent…not because he cannot but because he is a desperate sinner and will not’. Park did not require a shift to the model of a self-determining will in order to preserve human freedom, even if such a position followed clearly from his own Scottish realism. Without turning the sovereignty due to God over to an independent human will (as had the Taylorites), Park’s Edwardean voluntarism mediated through Hopkinsianism was sufficient to preserve the common sense intimations of consciousness in favour of freedom.

What was Edwards Park likely to draw from the diverse intellectual and theological streams represented at Brown and at Andover, in Germany, in England and in Scotland? Certainly, the fundamental structure of his Hopkinsian theology and realist

epistemology was formed early under his father’s influence, and Park never allowed those presuppositions serious challenge. It is true that following his exposure at Brown to the great intellectual banquet of the moderate Enlightenment, he held to a higher view of reason and of human ability than would have Calvinists even of two generations earlier. Natural theology and Scottish common sense realism would give him a life-long confidence in the power of reason to organise into a theological system those natural and biblical facts appropriated inductively from the experience of consciousness. Additionally, Scottish rhetoric would reinforce Park’s instruction to future revivalists at Andover to attend to both the understanding and the heart in order to move the will of the hearer. Park would teach such practical apologetics for five decades at Andover seminary, where a tolerant view of orthodoxy was built into its very founding documents and institutional identity—a narrow, sectarian dogmatism would have little appeal for him. The period in Germany among the mediating theologians lent additional credibility to a non-dogmatic and irenic theology, while affirming methodologically Park’s own personal theological project to construct a definitive and representative New England theology. In the end, German scientific empiricism was far more influential for Park than German idealism. Edwards Park incorporated insights and methods from a broad array of intellectual influences, and bent them to the service of his life-long identification with Edwardsean Calvinism. After all, it was Park who told his seminarians at Andover that their ‘sermons should have the spoils of all the nations’.  

157 [EAP,] Learned, ‘Notes’, p. 123.
CHAPTER FOUR

‘THE THEOLOGY OF THE INTELLECT AND THAT OF THE FEELINGS’:

RHETORICAL STRATEGIES

The setting for Edwards Amasa Park’s most famous sermon, ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’, was the annual meeting in 1850 of the Convention of Congregational Ministers at the Brattle Street Church in Boston. An unusually large congregation—a mixture of Old Calvinists, Hopkinsians and Unitarians—had come to hear the man who had only recently succeeded Leonard Woods in the Abbot chair at Andover. Although Park was only forty-two years of age, his reputation was such that the old church was filled from bottom to top. The sermon itself did not disappoint the assembly: one listener remarked that Park’s ‘whole powerful personality’ had arrested

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1 Frank Hugh Foster observes that the annual Convention ‘was not a popular institution’ and that the weekday address was typically ‘formal and perfunctory’; see Foster, The Life of Edwards Amasa Park (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1936), p. 148.
2 A contemporary account from the Boston Courier observed that ‘Professor Park has the honor of doing what has not been done for a long time before, on a similar occasion, namely, the filling to overflowing, yesterday forenoon, [of] the Brattle Street Church. Every aisle, above and below, was crowded with gentlemen and ladies who stood during the whole services, though the time was nearly two hours. His topic was the theology of the intellect and the affections in their mental action upon one another. Rarely has a discourse, so brilliant in thought and illustration, so comprehensive and clear, been delivered in this city….The elocution of the speaker materially assisted the performance, and the effect in some passages where his fertility of illustration and aptness of remark made clear and prominent some important truth frequently seen under a cloud, was almost overpowering. Metaphysical discernment and a luxuriant imagination united to make the sermon exceedingly interesting to cultivated minds, and the practical bearing of the whole discourse on doctrinal belief and religious literature, made it a timely and useful disquisition.’ The Courier account is found in EAP, Memorial Collection of Sermons, ed. Agnes Park (Boston: The Pilgrim Press, 1902), p. 74.
‘the attention of every person in the vast audience [from] the first word of the oration’, so that, at its conclusion, ‘instantly, in their relief from long overwrought feeling, every listener, with flushed face, drew a long breath which was audible in every part of the church’.

Three thousand copies of the sermon were distributed within days of its delivery, and its content was widely reviewed in newspapers and theological journals.

However, if this sermon at Brattle Street Church was perhaps the apex of Park’s public career, an appreciation of its significance requires that it be fitted into two specific contexts. First, ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ is just one part of Park’s larger theological project, and it is particularly important that the Convention sermon be interpreted in view of Park’s earlier works on rhetoric from the American Biblical Repository. Secondly, Park’s famous effort in 1850 to strike a proper balance between role of the intellect and the feelings in religious experience must be set alongside contemporary treatments of similar themes by Park’s theological peers, who were responding in surprisingly diverse ways to the challenges from Europe of a fresh Romantic sensibility.

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3 Dr J. W. Wellman in EAP, Memorial Collection of Sermons, p. 74. Joshua Wellman was a graduate of Andover seminary, class of 1850, and a minister who later served on the Andover board. Wellman was a friend and an ally of Park’s during the Andover controversy in the 1880s. If this description sounds immoderate, no less a detached observer than Emily Dickinson described her own similar reaction to hearing Park, after he gave his famous ‘Judas’ sermon at Amherst’s First Congregational Church on 20 November 1853: ‘I never heard anything like it, and don’t expect to again, till we stand at the great white throne….And when it was all over, and that wonderful man sat down, people stared at each other, and looked as wan and wild, as if they had seen a spirit’; see Jay Leyda, ed., The Years and Hours of Emily Dickinson, 2 vols (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), vol. I, p. 287. See also Alfred Habegger, My Wars Are Laid Away in Books: The Life of Emily Dickinson (New York: The Modern Library, 2001), pp. 311-313. The Amherst newspaper, The Hampshire and Franklin Express, on 25 November and 2 December reported on Park’s address on 22 November at Amherst College: presumably the college event drew him to Amherst and he took the opportunity to preach beforehand at the local Congregational church. Park had served on the Amherst faculty in 1835-1836. The ‘Judas’ sermon is included in EAP, Memorial Collection of Sermons, pp. 45-72.

A brief summary of the Convention sermon may be useful before its larger context is considered in detail.⁵ Park’s address followed a simple structure that first defined the terms ‘theology of the intellect’ and ‘theology of the feelings’, proceeded to examine their interaction with each other, and finally detailed their application to the work of ministers and theologians. The theology of the intellect was the language of doctrine and propositional or credal statements—the ‘theology of reason’. It was primarily abstract, applying ‘deductive powers’ to ‘evidence [and] trains of proof’.⁶ Alternatively, the theology of the feelings employed indefinite but expressive language to capture vital religious experience. It preferred the ‘particular rather than the general’ in seeking tangible ways to incarnate biblical truths: Park asserts, ‘we must add a body to the soul of a doctrine’.⁷ The two theologies did not operate in isolation, but complemented each other. The theology of feelings supplied illustrative material to amplify the conclusions developed by the intellect, while the latter set boundaries in order ‘to rectify the statements which are often congenial to excited emotions’. The feelings did in fact suggest new avenues for inquiry, for ‘our sensitive nature is sometimes a kind of instinct which anticipates many truths’, but they relied on the intellect to collate their varied impressions: ‘We must define, distinguish, infer, arrange our inferences into a system. Our spiritual oneness, completeness, progress, require it.’⁸ The essential task of the minister was to keep each theology in its proper sphere, so that one propounded neither brittle doctrine nor unrestrained speculation, but warm and enlivened revival preaching. Park asserted that ‘perfection of our faith is, that it combine in its favor the

⁵ A detailed analysis of the sermon appears later in this chapter, pp. 155-162.
logic of the understanding with the rhetoric of the feelings’. The Convention sermon provided the means to combine effectively the substance of doctrine with affective modes of expression.

Park’s representation in the Convention sermon of the essential distinctions between systematic doctrinal propositions and the felt experience of heart-religion was in one sense a part of a larger accommodation within orthodoxy in the nineteenth century to an increasingly affective religious sensibility. Evangelicalism itself had been birthed during the eighteenth century in a broad transatlantic consensus of Enlightenment rationalism and empiricism, but in the nineteenth century Romanticism increasingly challenged the limits of mechanistic forms. Resembling in some ways the earlier pietist revolt against religious formalism on the Continent, the new Romantic spirit stressed organic metaphors and the central role of intuition as a conduit to genuine religious experience. This new current of sensibility drew on sources as diverse as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottfried Herder and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Most influential in the United States were Friedrich Schleiermacher and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, though William Wordsworth, Thomas Carlyle, Walter Scott and Victor Cousin all found a wide readership.

Schleiermacher’s assertion in The Christian Faith (1822) that genuine Christianity consisted of living experience led to the conviction that religious life could be pursued through intuition and feeling (Anschauung und Gefühl) independent of dogma. This re-evaluation, coupled with Coleridge’s distinction between the Understanding and Reason, proved compelling to American churchmen ready to re-
assess their Enlightenment inheritance by way of this new cultural style. Romanticism in this sense may be described as employing German idealism to energise currents of affective sensibility latent in English-speaking cultures. These currents were from tributaries as diverse as Puritan mysticism and the rejection in the seventeenth century of the moralistic doctrines of William Perkins and William Ames by such as Richard Sibbes, John Preston and John Cotton, in the Edwardsean appreciation of the affections in the eighteenth century, and in the intuitionist element in Scottish realism so prevalent in the United States in the early nineteenth century.¹⁰

If Romanticism was itself a diverse movement, the American theologians who constituted Edwards Park’s peers in the 1830s and 1840s illustrate that the reception of Romanticism also moved in very different directions. It has been seen in Chapter Three that the dominance of empiricism, Baconian induction and Scottish realism could be challenged on an individual basis depending on the extent to which particular aspects of Romantic idealism (or, more specifically, which elements of their experience of study in Germany) were embraced or rejected.¹¹ Conservatives like Charles Hodge at Princeton, for example, rejected the influence of German idealism because, in his view, its inherent pantheism was inconsistent with the personal God of scripture. For Hodge, writing in 1840, the ‘Latest Form of Infidelity’ in America—incipient pantheism among Boston


¹¹ See the discussion in Chapter Three, pp. 114-119.
Unitarians—had ‘its origin in German philosophy’, so that ‘the man who can see no harm in pantheism, who thinks it a most religious system…has but one step to take, and he is himself in the abyss’. Others like Park at Andover and Henry B. Smith of Union found that it was possible to incorporate insights from Romantic, even German, sources without a wholesale rejection of rationality and propositional truth. Genuine religious experience on the part of a Christian is, in Smith’s words, ‘another series of facts’ which the theologian receives as a component of the ‘historic revelation’ of the faith. Park argued in ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ that ‘uniform, self-consistent’ feelings are ‘data on which the intellect may safely reason, and by means of which add new materials to its dogmatic system’. Subjective experience constituted reliable sense information that advanced propositional doctrine. It was not necessary to reject the insights of intuition: affective data could be seen as a unique form of induction. In this way, one might incorporate valuable lessons from Romanticism and ideality as a complement to Enlightenment rationality.

A third possibility, of course, was that a thoroughgoing adoption of the new Romantic mood might occasion a complete overthrow of the Enlightenment project. It has been seen in Chapter Three that Vermont’s James Marsh produced in 1829 an edition

13 HBS, ‘The Relations of Faith and Philosophy: An Address Before the Porter Rhetorical Society of Andover Theological Seminary, at its Anniversary, September 4, 1849’, BS 6 (1849), pp. 687-688. Charles Hodge’s review of Smith’s lecture grudgingly admitted that ‘We do not understand Professor Smith as by any means subscribing to one of the German philosophies; but a stronger caveat against the errors of Schleiermacher seem to us to be demanded by the times’; CH, ‘Short Notice of The Relations of Faith and Philosophy’, BRPR 22 (1850), p. 171.
of Coleridge’s *Aids to Reflection* that proved to be a seminal resource for many in America regarding the new Romantic spirit. Marsh’s reception of German influences by way of Coleridge constituted an explicit rejection of ‘the Scotch metaphysicians’.

Marsh’s heroes were Coleridge’s: the Cambridge Platonists and seventeenth-century English divines—Archbishop Robert Leighton, William Bates and John Howe. In his introductory ‘Preliminary Essay’ to Coleridge’s work, Marsh was careful to distance the organic life of the spirit from the rational processes of the mind: ‘The spiritual life…is, in itself, and in its own proper growth and development, essentially distinct from the forms and processes of the understanding’. Although faith ‘cannot contradict any universal principle of speculative reason, it is yet in a certain sense independent’. Christianity is not ‘properly speaking a species of knowledge, as a form of being’. Life was more mysterious than Scottish common sense realism had allowed.

This new tide of Romantic sensibility soon advanced like a flood. In America, Edwards Park’s contemporary, Frederic Henry Hedge, produced German literature in translation and at the Dudley Lectures in 1850 would introduce Harvard to philosophical idealism. Margaret Fuller, fellow-member with Hedge of the Transcendental Club, spiced the Transcendentalist diet in the *Dial* in the early 1840s with passages from Goethe. Ralph Waldo Emerson led the Concord *literati* in their break

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from cold Unitarian rationalism to the contemplation of internal divinity by way of intuition.\textsuperscript{20} Romanticism may have been a movement of many diverse parts, but its counter-Enlightenment spirit was clear to those who drank deepest at its well—the old rational, propositional, substantial and mechanical world had been overwhelmed by the breaking-in of the idealist, subjective, organic and mystical plane.

The critical figure in Romanticism’s impact on American theology is Horace Bushnell (1820-1876). It would be difficult, for instance, to place Park’s ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ properly in its intellectual setting without a due appreciation for the way Bushnell had expanded the terms of theological discourse within orthodoxy. His interpolation of Romanticism into an inherited notion of what constituted a pious New England community gave shape later to much of liberal Protestantism. Because he injected into orthodoxy a Romantic sensibility that did not immediately reject swathes of evangelical doctrine out of hand, Bushnell in his time created an influential middle way in New England.\textsuperscript{21} He updated Old Calvinism’s church-in-society model by promulgating a nurturing, organic communitarianism that in his view avoided the theological radicalism and anti-institutionalism of the Transcendentalists on the one hand and the hyper-individualism and social dislocation of revivalist Edwardseanism on the other.\textsuperscript{22} Bushnell had certainly heard the case for the New Haven improvements on New Divinity theology, having attended Yale both as an undergraduate (class of 1827) and as

a student of Nathaniel W. Taylor in the Divinity School. Sometime in 1831 he read Marsh’s edition of Coleridge and embarked upon a course markedly different from Taylor’s:

For a whole half year I was buried under… *Aids to Reflection* and trying vainly to look up through…. My habit was only landscape before, but now I saw enough to convince me of a whole other world somewhere overhead, a range of realities in higher tier, that I must climb after, and, if possible, apprehend.  

Bushnell would write later that he ‘was more indebted to Coleridge than to any other extra-Scriptural author’. Bushnell began to communicate in the sentimental categories familiar to middle-class literature—the ‘sublime’, the ‘infinite’, the language of the ‘heart’. Travelling through Europe, he described himself in a letter home as ‘dissolved in feeling’ before a Gothic church.

Serving his entire ministerial career at the genteel North Congregational Church in Hartford, he mirrored his congregation’s concern for decorum, for domesticated reform and self-improvement. Bushnell could not abide New Divinity revivalism because it did not allow that ‘any one might be in the Spirit and maintain a constancy of growth, in the calmer and more private methods of duty, patience, and fidelity on the

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26 See Cross, *Horace Bushnell*, p. 27. Bushnell served as minister at North Church in Hartford until 1859.
level of ordinary life’.  

God could compel gently, ‘tenderly’, without ‘the artificial firework, the extraordinary, combined jump and stir, supposed to be requisite when any thing is done’. In fact, the ordinary, quiet work of the Spirit is ‘a more efficacious way’, for spiritual life ‘must come to pass naturally…if it is to have any consequence’.  

He asserted that it was ‘a common mistake [to suppose] that the Spirit of God is present in times only of religious exaltation’. He may be ‘doing as glorious a work in the soul, when there is but a very gentle, or almost no excitemt of feeling’.  

The work of the Spirit was revealed not in the boom-and-bust cycles of revival but in the natural rhythms of organic growth. Bushnell ensured that the Great Awakening would be house-trained in Hartford.  

Similarly, Bushnell opposed the entire thrust of conversionism, arguing in his influential Christian Nurture (1847) that ‘the child is to grow up a Christian and never know himself as being otherwise’. The ‘aim, effort, and expectation should be not, as is commonly assumed, that the child is to grow up in sin, to be converted after he comes to a mature age’. Rather, the child is ‘open to the world as one that is spiritually renewed, not remembering a time when he went through a technical experience, but seeming rather to have loved what is good from his formative years’.  

Bushnell employs explicitly natural metaphors to suggest this spiritual nurture: ‘There ought to be seeds of gracious character already planted in [children], so that no conversion is necessary, only the

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development of a new life already begun.’ Bushnell would rebuild the New England Way without the spectre of Calvinist depravity. He observed that individualistic revivalism ‘makes nothing of the family, the church, and the organic powers God has constituted as vehicles of grace’. It takes every man ‘as if he had existed alone, presumes that he is unreconciled to God until he has undergone some sudden and explosive experience’. Bushnell’s anthropology was essentially a sentimental moralism informed by a Romantic sensibility: ‘I should like…to use the word esthetic [sic], and represent Christianity as a power moving upon man…both to regenerate his degraded perception of excellence, and also to communicate, in that way, the fullness and beauty of God’. Unlike Park, Bushnell rejected out of hand the individualistic conversionist tradition of Edwardsean Calvinism. The evangelical revival’s heritage of Enlightenment atomism challenged the organic dynamics of community.

Bushnell’s innovative theories on language also constituted a rejection of Enlightenment rationality. As he argued in his influential ‘Preliminary Dissertation on the Nature of Language’ (1848), a mechanistic, logical ideal of language should be superseded by one that was aesthetic and representational. Language itself was rooted in nature, in an external language of natural objects and physical action that in turn suggested an internal language communicating spirit and thought: there was a ‘logos in

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31 Bushnell, Christian Nurture, p. 373.
32 Bushnell, Christian Nurture, pp. 15-16.
34 Bushnell, ‘Preliminary Dissertation on the Nature of Language, as Related to Thought and Spirit’, in God in Christ, pp. 7-117.
the outward world’ that answered to ‘the Logos or internal reason of man’. Words of ‘spirit are possible in language only in virtue of the fact that there are forms provided in the world of sense, which are cognate to the mind, and fitted, by reason of some hidden analogy, to represent or express its interior sentiments and thoughts’. Language might give form to expression, and experience could give meaning to linguistic form, but spiritual truth could only be suggested metaphorically. We ‘commonly understand by a formula what is never really true of it…viz., a propositional statement that conveys the spiritual truth or doctrine of a subject by words of exact notation’. Language about God is merely suggestive or symbolic, for theological propositions could not themselves bear the burden of truth-telling: ‘It will not be our endeavour to pull the truth into analytic distinctions, as if theology was a kind of inorganic chemistry.’ In short, words as mere analogical forms were not able to serve dogmatic purposes: ‘Let me freely confess that when I see the human teacher elaborating a…mere dialectic proposition, that is going to tell what God could only show me by the mystery of the ages…I should be deeply shocked by his irreverence.’ Language is ‘such an instrument, that I see not how any one, who rightly conceives its nature, can hope any longer to produce in it a real and proper system of dogmatic truth’. Bushnell believed that the indeterminate nature of language made paradox more useful than proposition, so that ‘as form battles form, and

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one form neutralizes another, all the insufficiencies of words are filled out, the contrarieties liquidated, and the mind settles into a full and just apprehension of the pure spiritual truth’. We never ‘come so near to a truly well rounded view of any truth, as when it is offered paradoxically; that is, under contradictions’. Dogmatic and confessional conclusions are by their very nature at odds with the reality of language.

One could not argue, then, that any particular sect could certify its claim to exclusive truth. When creeds ‘are subjected to the deepest chemistry of thought, that which descends to the point of relationship between the form of the truth and its interior formless nature, they become…so elastic, and run so freely into each other, that one seldom need have any difficulty in accepting as many as are offered him’. Dogmatic propositions are simply unable to convey what they intend, because there is a ‘point of mystery and even of contradiction…a something transcendent, which no investigation will ever reach’. Bushnell would argue that propositional efforts to capture divine truth are finally disingenuous at best: ‘And what is theology? It is commonly supposed to be a speculative system of doctrine, drawn out in propositions that are clear of all metaphor and…have finally attained a literal and exact sense’. But, ‘no such system is possible, for the very plain reason that we have no such terms’.

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42 Bushnell, ‘Preliminary Dissertation on the Nature of Language’, p. 55. Apparently Bushnell’s mind was particularly open to paradox: his friend at Yale, N. P. Willis, describes Bushnell showing him how to sharpen a razor by ‘drawing it from heel to point both ways,’ making ‘the two cross-frictions correct each other’ (quoted in Lewis, The American Adam, p. 68).


44 Bushnell, ‘Preliminary Dissertation on the Nature of Language’, p. 82.


Bushnell’s reordering of theology suggested the shape of liberal theology in the United States in the late nineteenth and in the early twentieth centuries in his flexible anti-dogmatism and non-sectarianism, in his emphasis on subjective religious experience, and in his domestic and church-in-society sentimentalism. His views became accepted wisdom: that the Bible was figurative poetic literature, that religion worked primarily through the human imagination, that supernatural truths pervaded the organic networks of nature and society and that language (especially metaphor) was the key to spiritual understanding. In the summer of 1850, the year of Park’s Convention sermon, Bushnell barely escaped a trial for heresy by his Congregational brethren; upon his death in 1876, he was eulogised as a grand old man of Victorian Protestantism. In an age of rapid social and economic restructuring, Bushnell had proposed a renovation of orthodoxy in favour of the subjective and organic, displacing reason and doctrine with intuition and metaphor.47 In abandoning the Enlightenment notion of truth as a verifiable, independent, objective absolute, Bushnell had no recourse but to substitute his own ‘opinions…on important theological subjects’. As to the truth value of such opinions, Bushnell could ‘only say, that to me, they are true’.48 This particular application of intuition may on one level be just a safe form of Emersonian self-reliance for respectable Hartford Congregationalists, but, in its absolute confinement of truth within the boundary of the subjective self, it was nonetheless radical.

It is clear that Edwards Amasa Park and his Convention sermon must be evaluated in part as a response by Park to Bushnell’s re-orientation of orthodoxy.

47 Claude Welch contends that Bushnell undertook ‘a re-ordering of the theological enterprise comparable to the work of Schleiermacher or Hegel or Coleridge’; see Welch, Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Volume One, 1799-1870 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 127.
48 Bushnell, ‘Preliminary Dissertation on the Nature of Language’, p. 10 [emphasis in original].
Bushnell promulgated his views on two occasions at Andover seminary, and it is likely that Park himself attended each oration. In 1839 Bushnell addressed Andover’s Society of Inquiry on ‘Revelation’, during which he argued in rudimentary form for his analogical view of language. The substance of revelation was not to be found in dogma logically derived from scripture but in an inward spiritual discovery effected by intuition.⁴⁹ Nine years later, Bushnell delivered an address before Andover’s Porter Rhetorical Society entitled ‘A Discourse on Dogma and Spirit; or the True Reviving of Religion’ (1848).⁵⁰ Bushnell asserted that mechanistic revivalism was an inadequate response to the needs of New England’s spiritual life: authentic revival was to be found not in ‘tumult’ or ‘busy clatter’, but in ‘the quiet reading of God through the heart’.⁵¹ He called for a reversal of the ‘relations of dogma and spirit, so as to subordinate everything in the nature of science and opinion to the spirit’.⁵² Bushnell, characteristically, argued that knowledge received by intuition was essentially superior to knowledge gained by dogmatic study: ‘What is loftiest and most transcendent in the character of God, his purity, goodness, beauty, and gentleness, can never be sufficiently apprehended by mere intellect’, or by ‘any other power than a heart configured to these divine qualities’.⁵³ As Bushnell proposed in his influential ‘Preliminary Dissertation on the Nature of Language’ (published in 1848 as an accompaniment to the Andover address), truth was exclusively

⁴⁹ Bushnell’s ‘Andover Society of Inquiry Address’ is in manuscript in the Yale University Divinity School Library. Bushnell’s daughter describes its setting in Bushnell, Life and Letters, pp. 88-89: ‘The material had long been in his mind…and was destined to become central to his system of thought….The doctrine here first broached [on the Trinity] was, according to orthodox standards, not less than heresy. Such he felt it to be, and knew that he was taking the first step, which was to cost him so much.’
metaphorical and as such was by definition anti-rational: if ‘language [is] an instrument wholly inadequate to the exact representation of thought’, then ‘our terms are only analogies, signs, shadows…of the formless mysteries above us and within us’.54 Bushnell’s discourse at Andover—a Romantic description of the new constituent elements of genuine, that is non-Edwardsean, revival—was one part of the immediate context of Edwards Park’s Convention sermon in 1850.

A year after Bushnell’s address, Henry B. Smith stood before the same Porter Rhetorical Society at Andover (and before Andover’s Abbot professor)55 and argued without mentioning Bushnell against the latter’s opinion that language was inadequate to convey spiritual truth.56 The century’s most prominent New School Presbyterian theologian,57 Smith was just beginning a career at Union Seminary as a defender of ‘doctrinal theology’. Language ‘may have had its origin in the regions of sense; but by

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55 Many years after the address, Edwards Park praised (with some admixture of an ironical tone) its ironic content: Smith ‘spoke to every one a word in season [and] every one was delighted with it. The men who rejected faith, and the men who condemned philosophy; those who believed in Bushnell, and those who disbelieved in Schleiermacher; theologians who had a power to the contrary and theologians who had not much power of any kind, all crowded around the orator of the day, and thanked him for the lesson to their brethren, and praised his diversified gifts’; EAP, ‘Review of H. B. Smith’s Faith and Philosophy’, BS 35 (1878), p. 201. Park’s description seems to justify the inference that he was in attendance when the address was given at Andover.
57 Smith was, like F. D. Maurice, the son of a Unitarian, and was a graduate of Bowdoin College, Maine. He was a student of Moses Stuart’s at Andover seminary in 1834-1835, later serving as professor of mental and moral philosophy at Amherst College from 1847 to 1850 (the position Park held from 1835 to 1836), professor of church history at Union Seminary (New York) from 1850 to 1855, and professor of systematic theology at Union from 1854 to 1870. For a general overview of Smith’s place in nineteenth-century American theology, see Mark A. Noll, ‘Jonathan Edwards and Nineteenth-Century Theology’, in Nathan O. Hatch and Harry S. Stout, eds, Jonathan Edwards and the American Experience (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 260-287.
the action of the soul upon it, it has been transfigured’ into ‘the express image of spirit’. Bushnell may have been correct that ‘the letter kills if the spirit be not there’, but it was necessary in Smith’s view to balance ‘a real inward experience as well as an objective reality’. Smith—like Park—had studied with Tholuck and Hengstenberg and approved of the general scheme of evangelical scholarship found in the work of the German mediating theologians. He was even capable of giving qualified praise to Schleiermacher, calling him a ‘noble and venerable name’ representing ‘a middle ground between dogmatism and mysticism’. Smith’s unifying principle was a Christocentric theology that corralled subjective experience within the objective ‘substance of Christian faith in a scientific form’, but which at the same time disciplined philosophical speculation by demanding spiritual vitality.

It was a grave error to assume that faith—‘trust’ or ‘reliance on Christ’—and philosophy—‘knowing things rationally’, ‘the rational knowledge of things in their connections, relations, and ends…in the harmony and completeness of a system’—were necessarily at odds, that ‘it is war and only war: it is faith or philosophy’. On the contrary, ‘faith and philosophy are not inherently opposed but inherently at one’. Faith cannot discard rationality to establish ‘a faith which no thinking man can rationally hold’, since, if ‘he holds it irrationally, it cannot long maintain its sway’. Smith rejected Bushnell’s view that doctrinal theology was inimical to faith, for faith without

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60 See William K. B. Stoever, ‘Henry Boynton Smith and the German Theology of History’, Union Seminary Quarterly Review 24 (1968), pp. 69-89. Smith travelled in Europe from 1837 to the summer of 1840, studying most of the time in Germany, just a few years before Edwards Park; see E. Smith, ed., Henry Boynton Smith: His Life and Work, pp. 49-52.
‘knowledge may be superstition, being unchecked’. Faith as a ‘state of trust’ was undergirded by both the external, objective historical manifestation of God in the person of Christ and the internal, subjective experience of redemption in the hearts of the regenerate.\(^63\) Similarly, philosophy as a ‘mode of knowledge’ depended on the ‘material, the substance, the facts’ of genuine religious experience which ‘exist before the philosophy’ and are ‘attested [to] on independent grounds’. Thus man’s spiritual response is itself ‘internal evidence’, in which ‘profound experience’ produces ‘another series of facts, reaching across thousands of years’.\(^64\) Faith and philosophy are ‘employed about the same great subjects’, but are ‘employed about them in a different way’.\(^65\) Each had different but ultimately a complementary character and purpose.

