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PERSON AND WORLD:

THE INTERRELATION OF NEWNESS AND PRESENCE

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A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF
(Footnotes are referred to, in the text, by a number in brackets which is doubly underlined.)
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Preface

The concern of this essay is in many ways an attempt to say what each one of us must in fact come to see for himself, and this is a procedure which has obvious dangers. Either one storms the summit, leaving everyone else both behind and indifferent (with good reason); or one seeks so hard to be understood, and to be sure that one will be understood, that what is actually said becomes, if not trivial, then so public that it becomes incapable of leading anyone to vision, to seeing for himself. The method by which one therefore attempts to move between these tensions is consequently important; it has seemed to me that it requires both stopping and starting, a dialectic between what appears incomprehensible and what appears familiar. This rather jerky motion I have sought to perform with respect to particular writers who, in their respective fields, have appeared to many to be at least almost incomprehensible; most notably here these are Ludwig Wittgenstein, Simone Weil, and then Plato, Martin Buber and in contemporary Scotland Ronald Gregor Smith and John Zizioulas.

The form which the stopping and starting takes is in effect that of formulating a question or framework of approaches from which we may move into exegesis or investigation of a writer or problem, where the question is itself derived from the writer or problem we come to see in its light. The question is both our starting point, and also what allows us to go beyond a particular writer or problem - stopping, as it were, not with the problem or writer studied, but at the question, discovered anew in this object of study. It is very much the technique Dietrich Bonhoeffer employs in his Christology lectures (a work to which I owe a great deal): the question developed out of the essence of Christology (Who are you? Addressed to Christ, as opposed to what or how are you?) is then used to criticise and rediscover the history of Christology.
Bonhoeffer is often criticised for bad patristics by those who are suspicious of such a methodology – and certainly the danger of this approach is a distortion of detail and passing-over of the particular aims of the writers involved. I cannot claim that this essay is free from such error, but can only express the hope that the errors appear worthwhile within the context of the whole.

My debts are heavy. Peter Winch, Professor of Philosophy at King's College, London, first showed me how to understand Wittgenstein. John Zizioulas, Senior Lecturer in Theology at Glasgow, first showed me how total and all-embracing theology is. And above all Stewart Sutherland, now Professor of the Philosophy of Religion at King's College, London, not only allowed me to understand Simone Weil but has born the brunt of the resultant obscurities and hesitations in progressing with the thesis at all. My personal debt to him is great, and I am happy to acknowledge it here.

I hope it is not out of place to record a final and complete debt of thanks to Helen, my wife. It is from her that most of my learning has come, daily.

Edinburgh
June 1977
Introduction

a) Methodology

In the essay which follows, three concepts occupy the central stage: learning, the world, and the person - and in large measure the essay is an exploration of the ways in which these three are bound together. It is thus in one sense a conceptual exploration; but not one which proceeds by considering cases, and any appeal to illustration and example is more often than not absent.

A full explanation of this belongs, obviously, to the body of the text: a general justification for such an approach is that it is the concern of the essay to put forward certain basic features of learning, the world and the person - features which are ontologically prime - and this concern with what is basic is inimical to any analysis which proceeds by examination of cases. Up to this point I would agree with P F Strawson (Introduction to Individuals), that philosophy is competent to handle other questions than those arising out of the consideration of examples, and that this leads it back into metaphysics. What Strawson has seen, and rightly, is that the very presuppositions made by a methodology that describes how we speak, typified by J L Austin and the bulk of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, are still logical ones and need viewing in a more general framework. But Strawson's own approach - to generalise on these logical presuppositions and set out the kind of particularity and generality we in fact operate with, although legitimate as far as it goes, begs as many questions as it deals with. Descriptive metaphysics, which is how Strawson labels his own work, goes hand in hand with the description of cases; thus Strawson properly describes the methodological presuppositions of anyone seeking understanding through the description of particular cases.

Where it has seemed to me that we must leave this approach behind is when we attempt to understand what learning is, and in particular
the development of a concept of particularity - the concept of an 'object'. Strawson is aware that the concept of a person does not quite fit into the framework of 'objects' he first develops, and thus that particularity is strangely difficult to set out with respect to other people and to oneself. My own concern in this essay is to approach the question of particularity, both in 'objects' and people, from a completely different angle - that of learning, in which the question of the emergence of our concept of particularity is not handled in isolation from the fact that we are people. That is, I have sought to view the concept of an 'object' in continuous relation to the concept of the person who has such a grasp of objectivity, rather than treating language, even on this very general level of logic, as a reality which can be understood without reference to the very personal being of those who speak it.

This I take to be the problem in metaphysics - not to say how all reality is, from the point of view of omniscience, nor simply to relativise that omniscience and offer a world-view, but to say how it is in fact possible for this concept of reality to be thought through by a person at all. It is not then a consideration of the concept of reality we do in fact employ - this is descriptive metaphysics in Strawson's sense - but rather a consideration of how people are related to reality in such a way that they can have a concept of reality at all.

One very important way of tackling this question is Heidegger's; the approach to reality must be through the reality of the man who conceives of it in order to approach it. But my own background and training have led me to Wittgenstein, whose principal questions are not about 'man' as such, but about the relation between language and the world. As I have noted, Wittgenstein often appears as one of the archetypal representatives of a purely illustrative philosophy of cases - a describer of logical geography par excellence. But although I have continually born in mind a remark of Peter Winch.
(in "Wittgenstein's Treatment of the Will") to the effect that a concern with some features of language as more basic than the rest is a concern which is rather alien to Wittgenstein's later thought, it has also seemed correct, as I take it it seems to Winch, not to take the techniques of the bulk of Philosophical Investigations as the fullness or point of this later thought; hence one of the secondary themes of this essay is the extent of the projection of earlier ideas into Wittgenstein's later thought.

b) Aims

My purpose in writing the essay, and focussing on the concepts of learning, person and world, has been primarily to work out a model for personhood, for being a person. This has involved a 'sifting out' of the concept of a person from that of the world, a gradual differentiation handled with almost exclusive reference to the concept of learning. The attention given to learning owes a great deal to Wittgenstein, largely because Wittgenstein has always seemed to me to be metaphysician in the above sense, and to have found that this concern to speak about how we speak about the world required him to approach this through the way we learn.

The central three chapters of this essay are concerned to work out what this approach to the world, and our conception of it, can be seen to tell us about the concept of a person. The fifth and final chapter then explores this concept more critically, with particular reference to the Jewish theologian Martin Buber. Buber's very decisive importance in developing and popularising the ideas of personal encounter and relationship is not one I have any wish to minimise - but it does seem to me that the cost of this popularising has been that he writes on a moral level rather than the ontological level he claims to be working on, and hence that, while he constantly draws our attention to the riches and centrality of other people in our lives, he never does justice to the 'I' that is
to come into relationship with them. Rather than writing about I-Thou relationships, Buber writes about Thous, and thus he never quite leaves discourse about possibilities of experience rather than of a relationship which transforms the experiencing self as well as his experience of the other.

At apparently the other extreme to Buber, the writings of the French thinker and mystic, Simone Weil, almost ignore the possibilities of encounter with other people. It is the self, and the possibility of transforming oneself, which is at the centre of Weil's thought - yet for this reason she offers a valuable foil to Buber's focus on 'the other'. She is a writer who seeks to set out the possibilities of transformation of the self with reference to nothing other than the world of matter, while holding firm to the conviction that it is God's will that one should never for one minute look beyond this world, even to God.

It is my concern to show that neither Buber nor Weil does justice to what a person is. Both writers as it were overreact - Buber by forgetting self, Weil by forgetting the other. They are still working with a concept of objectivity which assumes that a person exists in the same dimension of particularity as an object; and hence that it must in the end be possible to say that 'I' and 'the other' are two of a kind. This question of the 'sameness' with which we may speak of self and others is a problem Wittgenstein concentrated very heavily on, and it has led to much discussion of the ideas of 'inner' - as opposed to 'outer' or worldly - experience, and of private knowledge of, and language about, oneself. While aware of the breadth of this discussion, I have tried to pick my own way through this rather highly-strung area, and have made reference to only a few articles. Wittgenstein's basic approach seems to me to have a great deal to say to the enthusiasm of Buber and Weil, in redressing the balance between their extremes and suggesting that what a person actually is is something a bit more mysterious than either writer has seen.
This dimension of mystery is not a puzzle or a problem; however, and it is the serious defect of Strawson's approach that this is how it in fact appears: we can only record that mind and body are in fact related, though we know not how. Certainly I would agree that it is impossible to do justice to what a person is without taking account of our concept of 'the world'—here again Buber and Weil between them point to what is needed; the question is whether we begin from the understanding we have of 'the world' in order to place people within it, or rather begin from this understanding in order to ask how people can understand the world at all.

The thesis of the essay is that when we follow this latter approach, and only in this way, can we do justice to what a person is, because we find that one person's understanding of the world presupposes and rests upon others who are not part of this world. This is not to say, then, that 'a person' is one of these others rather than oneself, or vice versa: the attempt to reduce person to one or other of these goes hand in hand with particular philosophical reductions—realism or solipsism.

Wittgenstein early on recognised that these are both oversimplifications:

Solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality coordinated with it.

Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-psychological way. What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that 'the world is my world'.

(Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 5.64 – 5.641)

But at this stage, as we shall be considering in more detail, Wittgenstein, like Weil, viewed the problem as one arising between self and world, without reference to any problem surrounding the notion of other people—thus it is fair to say that there is here no distinct concept of a person at all; rather than asking whether 'person' can be reduced to 'others' in
the world', or to the self, Wittgenstein's problem was simply whether the self can be reduced to the world, or the world to the self. There are only two elements in the reduction, not three - nonetheless the fact that he wished to avoid either reduction remained the base from which he could much later reject the corresponding reduction of what a person is.

Such a reduction appears even in Strawson's proposal that person is a two-sided concept, applying both to others and to oneself, as if we already knew the particular distinctness of self and others - that they are different kinds of entity which we simply have to hold together. What I have therefore essayed is to consider what happens when we no longer assume we know what kinds of entity people - self and others - are, but simply ask how we arrive at our concept of particularity - an object. The mystery of the person which emerges is certainly a 'relational' concept, in which it is not possible to isolate out individuals; but a 'relation' whose primary mode of description is that of 'object'. It is not, that is, a relation between objects (individual people, or subject and object), but itself an object.

This of course means that it is an object in a somewhat specialised sense - an object of metaphysics rather than physics. But this in no sense means that it is a formal category without relation to our day-to-day view of the world's furniture - the point is rather that we are not asking, What is the general category of object we employ? (the question from Aristotle to Kant and Strawson), but How do we come to have any conception of an object? This is not, as it is sometimes taken to be, an empirical question rather than the former analytic one; it is not a question of genesis and of educational study. Certainly learning is the key concept here, but one we are still obliged to handle metaphysically - thus I have made sparing use of discussion in the philosophy of education, and only comment in passing on the controversy about the 'new education' (with reference to Illich and Freire).
How do we come to have any concept of an object? Is a question on a par with Why is there anything at all? and How did there come to be anything (rather than....)? questions which Wittgenstein's pupil and colleague, Rush Rhees, discusses with reference to Plato's Parmenides in a most helpful way ("Where does the world come from?" in Without Answers, pp 115-9, to which I am indebted). Our own question does not lead us to generalise on the evidence of education, as if we know in advance of our observation what an object is and what a learner is required to do to show us he has understood its existence. If this latter is an intelligible inquiry - and it is certainly undertaken by many educational psychologists - it is a 'realistic' approach which takes no account whatsoever of the basis of experience - the movement, for the learner, from nothing to something being before him.

This is not to say that it is a separate question - a matter of subjective rather than observational or objective psychology - and I have tried in what follows to bring out how this notion of experience in fact serves to point us back to problems that cannot be defined simply in terms of either subject or object. The key to this seems to me to be the concept of presence, and with it the move from nothing to a presence - the move to what is new. Thus the essay begins with an introductory chapter which raises the problems surrounding the concepts of presence and newness in their most acute form - Meno's paradox.

I make no apologies for taking this paradox seriously, even though this is perhaps unfair to the thrust of the dialogue. It has been a great comfort at times when the prevalent methodology of linguistic philosophy - exhibiting cases - has seemed to indicate that we do, as Socrates argues against Meno, know everything anyway, and newness should not be a problem. It is not a problem within philosophy, perhaps - that is the basis for Strawson's notion of descriptive rather than revisionary metaphysics: to
say where we are rather than go somewhere else — and Wittgenstein clearly assented to this:

it is rather, of the essence of our investigation that we do not seek to learn anything new by it. We want to understand something that is already in plain view. For this is what we seem in some sense not to understand. (Philosophical Investigations I 89)

But it has been a terrible straight-jacket on philosophy in the West that it has, by and large, taken this to mean that there is no such thing as learning anything new — whereas Wittgenstein himself devoted much of his investigation to precisely this phenomenon.

The first chapter leads on to an initial consideration of presence with respect to 'object' and 'world', and at that point develops by contact with Weil, who has set out a very powerful conception of the 'world'. This concludes the chapter, as a flag-marker, from which the essay moves off to review what 'the world' means. After a lengthy discussion of 'learning', 'object' and 'understanding', the final chapter, as already noted, sets out more explicitly what this means for our understanding of 'person'. This attempt to be more explicit has obliged me to write in a more 'religious' atmosphere than throughout the rest of the essay — a fact which reflects the much greater interest and understanding theology, unlike philosophy, has shown the concepts both of a person and of learning. This of course raises significant questions about the relation between philosophy and theology, and I realise that the loss of even a reference to other philosophers would, for many philosophers, exclude this final chapter from consideration as philosophy, while its unwillingness to talk explicitly about God would seem also to exclude it from consideration as theology. Since my prime concern here was with what is going on in a particular kind of experience and activity, and the understanding of personal presence we can draw out of it, it is, I think, a valid question to ask whether this experience and activity is in fact
intelligible to any reader who does not know something of God’s self-
revelation, and has not been led to see all else from this base and
relationship. But, although valid, this is not a question I feel competent
to answer; it would require lengthy and thorough understanding of central
theological issues, ranging from general/special revelation to universalism
and the operation of the Spirit.

Nonetheless, I have tried to develop, out of the more philosophical
understanding of person in the essay, a perspective on the nature of faith
which allows us to live a little more easily on the borderland between
philosophy and theology. While I write from a firm conviction of God’s
complete self-disclosure in his Son Jesus Christ, and the trinitarian nature
of this revelation, it does not seem at all helpful to take this as a
starting point for viewing the interrelation of philosophy and theology. It
is not a matter of Yes or No to "Does God exist?" etc – and it has seemed
important to comment on this simply because faith is so invariably viewed
as an attribute of an individual person, something to mark him out from his
fellows. If the concept of a person which I have been developing, as not
primarily an individual at all, is correct, then this affects our under-
standing of what faith itself is, since it becomes tied up with the
relationships people participate in rather than the means by which they are
enabled to participate. Faith, that is, is not the prerequisite for
communion – neither is religion; that both nonetheless occupy a central
and essential place in our fuller understanding of person and communion
requires, as I readily acknowledge, further and separate discussion.
One: Approaches to the Concept of Learning

How will you know the answer when you don't in the least know what it is? Any one going to say as something you know as the object of your search. To put it another way, even if you can't right away find it, how will you know that what you have found is the thing you didn't know? (102)

We may begin our consideration of learning by trying to bring out, more or less in our own form, what Plato discussion has to offer.

Socrates does not directly answer Socrates' question, apparently because it is not completely on the point of what he himself has just said. In fact, he says it is not a goal approach (Socrates), what he does try to do is to say, unexpectedly that he is in an activity that is necessary to do, to do some how it is possible because but to make investigation and inquiry into what it is (in this case Socrates) to, given that we don't know such it is a fact.

The objection or parable from another is said in the different, though related form, which means that the difficulty it raises, whether or not it seems at all likely that Socrates himself should be taken to be aware of this, in fact that any search presupposes some knowledge of what we are looking for, and that recognition presupposes some prior acquaintance with whatever we are to recognize.

In more general terms, the objection in that Socrates is denying or recommending predefinition of any inquiry is without any purpose. The objection itself, expressed in isolation, is reasonable and forceful, the question is
ONE: APPROACHES TO THE CONCEPT OF LEARNING

We may begin our consideration of learning by trying to bring out, more or less in its own terms, what Karl Marx wrote on the subject.

Somehow or other, it seems to me, the problem is not so much what we are to do with the knowledge, as what is to be done to the knowledge, what kind of content it is to consist of, what kind of growth there is to be, and what kind of development of our own selves there is to be. And so it seems to me that what we have found is the third form of learning.

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The statement that sounds best resembles, in part, the different, though related forms, in so far as that the difficulty it seems to be, whether or not it is done at all, that Karl Marx himself should be found to be aware of this, is based on my finding presupposes some knowledge of what we are looking for, and that this not presuppose some prior assumption with whatever we are to express.

In more general terms, the objective is that learning is nothing more than mystical preoccupation or an act, but to which is pursue. The objective, clearly, conditioned by evolution, in homeostasis and formal interaction in
a) The Meno: Learning, contrasted with teaching

Learning does not often show itself as a problematic notion to those who teach. In particular, when difficulties are raised about it, it will seem that the terms we use in order to speak about teaching will do equally well when we speak about learning. Attempts to begin from learning rather than from teaching are rare: the earliest and for that reason perhaps the most fruitful and suggestive discussion which does occur is in Plato's Meno, when Meno asks:

How will you look for something when you don't in the least know what it is? How are you going to set up something you know as the object of your search? To put it another way, even if you come right up against it, how will you know that what you have found is the thing you didn't know? (80d)

We may begin our consideration of learning by trying to bring out, more or less in its own terms, what this discussion has to offer.

Socrates does not directly answer Meno's question, apparently because it is not completely to the point of what he himself has just said. In fact he says it is not a good argument (81a); what he does try to do in reply, and obviously what he feels it necessary to do, is to show how it is possible to carry out "a joint investigation and inquiry into what it (in this case: virtue) is", given that we don't know what it is (80d).

The objection or paradox Meno produces is cast in two different, though related forms, which means that the difficulty it raises, whether or not it seems at all likely that Meno himself should be taken to be aware of this, is both that any search presupposes some knowledge of what we are looking for, and that recognition presupposes some prior acquaintance with whatever we are to recognise.

In more general terms, the objection is that Socrates is denying an essential presupposition of an inquiry he wishes to pursue. The objection itself, considered in isolation, is reasonable and forceful; the question is
of whether or not it is relevant to what Socrates has said. And indeed Socrates does wish to inquire into what a thing is, given that he (and anybody) does not know what it is; at the end of the episode with the slave, the point he places all his weight behind is that we must look for what we don't know (86b-c). In what way, then, is Meno's objection beside the point, or a bad argument?

Socrates' concern is to give an account of, or rather the essential definition of, a general notion such as virtue, and he thinks it is possible to look for such a definition. This is not, however, because in some sense one does after all know the answer; very few men know what virtue is, or come close to any real idea of what it is, because very few men are virtuous. Indeed Socrates does not actually say that one can know what virtue is in the Meno - only that it is possible to seek after that knowledge. The possibility lies in the fact that the acquisition of knowledge is possible, and thus that it is possible to know something one did not previously know. But merely to illustrate or point to teaching, and learning by being taught, will not do in order to show this possibility to be a real one; whether these pointers or illustrations can really be learning is what is called into question.

In this case it will not do for another and more obvious reason: Socrates has made it plain to Meno that he, Meno, does not know what virtue is, in the previous discussion; and Socrates acknowledges that he himself does not. So neither of the participants in the discussion would be in any position to teach the definition of virtue. The failure of the sophists to have realised how little each knows (the sense of 'wisdom' in which Plato allows Socrates to acknowledge that he himself possesses some wisdom (Apology 21d)) is what makes their claims to be able to teach so presumptuous.

And so teaching is distinguished from something else: questioning (see e.g. 84c-d, 85d). This, however, seems to present difficulties.
The episode with the slave is intended, in part, to show that learning is recollecting something known previously and then forgotten (although the notion of *lose* is more fully stressed in the *Phaedo* 75d–e; thus Socrates says "seeking and learning are in fact nothing but recollection" (81d) (and see 81d–e)). Yet at 82b, learning is distinguished from recollecting or being reminded. Now, if learning is recollecting, then it would seem that being taught is ipso facto recollecting; yet at 85d, at least, it seems to be distinguished from it. And going on to say here that being taught is not learning would not only be extreme, but would not square with the suggestion, made at 96c, that learning presupposes teachers, or the possibility of teaching.

If all that is called learning really does involve recollection, Socrates would have a stronger case for saying that the soul is immortal - or at least existed prior to this life. But then being taught, which can at least seem to be the most common form of learning, would have to be seen to involve recollection, which Socrates does not appear to agree to. When he mentions the suggestion of a prior life of the soul (86c–b), he puts the case for immortality hypothetically, in a weak way, and it is obviously a conclusion he is unsure of. (1)

Yet whether or not the notion of recollection manifested in the questioning of the slave does necessarily involve some idea of immortality, it does at least show up certain elements that enter into learning in general. By this I mean that it is possible to feel more at home with the apparent difficulties in consistency of Socrates' understanding of learning if it is the case that all learning does in some sense involve recollection, yet that this can be seen more clearly in some cases than in others. This difference in perspicuity is the difference between learning by being taught and by being reminded which he wishes to stress. The alternatives noted at 82b then appear as learning (by being taught) and (learning by)
being reminded; and the distinction between teaching and recollecting (that is, between being taught and recollecting) at 82e, 84c-d, and 85d then makes sense because it shows something about learning which a mere consideration of teaching tends to obscure; a point at which the notion of teaching has shrivelled and disappeared, leaving simply the learning.

Let us spend a little time on the episode with the slave. When this is alluded to in the Phaedo. Cebes' introductory remarks show that he naturally thinks of the notion of recollection in connexion with the relationship of question and answer, an emphasis not brought to the foreground in the Meno. It is a general point that being able correctly to answer questions presupposes knowing the answers; and because Socrates does nothing but question the slave, it must seem as if (since after his initial failure and the reaching of the Socratic elenchus, the slave answers the questions correctly) the slave does know the answers.

It is important to note that the question the slave initially answers is: How long is the side of a square of eight feet? The question he finally answers is: Is it your opinion that the square on the diagonal of the original square is double its area? — If these questions are the same, one must know, at the very least, what a diagonal is, something the slave did not know when he began. But in considering the questioning, the point is not to ask whether, or not, Socrates does in fact teach (i.e. because he speaks in terms of questions).

If that were the worry, then informing this would be the idea that teaching amounts to the making of true assertions, successful when the pupil shows himself able to reproduce most of the assertions made to him. —— Pupils often do not accept what their master is teaching them as (simply because of that fact) true, and not unreasonably or obstreperously, but because they do not understand what they are being taught, or it seems wrong.
to them because it does not make sense. Whether or not a pupil takes an assertion correctly depends in first measure on whether or not he has understood what is said: the point is that he is not also taught how to take it correctly.

The slave answers questions he has never been asked before, and, with the exception of a passage at 85a, where Socrates is most obviously explaining what he has in mind because the slave has said he does not understand the question, he answers them correctly. But if we say that the answers were "somewhere within him" (85c), that is simply because he did give correct answers to these questions without having been taught the correct answers before. All we are registering is the fact of his success, not any one or other account of the manner of development of his thought. And if he were taught in terms of assertions, and then shows that he has indeed learnt what he was taught, it behoves us equally to say that the correct way of taking what he was told was "somewhere within him". Could the slave know how to take what he is being told unless in some sense he knew what is is now being taught, but had lost the knowledge?

If this is a caricature of teaching, then that only reinforces the recognition that it does not matter whether or not Socrates is actually teaching or doing something else. He could have proceeded, e.g. at 84d ff., as follows: "Now, I shall show you how to answer our question. We add these squares to obtain one four times the size of the original. Do you understand so far? - And then we add these lines (the diagonals) to obtain this area. As each diagonal divides its square into equal areas ..." and so on. The slave need not have seen that the diagonal of a square bisects it. He need not have understood any of the steps of the demonstration. That he is able to agree (as most pupils can) to the steps of such a demonstration suggests that he knew the steps anyway.
When I said that there was something in the notion of recollection which we are shown here that does enter into all learning, I had this in mind: that whether a pupil is taught or questioned, he need not come to be able to see the answer, answer correctly, however many variations of the question we offer him, and however simple they are. At some point he must just know what we mean.

However, although this shows us to a part of learning, or the acquisition of knowledge, that stands beyond the act of teaching, it does not also show that learning is possible in the absence of a teacher. Socrates is clearly unwilling to allow force to Meno's objection because he knows very well that dialectical discussion is an important and intelligible notion – he himself practises it so fully. But he has not shown how it is possible to learn; and it is this that is at the heart of Meno's objection. The slave is said, at the end of his questioning, to have had the answer as an opinion within him (85c), and although it is a true belief, it still needs to be tethered down, as knowledge (ibidem, and also 97e-98a). But he himself has no criterion of the correctness of his answer, and neither does he recognise it as the right answer: it seems to him to be right, but then so did his answer at 82e, which was wrong. That it is the right answer is something that we, or Meno or Socrates, recognise – not the slave: if he is left simply to say what it makes sense for him to say, then he will have no criterion of rightness at all.

We may record the fact that the slave is in fact in the process of learning, as we may record the fact that, whether or not Socrates is said to be teaching, he could do so. But it does not help us to understand how the slave comes to learn, or what that learning is.

Socrates has not answered Meno's objection, because he needed to show us how we could find what we were looking for. And all that he has done is to show us how someone else can be helped to discover what we already know.
He has answered a question about learning in terms of teaching, introducing a particular conception of teaching as if it were a way of learning. More than this, it seems to be misleading even to begin to answer the objection by using any sort of example.

Suppose that he had used (as an example) the slave's coming to discover what virtue is.

---But that would surely only be of any help if we ourselves could recognise when the slave finally showed that he understood; and if we don't ourselves understand what virtue is, we certainly can't do any such recognising. We would have, each of us individually, to find our own what it is, before we can start to consider any cases that are to demonstrate how it can be learned.

Socrates does not suppose himself to know what virtue is; and whether or not each of us can share in this understanding (i.e., share the supposition of one's own lack of understanding) determines whether or not each of us can recognise here a fundamental difference between the case in the Meno, where the slave comes to understand something of geometry, and the case of ourselves seeking some understanding of virtue; the difference being that the slave is being questioned by a man who knows the answers (and that we know the answers), whereas for our own case we cannot even specify who knows the answer, if there is any such man (that being part of what we would seek to understand).

The difficulty in making sense of the nature of this difference lies in the suggestion that it makes some difference to the slave's coming to understand something that the answers should already be well understood. Does the slave learn because his teachers have already agreed upon the answer? Is this, as it were, his reason for learning as he does?

b) The role of 'language' in coming to understand anything at all

Socrates' unannounced point of departure for his answer to Meno is
"what is known": it is this which gives any depth to the idea of giving examples of learning. Consequently, if it is at all intelligible to question the need, or even the possibility, of such a point of departure, then we will be attempting to explore a notion of learning that cannot be referred to "what is known". In this first chapter our concern is both to question Socrates' starting point, and to indicate the range of learning which does not deal with what is known. In particular, there is an obvious ambiguity in such a notion: does it mean learning what is not (yet) known, or learning what has nothing to do with knowing, and hence cannot be known? Is it discovery, or arcane, silent understanding?

Such a distinction will not, in fact, be adequate to characterise the dimension of learning we will be exploring. Yet it is the great virtue of Meno's paradox that it points to the questions to which this ambiguity is a first approximation to an answer. Likewise, it suggests a parallel ambiguity which emerges in the concept of trying: if, that is, we view learning as a man's attempt to master, discover, or attain to something, how are we to understand an approach to trying which has no goal or object, but is apparently defined solely with reference to itself:

Where action were otherwise movement
Of that which is only moved
And has in it no source of movement——

......right action is freedom
From past and future also
For most of us, this is the aim
Never to be realised;
Who are only undefeated
Because we have gone on trying...
(T S Eliot, The Dry Salvages V)
In seeking to understand how it is possible to try to understand, to seek an understanding which one does not possess, then it is of no help to begin from the position of teaching; we must needs begin from the position of the pupil. How is it possible to come to something, even of geometry, of one (which here means "we") doesn't know the right answers, the right ways of proceeding?

If we return to Meno's slave: I suggested that the fundamental difference between that case, where the slave does learn something, and our own, where we are not clear how to begin, is that in the former case the answer is known. That is of course an immensely trite point to make, yet I cannot see another difference that would be of any help in speaking on the slave's achievement, and our own lack of it. However, this would seem to suggest that the slave himself has, as his reason for learning as he does, that the answer is already known. And the idea of a reason for learning or coming to understand something is a strange one.

In the "Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics", Wittgenstein comments:

And does this mean, e.g. that the definition of "same" would be this: same is what all or most human beings with one voice take for the same? - Of course not.

For of course I don't make use of the agreement of human beings to affirm identity. What criterion do you use then? None at all. (V 33)

Wittgenstein's thought has been developed in Rush Rhees' paper "Wittgenstein's Builders" (in Discussions of Wittgenstein) (2). Rhees draws out a distinction of great importance between saying, on the one hand "that is not what we generally do", and on the other "that makes no sense". (Discussions of Wittgenstein: p 77). And what he found unsatisfactory about Wittgenstein's examples of builders' language was that, in that account, they could make no such distinction.
Now it is not hard (perhaps not hard enough) to feel that one understands the expression "what we generally do". Against this, Rhees contrasts "making sense"; however:

"What it makes sense to say" is not "the sense these expressions have". It has more to do with what it makes sense to answer or what it makes sense to ask, or what sense one remark may make in connexion with another. (Op. cit. p 80)

Earlier on in the paper, Rhees makes the distinction in a different way:-/ One may speak about language games, and about what makes sense within a particular language game; and that can be of great help in coming to understand the enormous variety that characterises notions such as "teaching someone the meaning of a word", "appealing to the way the word is used", "justifying one's use on a particular occasion", and so on. But when one speaks about language one cannot speak about it as the sum total of all these varied and complex "games", ways of thinking, practices, or whatever: for that takes for granted that it is the same language that is spoken in the various games!

(Op. cit: p 75)

When someone learns the language, he learns how to speak. But that is not just the ways of speaking:

He learns to tell you something. This is connected with the ideas of addressing you and greeting you. And you cannot teach it him by putting him through the motions.

(Op. cit: p 80)

If he learns the language, how to speak, then he comes to draw a distinction between "making sense" and "ways of doing". He speaks out of what makes sense (to him), which is how he can "bring something to the conversation" and "have something to say" (ibid p 81).

Rhees is not saying that, if one were asked to justify one's way of speaking, one could not appeal to other things - in particular
it is the way in which we have come to know (expressions) in other
connexions that decides whether it makes sense to put them together
here, for instance: whether one can be substituted for another,
whether they are incompatible and so forth.

(op. cit. p 79)

But the simple record of this activity (justifying one's use, one's way of
speaking here) points beyond itself to the 'life' that language has: where
it cannot be distinguished from its speaker, its thinker. Such a notion -
of the life of language - is not taught by any notion of rules, ways of
speaking, and so forth. It is, as we will come to consider below, to be
understood through the fact that one comes to have a conception of the world.

What we have seen, in the Meno, is that, in being taught, a pupil must
be able to follow his teacher in the introduction of ideas that are new to
him. And we can say that conversation relies on this - being able to speak
the language requires being able to bring something new to the conversation.
It does not matter, for this, whether we say that the episode in the Meno
is a lesson or a conversation: both require the following of new ideas.

If we lack a teacher, then it may seem, as it seems to Socrates, that
language is itself enough: conversation can lead us to what is new.

However, all that Socrates has shown is that it can lead someone to ideas and
a way of thinking that are new to him but not to us.

For it is clear that we have to do more than grasp what Socrates, or
others, think and do. We have to find something new ourselves. And although
conversation relies on this, that does not mean that it can allow us to find
what is new, for that would seem to require that at least someone in the
conversation know already. (I say 'seem' because that is all Socrates has
shown.)

In as much as we are considering the discovery of newness, then that
may mean 'new to oneself but not to others'; but this is not an idea of
nnewness that will play a part in Meno's paradox of searching. I cannot seek what is new to myself but not to others, without knowing what it is others possess. And as long as newness is understood as knowledge, it must remain recalcitrant to this. Something new may come to oneself, of course; and in part the slave appears to have undergone this. But he sought nothing new.

Meno's paradox requires us either to understand newness as something other than knowledge, or to leave behind any assumption that knowledge is a kind of acquisition, a party to public transaction. For, as we noted, the paradox is phrased in two ways, concerning seeking and finding, active and passive; so that were we to suppose that newness cannot be sought, but comes if and when if does, any notion of acquisition here still requires us to ask how we know it is new. The concept of 'the given' will still require us to leave behind an acquisitive model of knowledge.———We may, of course, simply conclude that newness does not come at all.

A search for newness is not a search for anything recognisable, and does not involve criteria. This is the full import of Meno's question; and we can only begin to explore it by considering how it is that one comes to have a conception of the world. Certainly the force of Socrates' reply to Meno is an exhibition of learning that is not a transaction of knowledge, and hence able to leave aside the obvious difficulties about criteria. But because he illustrates the learning of what is known, Socrates, has not illustrated a search at all. In a sense, the discussion of recollection in the Phaedo is a more pertinent answer to Meno, because the questions about learning are raised in a more solitary context - from within the framework of experience of the learner.

c) The Phaedo: Learning and the possibility of experience

In this portion of the dialogue, Socrates is again concerned to show that all learning is recollection (76a), by considering our knowledge of
standards of judgement - viewing it as prompted by objects of sense.

Its argument is as follows:-

At 73d Socrates points out that a man, on noticing one thing, may be reminded of something else. This, he says, is recollection: it may be caused by similar or dissimilar objects. (74a). Now we do, it is agreed, have knowledge of absolutes, and in this case absolute equality (74b), a knowledge which comes from instances of equal objects: "It is these equal things that have suggested and conveyed to you your knowledge of absolute equality, although they are distinct from it?" (74c).

Recollection involves becoming aware of something (which had been out of mind) (74c—d), and this something must be distinct from the reminder. And it also requires previous knowledge of what is recalled, if one is to be able to judge the imperfection of the reminder (74e). Now this is "our position with regard to equal things and absolute equality" (74e). We need to have known the absolute before we saw imperfect things, in order that, when we see them, we can immediately see that they are imperfect - the two steps are one and the same. Yet, if it has been agreed that our knowledge of absolutes comes through the senses (75a and 74c above), how can it also be agreed that we had any previous knowledge of absolutes?

The passage from 75a-b seems more like a series of inferences than it is; essentially Socrates is drawing together a set of agreed judgements which allow us to say that we (obviously) see objects of sense through the senses, that these suggest absolutes, and that shows that they are striving after perfection. The desired conclusion then follows:- Objects of sense show themselves to be striving after perfection, and this striving, being their similarity or dissimilarity to absolutes, reminds us of what they are striving towards. And this is only possible if we knew but had forgotten the absolutes.

We have to have known the absolute in order to be reminded of it now, yet it is the feature of the object which is its likeness to what we remember
which allows us to remember. But this, although it is the mechanism assumed, does not require us to see the striving in order to see the absolute; we just see the object, and are reminded; then we can look back to the object to see why or how it reminded us. That is, if we think of the awareness of objects in terms of the image of being reminded, we see the striving or degree of likeness only once we have remembered the absolute.

The plausibility of this is strengthened when we recall that equal sticks may indeed be used, in teaching, to introduce to the child the notion of equality - for here we can speak of the child's awareness of the sticks without any judgement of their equality. That is, it seems to make sense to say that we can see equal sticks without knowing that they are equal. (However, that presupposes that we either come to see that they are equal, or at least learn through the word of others that they are; possibilities which alter the dimensions of the Phaedo's discussion.)

Yet we do not come to a knowledge of absolutes separate from our knowledge of objects. When we learn an absolute, we simply see it in the world. Within the terms of the discussion (75c) we see something beautiful, or good, or equal. At this point in the Phaedo, when the discussion begins to move towards a conception of the Forms ("which realities exist" (76e)), and the later questions of a higher sense or perception, it is extremely important that Socrates is preoccupied with the comparison of absolute and object of sense. But it is just the intelligibility of this comparison that must be rejected.

What supports Socrates is the idea of a mode of comparison between object and absolute that can be understood in terms of being reminded, and hence in terms of similarity (and dissimilarity). If equal sticks are like equality, then that is a plausible way of suggesting that they operate like a picture, and remind us of it. But equal sticks are not like equality; they instance or exhibit it. Socrates is wrong to say that a portrait of Simmias reminds us of Simmias (74a) - it shows us Simmias.
It would appear here to be important to Socrates that we can compare a portrait with the subject portrayed, because the idea that a portrait reminds us of its subject always presupposes another means of access to the subject beyond that of the portrait (which it is also tempting to call 'direct access'), and thus led Socrates to say that when we see an instance of an absolute - the equal sticks - we at the same time see that it is only a copy, an imperfect equality. However, we look at a portrait, not in order to compare it with its subject, but in order to see its subject. (Quite clearly, the possibility of comparison exists, and is often taken up. But I will say, below, that this is precisely what prevents our allowing a picture to introduce us to anything absolute.)

If Socrates is to have explained learning as the recollection of absolutes under the prompting of objects of sense, he must be right in assuming that we can know objects in independence of the operation of these absolutes, so that we can see something in order to be reminded (i.e. so that we see a portrait at all, even before reading it). But such an assumption would not cover the fact that we must also be able to see the imperfect equality they manifest.

If an object of sense reminds us of a category of judgement in order to allow us to apply that category to itself, this still does not cover the recognition of imperfection in the object's equality - it is one thing to see that the sticks are equal, and another to see that they are like equality. Only in the latter case have we the room to realise the operation of the reminder - because we can see the object (in its imperfection) and, knowing absolute equality, recognise the similarities; but in order to see the imperfect objects, we need to see that they are equal, albeit imperfectly. That is, the only way in which an object of sense can become a candidate for recognition as a reminder - or as striving - is by showing us its equality anyway. It only makes sense to speak of comparing a
portrait with its subject if we can already see the subject in the portrait; but if we can see that the sticks are equal, we must know what equality is, before any question of being reminded arises.

We can only be said to recognise the striving of the object if we can see equality in it. But if we can do that, then there is no need to say that the object has reminded us of an absolute which bears comparison with the object; any idea of the independence of the absolute, of its existence outside of our judgement of objects, is unnecessary. This still does not explain how we come to any awareness of the absolute's presence - how we learn to see.

d) Problems in the models of picturing and abstraction

The reason for labouring this discussion of the Phaedo more or less in its own terms, taking them more seriously than might appear warranted, is its introduction of the notion of picturing. Socrates is concerned with the comparison between absolutes, and imperfection in the world of sense; but he understands this imperfection in such a way that he annuls his argument. If there is any sense in speaking of the imperfection of the world, it is not that of objects failing to meet an absolute standard.

"Is it not true that equal stones and sticks sometimes, without changing in themselves, appear equal to one person and unequal to another?.... Do they seem to us to be equal in the sense of absolute equality, or do they fall short of it in so far as they only approximate to equality? Or don't they fall short at all?——They do - a long way." (74b & d)

But in these terms it is not the objects which fall short, but our awareness of them. They appear equal to one person, unequal to another. The imperfection here is a function of judgement, not of objects. It arises as a dimension of possibility (truth and falsity) which judgement seems to inhabit. That is to say, imperfection is sensed in a lack of certainty.
The importance of the notion of picturing is not that it involves a comparison between picture and subject, but that we are required to read a picture - to see what is portrayed. And there is an imperfection which can arise out of this, and which does apply also to our awareness of objects (as pictures): a recognition that the objects are picturing. The world remains as a jumble of paint, so to speak - because we feel a wish to get at the real meaning, not just its picture. The world is at fault because it secretes its meaning, and we do not know how to read it.

