PIERRE BOURDIEU IN CONTEXT:
ETHNOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY IN THE ERA
OF FRENCH LATE CAPITALISM

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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

This thesis attempts a critical examination of the work of the French ethnologist and sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu. It reads his work in the context both of the intellectual traditions within which and against which Bourdieu has elaborated his sociological theories, and of the socio-historical developments in postwar France which those theories have sought to describe and explain. Following the development of Bourdieu’s thought chronologically and thematically, the thesis argues that his most important works have been centrally concerned with the analysis of a series of social and cultural changes contingent on France’s transition to an era of late capitalism, an era characterised by decolonisation, the advent of mass consumerism, unprecedented expansion in the university sector and the consequent challenge to the humanist culture traditionally dispensed there, the waning of a once dominant Left-wing political discourse and its replacement by discourses of managerialism, business efficiency, and neo-liberalism.

Hence, rather than analysing key Bourdieusian concepts such as ‘practice’, ‘habitus’, ‘strategy’, ‘cultural capital’, and ‘field’ in purely theoretical terms, this thesis will understand such concepts as explanatory tools which emerged in response to a particular historical conjuncture, questioning the contribution they might make to our understanding of that conjuncture. The French intellectual field, with its poles of attraction and repulsion, forms an integral part of that historical conjuncture and this thesis will, therefore, also examine how Bourdieu’s approach defined itself in relation to the key protagonists in that field, analysing his debt to figures such as Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Gaston Bachelard, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, and Karl Marx, as well as his more agonistic relationship with figures such as Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, Frantz Fanon, and Jean-Paul Sartre.

Whilst this thesis neither pretends to provide the definitive reading of Bourdieu’s work nor claims that his work’s significance is limited to the particular context in which it was produced, it does argue that a detailed understanding of that context forms the necessary precursor to any objective assessment of the work’s strengths and weaknesses.
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DECLARATION

The second section of Chapter Five, entitled "Ethnology as "Socio-Analyse"", has been published in slightly modified form as "Domestiquer l’exotique... exotiser le domestique": the symbiosis of ethnology and sociology in the work of Pierre Bourdieu, Modern and Contemporary France, (1997). 5, 4, 445-456.

A NOTE ON REFERENCES

For the sake of simplicity, the author-date system of referencing has been used throughout this thesis. As far as practicable, dates refer to the date of publication of the first edition of the work in question in its original language. Full details of the particular editions or translations referred to can be found in the Bibliography at the end of this thesis.
INTRODUCTION

On 9 May 1998, the cartoon on the front page of Le Monde featured two young homeless men. Slightly the worse for drink, sitting in large cardboard boxes. One of the men summed up his understanding of the issues involved in the moves toward further European monetary union: "Toute la question est de savoir si le modèle de la Bundesbank est transposable à la Banque centrale européenne". His companion replied laconically: "Tu lis trop Bourdieu".

The humour of this cartoon relied on two assumptions, both of which are highly revealing of Pierre Bourdieu's current status in his native France. For the cartoonist assumed that the readership of Le Monde would not only know who Bourdieu was, but would also immediately associate him both with a particular political stance on monetary union and with a concern for the plight of France's most impoverished and marginalised social groups, whether it be the homeless, illegal immigrants, or the unemployed. That Bourdieu should be so immediately identified with the defence of the rights of the impoverished against the power of the global banking system reflects the extent of his notoriety and influence, an influence which extends beyond the restricted field of French sociology proper to impinge onto the wider political and cultural scene.

For many years now, Bourdieu's work has exerted a considerable influence within the field of both French and world sociology. His theories of class, culture, and education, elaborated in texts such as Les Héritiers (1964), La Reproduction (1970), and La Distinction (1979), are obligatory points of reference for anyone writing in these areas. His three book-length studies of Kabyle ethnology, Esquisse d'une théorie de la pratique (1972), Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977), and Le Sens pratique (1980), have acquired a similar status within the domain of anthropology.

The publication in 1992 of Bourdieu's detailed study of the structure and genesis of the nineteenth-century French artistic and literary fields, Les Règles de l'art, meanwhile, has extended his influence in the areas of literary and cultural studies. Bridget Fowler's recent study, Pierre Bourdieu and Cultural Theory (1997), takes Les Règles de l'art as the starting point for a general assessment of Bourdieu's contribution to cultural theory. Special numbers of the journals French Cultural Studies, in 1993, and Modern Language Quarterly, in 1997, have examined the usefulness of Bourdieu's theory to cultural and literary studies. Toril Moi's recent biography, Simone de
Beauvoir: the making of an intellectual woman (1994), draws heavily on Bourdieu’s work on the grandes écoles, on educational and cultural capital, to illuminate the intellectual formation of this important novelist and thinker. John Guillory, in his Cultural Capital: the problem of canon formation (1993), has applied Bourdieu’s work to a thought-provoking intervention into the debates around the literary canon and the curriculum at American universities.

It is, however, Bourdieu’s more recent work, such as the collaborative volume La Misère du monde (1993) or the much shorter pamphlet Sur la télévision (1996), combined with his public interventions in support of striking French students and workers in the Autumn of 1995, which seem to have resonated with a broader sense of political, cultural, and social malaise in contemporary France. It is these works and his more directly political prises de position which have earned him the status of one of the most high profile intellectuals currently working in that country, the very status which the cartoon in Le Monde takes for granted.

The importance of and interest in Bourdieu’s work in his native France has been underlined by the recent publication of two collections of articles dedicated to his work, special numbers of the journals Critique in 1995 and Actuel Marx in 1996. 1997 saw the publication in France of two general introductions to his work, Patrice Bonnewitz’s Premières leçons sur la sociologie de Bourdieu (1997), an exposition of Bourdieu’s theories intended for use by baccalauréat students, and Alain Accardo’s Introduction à la sociologie critique (1997). This same year also saw the publication of two English-language monographs dedicated to Bourdieu’s work, Fowler’s Bourdieu and Cultural Theory and David Swartz’s Culture and Power: the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, as well as two international Bourdieu conferences, at the Universities of Southampton and Glasgow, which drew speakers from Britain, the Continent, the United States, and Australasia.

The immense interest in Bourdieu’s work, the huge and apparently ever increasing secondary literature generated by that work, as well as the rapidity with which his new works are translated into English and the other major world languages all suggest that his status as a significant thinker on the international stage is beyond question. However, if a broad consensus exists regarding the importance of Bourdieu’s thought, the same cannot be said when it comes to situating that thought with regard to other intellectual traditions and movements. As the authors of the volume An Introduction to the Work of Pierre Bourdieu (1990) have pointed out, Bourdieu ‘has been
authoritatively placed in all major theoretical traditions', Marxist, Weberian, Durkheimian, even poststructuralist or postmodernist (Harker et al 1990, 213). Loic Wacquant has similarly emphasised what he terms the 'blurred visions', 'conflicting reactions', and 'fragmented readings' which have hampered Bourdieu's reception in the English-speaking world (in Calhoun et al 1993, 235-62).

The extent to which Bourdieu's work continues to elicit 'conflicting reactions', not only in the English-speaking world but also in his native France, can perhaps be best illustrated by reference to the vexed question of his relationship with Marxism and 'poststructuralism' or 'postmodernism'. Indeed, this question represents one of the most enduring controversies surrounding Bourdieu, with a series of critics claiming to have identified close affinities between his work and one, either, or both of these ostensibly opposed intellectual currents. The question of Bourdieu's relationship to 'postmodernism' or 'poststructuralism' is rendered more problematic by the notorious imprecision of these two terms. Indeed, there appear to be almost as many conflicting definitions of the terms as there are books dedicated to the subject. Thus, assessments of Bourdieu's relationship to 'poststructuralism' or 'postmodernism' will vary widely depending upon the particular definitions of these terms which critics choose to employ. As Geoffrey Bennington (1994, 172) has argued: 'The so-called “debate” around “postmodernism”, “postmodernity”, and the “postmodern” is probably most distinguished by its confusion. [...] The situation is complicated further still by a recent tendency [...] to conflate postmodernism with “so-called poststructuralism”.' He goes on,

In more than one way, the name 'post-structuralism' is improper: it is an English name for an essentially (apparently originally) French movement: it designates as 'literary theory' a complex set of work in philosophy, psychoanalysis, literary studies and so forth; the thinkers grouped under this name are in fact more or less violently opposed to each other. With the exception of Lyotard [...], none of these thinkers has, to my knowledge, laid claim to (or even used with reference to their work) a name beginning with 'post-'. (241)

Despite the confusion surrounding the terms 'poststructuralism' and 'postmodernism', however, given that critics continue to use the two terms to situate, criticise, or praise Bourdieu's work, this
thesis will be obliged to retain them. For the purposes of this thesis, then, ‘poststructuralism’ will be used to refer to a broad and diverse group of thinkers, including Derrida, Jean-François Lyotard, Gilles Deleuze, and the later Michel Foucault, who share a concern to challenge the classically modernist conceptions of subjectivity, Reason, Science, and History. If all these thinkers can also be considered ‘postmodernists’, it is because they have all questioned the self-identity of the rational subject in the name of a structure of desire, difference, or alterity which cannot be dialectically sublated into a modernist meta-narrative of History or Reason.

Scott Lash (1990, 237-65) has provided perhaps the most sustained argument in favour of viewing Bourdieu as a postmodernist, situating Bourdieu’s work alongside that of ‘poststructuralists’ such as Derrida, Foucault, and Deleuze. Focusing on Bourdieu’s epistemological reflexivity, his emphasis on the relationship between power and knowledge, on symbolic consumption over material production, and on the commodified culture increasingly consumed by France’s aspirational ‘classes moyennes’, Lash argues that all identify Bourdieu as a theorist of the postmodern. Mike Featherstone, in his Consumer Culture and Postmodernism (1991), advances similar arguments in favour of Bourdieu’s perceived postmodernism. However, both Lash and Featherstone understand postmodernism as the corollary, at the level of culture, of a shift to ‘post-industrial society’ or ‘advanced consumer capitalism’, thereby interpreting the postmodern in terms of precisely the sort of eminently modernist historical meta-narrative that postmodernism has sought to challenge. Furthermore, Lash’s assertions that Bourdieu’s focus on the cultural consumption of the ‘classes moyennes’ in La Distinction reflects the ‘de-differentiation’ of previously discrete cultural and social spheres, the waning of distinctions between high and low culture, appear to be based on a highly partial reading of the text which ignores its author’s emphasis on the way new cultural forms can become the basis for the reassertion of older class distinctions.

If Lash’s attempt to demonstrate an affinity between Bourdieu and contemporary postmodern theorists, such as Derrida, Foucault, or Deleuze, is undertaken from a neutral or broadly favourable point of view, the same cannot be said for the two French critics Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut. In their La Pensée 68: essai sur l’antihumanisme contemporain (1985), Ferry and Renaut place Bourdieu alongside his contemporaries or near-contemporaries, Derrida, Foucault, and Jacques
Lacan, arguing that all are representative of an 'anti-humanist' and thoroughly relativist strain in postwar French thought. Where Derrida is identified as promoting 'un heideggerianisme français', Foucault 'un nietzschisme français', and Lacan 'un freudianisme français', Bourdieu is held up as the representative of 'un marxisme français', adopting a radically materialist and hence relativist approach to cultural value whose roots are to be located in a disavowed debt to Louis Althusser's structural Marxism. This argument has been repeated more recently by Jeffrey Alexander in the lengthy section of his Fin de siècle Social Theory: relativism, reduction, and the problem of reason (1995), which he dedicates to Bourdieu's work.

It is questionable, however, whether Ferry and Renaut have done anything more than note the immense influence of Marx, Freud, Nietzsche, and Heidegger over the entirety of the postwar French intellectual field, wilfully conflating the different uses to which these thinkers have been put by figures as different as Lacan, Bourdieu, and Derrida, the better to support their call for a 'return' to the certainties of a humanistic rationalism whose value they never question. Meanwhile, as Wacquant (1996) has noted, Alexander's attempt to prove that Bourdieu is really a Marxist follows an almost McCarthyite logic and appears to be motivated more by resentment than serious intellectual critique.

Where critics such as Alexander and Ferry and Renaut have argued that Bourdieu's perceived debt to Marxism is consonant with the generalised 'relativism' and 'reductionism' they associate with postmodernism, other commentators have identified this same debt to Marxism as precisely that which distinguishes his work from the postmodernists. Thus Toril Moi (1991, 1018-19) contrasts 'poststructuralism and postmodernism' with Bourdieu's debt to 'classical French sociology, structuralism, and even Marxism', seeing 'an echo of Gramsci's theory of hegemony' in his work on education, culture, and social reproduction. Terry Eagleton (1991) has sought to situate Bourdieu's work firmly within a Marxist tradition of Ideologiekritik, whilst some such affinity has been emphasised by numerous other critics, both English- and French-speaking (Hall 1977; Garnham, ed. 1980; Collectif 'Révoltes Logiques' 1984). For his own part, Bourdieu has always challenged the assertion of any debt on his part to the Gramscian or Althusserian traditions, emphasising that he only discovered Gramsci's work after he had written his most important studies of education and reproduction and highlighting his criticisms of the structural Marxist conception
of subjects as the passive 'supports' or 'Träger' of the socio-economic system, criticisms which date from the 1965 preface to Un Art moyen (Bourdieu 1987, 39; 31). Nonetheless, the question of Bourdieu's relationship to Marxism remains a highly contentious one.

It is not merely, however, Bourdieu's perceived affinities with Marxism that have led some critics to distinguish sharply between his work and that of the poststructuralists. Other commentators highlight his commitment to the scientific value of sociological study as evidence of Bourdieu's continuing adherence to an essentially modernist, rationalist tradition. Such commentators have focused on Bourdieu's (1984, 291) own trenchant critique of what he terms the 'mise en question nihiliste de la science', typical of 'certaines analyses dites postmodernes', to elevate his work to the status of some kind of panacea or antidote to the perceived ills of a dangerously 'irrationalist', 'nihilistic', or 'relativistic' fad for French postmodern theory. Thus Derek Robbins (1991, 173) distinguishes between Bourdieu and 'Parisian postmodernists', 'intellectual cowboys', such as Derrida or Lyotard, who 'are intellectually dishonest and have forfeited moral integrity by indulging in a shallow form of academic journalism'. Fowler (1997, 1) suggests that Bourdieu 'offers a welcome relief to anyone suffering from post-Lacanian excess on the issue of the subject'. Swartz (1997, vii) argues that it was Bourdieu's 'rigorous attention to sociological method' which 'rescued' him from 'the temptation of intellectual dilettantism' during his 'student years at the Sorbonne'.

To elevate the status of Bourdieu's work to that of a panacea for the perceived ills of postmodernism in this way is, however, surely less than helpful when attempting an objective assessment of that work's strengths and weaknesses. As the rhetoric of 'temptation', 'excess', 'relief', and 'rescue' employed by critics such as Swartz and Fowler suggests, Bourdieu's work is judged here less on its own merits than in terms of its usefulness as a weapon in the struggle to defend social science against the 'dangers' of postmodern theory. For these critics, it appears to be the strength of Bourdieu's stated commitment to the values of science and reason, rather than a detailed analysis of the theoretical bases of his claims to scientificity, which ground their assertions as to the a priori superiority of Bourdieu's thought in comparison with 'poststructuralism'. This, in turn, carries the risk of a rather facile moralism whereby Bourdieu's commitment to 'science', 'history', or 'reason' can be opposed to the apparently wilful irresponsibility, irrationalism, and
faddishness of poststructuralist theorists without the validity of the challenges posed by such theorists to science, reason, and history ever being considered.

Indeed, this is precisely the procedure adopted by Bourdieu’s close collaborator Louis Pinto (1987) in his reading of the French philosophical field of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Here Bourdieu is posited as a lone figure bravely defending the values of science and reason against the assaults of his ‘more fashionable’ contemporaries. At a less extreme level, a similar logic can be found at work behind Niilo Kauppi’s analysis, in French Intellectual Nobility (1996), of the ‘post-Sartrean’ French intellectual field, in which Bourdieu’s scientific rigour is praised over the more marketable qualities of contemporaries such as Derrida, Foucault, Barthes, and the telgueliens. It is perhaps in the light of such attempts to emphasise Bourdieu’s distance from and opposition to the perceived dangers of postmodernism that the contributions of Jacques Bouveresse, Richard Shusterman, and Charles Taylor to the recent special number of Critique on Bourdieu’s work might be understood. For, by emphasising the importance of the Anglo-American philosophical tradition to Bourdieu’s ‘theory of practice’, to the detriment of any acknowledgement of the much more decisive influence of the work of Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, such critics were presumably attempting to dissociate Bourdieu once and for all from a tradition of Continental Philosophy associated with a dangerous irrationalism and nihilism.

Wholly schematically, then, it would be possible to distinguish between three diametrically opposed approaches to the question of Bourdieu’s relationship to Marxism and postmodernism, respectively. For some commentators, Bourdieu’s Marxism and/or his commitment to a scientific sociology mark his work out as wholly distinct from and clearly superior to a dangerously irrationalist and nihilist postmodern turn in French contemporary thought. For others, Bourdieu’s emphasis on epistemological reflexivity, on symbolic consumption rather than material production, and on the power-knowledge nexus signal his affinities with that very postmodern turn. For others still, the rejection of any notion of a universal cultural value implicit in Bourdieu’s continuing debt to Marxism is consonant with a more generalised relativism and reductionism characteristic of a contemporary ‘anti-humanism’ which he shares with other postmodernists: Bourdieu is both Marxist and postmodernist. These three conflicting assessments of Bourdieu’s position within the contemporary intellectual field certainly do not exhaust the range of critical judgements that his
work has elicited. However, they do nicely illustrate the extent to which Bourdieu’s work continues to be subject to diametrically opposed critical assessments in a way almost unique for a thinker of his stature and importance.

Unless Bourdieu’s work is attributed a peculiar level of inherent ambiguity, it can only be supposed that, as Wacquant has argued (in Calhoun et al 1993, 245), the endurance of such ‘conflicting reactions’ reflects a failure by critics adequately to grasp the theoretical traditions within which and against which Bourdieu is writing, that ‘nexus of antagonistic and competing positions within and against which Bourdieu developed his own stance’. Amongst those whom Wacquant cites as important to an understanding of Bourdieu’s work are Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Marcel Mauss, the Durkheimian Maurice Halbwachs, and the philosophers of science Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem.

Taking the single example of Husserl, it is certainly remarkable that, with the honorable exception of an article by François Héran (1987), no critic, either French- or English-speaking, has analysed in any detail the immense influence of his work on Bourdieu’s conceptions of temporality, ‘practice’, and the ‘doxic relation’ at the heart of the ‘habitus’. Several critics have noted the influence of Merleau-Ponty’s concepts of incorporation and embodied practice on the Bourdieusian concept of ‘habitus’. However, they characteristically fail to explain how this debt to a phenomenologist such as Merleau-Ponty can be squared with their assertions that Bourdieu’s theoretical approach derives from a decisive ‘break with phenomenology’ (see for example Harker et al 1990). Moreover, the importance of Merleau-Ponty as one potential model for Bourdieu’s own intellectual trajectory has not been sufficiently acknowledged. By attempting, in the essays in Signes (1960) particularly, to open a dialogue between the phenomenological philosophical tradition, into which Bourdieu himself had been immersed as a philosophy student at the Ecole normale supérieure (ENS) of the 1950s, and the social sciences, in the form of the work of Marcel Mauss and Claude Lévi-Strauss, Merleau-Ponty served as one important precursor to Bourdieu’s own intellectual development. As the latter was to put it in Choses dites (1987), Merleau Ponty ‘paraissait représenter une des issues possibles hors de la philosophie bavarde de l’institution scolaire’ (1987, 15).
Another area which has been either overlooked or dealt with rather superficially by most English- and French-speaking critics alike is the question of Bourdieu's debt to the work of Bachelard, essential to any understanding of the former's epistemological theories. Thus, Richard Jenkins in his concise and lively introduction to Bourdieu's work, *Pierre Bourdieu* (1992), dedicates a whole chapter to Bourdieu's epistemology without ever mentioning Bachelard's work. Similarly, Fowler (1997, 92-3) identifies certain 'points of alignment' between Bourdieu's work and the Foucault of *Les Mots et les choses* (1966) and *L'Archeologie du savoir* (1969) without considering the debt both thinkers owe to the work of Bachelard and Canguilhem.\(^5\) Robbins (1991, 77), Kauppi (1996, 39-52), and Swartz (1997, 31-5) have all acknowledged the influence of Bachelard on Bourdieu's work. However, all assume that Bourdieu follows Bachelard to the letter, an assumption which ignores the very real problems inherent in Bourdieu's adoption of a Bachelardian conceptual vocabulary, problems which Mary McAllester-Jones (1995) has enumerated and analysed in considerable detail.

Finally, the importance of the Durkheimian school, not merely as a source of concepts and theoretical approaches but also as a model for a collective practice of scientific sociology centered around a single journal, *L'Année sociologique* in the case of Durkheim, *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* in the case of Bourdieu, has rarely been fully appreciated. The work of Halbwachs in particular, both on the lifestyle and consumption of the working class in his *La Classe ouvrière et les niveaux de vie* (1912) and on the central importance of social morphology to an understanding of social change, has certainly tended to be overlooked. But, as Frédéric Bon and Yves Schemel (1980, 1202) have rightly pointed out, it is the Durkheimian project as a whole which offers a series of important parallels with Bourdieu's own theoretical practice:

Il existe entre la construction de l'oeuvre de Bourdieu et l'ensemble formé par celles de Durkheim et de Mauss un parallélisme surprenant. A *La Division du travail social* répond *Travail et travailleurs en Algérie*; aux *Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* correspondent à la fois les essais d'ethnologie kabyle, les travaux sur le champ religieux et sur les classifications; à *L'Evolution pédagogique* en France, ainsi que *Education et sociologie*. 
répliquent Les Héritiers, La Reproduction, Les Etudiants et leurs études; enfin, Les Règles de la méthode sociologique sont réécrites dans Le Métier de sociologue.

To emphasise the importance of the Durkheimian school as another important presursor for Bourdieu’s sociological project is not to seek to deny the influence of the other two giants of classical sociological theory, Max Weber and Karl Marx, on his work. Rather, it is important to understand how these three figures together represent theoretical touchstones for Bourdieu, exemplifying a series of historical, theoretical, and empirical approaches to which he can ‘return’, as it were, in order to emphasise his distance from those of his contemporaries he considers guilty of superficiality and lack of scientific rigour. This insight, in turn, leads to another issue that will prove essential to a clear understanding of Bourdieu’s work. For Bourdieu is an extremely combative thinker; his approach to any of the subjects he covers typically emerges out of a polemical exchange with other commentators on the same subject. The extent to which his own ‘theory of practice’, elaborated primarily in his works of Kabyle ethnology, emerged out of a critical reaction to both Sartrean existential phenomenology and Claude Lévi-Strauss’s structural anthropology is made quite explicit by Bourdieu and has elicited much commentary.

Frequently, however, Bourdieu does not identify by name those in opposition to whom he develops his own approach, preferring instead to use a series of euphemisms which, if easily decipherable by those working within the Parisian intellectual field, are much less so to Anglophone critics with no specific knowledge of that field. This approach is epitomised by a passage in La Reproduction in which Bourdieu lambasts a whole series of contemporary French commentators on education and culture without identifying a single one by name (1970, 228-30). A disparaging reference to ‘les voltigeurs de toutes les avant-gardes, sans cesse occupés [...] à scruter l’horizon de la “modernité” et toujours prêts et prompts à discerner la dernière-née des “nouvelles classes”, des “nouvelles aliénations” ou des “nouvelles contradictions”’ (1970, 228) will surely remain opaque to those not familiar with the debates around mass culture, cultural ‘homogenisation’, and the birth of a ‘new working class’ sparked in the 1960s by the work of Serge Mallet, Alain Touraine, Henri Lefebvre and the group collected around the journal Arguments. However, a knowledge of these debates and of Bourdieu’s criticisms of their chief protagonists will prove essential in attempting to
situate not only Bourdieu’s works on higher education, such as La Reproduction, but also his early works on class and culture, Un Art moyen and L’Amour de l’art (1966). As this thesis will attempt to show, Bourdieu’s work of the 1960s, in particular, emerged out of a series of critical interactions with a wide range of his contemporaries including Roland Barthes, Benigno Caceres, Joffre Dumazedier, Frantz Fanon, Henri Lefebvre, Serge Mallet, Edgar Morin, and Alain Touraine. Understanding how Bourdieu defined his approach in relation to these thinkers will also facilitate an assessment of the later development of his works, through the 1970s, 80s, and 90s.

That commentators on Bourdieu’s work trained in the Anglo-American sociological tradition should be unfamiliar with the work of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Bachelard, or even Halbwachs and ill-equipped to decipher some of Bourdieu’s more allusive references to his contemporaries in the intellectual field is, of course, perfectly understandable. Unfortunately, however, the secondary literature generated by his work in France has done little to overcome these failings. The two introductions to Bourdieu’s work published by Alain Accardo, Initiation à la sociologie: l’illusionnisme social, une lecture de Bourdieu (1986) and Introduction à la sociologie critique (1997), together with the selection of excerpts he co-edited with Philip Corcuff, La Sociologie de Bourdieu (1986), provide useful expositions of his major theoretical concepts but do not attempt a detailed analysis of their theoretical foundations or even their strengths and weaknesses. Bonnewitz’s Premières leçons sur la sociologie de Bourdieu (1997) is, as its title suggests, no more than a general introduction to his work. The four collections of articles dedicated to his work, the ‘Collectif: Révoltes Logiques’ collection of 1984, the Cahiers du L.A.S.A. special number of 1988, the special numbers of Critique (1995) and Autour de Marx (1996), are, as is the nature of such collections, of varying quality and can by no means substitute for a more detailed study of Bourdieu’s work.6

There is, therefore, clearly a need for a study which places Bourdieu’s work much more precisely in terms of the contemporary French and, by extension, international intellectual field, by analysing in greater detail the theoretical traditions within which and against which his approach defines itself. However, if the ultimate aim of such a study were to be simply to place Bourdieu’s work definitively under one or other of the categorisations which have been applied to it, ‘postmodern’, Marxist, Durkheimian, Weberian, then this would prove a peculiarly academic.
to say ultimately rather futile, exercise. As Bourdieu himself has frequently emphasised, his concepts are intended as tools for thinking with rather than as a set of self-sufficient theoretical statements and he has urged his fellow sociologists to apply his concepts to their research projects rather than to use them as pretexts for dry conceptual exegesis. As he put it in Méditations pascaliennes (1997):

"le plus clair des malentendus vient du fait que la lecture du lector est à elle-même sa fin, et qu'elle s'intéresse aux textes, et aux théories, méthodes ou concepts qu'ils véhiculent, non pour en faire quelque chose [...], mais pour les gloser, en les rapportant à d'autres textes (sous couvert, à l'occasion, d'épistémologie ou de méthodologie). Cette lecture fait ainsi disparaître l'essentiel, c'est-à-dire non seulement les problèmes que les concepts proposés visaient à nommer et à résoudre - comprendre un rituel, expliquer les variations en matière de crédit, d'épargne ou de fécondité, rendre compte de taux différentiels de réussite scolaire ou de fréquentation des musées, etc. - mais aussi l'espace des possibles théoriques et méthodologiques qui a fait que ces problèmes ont pu être posés, à ce moment-là, et dans ces termes [...], et qu'il est indispensable de reconstruire par un travail historique... (1997, 77)"

Here, Bourdieu alluded to two different, but potentially interrelated, historical contexts which he saw as essential to an understanding of his work. He emphasised the importance of grasping the structure and historical genesis of the intellectual field into which his work has intervened, that 'nexus of antagonistic and competing positions within and against which Bourdieu developed his own stance', whose absence from the existing critical literature this introduction, following Wacquant, has sought to demonstrate. He also alluded to the rather broader, but no less important, historical context out of which his work has emerged, namely the specific problems which his theoretical concepts sought to name and analyse. Expressed somewhat differently, this is to highlight the importance of understanding the social, historical, and cultural developments in postwar France which Bourdieu's work has sought to analyse.

Perhaps the most frequent criticism made against Bourdieu's work concerns its perceived determinism and consequent inability to account for significant historical change. Even a
favourable critic such as Fowler (1997, 5) concludes that ‘apart from his studies in decolonisation’, Bourdieu ‘has never undertaken’ any ‘protracted discussion of transformation’ in the social, cultural, or political spheres. If this were true, then Bourdieu would have to be considered a very poor sociologist indeed, for his detailed studies of education, class, and culture in postwar France have coincided with a series of dramatic and rapid changes in these domains. The period from 1958 to the present day, the period which spans Bourdieu’s publishing career, has seen a series of changes which have significantly transformed the nature of French culture and society, changes which include the violent and traumatic process of decolonisation; ‘les trente glorieuses’, that thirty-year span of rapid French postwar economic reconstruction and growth; the massive and unprecedented expansion in the higher education sector from the late 1950s onwards, whose effects were to be most strikingly manifested in the disturbances of May 1968; the gradual waning of the Left Marxist or marxisant project, which had held such sway over the postwar intellectual and political fields, in the face of the emergence of a peculiarly French form of neo-liberal discourse mitigated by and mediated through a long tradition of centralised state intervention.

Far from being intrinsically resistant to the changes which have marked postwar French society, Bourdieu’s work has frequently taken such changes as its subject matter. Indeed, Bourdieu himself has often been not simply a commentator on such changes but a key protagonist in the intellectual and political debates they generated. His early works on Algeria, Sociologie de l’Algérie (1958), Travail et travailleurs en Algérie (1963), and Le Déracinement (1964), were centrally concerned with the traumas of colonial war and decolonisation. Early works on class and culture, Un Art moyen, L’Amour de l’art, and the frequently overlooked collection Le Partage des bénéfices (1966), were polemical interventions into contemporary debates surrounding the extent to which French postwar prosperity could really be seen as heralding an age of cultural democratisation and homogenisation. His works on French higher education, most notably Les Héritiers and La Reproduction, straddled the dramatic events of 1968 and were highly influential in shaping the debates regarding the function of the universities at a time of rapid expansion. Homo academicus (1984), Bourdieu’s retrospective study of the genesis and structure of the field of French higher education in the 1960s would focus on the shifting balance of power between academic disciplines and the changing sources and forms of academic prestige on the eve of the events of 1968.
Bourdieu’s later work, from the mid-1970s to the present day, has been equally concerned to trace and analyse the dynamics of social and cultural change. His definitive study of class, lifestyle, and culture, *La Distinction*, takes as one of its central themes the ‘reconversion’ of an older bourgeois culture of leisured refinement into a more modern, dynamic managerial or business culture. *La Noblesse d'état* (1989), Bourdieu’s immense study of France’s elite grandes écoles, focuses on the way in which this new managerialism is inculcated into an increasingly homogeneous social, intellectual, and political elite. The rise of the technocratic *Ecole normale d’administration* (ENA) at the expense of Bourdieu’s own alma mater, the *Ecole normale supérieure* (ENS), is taken to epitomise the supplanting of an older humanist tradition with the new exigencies of business efficiency and the market. *La Misère du monde* (1993), Bourdieu’s extensive collaborative study of contemporary forms of social and cultural marginalisation, attempts to trace the damaging effects of this technocratic discourse in the domain of social policy. *Libre-échange* (1994), his dialogue with the avant-garde artist Hans Haacke, and *Sur la Télévision* (1996), a polemic against the power of the media, focus on the threats posed to the autonomy of the artistic and intellectual fields, respectively, by commercial and political forces. *Les Règles de l’art* (1992) returns to the struggles of nineteenth-century artists such as Gustave Flaubert, Edouard Manet, Charles Baudelaire, and Emile Zola to achieve artistic autonomy in search of models for contemporary artistic and intellectual practice. The essays in the collections *Raisons pratiques* (1994) and *Méditations pascaliennes* (1997) have sought to establish the theoretical bases for Bourdieu’s increasing concern with the struggle to defend the autonomy of the artistic, intellectual, and bureaucratic fields from narrow political or commercial interests. His most recent collection, *Contre-feux* (1998), finally, contains a series of directly political interventions, ‘des propos pour servir à la résistance contre l’invasion néo-libérale’.

The changes which have formed the subject matter of so many of Bourdieu’s most significant works, decolonisation, the postwar consumer boom, mass expansion in higher education, the waning of an older humanist culture and its replacement by more technocratic, managerialist, even neo-liberal discourses, the increasing incursion of the market into the cultural and intellectual spheres, could all be read as symptomatic of what Ernest Mandel (1975) has described as the shift to ‘late capitalism’. Mandel argues that in the postwar period all the major Western economies
underwent a significant shift from an 'imperialist' stage to a 'late capitalist' stage. With the advent of decolonisation, Western economies could no longer accumulate capital through trade with their colonies but had to move instead to trading in an ever increasing range of finished consumer goods between one another. The search for new markets and the expanding range of new products fuelled by constant technological innovation led in turn to the emergence of new strata of middle-ranking executives in marketing, advertising, and research and development functions, executives educated in the rapidly expanding higher education sector. Faith in the ability of technological change and economic growth to provide the opportunity of prosperity for all, meanwhile, encouraged the emergence of certain technocratic, managerialist, and ultimately neo-liberal discourses.

Although Bourdieu has himself never used the term, this thesis will therefore argue that Bourdieu's work is best understood as an attempt to examine some of the key developments and contradictions contingent upon the advent of the era of French late capitalism. Indeed, even the three works of Kabyle ethnology, *Esquisse... Outline...* and *Le Sens pratique*, which ostensibly appear least concerned with the dynamics of social change, can be understood in this context. As Robert Young (1990) has argued, the physical process of French decolonisation was accompanied in the philosophical domain by a series of attempts to 'decolonise' the western philosophical tradition, attempts manifest in the attention of thinkers such as Lévi-Strauss, Derrida, Foucault, and Deleuze in the problematics of representing the Other, in an ethics of difference or alterity. Although Bourdieu has defined his own approach in opposition to these structuralists and poststructuralists, his Kabyle work does also manifest a concern with the problematics of ethnological representation and can thus be read as a parallel, if distinct, theoretical development.

To argue that Bourdieu's work is best understood as an attempt to make sense of French society's transition to late capitalism is not the same as arguing that Bourdieu is postmodernist. Although some commentators, most notably Frederic Jameson (1991), argue that postmodernism is 'the cultural logic of late capitalism', paradoxically such a contention rests on profoundly modernist assumptions, on an implicit notion of expressive causality and a typically modernist historical meta-narrative of a sort which those theorists most frequently dubbed 'postmodernist' would surely seek to question or deconstruct. This thesis will, therefore, distinguish between 'late capitalism', understood as an eminently modernist tool for theorising the development of postwar western
capitalism, and 'postmodernism', understood as a form of thought which would seek to challenge
the assumptions implicit in the notion of late capitalism.

The extent to which the transition to late capitalism has formed not merely the historical context
against which Bourdieu writes but also the very subject matter of his most important works has
tended to be ignored by critics of his work. A detailed study of the historical context in which
Bourdieu writes does not fall within the ambit either of Jenkins's concise introduction to his work,
Pierre Bourdieu (1992), or of Fowler's analysis (1997) of his cultural theory, whose focus is firmly
on Bourdieu's account of the nineteenth-century artistic and literary fields. Robbins' study, The
Work of Pierre Bourdieu (1991), is the most detailed monograph on his work in either French or
English and provides a useful exposition of the content of his major works up until 1989. However,
Robbins focuses on the internal development of Bourdieu's concepts and ideas to the detriment of
any sustained discussion of the social and cultural phenomena those concepts seek to elucidate. A
similar approach can be found in both Swartz's Culture and Power (1997) and the contributions to
the two collections, An Introduction to the Work of Pierre Bourdieu (1990) and Bourdieu: critical
perspectives (1993). In all three cases, Bourdieu's work is used as a pretext for drawing a series of
theoretical conclusions of a general rather than a specific nature with the result that the inherent
dynamism and combativeness of Bourdieu's writing seems to be effaced.

This thesis will approach Bourdieu's work from a rather different perspective, attempting to
place it in the closely interrelated contexts of contemporary developments in the French intellectual
field out of which it grew and of the broader socio-historical developments on which it has sought to
comment. Such an approach claims neither to be exhaustive nor to provide the definitive reading of
Bourdieu's work. Studies by Bourdieu which are addressed less squarely to the issues contingent on
the transition to late capitalism, such as his study of language and symbolic power, Ce que parler
veut dire (1982), or his analysis of Martin Heidegger's philosophy and politics, L'Ontologie
polistique de Martin Heidegger (1988), will only be mentioned in passing. Les Règles de l'art will
be analysed less in terms of its historical accuracy as an account of the nineteenth-century artistic
field than of its adequacy as a model for contemporary autonomous intellectual activity. Moreover,
to insist on the importance of understanding the context in which Bourdieu has produced his
sociological theories is not to suggest that the significance of those theories is limited to that
context. Bourdieu himself has frequently emphasised that his theories have pretensions to a
general, 'transhistorical' validity. However, he has also emphasised that to arrive at this level of
generality it is necessary to 's'immerger dans la particularité d'une réalité empirique,
historiquement située et datée, [...] pour la construire comme "cas particulier du possible". selon le
mot de Gaston Bachelard, c'est-à-dire comme un cas de figure dans un univers fini de
configurations possibles' (1994a, 16). Focusing on the particular empirical or historical realities
which Bourdieu has sought to analyse might thus be seen as a necessary precursor to any objective
assessment of the general validity of his ideas and concepts.

The question which animates this thesis, then, will not be that of the specific categorisation most
suited to Bourdieu's work, postmodernist, Marxist, Weberian, Durkheimian, nor will it be that of
the adequacy of his theories as a series of free-standing theoretical concepts of general applicability.
Rather, the theoretical foundations of concepts such as 'habitus', 'practice', 'field', 'cultural capital'
and so on will be examined only inasmuch as they help illuminate the question of the ability of such
concepts to make sense of the changes in postwar French intellectual, cultural, and social life
contingent on France's entry into the era of late capitalism.

The approach followed will be broadly chronological and thematic. Thus Chapter One will deal
with the series of books and articles which Bourdieu published on the Algerian conflict between
1958 and 1964, focusing on his polemics with Sartre and Fanon and emphasising the key role
played by Husserl's theories of temporality in the early development of Bourdieu's thought.
Consideration of these early works on Algeria will also facilitate an understanding of the model of
social change which Bourdieu was later to apply to his studies of postwar France. Indeed, Bourdieu
himself (1987, 33) has emphasised that the theoretical apparatus he had begun to sketch out in his
early Algerian work played a key role in the studies of class, culture, and education that he carried
out under the aegis of the Collège de sociologie européenne (C.S.E.) on his return to France from
Algeria. Chapters Two and Three will thus address these aspects of his work.

Chapter Two will analyse Bourdieu's early studies of class and culture, Un Art moyen, L'Amour
de l'art, and Le Partage des bénéfices, situating them in terms of the contemporary debates on these
issues sparked by the rapidity of French economic expansion in the 1960s. Chapter Three will
focus on his studies of French higher education, reading them in the context of the massive postwar
expansion in this sector and of the events of May 1968, which were surely the most dramatic manifestation of French universities' difficulties in adapting to this expansion. This will allow for a closer analysis of Bourdieu's relationship to the Gramscian and Althusserian traditions of Ideologiekritik with which this aspect of his work has so often been linked. Since this chapter addresses the question of May 1968, it will be necessary to abandon a strictly chronological approach to the development of Bourdieu's thought and consider his later, retrospective account of this period in Homo academicus. This will allow for an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of Bourdieu's key concepts 'strategy' and 'field' as tools for making sense of the changes in the French university sector at this moment of considerable upheaval.

Chapters Four and Five will return to the chronological development of Bourdieu's thought by examining the 'theory of practice' he elaborated in the three book-length studies of Kabyle ethnology he published between 1972 and 1980 and analysing the role played by his Kabyle work within his wider oeuvre. In a footnote to La Reproduction, Bourdieu (1970, 9) anticipated these later works, suggesting the theory of practice they contained would complement the theory of 'l'action pédagogique [...], l'arbitraire culturel, l'habitus et la pratique' he had sketched in his studies of education. Moreover, an understanding of the concepts which Bourdieu elaborated in his ethnological works, concepts such as 'practice', 'practical logic', 'excellence', 'practical mastery', and 'strategy' will prove essential to an analysis of his subsequent works on French culture and society. These works might, then, be seen as occupying a key place in the development of Bourdieu's sociological theory, situated at the point of transition between his earlier works on class, culture, and education and the theoretical apparatus he brought to bear on these issues in later works such as La Distinction or La Noblesse d'état.

Chapters Four and Five will, therefore, take a more heavily theoretical approach than earlier chapters. Chapter Four will demonstrate how the epistemological principles for sociological study which Bourdieu and his co-authors had set out in Le Métier de sociologue (1968) were put into effect in his Kabyle studies, examining the critical importance of a Bachelardian epistemology to this area of his work. It will also analyse the decisive influence of Lévi-Strauss, Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty on Bourdieu's theory of practice. Chapter Five will address the role of Bourdieu's studies of Kabylia within his wider oeuvre and his understanding of the relationship between
ethnology and sociology, questioning the implications of his use of Kabylia as a kind of archetype and microcosm of forms of domination he also finds at work in French society. Both chapters will allow an assessment of the conflicting claims which have been made regarding Bourdieu’s relationship to the reflexive, ‘postmodern’ turn in late twentieth-century anthropology.

Bourdieu (1987, 33) has argued that his final work of Kabyle ethnology, *Le Sens pratique* (1980), and his immensely influential study of class, lifestyle, aesthetics, and culture, *La Distinction* (1979), should be seen as ‘deux livres complémentaires’. Chapter Six, therefore, will turn to an analysis of *La Distinction*, showing how the ‘theory of practice’ he had elaborated in his Kabyle work inflected this more detailed treatment of questions he had already broached in *Un Art moven* and *L’Amour de l’art*. It will also examine the extent to which this work is concerned to trace the emergence of new forms of cultural practice and new grounds of social distinction, questioning whether this can really be used as evidence of Bourdieu’s supposed ‘postmodernism’.

Perhaps the most frequent criticism made of *La Distinction* is that it appears to disallow any possibility that high art or ‘legitimate culture’ might exert an influence over and above its implication in questions of social distinction. Nicholas Garnham has argued that such an analysis leaves no grounds on which to launch a defence of artistic or intellectual autonomy in the face of neo-liberal demands that the universities and the art world be ‘opened up’ to the market (in Calhoun et al 1993, 177-87). The final chapter, Chapter Seven, will examine Bourdieu’s own increasingly high profile political interventions in defence of artistic and intellectual autonomy, showing how these interventions have been reflected in a series of studies which have sought to trace the deleterious influence of commerce, the media, and the market over the French educational field and the state bureaucracy, in *La Noblesse d’État*, over the fields of politics and social policy, in *La Misère du monde*, and over the intellectual field, in *Les Règles de l’art* and *Sur la télévision*. This chapter will analyse Bourdieu’s assessments of these phenomena, placing them in the context of contemporary developments in French politics and society. Further, it will examine the model of autonomous intellectual activity he proposes in opposition to the emerging neo-liberal consensus and question whether Bourdieu’s relatively recent concern to safeguard certain ‘universal’ values of culture and reason can be reconciled with an earlier body of work so centrally concerned to
demonstrate the particularities of class and history which lay hidden behind assertions of universal
cultural or intellectual value.

This introduction opened by asserting the extent of Bourdieu’s influence not only in the fields of
French and world sociology but also over the broader intellectual, political, and cultural fields,
particularly in his native France. If much of the credit for this influence must go to Bourdieu
himself, to the power of his ideas and the immensity of his intellectual achievements, considerable
credit must also be paid to those critics, such as Jenkins, Robbins, Fowler, Wacquant, and others,
who have done so much to communicate Bourdieu’s thought to a wider audience. However, it
might be argued that, given Bourdieu’s current status within the international intellectual field, the
imperative for any commentator on his work has now shifted away from simply explaining and
emphasising the importance of his ideas to attempting a more critical, objective assessment of their
inherent strengths and weaknesses. This thesis, therefore, starts from a position of both respect for
and acknowledgement of the immensity of Bourdieu’s intellectual achievements. Nonetheless, it
seeks to mitigate such respect by means of a certain critical distance, in the belief that this will
prove the necessary prerequisite to any objective analysis of his sociological theories.
NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION

1. See also the special number of *Media, Culture, and Society* dedicated to Bourdieu’s work (Garnham ed, 1980) and the special number of *Forum for Modern Language Studies* of July 1997 which applies Bourdieu’s ‘theory of practice’ to the study of European medieval culture and literature.

2. To be fair, this is a contradiction which Featherstone (1991, 3-4) does acknowledge, although he rapidly returns to periodising the postmodern in conventional modernist terms. Bennington (1993, 172-95) offers a more detailed analysis of the inconsistencies inherent in locating the postmodern within a fundamentally modernist historical meta-narrative. See also the essays contained in Lyotard’s *Le Postmoderne expliqué aux enfants* (1988), particularly ‘Note sur les sens de “post-”’ (in Lyotard 1988, 105-13).

3. This controversy flared after the publication in *Libération* of the 15th January 1988 of an interview with the Communist Party cadre Pierre Juquin who included Bourdieu in a list of former members of the PCF cell at the *Ecole normale*. Bourdieu responded immediately with a denial but Juquin maintained that even if Bourdieu had not been a signed-up member he had still attended the cell’s meetings. Dufay and Dufort (1993, 197) provide a brief account of this affair.

4. Given the immense and ever-increasing secondary literature generated by Bourdieu’s work, this Introduction does not pretend to exhaustive coverage. It does, however, attempt to sketch out the broad lines of Bourdieu criticism to date and deals with all the book-length studies of his work which have thus far been published both in French and English.

5. As Dominique Lecourt (1974, 11-12) has argued, the use made by Bourdieu and his co-authors of Bachelard in their 1968 study *Le Métier de sociologue* needs to be understood as part of a more generalised contemporary rediscovery of the work of Bachelard and Canguilhem. This rediscovery was evident in the work of Althusserians, from the mid-1960s onwards, as well as in the early work of Foucault.

6. Alain Caillé’s lengthy contribution to the special number of *Cahiers du L.A.S.A.* has recently been re-published in a more easily accessible form in his *Don, intérêt et désintéressement: Bourdieu, Mauss, Platon et quelques autres* (1986).
CHAPTER ONE

PEASANTS INTO REVOLUTIONARIES?

‘BETWEEN CAMPS’ IN THE ALGERIAN WAR

The broad details of Pierre Bourdieu’s background and early intellectual career have been well documented, both in existing critical studies and in interviews given by Bourdieu himself (Bourdieu 1987, 13-46; Harker et al. 1990, 26-57; Honneth et al 1986). Born in 1930, the son of a postman in an isolated peasant community in the Béarn, he passed through the ‘classes préparatoires’ at the prestigious Lycée Louis-le-Grand in Paris before entering the elite École normale supérieure to study for an agrégation in philosophy. Having obtained his agrégation in 1954, Bourdieu abandoned his plans to prepare a doctoral thesis under the supervision of Georges Canguilhern on the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and took up a post as a philosophy teacher in a provincial lycée instead. His career as a philosophy teacher was short-lived, however, and in 1955 he was drafted into the French Army and sent to Algeria to join the struggle against the Algerian nationalist movement, the Front de libération nationale (FLN). His military service completed, Bourdieu stayed on in Algeria, working as an assistant in the Faculté des lettres of Algiers University between 1957 and 1960. In 1960, he returned to France to become Raymond Aron’s assistant at the Sorbonne.¹ On the basis of his experiences in Algeria, Bourdieu published a series of books and articles between 1958 and 1964 which examined the country’s social, economic, and political development. If Bourdieu had arrived in Algeria in 1955 a philosopher, he left in 1960 a sociologist.

However, although Bourdieu’s experiences in Algeria and the writings based upon them clearly represent a founding moment in his intellectual career, this early Algerian work has received relatively little critical attention to date. This is presumably because the work largely pre-dates the elaboration of such key Bourdieusian concepts as ‘habitus’, ‘champ’, ‘capital culturel’, or ‘violence symbolique’, whilst its subject matter appears tangential to the analyses of class, culture, and social reproduction upon which Bourdieu’s mature reputation rests. Indeed, Richard Jenkins (1992, 24-5) has referred to the ‘prosaic’ nature of these early works, arguing that ‘for much of their length they are almost irrelevant to a consideration of the subsequent development of Bourdieu’s thinking’. Where they have been subjected to critical analysis, as in Derek Robbins’s study of Bourdieu’s
work, these early writings have been examined in almost complete isolation from the theoretical traditions and competing field of intellectual positions out of which Bourdieu’s own approach grew (1991, 10-28). Thus, for example, Robbins makes no mention of Bourdieu’s polemic with surely the most important and influential theorist of the Algerian Revolution, Frantz Fanon, nor of the immense influence of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological theories of time on Bourdieu’s thinking at this early stage in his career.

As this chapter will attempt to demonstrate, Bourdieu’s early studies of Algeria offer a series of insights into the way he theorises social and cultural change, insights which will prove important to an understanding of his later work on socio-cultural change in French society. Further, it was in the course of his polemic with Fanon over the question of whether the Algerian peasantry and sub-proletariat could or could not be considered genuinely revolutionary classes that Bourdieu was to lay some of the theoretical foundations of his later studies, anticipating in important respects concepts such as ‘habitus’, ‘practice’, and ‘field’. The question of the effects of the War, and of colonialism in general, on the social, cultural, economic, and political development of Algeria’s indigenous populations was to prove a constant preoccupation in the numerous articles and three books which Bourdieu published, whether singly or in collaboration with others, over the period. Hence it can serve as a guiding thread when seeking to follow the development of Bourdieu’s thought and to trace its shifts of emphasis and approach as the events of the War unfolded and his own theoretical position evolved. Following this thread will offer insights not only into Bourdieu’s political position within the contemporary French intellectual field but also into the theoretical traditions within which and against which he was writing, revealing the importance of a wide range of thinkers, Marx, Lenin, Weber, Durkheim, Husserl, on the early development of his thought.

‘Problèmes de science et inquiétudes de conscience’

Assessments of Bourdieu’s early work on Algeria cannot, of course, limit themselves to the purely theoretical question of his relationship to his intellectual forebears and contemporaries. To write on Algeria during the War was necessarily to raise a whole series of political and ethical issues concerning racism, the relationship of ethnography and sociology to colonialism, the prevalence of ethnocentric representations of Algeria’s peoples, and so on. The question of the
relationship of these ethical issues to epistemology, to the scientific status which Bourdieu claimed for his work, must therefore be broached.

In his 1950 essay, 'L'Ethnographe devant le colonialisme', the French ethnographer Michel Leiris provided one of the earliest critical examinations of the vexed question of the relationship between colonialism and social scientific research conducted in the colonial context. Leiris maintained that ethnography's historical complicity with colonialism meant that its claims to objectivity or scientificity needed to be treated with extreme caution, whilst its practitioners carried a particularly heavy moral duty. This duty could only be discharged, he suggested, by a political engagement in the overthrow of colonialism and bourgeois capitalism as a whole (Leiris 1950, 145). For Leiris, therefore, the political or ethical stance adopted by an ethnographer could serve as a gauge of the inherent value of their theoretical output and this is an assumption which has been mirrored in the assessments of Bourdieu's early Algerian studies offered by some of his more favourable critics. Thus, for example, in an effort to attest to his anti-colonialist credentials, Bridget Fowler (1997, 13) speculates that Bourdieu 'may well have contributed to the events which led to resistance to service in the French Army'. Since she provides no evidence whatsoever to support this assertion, the reader would be equally justified in concluding that Bourdieu may well not have contributed to the events which led to resistance to service in the French Army. Ultimately, the truth or otherwise behind Fowler's speculation is perhaps of less importance than recognising its rhetorical function, allowing Bourdieu's personal good faith or authenticity to be taken as some kind of guarantee of the scientificity of his theoretical output.

Fowler concludes this attempt to provide Bourdieu with an impeccable set of anti-colonialist credentials by highlighting his description of Kabylia, in The Algerians (1962), as an 'ideal' democracy. She argues that in describing Kabylia in such terms, Bourdieu was effectively subverting 'colonialist or Orientalist discourse', undercutting 'any facile belief in the "barbarism" of Islamicised Algerians' (Fowler 1997, 14). However, Bourdieu's empathy for the Kabyles and his praise for their proto-democratic political structures cannot be read as 'subverting' colonialist discourse in quite such an unproblematic manner. As the historian Charles-Robert Ageron (1968; 1979, 137-51) has shown, what is known as 'le mythe kabyle' or 'berbère', the notion that the Kabyles were inherently democratic and hence in need of liberating from the negative influence of
regressive Arab or Islamic rule, was an integral part of French colonial discourse, providing one of several spurious justifications for the French colonial presence and directly influencing colonial governance for a significant part of the nineteenth century.²

As Ageron (1968, 269) argues, by idealising the ‘democratic’ nature of Kabyle social structures and exaggerating the allegedly superficial nature of the Kabyles’ adherence to Islam, by opposing the ‘industrious’, ‘sedentary’, ‘democratic’ Kabyles to the ‘idle’, ‘feudal’, ‘nomadic’, ‘fanatically Islamic’ Arabs, French colonial discourse had made of the Kabyle an ideal target for assimilation, ‘un bon sauvage’ à sa mesure’. If then, as Robbins (1991, 18-9) has argued, of the four ethnic groups whose society and customs he analysed in Sociologie de l’Algérie, Bourdieu demonstrated a clear preference for the Kabyles, this was by no means entirely innocent. Indeed, Patricia Lorcin (1995, 221), in her detailed account of the genesis and structure of the ‘mythe kabyle’, considers Bourdieu’s description of Kabylia as an ideal democracy to be not only ‘subjective’, but also ‘revealing’ of the enduring nature of that myth.³

The intention, here, is not to suggest that Bourdieu was merely parroting French colonial discourse and was thus an apologist for French colonialism. Indeed, given that The Algerians concluded with a declaration of support for the cause of Algerian independence, to do so would be patently nonsensical. It is, however, to emphasise that in writing a series of sociological and ethnographic accounts of the Algerian people, Bourdieu was not starting with a blank sheet. On the contrary, he was necessarily taking up a position within an already existing disciplinary field whose terms of enquiry were not limitless but had been determined in complex ways by, amongst other things, the history of that field’s relationship to and complicity with the institutions and procedures of colonialism. To assume that an individual statement of good intent or good faith might be sufficient guarantee of a thinker’s ability to transcend the limitations of such a disciplinary field would surely be naive.

Ironically, in a trenchant critique of Leiris’ ‘Ethnographe devant le colonialisme’, Bourdieu warned against precisely this kind of conflation of what he termed ‘inquiétudes de conscience’ with ‘questions de science’. Writing in Travail et travailleurs en Algérie (1963), Bourdieu argued that the purely subjective gesture of political engagement advocated by Leiris, itself an attempt to atone for the evils of colonialism, was merely a means of substituting a sustained epistemological
reflection on the methods and procedures of ethnography with a rather facile moralism: ‘Il importe donc que, renonçant à faire de sa “mission” une croisade à rebours destinée à expier la faute originelle, l’ethnographe sépare problèmes de science et inquiétudes de conscience. Il se pourrait, en effet, que de toutes les motivations, la plus impure soit celle du moralisme de l’intention pure’ (1963a, 259).

Almost twenty years later, in the preface to Le Sens pratique (1980), Bourdieu offered a clearer indication of how this separation of ‘questions de science et inquiétudes de conscience’ might be achieved, arguing that those who seek to assess the merits or demerits of work produced in the colonial context should resist the temptation ‘à se constituer en juges et à se faire plaisir [...] en distribuant le blâme et l’éloge entre les ethnologues et sociologues du passé colonial’. Rather, they should try to understand the ‘problematic’ within which ethnological and sociological knowledge was produced, where the term ‘problematic’ is understood in its Bachelardian sense as referring to what could or could not be thought within a particular historical conjuncture, to ‘l’impensable d’une époque [...] ce que l’on ne peut penser faute d’instruments de pensée tels que problématiques, concepts, méthodes, techniques (ce qui explique que les bons sentiments fassent si souvent de la mauvaise sociologie)’ (Bourdieu 1980, 14).

If, as Bourdieu argued, good intentions are no guarantee of good sociology, then clearly speculations regarding his conduct during the Algerian War cannot be taken as evidence of the inherent value of his work of the period. Rather, the concept of a ‘problematic’, involving that separation of ‘questions de science et inquiétudes de conscience’ advocated by Bourdieu, should enable the critic to move beyond questions of the personal insight or ethical intention of a thinker to grasp the necessary limits within which the production of his or her knowledge was possible. By understanding the sociological and philosophical traditions within which and against which Bourdieu defined his own position as constituting a problematic in this sense, questions regarding his intentions, personal insight, moral or political rectitude can be ‘bracketed off’, as it were, in favour of a more objective analysis of his work’s relationship to a tradition of colonialist and orientalist representations of Algeria and its peoples, an examination of the extent to which that work sought to think beyond the constraints of that pre-existing problematic or merely reproduced its dominant themes and tropes. This question is intimately related to the broader issue of the
capacity of Bourdieu’s theoretical apparatus to make sense of the Algerian situation at this period of massive social and political upheaval. As Robert Young (1990) has argued, it was precisely the emergence of France’s colonised peoples as a significant force on the world historical stage which obliged a generation of postwar ethnologists, sociologists, and philosophers to re-think the binary oppositions between the East and the West, the ‘primitive’ and the ‘modern’, societies ‘without history’ and those ‘with a history’ which had structured so much Western thinking about non-Western cultures.

**The Basic Problematic - Sociologie de l’Algérie**

The question of Bourdieu’s relationship to existing ethnographies and sociologies of Algeria, as of the problematic within which he attempted to analyse the events of the Algerian War, was posed in particularly acute fashion by his first published book, *Sociologie de l’Algérie* (1958). As he explained in his introduction, the first six chapters of the book were dedicated to a ‘reconstruction’ of ‘les structures économiques et sociales originelles’ of Algeria’s different ethnic and tribal groups, ‘indispensable pour comprendre les phénomènes d’acculturation et de déculturation déterminés par la situation coloniale et l’irruption de la civilisation européenne’, which he would examine in the final chapter (1958, 5). His analyses of the different groups which made up the Algerian population, Kabyle, Chaouia, Mozabite, and Arab, were thus to be seen as ‘des types idéaux au sens de Max Weber, issus de la seule reconstruction historique - avec toutes les incertitudes que cela implique’ (90).

Bourdieu maintained that this approach was consistent with ‘le désintéressement et l’impartialité’, ‘la constatation objective et sobre’ (5), necessary for the objective analysis of the causes and possible outcomes of the Algerian conflict which *Sociologie de l’Algérie* set out to provide. However, he left unanswered a series of questions regarding the basis for such an ideal-typical ‘reconstruction’, the nature of the documentary sources used, or the status of the very notion of ‘original’ structures. For Weber (1949, 93), the ‘ideal-type’ was a heuristic tool not an accurate description of some historically or empirically observable reality:
It is a conceptual construct which is neither historical reality nor even 'true' reality. It is even less fitted to serve as a schema under which a real situation or action is to be subsumed as one instance. It has the significance of a purely ideal limiting concept with which the real situation or action is compared and surveyed for the explication of certain of its significant components.

Yet, in stating that the 'ideal-types' or 'original structures' of Algerian society he had uncovered by means of a 'reconstruction historique' formed the necessary starting point for an analysis of Algeria's current problems, Bourdieu implied that those 'ideal-types' corresponded to a historical reality. The status of Bourdieu's accounts of pre-colonial Algerian society thus appeared rather unclear.

At a more straightforward level, the very composition of the text, with six chapters dedicated to an analysis of Algeria's 'original' social structures compared with only one to a discussion of the current situation, in itself suggested a rather unbalanced account of the events in Algeria. Similarly, Bourdieu's failure to make any mention whatsoever of the FLN, its genesis, ideology, or support, was an omission which carried profoundly political implications inconsistent with his claims to disinterested objectivity. The question which must be asked, therefore, is whether the absence of any discussion of indigenous liberation movements in this first edition of Sociologie de l'Algérie was merely an omission on Bourdieu's part or in some way symptomatic of a failing inherent in his adopted problematic.

As Bourdieu's use of the term 'ideal-type' suggested, his analysis owed much to the work of Weber and attempted to understand the effects of colonialism on Algeria in terms of the (incomplete) imposition of a 'modern' model of 'rational calculability' and economic behaviour onto a fundamentally 'traditional' society. However, the book might equally be read as an exercise in Durkheimian 'morphologie sociale', an attempt to describe each ethnic group's 'substrat social', defined by Durkheim as: 'la masse des individus, la manière dont ils sont disposés sur le sol, la nature et la configuration des choses de toute sorte qui affecte les relations collectives' (1897-8, 181). Durkheim saw this description of demography, spatial distribution, geography, economy, and customs as the necessary precursor to an analysis of a society's evolution, of its gradual
urbanisation, for example, or of changing population densities and distributions. In Sociologie de l'Algerie, Bourdieu set out to identify such a 'substrat social' for each of the ethnic or tribal groups he studied, showing how geography, economy, size and composition of population, and nature of religious belief fed into their different forms of social structure. He then examined how the advent of colonialism, the appropriation of the most fertile lands by the settlers, the consequent impoverishment of the indigenous populations and their drift from the countryside into the towns in search of work had exposed them to new models of cultural, social, and economic behaviour, irrevocably undermining that 'original' 'substrat social'.

Bourdieu identified numerous differences between the ethnic groups he studied. Nonetheless, he suggested that each group's religious, cultural, economic, and geographic characteristics formed the mutually determined and determining elements of a cohesive social whole, of a self-regulating, inherently stable entity, itself determined by the classically Durkheimian imperative of maintaining the group's social cohesion and equilibrium. This approach was exemplified by Bourdieu's analysis of two ostensibly very different ethnic groups, the Mozabites and the Kabyles.

The Mozabites, Bourdieu (1958, 43-58) explained, belonged to a heretical but puritanical sect of Islam. Seeking to defend their 'exclusivisme religieux', they had established themselves in the harsh, isolated environment of the Northern Sahara in the early eleventh century. The harshness of their geographical surroundings demanded that they develop sophisticated and costly irrigation systems. These could only be paid for by large sections of the male population migrating into Algeria's cities to indulge in trade and commerce. On the one hand, the Mozabites' religion predisposed them to success in trade, since their puritanism imbued them with an asceticism comparable, according to Bourdieu, with the asceticism which Weber had identified at the heart of the Protestant ethic (52). On the other hand, the Mozabites' involvement in a money economy and their frequent migrations seemed to pose a threat both to the strictness of their religious observances and the cohesion and self-enclosure of their social structures.

Bourdieu concluded, however, that these apparently contradictory centripetal and centrifugal forces were in fact mutually determined and determining. It was precisely the cohesion of Mozabite social and familial structures and the strictness of their religious beliefs, the absolute distinction
between the ‘sacred’ realm of religion and the ‘profane’ realm of the marketplace, which allowed labour migration to take place without upsetting the group’s delicate social balance:

ainsi la désolation et l’hostilité de l’environnement naturel renvoient d’une part à l’irréductisme et à l’exclusivisme de la doctrine religieuse qui en a déterminé le choix, et d’autre part à l’émigration qui permet la survie au désert; mais l’émigration elle-même suppose d’une part la doctrine religieuse, garantie de la cohésion, incitation à l’adaptation raisonnée et valeur des valeurs dont il faut à tout prix assurer la sauvegarde en en maintenant les fondements économiques; et d’autre part la famille, dont la forte unité, outre qu’elle assure l’équilibre social, est la sécurité et le point d’attache de l’émigré.... (55-6)

The circularity of Bourdieu’s argument here was striking, as was the image of a society as inherently unchanging, even fundamentally resistant to any change or progress.