Smith’s mediating theology avoided an unwarranted exaltation of subjective religion, where ‘Christianity is viewed rather as a system intended to cultivate certain states of feeling, than as a revelation to build us up in the knowledge of God and of Christ’. He also avoided a stultifying reliance on doctrinal systems, ‘as if all philosophy were in knowing the powers of the mind’, so that they are ‘made the basis of theology’. Smith’s evaluation of the New Divinity school was that its excessive rationalism led to ‘lesser controversies which have narrowed our minds and divided our hearts’.\(^66\) But philosophy nonetheless provided ‘essential and needed service to faith’ by virtue of ‘its office in giving a systematic form to faith’, in ‘unfolding the facts and doctrines of the


Thus, subjective experience and objective propositions when properly balanced were mutually supporting.

If Bushnell had launched the faith on to the wide waters of subjective experience, Smith would suggest that one very specific bearing was required for the navigation of practical divinity. Earlier New England theology had added Edwardsean virtue and Free Will to the system of the Westminster divines to answer ‘the most important and decisive questions of the age’, giving to the New Divinity ‘a distinctive character, an original theological cast’ representing genuine ‘advances in theology’. But the present age brought ‘other inquiries…to which our theories about sovereignty, virtue, and free agency can give no definite response’. 68 To answer the modern question, ‘what is the real nature of Christianity, what are its essential characteristics?’, the theologian must reply that faith and philosophy—subjective experience and objective doctrinal theology—find common ground essentially in the revelation of the person of Christ. 69

The central principle of Christianity as a distinct system can only be found in Him of whom the prophets did testify…in Him whose nature…unites the extremes of humanity and divinity…He is the centre of God’s revelation and of man’s redemption; of Christian doctrine and of Christian history, of conflicting sects and each believer’s faith….Christ, He is the centre of the Christian system. 70

This conviction is ‘at the basis of all theological systems which acknowledge a real revelation and manifestation of God in the person and work of his only Son’ and is ‘also in entire conformity with the dictates of Christian experience; it is demanded by that

experience’.\textsuperscript{71} Faith is ‘not a system of doctrines, nor a confession, nor a speculation; but…a grand historical economy, a manifestation of God and his purposes’ aimed at ‘one person…himself a man, in whom it is declared that heaven and earth are reconciled, that the great problems of human destiny are solved’\textsuperscript{72} Smith asserted that ‘real inward experience’ could be joined with ‘an objective reality’ only if the ‘centre of the experience is…identical with the work of redemption’\textsuperscript{73} Thus, Smith’s project, to unify faith and philosophy, accomplished its mediating work in adopting a Christocentric emphasis.\textsuperscript{74} This organising principle was able to harmonise both Old School Presbyterian doctrine and New School Presbyterian experimental religion (a formulation also largely suitable for Andover’s Congregationalists), and at the same time was able to give a nod to the denizens of more liberal schools in approving within limits Schleiermacher’s validation of inward experience.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{71} HBS, ‘The Relations of Faith and Philosophy’, p. 699.
\textsuperscript{72} HBS, ‘The Relations of Faith and Philosophy’, p. 687. Smith elsewhere asserted that ‘My object is to make and harmonize a system which shall make Christ the central point of all religious truth and doctrine. Such, I am convinced, is the biblical scheme.’; see E. Smith, ed., Henry Boynton Smith: His Life and Work, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{73} HBS, ‘The Relations of Faith and Philosophy’, p. 705.
\textsuperscript{74} ‘The Relations of Faith and Philosophy’ received only a brief notice in the BRPR, though Charles Hodge commented that if ‘this discourse [had] not come to us at the very close of our quarterly labours, it would invite us to enlarged remark….That which most interests us, is the prominence given to the Person and Work of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the justice which is done to those views of theology which connect themselves with this central doctrine, but which find less and less sympathy in New England….\[There\] is in several parts…a generous statement of several evangelical truths, which we have often missed from the religious philosophy of our Eastern neighbors. As a philosophical treatise we regard it with interest and respect. It has acumen, fairness and earnestness, and would be more impressive still, were it more plain and natural in its diction.’; see CH, ‘Short Notice of The Relations of Faith and Philosophy’, p. 171.
\textsuperscript{75} In fact Smith’s New School alliance at Union Seminary with the Old School Presbyterian W. G. T. Shedd (1820-1894) helped make possible the Presbyterian reunion in 1869. Shedd was a graduate of Andover seminary in 1843 and from 1853 to 1862 served as professor of ecclesiastical history there. After a year at New York’s Brick Church, Shedd served on the Union faculty from 1863 to 1890; see Robert T. Handy, A History of Union Theological Seminary in New York (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), pp. 39, 44.
Bushnell’s and Smith’s addresses in 1848 and 1849 at Andover provided the immediate theological context for Edwards Amasa Park’s Convention sermon in Boston in 1850 on ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’. If Bushnell had argued that truth was anti-rational, Park moderated Bushnell’s stance in suggesting that truth was inherently rational but could be expressed metaphorically. If Smith had argued for a balance between objective and subject elements in vital religion, Park would detail how two distinct modes of expression made that balance intelligible and thereby practical and preachable. It is important to observe that none of these positions was new to Park—the general perception in contemporary historiography that his Convention sermon was primarily a reaction to Bushnell (and to a lesser degree to Smith) is misleading. Although Park’s career as a theologian and controversialist in the Abbot chair overshadowed his time as a rhetorician in the Bartlet chair, his astute regard for rhetorical and homiletical tactics had from the beginning of his time at Andover informed the rhetorical strategies that ultimately would shape the Convention sermon and direct Park’s subsequent creation of a distinct, synthesised New England theological tradition. In critical ways it is more important that Park began as a rhetorician than that he ended as a theologian.

The rhetorical strategies delineated in ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ had been central to his teaching and published work at least as early as the day in 1836 when he returned to Andover Hill as a member of the seminary faculty.76 His early articles in the American Biblical Repository in 1837 and 1839 had attempted to

76 Park’s senior oration at Brown in 1826 (not delivered because of the undergraduates’ revolt against President Asa Messer, a Baptist with Unitarian leanings, in which Park took a significant if somewhat unintentional part) was entitled ‘Our View of a Theory should be influenced by Right Feelings’; see Walter C. Bronson, The History of Brown University, 1764-1914 (Providence: Brown University Press, 1914), pp. 186-192, 197. See the discussion in Chapter Three, pp. 91-94, regarding Park at Brown.
balance the importance of theology and rhetoric in the practice of preaching.\textsuperscript{77} For example, in ‘The Mode of Exhibiting Theological Truth’ (1837), Park elaborates a working distinction between substance and form. If ‘theology is concerned with the essence of Christian doctrine…sacred rhetoric is concerned with the manner in which this doctrine should be presented’. Unfortunately, in order to preach divine sovereignty some theologians have ‘conjoined it so constantly and intimately with God’s power…that the truth has seemed a hard and harsh truth, grating on the puny sensibilities of man, and leaving him motionless and awe-struck’. Thus, in ignoring an ‘elevated rhetoric’ for a ‘representation [that] will quadrate with the rules of empiric [sic] logic’, the truth becomes ‘painfully discrepant’. This ‘favourite doctrine…would appear far more amiable, and in its meaning far more correct, if it were blended more with God’s love’ and his ‘regard for the welfare of creatures who need a sovereign [as] a kind Father’. In such a representation, the ‘matter of the doctrine is the same, yet it is more seemly’.\textsuperscript{78} Theological truth requires a sense of ‘the proportion in which the truth is exhibited’. To ‘insist on the sterner truths in such vast excess’ is to forget ‘that in some matters position is everything, and that a minutest [sic] disorder of parts is subversive to the whole’. The cherished New Divinity ‘doctrine of disinterested love’ has been ‘desecrated…by a current mode of expressing it’ (that is, willing to be damned for the glory of God), but this ‘is nearly all a fault of mode, rather than of substance’.\textsuperscript{79} A due regard for rhetoric places ‘truth in its proper conformation and adjustments, in its nice adaptation to the


\textsuperscript{78} EAP, ‘The Mode of Exhibiting Theological Truth’, pp. 436, 442.

\textsuperscript{79} EAP, ‘The Mode of Exhibiting Theological Truth’, pp. 442, 444.
mind and alliance with congenial feeling; that is truth, that only’. In other words, truth does not exist in isolation, but is in a significant way a function of its presentation. In order to ‘be wise to win souls’, language must be selected from ‘a less obnoxious vocabulary’. After all, this is the very same method of ‘the sacred penmen’, who ‘accommodate themselves to the particular state of the individuals they address’. Park asserts an essential connection between the substance of a doctrine and its mode of expression, because—following Hugh Blair and George Campbell—the only suitable point of reference for a sermon’s content is the congregation who hears it.

The 1850 Convention sermon demands a close reading, for its encapsulation of Park’s rhetorically-driven methodology is the key to understanding the substantive content of what Park would subsequently detail in 1852 as the New England theology. The entirety of ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ depends on the assumption that observing a working distinction between these two very different modes of expression is necessary for the persuasive communication of spiritual truth. If an attention to both theological content and to its proportionate representation from the pulpit were demanded of the effective preacher (as Park had argued in 1837), the careful delineation of the two modes of intellect and feeling was, similarly, not merely an arcane epistemological exercise. Observing the differences in nature of the two theologies was an absolute requirement for proper preaching, for if ‘preachers aim to rouse the sympathies of a populace’ or to leave ‘men deeply affected by any theme’, they must ‘disturb some…logical proportions’ or ‘give a bolder prominence to some lineaments of a doctrine than can be given to them in a well compacted science’. Although ‘sometimes,

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indeed, both the heart and the mind are suited by the same modes of thought...often they require dissimilar methods’. Albert H. Plumb, in the eulogy that prefaces the posthumous Memorial Collection (1902) of Park’s sermons, observed that Park ‘was led to feel that he must first of all have and teach a theology that could be successfully preached; for the great object of teaching men theology he believed was to fit them to be successful preachers of the gospel of redemption’. Only to the extent that a preacher understood how to adapt the gospel message to the conditions of his audience could he be assured that the practical effect of conversion might follow.

The ‘theology of the intellect’ proper depends on ‘all the faculties which are essential to the reasoning process’ so that it ‘comprehends the truth just as it is, unmodified by excitements of feeling’. This ‘intellectual theology’ prefers ‘general to individual statements, the abstract to the concrete, the literal to the figurative’, and is by definition ‘self-consistent...abhoring a contradiction as nature abhors a vacuum’. It is not suited ‘for elegant appeals, but for calm, controversial treatises and bodies of divinity, not so well for the hymn-book as for the catechism; not so well for the liturgy as for the creed’, since it insists ‘on the nice proportions of doctrine, and on preciseness of thought and style’. Because it avoids ‘the dashes of an imaginative style’, it typically ‘seems dry, tame to the masses of men’. If the theology of the intellect speaks clearly, in the wrong hands it also speaks forgettably.

By contrast, the ‘theology of the feelings’ does not study ‘the exact proportions of doctrine, but gives especial prominence to those features of it which are and ought to be

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82 Albert H. Plumb, ‘The Relation of Professor Park’s Theology to His Sermons’, in EAP, Memorial Collection of Sermons, p. 6.
most grateful to the sensibilities’. It ‘chooses particular rather than general statements’, and ‘sacrifices abstract remarks to visible and tangible images’. The theology of the feelings is too ‘buoyant…to compress itself into sharply-drawn angles’, and is ‘often the more forceful for the looseness of the style, herein being the hiding of its power’. It cannot be contained by dogmatic forms, because it ‘often forces its passage through or over rules of logic, and presses forward to expend itself first and foremost in affecting the sensibilities’. If the theology of the feelings ‘brings out into bold relief now one feature of a doctrine and then a different feature’, it is merely using its ‘elastic’ property to assume ‘as great a variety of shapes as the wants of the heart are various’.84 The theology of the feelings is thus intentionally disproportionate, able to ‘individualize the single parts of a doctrine…so it can make them intense and impressive,’ but it does not require that the parts ‘harmonize with each other’. It is free to assume ‘discordant forms’ in order to meet the affections ‘in their conflicting moods’85—in effect, to embrace contradiction for contradiction’s sake.

The aim of the theology of the feelings is ultimately persuasion, ‘to arrest attention’ by straining a word ‘to its utmost significancy [Sic]’, even if the price to be paid is ‘a disproportion with the remaining parts of the system’.86 Clearly, Park is describing an apologetic tool of vast power, for ‘this emotive theology is adapted to the persuasive sermon’ and is in its plasticity is undoubtedly capable of an endless variety of application. Since ‘in its essence it is poetical’, the theology of the feelings requires only

an artist’s appreciation for ‘poetic license’ in order to exhibit its manifold usefulness.\textsuperscript{87} Thus, it is the province of such ‘quick-moving, wide-hearted, many-sided men, who look through a superficial impropriety and discern under it a truth which the nice language of prose is too frail to convey to the heart’. Because there are such men in every generation, ‘the same diversified representations are repeated again and again’, while the ‘progress of science’ effaces the marks left by the ‘theology of reason’: in fact, ‘theory has chased theory into the shades; but the theology of the heart...abides as permanent as are the main impressions of the truth’.\textsuperscript{88} In one sense, the theology of the feelings is more dependable over time than doctrine, which is subject to continual improvement by the increasing light of theological science.

If the appropriate purposes of each theology are properly maintained, the two modes are symbiotic, so that ‘the theology of the intellect enlarges and improves that of the feelings, and is also enlarged and improved by it’. For example, since the ‘whole doctrine…of the spiritual world’ is one that must be ‘made tangible by an embodiment’, the theology of the feelings supplies illustrative material lest ‘an intellectual view be too general to be embraced by the feelings’.\textsuperscript{89} In turn, the intellect as the organising entity ‘maintains ascendancy’ over ‘the impulses of emotion’. It is ‘the authoritarian power, employing the sensibilities as indices of right doctrine, but surveying and superintending from its commanding elevation’. Although ‘it is a tendency of pietism to undervalue the human intellect for the sake of exalting the affections’, our faith ‘becomes a weak or wild sentimentalism if we despise logic’. If a ‘sound heart is famished by an idle intellect, it

\textsuperscript{88} EAP, ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’, p. 539.
loses its tone’, but if ‘it is fed by an enquiring mind it is enlivened, and reaches out for an expanded faith’. In an earlier address, at his inaugural as Abbot professor in 1847, Park asserted that ‘the original law of our constitution is that feeling shall follow perception, and in obedience to this law, the heart is often enlarged as the understanding is expanded’. So, too, in the Convention sermon, once reason ‘amplifies…the affections’, it is in turn ‘improved and enlarged’ so that the ‘tendency of rationalism…to undervalue the heart for the sake of putting the crown upon the head’ is avoided. Intellect guides the feelings to deeper experience and is in turn itself enriched.

Nonetheless, pride of place ultimately belongs to the theology of the intellect. Park asserts the primacy of reason, since it ‘explains [the theology] of feeling into an essential agreement with all the constitutional demands of the soul’. If the ‘theology of reason derives aid from the impulses of emotion, it maintains its ascendancy over them. In all investigations for truth, the intellect must be the authoritative power’. As the ‘head is placed above the heart in the body, so the faith which is sustained by good argument should control rather than be controlled by the emotions which receive no approval from the judgement’. The intellect is ‘the decisive standard of appeal’, because ‘reason has an ultimate, rightful authority over the sensibilities’. The primacy of the intellect, however, is not the same as the sufficiency of the intellect. The ‘language of the emotions’ may be ‘dissonant with the precise truth’ but still possess ‘a significancy [sic]

more profound than can be pressed home upon the heart by any exact definitions’. The intense expressions ‘from the depths of our moral nature’ do not wait upon ‘the niceties of logic’. In the largest sense, ‘the literal doctrines of theology are too vast for expression by man, and our intensest words are but a distant approximation to that language which forms the new song that the redeemed in heaven sing’. The new language that we require is ‘unutterable in this infantile state of our being’. If Park assigns a necessary priority to the intellect over the sensibilities, he at the same time recognises—as Edwardsean Calvinists ought—that reason in and of itself is inadequate to apprehend the heights of a genuine spiritual experience of God.

Finally, the proper way of employing the two theologies is ‘to keep each…within the sphere for which they were respectively designed’. When an ‘intellectual statement is transferred to the province of emotion it often appears chilling, lifeless’. Alternatively, when ‘a passionate phrase is transferred to the dogmatic province, it often appears grotesque, unintelligible, absurd’. The preacher must not allow the ‘beautiful rhetoric’ of biblical metaphors to be reduced by ‘absurd logic’ into intellectual judgments [Sic], nor attempt ‘to square the effusions of poesy by the scales, compasses and plumb-lines of the intellect’. The theology of the intellect and the theology of the feelings are delimited by their appropriate modes of speech: for example, a ‘creed, if true to its original end, should be in sober prose, should be understood as it means, and should mean what it says’. It belongs to ‘the province of analyzing, comparing, reasoning intellect,’ and if it leaves this sphere it ‘confuses the soul’, setting ‘a believer at variance with himself by perplexing his

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reason with metaphors and his imagination with logic’. Men will never ‘find peace until they confine their intellect to its rightful sphere and understand it according to what it says, and their feeling to its province and interpret its language according to what it means’, in so doing ‘rendering unto poetry the things that are designed for poetry, and unto prose what belongs to prose’.\(^97\) Effective communication requires that a practised hand apply the right mode of speech at precisely the right time.

Both the theology of the intellect and the theology of the feelings are essentially integrating processes. Underneath all the ‘intellectual refinements lies a broad substance of doctrine’, and ‘this substance must be right, for it is precisely adjusted to the soul and the soul was made for it’. If there are ‘discrepant systems of philosophy pervading the sermons of different evangelical ministers,’ it is also true that ‘the rays of light which escape from these systems are so reflected and refracted…as to end in producing about the same image upon the retina of every eye’.\(^98\) The minister who understands Park’s message becomes ‘large-minded…and large-hearted’, having ‘all the sensibility of a woman without becoming womanish, and all the perspicacity of a logician without being merely logical’. The proper representation of the two theologies might yet produce a time when ‘the intellect will yet be enlarged so as to gather up all the discordant representations of the heart, and employ them as complements…or emphases of the whole truth,’ while the heart is ‘so expanded and refined as to sympathize with the most subtle abstractions of the intellect’.\(^99\) The theology of the intellect and the theology of the feelings properly applied together have the power to unite orthodoxy around a common

stratum of truth, to join the masculine and feminine elements of human nature and the objective and subjective elements of human religious knowledge into a coherent whole.

Park is not arguing for a mystical syncretism that merges any and all beliefs simply because certain religious feelings may be experienced by anyone. It is true that ‘there are indeed kinds of theologies which cannot be reconciled with each other’, since all or part of one may not be connected to the substratum of truth. There is a ‘line of separation which cannot be crossed between those systems which insert, and those which omit the doctrine of justification by faith in the sacrifice of Jesus’. This cardinal doctrine of the atonement is in fact the prime conjunction of the two theologies, for it ‘blends in itself the theology of the intellect and that of feeling’, where ‘the mind and the heart, like justice and mercy, meet and embrace each other’. When the ‘atoning death of Christ’ is ‘the organific [sic] principle of faith…these heterogeneous configurations may be one and the same, having for its nucleus the same cross’. 100 The theology of the intellect and the theology of the feelings regulate each other and resolve into a spiritual unity founded in the atonement and proclaimed in the gospel message.

If Park had hoped that in arguing from the centre in his Convention sermon he might himself unify the poles of the American theological spectrum, he was to be disappointed. Horace Bushnell for one did not find Park’s allowance for the intuition convincing. Bushnell argued that Park’s own propositional statement in the sermon which affirmed ‘the great, inevitable, scientific truth of regeneration, is itself packed full of figures and images, and is, in fact, interpretable only with more difficulty and

ambiguity than any and all of the figures proposed to be resolved by it’. To Bushnell, Park’s task is a fool’s errand, for ‘Human language is a gift to the imagination so essentially metaphoric…that it has no exact blocks of meaning to build a science of’. 101 Park and Bushnell are fundamentally at odds in this critical area: Park simply did not share Bushnell’s rejection of the intellect or his assumption of the inability of language to convey propositional truth. If Bushnell believed that contradiction—‘as form battles form, and one form neutralizes [sic] another’—in and of itself produces a ‘full and just apprehension of pure spiritual truth’, 102 Park maintained the importance of the intellect in organising such a resolution. Reason is ‘that circumspect power [that] seeks out some principle which will combine these two extremes’. Even if the feelings produce ‘contradictory statements’ at various times—indeed, they embrace contradiction, no more recoiling ‘from a contradiction…than the war-horse of Job starts back from the battlefield’—the theology of the intellect collates ‘the discordant representations which the heart allows’ and elicits ‘the one self-consistent principle which underlies them’.103 If Bushnell believed that paradox produced no conflict because in his view any mode of language was inadequate to convey spiritual truth, to Park, rather, contradictions are only apparent difficulties that proceed from a temporary confusion of modes.

Although Bushnell believed that metaphor was essentially an anti-rational description of the subjectivity of all language, metaphor was for Park a valuable device to express religious feelings. If all creeds are equal to Bushnell because none is relevant, and the business of explicating mysteries belongs to God and not to preachers, for Park

even diverse creeds are important because of their potential to reach a common deposit of revealed truth once the forms of their expressions are clarified. True to the irenic spirit at Andover, he argued in the year following the Convention sermon that many theological disputes arise either ‘from so innocent a cause as different temperaments of individuals’, or ‘from an honest misunderstanding of terms’. Park averred that ‘pious men often adopt systems which agree with each other in their essential principles’ even if they differ in ‘subordinate particulars’. Different modes of expression do not challenge the underlying unity of theological truth, for ‘the same doctrines presented in certain forms constitute the theology of the intellect, and presented in other forms constitute the theology of the heart’. The ‘Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ if properly understood and applied secured the eternal truths that rest below disputes over the varieties of religious expression.

Princeton’s Charles Hodge also responded to Park’s Convention sermon, in one of the most famous series of journal exchanges in the nineteenth century, but he responded for precisely the opposite reason to Bushnell’s: Park had incorporated too much of Romanticism into his address. Such an accommodation as Park promoted was all the more dangerous because it came from within orthodoxy. Hodge believed that Park gave too much away to Bushnell, and had moved into hazardous proximity to Schleiermacher’s grounding of Christianity solely in religious experience. Without a substantive role, the intellect became ‘the mere interpreter’ of the feelings. Park had

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104 EAP, ‘Unity Amid Diversities of Belief’, BS 8 (1851), pp. 595-596.
105 Bruce Kuklick observes that Park’s example (and also Mercersburg’s) demonstrates that German thought could reconstruct either heterodox (e.g., Transcendentalism) or orthodox religion; see Kuklick, Churchmen and Philosophers, p. 192.
opened the door to the possibility of conflicting theologies, since, in Hodge’s description of Park’s method, ‘if an assertion of Scripture commends itself to our reason, we refer it to the theology of the intellect and admit its truth’, but ‘if it clashes with any of our preconceived opinions, we can refer it to the theology of the feelings and deny its truth for the intellect’. Hodge argued that this was merely a strategy to dismiss inconvenient truths. Since truth was a unity, however, it was able to embrace without manipulation both the cognitive and affective aspects of the human soul. To Hodge, Park’s division was dangerously misleading and unnecessary: ‘There cannot…be two conflicting theologies; but on the contrary, the theology of the feelings is the theology of the intellect in all its accuracy of thought and expression’.106 God acts on the entire soul, so that the intellect and feelings always work in harmony without representing a duality in any sense.107

Congregationalist Parsons Cooke, speaking for Old Calvinism a decade later in East Windsor’s American Theological Review, agreed with Hodge that Park’s use of the intellect and feelings distinction was essentially just a stratagem: phrases like ‘strictly and literally’ were like ‘india-rubber clasps’, binding ‘more or less according to convenience and occasion’. Park had created a device able ‘to play upon figurative language’ in order to turn, for example, Jonathan Edwards’s principles into ‘inferences diametrically opposite to the main features of his system’. But ‘the truth is, that figurative language…has a meaning, as determinate and as clear to common-sense, as literal

language has on any subject'.\textsuperscript{108} Clearly, theologians from bastions of Old Calvinism were less than sympathetic to Park’s use of affective religious experience if it threatened the fixity and perspicacity of propositional statements drawn from scripture.

Park replied to Hodge’s specific objections in subsequent articles in the Bibliotheca Sacra by explaining that, if ‘two theologies’ was a misleading term, the ‘practical importance’ of his sermon was that, even if there were two modes of representing a doctrinal system, this might only mean ‘a preacher’s enlivening a single abstract doctrine by concrete exhibitions of it’. The title, ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’, is ‘expressly defined as not denoting two kinds of truth, but as denoting two dissimilar modes of representing one and the same truth’. Hence, disproportionate, figurative expressions are not in essential conflict with the underlying truth they mean to emphasise.\textsuperscript{109} As the debate progressed in a continued exchange of journal articles, little progress was made beyond the one-theology/two-theology disagreement. Both Park and Hodge would struggle, and sometimes fail, to maintain a civil exchange.

Not all the views of Park’s Convention sermon within orthodoxy followed Hodge and Cooke in decrying Park’s methodology as a solvent to faith. For example, the Baptist Christian Review called ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ a ‘discourse of rare eloquence and power’. If its views are ‘bold and startling’, they are also ‘just and sound’, with a tendency ‘to unite the disciples of Christ of every name’. The Review looked to meet with more ‘sermons, breathing the same spirit and possessing the

\textsuperscript{108} Parsons Cooke, ‘Edwards on the Atonement’, ATR 11 (1860), pp. 101, 107, 112. Cooke concludes that, in Park, ‘we have rarely met with an instance, in which so distinguished an author as Edwards had met with so much injustice at the hands of a commentator’ (p. 118).

\textsuperscript{109} EAP, ‘Remarks on the Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review’, BS 8 (1851), pp. 135-140.
same inherent power’. But if Hodge needed any more evidence that in Park’s unsound sermon the subjective ‘theology of the feelings’ had carried the day, he need only have looked to the praise for ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ found in the Unitarian camp. The *Christian Examiner* called the Convention address ‘a most excellent sermon’ in which Park ‘graphically set forth a very simple and universal principle of interpretation; namely, that there are different forms in which the emotions and the intellect express themselves’. The ‘practical lesson’ to be learned from the sermon is that ‘Creeds, as bond of union, are useless…the terminology of theology is the apple of discord’. So broadly approved was Park’s sermon, in this view, that the extremely ‘sensitive olfactories [Sic] of Princeton’ were required ‘to scent, under the perfume of roses, the brimstone of heresy’. The Convention sermon was ‘the most noteworthy contribution which Orthodoxy has made to the literature of New England for the last half-century’. It was a ‘nice piece of tamed Calvinism’, in which Park, ‘as Dr. Hodge shows…commits to the theology of the feelings…the carefully worded intellectual propositions’ which have been ‘selected for catechisms and creeds as gathering up the substance of the manifold and diversified representations of Scripture’. Hodge could scarcely have been reassured by this fulsome praise for Park from the Unitarians: those on Park’s left were happy to reject credal propositions for the sake of spiritual experiences of God.

It is intriguing that Charles Hodge himself later nearly replicated Park’s ‘Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ in the opening chapter of his

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Systematic Theology (1872). After making the case for a Baconian method of theological induction dependent on the Bible’s ‘store-house of facts’, Hodge contained religious enthusiasm in describing scripture’s function as a ‘safeguard and a limit’, so that no principle derived solely from religious experience can be assumed to be ‘intuitively true’ apart from the validating test of conformity to revealed biblical content. This ‘inward teaching or demonstration of the Spirit is confined to truths objectively revealed in the Scriptures’. Nonetheless, Hodge admitted that this same ‘inward teaching of the Spirit, or religious experience’ is ‘an invaluable guide in determining what the rule of faith teaches’. Hodge argues that one distinguishing characteristic of the Augustinian tradition that continued through Calvin was a readiness to allow ‘the inward teaching of the Spirit…its proper place in determining our theology’. The question is not ‘first and mainly, What is true to the understanding, but what is true to the renewed heart?’.

So legitimate and powerful is this inward teaching of the Spirit, that it is no uncommon thing to find men having two theologies,—one of the intellect, and another of the heart. The one may find expression in creeds and systems of divinity, the other in their prayers and hymns. It would be safe for a man to resolve to admit into his theology nothing which is not sustained by the devotional writings of true Christians of every denomination. It would be easy to construct from such writings, received and sanctioned by Romanists, Lutherans, Reformed, and Remonstrants, a system of Pauline or Augustinian theology, such as would satisfy any intelligent and devout Calvinist in the world.

In the context of the issues raised in the Convention sermon, Hodge affirms with Park and Smith that Christian faith has an essential affective element that is filtered through

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scripture and controlled by the intellect, but that it at the same time conditions doctrinal conclusions.