This sense of imperfection - that the world is only a picture - is not itself a sense of the imperfection of judgement, in that the latter seems to be a lack of our own ability, while the former is a failing of the world. If the sense of imperfection introduces a search for perfection, it seems one thing to pursue certainty of judgement; another to see into the meaning of objects. But they are different only so long as we assume judgement to be different from seeing: the ascription of predicates to be different from individuation.

This distinction has been fundamental to all ideas of learning as abstraction, where the general predicative concept emerges out of (the experience of) its instances. As with recollection in the Phaedo, the pure absolute is distinguished from its instances, even if the dimension of imperfection is overlooked. To view learning as abstraction relies on a picture in which, say, a child is seen playing with blocks whose organisation is obvious - to us:

When a teacher presents a child with some apparatus or materials, such as Cuisenaire rods, Dienes blocks or an assortment of objects on an investigation table, he typically has in mind some one particular conception of what he presents in this way. But then the incredible assumption seems to be made that the teacher's conception of the situation somehow confers a special uniqueness on it such that the children must also quite
inevitably conceive of it in this way too, even though they may not even possess the concepts involved (R F Dearden, "Instruction and Learning by discovery", in The Concept of Education, ed Peters p 146).

The child certainly does come to follow a teacher's examples, but this is not to say that he can do without the teacher:

Of course mathematics is all around us; so too are atomic physics, gravitation, molecular biology and organic chemistry. They are all, in a sense, though not all in the same sense, 'there'; but the point is that you need more than eyes to see them, and if children are to conceive of their environment in mathematical or in scientific ways, they have to be more than placed in contact with it. They will have to be taught how to conceive it...(loc. sit. p 149)

A general idea is not abstracted from particular instances, because without the general idea there are no particular instances. The resolution of this is of course familiar enough:

One gives examples and intends them to be taken in a particular way. I do not, however, mean by this that he is supposed to see in those examples that common thing which I - for some reason - was unable to express; but that he is now to employ those examples in a particular way. (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 71)

When someone defines the names of colours for me by pointing to samples and saying "This colour is called 'blue', this 'green'...." this case can be compared in many respects to putting a table in my hands, with the words written under the colour samples. Though this comparison may mislead in many ways. One is inclined to extend the comparison: to have understood the definition means to have in one's mind an idea of the thing defined, and that is a sample or picture. So if I am shown various different leaves and told "This is called a 'leaf'", I
get an idea of the shape of a leaf, a picture of it in my mind. - But what does the picture of a leaf look like when it does not show us any particular shape, but 'what is common to all shapes of leaf'? Which shade is the 'sample in my mind' of the colour green - the sample of what is common to all shades of green?

"But might there not be such 'general' samples? Say a schematic leaf, or a sample of pure green?" - Certainly there might. But for such a schema to be understood as a schema, and not as the shape of a particular leaf, and for a slip of pure green to be understood as a sample of all that is greenish and not as a sample of pure green - this in turn resides in the way the samples are used. (73)

If we leave aside for the moment what the idea of use and activity means for learning, we are left with the point that both abstraction and the Phaedo try to account for learning, in terms of the features of existing objects: instances. That is, learning is formulated in terms of a particular understanding of knowledge, of what is learned, wherein individuation is anyway taken for granted. We just do see instances as individual, so that we can then learn what they share, or what is true of one or other of them. If this is abandoned, as it must be, then the understanding of learning which we develop must allow for learning to individuate as we learn properties, relations, facts or whatever: so that the existence of individuals is learned at the same time as what is general.

This is not of course thus far to say what such learning is like, though we can go on to consider this below. But it does mean that it cannot be understood in terms of recognition, or any notion of criteria which would allow us to know what we are learning; our conception of the world is not a knowledge that would be open to justification, precisely because it does not come out of any comparison with other standards, and is not authenticated by any criteria. Thus: it is not new objects, or new qualities or relations, or new facts about objects. Even if these enter into a
discovery of newness, they are not what is sought.

While it is clear that, in our own past, we developed our conception of the world, this was not something we were seeking; thus, although our childhood was indeed filled with the discovery and teaching of new objects and information, and especially activity, this does not mean that they will ipso facto now be the means to a redeveloped conception, or the means to newness. Meno's paradox is a paradox of adult life, because it asks what newness can mean when distinguished from all that we know; and if we are to answer it at all, we have to go beyond the schema of knowledge and judgement in subject-predicate form, or indeed any mode of knowing in which it is possible to ask how (by what criteria) one recognises (whether individuates or identifies) what is known. This is what takes a search for newness beyond a simple return to the forms of learning that filled one's childhood: that one did not seek out what was learned here.

The sense in which "The Child is father of the Man" in Wordsworth's Ode (Intimations of Immortality) is not one that accomodates a return to childhood - for, as G H Hartman comments (Wordsworth's poetry, 1787-1814), although it is a poem about renewal, and the poet's grief at the greyness of nature, his longing to recover joy in nature (pp 274-5), nonetheless the source of renewal is not repetition of feelings, but acceptance of what made them possible:

We in thought will join your throng...
Feel the gladness of the May!
Though nothing can bring back the hour
Of splendour in the grass, of glory in the flower;
We will grieve not, rather find
Strength in what remains behind;
In the primal sympathy
Which having been must ever be;
The immortality intimated lies not in this joy in nature but in "fallings from us, vanishings" - in other words, in the impermanence of the splendour. The parallels with the Phaedo are noted by Hartman (pp 168-9) - the fact that we could find nature transient suggests an awareness of permanence. Wordsworth is rediscovering, in the poem, the source of the 'philosophic mind' that allows him gratitude for what nature does offer, rather than lament its transience. Hartman locates this in a concept of self transcendence, in which the child moves from "another world than 'nature', or if in nature, then one that is coloured by a sublime and terrible imagination. The soul's eventual turning to nature is therefore a real conversion, and proof of self-transcending powers....The mature man, therefore bases his faith in self-transcendence on the ease or unconsciousness with which the apocalyptic imagination turned in childhood toward life." (pp 276-7).

Thus although Wordsworth does consider the child as he:

(on whom those truths do rest

which we are toiling all our lives to find

and laments the fact that the child will "provoke/the years to bring the inevitable yoke", the wish to return is not a wish he is party to. Although in growing from child to man, man belies his divine origin under the weight of "custom" and his "newly-learned art" - the variety of parts he plays - it is nature which is to bring man to his true self: Wordsworth's hope is that the imagination can be domesticated, that nature can satisfy a mind which seeks, or used to seek, the supernatural.

Imagination is consciousness of self at its highest pitch, but Wordsworth writes in the faith that Nature will suffice the energies of consciousness. (Hartman, p 18)

The ancient Matura as in the fertile Chaos of Spenser's Garden of Adonis (Faerie Queene, III vi) clothes the soul with
'first being' sufficient to let it enter the changeable world.

But Wordsworth's Nature gives the soul its 'second being', which is more essential insofar as it lays the ground for all further second being or rebirth. (Ibid. p 277n)

We can later return to this understanding of nature in the context of the search for newness; but as it stands it is couched in a Platonic terminology which we have already seen to avoid the central difficulties in the notion of the search.

It may be said that Meno's paradox is itself couched in an overformal terminology, one which creates illusory difficulties, and that in the above discussions it has been given an undue weight, particularly since the dialogue does not itself suggest that Meno, as a character, would have had much or any of this in mind. He appears to speak out of desperation, or what Wittgenstein spoke of as 'philosophical cramp'.

But it is a measure of the power of the paradox that we can learn a great deal from Socrates' lack of success in resolving it. It has a kind of archetypal status - a power which allows it to be the expression or crystallisation of a host of problems concerning this concept of newness which enter different spheres of human life. Up to this point certainly, the only elucidation of 'newness' has been Meno's own formulation, "you don't in the least know what it is". For clearly enough, one sense of 'what is new' is bound up with being taught. We can go to a teacher, say at university level, and confidently expect to find out something new (to us), be it a theorem (maths or economics), a chunk of reasoning or critical technique in humanities, or approaches and insights, perhaps solutions and certainly explanations, to traditional or current problems.

If Meno were to have asked how we can learn any of this, the answer is that the knowledge is being offered, and requires us simply to get used to and master the gifts given. We know beforehand that something is there to be had, even without knowing the new thing, because the proclamation of
'having something to teach' is made.

But Meno's question concerned newness we have to find for ourselves. If there is no-one who claims to teach what we feel we lack, how are we to proceed?

We may notice, first of all, that we have to know at least that what we are seeking is not to be found in the available teaching. Meno could not have posed his question had not Socrates satisfied him of this. Indeed, although Meno's ignorance had a name - in this case virtue - it is not, for Socrates, this name which marks it out as distinctive but simply the fact that no-one knows what it is. We do not even know what it is that we lack - all that we can record is the fact of the lack.

In the Phaedo this is very revealingly transformed into a question about things: How can we know absolutes or ideals, unless through the senses? The ideals are not categories or object - they come closer to logical categories, and suggest that the existence of objects is made possible by the sheer givenness of these ideals: we know the ideals, or else we could have no experience of objects.

What is wrong with the Phaedo is, at 75a-b for example, the supposition that we compare objects with ideals in order to see that they are imperfect, or that the use of ideals is in judgement. If we are to go beyond this notion of comparison we must ask, instead, whether it is these ideals that allow there to be objects. Put in these terms, Socrates' insight would be that if we wish to know the ideals, and no-one teaches them, then we do see the world as imperfect, because we see the ideals in it. The world provides our only access to the ideals, rather than, in the Phaedo itself being an excuse for a comparison with them. By leaving behind the supposition that ideals are predicative, and belong in the context of judgement, we are in some sense concerned to know the world, but not as objects for judgement: rather we are concerned with what allows objects to exist in the first place.
with the world's existence.

If we tried to remain with the Platonic conception of ideals, we could only say again that certain absolutes or ideals are the ones we are seeking, but that they are distinguished solely by being those we do not already know. They are not something which can be called 'new to us' — for there is no contrast to be made here between ourselves and those who profess to teach it. The search is bound up with the world's imperfection: although the world is thereby grey and lifeless, we are searching not for an addition to the world, which would only partake of the same lifelessness, but the world's perfection. This is a change at the roots of the world: its existence.

This is not at all to say that criteria have no role in learning: on the contrary, they would feature largely in the range of cases learning may have. But we are not concerned, in exploring the concept of learning, to discuss its range — and hence our subject is not the philosophy of education, although it underpins it. The point is rather that, while learning may involve the use of criteria, we cannot set out learning in terms of a concept of criterion. Criteria enter into learning as part of what is learned: we learn differences and distinctions in terms of what we can notice about individuals. And of course they are the presuppositions of our making judgements, as of our making choices. Thus they mark a transition, in learning, between a conception of the world, and the observations and judgements we make within that conception.

That is, as we have notice concerning Rhees' comments on language-games, criteria may well feature in our setting up a language-game in order to teach it — and hence in our philosophical reflection on what goes into the language-game, and into learning it. But there is a more fundamental question, which cannot be treated as a question about illustrating and exampleing language: namely, how do we have a conception of the world at all within which to learn individual games/cases? The point here is that,
if we try to answer this question, then the concept of criterion is of no help.

e) The intelligibility of a "search for newness", and the problem of presence.

Up to this point we have taken Meno's paradox more or less formally, in order to ask why the search for newness cannot be easily resolved. The discussion of the Meno has indicated that it cannot be approached from the example of teaching; that of the Phaedo that the very possibility of newness, involving the leaving-behind of criteria, thereby requires the leaving-behind of a separation of individuation and predication, or the logical notion of the instantiation of a (general) property. We have, instead, to ask what is involved in the development of a conception of the world. This helps up to understand what 'newness' means here, for it is not a newness that applies to ordinary subject-predicate forms of judgement.

It is this which points to what is required in a search for newness: the search must at the least involve the development of a conception of the world. And of course we do already have a conception of the world - so that the search for newness may appear to involve abandoning this given conception.

But what this shows us is rather one of the forms of presupposition the searching may make: that of the imperfection of the given conception of the world - its flatness or two-dimensional quality - which may lead to finding the world grey and unreal, and thereby to seek another. What is significant here is not that this does indicate what a search for newness involves - namely the rejection of the given world - but that it is the world which is at stake. In other words, this is not a psychological aberration: rather than being a fact about the man alone - and hence apparently empirical - it is a fact concerning man and world (the whole) and must be understood as at the heart of the notions of man and world. (That it differs from a schizophrenic
substitution of one world for another depends solely on the man's relationship to other man in the course of the search. This is a fundamental point, to which we can return below.) Newness may be what is distracting: a new pleasure, a new experience. Or it may be new information, permitting new activities or revealing new objects. And whereas new experience is not learned, new information is. Both these are new by addition, presupposing an existing totality. That they may properly be called new is not, of course, called into question; but the newness we are concerned with in Menô's question is not measured against anything prior, but is something absolutely new.

This is the most fundamental notion of change, precisely because it is not a change that can come about within any particular class or limits. If we ask what is to change, the answer must be the world, the whole world; and the search for change in this absolute sense is made possible only when the world has itself become static. Its very capability for change is what we are seeking, and what is hidden.

But this is not to say that the world must be changed or exchanged. The world is not an enormously large object - a point we can consider when we ask, below, how it is that we come to have a conception of the world. For this reason it is equally difficult to speak of a concern with a new experience of the world, or a new awareness of the world, unless we are quite clear that it is not just the experience which is to be new, as it is not (just) the world which is to be new. (This is why the use of drugs is so limited in effect: it can produce a changed experience, which may or may not be an experience - in imaginative or distortive terms - of one's physical environment, but it always, when finished, presents the user with a choice between his everyday world and the one under drugs. Drug-taking is an activity that goes on within the world, and suffers like Archimedes because it has no fulcrum outside the world. The same point applies to the man who buys himself ever-changing entertainment. This is not, to say, of course
that either man continually moves from choice to choice, protected as he is by his own society and habit: but neither path can be considered as leading to anything absolutely new, precisely because their changes take place solely within the world."

To say that the world has become static is not simply to say that our understanding of the world, and of change, is materialistic, conducive to Marxist or pragmatist analysis. Within a materialistic understanding of the world the conception of change that can operate is adequate. It is possible to speak of the world as static only when there is indeed a possibility of change concerning the whole world — and it is precisely this possibility which we are considering as the search for what is absolutely new. The characteristic in which the world makes neither sense/or nonsense — in which it has no meaning — is to this extent one which applies to a materialistic understanding; but only to the extent that no question can be raised about its meaning. To find the world meaningless is already to have posed the question of its meaning: and this is to find the world static.

Simone Weil speaks of this stasis in terms of monotony:

"Monotony of evil: never anything new, everything about it is equivalent. Never anything real, everything about it is imaginary."

It is because of this monotony that quantity plays so great a part....

"Evil is licence and that is why it is monotonous: everything has to be drawn from ourselves."

(Gravity and Grace, p 62)

"This world....offers us absolutely nothing except means. Our will is forever sent from one means to another like a billiard ball. (p 133)"

But this is not the understanding which materialism could bring to the world — for it is the unsatisfactoriness of the world as seen here which already presupposes some possibility of satisfaction:
This world is the closed door. It is a barrier. And at the same time it is the way through.

All created things refuse to be for me as ends. Such is God’s extreme mercy towards me. And that very thing is what constitutes evil. Evil is the form which God’s mercy takes in this world. (p 132)

We can consider below what relation Weil’s notions of imagination and necessity have to that of newness; here we are left with the point that, as in what we have drawn from the Phaedo, the imperfection of the world, far from prohibiting any search for perfection, is really the presupposition of the search.

It is because we are faced with imperfection not at a quantitative level, but vis-a-vis the whole world — and because it is this notion of the ‘whole world’ that we are chiefly concerned to explore — that any concern with coming to see new objects will not do.

For it may seem that since the world now looks to us to be a collection of objects, we can only assume that we came to know it piece by piece. And that is what teaching seems to offer: introducing us to objects, either individually or in type. Yet we have already noted how inadequate this is as an account of learning in the Phaedo. The point here is that while the discovery of new objects is not simply a concern with the world as means, in Weil’s sense, there is no way an extra item is to transform the whole world. Although it may indeed appear that in childhood we found the world thrilling, what we cannot do is to approach this untroubled conception of the world as if it were the growth in awareness of new objects. What is the point in learning plant structure, anatomy, baroque ornamentation, the elements of Greek tragedy, or the lotus centres of the body, if the whole world is not transformed in the learning?

Study differs from being taught within the general context of learning. They share a notion of subject-matter, and a conception of learning in which
the learner is brought, or brings himself, into some relationship to the subject-matter. For being taught, this requires placing himself in the hands of his teachers: but study may seem to offer more of an avenue to newness, because its intention is to emerge with something new.

But it begins in questioning and puzzlement - and these are the crucial steps into study, which one cannot take for oneself. In the same way that teaching cannot be a means to newness, because to seek teaching requires a knowledge of what one is to be taught, the same pre-existence of a relation between a subject-matter and oneself is involved in study, even though puzzlement replaces admiration, interest or professional need.

This is not to say that study does not lead to discovery. Skills, certainly, may be original; an acrobat or an athlete can evolve a new movement or feat, and there may be a long period of experiment and slow discovery in this. The notions of experiment, research and discovery bring out quite clearly that an artist's creation of new postures (Michelangelo) or style (Leonardo's sfumato, Cezanne's solid geometry) - or equally the invention of the cloud chamber, or the creation of synthetic genes or non-natural elements - make genuinely new steps. The end product is something new - but if it is not a newness that we can share in, it will still be a newness that is different rather than absolute, or standing without reference to any comparison. It is not, that is, a newness we can experience or undergo - and this is the importance of "sharing" here: that we are involved in its very newness.

Whether we attempt to speak of this as making the object new (i.e. as a property or attribute of the object), or realise that newness has at least as much relation to our mode of encountering it as to whatever we subsequently observe of its objects, it is not an answer to our seeking newness to say that others have produced new objects, types, ideas or methods. We would like to find newness itself, rather than a newness which is referred back to
to our own limited knowledge of the objects that there are: we would like
to find newness which exists 'objectively', without reference to our own
subjectivity; and yet we do not know where to look apart from this
subjectivity.

Study, in as much as it yields a new solution or technique, produces
a result that is new in relation to its subject-matter. This is true even
of something as radical as Schoenberg's serialism; indeed it is at the heart
of the tragedy in Thomas Mann's novel Doctor Faustus, in which the central
character is a composer who endeavours to save 20thC. music by 'inventing'
serialism, that the composer sells his soul by doing so. For although the
discovery may resolve issues, or even surprise us, and is thus new with
respect to an earlier time, the time which posed the problem, this is not
a newness that involves the whole world, even for the student himself. We
are still left with a new possibility within time, when we seek a newness
that is actual and unambiguous, which commands time because it commands action
and does not merely present alternatives.

Yet this is not to say that science and art thereby do not enter into
a search for newness, any more than teaching does not. Both may do, but
only when what is sought is not measured against what is known. For science,
this means that it will involve the creation of the problem itself:

Science as it was carried on by Newton, Maxwell, and others, does
show us something about the world. And its latest discoveries do
not show us more.

A man may learn about the stars or the structure of the earth,
and be no wiser. If he learned this without an understanding of
the sort of problems that disturb astronomers of geologists,
he may only be more stupid.

(Phase. Without Answers. p 11)

Newton's work was deep, partly through his conception of the
general problem of explaining phenomena in terms of motion and
mass. Today we might question that...This would be to raise again the deepest question that Newton raised and answered. If the answer is different now, this does not mean that Newton's work is less profound. (ibid. 9)

But this is not study, even in science; it is creativity. This is why Simone Weil writes of literature that

It only escapes from this alternative (of being boring or immoral, or both) if in some way it passes over to the side of reality through the power of art - and only genius can do that. (Gravity and Grace p 63)

and of the dimension of genius in science:

Pythagoras. Only the mystical conception of geometry could supply the degree of attention necessary for the beginning of such a science. (p 120)

We will be able to develop the theme of creativity in its relation to newness at a much later point.———But concerning both teaching and study, we must note that, in as much as they are undertaken in response to a particular lack, they cannot feature in the search for newness because they offer only additions to the world's objects and activities. They do not amount to change in the whole world.

The 'intentionality' that enters into this consideration of teaching and study is what requires us to distinguish absolute newness from the more ordinary cases in which men discover something new, and to insist that the range of meaning newness can acquire throughout these cases is something different from the newness sought in terms of Meno's paradox. The difference is as radical as that between objects and the world: a distinction that it seems possible to draw only with reference to the self. Not, that is, to distinguish the world as one thing, the self as another - for even Descartes' "cogito" only casts the self as one object, even if the most basic or certain, within the world. But rather that the way in which there come to be objects
is not a question about physical causes: the origin of the universe as 'big bang' or steady-state creation: but a question about their presence to the questioner. 'The world' is the fact of the being of objects, which is a fact only to the self.

In these terms the imperfection of the world is an imperfection that cannot be placed solely in the dimension of objects. It concerns the self, too; and the search for what is absolutely new is for a newness in the world, rather than objects. But this is not to say that it is a newness of the self, rather than objects, for it is this distinction which prevents our dealing with the world itself, which prevents our being faced with the whole world, and hence its imperfection, and leaves us merely within the world.

To view the self in terms of the world is not to avoid self-concern. When Thomas Merton writes:

All sin starts from the assumption that my false self, the self that exists only in my own egocentric desires, is the fundamental reality of life to which everything else in the universe is ordered. Thus I use up my life in the desire for pleasures and the thirst for experiences, for power, honour, knowledge and love, to clothe this false self and construct its nothingness into something objectively real...in order to make myself perceptible to myself and to the world.

(Seeds of Contemplation, p 27)

the foundation of sin is not the assumption that selfhood is the fundamental reality, but that there is a thing an selfhood: the attempt to view selfhood in terms of the world.

What, then, finally characterises the search for newness is not the object for which it seeks change, even if that object is the self; it is that the change has no object. It is a change in the manner in which there are objects, affecting both self and objects at once. What is absolutely
new is what changes the whole world.

The problems which Meno's paradox focuses are thus those which seek such change. The central of these problems is that of presence: a concept which is especially problematic within theology, because it hovers untidily between (purely) subjective experience and objective 'manifestation', seeming to demand that we transcend any such distinction. (It is the presupposition of this distinction that this experience of the 'subject' is treated on the same level as the object - within the world.) John Zizioulas diagnoses the issue of presence as the fundamental difficulty in theology:

...either God's particularity is also one determined by space and time (by a 'body'), or it is impossible to attribute particularity to God at all, in which case it is also impossible to attribute ontology to him; we are simply forced to say that he is not. The only way out of such a dilemma - which if I am not mistaken is the difficulty in which theology constantly finds itself - is to admit the possibility of a particularity which is not determined by space and time, i.e. by circumscribability...

(for in this particularity) the person is particular only when its presence is constituted in freedom from its boundaries.

("Human capacity and Human incapacity", p 415n)

The problem Zizioulas is facing here is that of the lack of presence, although the form of the problem is of personal presence. The relation this has to the presence of objects is something we can consider only after working through the notions of world and 'other minds'. We may simply note here that, while the framework of Zizioulas' problem is one in which (other) persons are present only to the extent that physical objects are present, what he has to say about the inadequacy of this account of personal presence bears fully upon the presence of objects. (Having, in the discussion of the Meno, decided to approach newness from the position of the learner, we have
subsequently ignored any distinctiveness which (other) persons might present, and assumed their presence as ordinary furniture within the world. It belongs to subsequent sections to bring out any distinctiveness in this notion of other people.)

But presence is a problem at the heart of philosophy as well as theology, a problem put very acutely by Stanley Cavell:

In the unbroken tradition of epistemology since Descartes and Locke (radically questioned from within itself only in our period), the concept of knowledge (of the world) disengages from its connections with matters of information and skill and learning, and becomes fixed to the concept of certainty alone, and in particular to a certainty provided by the (by my) senses. At some early point in epistemological investigation, the world normally present to us (the world in whose existence, as it is typically put, we 'believe') is brought into question and vanishes, whereupon all connection with the world is found to hang upon what can be said to be 'present to the senses'; and that turns out, shockingly, not to be the world. It is at this point that the doubter finds himself cast into scepticism, turning the existence of the external world into a problem....(The sceptic) forgoes the world for just the reason that the world is important, that it is the scene and stage of connection with the present; he finds that it vanishes exactly with the effort to make it present....But the wish for genuine connection is there, and there was a time when the effort, however hysterical, to assume epistemological presentness was the best expression of seriousness about our relation to the world, the expression of an awareness that presentness was threatened, gone.

(Must we mean what we say?, pp 323-4)

It is central to Cavell's remarks here that the sceptic himself try to make the world present, to refer it back in his own effort. This is the
tragedy of scepticism - a tragedy Cavell notes in the course of his long essay on Lear:

Lear abdicates sanity for the usual reason: it is his way not to know what he knows, or to know only what he knows. At the end, recovered to the world, he still cannot give up knowledge... (ibid p 325)

This is not to say that the condition is insurmountable:

...we think scepticism must mean that we cannot know the world exists, and hence that perhaps there isn't one (a conclusion some profess to admire and others to fear). Whereas that scepticism suggests is that since we cannot know the world exists, its presentness to us cannot be a function of knowing. The world is to be accepted as the presentness of other minds is not to be known but acknowledged.

(p 324)

But although scepticism may suggest this, it in no way makes it possible. At best it may be considered as the expression of the precondition of a search for newness; the acceptance that Cavell requires is not possible as long as, in Simone's Weil's phrase, "everything is drawn from ourselves".

If we are to arrive there,

To arrive where you are...(then)

In order to arrive at what you do not know

You must go by a way which is the way of ignorance.

(Eliot, East Coker III)

And this is not something which the self - the self which scepticism presupposes - has the power to do. It can, to the extent of its power, affect what is within the world; but to affect the world itself will involve the self as much as it involves objects. In contrast to the (false) self which is viewed in terms of the world, Thomas Merton goes on to speak of the true self as "hidden in the love and mercy of God";

But whatever is in God is really identical with Him, for His
infinite simplicity admits no division and no distinction...If I find Him I will find myself and if I find my true self I will find him.

(Seeds of Contemplation, p 28)

In the same way, Simone Weil writes:

What (man) can know of himself is only what is lent him by circumstances. My 'I' is hidden for me (and for others): it is on the side of God, it is in God, it is God. (Op. cit. p 33)

To undertake a search for one's true self is not to be concerned with the self as opposed to anything else within the world. It is simply to seek that newness which transforms the whole world.

And Weil concentrates much of the force of her thought in a concept of necessity which she uses to set forward the way of overcoming one's false self:

This irreducible 'I' which is the irreducible basis of my suffering - I have to make this 'I' universal. (p 129)

Not, that is by reducing the 'I' - which is the concern of the sceptic. Weil has in mind neither logic nor certainty when she talks of necessity: in her use it is the counter to imagination, to the evil which is imaginative licence and which makes possible the use and abuse of objects, the construction of purpose and desire. In this sense necessity is spoken of as 'external' - the almost totally physical pressure of reality upon us:

Relentless necessity, wretchedness, distress, the crushing burden of poverty and of labour which wears us out, cruelty, torture, violent death, constraint, disease - all these constitute divine love. It is God who in love withdraws from us so that we can love him (p 28)

Necessity - an image by which the mind can conceive of the indifference, the impartiality of God. (p 94)

We have to associate the rhythm of the life of the body with
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Necessity - an image by which the mind can conceive of the indifference, the impartiality of God. (p 94)

We have to associate the rhythm of the life of the body with
that of the world, to feel this association constantly and to feel also the perpetual exchange of matter by which the human being bathes in the world. (pp 128-9)

Necessity is thus not any type of object: it is the whole world which, when faced, is found to be static and neutral, unable to mean anything. It is the world which we are forced to accept, because there is no other and we must accept it even as we find it in its lack of any perfection.

The paradox is that

This world, in so far as it is completely empty of God, is God himself.

Necessity, in so far as it is absolutely other than good, is the good itself. (p 99)

This good is the good we seek; for this is not, I think, other than the problem of presence, which is indeed a concern to 'bath in the world'. That is, the concept of necessity is in Weil's hands the limit to which the self can attain in confronting the world - Necessity is the experience the world offers which can bring us most nearly into contact with the point at which self and world are related inextricably. This experience is not the relation itself: necessity remains, in Weil's schema, something within the world. Yet with necessity we reach the highest point of ascent to this relation. Thus necessity is not presence; it remains possible to ignore or to embrace necessity, whereas presence involves the overcoming of the gap between self and world. Nonetheless necessity itself, when rightly understood (a qualification we turn to below), is the means by which presence is realised:

When a friend, long absent and eagerly awaited, grips our hand it makes no difference whether the pressure exerted be in itself agreeable or painful. When he speaks, we don't ask ourselves whether the sound of his voice is in itself agreeable. The pressure of the
hand, the voice, all is for us just the outward sign of a presence, and in virtue of that fact infinitely precious. In the same way all that happens to us... places us in contact with the absolute good formed by the divine will. (The Need for Roots, pp 275-6)

The dominant note in Weil's approach is her understanding of affliction - that is, of Christianity's "supernatural use" (Gravity and Grace, p 73) of affliction, the possibility of using the unchosen pressure of the imperfect and meaningless world. Affliction, understood as necessity, constitutes our approach to divine love (Gravity and Grace, p 28 (quoted above)).

As an understanding of the condition in which we are placed at the beginning of a search for newness, for a transformed world, her remarks are profound in the extreme; yet there is a tension in her writing which allows her not only to illustrate necessity through suffering, but also to suggest that suffering - or rather her more specific notion of affliction - is the only way to embrace necessity, to make the 'I' universal. On the one hand,

In emptying ourselves we expose ourselves to all the pressure of the surrounding universe. (Gravity and Grace, p 83)

In order that the imitation of God should not be a mere matter of words, it is necessary that there should be a just man to imitate, but in order that we should be carried beyond the will it is necessary that we should not be able to choose to imitate him. One cannot choose the cross. (Ibid., p 79)

which means that it is not up to us to seek a way of affliction - the choice (on our behalf) belongs to the "presence of God, not as Creator but as Spirit" (p 33). And yet she also writes:

To change the relationship between ourselves and the world in the same way as, though apprenticeship, the workman changes the relationship between himself and the tool. Getting hurt: this is the trade entering into the body. May all suffering make the
Suffering, teaching and transformation. What is necessary is not that the initiated should learn something, but that a transformation should come about in them which makes them capable of receiving the teaching.

Pathos means at the same time suffering (notable suffering unto death) and modification (notable transformation into an immortal being). (p 75)

We might note here the distinction she draws between learning, and the transformation of the self. It is this latter which is her concern - an emphasis appearing most clearly at the end of The Need for Roots:

labour and death, if man undergoes them in a spirit of willingness, constitute a transference back into the current of supreme Good, which is obedience to God.

Physical labour is a daily death....The labourer turns his body and soul into an appendix of the tool which he handles.

It is not difficult to define the place that physical labour should occupy in a well-ordered social life. It should be its spiritual core. (pp 286,288)

It is doubtless possible to exaggerate the emphasis she appears to place on choosing the way of suffering. And at the least we must note a balance to her stress on affliction - that this is not just suffering, but suffering, even unto death, in God's hands:

In contemplation, the right relationship with God is love, in action it is slavery. This distinction must be kept. We must act as becomes a slave while contemplating with love...

(Gravity and Grace, p 44)

Yet such a distinction, between passivity and activity, in which only the former relates us to God directly, has as a consequence that any idea of a
search for newness is ruled out as improper, given the role she assigns to action. It is this which has significant implications for her understanding of other people; and, connected with this, she does not raise the question of what makes possible our being faced with the world of matter she begins from— it appears simply as the datum of experience.

But if we are to make sense of a search for newness, this is the question we must begin from. How do we come to have a conception of the world at all? How does there come to be a world? And this means beginning outside an explicitly theological context, or tackling Weil directly on her understanding of creation, although we will return to the question of creation later on.

What makes Simone Weil a particularly notable writer at this point is precisely her concern to set out a change, even a transformation, of the self, with respect to the world only, and not at all with respect to other people. It is the lack of conception of others in her writing that makes it both so immediate and so important a point of reference for what we are exploring. It is not, I think, valid to say that Weil does at least write not only of the world but also of God, and therefore that she believes in God's existence and is working out the relation between self, world and God. Certainly the relation between God and the world is central to her writing, but it is a relation that is explored through the eye of the self, not in a grandly metaphysical manner (i.e. as a relation between two kinds of being); this is why all she is willing to say about God is that he is absent. Grace, and love, come, and are operative— but she works these out within the sphere of "the world"— the path the self has to tread is described solely with reference to the world (and the self itself).

Thus, what Weil charts is the self's encounter with the world, and the possibilities of transformation in this encounter. Her solitariness is such that 'other people' belong as a type within the overall encounter.
What matters is what the self comes to terms with in its relation to the world - which is why necessity plays such a large part in her characterisation of it. This necessity, we have already noted, is not simply the basic empirical structure of the world of matter; neither is it logic or certainty. It is in essence a concept she is employing in such a way as to bridge the gap between, on one hand, the self and subjectivity, and on the other, the world and objects. Thus, although she sometimes writes as though it is science which can lay hold of and set out necessity, and indeed means to say this, it involves a rather rarified understanding of science:

The operation of the intellect in scientific study makes sovereign necessity over matter appear to the mind as a network of relations which are immaterial and without force. Necessity can only be perfectly conceived so long as such relations appear as absolutely immaterial. They are then only present to the understanding as a result of a pure and lofty concentration emanating from a part of the mind not subjected to force... (i.e. not) under the sway of needs.

(The Need for Roots, p 277)

That is, science is here viewed in terms of her specific concept of genius - it is not experimental science, but creative rethinking, of the order of Newton, Maxwell or Einstein. It is what she calls an act of attention: the extreme subtlety of this lies in her perception that there is a fundamental correspondence between the object attended to and the subject attending, which correspondence is only brought out if the relation between them is purified or made proper. It is therefore impossible to get at the reality of the cosmos except by an act of attention in which the self accepts its own correspondence with this reality - the necessity at the heart of the world is grasped (i.e. becomes present) only when the self is itself subject to necessity. That is, all distinctions between self and world,
all methodologies whether in science or politics or morality, that assume such a distinction, prevent the self from coming into full apprehension of the world. Only when the self forsakes its distinction from the world, losing selfhood and leaving self behind, can necessity enter the soul and the world be seen as it really is:

So long as we think in the first person, we see necessity from below, from inside, it encloses us on all sides as the surface of the earth and the arc of the sky. From the time we renounce thinking in the first person, by consent to necessity, we see it from outside, beneath us, for we have passed to God’s side. The side which it turned to us before, and still presents to almost the whole of our being, the natural part of ourselves, is brute domination. The side which it presents after this operation, to the fragment of our mind which has passed over to the other side, is pure obedience.

(Intimations of Christianity, p 186)

The beauty of the world is not an attribute of matter in itself. It is a relationship of the world to our sensibility, the sensibility which depends upon the structure of our body and our soul.

(Waiting on God, p 119)

Necessity, then, is that to which the world is obedient:— the self requires obedience to come to any apprehension of necessity; and Weil thereby assumes that the presence of the world can only mean the experience of necessity. Presence matters, for her, only in as much as it is God’s presence, which she insists cannot be sought (as indeed it is taken that Newness cannot be); the goal of any search we undertake is necessity. Consequently she speaks of our obedience to what the world really is, and of a change in the self’s perspective on it, rather than a change in what the self is faced with, a change from necessity to presence; and of course this is
appropriate to the extent that presence is not simple something we are faced with. In other words, if we are to speak in terms of the self and its experience, the goal will always appear to be necessity rather than presence.

The path to it is obedience, which takes two forms, in that most of our being is still in the former state of domination by matter, yet part is not; i.e. affliction, for the former, and contemplation and beauty, for the latter. Weil is clear that it is God who opens us to the latter:-

Brute force is not sovereign in this world....What is sovereign is determinateness, limit. Eternal wisdom imprisons this universe in a network, a web of determinations. The universe accepts passively. The brute force of matter, which appears to us sovereign, is nothing else in reality but perfect obedience...That is the truth which bites at our hearts every time we are penetrated by the beauty of the world. That is the truth which bursts forth in matchless accents of joy in the beautiful and pure parts of the Old Testament, in Greece among the Pythagoreans and all the sages, in China with Lao-Tse, in the Hindu scriptures, in Egyptian remains....It will appear to us.... if one day God opens our eyes, as he did Hagar's

(The Need for Roots, p 272)

And yet, as we have also noted, when it comes to asking how the transformation of self, the renouncing of self, is brought about - in other words whether there is any area of action by which the self can prepare for or provide for this penetration by grace, whether morality can lead towards grace - she does not only answer that attention or waiting is all the self can do, but suggests further that one almost needs to embrace slavery and affliction.

The question, therefore, that we are taking up out of her writings is that:--- Is there anything can do to transform self and world, and if so what is the one follows: or is it exclusively up to God? For Weil, the
framework of the question, and thereby of the answer, is the self's encounter with the world: grace brings about a transformation which is still defined with reference to the world, but as the beauty of the world rather than its arbitrariness. And her answer is that grace is not completely arbitrary, but is promoted by the self's own decreation or loss of self.

Thus she attacks the idea of a personal providence: grace does not come out of the arbitrary whim of God. God is not personal, in any sense that anthropomorphises Him:

The conception of Providence which corresponds to God after the Roman style is that of a personal intervention in the world on the part of God in order to adjust certain means in view of certain particular ends. (The Need for Roots, p 267).

God is impersonal,

in the sense that he is the divine model of a person who passes beyond the self by renunciation. To conceive of him as an all-powerful person, or under the name of Christ as a human person, is to exclude oneself from the true love of God.

(Waiting on God, p 133).

She can thus attempt to "restore Christianity to Stoicism" (The Need for Roots, p 276) by what is essentially an insistence on the concept of logos as the ruling power of the universe, the Wisdom of God, insisting that the logos is apprehended and known only when the self is conformed to it by obedience to it — when (in terms that come rather from Athanasius and the Alexandrian Church Fathers) the self is "logified", brought like the rest of creation into conformity to the logos.

It is one and the same thing, which with respect to God is eternal Wisdom; with respect to the universe, perfect obedience; with respect to our love, beauty; with respect to our intelligence,
balance of necessary relations; with respect to our flesh, brute force. (The Need for Roots, p 281)

Thus 'person' already has, as a concept, the dimension of personality and selfhood which lead her to reject its application to God. God is known through his logos, which is necessity, and which Weil develops very strikingly in relation to the suffering of Christ (see especially "The Love of God and Affliction" in Waiting On God, pp 76-94). But just as, theologically, it is to the passion and death of Christ that she points, more or less ignoring the resurrection, so too at a more philosophical level it is to the impersonality of God that she points, ignoring any idea that love might relate not only to sacrifice and loss of self, but also to communion and relationship with and to another person. Theologically she ignores the claim that the Logos is the Person Jesus Christ; philosophically she ignores the claim that the self does not simply encounter the world, but also other people.

It is, I think, possible to see, in the dominant idea of her notion of other people - that of justice - an unwillingness to live with the relationships others do and will present. The tirade in which, at the age of 25, she recovers her sense of solitude (Waiting on God, pp 59-60) is certainly still capable of expressing the gift, the 'miracle' in real friendship - but there is a suggestion that she is waiting for the miracle. Her conception of the love of (for) others is restricted to a straight Yes or No:

Love (here) no longer knows how to contemplate, it wants to possess. (p 59)

The relevance of this is not, of course, that she must have been difficult with strangers, which is perhaps an attraction; but that if we are either to contemplate others, or to possess them, no possibility is attached to our learning from them, either as a 'virtue' like friendship, or as having bearing on the transformation of the world. (In her essay "On the right use of School Studies" in Waiting on God, the conception of learning/study as a preparation...
for prayer, although it points to later moments of beauty and discernment ("Perhaps he who made the unsuccessful effort (to solve a problem of geometry) will one day be able to grasp the beauty of a line of Racine more vividly on account of it". (pp 67-8), makes no attempt to relate to others.)