In Kabylia, Bourdieu found a very different form of religious observance and social organisation, yet his analysis appeared equally circular and relied on positing an equally close, not to say organic relationship between the Kabyles themselves, their environment, and their customs. Inhabiting isolated mountain villages, the Kabyles eked out a precarious existence based principally around the cultivation of figs and olives, Bourdieu argued. The harshness of their physical environment and the immense effort demanded by their attempts to cultivate their barren lands had, he suggested, been ‘compensated’ by an extremely strong sense of community, of mutual aid, and by the development of proto-democratic political structures:

Par une sorte de phénomène de compensation, à l’imperfection des techniques répond une perfection en quelque sorte hyperbolique ou hypertrophique du social, comme si à la précarité de l’ajustement à l’environnement naturel, faisait contrepoids l’excellence de l’organisation sociale, comme si, pour conjurer son impuissance à l’égard des choses, l’homme n’avait d’autre recours que de développer l’association avec les autres hommes dans la luxuriance exubérante des rapports humains. (13)
As with the Mozabites, Bourdieu noted that the harshness of the Kabyles' physical environment had led to a tradition of labour migration, both into the towns and cities of the Algerian plain and into factories in France. Again, as with the Mozabites, he argued that the strength of Kabyle custom, tradition, and familial structures ensured this migration did not introduce values which might have been inimical to the cohesion of Kabyle society (26). Similarly, although he noted Kabylia's history of colonisation by successive groups, Roman, Islamic, and French, Bourdieu argued that Kabyle society had responded to these outside influences by a conscious decision to preserve their own values:

l’attirance qu’exerce la nouveauté, la soumission à la force ou à la séduction d’autrui, est toujours pondérée par l’excès en sens inverse, destiné à sauvegarder le personnalité menacée. Aussi, là où on parle d’archaïsme, faut-il voir peut-être volonté d’archaïsme, sorte de ‘régression’ [...]. destinée à se défendre soi-même contre les autres et soi-même. Survivance ou reconstruction? Allégeance ou alibi? En tout cas rien de moins primitif. Au contraire, élaboration du groupe par lui-même, évolution réfléchie, la réinterprétation au dedans étant à la fois réponse à l’égard du dehors. (16-17)

For all Bourdieu’s laudable suspicion of seeking in Kabylie what he termed ‘un “primitivisme” berbère’ (16), his analysis still rested on the assumption that Kabyle society was driven by an inherent tendency to preserve its structures unchanged, to equilibrium, cohesion, and hence ultimately to stasis. Indeed, he attributed a similar tendency to all of the ethnic groups he studied, Mozabite, Kabyle, Chaouïa, and Arab, arguing that each were ‘traditionalist’, in the Weberian sense, marked by ‘l’absence de “calcul économique rationnel”’, the inability or lack of desire to indulge in any economic activity other than that directed to subsistence alone (1958, 103). This subsistence economy was linked to ‘structures sociales dont la cohésion garantit tant bien que mal l’équilibre entre l’homme et l’environnement naturel’ (101). In an analysis which owed much to the Durkheimian concept of ‘solidarité mécanique’, Bourdieu described this ‘société traditionnaliste’ as constituting a fundamentally self-regulating, self-enclosed system of familial and clan relationships. Social relations were ‘personnelles, directes et spécifiques’ rather than commercial
or political and any attempt to innovate or initiate change was subject to collective disapproval:

‘Cellules indifférenciées, simple juxtaposition de familles, cette société, strictement conservatrice, répète et imite le passé plutôt qu’elle ne l’assume pour le dépasser, dans une continuité du progrès, l’innovation étant tenue pour magie impure et impie qui porte en elle le malheur’ (101).

As Bourdieu put it in ‘La Logique interne de la civilisation algérienne traditionnelle’, the first of two consecutive chapters he contributed to the 1959 volume Le Sous-développement en Algérie, this traditionalism or predisposition towards cohesion, equilibrium, and stasis formed ‘the internal logic’ of all of Algeria’s indigenous tribal groups. According to Bourdieu, ‘la société traditionnelle algérienne’ was an ‘économie statique’; in ‘un ordre social traditionaliste et coutumier. réfractaire au progrès, tourné vers le passé’, all effort was turned towards maintaining the existing equilibrium, so that ‘la possibilité de poser un ordre meilleur en référence auquel l’ordre établi serait saisi comme imparfait, se trouve radicalement exclue’ (1959a, 50-1). In the second of the two chapters, ‘Le Choc des civilisations’, he argued that colonisation, ‘l’irruption de la civilisation européenne’, had shattered forever this state of ‘traditional’ equilibrium. However, the arrival of Europeans had also alerted the Algerians to the existence of alternative forms of social, economic, and cultural organisation; ‘L’Européen […] fait ainsi apparaître comme contingent ce qui semblait nécessaire, comme objet de choix ce qui paraissait “naturel”’ (1959b, 57). The immediate problem then, according to Bourdieu, was how to ensure the transition between the ‘traditional’ ways of life, now fatally undermined, and the ‘modern’ forms of socio-economic existence introduced by the Europeans without provoking further tensions and aggravating the phenomena of ‘désagrégation’ already affecting Algeria’s indigenous populations (60-4).

In the closing sections of Sociologie de l’Algérie, Bourdieu had argued that the only way of ensuring such a transition was through Algerian independence (1958, 116-26). French colonialism was an inherently contradictory enterprise, for although it proclaimed its intention to ‘civilise’ or secure the social and economic development of its colonial subjects, to succeed in such a project would necessarily spell the end of the colonial regime. Thus, if colonialism had destroyed the ‘traditional’ structures of Algerian tribal organisation, it could never construct a ‘modern’ society in its place, he maintained, since this ran counter to the interests of the colonial regime. Bourdieu’s argument was an attempt to refute the analyses offered by Germaine Tillion in her L’Algérie en
1957 (1957). Tillion, an ethnographer and adviser to Jacques Soustelle, the Governor-General of Algeria, had argued, on the basis of her research in the Aurès mountains, that the introduction of European medicines, famine relief, and the incursions of a money economy had all undermined the stability of 'traditional' tribal society without being able to secure the tribespeople's wholesale integration into a modern, rational economy. Abandoned 'au milieu du gué', as she put it, the Algerians of the Aurès were faced with a stark choice between 'le morn abandon ou la révolte inconditionnelle' (Tillion 1957, 53). If only the French colonial authorities were to pursue an enlightened policy of aid and education, facilitating 'une véritable mutation sociale' amongst Algeria's indigenous populations, then the transition between 'tradition' and 'modernity' could be secured peacefully and the Algerian nationalists' grievances would disappear (42-54).

As Paul Clay Sorum (1977, 84-88) has shown, Tillion's work was immensely influential amongst those he terms France's 'humanist', 'anti-colonialist' intellectuals, who were concerned with reforming the colonial system for the benefit of the colonised peoples rather than with ending the system itself. In pointing to the contradictions at the heart of French colonialism and in focusing on measures such as the major property laws of the nineteenth century, the Senatus-Consulte of 1863 and the loi Warnier of 1873, which had actively sought to leave the Algerian peasantry weakened, dispossessed, and in a state of permanent under-development, Bourdieu was able to highlight the inconsistencies in this position (1958, 118).

However, although Bourdieu disagreed with Tillion about the capacity of French colonialism to ensure the Algerian peoples' transition from tradition to modernity, and this was a disagreement whose political importance cannot be overstated, it might be argued that his analysis shared the same problematic as Tillion's. For both thinkers' work seemed to rely upon the same series of stark dichotomies between 'tradition' and 'modernity', 'pre-capitalism' and 'capitalism': the static, self-perpetuating 'internal logic' of Algeria's 'original' social structures and 'l'irruption' of a destructive but nonetheless dynamic 'civilisation européenne'. As Sorum (1977, 87-97) has argued, it was precisely these dichotomies which both Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre sought to question in a series of articles which challenged the terms of Tillion's analysis. They emphasised that what others had identified as the 'traditional' static structures of Algerian society should themselves be seen as the product of enforced retrenchment in the face of colonial occupation, that the 'internal
logic" of Algeria’s tribal societies was not some essential ‘traditionalism’ or predisposition to stasis and equilibrium but was itself a by-product of colonialism.

In the years following the end of the Algerian War, numerous commentators have extended Sartre’s and Fanon’s critiques of what might be termed the ‘classical’ problematic of colonial ethnography, which understood pre-colonial society to be composed of a series of self-enclosed, self-regulating tribal groups. For example, in her study of the Ifrissen Kabyle tribe, Camille Lacoste-Dujardin has shown how prior to French colonisation this tribe, marked by a noticeable degree of social stratification, had accumulated considerable wealth through the manufacture of arms and their sale throughout North Africa. It was only with conquest by the French and the interdiction placed on the manufacture of arms that the Ifrissen were forced to rely on subsistence farming and that their culture and society turned in on itself and stagnated (Lacoste-Dujardin 1997, 202-53).

Similar arguments have been made not only for the whole of Kabylia but also for all of the indigenous populations of Algeria. The historian Abdallah Laroui (1970, 64) has emphasised the importance of seeing the Maghrebian tribal system not ‘comme un système de base, à l’origine même de l’histoire’, but rather as ‘la réponse créée ou reprise (c’est finalement tout un) dialectique à un blocage historique. De là vient son double aspect: de permanence, de défense de soi-même, d’attachement traditionnel et aussi de transition’. Mahfoud Bennoune (1988, 15-31) argues that ‘the concept of tribe has been deliberately confused and ossified’ by colonial officials and ethnographers with the result that the extent of pre-colonial Algeria’s social, economic, and political development has been seriously underestimated. Abdelkebir Khatibi (1983) has offered one of the most sustained critiques of the whole tradition of understanding Maghrebian society as a set of self-sufficient tribes regulated by ‘segmentary’, ‘pre-capitalist’, or ‘traditionalist’ socio-economic relations. He traces this tradition back through not only colonial ethnography but also Arab historiography, seeing the importance of kinship and segmentary systems within tribal life as a form of self-defence and retrenchment, a response to the State’s removal of the tribes’ former military functions and power. To take the tribal system as somehow ‘original’ or fundamental to Maghrebian society is, he argues, merely to reproduce the dominant ideology of successive ruling groups, pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial alike (1983, 105).
As Khatibi argues (1983, 101), the problem with accounts of Maghrebian tribal society which see it as being driven by a Durkheimian conception of social equilibrium is that they are unable to account for historical change: ‘On ne voit pas [...] comment cet équilibre se maintient et échappe à l’histoire de la société globale’. This objection could equally be addressed to Bourdieu’s analyses in *Sociologie de l’Algérie*. For, if ‘traditional’ Algerian society were indeed as static as Bourdieu suggested, as inherently resistant to initiative, change, or innovation, how then could he account for the emergence of an indigenous liberation movement which was to prove powerful enough to provoke the downfall of a French Republic and the end of the French colonial presence in Algeria?

The absence of any discussion whatsoever of the history of Algeria’s different liberation movements, of their politics, ideology, or support base, in this first edition of *Sociologie de l’Algérie*, seemed to suggest that their emergence could not be easily accommodated within Bourdieu’s adopted problematic.

In the series of articles and books which Bourdieu published subsequent to the first edition of *Sociologie de l’Algérie*, he was to engage far more directly with the political aspects of the Algerian War, initially arguing that the War had created the conditions for a wholesale socialist revolution in Algeria and later moving back from that position to express severe reservations about the prospects for a successful revolution. By tracing the shifts in Bourdieu’s own position, it will be possible to gauge the extent to which he was forced to re-think his initial terms of analysis.

**From a ‘Conflict’ to a ‘War’ to a ‘Revolution’**

A useful index of Bourdieu’s increasing politicisation and radicalisation in the years which followed the publication of the first edition of *Sociologie de l’Algérie* can be found in the changing terminology he used to describe events in Algeria. Where previously he had referred to the events merely as ‘un conflit’ (1958, 125), in the 1960 article, ‘Guerre et mutation sociale en Algérie’, he referred to them as a ‘war’ and identified the FLN’s military wing, the *Armée de libération nationale* (ALN), as a significant force within Algeria. In two subsequent articles, ‘Révolution dans la révolution’ (1961) and ‘De la guerre révolutionnaire à la révolution’ (1962), he began to discuss the possibilities of the war of liberation transforming itself into a socialist revolution. Such apparently small changes of vocabulary were in fact highly significant since the French authorities
persistently sought deny that the events in Algeria constituted a ‘war’, preferring instead ‘a series of
euphemisms such as “operations to maintain order” or “the events”’ (Dine 1994, 7).

Bourdieu’s gradual radicalisation, which contrasted so strongly with the claim to ‘objectivity’
and ‘disinterest’ he had made in the first edition of Sociologie de l’Algérie, was reflected in two
revised editions of the text published over the period. In 1961, a second edition of Sociologie de
l’Algérie had been published which included not only extended versions of the analyses Bourdieu
had offered in the first edition but also ended with a more determined call for ‘le système colonial’
to be ‘détruit radicalement, c’est-à-dire de fond en comble’ in order that the Algerian masses should
be able to ‘assumer leur propre destinée en toute liberté et en pleine responsabilité’ and build a new
society based ‘sur la participation active, créatrice et délibérée à une œuvre commune’ (1961, 125-
6). In 1963, a third edition was published, identical to the second except for its final sections in
which Bourdieu argued that Algerian society, ‘profondément révolutionnée par la colonisation et la
guerre’, demanded ‘objectivement des solutions révolutionnaires’. The mass exodus of the
European population following independence had made ‘de l’accession à l’indépendance l’occasion
d’une révolution économique et sociale’, demanding a choice ‘entre le chaos et une forme de
socialisme étroitement mesurée à la réalité’ (1963, 126). In the interim between the publication of
the second and third editions of Sociologie de l’Algérie, its English translation, The Algerians
(1962), had appeared, which concluded with an extended version of the article ‘Révolution dans la
révolution’, in which Bourdieu had argued that the War was laying the conditions for a socialist
revolution in post-independence Algeria.

On one level, the increasing radicalism of Bourdieu’s pronouncements could be read as a
reflection of the pace of political change in Algeria and France alike. As John Talbott (1981, 176)
has argued, the fall of the Fourth Republic and the accession of Charles de Gaulle in 1958, his de
facto recognition of the FLN’s legitimacy the same year, and his declaration of support for the
principle of Algerian self-determination in 1959, combined with Algeria’s rapid descent into
political and military chaos, meant that: ‘By the Autumn of 1960, it was no longer daring to call for
Algerian independence, no longer shocking to write of the Army’s use of torture, no longer
unpatriotic to welcome the end of empire’. However, the articles Bourdieu published between 1960
and 1961 also seemed to owe a particular debt to the work of Fanon.
In his 1959 study, *L'An V de la révolution algérienne*, Fanon had argued that after five years of struggle Algerian resistance to French colonialism was entering a qualitatively different stage. Prior to the War, resistance to the French had largely taken the form of retrenchment, of a conscious adherence to tradition and a refusal of French language and education, of Western styles of dress, of cultural and social forms perceived to be the tools of the coloniser. However, as the War progressed, the Algerians were gradually appropriating these tools of colonial domination to turn them against the French. In a series of consecutive chapters, Fanon examined the uptake of radios, of Western forms of dress, and of Western medicines amongst the Algerians, whilst describing how the War had overturned 'traditional' rigidly patriarchal familial structures to allow both women and young men to play a key role in the liberation struggle.

In 'Guerre et mutation sociale en Algérie' and 'Révolution dans la révolution', Bourdieu was to repeat each of Fanon's points in turn. It was, however, his analysis of an event which took place during rioting by the European population in Algiers on the 13 May 1958, which revealed the greatest debt to Fanon. In a celebrated passage in *L'An V...*, Fanon had focused on the actions of a group of settlers who had dragged some Algerian women into the central square in Algiers, forced them to remove their veils and declare their allegiance to 'l’Algérie française'. For Fanon (1959, 23), this event epitomised the settlers' fear of the Algerians, their frustration when faced with the inscrutability of the colonial Other:

> il y a chez l'Européen cristallisation d'une agressivité, mise en tension d'une violence en face de la femme algérienne. Dévoiler cette femme, c'est mettre en évidence la beauté, c'est mettre à nu son secret, briser sa résistance, la faire disponible pour l'aventure. [...] Cette femme qui voit sans être vue frustre le colonisateur. Il n'y a pas de réciprocité. Elle ne se livre pas, ne se donne pas, ne s'offre pas. [...] L'Européen face à l'Algérienne veut voir. Il réagit de façon agressive devant cette limitation de sa perception. Frustration et agressivité ici encore vont évoluer en parfaite harmonie.

Writing a year later in 'Guerre et mutation en Algérie', Bourdieu would offer precisely the same interpretation of the events of May 13th:
Par le port du voile, la femme algérienne crée une situation de non-réciprocité: comme un joueur déloyal, elle voit sans être vue, sans se donner à voir. Et c’est toute la société dominée qui, par le voile, refuse la réciprocité, qui voit, qui regarde, qui pénètre, sans se laisser voir, regarder, pénétrer. Il est fréquent d’entendre dans la bouche des Européens des proclamations indignées contre cette sorte de déloyauté, ce refus de jouer le jeu, qui fait que les Algériens ont accès à l’intimité des Européens alors qu’ils leur interdisent tout accès à leur intimité propre. (1960, 27)

Like Fanon before him, Bourdieu argued that where prior to the events of 13 May women had gradually been abandoning the veil, after those events ‘le port du voile reprenait alors son sens de négation symbolique et l’abandon en pouvait être saisi, objectivement, comme signe d’allégeance’ (1960, 27).

Despite Bourdieu’s considerable debt to Fanon, however, there was a significant difference in their terms of analysis. Fanon (1959, 57) argued that the Algerians’ enthusiasm for radio, for example, coincided both with the setting up of radio stations broadcasting to Algeria from independent Arab states such as Egypt, Syria, and the Lebanon and with the first uprisings against French rule in the neighbouring states of Tunisia and Morocco. Similarly, he maintained that if the Algerians now accepted the Western medicines they had previously refused as a tool of colonial domination, it was because there were FLN doctors working in the maquis (1959, 133-40).

Bourdieu, on the other hand, implied that the Algerians’ increasing politicisation was attributable solely to the influence of Western ideas, arguing in ‘Révolution dans la révolution’ that their revolt was being expressed ‘dans la logique même de la pensée occidentale’. As he put it: ‘Il n’est pas indifférent que, depuis cinq années, l’Algérie lise dans les journaux et les livres français les réponses à ses questions et qu’elle formule dans la logique même de la pensée occidentale, ses problèmes, ses angoisses et ses révoltes’ (1961a, 40, my emphasis).

Ultimately, it could be argued that Fanon’s and Bourdieu’s respective analyses were equally partial. As a member of the FLN’s Bureau politique, Fanon clearly had a vested interest in exaggerating the extent of the politicisation of the Algerian masses. Nonetheless, his insistence on
locating the Algerian struggle within a broader movement of pan-Arab nationalism, even pan-African anti-colonialism, pointed to a fundamental aspect of the liberation movement which Bourdieu’s exclusive focus on the influence of Western ideas and ideologies seemed to have overlooked. Certainly, as Benjamin Stora (1992, 121-37) has argued, the experience of Algerian, principally Kabyle, immigrants into French factories in the inter-war years and their contact with the Marxism of the PCF and CGT (Confédération générale du travail) played a key role in the formation of the first Algerian independance movement, L’Etoile nord-africaine, in 1926. However, he distinguishes between this inter-war period, when the Algerians did indeed take their models from French political movements, and the postwar period in which the independence movement became more ‘genuinely’ Algerian; situated ‘à l’intersection de deux grands projets: celui du mouvement socialiste et celui de la tradition islamique’, by the very complexity of its ideological foundations, ‘il constitue un défi aux catégories, aux idées reçues et aux a priori idéologiques’ (Stora 1992, 129).

It could be argued that Bourdieu’s description of the Algerians expressing their resistance to the French presence ‘dans la logique même de la pensée occidentale’ was merely an over-simplification which failed adequately to account for the key influences of both Islam and pan-Arab nationalism on the FLN’s politics and ideology. However, it might also be argued that this oversight was symptomatic of the problematic within which Bourdieu was working, for within a problematic which understood the difference between Algeria and the West in terms of a binary opposition between static ‘tradition’ and a dynamic, if disruptive, ‘modernity’, any agency or initiative shown by the Algerians could surely only be understood as reflecting the influence of Western ideas and values.

It should be remembered here that in his account of Kabyle emigration in Sociologie de l’Algérie, Bourdieu had argued that the strength of Kabyle tradition and its inherent tendency to preserve itself unchanged in the face of all external influences meant that emigration could take place without significantly affecting the essential equilibrium of Kabyle society. Stora’s analysis of the emergence of the Algerian independence movement suggests a rather different story. Neil Macmaster has distinguished between two stages of Kabyle emigration, a first stage which was indeed facilitated by the strength of Kabyle social and familial structures and even contributed to
their maintenance and a second stage during which the experience of emigration itself 'radically transformed' those traditional values (in Hargreaves and Heffernan eds. 1993, 21-38).¹¹

As the nature of the FLN’s ideology suggested, with its mix of Islam and Marxism, the Algerian independence movement reflected a complex, dynamic interplay between Algerian and Western influences in a way which Bourdieu’s reliance on the polarities of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ seemed ill-equipped to grasp. Indeed, one of Fanon’s aims in L’An V... was to challenge any stable opposition between Algeria and the West, ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’, by uncovering, in the case of his analysis of the significance of the veil, the ‘dynamisme historique’ which lay behind this apparently static tradition. Although Bourdieu’s work of 1960-61 was clearly indebted to Fanon, he seemed to have overlooked this key element of Fanon’s message.

The confidence expressed by Bourdieu in ‘Révolution dans la révolution’ that the War had so transformed the social and political structures of ‘traditional’ Algerian society as to have provoked an inherently revolutionary situation was to be short-lived. The 1962 article, ‘De la guerre révolutionnaire à la révolution’, not only saw Bourdieu express uncertainties about the possibility of a successful transition to socialist revolution, it also saw him question the theories contained in a later work by Fanon, Les Damnés de la terre (1961). Here Fanon had argued that in the colonial context it was the peasantry and the sub-proletariat, rather than the proletariat itself, which constituted the primary revolutionary classes since the proletariat had a relatively privileged position within colonial society and thus a vested interest in its maintenance. Bourdieu responded by arguing that ‘c’est seulement au prix d’une altération de la réalité inspirée par le souci d’appliquer des schémas d’explication classiques que l’on peut voir dans la paysannerie la seule classe révolutionnaire’ (1962a, 8). Whilst admitting that the War had had a real effect on the politicisation of the Algerian masses, he argued that this should not be exaggerated since it remained incomplete, leaving the Algerians ‘floating’ between two incompatible traditions, the indigenous and the Western. Such a situation called for a continuing programme of education to foster a coherent new political culture (1962a, 7). It was these concerns, the precise level of the Algerians’ political and social development, the need for education, and the critique of Fanon, that Bourdieu was to pursue in a further series of articles, which themselves fed into the two book-length studies, Travail et Travailleurs en Algérie (1963) and Le Déracinement (1964).
In the series of essays and books which he published from 1962 onwards, Bourdieu was to take issue not only with the analyses contained in Fanon's *Les Damnés de la terre*, but also with the theory of revolutionary action elaborated by Sartre, Fanon's great ally, in his *Questions de méthode* (1960). The empirical basis for Bourdieu's critique was the fieldwork he had conducted between 1958 and 1960 amongst the some three million Algerian peasants who had either been forcibly re-located by the French authorities into 'centres de regroupement' or who had fled the countryside in search of work and shelter in one of the many *bidonvilles* springing up on the outskirts of Algeria's cities (Bourdieu 1964, 13).

Central to Bourdieu's dispute with Fanon and Sartre was the question of the distinction between these displaced peasants and sub-proletarians and a genuinely revolutionary proletariat. As Bourdieu was to put it in a 1985 interview, different extracts from which have been published as the opening chapter of *Choses dites* (1987) and as an article in the English-language journal, *Theory, Culture and Society* (see Honneth et al 1986): 'j'ai essayé de montrer que le principe de cette différence se situe au niveau des conditions économiques de possibilité des conduites de prévision rationnelle, dont les aspirations révolutionnaires sont une dimension' (1987, 13). He employed the ability to make rational calculations of future economic profit as a test of the revolutionary potential of these two social groups, a test he claimed was based not on theoretical speculation but on first-hand empirical study: 'je voulais aussi comprendre, à travers mes analyses de la conscience temporelle, les conditions de l'acquisition de l'habitus économique "capitaliste" chez des gens formés dans un cosmos pré-capitaliste. Là encore par l'observation et la mesure et non par une réflexion de seconde main' (17-18).

Bourdieu's emphasis on the importance of empirical observation, here, is significant. For, in this later interview, he was to identify his critique of Fanon and Sartre as exemplifying his adherence to a tradition of 'scientific' sociology quite distinct from the theoretical abstraction and speculation he considered to typify the French philosophical tradition. Noting his unease at the 'dangerous', 'speculative' nature of Fanon's *Les Damnés de la terre* and the 'utopianism' of Sartre's analyses of the Algerian situation, Bourdieu suggested that his preference for empirical
sociological research was intimately linked to the modesty of his social origins and his consequent
sense of alienation from the dominant ethos of the Parisian intellectual world, a sense of alienation
which had already manifested itself in his decision to abandon his proposed doctoral thesis
(Honneth et al 1986, 37-9). As he put it:

my more or less unhappy integration into the intellectual field may well have been the reason
for my activity in Algeria. I could not be content with reading left-wing newspapers or
signing petitions: I had to do something concrete, as a scientist [...]. That's where my
'scientific bias' stems from. (Honneth et al 1986, 39)

Furthermore, since he was neither a supporter of 'l'Algérie française' nor an enthusiast for the
'utopianism' of those on the radical non-Communist Left, Bourdieu found himself 'between camps
as far as intellectual life was concerned' (38).

Bourdieu's polemics with Sartre and Fanon thus constitute a key moment in his intellectual
trajectory, representing the first occasion on which he explicitly sought to demonstrate the
superiority of empirical sociology over the tradition of 'speculative' theoretical or philosophical
'abstraction' his own 'habitus' had pre-disposed him to abandon. Indeed, whilst he has
subsequently sought to distance himself from the 'naïvetés' of his earlier, more revolutionary
articles, 'Révolution dans la révolution' and 'De la guerre révolutionnaire...' (1980, 8), he has
continued to refer to his work on the Algerian sub-proletariat and peasantry, publishing it again in
1977 in the collection Algérie 60. Clearly, then, this body of work is key to an understanding of
Bourdieu's intellectual and theoretical development.

It was in the three articles, 'La Hantise du chômage chez l'ouvrier algérien' (1962), 'Les Sous-
prolétaires algériens' (1962) and 'La Société traditionnelle: attitude à l'égard du temps et conduite
économique' (1963), that Bourdieu fleshed out the critique of Fanon he had already sketched in 'De
la guerre révolutionnaire...'. He argued that whilst the war and the mass migrations from the
countryside had eroded traditional values and social structures, the economic and cultural insecurity
of the displaced peasants and sub-proletariat rendered them incapable of forming rational projects
for the future. Forced to live from hand to mouth, the sub-proletariat had no means of making
plans, of organising their present in terms of an abstract, still to be realised future. Everything was
subordinated to the immediate needs of subsistence and this, according to Bourdieu, prevented the
formation of a rational or coherent temporal consciousness. As he put it in 'La Hantise du
chômage...':

In the absence of regular employment, what is missing is not only a place to work and a daily task, it is a coherent organisation of the present and the future. It is a system of expectations and a concrete goal field in reference to which all activity can be orientated. It is only from a structured and mastered present that a future at once remote and accessible can be aimed at and set in a project or rational anticipation. (1962d, 327)

In short, Bourdieu's argument was that although they had abandoned their traditional way of
life, neither the sub-proletariat nor the displaced peasants had been fully integrated into an urban,
capitalist economy in which calculations of present sacrifice for possible future gain were regularly
made. They remained locked within an essentially peasant experience of time, in which the future
was not perceived as an immense, open field of possibilities to be realised by the rational
calculations of agents and groups, but rather was determined by the collective and cyclical rhythms
of a peasant economy. It was this peasant attitude to time that Bourdieu analysed in the article 'La
Société traditionnelle: attitude à l'égard du temps et conduite économique'.

Here Bourdieu distinguished between two opposing conceptions of temporality, one of which
corresponded to a simple peasant economy, the other to a developed capitalist society. In a peasant
society, he argued, the future is grasped as 'un à venir', as a series of future events whose
possibility, attested to by past collective experience, is inscribed into the present as a 'horizon' or
'field' of 'practical possibilities' or 'objective potentialities'. This conception of the future was
qualitatively different from that required to form a revolutionary 'project', a vision of a possible
future which, according to Bourdieu, implied the ability to 'suspend' one's investment in the
immediate self-evidence of the everyday in order to make a rational calculation of possible future
gain.
Bourdieu's argument relied on a series of oppositions between the peasant's realm of temporal and perceptual immediacy and the possibility of reflexive mediation, between the realm of self-presence inhabited by the Algerian peasantry and the capacity to construct a mediated representation of the social world. Each of these oppositions was then read as characteristic of the difference between a pre-capitalist and a capitalist economy. In a capitalist economy, he maintained, money was itself a medium of re-presentation, a sign or symbol which stood in for its absent referent and was thus implicated in a structure of mediation and deferral. In capitalism:

on ne raisonne plus sur des objets annonçant de façon quasi-tangible et palpable leur usage et la satisfaction qu'ils promettent, mais sur des signes qui ne sont en eux-mêmes source d'aucune jouissance. Entre le sujet économique et les marchandises ou les services qu'il attend, s'interpose le voile de la monnaie. (1963b, 33)

In a pre-capitalist economy, on the other hand, Bourdieu argued, no such medium of re-presentation existed; the peasants' perception of the social world was thus somehow immediate since the relation between objects and their function was itself immediate or self-present:

C'est ainsi que le blé se donne immédiatement, non seulement avec sa couleur, sa forme, mais aussi avec des qualités inscrites en lui au titre de potentialités, telles que 'faites pour être mangé'. Ces potentialités sont saisies par une conscience perceptive, au même titre que les aspects directement perçus; donc sur le mode de la croyance. Alors que la conscience du projet, conscience imaginaire, suppose la mise en suspens de l'adhésion au donné et vise les possibilités projetées comme pouvant également arriver ou ne pas arriver, la conscience qui saisit les potentialités comme 'à venir' est engagée dans un univers parsemé de sollicitations et d'urgences, le monde même de la perception. 'L'à venir' est l'horizon concret du présent et, à ce titre, il se donne sur le mode de la présentation, et non de la représentation, par opposition au futur impersonnel, lieu des possibles abstraits et indéterminés d'un sujet interchangeable. (1963b, 37, my emphasis)
Thus, Bourdieu argued that the Algerian peasants, inhabiting a pre-capitalist social universe, perceived the world in a purely ‘doxic’ manner, ‘sur le mode de la croyance’, as a series of immediate needs and urgent demands to be met in accordance with conventions and traditions so self-evident as to be beyond question. Any plan or project for the future would presuppose a break in this primary level of doxic adherence, in ‘l’acquiescement passif et la soumission spontanée à l’ordre actuel, naturel et social’ (40), as well as the accession to a notion of human agency alien to those not immersed in a capitalist mode of production:

Loin de se considérer comme facteur agissant de l’extérieur sur une nature extérieure, l’homme se sent tout englobé en elle. Par suite l’ambition de transformer le monde par le travail se trouve exclue, qui suppose la mise en suspens de l’adhésion au donné naturel et social et la référence à un ordre imaginé et espéré. (40)

According to Bourdieu, then, the Algerian peasantry inhabited a sphere of temporal immediacy in which objectives and goals could be perceived in an unmediated fashion but could not be the subject of a reflexive consciousness making rational assessments as to their potential chances of realisation. Constrained by a host of immediate, pressing needs, they were incapable of ‘re-presenting’ a better future to themselves, of making a rational calculation of present sacrifice against possible future gain.

As his choice of vocabulary made clear, Bourdieu was drawing heavily on Weber’s notion of the centrality of rational calculation to the ethos of Western capitalism. Indeed, he seemed to be echoing Weber’s argument in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904-5) that, ‘outside the modern Occident […], the proletariat as a class could not exist, because there was no rational organisation of free labour under regular discipline […]; because the world has known no rational organisation of labour outside the modern Occident, it has known no rational socialism’ (23). Large sections of both Travail et travailleurs... and Le Déracinement were devoted to more detailed assessments and empirical tests of the extent of the Algerian peasantry and sub-proletariat’s immersion into a capitalist ethos and hence their capacity for rational calculation.
Bourdieu’s analysis also owed much to a classically Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution. recalling Marx’s comparison of the peasantry to ‘potatoes in a sack’ who could not ‘represent themselves’ but had to ‘be represented’ in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon* (1852, 187). and Lenin’s emphasis on the historical role of the proletariat in *The State and Revolution* (1918). Moreover, Bourdieu’s recourse to detailed empirical research in *Travail et travailleurs...*, as a means to assess the economic and political development of Algerian society and propose a typology of its different classes and class fractions recalled Lenin’s polemic with the Narodniks and ‘Social-Democrats’ in his empirical study, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (1899). Indeed, in *Choses dites*, Bourdieu was to acknowledge the influence of Marx’s writings on the peasantry and ‘l’enquête de Lénine sur la Russie’ on his thinking at this time (1987, 17).

However, Bourdieu’s choice of vocabulary revealed he was also drawing on a rather different philosophical tradition and it was from this tradition that some of his more troubling assumptions about the unmediated nature of peasant experience derived. Terms such as ‘l’à venir’, ‘la mise en suspens’, ‘l’horizon concret’, ‘le champ du présent’, ‘le mode de la croyance’, ‘les potentialités objectives’, are standard French translations of the terminology employed by Husserl in his phenomenological studies of time. Bourdieu has described his essays on the Algerian peasantry and sub-proletariat as, ‘des recherches sur la “phénoménologie de la vie affective”, ou plus exactement sur les structures temporelles de l’expérience affective’ (1987, 16).

Husserl argues that time is not experienced as so many discrete moments arranged in a linear causal series, but rather as a ‘field’ or network of ‘retentions’ and ‘protentions’, of past experiences which are incorporated into a structure of expectations or dispositions, a ‘practical’ sense of what does or does not constitute an ‘objective potentiality’. He terms this structure of dispositions a ‘habitus’. Habitually, in an action such as taking a spoon and placing it in the mouth, agents will have only a ‘practical’ sense of what they are doing, a sense which requires no reflection on their part on the complex range of physiological and mental capacities involved (Husserl 1952, 266-93).

Husserl (1913, 253) thus distinguishes between this practical sense of what is to come, ‘cette conscience ou le regard se porte à la rencontre de “l’à venir”, de “ce qui vient”’, and the ‘modification’, ‘suspension’, or ‘époche’ in this ‘natural’ or ‘doxic’ attitude which allows for a
more reflexive awareness: 'il est possible par essence de détourner le regard de cet à-venir sur son devoir-être-perçu'.

Bourdieu's argument in relation to the Algerian sub-proletariat and peasantry, then, was that their material state, their need to satisfy the immediate demands of subsistence, prevented them from moving beyond a purely practical or doxic apprehension of their social universe to gain a more reflexive awareness either of the logic of their current behaviour or of possible alternative modes of behaviour. The enforced migrations of the sub-proletariat and peasantry may have provoked a suspension in their immediate adherence to old conventions and traditions, but their continuing economic insecurity and sense of cultural dislocation prevented them from integrating completely into a rational, capitalist mode of social and cultural organisation, the precondition, according to Bourdieu, for effecting that transition from the doxic to the reflexive mode.

Within this account of the internalised expectations and field of objective possibilities open to the Algerian peasants and sub-proletariat was contained the first tentative sketch of what would later become Bourdieu's theory of 'habitus', 'field', and 'practice'. As he put it over twenty years later, behind the concept of habitus lies the principle.

d'une connaissance sans conscience. d'une intentionnalité sans intention et d'une maîtrise pratique des régularités du monde qui permet d'en devancer l'avenir sans seulement avoir besoin de le poser comme tel. On retrouve là le fondement de la différence que faisait Husserl, dans Ideen I, entre la protension comme viseé pratique d'un à-venir inscrit dans le présent, donc appréhendé comme déjà là et doté de la modalité doxique du présent, et le projet comme position d'un futur constitué comme tel, c'est-à-dire comme pouvant advenir ou ne pas advenir.... (1987, 22)

This early formulation of the theory of habitus and practice also involved Bourdieu in a polemic with Sartre's theory of revolutionary action. For where Bourdieu grafted a Weberian theory of rational calculation onto a Husserlian reading of temporality, in Questions de méthode, Sartre had grafted a Hegelian reading of Marx onto that same theory of temporality to elaborate what he termed 'la méthode progressive-régressive' (1960, 76). Drawing on Husserl's concepts of retention
and protention, Sartre argued that human agents were the products of a history which they internalised, conserved, and sublated in their future actions or ‘projets’. In Sartre’s rather teleological and subjectivist account, the oppressed individual, having gained awareness of his or her alienated state, would engage in revolutionary praxis, in a ‘projet’ which aimed to overcome that alienation:

ressentir, c'est déjà dépasser vers la possibilité d'une transformation objective; dans l'épreuve du vécu, la subjectivité se retourne contre elle-même et s'arrache au désespoir par l'objectivation. Ainsi, le subjectif retient en soi l'objectif qu'il nie et qu'il dépasse vers une objectivité nouvelle; et cette nouvelle objectivité, à son titre d'objectivation, extériorise l'intériorité du projet comme subjectivité objectivée. (1960, 80)

Throughout Questions de méthode, Sartre invoked the example of colonised peoples who, denied rights and opportunities by the colonial system, would fight to overcome such obstacles by engaging in revolutionary praxis, a struggle for independence that was simultaneously a revolutionary transcendence of their alienated state (79).12

In ‘Les Sous-prolétaires algériens’, Bourdieu argued, against Sartre, that the Algerian sub-proletariat were alienated to such an extent as to be unable to gain objective consciousness of their subjective state: ‘l’aliénation absolue prive l’individu de la conscience même de l’aliénation’ (1962e, 1049). Thus they were unable to transcend their alienation through revolutionary praxis:

la constitution de l’état de choses actuel comme pourvu de telle ou telle signification suppose tout autre chose qu’une sorte de cogito révolutionnaire par lequel la conscience se ferait être comme révolutionnaire en s’arrachant au monde, monde auquel elle est présente mais qu’elle ne peut représenter parce qu’elle est englobée en lui et dépassée par lui. S’il est vrai que la constitution du donné actuel comme intolérable et révoltant suppose la position d’un autre état de choses, à la fois absent et accessible, il reste que la position même du possible suppose la possibilité de prendre un certain recul par rapport au monde. (1051)
It was precisely this 'recol', this reflexive distance, which was unavailable to the sub-proletariat. Bourdieu maintained: 'Bref, la réflexion veut une certaine aisance et, paradoxalement, la prise de conscience est un privilège qui incombe à ceux qui ne sont si totalement aliénés qu'ils ne puissent se dépendre et se reprendre' (1051). As he argued in both *Travail et travailleurs en Algérie* and *Le Déracinement*, it was only by ignoring the material conditions of the peasantry and sub-proletariat that one could accord 'quelque créance aux prophéties eschatologiques qui voient en la paysannerie des pays colonisés la seule classe véritablement révolutionnaire' (1964, 170).

Bourdieu's primary concern in criticising the analyses offered by Sartre and Fanon was with the damaging effects such analyses were having on Algeria's post-independence politics. In following Sartre and Fanon in elevating the Algerian masses to the role of revolutionary avant-garde, he argued, the post-independence leadership was preparing the ground for the hegemony of the educated petite bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie over an inflexible and centralised state bureaucracy, a hegemony justified precisely by the inability of the peasantry and the sub-proletariat to fulfill the unrealistic role that had been allotted them. This was an argument he developed first in the final sections of *Travail et travailleurs...* and subsequently pursued in the last chapter of *Le Déracinement* (1963a, 378-81; 1964, 161-77).

As Bourdieu (1968a, 380n.1) pointed out in a footnote, the final sections of *Travail et travailleurs...* were written in May 1963, hence just two months after the March Decrees of that year, which heralded the first major wave of nationalisations and have been widely interpreted as a key moment in Algeria's descent into centralised bureaucratic sclerosis. In response to this slide towards state bureaucracy, he advocated what appeared to be a classically Leninist solution, 'une action d'éducation, entière et totale', to ensure the Algerian masses' transition from tradition to modernity, overseen by 'une élite révolutionnaire' sensitive to the real state of the peasantry and sub-proletariat (1964, 176-77). Bourdieu's concerns at the turn taken by the revolution in post-independence Algeria were, moreover, to be mirrored in one final rewrite of the concluding sections of *Sociologie de l'Algérie*. Thus, the edition currently in print concludes by warning that to claim that the peasantry and sub-proletariat constitute a revolutionary force is to indulge in 'le populisme nationaliste', an ideology propagated by 'la nouvelle bourgeoisie des grandes bureaucraties d'État'.
in an effort to secure the support of the masses for their political and economic hegemony (1985, 125).

Over the course of the Algerian conflict and its immediate aftermath, then, Bourdieu’s analysis of events had undergone a series of significant shifts, from his assertion in the first edition of *Sociologie de l'Algérie* that a sociological approach did not justify a choice between the possible solutions to the conflict, merely the rejection of the colonial status quo as a possibility (1958, 126), through his revolutionary phase in ‘Révolution dans la révolution’, to the more measured concern of his final writings of the period. The concerns he expressed in these final writings would certainly appear to have been vindicated by Algeria’s gradual descent into a one-party, centralised, bureaucratic state.

However, it should be noted that Bourdieu’s criticisms of Fanon, in particular, were not entirely fair and made little allowance for the context in which Fanon was writing. As a member of an organisation engaged in a life and death struggle with the French, Fanon could surely be excused for exaggerating the extent of the politicisation of the Algerian masses. Moreover, as a member of the FLN, Fanon would never have received the necessary funding or permissions to conduct the kind of empirical research on which Bourdieu based his claim to the superiority of his analyses. In the context of the Algerian War, sociological ‘objectivity’ was thus a luxury not open to those, such as Fanon and even Sartre, who had unequivocally aligned themselves with the cause of the colonised against the colonisers. Furthermore, Bourdieu failed to acknowledge that Fanon had himself anticipated the possibility of post-colonial governments becoming centralised state bureaucracies dominated by the educated urban petite bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie, dedicating an entire chapter of *Les Damnés de la terre* to this very problem (see Fanon 1961, 187-248). As Jean-Marie Domenach (1962, 642) pointed out, Fanon’s emphasis on the role of the peasantry and sub-proletariat was intended precisely as a precaution against the possible hegemony of a self-interested urban indigenous bourgeoisie concerned only with the pursuit of industrial development.

A more serious criticism of Bourdieu’s critique of Sartre and Fanon relates to the question of the theoretical and empirical bases of the oppositions between pre-capitalism and capitalism, immediacy and mediation, presence and representation on which that critique rested. It might be
argued that Bourdieu’s contention that the Algerian peasantry and sub-proletariat were imprisoned in a realm of temporal and perceptual immediacy, hence incapable of reflexive thought, rested on a profoundly ethnocentric distinction between the ‘modern’, ‘rational’, dynamic West and the ‘primitive’, ‘pre-rational’, immobile East. Certainly, such an opposition was implicit in the Husserlian problematic within which Bourdieu was working, for Husserl’s distinctions between ‘l’avenir’ and ‘le futur’, between ‘doxic’ or ‘practical’ knowledge and theoretical knowledge were doubled throughout his work by an analogous opposition between Western and non-Western cultures. As Paul de Man (1971, 15-16) puts it: ‘Husserl speaks repeatedly of non-European cultures as primitive, pre-scientific and pre-philosophical, myth-dominated and congenitally incapable of the disinterested distance without which there can be no philosophical mediation […], he warns us, with the noblest of intentions, that we should not assume a potential for philosophical attitudes in non-European cultures’. It could be argued that this was precisely Bourdieu’s argument in relation to Sartre and Fanon, namely that they were wrong to assume a potential for philosophical mediation or political reflection amongst the Algerian masses.

In a letter he had addressed to Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, the theorist of ‘la mentalité primitive’, (extracts of which had been published by Merleau-Ponty in his 1960 collection Signes), Husserl had emphasised the importance for phenomenology to grasp the difference between the temporal consciousness of societies ‘with history’ and societies ‘without history’, of ‘modern’ European peoples and Lévy-Bruhl’s ‘primitives’. Thus, on the one hand he posited ‘primitive’ society, ‘une humanité fermée sur sa socialité vivante et traditionnelle, […] cette humanité possède le monde, qui n’est pas pour elle une “représentation du monde”’; in ‘primitive’ society, it was a question of ‘une vie qui n’est que présent qui s’écoule’. On the other hand, he posited Western society, which possessed ‘un avenir en partie réalisée (le “passe” national) et un avenir en partie à réaliser’ (in Merleau-Ponty 1960, 135).

Bourdieu himself was insistent that, as a materialist analysis, his approach avoided any such ethnocentric essentialism. For what he had established was not a congenital or essential difference between the minds of ‘primitive’ and ‘modern’ men but rather a difference in temporal consciousness contingent upon their different material and historical circumstances. He highlighted the need to ‘mettre en garde contre l’ethnocentrisme et contre l’inclination à décrire la conscience
temporelle de l'homme pré-capitaliste comme séparée de nature de celle que forme l'homme
capitaliste. En fait la conscience temporelle est solidaire de l'éthos propre à chaque civilisation’
(Bourdieu 1963b, 38). Nonetheless, Bourdieu’s analyses still appeared determined to a considerable
degree by the essentialist oppositions he had inherited from Husserl. Indeed, on occasion,
Bourdieu’s interpretations of his empirical data seemed to have been determined by those
oppositions, his data being stretched to fit the pre-existing interpretative framework he applied to
them rather than vice versa.

For example, in ‘La Hantise du chômage...’, Bourdieu transcribed the following remark made by
a porter from Oran in 1960. The porter expressed the wish that, with the founding of an Islamic
state, poverty and corruption would be banished: “dans un État musulman, il n’y aura plus de
bakchich, de piston. La mendicité d’abord sera supprimée, le gouvernement le prendra en charge”
(1962d, 1047). Given that the FLN’s stated objectives included independence ‘dans le cadre des
principes islamiques’, this surely could have been interpreted as a statement of political affiliation.14
Yet Bourdieu interpreted it as proof of his contention that the sub-proletariat were so destitute as to
be incapable of forming rational projects for the future; the remark was nothing more than wishful
thinking, an unrealistic dream for the future manifesting a lack of rationality: ‘Que peut-on attendre
sinon le miracle, lorsque toutes les conduites rationnelles sont et se savent condamnées à l’échec?’
(1047). Just one page later, he maintained that the urban poor were so destitute as to be unable to
conceive of an alternative economic and social order: ‘Les souffrances imposées par la situation la
plus inhumaine ne sont pas motifs suffisants pour que l’on conçoive un autre ordre économique et
social’ (1048). According to Bourdieu, then, to express the wish for the establishment of an Islamic
state in the middle of a bloody struggle against French colonial occupation did not manifest the
ability to conceive of ‘un autre ordre économique et social’, but merely ‘l’attente des paradis
prochains’ (1047).

It would, of course, be perfectly possible to argue that a belief in the ability of an Islamic state to
solve all of Algeria’s problems was indeed utopian, but this would not be the same as arguing that
such utopianism manifested the Algerian masses’ inherent inability to conceive of an alternative
economic and social order. Rather it would be to shift focus from a sociological analysis of the
Algerians’ level of socio-economic development to a political analysis of FLN ideology, to broach a
series of questions concerning politics, ideology, the Algerians' level of political education, the political judgement of the FLN leadership, and so on. Bourdieu's work, however, rested on the premise that there was a direct and unproblematic relationship between the level of the Algerians' socio-economic development and their capacity for rational calculation in the political domain. Thus, the unquestioned assumption behind Travail et travailleurs..., for example, was that detailed analysis of the social and economic conditions endured by Algeria's urban poor in could, in itself, serve as an objective measure of their level of politicisation, of their capacity to construct a rational political project for the future. As Bourdieu put it, the adoption of 'l'esprit de prévision et de projet rationnel':

varie en raison directe du degré d'intégration à un ordre économique et social défini par la calculabilité et la prévisibilité; [...] Parce que l'avenir objectif des individus ou des groupes dépend étroitement de leurs conditions matérielles d'existence, il est patent que le projet libre et la prévision calculée sont des privilèges inséparables d'une certaine condition économique et sociale; intériorisation de l'avenir objectif, le plan de vie est réservé à ceux dont la vie présente et future sont déjà arrachées à l'incohérence. (1963a, 366-67)

Bourdieu (1963b, 25-6) insisted that by refusing to judge the Algerian masses according to an ahistorical norm of the homo economicus as rational agent he was striking a blow against economism. However, it could be argued that, in measuring the Algerians' political development solely in terms of the extent of their insertion into a 'rational' capitalist mode of socio-economic organisation, his analysis remained profoundly economistic. Moreover, at times his argument seemed to rely on a slippage from a materialist analysis of the economic circumstances of the Algerian peasantry and sub-proletariat to certain essentialist assumptions about their inherent intellectual capabilities.

For example, when analysing the forms of 'credit en chaîne' practised in Algerian bidonvilles, Bourdieu quoted the testimony of a shopkeeper from Sidi-Bel-Abbès: "Où est le bénéfice maintenant?... Aujourd'hui je travaille à crédit.... Je prends à crédit la marchandise et quand je l'ai liquidée, à ce moment-là je paie le grossiste. Des fois, il me reste de l'argent et des fois non, je suis
obligé d’emprunter ailleurs” (1962d, 1037). This testimony surely suggested that what the shopkeeper lacked was not the mental capacity for rational calculation, but the economic structures within which to put that capacity into effect.

Bourdieu, however, interpreted the shopkeeper’s remarks as manifesting an inability to make rational calculations **per se**: ‘Ainsi, une somme d’incohérences, par la vertu du crédit en chaîne, du grossiste au détaillant, qui ne calcule pas, du détaillant au client, qui ne calcule pas davantage, finit par réaliser une sorte d’équilibre permettant aux couches les plus défavorisées [...] de subsister’ (1037, my emphasis). Here again, the interpretative framework within which Bourdieu was working seemed to have determined his interpretation of empirical data, the shopkeeper’s testimony being seen as proof of an inherent incapacity to make rational calculations when it might equally have been open to a quite different interpretation.

Interestingly, in *Le Déracinement*, Bourdieu would emphasise precisely the importance of distinguishing between the lack of an inherent capacity to make rational decisions of future economic gain, on the one hand, and the lack of the material resources necessary to put such decisions into effect, on the other. Here, he distinguished between ‘le traditionalisme traditionnel’ and ‘un traditionalisme du désespoir’, the latter being a ‘pathological’ response to colonialism rather than the essence of Algerian peasant life (1964, 19). If the peasants had not adopted modern farming methods, he argued, this was not because of an adherence to ‘le traditionalisme traditionnel’, an inability to make rational calculations of the future benefits such methods would bring, but because under colonialism they lacked the material resources to put such calculations into effect:

S’ils refusent les améliorations à long terme, [...] ce n’est plus toujours faute de savoir sacrifier un avenir tangible à un futur imaginaire; c’est surtout parce qu’ils n’ont pas les moyens d’attendre. Bien qu’ils reconnaissent volontiers, sur le mode abstrait et idéal, l’efficacité plus grande des techniques employées par le colon et la rentabilité supérieure des cultures de marché, ils sont contraints de s’en tenir aux conduites traditionnelles, parce que ce type d’exploitation exige, ils le savent, de gros moyens techniques et financiers.... (20)
Bourdieu's argument seemed to have undergone a significant shift, here, for if what held the peasantry back in the agricultural domain was not an inability to make rational decisions per se but rather the lack of the means to put such decisions into effect, then this surely need have had no direct influence over their ability to make rational decisions in the political domain.

Indeed, in Le Déracinement, Bourdieu offered a much more nuanced assessment of the Algerian peasantry, paying close attention to the different histories of the various groups he studied, the extent of their contacts with colonial society, their history of emigration to France, their education, the differing levels of their political and social development. He pursued the critique of Tillion's work he had first sketched in Sociologie de l'Algérie, but in terms which seemed to challenge the assumptions on which some of his own earlier work, such as 'La Logique interne de la civilisation algérienne', had been based. He accepted that, in the case of an isolated region like the Aurès, the breakdown of 'traditional' society could, 'dans certaines limites', be understood 'comme l'effet du choc entre une économie archaïque et une économie moderne'. However, he maintained that such an analysis could not be extended to Algeria as a whole and that, even in the case of the Aurès, it underestimated the influence of the colonial expropriation of Algerian land on the apparent stasis and 'traditionalism' of tribal society (1964, 33). Thus, he credited several groups of peasants with 'l'esprit de calcul' (68), a capacity for 'un retour réflexif' and 'une prise de conscience' (77) in a way which seemed to contradict his argument in essays such as 'La Société traditionnelle...' or 'Les Sous-prolétaires algériens', where the peasantry and sub-proletariat had been described as inherently incapable of any such reflexive 'prise de conscience'.

Co-written with Abdelmalek Sayad, Le Déracinement was a detailed empirical study of the effects of the French authorities policy of 'regroupement' on peasants from different regions of Algeria. The text can be read as a narrative of Weberian 'disenchantment' in which Bourdieu described peasants uprooted from their native villages and forcibly re-located into 'centres de regroupement' where older customs and traditions were eroded by a rational, regimented organisation of time, space, and economy. In a perceptive analysis of what he termed 'l'intention pathologique qui habitait le système colonial', Bourdieu read one French officer's obsession with ordering the peasant's dwellings in regimented rows as a metonym for the imposition of a Western rationality onto the 'traditional' structures of Algerian life, a process he traced back to the great
‘lois foncières’ of the nineteenth century (15-27). His descriptions of the older values which were being swept away by colonialism and war, meanwhile, had an elegiac, not to say nostalgic tone:

A ces enfants qui n’auront pas connu les ‘traquenards des troupeaux de chèvres’ ni la solitude et l’épouvante de la forêt, ni les longues demi-journées (lamquï) où l’on déjeune d’un morceau de galette ou d’une poignée de figues tirées de la besace, il manquera toujours l’adresse manuelle qui s’acquiert à diriger le troupeau par jets de pierre, le sens de l’orientation qu’aiguisent les parcours à travers des étendues désertes ou boisées, la malice et l’habileté dans les rapports humains qui s’apprennent à travers les mille ruses inventées par les groupes de bergers. (98)

However, in classically dialectical fashion, the rationality that was seen as destroying these older values and traditions was also held up as the key to the Algerians’ salvation, the key to progress and modernity. 16 Indeed, in The Algerians, Bourdieu (1962, 170) had suggested that the ‘centres de regroupement’ ‘might really have been (and could still be in another context) the occasion for a true revolution of the agricultural society, if they had been accompanied by an agrarian reform, by a redistribution of land, and by a concerted attempt to improve agricultural methods’. As Keith Sutton has shown, the old ‘centres de regroupement’ were indeed put to this use during the Agrarian Revolution of the 1970s when, like the French before them, the Algerian leadership justified the uprooting of older communities and their enforced resettlement policies by the need to combat ‘tribalism’ and ‘tradition’ in the name of ‘modernity’ and ‘progress’ (in Hargreaves and Heffernan eds. 1993, 185-86).

The Agrarian Revolution can be understood as part of the Algerian post-independence regime’s drive to rapid modernisation and industrialisation, its almost exclusive focus on certain key industrial sectors, ‘les industries industrialisantes’, to the detriment of all else, in the economistic belief that economic growth held the key to social and political progress. As several commentators have argued, it was this kind of economism which was responsible for many of that regime’s failings, social, political, and economic (Tlemcani 1986, 109-52; Bennoune 1988, 114-61). Selim Zaoui (1997, 45) has recently glossed this economic policy as follows: ‘persuaded by a European
adviser, a Marxist, that the only true revolution was that of the proletariat, Algeria's then president, Houari Boumediène, bartered away his oil for an imported industrial infrastructure and the creation of a working class...'.

The 'European adviser' to whom Zaoui refers is presumably the French economist G. Destanne de Bernis, the prime advocate of the theory of 'les industries industrialisantes' (see Destanne de Bernis 1971). Nevertheless, in the preface to Le Sens pratique, Bourdieu (1980, 8) was to note that both Travail et travailleurs... and Le Déracinement 'ont servi depuis (surtout la deuxième) à justifier certains des détournements probables qu'elles s'efforçaient par avance de prévenir'. This comment might be taken as confirmation of what has been the working hypothesis of this chapter, namely that there is no necessary congruence between Bourdieu's wholly laudable intentions throughout his early Algerian work and the unintended effects which might be implicit in his adopted problematic. For it could be argued that if his work could be appropriated in justification of the very policies he had sought to warn against, this was because the economism of such policies, their assumption of a binary opposition between tradition and modernity, between the immediacy of peasant experience and the mediated reflexivity available to the proletariat, were all implicit in the problematic within which Bourdieu continued to work.17

In seeking to question the adequacy of the problematic underpinning Bourdieu's early work on Algeria, this chapter has not sought to replace a vision of Bourdieu as impeccably 'non-ethnocentric' with a vision of a sociologist unthinkingly reproducing the ethnocentric tropes of colonialist discourse or irredeemably implicated in the unfortunate political developments of post-independence Algeria. Rather, it has attempted to achieve some kind of objective assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of these early works. If this assessment means Bourdieu's own claims regarding the inherent superiority of his 'objective', 'scientific' sociological approach over the theoretical or philosophical 'speculations' of Sartre and Fanon need to be treated with some scepticism, this is not to say that his analyses can be simply designated a failure. On the contrary, his numerous shifts of position, the tension between his principled political critique of colonialism and his continuing adherence to a series of oppositions between tradition and modernity, immediacy and mediation, presence and representation, whose ethnocentric implications he did not appear to have entirely thought through, might themselves be read as an index of the immensity of the
challenge posed by the events in Algeria to the moral, intellectual, and cultural assumptions of a whole generation of French thinkers.

The Algerian War was arguably the most traumatic event of French postwar history. Revelations about the French Army’s tactics, and in particular their systematic use of torture, challenged any claim the French nation might stake to moral or intellectual superiority, whilst Algerian independence in 1962 signalled the end of French imperial ambitions and highlighted France’s status as a second league political and economic power, subordinate to both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.. To imagine that anyone personally involved in such a traumatic event could somehow emerge from it unscathed, their anti-imperialist credentials firmly in place and their work unimpeachable in its scientificity would surely be naive.

The effects of the Algerian War were not, however, merely moral or intellectual, they were also economic and social. For Algerian independence heralded the end of France’s period as an imperial power and its definitive transition to a late capitalist economy in which wealth was accumulated less through colonial expansion and trade than through the production, distribution, and sale of an expanding range of commodities to a domestic consumer market. Having returned to France in the early 1960s, Bourdieu himself was to be caught up in a series of debates concerning the significance of this shift to consumer capitalism, publishing a series of works examining the effects of postwar modernisation on French culture and society. In seeking to make sense of these changes, Bourdieu was to draw on and extend the theoretical approaches he had first sketched in his Algerian work.

In his analyses of postwar France, Bourdieu was to adopt far more reformist political positions than he had in Algeria. Indeed, his early works on Algeria have proved the only occasion on which he has advocated revolutionary solutions to the social phenomena he studied. Further, the troublesome notion of the immediate, practical, or doxic apprehension of the social world would not reappear in his work until his elaboration of a ‘theory of practice’ in Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique of 1972. Thus, the problems inherent in the application of this notion both to his later works of Kabyle ethnology and to his later studies of class and culture in France will not be discussed until Chapters Four, Five, and Six.
Nonetheless, Bourdieu's analyses of postwar France would involve a claim for the pre-eminence of empirical sociology over philosophy analogous to that which he had first staked in his polemics with Sartre and Fanon. His descriptions of the French postwar 'exode rural' and of the new models of cultural and social life awaiting French peasants and workers as they moved into France's new towns and housing estates, the 'grands ensembles', would offer a series of extremely close parallels with his work on the morphological and cultural changes affecting the Algerian peasantry.

Similarly, his account of the rapid expansion in the French university sector would theorise that change as a shift from a 'traditional' or 'organic' system, a state of 'simple reproduction', to a 'critical' state in which the cycle of simple reproduction had broken down without a 'rational' alternative having been put in its place. Bourdieu's critique of Sartre's theory of agency and his description of the Algerians internalising a set of objective possibilities which reflected their material state would be developed into the concept of 'habitus' and offered as an explanation of different patterns of academic success and cultural consumption amongst France's various social classes. It is to a discussion of Bourdieu's use and elaboration of this theoretical apparatus in his contributions to debates on postwar French modernisation that the next chapter will turn.
NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1. Although Bourdieu was to dedicate The Algerians (1962) to Aron, their friendship and collaboration should not be taken to indicate any particular political affinity, either as regards the Algerian War or any other contemporary issue. Generally speaking, Aron’s approach to the Algerian question was both less radical and more pragmatic than Bourdieu’s (see Aron 1957, 1958; Colquhoun 1986).

2. As René Gallissot puts it: ‘l’impérialisme se légitime parce que tout simplement il restitue son droit à la démocratie archaïque, contre le système féodal arabe’ (quoted in Khatibi 1983, 91).

3. The highly subjective nature of Bourdieu’s description of Kabylia as ‘une démocratie idéale’ becomes clear when one considers that, according to his own analysis, in Kabylia women were subject to ‘l’inégalité brutale’, excluded ‘de toute participation à la vie extérieure’ and hence had no vote in elections to the village assembly (1958, 22-25).

4. When, in his path-breaking study Orientalism (1978), Edward Said identifies orientalism as a ‘discursive formation’, he too is drawing on the Bachelardian concept of the ‘problematic’, albeit mediated through the writings of Michel Foucault and Georges Canguilhem.

5. In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904-5), Weber defines ‘traditionalism’ as a state in which a ‘man [sic]’ wishes ‘simply to live as he is accustomed to live and to earn as much as is necessary for that purpose’ (60).

6. It should be remembered that in both De la division du travail social (1893, 152-53; 169), and Les Règles de la méthode sociologique (1894, 177), Kabylia had featured as an exemplum of ‘mechanical solidarity’, of a society structured according to ‘segmentary’ principles. In arguing that Kabyle society, ‘composée comme par emboitements successifs de collectivités, présente des cercles concentriques de fidélités’ (1958, 13), Bourdieu was clearly writing within this Durkheimian tradition.

7. Bennoune (1988, 44-50) provides a useful summary of the history and logic of both the Sénatus consulte and the Loi Warnier.

9. Although highly hostile to the Kabyles, whom he sees as an essentially bourgeois group placing obstacles in the path of a successful Algerian revolution, Roberts (1981, 182-95) provides a useful analysis of the level of economic development in pre-colonial and colonial Kabylia which confirms Lacoste-Dujardin’s thesis.

10. It is precisely the inability of ‘classical’ ethnography to account for political and social change that lies at the root of Lacoste-Dujardin’s fascinating account of the French Army’s use of ethnography during the Algerian War. She shows how, drawing on the ethnography of Jean Servier, which emphasised the ‘traditionalism’ of Kabyle social structures and their hostility to the Islamic FLN, the French Army decided to arm the Ifilissen as a counter-insurrectionary force. The Ifilissen, whose political development had been so dramatically under-estimated by Servier, gladly accepted the arms and, having drawn the French Army into an ambush, turned those arms against the French (Lacoste-Dujardin 1997). Significantly, in the preface to Le Sens pratiqué, Bourdieu (1980, 16) was to identify Servier’s ethnographic studies of Kabylia of this period as exemplary and as having exerted an important influence over his own thought.

11. In the later study, Le Déracinement, Bourdieu (1964, 105-106) was to acknowledge the importance of emigration as a force for social and political change.

12. The other example Sartre used to illustrate his theory was that of the novelist, Gustave Flaubert, whose role as ‘l'idiot de la famille’ was transcended, Sartre argued, in his ‘project’ as novelist. Bourdieu was to offer an alternative account of Flaubert’s literary production in the essays which fed into the 1992 study, Les Règles de l'art.

13. Chaliand and Minces (1972, 32-66), Bennoune (1988, 104-8), and Tlemcani (1986, 95-107) offer rather different analyses of the March Decrees but all concur in seeing them as a key moment in the slide to statist bureaucracy.

14. The FLN’s stated objectives, according to their declaration of November 1954, were:

‘Indépendance nationale par: 1. La restauration de l'Etat algérien souverain, démocratique et social dans le cadre des principes islamiques; 2. Le respect de toutes les libertés fondamentales sans distinction de races et de confessions’ (quoted in Hargreaves and Heffernan eds. 1993, 111).