In what ways, then, had evangelical orthodoxy responded to the challenges posed by the new Romantic currents of thought? If Horace Bushnell’s Andover address in 1848 had provoked their responses, Smith’s reply in 1849 and Park’s in 1850 had more in common with each other than either had with Bushnell, and both were closer to Princeton than they were to Hartford. Since arguing for a place for subjective intuition and feelings on Bushnell’s terms meant a rejection of the ability of language to express propositional truth, neither Smith nor Park could be expected to follow him: Bushnell’s proposals on the limitations of language denied the very project of systematic theology as they understood it. Bushnell’s assertion that knowledge gained by intuition was inherently superior to that gained through the intellect made nonsense of Park’s view of reason conditioning emotion or of Smith’s view of philosophy as a full partner to faith. At the same time, though both Park and Smith sought to balance and harmonise subjective expression and objective doctrine—an undertaking Bushnell had lost interest in—it is also true that their approaches to the problem were significantly different. Smith sought unity in the person of Christ, while Park’s reconciliation depended on a rhetorical appreciation for differing modes of expression related to an underlying deposit of truth. Where Smith’s response is essentially Christological, Park’s is fundamentally methodological.

It is interesting to inquire into the extent to which Park’s ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ played a role in a greater accommodation to affective elements of faith as necessitated by the rise of Romanticism. Park’s Convention sermon
was at the centre of a broad consensus among the orthodox that religious experience—not isolated enthusiasms but well-grounded and consistent piety practised within communities of faith over long ages of the Church—had attained a normative value for dogma. Park’s assertion that the facts of religious experience constituted real normative content in refining dogmatic truth was emblematic of the accommodation made by much of evangelicalism to the nineteenth century’s Romantic mood. Park had argued in his Convention sermon that whenever a ‘feeling is constitutional and cannot be expelled, whenever it is pious and cannot but be approved, then such impulses as are uniform, self-consistent and persevering are data on which the intellect may safely reason’. These ‘universal feelings provide us with a test for our own faith’, so that when a preacher’s words do not evoke ‘a responsive choice in the hearts’ of his audience, he has ‘left out of our theology some element which we should have inserted, or have brought into it some element which we should have discarded. Somewhere it must be wrong.’

Park was joined in this broad acceptance of heart-felt experience by Old School Presbyterian William G. T. Shedd. In his History of Doctrine (1889), Shedd asserted that ‘Two equally good men may not be equally successful in describing their own religious experience to others. But the description of the religious experience is substantially a statement of religious doctrine.’ If these men seem to ‘differ as perhaps to lead to the conclusion that they do not believe the same fundamental truth’, in fact their ‘religious experience, which is what God has wrought in them, is the same evangelical experience

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that belongs to all members of the one invisible church of Christ’. It has been seen that New School Presbyterian Smith suggested, similarly, that ‘faith claims an internal evidence, as well as an historical basis….the Christian finds in his own heart a profound experience, which fills and satisfies his soul…and here is another series of facts, reaching across thousands of years’, in which ‘all [believers], with one consent, testify that in this revelation they have found this solace and support’. Princeton’s Old School Presbyterian Hodge argued that the ‘true method in theology requires that the facts of religious experience should be accepted as facts, and when duly authenticated by Scripture’ ought to be ‘allowed to interpret the doctrinal statements of the Word of God’. It is clear that evangelical theologians of many stripes were working to strike the proper balance between propositional doctrinal content and genuine spiritual experience. If one might differ from another in the agreed proportion of influence between these two components, Park, Shedd, Smith and Hodge agreed that the facts of devout spiritual experience constitute an interpretative mass of evidence that conditions biblical dogma. Park’s Convention sermon in 1850—widely admired and widely criticised—was a prominent focal point in this broad, affective amendment to evangelicalism’s Enlightenment identity.

At the same time, it is clear that Park adopted those aspects of Romanticism that were complementary to presuppositions he already held. One might accept the probative value of the theology of the feelings without also rejecting the role that reason played in shaping the theology of the intellect. In fact, it was primarily the aesthetic elements of

Romanticism that proved useful to Park as a complement to his Enlightenment rationalism. When ideality bent toward immaterialism or pantheism, or when intuition and mysticism retreated from defined propositional truth in favour of shapeless and impenetrable mystery, Park resisted the Romantic shift in cultural mood that Marsh and Bushnell embraced. It is certainly true that ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ possessed formal similarities to contemporary efforts to incorporate affective elements into the theological enterprise. As suggested in Chapter One, D. G. Hart and others have seen the Convention sermon primarily as an incorporation of German ideas mediated by Bushnell.119 But Bushnell’s assertion that ‘in the matter of Christian doctrine, or Christian theology, we are found committing ourselves most unsuspectingly to language and logic, as if the instrument were sufficient, and the method infallible’, is fundamentally at odds with Park’s confidence in the ability of his British methodological-epistemological nexus of empiricism, induction, natural theology, and common sense realism to define truth propositionally.120 To read the Convention sermon as Park’s own Romantic, proto-liberal manifesto is to ignore the great distance that remained between him and Bushnell philosophically and theologically, and to forget that much of the methodological or modal aspects of the sermon had long been a feature of Park’s apologetic and homiletical instruction.121


121 Bruce Kuklick observes that ‘Park probably intended to meet Bushnell half-way’ but ‘in basing his views on a theology of the intellect, he assumed what Bushnell denied’; see Kuklick, Churchmen and Philosophers, p. 210.
At the least, the ‘Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ was a significant voice from the centre of orthodoxy that embodied and promoted an adjustment in the direction of the evangelical mainstream in response to challenges from Romantic conceptions of genuine spirituality.\textsuperscript{122} Even Charles Hodge admitted that Park’s Convention sermon ‘was listened to with unbounded admiration’, so that ‘the fame of [it] has gone through the land’.\textsuperscript{123} The \textit{Christian Review} observed that Park’s address had ‘been sought for with an eagerness which is seldom awakened by a production of this kind, and has been read with the deepest interest by Christian people in all parts of the land’.\textsuperscript{124} No less a figure than Daniel Webster wrote to Park to ‘say how highly I esteem it’, that ‘in shewing how Biblical expressions, apparently contradictory, are yet consistent; and how sensibility and religious emotion may be excited without violence to philosophical truth’, Park had rendered ‘real service, not only to all Biblical students, but to all Christians’.\textsuperscript{125} Clearly, the ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ was a powerful apologetic device—able to incorporate a Romantic and feminine sensibility of the heart without sacrificing manly doctrinal precision, able to recover and emphasise an underlying unity in orthodoxy, able to preserve the relevance of its gospel message in providing a mechanism to address changing notions of taste and respectability in its audience.\textsuperscript{126} In these ways the address made a significant contribution to meeting

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\item[\textsuperscript{123}] CH, ‘The Theology of the Intellect and that of the Feelings’, pp. 645, 646.
\item[\textsuperscript{124}] Sewall S. Cutting, ‘Notice of New Publications’, p. 637.
\item[\textsuperscript{125}] Daniel Webster to EAP, 20 June 1850, cited in EAP, \textit{Memorial Collection of Sermons}, p. 74.
\item[\textsuperscript{126}] Park argued in ‘The Duties of a Theologian’ (an oration given at Dartmouth College in 1839) that a minister, that ‘most useful of public servants’, ought to have sufficient theological knowledge to discriminate between essential doctrine and ‘refined speculation’, but also must learn ‘to associate his doctrines more intimately with what is delicate and refined in taste, comely, humane and magnanimous in sentiment’; EAP, ‘The Duties of a Theologian’, pp. 349, 369.
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the new demand imposed by a Romantic sensibility on evangelical orthodoxy—the requirement that, as Park suggested, ‘we discern the necessity of right feeling as a guide to the right proportions of faith’.\textsuperscript{127}

Edwards A. Park’s famed distinction between the theology of the intellect and the theology of the feelings was a flexible rhetorical device able to suggest an underlying unity in orthodoxy that spanned a breadth of theological opinion. Nevertheless, the harmonious balances of Park’s Convention sermon should not mask the fact that pointed arguments for a very particular theology were embedded in the sermon’s mellifluous exposition and appended notes. ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ provided tools for Park’s redaction of an Edwardsean Calvinism that served his own polemical ends.¹ At the height of his reputation and influence in the decade of the 1850s and in the early 1860s, Park deployed all the weapons at his disposal in an extended theological offensive mounted from his imposing salient on Andover Hill.

In a series of articles in the Bibliotheca Sacra, in lengthy biographical memoirs and in extended historical essays, Park defined a streamlined Hopkinsian exercise line as the ‘Calvinism in an improved form’ that he was ready to defend against all comers—not ‘improved’ in the sense of ‘discover[ing] principles which were never thought of before’.

but ‘improved’ in the sense that the New England divines ‘have brought out into bold relief the obscurer faith of good men of all ages’. The content of New England theology was the old truths in which pious men had always believed—but the old truths required re-discovery and were subject to fresh arrangement in every new age. Importantly, Park perceives the core New England theology in a dual sense: it has always existed as the substratum of the ‘great truths [which] are the common faith of the church’, but at the same time it is improved by every generation for the sake of the next. Park insisted that both ‘Edwards and Hopkins reiterated their wish and hope, that their successors would add to the improvements which the Genevan faith had already received’. Park himself received with his Hopkinsian inheritance the obligation to find fresh restatement for it in order to preserve and extend its influence and usefulness.

Each phase in this iterative process required a set of tools, described by Park in the Convention sermon as ‘the theology of the intellect’ and ‘the theology of the feelings’. The theologian assembles a structure of truth that coheres in its ‘self-consistency’ according to the common sense tests of equity and reasonableness, and then employs the tools of rhetoric to express such right doctrine in a manner fitted to the taste and temper of the day. In this dual action, the ‘New England system…is scriptural science’—first, because ‘it has developed its scientific temper in systematizing old truths’, and secondly, by ‘its accordance with the sensibilities of our race, it authorizes an intelligent use of the tropes which those sensibilities demand; demand not as faded, but as rhetorical figures’. Edwards Park undertook ‘as homage to our fathers’ memory’ a

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restatement of the New England theology for the middle of the nineteenth century that engaged all his skills as preacher, teacher, rhetorician and systematic theologian.4

In Park’s reconstruction, his New England theology described a line from Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) through Joseph Bellamy (1719-1790) and Samuel Hopkins (1721-1803) to Jonathan Edwards, Jr, (1745-1801) and Nathanael Emmons (1745-1840), among many others—a stream with its source in historic Calvinism but now quickened by successive ‘improvements’ on Edwards. This industrious, interconnected coterie of Edwards’s closest disciples was ‘employed in straightening the crooked parts of Calvinism’, while retaining ‘all its theories which could be made to hold together’. Thus, in Park’s words, ‘the substance of our theology is Calvinistic; here it is old. Much of its self-consistency is Edwardean and Hopkinsian; here it is new.’5

The term ‘New England theology’ was itself particularly useful, as it was (in Joseph Conforti’s phrase) ‘simultaneously historical and imprecise’—able to confer a historicity that authenticated Park’s own synthesis but also spacious enough to incorporate new or otherwise unalloyed apologetic elements.6 Princeton’s Lyman Atwater (1813-1883) complained in 1858 that ‘the various speculative systems that have, or have had, currency in New England, under the title of the New Divinity’ now used ‘the still more conveniently respectable but indefinite designation of New England theology’.7 Park’s genetic history of

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4 EAP, ‘New England Theology’, pp. 185, 211, 220.
Edwardseanism was thus simultaneously disarming competing canonical narratives with its inclusiveness while staking out a particularly delineated quarter of orthodoxy.

Edwards Park did not publish a systematic theology of his own, yet in his thirty-four years in the Abbot chair at Andover he taught hundreds of seminarians an Edwardsean Calvinism clarified by the improvements of his New Divinity forefathers. Park’s instruction followed closely the logic by which traditional aspects of Calvinism were modified in the anti-antinomian spirit of the exercise scheme associated with Samuel Hopkins and Nathanael Emmons. For example, the imputation of Christ’s righteousness to the believer as an accomplished fact appeared to release men from the demands of God’s law. Park observed that if ‘Christ obeyed the law for us, then there is no need of our obeying it for ourselves’. The New Divinity clerics almost universally rejected the traditional doctrine of imputation because of this antinomian hazard. Park was careful to correct any impression of moral laxity: ‘Christ’s obedience does not consist in his literally obeying the law for us, so that his obedience may be imputed to us.‘

God had not suspended the demands of his law—he could not do that because of his own moral character—but he had assured that, in Bellamy’s words, ‘the law is exactly upon a level with our natural capacities: it only requires us to love God with all our

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heart’. Thus, every moral agent is both required and able to honour God’s law, and can take no refuge in imputed righteousness. Park’s own extant lecture notes and the surviving transcriptions of his lectures by his students testify to the close correspondence between Park’s views and the anti-antinomian Hopkinsian exercise line—it was this particular Edwardsean inheritance that Park promoted from his lecture room in Andover’s Bartlet Chapel.

The appeal for Park in Hopkinsianism was that Hopkins in effect removed the necessitarian obloquy from Edwards’s determinism and so rehabilitated Edwardsean Calvinism for a dynamic and voluntarist national culture. In Park’s words, ‘he ever attempted to show that his doctrines were fair as well as true’, showing ‘the entire rectitude of the divine government’. Who cannot ‘delight too much in a sovereignty which is congenial to equity’? Hopkins was accused of being ‘abstract’, but in fact his ‘general aim was practical and benevolent’, intending to demonstrate that man’s obedience was ‘a reasonable duty’. Park told his seminarians that it was ‘absolutely blasphemous to suppose that God comes to me and says: thou shalt do a thing which is utterly impossible to you or thou shalt be punished with everlasting agony’. If ‘any man should require us to use our corporeal powers in such a way, we should say he was a tyrant…and no human subject would submit to it’. Whether God or man asks us to do the impossible, ‘we have a moral instinct which pronounces such a requisition absolutely

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9 Joseph Bellamy, True Religion Delineated; or, Experimental Religion Distinguished from Formality on the One Hand and Enthusiasm on the Other, in two discourses, by Joseph Bellamy, D.D., Minister of the Gospel at Bethlehem in Connecticut (Glasgow: Lochhead, 1828), p. 91.
absurd’. That we ‘are able to do all that we are under obligation to do is a self-evident truth involved in the very nature of moral obligation and moral government’.  

Hopkins’s doctrine (in Park’s reconstruction) can be expressed in clear and simple terms for a lay audience: that ‘God ought to be a Sovereign, and, therefore, is one; that his decrees are amiable, and, therefore, we ought to acquiesce in them...that his law is level to our natural power, and, therefore, ought to be obeyed forthwith’.  

To ‘love the government of God supremely’ is the ‘first, immediate, the fair, the reasonable duty of all moral agents’. Therefore, ‘the Hopkinsian scheme is the only one that preserves God’s sovereignty and the demands of his law, with man’s free agency and moral responsibility’. It is ‘the only one that connects a genuine proclamation of the gospel message to all with the practical effect of requiring active repentance on the part of every hearer’. For this reason, Park, writing to the historian George Bancroft in 1859, remarked that ‘I am more convinced that Hopkins was a great man, that he had great influence over Edwards, and that in many respects he is of more historical importance than any other American divine, unless Pres. Edwards himself be excepted’.  

Hopkinsianism was the shape of Edwardsean Calvinism best adapted to the new world of nineteenth-century evangelicalism because it preserved God’s sovereignty and man’s

moral responsibility in a manner that met the contemporary tests of equity and reasonableness.

Two years after Park’s much admired lecture in Boston, in the last projectile to be launched from the Bibliotheca Sacra in his skirmish with Princeton’s Charles Hodge over ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’, Park was ready to describe in detail this representative ‘New England Theology’ in an article of the same name.\(^1\) If the theology had been called by different names at different times—‘New-light Divinity’, ‘New Divinity’, ‘Edwardean’, ‘Hopkinsian’, ‘Berkshire’ or ‘American’ divinity—the term, New England Theology…signifies the formal creed which a majority of the most eminent theologians in New England have explicitly or implicitly sanctioned, during and since the time of Edwards’. This core of truth by definition ‘includes not the peculiarities in which Edwards differed…nor the peculiarities in which any of his followers differed’, but it ‘comprehends the principles, with their logical sequences, which the greater number of our most celebrated divines have approved’. Although they ‘did not harmonize on every theme…a decided majority’ held to ‘three radical principles, that sin consists in choice, that our natural power equals, and that it also limits, our duty’.\(^2\) Moral responsibility flows from the free choices that moral agents make regarding obedience to God’s law. Each man has the natural power to perform his duty, for otherwise God would not require it. Thus, it is ‘the common remark of the Edwardean school, that men have no inability to repent except their unwillingness, and this unwillingness is a sin, and sin is a voluntary act’. The ‘truth which has been so clearly unfolded by the New England

divines’, so ‘that it properly belongs to their distinctive system’, is that ‘an entirely depraved man has a natural power to do all that is required of him’. This is the ‘far-famed “natural ability” of the Edwardean school’. Man’s moral failure is not a lack of ability but a lack of willingness, and for that he is judged entirely culpable and without excuse.

The operative principle to which the New England theology always returned was a preservation of moral accountability for the individual: only an assertion of natural ability cured Calvinism’s old antinomian fault. To the degree that notions of ‘taste’ or ‘nature’ suggest an inherited inclination or disposition to sin that relieves the human agent of responsibility for his own actions, the terms must be rejected. Emmons proposed that, if ‘divine agency consist wholly in volition, then human agency must wholly consist in volition’, that is, ‘merely in volition or choice’. Man’s ‘free, voluntary, moral agency consists in the mere exercise of his will’. Park, too, suggests that moral qualities lie exclusively in volition, because if the ‘will is the power of choosing’, then ‘free moral agency consists in choosing’. Man’s moral agency is simply a function of the choices that the will freely makes. It follows, then, that if total depravity required that ‘all of man’s voluntary preferences are entirely sinful,’ sin may be properly defined as

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‘voluntary action in view of the Law’—sin is the exercise by fallen moral agents of free choice to disobey God’s law.\textsuperscript{20}

In asserting the active nature of sin and virtue, Hopkinsianism avoided descriptions of total depravity that sounded as if the sinner found himself in a pre-existing and irremediable condition for which he bore no responsibility. Park denies that sin can be ‘said to consist in the state—the original tendency of the being’. The exercise line depends on the ‘general proposition…that total depravity [is] not to be ascribed to a disordered state of mind [or] nature…antecedent to voluntary acts’.\textsuperscript{21} If, as Park lectured his students, ‘moral agency does consist in the choice or refusal of that which conscience approves or condemns’, it cannot ‘consist in the antecedents of choice’.\textsuperscript{22} Since ‘there is no morally corrupt nature distinct from free, voluntary, sinful exercises’, the unregenerate sinner is again without excuse before God’s law—if all ‘sin is in the sinning’, to use Emmons’s famed aphorism, and not in anything before, every man is entirely responsible for his own actions.\textsuperscript{23} In any case, for Emmons, ‘it is impossible to conceive of a corrupt and sinful nature prior to, and distinct from, corrupt and sinful exercises’.\textsuperscript{24} The traditional notion of total depravity must be carefully fenced in to prevent it appearing as a loophole for the unrepentant.

Other aspects of Calvinism were subject to modification by this absolute requirement of moral accountability. For example, the historic Reformed doctrine that


\textsuperscript{22} [EAP,] Guild, ‘Notes’, vol. III, p. 223.


God in his sovereignty acted monergistically and graciously to regenerate the elect required some adjustment. According to Park, ‘regeneration…introduces a change in [man’s] acts, preferences, and choices’. The ‘most important part of regeneration’ is that it ‘is an entirely voluntary change from entirely sinful action to holy action’. 25 Hopkins had differentiated between regeneration by God’s sovereign act of grace and conversion by the moral agent’s active choice of the good, but Emmons was unwilling to give sinners even this much room—for they might rest in antinomian slumber until the arrival of God’s grace. It may be true that ‘the divine agency is concerned in the renovation of the heart, yet this does by no means destroy the activity of sinners’. 26 Park followed Emmons in being ‘impatient with fine distinctions’. To insist on this separation between regeneration and conversion, if regeneration is ‘something anterior to moral acts,—conveys the impression that men may wait until they are changed’. Many are waiting’, and this response is demonstrably ‘not a safe impression’. Regeneration ‘should be used in its comprehensive sense as including moral acts’. 27 If the old notion of regeneration was complicit in producing moral laxity, if must be adjusted to conform to the strict demands of moral agency.

The exercisers can give only so much ground for the sake of fellowship: Park wrote in 1851 that ‘there is, lying back of our sinful choices and occasioning them, a disordered state of the sensibilities, or an involuntary corruption’—a clear nod to those who presumed that a sinful disposition or inclination or ‘taste’ must be the result of all

27 EAP, ‘Atonement’ [n.p.]; see also [EAP.] Ropes, ‘Lectures’, vol. I, p. 342: Park argues here (following Emmons) that ‘Regeneration and Conversion are inseparable from each other in point of time’, and so do not represent a meaningful distinction.
men falling in Adam. But Park was also clear that ‘Calvinism and Hopkinsianism coalesce in denying the criminality of any state which does not involve our choice’. In his summary statement in ‘New England Theology’ in 1852, Park concluded that if—with Emmons—’all sin consists in sinning’ and ‘if there can be no involuntary sinful act, there can be no involuntary sinful nature’. To the extent that ‘taste’ implied a sinful condition that preceded choice, it would always appear to exercisers as unduly amenable to moral negligence. Edwards Park challenged the tasters: ‘Change the sensibilities as you please, this way or that, a man never will be saved or lost by a change of sensibilities merely; but act right, and you will be saved; act wrong and you will be lost.’ Every traditional line in Reformed theology must be bent by the magnetic pole of human moral accountability.

It was not enough for Park simply to reproduce the theological substance of his inherited Edwardsean Calvinism as delineated by the Hopkinsian exercise line. If Park’s beloved body of doctrine was to become entirely ‘self-consistent’ Calvinism, it required some trimming and shaping by a redactor’s hand. After all, it was the product of strong and opinionated men, forged in theological trench warfare and not intended to be refined for some pristine treatise. Its form needed arrangement if its substance were to meet the test of consistency, and so gain the influence that it deserved in the larger evangelical world. It has been seen in Chapter Four that Park—both rhetorician and theologian, both a preacher to preachers and a self-conscious historian—had declared as early as 1837 that

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if ‘theology is concerned with the essence of Christian doctrine…sacred rhetoric is concerned with the manner in which this doctrine should be presented’. By the time of the Convention sermon in 1850, Park had a powerful shaping tool at hand. The intellect and feelings distinction would be used primarily to establish proper forms of expression. The New Divinity clerics, for example, generally rejected the suggestion that Christ had paid a debt at Calvary for sinners. Emmons asserted that ‘sinners who suppose that Christ…by his perfect obedience paid the full debt of obedience they owe to God’ assume ‘that they are no longer bound to obey the precepts, nor exposed to suffer the penalty’. The threat of antinomianism required that phrases suggesting Christ’s payment of debt be scrupulously avoided. The theology of the intellect, which ‘insists on…preciseness’ and words that are ‘exactly defined’, would ‘never suggest the unqualified remark that Christ has fully paid the debt of sinners, for it declares that this debt may justly be claimed from them’. Instead, it ‘teaches that this punishment may still be righteousness inflicted on themselves; nor that he has entirely satisfied the law, for it insists that the demands of the law are yet in force’. In the notes appended to the Convention sermon, Park quotes Edwards, Jr, that ‘Christ has not in the literal and proper sense paid the debt for us’, because such expressions are, in Park’s words, ‘metaphorical expressions, and therefore not literally and exactly true’.

of the intellect could see through the ‘emotive theology’ of metaphor and feelings to the true doctrine underneath.\footnote{EAP, ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’, p. 537.}

The usefulness of the Convention sermon’s methodology extended to other important clarifications of potentially misleading statements. If Hopkins and ‘and a few others in New England, have sanctioned the phraseology that God is the author of our wickedness….this does not express, without much qualification, the real philosophy of our writers who employ it’. Such a phrase ‘has recommended itself to them by its \textit{strength}, and not by philosophical exactness’.\footnote{EAP, ‘New England Theology’, p. 189, note 2 [emphasis in original].} The theology of the feelings allowed for strong if inexact expressions for the purpose of emphasis. If Edwardseans wished to emphasise God’s sovereignty and the absolute authority of his decrees, but had ‘contradicted themselves with regard to the divine agency in producing sin’, the intellect and feelings dichotomy made it clear that such ‘intense expressions of a profound truth’ were in the same class of expression as the ‘fervid words of inspired prophets’, and were not to be used ‘like the exact phrases of a metaphysical creed’.\footnote{EAP, ‘New England Theology’, p. 187.} The Convention sermon helped Park craft a seamless theological garment.

A special problem for Park occurred when Jonathan Edwards himself appeared to use terms that were in conflict with his formulation of the New England theology. One signal characteristic of the theology of the intellect was that ‘it insists on the nice proportions of doctrine, and on preciseness of both thought and style. Its words are so exactly defined, its adjustments are so accurate, that no caviller can detect an ambiguous,
mystical or incoherent sentence’.\textsuperscript{38} Park suggested that Edwards ‘intends sometimes to use his terms not in their stricter, but in their looser sense’, so that there is a potential confusion between a term used in ‘its precise and in its general meaning’.\textsuperscript{39} Unfortunately, Edwards ‘did not always employ the terms in such a wide acceptation’ and therefore ‘fell into apparent self-contradictions’. His ‘general remarks…must be compared with the more particular statements’. Park laments the fact that Edwards ‘so often used language in its looser sense, and then exchanged the vague for the exact terminology’, because in so doing he ‘tempted opposing parties to claim him as their champion’. Edwards’s followers thus ‘learned the importance of adhering more uniformly to a restricted and an exact meaning of technical words’.\textsuperscript{40} Only when ‘the theology of the intellect and that of feelings tend to keep each other within the sphere for which they were respectively designed’ did one have theological science—even the sainted Edwards was not exempt from this precept.\textsuperscript{41}

Jonathan Edwards was stubbornly capable of perfectly traditional language on imputation and justification: ‘Christ’s perfect obedience shall be reckoned to our account, so that we shall have the benefit of it, as though we had performed it ourselves’; ‘our Judge cannot justify us, unless he sees a perfect righteousness, in some way belonging to us, either performed by ourselves, or by another, and justly and duly reckoned to our account’; ‘Salvation is an absolute debt to the believer from God, so that he may in justice demand and challenge it’, not on ‘the account of what he himself has done, but

\textsuperscript{40} EAP, ‘Introductory Essay’, in \textit{The Atonement}, pp. xxv, xxxi [emphasis in original].
upon the account of what his Surety has done”; ‘it is but a piece of justice that the creditor should release the debtor, when he has fully paid the debt’.42 Park the redactor must make the most of ‘brief modifying phrases’ found in Edwards which ‘relieve his bolder statements from the objections originally suggested by them’. If Park can ferret out the hints and show that Edwards appends such phrases to otherwise traditional doctrinal formulations, Park is satisfied that ‘such qualifying words denote that his original terms are not to taken in their strict and precise meaning’.43

Edwards, of course, not only furnishes language that must be finessed, he also fails to supply language that is hoped for. For example, despite including great swathes of Edwards’s writing in a collection of essays on the atonement published in 1859, Park labours for almost thirty pages with the problem that Edwards’s references to a governmental theory are sparse and fairly oblique.44 This is awkward in that the New Divinity clerics and Park himself almost universally endorsed a governmental model of the atonement because it cured the antinomian faults attributed to a substitutionary atonement and its associated imputed righteousness. Moreover, the conservatives at Princeton were quick to seize any opportunity to show that the New England theology misrepresented Edwards. Lyman Atwater argued in the Biblical Repertory in 1858 that ‘no improvements of New England theology have been more vaunted’ than those regarding ‘the penal nature of Christ’s sufferings, the imputation of his righteousness to believers, [and] of their sin or guilt to him’. The New Englanders boast ‘of having cleared theology of these perplexities and incumbrances. But it is quite certain that Edwards

strenuously maintained and defended them. Thus, Jonathan Edwards’s use of traditional language provided an important competitive advantage for Princeton, and as such presented a significant challenge to Edwards Park’s exegetical skills.

Park would go so far as to acknowledge that Jonathan Edwards made remarks in his ‘enigmatical Treatise on Original Sin’ that appear to support the traditional doctrine of imputation, though ‘wrongly imputing to him the error, that sin lies in something besides moral agency’. Clearly, Edwards’s Original Sin might add significantly to Princeton’s side of the ledger if it could be shown to support innate depravity. Atwater maintained that the principle ‘that dispositions to sin or holiness, are themselves sinful or holy, is constantly maintained in the treatise on Original Sin’. Of course, no Hopkinsian could allow sin to be resident in a merely passive state, and Park laboured mightily to cast doubt on the consistency of Original Sin with the rest of Edwards’s work. Park believed that the treatise sounded ‘alien’ or incongruous’ when compared to the ‘spirit of New England divinity’ and to ‘the prevailing style of Edwards himself’. Original Sin gave evidence of ‘hurried composition’ in the midst of ‘Indian wars’ and ‘ill health’. It is likely that Edwards would have ‘explained a few remarks’ and eliminated ‘some verbal incongruities’ were ‘it not for his sudden decease’. Even Edwards was capable of ‘intense expressions’ that were misleading when interpreted as if they were the precise doctrinal

statements of the theology of the intellect, and not duly recognized as the emotive theology of the feelings.  