When she does write of the self's relation to others, these other people appear as the calling-forth of the loss of self, of occasions of sacrifice and the self's contact with necessity:-

There are cases where a thing is necessary from the mere fact that it is possible. Thus to eat when we are hungry, to give a wounded man, dying of thirst, something to drink when there is water quite near. Neither a ruffian nor a saint would refrain from doing so.

By analogy we have to discern the cases in which, although it does not appear so clearly at first sight, the possibility implies a necessity; we must act in these cases and not in the others.

(Gravity and Grace, p 39)

For Weil, "the Gospel makes no distinction between the love of our neighbour and justice." (Waiting on God, p 97). Justice means that He who treats as equals those who are far below him in strength really makes them a gift of the quality of human beings, of which fate had deprived them. As far as it is possible for a creature, he reproduces the original generosity of the Creator with regard to them. (Op. cit, p 101)

Love of one's neighbour thus requires, for Weil, just the same attention that is given to the world of matter. Taking as her model the parable of the Good Samaritan: this love is the exchange of compassion and gratitude which happens in a flash between two beings, one possessing and the other deprived of human personality. One of the two is only a little piece of
flesh, naked, inert and bleeding beside a ditch.....one stops
and turns his attention to it. The actions that follow are just
the automatic effect of this moment of attention. The attention is
creative. But at that moment when it is engaged it is a renunciation.
(p 103)

What is decisive about this is that other people are defined in relation
to the self, even though negatively in that it is the self in its movement
of self-renunciation. Other people are simply type, of which the love of
beauty is another:

The love of the order and beauty of the world is thus the
complement of the love of our neighbour. It proceeds from
the same renunciation, the renunciation which is an image of
the creative renunciation of God...(pp 113-4)

What needs to be transformed is the self. The world is the means by
which this comes about. Thus, although she is well aware of the dangers
in which others are ignored in their own being and treated simply as means
for the self's access to heavenly treasure:

(He who gives bread to the famished sufferer for the love of
God will not be thanked by Christ. He has already had his reward
in this thought itself. Christ thanks those who do not know to
whom they are giving food. (Waiting on God, p 106))

she does, in the end, radically mistake the kind of reality other people
have, converting them into means for the self's reward even though this
reward is dying to self. This is why no concept of newness appears in her
writing; there is nothing that the self can look to in the world, or as it
were in the world and in that sense objective, which will transform. For
Weil, the world changes when the self abandons itself: the beauty of the
world penetrates the soul. Thus there is nothing to be sought that is new;
newness comes to the experience of the world as a whole, when the searcher
leaves his selfhood behind. Thus the sense of searching that comes out of
her writing, and is of course supported in her own life by her drive towards
manual labour in the Renault Car Works and the fields of the Ardeche, is
directed not towards anything new, but towards what is in the end absolutely
and unbearably familiar and repetitive. Pain, affliction, defeat, loss of
dignity.——Now, this is extremely heroic, as was her death. It is also
isolated. She represents in the acutest form a searching for newness and
presence which rejects the possibility of any goal for the search, and
thus looks to whatever in the world affects and disrupts selfhood. The
world will not change — but it does not need to: what it requires is that
we see it aright, that our experience of the world be transformed. This is
the transformation of the self she seeks.

The possibility we are going on to consider is precisely that of a
goal for the search for newness, a goal that is not defined with respect
to the self, but stands over against it. A newness that is not a question
of changed experience, but "objective" newness; the presence of something
new rather than a new attitude towards or experience of one and the same
thing (namely the world).

For Weil, necessity, as that in the world which appears to be the
means to newness yet which remains familiar, must still be considered in
terms of experience. We have remarked that her notion of necessity is not
that of logical necessity, yet the structural parallels between these two
frameworks for employing such a concept — that which is experienced (and
in reality), and that which is the basis of (conceptualised) experience —
are important and revealing, and for this reason we can begin the next
chapter by raising, in relation to Wittgenstein's thought, the question of
the kind of interconnexion there is between (logical) necessity and presence.
Presence therefore becomes an important part of the formal differentiation
we can make between a search for newness, and the coming about of any new
selfhood, whether in experience or in mode of living. If it is at all
intelligible to speak about a search for newness, then that involves us in
speaking about a search for the presence of newness; a notion we have already touched on in speaking of the need for creativity to lead to a shared and shareable newness, something that stands in common between men.

Presence, in its peculiar role between subjective experience and objectivity, is thus our means of approaching the concept of newness: of something new which can be sought precisely because it is, itself, new. As we have already noted, Weil does not raise the question of how we come to have a conception of the world in the first place, and hence of the basis for speaking about presence. This is because presence arises as an issue for her only as God's presence — as we have noticed concerning pp 275-6 of *The Need for Roots* (see above), it is God's presence in and through necessity that she hopes for.

The question she ignores is therefore that of the presence of the world — friendship appears as a presence which happens, as if by miracle, without relation to the world. If we go on, instead, to look into the presence of the world, we may then ask what relation, if any, the presence of others has to this. For the key problem in Weil's thought is that she wishes the world to become the key to God's presence, yet has no/h notion that others might, in their own personal presence, be the key to the presence of the world. In consequence she cannot wish for the presence of newness, which in her terms would restrict newness to the level of matter, something in the world; but must look for presence at the level on which self and world actually meet and interrelate, the level of attention. Presence thus becomes, for her, the invasion of the self by the order and beauty of the world as a whole — and this is, further, the presence of an impersonal God. Whether we can talk more intelligibly of the presence of other people, and of the relation this has to the presence of the world, and hence to any objectivity newness can have, will only emerge when we have begun to approach these questions from the level Weil does not tackle — namely "How does
there come to be a world at all?" It is this question, of what gives us any conception of the world, to which we now turn.
II.

TWO: ON HAVING A CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD

The development of Wittgenstein's thought needs to be understood as a development, not only between the earlier and later ways of thinking that are, I think, essentially the same. But essentially the same thoughts can work a great deal of harm. Our concepts, our language, in which we try to express the way in which Wittgenstein posed his questions, is a very precious instrument, and often, the way in which Wittgenstein posed his questions led to developements in which, when he introduces them, they correspond to the philosophical understandings, as if they were opposed to them in any way. It is hardly a question of the way in which certain words, as opposed to the way in which they correspond to the philosophical understandings, as if they were opposed to them in any way. It is not merely a question of the way in which certain words are used, as opposed to the way in which they correspond to the philosophical understandings. The way in which words are used, as opposed to the way in which they correspond to the philosophical understandings.

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The development of a conception of the world, and our "making sense" of the world, are the central and key ideas in Wittgenstein's thought, and in this chapter and the two which follow it we will be concerned to explore the way in which Wittgenstein posed his questions on these themes. In this chapter this is done with reference to his earlier book, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, whose language is still explicitly metaphysical; the later chapters follow through the development of these questions until they re-appear in the Philosophical Investigations, as what has appeared to many to be merely a psychological or subjective commentary on the way we use certain words, an empirical commentary having nothing to do with logic or metaphysics.

This later development has disturbed, most significantly, those like Bertrand Russell who hoped that philosophy, through beginning from logical issues, could reach through to say something new about reality - to be, in Strawson's phrase, revisionary metaphysics. Thus, in relation to the above remarks on study and newness, for those who view philosophy as itself a, or the, path to newness, Wittgenstein has appeared to restrict newness to each individual's increased knowledge of the objects that there are, or rather to knowledge of the ways we do in fact speak in. Certainly Wittgenstein was not concerned to revise language; but neither did he take language to be simply the way we in fact speak, a point which will emerge in the following discussion.

The development in Wittgenstein's thought needs to be understood as a development, not only because the earlier and later ways of raising what are, I think, essentially the same questions can cast a great deal of light on one another, but more importantly because the potential ambiguity of the questions, when they are seen to move in a world of
discourse which is not obviously either objective and metaphysical, or subjective and empirical, brings out very fully the same ambiguity in the concept 'presence', which is at the centre of our concern with newness.

In the Tractatus these questions are raised in terms of the form of knowledge and judgement, by dealing with the questions of what makes possible our having a conception of the world formed into propositions. This involved a very radical understanding of the nature of logic:

4.0312 My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants'

are not representatives; that there can be no representatives of the logic of facts.

His own unhappiness with the idea of reduction in logic — of establishing primitive signs — was that such a notion in no sense helps to understand what is essential to logic. If one had to specify a basic logical constant, this would be simply 'saying something':

5.47 One could say that the sole logical constant was what all propositions, by their very nature, had in common with one another.

But that is the general propositional form.

There is no one fundamental operation in logic:

5.474 The number of fundamental operations that are necessary depends solely on our notation.

And indeed that consideration is not what is crucial to logic:

5.476 It is clear that this is not a question of a number of primitive ideas that have to be signified, but rather of the expression of a rule.

This idea of a rule has some connexion with the concept of "and so on" — that is the successive applications of an operation (c.f. 5.2523). But the rule is not itself the successive applications of an operation (a notion that would be captured by Rhees' "what we generally do"); rather
a rule is what makes possible the performing of the same operation
(which will certainly include the repetition of the operation):

5.512 But in "-p" it is not "-" that negates:
it is rather what is common to all the
signs of this notation that negate p.
That is to say the common rule that governs
the construction of "-p", "---p", "-p v -p",
"-p . -p", etc. etc. (ad inf.). And this
common factor mirrors negation.

The rule that governs the performing of an operation is "what is common"
to all the signs that give the construction of a particular proposition
out of another particular propositions: in this case -p out of p. In
other words, the operation is no more, and nothing other than, the move
from one proposition to another. The existence of the two propositions
gives the operation relating them. Thus Wittgenstein could say:

5.122 If p follows from q, the sense of "p" is
contained in the sense of "q".
We just "see this from the structure of the propositions" (5.13); the
propositions stand in relations which "are internal, and their existence is
an immediate result of the existence of the propositions." (5.131).

Considering 5.13 further:

When the truth of one proposition follows
from the truth of others, we can see this
from the structure of the propositions.

It is not really of any help here to try to think of the structure of a
proposition as simply a truth-functional breakdown of the proposition,
for what is at issue here is how we can move at all from one proposition
to another, which would include moving from a propositional analysis
or breakdown to the proposition itself, and vice versa. To think purely
in terms of truth-functional analysis when considering "structure"
inhibits anyone from seeing what enables Wittgenstein to say:

5.47 An elementary proposition really contains
all logical operations within itself.

or that:

5 (An elementary proposition is a truth-
function of itself.)

These remarks arise because, as soon as an elementary proposition is
spoken of as a proposition, we have already said that it falls into
truth-functional relationships; which just means that we think the
proposition - or think its sense - through in certain (i.e. (here).
truth-functional) ways. Any proposition, elementary or complex, stands
in certain logical relations to others in so far as we see the sense of
one in, or from, the sense of the others. And an elementary
proposition has a truth-functional structure in the same way as any other
proposition - the difference is that its structure is simple and unitary,
not complex. That it has a structure means simply that it says something
about the world.

This is to say that logic is, in a fundamental sense, not so much
the relations that are most generally said to hold between propositions
(and that these relations are not at its centre means that logical
relations need not be primarily truth-functional, if indeed truth-
functional at all, for us to speak of their being logical; - although this
is not developed in the Tractatus, it became the basis for Wittgenstein's
subsequent developments of the notion of a logical inquiry); rather, it
is that there are relations at all. If one wished more to emphasise the
internal nature of the relations: it is that there are propositions which
do contain the sense of others, call others to mind, etc.

Perhaps Wittgenstein's most important remark about logic here is:
5.552 The 'experience' that we need in order to understand logic is not that something or other is the state of things, but that something is; that, however, is not an experience.

A notion which, in effect, allows Wittgenstein to work with a concept of presence. It is where the world is limited, and in consideration of these limits, that there arises what is mystical. That is, the limits are the mystery:

6.45 Feeling the world as a limited whole - it is this that is mystical.

The experience that something is, which yet cannot be an experience, which gives the clue to the understanding of logic, must yet remain unutterable:

6.44 It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists.

And this 'experience' is the fact that one has a conception of the world; that one can think about, or have experience of, some one thing or other (the world). Understanding logic is understanding there being a conception of anything existing at all. (c.f. 5.552 above).

b) The concept of "the world".

What Wittgenstein has in mind by "the world" is: how things stand. It is not so much the things that exist, as if that were all, but rather: how things stand for everything that exists. (Cf.:

1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.)

But yet with the idea of the limits of the world what seeks attention is this: One can speak of particular facts, or of experiences of particular parts of the world; but the notion of the world as a "limited whole" does not involve thinking of a summation or assembly of these parts. That point is rather that, even if we do speak of experiencing some one part of
the world, that is still experiencing the world. It is not as if the rest were missing; there is no sense of a lack of the rest — the part is all.

Wittgenstein shows his insight into this when he approaches "the world" from the idea of logic; yet when he approaches it from the idea of "objects", the notion of summation or of totality raises its head quite directly — e.g. 1.1 above, or:

3.01 The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world.

That the latter approach is misleading, we can try to come to grips with when returning below to "objects", and the necessity for such a conception. But we should not overlook the explicit point of 1 and 1.1 — that there only comes to be a world in language, in what is thought or said. The extensive tension, throughout the book, between logic and objects, concerns the proper understanding of what "saying" amounts to.

We may note here, however, that the conception of the world as a totality was not one Wittgenstein alone suffered under. Stanley Cavell draws attention to the pervasive tendency to think in this way:

...no less explanation is required to understand why we have the idea that knowing the world exists is to be understood as an instance of knowing that a particular object exists (only, so to speak, an enormously large one, the largest).

Yet this idea is shared by all traditional epistemologists. (Its methodological expression is the investigation of a claim that a particular object exists.)

("The Avoidance of Love", op. cit. pp 324-5)

And in discussing Plato's Parmenides, Rhees notes that...

...it may seem as though you must be able to speak of 'what exists' or 'all that exists', and as though you must
therefore be able to say that 'all that exists, exists' or perhaps 'reality exists'. And if that has sense, well then by our argument it must have sense to say that 'all that exists' or the totality of existing things might not exist. That had been Parmenides' point.

But Plato's point was that you cannot talk about 'all there is' as one thing, or even as one collection, in the way in which Parmenides may have wanted to talk about 'all reality'. The question of what sort of unity the world has, is one that occupied most of Plato's philosophy. But he held at any rate that the world cannot have the unity of a thing, of which you can sensibly say 'it is'; (nor the unity of a form either).

(Without Answers, p 117)

Both Cavell and Rhees view this tendency within a wider perspective, which allows Cavell to comment on Hume's critique of the 'argument from design' in the Dialogues on Natural Religion and to point to the unquestioned assumption both Cleanthes and Philo make in this book that the argument concerns a particular object. If it is not, then

"the" experience of design or purpose in the world...has a completely different force....It has, in terms of Hume's own philosophizing, the same claim to reveal the world as our experience of causation (or of objecthood) has. (ibid, p 325)

And for Rhees, the question of the origin of the world is not a 'quasi-physical' one, but much more 'Why is there anything at all? What is the sense of it?'. "Or it may be an expression of wonder at the world, ("Isn't it extraordinary that anything at all should exist?")(ibid, p 119).

What both these comments indicate is that putting the world into a religious role is not simply a matter of taking up a particular stance vis-a-vis some kind of object: if it is experience, as Cavell uses the word,
it is not an experience of something. It has to do instead with one possibility of experience — and so, too, with the possibility of language, for in terms of just this general point was it that Rhees (op. cit.) wished to show that, if we speak about the various language-games, that still presupposes it is the same language that is spoken in all of them. The question is not of what there is, but that there in something, beyond oneself, in a way that allows experiencing and talking about it, whatever it is.

In his paper "Distance and Relation" (The Knowledge of Man: p 61), Martin Buber writes:

...man is, or can be, in the world as a dweller in an enormous building which is always being added to, and to whose limits he can never penetrate, but which he can nevertheless know as one does know a house in which one lives — for he is capable of grasping the wholeness of the building as such.

Man is like this because he is the creature through whose being "what is" becomes detached from him, and recognized for itself.

And the point is that one should be able to "grasp the wholeness" without being able to discover, penetrate to, the limits. Which shows us that we cannot think of these limits in terms of division or partition: in the Preface to the Tractatus, Wittgenstein writes:

"Thus the aim of the book is to set a limit to thought, or rather — not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to set a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought).

It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be set, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense."
It is of language - of the apparently 'public' proposition, and to avoid the traps of thinking about thinking in connexion with psychology - that the question of limits will be asked. But of course Wittgenstein does not contrast cases of sense from those of nonsense: the limit is rather "what all propositions, by their very nature, have in common" (5.47 above). Which is the general propositional form, and it is also logic: the "sole logical constant".

That the limits of logic are the limits of the world means that at the kernel of logic (its limiting case, as it were) is the fact that the world is limited, is a limited whole: the fact that there is a world at all.

And it may still be hard to see why one should speak of logic in connexion with the existence of the world, because what had always seemed to lie at the heart of logic were the particular operations performed. It is of something else in logic that we are being reminded here: that, given a particular state of affairs (and if we speak of a state of affairs at all, we picture it: it makes no difference, then, whether we say here that we are describing a state of affairs, or (re)describing what was represented in a proposition; it makes no difference whether we speak of our concern as the logic of the world, or the logic of language), there are certain relations it can have, and certain it cannot have, to other states of affairs. There are some things that can, and some that cannot, be said in connexion with it. And these we just see from the existence of the proposition, the state of affairs.

It is the existence of this limit to what can be said that generates the conception of the world, of existence beyond oneself - this is why the limits of logic are the limits of the world. The point at which one can go no further in experience, or picturing, i.e. where one cannot
experience experiencing, or picture picturing (the fact that the logical constants cannot themselves be represented), presents simply the existence of the world. It is the point at which we just do experience or speak as we do, at which we discover or say how things are; the limit is the fact that experience is of states of affairs, and thought the representation of that existence.

c) Experience of "the world", and the subject which experiences.

It must be emphasised that Wittgenstein is not speaking of logic as at the heart of (someone's) experience of the world (if that is differentiated from the world), but of logic as at the heart of the existence of the world. Consider the following sentence:

There is a strong impression made by the end of the Tractatus, as if Wittgenstein saw the world looking at him with a face; logic helped to reveal the face.

(G E M Anscombe: "An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus": p 172)

Speaking in such a way still suggests that there is one thing, the world, and another thing, the self, which look at one another; it is this (near-irresistible) picture which creates the difficulty of seeing why speaking of experience is adequate for speaking about the world; or why, for Weil, the transformation of the former can affect the latter - the problem she does not really consider.

The picture is very much one that Wittgenstein wished to reject, for it manages, as a picture, to place the self within the world even whilst claiming to distinguish the two:
5.633 Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found? You will say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. But really you do not see the eye.

And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye.

5.6331 For the form of the visual field is surely not like this:

Eye -

Of course this means that there can be no experience of the distinction between the self and the world, and that nothing could ever be said about the distinction. But the point is a larger one than this suggests, for the very phrase "experience of the world" is being called into question, in such a way that the distinction between "the world" and "experience of the world" is to be rejected.

5.632 The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.

But the understanding of a "limit" is not of contrast, distinction or comparison (nor, therefore, criteria); and so there is not a 'self', or indeed anything else, on the other side of the limit.

It seems here, then, that:

All experience is world and does not need the subject.

(Notebooks 1914-16: p 89)

Any question about the limits of the world would involve asking: What is it that makes these (experiences) experiences of the world? (Referring again back to Rhees' discussion: What is "the same language" that is spoken in all the different language games?) ——It is of no help to
list the things that are "of the world", any more than Socrates answered
Meno by giving examples of what is already known. For the basic question
that arose for Socrates was: And what makes this, or this, knowledge -
the right answer? In asking how we can know that anything known is in fact
knowledge - for a criterion of knowledge that would allow us to seek or
recognise it - Meno's question asks both how we can recognise the knownness
of new knowledge, and how we know what we do. Socrates avoids both by
answering that everything is known; but this is not something that could
be illustrated in terms of what we already know:
Understanding this in the Tractatus - that is, understanding that the limits
of language and of the world are fundamentally ineffable, because they do
not distinguish between anything - Wittgenstein seems then to say that
there really is no subject at all:

5.631 There is no such thing as the subject that
thinks or entertains ideas.

In criticising Socrates' reply to Meno, I suggested that it would
only be possible to come to any insight into learning if the questions
about the possibility of learning were asked as for the learner. This
way of asking questions seems to me to underlie the whole of the exploration
of "the world" in the Tractatus - and so of "experience", "self", and
"language". The questions are asked of myself, and I must speak for myself
in answering them. In the remark quoted above (5.631), Wittgenstein
continues:

If I wrote a book called "The World as I found it", I
should have to include a report on my body, and should
have to say which parts were subordinate to my will, and
which were not, etc., this, being a method of isolating
the subject, or rather of showing that in an important
sense there is no subject; for it alone could not be
mentioned in that book.
Within this understanding of "the world", the world is "as I find it":
there is no appeal to the way things stand that might show how I can
learn of the world, or from it: the world is what I already possess.
It is this that Socrates fails to take account of: it is of no help to
speak of what is known and distinguish this from the comprehension of
the learner, because it is precisely then that we ask: How then does he
come to grasp even that it is there to be learned? — Where I ask of
myself how things are - it is just here that it is not possible to add
that what is being spoken of is (my own) experience of the world rather
than the world itself. For I have no conception of experience - or of
my world - that is anything other than "the world". I do not have one
world that is my way of thinking, and another that is the world as it is.
I do not know of, cannot experience or speak of, any distinction between
myself and the world, for I do not know of that self at all. If it has
any manifestation whatsoever, this is just that it (one might better say
"I") know of the world— and that is the fundamental difference between
them.

However, this does not explain why Wittgenstein approaches the
world as he does - for he does not speak about learning at any point in
the book, and does not use the word even once. At this point other
general considerations within the Tractatus become relevant.

d) How language comes to be 'about' the world at all.

There is something else (i.e. other than the notion of a limit)
that he calls "the whole sense of the book": that "what can be said
at all can be said clearly..." (Preface p 3) - even though in order to
grasp this one would have to grasp its complement at the same time: one
would have to understand not only how to speak to the point of complete clarity, but also how to be silent.

The requirement is that sense be definite:

3.25 A proposition has one and only one complete analysis.

3.251 What a proposition expresses it expresses in a determinate manner, which can be set out clearly: a proposition is articulated.

The sense of the proposition is given in the proposition itself: there is no further question to be asked about how the proposition might be understood (i.e.: ways in which it might be understood). Which suggests that the notion of understanding has suffered, in the Tractatus, the same apparent fate as the self, and disappeared completely.

Yet the notion is retained, as a limit to language. We can see this in as much as something crucial to the whole conception of determinateness of sense is the idea of unanalysable names, the point at which sense achieves its much sought after clarity, and becomes crystal-clear:

3.23 The requirement that simple signs be possible is the requirement that sense be determinate.

3.26 A name cannot be dissected any further by means of a definition: it is a primitive sign.

If the notion of understanding seems to have shrivelled away, that apparition addresses itself most strongly to names themselves; there is no possibility of misunderstanding names:

3.203 A name means an object. The object is its meaning. ("A" is the same sign as "A").

The import of the last sentence of this remark is that, if one tried to explain what object "A" is the name of, one could only 'get at' the object in terms of "A", which is all that one has to go on. It is all
that one has to go on. It is all that one can say of the meaning of the name.

This seems to introduce a paradoxical difficulty, one that Wittgenstein is aware of:

3.263 The meanings of primitive signs can be explained by means of elucidations. Elucidations are propositions that contain the primitive signs. So they can only be understood if the meanings of those signs are already known.

3.3 Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have meaning.

What this means, however, is that in a sense any such elucidations are not necessary anyway: there is no need of them. There is no possibility of misunderstanding names in the first place.

We could also say here that there is no 'correspondence' between object and name. As Rhees notes ("Ontology and Identity in the Tractatus", in Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, ed. Winch, pp 55ff), a name is not a thing, and to ask "How do you know this is A?" is as meaningless as asking "How do you know this is white?".

The sign 'A' is the same as the sign 'A' because they are both signs 'A', not because they are physically similar. It is not because of "the syntax of 'sign'...that then we'd know the syntax of signs - i.e. what they must have in order to be signs." (Loc. cit. p 55). It is "the syntax of words that determines the syntax of 'word'" (ibid.).

We know (in advance) what the sign means: because we think it. (See also below.) We see it, or hear it, or say it or write it: the sign is 'given' sense by being offered in a true or false proposition. If we do not think it, there is no reason why it should be the sign for
such-and-such, or that this proposition should have the sense it does.

But is it then arbitrary what signs we use? Does meaning depend on thinking)?——Rhees writes: "I am committed to the signs I use and the ways I combine them - by the general rule, the syntax of the language. It is through this that the marks and sounds become symbols."

(Loc. sit., p 56).

And this notion of a rule, we must consider as it later develops in "Philosophical Investigations". A rule is not a thing, any more than a name. It is because he takes a name to be a sign, and no more, that Anthony Kenny can say that "the connection between a name and what it names is a matter of arbitrary convention" (Wittgenstein, p 64), quoting in support of this remarks in the Tractatus which concern signs. For although Wittgenstein did wish to emphasise the arbitrariness of signs, this marked their distinction from symbols. That a picture is a fact means, as Kenny notes (p 55), that its elements do exist in their given relationship; and this 'given relationship' is what makes the picturing possible. Thus it is that Wittgenstein says, at 3.1432, that the complex sign 'aRb' does not say that the relation R obtains between a and b, but the relation in the sign says that aRb: the relation is itself a feature of the picture. In use, it is involved in representing that aRb. The fact of the givenness of the relation in the picture allows it to be a picture, representing another fact.

The assumption of a systematic distinction between sign and symbol, in order to cure philosophy of confusions prompted by unclear sign-language (3.324-5) is symptomatic of the tension in the Tractatus between the objectifying of language (signs) and the contact between language and world (symbols). What we must note here is that, because a name is caught up in symbolisation as much as with signification, Kenny is wrong to suppose that "the correlation of names and objects is arbitrary"
(p 65): if it is a name, then that is because we see what it refers to. Likewise, it is because there is a conception of the world in the first place that the question may be raised of how it is a conception of the world. That is, one has already 'got over' the difficulty that seems to prohibit the learning of names; so the Tractatus, presupposing the possession of a conception of the world, would not feel any need of discussing the learning. One already knows of the world, one already knows of the world of objects:

2.026 There must be objects, if the world is to have an unalterable form.

2.027 Objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent are one and the same.

2.0271 Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing and unstable.

2.0272 The configuration of objects produces states of affairs. Saying that the simple fact of the existence of objects is what is unalterable is also saying that the existence of names, of final steps in analysis, is what is unalterable. The simple fact of the existence of objects the "that the world is", is what is given; and so, too, the given is the existence of names - i.e. the possibility of reaching endpoints in analysis.

An object does not exist in isolation from others, but rather within its "logical space (2.013 f.), the possibilities that each object has for forming a particular state of affairs in configuration with other objects. What that means is that the existence of objects, each within its own possibilities, is already given: it is the conception of the world, the existence of the world.

David Pears ("Ludwig Wittgenstein": p 80) writes about the need to see that:

when we think of (a name) in isolation, we must take it together with its necessities
of combinations with other names.

Such 'necessities' are the ways in which - as in 3.3 above - a name only has meaning in the context of a proposition: the necessities are manifested in the possible elucidations. But, on Pears' account of Wittgenstein's thought, the source of these necessities is:

that they reflect the necessities governing the combinations of objects with which the names are correlated. So propositions are pictures constructed according to, and therefore reflecting, the necessities which govern the structure of reality.

(ibidem)

In another way of putting it, the idea within the Tractatus is that:

the structure of reality determines the structure of language.

(Op. cit.: p 13)

This is wrong. When one speaks of realising that the existence of the world, that there are objects, is given, then it is given also that the only way of getting to the object is through the name. You can put this by saying that the name is reached only where there is no possibility of misunderstanding, and that there and then the object is reached. Or you can put it by saying that, where the being of a conception of the world is given, then names and objects are already in their relation, their correlation.

The intelligibility of Pears' interpretation assumes a distinction between language and the world in such a way that one could conceivably speak of either the dependence of language on the world (which idea might be called realism), or of the dependence of the form of the world on a way of thinking (which idea might be called idealism, or else solipsism). Yet Wittgenstein would not wish to allow for any such differentiation - how would one 'get at' the object except through the name? Certainly
there are all the elucidations that manifest the possibilities of configuration of the object - but understanding them in the first place is already to have understood the propositional context within which the name of the object has its meaning.

At the end point of analysis one has reached names - but in that, one has also reached objects. It is not just that one reaches the name and 'knows perfectly well' what object the name is related to - there is no other thing that is the object apart from the (discovered) name.

Pears assumes that necessity is something discernible in language, and again in reality, and that Wittgenstein's question was simply of how the two come to be related, whereas what Wittgenstein is working with here is the question of what makes either or both of them 'necessity', and hence of how necessity arises out of the relation between language and world. This therefore goes beyond the difficulties with necessity we noted when discussing Weil: Whatever necessity there is in reality must be understood as such, like that in language, not from reality or from language but in the interrelation of the two. Wittgenstein's question is therefore what makes necessity necessary? - the problem, however, which gives rise to Pear's confusion is that he also thought he knew what at least linguistic necessity looked like.

e) Problems in the Tractatus account: the ambiguity of "meaning"

as noun and verb.

The difficulty with the Tractatus is that, even as it leads to this realisation, it at the same time renders it an absurdity. For it is yet fundamental to the notion of "saying something", the proposition, that it be either true of false - that it express a possible state of affairs, the existence (or not) of which is then the verification or otherwise of what is said.
Peter Winch, in his paper "The Unity of Wittgenstein's Philosophy" (Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein: p 8) draws attention to "the ambiguity of the word 'structure' as applied to elementary and non-elementary propositions respectively". He means that the structure of the elementary propositions is not truth-functional. Now what this means is that the elementary propositions cannot be true or false - they are not further analysable into names, and the relation between names (which account Russell might give). They are just, names. Certainly they are "concatenations" of names, but that cannot mean any sort of relation.

The elementary propositions manifests a possibility of configuration of a name, that is essential to that name in the first place; it does not add anything to a name, or group of names, for then it could be misunderstood.

As Winch says (loc. cit.: p 13), the elementary proposition must show that it refers to the objects it does; there is no way of checking this. We see the certainty of the reference in the proposition itself.

This is not just names, but meaningful concatenations of names: something given by the logical space of names (and objects). The clarity of the elementary proposition depends not only on names, but logical space, for we cannot reach transparency and certainty unless it is that of saying something. If only names were unambiguous, we could still never reach propositions that said something clear, which is the essential requirement of truth and falsity: we must know what is being said - i.e. how to verify the proposition.

A name has meaning only in the context of a proposition, precisely because if we could isolate the names and know what they mean on their own, the elementary proposition would involve an external relation between them, and therefore be untransparent.

But the truth of an elementary proposition would seem to involve being able to split it up. This is why Winch says that the elementary
proposition is not truth-functional, and yet must be. How can we check the truth or falsity of an elementary proposition, except by turning to the objects it refers to?

This is the great inconsistency of the Tractatus: that the need to unite language and world is understood as the uniting of truth-functional propositions and facts. I've argued that, where the Tractatus does approach its problems within a first-person context, the uniting of language and world is all-important, but important only if the truth-functional terminology is left out. This would mean that it is indeed names which must then be the 'unity' of connexion: that an elementary proposition is not to be either true or false, and hence not a proposition. The relation of logic to existence means that logical space is not truth-functional; as Winch says (loc. cit., p 6), the possible combinations of objects has to do with their own natures.

The need to distinguish between names and elementary propositions arises out of the supposition that the elementary propositions can be true or false. If this supposition is abandoned, then the logical space which presupposed that objects are separable becomes transformed. For: the object is revealed, not prior to what is said about it, but in the saying. This is one of the 'great themes' of the Tractatus: to be shown, not said. It means, again, that understanding - in the thinking of propositions - is what 'establishes' existence.

What this means for logical space is that it cannot be, as thus far, understood as a set of possibilities, even though a wide range of propositions seems to set it out fairly well for us. Logical space is not an extension of a large number of possibilities, by some such process as filling in the slight difference between each of them to provide a proper continuum. Logical space has to be existence.

It won't really help here to try to speak of the elementary proposition
as an analytic one, or a tautology; within the Tractatus Wittgenstein is trying to work towards the notion of the very existence of the world in a way that goes beyond his acceptance of the truth-functional conception of a proposition. (It is just this sense of the conflict in the book that Pears, for example (op. cit.), does not see, in trying to speak of 'deep tautologies' (esp. pp 83 ff.) and saying that they do not lead Wittgenstein to the "ontological conclusions" he desired.) At some point, "saying something" must (he tried to show) do more than manifest possibility - it must also manifest existence, the "that there is a world".

In a sense, this is a combination of certainties, logical and existential. More correctly, we already have the idea that there is only one kind of certainty: where logic is the same thing as existence. That there is something, means that already all of logic is present; but this is not a conditional statement: where all of logic is present (the thought) then there is existence. The thinking which is the sense of the proposition is the same thinking which is the rule of logical operation.

The Tractatus does not say a great deal about "meaning something" or "thinking something" or "understanding something" (I mean it does not speak much in these terms). What Wittgenstein had to say about them, he felt could just as sufficiently be said about propositions (hence that the limit of thought can be manifested in discerning or speaking of the limit of the expression of thought - viz. language (c.f. Preface: p 3)).

He writes:

3.11 The method of projection is to think the sense of the proposition.

3.13 A proposition includes all that the projection includes, but not what is projected.

Therefore, though what is projected is not itself included, its possibility is.
A proposition, therefore, does not actually contain its sense, but does contain the possibility of expressing it.

("The content of a proposition" means the content of a proposition that has sense.)

A proposition contains the form, but not the content, of its sense.

A thought is a proposition with a sense.

Which means that the proposition comes to have sense only through being thought - but it does not mean that the proposition can be thought with any other sense. The existence of the proposition lies in its being thought, but what is thought is no more than what is said in the saying of (or thinking of) the proposition.

In a letter to Russell (Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore" ed. von Wright, p 72 (1919), Wittgenstein emphasises the coextension of thought and language:

"I don't know what the constituents of a thought are but I know that it must have such constituents which correspond to the words of language. Again the kind of relation of the constituents of thought and of the pictured fact is irrelevant. It would be a matter of psychology to find it out."

Then he says:

"You cannot prescribe to a symbol what it may be used to express. All that a symbol can express, it may express. This is a short answer but it is true!"

Which means that a symbol is a symbol precisely because we see what it means. We don't give it its meaning. A symbol may 'hide' its meaning (i.e. need analysis) but we can allow it to express only what it is capable of expressing.
(Although this is very important in understanding the relation between language and world, Wittgenstein had not at this time seen that the expressive power of a symbol cannot be spoken of in separation from the world (as it is in the notion of elementary propositions). We see the move in transit in Philosophical Grammar (99):

What happens is not that this symbol cannot be further interpreted, but I do no interpreting. I do not interpret because I feel natural in the present picture. When I interpret, I step from one level of my thought to another.

If I see the thought symbol 'from outside', I become conscious that it could be interpreted thus or thus; if it is a step in the course of my thoughts, then it is a stopping-place that is natural to me, and its further interpretability does not occupy (or trouble) me. As I have a railway timetable and use it without being concerned with the fact that a table can be interpreted in various ways.)

The proposition, being thought, cannot be misunderstood. It might be said that, if this is true, it is true only of the thinker or speaker; however, Wittgenstein's deliberation is carried through the whole of language; for example, it underlies his account of belief:

5.542 It is clear, however, that "A believes that p", "A has the thought p", and "A says p" are of the form "'p' says p"; and this does not involve a correlation of a fact with an object, but rather the correlation of facts by means of the correlation of their objects. If we say that A thinks p, then we know what is meant by "p" (the propositional sign), and if
A thinks it, then that simply means that p is meant as it is. The occurrence of the propositional sign "p" (at A, so to speak) is unambiguous, and must be taken as expressing that proposition, or better, that thought.

In a letter to Russell (June 1913 - loc. cit., p 23), Wittgenstein wrote:

"I can now express my objection to your theory of judgement exactly: I believe it is obvious that, from the proposition "A judges that (say) a is in the Relation R to b", if correctly analysed, the proposition "aRb v. ¬aRb" must follow directly, without the use of any other premiss. This condition is not fulfilled by your theory."

(This, incidentally, Russell saw was right, and he later wrote: "I saw then that I could not hope ever again to do fundamental work in philosophy.")

Why was it so important? — It means that meaning, thinking, are not hidden acts, separate from the 'external' proposition. We see that A thinks because we see what he thinks. We understand another by our awareness of his subject-matter.

A's belief, thought, etc. is a propositional sign which, as a fact, represents another fact (that p) - to say that it does this is not to produce a pseudo-proposition, as Anthony Kenny takes it to do (Wittgenstein, p 101), because 'p' cannot say that p but only show it. The point of 4.022 is not that 'The cat is on the mat' cannot say that the cat is on the mat (Kenny, p 66) - on the contrary this is precisely what it does. Wittgenstein's point is that a proposition cannot 'guarantee' that it says what it does - it must be understood, and it must be thought. A proposition only has sense if it is thought: we cannot separate out the thinker and the proposition,
because in trying to do so we remove the basis of there being a proposition.

"p" says that "p" is no more a pseudo-proposition than any in the Tractatus, and the remarks on belief are far from being as penumbral as Kenny takes them to be. As we have already noted, he goes astray in assuming an arbitrariness in the correlation of names and objects — and further by taking Wittgenstein to say that the general correlation of a relationship between names and a relationship between objects is arbitrary, while only the particular case is therefore not an arbitrary correlation (p 65).

The great mistake in taking Wittgenstein to be a kind of 'constructivist' here, and using the word 'convention' more or less willy-nilly (when Wittgenstein's own use of the term is both infrequent and unrelated to the central themes of the book (being applied to the uses of signs)), is that the very real problem he is concerned with — that language does 'reach right out to the world' and attains certainty rather than possibility even though individual propositions are (to be) possible — is ignored. What we can see, in relation to the first-person context, is this: If I have to speak about the world, then I cannot call into question my own understanding of it, for I have nothing else to go on; if I am to attend to any question about the world, then I cannot suppose my own understanding of the world to be accountable with reference to something else called the world, for this is what I thought I was starting from. (Compare, in this connexion:

If there were a verb meaning "to believe falsely", it would not have any significant first person present indicative.

(Philosophical Investigations, p 190))

It does not mark a difference here to speak of the world, rather than of belief or thinking, or even of language. Within this purely first-person context they are the same. It is because of this that it could seem
that analysis could lead, not to the basic elements of language or of thought (not, that is, simply these) but, the very existence of the world. What is said - the proposition that has its sense thought - is believed (it is this that underlies Wittgenstein's rejection of Frege's assertion sign at 4.442); and what is said simply is the world.

(This is precisely why there is what Kenny takes merely to be an ambiguity in the notion of complete analysis: between:

an analysis in which the proposition would contain as many elements as the state of affairs it depicts (as suggested by the entries for 12 October, 20 October, 18 December 1914, etc)? Or does it mean an analysis in which the proposition would contain as many elements as I know there to be in the state of affairs (as suggested by Notebooks 1914-16, p 64)? (p 84)

That this is not a simple ambiguity (within conventional 'subject-object' terms) but an attempt to meet the problem of certainty and existence on a different level is something Kenny does not see.)

Clearly enough, Wittgenstein's remarks on belief appear to be incapable of handling the obvious distinctions between others and the world, wherein others are both in the world and at the same time 'like me': invisible subjects that are part of the world. If A thinks that p, then although A is not related to p by some third thing - thinking - as Russell thought, nonetheless A is not as it were projected into p without trace leaving only the occurrence of the thought as the subject A. (As an expression of this difficulty which we can later consider, Wittgenstein here thought of bodies and the movements and activity of what he called the 'phenomenal will' - the will as a subject for psychology - to be part of the world, and these were to be distinguished from the willing subject, which he needed to say was not the thinking subject.)
The critical point is not the obvious one that A has a body, acts, etc., as opposed to just being thoughts, significant though that is; but that in our understanding of another we cannot simply 'phase out' the other as subject, for we have to be able to learn from him. The possibility of misunderstanding another is not simply a lack of clear analysis in his thinking, so that after analysis we can move to the truth or falsity of what is thought: it brings about the beginning of learning from him.

f) The possibility of a new approach to "meaning something".