15. A useful point of comparison, here, might be the series of articles published by Jean-François Lyotard in the journal Socialisme et barbarie between 1956 and 1963 and reprinted in the 1989
collection, *La Guerre des Algériens*. As early as 1956, Lyotard had tempered his support for the cause of Algerian independence with a series of remarkably prescient warnings of the political and ideological failings of the FLN and the consequent risks of a post-independence regime sliding into a centralised military bureaucracy.

16. A similar logic underlies Marx's comments on British imperialism in India, which ally a sympathy at the plight of the indigenous population whose culture is being destroyed with a belief that such destruction is the key to the Indians' economic development and political liberation: 'England has to fulfill a double mission in India: one destructive, the other regenerating - the annihilation of Asiatic society, and the laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia' (quoted in Said 1978, 154). For Said (1978, 153-54), this mix of nostalgia and support for the destruction of Indian tradition is symptomatic of Marx's adherence to a 'Romantic redemptive project' characteristic of orientalism. Aijaz Ahmad (1992, 221-42) has questioned Said's interpretation of Marx but he does agree that Marx's comments on India reveal a 'partially fanciful' view of the stasis and self-sufficiency of the 'traditional' Indian economy allied to a 'disagreeable', 'positivist belief in the march of history'. It is these two elements in Bourdieu's treatment of Algeria that this chapter has sought to question.

17. It was, of course, precisely this problematic that Louis Althusser and his colleagues were trying to think beyond in their attempts to theorise a non-historicist 'structural' Marxism in *Pour Marx* and *Lire le Capital*, both published the year after *Le Déracinement*. For the Althusserians, it was an economistic reading of Marx which had led to the bureaucratic sclerosis of Stalinism and they sought instead both to emphasise the way economic changes were mediated through and articulated with political and other superstructural 'instances' and to re-think an evolutionary or teleological model of history based on straightforward oppositions between tradition and modernity in favour of a differential concept of history, 'une temporalité différencielle' (Althusser 1965a, 272-309). In citing the example of the Althusserians, the intention is not to suggest that their conception of history and politics represented a perfect resolution of the kind of problems thrown up by Bourdieu's analysis. Rather, the intention is merely to bring attention to the fact that these problems were being broached in a more systematic, reflexive, and self-conscious manner by some
of Bourdieu's contemporaries. Hindess and Hirst (1975, 271-7; 313-23) provide the most succinct account of the Althusserians' ultimate failure to theorise a non-teleological conception of history.
CHAPTER TWO
DE-MYTHOLOGISING CONSUMER SOCIETY: CLASS AND CULTURE IN FRANCE,
1962-1969

Bourdieu's work in the first half of the 1960s was not limited to writing up and publishing the results of his fieldwork in Algeria. If his experiences during the Algerian War had led him to undertake what he had initially considered to be a temporary detour into sociology, by the mid-sixties he had become clearly established as a professional sociologist occupying a position of considerable institutional prestige and surrounded by a growing team of collaborators. After a year spent as Raymond Aron's assistant at the Sorbonne, Bourdieu had been appointed as a sociology lecturer at the University of Lille in 1961, working there until 1964. During this period, he also spent a year as a visiting research fellow at Pennsylvania University, where he worked under Erving Goffman, and became secretary of the Centre de sociologie européenne (C.S.E.), a fairly loose grouping of researchers and academics established by Aron. In 1964, he became Directeur d'études at the École pratique des hautes études en sciences sociales in Paris, a post he has continued to occupy even after his appointment as a professor at the Collège de France in 1981.

Bourdieu's new status was reflected in a broadening of his research interests and the 1960s saw him publish a series of articles and book-length studies of contemporary developments in French culture and society. This new body of work grew out of various research seminars at the C.S.E. and the books themselves were written in collaboration with other researchers attached to the centre. As Bourdieu (1987, 33) was later to remark, the studies of education, class, and culture he published under the aegis of the C.S.E. were 'nés d'une généralisation des acquis des travaux ethnologiques et sociologiques que j'avais réalisés en Algérie'. Bourdieu's work on class and education will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. This chapter, however, will focus on his early analyses of the relationship between class and culture, examining the ways in which the approach he had sketched in his Algerian work was to be applied and refined in this new context. This work on class and culture ranged from his well-known studies of photography and the art gallery, Un Art moyen (1965) and L'Amour de l'art (1966), to less well-known analyses of the effects of France's postwar economic boom, whether on the peasant communities of his native Béarn, in the long essay
'Célibat et condition paysanne' (1962), or on French society as a whole, in the essays he contributed to the collection, *Le Partage des bénéfices* (1966).

Unfortunately, these early works have tended to be overshadowed by the immense success of the later, more detailed study of class, culture, and lifestyle, *La Distinction* (1979). Viewed through the prism of *La Distinction*, earlier works such as *Un Art Moyen* and *L'Amour de l'art* have too often been seen merely as preliminary sketches for this later work. This tendency has surely been strengthened in the English-speaking world by the belated translation of these earlier works.

Whilst *La Distinction* appeared in English translation in 1984, *Un Art Moyen* and *L'Amour de l'art* were not translated until 1990 and 1991 respectively. Neither 'Célibat et condition paysanne' nor *Le Partage des bénéfices* has ever been translated. Under such circumstances, it is perhaps unsurprising that Richard Jenkins should write of *Un Art Moyen* and *L'Amour de l'art* that 'neither is very substantial' and conclude that but for Bourdieu's later fame they would never have been translated (1992, 130).

The problem with downplaying the importance of Bourdieu's early works on class and culture in this way, interpreting them merely as precursors to the later *La Distinction*, is that it strips them of their historical specificity. Indeed, this chapter will argue that these early works are best understood as polemical interventions into contemporary debates surrounding the extent to which France's postwar economic expansion was heralding the advent of a 'mass' consumer culture, an era of cultural 'democratisation' and 'homogenisation' in which older class divisions were either disappearing or being significantly redrawn at a time of unprecedented economic growth and prosperity.

Works such as *Un Art moyen*, *Le Partage des bénéfices*, and *L'Amour de l'art* were published at the height of 'les trente glorieuses', that thirty-year period of demographic renewal, rapid reconstruction, modernisation, and economic growth that marked France's emergence from the Second World War. Over the period 1959-70, France's Gross Domestic Product achieved an average growth of 5.8%, second only to Japan amongst the Group Seven nations (Berstein 1989, 151). This growth was accompanied not only by an increase in disposable incomes, from 1958 to 1969 average incomes rose by 50% in real terms, but also by a reduction in working hours and an increase in paid holidays (ibid, 210-13). This, combined with the availability of new forms of
consumer credit, meant that French consumers had both more money to spend on consumer durables such as cars, radios, fridges, or washing machines and more time available for leisure and holidays. Between 1958 and 1969, household expenditure on leisure and cultural activities increased by an average of 50%. The same period saw the beginnings of mass tourism: in 1958, just 31% of the French went away on holiday, by 1973 that percentage had risen to 62% (ibid).

This period of economic reconstruction and growth, which coincided with the often violent process of French decolonisation, can be read as symptomatic of that shift from 'imperialist' to 'late capitalism' which Ernest Mandel (1975) has argued affected all the major Western economies in the years following the Second World War. Certainly, those features which Mandel takes as characteristic of the shift to late capitalism were all clearly discernible in the France of the 1950s and 1960s. For decolonisation was accompanied by a rapid decline in trade between France and its colonies or former colonies and its replacement by an emphasis on the sale of an ever-increasing range of consumer goods within France itself or between France and other developed economies. Not only did this demand the rationalisation and modernisation of French industry's production and distribution processes, it also heralded the growth of a large tertiary sector and the emergence of new strata of middle managers, advertisers, research and development executives, and market researchers, who were charged with locating new markets and planning and manipulating consumer demand. It was these new strata who were to form the core of the aspirational and upwardly mobile 'classes moyennes', the subject, as Kristin Ross (1995, 126-45) has shown, of so much interest in the journalistic, novelistic, and sociological discourses of the day.

As Mandel has argued, the advent of late capitalism has typically been accompanied at the ideological level by a proliferation of discourses proclaiming the ability of technological progress and planned economic growth to end class conflict and ensure the progressive satisfaction of all material and spiritual needs (1975, 501-7). Whilst Bourdieu himself, neither in the 1960s nor subsequently, has never theorised this shift to late capitalism as such, this chapter will argue that his work of the period was centrally concerned with challenging such technocratic ideologies by attempting to achieve a more objective measure of the extent or limitations of the social and cultural changes wrought by France's rapid postwar economic reconstruction and growth. Having sketched the broad lines of the sociological field into which Bourdieu's work intervened, the competing
discourses against which his own position defined itself, this chapter will analyse the nature of his challenge to those discourses which proclaimed the advent of a new classless society, an era of cultural homogenisation and democratisation. It will show how this challenge mirrored in important respects themes and approaches Bourdieu had elaborated in his work on Algeria: it involved a return to the ‘classical’ sociological tradition, to Marx, Weber, and, most significantly, to Durkheim and the Durkheimians, as well as an emphasis on the importance of empirical research. Moreover, Bourdieu’s analyses of the dislocating effects of modernisation on the French peasantry and working class offered a series of parallels with his work on the Algerian peasantry’s drift to the towns and ‘centres de regroupement’.

Of Technocrats and ‘Massmédiaologues’

In an article of 1967 he co-authored with Jean-Claude Passeron, entitled ‘Sociology and Philosophy in France since 1945, death and resurrection of a philosophy without subject’. Bourdieu surveyed postwar developments in the French intellectual field for an English-speaking audience. He suggested that the increasing institutional prestige enjoyed by the social sciences from the late 1950s onwards, as manifest in the establishment of the first licence de sociologie in 1957, in the rise in the number of social scientific researchers and research bodies, as well as in the appearance in the 1960s of a raft of new sociological reviews, Archives européennes de sociologie, Communications, Etudes rurales, L’Homme, Revue française de sociologie, was intimately linked to France’s economic recovery. Where ‘the atmosphere of economic and social crisis that dominated France after 1945’ had proved favourable to the introverted, even ‘narcissistic’ philosophies of existentialism, the ‘economic prosperity and concomitant security’ of the subsequent two decades had contributed both to ‘the development of an empirical sociology of a positivist kind’ and to the vogue for structuralism. Despite the apparent methodological differences separating these two schools, Bourdieu argued that they shared an affinity with a general desire to control and rationalise France’s economic development, with a typically technocratic faith ‘in the autonomous and anonymous efficiency’ of economic systems and business organisations, an emphasis on systematicity and synchronicity which had superseded ‘the previous interest in history and in the subject as agent of history’ (1967a, 191-92). According to Bourdieu, then, the most significant
development in the postwar French intellectual field had been the rise of the social sciences, a rise he attributed to France’s postwar reconstruction and the dominant role played by centralised state planning in managing that reconstruction; as he noted, the Fourth Plan (1962-65) had ‘placed some rather large “orders” in the field of sociological research’ (186).

Whilst it might be argued that by the 1960s the importance of French state planning was on the wane, with the Commissariat au Plan taking an ever less dirigiste, ever more advisory role (Hall 1994, 175: Hayward 1986, 170-71), Ross (1995, 178) suggests that the return to power of Charles de Gaulle in 1958, surrounded by ‘an elite and overt entourage of ministres-techniciens’, had brought the question of technocracy to the top of the political agenda. She cites a 1964 article by Claude Gruson, director of the Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE), in which he called on sociologists to put their expertise at the service of the economic planners, as evidence of ‘the direct and frequent use’ made by the state planificateurs of social scientific knowledge (ibid, 186). Moreover, the early 1960s saw the publication of a number of books vaunting the social and economic advances brought by the Plan and attributing a particular role to the social sciences in securing those advances. Amongst these were Le Plan ou l’anti-hasard (1965) by Pierre Massé, himself commissioner-general at the Commissariat au Plan, and Paul Bauchet’s La Planification française (1962), which, according to one commentator, epitomised the ‘néo-évolutionnisme technocratique’ then current in official circles (Boltanski 1982, 246n.6).²

In their 1963 study, La Planification économique en France, Jean Fourastié, president since 1948 of the ‘groupe de travail sur la productivité’ at the Plan, and his co-author Jean-Paul Courthéoux explicitly linked the success of the Plan with the development of the social sciences (1963, 15). They argued that it had been the lack of developed social sciences which had encouraged their predecessors in the mistaken belief that economic growth and social progress could only be achieved through continued imperial expansion. With decolonisation and the development of the social sciences the path now lay open to an era of rational planning, economic growth, and social progress (199-202).³

In official circles, then, a general mood of technocratic optimism seemed to coexist with a particular conception of the role of the social sciences and their subordination to the goals of centralised economic planning. As Richard Kuisel (1981, 270) points out, one of ‘the most prolific
campaigners for expansion' was Fourastié, for whom 'technology was the moving force of our
times, and America led the way toward the final age of automation and a tertiary or service
economy'. In a series of works of the postwar period, perhaps most notably Le Grand Espoir du
XXe siècle, originally published in 1949 and reprinted in a series of revised editions until the
‘édition définitive’ of 1963, Fourastié used France's economic performance, the widening access to
education, the vast improvements in housing conditions and standards of living as the basis upon
which to construct a utopian vision of the modern, meritocratic society just around the corner. For
his part, Boltanski (1982,178) has pointed to the popularity, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, of
Seymour Martin Lipset’s hypotheses about a coming ‘post-industrial age’ in which technological
advance would herald ‘une société sans classes’, as evidence of the prevalent mood of technocratic
optimism.

Bourdieu’s concern in ‘Sociology and Philosophy...’, however, was not merely with the
emergence of such technocratically inclined forms of sociology but also with the more subtle ways
in which the very existence of a state-sponsored sociology was inflecting the discipline away from a
concern with problems of deprivation, poverty, or class division towards an emphasis on the
sociology of ‘bureaucracy’ and ‘administrative organisation’ (1967a, 186)5. He noted with some
dismay the participation of high-ranking planners and bureaucrats such as Gruson and Massé at the
1965 Congrès de la société française de sociologie, as well as the proliferation of ‘new exchange
places’, political ‘clubs’ such as the Club Jean Moulin, Prospective, and Futuribles, ‘where senior
officials and sociologists of the upper echelons of the administration pool their common ideas on
the “administrative phenomenon”’ (1967a, 187)6. He also noted the way that certain academic
journals of the Left, notably Esprit, had ‘opened their pages to this dialogue’ between academia and
state bureaucracy, encouraging the imposition of a new, more technocratic model of intellectual
labour (188).7

The critical stance adopted by Bourdieu both to the technocrats themselves and to those
sociologists he considered guilty of accommodation to the dominant discourses of business and
bureaucracy might seem to place him in alliance with a range of contemporary thinkers on the Left
who were equally critical of technocracy and of the ideologies of consumerism. Indeed, in his
Position: contre les technocrates (1967), the Marxist Henri Lefebvre pointed to the same affinity
between structuralism and technocracy which Bourdieu had noted in his 'Sociology and Philosophy...’ of the same year. Lefebvre’s diagnoses of the ‘alienating’ and ‘reifying’ effects of mass culture in his various studies of ‘la vie quotidienne’ and ‘la modernité’ had exerted a considerable influence over the critical sociology of the day. Its traces could be seen in Alain Touraine’s attempts to enumerate the different forms of ‘alienation’ characteristic of modernity in his Sociologie de l’action (1965), whilst his later collection, La Société post-industrielle (1969), contained a sustained reflection on the problem of technocracy. In the domain of cultural analysis, Roland Barthes worried over the alienating effects of a reified consumer culture in his immensely influential Mythologies (1957), whilst Edgar Morin in L’Esprit du temps (1962) expressed similar worries about the ‘homogenisation’ of mass culture, even as he held out the hope that the new mass media might yet facilitate freer access to high culture.

However, it might be argued that for all their apparent criticisms of technocracy and consumerism these thinkers of the Left shared with figures such as Fourastié or Bauchet a belief that technological and economic progress had significantly altered the traditional divisions between social classes. Touraine’s work, for example, drew heavily on Serge Mallet’s (1963) analysis of the emergence of ‘une nouvelle classe ouvrière’. He argued that the emergence of a highly technically qualified ‘new working class’ signalled an end to the old struggle between capitalist and worker over ownership of the means of production and its replacement by a struggle between ‘technicien’ and technocrat over ownership of knowledge and the instruments of technological control (Touraine 1969). Morin’s work, meanwhile, in its emphasis on the ‘homogenising’ effects of mass culture and the mass media, suggested that a similar redrawing and attenuation of traditional class divisions was in progress in the cultural domain.

All these figures, Morin, Touraine, Lefebvre, and Barthes, were associated with the review Arguments, described by Bourdieu (1967a, 182) as being run by ‘a marginal intelligentsia’, ‘intellectuals who had been excluded from or had left the Communist Party, after the crisis of confidence provoked in them by the Budapest events’. The Arguments group had been responsible for some of the first studies of the effects of ‘mass consumerism’ and the ‘mass media’ on French society, for what Bourdieu (181) disparagingly termed ‘a kind of literature’ whose ‘favourite themes’ were ‘the collective tragedies of “mass civilisation”, the science fiction marvels of an
“affluent society” and the “anthropological mutation” brought about by the efficient magic of modern means of communication’. Politically, having rejected the Stalinism of the French Communist Party, the group was associated with efforts to construct a ‘troisième voie’, neither Stalinist nor Gaullist, around Pierre Mendès-France, generally known as an Atlanticist, a moderniser, and a champion of democratic planning. Theoretically, their work had been influenced by American sociology: as Mark Poster (1975, 214) points out, members of Arguments’s editorial board such as Lefebvre and Pierre Fougeyrollas had attended classes by Paul Lazarsfeld and other quantitative American sociologists.

Bourdieu could thus argue that there was an objective affinity between state technocrats and the members of the Arguments group. In La Reproduction (1970), he suggested that certain ’idéologies critiques’, marked by their fascination with ‘l’effet d’homogénéisation et d’aliénation de la télévision ou des “mass media”’, shared the same blindness to questions of class, ‘l’indifférence pour les différences’, as ‘la technocratie, leur adversaire d’élection’ (1970, 229n.15). He drew a direct parallel between those thinkers who had adopted American models of positivist sociology, ‘les représentants patentés d’une sociologie importée’, and sociologists, such as Lefebvre and Touraine, who were writing about ‘alienation’, ‘modernity’ or the emergence of ‘la nouvelle classe ouvrière’; ‘les voltigeurs de toutes les avant-gardes, sans cesse occupés, par crainte d’être en retard d’une révolution idéologique ou théorique, à scruter l’horizon de la “modernité” et toujours prêts et prompts à discerner la dernière-née des “nouvelles classes”, des “nouvelles aliénations” ou des “nouvelles contradictions”’ (228).

It was, however, in the earlier essay, ‘Sociologues des mythologies et mythologies des sociologues’ (1963), again co-authored with Passeron, that Bourdieu had launched his harshest critique of the Arguments group, singling out Morin’s L’Esprit du temps, Barthes’s Mythologies, and Fougeyrollas’s L’Action sur l’homme: cinéma et télévision (1961) for particular criticism. At the heart of Bourdieu’s critique was the question of the failure of these ‘massmédiologues’ to conduct any empirical research into the ‘mass’ cultural phenomena they analysed. A central concern of the work of these commentators was the analysis of the images of consumerism and modernity transmitted through the ‘mass media’, through advertising, Hollywood cinema, radio, television, and the photojournalism of magazines such as Elle, Paris Match, L’Express, and
Madame Express. However, Bourdieu argued, rather than base their analyses on detailed research into the modes of production, distribution, and reception of such images, the ‘massmédiologues’ fell back on a kind of technological determinism in which the existence of such new ‘mass media’ was taken in itself as evidence of the prevalence of an alienating ‘mass culture’ being passively consumed by the docile ‘masses’ (1963c, 1002). Freed from the burden of undertaking detailed empirical research into the way in which these ‘mass’ cultural forms were actually being produced or consumed, the ‘massmédiologues’ could secure the symbolic profits attendant upon a hermeneutic style of structuralist or semiotic analysis; in an ostentatious and typically intellectual display of ‘prophétisme’ or interpretative brilliance, they could reveal the ‘truth’ behind the ideological mystifications which held the everyone else in their thrall (1000).

Further, Bourdieu maintained that uncritical use of the term ‘mass’ allowed the ‘massmédiologues’ to play off a series of opposing registers at once. By using the term ‘mass’, the ‘massmédiologues’ could give the appearance of fidelity to the Marxist tradition, proclaim the advent of a new era of cultural democracy or ‘une société sans classes’, whilst simultaneously expressing a typically elitist disdain at the superficiality of a universally ‘alienating’ mass culture:

comme il implique nécessairement la référence à l'opposition entre masses et élites, le terme de 'masse' autorise l'apparence d'une fidelité verbale au schéma révolutionnaire dans le moment même où l'on met Marx sur la tête: en affirmant l'égalité de tous dans l'aliénation, on se donne une société sans classes, mais aussi sans révolution faite, à faire, ou faisable, tout en se réservant la possibilité de jouer sur les résonances sémantiques du mot 'masse' qui peut évoquer indifféremment la tradition révolutionnaire ou la tradition machiavelienne en sa forme parétienne. (1019)

Bourdieu’s criticisms of the technocrats and ‘massmédiologues’ were thus both ideological and methodological. He argued that both groups of thinkers shared an ideological faith in the power of technological change and economic growth to ensure significant and positive social and cultural advances. Such a faith, he maintained, could only be sustained by a failure, at the methodological
level, to conduct detailed empirical research into the precise implications of the changes in question, a failure which encouraged some of the more extravagant claims made regarding 'mass culture' and the advent of an age of cultural democracy. It was precisely these claims that Bourdieu's work on class and culture in the 1960s sought to challenge. This challenge was to be fought on a number of different fronts. It implied a particular vision of sociology, of its critical force, and of the need to retain its intellectual independence of commercial and administrative interests. It also involved an emphasis on empirical research as a means to gain a more objective measure of the true extent of the changes being wrought by technological advance and economic growth.

Having criticised the analyses of postwar French society offered by technocrats and 'mass médiologues' alike, the onus was on Bourdieu to explain precisely how he understood the significant social and cultural changes which marked the period. His critique of those using the term 'mass' to proclaim the advent of 'une société sans classes, mais aussi sans révolution faite, à faire, ou faisable' seemed to suggest he was calling for a return to a more orthodox Marxist analysis. However, as a reading of the article 'Celibat et condition paysanne' (1962) revealed, Bourdieu's account of the changes sweeping through the rural communities of his native Béarn owed more to the Durkheimian tradition than it did to the Marxist.

**Country versus City: From the 'exode rural' to the 'grands ensembles'**

The starting point for Bourdieu's analysis of matrimonial exchange in the Béarn was a recorded increase in the rate of enforced celibacy amongst elder sons living in outlying hamlets. These elder sons had traditionally enjoyed high chances of finding a marriage partner since it was they who stood to inherit land. That they should have begun to experience enforced celibacy for the first time was, according to Bourdieu, symptomatic of a major shift in the social and economic organisation of the traditional peasant communities of the Béarn. Increasingly, those who had greatest value on the marriage market were not those who stood to inherit land but those who lived in urban areas; a social hierarchy based on land ownership was giving way to one based on 'la distribution dans l'espace géographique' (Bourdieu 1962c, 59). Modern, urban values were eroding that carefully constructed set of moral precepts and social conventions which had traditionally regulated peasant
life, the peasant ‘ethos’ which set collective limits on ambition and future action, securing the integration of the whole group. Thus, for example, where inhabitants of the ‘bourg’ would traditionally have invested any accumulated wealth in the land, ‘se référant à un système de valeurs typiquement paysan’, now they would invest in ‘l’accumulation ou [...] l’ostentation de biens de consommation tels que l’automobile ou la télévision’ (83).

Young women in particular, argued Bourdieu, served as the ambassadors for this set of modern urban social mores. As the possessors of ‘le monopole du jugement du goût’, women were predisposed to adopt modern urban modes of behaviour and dress (104). Moreover, a series of economic and social developments since the end of the First World War had increased their autonomy and broadened their horizons. Inflation in land values immediately after the First War had rendered it impossible for parents to provide their daughters with a dowry in proportion to the value of the land owned by their future husbands. Freed from the threat of disinheritance, women could thus choose a marriage partner at will. Further, unlike their male counterparts, who were forced to stay at home to work the land, young women had been able to take full advantage of the extension of formal education in the form of the introduction of the ‘cours complémentaire’. Not only were their intellectual horizons therefore broadened, but their time spent at school in the local town exposed them to a range of other cultural influences: ‘A la ville, par la médiation des hebdomadaires féminins, des feuilletons, des films racontés, des chansons à la mode transmises par la radio, les filles empruntent aussi des modèles de relations entre les sexes et un type d’homme idéal qui est tout l’opposé du paysan “empaysanne”’ (105-6). Women, then, stood at the avant-garde of a whole series of cultural and social shifts which had dramatically altered traditional Béarnais society and it was they who were leaving the countryside in the greatest numbers; ‘l’exode est essentiellement le fait des femmes [...] qui aspirent toujours davantage à fuir les servitudes de la vie paysanne’ (67).

The new models of behaviour, so readily adopted by the women, were, however, deeply inimical to the men, in particular to first-born sons who had a greater emotional attachment to the land and still aspired to a model of the ‘paysan accompli’ entirely at odds with women’s new ideal for a desirable marriage partner. A local ‘bal de Noël’ furnished Bourdieu with an opportunity for ethnographical observation of this clash between two cultures and of the way these two opposing
sets of values had become internalised into the deportment, dispositions, and aspirations of peasants and 'citadines' alike. Here Bourdieu made his first use of two terms that were to take on an increasingly central role in his later work, the Aristotelian word for 'habit', 'hexis', and its Latin Thomist equivalent, 'habitus'. As he made clear in two footnotes, the terms were borrowed from Marcel Mauss's essay 'Techniques du corps', where they had been used to describe the way agents and groups incorporate social imperatives into their deportment and bodily dispositions (see Mauss 1950, 365-86).

In the case of the Béarnais, this process of incorporation was evident in the contrast between the fashionably dressed women and young 'citadins', on the one hand, and the male peasants, on the other, who stood awkwardly on the edge of the dancefloor, singing songs in Béarnais dialect, 'tandis que l'orchestre joue des twist et des cha-cha-cha' (Bourdieu 1962c, 98). The awkwardness of the peasants, manifest in their deportment or 'exis corporelle', not only signified their lowly status and crude lack of sophistication to the women and 'citadins' present, it also provided an occasion for a 'prise de conscience' on the part of the peasants themselves. Their 'habitus' and 'hexis' rendered the peasants self-conscious in two senses of the term, not only awkward and embarrassed, but also aware of how such awkwardness reflected their peasant status: 'C'est parce qu'il saisit son corps comme empaysanné qu'il a conscience d'être empaysanné […]. la prise de conscience de son corps est pour lui l'occasion privilégiée de la prise de conscience de la condition paysanne' (100). This uncomfortable 'prise de conscience' led, in turn, to the peasants' effective self-exclusion from the marriage market; conscious of their low objective chances of finding a marriage partner, they adjusted their expectations to reflect those declining chances: 'Ainsi, la condition économique et sociale influence la vocation au mariage principalement par la médiation de la conscience que les hommes prennent de cette situation. En effet le paysan qui prend conscience de soi a de bonnes chances de se sentir comme paysan au sens péjoratif' (102).

The implications of this account of anomie and cultural dislocation in the face of rapid social, economic, and cultural change extended far beyond the specific case of the Béarn. Indeed, the problems faced by the Béarnais peasants might be read as typical of those faced by the French countryside as a whole as it was forced to modernise and abandon its outdated modes of social and economic organisation in the postwar period. For, although Bourdieu traced the breakdown in the
system of matrimonial exchange in the Béarn to land-price inflation in the inter-war years and the
extension of formal education in the nineteenth century, his references to ‘la crise qui affecte l'ordre
social’ and ‘l'exode rural’ could not fail to have a very specific resonance in 1962 when ‘Célibat et
condition paysanne’ was published. Just as Bourdieu had found that in Algeria it was the peasants
who were most acutely affected by the turmoil of the War of Independence, so in France after 1945
it was the rural population which experienced some of the most profound and radical upheavals.
‘L'exode rural’, the mass migration of workers from rural areas into the towns in search of work,
was perhaps the most visible manifestation of such upheaval. In 1946, 53% of the French
population lived in urban areas and 47% in the countryside; by 1968, those percentages had
changed to 66% in urban and just 34% in rural areas (Braudel and Labrousse, eds. 1980, 997).
Moreover, as Pierre Barral has shown, between 1960 and 1962, the very years when Bourdieu was
conducting and writing up his research, a series of peasant demonstrations and violent protests at
Amiens, Morlaix in Brittany and villages throughout the Midi, provoked by the plight of French
agriculture, had placed ‘les problèmes agricoles au premier plan de l'actualité’ (ibid, 1438).
Indeed, ‘Célibat et condition paysanne’ was merely one early contribution to the growing
literature examining the changes sweeping through the French countryside, of which the most
notable examples were Mallet’s Les Paysans contre le passé (1962), Gordon Wright’s Rural
Revolution in France (1964), Henri Mendras’s La Fin des paysans (1967), and Morin’s Commune
en France: la métamorphose de Plodémet (1967). Much of this literature focused on the efforts of a
militant national movement of young farmers to embrace progress and force the pace of
modernisation. Mallet’s book, for example, examined this movement in the Finistère region,
whilst the conclusion of Mendras’s study placed considerable faith in the ability of these progressive
farmers to ensure French agriculture’s smooth transition from traditional to modern techniques,
seeing the rural exodus as both an inevitable and beneficial part of this process.

Bourdieu’s approach, then, was distinguished by its emphasis on the uneven and highly
problematic nature of the changes affecting French rural communities, on the divisive and anomic
aspects of modernisation. However, it might be argued that in focusing on the problems of
modernisation, in emphasising how such problems engendered a sense of resignation and
impotence amongst the peasantry, he was ignoring the ability of a significant section of the French
peasantry to take genuine initiatives to better their lot and was thus presenting an equally partial
view of a complex and contradictory situation. It was these contradictions which Morin sought to
analyse in his study of the Breton village of Plodémet. Like Bourdieu, he pointed to the key role
played by young women in imposing new fashions and models of behaviour learned from women’s
magazines, radio, film, and popular song. He noted too the tendency of the men to be left behind
by such developments and their consequent difficulties in finding a marriage partner. At the same
time, however, he emphasised the extent to which the peasants were only too happy to abandon a
lifestyle that had been harsh and unprofitable, whilst seeking, nevertheless, to preserve the cultural
traditions so central to their sense of identity. Indeed, Bourdieu’s criticisms of Morin
notwithstanding, only the most unjust reading of Plodémet could see a direct parallel between its
author’s attempts to delineate this complex ‘dialectic of modernisation’ and a technocratic faith in
the onward march of social and economic progress.

Bourdieu’s analysis in ‘Célibat et condition paysanne’ was not merely distinctive for its focus
on the social problems which flowed from modernisation and ‘l’exode rural’. Its distinctiveness
resided also in its reliance on a set of theoretical concepts borrowed from the Durkheimian tradition
to make sense of these problems. The whole problematic of the essay, its emphasis on the clash
between urban and rural values, on changes in the morphology of the Béarnais population, was
profoundly Durkheimian, whilst its focus on shifting patterns of celibacy and nuptiality seemed to
owe a particular debt to an essay of 1935 in which Maurice Halbwachs had analysed the effects of
the First World War on the French marriage market, ‘La Nuptialité en France pendant et depuis la
guerre’ (in Halbwachs 1972, 231-74). Further, Bourdieu’s description of the peasant ethos as a
shared set of social values and norms which not only generated a sense of solidarity amongst the
Béarnais peasants but also led them to condemn any action that threatened to go beyond the
collectively established norm recalled Durkheim’s argument in Le Suicide (1897) that each social
group constrained its needs and desires, adjusting them in line with a collective norm: ‘chacun dans
sa sphère, se rend vaguement compte du point extrême jusqu'où peuvent aller ses ambitions et
n’aspire à rien au-delà’ (1897, 277). If such collective ‘dispositions’ generally served to secure a
collective sense of social harmony and equilibrium, Durkheim also conceived of moments when the
old social hierarchies broke down, ‘cet état d’ébranlement [...] quand la société traverse quelque
crise maladive’ (279). Durkheim gave the examples of the breakdown in the relations between patricians and plebeians at the end of the Roman Empire, or the erosion of aristocratic privilege in the face of rampant nineteenth-century industrialism. Bourdieu’s analysis of the breakdown of the traditional system of matrimonial exchange in the Béarn, ‘dérèglement du système, c’est-à-dire anomie’ (1962c, 59), clearly represented such an ‘état d’ébranlement’.

Writing at the end of the nineteenth century, Durkheim described how at a time of rapid economic expansion, ‘un brusque accroissement de puissance et de fortune’, the collective limits set on desires and ambitions broke down, unleashing an unseemly scramble to satisfy new needs and appetites:

l’échelle d’après laquelle se réglaient les besoins ne peut plus rester la même […] On ne sait plus ce qui est possible et ce qui ne l’est pas, ce qui est juste et ce qui est injuste, quelles sont les revendications et les espérances légitimes, quelles sont celles qui passent la mesure. Par suite, il n’est rien à quoi on ne prétende […]. Telle classe, que la crise a plus spécialement favorisée, n’est plus disposée à la même résignation. et, par contre-coup, le spectacle de sa plus grande fortune éveille autour et au-dessous d’elle toute sorte de convoitises. (1897. 280-81)

In the 1966 essay, ‘Différences et distinctions’, Bourdieu sought to trace the fortunes of the peasants who had abandoned the land to seek work in urban areas, showing how their migration into the modern housing estates springing up around French cities was unleashing an analogous series of new needs and desires and establishing a new ground for social and class distinctions.

‘Différence et distinctions’ was just one of three essays Bourdieu contributed to the 1966 volume, Le Partage des bénéfices: expansion et inégalités en France. This collective study grew out of a colloquium organised the previous year by Bourdieu and his colleague from the INSEE, the statistician Alain Darbel. The colloquium was a response to the perceived need to examine and correct some of the more extravagant claims made by a whole series of commentators, technocrats and ‘massmédiologues’ alike, by means of a detailed empirical and theoretical analysis of the extent and limitations of the social and economic changes wrought by France’s postwar reconstruction.
Bourdieu himself contributed three essays to the volume. ‘La Fin d’un malthusianisme?’, co-written with Darbel, was an analysis of the take-up of ‘allocations familiales’ by the different social classes and of the influence of this kind of state benefit on France’s postwar demographic boom. ‘La Transmission de l’héritage’ drew together elements from Bourdieu’s research into education and museum visiting, endowing them with a new force and emphasis in the polemical context of Le Partage des bénéfices. ‘Différences et distinctions’ was perhaps the most interesting of the three essays since it sought to formulate more general hypotheses about the effects of French economic expansion on social distinctions. The essay focused on a series of major socio-cultural changes, the rural exodus, the advent of mass tourism, the mass availability of consumer durables such as television sets, cars, and washing machines, the migration of workers from the old ‘quartiers populaires’ into modern housing estates, and the emergence of the socially mobile and highly aspirational ‘classes moyennes’ as a significant social force.

For Bourdieu, the rural exodus had played a key role in increasing expenditure on consumer goods. Migration from the country into the city, he argued, provoked a break with the ascetic ethos of traditional peasant life which had forbidden excessive or conspicuous expenditure, encouraging individuals to take advantage of new consumer credit opportunities and to ‘s’engager dans la compétition de la consommation ostentatoire’ (Bourdieu 1966, 118). This trend could not, however, be attributed to a conscious search for prestige through conspicuous consumption, on Thorstein Veblen’s model, but rather to ‘la victoire de la ville sur la campagne, des valeurs citadines sur les valeurs rurales’ (119), the desire of migrants from the countryside to demonstrate their adherence to modern urban values through the purchase of a television, fridge, or washing machine.

However, Bourdieu maintained that as the possession of certain consumer goods became established as the norm, so a new set of perceived needs would arise. Satisfaction of one need simply triggered a series of supplementary needs contingent upon adherence to new models of behaviour and consumption. Thus, workers who had been re-housed in modern housing estates discovered they were ‘sommés d’inventer un nouvel art de vivre et une nouvelle morale de relations interpersonnelles’. Not only were they frequently incapable of meeting ‘les nouvelles charges et les nouveaux besoins qui sont comme impliqués dans le logement moderne’, they were also alienated
by the isolation of their new environment: 'enclins à établir des rapports directs et simples avec leur entourage, ils ressentent comme privation la rupture des relations étendues qu'autorisent la vie de quartier et sont mal préparés à goûter les satisfactions de l'intimité autorisée par leur nouvel habitat.' (121).

Whilst acknowledging that material differences between rich and poor had undoubtedly been mitigated, Bourdieu argued that other kinds of distinction were rapidly taking their place. The difference between the fact of possession or the quantity of goods possessed was giving way to an emphasis both on the quality of those goods and on the manner in which they were consumed. The cultural domain was, moreover, a privileged arena for the making of such distinctions:

En outre, du fait que le système de production rend accessibles au plus grand nombre des biens jusque-là réservés à quelques-uns, la recherche de distinction, qui s'attache moins, désormais, à la possession de certains biens qu'à la manière d'en user, ne va-t-elle pas réintroduire une nouvelle forme de rareté, rareté de l'art de consommer et non plus du bien consommé? Les pratiques culturelles seraient prédisposées à tenir une place éminente dans cette dialectique de la divulgation et de la distinction. (118)

Thus, for instance, Bourdieu argued that the overall growth of mass tourism not only concealed continuing inequalities in the tendency to go away on holiday but also newer distinctions between the quality of holiday taken, the resorts frequented, or the activities undertaken there (127).

Brute material differences between rich and poor were increasingly being replaced or supplemented by differences in the way class identities were symbolised or signified through different lifestyles. The most prestigious differences were now those which symbolised social position most clearly, clothing, language, and cultural taste, for such symbols could be read as signs of essential human qualities of refinement and moral excellence; they were culture transformed into nature. Here Bourdieu moved closer to a structural reading of culture, drawing on the work of the Russian linguist, Nikolai Troubetzkoy, to posit the field of class distinctions as a structure of arbitrary and differential signifying elements or expressive values:
C'est dire que les différences purement économiques, celles que crée la possession de biens, sont redoublées par la recherche des distinctions symboliques dans la manière d'user ces biens, ou, si l'on veut, dans la consommation. Et, plus encore, dans la consommation symbolique qui transmue les biens en distinctions signifiantes, ou pour parler comme les linguistes, en 'valeurs' en privilégiant la manière, la forme de l'action ou de l'objet au détriment de sa fonction. (128)

If the workers who had recently abandoned their 'quartiers populaires' or the peasants their villages to flood into the new housing estates were the losers in this new struggle for social and symbolic distinction, Bourdieu suggested that the upwardly-mobile 'classes moyennes', the sons and daughters of the old petite-bourgeoisie, were better placed to take advantage of the new modes of social and cultural life.\(^\text{30}\) Having more money and less traditional reliance on extended family and social networks, they were well-equipped to benefit from their new environment and the new models of behaviour that accompanied it, creating a new lifestyle around the couple or the nuclear family as the primary social unit:

c'est toute l'existence qui se réorganise autour de la vie de famille, comme si les relations gagnaient en intensité ce qu'elles ont perdu en extension: on accorde plus d'intérêt aux enfants et à leur travail scolaire, on entend se pourvoir des deux instruments obligés du loisir familial, l'automobile et la télévision, bref on savoure la vie privée comme intimité au lieu de la subir comme privation. (122)\(^\text{21}\)

Further, Bourdieu argued that it was the aspirational 'classes moyennes' who were most likely to avail themselves of the increased opportunities for cultural consumption afforded by the mass media. The old collectively established limits on desire and ambition that had characterised the traditional petite-bourgeoisie had broken down to be replaced by new models of behaviour reflecting higher aspirations. These aspirations were manifest in the cultural domain in what he termed the 'bonne volonté culturelle des classes moyennes', their quest for cultural legitimacy, 'dans les sous-produits de la culture savante ou les succédanés des expériences culturelles directes que leur livrent
les moyens de communication modernes. Drawing on audience data for television and radio, Bourdieu argued not only that the ‘classes moyennes’ were far more likely to consume ‘cultural’ programmes on television or radio than the working class, but also that the bourgeoisie were likely to turn up their noses at the ‘vulgarisation’ of high culture through the ‘mass media’. Thus, even the domain of the ‘mass media’ was, according to Bourdieu, marked by a dynamic of class distinction and division.

In insisting on the continuing importance of class distinctions in an age of consumerism and mass media, Bourdieu was clearly carrying out a war on two fronts, against both technocrats and ‘massmédiologues’ alike. The very real progress made by the mid-1960s in solving France’s postwar housing crisis, the replacement of slum housing by the construction of large modern housing estates or ‘grands ensembles’ on the edge of many French cities offering affordable, well-equipped modern apartments, seemed to give credence to the kind of utopian vision of the workers’ housing of the future offered by Fourastié (1963, 274-76) in Le Grand espoir du XXe siècle. Bourdieu’s emphasis on the problematic nature of the transition to life in this new environment was surely an attempt to rebut such utopianism. Fourastié (283-84) also argued that radio, television, and film were greatly increasing the cultural competence and intellectual abilities of the French population as a whole, a point which seemed to be echoed by Morin’s assertion in L’Esprit du temps that the ‘démocratisation de la culture cultivée est un des courants de la culture de masse’ (1962, 59). Both Morin (1962) and Mallet (1963, 8) had argued that improved housing and mass tourism meant that at the level of lifestyle differences between the working class and the bourgeoisie were disappearing. Again, ‘Différences et distinctions’ sought to question such hasty assumptions.

It would, however, be wrong to suppose that Bourdieu and his collaborators were the only sociologists to emphasise the problematic aspects of French postwar reconstruction. Indeed, in a series of essays from the early 1960s onwards, Lefebvre had examined the sense of alienation suffered by the inhabitants of the new town of Lacq-Mourenx as they confronted the rationalised and reified environment of the ‘grand ensemble’ (1962, 121-30; 1970, 109-28). Like Bourdieu, he highlighted the extent to which the development of ‘la société urbaine’ was unleashing a set of ‘besoins nouveaux’, of manipulated, conditioned, and programmed consumer desires (1968, 141-42). This increased emphasis on consumption, he maintained, was leading to the transformation of
consumer goods into signifiers of wealth and status, 'la consommation de signes, symboles et significations', hence establishing new grounds for social discrimination: 'Les signes ne sont pas innocents, pas plus qu'innoffensifs: des groupes, agents sociaux les lancent ou s'en emparent. Ils s'en font les signes d'exclusion ou d'appartenance' (1967, 24). As the possession of consumer durables, such as cars, became more widespread, so the grounds of distinction shifted from the possession or lack of a car to the possession of the 'right' model or marque.

Bourdieu's work was, therefore, not perhaps as unique in its critical stance as he might have his readers believe. Indeed, it might be argued that at its most general level, his analysis of postwar reconstruction partook of what Ross has identified as the dominant contemporary ideologeme. For Bourdieu's account of the breakdown of a traditional peasant ethos in 'Célibat et condition paysanne' and of the shift from the highly integrated environment of a peasant society to the urban 'anomie' of the 'grands ensembles' suggested a series of parallels with his contemporaneous writings on the effects of colonialism on the Algerian peasantry, their enforced migration from isolated rural communities into the 'disenchanted', strictly rationalised habitat of the 'centres de regroupement'. As Ross (1995) has pointed out, this kind of analogy between postwar economic modernisation and the de-humanising effects of colonialism, whether explicit or implicit, was a prevalent trope of the discourses of sociology, advertising, film, and the novel of the period. She cites Lefebvre's and the Situationists' coinage of the phrase 'la colonisation de la vie quotidienne' to describe the reifying effects of consumer culture on French society as typifying this trope (1995, 7).

In both 'Célibat et condition paysanne' and his contributions to Le Partage des bénéfices, then, Bourdieu had situated himself quite clearly in opposition to the dominant technocratic discourse, providing a timely reminder of the dangers inherent in too hasty assessments of the progress achieved by France's economic recovery. His position vis-à-vis other sociologists of the Left, however, appeared less clear-cut and it might be argued that the similarities between his work and that of a figure like Lefebvre were at least as great as the differences. Indeed, like Bourdieu, Lefebvre had warned that certain sections of the French Left were as guilty of propagating the myths of technocracy as those on the Right (1967, 16), whilst underlining 'les dangers d'une manipulation imprudente' of the notion of 'la nouvelle classe ouvrière' (1970, 125n.3).
principal difference lay in the interpretative frameworks applied by the two thinkers. Bourdieu’s emphasis on shifts in social morphology as the key to understanding the increased consumption of consumer durables highlighted once again his debt to Durkheim, recalling the latter’s argument in *De la division du travail social* (1893) that the fundamental cause of social and cultural change was an increase in ‘le nombre des individus en rapports et leur proximité matérielle et morale’ (330). However, this risked attributing consumerism to a hypostatised ‘dialectique de la divulgation et de la distinction’, an innate tendency in all consumers to seek to distinguish themselves from their peers. Lefebvre, in classically Marxist style, avoided this by locating the motor for increased consumption in the economy, in what he termed ‘le néo-capitalisme’, a post-imperialist stage of economic development characterised by the search for increased marginal profits through constant product differentiation (1967, 14n.1).

Bourdieu’s adherence to a fundamentally Durkheimian tradition of sociological analysis did, then, constitute a genuinely distinctive feature of his work, albeit not necessarily a wholly positive one. His opposition to Morin’s rather optimistic conclusions regarding the cultural ‘democratisation’ and ‘homogenisation’ provoked by the spread of the mass media, on the other hand, was both distinctive and fully justified. It was these distinctive features of his work which marked out his study of photography, *Un Art moyen*, positioning it as an attempt to apply the criticisms he had made elsewhere of Morin and Barthes to the detailed analysis of a ‘mass’ cultural form.

**Sociology versus Semiology - Un Art moyen**

*Un Art moyen: essai sur les usages sociaux de la photographie*, to give it its full title, was a collaborative study which grew out of Aron’s seminar on ‘l’image dans la société industrielle’ at the C.S.E.. On one level, it can be read as a direct response to the work of Barthes and Morin on the profusion of images of modernity and consumerism in cinema, advertising, and the new mass market magazines such as *Elle, Paris-Match, Marie-Claire, and Marie-France*. One of Bourdieu’s criticisms of this work had been that it failed to examine empirically either the structures of production or the modes of reception of such images. Thus, *Un Art moyen* contained chapters on photojournalism and the use of photography in advertising, but in each case the findings of
Bourdieu’s co-authors were based on empirical research amongst the journalists and photographers who actually produced the images in question. Bourdieu himself contributed a general introduction to the volume and two chapters examining photography as a ‘mass’ leisure practice and the consumption or reception of photographs as a ‘mass’ cultural form. Again, his findings were rooted in empirical research, namely an ethnographic study of photographic practice in the peasant communities of the Béarn and a more quantitative survey of the practices and tastes of a representative sample of 692 inhabitants of Paris, Lille, and a small provincial town.

Sometimes, the findings of Bourdieu and his team seemed to constitute quite direct rebuttals of the kind of semiological readings of photographic images offered by Barthes and Morin. For example, in ‘Sociologues des mythologies... ’, Bourdieu (1963c, 1020) had argued that semiological analysis was merely a means for the ‘massmédiaologues’ to ‘s’épargner le désenchantement de découvrir que les rédacteurs et les photographes de Paris-Match, leurs confrères, mettent explicitement et méthodiquement dans leur message ce que l’analyse structurale, cette baguette magique, en fait surgi’. This mention of Paris-Match might be read as a reference to Barthes’s celebrated analysis in Mythologies of the colonial ideology implicit in a cover photograph of a black soldier saluting the French flag. In the essay he contributed to Un Art moven, Boltanski reported the following testimony of a Paris-Match photographer which seemed to support Bourdieu’s assertion that such individuals were often wholly conscious of the ideologies they were disseminating:


Similarly, in Mythologies, Barthes had offered a critique of the liberal humanist ideology implicit in an exhibition of photographs entitled ‘The Family of Man’. It was surely no coincidence that the images Bourdieu chose to show his sample of research subjects, in order to test empirically the possible relationship between their aesthetic tastes and their social origins, were taken from this
same exhibition. The message of Un Art moyen seemed clear; empirical sociology was reasserting its pre-eminence over a semiological or structural hermeneutics.

This almost ostentatious ‘return’ to a tradition of empirical social science was to be made more explicit in Bourdieu’s introduction, which included a long quotation from that classic text of nineteenth-century experimental science, Claude Bernard’s Introduction à la médecine expérimentale (1865), followed by a typically Durkheimian assertion that sociology should mimic the methods of the natural sciences (1965, 19). Furthermore, Bourdieu’s argument in the opening sections of his contribution to Un Art moyen followed closely the argument of Durkheim’s Le Suicide. In Le Suicide, Durkheim had attempted to show that even the most apparently personal decision, the decision to take one’s own life, was explicable in sociological terms. To this end, he had opened his study by rejecting psychological motivations as an explanation for the incidence of suicide. In Un Art moyen, Bourdieu was attempting to demonstrate that an area apparently equally governed by personal motivations, namely aesthetic taste, was in fact determined by sociological norms and rules. Like Durkheim before him, then, Bourdieu rejected psychological motivation as an explanation of a social practice, in this case photography (1965, 32-5). Photography, he argued, was not explicable in terms of ‘l’anarchie des intentions individuelles’ (39).

Having dispensed with psychological motivation as a possible explanatory tool, Bourdieu determined to replace it with the concept of a class-determined ‘habitus’, a concept he had elaborated in general terms in his introduction. Here, in an argument which foreshadowed his later critiques of structuralism and Sartrean existentialism in his works of Kabyle ethnology, Bourdieu presented the concept of habitus as the means of overcoming ‘l’alternative fictive’ between objectivism and subjectivism, between ‘un pan-structuralisme objectiviste’ and ‘un subjectivisme obstiné à rechercher le lieu de surgissement pur d’une action créatrice irréductible aux déterminismes structuraux’ (22). The habitus was proposed as a mediating term between the two opposing doctrines of existential freedom and unconscious structural law, explaining how objective reality, as measured by the statistical chances of a particular course of action meeting with success, became internalised into a structure of dispositions and aspirations, an implicit sense of what could or could not be reasonably achieved, so as to generate a set of objectively determined practices which were experienced, at the subjective level, as free choices (22-3). The habitus was determined
by class in two ways, firstly because the objective chances of an Algerian sub-proletarian finding a
job or the son of working-class parents reaching university were closely correlated with social origin
and, secondly, because the collective historical experience of the sub-proletariat or working class
had engendered 'un ethos de classe', a collective sense of the limits of reasonable or achievable
aspirations. To transgress the limits set by such a 'class ethos' would risk the disapprobation of the
whole group (26-7).

Bourdieu's theorisation of the habitus in the introduction to _Un Art moyen_ thus merely
formalised an interpretative approach he had already used in his work on the Algerian sub-
proletariat and the Béarnais peasantry to analyse the process whereby a set of objective chances or
probabilities, 'un champ des possibles', had become internalised into a class ethos, a set of
collectively engendered limits on behaviour and aspiration. In his study of both the practice and
reception of photography, Bourdieu hoped to show that an analogous process was at work; a set of
class-determined collective limits were impinging on what might fall within 'le champ du
photographiable', on what might constitute a suitable subject for a photograph. Rather as in his
Algerian work an ideal-typical representation of 'traditional' Algerian society had served as a kind
of theoretical starting point against which to assess the extent of the changes wrought by
colonialism and the War, so in _Un Art moyen_, Bourdieu would use the Béarn, a highly regulated
society in which collective limits on acceptable behaviour were at their highest, as a kind of
benchmark against which to measure the extent to which photographic practice elsewhere was
genuinely autonomous, with any subject considered legitimate for representation. 27

In the peasant communities of the Béarn, Bourdieu argued, photography performed a very
specific role within the family unit, 'à savoir de solenniser et d'éterniser les grands moments de la
vie familiale, bref de renforcer l'intégration du groupe familial en réaffirmant le sentiment qu'il a
de lui-même et de son unité' (39). Photography served primarily to record and solemnise collective
or family ceremonies and celebrations, marriages, christenings, or reunions. Where Durkheim, in
_Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse_ (1912), had emphasised the role played by rite and
festival in cementing group solidarity, Bourdieu argued that photography now supplemented that
role: 'Si l'on admet avec Durkheim, que la fête a pour fonction de revivifier et de reconstruire le groupe,
on comprend que la photographie s’y trouve associée, puisqu’elle fournit le moyen de solenniser les moments culminants de la vie sociale où le groupe réaffirme solennellement son unité’ (41).

Thus, within the traditional peasant society of the Béarn, photography fulfilled a carefully defined social function; subjects deemed worthy of photographing were limited to certain specific family occasions and the practice of photography was itself conventionally left to a professional photographer. Drawing on Mauss’s Essai sur le don (1923-24), Bourdieu suggested that the expense incurred in paying a photographer constituted a kind of ‘dépense ostentatoire’, a conspicuously wasteful piece of expenditure which served to solemnise the event further:

le gaspillage faisant partie des conduites de fête, l’achat de la photographie de groupe, dépense ostentatoire à laquelle nul ne saurait se dérober sans manquer à l’honneur, est ressenti comme obligatoire, au titre d’hommage rendu aux mariés [...]. Objet d’échanges réglées, la photographie entre dans le circuit des dons et des contre-dons auquel le mariage donne lieu. (75)

Any photograph that did not fulfil a clear social function or any peasant who set himself up as an amateur photographer, choosing his subjects at will, would meet with the collective reprobation of the community. Such novel activities had no place within the collectively sustained circuit of ‘dons’ and ‘contre-dons’:

La communauté ressent comme un défi et un désaveu la novation qu’elle soupçonne d’être dépourvue de toute justification rationnelle ou raisonnable. C’est que la conduite ostentatoire ou perçue comme telle, à la façon du don excluant tout contre-don, place le groupe en situation d’infériorité et ne peut être ressentie que comme un affront, chacun se sentant atteint dans son estime de soi. (75)

Indeed, to set oneself up as an amateur photographer would be seen as pure affectation: ‘faire de la photographie, ce serait jouer au citadin ou comme on dit “jouer au monsieur”’ (77).
Whilst Bourdieu's research indicated that possession and personal use of photographic equipment was more widespread amongst the urban classes, the role of photographer generally falling upon the father as head of the family, he argued that photography continued to play its role as a means of integrating social groups. Indeed, photography took on an even more important role in the cities where communal affective ties had been severely weakened. Quoting Durkheim, Bourdieu painted a picture of urban anomie in which extended familial and communal ties had been whittled away until the only 'groupe primaire qui puisse maintenir son unité et sa continuité dans la société urbaine', was 'la famille restreinte'. Photography now represented the only means of fulfilling 'la fonction de thésauriser l’héritage familial' (50-1). The kinds of photographic subjects chosen by the urban classes thus remained as ritualised and routinised as was the case in the Béarn. If the advent of mass tourism had increased the opportunities to take photographs, the form and content of such photographs remained highly conventional, typically limited to recording the presence of family members in front of well-known monuments, city- or landscapes (58-9).

Moreover, according to Bourdieu, this subordination of photography to a purely functional role within the family unit was manifest in the practice of the bourgeoisie also. When asked to express an opinion on its aesthetic value, bourgeois respondents tended to reply in one of two ways. Since as a class they possessed the greatest knowledge of fine art and high culture, they might use photography as an opportunity to 'actualiser l’attitude esthétique, disposition permanente et générale' (95), judging photography according to a set of autonomous aesthetic criteria which they so notably failed to apply to their own photographic practice. On the other hand, Bourdieu argued, they might simply refuse to accord any aesthetic value to photography at all, suspicious of its popularity and easy accessibility, rejecting, 'l’adhésion fervente à une pratique suspecte de vulgarité du seul fait de sa divulgation' (74). For Bourdieu, this striking contradiction between the bourgeoisie's actual practice of photography and their stated opinions regarding its aesthetic merits or demerits provided stark testimony as to the logic of social distinction and snobbery underpinning all cultural practices. Whether judging photography according to the criteria of 'legitimate' aesthetics or rejecting it as devoid of aesthetic merit, his bourgeois respondents were all seeking to distinguish themselves from the stereotypical image of vulgar 'snap-happy' tourists so intent on
taking a photograph that they failed to contemplate the beauty of what was on the other side of the lens (100-1).

In his analysis of photography as a ‘mass’ cultural practice, then, Bourdieu had sought to make two principal points. Firstly, the simple fact that the availability of mass-produced photographic equipment had brought the possibility of engaging in an art form to all but the poorest members of society did not in itself mean that the capacity for genuinely autonomous artistic production had suddenly been placed within the grasp of all; ‘le champ du photographiable’ was still constrained by a class habitus and ethos. Secondly, photography, a cultural activity not only open to all but also practised by all in broadly the same way, remained a terrain of conflict and distinction between the different social classes. It was this notion of photography as a grounds for social distinction that Bourdieu emphasised in his analysis of the reception of photographic images.

Drawing on quantitative survey data regarding both the way in which different social groups responded to certain photographs and the judgements they made in deciding which subjects might make a ‘beautiful’, ‘interesting’, ‘insignificant’, or ‘ugly’ photograph, Bourdieu argued that the popular aesthetic was essentially functionalist. Any photograph or potential subject for a photograph which did not fulfil an identifiable function, whether by recording an event of note or capturing a subject, such as a sunset, which was picturesque in the most conventional sense, would tend to meet with incomprehension. There was a direct continuity between the ethos and habitus of the ‘classes populaires’, the internalised set of values and norms which regulated their social behaviour, and the judgements they brought to bear in the aesthetic domain. Their aesthetic judgements were, in the last instance, ethical ones (123). Moreover, their taste for the functional and rejection of the perceived gratuitousness of formally inventive or autonomous photographic production reflected a class habitus engendered in conditions of material necessity, a whole lifestyle and ethos deeply inimical to art for its own sake.

Such functionalism, Bourdieu argued, represented the antithesis of a genuinely autonomous aesthetic, at least in the terms in which such an aesthetic had been defined in Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgement (1790), that founding text of modern aesthetics. In Kantian terms, the popular aesthetic was an example of ‘barbarous taste’, of a taste ruled by a direct appeal to the senses or by the application of ethical standards rather than by that ‘disinterested’ contemplation of
'pure' aesthetic form, which, according to Kant, defined the specificity of the truly aesthetic experience. For Bourdieu, however, such aesthetic 'disinterest', far from guaranteeing the universal validity of aesthetic judgements, as Kant claimed, was itself merely the expression of a typically bourgeois ethos and habitus: it was a disinterest born of a sense of material security and which expressed the certainty of moral and intellectual superiority (122).

However, if both the popular and the bourgeois aesthetic were equally contingent upon social conditions, it was the bourgeois aesthetic which enjoyed sole legitimacy. To misquote Marx's *The German Ideology*, the 'legitimate' aesthetic was the ruling idea of the ruling class. Further, Bourdieu argued that despite possessing a system of aesthetic judgements of their own, the urban popular classes, who had greater exposure to 'legitimate' culture than the peasantry, were aware that there existed a set of alternative criteria and, moreover, that those criteria held greater legitimacy. Rather as in *Economy and Society*, Weber (1968, 32) had argued that the thief who went about his business surreptitiously thereby manifested a certain recognition of the de facto legitimacy of the rule of law even as he infringed it, so Bourdieu described how the responses of his working class research subjects manifested an analogous 'double registre de jugement' (1965, 135n.30). They expressed both an adherence to the norms of the popular aesthetic and an awareness that there existed another more legitimate aesthetic with which their tastes ought to comply. This constituted a 'double normativité', forcing, 'le même sujet à distinguer, de lui-même, entre ce qu'il aime faire et ce qu'il devrait aimer faire' (121).

Somewhat surprisingly, Bourdieu found that the bourgeoisie's tastes in photography 'se distingue peu des autres classes lorsqu'il s'agit de hiérarchiser des objets selon la beauté de l'image que l'on peut en faire' (133n.28). However, he took this as further confirmation of his hypotheses. Photography, he argued, was 'un art mineur' which had yet to formalise its own legitimate set of aesthetic criteria. The fact that, in the absence of such criteria, bourgeois practice and reception of photography tended to manifest the same 'realism' as characterised the popular aesthetic merely emphasised the extent to which the legitimate aesthetic was itself a historical and social construct, the product of a class determined process of education and inculcation. Indeed, Bourdieu only identified two groups amongst whom he detected a genuine tendency to transform photography into an autonomous aesthetic activity. The first group was composed of bachelors; theirs was a 'pratique
“égoïste” ou “anomique” in Durkheim’s sense of a practice which resulted from a low level of social integration (67). The second group was composed of members of the aspirational ‘classes moyennes’ who sought in photography a substitute for legitimate cultural activities which were beyond their reach (106).

Cathedrals to Culture: Inside the Art Gallery

Where Un Art moyen attempted to demonstrate that class distinctions had a determining force even in the domain of ‘mass’ culture, L’Amour de l’art sought to do the same for the realm of legitimate culture, demonstrating that even in the absence of any formal barriers to access to high culture, in the form of admission fees or cultural provision, the tendency to consume consecrated works of art was closely correlated with social class and education. Originally published in 1966, L’Amour de l’art was reprinted in an extended version in 1969 which broadened the scope of Bourdieu’s empirical research to include France and four other European countries, Holland, Spain, Greece, and Poland. Bourdieu’s co-author, the statistician Alain Darbel, used the data from this extensive empirical research into the composition of the European gallery-visiting public to elaborate a statistical model predicting the probability of visiting a gallery according to variables of class, age, sex, and education. Bourdieu himself, meanwhile, contributed the interpretative commentary on the data, seeking to establish more specifically the way in which such variables affected the tendency to visit an art gallery and hence to consume legitimate culture.

At its simplest level, L’Amour de l’art highlighted the very close correlation between social class and education, on the one hand, and the tendency to visit an art gallery, on the other; the cultured bourgeoisie being far more likely to visit art galleries on a regular basis than their working class counterparts (1969, 35-66). On a more ethnographic level, Bourdieu noted the frequently rebarbarative nature of the gallery environment, the sense of respectful distance it demanded of the public, and the fact that few, if any, concessions were made to those working class or petit-bourgeois visitors who lacked an intimate knowledge of art and artists (166). He used these findings to pursue the critique of legitimate aesthetics he had first sketched in Un Art moyen.

Indeed, the very emphasis on the influence of both social class and education on the tendency to visit art galleries was in itself a challenge to Kant’s notion of the universal nature of disinterested
aesthetic contemplation, as well as to what Bourdieu termed ‘l'idéologie du don’, the notion that the ability to appreciate fine art was an innate ‘gift’ (90). The appreciation of a work of art was, he argued, an act of decipherment which demanded possession of the requisite cultural code (108).

Members of the bourgeoisie were far more likely to possess such a code, not simply because of their longer exposure to formal education but also thanks to a more general familiarity with the things of taste and culture, an aesthetic disposition they had acquired in earliest childhood by inhabiting a cultured environment of which high art and culture formed an integral part (52).

Thus, Bourdieu argued, the aesthetic disposition, measured by the propensity to visit art galleries and hence appreciate fine art, formed part of the bourgeois habitus, constituting a stock of ‘cultural capital’ which the dominant class could exploit to naturalise and reproduce their dominant status. In attributing aesthetic taste to an innate gift, ‘l'idéologie du don’ functioned by masking the social determinants of the aesthetic disposition, allowing a socially determined propensity to consume legitimate culture to become a marker of apparently natural intellectual and moral superiority. Further, Bourdieu argued that in a world increasingly subject to the laws of the market, to indulge in the ‘disinterested’ pleasures of the aesthetic had itself become a luxury, the symbol of the dominant class’s objective distance and subjective sense of distinction from the realm of vulgar material necessity inhabited by the dominated classes:

les classes privilégiées de la société bourgeoise substituent à la différence entre deux cultures, produits de l’histoire reproduits par l’éducation, la différence d’essence entre deux natures, une nature naturellement cultivée et une nature naturellement naturelle. Ainsi, la sacralisation de la culture et de l’art, cette ‘monnaie de l’absolu’ qu’adore une société asservie à l’absolu de la monnaie, remplit une fonction vitale en contribuant à la consécration de l’ordre social.... (165)

Bourdieu’s critique of the art gallery as an institution, of legitimate aesthetics and of its role in naturalising and reproducing class differences has been discussed at some length by previous commentators on his work. What has attracted less attention, however, is the fact that this critique was carried out not merely at the general level, against legitimate aesthetics per se, but also had a
series of more specific targets closely related to the historical context in which Bourdieu was writing. The placement of the phrase ‘monnaie de l’absolu’ within inverted commas in the above quotation offers one clue as to whom, more precisely, Bourdieu was seeking to attack here. For La Monnaie de l’absolu was the title of the third volume of André Malraux’s Essais de psychologie de l’art (1948-50).