Park finds a solution to the impolitic language of the treatise in Edwards’s view of mankind’s unity in Adam. This organic tie explains references that might otherwise have suggested that ‘an evil disposition…which precedes our own personal action’ is ‘itself not only sin but also a consequence of the imputation of Adam’s sin’. Instead, ‘the derivation of the evil disposition to the hearts of Adam’s posterity…implied in Adam’s first rebellion, in the root and branches, is a consequence of the union, that the wise Author of the world has established between Adam and his posterity’, but is not ‘properly a consequence of the imputation of his sin’. Every man sins in consequence of Adam’s fall because of our organic unity with him, as Edwards has detailed, but this is not the same at all as sinning because Adam’s own sin is reckoned to us in the traditional sense of imputation: each man is always responsible only for his own sin. Park uses Edwards’s doctrine of our oneness in Adam to give a context for Edwards’s lapse into ‘intense expressions’ and so is able to nudge even Original Sin into the main New Divinity line. It is likely that Princeton was unimpressed with Park’s manoeuvre.

It has been seen in Chapter Four that Park allowed that a careful use of the intellect and feelings distinction might be employed for the sake of emphasis, if one wished to overstate a particular truth as a corrective. Park had asserted in his Convention sermon that one aim of the theology of the feelings is ‘to arrest attention’ by straining a

51 EAP, ‘New England Theology’, p. 206 [emphasis in original].
word ‘to its utmost significance [sic].’  

Emmons, for example, might seem to say that God’s absolute divine efficiency made God the direct cause of every evil act. Park shows that when Emmons overstated direct divine efficiency he meant to use ‘the word efficient as denoting independent’, to show that all subsequent choices ‘absolutely depend on the first external choice of the First Cause’. If Emmons underplayed second causes, it was for genuine didactic purposes: Park cites Emmons’s assertion that ‘God employs so many secondary causes in bestowing blessings upon mankind, that men are extremely apt to overlook the primary and supreme Cause from which they flow’. Park comments that Emmons ‘chose to say but little of the Natural Forces, lest he should withdraw attention from the Supreme Dominion of Jehovah’. If an ‘objector’ were to ask, for example, if such a use of the word efficient is ‘plain and exact’, Park answers: ‘It is more intense than plain. It is more emphatic than exact.’ Park admits that Emmons has ‘a fondness for expressing his opinions in a style which can never subject him to the charge of aiming at popularity, of prophesying smooth things, of polishing away the corners of any triangle or hexagon’. Emmons’s style can be validated if one keeps in mind the capacity for emphatic purpose built into the theology of the feelings.

It was possible, alternatively, for emphatic speech to flow from an abundance of strong religious emotion. If Hopkins had overreached himself in his descriptions of God’s sovereignty and his hatred of sin—the famous willingness to be damned for the glory of

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God—this was really no more than an emotive expression of Hopkins’s great love and regard for God’s majesty: Park finds a ‘striking resemblance between the feelings of Dr. Hopkins and the feelings of Fenelon, Madame Guion, and many other mystics, with regard to the endurance of pain for the divine glory’. If, too, Hopkins had overstated the principle that sin was allowed for the greater good of the universe, it was ‘not from the impulses of a merely metaphysical theory, but from a heart panting for solace from the afflictions that result in sin’. Hopkins’s theology grew from a real world of earnest revival preaching and from his deep-seated love for God. The precise theology of the intellect could not always restrain the expressive ardour of the theology of the feelings.

The greatest exegetical credit that can be given to the intellect and feelings distinction is to show that it functions precisely as scripture does. Park describes the New England theology as a ‘comprehensive system of Biblical science’. All its great divines were deeply attached to scripture, and as theological scientists were able to distinguish between the Bible’s ‘poetry and eloquence’ that ‘pertain to the form of presentation suited to earnest feeling’ on one hand, and ‘true theories’ on the other. The ‘rare merit of the New England system’ was precisely this ‘scriptural science’ that looked ‘through the metonymy and the hyperbole of oriental expression’ and seized the ‘true thought’ behind it. Park asserts that Samuel Hopkins’s great attachment to the Bible had the practical effect of exposing ‘himself to much obloquy, by adhering to the forms of utterance which he found in the bold appeals of inspired men’. Hopkins might have ‘avoided many

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censures, if he had couched his ideas in other phrases. But no. His bold utterance, in following the poetic forms of the biblical prophets, led to the ‘charge of hyper-Calvinism’, but this was suggested, in Park’s view, ‘by his diction more than by his meaning’. Similarly, Nathanael Emmons’s commitment to scripture tended to lead him toward emphatic and prophetic claims that may not have met strict doctrinal standards. Park suggests that Emmons ‘deemed it his duty to employ the sublime words of Jewish poets in the prosaic statements of Christian doctrine’. Although Park admires Emmons for modelling the ‘manner’ in ‘which uninspired reasoners should employ…the overwhelming poetry and oriental idioms of inspiration’, he admits that he ‘does not agree…to the wisdom of adopting the poetical phrases of inspired men as the common nomenclature of scientific theology’. It was essential that the theology of the intellect and of the feelings operate within their own proper spheres—even the understanding of scripture was not exempt from the necessity of distinguishing properly between modes of expression.

The theology of the feelings may properly express righteous anger, as when we ‘are roused’ by the ‘odious, loathsome’ quality of sin to pronounce our fallen nature (which merely ‘occasions a man’s first actual sin’) as itself ‘sinful’. We may ‘thus earnestly reprobate it’, as long as we do not insist on interpreting sinful as ‘scientific language’. We may ‘in fact apply any epithet whatever to our inborn, involuntary corruption, provided that this epithet express our dread or hatred of it’, and not ‘require our belief that a passive condition, previous to all active disobedience, is itself deserving

of punishment’. With the proper qualifications, then, the common ground of emphatic pious feeling clears the way for a Hopkinsian exerciser like Park to come alongside a devotee of the taste scheme—those who believed that sinfulness proceeded from a native depraved disposition or ‘taste’—as long as all parties recognise the proper boundary for their particular order of truth. Each party will never ‘find peace until they confine their intellect to its rightful sphere and understand it according to what it says, and their feeling to its province and interpret its language according to what it means’. 64 The distinction between the theology of the intellect and that of the feelings defines a formal area of reconciliation where genuine, precise, consistent doctrinal truth, ‘unmodified by excitements of feeling’, may meet emphatic, religious expression that is ‘too buoyant, too earnest…to compress itself into sharply drawn angles’. 65 A positive application of the theology of the feelings is the suggestion that religious zeal is capable of leading to a modest reconciliation of opposing doctrinal factions.

The intellect and feeling distinction was broadly applied by Edwards Park in a variety of ways in shaping and smoothing a sometimes unruly New England theology. It could be used to establish doctrinal parameters and clarify potentially misleading phrases; it could be employed tactically to give emphasis to a particular truth or be a vehicle for profound emotion in the manner of the scriptures. In the construction of the New England theology, Edwards Park had a multi-faceted tool at his disposal. However, there were times when he took another approach—if the Edwardsean divines disagreed amongst themselves and no methodology was capacious enough to restrain them, Park make a

64 EAP, ‘The Theology of the Intellect and that of the Feelings’, pp. 554-555 [emphasis in original].
New England virtue out of a necessity. He described such contradictions as having grown from a tradition of rugged, independent thought: ‘There has never been a more independent class of thinkers than our Edwardean theologians.’66 Did not Edwards himself, while declaring that his ‘principles were Calvinistic’, deign to call ‘no man father’? The New England theologians benefitted from ‘free inquiry’ and ‘lived under a free government in church and state’—after all, when it was ‘embraced by Andrew Fuller, Dr. Ryland, Robert Hall, Sutcliffe, Carey, Jay and Erskine, it was called American theology’.67 The theology of the intellect and of the feelings can do only so much smoothing: Park declares that the rough texture and jagged edges of Edwardsean thought are, like the region’s omnipresent granite outcroppings, part of the New England landscape.

Edwards Amasa Park’s unsurpassed familiarity with the primary texts of New England theology gave him a significant competitive advantage over those who, like Princeton’s Old Calvinists, would attempt to define that tradition differently but who lacked Park’s encyclopaedic knowledge. Park’s intimacy with the unpublished works and correspondence of Jonathan Edwards and his disciples gave him access to an essentially oral tradition that he would used to establish the legitimacy of his particular historical narrative. This strategy had an important advantage over the intellect and feelings distinction—it was virtually unassailable. Park’s strategy depended in turn on the intimacy of Edwards, Bellamy and particularly Hopkins with each other and then with the

interrelated body of disciples they instructed in the Edwardsean schools of the preachers. In this bout for the prize of Edwards’s mantle, Park’s comprehensive interpretation of his Edwardsean heritage depended less on his exegetical wizardry and rhetorical sleight-of-hand than on an historian’s intimacy with his sources.

It is no surprise that Jonathan Edwards is again the theological touchstone from whom authority is derived: ‘Edwards often affirms that we have power commensurate with duty’; ‘Edwards affirms that the race have as real a natural ability as they ever had’; ‘And does not Edwards often say, that affections “are only certain modes of the exercise of the will?”’. But Park does not rely on Edwards alone to mark a line of influence. Samuel Hopkins serves as the vital link between Edwards and Bellamy on the one hand and the next generations of Edwardseans on the other, deriving his unique authority from his intimacy with Edwards and leaving his own distinctive ‘exercise’ cast on those who followed him. Park describes Hopkins as ‘the beloved pupil of the first President Edwards, and through life, was the most confidential of his friends; was with him in sickness and in health, in the house and on journeys, by day and often by night’. He was ‘an adviser and more than a brother to Bellamy…the teacher and a spiritual father of the younger Edwards, West, Spring, and he was an intimate friend of Emmons’. Hopkins ‘serves…as a commune vinculum between the elder Edwards and Bellamy on the one

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69 Stephen West (1735-1813) succeeded Jonathan Edwards in Stockbridge, was instructed by Bellamy and Hopkins and was a friend of Edwards, Jr, Smalley and Emmons. His ‘Essay on the Scripture Doctrine of the Atonement’ (1785) was an early expression of the New Divinity theory of a governmental atonement. See the section on West in EAP, ‘Introductory Essay’, in The Atonement, pp. lxxix-xcvii.
70 Samuel Spring (1746-1819) was instructed by Bellamy, Hopkins and West, and was a brother-in-law to Emmons. Spring was influential in shifting the efforts to begin a seminary in Newburyport, Massachusetts, to Andover; see Henry K. Rowe, History of Andover Theological Seminary (Boston: Thomas Todd Company, 1933), pp. 2-3.
hand’ and the ‘choir leaders’ of the ‘Exercise Scheme’ on the other’.\textsuperscript{71} Sometimes this familial scheme is surprisingly domestic. Park demonstrates that Hopkins, the frequent houseguest of President Edwards, had access to the wisdom of Mrs Edwards as well. Park connects the famous ‘willingness to be damned’ Hopkinsian trope to a conversation between Hopkins and Sarah Edwards.\textsuperscript{72}

In his efforts to demonstrate that one of the signal Hopkinsian ‘improvements’ on Edwards—the rejection of the ‘use of means in the impenitent state’—was actually ‘a logical result of the President himself’, Park takes pains to show that Hopkins had unique access to an oral tradition rooted in his closeness to Edwards.\textsuperscript{73} If Princeton argued that Edwards’s ‘Dissertation on the Nature of True Virtue’\textsuperscript{74} was misappropriated by the Hopkinsian exercisers as a utilitarian work, Park could sensibly ask how it was possible for Hopkins of all men to misunderstand the text: ‘It was probably the theme of frequent conferences with Hopkins….Edwards was accustomed to subject all his work to the criticism of Hopkins, his nearest clerical neighbour for seven years, and to follow that great man’s advice’.\textsuperscript{75} If Hopkins had not ‘more fully than any other man, comprehended [Edwards’s] principles, he must have been singularly obtuse’, for ‘he was far more conversant than any other man with their author, when he first developed them; he aided in that development; his suggestive mind was often consulted and confided in by their

\textsuperscript{71} EAP, ‘New England Theology’, p. 175.
\textsuperscript{75} EAP, ‘New England Theology’, pp. 197-198, note 4. Park observes here that the ‘Dissertation on True Virtue’ was ‘written with far more care than [Edwards’s] treatise on Original Sin’—the latter the work better loved by Princeton; see ‘New England Theology’, p. 197, note 4; and see the discussion earlier in this chapter, pp. 187-191.
author’. After Edwards’s death Hopkins ‘devoted the study of years’ to Edwards’s doctrines; he saw them in their practical workings; he learned them by living them’. For Park, ‘Hopkins was better prepared than any other man to interpret the writings of his teacher’. He was ‘the companion in whom Edwards confided more than in any other man, and it was Hopkins who first published some of President Edwards’s most decisive statements on the Atonement’. Similarly, Park observed that the ‘Treatise of Bellamy [True Religion Delineated] was read to Hopkins, and approved by him before its publication, and was often quoted by him confidingly afterward’. Samuel Hopkins’s personal access to the very men who originally inspired the New Divinity improvements is a unique weapon that Park may deploy.

Hopkins is invaluable to Park in second sense: if he provides a link that looks back to Edwards and Bellamy, he also looks forward to Edwards, Jr, and Emmons: ‘As Hopkins was the confidential friend of the elder Edwards, so he was of the younger.’ Furthermore, Park asserts, ‘it is known that Dr. Edwards [Jr] regarded Dr. Hopkins as agreeing with the substance of the doctrine as taught by West, Edwards [Jr], and Smalley’. Park develops a series of vital intergenerational loops: Jonathan Edwards influenced and was influenced in turn by Hopkins; the latter cleric exerted ‘a decided influence on Drs. West, Edwards [Jr], and Smalley’, yet he ‘received an influence from them, and modified his phraseology somewhat, in consonance with their style’. From the ‘intimacy of Dr. Hopkins with President Edwards and Dr. Bellamy on the one hand,

79 John Smalley (1738-1808) was, like Bellamy, Hopkins and Emmons, a Connecticut-born graduate of Yale; see the discussion of the New Divinity men in Chapter Two, pp. 56-73.
and with Drs. Edwards, Smalley, Spring, West, and Emmons on the other’, Hopkins becomes ‘an invaluable witness to the essential coincidence between the school of the elder Edwards and the school of the younger’. Park remarks that ‘the peculiar relations of Hopkins to the elder and younger divines of New England, make him in some respects the most important of our theologians’—this time, Jonathan Edwards not being excepted.  

At times Hopkins’s close connection to Edwards requires Park to make some clarification of the official record. Park admitted that, though Hopkins repeatedly described sin as action, there were times ‘in some of his expressions’ that he ‘approaches more nearly to the style of Edwards’s treatise’ on *Original Sin*. For example, Park allows that Hopkins declared ‘that there is a certain state of the soul, preparing the unregenerate to disobey the law’. Park notes that this disposition may help explain the certainty of sin, but it cannot be denied that ‘this state of the soul is neither holy nor sinful’, but ‘the disobedience, being active, is sinful’. Park finds in this minor anomaly ‘proof of his most affectionate attachment to his theological instructor’, since Hopkins ‘nowhere specifically declares his dissent from Edwards’s philosophy on this theme’. Hopkins’s close connection with Edwards required careful assessment: it could be a sword that cut two ways.

Park depended on a wide network of teaching relationships for his *prima facie* evidence of Edwardsean continuity. For example, Joseph Bellamy was ‘the pupil and friend of the elder Edwards, the theological teacher of the younger Edwards and of

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Thus, whenever Jonathan Edwards’s writings discourage the hope of support for a general atonement, one need only ‘remember that…Bellamy’s True Religion Delineated’, which opens ‘the door of mercy to all’, ‘was carefully examined in manuscript by President Edwards, and was published with a Preface from Edwards’, where he ‘recommended the Treatise in exalted terms’. Perhaps Edwards, who was ‘commonly supposed…to have favored the doctrine of Limited Atonement…changed his opinion in regard to it’. These interlocking friendships establish the likelihood of a ‘substantial agreement with each other’. If Park needed evidence that the stubbornly traditional Original Sin did in fact imply exercise and not taste, he could appeal to the logic of relationship: does Edwards, ‘the choicest friend of Hopkins and Bellamy sanction their theory of an inward, neutral occasion of holiness and sin? They derived their theory from him more than from any other divine.’ A complete understanding of Edwards’s text surely relies at least in part on its reflection in the almost contemporaneous work of his closest disciples. In addition to the intellect and feelings distinction, Edwards Park was able to wield repeatedly his strategic advantage in weaving an oral tradition to shape and authenticate his distinctive New England theology.

If Jonathan Edwards’s Original Sin had produced exegetical struggles for Edwards’s New Divinity heirs, his ‘Dissertation on the Nature of True Virtue’ yielded a tremendous strategic advantage for the Hopkinsian line of exercisers. Edwards’s stress throughout that work on the active nature of sin and right conduct reinforced Park’s

continued assertion that Edwardsean Calvinism was a ‘practical theology’: its success was founded on effective preaching that produced godly lives of service. In his defence of the New England theology, Park returned again and again to the simple strategy of declaring that the proof of a correct doctrine was its successful results in practice. Park cites a letter in 1799 from Hopkins to Andrew Fuller that asserts that Hopkinsian ‘principles are gaining ground fast in New England….But what appears most favorable now to the spread of our principles of true religion, is a great and remarkable revival of religion’, which has ‘spread wider and risen higher than anything of the kind has done in America, for above fifty years’. This second Great Awakening ‘has taken place in almost all, if not in every instance, under the preaching of those ministers who have embraced Edwardean principles’. It is clear that for Hopkins, and for Park, the Hopkinsian

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86 EAP, ‘New England Theology’, p. 192. Edward Beecher, writing in the Bibliotheca Sacra in 1853, declared that the New England theology was pointed to ‘practical ends’, despite the charges of Princeton that it was merely metaphysical speculation; see Beecher, ‘Review of Works of Samuel Hopkins’, BS 10 (1853), p. 79.

87 Hopkins to Andrew Fuller, 15 October 1799, cited in EAP, ‘Memoir of Hopkins’, in Hopkins, Works, vol. I, pp. 236-237. On the connection between English and American Edwardseans, Park writes: ‘It is well known that “American Theology” as it was termed, had a marked influence in breaking down the Antinomianism of the English dissenters. The three American writers who were most carefully studied by the British assailants of Antinomianism, were Edwards, Hopkins, and Bellamy; and this triumvirate exerted, through Andrew Fuller and his coadjutors, nearly as much power over Old, as over New England. No small part of this influence came through the correspondence with Hopkins’; EAP, ‘Memoir of Hopkins’, in Hopkins, Works, vol. I, pp. 224-225. Interestingly, even here Park is ready to employ the intellect/feeling distinction: ‘Fuller was objecting, not to strict Hopkinsianism, but to an erroneous view of it; not to the substance, but to Hopkins’ expression of the doctrine, that God decrees the existence of sin and insures the fulfillment of his decree.;’; see EAP, ‘Memoir of Hopkins’, in Hopkins, Works, vol. I, pp. 224-225.
'principles of true religion' are ultimately validated by their utility in promoting revival—that most Edwardsean of all authentications.

Park’s aim in his Memoir of Samuel Hopkins, published in 1853, is not so much a detailing of the Hopkinsian exercise scheme—for all intents and purposes that had been accomplished in the summary article on ‘New England Theology’ the year before in the Bibliotheca Sacra. Park’s primary goal was to show that neither Hopkins personally nor the vital centre of New England theology generally lived in arid regions of metaphysics, but in a real word where virtue consisted of active expressions of disinterested benevolence. In the same letter to Andrew Fuller in 1799, for example, Hopkins observes that, if ‘all the missionary societies lately formed in America, owe their rise to those formed in England’, of the ‘five…societies now in New York, Connecticut, and Massachusetts States’, the ‘leaders in all…(except one)…are Edwardians’.88 When the Massachusetts Missionary Society was founded in 1799, ‘the greater part was firm Hopkinsians’.89 The American Doctrinal Tract Society was ‘at first formed exclusively by Hopkinsian divines’.90 In Park’s retelling Hopkins himself becomes part latter-day David Brainerd, preaching to the Indians with little result, and part Jonathan Edwards, bearing the stigmata of eviction from his church in Great Barrington.91 Park documents Hopkins’s concern for the poor, particularly in the aftermath of the displacement of his entire congregation in Newport, Rhode Island, during the Revolutionary War.92 Even Hopkins’s pronounced lack of ability as a preacher—William Ellery Channing described

his voice as ‘most unfortunate’, so that ‘some of the tones approached a cracked bell, more nearly than anything’—at least proved his persistence in his calling.93 Almost fifty pages in the centre of Park’s memoir detail Hopkins’s work as an abolitionist, his opposition to the slave trade, and his schemes for the evangelisation and later colonisation of Africa.94 Park comments that ‘we cannot understand him as a theologian, without examining his life of beneficence; and we cannot appreciate his activity in doing good, without studying his particularities as a divine’. Whether ‘his speculations be true or false’, he has done ‘great work’ in demonstrating that ‘piety is something more than blind sentimentalism’. It was ‘more natural for him than for some other men, to resolve all virtue into benevolence’.95 Hopkins’s famous doctrine of disinterested benevolence flowed from the cardinal New Divinity teaching that virtue and sin are meaningful only when connected to the active choices of the moral agent, and Edwards’s ‘Dissertation of True Virtue’ was the source of its authority.

In Park’s lengthier Memoir of Nathanael Emmons in 1861, Park once again labours to portray his subject as fully engaged in the practical application of New Divinity selflessness. Park documents Emmons’s involvement with missions and with the establishment of Andover seminary and Williams College.96 The memoir contains a lengthy section of biographical sketches of Emmons’s students to establish that Emmons’s was a real influence in New England: the evidence of almost one hundred

theological pupils testified that he was not a marginal *isolato* in Pilgrim attire.\(^{97}\)

Emmons’s pupils were fully engaged in the massive undertakings of many voluntarist evangelical institutions and societies in the first half of the nineteenth century. Emmons’s legacy, like Hopkins’s and Edwards’s, was to be found not in dry treatises condemned to disuse but in the sacrifice and active service of his many theological children. Park deflected criticism from the New England theology by pointing to its validation in the active, voluntarist, disinterested Edwardean culture that decisively promoted revival and sacrificial service around the globe. This theology proved itself to be in harmony with the foundational principles of Jonathan Edwards by its origin in the ‘Dissertation on the Nature of True Virtue’ and in its long-established contributions to revivalism and missions: unique among competing schemes, the New England theology honoured Edwards in both theory and practice.

Park published a lengthy historical essay in 1859 that fronted a collection of works on the atonement by Edwards, Jr, Smalley, Emmons, Edward Dorr Griffin of Williams College, and others.\(^{98}\) The essay traced the genetic development of the characteristic governmental modifications of the atonement by the New Divinity clerics, with a particular emphasis on establishing that ‘certain germs’ of the New Divinity theories were to be ‘found in the writings of the elder Edwards’.\(^{99}\) The moral government theory broadly intended to avoid the antinomian abyss of the traditional substitutionary model and its attendant language of cancelled debts and imputed righteousness. Park’s

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editorial burden was to establish that there was a substantial similarity between Edwards and the later Edwardsean Calvinists. He was forced to admit at the start that, at least in a cursory reading, Edwards had ‘adopted, in general, both the views and the phrases of the older Calvinists, with regard to the atonement’. Nevertheless, a careful reading of Edwards would lead to the observation that ‘he made various remarks which have suggested the more modern theory’.100 Park’s aim in establishing such an organic connection with Edwards is to push the New Divinity origins of the moral government model back in time to legitimise and defend that tradition—now ‘the Edwardian theory of the Atonement’—by finding its origins in Edwards himself.101

It required considerable exegetical skill for Park to draw from Edwards’s traditional language hints that Edwards had at least intimated elements of the governmental scheme. For example, Park acknowledged that Edwards often used the term ‘merit’—which was a dangerous term for anti-antinomian exercisers because it sounded like the traditional imputation of Christ’s righteousness to the elect. However, Park insists that Edwards does not mean by that term to ‘signify…a moral’ or a ‘legal state’, but is merely giving a ‘general recommendation, or a general means of securing favor’.102 One can say then that ‘in a general sense, believing sinners have merit…in a general sense they are one with Christ [and] his righteousness is theirs, belongs to them, therefore may be justly imputed to them’, and in a ‘general sense Christ has been punished for them, and they deserve no more punishment’. When, ‘however, all these words are used in their restricted sense, and not in their general sense’, Edwards merely

‘refers the phenomenon denoted by them to the sovereignty of God’, where ‘the character and condition and history of an illustrious father are a means of securing favour for his child’—that is, the atonement is at the disposition of a loving sovereign who cares for his subjects, but who themselves have no claim on his government.103 Thus, by careful if not wholly convincing exegesis Park demonstrates in over thirty pages of close reading that suggestions of moral government can be found in Edwards in the ‘restricted’ sense of the terms, despite Edwards’s broad remarks on the topic. In this way Park can claim Edwards’s paternity for the later Edwardsean form—which was the entire point of the exercise.

Park’s work on the atonement demonstrates that he uses a genetic strategy in a similar fashion to his tactical development of an oral history—he develops lines of theological transmission that play to his own superior command of the material. Park finds the evolving improvements regarding the atonement in Edwardsean Calvinism in the ‘germs...in the writings of the elder Edwards’, in the ‘germs’ developed in Bellamy’s treatises, and ‘still more in the writings’ of Hopkins.104 Once again Samuel Hopkins is the critical point of conduction in two directions. In crafting a ‘joint between divine sovereignty and human agency’, Park believed that Hopkins had ensured that ‘the germ of Emmonsism’ is found in the New Divinity.105 In other words, the working balance that Hopkinsian exercise achieved between God’s sovereignty and man’s accountability was the foundation for the work of Emmons in detailing how direct divine efficiency existed in parallel with the active choices of the moral agent. At the same time, drawing the

historical narrative back to Edwards through Hopkins lends the Hopkinsian scheme an authenticity conferred by a close identification with the person of Jonathan Edwards. Park employs an organic and developmental model that draws particularly on the authority of Jonathan Edwards and Samuel Hopkins (and on his own unparalleled expertise regarding them) to validate his particular contemporary restatement of the New England theology.

In addition to tactics like the delineation of an oral tradition and a genetic model or maximising the leverage derived from the ‘Dissertation on the Nature of True Virtue’ and disinterested benevolence, Edwards Park consistently employed a particular architectonic strategy to help define the fundamental structure of his New England theology: its ‘self-consistency’ consisted of harmonizing and balancing two lines of truth.106 The ‘Edwardean school’ nods to the past in having ‘shown more fully than others have done’ the agreement of ‘natural power’ with the ‘truths of man’s entire sinfulness and of God’s decrees’. But they have ‘been the first to make obvious, prominent and impressive, the consistency of those two truths’, which ‘all good men have more or less secretly believed,—that a sinner can perform what a reasonable law requires of him, and that he certainly will never do as well as he can, unless by a special interposition of Heaven’.107 Park is adamant that Hopkinsianism uniquely works in two directions. It preserves moral agency by ensuring that it is not eclipsed by the weight of total depravity, but does not neglect the great parallel principle in Calvinism of an utter

dependence on God’s gracious initiative to regenerate and save. Assertions of natural ability are required by the antinomian challenge, but these are held in check by a real moral inability—which Arminianism cannot answer.

Park did not follow the New Haven theology at this crucial point. Park told his Andover seminarians that ‘man has no independent power to love or serve God. On this one point, what is called New England Theology—which is not a partisan theology but the truth—has been much misunderstood.’ Its opponents ‘declare it to contend that the natural power man has is an independent power—as if he did not receive it from God’. On the contrary, ‘we are drawing down from him new gifts every moment’. This is not a natural ability with a self-determining power that voids moral inability and a proper understanding of total depravity. If ‘some appear to think that this doctrine[ of natural ability] dispenses with the influence of the Spirit—by no means’. Man ‘will not repent therefore he cannot be saved without the influence of the Spirit…. not because he cannot but because he is a desperate sinner and will not’. The Bible ‘asserts that the Spirit’s influences are necessary to convert men…. They are necessary because men will not convert without them’. Park acknowledged in his lectures that ‘Altho[ugh] it is important to hold up the doctrine[ of natural ability], it is ‘not the only doctrine to be held up. There are two great truths to be insisted upon—man’s natural ability to do his duty—and that unless aided by the Spirit he will never do his duty.’ Only Hopkinsianism preserves the integrity of the Edwardean arch—one column securely

founded on God’s sovereign decrees and the other on man’s natural ability and immediate moral obligation to the law.