There would be no point, and too much absurdity, in trying to deny the reality of the notion of possibility, of truth or falsity, within "saying something". But Wittgenstein's insistent concern with the limits to this "saying something" takes him, in the Tractatus, beyond the notion (of truth or falsity). ——— And it is this more that is asked after in the attempt to understand learning itself — where what is of paramount importance has nothing to do with the truth or falsity of what is taught, but with the ability to learn something new.

Learning is not one of the themes of the Tractatus; and that is because Wittgenstein was trying there to bring out the notion of limits within the terms of truth-or-falsity. Winch (op. cit.: p 15) records a late conversational remark of Wittgenstein's: to the effect that what was wrong with his conception of elementary propositions in the Tractatus was that he had confused "the method of projection" with "the lines of projection". Winch goes on to suggest that what Wittgenstein had in mind here was that, at the same time that the Tractatus urges the senselessness of trying to picture, say anything about, picturing itself (i.e. projection), nonetheless the book suggests a manner in which the picturing can be understood — in other words it speaks of the method of projection as if one could draw in the lines of projection. (This notion of 'lines'
Such an assimilation of "the method of projection" to a particular picture is very much what underlines the wish to show plain the limits of the world and language in terms of object and name. I have already suggested that Wittgenstein cast his explorations of the notion of "the world" in fundamentally first-person terms: this suggestion can be developed further here, because it is what gives some sense to his drawing together of the lines and the method of projection (the drawing together of the conception of objects and names in analysis, and the conception of logic). The conflation is important, even though it misrepresents by replying on a method of picturing (analysis) which itself pre-judges and restricts what is seen as the method of projection. (For what is right in the first-person context - that is, what does correctly emerge from placing these questions in such a context - is that the lines and method of projection are the same. But what is wrong is the assumption that this can be depicted within a third-person context (and, as a corollary, that the same things can be said about the thinking, belief, etc. of another person as of myself).)

The analysis into names would have to stop at the point where there is no possibility of misunderstanding them - that is what makes them names. It is the point at which what shows itself is the existence of the world. That is not any assemblage of facts. Trying still to think in truth-functional terms would lead to the idea of searching for the "hard nuggets" of the world (a phrase borrowed from Winch - loc. cit., p 15), and of the totality of these. But the possibility of comparison between language and the world here, if the names are not seen to be all there is to an elementary proposition, still leaves room for misunderstanding - and so that the world might not be my world, or vice versa.

I would not have learned anything, but would still be guessing.

The point at which what shows itself is the existence of the world
is the point at which all that can be said is the name/elementary proposition. And this is necessarily one's own response - the response of an understanding finding itself in a position of complete clarity and unambiguity.

Now 'name' is a misleading and inadequate term for this response. In the Tractatus, a name is not an action. Because of 3.3, it is clear there that a name, though it cannot be misunderstood, has meaning only within a proposition: we have to be thinking a proposition in order that its names have meaning. (Which does not, of course, mean that we 'decide' their meaning, or whatever.) We cannot think names; we think thoughts.

But Wittgenstein thought that names tied language to the world: names cannot be misunderstood. And there is no way to go on from this and relate names to understanding, which would here mean thinking. For we cannot understand names, except in a thought; then, however, the thought must get down to existence, not just the name. And it is because it cannot (being truth-functional) that we cannot get at names; even though at the same time, since we cannot understand a name alone, we must have a thought (proposition) in order to get down to existence.

This means that if understanding does get down to existence, and permit a conception of the world, it is not through names as parts of elementary propositions; neither through an unbroken proposition. It is not the transparency of the name which relates language to the world, but our thinking, and this we cannot speak of in connexion with names propositions, or pictures. The name is the apparent end-point of analysis only because it is simple; a bewitching conception which Wittgenstein later recorded as stemming from Socrates to Russell and himself (Philosophical Investigations I 46).

In a sense, the changed perspective of Wittgenstein's later wr--
is the point at which all that can be said is the name/elementary proposition. And this is necessarily one's own response - the response of an understanding finding itself in a position of complete clarity and unambiguity.

Now 'name' is a misleading and inadequate term for this response. In the *Tractatus*, a name is not an action. Because of 3.3, it is clear there that a name, though it cannot be misunderstood, has meaning only within a proposition: we have to be thinking a proposition in order that its names have meaning. (Which does not, of course, mean that we 'decide' their meaning, or whatever.) We cannot think names; we think thoughts.

But Wittgenstein thought that names tied language to the world: names cannot be misunderstood. And there is no way to go on from this and relate names to understanding, which would here mean thinking. For we cannot understand names, except in a thought; then, however, the thought must get down to existence, not just the name. And it is because it cannot (being truth-functional) that we cannot get at names; even though at the same time, since we cannot understand a name alone, we must have a thought (proposition) in order to get down to existence.

This means that if understanding does get down to existence, and permit a conception of the world, it is not through names as parts of elementary propositions; neither through an unbroken proposition. It is not the transparency of the name which relates language to the world, but our thinking, and this we cannot speak of in connexion with names propositions, or pictures. The name is the apparent end-point of analysis only because it is simple: a bewitching conception which Wittgenstein later recorded as stemming from Socrates to Russell and himself (*Philosophical Investigations* I 46).

In a sense, the changed perspective of Wittgenstein's later wri---
is designed precisely to reveal thinking, or understanding, given that
name and proposition do not do it, which is why central 'psychological verbs'
come up for discussion throughout. The notion of response, as the point
at which what shows itself is the existence of the world, is part of the
breakdown between language and world which is so central a theme in this
later writing, although the word 'response' is not used and it is discussed
predominantly in connexion with the concept of pain, and in terms of the
idea of "expression":

For how can I go so far as to try to use
language to get between pain and its expression?
(Investigations: I 245)

What I do is not, of course, to identify my
sensation by criteria: but to repeat an expression.
But this is not the end of the language-game:
it is the beginning.

But isn't the beginning the sensation, which
I describe?.....
(I 290)

.....if we construe the grammar of the expression
of sensation on the model of "object and
designation", the object drops out of consideration
as irrelevant.
(I 293)

It would scarcely be novel to say that central to Wittgenstein's
discussion here is that one cannot 'properly' speak about "knowing that
one has a sensation", or rather that, if one does, then:

...here "know" means that the expression
of uncertainty is senseless. (I 247)

But what we may go on to notice is that it is just this aspect of the
matter that would seem after all to give some sense to the notion of privacy:

...But "I impress it on myself" can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connexion right in the future. But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'. (I 258)

(While Kenny is right to ask what the target of the discussion of privacy is in the Investigations (op. lit. p 16), to suggest that it is the Tractatus' linking of thought-elements and 'world-atoms' completely misses the reliance of the concept of following a rule on just such a link.)

g) Learning "meaning", and the problem of privacy.

Iris Murdoch, in "The Sovereignty of Good", sets out one form of schematising learning (a form she herself rejects).

"How do I learn the concept of decision? By watching someone who says "I have decided" and who then acts. How else could I learn it? And with that I learn the essence of the matter." (p 13)

On this account, that is, the activities and the complex or matrix governing the concept are already there to be learned; to be grasped, as it is said. But nothing is said on the question of seeing something new; for indeed it supposes that what is learned is not news: rather, for some people (the young, the uneducated, the stupid) it is, more simply, not yet known.

Murdoch is concerned at the reduction of morality to the concept of action: to a canonisation of a will that roams freely over the range of
acts it can perform; the freedom of which is, however, restricted to a metaphorical pressing of the required button to bring about the requisite performance. The canon is

"of the 'self' of 'will' as outside the network of logical rules, free to decide where to risk its tyranny, but thereafter caught in an impersonal complex. I can decide what to say, but not what the words mean which I have said. I can decide what to do but I am not master of the significance of my act." (p 20)

In this enformulation, we see each action in relation to the changes it will produce. (Murdoch records Stuart Hampshire's definition of an act: "Nothing counts as an act unless it is a 'bringing about of a recognisable change in the world'.")

A recognisable change i.e. a change that we knew beforehand. But if we are confronted by the forms of actions and their recognisable changes, then we must have to learn just these that we are later to recognise. If we trouble to ask how it is, from this position, that we manage to learn, Meno's exasperated complaint acquires great significance.

In an attempt to move away from this conception, in which learning can only be the mastery of the existing rules, Murdoch introduces her own notion of privacy. It is one she would like to apply to all 'concept-learning' (pp 29-30), but she contents herself with a more limited application:

"Knowledge of a value-concept is something to be understood, as it were, in depth, and not in terms of switching onto some given impersonal network......We may have to learn the meaning; and since we are human historical individuals the movement of understanding is onward into increasing privacy, in the direction of the ideal limit, and not backward towards a genesis in the rulings of an impersonal public language." (p 29)
Murdoch views Wittgenstein with some suspicion, and of course her introduction of a notion of privacy is at first glance very much at odds with Wittgenstein's patient dissolution of the possibility of private experience in "Philosophical Investigations". But what she introduces with the use of the term 'privacy' is not private experience, or private language, but a dimension of privacy within (public) experience and language. This leads us to the lack of meaning we can attach to checking in relation to what we learn. ("I obey the rule blindly.")

Although it is possible in many contexts to speak of checks I can make on my own learning, it is not as regards the development of a conception of the world, the emergence of objectivity; checking and comparison are activities we learn in terms of given objects. (It may be suggested that they are activities which as they are learned determine part of our conception of the world themselves. We can turn to this later; the point here is that, even if this is so, they can compare neither themselves nor any other developing objectivity.)

However, if there is no checking, then what if anything does differentiate the development of a conception of the world from private experience?

"If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgements. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so. It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call measuring is partly determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement." (Investigations 1242)

(That is: logic would be abolished, if it were a matter of external connexions between judgements: if the judgements agree anyway then there seems to be no room for the application of the notion of possibility (truth and falsity). But even in the Tractate logic has to be understood
in connexion with existence; it is now, so to speak, made internal not only to the form of propositions but to what is said/judged. There is a 'certain constancy' not only in the form of thinking, but in what we have to say, what is given to us to say.

The constancy, the agreement, are not themselves agreed or decided on; they are given, they come about in this way. (So that we take them for granted, or do not call them into question, etc.) What differentiates the learning or emergence of existence - the development of a conception of the world - from privacy is not the applicability of a method of verification, or rather its inapplicability, but the notion of expression. In the postulated private experience, that there can be no expression of the experience roots out even any suggestion of the existence of the experience, of its being anything at all:

"If you admit that you haven't any notion what kind of thing it might be that he has before him - then what leads you into saying, in spite of that, that he has something before him? Isn't it as if I were to say of someone: "He has something. But I don't know whether it is money, or debts, or an empty till."

Investigations 1 294)

Whereas in expression what is before us - or at least what we are aware of - is unavoidably conveyed: it comes about, it is given.

Within Wittgenstein's later writing, the central feature of a man's coming to understand something - learning something - is that he now sees how to take it, he sees what to do with it. He has learned how to follow a rule. How, then, is he certain he has got it right? Other people may pat him on the head, so to speak, but that in itself surely cannot be his reason? He sees something new, he sees 'how to go on'.

How am I to obey a rule? If this is not a question about causes,
then it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do.

If I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say "This is simply what I do". (Investigations 1 217)

That is: I know how to do it. I am sure. If I offer justifications, and you are not satisfied, I do not begin to doubt my own judgement. I feel myself to be justified, to be secure.

It would be clear here that I feel there to be no alternative to understanding the rule as I do: that is what the rule is. (As far as this goes, the understanding of the rule has dropped away, to be adequately replaced by "the rule itself". The sense of the rule is transparent. But only to me. Its clarity and sense of perspicuity arise (for me) at the point where "I see how to go on": where there are no alternatives, no sense of there being other interpretations.)

"All the steps are really taken" means: I now no longer have any choice. The rule, once stamped with a particular meaning, traces the lines along which it is to be found through the whole space. - But if something of this sort really were the case, how would this help?

No; my description only made sense if it was to be understood symbolically. - I should have said: This is how it strikes me.

When I obey a rule, I do not choose.

I obey the rule blindly.

(I 219)

Could I not be wrong? Having made no choice in the matter, I cannot expect myself sensibly to think myself either right or wrong. The way
others judge is not my reason for so judging:—my grasp of a rule (my seeing what a proposition means, or seeing what something of the world is really like) is my own achievement.

h) The context for questioning the relation between understanding and existence.

The language of these remarks is, of course, explicitly couched in first-person terms. They are not illustrations of expression, for such a means of representation could not show the one essential thing here: that the man does understand, that he is acting "under compulsion" (Ibid I 231). Rather they illustrate our inability to analyse out the compulsion—something which, within its first-person context, the Tractatus tried to do. The Investigations does not work solely within a first-person context. Rather, it re-explores the significance of this context in terms of a language ("ordinary discourse") that is common and needs no explanation. The significance of this context here emerges in the discussions of various areas of language, and again and again through the learning that permeates them all. In the terms of the Tractatus, what emerges is still the relation between language and world, the limits of language and world, the nature of logic; but the mode of discussion is transformed.

Barry Stroud reviews Pears' book on Wittgenstein in the Journal of Philosophy (13 Jan. '72), and in dealing with Pears' comparison of Wittgenstein (Tractatus) and Kant, writes:

If Kant's transcendental deduction is successful it shows that every event's having a cause is a necessary condition of there being such a thing as experience. Any necessity the causal principle is shown to enjoy as a result of that agreement is still conditional on something contingent, viz., on there being such a thing as experience. Kant himself explicitly makes this point
at A737-B765. His conclusion can be seen as "Absolutely" necessary if (as he maintains) there is nothing more to being "absolutely necessary" than being required for all possible experience.

(Loc. cit.: p 24)

Stroud wishes to argue that the Tractatus is "at least as respectable" (ibid.) as Kant. His comments on Pears are valuable, but it is still accepted that Wittgenstein is writing about the "conditions" of something's being the world, or an experience of the world; and not the existence of the world itself.

The idea that it is contingent that there is such a thing as experience still presupposes the divorce of language and the world; and because of this it presupposes a further 'distillation' of what they have in common - their 'structure', logic. The Tractatus still tried to distinguish language and the world as picture and pictured: - but its understanding of logic was not that of a structure that was 'animated' in one way to come to life as "the world" (and presumably in another way to come to life as "language", the picture): so it tries to go beyond the apparent distinction between the structure and the coming-to-life. Logic and the existence of the world are the same, and are given in the understanding of names (but in the Tractatus Wittgenstein tried to account for this "understanding" of names within a castrated picture - of picturing).

And this goes beyond the idea of a 'something' that, when structured (or in Kantian terms: conceptualised), is an experience; the acquisition of concepts or ways of thinking, the "learning how things are", is the experience of the existence of the world. Hence it is fundamentally a matter not of necessity but of presence.

For that is how there comes to be a conception of the world, a "making sense" - when, from within the first-person context, the position
of the learner, there is the world. In its truth-functional dimension, the Tractatus could only account for learning, if at all, if it spoke of the acceptance of the truths that are taught; and the question of understanding the language in the first place would not have been touched. Yet the book also points to another dimension within language or thought - the understanding of the existence of the world, the development of a conception of the world. That there are objects.
THREE: LEARNING: COMING TO A CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD

In any case, this conception abandoned the notion of knowledge in the older interpretations but that we have to be a combination, in radical defined. Now the new conception of object already beginning to be determined. The objects are the determining form of the idea of a cause or example.

In order to make clear, it is clear to all experience, not just through the experience, no empirical determination of consciousness can be allowed to affect his. In some sections of the object, crystals, that this object does not mean to be determined, by something complete, instead, to the most complete, as it were the logical limit, there is. (Intelligibility 192)

With this, it is the case that this conception failed to secure the existence, turning instead to a different ground of explanation, a model which was not a model at all, but the everyday facts of our sensations, with letters. Analysis failed the first-gross matter in the phenomenon, among all experience to world and does not need the subject, but in seeing language a different part of the world, it could not account for any necessary connection between the two. It could not explain how a phenomenon of the world is not just a fact aside, or a mistake.

Training, although a mental part of the attempt to forge this connection, see reduced to an undetermined point on which a proposition could not itself. Any attempt to speak about it would show the key.
a) A new approach: the idea of a case or example.

It may seem that Wittgenstein abandoned the notion of objects in the later *Investigations*; but what we have is a continuation, in radically different terms of the new conception of object already beginning in the *Tractatus*. In the *Tractatus*, 'objects' are the determining form of picture, even though a picture is a fact, and the world is the totality of facts, not things.

Analysis is a 'physical-object' - based procedure, in which a pre-determined logic and pre-determining object are the same: the essence of thought (logic)

"must be utterly simple. It is prior to all experience, must run through all experience; no empirical cloudiness or uncertainty can be allowed to affect it. — It must rather be of the purest crystal. But this crystal does not appear as an abstraction, but as something concrete, indeed, as the most concrete, as it were the hardest thing there is." (*Investigations* I 97)

Wittgenstein came to see that this conception failed to answer his questions, turning instead to a different ground of explanation, a model which was not a model at all, but the everyday facts of our relations with others. Analysis suited the first-person context in the *Tractatus*, where all experience is world and does not need the subject, but by making language a (different) part of the world, it could not account for any necessary connexion between the two. It could not explain how a conception of the world is not just a bad guess, or a mistake.

Thinking, although a crucial part of the attempt to forge this connexion, was reduced to an extensionless point on which a proposition could form itself. Any attempt to speak about it would miss the key
criticism of Russell's theory of belief, that the thought is not something related to the proposition. But in the Investigations, Wittgenstein sees that this still assumes that the thought is something more than the ordinary proposition, because the proposition is itself spoken of as something related to the world.

We are trying to get hold of the mental process of understanding which seems to be hidden behind those coarser and therefore more readily visible accompaniments. But we do not succeed; or rather, it does not get as far as a real attempt. For even supposing I had found something that happened in all those cases of understanding (how to continue the series), why should it be the understanding? And how can the process have been hidden, when I said "Now I understand" because I understood? And if I say it is hidden then how do I know what I have to look for? I am in a muddle.

(Investigations: 153)

The cases Wittgenstein considers allow us to realise something that Socrates was not able to. In them we are dealing with a man's understanding and there is nothing hidden, that might be needed to make them cases of understanding, because they are cases of understanding.

In answering Meno, the move of showing a case of coming to understand something seems ideally suited for showing us how to understand; Socrates thought so, and sought in the case for the essence of understanding. But what makes his demonstration a case of understanding, or coming to understand, is that we already ourselves understand......

In order to find the real artichoke, we divested it of its leaves. For certainly (162) was a special case of deriving; what is essential to deriving, however, was not hidden beneath the surface of this case, but this 'surface' was one of the family of cases of deriving.
And in the same way we also use the word "to read" for a family of cases. And in different circumstances we apply different criteria for a person's reading. (164)

This 'great question' (65) that runs through the Investigations concerns many aspects of judgement, criteria, essence; it is not however answered by showing that essence is expressed by grammar (171), or what a family of cases is like. It is important to see this; but even though we speak of criteria when in a real case we are asked to explain ourselves, we must be on our guard against thinking that there is some totality of conditions corresponding to the nature of each case (e.g. for a person's walking) so that, as it were, he could not but walk if they were all fulfilled. (183)

If we attempt to put this in the terminology of the Tractatus: our concern is not with totality, but with the case as a whole. And this leads on to the question: What kind of limit circumscribes the case as a whole? For if the case has no totality underlying it, this does not mean we can assume it still occupies a demarcated area of conceptual territory, within which there is no sum of parts but rather a vague web in which some conditions at different times appear most relevant. Nor that there is a central case or cases which projects outwards onto many shifting plane and which itself pins the cases down as a permanent picture for reference - for of course appealing to cases is like appealing to pictures: on its own the appeal achieves nothing. Rather, the limit is that there is a case before us; and this is why the ordinary notion of limit, even as it occurs in the Tractatus, becomes too strained to be usable.

Wittgenstein came, instead, to realise that nothing is hidden beyond a limit: "If it is asked "How do sentences manage to represent?" - the answer might be "Don't you know? You certainly see it, when
you use them." For nothing is concealed.

How do sentences do it? - Don't you know? For nothing is hidden....'(435)

It is not enough that the sentences are being used - it is when you see them that nothing is hidden. There is no final criterion of something's being a case, because when we find ourselves with any situation before us, then already it is a situation we find before us. Certainly we offer criteria, and legitimately; and Wittgenstein is quite clear that we possess criteria for all sorts of things. But the steps that led to our being able to offer criteria do not themselves have to involve such criteria. Neither do they, or could they.

There is, I think a strong temptation in philosophy, and elsewhere, to think that cases are like the booths of sideshows, side by side, in which different episodes are enacted. We forget that cases in our lives are constituted by us - that we cannot peep into them, but bear responsibility for them. And considering cases begins from this, rather than from the hope that a case may constitute an answer.

Wittgenstein's concentration on the question of the essence of language-games requires us to see that there is no essence in the game, no deciding criterion, that justifies our seeing the game as of this kind. And as long as we proceed along those lines - of what can be said about the cases - we can only say that cases are related: they bear resemblance to one another, project on one another. But even in the Tractatus Wittgenstein understood that such projection is not a property of the cases - that was the point of saying that the logical constants do not represent. (This is part of the way in which the notion of grammar is that of logic.)

When the variety of cases is so strongly made out, it will perhaps seem that this is all there is: similarity and difference, difficult
borderline cases, but also many fully determined ones. And when the
question is: What makes this or that case what it is? as if there were
something in the cases themselves, either on the surface or concealed and
needing explanatory hypotheses to yield it, then the variety of cases,
the variety of language-games, is indeed all there is. The question frames
the answer. And yet Wittgenstein observes:

This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined
by a rule, because every course of action can be made to accord
with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to
accord with the rule, then it can also be made to conflict with
it, And so there would be neither accord or conflict here.

It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the
mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpreta-
tion after another; as if each one contented us at least for a
moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. What
this shows is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not
an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we actually call
"obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases ....(201)

That is from the immense variety of cases we should not conclude that, so
to speak, there is no question at all of essence; only, the essence is
not a feature of any case, even the most common or normal, but is "what
we do".

b) Cases and language-games, with reference to the Tractatus

The thrust of this is that the question raised here is not about
any feature of cases - that is to say with what might be offered as an
example - but about how there come to be cases. Not only has that no
example; it determines the sense we can give to the giving of examples.
borderline cases, but also many fully determined ones. And when the question is: What makes this or that case what it is? as if there were something in the cases themselves, either on the surface or concealed and needing explanatory hypotheses to yield it, then the variety of cases, the variety of language-games, is indeed all there is. The question frames the answer. And yet Wittgenstein observes:

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It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shows is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we actually call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases ....(201)

That is from the immense variety of cases we should not conclude that, so to speak, there is no question at all of essence; only, the essence is not a feature of any case, even the most common or normal, but is "what we do".

b) Cases and language-games, with reference to the Tractatus

The thrust of this is that the question raised here is not about any feature of cases - that is to say with what might be offered as an example - but about how there come to be cases. Not only has that no example; it determines the sense we can give to the giving of examples.
In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein conceived of language as part of the world even while trying to avoid this: propositions were a certain kind of entity, related to more definite parts of the world - states of affairs. However, the significant mistake or confusion here is not that language and the world are thought of as separate and comparable (where a relation is sought between them, even when the conclusion is that about relationship nothing can be said). And consequently Wittgenstein did not later set out to show language as all there is to the world; you could not come to understand what there is by looking at language. Not that he still attempted to set the world alongside language: if language is not one part of what there is, it does not follow that it is all there is. There is a confusion in the comparison of language and world; and it merely arises from the more fundamental urge to treat language as part of what there is: as a subject for depiction.

And in the *Tractatus* this was partly seen. "The world" is there not a neutral area of study, but is constituted by the form of depiction. This is its limit. As we have seen, this general form involves an immediate grasping of the world, on the level of objects, where it is impossible to maintain any distinction between world and language. Yet Wittgenstein could only go on to depict the distinction, forcing language onto the level of the world.

Later he wanted to show that language is not a calculus of any sort, and that understanding is not the employment of the calculus. We have seen that Rhees has remarked that Wittgenstein could not deal with this by talking about language-games, and that is because the notion is in itself no more illuminating than the idea of what we might call a social calculus would be. What needs to be added to the idea of language-games is that in a sense they are still facts: - in the way in which in the *Tractatus* the picture is a fact. Not, that is, a fact if it is true - but itself a
fact. The question of what there is is given in the picture; so too the question of what there is is given in the language-game - which is to say that the existence of such things as language-games, institutions, practices, etc., is given in the language-game. This is not something we can begin to understand by thinking that there are many different kinds of language-game.

In the *Tractatus* two things were important about a picture: that it was a fact, and that it could yet be true or false. This is why it was necessary for Wittgenstein to elaborate the idea that the picture is the expression of a thought, the possibility of a situation (3.1 ff and 4.022) - so that the question of truth or falsity always remained to be decided. Yet this involved him in backtracking on the original insight. A proposition does not contain its sense - the sense is not a property of the proposition, but rather the existence of the sense is what enables us to call this or that a proposition, where this or that are what Wittgenstein calls propositional signs. To see a proposition at all is already to understand what it says. As he was to ask rhetorically in the *Investigations*:

> Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life? - In use it is alive. Is life breathed into it there? - Or is the use its life? (432)

And as he answers in 435 (quoted above), we begin with the life, before we see such things as signs, and especially such things as uses of signs. The problem is created by assuming beforehand that the sign is dead - that it is only one object, to be related to another (i.e. a part of the world proper). This is the great failing of the 'picture-theory': that it requires us to think the reference of its components (names) without difficulty, though we can only think them in propositions. Some thinking may indeed be the saying of something true or false about clearly referred objects, but a great deal cannot be; neither is our understanding
of truth and falsity helped by a theory which assumes that a picture is compared with a reality it refers to, without affecting our notion of where and for what to look. This became Wittgenstein's point in considering such notions as intention, remembering, having an image of someone, in the later parts of the Investigations.

The attempt to begin from the sense of a proposition, yet distinguish this from the world, corresponds to the making of a distinction between object and name. And yet Wittgenstein had seen that language must somehow or other become the world, being here beyond misunderstanding, and gave the work of doing this to objects and names, without realising that the language that could be based on this could not comprise the notion of propositional possibility he had developed (and with it the idea of truth-functional calculus).

It is doubtless misleading to speak here of language-games as facts. But it does serve to stress that they are not separated parts of the world, even when thought of under the headings of human activity or human life. They are the facts, the given; not related to any more immediate part of the world, such as environment of human biology, but the world itself.

This means that to describe a language-game is not to describe a part of the world - a social practice or institution. Ethical, religious or personal views are not separated perspectives on a given situation precisely because they are not different ways of relating men to things. (In the Tractatus Wittgenstein refused to think of belief, as we have seen, as a relation of man to proposition; and though he could not say the same for ethics, etc. - there being no comparable notion of picturing - still the questions of what is higher do not involve a relation of man to anything else.) To describe a language-game is not to describe what others do. It is to describe what we do; and unlike the attempt to describe what
others do, the question of a distinction between the world and man's action does not arise. Characteristically, describing a language-game is an expression of what there is.

c) Reconsidering the Tractatus' relation of self and world.

Wittgenstein's remarks on the whole dimension of life which in the Tractatus he spoke of simply as 'what is higher' point to the most revealing way in which he sought to abandon saying how man relates to things, and it is this which gives shape to the notion of 'person' he subsequently came to work with - of man as he is in the world.

In the Tractatus, the will appears as a general form of the limits of language and the world (6.423 and 6.43). The will cannot enter into changes in the world, because it cannot be depicted. It cannot be discerned in relation to an action - though action, being in the world, typifies what Wittgenstein calls the "will as phenomenon". That is, because he still thought here of the world as something other than language, the will could not be present in the world; neither could anything else of "what is higher". The will as it appeared in the world could only be viewed in a causal way (as a subject for psychology: 6.423):

"A stone, the body of a beast, the body of a man, my body, all stand on the same level.

This is why that happens, whether it comes from a stone or from my body, is neither good nor bad." (Notebooks, p 84)

But the 'real' will - the will as the subject of ethical attributes - does not enter into changes in the world; it determines what constitutes the world.

What it seems Wittgenstein then thought was that all aspects of the 'higher' could be concerned under the general notion of objects - in this way the world is constituted where the self is found; at the
limits of language and world. These limits are always the givenness of objects; but thinking is only one aspect of the limits, one way in which objects are grasped or 'found'. It is this which makes him say:

"Ethics does not treat of the world. Ethics must be a condition of the world, like logic. Ethics and aesthetics are one." (Notebooks, p 77)

"The thinking subject is surely mere illusion. But the willing subject exists.
If the will did not exist, neither would there be that centre of the world, which we call the I, and which is the bearer of ethics."
(Loc. sit., p 80)

The import of these intense but disparate remarks is, I think, that the 'thinking subject' would not bear any responsibility for the world - that any self-consciousness (for thus is there an 'I') requires not the passive reception of the world, but a world problematic for the will i.e. as a responsibility. If there is no self-consciousness, then there is no problem either. This actually arises out of the first-person context employed here, where the self is to vanish; because in this context the problem would vanish too.

The self is not separate from the world, as being something else - its centre; it is the centre solely by being the fact of its limits.
What there is (the world only) is limited, but the limits are not something separate: they are rather the form of the world's givenness: its presence. which as we have seen Wittgenstein spoke of as 'the mystical'.

This 'form of givenness' is the point of unity between self and object, where there simply is the object. And thinking is here only one form of the self: we cannot think about ethics or aesthetics because they are not objects, or facts, but other forms of 'self-united-with-object'.
"The work of art is the object seen sub specie aeternitatis; and the good life is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis."

(Notebooks, p 83)

(The 'world', here, would be given as a whole - not as a complex object)

What this account cannot make sense of is that the will does appear in the world. This applies not only to action-as-ethics, but also to logic. The self/will is part of the world; and I take it as crucial to this that we learn, and that our selfhood does not help itself (with its own happiness - i.e. the meaning of life) so long as it has to live with the world-as-a-whole. Wittgenstein's changed approach, between Tractatus and Investigations, shows more than anything else an awareness of learning; and this seems to me to be the lever where the self can transform itself in relation to the world. Wittgenstein's questions in the Notebooks are riddled with the stasis of a man aware of his will, but unable to change his life (that is, his world (p 77). How can one become happy/unhappy, or good/evil (which again are the same)? By the life of knowledge, he seems to say (p 81). But - and this is a point made in a slightly different way by Winch ("Wittgenstein's Treatment of the Will", in Ethics and Action, p 119) - what is one to do about it?

The will must have a foothold in the world (p 87) - hence the long entry on pp 86-8 which Winch (ibid. p 121 f) rightly sees as alien to the Tractatus. For here Wittgenstein accepts that everywhere else he is overlooking some basic features of willing:

Does not the willed movement of the body happen just like unwilled movement in the world, but that it is accompanied by the will?

Yet it is not accompanied just by a wish! But by will. We feel, so to speak, responsible for the movement.

Then is the situation that I merely accompany my actions with my will?
But in that case how can I predict – as in some sense I surely can – that I shall raise my arm in 5 minutes’ time? That I shall will this?

It is important for us to realise that, though not named, the issue of responsibility is central here: Wittgenstein is having to face the fact that ordinary bodily action may have an ethical dimension, as indeed it may reveal all else of what is higher. His attempt to keep “what is higher” out of reach of thinking – by insisting that, like thinking, it concern itself with objects rather than actually be objects – is abandoned here, as it was to be in the later writings, in the sense that all becomes part of the world; the will is revealed in the world.

But this does not mean that there is no will (as the bearer of anything higher) but instead just action: – rather it means asking a new form of question. If the self does limit in ‘public view’, what form does this take? If rules are public, and the will exists in activity, then where is the source of the world, that which constitutes objectivity?

This applies not only to aesthetics, ethics and religion; but again to logic – it concerns the source of necessity in a man’s life.

d) The problem re-cast: the Philosophical Investigations

Winch remarks on this that the questions Wittgenstein was concerned with here do not disappear if the distinction between a phenomenal and ethical will is abandoned (ibid. p 126). But this does not mean that we can allocate them merely to particular language-games (as, that is, a different conception of the will in ethics from that in ordinary action), rather than as underlying the possibility of language (which Winch also suggests, ibid.). Clearly the questions do not arise in most language-games in any such form – but the need to distinguish between a man in the
grip of a rule, and another who is not, is a distinction that does underly the possibility of language, because it includes the possibility of learning a language-game in the first place.

We can consider this below - but it is worth noting here that, although most areas of life may leave out any concern with language or life "as a whole", this more general concern is not thereby not concerned with the possibilities underlying language, life and world. It may be a language-game that not many people enter upon, as not many may seek newness; but this is no way shows that those who do are themselves concerned with only one area of language, rather than language as a whole. Formal religion is, of course, an obvious candidate for "one language-game among many" - but the search for newness, which should not be equated with formal religion, is not a search for anything in particular, or anything pre-formed. (Whether anything can be said about such search is the point of this thesis, and thus whether the search is a language-game at all. This is the point of taking up, below, the question of privacy and "private" language-games.)

It may be said that, in the Investigations, Wittgenstein, although not concerned to show any relation between language and the world, was nonetheless concerned to show the relation between the way men behave and the world: to show that the practices and activities of men are not conventional or adopted, but are built on a core of necessity determined by certain unavoidable features of the world. To this end, several writers in a collection of articles on Wittgenstein edited by Klemke (5) lend their support to the idea that our ways of behaving are founded on biological necessity - the kind of organism man is. (Similar claims might of course be made on behalf of the necessity imposed on us by environment.)

But this really is to look at things in the wrong way. It assumes a clear differentiation between language - conceived of as practices or
forms of life - and the world (which involves perhaps the objects that the practices make use of, or, as for these writers, the structure of the human animal.) In other words, it assumes a concept of objectivity that is alienated from the language - one not given in the language at all. Yet surely one of the many achievements of Philosophical Investigations is to show the variety in the concept of object - the point being, not the variety for its own sake, but that 'objects' is not a category used in identifying objects, but a category given in the existence of the language-game. We can only speak of an object when we speak the language-game, that is when we understand. (There is no question of comparing language with reality, or borrowing an alternative objectivity in order to map out reality and then compare it with its own area of language. This is why the crucial question in the Investigations remains, as in the Tractatus, how do we have objectivity? What is it that allows language to be objective?)

In II xii of the Investigations, Wittgenstein writes:

I am not saying: if such-and-such facts of nature were different people would have different concepts (in the sense of an hypothesis). But: if anyone believes that certain concepts are absolutely the correct ones, and that having different ones would mean not realizing something that we realise - then let him imagine certain very general facts of nature to be different from what we are used to, and the formation of concepts different from the usual ones will become intelligible to him.

The "sense of a hypothesis" is the assumption that there are both facts of nature and concepts. Barry Stroud "Wittgenstein and Logical Necessity", in Wittgenstein, ed. Pitcher, pp 493 ff. argues that what Wittgenstein is saying here is that the formation of different concepts, but not the concepts themselves, can become intelligible to us. But the difficulty
with taking this line is that the formation of concepts thus seems to be something recognisable on its own terms, that is apart from its being clear that it is indeed concepts that are being formed. Does it make sense to say we know what concepts look like although we don't understand them? (Or that we know that a man means all sorts of things, only we have no idea what he means?) It is not clear in what Stroud goes on to say about "natural reactions", human practices that constitute being human, "facts of our natural history" - whether he thinks that these are what our concepts depend on, and that this dependence is what we appreciate when we imagine them otherwise. If it is, then this would seem to be what Wittgenstein says he is not saying. If we can imagine different general facts, then in the imagining, different concepts are formed. And yet, of course, Wittgenstein's own many examples, on continuing a series, measurement, buying and selling etc., in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, do not lead to this, a point which Stroud is equally anxious to make. The imagining is not an assumption that nature has changed.

Yet if we cannot imagine nature otherwise, we must conclude that our concepts are "absolutely the correct ones" - and surely Wittgenstein wishes to deny this?——It seems to me that he wishes neither to deny nor to assert it: what we find becoming intelligible to us in the attempted imaginings he explores is that there are no facts of nature, or human practices, that are free from our concepts. To identify or discern a human practice, or a fact of nature that seems unconnected with human activity (biology, in this case) - these proceed from a knowledge of facts of nature, or (what is the same thing) the application of concepts.

If we are to understand this, we must also understand its complement. There is a formation of concepts; but it doesn't depend on something else. (The temptation to think in this way has its root in the supposition that
concepts are applied - that is, that what they are applied to is not itself fundamentally a question of concepts because concepts do not account for there being something there in the first place.) The formation of concepts is learning:

.....what has the expression of a rule - say a sign-post - got to do with my actions? What sort of connexion is there here?
- Well, perhaps this one: I have been trained to react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it.

But that is only to give a causal connexion; to tell how it has come about that we now go by the sign-post; not what this going-by-the-sign really consists in.

On the contrary; I have further indicated that a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom. (198)

(There are important questions attached to this idea of being trained, in as much as this might require acting in a particular way, and this leads on to the sense in speaking of a custom here. We turn to these questions below.)

Were we to continue to think along the lines of a relation between language and world - or rather were we to continue to think of these as different (for "our interest certainly includes the correspondence between concepts and very general facts of nature" (II xii) — but that is our interest, not our conclusion) - then perhaps it would appear that philosophy is not unlike anthropology and the social sciences, the difference being that its observations are not empirical. Philosophy would then enter into the great trend of modern thought: to understand and explain the lives of men: that is, to explain the meaning - their thought, emotion, personality and aspiration - in terms of what they do. The basic concept in description (which then also becomes explanation)
would be that of action. (The further Aristolelean corollary would be that human happiness lies in activity.)

It is, I think, necessary to argue against this, and in order to do so we must realise that the expression 'form of life' as it appears in the Investigations is not another way of speaking of society, or practices, or the histories of men of integrity. It is the means of coming to grips with the central wrong direction of the Tractatus - that language is a phenomenon, part of what there is. Certainly, in the Tractatus, the logical constants do not represent; neither can the method of projection be represented (and we have seen that these are not different thoughts). The sense of a picture, and the analysis of the sense, were given in its being a picture. But at this point it had seemed to Wittgenstein that language was then the totality of pictures, the totality of logical space, and these pictures, although being the facts, were yet separate from the world, or from states of affairs; only in this way could they be true or false. So the method of projection had something of the character of a hidden link between different kinds of entity in the world (hence Wittgenstein's expression of this image in the Investigations), even though propositions, let alone thoughts, were not themselves states of affairs or states of objects at all (except for those they represented). (As a painting should not be an arrangement of paint at all - except in so far as that means it is, say, the Creation of Adam.)

e) Necessity and action : the concept of response.

I mentioned, earlier, the essential but concealed first-person context in which the Tractatus is written. It may seem that this, more obviously than anything else, was abandoned in the Investigations, and that one of the great steps forward was to leave behind the older style of questioning - a kind of introspection (exhibited in the Notebooks).
in which the great questions of the world, reality, space, time, and God are asked concerning colossal objects which are present to one in experience - and to go on to what is basic: i.e. human action, what men do. Thus Wittgenstein is noticed as saying:

We are talking here about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about some non-spatial, non-temporal phantasm. (108)

And the recovery of the dimension of time, rather than the previous language of timeless presence, may seem an especially valuable achievement. But 108 continues:

But we talk about it as we do about the pieces in chess when we are stating the rules of the game, not describing their physical properties.

And rules are not physical properties, spatial or temporal.