Malraux had been appointed de Gaulle’s culture minister in 1959 and was to remain in post until de Gaulle’s fall from power in 1969. He headed a ministry whose mission, according to the decree of July 1959 which had founded it, was to: ‘Rendre accessibles les oeuvres capitales de l’humanité, et d’abord de la France, au plus grand nombre possible de Français, assurer la plus vaste audience à notre patrimoine culturel, et favoriser la création des œuvres de l’art et de l’esprit qui l’enrichissent’ (quoted in Loosely 1995, 37). This mission had fed into the Fourth Plan (1962-65), which, for the first time, had a commission dedicated exclusively to cultural provision. Malraux himself oversaw the creation of a ‘Service des expositions’, which mounted a series of high-profile international exhibitions dedicated to such as Picasso or Tutankhamon, and launched an ambitious plan to build Maisons de la culture in France’s major provincial towns, completing eight between 1961 and 1968.26

Malraux’s culture ministry was, moreover, not the only body involved in an active campaign to achieve a greater measure of cultural democratisation. For the postwar period in France had seen the establishment of a series of groups who hoped to bring culture to the masses by staging cultural events in working class districts or at workplace canteens. Amongst the best-known of these were Joffre Dumazedier’s and Benigno Cacérès’s Peuple et Culture, Jean Vilar’s Théâtre national populaire (TNP), and Roger Planchon’s theatre in the working class suburb of Villeurbanne. The campaigning agenda behind these various popular culture movements had been set out in a series of influential studies of the early 1960s, most notably Dumazedier’s Vers une civilisation du loisir? (1962), Jacques Charpentreau’s and René Kaes’s La Culture populaire en France (1962), and Cacérès’s Histoire de l’éducation populaire (1964). Whilst these movements had initially been associated with the French Left, as Brian Rigby (1991, 132-33) has pointed out, with the installation of Malraux as Minister for Culture in 1959, many of the leading lights of the popular culture movement became co-opted into state-run policies for cultural development. As with the
technocrats and ‘massmédiologues’, so in the domain of cultural policy there seemed to be
complicity between militants of the Left and Right.\textsuperscript{30} Moreover, both Malraux and cultural
‘animateurs’ such as Dumazedier and Cacérès shared the same basic philosophy, the same belief
that it was sufficient to expose the working class to great works of culture to satisfy their innate
‘cultural needs’, ‘needs’ universally shared by every social class.

L’\textit{Amour de l’art}, then, was not simply an assault on the dominant or legitimate aesthetic in
general, it was also quite specifically targeted against some of the claims being made, whether by
the ‘animateurs’ of the popular culture movement or by Malraux, regarding the successes achieved
in the domain of cultural democratisation.\textsuperscript{31} At its simplest, this involved using statistics, ‘le
réalisme désenchanteur des chiffres’, to challenge those intellectuals who vaunted ‘les moindres
indices d’une démocratisation de l’accès à la culture’, such as the success of the recent ‘exposition
Picasso ou Toutankhamon’ (131-32). Thus, Bourdieu marshalled a set of statistics which suggested
that the \textit{Maisons de la culture} had conspicuously failed to attract a significantly broader cross-
section of society than traditional museums or art galleries (149-50).

At a more theoretical level, Bourdieu set about a sustained critique of the assumptions behind
the activities of the popular culture movement, in particular the notion of ‘cultural needs’. Indeed,
he argued that these ‘\textit{modernistes}’ who sought to democratise high culture paradoxically shared the
same presuppositions as the ‘\textit{traditionnalistes}’ who considered such culture to be the preserve of the
cultured few. Both groups adhered to ‘l’\textit{idéologie du don}’, the belief that the ability to appreciate
art was somehow innate or natural and thus the ‘\textit{modernistes}’ thought it sufficient to make art
available to the masses for them to respond to it. Moreover, Bourdieu maintained, such a
conviction was strengthened by a belief in the ‘innocence’ of the dominated classes, their freedom
from the kind of prejudices learned through formal education which might prove an obstacle to the
mystical communion between the spectator and the work of art:

\begin{quote}
Ainsi, convaincus que les classes les moins cultivées, donc les moins corrompues par
l’influence routinisante de l’enseignement universitaire, sont prédisposées par l’état
d’innocence culturelle où elles sont à accueillir sans préjugé les formes les plus authentiques
et les plus audacieuses de l’art, les animateurs de Maisons de la culture croient pouvoir
\end{quote}
concilier sans contradiction les recherches d’une avant-garde esthétique avec la recherche d’un public populaire. (151-52)

In a footnote, Bourdieu (152n.21) suggested that ‘un exemple typique de cette idéologie’ could be found in Charpentreaus’s and Kaës’s La Culture populaire en France.

In insisting on the importance of education as a determinant of the propensity to visit art galleries, Bourdieu was thus not simply questioning the supposedly universal criteria of legitimate aesthetic judgement, he was also contesting the notion that universal ‘cultural needs’ could be satisfied by overcoming ‘la seule inaccessibilité physique des œuvres’ (151). These apparently universal cultural needs were in fact the product of a particular education: ‘ce “besoin culturel” [...] à la différence des “besoins primaires”, est le produit de l’éducation’ (69). Simply removing the formal obstacles to legitimate culture, whether economic or geographical, was, Bourdieu argued, to overlook the whole series of cultural, educational, and class determinants affecting the propensity to consume legitimate culture:

Les expositions de tableaux aux usines Renault ou les représentations théâtrales pour les ouvriers de Villeurbanne sont des expériences qui ne peuvent rien prouver puisqu’elles font disparaître l’objet même de l’expérience, en se donnant pour résolu le problème qu’elles prétendent résoudre, celui des conditions de la pratique culturelle comme entreprise délibérée et régulière, mais elles ont en tout cas pour effet de convaincre ceux qui les entreprennent de la légitimité de leur entreprise. (151)

As David Looseley (1995, 40) has pointed out, Malraux’s adherence to the doctrine of cultural needs implied an almost religious belief in the revelatory power of the work of art; the Maisons de la culture were to be ‘cathedrals to culture’ in which the masses would ‘commune’ with high cultural artefacts. This, in turn, implied considerable hostility to the notion that the Ministry of Culture’s mission should overlap with that of Education. Looseley (1995, 41) cites Pierre Moniot, Malraux’s head of theatre and cultural action, on the role of a Maison de la culture, stating that it, ‘n’a pas le souci d’organiser l’enseignement, même des arts, et donne toujours le pas à l’œuvre.'
confrontation qu'elle suscite est directe, évite l'écueil et l'appauvrissement de la vulgarisation simplificatrice'. In L'Amour de l'art, Bourdieu noted a similar hostility to providing formal education in the principles of art appreciation in the work of Charpentreau and Kaës, attributing it to their 'ethnocentrisme de classe': 'ceux qui invoquent la répugnance des classes populaires à l'égard de l'action scolaire ne font que leur prêter, selon l'ethnocentrisme de classe qui caractérise l'idéologie populiste, leur propre attitude à l'égard de la culture et de l'école' (1969, 88).

It is in this context of general hostility to formal education as a means to democratise access to culture that Bourdieu's emphasis on the importance of education as a determinant of cultural practices should be understood. Indeed, this emphasis on education was to be reflected in his suggestions for achieving a genuine measure of cultural democracy. Within the gallery itself, he called for wider provision of signposting and guidebooks to make for a less rebarbative environment (139-40). He also called for reforms in the recruitment and training of gallery curators whom, he argued, should be recruited on a meritocratic basis and trained in accordance with rational principles in a State-run school or academy (142-43). However, he maintained that it was only through the extension of formal education, and not through 'l'action culturelle directe', that a lasting disposition towards aesthetic appreciation could be engendered amongst all social groups. The style of that education would have to be changed, moreover, so that it rested on 'une pédagogie rationnelle' rather than on the implicit presuppositions which reflected the habitus of the dominant class (141). At present, Bourdieu argued, the school was abdicating its responsibilities by failing to transmit equal amounts of knowledge to all, regardless of their social background:

l'institution scolaire abdique le pouvoir, qui lui incombe en propre, d'exercer l'action continue et prolongée, méthodique et uniforme, bref universelle ou tendant à l'universalité, qui est seule capable de produire en série, au grand scandale des détenteurs du monopole de la distinction cultivée, des individus compétents, pourvus de schèmes de perception, de pensée et d'expression qui sont la condition de l'appropriation des biens culturels.... (106)

This emphasis on the duty of the educational system to guarantee equal opportunities for all, as well as the call for a rational, meritocratic system of recruiting curators, placed Bourdieu's work
firmly within the traditions of French Republicanism. Indeed, his call for the principles of art appreciation to be taught in schools seemed to hark back to one of the high points of that tradition. to the time of Jean Zay, the celebrated reforming education minister under the Popular Front who had attempted, in vain, to provide a creative arts curriculum in French schools (see Looseley 1995, 15). The reformism of Bourdieu's proposals for change, his continued adherence to a peculiarly French Republican vision of the role of formal education, was also entirely consistent with his theoretical debts to Durkheim. Throughout L'Amour de l'art, Bourdieu deployed a series of religious metaphors to describe the forms of 'belief', 'consecration', 'communion', or 'revelation' which surrounded the aesthetic experience as traditionally understood and described. On one level, these could be read as so many ironic ripostes to Malraux's description of culture as a humanist alternative to religion and the Maisons de la culture as the new cathedrals. Yet, on a more general level, such metaphors echoed Durkheim's support for secular education against the entrenched power of Catholicism at the turn of the century and his belief in the ability of rational sociological analysis to demystify religious superstition.

However, if the reformism of Bourdieu's proposals for change appeared consistent with his theoretical debts to Durkheim, it seemed strangely at odds with the radicalism of his critique of legitimate culture. For at times in L'Amour de l'art he had suggested that the content of legitimate culture was itself entirely culturally arbitrary, the product of a historically determined process of familial and formal education whose sole objective function was to naturalise and reproduce class divisions: 'Dans la mesure où elle produit une culture (habitus) qui n'est que l'intériorisation de l'arbitraire culturel, l'éducation familiale ou scolaire a pour effet de masquer de plus en plus complètement, par l'inculcation de l'arbitraire, l'arbitraire de l'inculcation' (Bourdieu 1969, 162). If legitimate culture were merely the expression of the ethos of the dominant class and hence culturally arbitrary, there seemed no obvious reason to urge the dominated classes to learn to appreciate such culture. On the contrary, a more consistent course of action would seem to be to call for a radical assault on the bourgeois values transmitted through legitimate culture whilst fighting for its replacement by a more 'authentic' set of cultural forms. As both Rigby (1991, 139-50) and Looseley (1995, 43-4) have shown, during and after the events of May 1968 this was precisely the form that criticisms of both Malraux's culture ministry and the popular culture
movement began to take, with a series of voices on the non-Communist Left, frequently inspired by Mao's Cultural Revolution, calling for revolutionary change in the cultural sphere. Rather as had been the case during the Algerian War, Bourdieu thus found himself once again 'between the camps', occupying a position which was critical of official discourse but less radical than many on the far Left.

Bourdieu's early studies of class and culture were thus very clearly marked by the specific historical and intellectual context within which they were written. His particular contribution to the debates of the day was to offer a view of the social and cultural changes wrought by France's postwar economic boom which challenged the sometimes extravagant claims made by commentators of Right and Left alike concerning the advent of an age of 'mass' culture, 'mass' media, and 'mass' consumerism. *Un Art Moven* and the collaborative volume *Le Partage des bénéfices* remain important for the rather different light they cast on French culture and consumerism in the 1950s and 60s to that offered by more frequently cited sources such as Barthes and Morin. Similarly, in *L'Amour de l'art*, Bourdieu was surely right to focus on the inherent idealism of the popular culture movement and to emphasise the extent of the obstacles to be overcome before any genuine measure of cultural democratisation could be achieved.

That said, however, Bourdieu did manifest a tendency to tar all his contemporaries with the same brush, conflating, for example, the very different ideological and theoretical concerns of thinkers as essentially distinct as Fourastie and Lefebvre. Indeed, Bourdieu's own analyses of class and culture might have benefited from Lefebvre's insight that what was at the heart of the changes both he and Bourdieu had observed was a wholesale shift in the nature of French capitalism, the advent of an era of what he called 'le néo-capitalisme' or what, following Mandel, might be termed 'late capitalism'.

If Bourdieu's conclusions were not always as different as he claimed from those offered by Lefebvre, for example, the style of his analyses did remain quite distinct. All of Bourdieu's work on class and culture of the period might be seen as an attempt to reassert the value of classical empirically based sociology over semiotic or structuralist forms of cultural analysis by staging a return to the classical French sociological tradition, symbolised by Durkheim and his collaborators such as Mauss and Halbwachs. This is not to say that Bourdieu's work was not indebted to other
sources, to Weber’s analyses of legitimation in *Economy and Society*, or to a Marxist or *marxisant* conception of the dynamics of class struggle. Indeed, Bourdieu’s analysis of the way the aesthetic ideology of the bourgeoisie masked the historical conditions of its inculcation clearly owed a major debt to Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism. However, it was the Durkheimian tradition which seemed to play the role of touchstone for Bourdieu over this period, a symbol of the scientificity and rigour he found so lacking in the work of technocrats and ‘massmédiologues’ alike.

Nowhere was Bourdieu’s allegiance to this classical, Durkheimian tradition clearer than in his continued faith in the ability of a rational, secular form of education to combat the mystifications and superstitions surrounding high culture. To argue that Bourdieu retained a residual faith in the democratic mission of the Republican school as traditionally defined would seem to fly in the face of all the received wisdom regarding his theories of class and education. For between 1964 and 1970 Bourdieu published four book-length studies and numerous articles on French higher education, all of which appeared to reject the Republican vision of education as a pure myth and emphasise instead school’s role in reproducing and legitimising class divisions. However, as the next chapter will demonstrate, a closer reading of his work on class and education reveals that, as in his critique of ‘legitimate’ culture in *L’Amour de l’art*, Bourdieu’s criticisms of French education co-existed, in a perhaps contradictory way, with a belief that, suitably reformed, French universities could indeed realise their stated goals of meritocratic and democratic access.
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

1. Over the period 1960-70, the proportion of French trade with its colonies and ex-colonies in ‘la zone franc’ dropped from 30% to 10% of exports and from 23% to 9% of imports. Trade with other EEC countries increased from 10% to 50% of exports and from 30% to 49% of imports over the same period. As Serge Berstein points out, this shift was greatly accelerated by the reduction and eventual elimination of trade barriers between the members of the EEC throughout the 1960s (1989, 155).

The expansion of the tertiary sector was similarly marked. In 1946, the primary sector accounted for 34% of France’s total working population, the secondary 30%, and the tertiary 35%. By 1968, those percentages were 15%, 39%, and 46%, respectively (Braudel and Labrousse eds. 1980, 998).

2. In his study, Les Cadres: la formation d’un groupe social (1982), Luc Boltanski provides a fascinating account of the importation of American models of managerial and technocratic efficiency into postwar France. As Boltanski (1982, 155-236) shows, the promise of a ‘modernised’, ‘rationalised’ economy on the American model proved peculiarly seductive not only to French bureaucrats and businessmen but also to certain sociologists and politicians of the Left and centre-Left for whom the inefficiency and moral bankruptcy of France’s ‘traditional’ bourgeois model had been so shockingly proven in the débâcle of 1940 and all that followed.


4. As the Situationist Raoul Vaneigem (1967, 69) put it: ‘La nécessité de produire trouve si aisément ses justifications que le premier Fourastié venu en farcit dix livres sans peine’.

5. Boltanski (1982, 187-205) has noted the enthusiasm of French business leaders of the period for the new disciplines of sociology and psychology as potential tools in their mission to impose American models of personnel management and organisational efficiency on French industry. He...
sees this development as part of a more general assault on traditional notions of academic autonomy.

6. Bourdieu’s placement of the phrase ‘administrative phenomenon’ within inverted commas suggests that in the original French it was probably ‘le phénomène bureaucratique’ and hence a disparaging reference to Michel Crozier’s 1963 book of the same name. For Bourdieu’s critique of *Le Phénomène bureaucratique*, see Bourdieu 1970, 224-25.

7. As Bourdieu was later to emphasise in an article co-written with Luc Boltanski, ‘La Production de l’idéologie dominante’ (1976), Emmanuel Mounier, the prime mover behind *Esprit*, had been interested in this kind of technocratic vision since the inter-war years. Winock (1975) provides a more detailed account of the history and ideology of *Esprit* over the years 1930-50.

8. Pierre Belleville’s *Une nouvelle classe ouvrière* (1963) also contributed to the dissemination of this theme at this time. However, Belleville’s study was more sceptical than Mallet’s and was concerned primarily to trace the continuing and new forms of exploitation and inequality in France’s rapidly modernising economy.

9. This was clearly a reference to Morin and Lefebvre who had respectively left and been excluded from the Communist Party following the events in Budapest. For a more detailed analysis of the *Arguments* group, see Poster (1975, 209-63), and Stafford (1997).

10. It should be noted that sections of Mallet’s *La Nouvelle classe ouvrière* (1963) were originally published under the aegis of the Club Jean Moulin, one of the ‘meeting places’ between bureaucracy and academia which Bourdieu criticised in ‘Sociology and Philosophy...’ (see Mallet 1963, 27n.1). Bourdieu’s hypothesis of an affinity between certain thinkers on the non-Communist Left and the more modernising, technocratic fractions of the Right might find confirmation in the trajectory of Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber. One of the most vociferous supporters of Mendès-France, he was later to join Giscard d’Estaing’s *Républicains indépendants*.

11. Ross (1995, 78-86) provides a useful account of the growth in the market for women’s magazines in particular, noting ‘the leading role’ they played ‘in disseminating and normalising the state-led modernisation effort’ (78).

12. In *Les Héritiers*, published the following year, Bourdieu would argue that 'l'étude des mythologies' was a favourite topic amongst 'les étudiants les plus favorisés' not merely because it
was fashionable but also because: 'l'exotisme intellectuel et la bonne volonté formelle représentent le
moyen symbolique, c'est-à-dire ostentatoire et sans conséquences, de liquider une expérience
bourgeoise en l'exprimant' (1964b, 27-9). The study of mass culture as contemporary myth was, it
was thus argued, simply the expression of so much bourgeois bad faith, of the desire to dip one's
toes into the murky waters of popular culture whilst simultaneously retaining a reassuring
intellectual distance from its practitioners and consumers.

13. In this early article, Bourdieu followed Mauss's spelling of the term 'hexis', transcribing it
from the Greek but failing to take account of the breathing on the epsilon, hence giving 'exis'.
Following 'Célibat et condition paysanne', Bourdieu has consistently transcribed the term, more
accurately, as 'hexis', a spelling that this thesis will observe throughout.

14. For a useful discussion of the young farmers movement, centred around Michel Debatisse and
other progressives within the Jeunesse agricole chrétienne (JAC), see 'Rural Revolution: the rise of
a new generation', (in Wright 1964, 143-82).

15. La Fin des paysans had initially been published under the aegis of Futuribles, one of the think
tanks criticised by Bourdieu in 'Sociology and Philosophy...'. In 'La Production de l'idéologie
dominante', Bourdieu would include 'la fin des paysans' as one of the catchphrases of the dominant
economic and political ideology whose roots he was seeking to trace. Furthermore, as Gordon
Wright (1964, 151) points out, progressive farmers such as Debatisse had been much influenced by
the liberal, progressive Catholicism of figures like Teilhard de Chardin and Mounier. In both
'Sociology and Philosophy...' and 'La Production de l'idéologie dominante', Bourdieu associated
these two figures with the postwar technocratic faith in economic and social progress. Thus his
emphasis on the negative aspects of modernisation in 'Célibat et condition paysanne' may possibly
have concealed an ideological 'prise de position' against Debatisse and his supporters.

16. Bourdieu and Morin's emphasis on the leading role of women in 'l'exode rural' has been borne
out, on the national level, by Claire Duchen: 'between 1958 and 1968 women were moving at a
faster rate than men towards salaried employment in non-agricultural occupations, they were
therefore responsible for the major shifts in employment structure, largely determining the overall
17. The influence of this essay by Halbwachs on Bourdieu’s thinking would be made clear in the later *Homo academicus* (1984). Bourdieu (1984, 183 n. 8) compared the French universities need to extend their conventional staff recruitment pool at a time of rapid expansion to Halbwachs’s analysis of French women in the aftermath of the War who were forced to look beyond the conventional pool of possible marriage partners. These breakdowns in the ‘traditional’ cycles of social and intellectual reproduction were compared to the changes in the marriage market in the Béarn of the 1950s (1984, 167).

18. Boltanski (1982, 228) notes the importance of Jacques de Fouchier, founder in 1951 of *L’Union de crédit pour le bâtiment* and in 1959 of *la Compagnie bancaire*, in the provision of consumer credit guaranteed not, as had traditionally been the case, by fixed assets, but by the career possibilities of each individual. He also notes that in 1964, in collaboration with Jean-Claude Chamboredon and Bourdieu, he authored a roneotyped report, published by the C.S.E., *La Banque et sa clientèle: introduction à une sociologie du crédit*, which examined the impetus given to consumer spending by the new credit opportunities (228 n. 123).

19. Between 1954 and 1970, the percentage of French households owning a fridge rose from 7% to 76%, a washing machine from 8% to 53%, a car from 21% to 55%, and a television set from 1% to 66%.

20. In ‘La Fin d’un malthusianisme?’, drawing on Darbel’s detailed statistical analysis of the take-up of ‘allocations familiales’ Bourdieu concluded that it was the ‘classes moyennes’ who had most benefited from the introduction of a policy of state benefits to reverse France’s demographic decline. In an argument which recalled his work on the Algerian peasantry and sub-proletariat, he suggested that the decision to have a child was mediated through ‘l’attitude à l’égard de l’avenir (variable selon les classes sociales) et l’aptitude à maîtriser l’avenir par le calcul et la prévision rationnels’ (1966a, 143). The introduction of ‘allocations familiales’ was only one of a series of variables affecting each social class’s judgement of their future prosperity and security. Not only were the ‘classes moyennes’ more predisposed to make such rational ‘projects’ for the future than say the sub-proletariat, for whom ‘le défaut d’un minimum de sécurité entraîne l’abandon total au présent [...], un renoncement généralisé à maîtriser l’avenir’ (147-48), but the advantages they enjoyed in the postwar conjuncture encouraged them ‘à ressentir plus fortement l’accroissement général de la

21. The increasing importance of the nuclear family as the primary unit of both consumption and social organisation was a recurrent theme in the sociology of the period. In *L’Esprit du temps*, Morin noted that, ‘l’unité complexe de la grande famille se réduit au noyau formé par le couple et ses enfants’ (1962, 76). In his *Introduction à la modernité*, Lefebvre described what he called, ‘la moderne “re-privatisation” de la vie quotidienne [...], repliement sur la famille et sur soi’ (1962, 193). See also the chapter, ‘Couples’, in Ross (1995, 122-56).

22. In *L’Amour de l’art*, Bourdieu made this link between ‘la bonne volonté culturelle’ and the increased prosperity of the ‘classes moyennes’ more explicit:

> la bonne volonté culturelle des classes moyennes est un effet de l’ascension sociale en même temps qu’une dimension essentielle de l’aspiration aux droits (et aux devoirs) de la bourgeoisie. Parce que les aspirations sont toujours mesurées aux chances objectives, l’accession à la culture savante comme l’ambition d’y accéder ne peut être le produit miraculeux d’une conversion culturelle, mais suppose, en l’état actuel, un changement de condition économique et sociale. (1969, 51)

23. Between 1954 and 1968, the percentage of French homes without running water fell from 42% to 9% and without flushing lavatories from 73% to 48%, whilst those with a bath or shower rose from 10% to 48%. Over broadly the same period, the government had been involved in an ambitious programme of house building, symbolised most dramatically by the construction of large, out of town housing estates or ‘grands ensembles’, such as the one at Sarcelles, offering cheap, subsidised rental accommodation.

24. A decade later, Bourdieu was to re-publish his contribution to *Travail et travailleurs en Algérie*, in somewhat modified form, as *Algérie 60* (1977). In the preface to this later work, he stated that he had wished to supplement his findings on the Algerian peasantry and sub-proletariat with the
results of a complementary study he had conducted into equivalent social phenomena in France, but had been prevented from doing so through lack of time (Bourdieu 1977, 8). This was presumably a reference to his work on the Béarn in the 1960s. Significantly, in Le Sens pratique (1980), he would juxtapose an updated version of ‘Célibat et condition paysanne’ with an analysis of matrimonial exchange in Kabylia (see Bourdieu 1980, 245-331).

25. The photographer’s testimony reflects so closely both the language and content of Barthes’s analysis that it is questionable to what extent it proved Bourdieu’s point. Mythologies enjoyed huge popular success and, as Bourdieu himself noted in ‘Sociology and Philosophy...’, the structural analysis of myth had become a topic of dinner party conversation (1967a, 192n.37). Thus, it is perfectly possible that the photographer was simply repeating what he had himself read or overheard.

26. As Bourdieu put it much later, in Raisons pratiques (1994), the theory of practice he was to elaborate in his Kabyle work had already been formulated, ‘sous une forme moins élaborée, dans des travaux antérieurs - notamment dans l’introduction à Un Art moved’ (1994a, 169).

27. For Bourdieu’s own theoretical justification of his use of this sort of ideal type as ‘a privileged means for grasping the range of real conducts the ideal type allows to objectivate by objectivating [sic] their differential distance from the pure type’, see his article ‘Structuralism and Theory of Sociological Knowledge’ (1968c, 697-703).

28. In the later article, ‘Le Marché des biens symboliques’ (1971), Bourdieu acknowledged his debt to Weber more openly. Discussing the recognition of cultural legitimacy, he stated: ‘cette reconnaissance ne suppose aucunement un acte de conscience fondé sur la connaissance de la loi reconnue et moins encore une adhésion élective (comme l’indique le paradigme weberien du voleur qui reconnaît la légitimité de la loi par le seul fait de se cacher pour voler)’ (1971c, 78).

29. For an account of Malraux’s years as Minister for Culture, see Loosely (1995, 33-48).

30. For an account of the theory and practice of the popular culture movement in the postwar years, see Rigby (1991, 39-67).

31. This point is made by Brian Rigby, who is one of the only commentators to have noted that Bourdieu’s early works on class and culture, such as L’Amour de l’art, were ‘a response to those French debates on culture and popular culture [...], which became particularly active in the period
from the Liberation to the mid-1960s' (1991, 96). It is in the context of such debates that Bourdieu's interest in 'photo-clubs' in *Un Art moyen* and his scepticism regarding the effects of mass tourism and the media on cultural consumption should be understood. For groups such as *Travail et Tourisme* or the vogue for 'ciné-clubs', 'photo-clubs', and 'télé-clubs' in the 1950s and 60s were all premised on the belief that tourism and the media could be used as weapons in the struggle to achieve cultural democracy.

32. A selection of Malraux's speeches whilst Minister for Culture has recently been anthologised and offers useful insights into his vision of culture as the new religion, see Malraux (1996, 251-351).

32. For an analysis of Durkheim's Republicanism, his support for secular education against the Church, as well as the relationship between his political views and his sociological practice, see Lukes (1973, 320-60).
In his early studies of France and Algeria, Bourdieu had given a high priority to education, seeing it as a positive force capable of provoking significant social and political change. In Algeria, education was seen as the key to raising the class consciousness of the uneducated masses. In the Béarn, the extension of formal education was identified as a key factor in widening the intellectual horizons of Béarnais women and hastening the 'exode rural'. In L'Amour de l'art, the establishment of a 'rational pedagogy' was proposed as the only means of ensuring democratic access to works of high culture.

This emphasis on education as a positive force for social change would seem to contrast strongly with the four studies of French higher education, Les Etudiants et leurs études (1964), Les Héritiers (1964), Rapport pédagogique et communication (1965), and La Reproduction (1970), which Bourdieu published, in collaboration with his colleagues at the C.S.E., over the same period. Bourdieu's central concern in these works appeared not to be with education as a force for change but rather with its role in the reproduction of existing class divisions. Thus, in his native France, Bourdieu's work on education was and continues to be interpreted as part of a wider Marxist or marxisant assault on 'bourgeois ideology', epitomising the spirit of contestation which marked the years immediately preceding and succeeding the events of May 1968 (Collectif 'Révoltes Logiques' 1984; Ferry and Renaut 1987)

Indeed, the apparent force of Bourdieu's critique of the class bias of French higher education has led many critics to point to a close affinity between his work and a Marxist tradition of Ideologiekritik, whether Gramscian or Althusserian in inspiration (Hall 1977; Garnham 1980; Eagleton 1991; Moi 1991; Alexander 1995). The assumption that Bourdieu is an adherent of what Nicholas Abercrombie and his co-authors (1980) have termed 'the dominant ideology thesis' has often led to the accusation that his work on education is too determinist, overly concerned with social reproduction, and hence unable to account for social or historical change (Giroux 1982; Jenkins 1982; Connell 1983; Willis 1983).

This chapter will argue that all of these assessments of Bourdieu's theories of class and education are fundamentally flawed. The notion that he was working within a Marxist or marxisant tradition
ignores the fact that throughout his studies of education, Bourdieu continued to express a typically Republican faith in the ability of a suitably reformed system to ensure democratic and meritocratic access to knowledge and culture. The accusations of determinism and inability to account for historical change, meanwhile, have overlooked the fact that Bourdieu's major works on French higher education were written against a background of rapid and radical change in the sector occasioned by a massive increase in student numbers. In the academic year 1949-50, the number of students in French higher education was 136,744. By 1959-60 this had almost doubled to 202,062, and by the end of the 1960s this number had more than quadrupled to 615,300 (Braudel and Labrousse eds. 1980, 997). This expansion in student numbers represented a significant increase in the percentage of the French population as a whole entering higher education, bringing new categories of student, most notably large numbers of women, into French higher education for the first time. Such changes might be seen as symptomatic of a general shift in the nature and function of French higher education, a shift consistent with France's need, under late capitalism, for an increasing number of technically and academically trained workers to manage and plan continued economic growth.

Ernest Mandel argues that under late capitalism the role of higher education undergoes an important redefinition, being 'no longer to produce "educated" men of judgement and property - an ideal which corresponded to the needs of freely competitive capitalism - but to produce intellectually skilled wage-earners for the production and circulation of commodities' (1975, 261). As Bourdieu put it in Les Héritiers, French universities were experiencing problems in adapting to this new role since they continued to function according to a 'traditional' rather than a 'rational' logic: 'la logique d'un système qui, comme le système français en sa forme présente, semble servir des fins traditionnelles plutôt que rationnelles et travailler objectivement à former des hommes cultivés plutôt que des hommes de métier' (1964b, 88). For Mandel (1975, 260-61), the difficulties faced by universities reflected 'the crisis of the classical humanist university', occasioned not only by the 'excessive number of students', the 'backwardness of material infrastructure', and 'changes in the social background of students', but also by 'directly economic reasons specific to the nature of intellectual labour in late capitalism; the
constraint to adapt the structure of the university, the selection of students and the choice of syllabuses
to accelerated technological innovation under capitalist conditions’.

This chapter will argue that Bourdieu’s work on higher education, the four books he published on
the subject between 1964 and 1970 as well as his retrospective study of the French academic field of the
1960s, Homo academicus (1984), are best understood as highly influential interventions into
contemporary debates sparked by this ‘crisis of the humanist university’ or attempts to analyse that
‘crisis’ post hoc. As such, these studies need to be situated within that specific context before any
definitive conclusion can be reached concerning their alleged determinism or their apparent affinities
with Marxist interpretations of that ‘crisis’, whether Gramscian, Althusserian, or otherwise.

The period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s in France saw a proliferation of discourses, from
both Left and Right, on education and the state of the universities. Some commentators were content to
point to the overall increase in student numbers as evidence of the ‘democratisation’ of higher
education, anticipating an era when the extension of formal education, combined with the
democratising effects of the ‘mass media’ would ensure access to culture and knowledge for all
(Fourasté 1963, 283-84). Other commentators were less optimistic. The difficulties experienced by the
universities had led a range of politicians, university administrators, and intellectuals to consider ways
in which the system could be reformed to meet the new demands being placed upon it and serve the
needs of a ‘modernising’ French economy more efficiently. Such concerns were evident in
contributions to a 500-page special number of the journal Esprit of 1964 dedicated to the universities, in
Michel Vermot-Gauchy’s 1965 study, L’Education nationale dans la France de demain, in contributions
to the 1966 colloque de Caen, and were at the heart of the reforms introduced by education minister
Christian Fouchet in the mid-1960s.

In the vanguard of campaigns to resist such attempts to ‘industrialiser l’Université’, as Fouchet
himself put it (quoted in Gorz 1964, 102), was the Union nationale des étudiants de France (UNEF). In
1964, UNEF’s general secretary, Marc Kravetz, published an article on student politics in Temps
modernes, which was followed by a spate of articles on education in the journal in the years preceeding
and succeeding the events of May 1968. Kravetz (1964), in common with figures on the non-Communist Left such as André Gorz (1964; 1967) and Alain Touraine (1968), argued that attempts to reform the universities along ‘technocratic’ lines meant that under ‘neo-capitalism’ students were enduring an alienating and exploitative ‘condition’ analogous to the condition of the ‘nouvelle classe ouvrière’.

UNEF had managed to mobilise significant numbers of students during their ‘week of action’ in November 1963, a series of sit-ins, strikes, and demonstrations which anticipated the more dramatic events of May 68. The following year, in response to these strikes, the Communist Party journal, La Nouvelle Critique, dedicated a special number to the universities, to which Louis Althusser contributed an article, ‘Problèmes étudiants’ (1964), notorious for its unsympathetic attitude towards the students. It would only be after 1968, in the article ‘Idéologie et appareils idéologiques d’Etat’ (1970), that Althusser would identify education as the primary ‘state ideological apparatus’ and acknowledge the wider significance of struggles in the educational field.

Thus, Bourdieu’s work on education entered a peculiarly crowded field and defined in itself in opposition to many of those who had taken up position in that field, from Vermot-Gauché and Fourastié to the Althusserians, UNEF, Gorz, and Touraine. The theoretical approach which Bourdieu had employed in his Algerian work and his early studies of class and culture in France was mirrored in his work on education, in his recourse to the concept of ‘habitus’ to explain the way social groups ‘internalised’ their objective chances of educational success, and in his use of empirical research interpreted through the ‘classical’ sociological texts, an eclectic mix of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, to attempt an ‘objective’ analysis of the state of French higher education. Further, in understanding the ‘crisis’ in the universities as resulting from the breakdown of a ‘traditional’ system contingent upon a dramatic change in the ‘morphology’ of the student and teaching bodies, Bourdieu’s work on education suggested a series of analogies with his analyses of the breakdown of the ‘traditional’ systems of social reproduction in Algeria and the Béarn.

To argue that Bourdieu’s sociology of education can best be understood when set in the context of the changes affecting French universities post-war is not to argue, pace Alain Accardo (1986, 167) and
Loic Wacquant (in Bourdieu 1992, 58), that since Bourdieu has acknowledged historical changes in the educational field, accusations of determinism are necessarily mistaken. Rather, it is to approach the problem from a historical viewpoint, by assessing how the changes in French education were reflected in his work, how coherently he explained their extent and implications, and how he accounted for their most striking manifestation in the events of May 1968. In short, it is to evaluate the extent to which the theoretical tools with which Bourdieu equipped himself were capable of elucidating the workings of the educational field at a time of rapid historical change.

The Limits of Democratisation

At their simplest, the four works Bourdieu published on education between 1964 and 1970 can be read as attempts to challenge those who pointed to the increase in the number of students entering higher education as evidence of the advent of an era of educational democracy. As such, they complemented his concurrent work on 'mass' culture, reflecting his scepticism regarding the dawning of an age of cultural 'homogenisation'. Moreover, his diagnosis of the problem and the solutions he offered were analogous to those he offered in the cultural domain. Thus, in Les Héritiers, Bourdieu produced official data for the student intake of 1961-62 which indicated that, despite the expansion in overall access to higher education, older distinctions of both class and gender continued to play a determining role in academic success.

In terms of class, Bourdieu demonstrated that whilst the son of a 'salarie agricole' had less than one chance in a hundred of reaching university, the son of a member of the liberal professions had more than eighty chances in a hundred (1964b, 11). Following a line of argument familiar from his work on both the Algerian sub-proletariat and photography, he argued that the low objective chances of lower class children entering higher education were internalised into their habitus, into an implicit sense of what did or did not constitute an objectively possible future, at once a subjective disposition and a class 'ethos' which encouraged such children to rule out university as a 'practical possibility'. If everything in the dispositions, social trajectories, and expectations of immediate family and friends militated
against children from lower class backgrounds considering university as a 'practical possibility'. the reverse was true for children from a privileged background:

This process of internalising a socially determined sense of what constituted an 'avenir impossible', 'possible', or 'normal' was also manifest in the persistence of gender inequalities within the university. As Bourdieu demonstrated, since the mid-1920s and a fortiori since the Liberation, the proportion of female students had increased dramatically, from 3.2% of the total in 1900-01 to 21.0% in 1925-26 and 41.6% in 1961-62, provoking 'une véritable mutation culturelle' in French universities (1964b, 129). However, he argued that the immense majority of these female students, 63.3%, had ended up in the 'faculté des lettres' rather than the more prestigious law or medical faculties and were 'relegated' within the arts faculty to the least prestigious disciplines, foreign languages, sociology, or psychology rather than philosophy or French literature (17-18). This process of relegation, Bourdieu maintained, reflected the way a collective sense of what represented a reasonable ambition for a young woman, 'l'influence des modèles traditionnels de la division du travail (et des "dons") entre les sexes', had been internalised into the habitus of female students and their parents to influence their 'choice' of course (17). He suggested that this gendered habitus was articulated with class inasmuch as female students from more privileged backgrounds were statistically more likely to avoid relegation, demonstrating greater confidence in their own abilities by choosing more prestigious courses (17-18).

By 1970 and the publication of La Reproduction, Bourdieu had access to a wider range of data on the gender and social origins of French students and was able to achieve a broader perspective on the
nature of the changes he had examined in Les Héritiers. Whilst acknowledging that between 1962 and
1966 the chances of entering higher education had risen for all social classes, he argued that it was the
privileged classes who had benefited most from this development (1970, 261). There had been 'une
translation vers le haut de la structure des chances scolaires des différentes classes sociales' (261), so
that where in 1961-62 the possibility of the son of a ‘cadre supérieur’ reaching university had been ‘un
avenir probable’, by 1965-66 it had become ‘un avenir banal’ (262). The rise in the chances of the son
of an ‘ouvrier’ from 1.5 to 3.9 in a hundred over the same period, however, had not been enough to
‘modifier l’image qui fait des études supérieures un avenir improbable, sinon “déraisonnable”’ (263).

Furthermore, if certain fractions of the ‘classes moyennes’ could now consider higher education to
be ‘une possibilité normale’, this suggested that attending university was rapidly losing its distinctive or
rarity value. New grounds of distinction were being produced within the university itself and Bourdieu
produced a set of statistics to show that as new categories of student gained access to higher education
so the disciplines they chose, primarily in the faculties of science and letters, began to lose prestige.
The goalposts were shifting and bourgeois students increasingly abandoned the faculties of science and
letters in favour of more prestigious disciplines, medicine, law, or the grandes écoles. As Bourdieu put
it, absolute exclusion from higher education was being replaced as the primary means of social and
educational distinction by relegation into less prestigious disciplines (264-67). A similar process was
affecting female students, whose increased chances of access concealed their continuing relegation ‘à
certains types d’études (les lettres, principalement) et cela d’autant plus nettement qu’elles sont de plus
basse origine’ (215). Although more women were now entering the labour market, Bourdieu argued
that the entry of women into a profession such as teaching frequently coincided with that profession’s
relative loss of prestige (215).10

A central concern of Les Héritiers and La Reproduction had, therefore, been to highlight the limits
of democratisation and the extent to which older distinctions of class and gender continued to play a
decisive role in education, even as they were being reproduced in new forms. However, Bourdieu’s
proposals for remedying this situation appeared only to address one of the forms of discrimination he
had identified, namely class. According to Bourdieu, the role played by the bourgeois habitus in the
academic achievements of the privileged classes was not limited to its status as a structure of internalised expectations which reflected those classes’ high objective chances of academic success. The bourgeois habitus was also the repository of a set of values, aptitudes, modes of thought and speech picked up from earliest childhood through being socialised in a cultured, literate, bourgeois environment. It was these values and aptitudes, he maintained, which were rewarded in an educational system which placed such emphasis on oral skills and rhetorical flair, valuing form over content and encouraging a kind of intellectual dilettantism closely attuned to the linguistic and cultural ‘capital’ that constituted the bourgeois habitus. Passing off these socially determined skills and values as universal, objective measures of intellectual ability, the education system both legitimised and reproduced existing class divisions.

Moreover, Bourdieu argued, the influence of the bourgeois habitus extended beyond the realm of the academic curriculum proper. In Les Héritiers, he drew on research conducted by the C.S.E. over the period 1961-63 into the tastes and cultural practices of students in various provincial and Parisian ‘facultés des lettres’ to demonstrate a strong correlation between elevated social origin and the tendency to consume the so-called ‘arts de masse’ such as jazz and film (1964b, 30-5). He rejected the notion, ‘dans l’air du temps’, that the influence of formal education was waning in the face of the rise of more democratic forms of ‘mass’ culture disseminated by ‘les moyens modernes de communication’ (63).

Just as he argued in his critique of the Maisons de la culture in L’Amour de l’art that making culture formally open to all, through free entrance to museums or use of the mass media, could not overcome the effects of class habitus, so in Les Héritiers he argued that the removal of the economic barriers to education by ‘une politique systématique de bourses ou d’allocations d’études’ would not in itself be a solution (1964b, 44). What was required was ‘une pédagogie rationnelle’, to rationalise teaching practices so as to render those values implicitly rewarded by the system explicit: ‘Toute démocratisation réelle suppose [...] que l’on élargisse le domaine de ce qui peut être rationnellement et techniquement acquis par un apprentissage méthodique aux dépens de ce qui est abandonné irréductiblement au hasard des talents individuels, c’est-à-dire en fait, à la logique des privilèges sociaux’ (111). In La Reproduction, Bourdieu repeated this assertion, calling for ‘une pédagogie parfaitement explicite’.
which would make explicit the set of values implicit in academic discourse, providing all students with
the necessary ‘code’ to decipher the ‘message pédagogique’ (1970, 161).

As in L’Amour de l’art, so in his work on education. Bourdieu seemed therefore to retain a typically
Republican faith in the ability of the education system to provide democratic access to culture and
knowledge, even as he criticised that system’s failings. As he put it in Les Héritiers, ‘l’Ecole’
remained, for the least privileged, ‘la seule et unique voie d’accès à la culture’. It would be ‘la voie
royale de la démocratisation de la culture’ if only it were reformed along rational lines, if only ‘elle ne
consacrait, en les ignorant, les inégalités devant la culture et si elle n’allait souvent [...] jusqu’à
dévaloriser la culture qu’elle transmet au profit de la culture héritée qui ne porte pas la marque roturière
de l’effort et a, de ce fait, toutes les apparences de la facilité et de la grâce’ (1964b, 35). However, if
Bourdieu’s calls for a ‘rational’ or ‘explicit’ pedagogy addressed one of the factors he had identified as
contributing to the perpetuation of the class bias in higher education, they seemed to offer no solution to
the problems of gender inequality he had also analysed. Furthermore, there seemed to be a
contradiction between the radicalism of Bourdieu’s critique of the kind of culture and knowledge
disseminated through formal education and the reformism of his proposals for change. This
contradiction reflected an ambiguity at the heart of Bourdieu’s critique of the culture inculcated in
French universities. At times, he suggested that it was the content of that culture which determined its
role in the legitimation of class divisions; at others, it was ‘le rapport à la culture’ which determined its
role by demanding that culture should be consumed with a refinement and ease which was the preserve
of those who had been acculturated in a bourgeois environment (1964b, 86n.1; 1970, 166).

In his analysis of the events of May 1968, La Révolution introuvable (1968), Raymond Aron focused
on this contradiction. Noting the considerable influence that Les Héritiers had exerted on the student
movement, he argued that the student radicals had misread the text, reading into it a revolutionary
agenda it did not in fact possess (Aron 1968, 79-81). The seeds of this misinterpretation, according to
Aron, were located in an ambiguity at the core of Bourdieu’s work: ‘il a toujours laissé le choix à ses
lecteurs entre deux interprétations de sa critique universitaire; souhaite-t-il que tous puissent accéder à
Student Politics - ‘Jeu sérieux et jeux du sérieux’

The ambiguity identified by Aron in Bourdieu’s approach to culture, that imbalance between the radicalism of his critique and the reformism of his proposed solution, was reflected in Bourdieu’s relationship to the radical student politics of the 1960s. Following Aron, several commentators have noted the extent of Les Héritiers’ influence on the nature of the students’ demands in the run up to May 1968 (Schnapp and Vidal-Naquet 1969, 17; Ferry and Renault 1987, 67-9; Capdevielle and Mouriaux 1988, 211). However, this should not be interpreted as evidence of a direct political affinity between Bourdieu and the student movement. For Bourdieu’s emphasis on the persistence of class divisions between the tastes and practices of those studying at university was intended not only to refute the claims of those who took the expansion in student numbers as a sign of educational democratisation, but also to challenge the idea, central to UNEF politics, that ‘la condition étudiante est une. unifiée ou unifiante’ (1964b, 24).

As Luc Boltanski (1980, 358-64) has shown, between 1963 and 1965 UNEF commissioned a series of sociological studies which aimed to establish the existence of a unified ‘condition étudiante’. UNEF argued that under ‘neo-capitalism’ the university was changing from a ‘université libérale’ to a ‘université technocratique’ in which students were subjected to alienating and exploitative conditions which placed them in objective alliance with the technical fractions of the working class, Mallet’s ‘nouvelle classe ouvrière’ (Kravetz 1964; Griset and Kravetz 1965).

In an article of 1967, Gorz drew on UNEF’s analyses to provide a classically Gramscian analysis of the situation. There was a contradiction, he argued, between the knowledge and autonomy a neo-capitalist economy demanded of its workforce and the archaic, hierarchical structures of French society. This contradiction, expressed in the frustrations, alienation, and exploitation suffered by students and the ‘new working class’ alike was melding these two groups into a new ‘hegemonic’ force, in the Gramscian sense, ‘un nuovo blocco storico [in Italian in original]’ endowed with revolutionary potential.
Gorz's analysis was later to be echoed by Alain Touraine in his explanation of the events of May 1968, Le Mouvement de mai ou le communisme utopique (1968).

The notion of a 'new working class', so central to the analyses of UNEF, Gorz, and Touraine, was subjected to harsh criticism by Bourdieu in his early works on class and culture and he adopted a similarly polemical stance towards the notion of 'la condition étudiante'. Not only did he reject the use of grants as a solution to the problems faced by students from lower class backgrounds, rebuffing UNEF's support for such measures, he also devoted much of Les Héritiers to uncovering the differences of class and gender which lay behind the shared experiences which apparently defined the student condition. As he put it, 'éprouver ensemble la pénurie des locaux, l'anonymat de l' amphithéâtre ou des salles d'examens, [...] subir les contraintes du même programme ou les manies des mêmes professeurs'. was not enough 'à définir même vaguement ou négativement, un groupe intégré et une condition professionnelle' (1964b, 47).

Drawing on studies undertaken by colleagues at the C.S.E., Bourdieu emphasised the lack of integration amongst the student body, demonstrating not only the failure of attempts to foster any sense of community through extra-mural activities or study groups, but also the very different cultural tastes and practices of students of different social origin. Those student leaders who diagnosed 'la crise de l'enseignement' from the partial point of view of the male offspring of the Parisian bourgeoisie should remember, he argued, that female and working class students had a very different experience of the university (1964b, 74). The experience of both these groups, mediated through an internalised sense of the relatively modest positions they could objectively hope to achieve in later life, was manifest in the seriousness and modesty with which they approached their studies, attitudes quite at odds with the self-assured dilettantism typical of the Parisian male bourgeois student. Bourdieu suggested that it was this self-assurance and dilettantism, this predisposition 'à entrer dans les jeux du Paris littéraire', which was at the root of their apparently radical political affiliations (73). The 'groupuscules gauchistes' merely provided one further opportunity for Parisian bourgeois students to demonstrate their avant-gardism, dilettantes in politics just as they were in culture:
Radical politics was the means to 'consommer symboliquement la rupture avec le milieu familial sous la forme à la fois la moins coûteuse et la plus scandaleuse' (70).

As Keith Reader (1993, 89) has pointed out, Bourdieu's dismissive attitude to the student radicals was to be echoed in the Communist Party cadre Georges Marchais's denunciations of the student protestors of May 68 as so many 'fils à papa'. A more interesting point of comparison might be with Althusser's article, 'Problèmes étudiants', which appeared in the same year as Les Héritiers. In this article Althusser, himself a Party member, issued a stern rebuke to the student radicals, calling on them to respect the Party line. He went further than Bourdieu, instructing the students to respect their lecturers and busy themselves with the acquisition of 'scientific' knowledge which could then be placed at the service of the genuine revolution. Althusser reminded the students that the liberal values of the university were both inherently valid and potentially scientific: 'Traditionnellement, l'Université représente les valeurs “libérales”: esprit critique, liberté de la recherche scientifique, liberté de la discussion scientifique, etc., qui sont non pas, comme certains le disent dangereusement, réductibles à l'individualisme bourgeois, mais d'authentiques valeurs scientifiques' (1964, 86).

Not only did Bourdieu offer a more radical critique of the role of the university in reproducing and legitimising class divisions, he was also more sympathetic to the plight of certain students. For, he argued, not all the criticisms of the universities were issuing from bourgeois students confident of their future career success, playing at radical politics, indulging in 'des jeux du sérieux'. For students from more modest backgrounds the stakes of the game were higher, it was 'un jeu sérieux', and their complaints reflected genuine worries about their future job prospects, about the ability of 'un enseignement peu transformé dans ses méthodes et parfois dans son contenu, peu adapté aux attentes et
aux intérêts qu’ils doivent à leur milieu'. to prepare them for ‘un avenir professionnel dont ils ont un souci plus réaliste’ (1964b, 78).

Bourdieu’s attitude to student politics left him between camps on the French Left. Less censorious than Althusser, more sympathetic to the plight of certain students, he remained highly critical of the more Gramscian line taken by UNEF and Gorz in anticipating a ‘new historic block’ of students and workers. This attitude of conditional sympathy was mirrored in May 68 in a petition drawn up by Bourdieu under the aegis of the C.S.E. in which he expressed sympathy for the students whilst reminding them that ‘les principales victimes du fonctionnement et de l’organisation actuels du système scolaire sont par définition à l’extérieur du système pour en avoir été éliminées’. and hence that ‘toute mise en question qui ne porte pas fondamentalement sur la fonction d’élimination des classes populaires, et par là sur la fonction de conservation sociale du système scolaire est nécessairement fictive’ (in Schnapp and Vidal-Naquet 1969, 695-96). This insistence on the need to take account of education’s role in the reproduction and legitimation of class distinctions was to be reiterated in La Reproduction where Bourdieu rejected all those, such as Morin (1969), Touraine, Gorz, or UNEF, who had diagnosed the crisis in higher education in terms of the ‘nouvelle classe ouvrière’. of the alienation suffered by students, their sexual frustrations, or the generation gap between them and their lecturers (1970, 228-29).

**From the ‘Organic’ to the ‘Critical’**

With hindsight, it is possible to see that, in Les Héritiers, Bourdieu considerably underestimated the importance of the student movement. However, this should not obscure the importance of his work on education or its prescience in providing detailed empirical analysis of a situation of which many were aware but which few had studied in such depth. This was particularly true of the collaborative study Bourdieu published in 1965, Rapport pédagogique et communication. The study diagnosed a failure of communication between lecturers and their students by focusing on the physical and symbolic distance that separated the two parties and by empirically testing the ability of students in various ‘facultés des lettres’ to understand the vocabulary they encountered in lectures and reproduced in their work.
Bourdieu argued that this failure of communication reflected the ‘décalage’ between the linguistic and cultural habitus of lecturers and the habitus of the new categories of student:

> Si [...] les étudiants originaires des classes populaires et moyennes réussissent moins bien à s'adapter au système universitaire et à ses exigences, c'est que le décalage entre les générations doit sa forme et son acuité au décalage entre les classes sociales qu'il dissimule. Et, si les professeurs sont aussi fortement déconcertés, c'est que, membres de la classe cultivée, et souvent par la naissance, ils découvrent chez leurs élèves des goûts et des intérêts qui sont avant tout ceux des adolescents des classes populaires ou moyennes. (1965a, 19-20).

Such conclusions were prescient indeed given the nature of the events of May 68, when, as Sherry Turkle (1978, 3) puts it: ‘France was gripped by a paroxysm of the spoken word. There were confrontations and attempts at communication across generational and class lines that were unparalleled in her recent national life’.

Two years after the events of 1968, in La Reproduction, Bourdieu linked the breakdown in communication between students and lecturers more explicitly to the changes in the morphology of the student body which had accompanied a period of rapid expansion. It was these morphological changes, he argued, which had provoked ‘la crise que connaît aujourd’hui le système d’enseignement, c’est-à-dire les dérèglements et les discordances qui l’affectent en tant que système de communication’ (1970, 115). Under a previous, more selective system of university entry, only those equipped with a high level of linguistic and intellectual ability had been able to gain a place. As the universities expanded to accept virtually any student of bourgeois origin, this category of student became ‘under-selected’, no longer possessing the abilities required at a previous stage of the system’s history. Similarly, under a more selective system, only the very best students from the working class or ‘classes moyennes’ could hope to reach university; they were ‘over-selected’. Increasingly, however, the ‘effet correcteur de sur-sélection’, which had compensated working and lower middle class students for their lack of the
requisite cultural and linguistic habitus, was waning and the potential for linguistic and cultural misunderstandings increased (114).

Bourdieu maintained that it was this communicative crisis, provoked by the changing composition of the student body, that had revealed French universities’ role in legitimating class distinctions. Previously, this role had passed unnoticed since the linguistic and cultural aptitudes demanded by the university were in accord with a body of almost exclusively bourgeois male students. With the arrival of categories of student previously excluded from the system that ‘pre-established harmony’ had broken down to reveal the social and cultural presuppositions upon which it had rested:

La situation de crise naissante est l’occasion de discerner les présupposés cachés d’un système traditionnel et les mécanismes capables de le perpétuer lorsque les préalables de son fonctionnement ne sont plus complètement remplis. C’est au moment où commence à se rompre l’accord parfait entre le système scolaire et son public d’élection que se dévoile en effet ‘l’harmonie pré-établie’ qui soutenait si parfaitement ce système qu’elle excluait toute interrogation sur son fondement. (1970, 124-25)

Bourdieu thus identified two distinct objectives in writing La Reproduction, both of which were linked to the ‘crisis’ in French higher education. The first was to use that crisis to uncover the ‘présupposés cachés’ of a ‘traditional’ system of education. The second was to explain how that system was able to perpetuate itself when ‘les préalables de son fonctionnement’ had been undermined. These two objectives were addressed in Books One and Two of La Reproduction, respectively.

The first book consisted of a series of numbered propositions deploying a battery of concepts, ‘action pédagogique’, ‘travail pédagogique’, ‘système d’enseignement’ to develop ‘les fondements d’une théorie de la violence symbolique’. where ‘symbolic violence’ was defined as the ‘imposition, par un pouvoir arbitraire, d’un arbitraire culturel’ (19). This arbitrarily imposed cultural arbitrary constituted ‘la culture legitime’; it expressed the objective interests of the dominant class and, as such, its objective function was to legitimise and reproduce that class’s social and cultural dominance.
Read in isolation, Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic violence appeared determinist and functionalist, marked by a kind of circularity; ‘dominant’ or ‘legitimate’ culture was defined by its objective function in the legitimation of the dominance of the dominant classes. It was perhaps in acknowledgement of the dangers of functionalism implicit in his theory of symbolic violence that Bourdieu emphasised that the theory should be understood as enjoying a reciprocal relationship to the specific historical circumstances which had engendered it, the theory being applied to those circumstances and the circumstances influencing the nature of the theory according to a process of ‘rectification réciproque’ (9). As he put it in Book Two:

If the changing nature of the student body had signalled the end of the previous ‘organic’ stage in French higher education without leading to its complete collapse, this was, as Bourdieu attempted to show in Book Two of La Reproduction, largely because of that system’s ‘relative autonomy’. Both Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut (1985) and Jeffrey Alexander (1995) see Bourdieu’s emphasis on the role of a ‘relatively autonomous’ education system in the ‘reproduction’ of the status quo as evidence of the direct influence of Althusser on Bourdieu’s work. Certainly, Althusser’s seminal essay ‘Idéologie et appareils idéologiques d’État’ (1970) had identified a relatively autonomous education...
system as playing the primary role in social reproduction. However, for Althusser, the system’s relative autonomy was not what explained its continued existence; it was what allowed for the ‘action en retour’ of a superstructural instance such as education onto the economic base. So that conflicts in the educational domain could pose a challenge to the existing social order. As Jacques Rancière (1974) points out, Althusser’s 1970 essay on ideology was the first occasion on which he identified education’s particular role in social reproduction or acknowledged the importance of struggles in the educational field, and can thus be read as an attempt to excuse his earlier hostility to student politics in ‘Problèmes étudiants’, as well as the French Communist Party’s inaction in May 1968.13

Bourdieu’s conception of relative autonomy was quite different from Althusser’s. For Bourdieu the education system’s relative autonomy was ‘la condition nécessaire et spécifique de l’accomplissement de ses fonctions de classe’ (1970, 238n.22). In this he was echoing Durkheim who, in L’Évolution pédagogique en France (1938), had linked French education’s relative autonomy to its ability to reproduce its own corps of teachers and professors. Bourdieu radicalised this insight, arguing that the system’s relative autonomy was related not merely to its role in the reproduction of university staff, but also to its role in the reproduction of the class structure as a whole:

En concevant l’autonomie relative du système d’enseignement comme pouvoir de réinterpréter les demandes externes et de tirer parti des occasions historiques pour accomplir sa logique interne, Durkheim se donnait au moins le moyen de comprendre la tendance à l’autoreproduction qui caractérise les institutions scolaires […]. Il reste que, faute de rapporter l’autonomie relative du système d’enseignement et de son histoire aux conditions sociales d’accomplissement de sa fonction propre, on se condamne […] à expliquer circulairement l’autonomie relative du système par l’autonomie relative de son histoire et vice versa. (1970, 231-33)

Echoing Durkheim’s L’Évolution pédagogique en France, Bourdieu argued that the peculiarities of the French system, its emphasis on form over content, its reward for rhetorical skill and dilettantism.
even its excessive interest in training the next generation of teachers and lecturers, could be traced back to the influence of the Jesuits from the Renaissance onwards (1970, 171-84). If these anachronistic forms of learning could survive, despite their lack of suitability given the composition of the contemporary student body and the demands of a modernising French economy, it was because of the system’s relative autonomy, the reward for its ability to reproduce the dominance of the dominant classes:

Il faut donc se demander si la liberté qui est laissée au système d’enseignement de faire prévaloir ses propres exigences et ses propres hiérarchies, au détriment par exemple des demandes les plus patentès du système économique, n’est pas la contrepartie des services occultes qu’il rend à certaines classes en dissimulant la sélection sociale sous la sélection technique et en légitimant la reproduction des hiérarchies sociales par la transmutation des hiérarchies sociales en hiérarchies scolaires. (186)

Moreover, Bourdieu argued, it was this objective function, guaranteed by the system’s relative autonomy, which technocrats such as Vermot-Gauchy overlooked when they accused the universities of lacking ‘productivity’ and wasting France’s intellectual ‘resources’ (195; 218-19). Such wastage and lack of productivity, he suggested, were intrinsic to the system’s fulfilling its class function.

In common with Bourdieu’s earlier studies of education, then, La Reproducción was centrally concerned with examining the process whereby older divisions of class and gender were being reproduced at a time of rapid change. However, he seemed to have offered two rather different, even contradictory, explanations of how these older distinctions were being reproduced. On the one hand, he argued that as the new categories of student gained university places in the arts and the humanities those subjects lost their prestige and the real power moved elsewhere, to disciplines where selection still applied, to the medical and law faculties or the grandes écoles, all dominated by bourgeois students. On the other hand, in attributing the high rate of educational success amongst the bourgeoisie to a cultured.
literate habitus closely attuned to the classical humanist values rewarded by the education system, he seemed to imply that the prestige traditionally attached to those values had remained largely unchanged.

This apparent contradiction was mirrored on the methodological level. Bourdieu's research was conducted exclusively amongst students in the arts and humanities. As he put it in Les Héritiers, this was because, 'c'est dans l'enseignement littéraire que l'influence de l'origine sociale se manifeste le plus clairement' (19). By his own admission, then, the influence of social origin was most evident in those disciplines which, under the new academic hierarchy, had little prestige, whilst his analysis of the contribution of the bourgeois habitus to the academic success and reproduction of the bourgeoisie was based on empirical research conducted amongst students in disciplines that were slipping to the bottom of the academic hierarchy.

In 'Sociology and Philosophy in France since 1945: death and resurrection of a philosophy without subject' (1967), Bourdieu had argued that the whole concept of intellectual labour in post-war France was shifting away from the classically humanist towards a vision of the intellectual as a bureaucratic, technocratic, or scientific expert. In Homo academicus, almost twenty years later, he would characterise the universities of the 1960s as the site of a struggle to 'soumettre à la culture scientifique, jusque-là subordonnée, la citadelle de la culture littéraire' (1984, 160). He did not, however, seem to have provided any empirical evidence to attest to the existence of a direct relationship between a cultured bourgeois habitus and academic success in these newly dominant disciplines.14

These apparent lacunae in Bourdieu's account of post-war French higher education might be read as symptomatic of the contradictions inherent in his attempt to describe and explain the extent of the changes sweeping through the universities by recourse to a set of theoretical concepts, habitus, cultural capital, reproduction, and so on, which remained inherently determinist. A more generous reading, however, would see such contradictions as potentially productive, revealing precisely the contradictory status of an older humanist culture, still an important marker of social and intellectual distinction, in an age which purported to value scientific, rational, or technocratic forms of knowledge above all.

In La Reproduction, Bourdieu suggested that the humanities had been able to retain some of their traditional prestige by appropriating a discourse of scientificity, referring to the structuralists as the
'dandys de la scientificité, passés maîtres en l'art de l'allusion “chic” qui suffit aujourd'hui à situer son homme aux avant-postes des sciences d'avant-garde, lavées par cela seul du péché plébéien de positivisme' (157). Further, he maintained that the newer scientific disciplines could also play a role in social distinction, arguing that: 'il serait naïf de croire que la fonction de distinction sociale du rapport cultivé à la culture soit exclusivement et à jamais attachée à la “culture générale” en sa forme “humaniste”: les prestiges de l'économétrie, de l'informatique, de la recherche opérationnelle ou du dernier des structuralismes peuvent [...] servir de parure mondaine ou d'instrument de réussite sociale' (1970, 156-57).

Nonetheless, if ‘legitimate culture’ was now to embrace everything from computing to Corneille, the concept surely risked losing all its specificity and explanatory force. Moreover, Bourdieu’s frequent references to the ‘crisis’ in higher education and to changes in the forms and hierarchies of intellectual labour seemed to contradict his assertion that the system was able to reproduce itself relatively unproblematically. It might be argued that both the ‘crisis’ of the ‘traditional’ university and the polemics provoked by structuralism’s challenge to its classical humanism were symptoms of the system’s very inability to reproduce itself and its values, an inability manifest in the violence of the protests of May 68. It was only with the publication of Homo academicus in 1984, that Bourdieu would discuss in detail the relationship between the morphological changes affecting the student body, the challenge to legitimate culture posed by structuralism, and the events of 1968.