Park suggests that this fundamental architecture proceeded from a number of sources. In his view, it was Hopkins’s great personal capacity for God’s truth that enabled him to develop a ‘comprehensive theology’ that carried ‘the Genevan principles to their logical result’ by using ‘established truths in a new way’.\footnote{EAP, ‘Memoir of Hopkins’, in Hopkins, \textit{Works}, vol. I, p. 183.} His Calvinism was, for Park, consistent in two senses—in its historical fidelity and its internal logic. It was ‘because Hopkins was large-minded and large-hearted, that he held together what less capacious minds are tempted to put asunder’. He ‘asserted in the boldest terms, that God is the original Cause producing the certainty of sin; but he combined this assertion with another, that man is under no natural inability to be holy’.\footnote{EAP, ‘Memoir of Hopkins’, in Hopkins, \textit{Works}, vol. I, pp. 183, 186.} Hopkinsianism is in a unique sense the bridge that preserves both divine sovereignty and human agency, both total depravity and moral accountability, both man’s utter dependence and his requirement of immediate repentance, both the old Genevan principles and the New England improvements. Hopkins boldly proposes, in Park’s words, that ‘God so makes, preserves and circumstances men, that the unregenerate do uniformly and certainly sin; their sin is made certain by the efficiency of Him who predestined their whole moral course; but yet they are as free as moral agents can be’. Their own ‘inability is the certainty of their sin, and their certain sin is their free choice’. Simply put, each ‘one of
these doctrines explains the other'.

It is clear that Hopkins provides the primary architecture for Park’s Edwardsean Calvinism.

Importantly, the dual structure of New England theology was not merely an abstraction: its particular architecture was required for immediate apologetic and polemical purposes. Park cites the observation of Edwards, Jr, that ‘before these distinctions were made, “The Calvinists were nearly driven out of the field by the Arminians, Pelagians and Socinians”’. Similarly, Park suggests that the bipolar shape of Emmons’s theology was urgently required by the polemical needs of his day. Emmons was not labouring in dreamy isolation in his study in Franklin, Massachusetts, but in the midst of those theological storms that periodically darkened the New England mental landscape. Park explicitly argues that, had Emmons been unable to ‘joint’ improvements into the traditional doctrines, ‘unless he made frank avowals of the power of men, he could not maintain the Calvinistic creed’. It was ‘by his horror at seeing the Genevan citadel surrendered to its foes, that he was prompted to combine free agency with decrees, and to represent free agency in sinning as the very essence of sin’.

Emmons would raise the standard of natural ability to defend Calvinism, since ‘the denial of this doctrine is the logical precursor of Antinomianism’. If ‘Christ performed our obedience’ or if ‘Christ’s holiness is literally imputed to us’, why ‘should the law demand of us an obedience that has already been paid?’ Emmons—like the rest of the New Divinity men—would never place something behind the will that looked like the traditional disability of depravity if that might provoke the antinomian excuse of ‘an insurmountable

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obstacle or natural inability, in the way of their loving God, repenting of sin, or doing anything in a holy manner’. Like Hopkins, Emmons found it more or less ‘impossible to conceive of a corrupt and sinful nature, prior to, and distinct from, corrupt and sinful exercises’. The exercise line militated against all excuses to avoid the demands of God’s law.

Emmons understood, however, that in establishing moral accountability and the freedom of the moral agent, one could not neglect God’s absolute sovereignty. He had been bold to declare, as Park demonstrates, that God, as the sole efficient cause directly behind all volition, ‘exerts his agency in producing all the moral and voluntary exercises of every moral agent’. In his famous sermons on Pharaoh, Emmons describes God as ‘determined to operate on [Pharaoh’s] heart itself, and cause him to put forth certain evil exercises’. God ‘stood by him and moved him to exult in his obstinacy’. God ‘continually hardened his heart, and governed all the exercises of his mind, from the day of his birth to the day of his death’. Rigorously applying immediate divine efficiency, rejecting the existence of a sinful taste or disposition behind volition and borrowing from Edwards’s views on continuous creation, Emmons at one level made God the sole, direct and efficient cause behind the will, either for good or evil. These uncompromising views were required if God’s sovereignty was to be maintained.

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121 See Conforti, ‘Edwards A. Park’, p. 201, for Emmons’s connections to Edwards’s doctrine of continuous creation.
With some justice, then, Park described Emmons’s method of instruction as consisting of ‘startling apothegms [sic]’. Park’s editorial challenge in the Memoir was to show that Emmons was in fact striking a proper Edwardsean balance between God’s sovereignty and man’s accountability. Park demonstrates that Emmons was convinced that volition consisted only in the active choices of the moral agent, and ‘in nothing before his choice, nor after his choice, nor beside his choice’. If ‘a new heart consisted in a new faculty, principle, or taste, then there could be no more propriety in God requiring sinners to change their heart, than in requiring them to add another cubit to their stature’. But if a ‘new and holy heart consists in new and holy affections, then there is the same propriety in God’s requiring sinners to change their hearts, as in requiring them to do any duty whatsoever. Indeed, it is only in view of the heart as consisting in free and voluntary exercises’ that we can ‘see the consistency of divine commands to sinners’. Emmons asserts at the same time absolute views of both divine efficiency and human agency.

Park accordingly represents Emmons’s essential theological method as the connection of opposing poles of truths—this is Hopkinsian architecture. He cites Emmons’s own description of his work: ‘I have spent the greater part of my time making joints’. Park admits that Emmons ‘has made such doctrines [as the decrees and election] unusually prominent’, but he has also ‘given bold expression to the correlative or antithetical doctrines’ of natural ability. Emmons has not projected ‘one class of truths to a point where they excluded other truths’. Emmons ‘instinctively uncovered the point

of one doctrine as if it were the only doctrine; and then instinctively displayed the edge of another truth, as if that were the only truth’, though it ‘appears to be in collision with the first’. But he did not stop there, ‘as narrow minds would stop, for he then instinctively unfolded the real agreement between two seemingly discordant ideas’. Emmons regarded it ‘as the great labor of his life, to draw out two parallel lines of doctrine…each line differing from the other, for there were two lines’, neither ‘contravening the other, for they were parallel lines…both tending to form a compacted whole with unity amid variety’.126 Park describes Emmons’s method as ‘galvanic’ and like a ‘galvanic battery’ that produces electric current between two poles.127

In a letter late in his life, Park argued that because of Emmons’s confidence ‘in his belief in Divine Goodness…he did not hesitate to say: “God stood by and moved Pharaoh’s heart.”…. [but] such expressions have been very costly to Dr. Emmons. They have injured him very much in the esteem of good men. He had the right meaning, but used the wrong words.’ Even the great Franklin divine who loomed so large over Park’s youth was not exempt from the principle of rhetoric that the proclamation of truth (‘the right meaning’) required a proper presentation (e.g., the right words) in order to be persuasive. In describing divine agency infelicitously, Emmons damaged his own reputation and ‘threw away a large part of his influence by such remarks’.128 Park’s lengthy biographical study of Emmons had intended to correct this unwarranted marginalization. Park showed that Emmons properly belonged in the mainstream of New England theology by arguing in the Memoir that Emmonsism was linked structurally and

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128 EAP to Joseph Cook, 7 November 1899 (MS in the Joseph Cook Papers, Duke University Library).
practically to Hopkinsianism—that it was in fact Hopkinsianism taken to its logical conclusions. Park proposed to his seminarians that ‘God’s government and free agency [move] through the whole Bible in parallel lines’. Every ‘system of theology—to be true must keep both prominent—Decrees—the certainty of things—the will as the greatest apparent good—and then man’s freedom….without this, a system is one-sided’. Park’s editorial efforts centred Emmons theologically in this ‘self-consistent’ Calvinism by showing that he held to the balanced parallel of divine sovereignty and human responsibility on explicitly Edwardsean terms. At the same time, Park certified Emmons’s historically by establishing his active role in the defence and propagation of Edwardsean revivalism and Hopkinsian evangelical industry. Park’s work was essentially methodological in that he had to make Emmons’s jointing process convincing either by careful exegesis of his parallel lines or by employing the trusty intellect and feelings dichotomy when Emmons’s ‘startling apothegms’ proved unbridgeable.

Edwards Park’s own New England theology intended to be a re-engineering of traditional Calvinism into a structure that was architecturally balanced and therefore polemically useful and apologetically vital—‘so interpreting the Bible as to make sensible men confide in it’. Park’s summary statement in 1852 in the article ‘New England Theology’ demonstrates the essential features of his redaction of the ‘Edwardean scheme’. The New England theology is ‘comprehensive’: it ‘unites a high, but not an ultra Calvinism, on the decrees and agency of God, with a philosophical, but not an Arminian theory, on the freedom and worth of the human soul’. New England theology

has reconciled the ‘two great classes of truths; one relating to the untrammelled will of man, another relating to the supremacy of God. Because it has secured human liberty, it exalts the divine sovereignty’. Its common sense ‘genius is to blend the loftiest truths concerning the Creator, with the most equitable truths concerning the creature’. New England theology ‘combines the one-sided truth which the Antinomian had distorted, with the one-sided truth which the Arminian had distorted…and harmonizes the two into one capacious system’. It is a ‘system rigidly accurate in form, and still indulgent enough to allow many bold hearty expressions of its own truth’. Park centres the good sense of his scheme in its dual architecture, one that is clearly dependent on Hopkinsianism and Emmonsism. This organisation lends to his New England theology a consistency and a comprehensiveness that ensures that it is apologetically useful in its appeal to a broad constituency.

Edwards Amasa Park applied his substantial exegetical and polemical skills to the fabrication of useful tools intended to sculpt a coherent tradition from sometimes discordant theological materials that would conserve an essential line of spiritual truth. His creation, the ‘Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’, proved able at least superficially to reconcile a wide array of theological opinions. In the hands of a redactor it was able to prune wild branches straying from the living vine of common sense, able to restate without dogmatic compromise the truths found in a fervent expression of the heart’s zeal, able to suggest a broad underlying evangelical unity in order to secure a very

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particular Calvinist tradition. Blessed with unsurpassed access to and familiarity with Jonathan Edwards and the subsequent generations of Edwardsean divines, Park imposed a systematic consistency on his inherited theological materials and then proceeded to authenticate his very own synthesis by enveloping it in an Edwardsean mantle of historical authority. Using a genetic model of development that complemented Park’s distinctive command of an oral tradition, and using his editorial platform in a series of articles in the Bibliotheca Sacra and in his widely-reviewed biographical works, Park constructed a past that met the apologetic and polemical needs of antebellum Calvinism. His New England theology used the linguistic framework of Edwards’s distinctions between natural and moral inability to create more operating room for human ability than that supplied by Westminster. At the same time, Park’s historical project imposed a set of canonical boundaries by retaining an older New England’s convictions about total depravity—if not precisely on the same ground. If this New England theology represented (in Park’s view, at least) a harmonious balance of inherited Edwardsean Calvinism and successive New Divinity improvements, it was in fact to be much contested by other claimants to Edwards’s lineage. Embroiled in theological controversy for the latter portion of his career, Park nevertheless proved able to create and simultaneously legitimate a genetic tradition that preserved his inherited and beloved Edwardsean Calvinism for the community of ‘men of good sense’.

133 See the discussion in Conforti, ‘Creation and Collapse’, pp. 137-141, and in Chapter Six, pp. 239-252.
CHAPTER SIX

DEFENDING THE NEW ENGLAND THEOLOGY:

COMPETING METHODS AND NARRATIVES

Edwards Amasa Park’s distinction between the theology of the intellect and the theology of the feelings was more than a methodological scheme. It was actively applied by Park in the decade following the Convention sermon to craft a substantial New England theology rooted in Edwardsean Calvinism. This undertaking was an exercise in tradition-making, marshalling rhetorical strategies to shape a sometimes unruly Hopkinsian exercise scheme into a canonical narrative of improved orthodoxy in the spirit of Jonathan Edwards. But if Park’s redaction was pointed in a particular theological direction, it was also intended to accomplish more than that. Park’s hope was that an understanding of the intellect and feelings dichotomy might enlarge the number of theologians who could subscribe to this New England theology—those who by a ‘liberal construction of forms’ might enjoy ‘the same spirit’.¹ Park’s New England theology, then, was both particular in its historical reconstruction and capacious in its methodology:

¹ EAP, ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’, BS 7 (1850), p. 561. At least one Baptist reviewer of the Convention sermon agreed with Park’s irenic intent: ‘It will have a tendency both to improve the style of preaching among ministers and to unite the disciples of Christ of every name, by the ties of those common sympathies and common feelings, which are inspired by the sublime truths and the affecting scenes contained in the gospel narrative’; [Anon.,] ‘Review of “The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings”’, Christian Review 15 (1850), p. 637.
if the theology of the intellect narrowed doctrinal truth toward Park’s own New England theology, the theology of the feelings could still encompass a wide variety of forms. Park as early as 1839 had argued that theologians ought to countenance ‘an honest variation of opinion’, in view of the core of truth that lay below extrinsic differences in phraseology. In fact, though Park’s mediating synthesis drew praise from across the religious spectrum, to the extent that Park had asserted a particular method and a distinct historical narrative he was vulnerable to challenge on both counts.

When the Convention sermon provoked an immediate response from Princeton’s Charles Hodge in 1850 in the Princeton Review, one of the grounds of Hodge’s objections was methodological. Hodge insisted that Park’s application of the intellect and feelings distinction was merely ‘arbitrary’, ‘only discard[ing]…everything he is not willing to receive…for no other reason and by no other rule than his own repugnance’. In Hodge’s view, many will ‘have cause to lament’ that Park ‘should have prepared a weapon which may be used against one doctrine as easily as another’. The intellect and feelings distinction was nothing more than ‘a convenient way of getting rid of certain doctrines’ that had become ‘unpalatable’. Park’s careful delineation of the differences between cognitive and affective approaches to truth in ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ was to Hodge merely an editor’s ruse.


The same challenge to the genuine usefulness of Park’s method came a decade later when his lengthy *Memoir of Nathanael Emmons* (1861) was published as a separate volume. One of Park’s purposes in the biographical study was to smooth Emmons’s perceived eccentricities in order to draw him into the mainstream of Park’s New England theology. Yale’s George Park Fisher—a student of Park’s at Andover who had attended the Convention sermon in 1850 and who had studied in Germany afterwards, serving as a foreign correspondent for the *Bibliotheca Sacra* while overseas—reviewed his former professor’s *Memoir* of Emmons for the *New Englander* with scarcely concealed disapproval for Park’s editorial tactics: ‘It was formerly thought, unanimously as far as we know, that Emmons held to a novel and startling theory upon the relation of God to the sins of man….But his careful biographer…pronounce[s] this interpretation incorrect,’ and endeavours ‘to clear him of responsibility for his obnoxious opinions’. Fisher suggested that in Park’s mind such a view ‘is not warranted by [Emmons’s] language, save in a few cases where it is admitted that his expressions were unguarded; and even here he is defended on the ground that he simply copies the style of the Scriptures’.

When Fisher examines Emmons’s famous sermon series on Pharaoh, he concludes that ‘it is impossible to deny that a fair interpretation of the language…when taken by itself, accords with the common understanding of Emmons’s doctrine’ that ‘the Deity, [if] not

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6 The Unitarians did not think Emmons’s biography a worthy project. Their review of it contrasted ‘the prominent gifts of the biographer’ against ‘the very limited importance of the subject-matter of his volume’. Thus, Park’s *Memoir* only served to reinforce, in this view, ‘the dying out of Calvinism in New England’; see [Anon.], ‘Review of *Memoir of Nathanael Emmons* (1861)’, *Christian Examiner* 71 (1861), pp. 287, 290.


the subject of the sinful act’ is the ‘efficient, creative cause’. Against this ‘interpretation of Emmons we have the authority of Professor Park’, who suggests that, ‘though [Emmons’s] expressions may be open to objection’, Emmons ‘believed in a real liberty of the human will’. Fisher allows that this ‘suggestion is entitled to great deference…’. It may be right that Professor Park is right in cutting off the claws—if he will pardon the expression—of the author he has taken in hand’. It is certain that ‘a more discriminating and well-informed critic than the Abbot Professor is not to be found’. Yet, ‘we confess…that a portion of his criticism strikes us as being too kind to the subject of it’. If Park ‘is right, [Emmons] is chargeable with a remarkable abuse of language, which relieves his opponents of all blame for mistaking his views’. In Fisher’s opinion, Park’s work as editor had obscured the real Emmons more than it had clarified his place in the stream of New England orthodoxy.

Like Fisher, Union Seminary’s Henry B. Smith did not believe that Nathanael Emmons could be softened and moderated by even as sinuous an editorial tool as the intellect and feelings distinction or by a hand as practised as Edwards Amasa Park’s in ‘keen logic and exegetical skill’. In a widely-read review of Park’s Memoir of Emmons in 1862, Smith protested that Emmons’s ‘sharp doctrinal statements’ and ‘definite formulas should not be taken in an indefinite sense’, because ‘the essence of his system is in its definiteness’. As a ‘single-eyed divine’, Emmons was ‘simple, straightforward, unambiguous, unshrinking’. If one explains away ‘the peculiarities of his system…Emmons himself is explained away’. Park’s Memoir may be ‘the most

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entertaining, ingenious and finished piece of ecclesiastical biography which New England has yet set forth in honor of her religious patriarchs’, but ‘to subject [Emmons] to the metaphorical interpretation is peculiarly inapt’, for this ‘the most literal of our divines’. For Park to argue, for example, that when Emmons says God is the only efficient cause, he means independent, Smith asserts that in that case the word ‘efficient’ does not ‘mean anything like what it is usually supposed to mean’. Park has ‘blunt[ed] the edge of our acutest divine’s sharpest sayings’ and we are left to choose between ‘the definite dogma or the indefinite interpretation’. Smith is clear that in his mind the use of linguistic legerdemain to contour Emmons into smoother shapes or to relax his conclusions as a ‘logician’ by describing him as ‘ardent’ or ‘intense’ is fundamentally to misrepresent Emmons.

In rejecting Park’s methodological application of his two-theology dualism, Smith was challenging as an historian, as had Fisher, the substantive results of Park’s strategy as a rhetorician. Smith suggested that with a mere stroke of the pen any apparent deviations from a central core of truth could be turned into figurative expressions whose purpose was emphatic, not dogmatic. If Emmons’s extreme view of God’s immediate agency in holy or sinful exercises needed to be trimmed from the New England canon, his views on the matter can be assigned a rhetorical purpose by Park the redactor. Park’s pruning of Emmons for the purpose of tradition-making was for Smith a serious substantive misrepresentation, however well motivated or skilfully done.

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In the critique of Park’s rhetorical strategy, then, a reservation about the methodology of the intellect and feelings distinction could readily run into larger questions. Charles Hodge’s response to the Convention sermon indicated that the Princetonian was concerned with the implications of the intellect and feelings distinction from a broad epistemological and theological perspective, as well from a methodological standpoint. If Park’s new exegetical ‘theory will allow a man to assert contradictory propositions’, as Hodge believed, Park had in effect challenged the ‘normal authority of scripture’. Park’s two-theology system aligned with German idealists and the likes of Horace Bushnell to introduce uncertainty into both propositional truth and biblical language. For Hodge, neither the unfettered life of the spirit nor the theology of the feelings ought to supersede the propositional truths found embedded in scripture and subsequently summarised in the orthodox creeds. To allow contradictory propositions to stand because intellect and feelings may point in separate directions is to disconnect religious experience from real life. Since both ‘scripture and consciousness teach that the soul is a unit’, it is ‘impossible…that what is true to the feelings should be false to the intellect’. Park, in Hodge’s view, assumes that ‘such contradictions actually exist’, not as ‘different modes of activity, but as different percipient agencies in the soul’. Hodge asserts that Park has depended on ‘a much greater distinction between the cognitive and

15 Although Hodge’s criticism of ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ does not in this immediate context extend to a critique of Park’s use of language, Hodge’s criticism just one year earlier of Bushnell’s God in Christ (1849) for its assertion of the uncertainty of language was based on Bushnell’s views producing the very same deleterious effect as the intellect and feelings dichotomy—undermining scriptural authority: ‘It undermines all confidence in the ordinary transactions of life…..This doctrine supposes that there can be no revelation from God to men, except to the imagination and the feelings, none to the reason’. The doctrine that ‘language can convey no specific, definite truth to the understanding, which Dr. Bushnell uses to loosen the obligations of creeds, is all the sceptic needs to destroy the authority of the Bible’; see CH, ‘Review of God in Christ by Horace Bushnell’, BRPR 21 (1849), pp. 266-267.
emotional faculties in man than really exists’. The Bible ‘never recognizes that broad distinction between the intellect and the feeling which is made so often by metaphysicians’. Hodge suggests that ‘there is no such dualism in the soul, and therefore no foundation for two such systems of conflicting theologies’ as the Convention sermon proposes, ‘one affirming, the other denying’—what ‘is true to one must be true to the other’. Hodge’s critique of Park’s theology and feelings duality is in this case epistemological: there are not two kinds of knowledge.

It has been seen in Chapter Four that Park’s first reply to Hodge in 1851 rejected the latter’s characterisation of the two theologies as a dualism. The theology of the intellect and that of the feelings ‘represent two generic modes of representing the same system of religious truth’. One is ‘suited to the scientific treatise, the other to the popular discourse, hymnbook and liturgy’. When figurative language is employed, it is not false to its underlying truth. In the place of Hodge’s ‘two conflicting theologies’ it would be best, in Park’s terms, to describe the intellect and feelings distinction as ‘two forms’ or ‘two modes of expression’. Park meets Hodge at the epistemological point of dispute by affirming with Hodge the unitary nature of truth and by describing the Convention sermon as being concerned primarily with the practical application of its formal distinction between modes. Yet it is clear that important differences informed the debate. Hodge’s insistent identification of one theology with one mode of expression took its warrant from a tight connection between language and experience: ‘Language which

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18 EAP, ‘Remarks on the Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review’, p. 137; see the discussion in Chapter Four, pp. 164-166.
satisfies the reason in the expression of truth must convey the precise idea which is embraced in the glowing cognition which constitutes religious feeling. For Park, linguistic expression required room for imprecision, for metaphor and image, for a balance between dogmatic prose and affective poetry, if it is to capture truth comprehensively. The theology of the feelings ‘is elastic’, assuming ‘as great a variety of shapes as the wants of the heart are various’. It is ‘too buoyant…to compress itself into sharply-drawn angles’ and is often ‘the more forceful for the looseness of its style’. Hodge charged that this position was suspiciously close to the stance of Horace Bushnell, for whom all language was metaphor and to whom propositional truth was a vain illusion. In Bushnell’s words, ‘Human language is a gift to the imagination so essentially metaphoric…that it has no exact blocks of meaning to build a science of’. Park had not in fact abandoned the possibility of propositional truth: it was the work of the theology of the intellect to ‘comprehend the truth just as it is, unmodified by excitements of feeling’. This ‘intellectual theology’ is received ‘as accurate not in the spirit only, but in the letter also’. But Park as a rhetorician argued for a connection between language and reality that was far more plastic than Hodge was willing to accept, even if it was still too confining for Bushnell.

Hodge’s reservations about Park went beyond general epistemological questions to one specific issue that really mattered at Princeton: holding a very high view of the verbal inspiration of the Bible, Hodge saw a serious threat to scriptural authority from

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Park. If Bushnell had, in Hodge’s view, ‘endeavoured to seduce us from cleaving to the letter of the scriptures, by telling us the Bible was but a picture or a poem’, Park’s support for a theology of the feelings—which Park describes ‘as involving the substance of truth,’ though, ‘when literally interpreted, it may or may not be false’—also makes nonsense of any claims for scriptural authority. For Hodge, the Convention sermon’s application of figurative language is ‘inimical to the proper authority of the Word of God’.

Moreover, it has been seen in Chapter Three that Hodge’s fears of indeterminateness suggested a second, related problem with Park: Hodge could not accept a developmental model in theology if it posed a threat to the notion of a fixed deposit of biblical truth. The treatment in Hodge’s Princeton Review in 1864 of Old School Presbyterian W. G. T. Shedd’s History of Christian Doctrine makes this plain: ‘Development is the favorite idea of our author. It is in this light that he contemplates all history, especially church history, and the history of Christian doctrine.’ Although it is recognised that Shedd—who like Hodge and Park had studied in Germany, who had even produced a seven-volume edition of Coleridge in 1853, and who showed that Old School Presbyterianism and an explicitly organic, developmental view of church history

27 The Unitarian Christian Examiner was willing to consider challenging Park’s orthodoxy on the charge of ‘development’ alone: ‘In the controversy between him and Professor Hodge of Princeton, [Park] appears to us to have effected nothing in the way of substantiating his orthodoxy, if that is to be judged by the Andover Creed. Indeed, apart from his assailing some of its chief and distinguishing articles, we should have little confidence in our hope for his soundness of faith as tested by that, were it only for the ground he takes in favor of theological progress’; see Christopher Tappan Thayer, ‘Heresy in Andover Seminary’, Christian Examiner 20 (1853), pp. 83-84 [Review of Daniel Dana, D.D., A Remonstrance addressed to the Trustees of Phillips Academy, on the State of the Theological Seminary under their Care, September, 1849 (Boston: Crocker and Brewster, 1853)]. See also the discussion in Chapter Three, pp. 116-117.
could safely co-exist—is ‘careful to repudiate the modern German pantheistic doctrine of development in all its forms’, he is not careful enough, in Princeton’s view, to demonstrate that development has ‘no relation to the Infinite and Absolute, who is evermore perfect, and is, therefore, *ex vi termini*, incapable of development’. Moreover, the perfection attributed to God is also ascribed to the word of God, so that the ‘sum and substance of all Christian doctrine is found in the sacred volume’. If development suggests that the truth of the Bible is in flux, such a position is as dangerous as suggesting that there might be two contradictory theologies.

Park’s own description of the doctrine of inspiration remained remarkably consistent over the course of his lectures at Andover. In 1855 he described inspiration as ‘such a divine influence upon the writers of the Bible as caused them to reveal religious truths in the best manner and without any mixture of religious errors’. This inspiration was ‘verbal in…that the sacred writers were superintended in the use of such words as it was best they should use’, but it was ‘not necessary to suppose the writers of the Bible verbally inspired in…that they in general received their words by dictation’. If it were

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33 [EAP.] Guild, ‘Notes’, vol. II, pp. 34, 37; see also [EAP.] Hill, ‘Lectures’, vol. I, pp. 227, 229: ‘The sacred writers [were] superintended in [their] use of such words which it was right that they should use….We cannot say that they received dictation in such a sense as to make them merely…amanuenses for the Holy Spirit’.
necessary for the inspired authors to receive specific words, it was because of the special nature of the particular material: ‘the writers of the Bible may have been ins[pired] in [the] sense of receiving words from God for the expression of those truths which were undiscoverable by themselves—such as the idea of atonement’.  

Park asserted that the Bible was absolutely reliable when it conveyed religious truth: ‘All that the Bible teaches in regard to God’s character….to the sanctions of God’s law….to the entire sinfulness of man [and] the need of regeneration in order to be happy….to the divine decrees and God’s right to elect some to everlasting life is true’. But scripture made no claims to possess truth comprehensively, for the definition of inspiration ‘does not affirm or deny that the statements of the Bible on merely scientific subjects are true’, or that its statements on ‘merely historical subjects are true’.  

Although inspiration does ‘affirm that all the religious doctrines of the Bible are correct’, it is ‘unwise to encumber the theory of inspiration with the necessity of proving that every merely historical and merely scientific subject is correct’, except to say that ‘every historical statement which is of a religious character is strictly correct’. Thus, in carefully delimiting the areas of scripture that are authoritatively true, Park introduced the potential for unreliability in biblical material outside the boundary—a conclusion Hodge could not accept.

Park, like Shedd, had taken from his own studies in Germany an openness to the model of historical development—or, at least, he perceived that such an idea as

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37 Johann August Wilhelm Neander (1789-1850) told his students—of whom Park was (briefly) one—that ‘the reigning theological thought of the day is Entwicklung—‘development’. The transition from Johann Lorenz von Mosheim’s (1694-1755) static view of institutions as the proper subject of history to Neander’s sense of history focusing on persons was complete in Germany (because of Hegel’s influence) by the time
Historismus resembled the Enlightenment model of progressive understanding in the guise of Entwicklung, ‘development’.

As early as 1839 Park had suggested that a theologian must ‘cherish a liberal faith in the possibility of improving…standard theological systems’. Just as ‘every age may begin with the results of the age preceding, as the tendencies of the intellect are ever upward,’ we cannot ‘but hope that the most extensive of all the sciences [theology] will yet be explored with new vigor and success’.

Moreover, improvement was itself in the New Divinity spirit: Samuel Hopkins believed that there ‘is no reason to doubt that light will so increase in the church…that what is now done and written will be…superseded’.

Park observed in 1850 that it may be that ‘the truths in the book of nature and in the inspired volume are incapable of improvement, but our knowledge of those truths is progressive.…The speculations of every successive age will develop new features in the great truths which are to shine brighter and brighter unto the perfect day’.