The Tractatus certainly does suffer under the conception of language as a phantasm. But this is not part of a general metaphysical perspective underlying the book in which all things - world, reality, God, etc., - present themselves for contemplation. The first-person context of the book is not this, and it is not to be described as if the context itself were simply a state of affairs in the world. It needs to be shown, or better expressed, in the condition in which existence itself is understanding. Here, to consult something present to experience is not the beginning of understanding, as if the presence were a presupposition of it: understanding begins at the thing's existence. (6) This is a first-person context not because understanding precedes even existence for there is here no separate identification of understanding. Correspondingly there is no separate identification of the self; and yet it is in this context that Wittgenstein can say "the world is my world".

It is only in this context that the important questions of the Tractatus - about what is "higher" (6.42) - can be raised. For it is only here that the question of limits can be raised. The limits of
the world are not a part of the world: consequently they cannot be put into words.———In the context the Tractatus introduces, however, the presence of the limits is presupposed. They constitute the identity of existence and understanding. The mystical, or rather 'what is mystical', is both the world's existence, and what is manifested (6.44 and 6.522).

This does not mean that some third thing, called the mystical, takes different forms, appearing now as the world's existence, now as manifestation. (Wittgenstein's Letters to C K Ogden (ed. von Wright, pp 36-7) make it clear that he does not mean 'mystical feeling' at either of these points — the phrase "that the world exists" has nothing to do with a sense of awe.)

The world's existence, and what is manifested, are one and the same — the manifestation which brings in all that is higher, all that shows itself, is no more than existence. The mystical is the focus of the first-person context of the work — the focus of the fusion of existence and understanding.

It is this that continues to run throughout the Investigations, particularly in the preoccupation with the question: What is it in what men do that accounts for its necessity — where is the meaning in what a man does? The Investigations certainly shows the variety in the idea of "an object" — how this varies from language-game to language-game — but its point is not this variety, but there is no category "object" to be applied as a criterion for identifying objects. We can only speak of an object, speak objectively, when we already have understanding; and it is this "having understanding" that Wittgenstein constantly explores.

In his development of the notions of rules (and the action of following a rule), family resemblances, etc., Wittgenstein destroyed the idea of an object which arose with that of a calculus; instead, the object belongs in the language-game. This does not mean, however, that we can avoid using the category of object, because it is precisely this category which makes the language-game real, not just a game. It makes the game under—
standing, or following a rule a realisation.

This is a general comment; in a sense it is the general theme of the Investigations, continuing the founding question of the Tractatus: How is language about the world? The Investigations revises the notion of object by revising the notion of name: a name is action, the following of a rule. It is this blind action which I wish to speak of as response: it is the activity in which objects are alone understood, seen, experienced, formed - but not an activity which can be undertaken prior to the object's existence, or in any way independently of the object's existence.

The question of the necessity in what men do - including its overtones of morality and worth - is thus a continuation of the Tractatus' concern with logic and existence. Necessary action is that in which man's understanding is secured to objects, in which his awareness comes to be about the world at all: and to this extent it is what is sought in any search for newness: it experiences objects, and is the only possible illustration of the world (in which there comes to be objects).

If we return to Simone Weil's idea of necessity:

We have to consent to be subject to necessity and to act only by handling it.

We should do only those righteous actions which we cannot stop ourselves from doing, which we are unable not to do, but, through well directed attention, we should always keep on increasing the number of those which we are unable not to do.

(Gravity and Grace, pp 38-9)

And although Weil certainly does not mean logic when she writes of necessity, we have already noted this understanding of necessity is caught up with that of 'the whole world'. To act under necessity, in the sense she speaks of here, is not to act within the world but at its limits, the activity in which there is no distinction between self and object; in Weil's words
it is to "bathe in the world".

Weil is, as I have suggested, right to locate the possibility of transformation in the interrelation of subject and world. But she is wrong to then view the transformation as of the self alone: and thus necessity takes on, in her writings, the overtones of an object of, or content of, experience - it appears as the awfulness which needs to be embraced. Had she modified this by a more Kantian stress on the rule of necessity in the self's conceptualisation of experience, she would have come much closer to Wittgenstein's fundamental grasp of the ambiguities in learning and in necessity. Yet this itself depends upon a reviewing of the nature of other people with respect to the world and to the interrelation of subject and world, and, in intimate relation to this, the rule of action in the account we give of conceptualisation itself, and hence the interrelation of activity and necessity.

For it is not enough simply to hold together the necessities in logic and in reality and say that they are one: the link between the kind of accounts of the one and the other which the Tractatus and Weil give - i.e. of propositional form and affection - will seem tenuous in the extreme. (7) What we are considering in the concept of learning is a notion of necessity that is not experienced at all. Not, that is, placed as an 'object' in the world, whether in language or in 'reality'. Rather than being experienced, it is expressed: we are to find necessity, in its relation to newness, not as an object at all, but in what we do.

Response is simply that activity which expresses the existence of objects, which allows them to exist within the world. It is the form in which we can approach the search for newness as the development of something already given. For clearly enough we respond to objects all the time: it is the level of blind activity. But the blind activity we are constantly party to is not itself finding anything new: and to seek newness,
even in these terms, is not as it were to recognise that our present blindness is enough. For the sceptic, our concern would be the attempt to illuminate this blindness - something that we cannot do from within ourselves - but to seek newness here is crucially a recognition that we are not acting blindly, a recognition that we control our own action as fully as we can; and that it is precisely this which turns the world stale, because our activity has become detached from objects in order to put them to use.

The development of response is not thereby a quantitative increase - a concern to add new responses, and hence new objects, to one's awareness and performance. Such an idea of addition necessarily reintroduces the self, as the focus for competence and experience, at a point where we are concerned with response as the expression of objects rather than as any type of object within the world. This should become clearer when we later return to the understanding we have of what an object is; for the moment we can remain simply with the formulation of 'blind activity'.

f) Response distinguished from 'play' and 'instinct'.

One apparent dimension contained in Wittgenstein's remarks on the blindness of this activity is that of instinct, and that one possible answer to the question "How can we (come to) respond?" lies in the educational concept of play of learning by instinctive discovery in a context allowing the learner complete freedom of response. (This serves also to bring us back to teaching as the avenue to newness, an avenue we must now consider in relation to the concept of following a rule.)

The assumption shared by Rousseau, Froebel and more recent educationalists who mistrust the notion of rule-following is that the natural child - which means both freed from convention and allowed to be himself, in his own nature - has in himself "the needs, as it were, of
a potential unfolding and perfect flowering" (R F Dearden, "The
Concept of Play", in The Concept of Education, ed Peters, p 75).

But Dearden rejects spontaneity as a criterion for play on the
grounds that work, too, for a child can be spontaneous:

Parents often have to dampen spontaneous willingness to help in
the performance of some task, such as painting or weeding, on
account of the likelihood of a mess or accident... (p 78)

Yet even in such a case, surely, the willingness is a menace precisely
because the child is playful. He is not prepared to be guided by the
demands of the task; he is not prepared to be taught. He is playing
at painting, weeding, etc. in imitation of his father. Dearden confirms
this himself later on:

If he does just as he pleases, then he is playing; if he sees
what he does as a task, so that not to remove some egg from a
spoon, or to finish, would be neglect by the norms of the task,
then he is not playing. (p 81)

Since in a game one does subject oneself to the rules, it is possible
to be serious about one's play. On pp 81-2 Dearden introduces a notion
of "the serious" as the "typical activity of adults" against which
play is, by contrast, to take its sense.

However, while it may be correct to say that we cannot speak of a
child as playing, unless he can also be, and sometimes is, serious, it is
surely misguided to argue, as Dearden does, that the child must be aware of
'the serious' before he can be said to play. It would be more correct
to say that some play actually introduces the child to 'seriousness'. It is
because a game can be taken seriously that life becomes 'serious' in
Dearden's sense - a sense which he assumes is clearer than that which play
has, but which he counts as involving prudence and obligation, the idea
of means and ends. (And also, thereby, competition and success.)

It is possible in these terms to question whether he is correct in
saying that the child's awareness of what he is doing is not the same thing as the seriousness of growing up: the function of play as the educationalist sees it. Certainly play need involve no awareness of means to an end: but the seriousness of a child's play often is the same seriousness which issues in adult life. The child does not usually know that in doing this or that he is growing up, because he will have very little conception of seriousness as a goal (although some highly intelligent children do); but it is because he does not have such an external reference to what is serious that he can discover it 'internally' as something connected with his own spontaneity, rather than the wishes of adults for him. The success or failure of his play, the need to get the make-believe right, to have the sand-castle or the pebbles in the stream as he wants them - these are all precursors of the way we live in adulthood.

This is to say that we must allow play a more prominent role in the path to adulthood that Dearden would wish - but it is not to say that it features in a development of response and the emergence of objects.

A young child does come to discover objects. And it is clear at least that play takes up a lot of his time when he does this: a lot more than being taught. It may thus seem that play should be retained, or encouraged much more than it is, in later life.

At the very least, to encourage play educationally is to re-introduce, to over-serious adults, an opportunity for relaxing into childhood, or rather childishness. This may indeed be necessary psychiatrically, as a means of supporting the existing 'seriousness' - as in executive America group therapy serves as a safety-valve allowing one to continue in the rat-race.

And play is connected with imagination: not only in pretending, but in 'playing with', and often also with games. But if it is to involve learning what there is, then that has to be shown in the course of the
play. That is, if play is a vehicle for learning (and it is for this that educationalists will speak of it as a means of teaching) then the vehicle must show its results. ——Teaching must have some notion of its success; indeed this is why a lot of teaching relies on the idea of reproduction and imitation in practice, as a criterion of its success.

And yet play lacks this structure for exhibiting what is learned. To play at hospitals, say, obviously presupposes some knowledge of what goes on in hospitals; or to play with paints or blocks or drums requires some grasp of physical movement and co-ordination, which itself involves the physical distinctness of these objects; but if a child is to learn about the world — about the existence of objects, then the play must exhibit this in what he goes on to do. And yet it relies on a notion of activity in which the child's awareness is focussed on the activity itself, whether in imitation and pattern (role-playing and games) or kinaesthetically (playing with objects, running, dabbling etc.). It is this exclusive concentration on activity, without reference to objects, which underlies the (educational) notion of play.

This is not to say that play cannot come to involve an awareness of objects: playing a game, in sport par excellence, leads to an increasing familiarity with particular objects. But then this notion of play also involves teaching and practice, and introduces Dearden's concept of seriousness. The particular forms of activity peculiar to this or that game do allow the pupil the terms in which to express his awareness of objects; and we can go on to consider this in more detail below.

But without a characteristic behaviour that is part of the play, a child cannot convey any discovery of objects which may be used in it. It makes no sense to say that he has come to any awareness of what there is: this is why Wittgenstein comments:

Children do not learn that books exist, that armchairs exist,
etc. etc., - they learn to fetch books, sit in armchairs, etc etc..... (*On Certainty*, 476)

(This will bring us to consider the idea of 'conveying' any awareness of existence, in terms of the problem of privacy.)

Any notion we have of instinct as the basis of response - for example in 'primary' activities like breathing, walking, feeding, sexuality, etc - may suggest that we as adults should return to these, as to play, in order to live an instinctive life, at one with nature. Weil comments, echoing even the most basic Hindu and Buddhist meditation techniques:

External necessity or an inner need as imperative as that of breathing. 'Let us become the central breath.' *Gravity & Grace*, p 128)

but it would be a mistake to take this as advocating a return to the condition of a 3-month old baby, or that such a return would be tantamount to the discovery of the world. If instinct is an 'activity' which in some sense makes possible our having a conception of the world (and related to this is Wittgenstein's remark in *On Certainty*:

I want to regard man here as an animal, as a primitive being to which one gets instinct but not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination. (475))

to treat the activity itself as what we require is to treat response purely in quantitative terms, as if the world could be reduced to a few of the activities in it. Instinct, although involving necessity, and indeed pointing to presence, remains on the level of necessity as it stands in the world, rather than as a source of newness. By particularising necessity, even in order to make it a goal in our
search for newness, we find it detached from newness.

Instinct cannot yield newness, precisely because the point that applies to rules of language applies either to activities or to objects considered in isolation: it must be possible to speak of error, of correctness and mistakes, in connexion with an object and activity in instinct, we could also speak of its necessity. But what would it mean to say that a baby who sucks, swallows when hungry, exhibits a walking reflex at a certain age, discovers the world in these? None of these enter the class of activity, and form part of showing anything. It is only when the baby is taught to do things that we can speak of necessity in his life, or of certainty and sureness in his activity.

Connected with this is the point that a 'natural' or 'instinctive' basis for violence or lust can be put forward as a justification for their being exercised. And I would not question that anger and sexuality have a 'natural' base, in which it is not possible to speak of them as activities. But violence and lust are learned, and they are ways of manipulating objects, requiring justification in the way of all other activity. More than this, if anger or sexuality are taken as a means to growth, in exactly the kind of therapy we noted in discussing play, then they are confused with violence and lust in order to be performed at all.

If they are involved in growth at all, that will come about in relationship with other people: as Rush Rhees writes in criticising a behaviourist approach to learning (in which the word 'response' is taken from the expression 'stimulus-response'; and has a somewhat different meaning from that we are considering):

I am trying to emphasize that in all this we have not to do with discovering more complex and more all-inclusive ways of satisfying one's responses: of achieving a better economy in one's responses, so that one may avoid frustration, etc. It is not
that one has found a better method of getting what one wants. It is that one's eyes have been opened. And this has been through what has come to one, not in the form either of reward or of punishment, but from people and from culture and from teachers. It is because one has learned from something, and one would never have grown otherwise. (Without Answers, p 158)

The role which instinctive behaviour has in learning is obscured precisely by our own recent attempts to 're-activate' it: I would suggest that it is the dimension of activity in which a child commits himself in the hands of others and in which he is most completely vulnerable - something which is recorded by the earlier importance of sharing and revering their gifts (whether in eating, or sexual intimacy) - and hence capable of being led by others.

But to allow this speculation to affirm instinct as involved in the possibility of relationships with other people only reaffirms that it cannot enter into the learning those relationships may contain: we cannot seek instinct, but must approach newness through the notion of activity which is learned.

g) Learning, in relation to activity and training.

If we consider being shown a way of behaving that is conventional - a matter of custom, of manners, or of what to do in a game, or a manual job - then if I learn to act in this way, I must learn to act this way by myself. The idea of the dignity of labour stems from this, and it applies even to etiquette. If a child holds his knife and fork as he has been instructed to do, but only when his parents are watching him, then he has not learned table manners. Even if we speak about "how to hold table utensils" as what he has learned, if he does not so hold them away from the eyes of his parents, then he has not learned how to hold them.
Perhaps we might wish to say that he has learned how his parents expect him to hold them, where 'learn' means 'made aware of' or 'find out'. He could perhaps impersonate or mimic his intended manners. However, even this requires us to ask whether he really has learned what his parents expect of him - for it is not something he does on his own. If he does learn to imitate his parents, then it seems that we can simply say he has learned the convention. And of course we do say this: but that does not mean that he has learned "what his parents do" or "what is done". For in this case he has come to act in this way by himself, and what he does is his own action. (8)

We do learn by being shown the performance of actions. Climbing, riding a bicycle, mowing the lawn, reading, playing a musical instrument, spelling, writing, calculating, painting. (And all of these are part of our learning to think, which we are taught as much as anything else.) Ryle goes to some length to remind us that even to have learned the piece of information that something is so is more than merely to be able to parrot the original telling of it - somewhat as to have digested a biscuit is more than merely to have popped it into one's mouth.

("Teaching and Training," in The Concept of Education, ed Peters, p 111.)

Or as Wittgenstein had anyway put it:

If a parrot had uttered the formula, we should not have said that he could continue the series.

(The Brown Book, p 113)

In this way, connexions between teaching and training are made out, so that all learning is seen as coming to be able to do something. This is a valuable move, and it is part of the importance of Wittgenstein's expression "following a rule" that it ceaselessly prepares us for this.
But — and this is something that Ryle, say, has not got hold of —
to compare teaching with training presupposes that being trained is less
difficult to understand than being taught: that being trained is simply
learning to do what my trainer does, and then going on from there. Yet
what I learn is not simply "what my trainer does". (That is why it does
not help our understanding of learning, to be told that we must begin by
learning what is simple, so that more complex lessons can then be handed
on to us. (9) This not only oversimplifies, but completely overlooks the
more basic question of the relation between what my teacher does, and
what I do — for it is only by assuming that these are the same, and that
this is a word which raises no problems, that Hamlyn can pursue any
conception of simple and complex units. It is an assumption with obvious
parallels with the Tractatus' notion of the truth-functional calculus in
relation to the sameness of elementary proposition and state of affairs.)

I may have an action or a piece of information, broken down into
simple elements and rehearsed before me. And then I go through the
motions. For it is not at issue that teaching contains a concept of
analysis and of components, as an activity (teaching) which the teacher
himself engages in. It is indeed part of the job and of the skill and
sensitivity of the teacher. And a very young child may be literally held
and led through the component actions. And if he learns anything at all in
this moving about, it has to occur to him that there is something he can
do, namely to take command of the movements for himself. If we say that
he has learned something more complex, however, that can only mean that
the teaching involved breaking the action into parts. What he has learned
is not a synthesis, or a relation between parts. He has learned to do
something new. And speaking of training only adds to the idea that what
is learned is the sum of parts. If we tried to go on to say that the
parts are 'appreciated' in a new way, as a whole (that is, as if the
parts are placed within his experience, to permit room for the concept of sameness between what he does and what the teacher does) then that obscures the problem, because it suggests that here is something he has learned, which is the same as what his teacher does. But the particular actions the teacher performs in illustration are not what the child learns; neither does he learn the teacher's ability to act. There is no new pattern or standard of action that now makes sense to him, which he can accord with: it is simply that he has found himself able to act.

Suppose I learn to impersonate somebody. But if I really do learn to do this, then I so to speak find myself in the impersonation. The mere trick of seizing on one or two 'identifying characteristics' fails because it belongs with "learning what something is called": say as a sports enthusiast, or the child learning table manners. Any attempt to act out what one has learned to identify is not an action at all, but only an alternative form of specifying criteria. (On another kind of acting, Ronald Pickup, of the National Theatre, could not play the part of Don Armado in Love's Labour's Lost, until the producer (Laurence Olivier) taught him how to walk onto the stage. As Pickup attempted this, he as it were found the whole of his path through the play opening up before him.)

Now it is of course important that the impersonator or actor has something before him to attempt; but as we consider this, the questions are circumscribed by its being his own action he learns, so that even in acting he is himself, is exercising his own ability.

The way in which one has to try to do what one is learning to do makes it clear how natural it is to speak of what one is learning to do. And yet it is precisely a clear idea of what one must try to do that can prevent one's learning how to do anything: the advice to a beginner at tennis to stop trying is the help that stops him from trying to play by watching himself copying his coach. From here on he can find himself in
strokes, find his own game.

Training is "not just putting the pupil through stereotyped exercises which he masters by sheer repetition" (Ryle: op. cit., p. 109).

"The well-disciplined soldier, who does indeed slope arms automatically, does not shoot automatically or scout by blind habit or read maps like a marionette." (ibid).

And what we learn to do as a result of training is indeed news:-

"The poet composes a sonnet, taking care to adhere to the regulation 14 lines, to the regulation rhyming scheme, to the regulation metrical pattern, or else perhaps to one of the several permitted patterns — yet, nonetheless, his sonnet is a new one. No one has ever composed it before. His teacher who taught him how to compose sonnets has not and could not have made him compose this sonnet, else it would be the teacher's and not the pupil's sonnet. Teaching people how to do things just is teaching them methods or modi operandi; and it is just because it is one thing to have learned a method and another thing to essay a new application of it that we can say without paradox that the learner's new move is his own move and yet that he may have learned the how of making it from someone else. The cook's pudding is a new one and piping hot, but its recipe was known to Mrs Beeton in the days of Queen Victoria." (loc. cit., p. 114)

Method, Ryle says, makes the new result possible. It is the rule that offers generality (p. 114), and thus we could say that what we learn is: rules. The crucial characteristic of a rule is that learning it allows the pupil to do something new, to do something or produce something of his own.

The idea of generality that operates here is designed to allow the application of a rule to explain newness as a kind of instantiation. And the learning of a skill does suggest, as it does to Ryle, that in solving
problems in mathematics, riding a bicycle, shooting or French grammar, the newness is "teaching oneself" - i.e. getting it right in new cases, reaching bits of the domain of knowledge and ability by oneself. And this can be accommodated under the fact that in practice each man enters on his own ability. He can grasp the rules: because that is what he is anyway doing when he practises. He does the trying and performing, and that explains the newness because he is already exercising an ability, albeit imperfectly or unnaturally. When we practise, this is not to borrow someone else's action at all, but to exercise our ability: and newness is the fact that my ability is not yours.

For Ryle, that is, training thus resolves an initial paradox about 'teaching oneself', or rather coming to new results and abilities by oneself. Practice begins with a kind of imitation, out of which the ability emerges. The training/teaching allows rules to be employed as criteria of correctness, but nonetheless as essentially negative prescriptions which correct failure so that the free exercise of ability can effloresce. The transition from what the teacher does or says, as an exhibition of the rule, to the pupil's tryings, is understood here simply as his doing, or trying to do, the same thing. The presupposition is that he can make a comparison between what he does, and what his teacher does; that he and his teacher are both instancing the same general rule.

And in a lot of activity, this is certainly more or less what goes on. Were we to speak of such learning as "learning how", then this transition from one instance to another will be in at the beginning of such learnings: whether of information, techniques in calculus, or sport. The familiarity of the emergence of ability out of imitation may not remove all sense of mystery from what is going on in learning; but it is a clear example of what is going on. The answer to Meno here would be simply practise.

What the pupil sees the teacher doing is, of course, also new to him;
the actions are broken down, made simple; but the pupil can somehow understand what they comprise, on the basis of a generality he has already acquired: he can, say, accept the teacher's advice and act as he anyway would in such-and-such a previously mastered activity, but now on this object or with this formula. This is indeed what training presupposes, and if we were to learn to do something new, then this 'generalising' ability would be assumed. (Socrates was able to show Meno that, since we do have this ability, there is nothing to stop us learning how to do something new, given the further 'tethering down' of practice. Except that Meno did not ask about doing something new, but about seeking it.)

h) The distinction between being trained, and understanding another person.

A lot of teaching could be called training, along these lines. But newness is not a matter of an ability alone. And I think this becomes clear when we turn to the idea of understanding another when he teaches. If he trained us, we would in some sense know in advance what he was bringing us to. We want to do what he can do - even if, later on, we discover more in it than he did. To accept his rules of practice or method is not, however, to understand him; it does not explain how we could ever have such a notion. If seeing the world is an ability, then I may be able to do it awfully well, and very originally - but then another person's ability must also be shown as an activity, however complex and subtle, which I can pick up and develop for myself.

Even to concede that as an ability it is not only taught to us, but it must be able to emerge in some other way as well, for we need to see others and some world already in order for this to come about; even this is still to say that seeing the world is nonetheless an ability, or perhaps the form of all abilities.——The driving force, for Ryle and others, behind speaking of abilities was to do away with the mystery of 'secret perception', of seeing as a world inside each man's head. Thus Ryle speaks
of seeing as itself a matter of achievement. But, if we begin to realise that seeing is an ability which cannot always be taught, then there is no point in speaking of it as essentially an ability: we cannot always apply the notion of the relative success or failure of the seeing. It makes sense to say that a child can be taught seeing — but only if he can already see to follow the lesson. And if in these individual lessons there seems to be a criterion of achievement, in what the child can do, there is not also a criterion of his seeing the teacher's dummy runs. When we take it for granted that he can see what we show him, to say that in some cases he might not even see this (and hence that we would have to teach him) is not to say that we can teach him everything, or that all is in principle teachable.

To take his seeing for granted when we teach him is not implicitly to believe that he is exercising abilities. The 'achievement' of seeing is not to pick out, describe correctly, pair off, etc. — or rather it is not these alone. Such would require that we, as teacher or judge, can already see to compare the 'exercised abilities' with the world. Yet, to return to Socrates, that does not explain what learning to see is at all. It says only that seeing must show itself in what is done.

We have to ask, here, what it is that enables even an activity (e.g. a new identification) to be applied in the right place. Is it simply the complexity of the activity, the way in which an ability is not only a type of action, but actually knows where and when to exercise itself? For if it is not this, and if we have to say that the pupil sees without doing anything, then we gain no greater insight than we forfeit in using the concept of ability.

The point to be made about learning to see is not that, when a pupil has learned, then he is acting, but that in order to learn, he has to stop acting and see what his teacher is showing him. Then seeing
something for himself may develop out of this - and therefore ability will emerge; but not out of any exercise of ability. This is why we have to speak about seeing as something more than, or other than, ability. Learning by being taught leaves us seeing, looking at what the teacher presents us with.

That is, this is the necessary beginning of understanding another. Sheer force or fear may keep a pupil inactive, but they do not keep him looking at something new. We look because another is showing us something.

It is precisely here that the *Tractatus* distinction between saying and showing can in fact grip: it is the activity of understanding another which gives expression to, and form to, the first-person context. And like 'showing', we cannot say what is understood. This is not to say or deny that, if it is understanding, then 'what is understood' must show itself in what the learner goes on to do - yet there are many important areas of understanding, as we can go on to, where he cannot.

It is part of the relation this concept of understanding another has to that of newness that we cannot give examples, beyond saying that it could be anything, but must rather discuss the concept as a requirement and as a given, in what are essentially metaphysical relations to those areas of language which require it: most notably the concepts of learning the existence of the world, and authority in teaching, as well as learning from art and nature.

This in one sense marks a return to the *Tractatus* insistence that there must be objects - although the terms used have been modified. But this is not an insistence Wittgenstein abandoned in his later writings: on the contrary, as he insists throughout the discussions of ostensive definition and learning to follow a rule, there must be a point at which the learner just sees. The appeal to the givenness of understanding another is in essence a reworking of this, in answer to a somewhat different question; but in both cases the form is "There is such a thing as.....". But the consequence of making this admission will of course only become clear as
we go on to consider the notions which most clearly require it.

If what another shows us, when we are learning, is how to do something, then we do not normally speak of understanding him. We look at a trainer because we know he can do what we want to do. We've seen him do it. But we look at a teacher not because he can do something, but because his language (word and action) show that he sees. Not because he gets it right; because we're really not in a position to know that! But because something new comes through his expression of it (where 'it' is necessarily ambiguous).

Although we have to practise in order to get it out into the world for ourselves, we have understood him - he has shown us something of what there is. He has not trained us, because it was not an action he showed us but an object. He can, and must, include some training. But the difference between training and teaching (as 'enabling to see') is that the looking which training requires does not demand seeing anything new. We see the trainer's examples - without ourselves acting - yet our criterion of success is also his; we do not learn to see anything.

Certainly we have to see what he is getting us to do. To say that we know he can do it, and thus that we possess some criterion of success before we can embark on, let alone master, the activity (whether in swimming, or riding a bicycle, or getting the authorised answers) does not seem that we can see through his slow-motion demonstrations to "the action itself". What he is doing, at a particular step in the demonstration, may elude us - and then we see it. It becomes something we can attempt ourselves. This may well be called understanding; and it also requires us to look and watch, without at first seeing. And what we then go on to see is not a new object; we understand not what another reveals but what he is doing.

It is important to realise that this understanding is something more than simply a 'spectator-interest' in the activity, precisely because the
only sense in which we may speak of seeing what the trainer is getting us to do is that of getting out and doing it ourselves. While what the trainer has shown us will be part of an activity for which there are external criteria, for spectators, learning to do something requires new abilities which are not illustrated externally. A man can learn the rules of tennis well enough to watch a game and make judgement of its players. But he cannot tell why a player is double-faulting unless he himself can serve.

This is not a question of one individual's ability to be a knowledgeable spectator, and hence - like the possibility of pretence which it is related to - not a question of what others think of his grasp of the game on any particular occasion. The point is that if someone does develop a spectator interest, say in swimming, then that is not a concern to learn from other swimmers. He knows that there are people in the water, that they are moving in certain directions, free of the bottom; and that is how he knows that so-and-so is swimming. "To know" here has much more to do with his ability to justify what he says, to explain how he knows. And this supposes that he knows they are people, that this is water, and so on, which leaves us with the further question: How does he know all this?

On the other hand, for someone who is learning to swim, other swimmers will be his trainers, even if he simply watches them. If he knows that they are swimming, that is because this is what he is learning from them. The expression of a doubt about this - How do you know that they are swimming? - has no sense for him, because swimming features, and features significantly, in his life.

For the spectator, there is always a distinction to be drawn between individuation and identification; and if we think of learning in terms of such a spectator-model, then although in a specific case identification will concern criteria applied to a 'recognisable' object, yet as the questions of
the recognition of the object are pushed further, the question of how one individuates becomes unfathomable. It may then seem that all we can do is to accept that we do individuate in certain very general ways, as well as more specifically, as Strawson concludes in Individuals.

But to speak of this as an account of understanding is to overlook the whole dimension of learning and teaching in which a new understanding is expressed in the ability to teach and advise: to participate in the language of the activity. Understanding a new action or activity is revealed solely by doing it. There may well be a moment of realisation, a pause; but this is necessarily just the beginning of one's ability: to see what another is doing is already to be capable of so acting.

Thus, understanding how to do something is not separate from the ability to act. It differs from seeing something new - a new object - not because it does not involve looking and watching, for it may well do. But the expression of seeing how is solely in terms of the action; whereas seeing a new object has an expression that is not any particular activity at all. To grasp it is always to see how to do something - and this is the basis for our differentiating between understanding-as-learning from understanding-as-sympathy. But more than this, something is revealed, which we had not seen before, and which - crucially - we cannot see for ourselves. We have, in understanding the teacher, received the loan of another's eyes: and expressing this is not doing anything, except that we place ourselves in his hands.

The need to refer this understanding to the other person, the teacher, marks the crucial distinction between this account of understanding, and the role of 'attention' in Weil's writing, or Buber's concept of 'the onlooker' - a distinction we shall return to in the final chapter. Attention would here serve as the expression of an activity, however passive; and hence is to be predicated of the self. It is the attention one may give to a trainer, a teacher from whom one expects to master skills, however intellectual or purely 'spiritual' these may be. The further reference we require
in understanding another - being in the other's hands - means the inability to practise by oneself. Initiative comes from the other, not from oneself.

The grave difficulty with Weil's concept of attention lies in the self's own initiative and the suggestion of a spiritual 'training for life'. What we are considering here is an approach to learning which, while acknowledging how much of learning can be mapped out in terms of being trained, as Ryle wishes, requires us to look at learning as fundamentally more than the activity of an individual.

We can consider below what this 'more than' requires us to say about both learning and the presence of others; the point here is that, in relation to the need to refer learning to see to more than the self, learning to see is itself more than what the self learns to do. The success of learning is indeed shown in what we do - but as we noted initially about the *Meno*, our problem is not of whether learning occurs, but of what it is like for the learner; it is this I have spoken of as the question posed in a first-person context. The success of learning is not the same thing as its newness. Quite properly, it must be asked how this newness shows itself, if not through what is done. Yet if newness shows itself, it is not because the learner measures up to any standard, but simply because there are learners. That is, we find one another, we find 'other minds', not only in parallel training, but in the wish to see.

The expression of seeing is not solely achievement; language does not place us side by side, as it were, exercising our abilities as best we can. Co-ordinate with this, seeing is not only a matter of judgement, of individuation or identification. Ryle, I have suggested still assumes that it is; which does scant justice to the kind of life we live with others, what others mean or can mean to us. If seeing were an achievement, that would, I take it, make it active; it may seem, in these terms, that what I am discussing is an alternative *passivity* in which experience is
'interior'; but what I wish to draw attention to is rather the passivity of understanding another, which is not an experience at all. (10)

The attempt to draw out more fully what is involved in this further dimension of understanding another will occupy us in the two chapters which follow; and it is there that we can consider the question of the form which this understanding takes - i.e. the expression it receives, without which it would indeed be merely a private fiction. Having seen that it is not what Wittgenstein spoke of as an idling wheel, irrelevant to the rest of the mechanism, it does not follow that its expression is simply public - a state of affairs or language-game within the world, and the final chapter therefore explores something of the complexity of expression it in fact has. To understand another is not to be able to do what he can do; and while if he can teach, then he can involve us in training so that we come to see what is new without his eyes, if he cannot provide this training we can only acknowledge that he sees something which we ourselves are not, or not yet, capable to understanding.

This is not to say that we have here two distinct phenomena: the understanding of another, and then the optional extra of his teaching and training. The concept of suppression which we consider below will, I hope, allow us to view the interrelation of these more clearly. We may note here simply that the condition in which we understand another who cannot teach us has important connexions both with art (and Nature) and with sympathy for another. The former of these is discussed fully below; the latter we may touch on more briefly.———When we understand another's grief, or anxiety, we do not place ourselves in his hands that he might teach us - not because the object he is faced with (his situation or painful condition) does not require its own response in activity from him, for it does. And yet he does not know what to do, or how to give expression to it. This is why, when we understand another in this sense -
showing or being understanding - it is the emotion we have to understand; as we can consider more fully in relation to art, it is this inability to respond to or give expression to an object which constitutes emotion.

This is not to say that sympathy and compassion are the same as appreciation of a work of art, although I would say that the common ground between them is worth pursuing beyond the scope of this essay. The difference is that compassion is, however mute, a conversation and exchange, a sharing on the basis of a suppressed expression which is actually allowed to find expression in being understood. The sufferer may himself learn, at the same time as he is understood by someone ready to learn from him. (11)
FOUR: THE DIMENSION OF PRIVACY IN LEARNING
a) Learning and following a rule.

It may appear, from the last chapter, that we should conclude that Socrates was right, in the *Meno* - we learn to see through conversation. Yet that much we have agreed with. The notion of understanding another shows a great deal about learning, not least because it will allow us, in this next chapter, to come to terms with the kind of privacy which learning *does* in fact require.

However, although we have approached the notion of understanding another through that of being taught, we have not established that teaching is itself the guarantee or locus of what is new; and therefore we must ask both how it is that teaching can bring us to see, and also whether or not teaching is the only form in which we can come to see something new. Having approached being taught from the perspective of the learner, we may say that to be taught can indeed bring us to what is new; but this is not to say that we simply sit before a teacher. This is why Socrates does not answer *Meno* adequately - the mere fact that conversation, question and answer, take place is no guarantee that as learners we will find newness there. To be sure that it will is possible only for a teacher, which is why Socrates could illustrate learning in terms of what he, and we, already know. But if such confidence in conversation, as the locus for newness, is in effect the essential presupposition of being a teacher, at least on Socrates' level, this is the one thing the learner cannot do.

*Meno* begins by demanding a certain kind of experience, a certain 'content': that which is new. Socrates proposes a path, or situation - a particular 'form'. But then *Meno* can only ask for a form which *guarantees* it content - some kind of object within the world which is yet not fixed or limited in form and content, but is itself new. If we are to set out such an object, it must be from within the first-person context of the learner, for it is here that it is possible to lay hold
of new objectivity, of something new.

Therefore our concern here is to ask, within learning, what it is that makes this learning possible. Such a concern with the first-person context of learning is perhaps the dimension of Wittgenstein's concept of 'following a rule' which it is most difficult to grasp. If the rule is something general, an instruction (so Max Black ("Rules and Routines", The Concept of Education, ed. Peters, p 94): "Obedience to the rule is shown by trying to do as instructed"), then it seems to describe an action, with reference to other actions or situations, which is what we each do or try to do or avoid doing. Thus, philosophically, we would explain the meaning of a language-game by referring one action to another, or to its situation and objects.

This, I have suggested, can be called a 'spectator interest', because it is not concerned to learn the language-game. Not that a man may not learn to follow the rules out of external motivation - say to improve his image amongst family, friends or employers, or even with himself. The teacher here would, however, be his trainer - the man's concern is not to understand him, but (to use him) to understand the game.

In his introduction to Wittgenstein's The Blue and Brown Books, Rush Rhees remarks that, on the question of 'meaning-blindness' - i.e. whether a man could act in accordance with a language-game's rules and yet know nothing of the meaning of the terms involved, Wittgenstein was unclear, but that he had to go beyond description in terms of language-games (and forms of life). Rhees went on himself to argue (in "Wittgenstein's Builders") as we have seen that we cannot mean much at all by "to act in accordance with the rules of a language-game" unless we mean: bringing something new to the game, a new understanding of where the game can go. (Or, as Iris Murdoch forcefully argues, that in real understanding one is on one's own.)
Speaking of language-games may allow us to explain what a man means, given that we are sure that, and have some idea what, he means in specific cases. But this only ignores the question it is so much a part of: How do we know that we are concerned with a man, who means something? This is not, I think, answered by saying that we can see what a man means sees, experiences, feels, in his life as a whole — whether that means the man’s history, or rather his day-to-day society. If that were the answer, the man would be part of them, not they a part of him. Clearly others do not often, let alone always, teach, and their lives seem separate enough from our own to enable us to laugh at them or ignore them. To focus on the concept of understanding others and its relation to teaching is not to ignore this, and it is not to offer a description of our experience. However, we could have no conception of ‘others’ (i.e. like us) had they not been, and were not still, teachers.

Certainly learning can involve a context of judgement in which the learner watches himself and compares himself with others, and this context involves him in the recognition or taking for granted of many kinds of object. He learned about the world, and this requires him to know what he is learning about. But this differentiation of the teacher from the objects of the lesson can only proceed, as indeed it has only reached thus far, when teacher and object (of the lesson) have at some point been indistinguishable. This is indeed part of the ‘recovery of time’ which the concept of learning introduces. — It is a corollary of this that a bad teacher operates in terms of the expected of standard behaviour of his pupils, because he has no other notion of how to judge his own success. A good teacher, on the other hand, is concerned to reach a point when he learns from the new understanding of his pupil.

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We say that the learner learns to act in the same way that we act, or that his judgement agrees with ours. But what this means is not
that there is some standard or pattern which exists between us all - a mould into which we are all fitted. The sameness of what we do, which is certainly a feature of the case, does not amount to the way I behave as compared with the way others behave. The fact that such comparison occurs and is increasingly common – that we try to understand sameness in this way – only obscures the fundamental sameness which allows us to speak of ‘others’ (where the ‘like myself’ is presupposed). We cannot speak of the sameness of others as we might speak of the sameness of actions. To see that our judgements agree will indeed usually require some proof: a common party slogan or stereotyped action. But to agree in judgement is to be able to see what another means.

The question of the fragmentation of learning – in which it becomes possible to form judgements of others, including one’s teachers, and of oneself – has no obvious cause, although it certainly occurs. Yet we do have to make it clear, that the relation between learning and judgement, in which we can know about others and yet learn from them, is not something that can be understood in causal terms. This is a question that has much in common with Wittgenstein’s discussion of the perception of meaning, whether in a sign or in a man: How is it possible to say of this object (sign or man) that it means such-and-such? Or: How, if we see what the painting represents, do we yet see that it is a painting? How do we see the paint, then what is painted? (This is not, of course, to suggest that the way a sign means is the way a man means.)

In answer to these questions, the perspective we are developing out of Wittgenstein’s remarks is that the idea of meaning what one says is not a matter of following rules, whether in one context (the language-game) or another, or throughout one’s life. It is the understanding we come to have through what another says – that we come to see. The ‘criterion’ of what another means is our understanding. (13) If we
learn a language-game 'externally' this does not mean that we are necessarily stiff or awkward in it. We learn to do something new: and like a sport or recreation our ability can develop. But that development does not allow us to bring anything new to the game, because we see nothing new. The wish to learn a particular language-game, if it is a wish that develops externally to the game as it is now played before us, is a wish to achieve a particular result, whether in competence, or in a product the game (say technological) can lead to. There is a difference between learning how a language-game goes (whether out of a spectator-interest, or in order to master it), and understanding someone who plays the game. It is in the latter case that we see something new.

b) The problem of learning the same thing

When we are learning the game (whether it is the expansion of a series, as in Philosophical Investigations 142 ff., or art appreciation, or the expansion of gases, or finance, or politics), we have to practise. Thus far, both the externally involved and the internally involved do the same things. There is a notion of action peculiar to the game, which we begin to imitate. And we are required to pick up the action(s) out of a general context of comparison, in which our own actions are compared with others', and with the objects they employ or avoid. We are able to speak of individual actions here, as being on a par with other objects: they are features of the world, albeit bits of motion rather than bits of stasis. And this goes with a conception of 'other minds' in which we are introduced to others as competitors, as concerned to do what we are concerned to do. Our awareness of others is based on their success or failure in doing the same things.