‘La lutte pour l'imposition d'une définition renouée de la culture légitime’ -

The Barthes-Picard Affair

Published 16 years after the events of May 1968, Homo academicus set itself the task of analysing ‘les fondements et les formes du pouvoir dans les facultés des lettres et des sciences humaines à la veille de 1968’ (1984, 48). Moving from a description of the structures of power in the ‘champ universitaire’ on the eve of May 68 to an analysis of the events of that month, Bourdieu hoped to ‘échapper à l’alternative […] de l’histoire structurale et de l’histoire événementielle’ (227), understanding the events as the result of a series of structural transformations in the university field from the early 1960s.
onwards. For Bourdieu, the Barthes-Picard Affair had a particular significance as a 'microcosm' of these structural transformations and as a precursor of the political fault-lines along which different groups of lecturers and professors in 1968 would divide.

The Barthes-Picard Affair, a polemic between two literary critics, Roland Barthes and Raymond Picard, was provoked by two articles Barthes published in Modern Language Notes and the Times Literary Supplement, respectively. In these articles, he identified two conflicting schools of French literary criticism, 'la critique universitaire', with its roots in a positivist tradition of literary history whose principles had first been formulated by Gustave Lanson early in the century, and 'la nouvelle critique', which included figures such as Barthes himself, Lucien Goldmann, Jean Starobinski, and Gaston Bachelard, and which drew on structural linguistics. Marxism, psychology, and psychoanalysis to claim a scientific status for its findings (Barthes 1963a). These articles provoked an angry response from Picard, himself steeped in the tradition of Lanson, whose pamphlet Nouvelle critique ou nouvelle imposture? (1965) took issue with the assumptions behind the 'new criticism', concentrating specifically on Barthes's psychoanalytic and structuralist readings of Racinian tragedy in Sur Racine (1963).

The quarrel was widely reported in the French press, which divided along predictable lines. the right-wing Le Figaro defending Picard, whilst more left-wing or modernising magazines such as Le Nouvel Observateur and L'Express lined up behind Barthes. As Barthes pointed out, what really seemed to have provoked Picard's ire was that French universities should have been criticised in a foreign publication and that the 'new criticism' should employ a language so at odds with the tenets of good taste. The honour of a national institution, a certain uncritical notion of the transparency of the French language, 'la clarté française'. and an equally uncritical notion of 'taste' were all under assault from a discourse which drew on Marxism and psychoanalysis to emphasise the material bases of culture (Barthes 1966).

According to this analysis, the position of Barthes in the Affair would seem to be analogous to Bourdieu's own critical position vis-à-vis the French University. Albeit in the specialised domain of literary criticism, Barthes could be seen to be challenging the assumptions of legitimate culture and its
relationship to the myths and institutions of French Republicanism in just the way Bourdieu had done in *Les Héritiers*. However, far from exploring such analogies, in *Homo academicus* Bourdieu (1984, 151) claimed that there was a certain 'complicité structurale' between Barthes and Picard, that behind their apparent dispute, the two protagonists retained an unquestioned adherence to the values of legitimate culture; they were, in fact, 'des adversaires complices' (149).

Bourdieu's analysis repeated an earlier account of the Affair he had offered in the 1966 essay 'Champ intellectuel et projet créateur'. The importance of this early essay lay in the fact that it was the first occasion on which Bourdieu employed the term 'field' in its wider sense. Where in his analyses of the 'field of possibilities' open to the Algerian sub-proletariat or the 'champ du photographiable' which offered itself to different sections of the French population the term 'field' referred merely to an internalised set of 'objective possibilities', in 'Champ intellectuel...' the term took on the sense of a structured space of differential relations. A 'field' was analogous to a magnetic force-field with its poles of attraction and repulsion; it constituted a structured space of relations in which the positions of individuals or schools of thought were defined in terms of their differential relationship with other participants in the field. New entrants into the field were necessarily situated within this network of competing positions; their 'prises de position' were the result not of free choice but of the meeting between the field and their habitus, a socially inculcated structure of dispositions which ensured their investment in what was at stake in the field. In the case of Barthes and Picard, whilst different interpretations of Racine were in question, the inherent value of studying Racine never was (Bourdieu 1966f).

As Bourdieu later put it in *Questions de sociologie* (1980), the most vehement disputes between participants in a field may in fact contribute to the field's reproduction, concealing a level of complicity over what is at stake in that field and an unquestioned investment in its continued survival:

> On oublie que la lutte presuppose un accord entre les antagonistes sur ce qui mereit qu'on lutte et qui est refoule dans le cela va de soi, laisse a l'etat de doxa, c'est-a-dire tout ce qui fait le champ lui-meme, le jeu, les enjeux, tous les presupposes qu'on accepte tacitement, sans même le savoir.
Bourdieu has argued that this uncritical investment in the rules of the game, the 'illusio', generates a
'sens du jeu', a 'practical' or implicit sense of which actions are likely to reap rewards, not a conscious
search for prestige but a series of 'strategies' objectively orchestrated towards preserving or
accumulating capital within the field.

In 'Champ intellectuel...', Bourdieu limited his remarks to hinting at the 'complicity' between
Barthes and Picard. In Homo academicus, he offered a more detailed analysis of the Affair, placing it
within the context of the structural changes affecting the university field of the 1960s and explaining
the different 'strategies' adopted by Barthes, Picard, and their supporters as responses to those changes.

In order to accomplish this, he needed first to chart the competing positions within the university field.
Having gathered a mass of biographical data concerning the principal individuals in Parisian higher
education establishments, their social origin, their cultural capital, their social capital, their membership
of administrative committees, the institutions in which they were employed, and so on, he plotted these
variables using correspondence analysis.

The analysis revealed certain clearly distinguishable groups. The most significant distinction, he
argued, was that between those intellectuals with 'temporal' and those with 'spiritual' power. On the
one hand, there were intellectuals with roots in the Catholic bourgeoisie who tended to occupy senior
administrative positions, have right-wing political views, work in the law or medical faculties and
'compensate' for their lack of prestige in strictly intellectual terms with decorations for public service
and influence over temporal power. Opposed to these were left-of-centre intellectuals, perhaps Jewish
or agnostic, who concentrated on research, on the accumulation of symbolic rather than social or
political capital. This second group were most numerous in the science faculties (1984, 55-96).

Situated at the mid-point between these two poles, the 'sub-field' of the faculties of arts and social
sciences reproduced this opposition in microcosm and as such represented 'le lieu privilégié pour
observer la lutte entre les deux espèces de pouvoirs universitaires' (99).
Appropriating and adapting a terminology first coined by Gaston Bachelard, Bourdieu argued that the individuals whose positions he had plotted by correspondence analysis represented not ‘des individus empiriques’ but ‘des individus construits’, ‘constructed’ by being located with a ‘field’ of differential ‘relations’ in a process of ‘theoretical construction’, itself the product of an ‘epistemological break’ between Bourdieu’s personal experience and genuinely ‘scientific’ knowledge of the field. Individuals, groups, or institutions were not fixed substances but rather were to be ‘constructed’ ‘relationally’, their nature defined differentially in terms of their position within a field of conflictual relations. Moreover, by locating or ‘objectifying’ his own position within the field, Bourdieu sought to work through and transcend the limitations of his partial point of view, his personal interests or anecdotal experience, to achieve a truly ‘objective’ ‘scientific’ grasp of the phenomena he described (11-52). To emphasise the point that he was involved in a ‘scientific’ analysis of the field’s ‘objective’ logic, rather than a series of ad hominem attacks, he omitted the names of the individuals concerned (see fig. 1 overleaf).

In the bottom left-hand corner of the sub-field were clustered those individuals and institutions, exemplified by Barthes in the Vie Section of the Ecole pratique des hautes études (EPHE), who were oriented towards innovation and research which drew on the ‘newer’ social sciences such as sociology, psychoanalysis, and structural linguistics. These individuals tended to side with Barthes during the Affair and were more sympathetic to the demands of the students in May 1968. In the bottom right-hand corner were clustered individuals and institutions, exemplified by Picard at the Sorbonne, whose efforts were directed towards the reproduction of legitimate culture and who pursued ‘older’ disciplines such as philology or classics. These individuals tended to side with Picard and sought to defend the universities against the criticisms of student radicals in May.

There was nothing eternal about this structure. Bourdieu argued that the field as he had plotted it merely represented one stage in a struggle between opposing conceptions of academia at a moment in history when the traditional hierarchy of disciplines was undergoing a dramatic inversion. The old hierarchy with philosophy and the humanities at its peak was being overturned by the increasing prestige accorded science. The field was at a critical point: ‘un moment critique du processus historique
Fig 1 : L'espace des facultes des lettres et sciences humaines : analyse de correspondances : plan des premier et deuxième axes d'inertie (1984, 107)
Bourdieu read the Barthes-Picard Affair as a product of this shift in the hierarchy of disciplines. Barthes’s attempt to apply scientific methods to the study of literature, through semiotics and psychoanalysis, constituted ‘une stratégie de reconversion’, an attempt to ‘cumuler les profits de la science et les prestiges de la philosophie ou de la littérature’, by ‘reconverting’ literary into scientific capital or rather accumulating the capital inherent to both at this transitional stage (154-55). Bourdieu argued that behind the veneer of scientificity, Barthes remained allied to a much older conception of the critic as creative genius: ‘créateur capable de recréer l’œuvre par une interprétation elle-même instituée en œuvre littéraire et ainsi située par-delà le vrai et le faux’ (154). Behind Barthes’s critique of the Sorbonne’s ‘lansonisme’, Bourdieu saw the spectre of a classical assault on the ‘reductivism’ of positivist social science: ‘cette lutte sans cesse recommencée contre le ‘matérialisme réducteur’ des sciences sociales, cette fois incarnées dans une caricature révée, s’accomplit désormais au nom d’une science qui, avec la sémiologie, voire l’anthropologie structurale, s’affirme capable de réconcilier les exigences de la rigueur scientifique et les élégances mondaines de la critique d’auteurs’ (155).

For Bourdieu, Barthes was representative of a whole generation of thinkers occupying marginal positions within the intellectual field, ‘des herétiques consacrés’, who attempted similar ‘stratégies de reconversion’. In a preface which he had written for the English translation of Homo academicus and which was appended as a ‘postface’ to the second, 1988, edition of the French text, Bourdieu (1984, 297n.6) had decided to help his readers by providing ‘en toutes lettres’ the names he had previously left blank (see fig.2 overleaf).

Bourdieu argued that thinkers situated in the bottom left corner of this chart, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, had all undertaken ‘reconversion strategies’ analogous to Barthes’s. Appropriating certain methodologies from social science they had sought to historicise or deconstruct philosophical concepts, but they had done so in such a way as to retain both their own prestige as ‘maîtres à penser’ and the traditional prestige of philosophy. Repeating an argument he had first advanced in La Distinction (1979, 578-83), Bourdieu maintained that, for example, Derrida’s
fig. 2: 'L'espace des facultés des lettres et sciences humaines: Analyse de correspondances: plan des premier et deuxième axes d'inertie "individus" (1984. 290)
deconstructive readings of Kantian aesthetics in ‘Economimesis’ (1975) and La Vérité en peinture (1978), were playing ‘un double jeu’; apparently challenging the foundations of philosophical thinking. These deconstructive readings remained within the terms of philosophy as such. Unlike Bourdieu himself, whose reading of Kantian aesthetics revealed the latter’s ‘objective’ social function, ‘Derrida sait arrêter la “déconstruction” au point où, en basculant dans une analyse sociologique vouée à être perçue comme une “réduction sociologiste”, il se “déconstruirait” lui-même en tant que philosophe’ (1984, 304).

Further, Bourdieu suggested that Barthes, Foucault, Derrida, and Deleuze were implicated in what he termed, ‘le brouillage des différences entre le champ de production restreinte’, in which academic work was produced for and judged by an audience of one’s academic peers, and ‘le champ de grande production’, in which a work’s merit was judged by its marketability, its capacity to make an impression in the journalistic field (157). Barthes’s challenge to Picard had involved appealing to a market composed of the increasing number of students, of newly recruited junior lecturers, and of graduates now working on the edges of the intellectual and the economic fields, in advertising, the media, and public relations. A market whose demands were fashioned ‘par le journalisme à prétention intellectuelle’ (156-57, 162). An institution such as the Vle Section of the Ecole pratique, which could encourage innovation in research, also encouraged its staff to seek recognition outside the autonomous university field in compensation for their relative lack of recognition within that field; it thus constituted, ‘le point faible de la résistance du champ universitaire à l’intrusion des critères et des valeurs journalistiques’ (148).

Thus Bourdieu argued that ‘le véritable principe’ behind the Barthes-Picard Affair, and by extension behind the emergence of structuralist and post-structuralist theories in 1960s France, was not to be found ‘dans le contenu même des prises de position respectives, simples retraductions rationalisées des oppositions entre les postes occupés, les études littéraires et les sciences sociales, la Sorbonne et l’Ecole des hautes études, etc.’ (151). Rather, this profusion of new theoretical approaches in philosophy, literary criticism, and the social sciences was to be understood as a strategic adaptation to changing forms and sources of academic prestige.
For all his insistence on reflexivity, the 'epistemological vigilance' which secured the 'scientificity' of his analysis, Bourdieu's conclusions involved a series of theoretical slippages whose epistemological status remained unquestioned. He never questioned the epistemological status of correspondence analysis, simply and boldly asserting that it offered an 'image vraie' of the university field (38). This allowed him to posit a direct causal relationship between the position occupied in the field and the nature of an individual's intellectual production, enabling what he termed 'le passage de la sociologie du champ comme espace de positions à la sociologie des productions culturelles' (149). In implying that 'le véritable principe' behind the 'content' of any such intellectual production was reducible to the position occupied in the field, Bourdieu conflated questions belonging to the sociology of knowledge, the historical conditions under which certain forms of thought emerged, with questions of epistemology, the inherent validity of those forms of thought or knowledge. Whilst these two domains are related, the nature of that relation cannot a priori be assumed to be direct or straightforward and the value or significance of an intellectual movement cannot entirely be reduced to the particular historical circumstances in which it emerged.

Certainly, the concept of field and Bourdieu's use of correspondence analysis to plot the various positions occupied by participants in that field proved a powerful heuristic tool, locating the Barthes-Picard Affair within a much broader context, uncovering networks of affiliation and opposition which might otherwise have remained obscure. However, it is not necessary to deny the importance of these struggles between different groups and shifting sources of academic power to question whether they can be singled out as 'le véritable principe' behind structuralism and poststructuralism in quite the way Bourdieu claimed. Homi Bhabha (1994, 31) has argued that post-structuralism's fascination with questions of 'alterity' can indeed be read as a symptom of 'a dire disciplinary struggle' in which the 'other' is prized above all as a means of boosting 'theory's' institutional prestige. Yet he also insists that this does not exhaust post-structuralism's significance since there is 'a distinction to be made between the institutional history of critical theory and its conceptual potential for change and innovation'. Serge Doubrovsky (1967, 10) made a similar point in his study of the Barthes-Picard Affair, pointing out that Barthes's desire to 'réunir, par une épineuse synthèse, le bien-dire de la
littérature et le vrai-dire de la science’ did not prevent his discourse from having ramifications which
extended far beyond questions of intellectual capital and were bound up with contemporary disputes
over pedagogy and the outdated institutions of French higher education (xiv).

This final point was one which Bourdieu conceded in the ‘postface’ which he appended to the
second edition of Homo academicus. Having argued that the ‘true principle’ behind the work of
Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, and Barthes was a strategic reconversion to the increasing dominance of the
sciences, Bourdieu then maintained that their works were, ‘beaucoup plus que des reconversions plus ou
moins réussies de l’entreprise philosophique’; they partook of a more general critique of the institutions
of higher education, ‘contre l’archaïsme de leurs contenus et de leurs structures pédagogiques’. and
were ‘en résonance avec les mouvements qui agitaient l’avant-garde éthique et politique du monde
étudiant’ in the years around 1968 (1984, 304-6).

This introduced a puzzling paradox; if the works of these thinkers were indeed ‘much more’ than
simple reconversion strategies, if they fed into the protests and criticisms of French universities around
May 68, it was difficult to see how those who produced them could be considered ‘des hérétiques
consacrés’ whose struggles had merely contributed to the reproduction of the field. This implied that
far from being ‘le véritable principe’ behind the struggles in the French university field of the 1960s,
the reconversion strategies of Barthes et al provided only one of a range of different explanatory
principles. Alternatively, Bourdieu was arguing that the events of 1968 were themselves merely a
strategic adaptation to the shifting balance of power within French higher education. an adaptation
whose forms and wider significance were anticipated by the Barthes-Picard Affair and which hence left
the system fundamentally unchanged.

The Events of May 1968

Bourdieu’s analysis of the events of May 1968 in Homo academicus picked up where La
Reproduction had left off. He rejected previous analyses of the events for the hastiness of their
conclusions and their reliance on the ‘données partielles et superficielles de l’expérience biographique’.
and attributed a key role to the changes in the morphology of the student and lecturer populations he
had first noted in La Reproduction. Indeed, he argued that it was such morphological changes which, on a general level, 'introduced' historical change into fields whose semi-autonomy otherwise ensured their reproduction:

Les changements morphologiques sont ici [...] la médiation à travers laquelle l'histoire, que les mécanismes de reproduction tendent à exclure, s'introduit dans les champs, espaces ouverts, contraints de puiser au-dehors les ressources nécessaires à leur fonctionnement, et exposés de ce fait à devenir le lieu de la rencontre entre séries causales indépendantes qui fait l'événement, c'est-à-dire l'historique par excellence. (49)

More specifically, Bourdieu argued that the sudden need for a mass of new lecturers to deal with the rapid expansion in student numbers had significantly changed the criteria of university recruitment. Traditional subjects such as philosophy or French literature had an existing 'reserve' of personnel, in the form of 'agrége's' either working in or destined for secondary education, upon which they could draw. Newer disciplines such as sociology, which were not taught in the lycées and thus had no 'agrége's', had to employ personnel who did not have the same history of acculturation into the customs of French higher education. Thus, Bourdieu argued, where the newly recruited 'agrége's' were predisposed to accept the rigid structures of French academe, its slow temporal rhythms, the long wait for promotion, the new recruits into social science departments were not so disposed. Their accelerated initial promotion into higher education had raised expectations of further advancement which had little objective chance of being met. This 'décalage' between subjective aspirations and objective chances led to a growing sense of resentment and critique of the University authorities (169-203).

This sense of resentment was mirrored amongst the students. Bourdieu argued that with the massive increase in student numbers had come a 'déclassement généralisé', a significant reduction in the value of a university qualification (213). A university degree was no longer a guarantee of future success and this was particularly true of disciplines such as sociology or psychology which had no well-defined career path and did not lead to employment in secondary education (215). Furthermore, these new
disciplines tended to serve as 'refuge' for bourgeois students who had failed to gain entry into more prestigious degree courses and were 'dotés d'aspirations fortement désajustées par rapport à leurs chances objectives de réussite sociale' (222). The effects of this 'déclassement' were not, Bourdieu maintained, limited to the universities alone. For, as the level of formal qualification demanded for every job rose, so adolescents with qualifications that would have previously guaranteed them a clerical post found themselves reduced to working on the factory floor. These young discontented workers, he argued, were to play a key role in the strikes of May (216). 18

Thus, a whole generation of young 'assistants' and 'maîtres-assistants', of students and of young workers shared similar frustrations and occupied homologous, dominated positions in their respective fields. Similarly, those graduates who had moved into new jobs in the domain of media, cinema, advertising and marketing, 'les nouveaux agents de manipulation symbolique', felt an equivalent sense of frustration provoked by 'l'opposition entre la représentation qu'ils ont de leur tâche comme création intellectuelle à part entière et les contraintes bureaucratiques auxquelles ils doivent plier leur activité' (228-29).

The coincidence of these events in different fields, all endowed with their own relative autonomy, resulted in 'un effet de synchronisation' which provoked a more general crisis (211-12). This objective crisis was fuelled by various critical discourses whose combined effect was to introduce a 'rupture' or 'suspension' in the investment of groups or individuals in the continued smooth functioning of their respective fields:

Si la crise a partie liée avec la critique, c'est qu'elle introduit dans la durée une rupture, qu'elle met en suspens l'ordre ordinaire des successions et l'expérience ordinaire du temps comme présence à un avenir déjà présent; en bouleversant dans la réalité ou dans la représentation la structure des chances objectives (de profit, de réussite sociale, etc.), à laquelle se trouve spontanément ajustée la conduite réputée raisonnable [...] elle tend à déjouer le sens du placement, sense of one's place et sens du bon investissement, qui est inséparablement un sens des réalités et des possibilités que l'on dit raisonnables. C'est le moment critique où, en rupture
Where, in describing the ‘temporal consciousness’ of the Algerian peasantry, Bourdieu had turned to Husserl’s conception of an internalised structure of ‘retentions’ and ‘protentions’, an implicit, ‘practical’, or ‘doxic’ sense of what was to come, ‘l’à-venir’, which precluded a reflexive return onto the potentially arbitrary nature of the social order, here he argued that that ‘doxic’ order had broken down; the morphological changes affecting French universities had provoked a ‘suspension’ or ‘rupture’, ‘une véritable époché pratique’ in the apparent self-evidence of the ‘doxic order’ (305). The temporal rhythms of doxa, ‘l’expérience ordinaire du temps comme présence à un avenir déjà présent’ in which the structure of expectations internalised into the habitus was in accord with the objective possibility of those expectations being realised, had broken down. As a result, time opened up into a kind of festive time, ‘de temps libre, férié, festif’, ‘un temps public’ in which ‘les processus de reproduction sont suspendus pour un moment, et […] tous les futurs sont possibles pour tous’ (237-40).

For Bourdieu, the crisis of May 68 signalled the end of ‘le temps cyclique de la reproduction simple’ typical of ‘traditional’ societies (237). He drew a series of analogies between this breakdown in the time of ‘simple reproduction’ within the universities and the breakdown of ‘traditional’ society he had analysed in his work on Algeria and in ‘Célibat et condition paysanne’, comparing ‘la crise des successions’ occasioned by the recruitment of an army of new ‘assistants’ and ‘maîtres-assistants’ to the crisis of succession he had described in the Béarn. Lecturers and professors who attempted to retain the prestige they had enjoyed at a previous moment in the system’s history were like ‘les aînés des “grandes” familles paysannes qui, dans le Béarn des années 50, ont été condamnés au célibat par le souci d’éviter la mésalliance en une période de crise du marché matrimonial’ (167). The shock these same lecturers expressed when confronted with rebellious students reminded Bourdieu of old Kabyle peasants: ‘Tels les vieux paysans kabyles parlant des manières de cultiver hérétiques des jeunes, ils ne peuvent que dire leur stupéfaction, leur incroyabilité devant l’incroyable, le monde renversé’ (238).
Bourdieu’s account of the liberating effects of this breakdown in the ‘cycle of simple reproduction’ in French universities in 1968 was mitigated by the reservations he expressed concerning the movement’s political weaknesses. Echoing criticisms of the student movement he had first made in *Les Héritiers*, Bourdieu argued that ‘le mouvement déclenché par la révolte nobiliaire des étudiants d’origine bourgeoise’ had few chances of uncovering the role of the universities in the legitimation and reproduction of class divisions (240). The alliances struck up between ‘déclassés’ students and workers were ‘plus ou moins fictives’ (214-15), and the calls of the student leaders for students and workers to unite were often rooted ‘dans la dénégation magique des facteurs déterminants’ of the ‘malaise’ in education and society as a whole (241). Bourdieu maintained that the teaching union most directly involved in the strikes and protests, the *Syndicat national de l’enseignement supérieur* (SNESup), was run by ‘des appareils à peu près complètement dépourvus de réflexion libre et originaire sur le système d’enseignement’, a fact reflected in ‘l’absence à peu près totale d’analyse du fonctionnement et des fonctions spécifiques de l’enseignement’ (241). It was this absence of sustained reflection on the function of education which had encouraged SNESup to see the divisions within the universities as directly analogous to social divisions outside and to use ‘l’impératif de la “démocratisation de l’accès à l’enseignement supérieur”, slogan vague et vide, comme idéologie justificatrice des revendications corporatistes des enseignants subalternes’ (241-42).

For Bourdieu, the most important and durable effect of the crisis was ‘la révolution symbolique comme transformation profonde des modes de pensée et de vie, et, plus précisément, de toute la dimension symbolique de l’existence quotidienne’ (250). This ‘symbolic’ revolution had transformed ‘le regard que les agents portent à l’ordinaire sur la symbolique des rapports sociaux, et notamment des hiérarchies, faisant resurgir la dimension politique, hautement refoulée, des pratiques symboliques les plus ordinaires’ (250). In ‘La Production de l’idéologie dominante’ (1976), Bourdieu had suggested that this ‘symbolic’ revolution, the demands for greater social, cultural, and sexual freedom, had rapidly been recuperated into the dominant discourses of consumerism (1976, 44n.9; 55). In both *Libre-échange* (1994, 72) and *Contre-feux* (1998, 15), he argued ‘la réaction de panique rétrospective qu’a déterminée la crise de 68’ had paved the way for ‘la restauration culturelle aux termes de laquelle “la
pensée Sciences-po” a remplacé la “pensée Mao”. for the hegemony of neo-liberalism at the expense of an earlier tradition of Left-wing radicalism. Thus, Bourdieu’s final assessment of May 68 seemed to recall that offered by Régis Debray in his Modeste contribution aux discours et cérémonies du dixième anniversaire (1978). For Debray, the events were the result of a clash between the traditional, archaic structures of French cultural, social, and political life and the forces of economic modernisation which demanded those structures be challenged and reformed before France could complete her transformation into a modern, free market, consumer economy.

It is in the light of Bourdieu’s rather ambivalent verdict on the events of May that his reading of the theoretical innovations introduced by Barthes, Foucault, Deleuze, and Derrida might be understood. His assertion that such innovations were both ‘really’ reconversion strategies and much more than that could be seen as a reflection of the essentially contradictory nature of both the intellectual shifts and the socio-political movements in French universities in the 1960s. movements which both challenged the status quo but were ultimately to be recuperated within a modified system. If, then, there is indeed a tension throughout Bourdieu’s work on higher education, from Les Héritiers to Homo academicus, between acknowledging the extent of social change or of a challenge to the status quo and concluding that any such change or challenge could be accommodated within the system’s existing logic, then that tension can be seen as a productive rather than a negative feature.

One of the primary objectives of this chapter has been to emphasise the extent to which Bourdieu’s work on the sociology of education was centrally concerned with diagnosing the effects of major changes in French higher education, changes related to France’s rapid postwar economic modernisation and her transition into a late capitalist economy. Indeed, Bourdieu’s ability to identify the problems contingent upon such rapid change was perhaps most evident in the number of his contemporaries who cited his work in support of political programmes with which he had little or no sympathy. Thus in his 1967 essay ‘Etudiants et ouvriers’, Gorz cited Les Héritiers in support of his argument that ‘un nuovo blocco storico’ was being formed between students and workers: in a later essay he would cite La Reproduction in support of his call to ‘détroiure l’université’ (Gorz 1967; 1970). In L’Ecole capitaliste en France (1971, 314), the Althusserians Christian Baudelot and Roger Establet, whilst highly critical
of Bourdieu's theoretical approach and political reformism, credited him with having been the first to identify education as 'l'appareil idéologique numéro un', suggesting that it was on the basis of Bourdieu's work that the Althusserians had been able to develop a 'genuinely' Marxist theory of class, education, and ideology.19 At the other end of the political spectrum, Philippe Bénétton and Jean Touchard (1970, 513) have argued that the speeches of the Gaullist education minister Edgar Faure brought in to reform the universities after 1968, contained echoes of Bourdieu's discourse.

From rebellious students to government ministers, Bourdieu's work exerted a profound influence; it set the agenda for the debates on education from the mid-1960s to 1970s, particularly on the Left, and formed the central pole around which other protagonists in the field gravitated and in relation to which they defined their own approach. Bourdieu's own approach revealed a characteristic eclecticism, owing much to Weber's theories of legitimation and a Marxist understanding of class struggle, as well as to the Durkheimian concepts of relative autonomy and reproduction, of 'déclassement' and morphological change.

If Bourdieu's theoretical debt to Durkheim was consistent with his continued political faith in the ability of a reformed education system to ensure democratic access to culture and knowledge, it also explained a residual functionalism in his work. At its core, his work remained allied to the notion that the institutions of higher education possessed an inherent tendency to reproduce themselves unchanged, the values they dispensed, the hierarchies they consecrated, and the wider set of social relations they legitimised. Historical change was thus theorised as the sporadic breakdown, 'rupture', or 'crisis' in an otherwise 'doxic' or 'organic' state of 'simple reproduction'. The concepts of 'field' and 'strategy' seemed to betray a similar functionalism, manifest in Bourdieu's assertions that struggles within a field ultimately contribute to the reproduction of that field and that strategies are always reducible to an internalised tendency to accumulate the capital on offer within any particular field.

For reasons of historical chronology, this chapter has been forced to consider the concepts of strategy and field out of sequence, as it were, before examining in any detail the three works of Kabyle ethnology, published between 1972 and 1980, in which Bourdieu had laid their theoretical foundations. It was in these three studies that Bourdieu had offered a more detailed elaboration of the concepts of
habitus, practice, and strategy. concepts which, according to Richard Harker (in Harker et al 1990: 86-108) need to be fully understood if the impression of determinism left by a work such as La Reproduction is to be countered. Further, these works appeared to have had an important influence on Bourdieu's theorisation of social change in terms of that sporadic shift from an 'organic' to a 'critical' state. Throughout Homo academicus, Kabylia was invoked as an empirical example and an archetypal instance of 'simple reproduction', an 'organic' state, which could be contrasted with the 'critical' state of French higher education. It was unclear whether the allusions to Kabylia in Homo academicus were purely rhetorical or were intended to have a more 'scientific' status. Nevertheless, it is clear that before any definitive conclusions can be drawn regarding the accusations of determinism which have so frequently be made against Bourdieu's work and which have resurfaced in this chapter, albeit in mitigated form, it will be necessary to undertake a more detailed analysis of the concepts of habitus, field, practice, and strategy, which he had elaborated in his Kabyle work.
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1. This is intended as a representative sample rather than an exhaustive list of those critics who
have identified a deterministic bias in Bourdieu’s work. A full list would run to several score.
2. This implies rejecting Jenkins’s argument (1992, 121) that there is a sharp distinction to be
drawn between the ‘static and unchanging picture’ of higher education presented by Bourdieu in his
earlier works and the concern with historical change manifest in Homo academicus. As will be
demonstrated, the broad lines of Bourdieu’s argument in Homo academicus were anticipated in the
earlier La Reproduction.
3. A special number of the Revue de l’enseignement supérieur, no. 4, 1966, contains transcripts of
the most important contributions to the colloque de Caen. An article by Bourdieu (1966g) was
included in the appendix.
4. P. Chevallier and his co-authors (1968, 196-204) provide a brief but useful account of the
Fouchet Reforms. For a more detailed contemporary analysis of the different responses to the
proposed reforms see Antoine and Passeron (1966).
5. For responses to Kravetz’s article in Temps modernes, see Cluvel and Colombel (1964). Come
(1964), Misraki (1964). See also Kravetz’s subsequent article, co-written with Antoine Griset
(Griset and Kravetz 1965), and other articles of relevance from this period such as Briand and
Briand (1964), Nacht (1964), Milbergue (1965). Temps modernes also published a pre-publication
excerpt from Rapport pédagogique et communication in its September 1965 edition.
6. Fields (1970) provides a useful account of the ideology and political campaigns of UNEF in the
years prior to 1968.
7. At the very beginning of La Reproduction, Bourdieu weighed up the strengths and failings of all
three of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim in theorising the relationship between education and class,
suggesting that he would proceed by supplementing the failings of each thinker with the insights of
the other two (1970, 18-19).
8. There was considerable overlap between the content of these four studies. Les Etudiants...
containing in full the empirical data on which Les Héritiers was based and La Reproduction
reproducing, albeit in modified form, the analyses of the communicative breakdown between
students and lecturers first published in *Rapport pédagogique...*. Of these four works, *Les Héritiers* and *La Reproduction* were both the best known and most influential and this chapter will therefore focus on these two books, drawing on Bourdieu’s other books and articles as appropriate. The greater popularity of *Les Héritiers* and *La Reproduction* can be explained largely by the fact that they were published by Editions de minuit and were hence more widely available than either *Les Etudiants...* or *Rapport pédagogique...* both of which were published by the academic publishers Mouton.

9. Claire Duchen (1994, 150-51) cites a survey of 1966 amongst a broad sample of French parents which seems to support Bourdieu’s assertions regarding the influence of internalised notions of appropriate gender roles on parents’ aspirations for their daughters. Of those who wanted their children to go into higher education, 32% wanted their daughters to pursue a literary course, whilst 46% wanted their son to follow a technical course; 46% hoped their sons would become either a ‘cadre supérieur’ or enter the liberal professions, whilst 27% expected their daughters to rise no higher than ‘employée’.

10. Duchen has described the process whereby French women’s apparent progress in education and the labour market in the post-war period was accompanied by shifts in the prestige and power associated with certain disciplines and occupations:

> As women increasingly entered the non-agricultural labour market, the sexual segregation of employment in both occupational and hierarchical terms kept them in typically ‘feminine’ subordinate positions, as secretaries, as carers, at the bottom of the wage hierarchy. Occupations which became more ‘feminised’ were devalued; as women gained more and higher qualifications, so too the value of qualifications was shifted from literature and philosophy to the more male dominated streams of science and mathematics. (1994, 164)

11. This was a point Bourdieu developed further in the second part of *Les Etudiants et leurs études*.

12. Following the events of 1968, Mallet’s *La Nouvelle classe ouvrière* was reprinted in a new edition with by a preface by Touraine.
13. In the posthumously published notes which had been intended to form the basis of a book-length study of ideology and ideological state apparatuses, Althusser made clear the extent of his frustration at the Party’s line over May 1968, arguing that the disturbances in French education were: ‘Signe que, comme le disait Lénine, la Révolution était à l’ordre du jour, ce qui ne signifie pas - nuance capitale - que la situation soit révolutionnaire (nous en sommes encore loin)’ (1995, 190). See also his accusations that the PCF betrayed the masses in 1968 (Althusser 1992, 222-23).

14. For details of the research conducted by the C.S.E. amongst students in the sciences, see Bourdieu (1966g) and de Saint Martin (1968).

15. Doubrovsky (1967) provides a useful introduction to the Affair and to the literary theories which made up ‘la nouvelle critique’. For an introduction to Lanson’s literary theories see the collection of essays edited by Henri Peyre (1965). Compagnon (1983) provides a more historical perspective on the rise of ‘lansonisme’.

16. For an exposition of these key Bachelardian concepts, see Bachelard (1971). Bourdieu had acknowledged the extent of his debt to Bachelard in Le Métier de sociologue (1968).

17. Bourdieu’s analysis of the shifts in the French academic field of the 1960s and the emergence of a generation of ‘maîtres à penser’ apparently compromised by their association with journalistic fashion was remarkably similar to that offered some years earlier in an article by Raymond Boudon (1981). Predictably, and perhaps revealingly, Bourdieu (1984, 29-30) lambasted this article in Homo academicus, claiming it typified what he termed ‘cette sorte d’usage illégal de la science sociale’ and thus stood at the antipodes to his own genuinely ‘scientific’ analysis.

18. The importance of this phenomenon was also noted by Alain Touraine (1968, 170). On a more general level, Bourdieu’s emphasis on the changing nature of the student and teaching bodies as a prime determinant of the events of May seemed remarkably similar to the analysis offered by Boudon (1969) a year after the events. Boudon had also focused on the influx of young lecturers and new categories of student, claiming that the universities were shifting from a bourgeois institution to one serving primarily the interests of the ‘classes moyennes’. Bourdieu had criticised this final point in La Reproduction, claiming it was based on a superficial reading of the statistics and a loose definition of the ‘classes moyennes’ (1970, 256n.1, 257n.3). Nonetheless, the broad lines of their analysis remained very similar.
19. Baudelot had been Bourdieu's pupil and a contributor to *Rapport pédagogique et communication* before he left the C.S.E. to join the Althusserians. Amiot (1972) provides a more detailed analysis of Baudelot's and Establet's debt to Bourdieu's work on education.
CHAPTER FOUR
RETURNING TO KABYLIA: THE THEORY AND POETICS OF PRACTICE

In a footnote to La Reproduction, Bourdieu stated that his 'théorie de l’action pédagogique' was founded on 'une théorie des relations entre l’arbitraire culturel, l’habitus et la pratique qui recevra son développement complet dans un ouvrage en préparation' (1970, 91). The work in question was published two years later and drew on fieldwork Bourdieu had conducted during the Algerian War. Entitled Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique (1972), it took the form of three ethnological studies of Kabylia followed by a sustained reflection on the social, ethical, and epistemological implications of undertaking ethnological work. Five years later, Bourdieu revised and entirely rearranged Esquisse... in preparation for its English translation as Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977). Three years later, he returned to the subject of Kabylia once more, revising his initial analyses one further time before publishing them as Le Sens pratique (1980).

The frequency with which Bourdieu has returned to data that were by 1972 already ten years old suggests that these works of Kabyle ethnology occupy an extremely important position within his broader intellectual project. Indeed, the three works, Esquisse..., Outline..., and Le Sens pratique can be situated at a transitional stage in Bourdieu’s work; they represent a kind of theoretical hiatus during which he was able to elaborate the concepts of habitus, practice, and strategy into a full-blown ‘theory of practice’. It was in the light both of this ‘theory of practice’ and of socio-cultural changes in the France of the 1970s and 1980s that Bourdieu would return to questions of class, culture, and education in later works such as La Distinction (1979) or La Noblesse d’état (1989), refining and extending the analyses of these phenomena he had first offered in the 1960s. Clearly, then, if these later works on class, culture, and education are to be properly understood, it will be necessary first to undertake a critical analysis of the ‘theory of practice’ Bourdieu elaborated in his Kabyle work and of the place of that Kabyle work within his wider oeuvre, of the relationship between the ethnological and sociological aspects of his work. This chapter will, therefore, focus on Bourdieu’s theory of practice, leaving discussion of the relationship between ethnology and sociology in his work to the next chapter, Chapter Five.

The importance of Bourdieu’s Kabyle works is not, however, limited to their role in the development of his thought. For these works have exerted a considerable influence over the field of
anthropology and have been caught up in a series of debates sparked by what might be termed the ‘reflexive turn’ in anthropology, a postmodern or post-colonial questioning of that discipline’s colonial past and hence of the validity of its claims to scientificity. Bourdieu has argued that his frequent revisions and re-workings of his Kabyle work represented an instance of epistemological reflexivity, that constant process of rectification and theoretical self-critique in which earlier errors were worked through and dialectically overcome. As he put it in Ésquisse... : ‘l’histoire des erreurs successives fait partie intégrante d’un acquis scientifique dont l’essentiel n’a pu être obtenu que par une réflexion sur ces erreurs’ (1972, 129 n. 1). In Le Sens pratique, he chose a more literary metaphor, likening this open-ended process of reflexive critique to a ‘work in progress, comme disait Joyce’ (1980, 7). In describing the path to (social) scientific knowledge as an open-ended process in which prior errors were to be worked through and dialectically overcome, Bourdieu was acknowledging his debt to the work of Gaston Bachelard. As he had put it in Le Métier de sociologue (1968):

Comme le montre toute l’œuvre de Gaston Bachelard, l’épistémologie se distingue d’une méthodologie abstraite en ce qu’elle s’efforce de saisir la logique de l’erreur pour construire la logique de la découverte de la vérité comme polémique contre l’erreur et comme effort pour soumettre les vérités approchées de la science et les méthodes qu’elle utilise à une rectification méthodique et permanente. (1968, 9)

Le Métier de sociologue, a collaborative study in which Bourdieu and his co-authors attempted to provide secure epistemological groundings for sociological research, can be seen as providing the epistemological principles which Bourdieu attempted to put into practice in his Kabyle work, rather as Durkheim’s Les Règles de la méthode sociologique (1894) formalised the principles he had put into practice in De la division du travail social (1893). The book took the form of a lengthy theoretical introduction followed by a series of ‘textes d’illustration’ drawn from a characteristically eclectic range of thinkers, Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Bachelard, Erwin Panofsky, Charles Darwin, and Georges Canguilhem, amongst others. The precedence given Bachelard’s work was evident both in the introduction and in the titles of the various sub-sections under which the ‘textes
d’illustration’ were grouped; ‘La Rupture’, ‘La Construction de l’objet’, ‘Le Rationalisme appliqué’ all referred to key Bachelardian concepts.

Bourdieu’s emphasis on the need for epistemological vigilance was not, however, motivated by scientific rigour alone. As he argued in the preface to Le Sens pratique, the Algerian War had highlighted a series of profoundly political and ethical questions concerning the relationship between colonialism and ethnology and had revealed the inadequacy and ethnocentrism of primitivist representations of Algeria’s tribal societies (1980, 9). Bourdieu recounted an anecdote which served to epitomise the congruence of these ethical, political, and epistemological issues, whilst providing a kind of parable of the urgent need for epistemological vigilance. Looking at some photographs of a house in the Collo region taken in the 1960s, Bourdieu was reminded that had it not been for the French Army destroying the house’s roof in the course of expelling its inhabitants he would not have been able to obtain such clearly defined shots. In such circumstances, he suggested, he could not but have reflected on the social and political determinants of ethnological knowledge (10-11). It was precisely this reflexive awareness of their own conditions of possibility that Bourdieu found lacking in both Claude Lévi-Strauss’s structural anthropology and Jean-Paul Sartre’s existential phenomenology, the two competing visions of the social world against which he was to develop his ‘theory of practice’.

Scott Lash (1990, 237-65) has argued that this reflexivity and this emphasis on the relationship between power and knowledge marks Bourdieu’s adherence to that broad current in contemporary French thought generally termed ‘post-structuralist’ or ‘postmodernist’. These two terms are notoriously imprecise and are frequently used to qualify the work of a very heterogeneous group of thinkers including Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Jean-François Lyotard, and Jacques Derrida. Inasmuch as any unity of approach can be attributed to this diverse group of thinkers, it lies in the challenge all pose to the sovereignty of the rational subject and the ethnocentric premises of Western thought, a challenge undertaken in the name of a ‘difference’ or ‘alterity’ that cannot be dialectically sublated into a ‘grand narrative’ of Western science, progress, and reason.

As Robert Young (1990) has argued, these various ‘philosophies of difference’ can be read as concurrent attempts to ‘decolonise’ Western thought, attempts whose roots lie in the French
experience of decolonisation, in general, and the Algerian War, in particular. They have been central to the emergence of the new discipline of ‘post-colonial studies’ and to the work of its most influential theorists, Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak, and Homi Bhabha, who draw, in very different ways and to varying degrees, on the legacies of Foucault and Derrida in particular (Said 1978; Spivak 1988; Bhabha 1994). In the realm of ethnology proper, meanwhile, the seminal collection Writing Culture: the poetics and politics of ethnography (1986) has exploited what its editors call ‘a new space opened up by the disintegration of “Man” as telos for a whole discipline’. to question some of that discipline’s founding assumptions (Clifford and Marcus 1986, 4). They cite Bourdieu’s ‘theory of practice’ as one key influence in this process (3).

Bourdieu himself, however, has responded with hostility to any suggestion of an affinity with this broad current of thinkers. In Homo academicus, having argued that the ‘true principle’ behind their theoretical innovations lay in a strategic adaptation to changing forms and sources of academic prestige, he went on to distinguish his own brand of reflexivity from that ‘mise en question nihiliste de la science.’ typical of ‘certaines analyses dites postmodernes’ (1984, 291). In this, he was merely repeating a point he had made less explicitly in Le Sens pratique: ‘je n’ai jamais songé à passer, comme cela se fait si volontiers aujourd’hui, d’une analyse critique des conditions sociales et techniques de l’objectivation et de la définition des limites de validité des produits obtenus dans ces conditions, à une critique “radicale” de toute objectivation et, par là, de la science elle-même’ (1980, 24). In similar vein, he has attacked the editors of the Writing Culture collection for their ‘dénonciation faussement radicale de l’écriture ethnographique comme “poétique et politique”’, which opened the door, ‘à une forme de relativisme nihiliste à peine voilé qui […] se situe à l’exact opposé d’une science sociale véritablement réflexive’ (1992, 52).

The notion that Bourdieu’s work offers a more scientific, historically grounded, but nonetheless reflexively vigilant alternative to the perceived ‘relativism’ or ‘nihilism’ of postmodern theory has been picked up by some of his more favourable critics. Both Loïc Wacquant (in Bourdieu 1992, 38) and Craig Calhoun (in Calhoun et al 1993, 62) suggest it might offer what the latter terms ‘a sensible third path’ between Habermasian ‘universalism’ and postmodern ‘relativism’. For Calhoun (1996), Bourdieu’s ethnological work constitutes ‘a different post-structuralism’, ‘better grounded’, ‘more scientific’, but nonetheless sensitive to the ethical and political implications of
representing the anthropological other. This finds an echo in Nicholas Thomas's study, Colonialism's Culture (1994), in which he plays Bourdieu's concept of 'practice', 'his interest in located subjectivities [...] which situates colonial representations and narratives in terms of agents, locations and periods', against the 'global theorising' of thinkers like Said, Spivak, and Bhabha (Thomas 1994, 8-9; 58-60).

Any assessment of Bourdieu's work on Kabylia will, therefore, have to examine the validity of the claims that both he and his more favourable critics have made for it. These claims centre on the issues of epistemology, history, and representation, as well as on the historical agency ascribed to the subjects of Bourdieu's studies, the Kabyles themselves. To focus on such issues will demand paying greater attention to the theoretical underpinnings of Bourdieu's thought than to the specific historical circumstances out of which it grew and which it attempted to analyse. However, this shift of interpretative focus merely reflects a shift implicit in Bourdieu's own work and in his approach to Kabylia, a shift whose implications this chapter will also have to consider. As Camille Lacoste-Dujardin (1976, 111) has pointed out, there seemed to be 'une certaine contradiction' between 'la dynamique si vivante' of Bourdieu's earlier studies of Algeria and 'le caractere intemporel' of his later analyses of Kabyle society. Lacoste-Dujardin was merely the first of a growing number of commentators to have questioned the static, atemporal nature of Bourdieu's portrayal of Kabylia, a stasis and atemporality they identify as characteristic of precisely the kind of ethnocentrism Bourdieu claimed to have worked through (Herzfeld 1987, 7-8; 83-4; Caillé 1994, 163-64; Reed-Danahay 1995; Free 1996).

Bourdieu's works of Kabyle ethnology have, thus, elicited a series of diametrically opposed critical responses. For some, they manifest a typically 'postmodern' or 'post-structuralist' reflexivity; for others, they represent a 'different post-structuralism', non-ethnocentric but better grounded in science and history; for others still, they are marked chiefly by an ahistoricism and atemporality which holds worryingly ethnocentric implications. This chapter will argue, against Lash but with Bourdieu, that the latter's commitment to scientificity did indeed distinguish his work from that of the postmodernists and will seek to assess his claims that this allowed him to offer a scientific, historically specific, non-ethnocentric representation of the Kabyles. It will start by focusing on his attempts to elaborate a truly reflexive epistemology, show how this leads to the
development of concepts such as 'practice', 'habitus', and 'strategy', all the while examining to what extent these concepts live up to the claims that have been made for them both on the theoretical level and from a more empirical, historical standpoint.

Epistemology: The Critique of The 'Scholastic Point of View'

Bourdieu's frequent returns to his Kabyle material can be explained, in part at least, by the extent to which ethnology provided him with a striking paradigm of the pitfalls attendant on any intellectual discourse about the social world. The very tangible distance between Western anthropologists and the non-Western societies they studied was merely, he suggested, a more extreme example of the distance that separated all detached, leisured bourgeois intellectuals from the social and cultural phenomena they sought to interpret. Failure to think through the distortions inherent in this distance was, moreover, manifest in the false dichotomy between objectivism and subjectivism, structuralism and existential phenomenology, which Bourdieu took to be impoverishing so much sociological thought.

Structural anthropology, for example, was a clear case of a social theory that had failed to think through the distortions inherent in the distance that separated observer from observed. In reducing complex social practices to a closed system of structural laws intelligible only to the impartial observer, structuralists forgot that what appeared to the detached intellectual as a reed set of formal rules, constituted for native participants a set of practical problems to be negotiated with relatively unpredictable outcomes. Sartrean existentialism, meanwhile, committed an analogous error, albeit in reverse: it attributed to every agent a freedom in fact contingent upon the privileged status of the intellectual. In each case, intellectuals were guilty of unconsciously importing their relationship to the object of study into their analysis of that object: 'comme l'objectivisme universalise le rapport savant à l'objet de la science, le subjectivisme universalise l'expérience que le sujet du discours se fait de lui-même en tant que sujet' (1980, 77). In neither case had intellectuals reflected upon the social, historical, and material determinants of that relationship. As Bourdieu put it in *Esquisse...*:
On pourrait suggérer que l'expérience d'un monde social sur lequel on peut agir, de façon quasi-magique, par signes - mots ou monnaie - c'est-à-dire par la médiation du travail d'autrui, ne prédispose à percevoir le monde social comme lieu de la nécessité et entretient une affinité certaine avec une théorie de l'action comme exécution mécanique d'un modèle ou comme surgissement pur de la décision libre, cela selon que l'on pense plutôt à soi-même ou aux autres. (1972, 195)

Moreover, Bourdieu argued, the intellectual attitude that led to this sort of theoretical distortion was not limited to the domain of ethnology alone. By a series of analogies, he suggested that this kind of failing was characteristic of intellectual discourse about a range of other social phenomena, from aesthetics to education. Thus, just as Sartre attributed a universal value to freedoms that were contingent upon his status as a bourgeois intellectual, so Kantian aesthetics elevated certain historically and socially determined principles of taste to the status of universals, positing, as Bourdieu put it in La Distinction, a 'homo aestheticus [...] en sujet universel de l'expérience esthétique' (1979, 577).

Structuralism too had an affinity with Kantian aesthetics; both were types of formalism. For just as the Kantian aesthete appreciates a work of art on the level of pure form, as 'une finalité sans fin', an object of beauty in and of itself, so structuralism understood linguistic or cultural phenomena as a kind of formal game, a set of logical operations to be decoded: 'comme un objet autonome et autosuffisant, c'est-à-dire comme finalité sans fin, sans autre fin, en tout cas, que d'être interprété, à la façon de l'œuvre d'art' (1980, 53). The condition of possibility of both these formalisms, Bourdieu argued, was a certain bourgeois 'aisance', a certain distance from the constraints of material need which allowed the aesthete to suspend all interest in the practical utility of the work of art and ensured that the interests of structural linguists or anthropologists were not at stake in the social practices they described. Detached from the issues at stake in practice, structural anthropologists were free to view the society under study in purely theoretical terms, as a spectacle laid out for their contemplation, a code to be deciphered, a reified structure of fixed rules or disembodied forces beyond the ken or control of individual agents.
Playing on the etymology of the term ‘scholastic’, from the Greek skhole, meaning ‘leisure’.

Bourdieu argued that such typically ‘intellectualist’ failings were the product of what he termed the ‘scholastic point of view’, of a particular disposition inculcated in and rewarded by the academic world: ‘un produit de la situation scolaire, au sens fort de situation de skholé, d’où un d’inaction’ (1980, 53). Thus, four of the main strands of Bourdieu’s thought coalesced around the single concept of the ‘scholastic point of view’: Bourdieu had already attempted to trace the genesis and effects of this ‘scholasticism’ in his work on education, whilst he was to develop his critique of its application to the fields of aesthetics, in La Distinction, and linguistics, in Ce que parler veut dire (1982).³

Bourdieu himself (1994a, 221) has acknowledged that the phrase ‘scholastic point of view’ derived from J.L. Austin’s Sense and Sensibilia (1962, 3-4) and this has led several critics to suggest a significant affinity between his thought and the Anglo-American philosophical tradition (Bouveresse 1995; Shusterman 1995). However, it was surely Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s critique of the pitfalls attendant on the opposing doctrines of ‘empiricism’ and ‘intellectualism’ in La Phénoménologie de la perception (1945) and his consequent emphasis on the inherently embodied nature of human ‘practice’ which represented a more important precursor both to Bourdieu’s critique of the ‘scholastic point of view’ and to his own ‘theory of practice’. The particular form taken by that critique, meanwhile, owed much to the work of Bachelard.

In La Formation de l’esprit scientifique (1938). Bachelard argued that scientific knowledge could only progress by ‘une psychanalyse de la connaissance objective’, by constantly reflecting upon and thinking through the irrationalisms, outdated problematics, errors, and ‘obstacles épistémologiques’ contained in every scientist’s unconscious, their ‘inconscient épistémologique’. Bourdieu’s determination to think through the unconscious social determinants of sociological discourse can be seen as an effort to transfer this method from the natural sciences to the social sciences, to, as he put it in Le Métier de sociologue, ‘prolonger la “psychanalyse de l’esprit scientifique” par une analyse des conditions sociales dans lesquelles sont produites les œuvres sociologiques’ (1968, 9-10).

Phenomenology and structuralism thus represented for Bourdieu two ‘epistemological obstacles’, ‘un couple épistémologique’, in the Bachelardian sense, blocking the further advance of
social scientific knowledge. Working through this ‘couple épistémologique’ did not involve ‘breaking’ with structuralism and phenomenology in any straightforward sense. Rather it was a question of locating and working through the blind spots implicit in each approach, whilst integrating their respective insights in a dialectical synthesis which would ‘dépasser l’antagonisme qui oppose ces deux modes de connaissance tout en conservant les acquis de chacun d’eux’ (1980, 43). This classically dialectical movement also had a precedent in Bachelard’s work. As R.C. Smith (1982, 26) points out, when Bachelard explained the advances secured by non-Euclidean geometry over what had gone before he emphasised that this advance was not won simply by denying the insights of Euclidean geometry but rather by locating Euclidean geometry’s specific realm of application within a more advanced synthetic general geometry. It was precisely this procedure that Bourdieu would effect with regard to phenomenology and structuralism, each theory being not denied but rather integrated and re-positioned within an overarching, synthetic ‘theory of practice’.

For Bourdieu, a truly scientific sociology involved a double movement. Firstly, it was necessary to undertake ‘une rupture épistémologique’, to achieve a moment of objectification in which the hidden logic of social processes was laid bare. When Ferdinand de Saussure first claimed the autonomy of the linguistic system, ‘langue’, from its individual moments of actualisation, ‘parole’, he had undertaken one such epistemological break. However, Bourdieu argued, this epistemological break had also concealed a social break which brought with it the dangers of a theoretical distortion. In appropriating Saussure’s model for anthropological study, structural anthropologists had overlooked the significance of this social break, leaving an unanalysed ‘inconscient épistémologique’ at the heart of their work (1972, 166).

This ‘inconscient épistémologique’ could, however, be thought through by means of a second epistemological break, a reflexive return onto the first break’s social, historical, and economic conditions of possibility. This allowed social scientists to acknowledge the potential for theoretical distortion inherent in their project and to grasp that level of ‘practical knowledge’ deployed by native agents which unreflected objectivism had necessarily excluded. It was this double process, Bourdieu argued, that theoreticist or objectivist modes of thought failed to understand:
le triomphalisme de la raison théorique a pour rançon l’incapacité de dépasser, et cela depuis l’origine, le simple enregistrement de la dualité des voies de la connaissance, voie de l’apparence et voie de la vérité. doxa et epistémé, sens commun et science, et l’impuissance à conquérir pour la science la vérité de ce contre quoi la science se construit. (1980.61-2)

In his Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1954), Husserl had argued that it was precisely the absolute distinction between the realms of epistémé, objective knowledge, and doxa, common sense, everyday appearance, or ‘practical knowledge’, that had led to the excessive rationalism and objectivism of the modern sciences, their banishment of lived experience. For Husserl (1954, 155-56), the task of phenomenology was to revalorise lived experience or the ‘disparaged doxa’, as he put it. Phenomenology would thus prove, ‘a peculiar science for sure, since it concerns the disparaged doxa, which now suddenly claims the dignity of a foundation for science’.

However, if Bourdieu’s critique of structuralist objectivism was clearly indebted to Husserl, he was not simply advocating a return to lived experience on the phenomenological model. His theory of practice had, as he put it, ‘rien à voir avec la restitution phénoménologique de l’expérience vécue de la pratique’ (1972.156). If ‘practical’ experience constituted an integral part of all social phenomena, it did not, for all that, contain their objective logic, which could only be revealed by means of the kind of objectifying epistemological break undertaken by structuralism. Thus, scientific knowledge of the social world required the dialectical synthesis of both theoretical and practical modes of thought, of epistémé and doxa, of the objective knowledge secured by structuralism and the subjective knowledge secured by phenomenology. As Bourdieu put it in Réponses: ‘il ne suffit pas de rompre avec le sens commun ordinaire [...]; il faut rompre avec les instruments de rupture qui annulent l’expérience même contre laquelle ils se sont construits. Et cela pour construire des modèles plus complets, englobant et la naïveté première et la vérité objective qu’elle dissimule’ (1992. 221, my emphasis). This synthesis of epistémé and doxa would thus conserve the gains of each whilst transcending their limitations, producing what Bourdieu variously termed ‘la connaissance praxéologique’ (1972, 164), ‘a sort of third order knowledge’ (1977, 4), or more simply ‘une objectivité plus haute’ (1980a, 32).
Thus the objectivity and scientifcidity which Bourdieu claimed for his work seemed to rest on a
dialectical synthesis of subjectivism and objectivism, of the practical and the theoretical points of
view, a synthesis which integrated the gains of each even as it transcended their limitations.
However, Bourdieu has also frequently emphasised that his epistemological precepts need
themselves to be understood as constituting a ‘theoretical practice’ or ‘une pratique sociologique’, a
set of ‘préceptes pratiques’ internalised into ‘un habitus scientifique [...] fonctionnant à l’état
pratique’ (1968, 10-11; 1992, 192-94). It was unclear how Bourdieu could argue that his work
constituted a ‘theoretical practice’, generated by ‘un habitus scientifique’, whilst simultaneously
defining ‘practice’ as that naive, pre-reflexive level of knowledge against which science was
constructed. There seemed to be a contradiction at the very heart of Bourdieu’s epistemology. For,
on the one hand, he clearly wanted to work through the opposition between theory and practice.
Indeed, this much was evident in the very title of Le Métier de sociologue which, in figuring
sociology as a ‘craft’ rather than a purely intellectual activity, alluded to Heidegger’s aphorism
‘Denken ist Handwerk’ whilst echoing those sections of Being and Time (1927) in which Heidegger
compared ‘Dasein’ to the relationship between a craftsman and his tools and hence irreducible to
objectivist analysis.4

On the other hand, however, this apparent willingness to dispense with the distinction between
theory and practice seemed inconsistent with Bourdieu’s own descriptions of practice as a kind of
immediate investment in the apparent self-evidence of the social world, a ‘doxic relation’ to the
world which precluded, by definition, a reflexive return onto its objective logic. As he put it in Le
Sens pratique: ‘la pratique exclut le retour sur soi’ (1980, 154). Thus, in Réponses, Bourdieu would
insist on the need to keep the distinction between practical and objective modes of knowledge firmly
in place:

S’il faut objectiver les schémes du sens pratique, ce n’est pas pour faire la preuve que la
sociologie ne peut jamais être qu’un point de vue sur le monde, ni plus ni moins scientifique
qu’un autre, mais pour arracher la raison scientifique à la raison pratique, pour empêcher
que celle-ci ne vienne contaminer celle-là, pour éviter de traiter comme instrument de
connaissance ce qui devrait être objet de connaissance, c’est-à-dire tout ce qui fait le sens
Having defined 'la vérité de la pratique comme cécité à sa propre vérité' (1980, 153), it was by no
means clear on what basis Bourdieu could describe his own reflexive epistemology as itself a
'scientific practice' and this for two reasons.

Firstly, if the precepts of a scientific sociology were to be internalised at the 'practical level' into
the habitual, pre-reflexive structures of a 'scientific habitus' this, by Bourdieu's own definition,
would place them beyond the grasp of that reflexive return necessary for the Bachelardian
imperative of 'epistemological vigilance' to be respected. As Bachelard put it: 'Par bien des côtés,
la méthode est l'antithèse de l'habitude et c'est l'erreur gnoséologique du formalisme qui voudrait
rendre la méthode machinale. La conscience de méthode doit rester vigilante' (1949, 25).

Secondly, according to Bourdieu's account, science demanded an epistemological break with the
realm of pre-reflexive or 'practical' immediacy. However reflexively undertaken, the ability to
achieve such a break was, by Bourdieu's own definition, the preserve of the detached bourgeois
intellectual. His claim to scientificity, then, seemed to rest on maintaining, rather than
undermining the absolute distinction between theory and practice, whilst objective knowledge about
the Kabyle world appeared to remain the exclusive privilege of the detached intellectual observer. It
is this problematic that surely explains the extent of Bourdieu's hostility to the 'nihilism' and
'relativism' of that 'postmodern turn' in ethnology exemplified by the Writing Culture collection.
For the contributors to this collection have all challenged the notion that the detached
anthropological observer has privileged access to objective truths about the social world which are
not accessible to native participants. They emphasise instead that anthropological knowledge is
necessarily a narrative construct, the product of an ongoing 'dialogical' encounter between observer
and observed. For all Bourdieu's attentiveness to the distortions inherent in the status of the
detached observer, this was a step he was not prepared to countenance since it would have involved
abandoning any claim to a privileged measure of objectivity and scientificity.

There was, thus, at the heart of Bourdieu's epistemology, an unresolved tension between a stated
desire to undermine the oppositions between theory and practice, subjectivism and objectivism, and
Bourdieu’s critique of the ‘scholastic point of view’ rested on the a priori assumption that there was a qualitative difference between the kind of knowledge of the social world accessible to detached intellectuals, on the one hand, and native agents, on the other. Whilst Bourdieu’s intention was clearly to challenge the somewhat grandiose theorising characteristic of structural anthropology, this distinction between intellectualist and practical modes of thought cut both ways. For, if the intellectual’s experience of the world was intrinsically mediated, distant, and objectifying, this seemed to imply that native experience was, by contrast, irrevocably immediate, pre-reflexive, and subjective.

At the theoretical level, the contradictions inherent in Bourdieu’s epistemology can be read as symptomatic of the difficulties inherent in any attempt to work through the opposition between objectivist and subjectivist modes of thought and, by extension, to synthesise elements drawn from Bachelard, who insisted on the absolute separation between science and common sense or practical knowledge, with elements drawn from the phenomenological tradition, which privileged such practical knowledge. These problems at the level of epistemology had a direct impact on questions of structure and agency, of the extent to which the Kabyles themselves were considered able to know and transform their social world through willed praxis. Indeed, closer analysis of the concepts of ‘habitus’, ‘practice’, and ‘strategy’ will reveal that they too were marked by an unresolved tension between an emphasis on their creative, improvisational qualities and Bourdieu’s insistence that such improvisations were always ultimately determined by an ‘objective logic’, the imperatives of social reproduction, which the Kabyles themselves ‘misrecognised’.

‘La Maison Kabyle’ and The Poetics of Space

Of the three ethnological studies which opened Esquisse..., perhaps the best known is ‘La Maison kabyle ou le monde renversé’. Originally written in 1963-64, it had first been published in 1970 in a volume of tributes to Lévi-Strauss on his sixtieth birthday. Described by Bourdieu as ‘mon dernier travail de structuraliste heureux’, a reworking of the essay, which reflected his critique of structural anthropology, appeared in all three of Esquisse..., Outline..., and Le Sens pratique. For this reason and because the Kabyle house represented for Bourdieu a microcosm of
the entire mythico-ritual structure of Kabylia, 'La Maison kabyle' provides a good way to examine the theory of practice Bourdieu elaborated in critical reaction to both structuralism and phenomenology.