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38 See the discussion in Chapter Three, pp. 119-121; see also Rowe, ‘Nestor of Orthodoxy’, p. 42.
41 EAP, ‘The Utility of Collegiate and Professional Schools’, BS 7 (1850), p. 634. Of course Park was not alone in assuming that the record of New Divinity improvements was simply a natural part of progress in theological understanding. Daniel Fiske, chosen by Park to summarise New England theology in the Bibliotheca Sacra, did not hesitate to set the spirit of improvement at the very beginning of the New World experiment, for ‘the distinguished divines [of New England theology], in the spirit of the charge which John Robinson gave to the first settlers of Plymouth when they were about to leave Leyden, have believed in the possibility of progress in theological science, and were animated with the hope of contributing to that progress’; see Daniel T. Fiske, ‘New England Theology’, BS 22 (1865), p. 470. East Windsor’s Edward Lawrence, who denied the virtues of ‘development’ in theology, cast Robinson in a different light from Fiske: ‘It has been claimed that John Robinson belonged to the progress-party in theology….But his discussion with Episcopius and his Defense of the Doctrine of the Synod of Dort, in historical fairness, remove all doubt respecting the complexion of his theology. They place him in direct antagonism to the Pelagian and Arminian tendencies of that and every other age. They show that he regarded all movement in that direction as retrogressive, and that the further light, which he taught the Plymouth pilgrims might
from distant Bangor Seminary in Maine, agreed that ‘it is not claimed that our theological system is already perfect—so perfect as to be susceptible of no further improvement’. Its leading principles ‘can not, indeed, be changed; but in their mode of stating and explaining these great principles…there may be improvements for years to come, as there have been in ages past’. Jonathan Edwards, Jr, had asserted that there ‘is abundant room for discovery and improvement in every science, especially in theology’. Park told his seminarians ‘we must consider…the progressive development of the divine will’. Thus, in the temper of both the Enlightenment and the New Divinity amendments to Jonathan Edwards, theological science was no different in kind from the natural sciences—each embraces continual progress. This was an appropriate outcome for Park, but one that for Charles Hodge was simply a bald challenge to his literalist view of scriptural inspiration.

The varied reactions to the work of Andover’s Abbot professor in the 1850s and early 1860s from theologians of the significance of Yale’s Fisher, Union’s Smith and Princeton’s Hodge can be seen as challenges to Park’s intellect and feelings distinction arising from methodological, epistemological and hermeneutical concerns. It was also possible to dispute the larger historical construct that Park assembled—the New England

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42 Enoch Pond, Sketches of the Theological History of New England (Boston: Congregational Publishing Society, 1880), pp. 75-76.
theology. Hodge’s second reply to Park in 1851 shifted ground to a historical critique. From ‘an early period in the history of the Church, there have been two great systems of doctrine in perpetual conflict’, according to Hodge. The first system ‘begins with God’, and ‘has for its object the vindication of the Divine supremacy and sovereignty in the salvation of men’. God is ‘himself the end of all his works both in creation and in redemption’. This is the historical ‘system that underlies the piety of the Church in all ages’—for Hodge, the system of Geneva and Westminster and Princeton. The other, opposite system begins ‘with man…and has as its characteristic aim the assertion of the rights of human nature’. It starts with a ‘theory of free agency and of the nature of sin, to which the anthropological doctrines of the Bible must be made to conform’. From this basis flow the conclusions that ‘there can be no moral character but in moral acts’; that the ‘power to the contrary is essential to free agency’; and that ‘ability limits responsibility’ in that ‘men are responsible only so far as they have adequate power to do what is required of them’. From these principles it is possible to reach the conclusions that there is ‘no such thing as “original righteousness”’ nor can ‘there be any “original sin”’. Adam was ‘in no…sense the head and representative of his race,’ nor was ‘his sin was the ground of our condemnation’, because every man ‘stands his probation for himself’. The work of Christ ‘was not a satisfaction to law and justice’ but a

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45 Hodge did dismiss in a footnote in his second article Park’s contentions about the formal properties of the intellect and feelings distinction: ‘One of the complaints against us, which Professor Park urges most frequently, is that we misrepresent him as teaching two “kinds of theology,” instead of “two different forms” of one and the same theology. After many iterations of this complaint, he loses his patience and asks, “Will the Reviewer never distinguish between two doctrines, and the same doctrine expressed in two forms?” We are afraid not. There is not the slightest difference between the two statements, except in words…It is…perfectly immaterial whether Professor Park teaches that there are “two theologies”, or “two forms of one and the same theology”’: see CH, ‘Prof. Park’s Remarks on the Princeton Review’, p. 337, note.


‘governmental display of certain divine attributes’, and his ‘righteousness is not imputed to believers’. This second system, clearly, is Hodge’s summary of Hopkinsianism conflated in some measure with Nathaniel W. Taylor’s New Haven theology.

The difficulty for Park, in Hodge’s view, is that, while Park intends to teach ‘that the two theologies, the intellectual and the emotive, though they differ in form, agree in substance and doctrine’, he has at the same time ‘distinctly presented in the [Convention] sermon…the radical principles of one of the systems…that moral character is confined to acts, that liberty supposes power to the contrary, and that ability limits responsibility’. The astute Hodge did not miss the fact that the Convention sermon was more than an argument for the intellect and feelings distinction—it was pointed toward a very particular theology. Hodge objected that ‘Professor Park proposes to show…that the two systems…are identical; that the one is the philosophical explanation of the other; that they are different modes of stating the same general truths’. Hodge marvels that ‘any uninspired man could have the courage to say to the two great parties in the Church, that…while they think they differ, they actually agree’. In fact, ‘these are not different modes of stating the same truth. They are irreconcilable assertions’. Hodge’s second response ascribes to Park the fault of not only an epistemological but also a historical dualism.

Park’s subsequent response to Hodge’s second article in the Princeton Review makes it clear that Park intended to resolve each of Hodge’s dualisms with the same rhetorical strategy—despite Hodge’s claims, it was entirely possible, in Park’s view, that

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‘the same doctrines presented in certain forms constitute the theology of the intellect, and presented in other forms constitute the theology of the heart’. Hodge may conclude from his model of two competing historical systems that, in Park’s words, ‘the theology of New England is a distinctive system’, but it is in essence just ‘theology conformed to the fundamental laws of human belief’. It is ‘the theology which all good men adopt when they act in the capacity of men’, and not as ‘mere scholars and polemics’. The church has ‘ever been for it in substance, even when against it in its forms. It is in fact nothing new save in the precision and accuracy of its statements.’ When had the ‘old Hopkinsian divines…overlook[ed] the sovereignty of God? The stale objection to them was that they thought and talked and preached of nothing else!’ Park suggests—perhaps with more hope than conviction—that ‘both the reviewer and the author meet and walk in the same straight path of New England theology’. There may be different modes of representation or choices of terminology from the standpoint of rhetoric, but the underlying stratum of theological truth has been ever the same to men of goodwill.

Hodge’s final reply in the Princeton Review suggests that he had concluded that continued dialogue would produce little movement: ‘Our object in what follows is to present in a few words our reasons for putting an end to the discussion between Professor Park and ourselves.’ Hodge has no remaining interest in a contest where ‘we feel ourselves to be no match for our author in such a game as this’. One point, however,

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51 CH, ‘Professor Park and the Princeton Review’, pp. 674, 687. Hodge’s view of Park’s linguistic gymnastics was echoed from the Unitarian side: ‘The difficulty is, as Dr. Hodge shows, that Professor Park commits to the theology of the feelings, as rhetorical or impassioned statements uttered for effect, the carefully worded intellectual propositions which have been selected for catechisms and creeds as gathering up the substance of the manifold and diversified representations of Scripture.’; see George E. Ellis, ‘The New Theology’, Christian Examiner 27 (1857), p. 356.
must be reasserted. If there is ‘one characteristic of New England theology more prominent than any other, it is opposition to the anti-Augustinian principles’. The ‘world-wide fame of President Edwards as a theologian, rests mainly on his thorough refutation of them….In this opposition, Bellamy, Dwight, and the other great men of New England were no less strenuous’. Even the ‘aberration of the advocates of the “Exercise Scheme”…was at least in the direction of ultra Calvinism’. It was not until the ‘rise of New Havenism…that these principles were rejected by any other class of New England divines reputed orthodox’. 52 Once again, Hodge identifies New Haven theology as a logical development from the New Divinity improvements: even if Park cannot be identified with Nathaniel W. Taylor, his affiliation with one link in the chain along the ‘anti-Augustinian’ line is enough to discredit him. Hodge defines briefly an alternative historical model to Park’s (though Princeton would later take the opportunity to expand on the idea): the true line of New England theology runs from Geneva through Northampton to those in the nineteenth century who still, as had Jonathan Edwards, accepted the tenets of Old Calvinism.

How far had the three journal exchanges with Charles Hodge moved Edwards Park? In his reply in 1851 to Hodge’s first article, Park found it politic to put some distance between his views and Taylor’s, since Hodge conveniently merged the two for the purposes of his own argument. Park wrote that he ‘has never doubted but firmly believes that in consequence of the first man’s sin all men have at birth a corrupt nature’. This condition ‘exposes them to suffering’ and ensures ‘the certainty of [their] actual transgression as soon as they can put forth a moral preference’, as well as ‘their eternal

punishment’—surely Hodge must see in all this that he and Park have common cause as Calvinists? A ‘corrupt nature’?—that is indeed a concession from a Hopkinsian exerciser. But Hodge must also agree that it is impossible that men could be liable for sin before there is sinning: this ‘corrupt nature’ does not consist of ‘actual transgressions’ that expose men to ‘punishment’. Nonetheless, if New Haven could not in good conscience assert innate depravity, such was not the case with Andover—as long as one chose one’s terms carefully and did not cease to guard against the old antinomianism fault built into hyper-Calvinism.

But Park was not convinced that he had departed from orthodoxy: he closed the series of exchanges with Hodge with a fifty-page article in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* in 1852 entitled ‘New England Theology’ that (as has been seen in Chapter Five) constituted his major summary statement of the Hopkinsian exercise scheme. In it Park reiterated his commitment to the theological principles that Hodge earlier had attributed to the system opposing the genuine piety of the Church. The substance of the New England theology that Park detailed was precisely the same content that appeared in the theological notes appended to ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’—as Charles Hodge himself had astutely observed. Subsequently, Park undertook his great biographical works on the two most prominent exercisers, issuing a short memoir of Samuel Hopkins in 1852 and a lengthier biographical study of Nathanael Emmons in 1861. It is clear that Park continued to promote his ‘New England theology’ in the exercise line of

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54 EAP, ‘New England Theology’, pp. 170-220; see also the discussion in Chapter Five, pp. 181-182.
Hopkins and Emmons. Moreover, Park continued to interpret the issues with Princeton as essentially rhetorical in nature. In the heat of the exchanges with Hodge in 1850 and 1851, Park was capable of harsh criticism of Princeton’s own linguistic methodology. For example, Park commented in a private letter that the Princetonians ‘erred in mistaking [the Psalmist’s] poetry for prose’, so that in reality their ‘prosaic theories…were suggested by poetical or eloquent expressions’. It followed then that Princeton’s theology is ‘false, and is not the theology of a sound intellect or a right heart’—Princeton had failed to appropriate the intellect and feelings distinction.

Nevertheless, Park the ecumenical churchman saw that it would be best for all if Princeton and Andover agreed—at least in public—on a basic core of doctrine. Park’s published responses to Hodge in 1851 in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* consistently argue for such a unity. It was the very function of ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ to clear away the clutter of apparent differences in language in order to reveal an underlying agreement on the boundaries of orthodoxy: ‘The discrepancies so often lamented are not fundamental but superficial, and are easily harmonized by exposing the one self-consistent principle which lies at their base’. Park told his class at Andover in 1855 that they ‘may read in books [that] an impenitent man cannot repent, cannot love God’. This view ought not to be dismissed out of hand, because ‘it is perfectly silly for

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56 EAP to Josiah Willard Gibbs, 20 December 1851 (MS in Josiah Willard Gibbs Papers, Yale University Library), pp. 2-3.
57 Princeton was also capable of stinging criticism under the cover of private correspondence: see Lyman Atwater to CH, 2 August 1850 and 22 July 1851 (Folder 32, Box 13, Ser. 14, Charles Hodge Papers, Princeton University Library): Park’s ‘famous invention of a theology of intellect [and] a theology of feeling was a mere device for reconciling old-fashioned Calvinism to his perversities’, and that Park’s ‘power seems to be chiefly that of throwing dust in the eyes of persons who are not masters of the subject’; cited in Douglas A. Sweeney, ‘Nathaniel William Taylor and the Edwardsian Tradition: Evolution and Continuity in the Culture of the New England Theology’ (unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Vanderbilt University, 1995), p. 15, n. 14.
any man to undertake to say that expressions wh[ich] have had a long continual currency have no truth in them—they have’. It is a mistake to ‘consider the two schools of theology as directly antagonistic’. If you ‘search the language of the different schools…you will find both have a true meaning in what they say. The difference is, the New School [i.e., improved Calvinism] use language consistently—the Old School perpetually contradicts itself.’ At the end of the decade, reviewing in 1858 a collection of sermons by Edward Dorr Griffin (1770-1837), famed New Divinity president of Williams College and one of Park’s predecessors in the Bartlet chair at Andover, Park argued that the barrier for Old Calvinists to rapprochement with the Edwardseans was their ‘inaccurate and…perilous phraseology’, a ‘language [that] often produces a ruinous impression on the soul’ by failing to “distinguish between the literal and figurative meaning of texts’” (quoting Griffin), by ‘reason[ing] from poetry as if it were prose’. Nevertheless, in the remainder of the decade that followed Park’s and Hodge’s exchanges over the Convention sermon, Park held to his position that Princeton and Andover agreed in substance on the basic principles of the New England theology, but continued to disagree on terminology—that is, on the proper use of language to convey doctrine.

This approach became the standard argument vis-à-vis Princeton for the moderate Congregationalists. Park’s friend, Enoch Pond, in reviewing a work on the moral government theory of the atonement that had been ‘subjected to an elaborate and merciless criticism’ in the Princeton Review, concluded an extended discussion by observing that ‘we differ from our brethren at Princeton…in very little except the

meaning of words’. As late as 1873, in Pond’s review in Park’s *Bibliotheca Sacra* of Charles Hodge’s own *Systematic Theology*, Pond concluded that Dr Hodge ‘really differs from us of New England much less than he thinks he does…. [the] difference between us is chiefly in words’.

Both the irenic spirit and the approach to language signalled by Pond flow directly from Park’s Convention sermon. ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ intended to unify the parties of orthodoxy by providing a rhetorical methodology for language that would reveal an underlying theological unity—though Park and Pond took for granted that the exposed core of theology looked exactly like Hopkinsian exercise. In a larger sense, too, this irenic spirit of moderate Congregationalism was built into Andover seminary from the first, and the Convention sermon can be seen both as its most prominent expression and as the methodological engine that drove it after 1850.

If Park was not convinced by Hodge, neither was Hodge convinced by Park. In the *Princeton Review* in 1859, editor Hodge included a lengthy review of a major work by New School Presbyterian Albert Barnes (1798-1870) that closed by observing with tongue in cheek that there ‘is a sense in which we are full believers in the theology of the intellect and the theology of the heart’. A man in his study may convince himself that ‘matter has no existence’, but when he returns to the world he resumes ‘his normal state’ and believes in the existence of a material world like other men. Thus, ‘really good and devout men may spin out a theory which to their understanding seems true and

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consistent, but which they believe only as long as their pen is in hand. Both Park and Hodge saw the other as stuck in place: if Hodge still confused poetry and prose, Park still confused language and reality.

Princeton’s alternative historical narrative of an Augustinian and an anti-Augustinian line was only one of numerous schemes competing for authenticity in capturing the New England theology. One notable effort that supplemented Park’s own work was undertaken by Park’s colleague, Enoch Pond. His frequent writings on theology were typically in a more popular vein than were Park’s, often appearing first as articles in the denominational magazine, *The Congregationalist*, and not originating in scholarly journals (though sometimes reprinted there). The guiding spirit of the Congregationalists’ northern outpost at Bangor Seminary in Maine, Pond shared with Park an affection for placing their common revival Hopkinsianism in a historical context. He did not publish his major work, *Sketches of the Theological History of New England*, until 1880, even though it represented articles originally appearing in the 1840s and 1850s. Pond’s historical narrative began with a point of reference older than that typically employed by Edwards Park, but his efforts formed a united front with Park’s construction of New England theology. Pond chronicled the moral declension in New England that had been occasioned by the Half-Way Covenant and Stoddardism. The advent of Jonathan Edwards’s revivals in Northampton halted and then reversed the decline, as Edwards ‘and a select few who trained under his influence’ were engaged in

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‘first, restoring the New England theology to something like its original state; and, secondly, in improving upon this theology, in some of its modes of presentation and defence’. It is certain that ‘they held the same great doctrines with their fathers’, but they did not stop at mere restoration and were willing to attempt any ‘improvement in the way of statement, explanation, or defence’—the work of improvement followed naturally from the work of restoration.\textsuperscript{66}

For Pond, as in Park’s own work, Samuel Hopkins is the key link between Jonathan Edwards and the New Divinity party: ‘no man was better qualified than he [to explain] the connection of the early Hopkinsians with Pres. Edwards’ and to certify the fact ‘that Edwards did attempt some improvements upon the theology of the older Calvinists’ in seeking to ‘place some things in a clearer and fairer light’.\textsuperscript{67} This Edwardsean core of practical theology proved to be flexible enough, in Pond’s view, to admit ‘of some diversity of statement and explanation’, and served as a platform for the momentous events of 1808. The merger of the Old Calvinist \textit{Panoplist} with the Hopkinsian \textit{Missionary Magazine} that year, and the contemporaneous founding of Andover seminary itself, illustrated an underlying unity in rural Massachusetts. Andover, the signature theological project, was the work of ‘a united body’: ‘All were Calvinists, in a modified sense….they were agreed on all important points, and wherein they differed, they were tacidly [sic] pledged to a mutual toleration’.\textsuperscript{68} Proof of the power of this underlying theology was that ‘this is the theology which has been preached in nearly all our revivals during the last sixty or seventy years, which has filled up our churches with

\textsuperscript{67} Pond, \textit{Sketches of the Theological History of New England}, p. 37.
\textsuperscript{68} Pond, \textit{Sketches of the Theological History of New England}, pp. 53-60.
young and active members, which has aroused and sustained the spirit of missions, which has fostered and directed nearly all the charitable enterprises of the day’. It is ‘not Old Calvinism on the one hand, nor high Hopkinsianism on the other’, but retains ‘the better, the more essential parts of both’. For Pond, as for Park, the final validation of a Hopkinsian exercise line was its practical success in promoting revival—this was always the best test for true Edwardseans. Even if Park’s own historical frame generally ignored the century before Edwards, as Pond had not, Park and Pond laboured in concert to produce a coherent historical narrative: a story of spiritual revitalisation beginning with Edwards and continued by the Hopkinsians—a story that, even as it was created, traditionalised and thus authenticated their particular New England theology.

Edwards Park had lobbied for his own historical synthesis by wrapping New England theology in the folds of Edwards’s mantle of authority. But two could play at that game, and it was Princeton’s habit to challenge Park’s historical narrative with a dramatic counter-narrative—the story of the New Divinity betrayal of Edwards himself. Charles Hodge had offered this argument in brief in the last of his exchanges with Park over the Convention sermon. By presenting itself as Edwards’s legitimate historical successor, Princeton would in effect rescue Edwards from the New Divinity party, so that ‘the New Divinity men are not, as they and their friends often contend, the true

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69 Pond, *Sketches of the Theological History of New England*, pp. 74-75. This identification with a broad spectrum of New England Calvinism was an important authenticating criterion for the New Divinity. A reviewer in the *New Englander* remarked: ‘It is refreshing to see how little, and yet how creditable to New England, the real and intelligible difference is, between the Westminster formulas and the New England theology….the underlying doctrine on both sides is essentially the same, while the difference is chiefly in the mode of stating and explaining that doctrine’; see [Anon.], ‘Review of *The Theology of New England, by David Wallace, with an Introduction by Daniel Dana, D.D.*’, NE 14 (1856), p. 470.
successors or heirs either to [Edwards’s] philosophy or theology’.\textsuperscript{70} As early as 1839 the \textit{Princeton Review} had blasted the New Divinity for misappropriation: ‘Taking the premises of the great Edwards, they deduced a system of false theology, which under its first phase as Hopkinsianism, and under its second phase as Taylorism, has been to our church the \textit{fons et origo malorum} and which…has assumed the name of Calvinism to betray it to its enemies’.\textsuperscript{71} One useful and oft repeated tactic of the betrayal narrative employed Pelagian Taylorism as a charge against the Hopkinsians, asserting that New Haven theology ‘developed out of the novel elements previously introduced into New England theology’.\textsuperscript{72} Thus, if the New Divinity men had ‘furnished the germs of those peculiarities which constituted the essence of [Taylor’s] system’, they were co-conspirators ‘assailing, not merely Hopkinsianism and Emmonsism, but the whole Augustinian and Calvinistic system’.\textsuperscript{73} The betrayal thesis long retained its power at Princeton. Lyman Atwater (1813-1883), co-editor for a time of the \textit{Princeton Review} with Charles Hodge, was still making this case on the eve of the Civil War: ‘We propose to prove that Edwards held and devoted his labours to prove the doctrines commonly know as Old Calvinism.’ Atwater was confident that it was ‘easy to show…that the distinctive form of New Divinity, in all its successive forms, [is] utterly repugnant to his entire system’. The usurpers ‘connect the name of Edwards with a set of opinions which he gained his chief celebrity in demolishing’.\textsuperscript{74} Edwards’s posthumous approbation was

\textsuperscript{70} [Anon.,] ‘Reply to the \textit{New Englander} for August, 1860’, \textit{BRPR} \text{32} (1860), p. 768.
\textsuperscript{72} Lyman Atwater, ‘Jonathan Edwards and the Successive Forms of New Divinity’, \textit{BRPR} \text{30} (1858), p. 608.
\textsuperscript{73} Lyman Atwater, ‘Dr. Taylor’s \textit{Lectures on the Moral Government of God}’, \textit{BRPR} \text{31} (1859), p. 493.
\textsuperscript{74} Atwater, ‘Jonathan Edwards and the Successive Forms of New Divinity’, p. 589.
still worth battling for well after mid-century, as Edwards Park and Princeton were well aware.

It was yet another part of Princeton’s strategy to insist that Edwards was not in fact an innovator at all, but part of an older stream of Reformed orthodoxy. Atwater presses the example of the famous distinction between natural and moral ability. Some ‘claim that Edwards was the inventor of this distinction; that it is the distinguishing characteristic and special property of his followers; that they therefore are the true Edwardeans, because they are the patrons and inheritors of this, his grand discovery in theology’. It can easily ‘be shown, however, 1. That whatever of truth was connected with this distinction was familiar to theologians…before the time of Edwards’ and ‘2. That Edwards did not regard himself as introducing any novel doctrines or discourses on the subject’. In fact, the historical record supports the traditional Old Calvinist understanding of natural depravity—Atwater cites Bernard, Turretin, Pictet, Owen, Bellamy, and Dwight: ‘They meant a rooted propensity to evil, and aversion to good; a moral bias, which man has not the requisite power to remove’. In this manner

75 Of course, this strategy, too, can be stood on its head to support the New Divinity innovations: see [Anon.,] ‘Ellis on the Unitarian Controversy’, NE 16 (1858), p. 517: ‘Surely, Dr. Ellis ought not to be ignorant that these opinions [challenging Old Calvinism] have been freely canvassed for centuries…that in New England itself and among the Orthodoxy, there were schools of theologians, long before the Unitarian division, who did not accept all that Calvin and the Westminster divines inculcated, and that Prof. Park and Dr. Edward Beecher are not the first theologians in New England who took exception to some positions in the old theology’.

76 Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1153), a French Cistercian abbot and theologian; Francis Turretin (1623-1687), Calvinistic Scholastic theologian; Benedict Pictet (1655-1724), Swiss Reformed theologian; John Owen (1611-1683), English Puritan minister and theologian.

77 Lyman Atwater, ‘Modern Explanations of the Doctrine of Inability [Review of The Inability of the Sinner to comply with the Gospel, his inexcusable guilt in not complying with it, and the consistency of these with each other…by John Smalley, D.D. (New York, 1811)]’, BRPR 26 (1854), pp. 236, 246. Atwater quotes Andrew Fuller on inability: ‘We suppose that the propensities of mankind to evil are so strong as to become invincible to every thing but omnipotent grace’ [Works of Andrew Fuller (Boston, 1833), p. 486], p. 242.
Princeton, no friend to innovation at any time, filed a counter-suit against the New Divinity narrative of which Edwards Park was the foremost proponent.

One proven technique in the betrayal scheme crafted by Princeton and the wider Old Calvinist party was the assertion that the power of the New Divinity clerics came not from their improvements but from the very places where they relied on old truths. Ezra Stiles, President of Yale, set the pattern as early as 1781, observing that, ‘although New Divinity preachers collect some large congregations in some parts…their preaching is acceptable, not for the new tenets, but for its containing the good old doctrines of grace, on which the new gentlemen are very sound, and, clear, and full’. Lyman Atwater agreed that ‘most of the preachers who adopted this system [New Divinity] were indeed earnest supporters of some of the high doctrines of grace, and set them forth in preaching with remarkable distinctiveness and force’. But this force ‘was due to the old truths, not to the new discoveries they proclaimed: which…were an incumbrance and a clog to their usefulness’. This technique cleverly turned the Hopkinsians’ strategy on its head: if the New Divinity clerics had repeatedly stressed that their theological positions were vindicated by success, the Old Calvinists co-opted that success by claiming it to be the product of their old tried-and-true principles.

Perhaps the subtlest strategy for undermining the New Divinity authority was to agree to the designation ‘Edwardean’ as long as it meant the younger of the two Edwards. Atwater asked, ‘What is meant by “Edwardean theology”? Was it the theology of

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78 Ezra Stiles, Diary, 1781, cited in EAP, Memoir of Hopkins, pp. 107-108 [emphasis in original].
Edwards, or Edwards the son and his confederates and successors? As late as 1860, when Park’s lengthy essay on the atonement appeared, the *Princeton Review* continued to work this dismissive angle: ‘This book…does not pretend to give the theory of Edwards, but of his successors, and especially of his son’. There is, therefore, ‘some historical propriety in the designation [Edwardean], but as it is adapted [by Park] to mislead, it is on that account to be regretted’. This genealogical brush-off was one of a set of techniques used by Princeton and its allies to craft a historical narrative that reclaimed Jonathan Edwards from the New Divinity usurpers and in so doing validated an alternative set of theological propositions to those endorsed by Park’s historical narrative.

By the time Benjamin B. Warfield (1851-1921)—last in the imposing line of theologians at Princeton that began with Archibald Alexander (1772-1851) and included both Charles Hodge and his son, A. A. Hodge (1823-1886)—turned his hand early in the twentieth century to a summary of Edwardsean theology, the Princeton story-line was well fixed. Warfield runs the argument through its paces very capably: the system to which Edwards ‘gave his sincere adhesion, and to the defense of which, against the tendencies which were in his day threatening to undermine it, he consecrated all his powers, was simply Calvinism’. From this ‘system as it had been expounded by its chief representatives he did not consciously depart in any of its constitutive elements’. Sadly, it was ‘Edwards’ misfortune that he gave his name to a party; and to a party which, never in perfect agreement with him in its doctrinal ideas, finished by becoming the earnest advocate of…“a set of opinions which he gained his chief celebrity in demolishing”

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[quoting Atwater].

For Warfield, it was indeed ‘a far cry from Jonathan Edwards the Calvinist…to Nathaniel W. Taylor the Pelagianizer, building his system upon the doctrine of the power to the contrary, and reducing all virtue ultimately to self-love’. But the logical terminus in Taylor developed from the improvements of the New Divinity men, so that Emmonsism, for example, confining ‘all moral quality to acts of volition…afterwards became a leading element’ in Taylor’s system. Hopkinsianism—primarily responsible for a ‘perversion of Edwards’ distinction between “natural” and “moral” inability so as to ground on the “natural” ability of the unregenerate’—promoted a ‘theory of the capacities and duties of men without the Spirit’ which afterwards, in the hands of Taylor, became ‘the core of a new Pelagianizing system’—in sum, ‘the native sinlessness of the race, the plenary ability of the sinner to renovate his own soul, and self-love or the desire for happiness as the spring of all voluntary action’. In this logical sequence, then, Warfield’s increasingly noxious curve runs from Edwards through Bellamy, Hopkins, West, Edwards, Jr, Emmons, and Dwight to Taylor. Even at such a late date, Warfield demonstrates the essential features of Princeton’s historical counter-narrative: the misappropriation of Edwards the true Calvinist, the infection of Hopkinsian ‘exercise’ improvements, the fatal climax in Taylorism—even an echo of old Atwater is retained for good effect.

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Warfield’s sad story of ‘Pelagianizing’ actually closes with Edwards Park—but it does so in a manner which suggests that Park’s strategy with Charles Hodge in 1851 (featuring the tactical appearance of a ‘corrupt nature’\(^{84}\)) may have had the long-term effect at Princeton of making Park seem somewhat distant from Nathaniel W. Taylor. Warfield describes Park so reacting to the ‘extreme’ of Taylor ‘as to return to perhaps a somewhat more deterministic doctrine of the will’, being ‘of that line of theological descent which came through Hopkins, Emmons, and Woods’. This movement allowed Park ‘to rise above Taylor in his doctrines of election and regeneration, and to give the general type of thought [Park] represented a lease of life for another generation’.\(^{85}\) Warfield’s analysis confirms the wisdom of Park’s strategy in 1851—some distance from Taylor was both prudent and accurate.