If in this situation we come to understand our teacher, then that introduces a dimension of privacy. We see something new, in what he can
show us, but we cannot yet show our understanding. And if it seems that this is not really anything private - because we still have to show, out of what the teacher goes on to show us how to do, that we do understand - and show by performing the appropriate actions, then this relies mistakenly on a conception of sameness in which actions are measured against one another. (We may note again that this is not to deny the use of such a conception of sameness; but it is to deny that it has any place in the notion of understanding another.)

It is clearly possible for a teacher to rely on a standard of comparison in order to assess the learning of his pupils. And for him, if they understand then that means that they "get it right in the future" (Investigations 145 f.) And indeed it is the crucial objection to the notion of a private understanding that it seems we can only speak of another's understanding (such-and-such) if he almost invariably, except in 'unusual circumstances', conforms to certain observable standards of correctness. If we become puzzled at this, because it does not seem to leave room for the concept of newness, it will not help us to be told that a pupil can meet our standards and, additionally, have something new to offer. (Thus it might be said that the pupil is anyway always doing more than just the activity he is practising: including breathing, feeling weary, puzzling out what he is doing, etc.) If he has anything new to offer, then it is new to the game, and will be shown in terms of the activities peculiar to the game. Certainly extra activities can be introduced to any language-game, to make it more efficient, more modern, more appealing, etc., but whether they are part of a new understanding of the game requires that, rather than being added on, they be exhibited in terms of the present activity of the game.

Now what does this phrase 'in terms of' mean? Essentially, it means
that a requirement is placed upon us: that we be able to understand the pupil, rather than assess him. For what is private about his understanding is not that it is an experience of a rule of language which no-one else can understand. It is private because it requires us to look behind or beyond what he is doing. The newness of what he has to say is not public; it is not available to all. That is why it is not anything extra.

The question of whether we speak the same language can be answered in the affirmative in terms of the historical fact that we are taught activities. We see the same world because we are taught the same movements, the same uses of objects, the same uses of words. But the question can be so answered because the phrases "to speak the same language" and "to see the same world" have built-in terms of resolution: we can answer the question in terms of the notion of sameness which we employ in teaching: it is because we can teach activities that we can introduce it as the answer to the question.

But if the question is not taken in this way, this will be because we do not feel that we can judge the sameness of men's understanding. That is, there is even here an alternative way of taking the question which does not rely on these terms of resolution; instead, the question "Do we speak the same language?" and the further one "How do we speak the same language are posed, firstly and crucially, about myself: Do they understand me? How is this possible? That the question of sameness is taken in this way is not necessary: to pose the question with a view to answering as a teacher only, is just as possible, and more common. But that it can be raised in a different way, and indeed as a learner, is what I am calling the first-person context: it is the context in which, when a question is raised, it is placed within a first-person framework. The distinguishing of such a context is the point of the discussion of learning and of under-
standing another. If we follow through the example of a pupil learning to continue a series, the important point is that he discovers how he has to go on. He gets the answer right; but that is not something he knows. It is what he does: we know it. All he can do is follow out what he sees. This is why Wittgenstein compares it with the expression of feeling (Investigations 142).

The source of the newness is just this fact: that he can only act on what he sees. He does not know what he is doing; he can only do it. This means that he has no idea of the sameness or difference of what he is doing (with what others do): the question or situation in which he is practising has led him to see something, which he acts out. He is not learning the same language here; even though he is at the same time using the moves in the game which he has learned, one by one and which are common to all plays of the game; but the consideration of the sameness or correctness of what he is doing is not at issue. The what he learns is not language at all, even though in learning he comes to be able to speak the language; the what is an object, a part of what there is (15).

c) The possibility of the teacher's judgement and authority.

At Investigations 186 Wittgenstein begins to explain a crucial misconception in the idea that a teacher means something precisely anticipated in his instructions:

Here I should first of all like to say: your idea was that the act of meaning the order had in its own way already traversed all those steps: that when you meant it your mind as it were flew ahead and took all the steps before you physically arrived at this or that one...

Thus you were inclined to use such expressions as: "The steps are really already taken, even before I take them in writing or orally or in thought." And it seemed as if they were in some
unique way predetermined, anticipated – as only the act of meaning can anticipate reality. (188)

It is as if the pupil were a machine we have now rearranged to act in this way (193).

What the teacher means is not something which pictures all his pupil's actions. And at the same time, the pupil does not 'interpret' the rule, any more than the teacher does. "There is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation" (201); "and hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it." (202).

To suppose that there is a common action, meant by the teacher (who may also, say, demonstrate it) and mastered by the pupil, is to suppose that one interpretation must be accepted by the pupil. But, on the contrary, all he can do is put into practice what he sees. Thus:

But if a person has not yet got the concepts, I shall teach him to use the words by means of examples and practice. – And when I do this I do not communicate to him less than I know myself. (208)

"But then doesn't our understanding reach beyond all the examples?"

– A very queer expression, and quite a natural one:

But is that all? Isn't there a deeper explanation; or mustn't at least the understanding of the explanation be deeper? – Well, have I myself a deeper understanding? Have I got more than I give in the explanation? – But then, whence the feeling that I have got more? (209)

It is certainly true that what the pupil does is not the teacher's action. But if it is the same understanding as the teacher's, it is the same as something the teacher knows: the understanding the teacher has belongs
to what he does. If we create a picture of the understanding involved, and use it as the criterion for the pupil's success, we make it impossible for ourselves to know whether he really has understood. For we can tell only by the emergence of sharing, in which the pupil himself has something to offer.

Wittgenstein comments:

"We look to the rule for instruction and do something, without appealing to anything else for guidance." (228)

If it seems that the pupil must be using the same actions, in order that whatever he is showing be new to this language-game, then what I think we have to stress is that there is no double-edged understanding we can have of him, in which we both assess his performance, and understand the newness of what he has to say. If it is objected that on the contrary, teachers always, or often, mark their pupil's essays with one eye on originality, one on correctness, then we must ask how - if we are to take the phrase as it stands - is a teacher to correlate the two? If he has any standard he employs, how will he distinguish between error and clumsiness, and insight, for both are, in these terms, deviations from the norm. The most he can do is to decide that he must leave his paradigms behind. Now this certainly raises the further question: How does he know when to do this? And it is well illustrated in Wittgenstein's case of someone who continues a series in a strange way. Is he wrong? Or is he pursuing a natural way of thinking, which later be seen to tie up with a new non-Euclidean Geometry? ((143):

"Or perhaps one accepts his way of copying and tries to teach him ours as an offshoot, a variant of his.")

That is, how do we move from assessment to understanding, in a given case? Is it just a matter of the pupil's style - his confidence and readiness to explain? Yet that much, surely, can only convince us that
he is different; not that he sees something new, or that we can learn from him. There is no feature of what he does which can convince us that he is a case worth listening to: if we did decide this, what would we do about it? What could we ask him to explain? It is only because we already see something of what he is showing us that we have any point of contact at all. (16)

**d) Privacy and the concept of suppression.**

On this basis we must therefore attempt to make sense of some notion of privacy. As we thus far have it, it is the privacy of seeing something new through being taught; or rather, since this is teaching that will often not go by the professional name, through understanding another.

To call this private is not to re-introduce the paraphernalia of inner and outer experience. Understanding another is not an experience at all; neither is it a private representation of experience (i.e. a private language). If we follow through Wittgenstein’s discussion of sensation and pain we can see that any notion of access to an object, or sensation, which is not at the same time an activity not separate from the object or sensation, is in fact to be rejected. I would very much agree with Norman Malcolm on the importance of the notion of expression in understanding what Wittgenstein has to say, and also that it develops or "stretches ordinary language and in doing so illuminates the hidden continuity between the utterance of that sentence ("My head hurts") and - expressions of pain" ("Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations" in Wittgenstein, ed. Pitcher, p 83). (It is worthy of note that Malcolm should speak of Wittgenstein as bringing out what is hidden, were anyone to think that he was concerned solely with describing what is before our game.)

The question we need to follow through is whether we are to say that the expression of a sensation is learned, as well as words like pain? If this were so, one would have to associate pain behaviour with something:
the guide to what the behaviour signifies. The behaviour would here be seen as a common act; but in my case, and my case only, it is accompanied by a sensation.

For Wittgenstein, teaching does not here presuppose the possibility of pretence or false expression - the occurrence of the expression (i.e. that there is expressed pain) allows the teaching to begin. What he is criticising is the idea that there are both the pain and the expression, both identified: for he insists that there is no question of being more or less certain that it is pain. (If I say that I am not sure what I feel, then that is the sort of sensation it is - a 'sort of' sort of sensation.)

The problem of pretence which arises in Wittgenstein's discussion is that we can think, when a man pretends, that there is something missing, in the situation we are describing, such that pretence is just the behaviour, whereas in the real case there are both the sensation and the behaviour. (We could compare this with the relation between an object and our sense-impression of the object.) Yet certainly our attitude to a (discovered) pretender is not that he has something missing; even if he has not been found out! We have no clear criterion for pretence; certainly nothing that enables us to judge a man by it. It may be that our one way of telling is that we cannot understand him, cannot follow through his expression to the 'world'.

We are inclined to say that a man in pain can feel the pain; which, as Wittgenstein observes, is un informatively right (246 - All numbered references in this section are to the paragraph numbers of Philosophical Investigations.) But this does not mean that the pain is the cause of, or reason for, my behaving as I do. We can at this point develop Wittgenstein's remarks on pretence in order to bring out the real importance of the notion of suppression, a notion he does not in fact discuss. That is, if I hold back my tears or groan, then I do know I am in pain, but not on any grounds: to say this means that I can acknowledge the pain if I wish.
It means something to speak of directing one's attention to a sensation; and, indeed, to do so in order to establish what it is. This is something each person can only do for himself: we await his pronouncement. He can give voice to the sensation, and taking time over this shows again part of what the sensation is. But the point at issue is whether he learns various kinds of behaviour, at this point, in order to say/show what the sensation is. For this would be a strange thing to do when he had already 'given voice' to the sensation.

If there were no 'behaviour' that were natural to being in pain, we could not begin to teach a child the meaning of words like 'pain' and 'hurt', simply because we would not know when the child was in pain. In fact, we do not teach the child how to respond to pain; but we may teach it to suppress its natural expressions.

This is not to say, for example, that you, in pain, are not different from others - you are in pain, you "have the pain"; we do not. But this does not mean a different knowledge of sensations; you do not know in a different way, but instead in no way at all. We may doubt, and sympathise: perhaps we cannot tell, from your tears, whether you are happy or sad. What is being criticised is the idea that the pain is something you alone know of (and so, too, for sense-data, etc), or know of in a special way which gives you knowledge we cannot share.

It may be felt that, for oneself, the situation is three-dimensional: Wittgenstein suggests the image in which boiling water (pain) produces the steam (behaviour), whereas for everyone else it is only two-dimensional: the picture shows a steaming kettle. Consequently we are tempted to see boiling water in the picture, too. And yet pain is not a picture.

Wittgenstein does not deny that a man can feel pain in another's body.
What he rejects is the idea that pain is an extra to its expression; the older object/name model of the Tractatus does not apply. (293). But this is not to say that the pain is not real, not there: it is not a nothing, but not a something either! (304)

It is not enough to say, as P. F. Strawson does (18), that we just do take the behaviour (in the case of others) and the behaviour-plus-pain (in my case) as equal. For that would mean one could picture the pain, as well as the expression of it.——But really it is the expression which shows us the pain. And a picture of the expression (say in a film) is also a picture of the pain.

Manners, posture, patience, pretence — all involve some suppression. If I cross my legs, and get an uncomfortable feeling, a bit like cramp, in my right calf-muscle, then that is what I have got. And other people wouldn’t have known at all if I hadn’t told them. In that sense the sensation is private. Yet they know what I mean, and what I feel. And we know what cramp like this is — because, say, we crossed our legs at table for the first time when we were seven, and immediately uncrossed them again because they felt uncomfortable. We did this naturally, without instruction, and we were told that this is the kind of cramp we’ll have to get used to. On this basis we could begin to use the word.

What is important here is the naturalness of our uncrossing. It is only after this has happened, and the word has been raised, that it could make any sense to speak of “directing my attention to the sensation”. For a man does not attend to his sensation by looking at his behaviour, and in that sense he is differently placed from the rest of us. (This is part of the significance of Wittgenstein’s remark, p 192: “My own relation to my words is wholly different from other people’s.”) But neither does he look to the sensation rather than the behaviour, as if he could differentiate the two: on the contrary, his looking is a part of the behaviour.
He can attend to a sensation, or suppress his expression/reactions; and in a sense these activities isolate the sensation. But not as though the sensation were already isolated. On the contrary, it is only because the sensation is manifest to public view unless he suppresses its expression that we can speak at all of isolating the sensation or attending to the pain. (19)

The general notion of an 'inner process' which Wittgenstein criticises here is, as he remarks, a fiction. It is not something one is acquainted with in other people, of course; but neither in one's own case. It has sense only if it is used to distinguish what needs no further distinction anyway - that a man has the thoughts and sensations he has, and no-one else may know: (246: "I have my thoughts; I learn of the thoughts of others. But this does not mean that the thoughts are different, or the pains; though usually you and I do not have the same thoughts.")

Thus if a man imagines something red, and we ask how we in fact know that it is imagining, the point is that it does not matter, except for what he says and does. If he says he can imagine an event preceding its cause, then, if he can, it will come out in what he says.

This is not to deny that he does think of something, see it, have images, etc; or further, that he sees it, and we don't. He has a 'private access' to his mind, in the sense that he can keep it hidden from us (although not always or completely). It is possible to say here that he knows what he thinks/feels - we do not. But what he knows is what he is holding back: he does not know it except in the special sense of suppression - that he is trying not to show something. "His own mind" is not what he knows, but what he is.

It is worth asking here whether any attempt to 'know oneself' necessarily involves suppression, especially if it seems fairly clear that part of the path to maturity involves accepting oneself? - But the
significant point to notice is that acceptance does not mean to know while others do not. On the contrary, it is to accept that others know as well. Acceptance of self is precisely not to suppress one's mind; not to know oneself but to be known. It is a dimension of our consciousness that we will see ourselves in action; acceptance requires a transcendence of idealism and self-judgement.

Perhaps it can be said that the knowing (that suppression leads to) can itself raise questions of doubt and certainty — that is, the possibility of doubting oneself. In that others do not know me, the question then arises, Do I know myself? If we did know our minds privately, then these questions would not arise: suppression and self-doubt would not be intelligible. But what Wittgenstein's investigation of privacy leads us to say is that we learn to speak about our minds firstly and primarily in learning to speak our minds: we do not learn what is in them, but their expression, and only on this basis do we have minds. In terms of the image that our thoughts are pictures of reality, we do not know the pictures that are our thoughts; and this is why they are not pictures. At best we could say: we live the picture. What is rejected here is the assumption that we can compare our thoughts or sensations with the world or with words or behaviour.

More generally, Wittgenstein's overall conception of expression on which this account of suppression is founded, is one which rules out any notion of learning for which what goes on is the correlating of object and name, as though the object were experienced in one 'world' and related to the 'world' of the name. For those arguing for private experience, it is the world of the object which is inner and private; for those arguing for private language, it is the world of the name which is inner. And both are rejected.

1) Privacy as an 'inner process', and privacy as the sharing of an object.
Thus when we take up again the notion of a private understanding in connexion with learning and teaching, this is not an attempt to re-introduce any such correlation: the privacy we are focussing on is not that of an inner world or inner rules, or any privacy which has no expression. But its expression is not a possibility when referred to the individual alone; and hence, with reference to the individual, the understanding is private, in that it has no self-expression. It is not even waiting, or attention, as we remarked at the end of Chapter Three.

To speak of a private understanding here has a notably one-sided sense and focus. It is the pupil's understanding which is private, not the teacher's; but we cannot speak of the two in separation. For the pupil, we can indeed only say that he understands: what he understands is not part of the expression, but is as it were borrowed from the teacher. The understanding is private with reference to the relationship of which it is a part. This can, I think, be viewed more fully in connexion with the concept of communion, and it is on this basis that we will go on, below, to consider Buber's 'ontology of the between'. For the moment, let us notice that what the learner comes to see in what the teacher understands and sees, and that this has the logical status of an object, a part of the world, not something referred to individual persons.

If it is asked what we see in understanding another - particular objects or 'the whole world' - then the answer is essentially both. This is the manner, the only manner, in which we can speak of newness: an object which is unlimited, not separated out from others but entire and self-sufficient: an object which brings the whole of existence with it.

As we come to practise and, in Socrates' phrase, to 'tie down' what we see, a particularity emerges through the separateness of the activity or activities which the object itself demands. Then it is indeed
a particular object, and at a cursory glance it is only what we or someone else were already well aware of. But if, instead, we enter upon understanding the pupil who has learned to see, we find instead that he is not showing us what we already knew, but has something new to offer us.

'Object' does therefore here have a formal sense or use, corresponding to 'what we see' in understanding another. This formal sense makes it a metaphysical category: it has its use not in noting how things are, even if this were to mean "How this language-game is played", but in speaking of the transformation of the world and of our coming to a conception of it. It is not, that is, caught under the schema of physics, as 'physical object', 'material object', 'psychic object' or whatever. Physically, or psychologically or biologically, or sociologically, we can to an extent say what the new object is. That is, it is this sonata, the Exodus, social life, tennis, finches.—But to attempt to illustrate new objects in this way is not really relevant to our inquiry. For we are not asking, "What are the things which are new?" but "How can we learn what is new?". Newness is not anything extra in number: it is the real difficulty in Meno's paradox, which Socrates does not question, that newness is assumed to be quantitative.

But this does not mean, glibly, that it is a quality of life. It is, after all, the world which we come to see, not an attitude to or in life. Newness is the world, but not extra bits of the world. Newness concerns what we are already aware of just as much as it concerns 'things to come' - it is the world 'as a whole'. The world's existence, not what we can say about it.

Response is not governed by each object, as if we knew the object before the response. Even a saint does not respond to 'a tree', 'a stone', etc - and it is noteworthy how Zen thought, given its reverence for nature, avoids 'singling things out'. This is why it is more or less irrelevant to illustrate response; as we noted above, it is defined more by its absence;
by the judgement, choice, control and dryness which lead us towards newness: not as an extra, but in order to overcome its absence. Newness may come with what another shows us in mathematics, or plumbing.

This is not to ignore the concept of talent, of ability, which goes with that of practice and submission to another's training; a man may see or sense the newness in another, but be unable to come to grips with it himself. But he will at least be willing to spend time with the other in the attempt. (20)

It may seem, then, that what we are in fact attempting to speak of is an object which is somehow or other both private and public. In a sense this is correct: for it is one and the same object which is on public view (which the teacher sees and has introduced the pupil to, giving expression to it), and yet private in what the pupil cannot yet express. In terms of Wittgenstein's 'beetle-in-the-box' metaphor, it is indeed not even a something, an object: except that in this case - the case of learning, and this case only - we can at the same time say what it is he understands, even though he cannot express it: it is what the teacher has taught him.

Now, in as much as the pupil does come to express what he has grasped, as the teacher leads him through the routines of practice, we may seem to need to separate out the pupil's understanding from the teacher's and therefore to ask if, and in what way, they are the same. The question of the sameness of the language we speak is thus again raised.

But it is not a question which can be handled in terms of the sameness of action. The crucial factor in the concept of expression is that the object comes with it: if pupil and teacher understand the same thing that is because the same thing comes out in their expressions. We are brought back, by both of them, into contact with the object. I realise that to use this term 'contact' here will merely metaphorical: we
must leave until later the argument that in fact we are dealing with the one object, whatever it is and whether or not it is physical, sensational, or spiritual, etc. Yet what our discussion has in one sense amounted to is a re-evaluation of the role of the term 'object', such that it not be viewed as a term in common-sense physics or materialism.

The understandings of pupil and teacher are not properties of pre-individuated subjects. They are what we understand through them. The sameness of the language we speak is the sameness not of our actions but of what we understand: the basis of shared understanding and of communion is learning from one another, because what we learn is not something personal and particular to each of us, but precisely what is common — namely the world, what there is. Not, that is, common opinion about the world, either — not the totality of facts — but the world itself.

The notion of private understanding simply points to this — to the 'transmission' of the world in learning. It does not mean that there is an understanding which is necessarily not public or available to all — we can only call it understanding if it eventually reaches expression. The function of the notion is to draw attention to a feature of understanding itself — namely that we can speak of a case of a man's understanding only when we ourselves understand him. There is an unavoidable relativity in the concept which prohibits our attempting to illustrate a man's understanding.

The newness in understanding is thus not something we are to call 'new to the learner, but not to the teacher (or to us)'. Whether or not it is new to anyone else depends entirely upon that other's understanding the pupil as he comes to express himself. We ourselves need to come into relation (which is part of the meaning of relativity) with the pupil. And it may well be that he has nothing new to offer — the point is that the only criterion we can have of whether he has understood something new or
not is bound up with our understanding: can we come to learn from him?

For this is what another man's understanding looks like: that he has something to offer us: that there is something in what he says and does which brings us (back) to the world. The rule of the concept of privacy here is to single out one strand in this concept of understanding: namely that it is the world we see, not another picture of it, and this simply because understanding another need not have any expression beyond dependence on the other, which expresses understanding without expressing what is understood.

If it seems that we are thereby doing precisely what Wittgenstein warned against - taking a feature from one example and insisting that it must be present in all examples, being the general form of this case - then I can only re-iterate that we are dealing not with examples of an activity (which can be learned and taught) but with learning and teaching, and those precisely in that they cannot be learned and taught. It is because they cannot be learned and taught that we are required to go beyond the use of examples, the very activity in which philosophy seeks to approximate to learning and teaching.

We are indeed saying that one type of case in particular - that of understanding another - plunges through its own particularity and shows something general. And that we should need to distinguish waiting and attention from this brings out the parallel these questions have with more specifically religious ones about the relation between grace and works, and the notion of prayer and silence as a 'work' which is not Pelagian or self-justifying; questions we can at least point to when discussing creativity below. The case allows us to speak of the concept of understanding as one which brings the world with it. To understand another is not to be trained by him, although that may often be involved. It is essentially to come to an object through him; and in cases of private understanding we have an expression of this: that we see something, though we cannot show
it to others.

Thus there is what we may call a 'range' in the concepts of learning and understanding, with regard to the relation between object and activity. 'Private' understanding focuses on an object with no activity; being trained focuses on activity with no object. What we are then doing with this range of cases is saying that only in as much as the understanding is of an object is it relevant to the search for newness, and that this understanding of an object is necessarily 'understanding another'. (22) Thus it is the existence of the world which is bound up in a fundamental way with other people: not, however, that others cause our coming to a conception of the world, nor that things in the world bring us to a conception of others, but that the emergence of the existence of the world is the same thing as understanding others.

To distinguish the two is therefore possible only when their fusion has been presupposed. This is not to deny what is obvious – that each of us goes on to a concept of the person in which criteria are quite heavily employed, and that on such a basis we also distinguish between world and person thoroughly enough to be able to speak about a particular person's individual conception of the world. And here, indeed, the notions of picturing and correlations between the conception, and the world itself, have a grip; here it will appear that a person's conception of the world cannot be the world itself, the existence of the world.

But these are developments in our conception of the world; developments which are concerned to incorporate both self-knowledge and knowledge of others into the way the world is. And in order to understand how a man can come to the more primary conception of the world and its objects which this possibility of development presupposes, we have focussed on the idea of understanding another and learning from him, in order to say that here both the limits of the world and the transcending of them may be found; and
found, or at least pointed out, within the world. Understanding another illustrates the fusion of existence and understanding; it gives expression, in a third-person context, to a first-person context which is indeed private (rather than public and 'third-personal'). It is just because it is possible to see through another's eyes, to understand him without (yet) being able to say or act upon what one has come to see, that we can speak of a first-person context at all; by following through the development of this primary idea in Wittgenstein's thought we have been able to see that the failure of the *Tractatus* is that it does not relate this context to other people and self, but attempts of it as the mode of being of the self by contrast with that of the world. To move beyond this requires exploring the first-person context in terms of self and others together - ideas of relationship and communion to which we now turn.
FIVE: NEWNESS AND THE PRESENCE OF OTHERS

This means that an object involves present only when it is involved by another person, not at the same time that person is present. The

naturalness - otherwise he is not present at all on the level of

every object which the self feels closely present. The level

of presence that becomes present in a new way - personal presence.

Because of others, is not a separate level from the presence of objects,

but in the contrary makes possible the presence of objects. Still, as we

here need, does not raise the question of the presence of objects, and

even the very fact of this is affecting the presence of the other, and this is

because the other does not see the presence of the world as in any way related

to the presence of others - on the contrary, others are present, if at all,

to it by presence.
a) The presence of others.

The interrelation of form and content, experience and object, which we have come to in the idea of understanding another, for which a form and an experience are themselves the guarantee of content and objectivity, is possible only because understanding another is not simply the act of an individual, or a learning experience 'imposed' on the individual, but refers to the relationship in which two people find themselves. As we have seen, this is not a relationship in which each individual finds himself presented with the other: any such idea of meeting or encounter remains, as we shall see when discussing Martin Buber's idea of relationship below, on the level of experience of the world. There is nothing here fundamentally different about the presence of another person, compared with the presence of any object; whereas in understanding another we have a relationship which is not defined in terms of two individuals, but of these two and the object they share - the object which one introduces to the other and which constitutes the fact of the relationship.

This means that an object becomes present only when it is presented by another person; and at the same time another person is present only in this presenting - otherwise he is not present but placed on the level of the world, over against which the self then stands preserved. The issue of presence then becomes focussed in a new way - personal presence, the presence of others, is not a separate issue from the presence of objects, but on the contrary makes possible the presence of objects. Weil, as we have seen, does not raise the question of the presence of objects, and hence the role of this in seeking the presence of the world; and this is because she does not see the presence of the world as in any way related to the presence of others - on the contrary, others are present, if at all, as if by miracle.
When an object is presented to us by another, it is absolutely new. To seek a newness that stands by itself, without reference to the particular limitations and knowledge of the searcher, is, as we noted in the first chapter, bound up with seeking objectivity; and what we are now in a position to say is that this is given by the phenomenon in which another presents an object to us - for this is not objective in terms of the category of 'the world', but in terms of our coming to see through another's eyes. It is the fact that we see through another person which allows the object to be new, and indeed to have the particularity of an object, a particularity that is defined not by criteria but by our own dependence upon the being of the other person: what we see is simply what we cannot see for ourselves.

However, the further question of the form of another's presence has not been answered. Teaching is of itself no guarantee of understanding, since teaching may in any particular case be no more than training. The most we can say is that teaching does provide the relationship of understanding another, sometimes; but this leaves us with two questions:

1) What other forms of learning do provide such a relationship of understanding?

2) What do they allow us to say, reciprocally, about the general form of understanding another in which our search for newness can be realised?

In this final chapter, we will consider the first of these questions in some detail, asking why it has seemed possible to man to demand the presence of newness from objects themselves, without reference to other people. This discussion ranges over both Art and Nature, and the notion of creativity; the concept of study, which we have already touched on in the first chapter, reappears in connexion with that of art in order to set out more clearly why the making of a discovery, whether in art or science,
is not intelligible in terms of this relationship of understanding. (23)

The final sections of the chapter turn to the second question, in order to develop the interrelation of 'understanding another' and 'communion'. It is important to realise that, as with learning from a teacher, we are approaching these subjects from within the context of the learner: that is, the first-person context in which presence functions as the key term. The comments made here about art and nature may appear otherwise to be merely subjective, and indeed in one sense they are: that is, the objects of art and Nature need not be present, and may be known and experienced in a very manipulative way. But the possibility we are exploring is that such objects can be present to an individual in such a way that his experience of them needs essentially to be referred to more than himself and the object or objects before him: it is not simply his experience of an object, but a relationship in which the object becomes present to him. That is, we have not here left behind us the need to insist that at some point the distinction between an individual's experience of the world, and the world itself, is one which it becomes impossible to make; and this affects our understanding not only of the individual's experience, but of the world as well. It is Wittgenstein's consideration of the concept of learning which we have leaned upon in this, and consequently it is the possibility of learning from art and Nature to which we turn.

b) Learning from a work of art, and its presence as a work.

Art does not deal with discovery as its result, but as a means: the basis for discovery is the work of art, not its techniques and effects. Matthias Grünewald is a convenient example of a painter who can create great work without new discovery: discussing the Isenheim altar, Ernst Gombrich comments that:

Grünewald's work may thus remind us once more that an artist can be very great indeed without being 'progressive', because the greatness
of art does not lie in new discoveries. That Grünewald was familiar with these discoveries he showed plainly enough whenever they helped him to express what he wanted to convey...

(The Story of Art, p 270)

The discoveries of the Renaissance: the "tangible achievements of the Italian masters" in the south, notably perspective, knowledge of anatomy, and knowledge of classical forms - the artistic dimension of the "new learning": these are in one sense necessary to the greatness of Renaissance art. We can only come to acknowledge any necessity in the works by taking account of the treatment: the sheer power of the figures in 'The Creation of Adam', the sheer ambiguity of the 'Mona Lisa' or St Anne in the National Gallery cartoon, are necessary to our being able to say "Yes, that is how it is". But it is not the power, or the sfumato, which we consent to; it is the work itself.

Leonardo's continual studies were undertaken in response to a range of problems concerning processes in nature; Michelangelo's to the single question of the movement of the human body; and Raphael's included the problem of volume, amongst the "certain idea" of beauty that developed in his mind during studies of classical sculpture. But their works are not great because they solve these problems, any more than Braque or Cezanne solved similar problems: they are great because they offer an answer to the question "Why do this at all?". The techniques are an answer to the problems each artist faced, but not to the question of why he should bother to consider those problems; or further why we, now should pay any attention to them. And the newness which a work of art has is not the necessity of using this or that technique, even though the artist could not have worked otherwise.

This is connected with the fact that, in understanding another person, we run the risk of having to act on what he shows us. Another's discoveries
are not part of understanding him; they may require understanding his achievement. The discovery is self-contained: to be used, or built upon. It does not require us to act, any more than it requires us to see.

If we supposed that a discovery is what a man "brings to the conversation", in Rhees' sense, we would, for example, miss the role of proof in science: understanding another is not seeing that what he says is true - it is realising the authority of what he sees - it is new precisely because it commands our readiness to be taught.

And this newness is that given in the work of art. It is new because it has the power to involve - because we come to see something new in the work. (The necessity the new technique has - for the artist - is certainly related to this newness; but, as we will go on to, as the activities of practice are necessary to what is newly seen in another.) The 'object' which the work of art is, is not an object in space and time, but a new object, bringing the source of objectivity with it. In this sense Wittgenstein was exactly right in saying "The work of art is the object seen sub specie aeternitatis" (Notebooks, p 83 above).

John Zizioulas has powerfully set out this 'new objectivity', concerning the created work, as the presence of the artist in the work. In contrast to the manufacture and production of objects:

When we look at a painting or listen to music we have in front of us "the beginning of a world" (to use the profound observation of Paul Valery with regard to music), a 'presence' in which 'things' and substances (cloth, oil, etc.) or qualities (shape, colour, etc.) or sounds become part of a personal presence.

(Human Capacity and Human Incapacity, pp 411-2)

Before considering the fuller implications of this 'datum', we may note that the creative presence of the artist or scientist means that we are led towards understanding him, through his own created object, the work
of art, the published model or theorem. He has the drawing power of
the teacher - that we see through his eyes. Science is not finally of
interest because of any discovery of new objects, nor art because of novel
effects, although it is perhaps characteristic of our age that this is the
concept of newness we rely on. Its depth belongs to the presence of the
creator in his work - and this is what involves us as his audience, this
is what introduces newness into our learning.

But at the same time, the radical difference between the teacher
and the creator is that we cannot be brought to see for ourselves by his
work, but are perpetually dependent on returning to the artist's eyes.
We are not at risk before the work, as we are before the teacher: not
because of a lack of presence in the work, but because it does not ask us to
practice and train, to re-order and change the way we spend our lives.

Nonetheless, the presence of newness in the work of art means that it
is not given in order to offer us a new possibility:

It is said by Dr Johnson, and felt by Tom Jones' friend Partridge,
that what we credit in a tragedy is a possibility, a recognition
that if we were in such circumstances we would feel and act as
those characters do. But I do not consider it a very live possibility
that I will find myself an exotic warrior, having won the heart
of a young high-born girl by the power of my past and my capacity
for poetry, then learning that she is faithless. And if I did find
myself in that position I haven't any idea what I would feel
or do. That is not what is meant? Then what is? That I sense
the possibility that I will feel impotent to prevent the object
I have set my soul on, and won, from breaking it; that it is
possible that I will trust someone who wishes me harm; that I can
become murderous with jealousy and know chaos when my imagination
has been fired and then gutted and the sense of all possibility
has come to an end? But I know, more or less, these things now:
and if I did not, I would not know what possibility I am to envision as presented by this play.

(Cavell, op cit, pp 330-1)

Equally, if it is not a possibility 'for me', it is not a possible way of looking 'at the world': commenting also on Lear, Rhees writes:

If I understand King Lear I have come to see certain horrible deeds, examples of ingratitude and ruthlessness, a character going to pieces – from which I must have turned away if I were there – to see these so that I stay and know I have something to learn from it. It does not show me how I might see any other events, the lives of other characters. And that would not be relevant. The drama shows me the force or the sense of these developments here. This is what I want to see again or listen to.

(Without Answers, p 145)

But then it is only on the idea of the 'use' of knowledge, its application, that art might seem to present possibilities, although in those terms it would be a singularly cumbersome and unhelpful way of learning.

We do learn from art – but I doubt if it would be helpful to pursue the analogy Rhees suggests with learning from 'experience of problems of life'. This would not help us to understand the peculiar authority which a work of art possesses – that we keep it for special reverence, and that the awe it can generate in us leads us to treat it with awe. For we believe it to be worthy of the best attention we can muster – so we go to a concert, exhibition, gallery or play because it is available then, rather than when we feel like it. We are in a sense prepared to be humbled by the work.

A more helpful notion in looking at this is that of sympathising with another, in his own problems – understanding another without being able to act on it, as we noted at the end of Chapter 3. For it is part of what it means to be suffering or in difficulties that a man is not able
to act in their terms (although he may attempt to remove them); he has nothing to teach us. And yet in his pain the world is made present to us. This is, indeed, response in the way that the expression of any sensation is— that it brings the object with it; if we sympathise with the pain, the pain will be something new which 'brings reality with it'.

What makes the sensation of pain or the feelings of grief, shame, loneliness, seem as objects to be merely 'subjective' (that is, predicates of the person-as-subject) is not only the disposition to prejudge reality, or better to employ the concept of an object, in physical terms; more significantly it is the fact that we cannot make these objects our own. They are present to us only as the other person is, for we come to them only through his eyes.

If art seems to be useless, it will seem to be so to those who also see suffering as useless, for the objects of the one are as 'unreal' as the objects of the other. When Mrs Stavrogin, in Dostoyevsky's The Devils, is converted to revolutionary anarchism, she can retort, at one and the same time:

Try drawing an apple and put a real apple beside it— which one would you take?

Charity corrupts both giver and receiver— under the new regime there won't be any poor at all. (p 343)

From them we do not learn how to act; yet if we enter the 'world' of the work of art, we are faced with an object which is not simply the artist's picture of the world (and not, therefore, in that sense a possibility). It is the work, certainly, but not as something well-made, beautifully crafted. The tragedy or development or recapitulation are out of the audience's control, working themselves out without addition or invention and we are held by it and cannot act. That is why the question 'Which one would you take?' is so telling. As Cavell notes, in terms which sufficiently echo these we have been using to need no explanation:
It may seem perverse or superficial or plain false to insist that we confront the figures on a stage. It may seem perverse: because it is so obvious what is meant in saying we do not confront them, namely, that they are characters in a play...
The trouble is, there they are. The plain fact, the only plain fact, is that we do not go up to them, even that we cannot...
For what is the difference between tragedy in a theatre and tragedy in actuality? In both, people in pain are in our presence. But in actuality acknowledgement is incomplete, in actuality there is no acknowledgement, unless we put ourselves in their presence, reveal ourselves to them. We may find that the point of tragedy in a theatre is exactly relief from this necessity, a respite within which to prepare for this necessity, to clean out the pity and terror which stand in the way of acknowledgement outside. (Op cit, pp 331-3)

Robert Cushman, reviewing the RSC Macbeth, observes:

Macbeth knows everything; he is the most self-aware of tragic heroes, and the play makes us free of his mind. (Here of course lies its greatness...) (Observer, 12 9 76)

But when Cavell offers his most searching account of this fact — that we do nothing and, more notably, need to do nothing, and in some sense that is why we are there — it is to say that, while we may be there as voyeur, or out of propriety, or in order to guess at what we might do (all of which relate to pornography as the imagination of power, whether through violence or sexuality; this is why Cavell can speak of these reasons as 'continuing our sponsorship of evil in the world'), it may be that:

I do nothing because there is nothing to do, where that means that I have given over the time and space in which action is mine and consequently that I am in awe before the fact that
I cannot do and suffer what it is another's to do and suffer,
(and) then I confirm the final fact of our separateness.

And that is the unity of our condition. (p 339)

But this recovers a kind of catharsis - of the emotions and without
ritual - at the expense of being able to relate it to any notion either
of self-transcendence or of understanding another. Cavell would thus
appear to concur with Forster's 'Only connect', and with the same dignity
say:

For human intercourse, as soon as we look at it for its own
seke and not as a social adjunct, is seen to be haunted
by a spectre. We cannot understand each other, except in a
rough and ready way; we cannot reveal ourselves, even when we
want to; what we call intimacy is only makeshift; perfect
knowledge is an illusion. (Aspects of the Novel, p 70)

If this is inadequate, that is not because comedy is ignored: on the
contrary Cavell rightly notes that comedy and tragedy stand together in the
point of "putting society back in touch with nature" (loc. cit.). But it
is to say that he takes art, generally, to be the fundamental dimension of
man's self-transcendence - which is, as it stands, no self-transcendence at
all; and this is because the nature he wishes society to rediscover contact
with is human nature: the necessary, given, facts about man. But the
tragedy is not a ritual in this sense: and that it once was, before Aristotle,
does not mean that 'separateness' is what the drama celebrated. While we
are indeed in awe, in the course of great drama, it is not the awe of a
ritual, and it is not the great truth of man's condition we confront. As
Cavell has insisted upon making his starting point, it is these people we
face.

This is not to deny the cathartic role of tragedy, or of any great
art; it is only to say that the catharsis is of the emotions and is not
to be extended into ritual, which demands of us something different. When
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Mary Warnock, in her introduction to Sartre’s *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions*, comments that what Sartre has to say best fits disagreeable rather than agreeable emotions, then she fails to take account of one of the great abilities of existentialist thinkers generally: to find all-pervasive (ontological) significance in particular emotions, pointing most acutely beyond themselves to man’s condition. (The same is true of Simone Weil’s use of the concept of affliction.) When Sartre writes that:

> emotion arises when the world of the utilizable vanishes abruptly and the world of magic appears in its place. (pp 90-1)

then even fellowship and joy must be understood in terms of this ‘world of the utilizable’ – the static world, the imperfect world. This is why Weil writes:

> Joy is the overflowing consciousness of reality. But to suffer while preserving our consciousness of reality is better...For this to be so it must be situated only in the feelings. (*Gravity and Grace*, p 73)

Perfect joy excludes even the feeling of joy, for in the soul filled by the object no corner is left for saying ‘I’ (p 27)

Gerhard Ebeling speaks of faith similarly: “And because it drives out the liking and misliking of the world, it creates room for pure joy in the world.” (*The Nature of Faith*, p 161)

But this “perfect and infinite joy really exists within God” (p 33), and if we attempt to speak of it without God, but in terms of this static world, then as Cavell says:

> The tragedy is that comedy has its limits. This is part of the sadness within comedy; the emptiness after a long laugh. Join hands here as we may, one of the hands is mine and the other is yours. (Op cit, pp 339-40)

And the point about emotion is not that agreeable emotions are good, disagreeable ones bad, or that the world is sometimes nice, sometimes nasty, but that the disagreeable ones can show more clearly the precondition of a search for newness: the imperfection of the world. Art is not a means of overcoming this imperfection; but it does affect the emotion which
Satre argues is our escape from the coldness of this world, and which for
Weil is imagination's escape from necessity.