At first glance, 'La Maison kabyle ou le monde renverse' reads like a classical example of structural anthropology, 'a most impressive tour de force of structuralist analysis', as Richard Jenkins (1992, 32) puts it. According to Bourdieu, the Kabyle social universe was structured by a series of primary spatial oppositions between inside and outside, east and west, which were overlaid with a complex network of arbitrary and differential symbolic meanings that reflected and reinforced the gender divisions of the Kabyle world. The interior of the house was a dark, humid space signifying feminine values of nurture, domesticity, and reserved respectability, or 'hurma'. Outside was the domain of men. Men went out into the fields to work, to meet and talk with other men. Male honour, or 'nif', was associated with this movement out into the world, with risk-taking and self-projection. When they went out to work in the morning, men left by the east door, walking out into the rising sun, leaving the dark domestic space behind them to the west. Just as the outside signified masculine values of light, openness, and honesty when compared with the dark, feminised domestic interior, so the east was associated with masculine values and the west with feminine.

The interior of the Kabyle house reproduced these oppositions in microcosm. Thus, although when viewed from the outside the house embodied purely feminine values, once inside it was subdivided into masculine and feminine spaces. However, within the house the poles were reversed. Where external space was divided between a masculine eastern pole and a feminine western one, within the house it was the western wall that was associated with masculinity since it was lit by the light of the rising sun, whilst the eastern wall was in shade. The orientation of values was thus overturned within the house, hence 'le monde renverse' of the essay's title, and the threshold, as the point where these opposing sets of values met and were inverted, took on a powerful symbolic function.

Bourdieu’s analysis was clearly greatly indebted to structuralism. The network of cultural meanings which overdetermined the spaces and objects of the Kabyle world formed a structure of binary oppositions and homologies in a manner seemingly typical of structuralism. However, unlike a classically structuralist analysis, the meaning of each signifying element, the objects or
spaces which formed the pole of each binary opposition. could not be deciphered merely by
reference to a transcendent code irreducible to its individual moments of actualisation. The
meaning of the domestic space, for example, was not solely dependent upon its position within an
overarching structure of difference, but altered depending upon the gender, perspective, and bodily
position of the individual apprehending it. Thus, the domestic space might signify purely feminine
values from the outside, or both masculine and feminine values from within. Further, for a woman
the domestic interior signified positive values of domestic respectability, whilst for a man it
signified a realm of essentially negative, feminised values. As Bourdieu explained: 'l’un ou l’autre
des deux systèmes d’oppositions qui définissent la maison, soit dans son organisation interne, soit
dans son rapport avec le monde extérieur, se trouve porté au jour selon que l’on considère la maison
du point de vue masculin ou du point de vue féminin' (1970a, 753).

The locus of meaning had thus shifted from the system of binary oppositions laid bare by the
detached intellectual observer to the movements and perspectives of the Kabyles themselves.
Meanings were generated not at the level of a purely theoretical, disembodied structure of difference
but by the Kabyles in their everyday actions and movements, in their 'practice'. as Bourdieu was to
put it in Esquisse..., Outline..., and Le Sens pratique.

This emphasis on changing perspectives and the embodiment of symbolic meaning suggested
Bourdieu was drawing as much on the phenomenological as the structuralist tradition. In Le
Déracinement (1964), written at the same time as ‘La Maison kabyle’, he had sought to distinguish
between the de-humanising, geometrical space of the ‘centres de regroupement’ and the traditional
space of the Kabyle house, rich in symbolic meaning and collective memory. Significantly,
Bourdieu had quoted the following passage from Bachelard’s phenomenological study of domestic
space, La Poétique de l’espace (1957): ‘Au-delà des souvenirs, la maison natale est physiquement
inscrite en nous: elle est un groupe d’habitudes organiques. [...] Le mot habitude est un mot trop usé
pour dire cette liaison passionnée de notre corps qui n’oublie pas à la maison inoubliable’ (in
Bourdieu 1964, 152n.1).

Clearly, in ‘La Maison kabyle’, Bourdieu was attempting to convey precisely this sense of
domestic space as ‘un groupe d’habitudes organiques’. Indeed, the oppositions between inside and
outside, dark and light, female and male, which Bourdieu found structuring the Kabyle house
seemed to echo the oppositions between inside and outside, between the dark cellar and the light, airy attic, which Bachelard had identified in *La Poétique de l’espace*. Moreover, Bachelard had laid special emphasis on the symbolic function of the threshold, quoting the following fragment of a poem by Michel Barrault:

Je me surprends à définir le seuil
Comme étant le lieu géométrique
Des arrivées et des départs
Dans la Maison du Père

(in Bachelard 1957, 201)

Commenting on this fragment, Bachelard had written: ‘le poète, lui, ne recule pas devant le renversement des emboitements [...], il vit le renversement des dimensions, le retournement de la perspective du dehors et du dedans’ (202, my emphasis). In all three of *Esquisse... Outline...* and *Le Sens pratique*, Bourdieu quoted this same fragment, praising the poet’s ability to ‘aller au principe de la pratique mythopoétique’, to grasp the significance of the threshold in its symbolic function as the site of the passage of socially marked trajectories, of the union, separation, and inversion of previously opposing principles, east and west, masculine and feminine, dominant and dominated (Bourdieu 1980, 158). It could, therefore, be argued that the very title of ‘La Maison kabyle ou le monde renversé’ was derived from Bachelard’s phenomenological study of domestic space.6

If ‘La Maison kabyle’ contained elements drawn from both the structuralist and the phenomenological traditions, the revisions to which Bourdieu subjected this essay in his later works of ethnology were less a matter of breaking with his earlier approach than of synthesising more completely the diverse elements on which it had drawn. Thus, from structuralism Bourdieu retained the notion of a socio-cultural universe structured by a set of binary oppositions which formed what he termed the ‘dominant taxonomy’. However, he emphasised that these ‘classificatory schemata’ constituted ‘practical taxonomies’; they existed not as a set of theoretically coherent, abstract, disembodied rules but were incorporated into the ‘hexis’ and ‘habitus’ of the
Kabyles, to generate a collective ‘practice’ which obeyed a ‘practical’ or ‘fuzzy’ logic not reducible to reified structural law.

The division between the sexes, which had been identified in ‘La Maison kabyle’ as the fundamental socio-cultural opposition structuring Kabyle society, was thus described in Le Sens pratique as being rooted in the Kabyles’ ‘hexis’ or bodily deportment rather than in a set of logical rules or norms, whether consciously or unconsciously obeyed:

L’opposition entre le masculin et le féminin se réalise dans la manière de se tenir, de porter le corps, de se comporter sous la forme de l’opposition entre le droit et le courbe (ou le courbé), entre la fermeté, la droiture, la franchise (qui regarde en face et fait front et qui porte son regard et ses coups droit au but) et de l’autre côté, la retenue, la réserve, la souplesse. (1980, 117-18)

Where the term ‘hexis’ referred to the style of deportment that resulted from the incorporation of a set of socially and culturally overdetermined oppositions, ‘habitus’ was employed in a more general sense to describe the whole series of bodily and cognitive dispositions which were both structured by past experience and structuring of future action. The habitus represented a durable and transposable structure of dispositions, an incorporated set of ‘practical taxonomies’, of ‘classificatory schemata’, of ways of seeing and doing in the world, ‘une vision et division du monde social’:

Produit de l’histoire, l’habitus produit des pratiques individuelles et collectives, donc de l’histoire, conformément aux schèmes engendrés par l’histoire; il assure la présence active des expériences passées qui, déposées en chaque organisme sous la forme de schèmes de perception, de pensée et d’action, tendent, plus sûrement que toutes les règles formelles et toutes les normes explicites, à garantir la conformité des pratiques et leur constance à travers le temps. (1980, 91)
This account of the habitus as the product of a historical process of bodily incorporation stood in clear contrast to Lévi-Strauss’s structural analyses of social norms and rules. For Lévi-Strauss had posited a direct correspondence between the binary structure of linguistic or cultural systems and certain unchanging, fundamental structures of the human unconscious. Paul Ricoeur had famously characterised Lévi-Strauss’s thought as ‘un kantisme sans sujet transcendental’, arguing that the latter’s conception of the unconscious functioned as a kind of transcendental matrix structuring all experience and denying any constitutive role to the rational agent (1969, 55). Bourdieu reiterated this charge of idealism:

Sous les airs d’un matérialisme radical, cette philosophie de la nature est une philosophie de l’esprit qui revient à une forme d’idéalisme. Affirmant l’universalité des catégories logiques qui régissent ‘l’activité inconsciente de l’esprit’, elle ignore la dialectique des structures sociales et des dispositions structurées et structurantes dans lesquelles se forment et se transforment les schèmes de pensée.... (1980, 69)

If Bourdieu’s emphasis on the dialectical relationship between habitus and social structure had a strong Marxist resonance, his insistence on the embodied nature of symbolic meaning recalled the phenomenological critique of Kantian idealism. In Phénoménologie de la perception, Merleau-Ponty had argued that the nature of experience could not be explained by reference to a set of a priori categories, but rather lay in the relationship between living body and lived world:

Le sujet kantien pose un monde, mais, pour pouvoir affirmer une vérité, le sujet effectif doit d’abord avoir un monde ou être au monde, c’est-à-dire porter autour de soi un système de significations dont les correspondances, les relations, les participations n’avaient pas besoin d’être explicitées pour être utilisées. (1945, 150)

This notion of the subject-in-the-world carrying around a series of meanings and correspondences which need not be explicitly posited to be practically deployed is very close to Bourdieu’s own
description of the structures of meaning attached to the divisions of the Kabyle social universe, which were realised in the Kabyles’ practice rather than existing as a set of logical, a priori rules.

According to Bourdieu, Kabylia possessed few, if any, objectified systems of social regulation and no specific institutional forms of education (1977a, 17). Thus, legitimate forms of thought and action were inculcated by what he termed ‘une pédagogie implicite’, by the social imperatives conveyed through myth, proverb, ritual, and the most apparently banal parental injunction to ‘sit up straight’ or ‘hold your knife in your right hand’, which imposed a whole vision and division of the social world onto the somatic structures of practice. Similarly, Bourdieu argued that the collective experience of living in and moving through a social universe structured by a series of cultural and symbolic meanings was enough to, ‘imposer l’intégration de l’espace corporel et de l’espace cosmique en subsumant sous les mêmes concepts [...] les états et les actions complémentaires et opposés des deux sexes dans la division du travail sexuel’ (1980, 196). Social imperatives were inculcated pre-thetically by a process of ‘mimesis, a sort of symbolic gymnastics [...] from body to body, i.e. on the hither side of words or concepts’ (1977a, 2).

Again, this account of ‘incorporation’ was greatly indebted to Merleau-Ponty, who had argued that motor skills such as dancing or typing were ‘picked up’ by the body in a way which a purely objectivist analysis of their constituent elements would be unable to grasp: ‘C’est le corps, comme on l’a dit souvent, qui l’attrape (kapiert) et qui “comprend” le mouvement. L’acquisition de l’habitude est bien la saisie d’une signification, mais c’est la saisie motrice d’une signification motrice’ (1945, 167). Quoting Husserl, Merleau-Ponty argued that the possession of such motor skills as typing or dancing did not reflect the deployment of a set of logical rules but rather a practical knowledge or ‘praktognosie’:

L’expérience motrice de notre corps n’est pas un cas particulier de connaissance; elle nous fournit une manière d’accéder au monde et à l’objet, une ‘praktognosie’ qui doit être reconnue comme originale et peut-être comme originaire. Mon corps a son monde ou comprend son monde sans avoir à passer par des ‘représentations’, sans se subordonner à une ‘fonction symbolique’ ou ‘objectivante’. (164)
It was precisely this practical knowledge, which passed ‘de la pratique à la pratique sans passer par l’explicitation et par la conscience’, that Bourdieu found at the heart of the Kabyles’ practice and habitus and which he argued objectivism was unable to grasp (1972, 190).

Having thus appropriated from structural anthropology the notion of a social and cultural world structured by a set of taxonomies, of binary oppositions and homologies, which could only be laid bare by effecting an epistemological break with the realm of first-hand experience, Bourdieu took from phenomenology the notion that such taxonomies were ‘incorporated’ into the kind of bodily disposition analysed by Merleau-Ponty to form part of what Husserl had identified as the ‘practical’ or ‘pre-predicative’ bases of experience. Where Bourdieu’s account differed from classical phenomenology was in its insistence on the material determinants of this process of incorporation. Husserl and Merleau-Ponty understood practice and incorporation from the point of view of, respectively, the transcendental Ego or the purely subjective experiences of an individual body. Bourdieu, however, saw the body as the site of the incorporation of a series of profoundly social and historical forces: ‘un corps géomètre, corps conducteur de part en part traversé par la nécessité du monde social’ (1980, 245).

Nonetheless, in addition to the concepts of ‘incorporation’, ‘practice’, and the ‘pre-predicative’, Bourdieu took from phenomenology a specific conception of temporality, again reinterpreting it on more sociological and materialist lines. As Merleau-Ponty explained, phenomenology understood temporal experience as a set of past experiences, ‘retentions’, internalised into so many ‘protentions’, a ‘practical’ sense of what could or could not be achieved in the future, ‘l’à-venir’:

‘Ceci revient à dire que chaque présent réaffirme la présence de tout le passé qu’il chasse et anticipe celle de tout l’à-venir, et que par définition le présent n’est pas enfermé en lui-même et se transcende vers un avenir et un passé’ (1945, 481).

As early as his work on the Algerian peasantry and sub-proletariat, Bourdieu had offered a sociological re-reading of this concept of temporality, attributing the nature of the retentions and protentions internalised by each social group to a particular set of historical circumstances. It was this conception of temporality that he repeated in Le Sens pratique when he described the habitus as follows: ‘l’habitus se détermine en fonction d’un avenir probable qu’il devance et qu’il contribue
à faire advenir parce qu’il le lit directement dans le présent du monde présumé, le seul qu’il puisse jamais connaître’ (1980, 108).

The phenomenological conception of time as a structure of retentions and protentions also implied a certain intentionality, even teleology, and it was only in his later Kabyle work that Bourdieu began to reinterpret this, in turn, in specifically sociological terms. In Experience and Judgement (1948), Husserl described the ego’s perception of a given object as consisting of a series of past apperceptions, retentions, which provoked a series of protentional ‘anticipations’, an ‘aiming’ or ‘tending-towards’, an ‘interest’ in accumulating knowledge about those aspects of the object as yet unknown, ‘a progressive plus ultra’. This ‘interest’, Husserl argued, had ‘nothing to do with a specific act of will’, but rather was inherent in the ego’s being-in-the-world, inherent in ‘every act of the turning-toward of the ego, whether transitory or continuous, every act of the ego’s being with (inter-esse)’ (1948, 80-6).

In La Structure du comportement (1949), Merleau-Ponty offered an alternative account of perception as practical ‘tending-toward’ or ‘anticipation’. Arguing that certain objects of perception were ‘vécus comme des réalités’ rather than ‘connus comme des objets vrais’, he gave the example of a footballer’s practical knowledge of the football field:

Le terrain de football n’est pas, pour le joueur en action, un ‘objet’, c’est-à-dire le terme idéal qui peut donner lieu à une multiplicité de vues perspectives et rester équivalent sous ses transformations apparentes. Il est parcouru par des lignes de force (les ‘lignes de touche’, celles qui limitent la ‘surface de réparation’), - articulé en secteurs (par exemple les ‘trous’ entre les adversaires) qui appellent un certain mode d’action, la déclenchent et la portent comme à l’insu du joueur. Le terrain ne lui est pas donné, mais présent comme le terme immanent de ses intentions pratiques: le joueur fait corps avec lui et sent par exemple la direction du ‘but’ aussi immédiatement que la verticale et l’horizontale de son propre corps. Il ne suffirait pas de dire que la conscience habite ce milieu. Elle n’est rien d’autre à ce moment que la dialectique du milieu et de l’action. Chaque manoeuvre entreprise par le joueur modifie l’aspect du terrain et y tend de nouvelles lignes de force où l’action à son tour s’écoule et se réalise en altérant à nouveau le champ phénoménal. (1949, 182-83)
It was this implicit sense of where the limits and boundaries of certain practices lay, of which ‘moves’ were most likely to pay off, that Bourdieu saw as the key to the ‘strategies’ of the Kabyles. ‘strategies’ generated at the intersection between their habitus and the social field they inhabited.

Applying Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s insights to the domain of social interaction, Bourdieu attributed to the Kabyles an inherent ‘tending towards’ and ‘interest’ in conserving or accumulating ‘symbolic capital’, whether through gift exchange or judicious matrimonial strategies. This ‘interest’ reflected less a conscious striving for personal gain than a ‘doxic’ or pre-reflexive adherence to ‘l’illusio au sens d’investissement dans le jeu et les enjeux, d’intérêt pour le jeu, d’adhésion aux présupposés - doxa - du jeu’ (1980, 111). Native participants in any social field deployed ‘le sens pratique’, an internalised sense of which moves would prove most profitable: ‘visée quasi corporelle du monde [...] ajustement anticipé aux exigences d’un champ, ce que le langage sportif appelle le “sens du jeu” (comme “sens du placement”, art “d’anticiper”, etc.)’ (1980, 111).

Although not motivated by a conscious striving for power or prestige, Bourdieu argued, Kabyle practice was nonetheless objectively oriented to that end and as such was endowed with a kind of intentionality without conscious intention, a purposiveness without explicitly articulated purpose: ‘C’est parce que l’appartenance native à un champ implique le sens du jeu comme art d’anticiper pratiquement l’à-venir inclus dans le présent que tout ce qui s’y passe paraît sensé, c’est-à-dire objectivement doté de sens et objectivement orienté dans une direction judicieuse’ (111-12). It was this intentionality without conscious intention, this ‘interest’ in the accumulation of symbolic capital which, Bourdieu argued, formed the objective logic behind the Kabyles’ various ‘strategies’. 9 The question that needs to be asked with relation to this concept of ‘strategy’ is whether the teleological nature of Husserl’s theory of perception, intentionality, and ‘interest’ did not, when transferred to the sociological domain, necessarily lead to a deterministic account of social practice.
From a Rule to a Strategy

Bourdieu's most detailed account of the concept of 'strategy' can be found in his analyses of gift exchange and kinship. Once again, these analyses represented an attempt to overcome dialectically the opposition between phenomenology and structuralism. In the case of gift exchange, his analysis was explicitly positioned as an attempt to work through and transcend the limitations inherent in the phenomenological and structuralist accounts of this phenomenon offered by Marcel Mauss and Lévi-Strauss, respectively, offering "une illustration paradigmatique de la théorie des rapports entre les trois modes de connaissance théorique (soit le mode de connaissance phénoménologique, avec l'analyse de Mauss, le mode de connaissance objectiviste, avec l'analyse de Lévi-Strauss, et l'analyse praxéologique)" (1972, 245n.8).

In his 'Introduction à l'oeuvre de Marcel Mauss' (1950), Lévi-Strauss had argued that Mauss's phenomenological analysis in L'Essai sur le don (1923-24) had fallen short of grasping the objective logic of the gift, namely the structural law of exchange, the necessity to give and receive which determined all gift exchange (in Mauss 1950. IX-LII). This analysis, Bourdieu argued, betrayed the failings typical of structuralism. By understanding gift exchange as an inevitable process in which the first gift was always reciprocated, Lévi-Strauss ignored the fact that the exchange took place over time and that this temporal aspect was intrinsic to the structure of the exchange. To give a gift in return immediately would cause insult since it would reveal the selfish intention behind the initial act of giving. Moreover, it would mean that the function of gift exchange, the exercise of power by the donor over the recipient through the latter's sense of obligation, could not be achieved: "le fonctionnement de l'échange de dons suppose la méconnaissance de la vérité du "mécanismes objectif" de l'échange. celle-là même que la restitution immédiate dévoile brutalement" (Bourdieu 1972, 223).

Furthermore, as Bourdieu put it, 'abolir l'intervalle, c'est abolir la stratégie' (ibid). The strategies employed by the Kabyles in gift exchange consisted precisely in playing off their implicit sense of how long the return of a gift could be deferred, whether it could simply be refused, what the implications in terms of loss or accumulation of symbolic capital would be of giving to which individuals, when, and how often. Gift exchanges thus had a characteristic rhythm and tempo, and to maximise the symbolic profits on offer required all the skill of a virtuoso: 'seul le virtuose
parfaitement maître de son “art de vivre” peut jouer de toutes les ressources qui lui offrent les ambiguités et les indéterminations des conduites et des situations pour produire les actions qui conviennent en chaque cas’ (226). It was this virtuosity which defined what Bourdieu termed ‘l’excellence’, a ‘practical mastery’ of social norm and convention which was neither the result of free choice nor of mute submission to structural rule or law, but was ‘“l’art” de l’improvisation nécessaire qui définit l’excellence’ (ibid).

The participants in gift exchange were, thus, neither freely choosing when and to whom to give, nor were they the unconscious puppets of immutable structural law, rather they were involved in a dialectical process in which social and historical circumstance met the generative schemes of the habitus to produce a relatively unpredictable outcome. For the system to function, its participants had to possess a certain partial or practical knowledge of what was at stake and which ‘moves’ would prove profitable or detrimental. Yet, Bourdieu argued, they also had to remain ignorant of the objective logic of gift exchange, of the arbitrary nature of the social hierarchies it produced and reproduced. This combination of partial knowledge with a pre-reflexive investment in the stakes of the game, this structure of ‘méconnaissance/reconnaissance’ was at the heart of gift exchange: ‘pour que le système fonctionne, il faut que les agents n’ignorent pas complètement les schèmes qui organisent leurs échanges et dont le modèle mécanique de l’anthropologue explicite la logique et en même temps qu’ils se refusent à connaître et à reconnaître cette logique’ (223).

Bourdieu’s use of a series of musical metaphors, virtuosity, rhythm, tempo, improvisation, was clearly intended both to echo and subtly to inflect the complex orchestral motifs employed by Lévi-Strauss in the Mythologiques (1964-71) series. In Le Cru et le cuit (1964), for example, Lévi-Strauss had compared South American tribal myth and ritual to a classical orchestral score, arguing that ‘le mythe et l’œuvre apparaissent ainsi comme des chefs d’orchestre dont les auditeurs sont les silencieux exécutants’ (1964, 25). In emphasising the improvisational nature of social practice, Bourdieu challenged the formal closure of this account, countering that the practices of the Kabyles were ‘collectivement orchestrées sans être le produit de l’action organisatrice d’un chef d’orchestre’ (1980, 89). Similarly, in his analysis of matrimonial exchange, Bourdieu emphasised that only those matches with major political implications, such as those which joined partners from different tribes or clans, demanded that official conventions be followed to the letter. Only in these
exceptional cases would it be appropriate to explain social practice by analogy with a written musical score: ‘parce que l’enjeu est grave, les risques de rupture si nombreux et si grands, que l’on ne peut se fier à l’improvisation réglée des habitus orchestrés et qu’il faut faire de chaque action l’exécution d’une partition’ (1972, 115).

In understanding social action as the execution of a musical score, Lévi-Strauss had overlooked the possibility that what native informants posited as the official rules regulating marriage might in fact constitute less a rule than, by turns, an ideal hardly ever realised, a duty of honour which could be broken in certain circumstances, or simply one possible ‘move’ amongst others. Thus, Bourdieu argued that parallel-cousin marriage, identified by Lévi-Strauss as the structural rule or norm behind kinship exchange, was empirically speaking relatively rare. The real dynamic behind such exchanges was not structural rule but strategy, the Kabyles’ own practical knowledge and implicit sense of which matches were objectively possible, given historical circumstance and the status of their own family, and which would best serve to preserve or accumulate that family’s symbolic capital. That native informants themselves frequently referred to parallel-cousin marriage as the rule regulating matrimonial exchange represented an instance of ‘les stratégies de seconde ordre visant à dissimuler les stratégies et les intérêts qu’elles poursuivent sous les apparences de l’obéissance à la règle’ (95).

The concept of strategy was, therefore, clearly intended to provide an account of social practice as the dynamic or dialectical interaction between habitus and social structure, internalised disposition and an objectively and historically determined set of possible alternatives. In this sense, it seemed to echo Marx’s famous remark in The Eighteenth Brumaire that: ‘Men make their own history […] but under circumstances […] given and transmitted from the past’ (1852, 103). However, Bourdieu seemed ambiguous about the extent to which the strategies of the Kabyles were the result of a conscious choice amongst a historically determined range of alternatives, or simply the product of a practical or implicit sense of what was to be done. Equally, it was unclear whether the ability to undertake strategies with relatively unpredictable outcomes in gift and matrimonial exchange really amounted to a capacity on the Kabyles’ part to make their own history or effect significant social change. For Bourdieu’s replacement of Lévi-Strauss’s vocabulary of structural rule and law with the notions of improvisation and strategy concealed the fact that these strategies
were determined by an immanent, hypostatised law which Bourdieu had inherited from Husserl’s concept of ‘interest’, namely that tendential law which apparently demanded that all strategies aim at the preservation or accumulation of symbolic capital. Moreover, he maintained that the result of this tendential law was to orient Kabyle society towards the reproduction of its existing social structure:

According to this account, strategies were anything but transformative of social structure: social change could, apparently, only come from changes in material circumstance and not from the willed praxis of the Kabyles themselves. The habitus represented an internalised set of expectations, an implicit sense of what could or could not be achieved which reflected objective probability, attested to by past experience and internalised into a structure of durable and transposable dispositions. As long as objective conditions remained unchanged, Bourdieu argued, an almost perfect fit between objective probability and subjective expectation would ensure that every action had the appearance of a self-evident necessity. Questioning the logic of such actions would thus be precluded and the cycle of simple reproduction preserved:

les pratiques engendrées par l’habitus et qui sont commandées par les conditions passées de la production de leur principe générant sont d’avance adaptées aux conditions objectives toutes les fois que les conditions dans lesquelles l’habitus fonctionne sont demeurées identiques - ou semblables - aux conditions dans lesquelles il s’est constitué... (1980, 104)
By definition, then, this cycle of simple reproduction could only be broken by changes to the objective conditions which structured the habitus, and not vice versa.

Both the teleology implicit in the concept of strategy and the notion of historical change as resulting from the breakdown in a previously smooth-running system were, of course, to mark Bourdieu’s account of May 68 in *Homo academicus*. His analysis of ‘le véritable principe’ behind the Barthes-Picard Affair rested on the a priori assumption that the strategies of participants in the university field reflected their internalised, practical ‘interest’ in conserving and accumulating their symbolic capital, an ‘interest’ which itself contributed to the reproduction of that field. Similarly, he saw the events of May 1968 less as the result of a particular conjunction of historical circumstance, ideological and political climate, and willed praxis, than of a change in objective conditions which led to a breakdown in the ‘pre-established harmony’ between subjective expectations and objective probabilities in a range of homologous fields.

Thus, whilst the concepts of habitus, practice and strategy were able to account for improvisation and relative unpredictability in a way structural anthropology could not, ultimately the ramifications of that improvisation and unpredictability remained strictly limited. As Michel de Certeau pointed out, Bourdieu's texts on Kabylia were characterised by a peculiar tension:

Examinant scrupuleusement les pratiques et leur logique [...] ils les ramènent finalement à une réalité mystique, l'habitus, destinée à les ranger sous la loi de la reproduction. Les descriptions subtiles des tactiques [...] kabyles débouchent soudain sur des vérités assénées, comme s'il fallait à une complexité si lucidement poursuivie le contrepoint brutal d'une raison dogmatique. (de Certeau 1980, 94)

As de Certeau (1980, 95-6) noted, this tension was rooted in Bourdieu’s epistemology, in his insistence that ultimately only the detached observer could grasp the objective, scientific logic of Kabyle practice. Only by attributing the Kabyles’ strategies to an imperative for social reproduction of which they remained unconscious could Bourdieu maintain the opposition between his theory of their practices and those practices themselves on which his claim to scientificity ultimately depended.
Thus, even as Bourdieu sought to emphasise the improvisational and relatively unpredictable logic of Kabyle practice, so his account seemed to resurrect the very determinism he wished to counter. This tension between an eagerness to grasp the dynamic, open-ended character of Kabyle practice and a tendency to reduce the effects of such practice to the reproduction of the status quo was to mark the final chapter of *Le Sens pratique*, entitled ‘Le Démon de l’analogie’.

**‘Le Démon de l’analogie’**

In ‘Le Démon de l’analogie’, Bourdieu drew on his concepts of practice, habitus, practical mastery, and virtuosity to offer an analysis of all of the temporal, spatial, symbolic, and social divisions structuring the Kabyle social universe. The title of the chapter referred to a prose poem of the same name by Stéphane Mallarmé. This allusion to Mallarmé worked on a number of levels. Firstly, Mallarmé himself was known for his facility for analogy and the Kabyles were portrayed as equally adept, virtuosos constantly playing off the analogies, homologies, and oppositions that structured the mythico-ritual space of Kabyle society. Secondly, the poem itself was rich in musical imagery. Mallarmé frequently contrasted the almost physical qualities of music, its rhythm, impetus, and impact to the rigidities of language or traditional poetic forms such as the Alexandrine (Kravis 1976, 202-05). Clearly, this conception of music corresponded closely to Bourdieu’s emphasis on the pre-predicative, pre-discursive structures of practice and habitus. Finally, one of the central themes of Mallarmé’s poem was, as Robert Cohn (1987, 13) argues, the experience of male meeting female, of the inversion of masculine and feminine principles: ‘the mystery of male-female [...], the way in which one inverts into another’. It was precisely this meeting and inversion of masculine and feminine principles that had marked Bourdieu’s analysis of the threshold in ‘La Maison kabyle’ and which would prove the primary dynamic at work in the final chapter of *Le Sens pratique*.

The title ‘Le Démon de l’analogie’ thus suggested Bourdieu was pursuing his notion of the fundamentally aesthetic and mythopoetic qualities of practice, where ‘aesthetic’ and ‘poetic’ are understood both in their technical sense and in the broader etymological sense as referring to the somatic, perceptual, bodily, and creative. As in ‘La Maison kabyle’, Bourdieu argued that the fundamental division structuring Kabyle society was the division of the sexes, of their social status.
and their labour. This constituted what he termed ‘la partition fondamentale’. and its effects could be read in the spatial, temporal, and symbolic oppositions structuring the Kabyle world.

The ‘partition fondamentale’ divided the social and symbolic world into opposing principles. It constituted what Bourdieu termed ‘la diacrisis originaire’, the positing of an arbitrary law or ‘nomos’ from which all further socio-cultural divisions derived: ‘principe de la séparation fondamentale, nomos originaire que l’on est tenté de penser comme situé à l’origine, dans une sorte d’acte initial de constitution, d’instauration, d’institution’ (1980, 357). Thus the primary opposition between male and female was overdetermined by a series of analogous oppositions, spatial oppositions between outside and inside, east and west, temporal oppositions between the dry hot summer and the wet dark winter, and oppositions which structured the division of labour between work in the fields and domestic chores.

The term ‘partition’ also referred to a musical score which, unlike Lévi-Strauss’s orchestral scores, was a ‘partition non-écrite’ (335). This ‘partition’ was the dynamic force behind the orchestration and improvisation of Kabyle practice. For the opposing principles separated by the ‘partition fondamentale’ needed, at certain moments, to be reunited. At times of marriage, for example, male had to unite with female; sowing demanded the union of dry ‘masculine’ seed with the damp, nurturing ‘feminine’ earth; ploughing demanded the ‘feminine’ earth be ‘violated’ by the ‘masculine’ ploughshare, and so on. Such moments were both sacrilegious, requiring the transgression of the literal or figurative threshold between the opposing principles separated by the dominant taxonomy, and entirely necessary to the survival of Kabyle society. Rite and ritual, Bourdieu argued, were ‘des transgressions déniées’, whose role was to resolve the contradiction inherent in this union of opposing principles (351).

Kabyle society was thus portrayed as being driven by an internal dynamic, by the constant union and separation of polar opposites, an uneasy dialectic in which the reunion of opposing elements was effected without that initial opposition ever being cancelled out or superseded. Bourdieu compared this dialectic to the account offered by the pre-Socratic philosopher Empedocles of a universe marked by the primary opposition, diacrisis, and constant reunion, synkrisis, of the opposing principles of neikos and philia, strife and love or harmony.10 He offered detailed readings
of the proverbs, rites, and myths in which this constant reunion and separation of opposites was given narrative form.

In its detail and scope, its description of the dense network of opposing and complementary principles which structured the Kabyle cosmos and which the Kabyles themselves enacted in their daily practice. 'Le Démon de l'analogie' represented a work of considerable interpretative skill whose very symmetry held a certain fascination. Yet, like Bourdieu's analysis of the Kabyles' strategies, the apparent dynamism and fluidity of the Kabyle mythico-ritual universe was rapidly domesticated and its primary function designated as the reproduction of existing social relations. Indeed, Bourdieu argued that it was the very fluidity of the logic at the heart of the Kabyle universe that ensured its reproduction. Social change, he argued, could come not from contradictions, questions, or challenges thrown up from within the system itself, but only from the intrusion of external historical determinants:

Indeed, Bourdieu argued that it was the very fluidity of the logic at the heart of the Kabyle universe that ensured its reproduction. Social change, he argued, could come not from contradictions, questions, or challenges thrown up from within the system itself, but only from the intrusion of external historical determinants:

The role Bourdieu attributed to writing, here, was significant. For he seemed to be opposing writing, as a medium of re-presentation, to the immediate self-presence of practice. In practice, social rules and conventions were realised through bodily actions, present only in the immediacy of their realisation. Thus practice excluded the possibility of a reflexive return onto its objective foundations:

happée par ce dont il s'agit, totalement présente au présent et aux fonctions pratiques qu'elle y découvre sous la forme de potentialités objectives, la pratique exclut le retour sur soi (c'est-à-dire sur le passé), ignorant les principes qui la commandent et les possibilités qu'elle
enferme et qu'elle ne peut découvrir qu'en les agissant, c'est-à-dire en les déployant dans le temps. (154)

Writing, it appeared, could arrest this unmediated temporal flow of practice, inscribing social rules and conventions into a synchronic medium which allowed for reflection upon their potentially arbitrary nature and comparison with alternative social systems. Writing, Bourdieu argued, transformed the whole relationship to the body and to time, permitting reflexivity and freedom of action on a scale previously impossible:

Ce qui est appris par corps n'est pas quelque chose que l'on a, comme un savoir que l'on peut tenir devant soi, mais quelque chose que l'on est. Cela se voit particulièrement dans les sociétés sans écriture où le savoir hérité ne peut survivre qu'à l'état incorporé. Jamais détaché du corps qui le porte, il ne peut être restitué qu'au prix d'une sorte de gymnastique destinée à l'évoquer [...], le corps se trouve ainsi continûment mêlé à toutes les connaissances qu'il reproduit et qui n'ont jamais l'objectivité que donne l'objectivation dans l'écrit et la liberté par rapport au corps qu'elle assure. (123)

It was the concept of 'sociétés sans écriture' which had been at the core of Derrida's deconstructive reading of the work of Lévi-Strauss in De la grammaïologie (1967). Derrida argued that the notion of a 'society without writing' had no secure empirical or theoretical grounding. He did not question the existence of pre-literate societies, nor did he deny that the spread of literacy or the invention of technologies of printing could have a significant effect on socio-economic and political development. Rather, employing the term 'writing' in an extended sense to refer to any medium of re-presentation in which the apparently immediate self-presence of the spoken word was deferred or mediated, Derrida argued that to posit the existence of societies 'without writing' was to construct an ethnocentric opposition between 'primitive' societies, the site of some primal, unmediated unity, and 'modern' Western societies, the source of all reason, progress, and history. To imagine a state before the advent of any structure of mediation or deferral, the unmediated self-presence of the spoken word or, in Bourdieu's case, the temporal immediacy of embodied practice.
was, Derrida argued, to indulge in a typically ethnocentric nostalgia: ‘A l'expression de “société sans écriture” ne répondrait donc aucune réalité ni aucun concept. Cette expression relève de l'individualisme ethnocentrique, abusant du concept vulgaire, c'est-à-dire ethnocentrique, de l'écriture’ (1967a, 161).

In opposing the mediated structures of writing to the immediacy of Kabyle practice and linking the advent of writing, from somewhere outwith Kabylia, to historical progress, social change, and free agency, Bourdieu's analysis seemed to rest on precisely those ethnocentric oppositions which Derrida had sought to deconstruct in his readings of Lévi-Strauss. Moreover, these descriptions of practice as inherently unmediated or immediate seemed to contradict Bourdieu's detailed analyses of the complex structures of Kabyle myth and ritual. For myth and ritual were clearly highly mediated structures of representation which appealed to cognitive rather than purely 'practical' or bodily dispositions. Bourdieu, however, distinguished between two senses of the word 'représentation', contrasting the more philosophical sense of 'représentation', implying a reflexive grasp on the social world, with 'représentation' in the sense of a theatrical performance. Myth and ritual, he argued, constituted representations in the second sense of the term; they were 'practical representations', a tacit bodily relation to the world rather than an articulated structure of belief or cognition:

Ces manifestations rituelles sont aussi des représentations - au sens du théâtre - des spectacles mettant en jeu et en scène tout le groupe, ainsi constitué en spectateur d'une représentation visible de ce qui n'est pas une représentation du monde social, une 'vision du monde', comme on aime à dire, mais une relation pratique et tacite aux choses du monde.

(184, my emphasis)

Ironically, in a conversation with the Kabyle poet and ethnographer Mouloud Mammeri published two years before Le Sens pratique, Bourdieu had warned against the ethnocentrism implicit in the assumption that an oral culture could not contain a reflection on the nature of the social world as conscious and profound as any written tradition:
On ne peut pas concevoir que des poésies orales et populaires puissent être le produit d'une recherche savante, tant dans leur forme que dans leur contenu. On ne peut pas admettre qu'elles puissent être faites pour être dites devant un public et un public d'hommes ordinaires et enfermer un sens esotérique, donc destinées à être méditées et commentées. Inutile de dire que l'on exclut la possibilité que l'œuvre soit le produit d'une recherche consciente, utilisant, au second degré, les procédés, codifiés et objectivés, qui sont les plus caractéristiques de l'improvisation orale comme l'itération. (1978a, 51)

If this passage, with its insistence on the objectified and reflexive structures of the Kabyle oral tradition seemed directly to contradict the oppositions between practice and writing which underpinned Bourdieu's analysis in Le Sens pratique, there were also good empirical historical reasons for questioning the adequacy of the description of Kabylia as a 'society without writing'. Salem Chaker (1984, 29-34) has argued that Berber had at one time been a written language but that in the face of successive invasions, Carthaginian, Roman, and most importantly Islamic, it had been increasingly marginalised until it disappeared from all official and religious documentation in the Middle Ages, becoming a purely oral language. Moreover, the fact that Kabylia had, since the seventh century, been an Islamic society meant that it possessed one clearly identifiable, highly codified, written, objectified set of moral and social precepts. Indeed, in the course of their conversation, Bourdieu and Mammeri emphasised the agonistic nature of the relationship between the oral tradition of the Kabyle bards and the written tradition of the Islamic marabouts, who, prior to the arrival of the French, were the representatives of State power, personnified by the Turkish Dey (1978a, 62-3). The arrival of the French in the nineteenth century had presumably rendered this 'rapport de forces' more complex still.

However, although Bourdieu's book-length studies of Kabylia contained passing references to the presence of mosques and Koranic schools, whilst Esquisse... told of Kabyle parents going to register their new-born children 'à l'état civil' (1972, 38), he never explained what the relationship was between these three competing and contradictory traditions, the Kabyle, the Islamic, and the French colonial. Nor did he explain how the existence of these codified and institutionalised forms of political and religious power could be squared with his claim that Kabylia was a 'society without
writing', a society in which social imperatives were inculcated exclusively in practical form, a society characterised by 'the absence of political institutions endowed with an effective monopoly of legitimate violence' (1977a, 40).

It is precisely this puzzling absence of any discussion of the relationship of the customs and values of Kabyle society at the local level with 'encompassing bureaucratic and religious institutions' that leads Herzfeld (1987, 8) to qualify Bourdieu's analyses in Outline... as 'Eurocentric'. Such 'eurocentrism', Herzfeld argues, is rooted in the 'false distinction between societies with codified laws and societies with a customary morality' (83). Reed-Danahay (1995), meanwhile, points to the absence of any discussion of Koranic or French colonial schools in Kabylia as evidence of Bourdieu's construction of an 'essentialised' Kabylie, 'a model of [...] traditional society as a counterpart to Western society'.

Thus, according to Herzfeld and Reed-Danahay, Bourdieu would appear to have reproduced the very ethnocentric tropes and oppositions which he had set out to avoid. For all Bourdieu's emphasis on the need for ethnologists to grasp the historical conditions in which they conducted they work, Esquisse..., Outline..., and Le Sens pratique seemed to be marked chiefly by the absence of attention to Kabyle history itself, to the frictions, contradictions, negotiations, and struggles between 'indigenous' Kabyle tradition, on the one hand, and the Islamic and French colonial, on the other. This, therefore, throws some doubt on the claims of critics like Calhoun and Thomas that Bourdieu's 'theory of practice' offers a more historically grounded, scientific, but nonetheless reflexively aware alternative to post-structuralist or post-colonial theory. However, perhaps what needs to be questioned above all in these critical assessments is their rhetoric of success and failure, their assumption that the problems with which Bourdieu engaged, those of ethnocentrism, of the subject-object dichotomy, of the relationship between practical and theoretical modes of thought, were themselves amenable to a straightforward dialectical resolution in which the privileges of scientifi city could not only be retained but also enhanced.

To question whether Bourdieu has overcome the oppositions between subjectivism and objectivism, practice and theory, in quite the way he claims, is, thus, not to argue that his attempts to do so were of no value. For, in the course of his Kabyle work, Bourdieu had identified some of the pitfalls attendant upon an 'intellectualist' viewpoint on the world and emphasised the need to
pay attention to the 'practical' aspects of social interactions in ways which can and have proved
important starting points for further research and reflection. Moreover, Bourdieu’s emphasis on the
static, self-enclosed nature of Kabyle society, to the detriment of any sustained discussion of its
relationship with broader historical currents, cannot simply be attributed to historical ignorance or
straightforward ethnocentrism on his part. In his dialogue with Mammeri and elsewhere (see
Bourdieu 1980c), Bourdieu had acknowledged the dynamic nature of Kabyle society and culture, its
agonistic relationship with both Islam and colonialism, in a way that was strikingly absent from all
three of Esquisse..., Outline..., and Le Sens pratique.

Both Lacoste-Dujardin (1976) and Herzfeld (1987, 8) have contrasted the apparent stasis of
Bourdieu’s later works of Kabyle ethnology with what the latter terms his ‘deep interest in the
complexities of the relations between local community and nation state in Algeria’ in earlier works
such as Sociologie de l’Algérie and Le Déracinement. This contrast should not be exaggerated, for
in Sociologie de l’Algérie Bourdieu had provided accounts of Algeria’s different ethnic groups,
amongst them the Kabyles, which had also presented these ‘traditional’ or ‘pre-capitalist’ societies
as fundamentally unchanging, self-enclosed, self-reproducing entities. Yet in this earlier work
these accounts were, however problematically, explicitly identified as ‘des types-ideaux, issus de la
seule reconstruction historique’, the necessary preliminary to an objective measurement of the
effects of colonialism and war on the ‘fundamental’ structures of Algerian society. If this suggested
that Bourdieu’s analyses of Kabylia in his later ethnological works might have reflected an equally
conscious process of ideal-typical ‘reconstruction’. it left unanswered the question of the purpose
served by such ideal-types now Bourdieu was no longer attempting to explain the nature and course
of the Algerian War. As the next chapter will demonstrate, answering this question will involve
examining the role played by Kabylia within Bourdieu’s wider oeuvre and the relationship between
the ethnological and sociological aspects of his work. It will be argued that Bourdieu’s depiction of
Kabylia as the archetypal ‘traditional’ or ‘pre-capitalist’ society was determined by the particular
role that he wanted Kabyle society to play in shedding light on the social and cultural phenomena
he had observed in contemporary France.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

1. Derek Robbins (1991) has analysed the differences between these three texts at some length, often reading much into apparently minor changes of vocabulary and syntax. However, this chapter starts from the premise that whilst there may be some changes worthy of note between the three texts, they remain fundamentally within the same problematic and it is this problematic that merits closer critical scrutiny.

2. More recently, this is an account of his work that Bourdieu himself has been eager to promote (see 1997, 128-29).

3. For a more detailed discussion of the 'scholastic point of view', see Bourdieu's 'Le Point de vue scholastique' (in 1994a, 221-36) and 'Les Trois formes de l'erreur scholastique' (in 1997, 61-109).

4. In Esquisse... Bourdieu had quoted these very sections from Heidegger to illustrate his notion of the 'practical' or 'doxic' relation between the Kabyles and their social world (1972, 202; 213). These references to Heidegger were removed from both Outline... and Le Sens pratique. Indeed, between the publication of Esquisse... in 1972 and Outline... in 1977, Bourdieu had published the article 'L'Ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger' (1975). A critical analysis of the relationship between Heidegger's fascism and his philosophical discourse, the article was published in book form in German in 1976, appearing as the French L'Ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger in 1988, as a contribution to the controversy sparked by Victor Farias's Heidegger et le nazisme (1987).

However, Bourdieu's reservations about Heidegger's politics did not prompt a complete break with his philosophical legacy. In an interview published in Raisons pratiques (1994), Bourdieu acknowledged an affinity between 'habitus' and Heidegger's concept of 'Dasein' (1994a, 172).

5. Bachelard saw modern science as demanding a complete break with common sense: 'la rupture entre connaissance commune et technique scientifique' (1949, 104). Post-Einsteinian science, according to Bachelard, required the adoption of a radically different mode of thought which broke irrevocably with common sense, 'un nouvel esprit scientifique' whose complexity was such it could only be shared by a small scientific community: 'un nouvel esprit scientifique se localise dans une cité intellectuelle très étroite, très fermée. La pensée scientifique actuelle se sépare, dans l'esprit même du savant, de la pensée commune' (104).
6. It is important to note that the kind of truth Bachelard attributed to poetry in these phenomenological studies was not the same as the scientific truth he sought in his works of epistemology. Poetry and modern science were analogous in their ability to stage a 'break' with the everyday and the conventional wisdom, he argued. Yet, they were sources of inherently different kinds of truth. Where poetry explored 'l'axe de la subjectivité', science explored 'l'axe de l'objectivation' (Bachelard 1938, 12). Poetry and science thus offered complementary but not equivalent modes of truth: 'Les axes de la poésie et de la science sont d'abord inverses. Tout ce que peut espérer la philosophie, c'est de rendre la poésie et la science complémentaires, de les unir comme deux contraires bien faits' (10). Bourdieu nowhere acknowledged this distinction and the epistemological value of poetry remained, in his work, unexplained.

7. In emphasising the importance of this kind of education in the formation of children’s habitus and hexis, Bourdieu was echoing Mauss’s focus in his essay ‘Les Techniques du corps’ on what he termed ‘tous les modes de dressage’, the ‘foules de détails inobservés et dont il faut faire l’observation’ which made up ‘l’éducation physique de tous les âges et de tous les sexes’ (in Mauss 1950, 375).

8. For Husserl’s emphasis on the ‘pre-predicative’ basis of experience see particularly the opening sections of Experience and Judgement (1948, 11-101).

9. As Jonathan Loesberg (1993, 1039) has pointed out, inasmuch as it functions purposively without purpose, the habitus has precisely the structure of the Kantian aesthetic object: ‘the habitus in fact constructs the field in which practice occurs and is read as that most familiar of literary objects, the organic whole that operates purposively without purpose’. Loesberg notes that in Le Sens pratique Bourdieu (1980, 28) describes the habitus as possessing ‘le “charme éternel de l’art grec” dont parlait Marx’ (see Marx 1857, 217). Again this ‘aesthetic patterning’ of the habitus has a precedent in the phenomenological tradition. For Husserl (1948, 65-6), phenomenology necessarily involved an ‘aesthetic’ turn, a turn to the perceptual, somatic, doxic bases of lived experience, to ‘aisthesis’. Merleau-Ponty (1945, 175-76) compared the structure of incorporated forms of behaviour and perception to that of a poem, a novel, a piece of music, or a painting by Cézanne.

10. Bollack (1965) provides a useful introduction to Empedocles’s thought.
CHAPTER FIVE

‘UNE VARIATION IMAGINAIRE’: THE ROLE OF KABYLIA

In the spring of 1980, the year in which Bourdieu’s final book-length study of Kabyle ethnology, *Le Sens pratique*, was published, Kabylia was shaken by a series of strikes, mass demonstrations, and violent anti-government protests. Generally referred to as ‘le printemps berbère’, the events of April 1980 were sparked by the decision of the ruling Islamic and Marxist FLN to ban a lecture given by Mouloud Mammeri at the University of Tizi-Ouzou to promote a bilingual French-Kabyle collection of poetry, *Poèmes kabyles anciens* (1979). A violent reaction against merely the latest in a series of attempts by the FLN to extinguish any expression of a specifically Kabyle identity, the ‘printemps berbère’ represented, as numerous commentators have remarked, the first significant challenge to the FLN’s political and cultural hegemony, a challenge whose effects are still being played out today (Ouerdane 1990, 183–98; Djender 1992; Stora 1992, 236–37; Colonna 1996, 3–4; Metref 1996).

‘Le printemps berbère’ might be seen as a prime example of those ‘local-national interactions’ whose ‘neglect’ Reed-Danahay and Herzfeld have both noted in Bourdieu’s works of Kabyle ethnology: it resulted from the tensions between national institutions, in the form of the university and a ruling party trying to impose a uniform Islamic culture on all of Algeria’s ethnic groups, the legacy of colonialism, in the form of a book of poems published in French by a Parisian publishing house, and ‘traditional’ Kabyle culture, in the poems themselves. Indeed, it was precisely this interpretation of events which Bourdieu offered in an article on the subject published in *Libération* in April 1980. He argued that the ‘printemps berbère’ could only be understood by taking into account the peculiarities of Kabylia’s history under colonialism, the fostering of ‘le mythe kabyle’ by the French, which made the Islamic FLN suspicious of any claims to the specificity of Kabyle culture and language, and the history of labour migration between Kabylia and France, which explained the Kabyles’ high level of politicisation, as witnessed in the predominant role they had played in the formation of the Algerian independence movement. Expanding on the conversation he had published with Mammeri in 1978, Bourdieu insisted that the events in Kabylia needed to be
placed within the context of a longer history of tensions between ‘indigenous’ Kabyle culture and Islam:

Mouloud Mammeri a montré avec beaucoup de précision que les transactions incessantes entre le fonds berbère et la norme islamique étaient le produit d’un jeu politique quasi-conscient dont les protagonistes étaient le lettré coranique (le marabout), le sage berbère (l’amousnaw) et le paysan kabyle. Si la tradition berbère s’est conservée, c’est au prix d’une espèce d’effort millénaire pour conserver en transigeant, en dialoguant avec les instances politiquement [...] ou symboliquement dominantes. Cette transaction défensive s’est continuée dans les rapports avec la culture des colonisateurs. (Bourdieu 1980c)

It would, of course, be unreasonable to expect Bourdieu to have anticipated the events of the ‘printemps berbère’ in Le Sens pratique. However, his description of Kabylia in that work and in his other two book-length studies of Kabyle ethnology as ‘une société dépourvue d’écriture’, lacking any ‘instances politiques constituées et dotées du monopole de fait de la violence légitime’ (1980, 186), was surely incapable of accounting for even the possibility of such a political upheaval. Similarly, his portrayal of Kabylia in those works as an entirely self-sufficient, self-reproducing entity, apparently untouched by wider social, economic, or political developments, seemed directly to contradict his emphasis in the Libération article on the historical frictions between Kabyle society and the instances of Islamic, later French colonial, political and symbolic power. Indeed, these ‘transactions incessantes’ between the Kabyle and the Islamic, which had apparently so marked Kabyle culture and society since well before the arrival of the French in the nineteenth century, had received no mention whatsoever in either Esquisse..., Outline..., or Le Sens pratique.

For Reed-Danahay, such a troubling contradiction can be explained in terms of the role Bourdieu wished Kabylia to play within his wider œuvre. Basing her remarks on a comparative study of La Reproduction and Outline..., she argues that Kabylia functioned primarily as a foil to the history of social and cultural domination which Bourdieu had charted in his work on French culture and education. As France’s ‘exotic other’, she maintains, Kabylia represented a realm of
relative freedom, of ‘possibilities for social manipulation by individuals’, which contrasted with the rigid structures of symbolic domination Bourdieu had analysed in his work on French education:

Bourdieu’s work can be read as an attempt to criticise this history of cultural domination of French schooling and its symbolic violence. The French educational system embodies the long-standing efforts of the centralised state to homogenise diversity and impose cultural unity. The Kabyle represent, in Bourdieu’s work, the exotic other, threatened by a similar process, but at some remove. (Reed-Danahay 1995, 78)

According to Reed-Danahay, Kabylia represented a ‘utopian vision’, ‘an ideal model of the traditional with which to rethink our own modern forms of symbolic violence and class culture’ (80). She argues that in constructing this ‘ideal model’, Bourdieu necessarily gave in to ‘a form of orientalism’, which ‘resulted in studies of social and familial practices among the Kabyle to the neglect of national institutions and local-national interactions in that setting’ (75). Similar criticisms of Bourdieu’s residual ethnocentrism and orientalism have been voiced by Herzfeld (1987) and Free (1996, 409), who argues that Bourdieu’s treatment of Kabylia was ‘doubly rooted’ in colonialism through the ‘two absences of the state-political and religious histories of the colonial and pre-colonial history of Kabylia’. 

Whilst acknowledging that the omissions identified by Herzfeld, Reed-Danahay, and Free do indeed amount to a residual ethnocentrism in his work, this chapter will argue that the relationship between Kabylia and the West, as understood by Bourdieu, took a more complex form than the classically orientalist opposition between idealised ‘primitive’ utopia and degraded Western modernity.1 Indeed, in order to understand how it is that Bourdieu ‘remains residually faithful’ to a tradition of Eurocentric ethology, ‘even as he initiates a critique of it’ (Herzfeld 1987, 83), it will be necessary to undertake a rather more nuanced assessment of the place of Kabylia within Bourdieu’s broader intellectual project, of the relationship between the ethnological and sociological aspects of his work, and of his own theorisation of the differences and similarities between Kabylia and the West. Once the theoretical bases of the relationship between sociology and ethnology in Bourdieu’s work have been clarified, it will be possible to assess how this relationship is worked out
in practice by examining his 1990 essay, ‘La Domination masculine’. This essay provides one of the most condensed examples of the cross-fertilisation of ideas and concepts between Bourdieu’s ethnology and sociology, for in it he juxtaposed an analysis of gender relations in Kabylia with a reading of Virginia Woolf’s *To the Lighthouse* (1927) to suggest certain ‘invariant’ structures of male domination which cut across any apparent differences between Kabylia and the West.

Rehabilitation or romanticism?

When reading the three works *Esquisse...*, *Outline...*, and *Le Sens pratique*, it is easy to forget that they represent historical reconstructions of forms of social and cultural existence which have long disappeared. This is because throughout all three works Bourdieu employed the present tense, implicitly invoking the authority of an ethnologist faithfully reporting what he himself had seen and experienced. It was only in the prefaces to *Esquisse...* and *Le Sens pratique* or in a footnote such as the following that he revealed the work of reconstruction which his use of the present tense tended to conceal: ‘On a adopté uniformément le présent de la narration pour décrire des pratiques qui, présentes à un moment donné dans la mémoire des informateurs, ont disparu de la pratique plus ou moins complètement et depuis plus ou moins longtemps’ (1980, 335n.2). If the striking vagueness of this formulation placed a question mark over Bourdieu’s claims to the historicity and scientificity of his account, his use of the present tense was also problematic. As Johannes Fabian (1983) has argued the use of what he terms the ‘ethnographic present’ serves to remove the subjects of ethnographic enquiry from that dynamic historical time inhabited by the ethnographer, placing them in an atemporal sphere instead. Moreover, sentences which begin ‘the Kabyles are...’ or ‘Kabyle society is...’, without specifying the historical epoch to which the description which follows refers, have an almost prescriptive force, suggesting not only that this is how Kabyle society has always been but also that it will always remain so. Bourdieu could thus return to his Kabyle work on numerous occasions from the 1960s to the 1990s, refining and revising his initial hypotheses. Kabyle society itself, however, was portrayed as entirely unchanged and unchanging over that same period.

Paradoxically, in the preface to *Le Sens pratique*, Bourdieu himself highlighted the dangers implicit in such an emphasis on the apparently unchanging structures of Kabyle myth and ritual to the detriment of an analysis of that society’s more contemporary political and social struggles. He
stated that when he had first started his researches in Algeria he had been suspicious of this ethnological focus on rite and ritual, which seemed not only inappropriate, given the circumstances of the War, but also complicit with certain racist or ethnocentric representations of the 'primitive' nature of Algeria's indigenous populations. If, from 1958 onwards, he had pursued 'l'étude des traditions rituelles', it was in order to attempt to 'l'arracher à la fausse sollicitude primitiviste et à forcer, jusque dans ses derniers retranchements, le mépris raciste qui, par la honte de soi qu'il parvient à imposer à ses propres victimes, contribue à leur interdire la connaissance et la reconnaissance de leur propre tradition' (1980, 10).

Bourdieu argued that he had been encouraged in his efforts to rehabilitate Kabyle tradition by 'l'intérêt que les informateurs prenaient toujours à cette recherche lorsqu'elle devenait aussi la leur, c'est-à-dire un effort pour se réapproprier un sens à la fois "propre et autre"' (11). Yet, such 'interest' notwithstanding, 'le sentiment de la "gratuité" de l'enquête purement ethnographique' had continued to haunt Bourdieu, prompting him to publish instead works such as Travail et travailleurs... and Le Déracinement, 'deux ouvrages consacrés à l'analyse de la structure sociale de la société colonisée et de ses transformations' (11). Indeed, although all Bourdieu's fieldwork was conducted over the period 1958-64, with the exception of one article which appeared in an English-language anthology in 1965, he was not to publish his ethnological studies of the region until the decade 1970-80, ten years or more after the end of the Algerian War.

Whilst Bourdieu's efforts to rehabilitate Kabyle tradition were surely entirely laudable and retained an urgency in the post-colonial conjuncture given the hegemony of the Islamicist, pan-Arabist FLN, his own account of this project seemed somewhat problematic, apparently relying on a marked distinction between two separate modes of enquiry into Algerian society. He seemed to accept, as a matter of course, a definition of ethnographic or ethnological enquiry as consisting of tracking down 'traditional', perhaps even archaic social structures and rituals. This definition of ethnography was then contrasted with a more sociological approach, apparently concerned with the dynamics of social and political change. It might be argued that any thinker concerned, as Bourdieu claimed to be, with the complicity between colonialism and certain forms of 'primitivist' ethnology would need, as a necessary preliminary, to dispense with any such rigid distinction by
questioning the assumptions behind ethnology's conventional emphasis on the 'primitive' or the 'traditional', the 'elementary forms' or founding structures of social life in 'exotic', 'other' societies.

Furthermore, it was by no means clear that Bourdieu's wholly laudable desire to rehabilitate Kabyle tradition against racist misrepresentation could be separated, by a mere assertion of good faith, from the long tradition of colonialist ethnologies and representations of Kabylia. For, in accordance with a classically orientalist trope, this tradition functioned not simply by disdaining Kabyle culture and society; rather it romanticised and idealised Kabyle society even as it classified it as irredeemably 'backward' or 'primitive'. Indeed, it might be argued that in its focus on Kabylia in preference to any of Algeria's other ethnic groups, its portrayal of Kabyle society as a self-contained entity, its tendency to play down, even ignore the influence of Islam on Kabyle social and cultural organisation, Bourdieu's Kabyle work betrayed a continuing debt to this tradition and in particular to 'le mythe kabyle'. It was surely only by undertaking a sustained reflection upon the whole tradition of colonialist ethnologies and representations of Kabyle society that Bourdieu could hope to avoid reproducing their characteristic tropes. Indeed, this kind of reflexive return onto the distortions inherent in certain pre-existing intellectual models and problematics would have been wholly in keeping with the Bachelardian tradition of epistemological vigilance to which Bourdieu claimed allegiance.

Bourdieu has undertaken such a reflexive critique, although strangely with reference not to Kabylia but to the French territory of Nouvelle Calédonie. In a conversation with the canaque sociologist and ethnologist Alban Bensa, published in 1985, Bourdieu conducted a detailed critique of the tradition of French ethnology, typified by the work of Maurice Leenhardt, which represented the canaques as archetypal 'noble savages'. Whilst this kind of ethnology could help restore a sense of pride in 'canaque' culture and tradition, Bourdieu argued, it could also be manipulated by the colonial authorities to keep the indigenous population in their place. Moreover, as he pointed out, such romanticised representations of the canaques could not accommodate their presence as active agents on the historical stage. Bourdieu and Bensa's interview was prompted precisely by the canaques' increasingly violent struggle against the French colonial authorities for independence, a struggle whose dynamic, Bourdieu argued, demanded the abandonment not only of the romanticism typical of so much ethnology, but also of any rigid distinction between the disciplines of ethnology
and sociology (Bourdieu 1985a). In an interview given the same year, and published two years later in *Choses dites* (1987), he declared that ‘tous mon travail, depuis plus de vingt ans, vise à abolir la distinction entre ethnologie et sociologie’ (1987, 82).

Bourdieu’s conversation with Bensa, thus, summed up the difficulties of steering a path between an ethnocentric and romanticised portrayal of the ethnographic other and rehabilitating their traditions and myths as a source of pride and cultural identity. It was this difficult path that Bourdieu was apparently attempting to steer in his own Kabyle work. Yet Bourdieu’s own criticisms of the tradition of ‘canaque’ ethnology’s inability to account for the contemporary political activism of the ‘canaques’ seemed equally applicable to his ethnological accounts of Kabylia and their problematic relationship to the events of the ‘printemps berbère’. Moreover, his insistence on the need to abandon any distinction between ethnology and sociology seemed contradicted by his own account of the difference between his early works on Algeria and his later works of Kabyle ethnology, an account which apparently took it for granted that ethnology should be concerned with ‘traditional’ rite and ritual where sociology should focus on social change. To get to the roots of such seeming contradictions, it will be necessary to examine more closely Bourdieu’s claim to have abandoned the distinction between ethnology and sociology and to demonstrate how it was precisely the nature of his efforts to overcome that distinction which paradoxically determined its retention or re-emergence. In short, what is at issue here is neither Bourdieu’s good faith nor his awareness of the potentially ethnocentric implications of ethnological study but rather the deficiencies inherent in the problematic he employed in seeking to work through such ethnocentrism.

**Ethnology as ‘Socio-Analyse’**

In seeking to justify his claim to have abolished the distinction between ethnology and sociology, Bourdieu has pointed to his readiness to apply certain findings, concepts, and ideas elaborated in the Kabyle context to his work on French, society, culture, and education. More specifically, he has emphasised that the ‘practical logic’ he found to be governing the oppositions between high and low, dry and damp, light and dark, masculine and feminine, which structured the Kabyle world, should not be seen as peculiar to Kabylia. Such oppositions, and the practical logic which governed
them, he maintained, were not to be attributed to some irremediably 'other' 'mentalité primitive', to
what he termed 'l'altérité essentielle d'une "mentalité"' (Bourdieu 1980, 40). On the contrary, a
practical logic, in every way analogous to that which governed the symbolic and spatial oppositions
of the Kabyle house, could be found at work behind numerous socio-cultural phenomena in the
West, he argued.

By way of example, he cited his 1975 article, 'Les Catégories de l'entendement professoral', in
which he had found a practical logic at work behind the oppositions structuring teachers' and
lecturers' comments on their students' work. Far from representing objective criteria of judgement,
he argued, the contrasting assessments lecturers offered of their students' work, 'brillant' or 'terne',
'aisé' or 'laborieux', 'distingué' or 'vulgaire', were rooted in class distinctions. Like the gendered
oppositions structuring Kabyla, such distinctions were internalised in the habitus of teachers and
lecturers to form of a set of 'taxinomies pratiques'. Inculcated and reinforced through long exposure
to the institutions of French higher education, their objective function was to reproduce the unequal
distribution of 'cultural capital' and hence naturalise class divisions, just as the function of the
practical taxonomies in Kabyla was to naturalise and reproduce the unequal division of labour and
prestige between the sexes.