Princeton’s alternative historical scheme was not the only challenge to Park’s narrative from the standpoint of a more traditional view of Calvinism. Closer to Andover, an Edwardsean party based at the Theological Institute of Connecticut—established in East Windsor, Edwards’s birthplace, and founded in 1834 to resist the entrenched Taylorism at Yale—constructed its own distinctive history intended to demonstrate that the trajectory from Edwards in New England involved a true line and a false one: the former generally the ‘tasters’ who understood native depravity, and the latter, the ‘exercisers’ who did not.\(^{86}\) East Windsor occupied a theological middle ground between Princeton and Andover. It affirmed many of the traditional Calvinist formulations of

\(^{86}\) See the discussion on ‘exercisers’ and ‘tasters’ in Chapter One, pp. 17-19.
Princeton while remaining solidly in the camp of revivalist Edwardseanism. Thus, they were revivalist Calvinists who were pointedly not Hopkinsians, and who rejected Hopkinsian departures from total depravity, imputation, the federal headship of Adam, the use of means, and other suspect innovations. In their dramaturgy, the true line of descent from Edwards ran through Joseph Bellamy to Bennet Tyler, the founder of the seminary. Tyler was an opponent of Taylor in the highly-visible ‘Taylor-Tyler Controversy’ beginning in the mid-1830s and continuing sporadically throughout the antebellum period, where Tyler maintained that New Haven theology had subverted the very foundations of historic Calvinism. As in Princeton’s view, the supposition that Taylor was the logical end-point of the exercise scheme clearly established that the extreme trajectory of Emmonsism must be in the line of the pretenders to Edwards’s crown. The defining element of the true line found in Edwards and then Bellamy was a commitment to innate depravity (‘tasters’ and not ‘exercisers’), though—unlike Princeton—with room for natural ability in order to drive Edwardsean revivalism, and—unlike New Haven—without losing Calvinist moral inability. Their seminary journal, the American Theological Review, described its purpose as intending ‘to represent what is familiarly know as the Old School of the New England theology,’ in order to act as an ‘intermediate between the extreme views and tendencies on either hand’—that is, the Old School Congregationalists stood between Old Calvinists opposed to revival and Hopkinsians opposed to old Calvinism.

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Edwards Park, in this scheme, represented the exercise extreme that had departed from Jonathan Edwards’s traditional theology. East Windsor’s Parsons Cooke, reviewing Park’s *The Atonement: Discourses and Treatises* (1859), charged that Park had ‘gone far to enucleate the paradox of Edwardeanism against Edwards’, to the point of demonstrating ‘how the progeny have devoured the parent’. Park in *The Atonement* traces ‘the line of Edwardean succession…and makes it terminate in himself and those like him, who hold views on material points, as he himself shows, opposite to those of the earlier Edwards’. There can be ‘no doubt that the true Edwardeans are in direct opposition with the new Edwardeans’. Cooke is certain that the unnamed Convention sermon is suspect: it is by ‘a play on figurative language, more than any other means, that there has sprung up a system of Edwardeanism, in opposition to Edwards and Calvinism’. Park’s own goal, of course, had been a streamlining of a core tradition in his New England theology so that it could repel just such a division as East Windsor’s between tasters and exercisers: in Park’s words, ‘idle, idle is the …attempt to draw a line of demarcation between the elder Edwards, Bellamy, on one side, and the younger Edwards, Emmons, West, on the other’. Where Park employed the unity of the artefact he crafted to augment its authority, East Windsor (like Princeton) created a historical framework that used division to establish the authority of their view.

Edward A. Lawrence (1808-1883), professor at East Windsor and son-in-law of Leonard Woods, produced the most substantial of all the conservative

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Congregationalists’ narratives. He defined the history of New England theology by drawing a longer arc than Park, reaching back beyond the time of Edwards to the proper point of origin ‘one hundred and thirty years…earlier’.\textsuperscript{92} Thus, Lawrence used the historical timeframe of Enoch Pond in order to establish a very different conclusion. In Lawrence’s view, going back only to ‘“the time of Edwards” comprehends historically but a fraction of the New England theology, and therefore allows only a partial view of the subject’. This longer historical view of New England theology ‘cannot accept [Edwards] as the \textit{father} or founder….It is older than Edwards, and made him, and not he it. It is the parent and he is the offspring.’\textsuperscript{93} Thus, what is called the ‘Edwardean Period’ in Lawrence’s scheme dates from the revivals under Edwards and Whitefield, and constitutes a recovery of the older New England truths after a period of decline under the Half-Way Covenant. Edwardseanism in this longer historical frame is ‘the reaction of the pure old New England Theology against an enfeebling amalgam of Pelagian, Socinian, and Arminian elements’. Edwards’s own doctrine was simply ‘the doctrine of the chief fathers of the New England churches’.\textsuperscript{94} For example, Edwards ‘held steadfastly to the doctrine of imputation, both of Adam’s sin and of Christ’s righteousness—to “the two federal heads”’. Edwards, then, ‘in the elaborate and masterly defence of the “Calvinistic Divinity,” was unquestionably with the Old and against the New’.\textsuperscript{95} For Lawrence the

\textsuperscript{92} EAP, ‘New England Theology’, p. 174; Lawrence, ‘New England Theology Historically Considered’, p. 211. Lawrence had a very good Old Calvinist precedent for this strategy: Richard D. Birdsall comments that ‘[Ezra] Stiles developed an Old Calvinist position which was supposedly as evangelical as the New Divinity but without its stern doctrine. He would summon New Englanders to forget the Great Awakening and re-unite on the solid ground of the original New England Puritanism of Hooker, Shepard and Cotton.’; see Richard D. Birdsall, ‘Ezra Stiles versus the New Divinity Men’, \textit{American Quarterly} 17 (1965), p. 257, and the discussion of the Old Calvinists in Chapter One, pp. 12-13.

\textsuperscript{93} Lawrence, ‘New England Theology Historically Considered’, pp. 210-211 [emphasis in original].

\textsuperscript{94} E[ward] A. Lawrence, ‘New England Theology: The Edwardean Period’, \textit{ATR} 3 (1861), pp. 37, 45.

\textsuperscript{95} Lawrence, ‘New England Theology: The Edwardean Period’, pp. 59-60, 64.
line of biblical theology in New England, that ‘adheres to the doctrine of hereditary moral
depravity’, runs from ‘the founding of the colonies’ to ‘Edwards and Bellamy’, and on to
‘Woods…and Tyler’ in the nineteenth century. It is designated the ‘Old School’ by
Lawrence ‘because of its adherence to the old Puritan theology, as set forth in our
confessions and maintained by the elder Edwards, and to distinguish it from certain
“improvements,” called “new theology,” of which Dr. Taylor was, at his death, the….ablest representative’. Lawrence intends to make the polemical point that neither
non-revival Calvinism nor revivalist non-Calvinism is any more genuinely Calvinistic
than genuinely Edwardsean.96

Lawrence joins Princeton in explicitly limiting the propriety of the notion of
‘development’ in theology. If New England theology to Park had been a record of
continuous improvements that brought new and coherent representational forms to a sub-
stratum of older truths, Lawrence rejected ‘processes of spontaneous generation…by
speculatists [sic]’. The ‘legitimate church doctrine is all in the Bible, and has always
been there’. The church does not ‘add to her wealth, but she [becomes] more and more
aware of that wealth’. The long history of doctrine breaks into ‘two great families in
theology…the believing and the speculative’.97 If the ‘New theology claims to be an
improvement upon the Old’, the Old finds ‘its substantive doctrines in the Old and New
Testaments, which cannot be improved’.98 The true Edwardsean line can be traced from
Plymouth Rock to East Windsor, passing through Edwards, Bellamy, Woods, and Tyler
in an unbroken stream of commitment to native depravity, by contrast to the ‘exercise’

line running through Hopkins and Emmons to Taylor. In Lawrence’s view, Park traces an inadequate and misleading history because his very authenticating device—finding the origin of New Divinity improvements in Edwards—provokes the error of looking back no further than Edwards.99

Edward Beecher wrote in 1853 in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* that the New England theologians ‘were engaged in a common work’. In ‘order to take a consistent view of the great whole they aimed to effect,’ it was necessary ‘to arrange in historical relations their particular works’.100 This great arrangement was particularly the labour of Edwards Amasa Park. He developed a flexible rhetorical device that allowed him to define a particular and comprehensive New England theology that he hoped would appeal to

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many throughout the evangelical world. But Park’s natural bent towards adaptability in both matter and manner occasioned great anxiety on the part of those theological conservatives who identified Park’s stratagems as poor cover for incipient heterodoxy. Charles Hodge of Princeton suspected as early as 1840 that Park’s ‘affectation of expressing a familiar truth in a philosophical form’, might in fact be ‘something far worse’—in effect, a contradiction of the ‘primary doctrines of the word of God’. Hodge asserted that the ‘disposition to hide the truths in the mists of philosophical language…is peculiarly characteristic of [Professor Park’s] writings’. Hodge is certain that this error in general ‘has its origin in German philosophy’. But it would be more accurate to see that Park’s work ought to be assessed not in the philosophical context of continental idealism but in the consequences of his (and Hodge’s) Scottish realism. The crucial analysis in this regard came from the New School Presbyterian Henry B. Smith.

Smith’s pivotal article appeared in 1862 on the occasion of a new edition of the collected works of Nathanael Emmons that included an extended biographical essay by Park. It has already been seen in this chapter that significant portions of Smith’s essay were a pointed criticism of Park’s method of rounding off the sharper edges of Emmons for the sake of easing him smoothly into the Hopkinsian line of historical progression from Edwards. But Smith’s review moved beyond its immediate subject and became a critique of the tectonic shifts in epistemology that had taken place after Emmons’s death and that underlay signal developments in New England like Nathaniel W. Taylor’s New

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102 HBS, ‘The Theological System of Emmons’, pp. 7-53. Mark Noll calls this article ‘still one of the most impressive essays ever written on New England theology’; see Noll, America’s God, pp. 287-289 [the quotation is from p. 287].
103 See the discussion in this chapter, pp. 221-222.
Haven theology. Emmons had built on Edwards’s principle of God’s continual creation a Calvinist ideality that held together God’s sovereignty (direct divine efficiency, against the Arminians) and man’s moral responsibility (exercise, against the antinomians). Common sense realism broke the link that joined the two by asserting a substantial world in which human action proceeded no longer immediately from God’s will but deliberatively from man’s, for, in Smith’s view, ‘the whole state of the case was entirely altered, when Berkeleianism was supplanted by the Scotch philosophy’. The exercise scheme ‘was cut loose from its Calvinistic moorings; it was divorced from the divine efficiency’. In effect, ‘the human will…took the place of the divine will’. Smith maintained that the necessary consequence of a shift from an idealist to a realist epistemology within evangelicalism was a dire transfer of sovereignty from God to man.

Although Smith’s trenchant evaluation had as its immediate occasion Park’s biographical essay on Emmons, and though Park shared with Taylor a commitment to Scottish common sense, one must be careful not to use this apparent conjunction to identify either Park’s views comprehensively with Taylor’s or Smith’s critique exhaustively with Park. Edwards Park sought to negotiate a difficulty that neither Smith nor New Haven theology found of great interest—to remain committed to Jonathan Edwards’s older volitional model of the will and still consider for the sake of apologetic

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105 Unfortunately, Park did not respond to Smith’s criticisms until 1878, and only then obliquely, when he reviewed in the Bibliotheca Sacra a collection of Smith’s essays that included the Emmons article from 1861 [HBS, Faith and Philosophy; Discourses and Essays by Henry B. Smith (New York: Scribner, Armstrong, 1877)]. Park’s favourable review only alluded to Emmons in remarking that ‘Some of Professor’s Smith’s opinions, particularly in regard to Dr. Emmons, we are far from adopting’; see EAP, ‘Review of H. B. Smith’s Faith and Philosophy’, BS 35 (1878), pp. 200-202. The quotation is on p. 202.
relevance what might be usefully borrowed—for example, ‘certainty, with power to the contrary’—from Taylor’s formulations. This position was a difficult one for Park to maintain (Smith might argue it was an impossible one), because one set of his own presuppositions—the epistemology drawn from Scottish realism—was certainly in favour of an intellectualist position in which a neutral will deliberates without the influence of motives. Park acknowledged as much to his Andover students: the ‘self-determining power means that a man does act without influence of motive’.

Park, however, remained aligned with Jonathan Edwards’s celebrated assertion in Freedom of the Will (1754) that ‘the will always is as the greatest apparent good’—that is, that the will is a simple extension of the mind’s perception of the strongest motive. Park’s lectures at Andover in 1856 enumerated twenty-three points and sub-points to establish soundly the heading ‘Reasons for the proposition that the will is as the greatest apparent good’. Park could not remain self-consciously Edwardsean and at the same time forsake Edwards’s simpler volitional model of the will for Taylor’s more contemporary structure, even if Taylor’s intellectualist model followed directly from the epistemology Park and Taylor shared. Park’s restatement of Edwardsean Calvinism within the frame of Scottish realism could not be undertaken with entire consistency if he were to remain loyal to Jonathan Edwards.

Smith, too, recognised that Nathanael Emmons’s clear repudiation of ‘the current doctrine of self-determination, of self-originated choice’ proceeded from the fact that,

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106 For example, see [EAP,] Guild, ‘Notes’, vol. III, p. 186.
107 See the discussion in this regard in Chapter Two, pp. 74-89.
110 See [EAP,] Guild, ‘Notes’, vol. III, pp. 239-244.
with Edwards, Emmons ‘identifies will and volition’. By contrast, in Smith’s view, the ‘new scheme’ by ‘affirming self-determination’ is ‘unfaithful to the real spirit of Emmons’: it ‘demands a pause…between the divine agency and man’s act, so that man may have a chance to choose’. Specifically, in the New Haven system—what Smith provocatively calls ‘Modern Hopkinsianism’—‘Dr. Taylor’ and ‘his Scotch psychology demanded a pause…to give the faculties of the soul a chance to work out the volition’.  

Park recognised in his Andover lectures that ‘the main if not the sole object of Pres. Edwards is to show that the will is not in a state of equilibrium—but is such that it will certainly act one way—viz. according to the greatest apparent good’.  

Thus, Smith had shown that a loyal disciple of Edwards like Park could not simultaneously embrace both Emmons and Taylor.

It may well be that Smith is correct in showing that the metaphysical shift to Scottish realism was fatal to the continuation of Jonathan Edwards’s ideal, theocentric vision. It may also be true that Edwards Park’s struggle to hold his ground on the Edwardsean volitional model in the midst of such a significant epistemological and anthropological phase-change was doomed to failure, particularly as Park identified with much of the change except as it challenged his fealty to Edwards and Edwards’s immediate successors. Park may have been no subscriber to ideality, especially in Edwards’s transcendent form, and this may have handicapped his efforts to extend Edwards’s theology in a new century, but neither was Park the thorough-going

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intellectualist of Taylor’s breed whom Smith asserts is required by Scottish realism. To argue in such a fashion is to make the part stand misleadingly for the whole.

Edwards Park had been engaged in theological trench-warfare from at least 1839, when Princeton charged him with the errors of German pantheism, until 1861 when Yale accused him of cutting the claws off Nathanael Emmons. Yet, for all the controversies, the many combatants largely shared the same fundamental presuppositions in method and epistemology. Whether one defended Andover, Princeton, East Windsor or Yale, the mode of the doctrinal arguments was essentially the same: all parties operated from an Enlightenment framework of rational propositions, empirical evidence and Scottish common sense perspicuity. This realist epistemological nexus had effectively established boundaries for theological debate in the antebellum period that were widely observed. In this arena, Edwards Park was a capable and indefatigable combatant among his own contemporaries.

The content of Park’s published work after the Civil War at first suggested a turn from the battles of the antebellum period. Park devoted his quarterly allocation in the Bibliotheca Sacra to largely practical concerns. Hundreds of pages were devoted to homiletic advice as opposed to rhetorical principles: would a sermon be better read or memorised? Homiletics had been a feature of sacred rhetoric at Andover since Park had trained under Ebenezer Porter in 1830, just as it had been a part of George

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Campbell’s and Hugh Blair’s New Rhetoric, and Park—now in his sixties and often in poor health—no longer deployed rhetorical weapons as a controversialist. But Andover seminary was changing around him. Despite Park’s protests, the faculty adopted a new curricular plan, the Parallel Course—an alternative curriculum minimising biblical studies in favour of religious studies—which was implemented fitfully throughout the late 1860s. The old plan had required every seminarian to spend his entire second year of three in systematic theology with Park. Thus Park took the change as a personal and professional affront, reporting to the Academy trustees that ‘the plan is, in my opinion, injurious to the Seminary and particularly injurious to me’.  

Frank Hugh Foster, Park’s student and the candidate hand-picked by Park to succeed him in the Abbot chair in 1881, failed to be appointed to the post. Park had only his frustration to take with him into retirement.

Young professors had arrived who did not share Park’s traditional orthodoxy. Most of the new class of faculty had been Park’s own students after the Civil War: William Tucker, Andover class of 1866, John Churchill, class of 1868, George Harris, class of 1869, and Edward Hincks, class of 1870. Egbert Smyth (resident licentiate at Andover in 1855) was appointed in 1863 to replace W. G. T. Shedd in church history and served as president of the faculty from 1877 to 1896. These younger Andover liberals operated from a very different set of assumptions from their old mentor. Smyth promoted

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115 EAP, ‘Report to the Board of Visitors’, 1866 (MS in the Archives of Phillips Academy), p. 4.
117 Most had exposure to German scholarship: Hincks studied at Berlin and Göttingen, Smyth at Berlin and Halle, Churchill had travelled widely in Europe. Tucker was the founder of the early settlement house, Andover House (named for the seminary) in Boston, and later served as president of Dartmouth. See J. Earl Thompson, Jr, ‘The Andover Liberals as Theological Educators’, Andover-Newton Quarterly 8 (1968), p. 203, n. 9.
118 See the General Catalogue of the Theological Seminary, pp. 14, 276.
an organic and developmental notion of sacred history that left it largely indistinguishable from the secular discipline, arguing that ‘theology is a growth, and should be studied as a growth’.\footnote{119} He described faith as founded not on ‘historical and rational grounds…important as these are in their place’, but on an immanent ‘witness of the Spirit’.\footnote{120} Newman Smyth (Andover class of 1867), Egbert’s brother and minister of historic First Church in New Haven (formerly the parish of Nathaniel W. Taylor), described the New England theology, by contrast, ‘especially as taught by Professor Park, to be an orthodox rationalism….My brother Egbert’s lectures on the ante-Nicene development of the doctrine of the Trinity led me to a truer conception of the possible development of theology—a living, expanding development’.\footnote{121} He argued in the \textit{Presbyterian Review} in 1882 that ‘the psychology underlying and coloring the so-called New England theology has been more rationalistic than its advocates have been aware’. The older theology was ‘too analytical and individualistic—an atomistic rather than an organic science of the mind’.\footnote{122} The Andover liberals were avid believers in progress and science, but they rejected outdated Enlightenment forms as rationalistic, mechanistic and individualistic.

The incarnation replaced the atonement as the organising principle of this new naturalistic theology. Newman Smyth argued that ‘the Incarnation is the final and perfect revelation of the whole God to the whole universe’. In an unmistakable echo of Horace Bushnell’s communitarianism, Smyth suggested that the old religious scheme—

conversionist and revivalistic—produced an ‘untenable individualism’ that neglected ‘the truth of the immanence of God’. If Park’s older New England theology was rationalistic, individualistic, legal and mechanical, the new Andover faculty increasingly favoured fresh religious expressions that were developmental, organic, immanent, incarnational and communal: ‘Rationalism has had its hour, Naturalism is having its day. Up on the horizon of our times are many signs that doubt is clearing off, and the promise of a fairer, brighter day to-morrow.’ If ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ in 1850 had suggested that Park’s affective sensibility might be a glimpse on his part of this brighter future, the liberals did not in fact make use of the sermon’s methodology nor did they find its underlying theology any more convincing for all of Park’s careful distinctions between propositional and metaphorical truth.

The Andover liberals’ wholesale embrace of naturalistic evolutionary models constituted, in their view, an entire rejection of Park’s older epistemology. Newman Smyth argued that Scottish realism was ‘out of relation to modern evolutionary thought, and fails to meet fully the demands of a scientific method in theology’. But it was a mistake to assume that Park (and most of his contemporaries) simply rejected evolution out of hand. Park himself had a very high view of science and the scientific enterprise, and he was pleased to call theology ‘a progressive science’, taking the part of those who ‘cherish a liberal faith in the possibility of improving our standard theological

systems’.127 His concomitant understanding of New England theology as a ‘harmonious development of ideas which had been confused’ was clearly not in and of itself threatened by an evolutionary fashion.128 Park gave substantial space in the Bibliotheca Sacra to George F. Wright’s articles evaluating Darwinism in the light of both science and theology.129 Wright was at the time a Congregational minister in Andover with theological training from Oberlin and an expertise in geology, particularly in glaciation. It was not at all remarkable, in Wright’s view, that the ‘gradual development of revelation and its spread by natural agencies…fall in with expectations of the scientific bent of mind which has constructed the Darwinian theory’. Wright was happy to give credit to Darwin as ‘a painstaking modern interpreter of nature’ for his scientific explanation of secondary causes.130

Moreover, neither Wright’s nor Park’s view of scripture required them to defend the Bible from any valid advances in scientific knowledge: the Bible simply did not pretend to be a scientific book. Park told his seminarians in 1874 that the doctrine of inspiration did ‘not affirm or deny that the statements of the Bible with regard to

130 Wright, ‘Science and Religion: Some Analogies Between Calvinism and Darwinism’, pp. 49, 75.
scientific truths are true…[The] Bible was not given to teach Geology, Astronomy, Nat[ural] Hist[ory], but to teach the Atonement….the Bible was given for religious truth’.

Moreover, the Bible’s scientific content was merely fitted in good rhetorical style to its original audience. Park had asserted before an earlier group of students that it ‘was best that the sacred writers should comply with the scientific notions of their day’. It was in fact entirely possible, Park explained, that in the long run the ‘advance of science may show the entire consistency of scientific truth with all that the writers of the Bible meant to attest’. Thus, it is misleading for Frank Hugh Foster to observe that regarding ‘the new theory of evolution…Professor Park observed a scarcely interrupted silence upon it’. In fact, Park told his seminarians that he had taken the trouble to ‘reorganize [his] lectures,’ so that the opening set of class questions might relate to Darwinism.

If Park did not actively champion Darwinism itself as did the younger Andover faculty, he would at the same time not necessarily reject its scientific accomplishments nor fail to identify with aspects of its developmental character.

Initially, the specific doctrinal point of contention at the seminary between the liberal and conservative factions was the question of ‘future’ or ‘second’ probation. It seemed to the liberal party that a permanent divine retribution did not well reflect God’s benevolent love. Newman Smyth, for one, tendered the hypothesis that those who had not

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133 Foster, A Genetic History of the New England Theology, p. 475.
135 George Marsden makes a similar observation about Henry Boynton Smith: He ‘opposed Darwin’s materialistic assumptions until the end of his life. But, characteristically he refused to condemn all theories of development through evolution…Progress was an integral part of Smith’s theological system’; see Marsden, The Evangelical Mind and the New School Presbyterian Experience: A Case Study of Thought and Theology in Nineteenth-Century America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 179.
known Christ in this life would have the opportunity to accept him in the next—a future probation.\textsuperscript{136} The fact that Smyth had been nominated to succeed Edwards Park in the Abbot chair in 1881 energised the conservative party within Congregationalism to condemn his views as heretical and to challenge his ability to subscribe honestly to the seminary’s Associate Creed as stipulated (though the creed made no specific mention of the theory of future probation).\textsuperscript{137} Park’s own view of the question was unambiguous, as one might expect from an unrepentant Hopkinsian who insisted on moral accountability: ‘no men who have persevered in sin through this life will ever obtain their pardon in a future life….We cannot love the atonement unless we love the law which the atonement was designed to honor’.\textsuperscript{138} Eventually the seminary’s Board of Visitors—the three-member panel established originally to protect Hopkinsian doctrinal interests, who still held a veto over the Academy trustees’ appointment to this particular chair—rejected Smyth’s candidacy by a two-to-one vote.\textsuperscript{139}

The probation crisis fuelled the ongoing disagreement over a larger question concerning the role of the Associate Creed itself. What did it actually mean to subscribe to its propositions? The Andover liberals brought all their progressive sensibilities to bear

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\textsuperscript{138} EAP, \textit{A Discourse Preached at the Installation of Rev. Horace H. Leavitt as Pastor of the Trinitarian Congregational Church, at North Andover, Massachusetts} (Boston: Congregational Sunday-School and Publishing Society, 1882), pp. 4-5.

\textsuperscript{139} The conservative victory over Smyth’s rejection was hard-won and short-lived. The Visitors’ decision was so evasively reasoned that it provided no future guidance: Smyth’s liberal fellow, George Harris, was soon appointed to the Abbot chair in 1883 in any case, and served as president of the faculty from 1896 to 1899; see the \textit{General Catalogue of the Theological Seminary}, p. 14. See also Rowe, \textit{History of Andover Theological Seminary}, pp. 168-169, 172-173; Richard D. Pierce, ‘Legal Aspects of the Andover Creed’, \textit{Church History} 15 (1946), pp. 28-47.
on the subject. William Tucker replaced Park’s friend and colleague Austin Phelps as the Bartlet professor of sacred rhetoric in 1880. The new man stood for the new day, observing at his inauguration that ‘love, not moral government, is the ground for the Atonement’, and asserting that ‘the Creed…to which I shall subscribe, I fully accept as putting forth the truth against the error which it was designed to meet’. But ‘no confession so elaborate…may assume to be the final expression of the truth or an expression equally fitted in language or tone to all times.’ Egbert Smyth, appointed Brown professor of ecclesiastical history in 1863, in defending in 1887 his own qualified allegiance to the Associate Creed in the face of criticism from Park and other conservatives, declared that there ‘is room for progressive interpretation of the Creed’ since its truths ‘may be adjusted to a larger knowledge and life than were open to [its] framers’. The truths of the creed ‘come to men as living and fruitful principles, and it is the very nature of such truths to find new applications and service in new forms.’ Edwards Park increasingly came to see that requiring a strict subscription to the Associate Creed for admission to the faculty would be the only practicable barrier to undesirable candidates, and in 1883 at the age of seventy-five published an extended argument for a literal reading of the creed.

143 See EAP, The Associate Creed of Andover Theological Seminary (Boston: Franklin Press, 1883), pp. 94-97. Park’s old reputation for liberalism in some quarters came to shadow what appeared to be his increasing conservatism. Princeton’s A. A. Hodge, the son of Park’s old nemesis, was ready to welcome Park if he were moving closer to Princeton’s views, but Hodge also had a long memory for Park’s (relatively) youthful indiscretions. He praised the summary ‘by the great Andover dialectician’ of the history of the Associate Creed as ‘a specimen of thorough, masterly, and triumphant argument’. However,
The subscription issue itself grew larger in coming to encompass the whole problem of the role of dogmatic creeds in greater Congregationalism. Park and other denominational conservatives resisted with an aggressive campaign the adoption of the amorphous Congregational Creed of 1883.\footnote{See Williston Walker, The Creeds and Platforms of Congregationalism (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1893), pp. 553-565.} Park drafted an alternative statement modelled on the seminary’s Associate Creed—called the ‘Worcester Creed’ because it originated in a request from the Pilgrim Congregational Church of Worcester, Massachusetts—and published it anonymously in 1884 as simply A Declaration of Faith.\footnote{See EAP, A Declaration of Faith (Boston: Thomas Todd, 1884), pp. 1-6.} The conservative forces were nevertheless handily defeated at the annual denominational assembly and the broad creed of 1883 adopted.\footnote{See Cecil, The Theological Development of Edwards Amasa Park, pp. 195-198.}

The following year, 1884, appeared to be the watershed year in the triumph of the liberal faction within Congregationalism. The installation of George A. Gordon at Boston’s Old South Church and Newman Smyth at First Church, New Haven, was emblematic of the final denominational rejection of a literal subscription to any creed. Smyth bluntly stated at his installation that ‘I accept as marking my spiritual ancestry, the historic creeds of the church…holding, however, my inherited beliefs in the
responsibility of Christian liberty, subject to the correction of experience’.\textsuperscript{147} Despite Park’s efforts on behalf of the conservative faction at Andover seminary, the Associate Creed itself effectively fell into disuse: when five faculty members (all Park’s former students) refused to sign it in 1886, the formal complaint against them failed to receive any significant attention from the Academy trustees and simply languished until its formal dismissal in 1892. In July 1900, just weeks after Park’s death, the Board of Visitors granted the trustees relief from subscription to the Associate Creed as a condition for faculty membership.\textsuperscript{148} The seminary that had been founded to oppose Harvard’s liberalism finally came to re-embrace the old enemy in 1908, when the Andover trustees voted in favour of removal to Harvard Divinity School.\textsuperscript{149} This was, in John Alfred Faulkner’s words, ‘the grimmest piece of irony ever known’.\textsuperscript{150}

Edwards Park’s life-long commitment to Scottish realism, Baconian induction and Lockean empiricism set him at odds with the fundamental presuppositions of the new Andover faculty. Because the liberals’ agenda proceeded from a set of modern evolutionary assumptions that were unlike Park’s own, it was inevitable that Park would seek to defend his beloved Andover—ineffectually, at the last—from their improvements

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\textsuperscript{147} Dr. Newman Smyth, Installation’ [newspaper clipping, undated] (MS in Congregational Library, Boston).
\textsuperscript{148} Rowe, \textit{History of Andover Theological Seminary}, p. 171.
\textsuperscript{149} Rowe, \textit{History of Andover Theological Seminary}, p. 192. The little that remained of Andover seminary would close in Cambridge in 1926 and re-open in 1930 as a part of Newton Theological Institute in Newton, Massachusetts, a Baptist seminary founded in 1825.
\textsuperscript{150} John Alfred Faulkner, ‘The Tragic Fate of a Famous Seminary’, \textit{BS} 80 (1923), p. 457. Faulkner describes ‘the second tragedy in the history of Congregationalism’ as ‘the loss in the last part of [the nineteenth] century of the oldest, and in some respects, greatest theological seminary in the world’ (p. 462). Faulkner attended Andover in 1882, and after a series of Methodist pastorates in Pennsylvania and New York served as professor of historical theology at Drew Seminary, later studying at Leipzig and Bonn.
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even if in gross terms their theological project could be compared to his own. The Andover liberals would themselves profess to be conserving the old by renovation, lending their considerable powers to the elucidation of new truths that validated spiritual experience at the expense of outdated dogma. The Unitarian George Ellis had observed of Park’s ‘Andover’ theology in 1857 that ‘it assumes that the doctrines long recognized as orthodox are substantially true and scriptural’, but sees that ‘by recasting…the old creed, its sway may be maintained’. How can ‘the old, worn ways of thought…be made fresh again, so that they will receive a new impress?’ Similarly, if it was possible to praise ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ in 1857 for its ‘spirit of free, yet reverent, thought’, it was possible to praise the same spirit in the Andover liberals in the 1880s.