That is to say, it brings us back to an object - by attracting,
fockussing the imagination, and then leading it beyond its own control.
The central notion of form in the work of art is essential precisely because
it is the way in which the work leads our emotion beyond itself. A work
of art is not a feast of fantastic moments: the movement from here to there
must be intentional, and yet not one we make ourselves. For this is the
meaning of the presence of the artist: not that we as it were find a face
peering at us through the picture, or hear a voice or footsteps in the
music - the presence of the artist is not that of his body. He is present
because our own imagination is caught and led by someone else, so that we
cannot exercise it.

Now this means that it is the world we are brought back to, rather
than the artist's opinion of it. Music transforms our imagined activity,
from its roots in singing and dancing; the 19th C novel transforms our
judgements of others and ourselves. But it is not as a collection of movements
or characters, that the work has its power to make the world present, but
through the work's form: which is not a structure imposed on a few pieces
of musical action or sketchy character, but the transformation of whatever
pieces are used into new ones. The newness of the work is not, of course,
the new unit, episode, theme or character, but the ability of the work
to transform the one into the other, insisting upon the unity of the
movement. This unity - which must be the basis of the work - is both the
object which the work is, and the necessity we are brought to in another's
hands. That is to say, we have here a necessity, intrinsic to the work,
which nonetheless seems to offer objective newness; this is not, however,
necessity in action.

This notion of unity is bound up, in music, with the need for potency
in a motif or theme: that it can, say, be question and answer, as in Haydn or some of Brahms' chamber music (notably the slow movement of the piano quintet), or the Beethoven quartets (most precisely and wittily the last movement of Op. 135, where Beethoven as it were caricatures his genius). But the unity is not solely a function of one idea: it is not the potency of the theme which itself matters. As Tovey insisted, against academic rules of form which almost flooded out the 19thC, until Debussy and Stravinsky learned to stop thinking about form:

...of all forms of criticism that is the most dangerous and most frequently futile which starts by laying down that a great piece of music must have pregnant original themes, and continues by comparing the merits of one theme with another on that assumption... sonata forms as wholes represent the conception of melody at a point at which it has expanded so as to cover the whole emotional range of a drama, while at the same time retaining its unity as melody.

(Sir Donald Tovey, Beethoven, p 84)

The crucial role of transformation in the novel is developed in terms of the independence of each character - for the point of Forster's remark (and except that he is writing about the theatre, Cavell's) is not that in a novel the characters understand one another and we do not, but that in the novel we can understand the characters. They are there not so that we can come into relation with them, but so that our judgement of them, or better our knowledge of them, can be transformed. What is purified in the novel is our unthinking claim to know others.

Plot, in these terms, is the means of shaping the transformation: we know this character as the same, yet different, through the people and events he stands among. The more we look at or into the form, the more we look at the story, the more we disentangle it from the finer growths that it supports, the less shall
we find to admire. (Forster, op cit, p 34)

If the actions of the characters are important, that is not because we like to know what people do, but because they are meant:

History, with its emphasis on external causes, is dominated by the notion of fatality, whereas there is no fatality in the novel; there everything is founded on human nature, and the dominating feeling is of an existence where everything is intentional, even passion and crime, even misery.

(Alain, *Système des Beaux arts*, pp 314-5, quoted in Forster, op cit, p 54)

The 'events' of the plot are not action but happenings; yet they do have this quality of being meant simply because they come to us through what goes on in each character because of them - change or history are not valuable aids to a novel unless they acquire a quite new dimension of unity and inevitability through the characters' self-revelation, which they prompt.

(Above all in *War and Peace*; the peak which Russian writers successfully scale is that in which the character's action itself becomes the event of his self-revelation and transformation. This is the peculiar greatness and intensity of *Crime and Punishment*, and contributes to that of *Karamazov*.)

Although it is not essential, in this transformation of our ability to know people, to produce wholeness or growth in life at the end of the process (fairly direct examples would be *Billy Budd*, *The Idiot*, or *Death in Venice* - but the apparent decline of the character will always be the world's loss, something which Visconti's film of *Death in Venice* does not, unhappily, convey), it is essential that the writer have sufficient mercy for his characters to allow them the transformation - that it be impossible for him to make up his own mind what they are like. It is this that underlies the disaster when the author takes us 'into his confidence' to let us know what he thinks. Paradoxically, he has no business knowing - or
else he will begin to confuse the personal presence he creates in his work, which in this sense is his presence, with the promotion of his own personality.

We have to do with the presence of the artist in his work only when the movement in the work takes us with it, rather than merely surprising us. The change is necessary, contained in what went before yet nonetheless produces something different, which would otherwise be merely additional.

We sing or dance along with music, familiarise ourselves with this or that character - agreeing with the work's premises, so to speak - only to find that we cannot move or observe as we wish, but are brought to move and to think in an alien way, yet one which is not at all arbitrary, but necessary. This is the presence of the artist - not as an object of perception but in his legacy, his gifts of movement, vision, etc. He is present because, for the duration of the work, we are in his hands, rather than free to act or think as we wish or are used to do. And in his hands we are faced with the necessity of the object he himself shows us.

What is essential to the form of the novel is that the narrative be capable of reflecting and giving terms for the changed self-revelation of the characters, although the sheer complexity of this in the grand novel - the unifying of the changes of a large number of characters - must still wait for its greatness, on the characters' own reflections of the events.

Painting, especially in the 19thC, developed a similar concern to overcome our illusions (of knowledge of the world). But if in Turner the conscious concern was simply to "show what such a sense was like", as he said about Snowstorm, or if in Monet's Terrace the real subject is sunlight, this concern with truth is no more than the concern with (one kind of) subject-matter. The form of the painting is the transformation of its subject-matter, to bring it back to us represented, and it is this which allows it to 'overcome our illusions'. Turner's greatness is not his discovery that shadows are blue, not black, but that in his paintings we
do not know what they are, because they are caught up in the massive vortices and cross-currents which transform them.

It is, of course, proper to speak of the characters in a picture, and of the character in a painted figure: Rembrandt's self-portraits, for example. But the figures, and our knowledge of character, do not grow independently; the growth and the form lie in the transformation of one figure into another. (Character in a figure is only an inducement, the imaginative act in which we commit ourselves to the painting - or one such act. The power of the painting lies in the 'beauties' of the face or body - its symmetries and inter-relations. For example, Leonardo's idealisation of ugliness.)

If a painting separates out its figures, not unifying them and making one impossible without the other, then it may be a virtuoso piece, but, like Manet's Execution of the Emperor Maximilian when compared with Goya's Third of May (Kenneth Clark, Looking at Pictures, p 129), will remain 'bourgeois' - a study without point. What Clark has to say about Titian's two Entombments applies to all painting:

The (Louvre) Entombment is convincing; but it remains a construction of art, in some ways as artificial as an operatic quintet...The fact that they fit so perfectly proves that the symbolic figures of an opera are more comprehensive than one might suppose, and are the result of long experience in simplifying the collision of human emotions. All the same...one does not think of a quintet before the late Entombment in Prado, where the figures are swept together by a rushing mighty wind of emotion; and to that extent it is the greater picture. (Ibid. p 28)

c) Nature and the presence of creation

We are faced with newness in a work of art because the presence of the artist in his work brings us to a new object, but one which we cannot make
our own, one which we must see through the artist's eyes. Nonetheless, we can to this extent come to newness through another - and this above all seems to be ruled out in the presence of nature, of the world that man did not create.

In "The Seven Lamps of Architecture", VI i (Ruskin Today, ed Clark) John Ruskin describes an hour "marked by more than ordinary fulness of joy or clearness of teaching" in the Jura hill forests. The description covers a wide range of rock, flower and tree formation, and continues:

I came out presently on the edge of the ravine: the solemn murmur of its waters rose suddenly from beneath, mixed with the singing of the thrushes among the pine boughs; and, on the opposite side of the valley, walled all along as it was by grey cliffs of limestone, there was a hawk sailing slowly off their brow, touching them nearly with his wings, and with the shadows of the pines flickering upon his plumage from above; but with the fall of a hundred fathoms under his breast, and the curling pools of the green river gliding and glittering dizzily beneath him, their foam globes moving with him as he flew. It would be difficult to conceive a scene less dependent upon any interest than that of its own secluded beauty....(p 96)

But Ruskin goes on to say that, in order to understand why it was so impressive, he supposed it to be a Canadian frontier forest (unexplored and unpopulated at this time), and everything shrivelled:

...it struck me suddenly how utterly different the impression of such a scene would be, if it were in a strange land, and in one without history...I think if that pine forest had been among the Alleghenys, or if the stream had been Niagara, I should only have looked at them with intense melancholy and desire for home.

(From Ruskin's diary, April 18, 1846 - Ruskin Today pp 94-5)

Although this will not be our reaction to Niagara, when it costs only money
to leave it behind, and when history is world-wide, the essential point is
that the impressiveness is rooted in a kind of changelessness - a
permanence by contrast with our transience. If it is true, here as with
a work of art, that we do nothing, that is possible only within the
environment of our activity, in which we are not afraid, or in any way need to
act in order to survive:

Those ever springing flowers and ever flowing streams had been
dyed by the deep colours of human endurance, valour and virtue;
and the crests of the sable hills that rose against the evening sky
received a deeper worship because their far shadows fell eastwood over
the wall of Joux, and the four-square keep of Granson. (p 96)

When we are faced with nature, it is not as an imperfect world. It is a
world we can do nothing with, nor wish to, and if a work of art takes
our emotion and imagination and brings them to the newness of an object,
the recovery of contact with nature places us where emotion and imagination,
desire and control have no meaning for us, where it is no longer for us to
act at all.

This is why, I think, it matters so much for this contact with nature
that one be there - that the reproduction of a sunrise is such a poor
substitute for the real thing (Rhea, Without Answers, p 143) - and why
it is not a matter, say, of observing unseen (although that might be
unavoidable, it is not the point of being there). Only by being there can
one see without being able to do anything: and yet this is exactly the
condition under which one attends to a work of art. And rather than being
a contact with newness that has nothing to do with understanding another,
it points - as does the work of art to the artist - to the presence of God
in his creation.

d) The possibility of learning through creating.

The significance of this may emerge out of an apparent imbalance in
the notion of (artistic) creativity we have been using. For if art bears analogy with understanding another sympathetically, then that is art considered by its audience. And it differs from being taught in that it does not bring us to any necessity which remains ours, rather than being dependent on time and the wishes of others. But does this impermanent necessity apply to the artist as well? That is, is creativity an avenue to newness - a path which, unlike being taught, needs no openness to others?

Without generalising on motives, creativity - in both art and science - involves producing an object which offers newness, and an object which replaces the merely human - the limitation to a particular space and time for a certain length of time. The creator is concerned to produce an object in which he may be, for others, a source of newness, a recovery of necessity. He may wish this because he cannot be present to others in his own body - for example, Beethoven's reaction to his deafness was to lament his isolation from others, and yet to "Take Fate by the throat; it shall not humble me" (Heiligenstadt Testament) and compose for them - or because he wishes to be known; but if he looks to this latter possibility the works he produces will be swamped by their style. That is, the presence of the artist in his work does not mean that his audience meet him, or even recognise the work as his; the presence depends totally on the necessity of the form. Beethoven's remark, reported by Bettina Brentano to Goethe, that music is "the wine which inspires one to new generative processes, and I am the Bacchus who presses out this glorious wine for mankind and makes them spiritually drunken..." characteristically avoids speaking of my music, a tendency which emerged in the latter half of the 19thC.

Zizioulas writes of the artist's creativity as bringing out the fact that:

Man as a person is not content with the presence of beings as they are given to him in the world. In a God-like fashion he
wants to recognise beings not 'according their own nature',
i.e. according to their compelling givenness, but as results of
his own free will - as idia thelemata, to recall Maximus the
Confessor. (Op cit, p 420)
(Maximus had insisted that God does not know beings in their nature but
'as the concrete results of his will'.) Yet because man does not have
this freedom, the artist can transform 'beings as given' - the objects
within the world - only by creating a presence, the shaping and leading
of his hand, in which he is absent.

Thus Eliot writes:

The moment in and out of time...

That it is not heard at all, but you are the music
While the music lasts.

(Dry Salvages V)
And the irony of the last line is essential - the moment is still in time,
still belongs to an imperfect world, one in which we will be returning to
action and the need for decision. This is why the work of art cannot
offer a necessity which is more than seen: the artist himself, although he
is present, and as such shows us not himself but the world, is nonetheless
absent: both in the sense that he cannot remain with us beyond the space
and time of the work, and in the sense that we are not 'at risk' in having
to give up time and space to be taught by him (although the emotional
catharsis art does offer can perhaps be spoken of in terms of risk).

This concept of presence-in-absence is introduced and used by
Zizioulas to illuminate the tragedy in a world in which man is (taken to
be) the only creator. The artist

is by not being there (an incidental actual presence of the
artist next to us while we are looking at his work would add
nothing to his real presence in and through his work, which
remains a pointer to his absence. (Op cit, p 412)

...the fact that the artist is absent through his personal presence in his work is due primarily to the fact that he has used pre-existing matter, because this means that his personal presence is embodied in something that is already part of the space-time structure. (p 417)

and Zizioulas uses the term 'space-time structure' to signify the world in which the only creativity is man's: in which the separation Cavell records as the basic datum of our existence is taken to be so: in which objects are separated out from one another and placed in terms of 'distance'.

Thus in terms of the transformation of the world the artist, creating a newness which is not our own, is unsuccessful. Were we to ask: But is it unsuccessful for him? then I think that for Zizioulas the question cannot be raised - because the transformation is possible only in communion. And in the sense that to speak of another's discovery of newness is possible only when we find newness in him, this is absolutely correct: it is a corollary of the fact that newness is not quantitative, that it makes no sense to speak of an observed growth in newness.

If we are to speak of necessity in this connection, it is solely that necessity which bears upon newness by being located in our activity, not as a particular phenomenon. (As we noted when discussing instinct, it is not a question of increasing the number of necessary actions, which is how Weil puts it; necessity as a source of newness is not quantitative, nor particularised.) Hence we cannot look for necessity, only newness; and the work of art remains in the end an object of necessity, not of newness.

But we may nonetheless go beyond Zizioulas' discussion and ask whether creating brings a man to such necessity. For the study and practice that an artist or thinker undergoes, is not itself to understand another, but simply to master the techniques of others. Clearly enough, an artist or
scientist will not enter or remain in his 'field' of activity unless he understands others in their involvement in it - why it is worth the involvement. Unless, that is, the language they speak, the techniques and activities they have in common and whose existence give sense to the concept of a field here, are necessary, bringing them to the necessity the world has. (This is the sense in which Eliot spoke of his 'friends' from earlier and other ages - above all Dante.)

But this does not mean that creating, even within such a discipline, is acting upon what another has taught: that is, creativity is not simply an extension of practice, of 'tying down' what one has seen from another, making it one's own. If it were, the object seen would be something one could bring others to see for themselves - not as the same thing, but as 'what one learned through one's teacher'. (He might put it differently, showing us something different - indeed it would only be worthwhile if he did.)

But the point about creativity is that it is not teaching, and it presents others not so much with something to be mastered as with something puzzling, the creation of a problem - which is what brings us to return to it.

The understanding an artist may have through his predecessors is not an understanding that involves practice - even though he must master something of the techniques they themselves invented. However much he has found the world in their work, there is nothing he can do to make these objects his: for 'these objects', bringing the whole world with them, are these particular works of art, or these particular scientific and metaphysical theories. The techniques they may employ are not the practice which ties the object down.

An artist may take from another a stylistic advance which is an answer to the problem which created it, as Mannerism took its style from Michelangelo. In the former artist's work, though, the style is not the object which, by
being such, makes the work important, makes it a work of art; neither is it any subject depicted. The style is important because it is necessary: because it shows why the work was created. If the later artist masters the style, his 'works' may well be a series of studies; but as long as they are, they do not help or allow the artist to 'see for himself'. He does not become an artist by dint of practice; and he does not bring out in stylistic mastery what he may indeed see in his mentor's work.

As we have seen with Matthias, this does not necessarily mean he has to evolve his own style: the newness of the style is no guarantee of the newness of the object. Rather, while style in art is transferable, its objects are not. This is not in any way to ignore the requirement of practice: but it is not the attempt to make one's own what was seen through another's eyes. It is the adoption of techniques which extend, or appear to extend, the activity which one's own vision, the object or objects already half seen, has demanded.

When Kenneth Clark discusses Raphael's Miraculous Draught of Fishes - and Raphael, more perhaps than any other really great painter, absorbed a wide range of stylistic influences over a long period of his life - he writes:

The places in his work where he has assimilated the discoveries of Masaccio and Michelangelo may fill us with admiration and astonishment, but we really warm to him in front of those figures which seem to come directly from the primum mobile of his art... a flow of movement and a nourishing sense of fulness in every form.

(Op cit, p 70)

And to say that is, of course, a let-down - just technique. Yet these chief characteristics are the mature style - but when Clark goes on to try to say why this is special:

in addition to this mastery of means, the movement of Raphael's
figures has a quality which cannot be learnt, that inner harmony which we call grace... (p 72)

This is why the painting was worth painting, why each employment of even one's own style is in this or that case worth making - not because we admire the result but because something comes from it which nothing else will give: it is both unique (and hence that nothing we, even as artists, can do will make it ours) and that it brings the world with it. No work of art can receive this from another. When we come to see through teaching, then the activity we undergo - as practice, as the sacrifice of our time and space - because of what we see in the other does bring us to see for ourselves.

The object is as it were drawn from the other by the activity. But in art the object demands its own activity, directly, and it is solely in terms of the activity that the artist may take techniques from others. He may find nothing of value, no object, in their work at all; but the technique is useful and relevant to the problems he is facing.

e) The idea of "inspiration".

Thus the difference we find in art is that the technique and practice which a man may take from others are not related to the objects those others reveal. We are, in the notion of creating, brought to face the idea of an object which, while being necessary to one man - the artist or thinker - is not available to anyone else. It is an object which the man can give expression to only once - through the activity which is his creating.

This uniqueness of the work certainly means that it does not function in the development of newness: yet the work is a gift of necessity, albeit within the imperfection of the world. For the artist has found it, not through others, but in the world: the uniqueness of its fashioning is a feature of its being within the world, separated out from other objects.

This means that a particular fragment of the world, whether a movement
of colour, the sketch of a character, a rhythmic image or a theme have for the artist become transfigured - he works with it, to bring out its necessity. Commenting on the ideas of John Cage - of the form which random events 'create' for a piece of music or art - Cavell writes:

"The invocation of chance is like an earlier artist's invocation of the muse, and serves the same purpose: to indicate that his work comes, not from him, but through him - its validity or authority is not a function of its powers or intentions. Speaking for the muse, however, was to give voice to what all men share, or all would hear; speaking through chance forgoes a voice altogether - there is nothing to say." (Op cit, p 202)

For Martin Buber, 'what all men share' is the world. And in a sense we can say that it is the world which itself transfigures an object for the artist, that the world is the point at which self and object are so bound together: where a change in the world means change in self and object together. Thus Buber writes:

"This is the eternal origin of art, that a human being confronts a form that wants to become a work through him. Not a figment of his soul but something that appears to the soul and demands the soul's creative power .... The form that confronts me I cannot experience or describe; I can only actualize it.

(I and Thou, pp 60-1)

And 'form' does not here mean pattern, or a Platonic Idea which the artist copies down or traces out in his material:

He does not portray the form, he does not really remould it;
he drives it into its perfection in its fully figured reality.

(Our Knowledge of Man, p 164)

'Form', as Buber uses it here, is very much the object of the work:
The Onlooker is not at all intent (on 'writing up as many traits as possible'). He takes up the position which lets him see the
object freely, and undisturbed awaits what will be presented to him...("The interesting is not important", he says.) All great artists have been onlookers.

(Between Man and Man, p 26)

Simone Weil develops her own distinctive notion of creative genius with reference to Plato's *Timaeus* (27d - 28b), where the beauty in a work emerges at all only when the artist "keeps his gaze fixed upon what is self-consistent" the essence or reality, rather than sensation or mode of becoming, of the object (*On Science, Necessity, and the Love of God*, p 132).

But the problem created by using an appearance/reality distinction here is that it does not do any justice to the role of 'appearance' or sensation in the artist's "fixed gaze" upon the essence of the object; i.e. the experience, in all its transitoriness, of the eternal. It remains necessary for us to speak of the experience of the artist, even though Weil here wishes to move from gaze to creative action; and hence we must remark that attention (gazing) is not itself a moral attribute, the condition man must aim at in order to be creative. That is, there is a tendency in Weil to seek for attentiveness; what we are saying here is simply that inspiration comes; the artist cannot take the muse by storm. Looking is not seeing; and Buber, like Weil, develops a concept of waiting which the artist can practice, learn how to do, which suggests not only that the artist will see when the world wants him to, but that he can see when he wants to. - This is not to say that waiting is out of place here; but waiting cannot be construed as a moral act, referred solely to the waiter or learner. The moral approach which considers waiting or passivity its goal runs into much the difficulties which quietism encounters in prayer - in the end one is left communing with oneself alone. Both require a very definite, if very obscure, vocation - hence, writing on the dangers of quietism in contemplative prayer, Thomas Merton observes:
The contemplative way is in no sense a deliberate technique of self-emptying in order to produce an esoteric experience. It is the paradoxical response to an almost incomprehensible call from God, drawing us into solitude, plunging us into darkness and silence, not to withdraw and protect us from peril, but to bring us safely through untold dangers by a miracle of love and power.

The contemplative way is, in fact, not a way. Christ alone is the way, and he is invisible. (Contemplative Prayer p 115)

The call, and the voice of another, Christ, are the basis of attention and waiting: silence is the training to which this other has brought a man. We cannot recognise the role of inspiration in creativity unless we are prepared to do more than speak about the being of the artist (i.e. the self) and the being of the object (i.e. the world), by speaking about a more radical being than just these two, in which the work of the creative artist, in creating a work, is understood as the training and practice he undergoes at the hands of another person - the Spirit.

Martin Buber remarks, in the 1957 "Afterword" to I and Thou, that Nietzsche circumscribed the process of inspiration by saying that one accepts without asking who gives. That may be so - one does not ask; but one gives thanks. (p 176)

And Ronald Gregor Smith, following Marcel's summation of secularism as 'I want to run my own life' (in Being and Having, p 131), asks as his guiding question: "Is the controlling power in human life made by men or given to them?" and then puts it another way:

The basic question for theology is neither what are we to do? nor How are we to think of things? but Whence do we receive?

(The Free Man, pp 33, 28)
The receiving in which an object is presented to us by another is not simply passive, but serious and strenuous labour in the artist's attempt to master the object, in a parallel with the pupil's practising in which he comes to lay hold of an object for himself. It is essential to the work's being a source of necessity that man and object be caught up together — if the transfigured object needs no working out, creativity becomes demonic, and the object will only masquerade as a created work, lacking the presence of the artist in and through it. This I take to be the submerged but immense point in the long central chapter of *Doctor Faustus*: Mephistopheles addresses the composer Leverkuhn, unveiling the fruits of the contract he had come to take upon himself:

Let us just for an instance take the 'idea' — what you call that, what for a hundred years or so you have been calling it, sithence earlier there was no such category, as little as musical copyright and all that. The idea, then, a matter of three, four, bars, no more isn't it? All the residue is elaboration, sticking at it. Or isn't it? Good. But now we are all experts, all critics: we note that the idea is nothing new, that it all too much reminds us of something in Rimsky-Korsakov or Brahms. What is to be done? You just change it. But a changed idea, is that still an idea? Take Beethoven's notebooks. There is no thematic conception there as God gave it. He remoulds it and asks "Meilleur". Scant confidence in God's prompting, scant respect for it is expressed in that "Meilleur" — itself not so very enthusiastic either. A genuine inspiration, immediate, absolute, unquestioned, ravishing, where there is no choice, no tinkering, no possible improvement; where all is as a sacred mandate, a visitation received by the possessed one with faltering and stumbling step, with shudders of awe from head to foot, with tears of joy blinding his eyes; no, that is not possible with God, who leaves the understanding
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too much to do. It comes but from the devil, the true master
and giver of such rapture.

(Thomas Mann, Doctor Faustus, pp 230-1)

If we ask what kind of music results, Mann characterises it by the
term 'lament'. Unlike the conception of creativity which Zizioulas takes from
Maximus - that God knows beings solely according to his will - at the end
of Leverkuhn's final and climactic work, the movement "sounds like the
lament of God over the lost state of his world, like the Creator's rueful
'I have not willed it!'" (p 471)

The use of serial technique means that the unity of the work does
not come from the form at all; rather the series underlies the cascade of
forms, which are themselves simply the greatest variety of expression. (pp 468-9)
Indeed, the success, which in one sense is huge, of Mann's description of
genius lies precisely in this fact: that he can say what is new and given to
the composer - he can specify newness as if it were a new discovery or
technique (which of course it is).

f) Learning from Nature.

Whether or not what Mann says, on the models of Mahler and Schoenberg,
is opposite to the condition of 20thC music (Cavell would say it is, but
this overlooks the equally powerful influence of Stravinsky and Debussy),
it does cast light on the way in which inspiration yields necessity in
action. Creating under inspiration is, like contemplative prayer, a way to
newness through the guidance of another - the Spirit of God. What in a
sense limits our discussion here is that the need we have to talk about
creation, and of the reality of the Spirit as Himself calling man forth - this
appears to take us outside our initial frame of reference, namely self, world,
and others. Before considering whether it does, the thrust of this discussion
may be taken up into the possibility of learning from Nature. For it would
be wrong to take Nature to be the inspirer of creativity; the artist may
find his idea, his inspiration in any kind of problem: but he is no more
or less inspired if he paints or writes about Nature than if he paints or
writes about the King or the plumber or his breakfast-table. If we do learn
from Nature, then we are not inspired to come to grips with its forms, but
can in some sense understand its creator. (And to this extent, Gregor Smith's
question, although its emphasis is right for creativity, does not go far
enough: receiving is only one model for understanding.)

G H Hartman, discussing Wordsworth's poetry leading up to the Prelude,
comments that for Wordsworth, by this stage of his writing:

The initiative has passed from nature to the poet, but only
because anything in nature can quicken him... for the first time
he looks at nature steadily. It is a power analogous to the mind
and which the mind cannot subdue to itself. Nature is an other;
to the natural man the other; its divinity is precisely to
escape a purely human, selfish use. (p 169)

When Hartman quotes from an unpublished biographical passage, it becomes
clearer that Wordsworth's own relation, as poet, to nature is his 'subject-
matter' - nature impresses him not because it inspires him, but because his
imagination is unable to overrun it:

He feels that, be his mind however great
In aspiration, the universe in which
He lives is equal to his mind, that each
Is worthy of the other; if the one
Be insatiate, the other is inexhaustible. (Hartman, p 270)

While Buber's formulation of creativity correctly brings out the transfigured
presence of the object with which the creator is caught up we should be clear
that such objects are not objects in nature - the sunrise, the stooping, the
falcon. Nature, the domain of nature, is precisely the 'world' man has not
created. That the domain of nature was sometimes, in the 19thC, used as a 'plot' does not mean that the artist works with nature: a confusion which some remarks by Thoreau do not overcome:

(The poet's) voice will not proceed from (nature's) midst, but by breathing on her, will make her the expression of his thought.

He then poetizes when he takes a fact out of nature into spirit...

Each publishes the other's truth. (Diaries, quoted in Hartman, pp 169-7)

It is hard to see the sense in saying nature publishes the poet's truth, unless it means 'nature as set out in the poem'. But then it is not nature: it lacks the whole character of nature which relies, as both Rhees and Ruskin bring out, on our being there.

Nature is, as we have it here, not caught up in man's creativity: if we return to the question whether our contact with nature is, like the audience's contact with art, a form of understanding another, then the answer as far as Hartman is concerned, speaking for Wordsworth, must be Yes.

This is not a case of projecting ourselves onto nature; we are not creating or controlling. We take in nature because it does move in a different way from our own; when, most magically, nature is still, that is at pause, not inertia or the absence of life. To speak of a creator here is not to purpose the re-introduction of God without further ado - it is not a proof; but nature does have sufficient in common with art for us to note that God's presence, if he really created all this, will not be a confrontation, an extra if 'spiritual' body or the pattern of a father's face. It will be, rather, the experience of being in another's hands, even though we are not led and there is no transformation of our imagined activity and observation. It is not a purification of emotion, but its redundancy - we are brought back to necessity because we are unable here to 'run our own lives' in the secular way - so we begin to breathe more slowly and listen more.
It cannot last, any more than the work of art can. Yet for a time we are in another's hands, without perhaps being able to say even that. This is not, vis-a-vis our learning from Nature, an unusual form of contact with God: when Thomas Merton writes:

Our knowledge of God is paradoxically a knowledge not of him as the object of our scrutiny, but of ourselves as utterly dependent on his saving and merciful knowledge of us.

(Contemplative Prayer, pp 103-4)

or when the rule of the Brakkenstein Community comments:

To seek God
means first of all
to let yourself be found by Him....
But even if you receive no sign, no word from Him,
you will still recognise Him.
His very absence
is full of the mystery of His greatness.

(Rule for a new Brother, pp 1,3)

then this simply prefigures Zizioulas' concept of presence-in-absence, or Simone Weil's "He whom we must love is absent":

God can only be present in creation under the form of absence.

(Gravity and Grace p 99)

Nature is not in any way a proof of God's existence; yet as with art we are brought here to reckon with some concept of presence, simply because we are faced with the absence – it is through another's eyes and in another’s hands that we are brought back to the world's newness. (24)

g) The nature of personal presence, with reference to Buber.

The point we have thus reached is one in which the transformation of the world, the recovery of its presence, is given with reference to
something still more fundamental — understanding another. It is through this, and not prior to it, that there come to be objects — not, that is, simply as a matter of the experience in learning — as a comment on the way we do learn — but because it is only possible to raise the question of the nature of 'persons' in the context of learning from them. The fundamental notion is not person rather than object — the difficulties that the individuation of persons brings are at least as great as those concerning objects — but learning: learning as understanding another.

To those who resist any suggestion that men are not clearly separated and independent individuals, free to lead their own lives without reference to others except through limitations of capacity and opportunity (and hence in Marcel's sense secular men), this will seem merely to be calling a complex term basic, when in fact it cannot be (because it is not simple). The 'simples', if there are to be any will seem to be the learner and the teacher — it makes no sense to talk about understanding another unless you have already got another there to understand.

I can only note again that the whole argument of this essay is designed to show why learning is not solely or fundamentally a relation between two individuated subjects or objects, and indeed cannot be if we are to take into account there being a world we can have any awareness of at all. To view learning as a relation is to construe it from the point of teaching: and it has been the value of Meno's paradox that it can liberate us from this assumption. Meno needs to be answered more seriously than in Socrates' manner, and in the section following this one we can attempt to sum up the answer we have developed.

In denying the primacy of learner and teacher over the learning it is not, however, the relation itself which is basic. To talk in this way is still to speak on the assumption that it relates two separated objects. This is the difficulty at the heart of Martin Buber's writing:
his emphasis on the 'between', the 'interhuman', is an attempt to establish the
primacy of relationship, but in doing so he must presuppose the separation
of the individuals related. The problem is put most acutely in his
'philosophical anthropology':

Man, as man, sets man at a distance and makes him independent:
he lets the life of men like himself go on round about him, and
so he, and he alone, is able to enter into relation, in his own
individual status, with those like himself.

("Distance and Relation", Our Knowledge of Man, p 67)

For although Buber is constantly and explicitly concerned to establish
an 'ontology of the between', he takes this to involve man's action: the
'primal movements' in man are both things he does: 'setting at a distance'
and 'entering into relation' (p 64) What he takes to be peculiar to human
life is that:

here and here alone a being has arisen from the whole, endowed
and entitled to detach the world as a whole from himself and to
make it an opposite to himself. (p 63)

This only sets out the problem more acutely: How is someone in the world
not open to the possibility of error in the world he makes an opposite to
himself?

Buber presupposes what must I think be called an Aristo telean
idea of entelechy: when he discusses conversation and meeting it is to say:
the strictness and depth of human individuation, the elemental
otherness of the other...is affirmed from the one being to the
other. The desire to influence the other then does not mean the
effort to change the other, to inject one's own 'rightness' into
him; but it means the effort to let that which is recognised as
right, as just, as true (and for that very reason must also
be established there, in the substance of the other) through one's
influence take seed and grow in the form suited to individuation.

(p 69)
That is, each man is set out as a substance, guided by the recognition
of 'his own' rightness or principle of growth. Truth is that "which
the soul gains by its struggle", and which is the same truth from man
to man, yet "different in accordance with his individuation, and destined
to take seed and grow differently" (loc sit.)

This allows Buber to offer the "principle of life' for man - but it is
not an ontology of the between. The purpose of the scheme is to allow
Buber to say:

the inmost growth of the self is not accomplished, as people like
to suppose today, in man's relation to himself, but in the relation
between the one and the other (p 71)

The means of self-realisation is this realm of the between: man becomes
most fully human in the relation in which he confirms the other and wishes
for confirmation of himself. Confirmation, a central idea in Buber's later
writing, is not simple acceptance, accepting another as he is, warts and all;
thus Buber goes beyond Carl Rogers' conception of therapy as acceptance,
to insist that if a man wants help:

what he wants is a being not only whom he can trust as a man trusts
another, but a being that gives him now the certitude that 'there is a soil, there is an existence'. And if this is reached
now I can help this man even in his struggle against himself.
And this I can only do if I distinguish between accepting and
confirming. (p 153)

Confirmation, that is, brings a man more firmly in touch with his own
truth, his own rightness or principle of growth.

Gregor Smith comments that Buber:

in effect never leaves his subjectivity behind, and even when he is
attempting to describe the ontology of 'between' he is not really
doing more than describing the act of meeting in terms of the

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Gregor Smith comments that Buber:

in effect never leaves his subjectivity behind, and even when he is attempting to describe the ontology of 'between' he is not really doing more than describing the act of meeting in terms of the I. (The Doctrine of God, p 133)
But I think the stress should be placed not on the 'I', but on 'acts'.
The relevance of subjectivity here is that the subject is the willing subject, the subject Wittgenstein could not, in the Tractatus, do away with.— For Buber, the 'I' takes up attitudes; Maurice Friedman, although staunchly advocating Buber's conception, unwittingly summarises it as:

The real determinant of the primary word (I-Thou or I-it) in which a man takes his stand is not the object over against him, but the way in which he relates to that subject. (Introduction to The Knowledge of Man, p 12)

And in criticism of Buber, Bernard Casper notes:

The I utters the primary word I-Thou as well as the primary word I-it. This goes so far that in I and Thou meeting is described as a 'working on the one who confronts us'....it is the intention of I and Thou to overcome the scheme of intentionality. But the phenomenon which is described is basically not the event of reciprocal speech, but the attitude of meeting.

(From Dialogische Denken p 301, quoted in Gregor Smith, op cit, p 133)

The subjectivity in Buber is not idealism; and the criticism I wish to lay against him is not that he goes too far into subjectivity, but that he does not go far enough. He seeks to preserve an objectivity in terms he can use to speak of an I or a Thou, so that they can be interchanged: that is, he supposes that the individuation of the one and of the other are both possible. But this means in effect that they are both in the world, and thus both a kind of object: organisms seeking confirmation and confirming. Buber has not been able to take the step which Wittgenstein made — from attempting to speak about the willing subject without bringing it into the world, to speaking about the limits of the world as they appear in the world; what, that is, which allows some action to be necessary. Instead, the Thou is present to me and I am present to 'him':
the Thou is present as some kind of it, which, because I know it is like me, I determine to treat as a Thou. There is no concept of absence, because there is no grasp of the separate being of personal presence from the being of objects in the world - that is, no grasp of absence as the lack of personal presence which objects here have, precisely because it is in this personal presence alone that objects are themselves present. (25)

The point is not, therefore, that Buber attempts to speak from 'within' the subjectivity of the 'I' - this is precisely what Gregor Smith is himself concerned to do, and what we have been doing. It is rather that, although he insists that we only come to know one another in relationship:

The essence of man which is special to him can be directly known only in a living relationship. (Between Man and Man, p 246)

nonetheless he will write:

When we walk our way and encounter a man who comes towards us, walking his way, we know our way only and not his; for his comes to life for us only in the encounter.

Of the perfect relational process we know in the manner of having lived through it our own going forth, our way. The other part merely happens to us, we do not know it. It happens to us, in the encounter. (I and Thou, p 124)

And if mine is the only 'way' I know, why and how is it a way, which others can and do have in their own way? To speak of ways here is to be able to make judgements within the world; and it means that an element of wilful decision must enter my 'letting things happen' in the meeting, my allowing the meeting to take place as meeting, an act which the other must reciprocate. I decide that the other who comes to me is a Thou and free (I and Thou, pp 126–7) in order to make my contribution of genuine relationship:

Relation is fulfilled in a full making present when I think
of the other not merely as this very one, but experience, in the particular approximation of the given moment, the experience belonging to him as this very one. (The Knowledge of Man, p 71)

In these terms, we cannot intelligibly do more than decide to treat this presence as a Thou - and thus the problem of how we come to know what a Thou, or even a man, is like, is once again raised and not answered. By ignoring epistemology, and notably the problem of other minds, Buber has not produced an ontology at all. He writes as a moralist, because he addresses our ability to act within the world. There is no notion of learning from others, or of the authority others have as teachers beyond the concept of confirming; and he thus takes for granted that we know the world. For the notion of the 'inmost growth of the self' which Buber advocates, and which has parallels with the Jungian concept of individuation which Buber himself employs, this perhaps does not matter; but this means that Buber is unable to raise the question of the nature of our concept of others in its relation to there being a world: whether our concept of others does permit the notion of the transformation of the world.

When Gregor Smith seeks to set out his conviction that "the reality of God and the reality of mystery" can only be approached through the understanding of man, he concentrates on the terms of "the experience of the presence of the other" (The Doctrine of God, p 128). Within this experience of presence a division into I and other is too simple: at the very least we must say it is "I-with-the-other-in-a-world". (Ibid.) Thus it is:

not simply the coming about of a relationship between two subjects, whether in causal and temporary or more permanent connection. Rather, it is to be seen as the disclosure of a reality in which I and the other share. (p 129)

This reality he speaks of as communion, or rather as "community in communion"
which simply stresses that it is myself and others in communion. And this, again, he speaks of as Spirit: and Spirit

is our world: it is the bond and strength of human existence.

Spirit is the total reality of our humanity. (p 130)

And Spirit is thus the framework or context of transcendence, the "experience of the other as presence".

It comes to me as a call: a call to respond and to be responsible in face of the other. (Ibid.)

Although this clearly runs together too much too quickly, I would say that Gregor Smith offers a much more convincing approach to the presence of others than Buber has done, by avoiding any treatment of the concept in which others are taken to be 'like us'. For rather than this being a barrier to communion, so that others must be like us before there can be any such thing as communion (the assumption which leads Buber to say: one can enter into relation only with being which has been set at a distance, more precisely, has become an independent opposite.

(The Knowledge of Man, p 60)

and to make this the starting-point of his 'anthropology') a return to the experience of presence is what makes communion possible. The argument of this essay has been that, if we are to approach this experience of presence, it must be in terms of the concept of understanding another: not as experience (of an object), nor as an action, but the fusion of the two in necessity. And it is possible for us to speak of necessity only in as much as the other brings the world to us, even though the activity in which the world becomes our own singles it out as an object within the world.