In addition to 'Les Catégories de l'entendement professoral', Bourdieu cited as further examples
his own work in La Distinction (1979) on the oppositions between 'modeste' and 'vulgaire', 'brillant'
and 'lourd', 'raffiné' and 'grosnier', which structured 'legitimate' taste, and the respondents to a
French opinion poll in 1975 who intuitively associated Georges Marchais with 'le sapin, le noir ou
le corbeau', and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing with 'le chêne, le blanc ou le muguet' (Bourdieu 1980, 38-
9). In each case, Bourdieu argued, a set of 'practical taxonomies' was at work, a structure of
homology and opposition, which was incorporated into the habitus in such a way as to appear to
constitute entirely 'natural' or 'objective' systems of classification. Apparently 'natural', these
practical taxonomies or systems of classification were, he maintained, rooted in social hierarchies
and distinctions, primarily of gender in the case of Kabyla and of class in the case of the West.

However, in an interview published in Choses dites (1987), Bourdieu noted wryly that where his
analyses of the social and symbolic structures determining gender relations in Kabyla had met with
'l'approbation, voire l'admiration', his analysis, 'des "catégories de l'entendement professoral". [...].
apparaissent comme des transgressions grossières ou des manquements à la bienséance' (Bourdieu 1987, 36). These differing responses were, he suggested, indicative of the 'unhealthy' disciplinary distinction between ethnology and sociology. More specifically, Bourdieu argued that to maintain ethnology as a separate academic discipline was necessarily to blunt its potentially critical force. For ethnology, as traditionally understood, was the study of societies which were both geographically and culturally very distant from our own. According to Bourdieu, this very tangible distance, which separated ethnologists and their readers from the societies they typically studied, predisposed them to accept unflinchingly an analysis of the objective determinants of social practice when it applied to some distant 'primitive' or 'exotic' society. They remained too distant, detached or neutral with regard to ethnological discoveries to acknowledge that, for example, Bourdieu's analysis of gender inequalities in Kabylia might have some relevance to their own societies. As long as the distinction between ethnology and sociology was kept in place, he argued, this would remain so. For this distinction institutionalised the distance that separates ethnologists from the objects of their studies: 'La distance que l'ethnologue met entre lui-même et son objet [...] se trouve institutionalisée dans la coupure entre l'ethnologie et la sociologie' (Bourdieu 1980, 34). It allowed the findings of ethnology to be contemplated as mere exotica, attributed precisely to 'l'altérité essentielle d'une "mentalité"'. As Bourdieu put it:

La distinction entre sociologie et ethnologie empêche l'ethnologue de soumettre sa propre expérience à l'analyse qu'il applique à son objet. Ce qui l'obligerait à découvrir que ce qu'il décrit comme pensée mythique n'est autre chose, bien souvent, que la logique pratique qui est la nôtre dans les trois quarts de nos actions: par exemple, dans ceux de nos jugements qui sont pourtant considérés comme l'accomplissement suprême de la culture cultivée, les jugements de goût, entièrement fondés sur des couples d'adjectifs (historiquement constitués). (Bourdieu 1987, 82)

If the readers and critics of Bourdieu's ethnological work had remained too distant, too objective or detached to grasp its critical force, readers and critics of his sociological work had committed the opposite mistake. For they remained too subjective, too close to the phenomena under discussion to
attain the necessary measure of objectivity and critical distance. Indeed, Bourdieu argued, the
proximity of these same individuals to the social phenomena which traditionally formed the subject
matter of sociology, their pre-reflexive or immediate adherence to the 'doxa', the apparent self-
evidence of their own social world, predisposed them to reject or resist analyses of the objective
determinants of their own social practices. Hence, according to Bourdieu, sociological discourse
provoked in its readers a response analogous to that elicited by psychoanalysis: 'Le discours
sociologique suscite des résistances qui sont tout à fait analogues dans leur logique et leurs
manifestations à celles que rencontre le discours psychanalytique' (Bourdieu 1980a, 41).

Bourdieu's project was, therefore, twofold. On the one hand, he sought a way of suspending his
readers' pre-reflexive investment in everything they took for granted about their own social
universe. On the other, he had to work to preserve the critical force of his ethnological work and
prevent it being reduced to the study of exotic curios. This twofold project necessarily involved a
challenge to the conventional distinction between ethnology and sociology. Hence, Bourdieu could
declare in 1985, 'tout mon travail, depuis plus de vingt ans, vise à abolir la distinction entre
l'ethnologie et la sociologie' (1987, 82). In his sociological work, this implied a constant effort on
his part to turn the ethnological gaze onto his own society; an act of de-familiarisation or critical
estrangement which aimed to suspend both his and his readers' uncritical investment in the
apparent self-evidence of the social conventions which governed their native social universe. This
de-familiarising strategy, he claimed, has profoundly political implications: 'Le fait de poser à
propos de nos sociétés des questions traditionnelles de l'ethnologie, et de détruire la frontière
traditionnelle entre l'ethnologie et la sociologie, était déjà un acte politique' (36).

In his ethnological work, Bourdieu needed to achieve the opposite. Namely, he had to render
the apparently irremediably 'other' more familiar by working through the distortions inherent in the
distance that typically separates ethnologists from the objects of their studies. Not only did this
distance threaten to undermine ethnology's critical force, reducing its discoveries to the status of
mere exotica, but, according to Bourdieu, it also encouraged the 'objectivism' typified by the work of
Claude Lévi-Strauss. This distance could not simply be wished away in an illusory attempt to adopt
the native's point of view since this would involve adopting a 'naively phenomenological' mode of
social analysis, falling into the diametrically opposed, but entirely symmetrical trap of 'subjectivism'.

The ethnological encounter, as defined by Bourdieu, thus involved the dialectical interplay of these two poles of objectivism and subjectivism, of structuralism and phenomenology, of the strange and the familiar. A sense of the essential otherness of the society under study had to be maintained, even as any similarities between forms of social organisation in Kabylia and those in the reader's or ethnologist's native country were fully acknowledged. In Le Sens pratique, Bourdieu described this process as follows:

C'est dire que le travail scientifique procure, en ce cas, une expérience étrange, rapprochant l'étranger sans rien lui enlever de son étrangeté, par le fait d'autoriser la familiarité la plus familière avec le plus étrange de l'étranger et de contraindre du même coup à une distance, qui est la condition d'une véritable appropriation, avec le plus étranger du plus personnel.

(1980, 246)

It was this interplay between the strange and the familiar which endowed ethnology with its critical force. Not only did it prevent the twin errors of objectivism and subjectivism: in staging an encounter with another, distant world, it also forced ethnologists and their readers to stand back from all that they took for granted in their own world, to grasp the objective determinants of their own practices by achieving critical distance vis-à-vis 'le plus étrange du plus personnel'. Ethnology thus became what Bourdieu termed, by analogy with psychoanalysis, 'une forme particulièrement puissante de socio-analyse':

L'ethnologie cesse alors d'être cette sorte d'art pur, totalement affranchi, par la vertu distanciante de l'exotisme, de tous les soupçons de vulgarité attachés à la politique, pour devenir une forme particulièrement puissante de socio-analyse. En poussant aussi loin que possible l'objectivation de la subjectivité et la subjectivation de l'objectivité, elle contraint par exemple à découvrir, dans cette réalisation hyperbolique de tous les phantasmes masculins
que propose le monde kabyle, la vérité de l'inconscient collectif qui hante aussi les cerveaux des anthropologues et de leurs lecteurs, au moins masculins. (246)

This quotation invites interpretation on several levels. At its most straightforward, it is a description of the dialectic of estrangement ('l'objectivation de la subjectivité'), and empathy ('la subjectivation de l'objectivité'), which Bourdieu placed at the heart of the ethnomological encounter. On another level, it describes Bourdieu's effort to work through the opposition between objectivism and subjectivism, an effort which animates his entire oeuvre. Yet these poles of objectivism and subjectivism, the strange and the familiar also have far more concrete referents. This passage prefaced two chapters on kinship in *Le Sens pratique*, the first of which dealt with Bourdieu's native Béarn, the second with Kabylia. Both drew on fieldwork conducted over the same period in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Thus, at the same time Bourdieu had conducted his fieldwork in Kabylia, he had also been working on the extended article on marriage and kinship in the Béarnais villages in which he grew up, 'Célibat et condition paysanne' (1962).

Bourdieu argued that it was the experience of working simultaneously on a world that was entirely familiar to him and one that was entirely foreign that first led him to question the adequacy of Lévi-Strauss's 'objectivist' analyses of kinship, and, from there, to reflect on the social determinants of that objectivism, its inherent distortions, and its relationship with the distinction between ethnology and sociology. Analysing matrimonial and kinship strategies in his native Béarn, Bourdieu was able to see the limitations of an objectivist or structuralist analysis of such phenomena. His personal experience of the Béarn meant he saw 'des visages derrière les statistiques, des aventures, entrelissées de souvenirs communs, derrière les biographies, des paysages à travers les symboles cartographiques' (Bourdieu 1972, 156).

If this might seem to imply a more phenomenological mode of analysis, an appeal to subjective experience, Bourdieu's simultaneous work in Kabylia alerted him to what might be gained by turning the objective, de-familiarising gaze of the ethnologist onto his own society. His two research projects on Kabylia and the Béarn thus formed, 'le point de passage et d'articulation entre l'ethnologie et la sociologie' (Bourdieu 1987, 75-6). Hence, throughout his career, in both his work on his native social universe, be it Béarn or the worlds of French education and 'legitimate' culture,
and his work on Kabylia. Bourdieu has attempted to retain the advantages of a typically
ethnological distance, even as he reflects on its social conditions of possibility and inherent
distortions. In this way, he aims to work through and dialectically transcend the oppositions
between objectivism and subjectivism, ethnology and sociology.

Central to this project is the constant alternation between the analysis of a world that is familiar
and the study of one that is foreign, between the conventional topics of sociological and
ethnological research, respectively, between France and Kabylia. This has led to what Bourdieu
termed, '[c]ette sorte d’expérience croisée du monde social, à savoir la familiarisation avec un
monde étranger et le déracinement d’un monde familier qui sont constitutifs de toute démarche
scientifique dans les sciences de l’homme' (1972, 156).

Bourdieu’s claim to scientificity and his attempt to think through the opposition between
objectivism and subjectivism are, therefore, inextricably bound up with his eagerness to abandon the
distinction between ethnology and sociology. For Bourdieu, the ethnological and the sociological
aspects of his work stand in a relationship that is both symbiotic and dialectical: the gains of one
discipline supplement and transcend the failings of the other, and vice versa. In Homo academicus,
he described this relationship as follows:

Le sociologue qui prend pour objet son propre monde, dans ce qu’il a de plus proche et de
plus familier, ne doit pas, comme fait l’ethnologue, domestiquer l’exotique, mais, si l’on
permet l’expression, exotiser le domestique par une rupture de la relation première d’intimité
avec des modes de vie et de pensée qui lui restent étrangers parce que trop familiers. Ce
mouvement vers le monde originaire, et ordinaire, devrait être l’achèvement du mouvement
vers les mondes étrangers et extraordinaires. Ce qu’il n’est pratiquement jamais: chez
Durkheim comme chez Lévi-Strauss, il n’est pas question de soumettre à l’analyse les ‘formes
de classification’ que le savant met en œuvre et de chercher dans les structures sociales du
monde universitaire […] les fondements des catégories de l’entendement professoinal. (1984,
289-91)
Bourdieu's emphasis on the de-familiarising effects of ethnological study had a long series of precedents in French philosophy and literature, stretching back through Voltaire, Rousseau, and Montesquieu to Montaigne and even beyond to Herodotus. Indeed, his description of the ethnological encounter as involving a dialectic between the strange and the familiar recalled the quotation from Rousseau that Lévi-Strauss habitually used to describe the role of ethnology: 'Quand on veut étudier les hommes, il faut regarder près de soi: mais pour étudier l'homme, il faut apprendre à porter la vue au loin: il faut d'abord observer les différences pour découvrir les propriétés' (quoted in Lévi-Strauss 1962, 326-27).

Clearly Bourdieu was seeking to place himself within this tradition, a worthy successor not only to Lévi-Strauss but also to Durkheim. Indeed, he seemed to be pursuing the Durkheimian project of providing a sociological grounding for Kant's a priori categories. If the Kantian allusion was clear in the title of the 1975 article 'Les Catégories de l'entendement professoral', the extended version of that article which was to form the first section of Bourdieu's study of the 'grandes écoles', La Noblesse d'état (1989), acknowledged the continuing debt to Durkheim. In an obvious reference to Durkheim and Mauss's seminal essay, 'Quelques formes primitives de classification' (1901-2), Bourdieu entitled this section 'Les Formes scolaires de classification' (1989, 17-98). More than a mere successor to Durkheim and Lévi-Strauss, however, Bourdieu clearly saw himself as having transcended the limitations of their approach by means of a reflexive return onto the social determinants of the very categories and systems of classification that both thinkers applied to their ethnological data.

Bourdieu's conception of the de-familiarising function of ethnology also had an important precedent in the phenomenological tradition. As Merleau-Ponty (1960, 173) explained, for Husserl ethnology offered 'une variation imaginaire', a means of breaking with the 'doxic' realm of unquestioned assumptions about one's native social universe to uncover certain invariant forms of human activity: 'les cultures dites primitives jouent un rôle important dans l'exploration du “monde vécu”, en nous offrant des variations de ce monde sans lesquelles nous resterions englues dans nos préjugés et ne verrions pas même le sens de notre propre vie'.

However, if Bourdieu's emphasis on the need for readers and ethnologists alike to 'suspend' their pre-reflexive adherence to the 'doxa', in order to uncover a realm of objective sociological truth,
might be interpreted as a sociological re-reading of the Husserlian *epoché*, he would certainly reject the Husserlian notion of 'l’exploration du “monde vécu”' as naively 'subjectivist', forming one of the two poles of objectivism and subjectivism, structuralism and phenomenology, he was seeking to overcome. Yet this attempt to transcend the limitations of the phenomenological and the structuralist approaches to ethnology was itself anticipated in Merleau-Ponty’s essay, 'De Mauss à Lévi-Strauss' (1960). Having outlined the limitations of Mauss’s phenomenological and Lévi-Strauss’s structuralist reading of gift exchange, Merleau-Ponty suggested working through these limitations in a way which closely prefigures Bourdieu’s own work. Describing ethnology as an ‘incessante mise à l’épreuve de soi par l’autre et de l’autre par soi’, he went on:

Il s’agit de construire un système de référence général où puissent trouver place le point de vue de l’indigène, le point de vue du civilisé, et les erreurs de l’un sur l’autre [...].

L’ethnologie n’est pas une spécialité définie par un objet particulier, les sociétés ‘primitives’: c’est une manière de penser, celle qui s’impose quand l’objet est ‘autre’, et exige que nous nous transformions nous-mêmes. Aussi devenons-nous les ethnologues de notre propre société, si nous prenons distance envers elle. [...] Singulière méthode: il s’agit d’apprendre à voir comme étranger ce qui est nôtre, et comme notre ce qui est étranger. (Merleau-Ponty 1960, 150-51)

Bourdieu’s output, alternating between studies of familiar and foreign social universes, working through the errors inherent in both subjectivism ('le point de vue de l'indigène'), and objectivism ('le point de vue du civilisé'), might, then, be seen as an attempt to put Merleau-Ponty’s suggestion into practice. For Bourdieu, this necessarily involved working through the opposition between ethnology and sociology in the name of a greater reflexive awareness of the ethnocentric distortions inherent in that opposition. Moreover, Bourdieu (1984, 291) claimed that it was the scientificity secured by this reflexivity that distinguished his work so sharply from the ‘mise en question nihiliste de la science’ typical of ‘certaines analyses dites postmodernes’.
Kabylia as Microcosm and Archetype

Rather than romanticising Kabylia, then, presenting it as 'an ideal model of the traditional', whose more authentic forms of social organisation could be contrasted with a class-divided West, as Reed-Danahay argues. Bourdieu stressed the essential similarities between forms of 'symbolic domination' in Kabylia and those at work in the West. He drew a series of analogies between the systems of classification which naturalised and reproduced gender inequalities in Kabylia and those at work in the worlds of French education, politics, and culture. Moreover, he pointed to such analogies as evidence of his determination to think through the opposition between ethnology and sociology, and hence to avoid exoticised representations of Kabylia as the West's 'primitive' Other. The most extended and significant of these analogies was the one Bourdieu drew between Kabylia's 'économie de bonne foi', a 'pre-capitalist' gift economy resting on a communal sense of honour, debt, and 'disinterested' reciprocity, and the realm of 'legitimate' culture in the West.

Within twentieth-century French thought, there is a tradition of idealising 'primitive' economies of gift exchange. The precedent for such idealist interpretations was set by Mauss for whom the study of gift exchange offered a vision of societies founded on reciprocity, a consoling thought in a France still reeling from the shock of the First World War. In La Part maudite (1949), Georges Bataille offered a reinterpretation of Mauss's work on the gift and potlatch. He drew a direct analogy between the sacrificial excess of potlatch and certain transgressive, avant-garde forms of writing and art; neither, he argued, could be contained within the 'restricted economy' of commodity exchange and both, therefore, held a certain utopian promise.

Bourdieu, however, offered an inverted representation of gift exchange and its analogous relationship with art and literature. Gift exchange in Kabylia, he argued, only appeared disinterested, in fact this apparent disinterest concealed the workings of 'symbolic domination' and 'symbolic violence', the struggles to accumulate 'symbolic capital', and hence impose and reproduce social hierarchies. In this, gift exchange was analogous to the realm of 'legitimate culture' in the West, whose apparent disinterest, Bourdieu argued throughout La Distinction, masked a series of profoundly material, class-based interests. In 'pre-capitalist' Kabylia, Bourdieu maintained, economic interest could never reveal itself as such but was always concealed behind the communal
sense of honour, debt, and reciprocity. In the West, with the emergence of a field of naked economic interests and exchanges, symbolic exchange took refuge in the realms of art and culture:

La dénégation de l'économie et de l'intérêt économique qui, dans les sociétés précapitalistes, s'exerçait d'abord sur le terrain même des transactions 'économiques', d'où il a fallu l'exclure pour constituer comme telle 'l'économie', trouve ainsi son refuge de prédilection dans le domaine de l'art et de la 'culture', lieu de la pure consommation, d'argent bien sûr mais aussi de temps, îlot de sacré qui s'oppose de manière ostentatoire à l'univers profane et quotidien de la production, asile de la gratuité et du désintérêt qui propose, comme en d'autres temps la théologie, une anthropologie imaginaire obtenue par la dénégation de toutes les négations qu'opère réellement 'l'économie'. (1980, 231)¹²

According to Bourdieu, traditional Kabylia was a society in which the absence of differentiated, semi-autonomous cultural, economic, juridical, and educational fields, guaranteed by the State which ensured the convertibility of the different forms of capital invested in those fields, meant that only symbolic capital could be accumulated through the various strategies adopted in an 'économie de bonne foi'. In Le Sens pratique, he offered what was at best a highly generalised, speculative account of the emergence in the West of the various state institutions which had led to the establishment of objectified relations of power and of codified measures of economic and educational capital (229). He argued that 'le développement des forces de subversion et de critique' prompted by the shift from a good faith economy based on interpersonal relations to 'les formes les plus brutales de l'exploitation "économique"', had led to 'un retour à des modes d'accumulation fondés sur la conversion du capital économique en capital symbolique' (230). Philanthropy, public relations, even the consoling, apparently disinterested pleasures of legitimate culture were increasingly deployed in the West as a means to mask the more brutal forms of economic exploitation (230-31).

In Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse (1912, 8-11), Durkheim had justified his interest in Australian Aboriginal religions by arguing that social and cultural phenomena which continued to hold force in the West were easier to discern in such 'civilisations primitives': 'primitive
civilisations' constituted 'des cas privilégiés parce que ce sont des cas simples', offering 'un moyen de discerner les causes, toujours présentes, dont dépendent les formes les plus essentielles de la pensée et de la pratique religieuse'. As a 'pre-capitalist' economy governed by symbolic exchange, 'le lieu par excellence de la violence symbolique', Kabylia played an analogous role, offering important insights into the functioning of symbolic domination, whose 'return' as a fundamental organising principle of Western societies could then be much better understood. Kabylia served Bourdieu, then, as an archetypal instance of the workings of symbolic domination, a microcosm or restricted arena in which concepts such as 'habitus', 'practice', and 'strategy' could be elaborated and refined before being imported back into analyses of symbolic domination in, say, the field of legitimate culture in the West.

Kabylia was the keystone in Bourdieu's attempt to elaborate 'une théorie générale de l'économie des pratiques', a theory which emphasised that social practice involved material 'interests' not directly reducible to naked economic interests, material interests whose logic had nonetheless to be understood. As a 'pre-capitalist' society, Kabylia provided Bourdieu with empirical 'proof' of the existence of material interests and competitions to accumulate forms of capital which were not reducible to economic exchange. By analogy, this insight could then be extended to an analysis of the interests at stake in the French educational and cultural fields: for these too, Bourdieu argued, were eminently material without being strictly equivalent to naked economic interests. It is these analogies between forms of symbolic domination in Kabylia and in the West which, Bourdieu maintained, attested to his determination to dispense with any disciplinary distinction between ethnology and sociology and the ethnocentrism such a distinction concealed.

However, it is important to remember that Kabylia could only play its role as the keystone of a general theory of practice as long as it was designated 'pre-capitalist', 'une économie de bonne foi', based on a communal sense of honour, debt, and reciprocity rather than on naked economic interests. As Herzfeld (1987, 8) argues, it is this 'uncritical acceptance of the notion of "honour"', which 'hermetically separates the values of the local community' from its 'encompassing bureaucratic and religious institutions'. This description of Kabylia as a 'pre-capitalist', 'good faith' economy, a society 'without writing' and hence lacking any objectified instances of legitimate power and violence, in turn, rested on a 'reconstruction' of the 'traditional' forms of Kabyle society.
Moreover, such an 'ideal-typical' representation of Kabylia demanded the avoidance of any mention either of the thousand year-old 'transactions incessantes' between 'indigenous' Kabyle culture and Islam or of the objectified instances of Islamic and French colonial power, which Bourdieu himself had identified in his 1980 article in Libération as the defining characteristics of Kabyle society. Paradoxically, then, the very point where Bourdieu claimed to have overcome the opposition between ethnology and sociology would seem to mark the re-emergence of that opposition. The analogies he had drawn between Kabylia and the West relied on the 'reconstruction' of 'traditional' forms of Kabyle social organisation now more or less disappeared. The reconstructive project Bourdieu pursued in his ethnological studies of Kabylia thus contrasted strongly with his sociological studies of culture and education in France, all of which were concerned with entirely contemporary issues.13

Kabylia did not, however, merely provide an archetype for the exchange and accumulation of forms of capital outside the operations of a purely monetary economy. It also provided a model for that 'doxic relation' to the world which Bourdieu (1990b, 6) placed at the heart of the pre-linguistic, pre-predicative, incorporated structures of the habitus, 'ce rapport au monde que Husserl décrivait sous le nom d“attitude naturelle” ou d’expérience doxique'. Bourdieu has insisted that it is this emphasis on the doxic nature of incorporated social norms and conventions which distinguishes his work from Marxist theories of ideology. Such theories, he maintains, continue to understand socialisation in terms of 'false consciousness', of a consciously held set of ideas, an 'ideology' susceptible to critique by means of a 'prise de conscience'.14 For Bourdieu, however, the incorporation of social imperatives and norms operates at a much deeper level; incorporated into the dispositional structures of the habitus, such imperatives and norms are placed beyond the sway of a reflexive 'prise de conscience':

Dans la notion de ‘fausse conscience’ que certains marxistes invoquent pour rendre compte des effets de domination symbolique, c’est ‘conscience’ qui est de trop, et parler ‘d’idéologie’, c’est situer dans l’ordre des représentations, susceptibles d’être transformées par cette conversion intellectuelle que l’on appelle ‘prise de conscience’, ce qui se situe dans
l'ordre des croyances, c'est-à-dire au plus profond des dispositions corporelles. (1997, 211-12)

Unlike Marxist theories of ideology, then, Bourdieu's notion of doxa emphasises the way in which socially determined criteria of judgement, systems of classification, expectations, and dispositions are internalised in agents without ever needing to be explicitly articulated or objectively codified. This is true even in Western societies such as France, whose educational institutions clearly represent institutions which embody and inculcate highly codified classifications, rules, and conventions, since, he argues, such institutions merely work to reinforce dispositions which have been inculcated into each student's habitus from earliest childhood. However, as Bourdieu suggested in Réponses, it was in societies 'without writing' and 'without schools' that this process of pre-discursive, pre-predicative inculcation could be most easily discerned:

Comme on le voit bien dans les sociétés sans écriture et sans école - mais cela reste vrai de ce qui se transmet dans les sociétés à école et dans les écoles mêmes - nombre de modes de pensée et d'action - et souvent les plus vitaux - se transmettent de la pratique à la pratique, par des modes de transmission totaux et pratiques fondés sur le contact direct et durable entre celui qui enseigne et celui qui apprend. (1992, 193)

Thus, Kabylia, stripped of its complex relations with the institutions of Islam, colonialism, or post-independence government, portrayed as a society 'without writing' and 'without schools', could serve as empirical 'proof' and archetypal instance of these pre-discursive forms of socialisation. At the basis of all experience, prior to any judgement or predication, Husserl (1948, 59; 65; 387) had identified what he termed 'Urdoxa' or 'protodoxa'. Re-interpreting this notion of 'Urdoxa' in sociological terms, Bourdieu suggested that Kabyle society represented an empirical example of the state of 'originary doxa', a state in which the social order 'goes without saying because it comes without saying', in which social norms and conventions were naturalised to such a degree as to pass entirely unquestioned and unchallenged (1977, 167). Kabylia, thus, also played the role of the archetypal instance of that doxic relationship to the world which Bourdieu placed at
the heart of his concepts of habitus and practice. As a society governed by the ‘logic of simple reproduction’, it provided a microcosm of the logic of reproduction at work in Western societies.

The relationship between Kabylia and the West, as theorised by Bourdieu, was therefore a complex one which operated along two mutually dependent axes, one of similarity, the other of contrast. The similarities identified by Bourdieu lay in the workings of symbolic violence and domination, the characteristic features of Kabylia which were returning to the fore in advanced Western societies such as France. This axis of similarity, however, was dependent upon a simultaneous axis of contrast which distinguished between modern developed Western economies and the ‘pre-capitalist’, ‘good faith’ economy of Kabylia.

Thus, whilst emphasising the similarities between the workings of symbolic domination in Kabylia and the West, Bourdieu also emphasised the differences between these two forms of society. In *Choses dites*, he distinguished between societies such as Kabylia, which lacked differentiated semi-autonomous cultural, educational, political, and juridical fields, and advanced Western ones. The latter were more open to historical change, he suggested, which emerged at the intersection between such semi-autonomous fields:

> à mesure que les sociétés deviennent plus différenciées et que s’y développent de ces ‘mondes’ relativement autonomes que j’appelle des champs, les chances qu’apparaissent de véritables événements, c’est-à-dire des rencontres de séries causales indépendantes, liées à des sphères de nécessité différentes, ne cessent de croître et, par là, la liberté laissée à des stratégies complexes de l’habitus, intégrant des nécessités d’ordre différent. (1987, 91)

In *Homo academicus*, Bourdieu had identified the events of May 1968 as one example of a historical event being born at the intersection of different relatively autonomous fields, the educational, the economic, and the cultural. The events of May were provoked by the ‘rupture du cycle de reproduction simple’ in the educational field and would have been impossible without the interactions between these semi-autonomous fields: ‘C’est cette indépendance dans la dépendance qui rend possible l’événement historique. - les sociétés sans histoire étant peut-être des sociétés si...
indifférencées qu'il n'y a pas de place pour l'événement proprement historique qui naît au carrefour des histoires relativement autonomes' (1984, 227).

Quite whether Bourdieu meant to claim the existence of 'societies without history' as actually existing empirical realities was rendered ambiguous by his use of the qualifier 'peut-être'. However, the very fact that he felt the need to evoke this now thoroughly discredited notion suggested that he retained some residual allegiance to it. If he did not explicitly identify Kabylia as a 'society without history', in describing it as 'without writing', lacking differentiated classes or relatively autonomous fields Bourdieu implied that he saw it as such. Certainly, Bourdieu appeared to place Kabylia at one extreme of a spectrum of social and political development which was itself a measure of a society's innate capacity for historical change. As Free (1996, 409) has argued, Bourdieu's narrative of historical development in Le Sens pratique, and hence his account of the differences between Kabylia and the West, was structured according to 'the dichotomies of nineteenth-century developmental models in which present societies were placed on a scale that was also a measure of their civilisation'. David Gartman (1991, 435-36), meanwhile, has pointed out that Bourdieu's account of the evolution from symbolic to objective or brutal forms of violence and back to symbolic again in advanced Western societies was 'essentially ahistorical', based on a 'severely truncated' theory of historical change, which appeared grounded more in theoretical speculation than empirical evidence.

Bourdieu's hypothesis of a 'return' to symbolic forms of domination in advanced capitalism can be seen as an example of his stated intention to establish the general applicability of his findings, in this case the general applicability of his 'general theory of the economy of practices', by grasping the 'invariant' forms of social organisation which lie behind any 'particular' object of experimental enquiry. As he put it in Réponses: 'Les “théories” sont des programmes de recherche qui appellent, non le “débat théorique”, mais la mise en œuvre pratique capable de les réfuter ou de les généraliser, ou, mieux, de spécifier et de différencier leur prétention à la généralité. Husserl enseignait que l'on doit s'immerger dans le particulier pour y découvrir l'invariant [...] Un cas particulier bien construit cesse d'être particulier' (1992, 56-7). In Raisons pratiques (1994), Bourdieu argued that 'bien qu'elle ait toutes les apparences de l'ethnocentrisme', such a procedure was preferable to 'l'intérêt pour les particularités apparentes de l'amateur d'exotisme qui s'attache
par priorité aux différences pittoresques’. Repeating the Husserlian imperative to ‘saisir l’invariant, la structure, dans la variante observée’, he juxtaposed it with the necessity to ‘s’immerger dans la particularité d’une réalité empirique, historiquement située et datée, mais pour la construire comme “cas particulier du possible”. selon le mot de Gaston Bachelard’ (1994a, 16-7).

There were, however, two major objections to be raised to this account. Firstly, what was so striking about Bourdieu’s analyses of Kabylia was the immense difficulty of situating them historically with any degree of certainty. Clearly, these analyses did not reflect the state of Kabylia at the time of Bourdieu’s fieldwork since, as he himself acknowledged in his article in Libération, the Kabyles had been in the ‘avant-garde’ of the independence movement, whilst ‘les régions berbères’ were ‘les haut lieux’ of the Algerian War (1980c). Nowhere in Esquisse..., Outline..., or Le Sens pratique were the effects of the War or the presence of the French army or the FLN in Kabylia discussed in any detail. Further, given that in that same article Bourdieu had referred to the frictions between Kabyle and Islamic culture as being ‘incessantes’ and ‘millénaires’, yet these frictions received no mention in any of his three book-length studies of Kabylia, his descriptions of Kabylia did not seem to apply to any identifiable moment prior to the outbreak of the War either.

Secondly, at the more theoretical level. Bourdieu’s juxtaposition of the Husserlian concept of the ‘invariant’ with Bachelard’s notion of ‘un cas particulier du possible’ conflated what were in fact two diametrically opposed conceptions of the nature of scientific truth. For Husserl, grasping the necessary, essential, or invariant truth behind a series of ‘imaginatively varied’ experiences involved following a process of deductive reasoning which moved upward, as it were, from the apprehension of ‘empirical generalities’ to the level of ‘pure generalities’, of an ‘a priori necessity’ which determined those empirical generalities in all their contingency. The invariant was, for Husserl, a ‘general essence [...]’, the eidos, the idea in the Platonic sense, the ‘necessary general form’ of a phenomenon which could be grasped through ‘the practice of voluntary variation’, a process of taking ‘an experienced or imagined objectivity’ as a ‘guiding “model”, a point of departure for the production of an infinitely open multiplicity of variants’. Reflection upon these ‘variants’ then revealed that, beyond their contingent differences, a ‘unity’ could be perceived: ‘in such free variations of an original image, e.g. of a thing, an invariant is necessarily retained’ (Husserl 1948, 340-41). If this process could be purely imaginary, as Merleau-Ponty had pointed
out, often in Husserl's thought it was 'les cultures dites primitives' which provoked this sort of
'variation imaginaire'.

Bachelard's conception of scientific experimentation, however, defined itself in opposition to the
phenomenological intuition of essences. He argued that scientific reasoning should be inductive not
deductive: 'la véritable pensée scientifique est métaphysiquement inductive' (1934, 10). Deductive
reasoning, which moved from the particular to a general or invariant law, was both reductive and
peremptory. Inductive reasoning, on the other hand, was expansive, productive, and creative; it
moved from the hypothesis of a general law or principle of identity to a series of experiments which
would test the precise and varied domain of application of that general law: unlike deductive
reasoning, it sought to find 'des variations sous l'identique' (1934, 150). Moreover, once a
general or invariant law had been established, Bachelard emphasised that it was essential to define
its precise area of application:

On ne doit plus parler [...] que d'une identité opératoire, que de l'identité relative à un
groupe d'opérations bien spécifiées. Des êtres géométriques qui sont invariants dans les
opérations d'un sous-groupe $G'$ du groupe général $G$ de la géométrie euclidienne peuvent
cesser d'être invariants pour des opérations qui, comprises dans $G$, ne figurent pas dans $G'$.
Leur 'identité' est donc simplement relative au groupe qui définit le système rationnel qui
sert de base à l'examen de leurs propriétés. Il ne servirait à rien de parler d'une géométrie
plus générale qui donnerait l'identité la plus spécieuse. Car la qualification désignée
comme la plus générale serait aussi relative à un point de vue particulier. (1949, 83)

Since laws which held invariant or general value in one specific domain need not have such
value in other domains, Bachelard proposed the elaboration of 'des rationalismes régionaux' which
took account of this by employing different axiomatics in different areas of scientific enquiry. He
insisted that any attempt to unify the diverse 'regional rationalisms' into a unified 'rationalisme
général' or 'intégral' would have to remain sensitive to these different axiomatics: a 'rationalisme
intégral' would have to be constructed a posteriori rather than proceeding by positing an a priori
principle of identity: 'Ce rationalisme intégral ou intégrant devrait être institué a posteriori, après
qu'on a étudié des rationalismes régionaux divers, aussi organisés que possible, contemporains de la mise en relation des phénomènes obéissant à des types d'expérience bien définis' (1949, 132).

Bachelard's emphasis on inductive rather than deductive reasoning reflected his suspicion of the search for a priori invariant laws or essences and was elaborated in direct opposition to the Husserlian search for the 'invariant sous la variante observée', which seemed to determine Bourdieu's approach to Kabylia. Furthermore, Bachelard's concept of regional rationalisms each operating according to their own axiomatic and hence developing at different speeds and rhythms was allied to a conception of historical temporality very different from the kind of evolutionary meta-narrative which Bourdieu employed to theorise the shift from a 'traditional' society such as Kabylia to an advanced Western economy. Indeed, Bachelard's focus on different regional rationalisms developing at different speeds and on the radical breaks and discontinuities which marked the history of scientific discovery meant that he was extremely suspicious of the attempts of 'les continistes de la culture' to write the history of science as a single evolutionary narrative, 'un récit continu des événements', so that, 'on croit facilement revivre les événements dans la continuité du temps et l'on donne insensiblement à toute histoire l'unité et la continuité d'un livre' (Bachelard 1971, 185).

As Robert Young (1990, 48-68) has argued, Louis Althusser's critique of Hegelian and historicist Marxism in Lire le Capital (1965) drew on Bachelard's concept of an inherently discontinuous history to articulate a notion of history as disjunctive and differentiated, driven by different, non-teleological temporalities and rhythms. In this way, Althusser sought to eschew the kind of dichotomies between 'pre-capitalist' and capitalist, 'primitive' and 'modern', which continued to structure Bourdieu's narrative of historical development. Indeed, Jacques Derrida has acknowledged the importance of Althusser's critique of historicism to his own project:

Toute la critique si nécessaire qu'Althusser a proposée du concept 'hégélien' d'histoire et de la notion de totalité expressive, etc., vise à montrer qu'il n'y a pas une seule histoire, une histoire générale mais des histoires différentes dans leur type, leur rythme, leur mode d'inscription, histoires décalées, différenciées, etc.. A cela, [...], j'ai toujours souscrit.

(Derrida 1972, 79)
Thus, the 'postmodern' suspicion of meta-narratives, far from being motivated by a 'nihilistic' or 'relativist' rejection of history and reason, as Bourdieu has suggested, needs to be understood as a critique of certain teleological forms of historicism and the way in which they subordinate the specificity of different regions, ethnicities, and sexualities to a narrative of the advance of a Western model of capitalism and rationality. As Homi Bhabha puts it:

> if the interest in postmodernism is limited to a celebration of the fragmentation of the 'grand narratives' of postenlightenment rationalism then, for all its intellectual excitement, it remains a profoundly parochial exercise. The wider significance of the postmodern condition lies in the awareness that the epistemological 'limits' of those ethnocentric ideas are also the enunciative boundaries of a range of other dissonant, even dissident histories and voices - women, the colonised, minority groups, the bearers of policed sexualities. (Bhabha 1994. 4-5)

It would, of course, have been perfectly possible for Bourdieu to have applied Bachelard's concepts of regional rationalisms and differential temporalities to his own research in Kabylia and France, respectively. This would have involved paying closer attention to the peculiarities of each society and more particularly to the history of Kabylia so that the latter was not simply understood as France's under-developed, 'primitive', or 'traditional' Other but a society in its own right whose specificities had to be grasped before any 'invariants' between itself and the West could be posited. However, ultimately Bourdieu's approach to Kabylia seemed determined more by a Husserlian search for the 'invariant' than by Bachelard's immensely subtle, reflexive, and differentiated theory of scientific experimentation and progress.

For Bourdieu, then, Kabylia functioned primarily as a 'variation imaginaire' in the Husserlian sense. It was the keystone in his 'general theory of the economy of practices', 'le lieu par excellence' of forms of symbolic violence and domination whose effects he also sought to trace in the West. Just as in the Crisis, Husserl had cited Indian and Chinese philosophy as exemplary of an inherently 'doxic' or 'practical' relation to the world which nonetheless had to be incorporated into Western
philosophy to counteract its tendency to excessive rationalism and fulfil its destiny of universal validity. So, for Bourdieu, Kabylia was the realm of 'originary doxa', of the 'doxic relation' to the world which characterised the pre-predicative structures of the habitus which existing theories of social action had overlooked. In each case, 'primitive' or 'traditional' cultures were important primarily for the role they played in supplementing the lacks of a general theory of apparently universal validity. If such universalising pretentions marked Bourdieu's work as inherently modernist, a 'postmodernist' approach might seek to question the idealist and ahistorical groundings of such universalism and to argue that the search for such universal invariants necessarily involved the effacement of the specificity, particularity, or 'difference' of Kabylia itself.

'La Domination masculine'

Perhaps the prime example of Bourdieu's willingness to use Kabylia both as 'empirical evidence' of the existence of certain 'invariant' forms of symbolic domination and as an archetypal instance of the 'doxic relation' to the world can be found in his 1990 essay, 'La Domination masculine'. Here Bourdieu juxtaposed a résumé of his analyses of Kabyle gender relations with a reading of To the Lighthouse to suggest invariant forms of male domination. He argued that male domination constituted 'le paradigme (et souvent le modèle et l'enjeu), de toute domination' (1990b, 31). Kabylia, he suggested, was the paradigm of this paradigm, offering the ethnologist, 'une image grossie et systématique de la cosmologie "phallonarcissique" qui hante aussi nos inconscients' (4).

Bourdieu's assertion of the apparently universal character of patriarchy (7n.9), might be one instance where the assumption of an a priori invariant between Kabylia and the West was relatively uncontroversial. However, as Leslie McCall (1992, 851) has argued, to emphasise the 'universal' nature of gender domination was to risk naturalising such domination: 'throughout Bourdieu's work [...] gender domination is seen as universal and natural, one of the relations of domination that structures all of social life'. Similarly, writing before the publication of 'La Domination masculine', Michèle Le Doeuff (1987, 45) had argued that Bourdieu's portrayal of women in his Kabyle work relied on a series of 'typical Parisian sexual stereotypes' and betrayed 'his own inability to conceive that his own gender categories might not be relevant to describe the idea of gender in a North African peasant community'. Employing Bachelard's memorable analogy, she compared the
stereotypical nature of Bourdieu's analysis to 'a piece of alchemy in a chemistry book', and called for a feminist epistemology to work through such stereotypes, 'in a style partly inherited from Bachelard'.

Ironically, Bourdieu opened 'La Domination masculine' by emphasising precisely the dangers of failing to reflect on the assumptions behind the inherited categories of thought all too often employed in analyses of the dynamics of male domination. He cited the work of Jacques Lacan and of those feminists inspired by his work, such as Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva, as typical of those who reproduced essentialism in a discourse which ostensibly sought to combat it.' The study of Kabyle gender relations, he suggested, offered a way out of this sort of essentialism:

Pour tenter de sortir du cercle, on peut, par une sorte de subterfuge méthodologique, appliquer l'analyse anthropologique aux structures de la mythologie collective que livre, à peu près franches de toute réinterprétation demi-savante, une tradition étrangère, et pourtant familière, celle des montagnards berbères de Kabylie qui, par-delà les conquêtes et les conversions, et sans doute en réaction contre elles, ont fait de leur culture le conservatoire d'un vieux fonds de croyance méditerranéennes organisées autour du culte de la virilité. (4)

Here, then, Kabylia was to play its allotted role as 'une variation imaginaire': similar enough to the West for parallels to be drawn, yet distant enough to estrange reader and sociologist alike from their unreflected adherence to the more persistent symbolic forms of male domination, it provided an archetypal instance of male domination as doxa, inscribed in the pre-predicative forms of ritual and practice rather than objectified in either institutional or ideological form. Kabylia was thus 'le cas limite' of a social universe in which male domination was inscribed in subjective and objective structures alike. The physiological differences between Kabyle men and women, like the spatial oppositions between outside and inside, the village assembly and the fountain were overdetermined by a dense network of homology and opposition which reproduced and naturalised gender inequalities, giving them an appearance of ineluctability:
C'est la concordance entre les structures objectives et les structures cognitives qui rend possible ce rapport au monde que Husserl décrivait sous le nom d'"attitude naturelle" ou d'expérience doxique, mais sans en rappeler les conditions sociales de possibilité. C'est l'accord entre la conformation de l'être et les formes du connaître, entre les attentes intérieures et le cours extérieur du monde, qui fonde l'expérience doxique. Exclusive de toute mise en question hérétique, cette expérience est la forme la plus absolue de la reconnaissance de la légitimité: elle appréhende le monde social et ses divisions arbitraires, à commencer par la division socialement construite entre les sexes, comme naturels, évidents, inéluctables. (6-7)

Bourdieu argued that it was only possible to understand the persistence of male domination in the West by grasping the fact that symbolic domination worked at this pre-discursive level and was incorporated into the very bodily dispositions of male and female subjects, their hexis and habitus, in a form so profound it eluded rational critique: 'Les pesanteurs de l'habitus ne sont pas de celles qu'on peut lever par un simple effort de la volonté, fondé sur une prise de conscience libératrice' (13). Having employed Kabylia as a limiting case to explore the logic of male domination as symbolic domination effecting 'la somatisation des rapports de domination' (13). Bourdieu went on to argue that in those societies where formal rights have been accorded to women, these forms of symbolic domination exerted a continued, even more manifest influence over gender relations. Just as the formal right for education for all or the provision of free museums and art galleries had not put an end to class barriers to education and culture, he argued, so rights for women had not ended male domination:

la libération des victimes de la violence symbolique ne peut s'accomplir par décret. On observe même que les limites incorporées ne se manifestent jamais autant que lorsque les contraintes externes s'abolissent et que les libertés formelles - droit de vote, droit à l'éducation, accès à toutes les professions, y compris politiques - sont acquises: l'auto-exclusion et la 'vocation' (négative autant que positive) viennent alors prendre le relais de l'exclusion expresse. (12)
Here, then, was an example of that return to symbolic forms of domination under advanced capitalism that Bourdieu had hypothesised in Le Sens pratique. Just as Kabyle women’s domestic labour was devalued in relation to the men’s agricultural labour, he argued, so, despite their massive entry onto the labour market, women in the West continued to occupy less prestigious posts in subordinate functions (29). Similarly, he mentioned that his research into the French housing market had revealed that, as in Kabylia, husbands tended to leave questions they considered beneath their dignity, such as domestic bills or negotiations over rent and house prices, to their wives (10n.12). Finally, he argued that the communally sustained exclusion which kept Kabyle women away from masculine spaces such as the village assembly was mirrored in Western women’s tendency to exclude themselves from political debate, abstaining more often than men when asked to express an opinion in political polls (13). 18

Bourdieu did not entirely deny the ability of women to gain consciousness of their objective state and even to criticise the status quo. In his reading of To the Lighthouse for example, he emphasised Mrs Ramsay’s considerable lucidity regarding the workings of male domination. Yet, he also argued that this lucidity, even ironic distance from the games of intellectual prestige and distinction entered into by her husband did not prevent her from colluding by proxy with those games, seeking to protect her husband from those to whom he might appear ridiculous, for example (24). Similarly, he argued that Kabyle women frequently ridiculed the dominant system of classifications and, along with it, the pretentions of men to absolute moral and intellectual superiority. However, he maintained that such instances of parodic or carnivalesque inversion merely constituted the resistance the dominated offered to the status quo. Since such resistance continued to operate within the terms of the dominant taxonomy, it should not be accorded a revolutionary potential (15). 19

Bourdieu’s emphasis both on the persistence and the doxic, embodied nature of symbolic domination was clearly intended as an alternative to a Marxist-inspired tradition of Ideologiekritik. As he put it in a more recent article on male domination:
Pour comprendre la domination symbolique et sa perpétuation, il faut rompre avec les philosophies de la conscience auxquelles les théories critiques, celle de Marx en matière de domination sociale, celle des théoriciennes féministes en matière de domination sexuelle, restent attachés. Il y a des choses sur lesquelles la conscience n’a que peu de prise, parce qu’elles se situent au niveau des dispositions corporelles. C’est le cas de la domination sexuelle.... (1995, 86)

Thus, the embodied, pre-predicative, pre-linguistic structures of the habitus, along with the immediate adherence or doxic relation to the world, provided for Bourdieu an alternative to a Marxist-inspired account of the function of ideology, as a structured set of ideas and concepts, in ensuring the reproduction of the status quo. Kabylia had a key role to play here by furnishing empirical proof of this doxic relation at work, of its resistance to conscious critique, and hence its endurance. However, the empirical validity of Bourdieu’s portrayal of Kabyle gender relations was not itself above question. In ‘La Domination masculine’, he stated that his analysis of Kabylia represented ‘la référence à un système encore en état de fonctionnement, donc directement observable comme tel’ (1990b, 5). A series of footnotes referred the reader to Le Sens pratique for a more detailed analysis of gender in Kabylia. Yet in Le Sens pratique itself, Bourdieu stated that his analysis referred not to ‘un système encore en état de fonctionnement’, but to practices which ‘ont disparu de la pratique plus ou moins complètement et depuis plus ou moins longtemps’ (1980, 335n.2).

This apparent confusion was of considerable importance since, in his earlier work on Algeria, Bourdieu had insisted that the combined effects of the War and the policy of ‘regroupement’ had destroyed traditional models and gender roles, undermining values of family and community and provoking conflicts over mariage and the role of women (1958, 124). In ‘Révolution dans la révolution’ (1961), he had argued that Algerian peasant women ‘font irruption dans l’espace ouvert, autrefois réservé aux hommes. Elles participent aux préoccupations et aux aspirations politiques qui, dans la société traditionnelle, étaient l’apanage des hommes’ (1961a, 38). Drawing on fieldwork she conducted in Kabylia in the 1970s, Camille Lacoste-Dujardin (1997, 160-71) has emphasised the extent to which ‘traditional’ Kabyle gender relations were radically altered in the
post-war conjuncture. In a society which had lost a large proportion of its men to the War or emigration and in which villages destroyed during the conflict had been rebuilt along more modern, urban lines, women, often financially autonomous thanks to the war pensions of their deceased husbands, had discovered new freedoms and were effectively challenging the old patriarchal system. In an increasingly urbanised, modern Kabylia, it was virtually impossible to find one of those ‘traditional’ Kabyle houses which Bourdieu had endowed with the central role in the pre-predicative inculcation of gender roles: ‘L'on cherche même vainement une de ces fameuses “maisons kabyles” où l'on serait bien en peine de trouver le “monde renversé” qu'a voulu y voir Pierre Bourdieu’ (Lacoste-Dujardin 1997, 274).

If Lacoste-Dujardin has emphasised the dynamic nature of gender relations in contemporary Kabyla, Zakya Daoud has argued that the rigidity of gender roles before the War needs itself to be understood as a specifically historical phenomenon, a response to colonialism, an attempt to conserve a specific identity in the face of foreign invasion and rule, which led to Algerians clinging to ‘traditional’ gender roles, the very virtues of ‘nif’ and ‘h’urma’ whose importance Bourdieu had emphasised (Daoud 1993, 133-34). This is, of course, a debatable point, but it does introduce the possibility that rather than being attributable to the pre-reflexive workings of the habitus, gender relations in Kabylia might be a response to the wider national and global influence of colonial and neo-colonial political, economic, and cultural domination. Like Daoud, Monique Gadant has emphasised that women's status throughout Algeria is inseparable from that country’s colonial and postcolonial past, from the extent to which the defence of national or local honour, of a specifically Algerian as opposed to French or European identity, became inextricably linked with the defence of the ‘honour’ of Algerian women (Gadant 1995).

Moreover, Daoud (1993:191-233) has shown that in the years following the mass demonstrations against President Chadli’s regime in 1988, a series of women’s movements, including several in Kabylia, were able to operate legally and protest against the restrictive ‘code de la famille’ which had been passed in 1984. This code exploited the pre-eminence accorded Islam as the national religion in Algeria’s constitution to override the formal equality for women also guaranteed by the constitution in an attempt to impose a minority status on Algeria’s female population. Mohammed Harbi has emphasised that the women’s movement was ‘cantonné
socialement dans les classes moyennes et géographiquement dans les grandes villes'. and that in Kabylia 'les populations sont encore gouvernées par un droit coutumier, rigide et patriarchal' (in Gadant 1995, 5-7).

It does not fall within the ambit of the current thesis to adjudicate on the historical or sociological validity of these different accounts of gender relations in contemporary Algeria. However, what all these accounts emphasise is the need to understand such gender relations as resulting less from the doxic or pre-predicative incorporation of gender roles than from a complex historical dynamic involving the interaction of local, national, and global determinants. Moreover, given that the mass demonstrations in 1989 and 1990 both for and against a reform to Algerian women's legal status received wide coverage in the French press, Bourdieu's decision to make no mention of these conflicts or even examine the extent to which they had or had not impinged on 'traditional' Kabyle society was by no means innocent. It emphasised the extent to which Bourdieu's interest in Kabylia, or Algeria as a whole, was directed less towards that society as a complex living, changing entity than as an archetype of doxic adherence. This served the polemical intent of 'La Domination masculine', namely, as Fowler (1997, 38) puts it 'to combat feminist utopianism', by casting doubt on the ability of 'une prise de conscience' followed by a process of ideological critique to alter forms of domination that were pre-predicative and pre-linguistic, composed of embodied dispositions rather than rational concepts.

However, this account failed to acknowledge, let alone to theorise, the complex relationship between such symbolic collective representations and objectified or institutionalised forms of coercion or legal restraint, either in Kabylia or the West. For example, Bourdieu's argument that the concession of formal equality to women did not in itself mitigate the power of symbolic domination ignored the possibility that such concessions might reflect, in part at least, the successful struggles of women to change the dominant taxonomies regarding the role and status of women. In Britain and France, the concession of formal equality was surely the result of the interaction between struggles in the symbolic or ideological domain by women's movements and infrastructural changes such as the mass entry of women into the labour market in response to the labour needs of two successive world wars.
Having claimed that formal equalities had little or no effect on the dominant symbolic taxonomies, Bourdieu (1990b, 30) was left in the somewhat paradoxical position of arguing that it was only by changing collective representations, only by means of 'une lutte symbolique', that a real challenge to male domination could be posed. How such a symbolic struggle could be initiated without ‘une prise de conscience’ of the arbitrary and enduring nature of symbolic classifications was not explained. However, this did offer an example of what Scott Lash has termed Bourdieu’s ‘idealism’, namely his emphasis on symbolic forms of domination, on collective representations and classifications to the detriment of any serious discussion of their relationship with legal, institutional, or coercive forms of social restraint (in Calhoun et al 1993, 200-1). Such idealism rested, of course, on Bourdieu’s construction of Kabylia as a society in which male domination precisely short-circuited such institutional forms.

‘La Domination masculine’, therefore, provided in miniature a summary of the roles which Kabylia has played in Bourdieu’s work to date. In the first instance, the turn to Kabylia was intended to provoke a kind of de-familiarisation or critical estrangement in Bourdieu’s readers. This estrangement, however, did not aim to recapture some more authentic, ‘primitive’ forms of social existence lost to Western modernity. In keeping with Bourdieu’s determination to eschew exoticising representations of the ‘primitive’, and hence to work through the opposition between sociology and ethnology, Kabylia provided, rather, an archetype of forms of symbolic domination and doxic adherence discernible also in the West. As such, it constituted a microcosm in which Bourdieu could both develop and ‘prove’ the empirical validity of concepts such as habitus, practice, and strategy, concepts apparently so lacking in other theories of social action and constraint, whether Marxist or feminist.

However, this use of Kabylia as archetype and microcosm was by no means innocent. It is here that the criticisms of Free, Herzfeld, and Reed-Danahay do hold some force. For Bourdieu’s analyses of Kabylia seemed systematically to ignore details of the region’s relationship with wider networks of religious, political, and economic power in ways which threatened to reproduce the tropes of colonial discourse. Further, Bourdieu’s use of Kabylia as an archetype relied upon a meta-narrative of socio-economic development and the ‘return’ of symbolic forms of domination under advanced capitalism which was at best highly speculative, at worst, as Gartman argued,
'ahistorical'. This meta-narrative not only stood in stark contrast to the kind of discontinuous, disjunctive history that Bourdieu's avowed allegiance to Bachelard seemed to demand, it also effaced the specificity of Kabylia's own history. Events such as 'le printemps berbère' or changing gender roles in post-independance Algeria were not merely overlooked by Bourdieu, they simply could not be accommodated within his terms of analysis. In short, the specificity of Kabylia was subordinated to the role Bourdieu needed it to play in establishing 'une théorie générale de l'économie des pratiques'.

It was in the light of this general theory of the economy of practices that Bourdieu had returned to an analysis of the links between aesthetics, taste, culture, and class in his 1979 study, La Distinction. As Bourdieu argued in Choses dites, Le Sens pratique and La Distinction constituted 'deux livres complémentaires' (1987, 33). Didier Eribon (1980, 1), meanwhile, has suggested that the two works form 'un seul et même ouvrage [...]'. Le Sens pratique établit le fondement théorique des recherches empiriques présentées dans La Distinction'. Given that the core of La Distinction was an extended version of the survey into tastes and cultural consumption which had formed the basis of Un Art moyen, the next chapter will examine to what extent Bourdieu's general theory of practice, and all the problems inherent in its elaboration, inflected and altered his earlier analyses of the relationship between class and culture.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

1. Although its terms of analysis have been subjected to modification (Bhabha 1994), and sustained critique (Ahmad 1992), Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1978) remains the most influential study of the genesis and structure of this kind of orientalism (Said 1978).

2. The fact that Bourdieu’s works of Kabyle ethnology involved such a reconstruction of ‘traditional’ practices now all but disappeared is rarely discussed or acknowledged by critics. Thus, for example, David Swartz (1997, 98) can write: ‘In studying Algerian peasants, Bourdieu encountered a social order in which social solidarity is based on sentiment and honour rather than on codified rules and regulations’ (my emphasis).

3. Edward Said has pointed to this kind of use of the present tense as a characteristic trope of orientalism:

   Philosophically, then, the kind of language, thought, and vision that I have been calling orientalism very generally is a form of radical realism: anyone employing orientalism, which is the habit for dealing with questions, objects, qualities and regions deemed Oriental, will designate, name, point to, fix, what he is talking or thinking about with a word or phrase which is then considered to have acquired, or more simply to be, reality [...]. The tense employed is the timeless eternal; they convey an impression of repetition and strength [...]. For all these functions it is frequently enough to use the simple copula is. (Quoted in Bhabha 1994, 71)

4. A useful point of comparison here might be Clifford Geertz’s recent work, *After the fact: two countries, four decades, one anthropologist* (1995), in which Geertz looks back over several decades of fieldwork in Morocco and Indonesia, placing his own evolving interpretations of the societies he studied in the context of changes both in the discipline of anthropology and in the local, national, and global social, economic, and political conjuncture.

5. Paradoxically, in *Travail et Travailleurs...* Bourdieu (1963a, 260-61) had claimed that precisely the opposite was true: "chaque fois que l’on essayait d’interroger les paysans regroupés sur leur
existence antérieure, on se heurtait à leur étonnement scandalisé voire hostile; au contraire, on rencontrait un intérêt passionné dès que l'on revenait au seul sujet digne d'étude à leurs yeux, à savoir leur misère actuelle'.

6. The article in question was entitled 'The Sentiment of Honour in Kabyle Society' and appeared first in the 1965 anthology, Honour and Shame: the values of Mediterranean society (see Bourdieu 1965c). This essay was later to form one of the 'trois études d'ethnologie kabyle' which opened Esquisse...

7. The very fact of claiming a specific Kabyle identity is a highly political act with a complex and problematic relationship to the history of French colonialism since the term 'Kabyle' was itself first coined by French colonial ethnographers to denote a cultural and geographical area whose boundaries they themselves had defined. Thus, even someone sympathetic to the Kabyle cause and critical of the cultural and political hegemony of the FLN such as the novelist and playwright Kateb Yacine expresses severe reservations about the demands for recognition of a specifically Kabyle identity:

Tous ces termes [kabyle, berbère, chaoui, etc] sont étrangers. ils proviennent tous des puissances ennemies qui nous ont envahies. ce sont des termes péjoratifs, dirigés contre nous, et leur emploi par nous est la preuve accablante que nous n'avons pas encore entièrement relevé le défi. Un tel langage venant de nous n'est-il pas suicidaire? (in Ouerdane 1990, 13)

Mohammed Hocine Benkheira (1996) argues that the calls for recognition of a Kabyle identity ultimately rest on an essentialism rooted in the history of colonial ethnography. It is significant that Bourdieu never engages with these thorny questions head on.

8. As the Kabyle commentator Amar Ouerdane (1990, 9) notes in his analysis of the historical genesis of the 'printemps berbère', a necessary preliminary to understanding those events is a total break with:
l’occultation de l’existence historique des Berbères entretenue par les historiens contemporains notamment algériens et français marqués par les idéologies nationale et coloniale [...] Plusieurs affirmations non fondées sont avancées par ces historiens avec le plus grand sérieux et les Berbères continuent, à leurs yeux, d’être des sujets d’études, d’objets de descriptions folkloriques ou ethnographiques et de simples témoins ‘aux marges de l’histoire’.

9. Bourdieu was referring to his 1976 article, ‘Un Jeu chinois: notes pour une critique sociale du jugement’, which he subsequently included in an appendix to La Distinction entitled ‘Un Jeu de société’ (see Bourdieu 1979, 623-40).

10. Ginzburg (1996) provides a concise analysis of the history of this notion of ‘de-familiarisation’ from classical historiography and ethnography to modernist literature.

11. In Esquisse..., Bourdieu (1972. 245n.8) described his analysis of gift exchange as representing precisely such an attempt to work through and transcend the limitations of Mauss’s and Lévi-Strauss’s respective accounts of gift exchange.

12. The precedent for this kind of analogy would seem to be Thorstein Veblen’s Theory of the Leisure Class (1912). Like Mauss, Veblen drew on Franz Boas’s analysis of the conspicuous destruction of goods in North American Indian potlatch ceremonies, but Veblen used these as a model for the ‘conspicuous consumption’ of wealth and time by the leisured classes in turn-of-the-century America. Bourdieu’s reference to ‘la pure consommation, d’argent bien sûr mais aussi de temps [...] qui s’oppose de manière ostentatoire à l’univers profane’, suggested a continuing debt to Veblen. Indeed, one of the sections of La Reproduction, ‘Les Rendements sociaux du temps gaspillé’ (Bourdieu 1970, 251), suggested a particular debt to Veblen’s final chapter on ‘The Higher Learning as an Expression of the Pecuniary Culture’.

13. One obvious exception to this was Bourdieu’s 1992 study of the nineteenth-century literary and artistic fields, Les Règles de l’art. However, this was identified as a work of historical research referring to a clearly defined historical epoch in a way in which his ethnological studies of Kabylia were not.
14. For Bourdieu (1971b, 303), the term ‘ideology’ denotes what he terms a ‘(quasi) système expressement systématisé’, such as an objectified system of religious or political belief, rather than the more general relation between agents or groups and social or economic structures. This contrasts strongly with Althusser (1970, 114) for whom ‘l’idéologie est une “représentation” du rapport imaginaire des individus à leurs conditions réelles d’existence’. For Althusser’s critique of the Husserlian notion of the immediacy of pre-reflexive or doxic experience, see Althusser (1965a, 70).

15. As Bachelard put it (1934, 149-50): ‘Quand on voudra mesurer la valeur épistémologique d’une idée fondamentale, c’est toujours du côté de l’induction et de la synthèse qu’il faudra se tourner. On verra alors l’importance du mouvement dialectique qui fait trouver des variations sous l’identique et qui éclaire vraiment la pensée première en la complétant’.

16. Bachelard’s critique of deductive reasoning and his elaboration of the concept of ‘regional rationalisms’ can be found in Le Rationalisme appliqué (1949), see particularly Chapter V, ‘L’identité continuée’, and Chapter VII, ‘Les Rationalismes régionaux’, (in Bachelard 1949, 82-101; 119-37). As Dominique Lecourt (1974, 109n. 13) has pointed out, the allied concepts of ‘des rationalismes régionaux’ and ‘des épistémologies régionaux’, which Bachelard elaborated in these chapters, were intended to parody the concept of ‘ontologies régionales’ which Husserl had developed in his description of the phenomenological intuition of essences in the first chapter of the Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie (see Husserl 1913, 13-59).

17. Bourdieu also suggested that women’s studies was a ‘cause’ with no epistemological justification other than the domination to which its practitioners were subject. This cavalier attitude to feminism and women’s studies incurred the entirely justifiable wrath of a group of French feminists (see Armengaud et al 1995).

18. This was a reference to Bourdieu’s earlier analysis of the tendency to respond to political opinion polls by both class and gender in the article ‘Questions de politique’ (1977), which was later included in La Distinction (see Bourdieu 1979, 463-541). This article has been subjected to sustained critique by Claire Michard-Marchal and Claudine Ribery (1982), who argue that Bourdieu uncritically posits men’s responses as the norm against which women are judged and found lacking. Thus, for example, the fact that women consider women’s liberation to be an
important political issue is judged by Bourdieu to be a manifestation of a more 'local', 'sentimental', or 'moral' conception of politics than that possessed by men.

19. Quite how the ironic distance both Mrs Ramsay and the Kabyle women displayed towards the existing structure of gender relations could be squared with the notion that those relations were internalised at the doxic or prereflexive level so as to be placed beyond the sway of reflexive critique was never explained by Bourdieu.
CHAPTER SIX
LA DISTINCTION: OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES?

In 1979, Bourdieu published what was to prove his most detailed and surely most influential study of the links between class, culture, and social reproduction. *La Distinction* was the culmination of over fifteen years work, having its origins in the survey of tastes and patterns of cultural consumption Bourdieu had conducted in 1963 amongst a sample of 692 inhabitants of Paris, Lille, and an unnamed provincial town. He had already used some of the data from this survey in his contribution to the 1965 study of photography, *Un Art moyen*. However, much of the more general data had remained unused and in 1967-68 he had conducted a second stage of research, boosting his sample to a total of 1,217 respondents. It was these data, supplemented by numerous surveys of cultural and leisure activities conducted by both public and private research bodies, which formed the empirical core of *La Distinction*.