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151 Daniel Day Williams, in his ‘Preface’ to The Andover Liberals (1941), describes this group of theologians as ‘developing a Christian theology related to the insights of the historic faith, but also aware of the new facts and perspectives which the modern world had secured’; see Daniel Day Williams, The Andover Liberals: A Study in American Theology (New York: King’s Crown Press, 1941), p. vii.

152 Of course, one party’s evolution may be another party’s ‘doctrinal somersault’. The Methodist Review reviewed the Andover liberals’ own summary statement, Progressive Orthodoxy (1886), and sounded much like Lyman Atwater: the work ‘has the advantage of novelty, not, perhaps in its teachings so much as in its methods, and in the fact that it demonstrates the doctrinal somersault performed by the teaching faculty of a venerable theological school that was established for the express purpose of maintaining and propagating doctrines that it now seems specially intent on destroying’. The ‘newness of the matter…is not in its substance, but in its forms and modes of statement’. Much that ‘is given us as new may be found in almost any non-Calvinistic treatise in theology, and other less acceptable matters have long been known but only to be rejected’. If Park’s improvement theory could be used against him, the betrayal theory could be turned around as well against Park’s successors; see ‘Editorial Miscellany’ [Review of Progressive Orthodoxy: A Contribution to the Christian Interpretation of Christian Doctrines, by the Editors of the Andover Review (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1886)], Methodist Review 68 (1886), pp. 314-315. This criticism of the Andover liberals did not mean that the Methodist Review was fond of the New Divinity theology being replaced at Andover seminary. In the same issue, the Review praises Reformed Baptist Augustus H. Strong for stating the ‘doctrine of the decrees with a directness and clearness…and with a boldness that might shame all the makeshift modifications of modern predestinarians of the New England schools, from Jonathan Edwards to N. W. Taylor to C. G. Finney’; see the ‘Editorial Miscellany’, Methodist Review 68 (1886), pp. 939-941.


The pathos of Park’s final years after his retirement from Andover in 1881 is informed by this irony of his own students turning the tables on him. George Harris, Park’s successor in the Abbot chair, argued that it was required that theology ‘bring the truths of the Bible and of the creeds into vital relation with the truths of the present age, to translate them into the truths and idioms of to-day, to make them real and rational to existing conditions’. Park himself had insisted in 1854 that the people have ‘emboldened, and even required’ their ministers ‘to portray fully and boldly the ancient faith in a form more consonant with its ruling spirit and with the idioms of our speech’. This is ‘true conservation’. But A. A. Hodge was surely correct when he suggested that ‘the development of far more radical departures from the orthodoxy of the reformed Churches than his own polemical Hopkinsianism has had the effect upon Dr. Park’, as well as his ‘former old-school opponents, of diminishing the sense of the importance of past differences, and in enhancing the sense of the vital necessity of preserving the things that remain’. Park certainly surmised that, in truth, there was little in Edwardsean Calvinism that the liberals genuinely hoped to conserve—but this too was ironical, for Charles Hodge at Princeton had held the same opinion of Park in 1851. In a letter to a written just three years before his death, Park confessed that since his retirement in 1881

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156 EAP, ‘The Fitness of the Church to the Constitution of Renewed Man’, in *Addresses of Rev. Drs. Park, Post and Bacon at the Anniversary of the American Congregational Union, May, 1854* (New York: Clark, Austin and Smith, 1854), p. 41.
his life had been ‘a series of painful disappointments’. ‘Conservation’ by the end of Park’s life meant preservation—a far more desperate enterprise.

There were also forces outside Andover that conspired against Park’s role. He was not immune in his position at the seminary to the general decline in theology’s status in the academic realm, as increasing specialisation in all the disciplines made it less likely that any department could claim to hold what Park had called four decades earlier ‘comprehensive truth’.

A jealous regard for the status of the ministry (and by extension the seminarian who trained ministers) had always been a quiet undercurrent in Park’s career. In 1837, he called the minister ‘the most useful of all public servants’ whose ‘good influence is seen in the physical, the intellectual, the social, the moral, and the religious condition of the people’. In a wistful note in an article in 1844 in the Bibliotheca Sacra on a newly recovered letter of Jonathan Edwards’s, Park observed that the letter was ‘a striking development of the power, which was wielded by the clergy in former days over the aristocracy of the land’. When the Methodist Review eulogised Park’s great friend Richard Salter Storrs in 1900, it focused on Storrs’s ‘old-fashioned dignity’ and ‘unquestioned precedence’ that harked back to the ‘position of eminent eighteenth-century New England clergymen in a community which deferred to his leadership’. But Park had gradually lost influence to wield even at Andover.

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158 EAP to Joseph Cook, 28 January 1897 (MS in the Joseph Cook Papers, Duke University Library).
Park’s hope for a theological unity that coalesced around his New England theology proved unfulfilled. His irenic-sounding Convention sermon in 1850 had provoked from Charles Hodge aggressive criticism of the methodology of ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ as an editorial convenience. Yale’s George P. Fisher and Union’s Henry B. Smith would level the same critique against Park’s Memoir of Nathanael Emmons in 1861. In fact, Park’s use of the intellect and feelings distinction was never arbitrary, but always calculated to support the Hopkinsian core of the New England theology to which all men of good will ought to rally. Hodge was unconvinced, and in particular rejected Park’s flexible use of language as too close to Horace Bushnell’s anti-propositional theory and too much like a challenge to the fixed character of scriptural inspiration. At the same time, Park’s New England theology was challenged by a significant epistemological critique from Union’s Henry B. Smith and by competing historical schemes from Princeton and East Windsor. Park in general ably engaged these contemporary challenges until a new generation arrived at Andover with a very different set of arguments. The contemporary triumph of evolution among the intellectual elite and the broad advance of a sentimental Romanticism after the Civil War amply reinforced the progressive theological project of the younger Andover faculty. By the end of the nineteenth century, the liberals’ rejection of rationalistic religious forms in favour of a naturalistic immanentism was being carried on much stronger cultural currents than was Park’s older synthesis. It was not Park’s personal gifts that had failed him at the end. Park remained, in the liberal George A. Gordon’s description, an ‘eagle in defeat’, who, while fighting ‘almost single-handed a revolution in belief’, possessed ‘the composure and uncomplaining fortitude of the fighter’, retaining ‘his unfailing dignity’ and ‘his
imperial manhood’. The champion who had long defended his New England theology against all comers was finally wrong-footed by adroit revolutionaries skilled in the new rules of engagement.

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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION
EDWARDS AMASA PARK: THE LAST EDWARDSEAN

Edwards Amasa Park’s life-long defence of revivalist Edwardsean Calvinism began with an unrepentant Hopkinessianism. Park was in the line of Samuel Hopkins in a dual sense: first, his theological conclusions were almost uniformly those of an exercise line drawn through Hopkins and Nathanael Emmons. Secondly, his project of conservation by renovation was in the same spirit as Hopkinessianism—Hopkins had said that his own work was not in itself new ‘but really a revival and improvement of sound Calvinism’.¹ The New Divinity clerics had been self-conscious Edwardseans who sought to extend the legacy of Jonathan Edwards by what Jonathan Edwards, Jr, called ‘improvements’ to his father’s theology.² Park in his own time fashioned a Calvinism that met the test of reasonableness—what Park would call ‘self-consistency’³—in its appeal to ‘the minds of an intelligent community’.⁴ He understood at least as early as 1837 that training Edwardsean revivalists at Andover to preach effectively depended on crafting

modes of expression that fitted doctrine for a ‘nice adaptedness to the mind’ and an ‘alliance with congenial feeling’. In his reprinting of the Hopkinsian exercise scheme for the taste of new audiences—this is the primary burden of ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ in 1850—Park was able to preserve his beloved New England theology after the Civil War and beyond, into an era that was recognisably modern.

Park worked from a wide range of sources in his project of conservation: how else would one preserve an older tradition as it encountered new conditions? In 1842 and 1843, when he studied first-hand in Germany the mediating Vermittlungstheologie of Tholuck, Dorner and Müller, Park built on the example of Moses Stuart in observing that it was possible to incorporate the insights of German scholarship into a vital, orthodox faith. It was not necessary to conclude that Schleiermacher’s insights led inexorably to pantheism in order to accept that religion as felt experience had a legitimate place in pious, non-dogmatic contemporary evangelicalism. Park also learned that the historicist understanding of Entwicklung (‘development’) provided models for his own historical project in crafting the New England theology. More centrally, as early as his undergraduate studies at Brown and later under the tutelage of Ebenezer Porter at Andover, Park was enveloped in the New Rhetoric of Hugh Blair and George Campbell. The Aberdonian Campbell and Blair at Edinburgh rejected the neoclassical presumption that rhetoric consisted primarily of ornamentation. Park would understand that effective public speech moves the feelings by its affective appeal and compels the intellect by its

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reasonableness—this is the practical force of ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’. As pragmatic rhetorician and revivalist Hopkinsian, Park taught his seminarians from the Bartlet chair that ‘the object of sacred rhetoric is to move men to immediate action’.7

Park’s time from 1836 to 1847 as rhetorician in the Bartlet chair has certainly been under-appreciated, for it was in this period that he began to deploy the insights that would later give definition to the characteristic theology of his subsequent years in the Abbot chair. If ‘New England Theology’ in the Bibliotheca Sacra in 1852 was his summation of a streamlined, coherent Edwardsean tradition, Park’s theological craft depended in vital ways on the earlier rhetorical articles in 1837 in the American Biblical Repository.8 These essays rehearse the methodological framework that is later employed in detail in 1850 in ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’. Park over his professional life was a preacher, a rhetorician, a theologian and a teacher—and in each sphere of responsibility it was essential that the matter of doctrine be adapted to the mode of delivery if evangelical speech was to attain its object of converting souls. He argued as early as 1844 that ‘the theological system, which is best fitted to be preached, is on that account most entitled to be believed’.9 The Convention sermon itself depends on the assumption that a careful attention to the functional differences between two different kinds of language is necessary for the effective communication of spiritual truth. ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ provided tools that preserved the

relevance of the substance of evangelical Calvinism by adapting the mode of its presentation to the interests of its audience—and in so doing preserved the continuing relevance of the teacher of preachers.

The famed Convention sermon sought a common ground for broad orthodoxy in its irenic modulations but at the same time argued for a particular New England theology that Park believed constituted the core of vital doctrine down the ages. Edwards Park would use all the tools at his disposal—seminary lectures, journal articles, biographical works, public addresses—to argue for his particular historical construct of Edwardseanism, one he would just as energetically have to defend against rival claimants on the basis of his own unrivalled access to the original sources. Princeton, East Windsor and Yale would challenge Andover’s direct heredity by constructing alternative narratives that competed for Jonathan Edwards’s authority, but Park would capably defend his streamlined Hopkinsian exercise scheme as the evangelical Calvinism best suited to balancing God’s sovereignty and man’s accountability in the proclamation of the gospel. Until his own successors at Andover seminary changed the rules of the game, Park held his ground over four decades.

One important resource for Park’s apologetic project was Nathaniel W. Taylor. Park was not averse to using elements of Taylor’s New Haven theology when it suited his own purposes. To the extent that Taylorism was an extrapolation from the earlier New Divinity line, much of Taylor’s work would naturally have found resonance with Park. Taylor and Park shared a desire to deflect from evangelical Calvinism the old charges of fatalism and antinomianism, so Park was sympathetic to aspects of Taylorism that cured such faults. Park lectured on ‘certainty, with power to the contrary’, but he applied it on
his own terms in support of his own system. Park did not uncritically or uniformly adopt the signal features of Taylor’s work. Park was too much a Hopkinsian to accept that selfishness—even if rehabilitated as self-love—ever led to righteous actions, or that waiting on the means of grace did any more than delay immediate repentance. Because Park was committed to Jonathan Edwards’s older, voluntarist model of the will, he rejected the desirability of, in Frank Hugh Foster’s words, a ‘neutral point’ in the will’s deliberations, for in achieving spontaneity Taylor’s intellectualist moral agent was also necessarily independent of all influences—even God’s.\textsuperscript{10} Foster—no mere amateur—was certainly correct when he observed that Park ‘maintained Edwards’s theory of the will, not following Taylor’s modifications’.\textsuperscript{11} Where Taylor departed from essential features of Hopkinsianism, Park explicitly rejected those signal features of Taylorism, despite the conclusions of Douglas Sweeney and Bruce Kuklick, for example, that Park was essentially a New Haven theologian.\textsuperscript{12} Park’s relation to Taylor was precisely the posture Nathanael Emmons described in a letter in 1838 to Park: ‘I have not given up any of my doctrinal opinions, am no nearer Taylorism than ever I was. I do indeed go about half way with Taylorites, and then stop and turn against them with all my might.’\textsuperscript{13}


If it cannot be said that Park was in thrall to Taylor in the 1830s, it also is no truer that Park had fallen uncritically for the charms of Horace Bushnell in 1850. An interpretation of the Convention sermon as a sympathetic response to Bushnell’s address at Andover in 1848\(^\text{14}\) is at best only a partial truth.\(^\text{15}\) Park’s specific attention to affective modes of presentation in the Convention sermon’s description of ‘the theology of the feelings’ resembles Bushnell’s attentiveness to the tastes of his upper-class congregation in Hartford, in that each theologian was responding to a new cultural fashion. But Park’s appropriation of a Romantic sensibility was primarily tactical, for he had observed in 1837 that it was a theologian’s duty ‘to associate his doctrines more intimately with what is delicate and refined in taste, comely, humane and magnanimous in sentiment’, because it allows one to ‘invest the Christian scheme with a claim upon every sensibility’.\(^\text{16}\) Bushnell’s adoption of a Romantic cultural mood was more thoroughgoing. His proto-liberal, sentimental moralism was profoundly energized by a Romantic sensibility. But Bushnell’s affection for Coleridge’s ideality was at the same time a rejection of Park’s sturdy Scottish realism. His famed metaphorical theory of language was just one of many instances of this departure. For Park, language was partly a matter of fitness and arrangement, but its inherent power to convey truth may only be limited by the skill of the rhetorician. Bushnell would reject this position as mere bravura, but Park never doubted the ability of language to communicate propositional theology.


The Convention sermon in 1850 was not a Romantic germination that presaged Andover liberalism: Park never abandoned his own nexus of empiricism, induction, natural theology and common sense realism. The roots of the Convention sermon are in the New Rhetoric of the Scottish Enlightenment—in Aberdeen and Edinburgh, and neither in Hartford nor Berlin. The vast difference between their individual appropriations of the new Romantic mood makes it clear that the resemblances to Bushnell suggested by Park’s affective strategy in the Convention sermon are largely superficial. Park’s accommodation to Romanticism was a consequence of the aesthetic element in his Scottish rhetorical theory and his attention to the requirements of his audience, while Bushnell’s identification with Coleridge was an entire epistemological sea-change. Park was attracted to Germany’s methodological rigour for the sake of his own theological science and was dismissive of its pantheistic ideality—the appeal of Germany for Bushnell was entirely the reverse.

Park’s faithfulness to Jonathan Edwards and to the New Divinity clerics who followed Edwards was not an antiquarian devotion that fixed ‘the Edwardean definitions’ in amber, with words removed from the world like Emily Dickinson’s in nearby Amherst or with terms settled in the distant past like Charles Hodge’s at Princeton.17 Park’s standard of success was like Jonathan Edwards’s own: his theology’s soundness was tested in the pulpits of America and across the world’s distant mission fields by its ability to promote genuine revival. Joseph Cook (whose public Monday Lectures in theology at Tremont Temple in Boston were extremely popular in the last two decades of the nineteenth century) eulogised Park, his teacher and mentor, as the ‘foremost of living

American theologians’ because his ‘instructions have confirmed hundreds of pupils of two generations in zealous loyalty to…vital orthodoxy’. In just the last decade of Park’s long career at Andover before his retirement in 1881, Park taught more than two hundred and fifty graduates and resident licentiates. Most are recorded as actively pursuing careers as ministers, missionaries, and teachers down to 1909 when the last Andover General Catalogue was published on the occasion of the seminary relocating to Cambridge. Charles Joseph Hardy Ropes, class of 1875, became a professor of New Testament at Bangor Theological Seminary. Francis Edward Clark, class of 1876 and a prolific author, founded the ‘Young People’s Society of Christian Endeavor’ and later became a colleague of Cook’s at Tremont Temple. Otis Cary, class of 1877, served as a missionary in Japan for the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Of the twenty-three members of Andover’s class of 1877 tallied in 1909, five were actively serving as missionaries, ten as ministers, and three as seminary professors—the latter group including Frank Hugh Foster, who retired from teaching in 1933. The extension of the Edwardsean line at least to the First World War in the careers of Park’s many students is striking: it may well be that the Civil War has been the wrong war to use in delimiting the influence of Edwardsean culture.

Joseph Cook’s own work is perhaps the most remarkable evidence for the continued vitality of Park’s influence. Cook studied at Andover seminary from 1865

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until his graduation in 1868, and then remained as resident licentiate until 1870. Cook was a devoted protégé of Park: he followed Park’s example and studied after Andover with Tholuck, Müller, Kahnis, Domer and others in Germany, but confessed that ‘in no one of these did I find as richly endowed or as impressive a theological teacher and preacher, or…as safe a guide and certainly not as inspiring a personal force as Professor Park’. When Cook formed an ecumenical committee to oversee his popular Monday Lectureship in 1877, Park was a member. At the height of Cook’s fame, following a world tour from 1880 to 1882, printed copies of his Monday Lectures distributed in various newspapers reached an audience of almost one million people. But Cook’s public theology was essentially a version of Park’s seminary lectures: Cook argued, for example, that ‘New-England theology does not assert that inherited evil disposition is sin; for it teaches always that responsibility cannot exist without freedom of the will, and that sin consists in evil choice’—this is indeed Hopkinsianism for the masses. The reformer and liberal populariser Washington Gladden described the Monday Lectures as ‘theologically a reproduction, almost to the extent of plagiarism, of Professor Park’s

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20 Cook described in the Bibliotheca Sacra his tenure as a resident licentiate in Joseph Cook, ‘A Fourth Year of Study in the Courses of Theological Seminaries’, BS27 (1870), pp. 244-261.
lectures at Andover’. Although Gladden does not offer this description in praise of Cook—nor even of Park—it is clear that Cook was a close study of the man he called ‘that theologian of Andover who has done more for religious science in this country than any other man since Jonathan Edwards’. Cook’s expression of his professor’s New England theology may have been in a more popular vein than Park’s own lectures to seminarians, and may have held little interest for the contemporary cultural elite, but Cook’s career suggests nevertheless that Park’s influence had been extended by proxy to a vast popular audience in the last years before Park’s death.

At the heart of Park’s life-work was a fusion of the substance of the Hopkinsian exercise scheme with effective modes of expression drawn from the rhetoric of the Scottish Enlightenment. Park’s training as a rhetorician is essential to an understanding of Park’s work as a theologian: his work was a dynamic interaction of content and arrangement. The early works on methodology in the American Biblical Repository and the bipolar form of ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ built the arsenal that defended the specific content of the ‘New England Theology’ found in Park’s Andover lectures and in the Bibliotheca Sacra, as well as in the vast biographical material published in the ten years before the Civil War. All the skills of the master teacher of preachers supported the historian who redacted authenticating Edwardsean traditions—the Bartlet chair stood alongside the Abbot chair at Andover. Edwards Park marshalled all the resources at hand to ‘conserve the substance of the old Calvinistic faith’, for if its attendant forms could be so constructed as to meet contemporary tests of

rationality and equity then the old religion might ‘prolong its influence over the minds of the intelligent community’—and by extension might carry the old religionist and his influence in its train.26

To what degree was Park successful? The persistence of Andover’s New England theology into the early years of the twentieth century is significant evidence that Park largely fulfilled his commission as a steward of the traditions passed on to him. Park was fully engaged in a highly visible public role in the socio-cultural life of New England throughout his long professional career, in widespread theological disputes across regional and denominational lines until even the 1880s, and in training at Andover hundreds of active ministers, academics and missionaries who would themselves propagate with significant success a flexible and distinctive Edwardsean Calvinism right to the brink of the First World War. Taylorism had all but ended with Taylor when he died in 1858,27 but the long prominence of Park and his New England theology suggest that the relevance of Edwardseanism cannot be contained by the final years of Taylor’s active career, and that Joseph Conforti is correct when he observes that Park—as a preacher, teacher, and editor—was a pivotal figure in this extension of Edwardsean culture beyond the Civil War.28

It is readily apparent in this regard that Joseph Conforti’s work on Edwards Park in the mid-1990s came at an auspicious time for a re-evaluation of Park’s accomplishments. The increasing momentum of the modern study of Jonathan Edwards

26 EAP, ‘The Fitness of the Church’, p. 41 [emphasis in original].
had by that time created fresh opportunity for the consideration of later Edwardseans like Andover’s Park. It has been seen in Chapter One that Conforti convincingly showed that Park was actively engaged in reshaping his inherited Hopkinsianism in compelling ways for the voluntarist evangelical culture of the middle of the nineteenth century. This representation was the first in almost a century to give Park a place of his own in the critical developments within Edwardsean Calvinism in particular and in broad evangelicalism in general.

It need not detract from this signal achievement to observe that Conforti’s work on Park suffers from two important handicaps. First, it is impossible to give full consideration to the Andover theologian within the scope of a single essay. For example, while Conforti rightly observes that ‘Park interpreted Edwards through Samuel Hopkins, not through Nathaniel Taylor’, this critical observation is left largely unsubstantiated, and of itself supplies no context for the use that Park did make of Taylor. Also, it is possible that in a more extended discussion Conforti might have avoided overstating the extent to which Park’s position was a compromise between the exercisers and the tasters. In fact, it has been seen in Chapter Five that, though Park was capable of a nod to the language of the tasters for the sake of good will, he never accepted—any more than had Hopkins or Emmons—that a passive condition of the soul could itself be sinful. Such a conclusion undermined the moral accountably of the human agent, and as such might be expected to be a product only of wobbly divines like Leonard Woods. Secondly, Conforti begins his analysis of Park with ‘The Theology of the Intellect and That of the Feelings’ in 1850,

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29 See the discussion in Chapter One, pp. 49-50.
30 Conforti, ‘Creation and Collapse’, p. 130.
32 See the discussion in Chapter Five, pp. 184-185.
and gives only slight notice to Park’s articles in the *American Biblical Repository* in the 1830s or to the importance of the earlier influences from Scotland and Germany on his theological development. At the same time, Conforti assumes that Park’s relevance does not extend much beyond the close of the Civil War, and he gives little notice to the fact that Park’s theology retained a significant vitality in the lives of his many students even to the opening of the twentieth century. Thus, both Conforti’s format and his effective timeframe are simply too restricted to supply the consideration warranted by Park’s and Andover’s enduring significance.

In view of his decades-long prominence, then, why is it that Edwards Amasa Park is given so little regard generally in today’s highly sophisticated treatments of virtually any topic nearly related to Jonathan Edwards? First, it has been seen in Chapter One that Park is inconveniently placed if one desires a direct line—of ascent per Frank Hugh Foster or of descent per Joseph Haroutunian—from Jonathan Edwards to Nathaniel W. Taylor. In either case, it has been established that Park should not be dismissed simply as a late and therefore irrelevant Taylorite. Secondly, Park, like Henry B. Smith, inevitably suffered the fate of many mediators. In attempting to hold a central position where Edwardsean orthodoxy was refreshed by fresh insights and contemporary modes of expression, Park would come to be criticised by the liberals for being too conservative and by the conservatives for being too liberal. He would be condemned by Foster, Daniel

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33 Foster’s chapter on Park in the *Genetic History* occupies pp. 471-540. Haroutunian’s only reference to Park in *Piety versus Moralism: The Passing of the New England Theology* (New York: Henry Holt, 1932) is on p. xxiii—and that in the context of a comment on Foster. See the discussion in Chapter One, pp. 35-38.

D. Williams and Harold Vanderpool in the spirit of Park’s successors at Andover for taking his hand from the liberal plough and failing to enter the new kingdom announced by Horace Bushnell. This criticism would be massively reinforced near the close of the nineteenth century by the success in the academy of Darwinian presuppositions, so that Park’s reputation declined alongside the rapid loss of primacy for the study of divinity in the university.

Park’s position in the centre makes it possible for his theology to be dismissed by the likes of Kenneth Rowe in the spirit of Joseph Haroutunian for rationalistic moralism and to be criticised at the same time by D. G. Hart in the spirit of the old Princetonians for the sin of Bushnellian liberalism. In either case, however contradictory, Park’s putative crime was his abandonment of Jonathan Edwards’s vital orthodoxy. In fact, Park’s long career was a sustained effort to preserve Edwards’s place in the national culture—an influence best secured in Park’s view by finding for revivalist Edwardseanism fresh, practical modes of communication calculated to secure an effective proclamation of the gospel. If Park’s efforts to conserve Edwardsean Calvinism were at the same time an attempt to retain for the minister and for the seminary their old place of leadership in American intellectual culture, he might be forgiven such a self-serving strategy since in the end it bore him such bitter fruit.

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Edwards Amasa Park was the last American theologian of significance to identify consciously with Jonathan Edwards. At the age of ninety, Park’s morning reading was ‘usually bearing upon the life of Jonathan Edwards’, though when he tired in the afternoons, Park would have read to him ‘Locke, Hamilton, Reid, Dugald Stewart, Dornier, McCosh….and Clarke on the Attributes’. Park drew on transatlantic intellectual influences in order to propound with fresh relevance a core theology and epistemology that had not changed from his early days in his father’s study in Providence to his last days in his own library on Andover Hill. From his hilltop, Edwards Park re-engineered Edwardsean Calvinism and so extended the legacy of his beloved namesake. In the manner of Jonathan Edwards himself, Edwards Amasa Park drew creatively on diverse contemporary streams of thought to adapt the received body of Calvinist tradition to the new dynamics of nineteenth-century American culture, prolonging into the next century the influence of the cherished New England theology he had inherited from his fathers.


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SUMMARY OF BIBLIOGRAPHY

The bibliography for the thesis is organised into the following major sections:

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I. PRIMARY SOURCES

a. EDWARDS AMASA PARK

i. PAPERS AND CORRESPONDENCE (BY REPOSITORY)

Major repositories for collections of personal papers, lecture notebooks and correspondence of Edwards Amasa Park include:

- Andover Historical Society, Andover, Massachusetts
- Andover-Harvard Theological Library, Harvard Divinity School, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts
- Beinecke Rare Book Room, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut
- Boston Public Library, Boston, Massachusetts
- Charles R. Park Family Papers, Nashville, Tennessee
- Congregational Library, Boston, Massachusetts
- Duke University Library, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina
  Joseph Cook Papers
- Hay Library, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island
- Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Massachusetts
- Oberlin College Library, Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio
- Phillips Academy Archives, Andover, Massachusetts
- S. P. Scattergood Family Papers, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
- Trask Library, Andover-Newton Theological School, Newton Centre, Massachusetts
- Yale University Library, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut
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