In answer to our initial question, however, the quest for newness must rest on this. Newness comes from others, in understanding them; and the newness which comes from art and nature are to be set out in these terms. But we cannot then ask, Where do others come from? or indeed, where do we find others?
unless we also move onto a theological plane; the creation of man is not to be understood solely in terms of the world he creates.

This question - of the basis on which there are others, the basis on which others are given in order to give expression to the world in response - brings us to ask whether the transformation of the world, in terms of understanding another, is intelligible with reference solely to man's searching (that he seeks this transformation); or whether it can only be referred to God's activity. By implication, then, it is a question about the relation of this 'philosophical' account of person and world, in terms of searching, to a theological conception in which God wills to draw men to him, a will disclosed in the Incarnation of his Son.

h) The intelligibility of seeking personal presence, and the nature of faith

This is to raise our understanding of faith, and to ask whether faith is in any sense necessary as a precondition of the transformation of the world. That is, if faith is taken to be an attribute of individuals, then it will appear that we have no choice but to insist one way or the other: if an individual succeeds in transforming the world (even with limited success) that must be either through faith, or without it, in which case faith is not necessary and God, if there is a God and if he has anything to do with the change (perhaps rewarding the endeavour), need not be known or acknowledged.

Yet in the terms we have arrived at, the basis of the concept of the person is his role in the transformation of the world; we cannot separate out there being a person from the world's newness. Faith in God's redemptive activity is not, therefore, an expectation that he will act regardless of man, but that he has, is and will bring about this transformation through and in relation to man; the extent to which another is present to us is
the extent to which the world is transformed. Faith in God's activity is necessarily faith in the presence of others - to trust in the promise of change is to trust in the existence of other people, not in terms of what they may do but in terms of what they already and do offer.

When Zizioulas writes:

The fact that...absence remains unacceptable to man is due to his personhood which drives him towards communion, and this is what makes faith a possibility for him: he is confident in presence in spite of absence. (p 422)

then this means that faith is trust in the presence which is already given: it is not the expectation that, without reference to (personal) presence, the objects in the world can be made present and new. The presence which is new, rather, is not that of the world alone, but the world only as it is given in others.

That is, there is an essential complexity in our searching for newness - that we must seek it in the presence of others, who nonetheless can withhold their own presence. In terms of the notion of understanding another which we arrived at in Chapter 3, there is a complexity in which we can speak of understanding as dependence on what we see through another's eyes, even though this understanding may never be our own (and consequently even though we may never be understood by others in its light). This complexity rests on the fact that understanding another is not to be predicated solely of an individual, the learner, but is itself the fundamental relationship in which we come to our awareness of individuals and predicates: that is, it is a relationship of shared objectivity in which an individual person may find objective newness for himself. The individual thus seeks to enter into this relationship of sharing, and yet is immediately at the mercy of the other person's readiness to share.

This is not to say that the learner mistakes the presence of the other
if this happens - on the contrary, the presence is both real and familiar. It is the experience of entering into the understanding of another person: to find reality or objectivity being expressed in their own understanding. This experience I take to be a fact and to be common. But to be led by the other along the steps that allow one to give expression to the new object for oneself - this rests with the other's willingness to guide and teach.

To seek the presence of others - to seek the newness of this shared and presented objectivity - thus runs up against the freedom of others. It is in this freedom that we may speak of necessity: others present us with necessity, in their own understanding of the world, and yet this presence is not one which brings us to newness, but as it stands appears intimidating and burdensome, in precisely the way that by ourselves we cannot indefinitely sympathise with or support another's grief or pain. This is one part of the experience of necessity which Weil constantly draws our attention to: the problem with such a one-sided approach is that, if this is the only form of presence others have - namely as threatening our freedom, then faith remains unintelligible as "confidence in presence". This means that only the necessity in presence can allow us to overcome the apparent antithesis between 'my' freedom and the freedom of others.

This discovery of necessity is in one sense inimical to theology, for which:

if necessity in any way was master of the life of man, the image (of God) would have been falsified in that particular part.

(Gregory of Nyssa, quoted in Zizioulas, p 428)

It is freedom which characterises man's life in God, not necessity. And this is a freedom which appears to present man with:

'two' ultimate possibilities: either to annihilate the 'given'
or to accept it as idion thelema. (p 433)

For, in acting according to his will, he will either destroy the created world - which, leaving art aside, was not created according to his will
and will not accord with it:— or else:

because in fact the world is not man’s thelema, if he is still
to maintain his freedom in accepting the world he can do this only
by identifying his own will with that of God (Ibid.)

And this second possibility is in fact therefore the only one in which
freedom is not frustrated: to accept what is 'given', to freely embrace
necessity:

The mystery of freedom (is) the capacity of man to embrace fully
his incapacity i.e. as his ability to turn weakness into strength
or rather to realise his power in weakness. This paradox is nothing
else but what Paul when he writes in 2 Cor. 12.10 after
mentioning his full acceptance of suffering: 'for when I am weak,
I am strong'. (p 430)

And this is the basis upon which we can answer the question whether
coming to newness in understanding another is 'redemption without needing
God'. To understand another is to be at risk in his hands, to see through
his eyes and be brought, through the giving up of our control and will over
place and time, to newness in embracing necessity. The other, as teacher,
brings us to the newness of the world, and in learning from him the world
comes to exist in necessity — the response we find emerging in ourselves is
a real necessity even though it remains possible (and most likely) that
we will begin to control it by suppressing it. But we are not able to do
more than submit to others, in view of the newness we find in them: they
show newness, yet we can only ask them to bring us to it. We act because of
the presence of the other, we place ourselves in his hands.

Presence, that is, that is formed as a concept and as a possibility
by this experience in which man is not present in spite of the world,
but brings the world to us. To speak of pure presence, as Zizioulas wishes to,
may then seem something different:
If there is ultimately no personal presence without absence, then there is no personal presence at all....For whence have we got the category of presence from, when we apply it to personhood? Is it an extrapolation or an analogy from the experience of the presence of objects as they are observed and recognised through our sense or minds? But the presence of which we are talking in the case of personhood is the very opposite of this experience: in terms of this experience presence in this case is, as we have seen, absence.

(pp 420-1)

Presence without absence, pure presence, is not then a confrontation or encounter with the other, which would be presence after the fashion of objects within the world, as we have seen with Buber. Pure presence is not the possibility of presence - not the frustrated presence in which we retain our freedom to refuse it. And yet, as we have noted, this frustrated presence is not an illusion or a mistake; it is real presence, yet inhibited by the fact that presence is not simply the experience of an individual, but the relationship of sharing between individuals. Thus if we try to speak of presence with reference to, or as structured in terms of, individuals, we are able to speak of it only as the tension between our experience of another, and that other's freedom to withhold his presence - i.e. presence as a phenomenon in the world, remains ambiguously between our own individual experience and the freedom of the other to be present.

Up to this point, Zizioulas distinguishes person and object, and takes this freedom of the other to be the basis of the distinction. This is not, we must emphasise, a freedom of arbitrariness or chance; it is really presence, yet presence which remains on the level of possibility. Zizioulas quotes Pannenberg in order to illustrate this:

Human beings are persons by the fact that they are not wholly and completely existent for us in their reality, but are characterised
by freedom and as a result remain concealed and beyond control in the totality of their existence. Their being as persons takes shape in their present reality, and yet it remains invisible to one whose vision—unlike the vision of love or even that of hatred—looks at what is existent in man. (Basic Questions in Theology, vol 3, p 112; Zizioulas p 413)

But what this does not seem to me to take account of is the transcending of this hiddenness of the other, in the notion of learning from another and coming to see for oneself. Here we are not working simply with presence as the frustrated presence which distinguishes person and object, but with further phenomenon of person as the sharing of an object; with reference to experience this is not the experience of another at all, but the experience of newness, of new objectivity. For Zizioulas, the human person can only be present in absence—this is the fact of man's fallenness:

The fact that presence in and through personhood is revealed to man in the form of absence constitutes the sign par excellence of the creaturely limitation of humanity. (p 416)

But the basis on which Zizioulas restricts man's presence to this is a use of the creatio ex nihilo doctrine which presupposes that, while God alone creates ex nihilo, man's creativity is restricted to creation out of pre-existing matter, and that on this basis God's presence is not a presence in creation; if it were, Zizioulas supposes, God could not be present without absence (pp 417-8). This seems to me to lean too heavily on an interpretation of personhood in terms of creativity, for man is not restricted to creating, as an artist, out of pre-existing matter, but also presents new matter, in the relationship of understanding. Whether or not this presenting, this 'being understood', may itself be spoken of as creation, and whether or not it is to be preferred to man's artistic creation as an analogical model for speaking of God's creating, is a question we
cannot hope to answer, and can only point to. (26)

What we can perhaps observe is that such a model of creating
would locate God's presence and his creation in a high degree of intimacy,
which would then call into question the radical dichotomy Zizioulas draws
between world and personal presence:

Personal presence qua presence is something that cannot be
extrapolated from created existence. It is a presence that seems
to come to us from outside the world - which makes the notion
of Person, if properly understood, perhaps the only notion that
can be applied to God without the danger of anthropomorphism.

(pp 419-20)

But from the fact that created existence does not enable us to discover
presence - i.e. that absence is not our basis for speaking of presence -
we should not conclude that presence is 'outside' the world. If, in under­
standing another, the other presents us with a new object, then his presence
and the world itself are inextricably linked, and we must hold personal presence
and the being of objects together as one ontological entity: with reference
to their being at all, they are one. Absence, and the frustrated presence of
others which keeps them distinct from objects yet within the world, are
both secondary to this.

Presence, then, is not outside the world, but the being of the
world. While Zizioulas is right to say that we do not reach presence from
the absence in which objects stand opposed to us, inanimate and meaningless
because apparently not 'spoken' by other people (see note 27), we must
point this to presence and objects together rather than in distinction.
The point to be made is that we have, as a fact about human personhood, an
interrelation of person and world in learning and teaching which requires us
to take seriously man's ability to serve as a source for newness, and that
this is a feature of personhood Zizioulas does not take account of.

Consequently, our final question must be about the possibility of our
seeking this newness in or from man, and the relation this has to any question of redemption without reference to God.

The concept of absence may be fully applied to what man can do about presence: that is, he is not freed in his own searching from the need to submit himself to absence - the control of others, his own bodily limitations, etc. Neither is he freed from the mere hope of presence, the hope that presence will sometimes happen or come to him, as if by miracle. Man, considered in terms of his own individuality, and thereby of what he can do, can only act in terms of absence: by himself his search will always be a confrontation with absence. And thus Zizioulas is right to insist that the basis for our having a category of presence is not absence at all, but presence without absence.

But if pure presence is not to be related to absence as a possibility created by it, and hence not to be sought with reference to absence, this does not mean, as Zizioulas' radical distinction between presence and absence involves, that it bears no relation to anything. The further 'unpacking' of the concept, and the kind of relations it has, require us to go beyond a simple distinction between presence and absence, to a distinction between the possibility of understanding another, a possibility created out of his presence; and the factuality or being of understanding another, which is in his presence. That is, the distinction between an understanding which is always dependent on the other in order for us to see through his eyes; and an understanding in which we lay hold of newness for ourselves. For these are both understanding, and both the presence of newness in the presence of another: but the former, as in art appreciation or compassion, involves the creation of the possibility of understanding another, which is a genuine possibility nonetheless frustrated by his inability to teach us, to understand what he sees for ourselves; whereas in the latter we do receive and share what is made present.
This complexity in presence, which we have sought to express in terms of the nature of learning, is a complexity which points us towards the complexity in the nature of faith itself. What distinguishes faith is not a hope for presence - a hope born out of the possibility of presence - but the fact of presence. This is not a fact of possibility becoming actual, of a frustrated presence which is suddenly released as the other 'decides' to teach us: it is presence in its actuality regardless of what others do, and also of what we do in seeking it. Absence is not itself a fact: the experience of absence has as its basis the personal presence through which we came to even this much of a conception of the world (ie that there are objects).

This is the presupposition from which Zizioulas argues that the suggestion that non-being might be ultimate is absurd, because there can only be an ontology if it begins from presence:

A dying being is still a being, for it is there. (p 424)

And indeed that there are objects, in their dimension of absence and of standing opposed to us, is possible only in and through pure presence, the presence which has presented them to us. Yet they have come to be experienced as absent, and if they are to be present in experience then this requires something more than a proof that they have been presented: it requires the experience of personal presence which brings newness with it. (27)

We cannot simply decide to be present to another - this is the attitudinising we find with Buber, which confuses the appearance of our presence to him (and hence his experience of a presence) with the fact of presence. The most we can do, as individuals, is to hold together, in balance, frustrated presence which has the possibility of another's bringing us to newness, and our own search for newness. Our search for newness can, as long as it remains in our hands, proceed only as far as the frustration of the other's freedom to be absent. If we are to find newness, it is not
enough to come up against the possibility of newness; we will find it only where we find presence.

This is the answer we are finally to make to Meno's paradox. Socrates, by taking a question about presence and its objectivity to be a question about knowledge as the ability to judge, overlooked the depths of Meno's puzzle. But that these depths concern the possibility of coming up against what is new does not mean that we can specify under what form or at which place we may look for it. The point is that neither are we to conclude, beyond this, that the search for newness is therefore ruled out, and that newness may or may not simply come, by chance or God's caprice. To find newness is not to take hold of other people and use them to surrender what they have to give; and consequently to seek newness, even though it may well begin with such implicit assumptions, cannot in the end attempt this.

To find newness is neither active nor passive, for it is neither the activity, nor the experience, of an individual confronting the world and others. Instead it is the fact of presence, of communion - the fact that we are in communion with others and at the same time can intelligibly seek to be. This complexity, in which we seek that which we already enjoy, is the complexity of faith, in which the experience of presence is sought on the basis of the fact of presence: it is, as Zizioulas writes, confidence in presence, not in absence.

This is why we cannot treat faith as a property of others or of ourselves - be it the man whose gaze is in the sky, or who waits upon the rooftop, or who has an attitude of openness to others. There is nothing to distinguish a man's faith from hope, from a pious wish and the charge of a 'lack of realism', unless we, looking at him, are aware of his own presence - of what he presents to us. We are 'confronted' by faith only in the learning and teaching we enter into; and then faith becomes, not an object in the learning, but the fact of sharing. Thus it is not the self's response
to necessity in another – it is not heroism, or foolhardiness, or imagination or power, or the self's response to anything.

To find faith is to keep faith, which an individual cannot himself do, for it arises along with the faithfulness of others. That is, we find faith in community: the fact of shared presence. The theological filling-out of this faith is a further, and more demanding pursuit: as we have it here, faith has been referred only to the fact of presence, not to the God who alone is purely present. To understand God's own personhood in terms of the nature of his presence is something which Bonhoeffer has (almost alone) attempted, in his Christology; the way in which faith, understood as the fact of presence rather than our attitude to its possibility, is to be grounded much more radically in the person of Christ is a problem whose centrality we can only record. (28)

That newness must in the end be found within faith, and hence in the fact of community, seems to me to be inescapable. Newness and shared presence go hand in hand: the problem of the nature of membership, of participation in the life of a community and the overcoming of one's individuality, is, however central, a problem we have only succeeded in pointing to, not resolving. It is the problem of baptism, of coming to be what one is in Christ; but the Christological ground on which we may say that there is presence without absence will lead us on to a different discussion.

Since the attempt to develop the concepts of faith and community with reference to Christian doctrine, in order to understand more fully what 'person' means is really the subject of a further essay, it may prove helpful here simply to sum up the position we have reached. This position is not a conclusion, having no finality to it – the most we can say is that we have been working towards a model of personhood in such a way that something of the detail of the model has emerged; I remain well aware that theology has developed different and perhaps finer tools for other parts of the construction.
The central feature of this model is the fact that we cannot speak, on any fundamental level, of a person as an individual: a person is not any kind of object in the world, but presents the world's objects to us. This means, further, that this person is not 'foresakeable' - we cannot ignore him or choose to leave his alone as an individual, for he is a person in his presenting the world to us. In other words, that there are other people already involves us. Of course, we do choose to ignore others, and this 'primal sin' of distance, of separating ourselves from others, is not one I wish to minimize. But I have not discussed the movement or development by which a learner, sharing in the newness presented by another, loses the necessity it evokes and at the same time the presence of both: this would certainly not be a question for empirical observation of, say, what a young child does in his spare time, but much more of the extent and manner in which such a child does in fact live in community. In other words, it is not an empirical question; and neither is it answered by our own discussion, which can only point us back to the other person, without asking about the cause of our separation. Such a question belongs with the theological discussion of community, in the idea of the Fall.

Part of the reason for this is that we cannot begin from the assumption that the Fall is what an individual 'does in his spare time' - any study proceeding on these lines begins from fallen premises. And, further to this, any idea we have of relationship as the objectifiable and particularisable essence of 'person' runs foul, as we have seen with Buber, of the central mystery of what 'person' means - that a person is not part of the world at all, and is yet intimately related to it, by presenting it to us. The categories of person and world go together, and we will not understand what a person is until we find the world along with him. In other words, until we understand him - until we learn from him, which is the very reversal of any attempt to observe his own 'decline' in understanding, or seek to observe
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how his understanding 'becomes' fallen. We cannot look at man in order to understand why he falls, for if we come to man himself we overcome his fallenness anyway. We can speak about man's fallenness only when we speak about God.

Consequently, in our own discussion we have not approached man's fallenness, either in his being an individual or his being 'something - in -relationship'. Instead, he is that which we understand - through whom we come to see something new. We should not then balk at the resulting tension or paradox, in which a person is that which inseparably incorporates ourselves, not only as Gregor Smith's "I-with-the-other-in-a world" but as I and the other sharing a world and defined by this sharing; and yet is also isolable and particular, both like me and unlike me, but not necessary to my being. This paradox is the situation we find ourselves in, and, as we have noted, is the root of the complexity in the notion of presence: it remains possible for us to say no to presence - to experience it and yet refuse to submit to it. That this differs from pure presence does not mean that the latter is simply our saying yes to presence, our accepting the yoke of necessity in fear and trembling - on the contrary in pure presence we accept necessity in confidence because we are already in the hands of the other person, and the necessity is one we find in ourselves.

Were this to be set out as a moral dimension - a matter of my own courage to say yes - then such a difference will appear incomprehensible. How, in my own experience, can I know the other is present that we may share what is new; and if in some way I were to know this, how could I refuse him? Over against this, the complexity of presence, which points to the heart of what 'person' means, means that the nature of presence is not decided with reference to me and my own experience. Rather, by being the situation I am in, it establishes the condition in which my own individuality may in fact insist on its freedom to say yes or no to others.
This is not to say that the moral dimension is irrelevant, or that it does not matter whether I say yes or no. We do have this (moral) level of experience, and on it we can only act in its terms. But the basis on which we say yes to the necessity (qua obligation and discipline) which others demand of us, in such experience of frustrated presence, is not simply our own hope that newness will come to us. It is that, while experiencing as an individual, we act as a person, i.e., through the presence of the other. Both of us act—he through me in bringing me to say yes despite my experience (which is of separation). I through him in placing myself in his hands; but this is one act, which we perform together.

This indicates the heart of communion—we do not act in our own individuality. In communion itself, our experience is further reconciled to our action, by allowing us not to experience the other at all, but rather to act with him in response to what he shares with me. Throughout this essay we have approached this conception through the notion of learning—through a privacy of experience in which I cannot myself give any expression to what I 'experience', since only the two of us together, learner and teacher, can express it. This is not, of course, to say that communion is a one-way relation, learning from the other, which the other does not himself undergo. Communion is not an experience, but a way of acting—acting in shared necessity—and the teacher acts as the pupil does. As we noted when discussing the teacher's ability to 'assess' his pupil, his concern is always and already to understand the pupil, to share in the newness the pupil comes to.

Our provisional conclusion, then, will be that we cannot understand what a person is except in understanding a person. The concern to understand what something is may seem always to be a question of what contemporary philosophy calls 'grammar'—the internal necessity in the use of the concept
in question; and hence our concern in philosophy may appear always to be to reach necessity, to take hold of it. Certainly a short-term question, about the kind of necessity involved in a particular concept, may be answered in this way: presenting it as an objective structure, even though one unique to the concept. But this is not to take hold of the necessity, merely to highlight it with respect to our own question. To the terms arrived at in this essay, we cannot take hold of necessity, we cannot grasp, absolutely and unshakably, the order of things — for necessity is unshakable only when it is a response to existence, to an object, and not the object itself. Consequently we are left with the need to root necessity in the existence of objects, not what we say about them — and this requires us to come to their existence, which is to come to a person (who presents them). To come not to the question of what a person is, but to the person himself.

While this applies to all necessity, it is of course acutely paradoxical in the case of the concept of a person. How are we to come to a person in order to find out what a person is? — This question, which is at the core of the problems of presence expressed in Meno's paradox, is answered only by allowing us to be already incorporated in what the person is. And this is a requirement rather than anything we can first point to in experience — we do not understand what learning is by being shown examples of learning.

Finally, we may indicate that this is not therefore a natural theology, even one prefacing Christology. It is not a theology at all, but claims only that the approach to newness, and to the resultant taking hold of necessity, is communion and our participation in it. Participation is not the act of an individual, and hence in one sense there is nothing we can do to answer Meno, except act in communion and corporately, which we cannot learn how to do. It is therefore a requirement of our coming to newness that we already be in communion — and it is at this point, on the fact of our being in communion, that we must speak of God and of Christ. But this
requirement does not in any way limit God to our own humanity and fallen limitations - it serves simply to say that if we are to go beyond this limitation, it must be towards God in Christ.

To say that we are in communion is not itself to say anything about God - it is God who says we are in communion. There is here an identity between God's word that we are in communion - a communion which, because it does not begin in separation, has no dimension of restriction or exclusion - and our being in communion with God. This is the nature of Christ's being as God's word - that the approach to God is not through man's own speech about God but by being in communion with God; and this is to rest and live in his life-giving word: that we are in communion. It is theology's task to speak about God as God's own word does; the more philosophical task we have been concerned with in this essay is that of sharing in God's word about man in the world. If metaphysics is therefore not theology, it is not also secular.
Footnotes

Chapter 1

1. This conception of recollection is fully vulnerable to a remark Wittgenstein makes in the *Tractatus*:

6.4312 Not only is there no guarantee of the temporal immortality of the human soul, that is to say of its eternal survival after death, but in any case this assumption completely fails to accomplish the purpose for which it has always been intended. Or is some riddle solved by my surviving for ever? Is not this eternal life itself as much of a riddle as our present life?

In the same way, recollection, thus formulated, does not show how we learned in any prior life. We can note that Socrates is still shown here to be thinking in terms of some unquestioned and presupposed category of immortality within which to map out and define learning.

If we are to move in a different direction, as will become increasingly necessary, we will also see how much concepts like immortality need to be understood in terms of learning, rather than the other way around.

2. It is hard to say whether Rhees has expanded, or rather criticised, Wittgenstein's thought; neither do I think that it matters. This is surely a feature of, and direct result of, Wittgenstein's style of writing: he once wrote that a philosophy book ought to be good enough to make you want to throw it across the room and think for yourself. Nonetheless, Rhees strikes distinctions which Wittgenstein does not very clearly touch.

Chapter 2

3. Wittgenstein came later on to connect this understanding of symbols with the power of the symbols used in ritual:

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Chapter 2

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What strikes us in (the story of the forest-king of Nemi) as
terrible, impressive, horrible, tragic etc., anything but trivial
and insignificant; that is what gave birth to them...

(Remarks on Frazer's "The Golden Bough", pp 314, 16, quoted in Rhees,
Without Answers, p 152.)

Chapter 2

4. From Wittgenstein's other remarks, this notion includes religion,
ethics and art, although no specific definition is offered because it
was Wittgenstein's fundamental belief at this time that nothing could
be said about this area at all, beyond the fact that it is "other than",
or "higher" than speech.

5. J P M Hunter, "Forms of life' in Wittgenstein's Philosophical
Investigations"; Hugh Petrie, "Science and Metaphysics: a Wittgensteinian
interpretation", Farhang Zabeeh, "On language-games and forms of life";
in Essays on Wittgenstein, ed Klemke.

6. It seems to me that this bears strong comparison with Heidegger's
approach to Being as suspension in Nothingness - but to carry out such
a comparison would take me beyond my resources.

7. Nonetheless it is a real link, as the discussion of pain and
expression, below, serves to point out.

8. Thus Rhees observes:

Perhaps the point would be that what you have learned must be your
own in some sense: that it cannot simply mean that you have learned
what to do when the officer gives the orders. For in this case what
you do is hardly even your own action. I suppose this goes with the
idea that when you have learned something you ought to be wiser than
you were before; it should have made a difference to you; or; you
ought to have grown.

(Without Answers, p 167)

9. A point which D W Hamlyn labours in his contribution to The Concept
of Education: "The logical and psychological aspects of learning",
especially pp 30 ff.

10. The condition of philosophical inquiry in which, like Descartes, one looks around at a familiar scene and attempts to ask what it is (Is this real, a projection, certain, uncertain?) is not any kind of experience. It is more an attempt to understand the world as if it were itself capable of speaking. We treat it as a picture, searching for meaning. And this is not to say that it is a foolish or misguided activity; it is rather the activity we engage in when we do not know how to read its meaning — a condition we remarked on in discussing the _Phaedo_.

The mistake in such a search for presence is that it assumes the world will speak, without reference to other people and without supposing that the world can only speak through others.

11. An interesting expression of this occurs in Eugen Herrigel's _The Method of Zen_, in discussing the art of compassion of a Zen priest: (The priest) will help the sufferer to see that great suffering is not overcome by refusing to face it or by surrendering to it in despair. He will warn him of the danger of allowing himself to be solaced, and of waiting for time to heal. Salvation lies in giving full assent to his fate, serenely accepting what is laid upon him without asking why he should be singled out for so much suffering...

If the sufferer's ears and eyes are opened by this clarification of his state of mind, he will mark that neither flight from reality nor denial of suffering can bring him detachment. And if, thrown back on himself, he shows that he is trying to become one with his fate, to assent to it so that it can fulfil its own law, then the priest will go on helping him. He will answer his questions, without offering anything more than suggestions and, of course, without preaching.
For it seems to him that there is something much more important than words. Gradually he will fall silent, and in the end will sit there wordless... (but) this silence is not felt by the other person as indifference... It is as though he were being drawn into a field of force from which fresh strength flows into him. (pp 100-2)

Chapter 4

12. On the notion of agreement in judgement, see above, p 109.

13. It is, I think, notably a problem of our own time that we find it difficult to believe in the sincerity or integrity of others precisely because we wish the reassurance of a criterion for such integrity in the others themselves, before we can entrust ourselves to them.

14. As both Norman Malcolm and John Cook, keen enthusiasts of Wittgenstein's thought, have argued: Malcolm in "The Privacy of Experience", Epistemology: New Essays in the Theory of Knowledge, ed. Stroll; and Cook in "Wittgenstein on Privacy", in Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations, ed. Pitcher; as well as in other articles. These two papers are criticised by Stanley Cavell in "Knowing and Acknowledging" (in What we mean what we say?), to which I am indebted.

15. Thus it is seriously misleading to say here that a young child is learning how to speak, and that this is what he would say he is learning 'if he could': it is precisely because he cannot that we should not invent such licence, reading the structures of teaching into learning.

As we have noted in Rhea's "Wittgenstein's Builders", language is not itself isolable for the learner. It is not a generic term for any kind of object, but the context in which he can learn particular 'games' and 'objects'.

16. For example, how would we explain to an examining board that such-and-such merits an allowance or an appointment because of the importance
of his new ideas, unless we already understand something of them even
though we cannot say what they are. The point is that we do do this,
as Maynard Keynes was able to do for Wittgenstein at the University
of Cambridge in 1929; and it is a private understanding, a private
certainty which brings with it the notions of authority and seniority,
and in essence creates the possibility of these concepts.

To this extent I would thus concur with R S Peters' thesis that
we may view education in terms of 'initiation'. ("What is an Educational
Process?", in The Concept of Education, ed. Peters; and "Education as
Initiation", in Philosophical Analysis and Education, ed. Archambault.)

Without discussing his models in detail, Peters has in mind that
education is something other than conditioning or indoctrination (i.e.
any process of establishing responses in other people without their
knowledge or consent), and therefore that it cannot involve abusing the
hiddenness or newness - relative to the pupil - of what is learned;
education commits us to 'morally legitimate procedures' upon which a
pupil may freely and knowingly embark.

The particular question this raises in connexion with our present
thesis is that Peters' concern with the kind of legitimacy that authority
can have in teaching is a concern which the prophets of the 'new education'
- notably Ivan Illich and Paulo Freire - would do well to attend to.
Peters does not work with the concept of privacy we have introduced, but
it seems to me to be a useful way of criticising the assumptions Illich
and Freire make, as well as providing a base on which Peters' themes
can be viewed more clearly.

Illich sets out what he considers the central error in all state
education as:

the fundamental approach common to all schools - the idea that
one person's judgement should determine what and when another
person must learn. (Deschooling Society, p 42)

And I would agree with Illich that a great deal of Western education has indeed served to: "initiate the citizen to the myth that bureaucracies guided by scientific knowledge are effective and benevolent...that increased production will provide a better life." (p 74)

and, by taking over what Illich sees as previously the religious role of determining people's demands and rights, to turn these into demands and rights to succeed institutionally - i.e. to promote and preserve society's institutions. In these terms the people become manipulated by the institutions (ibid. p 52 ff).

Agreeing with Illich's negative critique of Western education, we may also note that there is much in what he and Freire would put in its place which has marked parallels with the understanding of learning we have been working out in this essay - in particular the theme of education as dialogue, in which the teacher is viewed simply as another learner who nonetheless begins the dialogue, yet can learn as much from his pupils as they from him. (Freire uses the distinction 'teacher-student' and 'student-teacher' to indicate this - The Pedagogy of the Oppressed, pp 53 ff.) Such dialogue does not involve the rejection of training (i.e. the acquisition of skills); rather, they are to become available as the learner wishes, not within enforced curricula (Illich, op. cit., pp 14 ff). Yet the presupposition of this is an attribution of freedom to the learner which we are obliged to question: if education is to be concerned solely with providing resources to enable and promote free discovering and probing (Illich, pp 80 f.), in this presupposition of freedom, as both the learner's inalienable right (ibid. p 31) to seek and explore, and as his intrinsic ability to do so (Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness, pp 55 f),
a tenable basis for a new approach to education?

Both Illich and Freire write out of the Third World and its problems, working primarily with adults who have already developed some social and political conception of themselves. Within such a developed view, even though it provides no literate self-expression as yet, self-education is intelligible: but to use resources in this way requires a conception of the world in the first place, in which the learner can orientate himself towards resources. Freire's 'pupils' have already developed their basic conception of the world within families and groups they are a part of - i.e. from institutions and hierarchies which have forced them into close proximity and relationship with other culture-bound human beings.

The problem of the 'new education' is that it is not viewed simply as an aid programme in Third World countries, however, but taken to be an improvement on all Western education; in fact Illich would wish to dispose of the category of 'childhood' altogether. That is, claims are made here about the nature of learning, in which it is seen as a self-motivated activity; yet self-motivation requires a well-developed conception of the world, and the self within the world, a conception which, as we saw when discussing the concept of 'play' and following through the remarks of R P Bearden, a colleague of Peters, requires the guidance and authority of others who do rather more than simply teach what they are asked by their pupils to teach, but firstly what they find themselves obliged to teach, on the basis of the necessity (both in Weil's sense and in Rhees' more logical notion of "what it makes sense to say") which they find in their own lives.

Certainly, as Illich insists, the notion of obligation has led to the development of an institutionalised education in which curricula suppress teachers as much as pupils, and in which the idea of necessity involved is almost totally external and imposed. But the alternative to this is not an
'internal' necessity, one rooted in the individual's apparent freedom to be as he wishes to be; as we noted in Chapter One, this suffers in the same way as any attempt (including that of curricula) to locate necessity within the world, by here locating it in the self, viewed as an object in the world.

The alternative is, instead, to find the necessary, the given, in the relation between self and world; the problem this then poses is that, if one is to seek such necessity, it cannot be found in either self or world. The solution we are considering in this essay is that other people (or, in philosophical terms, "other minds") are not parts of the world - not 'resources' as Illich sees them - but a separate and distinct ontological category, whose relations to world and self are our fundamental concern.

17. The relation between knowing and acknowledging is explored in more detail by Stanley Cavell in his above-mentioned paper, "Knowing and Acknowledging", in Must we mean what we say?

18. Throughout the third chapter of Individuals. This is well criticised by J R Jones in his Presidential Address to the Aristotelian Society (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume XLI (1967) pp 1-18), in which he emphasises the need to separate out the grammar of the word 'I' from that of 'Person', although I do not think that Jones realises the way in which the grammar of 'I' then reflects back on our understanding of what 'person' means, which has been the thrust of our discussion of the idea of a first-person context.

19. Crying out is not the same thing as having a pain; but having a pain may well include crying out. In a case of masochism it may make sense to say that a man has a pain, but is not in pain, or does not feel it; this is not quite like being wounded or hurt, and not being in pain.

20. It is surely the gravest criticism to be laid against the mass media, and especially television, that they do not allow this. We hear music,
watch a programme on scientific discovery or natural history — and have no-one to turn to for help!

21. Teaching, as we have noted, has its professional aspect, of course, and so, for the career-minded, does learning. What we have tried to consider are learning and teaching with reference to the more primary relationship of understanding another.

22. This is in fact part of the objection Rhees makes against A J Ayer when the latter attempts to develop an intelligible concept of private language ("Can there be a Private Language?" (I & II), in Wittgenstein, ed. Pitcher). Rhees' criticism of Ayer is in terms both of the need for what a man says to be corrected in relation to the world, if and when necessary, and that speaking is itself a participation in matters that arise between people and hence must involve others (Rhees, pp 280 ff.). What we have developed from this is the interrelation of the concepts of objectivity and of other people.

**Chapter 5**

23. I am acutely aware that in what follows I have undertaken no discussion of the possibility of learning from scientific creativity, beyond the comments in the first chapter. This is not because I would take art to be more creative than science — and even setting up a new experiment, let alone theoretical rethinking, may require coming to see something new — but because I am not familiar with the 'works' of creative science. Whether or not this in fact reflects a problem in speaking of the 'work' of a scientist, in comparison with that of an artist, is a question I can only leave aside; and I take it that Newton or Einstein, like Kant or Heidegger, offer us a corpus which can bring at least some of us to see something new: to come into contact with objectivity, whether in physics or metaphysics, in a way that gives at least a formal expression to the transformation of
both ourselves and that objectivity.

24. Nonetheless, while it remains intelligible for us to speak about learning from art and Nature, we must also insist on the distinction between the appreciation of art and Nature, (and the experience of presence they provide), and a creativity which actually places itself at the disposal of the Spirit and is led to bring forth its object. In appreciation, we have an understanding of another which is expressed in silence and wonder, stillness and tears; and I have no wish to deny the reality of this understanding. But, as I have suggested, it is understanding on a parallel with the understanding we both have and give in sympathy with another's suffering: we can see the painful situation through their eyes, but it does not become our own, and we do not become able to express it for ourselves.

25. It is necessary, I think, to develop Zizioulas' concept of presence-in-absence in such a way as this. Although Zizioulas does not introduce any concept of Nature as the experience of God's creation, he is profoundly aware that redemption is not an escape from creation, but the presence of the whole of creation in man's presence to man and to God. The developed doctrine of man's priesthood of creation really means this: that the whole of creation becomes the shared object of man's personal communion and understanding.

26. What the creatio ex nihilo doctrine, as Zizioulas uses it here, assumes is that God is not and cannot be present in creation because he is in no way restricted by its pre-existence as matter; yet this still understands presence on the model of the artist's presence, as what the work 'expresses' or brings with it. It therefore supposes that personal presence must be distinct from any reference to objects.

If with creation God is present, then while the experience of Nature can only point to presence at the level of artistic appreciation (which is not to decry it), God's presence need in no way be restricted to his
presence in creation: his relation to his creation is that he himself presents creation. This is still admittedly anthropomorphism, but then so is a conception of creation out of nothing which, by insisting that God creates without materials, still assumes the separation of artist and work, God and creation, in which the goal of the creating is separateness and the establishing of 'another', even though this is taken to be the necessary means to communion. Certainly, as Zizioulas notes, the artist fails in this thrusting towards communion: his work has presence only in absence, whereas God does not create presence in absence, but rather presence and absence together; but this still assumes the creation of otherness, even though God's creation has its essential roles or final being in communion, and hence the possibilities of movement and growth into communion.

What this needs to be qualified by - qualified rather than replaced - is an understanding of creativity in terms of learning and inspiration, as we have outlined above, for which creativity follows out of communion. That is, the world comes into being as a consequence and outflowing of God's communion with man. If it seems that God must have created man over against himself before he could have communion with him - as it does on the model of the artist's creation, which is very much the model of creation and communion Bultmann uses in his conception of 'distance and relation' and 'setting at a distance' - then we must observe that this still implicitly assumes a person to be an individual object, in the way we have been calling into question, as well as assuming that communion is between people without reference to things.

The thesis of God's initial decree as constituting his covenant with man, the covenant which before creation God establishes in his Son, who therefore pre-exists (before creation) as man as well as Logos, is Barth's uniquely powerful reinterpretation of the doctrine of Election (in Church Dogmation II/2). It requires us to say that man's personhood is contained
in Christ's: that God's inspirational creation arises out of, and is the outflowing of, his communion with man in the Person of his Son: but this is again a further and theological refocussing of the concept of person we can only point towards. (See also note 28).

27. As we observed with reference to scepticism, and the sceptic's initial assumption that there is no presence, which presence he then attempts to find in and from objects. (See note 10.) This well indicates the extent of the divide between ontology, at least as Zizioulas expounds it, and epistemology as the West has developed it since Descartes.

Heidegger, of course, has attempted to begin anew from the problem of presence, but I am not in a position to discuss this adequately. We may note one striking alternative to Western empiricism, however, in Rilke's sensitive treatment of the way in which man presents objects, rather than seeking presence from them, even though this presenting is minimally related to other people or even to inspiration:

Praise the world to the angel, not the unutterable world;
you cannot astonish him with your glorious feelings;
in the universe, where he feels more sensitively,
you're just a beginner. Therefore show him the simple thing that is shaped in passing from father to son, that lives near our hands and eyes as our very own.
Tell him about the Things. He'll stand more amazed, as you stood beside the rope-maker of Rome, or the potter on the Nile. Show him how happy a thing can be, how blameless and ours; how even the lamentation of sorrow purely decides to take form, serves as a thing, or dies in a thing and blissfully in the beyond escapes the violin. And these things that live, slipping away, understand that you praise them;
transitory themselves, they trust us for rescue, us, the most transient of all. They wish us to transmute them in our invisible heart - oh, infinitely into us!

Whoever we are.

Earth, isn't this what you want: invisibly to arise in us? Is it not your dream to be some day invisible? Earth! Invisible!

(from the ninth Duino Elegy, trans. MacIntyre, p 71)

28. Greek thinkers, in the Orthodox Churches, appear to be almost alone in their development of this approach to theology. Apart from Zizioulas, the key figure is Lossky, who in his papers "Redemption and Deification" and "The Theological Notion of the Human Person" (in In the Image and Likeness of God) sets out precisely the theological notion of personhood we have been working out on a different level in this essay. It is a notion which begins from the Persons of the Trinity, where:

a person can be fully personal only in so far as he has nothing that he seeks to possess for himself, to the exclusion of others i.e., when he has a common nature with others. It is then alone that the distinction between persons and nature exists in all its purity....

(thus a human being) in the true theological sense of the word, is not limited by his individual nature. He is not only part of the whole, but potentially includes the whole, having in himself the whole of the earthly cosmos, of which he is the hypostasis.


The interrelation of nature and person in the notion of common nature has at the least been a helpful image in considering the role of the shared object in understanding one another as (human) persons. That many find such ideas incomprehensible has only encouraged me to pursue the aim of this essay, and set out the inadequacy of any other idea of what people are.
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