However, if Bourdieu's concern with the relationship between class and cultural consumption remained constant from his early studies, such as *Un Art moyen* (1965), *Le Partage des bénéfices* (1966), and *L'Amour de l'art* (1969), to the later *La Distinction*, the interpretative framework he brought to bear on this issue had undergone considerable refinement and modification. The key concepts of 'habitus', 'strategy', and 'practice' were to be employed in a way which had remained underdeveloped in the earlier works, whilst cultural practices in contemporary France were to be understood in terms of the 'general theory of the economy of practices', which Bourdieu had elaborated in his studies of Kabylia. This much was made clear by the very first sentence of *La Distinction*: 'Il y a une économie des biens culturels, mais cette économie a une logique propre qu'il faut dégager pour échapper à l'économisme' (1979, I). Just as the Kabyle gift economy functioned according to a logic which was not directly reducible to the workings of a money economy, so Bourdieu argued, the economy of cultural goods in the West functioned according to its own specific, 'practical logic'.

It was not merely Bourdieu's interpretative framework which had changed in the interim between the publication of his early works on class and culture and *La Distinction*. Those early works had been written at the height of 'les trente glorieuses', the thirty years of French post-war reconstruction and economic growth, and had been centrally concerned with dispelling certain
myths about the socially ‘homogenising’ and culturally ‘democratising’ force both of that growth and of the spread of the mass media. The first oil crisis of 1973-74 had heralded the arrival of a much less optimistic economic and social conjuncture. France, in common with other major Western economies, suffered a period of low growth and high inflation and was henceforth to be burdened with a high rate of structural unemployment. According to Emmanuel Godin (1996), the economic crisis of the mid-1970s provoked some amongst France’s political, economic, and administrative elite to re-think the French state’s traditionally dirigiste role in economic planning and to take the first tentative steps towards an embrace of a more liberal or neo-liberal economic ideology. This interest in more liberal ideologies was fuelled by the election in 1974 of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing who affected a more cosmopolitan, dynamic, modern style of presidency which, ostensibly at least, looked to America for inspiration rather than to the Gaullist tradition of centralised economic planning.

It would be wrong to exaggerate the significance of this political shift; neo-liberalism never achieved the hegemony it was to enjoy in Britain and America after the election of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, in 1979 and 1980 respectively. Indeed, Suzanne Berger (1987, 85-6), who notes the ‘first signs’ of the emergence of ‘this new liberal synthesis’ in the mid-1970s, emphasises that the ‘years of the Giscard presidency are today described by businessmen as a time of maximum interference in their day-to-day decisionmaking by a handful of top civil servants close to the President’. Jack Hayward (1986, 34) has talked of ‘a change to a new model “entrepreneurial state” in France’, at this time, ‘enveloped’ in the ‘liberal rhetoric’ of Giscard and his prime minister Raymond Barre. Thus, it would perhaps be better to think in terms of a French political and administrative elite who continued to exert considerable influence over the workings of the French economy, primarily through the management of large partly or wholly state-owned enterprises, whilst increasingly adopting a discourse championing a certain economic liberalism, managerial efficiency, and the imperatives of international business.

It was the structure and historical genesis of this particular mix of technocratic dirigisme and liberalism that Bourdieu had sought to trace and satirise in a lengthy article of 1976, co-authored with Luc Boltanski, ‘La Production de l’idéeologie dominante’. Bourdieu outlined the emergence of this ‘dominant ideology’ over the longue durée, locating its roots in the inter-war years in groups
such as ‘X-Crise’ or the personalists collected around Emmanuel Mounier and the journal *Esprit* and tracing its development amongst post-war administrators associated with the Plan, such as François Bloch-Lainé and Claude Gruson, intellectuals, such as Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, Michel Crozier, and Jean Fourastié, and politicians, such as Michel Poniatowski, Lionel Stolérus, and Giscard d’Estaing. The dominant motifs of this ideology were, he argued, elaborated ‘à l’intersection du champ intellectuel et du champ du pouvoir, c’est-à-dire au lieu où la parole devient pouvoir, dans ces commissions où le dirigeant éclairé rencontre l’intellectuel éclairant’ (1976, 4).

In what he termed an ‘Encyclopédie des idées reçues et des lieux communs en usage dans les lieux neutres’, Bourdieu presented an alphabetical listing of the keywords of this ideology which, starting from ‘Amérique’ and ‘Avenir’, ran through ‘néo-libéralisme’, ‘progress’ ‘technocratic planning’, and ended with an entry for ‘Tiercé’, under which Poniatowski’s critiques of the disincentive effect of social security payments on the workforce were quoted. According to Poniatowski, if the logic of social security payments to the disadvantaged was pursued to its logical extreme, ‘il faudra un jour que le gouvernement dédommage les parieurs malchanceux au tiercé’ (1976, 30-1).

Bourdieu emphasised that this new ‘dominant ideology’ was not the preserve of the Right, citing Jacques Delors as a prominent Socialist who had rallied to this ‘utopie technocratique de “gauche”’ based on the notion of ‘la planification démocratique’ (1976, 37). However, he did argue that it should be seen as a ‘conservatisme reconverti’ or ‘progressiste’ which had replaced older forms of conservatism and was enabling the dominant classes to retain their dominance in a modern multinational economy:

Parce que le conservatisme reconverti choisit le nécessaire, c’est-à-dire le progrès économique (et même “social”) nécessaire à la conservation de l’ordre établi. Il se définit contre le conservatisme primaire, qui rend ainsi un ultime service en faisant passer inaperçu le conservatisme reconverti ou en le faisant apparaître comme progressiste. [...] Le conservatisme progressiste est le fait d’une fraction de la classe dominante qui se donne pour loi subjective ce qui constitue la loi objective de sa perpétuation, à savoir de changer pour conserver. (42-3)
Bourdieu had first sketched this critique of technocratic ideology and of the 'lieux de rencontres' between the intellectual field, politics, bureaucracy, and the economy in his 1967 article, 'Sociology and Philosophy in France since 1945: Death and Resurrection of a Philosophy without Subject'. In the 1960s, his critique of that ideology took the form of a series of studies which emphasised the continuing inequalities of class and gender in culture and education in spite of France's post-war prosperity. In La Distinction, on the other hand, Bourdieu would set out to analyse the new kinds of bourgeois and petit-bourgeois aesthetic and lifestyle which were the adjuncts, on the cultural level, of this 'progressive' political ideology. Several of the newspaper or magazine articles with which he chose to illustrate the text made reference to those politicians or intellectuals he had identified in 'La Production de l'idéologie dominante' as the prime adherents of this 'conservatisme reconverti'.

Thus, for example, he juxtaposed a photograph of the high-tech interior of Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber's apartment with a photograph of a classically furnished bourgeois interior (1979, 359); he included an article from Madame Figaro praising the taste in interior decor of Isabelle d'Ornano, sister-in-law of the Giscardian minister Michel d'Ornano (302-03), whilst Giscard's own delicate frame was juxtaposed with a photograph of a working class bodybuilder (233). These excerpts from magazines and newspapers had been chosen not simply to illustrate the refined taste of the bourgeoisie but rather to emphasise the new aesthetic and lifestyle pursued by the 'nouvelle bourgeoisie', the adherents of that 'conservatisme reconverti' whose emergence Bourdieu had examined in 'La Production de l'idéologie dominante'. Within such excerpts, then, were crystallised a whole series of inextricably related social, cultural, and political phenomena whose evolution La Distinction would seek to trace.

A series of English-speaking critics have criticised Bourdieu's conception of cultural capital in La Distinction for ignoring the importance of managerial culture, drawing too heavily on the French experience, and emphasising the importance of a certain high 'belle lettriste' culture to the detriment of more commercial forms of knowledge and aptitude (Giddens 1986; Jenkins 1992, 148; Lamont 1992; Shusterman 1992, 196-97). This chapter will argue to the contrary that one of Bourdieu's central concerns in La Distinction was the shift in bourgeois and petit-bourgeois identities, particularly, contingent upon the emergence of a certain kind of economic and social
liberalism, as older models of petit-bourgeois parcimony and moral rectitude or bourgeois reserve and refinement gave way to new freedoms of cultural and sexual expression, new models of dynamism, cosmopolitanism, and managerial efficiency.

If some critics have claimed that the concept of 'cultural capital' in La Distinction is defined in an anachronistic way, others have seen in Bourdieu's emphasis on lifestyle, on consumerism, on symbolic consumption rather than material production a sign of the text's inherently postmodern qualities (Lash 1990; Featherstone 1991; Bauman 1992, 51). The question of whether Bourdieu is a postmodernist or not is, of course, rendered problematic by the fact that there are almost as many definitions of the term as there are books on the subject. If, as Frederic Jameson (1991) argues, postmodernism is 'the cultural logic of late capitalism', then Bourdieu's work will indeed have to be considered postmodern, concerned as it is with the developments and contradictions of French late capitalism. However, Jameson's definition of postmodernity relies on the very model of expressive causality which those theorists most frequently associated with the term have sought to challenge and deconstruct.

Moreover, if a focus on the symbolic rather than the material economy, on consumption rather than production, is taken to be inherently postmodern, then large sections of the work of such profoundly modernist thinkers as Veblen, Durkheim, Weber, even Marx himself, must be designated postmodern and the term risks losing all specificity or analytical rigour. As Bridget Fowler (1997, 49) has argued, Durkheim's De la division du travail social (1893) contains sections on sumptuary laws, codes of dress, food, and manners in a way which seems to anticipate Bourdieu's La Distinction. Indeed, Bourdieu's focus on lifestyle and consumption as key determinants of social class has other significant precedents within the classical French sociological tradition. Edmond Goblot's work on the distinctive, in both senses of the term, educational and cultural heritage of the French bourgeoisie in his La Barrière et le niveau (1925) is one such. Maurice Halbwachs's detailed study of working class lifestyles and patterns of consumption, La Classe ouvrière et les niveaux de vie (1912), provides another important precedent in this respect.

The distinction between classically modernist accounts of consumption and symbolic distinction and a postmodern account of such phenomena hinges on the question of whether or not one posits a set of 'natural' or 'essential' needs underpinning these signifiers of wealth and class. Despite their
differences, thinkers on the French Left as diverse as Touraine, Lefebvre, Barthes, and the Situationists had all offered analyses of mass consumerism in the 1960s which remained within a profoundly modernist problematic; they were united in analysing the advent of mass culture in post-war France by recourse to the Hegelian-Marxist concepts of alienation and reification. For all these commentators, mass consumer culture constituted a profoundly alienating domain, eliciting in individual and class subjects alike a series of 'false' needs which it then proposed to satisfy through the seductive, but ultimately vacuous, lure of the commodity. Mass consumerism, it was argued, replaced older organic ties of community and tradition with the ephemeral pleasures of a seemingly ever-increasing range of reified commodities.

This analysis assumed, firstly, that there was an underlying human essence which, alienated from itself under capitalism, could be recovered through the establishment of a future communist or socialist society in which the workers' 'real' needs would be satisfied. This, in turn, supposed that whilst the workers were in thrall to the seductive lure of the commodity, intellectuals themselves were not and were thus able to adjudicate, on the workers' behalf, between their 'real' and their 'false' needs. Further, this account was inherently teleological, projecting a messianic role onto both intellectuals and workers alike, for it assumed that as capitalism developed and the workers' alienation increased, so they would become aware of their objective state and rise up against it in a revolutionary movement that signified both the realisation of their allotted historical role and the recovery of the plenitude of their once alienated souls.

A postmodernist would seek to question or deconstruct the opposition between 'false' and 'true' needs which underpinned these analyses and in so doing undermine the meta-narrative of the workers' 'fall' into alienation and 'redemption' through revolutionary action which was its logical corollary. Thus, for example, in Pour une critique de l'économie politique du signe (1972) and Le Miroir de la production (1973), Jean Baudrillard sought to deconstruct the Marxist opposition between 'use value' and 'exchange value', arguing that it relied on an unstated opposition between nature and culture. He maintained that it was impossible to identify a realm of use values, of pure organic needs prior to their commodification in the reified domain of capitalist exchange.

According to Baudrillard, all needs were always already culturally mediated, to distinguish between 'real' and 'false' or 'alienated' needs was to indulge in an ethnocentric nostalgia for a realm of
organic, primitive nature to which the action of the working class would one day return us in a
realisation of its revolutionary essence. Uncoupled from their articulation to any concept of use
value, commodities were governed by an ungrounded play of signifiers. As Baudrillard (1973, 92)
put it, in a passage which nicely sums up the difference between a modernist and postmodernist
account of social distinction and symbolic consumption:

Les finalités de prestige, de distinction correspondaient encore au statut traditionnel du
signe, là où un signifiant renvoie à un signifié, là où une différence formelle, une opposition
distinctive (la coupe de tel vêtement, le style de tel objet) renvoie encore à ce qu'on pourrait
appeler la valeur d'usage du signe - à un profit différentiel, à une distinction vécue (valeur
signifiée). C'est encore l'ère classique de la signification, avec sa psychologie (et sa
philosophie) référentielle. C'est aussi l'ère concurrentielle dans la manipulation des signes.
La forme/signe décrit une toute autre organisation: le signifié et le référent s'y abolissent au
profit du seul jeu des signifiants, d'une formalisation généralisée où le code ne renvoie à
aucune 'réalité' subjective ou objective, mais à sa propre logique: il devient son propre
référent, et la valeur d'usage du signe disparaît au profit de sa seule valeur de commutation et
d'échange.

Postmodernism, then, at least as far as this thesis understands it, means something more than an
emphasis on the seductive lure of the commodity or the precedence of consumption over production
in late capitalist economies. It implies, rather, the deconstruction of a whole series of binary
oppositions between nature and culture, 'real' needs and 'false' needs, use value and exchange
value and, as a result, challenges the notion of the free rational subject and the historical meta-
narrative of his or her enslavement and emancipation. This chapter will therefore distinguish
between the concept of 'late capitalism' as a historical periodisation and the term 'postmodern', as
used to describe a series of intellectual concerns which strike at the keystones of typically modern
concepts such as free subjectivity, alienation, historicism, and so on. It will argue that whilst La
Distinction is concerned to track and analyse certain characteristic traits of late capitalism, the
mode of analysis adopted by Bourdieu remains profoundly modernist, rooted in the classical
traditions of French sociology. This distinction will facilitate a reading of the text which places it in the interrelated contexts of the development of Bourdieu's own thought, of changes in social class and cultural consumption in the France of the 1970s, and of contemporary developments in French thought, against which Bourdieu explicitly, and sometimes vociferously, defined his approach in *La Distinction*.

The chapter will start by outlining in general terms how Bourdieu's theory of practice affected his reading of the aesthetic dispositions of the different social classes. Only once Bourdieu's general and somewhat schematic model of different class aesthetics has been elucidated will it be possible to show how he complicated that initial model by emphasising both the agonistic nature of cultural judgements and distinctions and the way the basis of such judgements and distinctions had shifted under French late capitalism.

The Aesthetic Disposition as 'Le Sens Pratique'

In *Les Règles de l'art* (1992), Bourdieu was to distinguish between two stages in his understanding of the processes involved in the appreciation of a work of art. His early work, he suggested, remained too 'intellectualist', focusing on art appreciation in terms of the possession or otherwise of the requisite hermeneutic code with which to decipher the work in question. Progress beyond this 'intellectualist' mode of analysis was aided by two key developments. Firstly, his elaboration of a theory of practice in his *Kabyle* work and, secondly, his reading of Martin Baxandall's study, *Painting and Experience in Fifteenth-Century Italy* (1972). The combination of these two influences, Bourdieu argued, allowed him to understand art appreciation less as an intellectual exercise of decipherment than as a social practice; it encouraged him to think in terms less of a codified set of knowledge than of an aesthetic disposition and to analyse that disposition in terms of 'la logique spécifique du sens pratique, dont le sens esthétique est un cas particulier' (1992a, 431-34).

In his study of the painters of the early Italian Renaissance, Baxandall had shown that the way in which the modern art lover or critic interpreted the works of Piero della Francesca, Fra Angelico, or Ghirlandaio would have been totally alien to those who originally commissioned and consumed such works. Far from seeing such works as the expression of an individual creative genius.
fifteenth-century Italians would interpret the size of the painting and its use of expensive colours such as gold or blue ultramarine as quite intentional markers of the wealth and prestige of the man who had commissioned it. The form and subject matter of the work, meanwhile, would be interpreted in accordance with a set of internalised precepts which reflected the complex intellectual, social, and cultural mores of the educated Florentine or Senese.

The importance of Baxandall's work to Bourdieu's analyses of taste and aesthetics was clear. Firstly, Baxandall emphasised the historically and culturally arbitrary nature of modern conceptions of the autonomous artist whilst demonstrating the close homology between the historical conditions of a work's production or display and the modalities of its reception. Secondly, Baxandall's concept of 'cognitive style', of 'the interpreting skills one happens to possess, the categories, the model patterns and the habits of inference and analogy', the implicit, socially inculcated class ethos which determined the way early Renaissance art was received, clearly had much in common with the concepts of 'habitus' and 'practical taxonomy' that Bourdieu had elaborated in the Kabyle context (Baxandall 1972. 29-30).

Thus, in La Distinction Bourdieu argued that there was a homology between the leisurely, 'disinterested' gaze demanded by dominant aesthetics of the 'true' aesthete and the emergence in the mid-nineteenth century of a field of autonomous artistic production. As this field grew in autonomy, he maintained, so the tendency to view works of art as fulfilling any specific moral, social, or political function waned, to be replaced by an emphasis on the 'disinterested' contemplation of a work's form:

Le regard 'pur' est une invention historique qui est correlative de l'apparition d'un champ de production artistique autonome, c'est-à-dire capable d'imposer ses propres normes tant dans la production que dans la consommation de ses produits. Un art qui, comme toute la peinture post-impressioniste, par exemple, est le produit d'une intention artistique affirmant le primat du mode de représentation, exige catégoriquement une attention exclusive à la forme que l'art antérieur n'exigeait que conditionnellement. (1979. III-IV)
Bourdieu's enquiries into the historical genesis of this field of autonomous artistic production were to culminate in the publication of *Les Règles de l'art*, his study of the French literary and artistic fields at the time of Manet, Flaubert, and Baudelaire. In *La Distinction*, he was concerned less with the production than with the reception and consumption of cultural artefacts, arguing that the ability to adopt the 'pure' gaze demanded by legitimate aesthetics was socially determined. the expression of a habitus inculcated in very specific historical, social, and economic circumstances.

Towards the beginning of *La Distinction*, he presented the responses of his sample to two black and white photographs. The first showed the gnarled hands of an old woman. The second was a photograph of the gas refinery at Lacq; taken at night it appeared to represent little more than a series of vertical strips of light set against a black background. Class, Bourdieu argued, was the primary determinant of responses to these photographs. Working class respondents made judgements that were typically ethical or realist. They expressed sympathy for the plight of the old woman and were perplexed by their inability to identify the subject matter of the second photograph: their responses oscillated between non-comprehension at its apparent abstraction and efforts to identify its precise referent. The traditional fraction of the petite-bourgeoisie, artisans and shopkeepers, tended to reject this second photograph off-hand, seeing it as a pointless formal exercise; they manifested a certain resentment at the perceived ability of modern artists to earn large sums of money from works which had apparently demanded little or no effort or skill to complete. The newer fractions of the class, office employees, technicians, junior executives, were, according to Bourdieu, no less perplexed by the second photograph but were less willing to admit it for fear of revealing their ignorance or lack of culture. In their 'bonne volonté culturelle', they might seek to interpret the photograph by reference to a recognised canon of legitimate art, but they lacked that 'aisance' characteristic of the true connoisseur.

It was the dominant class, Bourdieu argued, who were the most likely to respond to both photographs as autonomous aesthetic objects, interpreting them in terms of form rather than function, reading the old woman's hands as an allegory or symbol of poverty, where poverty was understood as an abstract general phenomenon rather than a possible lived experience. Members of the dominant class were also most likely not only to identify correctly the subject of the photograph of the gas refinery, but also to relate the second photograph to other examples of abstract or avant-
garde art (1979, 46-9). These somewhat impressionistic findings were fleshed out and confirmed by more detailed statistical evidence regarding the kinds of subject deemed likely, by the various social classes, to make a beautiful photograph.

For Bourdieu, these different aesthetic responses were merely the expression of a class ethos or habitus, an ethos or habitus which itself was ultimately determined by the distance or immediacy of material need. To be able, as the dominant class was, to contemplate a photograph or work of art on the level of form alone, with no concern for its function or practical utility, reflected an attitude of leisurely, contemplative distance on the world dependent on the distance from immediate material need characteristic of bourgeois experience. Bourdieu argued that to contemplate a work of art with the 'pure' or 'disinterested' gaze demanded by legitimate aesthetics was to stage a 'break', 'rupture', or 'époché' with the ordinary world, which was itself a 'social break': 'Le regard pur implique une rupture avec l'attitude ordinaire à l'égard du monde qui, étant donné les conditions de son accomplissement, est une rupture sociale' (V). The echoes here of the description, in his Kabyle work, of the social break implicit in the epistemological break were entirely intentional. The aesthetic disposition, like the theoreticist or objectivist tendencies of the 'scholastic point of view', formed part of a more generalised capacity on the part of the bourgeoisie to stage a 'break' from or 'bracket off' the realm of ordinary existence and material necessity:

Capacité généralisée de neutraliser les urgences ordinaires et de mettre entre parenthèses les fins pratiques, inclination et aptitude durables à une pratique sans fonction pratique. la disposition esthétique ne se constitue que dans une expérience du monde affranchie de l'urgence et dans la pratique d'activités ayant en elles-mêmes leur fin, comme les exercices d'école ou la contemplation des œuvres d'art. Autrement dit, elle suppose la distance au monde [...] qui est le principe de l'expérience bourgeoise du monde. (57)

The bourgeoisie's distance from the realm of immediate material necessity, argued Bourdieu, determined their whole class ethos, an ethos which in turn functioned as 'la formule génératrice' determining tastes and practices not merely in the rarefied domain of aesthetics, but also in such mundane areas as clothing, food, interior decor, sport, and leisure. He admitted that the ability to
appreciate a work of art required a certain cultural competence, a particular stock of codified knowledge and reference, a code with which to decipher its meaning. Reading a work of art was 'un acte de connaissance, une opération de déchiffrement, de décodage, qui implique la mise en œuvre d'un patrimoine cognitif, d'une compétence culturelle' (III). However, he insisted that this 'patrimoine' was less the product of formal or explicit education than the expression of a structure of dispositions incorporated 'en deça du discours': 'la culture bourgeoise et le rapport bourgeois à la culture doivent leur caractère inimitable au fait que [...] ils s'acquérirent, en deça du discours, par l'insertion précoce dans un monde de personnes, de pratiques, et d'objets cultivés' (81). To be a connoisseur, Bourdieu argued, required a 'maîtrise pratique' of the principles of aesthetic taste and judgement, which could not be transmitted 'exclusivement par préceptes ou prescriptions' (71). Just as 'practical mastery' of the social norms and conventions in Kabyle society defined 'le paysan accompli', so in the West 'le jugement de goût est la manifestation suprême du discernement qui [...] définit l'homme accompli' (9).

The bourgeois aesthetic was, then, analogous to 'le sens pratique' of the Kabyle villagers. It was less the product of formal education than a structured set of dispositions, a habitus inculcated at the pre-predicative level, the expression of the experience of being born into and inhabiting a cultured, refined spatial, social, and affective universe. Working class people, Bourdieu maintained, inhabited a radically different social and affective universe; their class ethos was determined by the collective experience of material necessity and expressed itself in a realist aesthetic, a preference for function over form, quantity over quality, the 'straightforward' or immediate pleasures over the 'refined' or deferred, whether in the domain of art, sport, food, or fashion. This realist aesthetic also had its origins not so much in formal education or its absence as in the incorporated structures of the habitus. These two classes possessed a set of antagonistic 'practical taxonomies' which reflected the very different social environments in which they had been inculcated:

les rapports sociaux objectivés dans les objets familiers, dans leur luxe ou leur pauvreté, dans leur 'distinction' ou leur 'vulgarité', dans leur 'beauté' ou leur 'laideur', s'imposent par l'intermédiaire d'expériences corporelles aussi profondément inconscientes que le frôlement rassurant et discret des moquettes beiges ou le contact froid et maigre des linoléums déchirés
From ‘La Lutte des Classes’ to ‘La Lutte des Classements’

If the working class’s relationship to material necessity generated a particular class ethos and through that a particular aesthetic disposition, it also generated a very different conception of which qualities constituted ‘l’homme accompli’. According to Bourdieu, the working class ethos was based on the collective experience of material necessity; making a virtue of that necessity, their ethical code valued ‘honesty’ and ‘straightforwardness’ over the niceties and formalities of bourgeois social convention, it favoured the physical force of the manual worker, weight lifter, or wrestler over the deft grace of the tennis player. Thus Bourdieu described ‘deux visions du monde antagonistes, deux mondes, deux représentations de l’excellence humaine’. Neither of these antagonistic visions was neutral or absolute: the classifications and forms of behaviour valued by one class would be rejected by the other as either too ‘vulgar’ or too ‘formal’, depending on which class perspective was adopted:

là où les uns voient le sans-gêne, le laisser-aller, les autres voient l’absence de façons, de prétentions: la familiarité est pour les uns la forme la plus absolue de reconnaissance, l’abdicación de toute distance, l’abandon confiant, la relation d’égal à égal; pour les autres, qui veillent à ne pas se familiariser, l’inconvenance de façons trop libres. (222)

Caught between these two antagonistic visions of the world lay the petite-bourgeoisie. Bourdieu argued that their class ethos was determined by their need to distinguish themselves from the working class and their aspirations to social betterment. Amongst the more traditional fractions of the petite-bourgeoisie this would manifest itself in a rigorous work ethic and a rejection of both the ‘frivolity’ of bourgeois culture and the ‘vulgarity’ of the working class. Less conventionally moralistic, Bourdieu argued, were the newer petit-bourgeois fractions who had benefited from the expansion in higher education and were taking up white collar posts in the growing tertiary sector. Their aspirations were likely to manifest themselves in that ‘bonne volonté culturelle’, that enthusiasm for a culture too recently acquired, a culture which still bore the visible marks of the
effort involved in its acquisition and could not, therefore, compete with the 'aisance' and 'désinvolture' of the 'natural' aesthete. Where the petite-bourgeoisie sought to distinguish itself from working class 'vulgarity', the bourgeoisie sought to distinguish itself from petit-bourgeois 'pretention':

toute profession petit-bourgeoise de rigorisme, tout éloge du propre, du sobre et du soigné enferme une référence tacite à la malpropreté, dans les mots ou les choses, à l'intemperance ou l'imprévoyance; et la revendication bourgeoise de l'aisance ou de la discrétion, du détachement et du désintérêtement, n'a pas besoin d'obéir à une recherche intentionnelle de la distinction pour enfermer une dénonciation implicite des 'prétentions', toujours marquées en trop ou en trop peu, de la petite-bourgeoisie 'étriquée' ou 'tapageuse', 'arrogante' ou 'servile', 'inculte' ou 'scolaire'...

According to Bourdieu, then, questions of taste, culture, and lifestyle were played out on a dynamic, agonistic field of struggle between the classes: 'la définition de l'art et, à travers lui, de l'art de vivre est un enjeu de lutte entre les classes' (50). Individuals and classes were portrayed as being involved in a constant process of judging and being judged, of classifying and being classified, of defending the classifications they valued against those valued by other classes. Class identity, Bourdieu argued, was as much about a shared set of tastes and aversions as it was about a shared relationship to the relations of production: 'c'est enfin une adhésion immédiate, inscrite au plus profond des habitudes, aux goûts et aux dégoûts, aux sympathies et aux aversions, aux phantasmes et aux phobies, qui, plus que les opinions déclarées, fondent, dans l'inconscient, l'unite d'une classe' (249). Drawing on a mass of empirical data concerning the consumption of food, clothing, music, film, art, and sports. Bourdieu argued that lifestyle 'choices', from the kind of car driven or holiday taken, to the newspaper read or the interior decor chosen, formed 'les quelques traits distinctifs qui, fonctionnant comme système de différences, d'écarts différentiels, permettent d'exprimer les différences sociales les plus fondamentales' (249).

Bourdieu's emphasis on a differential system of classification made up of opposing and homologous terms revealed his continuing debt to structuralism. However, this was a structuralism
reformulated in accordance with the 'theory of practice' he had elaborated in his Kabyle work. In an article published five years before *La Distinction. L'Avenir de classe et la causalité du probable* (1974), Bourdieu had offered the following schematic representation of what he termed 'la taxinomie éthique dominante':

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(BOURGEOIS) :</th>
<th>(PETITS-BOURGEOIS) :</th>
<th>(PEUPLE) :</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;distingué&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;prétentieux&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;modeste&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aisé, ample (esprit, geste, etc.),</td>
<td>étroit, étriqué, emprunté.</td>
<td>gauche, lourd, embarrassé, timide, maladroit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>généreux, noble, riche,</td>
<td>petit, mesquin, chiche, parimonieux,</td>
<td>&quot;géné&quot;, pauvre, &quot;modeste&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>large (d'idées, etc.), libéral, libre,</td>
<td>stricte, formaliste, sévère.</td>
<td>&quot;bon enfant&quot;, &quot;nature&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>souple, naturel, aisé, désinvole, assuré,</td>
<td>rigide, crispé, contraint,</td>
<td>franc (parler).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ouvert, vaste, etc.</td>
<td>scrupuleux, précis, etc.</td>
<td>solide.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**fig. 3:** La taxinomie éthique dominante (Bourdieu 1974, 26)

Like the oppositions between inside and outside, light and dark, masculine and feminine structuring the Kabyle world, Bourdieu argued that these differential terms obeyed a 'practical logic'. The meaning and value of each term depended on the class perspective of the individual who apprehended it so that language and the classifications it mobilised became the locus of a struggle between competing class ethos. As Bourdieu put it, describing this ethical taxonomy:

Destinée à fonctionner dans la pratique, au service de fonctions pratiques, elle obéit à une logique pratique. C'est ainsi que le 'peuple' que les 'bourgeois' (c'est-à-dire plutôt les fractions dominantes de la classe dominante) engendrent lorsqu'ils le pensent par opposition à la petite-bourgeoisie n'est pas le 'peuple' qu'ils produisent lorsqu'ils le pensent par opposition à l'ouvrier des villes; ni davantage le 'peuple' qu'engendrent l'imagination
populiste (plus répandue dans les fractions dominées de la classe dominante), par opposition à la fois au 'bourgeois' et au 'petit-bourgeois', c'est-à-dire le bon et beau 'prolétaire', costaud, simple, franc, solide et généreux, à peine séparé par quelques inversions de signe du bon ouvrier modeste et gauche de l'imagination conservatrice. (1974, 26n.35).

There were, within this rather dense passage, the beginnings of a theory of the complex relations between language, class, and the myriad ways in which groups classify their own and others' tastes, values, and lifestyles. It is worth remembering that at the same time Bourdieu was publishing this and other articles which anticipated the content of La Distinction, he was also working on the essays on language and symbolic power he would later publish in the collection Ce que parler veut dire (1982). Moreover, as these essays show, Bourdieu had been reading M.M.Bakhtin/V.Voloshinov's study Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (1971), in which the linguistic signifier was considered to be inherently 'double-voiced', shot through with conflicting class and ideological values. In La Distinction, Bourdieu emphasised this 'double-voicedness' and its articulation with a broader range of struggles over class and cultural identities:

Sous leur apparente neutralité, des mots aussi ordinaires que pratique, sobre, propre, fonctionnel, drôle, fin, intime, distingué, sont ainsi divisé contre eux-mêmes, soit que les différentes classes leur accordent des sens différents, soit qu'elles leur donnent le même sens mais attribuent des valeurs opposées aux choses nommées.... (1979, 216)

Where Bakhtin, writing in the profoundly monologic context of Stalinist Russia, tended to see such 'double-voicedness' as inherently utopian, Bourdieu was decidedly less optimistic. In theorising language and culture as conflictual fields or marketplaces, he emphasised that not everyone entered the marketplace with equal amounts of linguistic or cultural capital. If the values attributed different cultural practices or linguistic terms were arbitrary and differential, some practices and some terms had greater objective legitimacy than others in ways which had all too material consequences. This too signalled a significant difference between Bourdieu's analyses of cultural practices in Kabylia and those in the class-divided West. He argued that where in Kabylia
there had only been one communally recognised conception of those values which constituted the
'paysan accompli', in a class-divided society the values which constituted the dominant conception
of 'l'homme accompli' would be those of the economically dominant class, the bourgeoisie.
Elevated to the level of an aesthetic and ethical norm, the culture and ethos of the bourgeoisie could
then constitute itself as so much cultural capital, a means of legitimating that class's economic and
political domination:

C'est là ce qui fait la différence entre la culture légitime des sociétés divisées en classes,
produit de la domination predisposé à exprimer et à légitimer la domination, et la culture des
sociétés peu ou pas différenciées où l'accès aux instruments d'appropriation de l'héritage
culturel est à peu près également réparti, en sorte que la culture, à peu près également
maîtrisée par tous les membres du groupe, ne peut pas fonctionner comme capital culturel,
c'est-à-dire comme instrument de domination.... (252-53)

Thus, Bourdieu argued, unlike the ethos of the working class or the petite-bourgeoisie, the
bourgeois ethos was legitimated in a philosophical discourse of aesthetics which elevated the
typically bourgeois attitude of leisurely, contemplative distance on the world to a prescriptive norm
of apparently universal validity. As in his earlier works, Bourdieu took Kant's Critique of
Judgement as the paradigm of a 'disinterested', 'pure' aesthetics. He argued that Kantian aesthetics
was 'une illusion bien fondée' inasmuch as it represented, at the level of philosophical discourse, a
faithful reflection of the bourgeois experience of the world. However, in positing a socially acquired
aesthetic disposition as a prescriptive norm of universal validity, it elevated a class-specific
experience to the level of a natural and immutable measure of intellectual and spiritual worth,
hence naturalising and legitimising class distinctions. One of Bourdieu's primary aims in La
Distinction was to de-bunk the claims of legitimate aesthetics to universal validity by demonstrating
that lofty claims to aesthetic 'disinterest' were in fact rooted in profoundly material, economic, and
social 'interests', that the same principles could be found at work behind a taste for Picasso as a taste
for pâté de foie gras, to use Elizabeth Wilson's example (Wilson 1988).
In effecting what he termed 'cette réintégration barbare des consommations esthétiques dans l'univers des consommations ordinaires' (1979, 110), as well as in illustrating the dynamic and agonistic nature of the cultural and linguistic fields, Bourdieu was greatly aided by his chosen style of textual presentation. In a style he named 'le montage discursif', and which had already characterised contributions to the journal he had founded in 1975, *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, Bourdieu supplemented the statistical analyses and textual commentary typical of a traditional work of social science with a collage of other texts and images, excerpts from newspapers and magazines, advertisements, and the personal testimonies of his research subjects. *La Distinction* thus contained a polyphony of conflicting voices and speech genres, each one clearly recognisable as the expression of a specific class ethos, of a particular socially determined set of judgements and classifications of the social and cultural world.

The same principles as motivated the Kantian doctrine of 'disinterested' aesthetics might be found in a sixteenth-century treatise on aristocratic manners, in the chevalier de Méré's assertion that: 'Ce qu'on doit corriger de la pluspart des Maistres, c'est quelque chose de trop concerté qui sent l'art et l'étude. Il faut faire en sorte que cela paroisse naturel' (quoted in 1979, 76). This preference for natural ease and grace might itself be found reproduced not only in Kantian aesthetics, but also in a young advertising executive's dismissive comments about a newcomer to his agency who lacked the intuitive sense of how to dress and behave. "qui compense, qui n'est pas très sûr de lui, qui veut en montrer aux autres", the "directeur financier de milieu très modeste [...] habillé comme un petit employé laborieux" (341-42). Thus were the lofty claims of taste and aesthetics revealed to have the most mundane and material of origins, to be rooted in the dominant class's objective distance and subjective sense of distinction from the realm of vulgar material necessity inhabited by the 'lower orders'.

This 'racisme de classe' did not operate on a purely linguistic level, however. As Bourdieu emphasised, the aesthetic and ethical taxonomies functioned also at the pre-predicative level. the opposing classifications they mobilised were incorporated into the habitus and hexis of class subjects, inscribed onto their very bodies:
Tout se passe comme si les conditionnements sociaux attachés à une condition sociale tendaient à inscrire le rapport au monde social dans un rapport durable et généralisé au corps propre, une manière de tenir son corps, de le présenter aux autres, de le mouvoir, de lui faire une place, qui donne au corps sa physionomie sociale. (552)

Where in Kabylia, this corporal hexis had been acquired by inhabiting a social space overdetermined by a rich network of symbolic associations, in the West it was acquired through inhabiting the socially differentiated spaces of home, work, and leisure. Again, Bourdieu used the technique of 'montage discursif' to illustrate these processes. Thus photographs of classical and formal bourgeois living rooms contrasted with the stark functionality of working class interiors. Photo-montages juxtaposed workers on the factory floor with an executive in his office, a body-builder with the slim frame of Giscard d'Estaing enjoying a tennis lesson.

Nor, Bourdieu argued, was this process of incorporation determined by class alone. Changes in the economy and the massive entry of women into the workforce had encouraged the proliferation of what he termed 'professions de présentation et de représentation (animateurs de tourisme, hôtesses, guides artistiques, présentateurs de radio et de télévision, attachés de presse, etc.)'. Beauty itself, he maintained, was receiving 'une valeur sur le marché du travail' and a 'redéfinition de l'image légitime de la féminité' was taking place under the combined effects of advertising, changing fashions, women’s magazines, and the emergence of a battery of advisors and educators, of 'médecins et diéticiens' imposing new norms of body weight, diet, and appearance through 'de nouveaux usages du corps et une nouvelle hexis corporelle', in the sauna, the gym, and on the ski slope. These transformations substituted 'la séduction à la répression, les relations publiques à la force publique, la publicité à l’autorité, la manière douce à la manière forte', and sought to achieve 'l'intégration symbolique des classes dominées de l'imposition des besoins plus que de l'inculcation des normes' (169-72).

It is this account of the body and its inscription by new discourses of consumer desire that a series of critics have identified as characteristically postmodern. Thus, Chris Wilkes has suggested an affinity between Bourdieu's conception of the body and the role of the body in the work of Michel Foucault (in Harker et al 1990, 117). Certainly, Foucault's description in *Surveiller et punir* (1975)
of the shift in penal practices from a 'classical' regime of brutal physical punishments to the 'modern' apparatuses involving close surveillance of the criminal subject's psychological state, needs, and motivations, did suggest one such affinity:

Le châtiment est passé d'un art des sensations insupportables à une économie des droits suspendus. S'il faut encore à la justice manipuler et atteindre le corps des justiciables, ce sera de loin, proprement selon des règles austères, et en visant un objectif bien plus 'élevé'. Par l'effet de cette retenue nouvelle, toute une armée de techniciens est venue prendre la relève du bourreau, anatomiste immédiate de la souffrance: les surveillants, les médecins, les aumôniers, les psychiatres, les psychologues, les éducateurs. (Foucault 1975, 16-7)

However, it is important to note the very particular conception of power, knowledge, and subjectivity which informed Foucault's analysis. For Foucault, the category of the 'free subject' was precisely one product of the 'modern', of that shift from a regime of severe physical punishment to a 'scientific' discourse of criminality and penalty. He sought to discover 'de quelle manière un mode spécifique d'assujettissement a pu donner naissance à l'homme comme objet de savoir pour un discours à statut "scientifique"' (28-9). Having identified subjectivity as itself a construct of modernity, Foucault could no longer undertake a classically modernist critique which sought to rescue the essence of free subjectivity from its alienation by certain identifiable repressive discourses or material forces. If Foucault's thought has been designated 'postmodern', it is precisely because it demands we think beyond the modern category of the subject and all it logically entails.

Bourdieu's analysis, on the other hand, continued to work within the terms of a classically modernist critique. If he portrayed the subject as being de-centered by a series of social and cultural forces inscribed on the body, he nonetheless considered that such forces could be identified and worked through in a process of self-reflexive critique. As he put it in Le Sens pratique, sociology offered, 'un moyen, peut-être le seul, de contribuer, ne fût-ce par la conscience des déterminations, à la contribution de quelque chose comme un sujet' (1980, 41). In La Distinction, he argued that socially dominated groups had an alienated relationship to their own bodies, being subjected to an objectifying 'regard social' which, paradoxically, 'trouve chez celui auquel il s'applique la
reconnaissance des catégories de perception et d'appréciation qu'il lui applique' (1979, 229).

Bourdieu's notion of the body and its alienations, thus, signalled his adherence to an older modernist problematic, a form of critique whose ultimate goal was to liberate the subject through the reflexive and rational grasp of those material determinants which threatened its freedom. Such a project distinguished his work not only from Foucault's, but a fortiori from other 'postmodern' accounts of desire and the body such as that contained in Deleuze and Guattari L'Anti-Oedipe (1972) or Jean-François Lyotard’s Economie libidinale (1974).

Similarly, Bourdieu's description of social and affective space as being traversed by a series of class divisions which mirrored and reinforced the opposition between high and low culture, seemed itself to constitute a peculiarly modernist vision of society. Certainly, it contrasted starkly with Jameson's (1991) attempt to theorise postmodernism as a failure of 'cognitive mapping'. For Jameson, the disorientating spaces of postmodern architecture, with its eclectic mix of classicism and kitsch, serves as an allegory for an era in which it is no longer possible to 'cognitively map' society according to 'older' co-ordinates of class and in which the increasing commodification of the cultural domain heralds the waning of any distinction between high and low culture. Bourdieu's insistence on the continuing importance of class and the fact that even commodities, perhaps especially commodities, could provide the grounds for distinctions between high and low culture might be seen as a timely reminder of the peremptory nature of such analyses. Certainly, Bourdieu emphasised that each class was defined 'par sa consommation [...] autant que par sa position dans les rapports de production (même s'il est vrai que celle-ci commande celle-là)' (1979, 564). However, there was nothing specifically postmodern about that assertion. Indeed, it had an important precedent in Halbwachs's study of working class lifestyles and patterns of consumption, La Classe ouvrière et les niveaux de vie (1912). Anticipating La Distinction by over sixty years, Halbwachs had used empirical data on working class expenditure on food, clothing, and housing to conclude that whilst position in the relations of production was important to class identity, so was consumption: 'si les distinctions sociales ont bien là leur origine, c'est ailleurs, c'est dans la société en tant qu'elle ne produit pas, mais qu'elle consomme, qu'elles se manifestent et se précisent' (Halbwachs 1912, 125).
To argue that Bourdieu was working within an 'older' profoundly modernist problematic is by no means to suggest that *La Distinction* was necessarily outdated, resistant to the dynamics of social or cultural change. For the apparent stasis and schematism of his description of the triadic structure of class relations were compensated by his emphasis firstly on the conflicting fractions contained within each class and secondly on certain significant changes in the definition of legitimate culture.

The possession or lack of cultural capital was not, according to Bourdieu, sufficient in itself to determine class identity or position. For, in a developed society with differentiated semi-autonomous fields, a diverse range of forms of capital existed, educational capital, economic capital, cultural capital, even social capital, that network of contacts and influential friends so important to a successful career. Thus, adherence to a particular class and, a fortiori to a specific class fraction, depended not merely on the volume but also on the structure of capital possessed. Moreover, Bourdieu argued, in different historical conjunctures different forms of capital would carry greater weight than others. A three dimensional map of social space could therefore be constructed, 'dont les trois dimensions fondamentales seraient définies par le volume du capital, la structure du capital et l'évolution dans le temps de ces deux propriétés' (1979, 128). Individuals and groups inhabiting that social space were involved in 'strategies' to conserve or accumulate capital, 'reconverting' economic into educational capital, social into economic in accordance with historical circumstances. The existence of different forms of capital and differentiated 'fields' or 'markets' in which that capital could be invested meant that agents followed potentially divergent 'trajectories' through social space; trajectories whose outcome was not determined once and for all by social origin but which rather reflected the meeting of class habitus and a field of objectively determined possibilities: 'le champ des possibles objectivement offert à un agent déterminé' (122). The ability to select the correct trajectory to follow or the most profitable field in which to invest was less a matter of free choice than of a strategy, that almost intuitive, socially inculcated 'sens du placement' or 'maîtrise pratique' which formed part of the bourgeois habitus.

The bourgeoisie itself was divided into fractions in accordance with the distribution amongst its members of these different forms of capital. Bourdieu described what he termed the 'chiasmatic' distribution of cultural and economic capital within the dominant class. At the dominant pole of
the dominant class were industrialists and senior executives who possessed high economic capital and relatively low amounts of cultural capital. At the dominated pole of the dominant class this relationship was inverted and the intellectual fraction possessed high cultural capital and relatively low economic capital. Between these two fractions were the liberal professions who, in possessing almost equal amounts of economic and cultural capital, were the epitome of the cultured, wealthy bourgeoisie.

Each of these different fractions, Bourdieu argued, possessed their own characteristic ethos and hence quite different tastes and lifestyles. For example, he contrasted 'l'aristocratisme ascétique des professeurs', their preference for serious, somewhat austere cultural pursuits, with the 'goûts de luxe des membres des professions libérales qui collectionnent les consommations les plus coûteuses' (325). Similarly, he maintained that while the intellectual fraction of the dominant class sought in art 'une contestation symbolique de la réalité sociale', the dominant fraction sought in art, literature, and culture 'des emblèmes de distinction [...], des instruments de dénégation de la réalité sociale' (334). Clearly, Bourdieu was attempting to provide a richer and more variegated analysis of a concept of cultural capital which, in his earlier work, had tended towards the monolithic and all-encompassing. Nonetheless, he remained doggedly sceptical as to the possibility of any cultural or artistic form offering a genuine challenge to the status quo. In opposing art to the base materialism of the market and the bourgeoisie, the dominated intellectual fraction deployed the same oppositions between 'disinterest' and 'vulgar materialism' as the bourgeoisie as a whole employed to distinguish itself from the dominated classes, Bourdieu argued. Hence, the most apparently radical artforms could be recuperated by the dominant fraction of the bourgeoisie to its own ends (284). Even avant-garde art, which apparently challenged the art institution itself, staged that challenge within the cultural domain and thus, 'par son existence même, contribue au fonctionnement du jeu culturel' (280n.25).

It might be argued that such surely unwarranted pessimism regarding the capacity of any artform, no matter what the specific historical circumstances, to provide a genuine focus for social or political dissent was the necessary price to pay if the concept of cultural capital were to retain any explanatory force. For once it was acknowledged that certain artforms had more than purely distinctive value, depending on the changing historical, political, or economic conjuncture in which
they were produced and consumed, then the principle of general equivalence between the 'classical' tastes of the haute bourgeoisie and the avant-garde tendencies of the intelligentsia could no longer apply and the metaphor of culture as merely 'capital' would break down. Put more simply, to argue that an intellectual's taste for the plays of Bertolt Brecht involves a certain intellectual and social prestige is not the same as saying that such a taste is reducible to that prestige and hence directly equivalent to a senior executive's taste for, say, the poems of Joachim du Bellay. Moreover, the line 'France mère des arts, des armes, et des lois' might itself take on a very different political resonance depending on where and when it is recited, whether, for example, by Jean-Marie Le Pen at a Front National conference or by a maquisard during the Nazi Occupation of France. The notion of cultural capital, in positing a principle of general equivalence between radically different cultural forms and the varied contexts in which they are produced and consumed, must inevitably overlook such complexities.

Another criticism frequently levelled at Bourdieu's use of the concept of cultural capital is that in drawing on the French experience it overestimated the importance of literary or artistic culture to the detriment of business or commercial cultures and aptitudes. Thus, in a recent article, Bonnie Erickson (1996, 220) argues that it is 'business culture' rather than high culture which predominates in the private commercial sector: 'Highbrow culture is defined as an irrelevant waste of time in the private sector and is actively excluded from the workplace'. What such criticisms ignore is the extent to which *La Distinction* anticipated and sought to trace precisely those shifts in the educational, economic, and cultural fields which accompanied the increasing hegemony of commercial over cultural values. Indeed, Bourdieu emphasised that the hierarchy of cultural over economic capital, or vice versa, was itself, 'à chaque moment un enjeu de luttes', and that if in certain conjunctures, 'le capital culturel peut être, comme aujourd'hui en France, une des conditions de l'accès au contrôle du capital économique', these conjunctures could and did change (1979, 131-32).

Referring back to his earlier studies of higher education, *Les Héritiers* and *La Reproduction*, Bourdieu argued that what he termed the post-war 'explosion scolaire' was a key determinant in a series of changes to the relationship between the different classes, between those classes and the education system, and between educational qualifications and job prospects (147). These changes.
in turn, were provoking a re-alignment in the relationship between economic, educational, and cultural capital. The influx of both women and the 'classes moyennes' into higher education had greatly increased the number of university graduates. In order to retain the rarity value of their qualifications, Bourdieu argued, the dominant class had to invest more in educational capital. These developments merely produced 'inflation' in the educational market and a general 'devaluation' in educational qualifications. This devaluation had the paradoxical effect of increasing the importance of inherited social and cultural capital.

In a job market increasingly filled with highly qualified graduates, the importance of a network of personal or family acquaintances increased exponentially; social capital was one of the 'moyens de résister à la dévaluation' (149). An equally important element of inherited cultural capital was that instinctive familiarity with the world of education, that highly refined 'sens du placement', which predisposed members of the dominant class to respond much more rapidly to changes in the educational and job markets, abandoning 'à temps les filières ou les carrières dévaluées pour s'orienter vers les filières ou les carrières d’avenir' (158). Lacking this inherited 'sens du placement', those who had recently gained access to higher education, women and the petite-bourgeoisie, continued, according to what Bourdieu variously termed 'alloodoxia' or 'l’hysteresis des catégories de perception et d'appréciation', to place their faith in those educational qualifications which had possessed value at an earlier historical moment (ibid). The resulting 'décalage entre les aspirations que le système d'enseignement produit et les chances qu'elle offre réellement', had, according to Bourdieu, given birth to 'une génération abusée', amongst the 'classes moyennes' and petite-bourgeoisie, forced, despite their qualifications, to accept relatively menial and uninspiring jobs (159-66). Those with no formal qualifications, meanwhile, were the most adversely affected by this devaluation of educational qualifications, finding it increasingly difficult to secure employment of any kind (150).

Bourdieu should be credited with considerable prescience, here. For the trends he sketched were to continue throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The periodic violent protest movements of French students against any measure perceived as likely to erode either their access to higher education or the already precarious nature of the privileges it guaranteed might themselves be seen as a somewhat paradoxical response to the continued devaluation of French higher education degrees.
Mass unemployment in France, meanwhile, has meant that it has become increasingly impossible to find even the most menial of jobs without some higher or vocational qualification.

These changes in the educational field coincided with and, to some extent, were determined by changes to the French economy, which Bourdieu argued, was becoming increasingly driven by the demands of multinational business and the international banking system (338). In order to retain their wealth and power, the dominant class thus had to 'reconvert' its economic capital into educational capital, ensuring that its offspring, who could no longer depend on the family's 'rentes', had the qualifications necessary to take up posts in multinational business:

La reconversion du capital économique en capital scolaire est une des stratégies qui permettent à la bourgeoisie d'affaires de maintenir la position d'une partie ou de la totalité de ses héritiers en leur permettant de prélever une part de ses bénéfices des entreprises industrielles et commerciales sous forme de salaires. mode d'appropriation mieux dissimulé - et sans doute plus sûr - que la rente. (155)

Bourdieu argued that a new managerial class was emerging; 'cadres de grandes entreprises nationales, publiques ou privés [...] ou patrons de grandes entreprises modernes, souvent multinationales'; their position was justified by qualifications obtained from one of the rising band of elite business or administrative schools. Unlike their predecessors, they had no particular attachments to 'des privilèges et des prestiges locaux, de plus en plus dévalués à mesure que progresse l'unification des marchés économique et symbolique qui les replace dans la hiérarchie nationale ou internationale' (360). Forming what Bourdieu termed 'la nouvelle bourgeoisie', this new managerial class constituted a 'nouvelle avant-garde éthique' with its own specific ethos and lifestyle quite different from France's more traditional 'haute bourgeoisie':

imprégnés de la culture économo-politique qui s'enseigne dans les instituts de sciences politiques ou les Business-schools et de la vision moderniste du monde économique et social qui en est solidaire et qu'ils contribuent à produire dans leurs colloques. commissions ou séminaires, ces 'cadres dynamiques' ont abandonné le champagne des patrons 'Vieille France'
At an institutional level, the emergence of this new managerial class was mirrored in the rising fortunes of the more commercially or managerially oriented grandes écoles, such as the Institut d'études politiques (Sciences-po), the Ecole des hautes études commerciales (HEC), or the Ecole nationale d'administration (ENA), at the expense of the guardians of a more traditional or classically Republican culture and learning, the Ecole normale supérieure (ENS) or the Ecole polytechnique. If Bourdieu argued that these two opposing visions of culture and education, of what constituted 'l'homme accompli', a literary or commercial culture, had always existed in one form or another, he suggested that currently it was the latter which was gaining hegemony (102-3). Thus, he maintained that the opposition between the 'cultured' intellectual and the 'materialism' of the bourgeois, 'céde la place [...] à l'opposition entre la culture gratuite, irréelle et irréaliste de l'intellectuel et la culture économique ou polytechnique des "cadres modernes"' (361).

At the level of taste and lifestyle, Bourdieu argued that a certain classicism in bourgeois manners, interior decor, sport, and leisure was being replaced by a greater emphasis on high tech interiors, a more relaxed, even narcissistic morality of self-realisation through 'la nouvelle morale hygiénique', and the practice of what he termed 'les sports californiens', archery, windsurfing, hang-gliding, and so on (243-46). Even those sports traditionally associated with the aristocracy or haute bourgeoisie, yachting, horse riding, or flying, were given a new valency when practised by 'une bourgeoisie multinationale et libre-échangiste, qui situe le principe de son pouvoir dans ses capacités décisionnelles et organisationnelles' (241).

The 'nouvelle bourgeoisie', according to Bourdieu, were playing a central role in the imposition of a new ethos based on consumption rather than production: 'une morale hédoniste de la consommation fondée sur le crédit, la dépense, la jouissance'. Occupying positions in marketing, public relations, and advertising, 'la nouvelle bourgeoisie des vendeurs de biens et de services symboliques' was responding to the demands of the 'new' economy by promoting consumer demand
for a whole range of products and imposing a new set of prescriptions about taste and lifestyle (356).

For Bourdieu, these significant shifts in the educational, cultural, and economic fields, as well as in the nature and structure of the forms of capital held by the bourgeoisie, by no means heralded an end to its dominant status. On the contrary, he emphasised that the new conjuncture had favoured the dominant class, even suggesting that those of its members who lacked the requisite educational capital could exploit their inherited cultural and social capital in the new professions in the media, marketing, and advertising which had less rigidly defined entrance criteria and thus fulfilled the same role as the army, the priesthood, or the colonies had in an earlier age (168n.37). Indeed, Bourdieu clearly considered that the increased importance of financial and commercial functions over technical or scientific ones under the impetus of an increasingly multinational economy, itself reflected in the rise of HEC, ENA, and Sciences-Po at the expense of Polytechnique and other 'écoles d'ingénieurs', had merely enabled the haute bourgeoisie to strengthen its grip on power:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{c'est ainsi que, à la faveur du changement des structures économiques et par l'intermédiaire principalement de l'Institut des sciences politiques, situés au bas de la hiérarchie proprement scolaire des écoles du pouvoir, la grande bourgeoisie parisienne s'est réapproprié sans doute plus complètement que jamais les positions dirigeantes dans l'économie et la haute administration de l'Etat} & . (338-39)
\end{align*}
\]

It might be possible to read into this passage, as in other passages where Bourdieu contrasted the elevated social origin that typified executives who had passed through HEC or ENA with the more modest social background of the typical polytechnicien, a certain lament for an age of more meritocratic, Republican cultural and educational values.

Many of the features of Bourdieu's description of the bourgeoisie were to be reflected in his analysis of the petite-bourgeoisie, both in terms of the chiasmatic distribution of forms of capital and the shifts in economic, educational, and cultural fields. The petite-bourgeoisie, he argued, was divided between artisans and shopkeepers, endowed with high economic capital but low cultural capital, and the 'instituteurs' and 'nouveaux intermédiaires culturels', whose low economic capital
was compensated for by their relatively high cultural capital (395). In between the two was 'la petite-bourgeoisie d'exécution', comprising 'employés de bureau' and 'cadres moyens'.

The 'nouveaux intermédiaires culturels', comprising all those who worked 'dans les professions de présentation et de représentation', from 'conseillers conjugaux', 'sexologues', and 'diététiciens' to 'animateurs culturels', 'éducateurs' and 'réalisateur et présentateurs de télévision', formed part of the most dynamic fraction, 'la petite-bourgeoisie nouvelle' (415). The composition of this fraction reflected the expansion of higher education and the feminisation of the workforce, whilst its emergence as a social force was determined by changes in the economy, 'en particulier l'accroissement de la part qui revient, jusque dans la production des biens, au travail symbolique de production du besoin' (397). Berstein and Rioux (1996, 156) have shown that these professions experienced one of the fastest rates of growth from the late 1960s onwards, the number of 'professions paramédicales, assistantes sociales, éducateurs spécialisés, psychologues et conseillers d'orientation' rising fivefold between 1968 and 1975. They link this to the development of the Welfare State, a factor which, as Jenkins (1992, 147) has pointed out. Bourdieu overlooked.

Bourdieu's interest seemed to lie more in the way this 'nouvelle petite-bourgeoisie', having abandoned 'l'ascétisme un peu morose' of traditional petit-bourgeois morality, was the natural ally of the 'nouvelle bourgeoisie' (1979, 423). Replacing the traditional petit-bourgeois respect for social norms and rigid hierarchies with an emphasis on the modern and the dynamic, the 'nouvelle petite-bourgeoisie' was in the vanguard of 'l'imposition des nouvelles doctrines de salut éthique' based around the expression and realisation of personal needs and desires:

à la morale du devoir qui, fondée sur l'opposition entre le plaisir et le bien, porte à la suspicion généralisée envers l'agrément et l'agréable, à la peur du plaisir et à un rapport au corps fait de la 'réserve', de 'pudeur' et de 'retenue', et qui assortit de culpabilité toute satisfaction des pulsions interdites, la nouvelle avant-garde éthique oppose une morale du devoir de plaisir qui porte à éprouver comme échec, propre à menacer l'estime de soi, toute impuissance à 's'amuser', to have fun, ou, comme on aime à dire aujourd'hui avec un petit frémissement, à 'jouir'.... (424)
In 'La Production de l'idéologie dominante', Bourdieu (1976, 44n.9) had argued that this emphasis on freedom of cultural and sexual expression had been born in May 1968 only to be appropriated and recuperated by the ‘nouvelle bourgeoisie’, ‘un de ces thèmes [...] que le nouveau discours a retenu du discours de mai en les retournant contre les menaces de subversion que ce discours enfermait’. The apparent liberalisation of a once rigid sexual and social morality thus concealed, according to Bourdieu, an equally normative ethic, ‘un culte de la santé personnelle et une thérapeutique psychologique’ whose injunctions to self-realisation were as prescriptive as the restrictive morality they claimed to contest (425). This ‘psychologisation du rapport au corps’ was, he suggested, accompanied by the emergence of a market for a whole range of ‘alternative’ therapies, sporting and leisure practices: ‘créativité, danse, diététique, drogue, dрогue, écologie, enfance, ésotérisme, expression corporelle’, ‘Gestalt-therapie’, ‘hatha-yoga, herbe, homéopathie’, ‘médecines orientales’, ‘nomades’, ‘parapsychologie, poterie, prisons, phénomènes psi’, the list was almost endless (429).

Gilles Lipovetsky, in his study L'Ère du vide (1983), was to argue that these new sports and therapies, ‘cette forme d’individualité à la sensibilité psychologique déstabilisée et tolérante, centrée sur la réalisation émotionnelle de soi-même’, was typical of the narcissism that characterised the postmodern era (19-20). Bourdieu’s attitude to these developments was equally critical. Not only did he argue that such narcissism was profoundly depoliticising (1979, 425), he also questioned whether ‘la nouvelle morale de la libération n’est pas en train d’offrir à l’économie le consommateur parfait’, a consumer freed of all the old restraints of class and community; an isolated, atomised individual defined primarily by consumption (431n.42). Moreover, Bourdieu's list of alternative therapies had included some sly references to those thinkers generally considered archetypal postmodernists, to Deleuze and Guattari, (‘nomades’), and to Foucault, (‘prisons’). His analysis of the new imperative to ‘jouissance’ might also be read as an allusion to the prevalence of a certain discourse of desire in contemporary French thought in texts such as Roland Barthes's Le Plaisir du texte (1973) and Lyotard's Economie libidinale (1974). Indeed, in referring to ‘les rencontres entre la thèmatique de la vulgate publicitaire - depuis longtemps accoutumée à parler le langage du désir - et les topiques les plus typiques de la haute vulgarisation philosophique’, Bourdieu pointed to what he saw as the complicity between ‘postmodern’ thought and the new forms of consumerism (431).
Far from betraying a static notion of 'highbrow culture', which ignored the importance of 'business culture', of 'personal networks and work relationships', as Erickson has argued, Bourdieu's analysis of both bourgeois and petit-bourgeois lifestyles was centrally concerned with the increasing dominance of a new business, managerial, or neo-liberal ethic. The changes in the economic, educational, and cultural fields which he described, the emergence of the multinational, the massive expansion in higher education, the appearance of new discourses of personal fulfillment and consumer desire could all be read as symptoms of that shift to late capitalism which Bourdieu had first traced in his work on class, education, and culture in the 1960s. However, if Bourdieu was analysing certain of the characteristic traits of late capitalism, his mode of analysis remained profoundly modernist. Nowhere was this clearer than in his treatment of the working class.

The Working Class as 'Repoussoir'

Bourdieu's portrayal of the working class in *La Distinction* and, more particularly, his assertion that the term 'culture populaire' represented a 'véritable alliance de mots', that, 'il n'existe pas d'art populaire' (459), has provoked harsh criticism even amongst his most favourable critics. Thus, Jenkins (1992, 148) refers to 'the superficiality' of Bourdieu's 'treatment of the working class', being 'matched only by its condescension'. Nicholas Garnham has seen 'a crude form of workerism' at work in *La Distinction* (in Calhoun et al 1993: 181). Bridget Fowler (1997, 100) questions whether Bourdieu's refusal to theorise any existing popular art suggests that he is still partly enchanted by the aesthetic ideology he wishes to deconstruct.

Central to Bourdieu's analysis of the aesthetic and lifestyle of the working class is the notion of the immediacy of material necessity. The precondition of the bourgeois aesthetic disposition was, he argued, that distance from the exigencies of material need which allowed the aesthete to suspend all question of the practical utility of a work of art and contemplate it on the level of pure form. The working class, on the other hand, because of the immediacy of their material needs, lacked the leisurely, contemplative distance on the world constitutive of the aesthetic experience. Theirs was a realist or functionalist aesthetic, 'une esthétique en soi' and not 'une esthétique pour soi', which manifested itself in a whole series of functionalist preferences in interior decor, for quantity over quality in food, art, sport, and so on (438). So strong was the class ethos based around this
collective experience of necessity and 'nécessité faite vertu'. Bourdieu maintained, that even the relatively wealthy fractions of the working class retained a taste for the simple things in life for fear of earning the ridicule and disapprobation of their peers (452-58). Intellectuals who attributed an independent and potentially liberating popular culture to the working class were guilty of naive wish-fulfillment, of ignoring the material conditions which prevented a popular aesthetic from ever constituting itself.

Key to Bourdieu's argument here were the conclusions he drew from a statistical analysis of the type and quantity of food consumed by working class households. He argued that the preference of the working class for substantial rather than delicate or 'formal' cuisine, a manifestation of the immediacy of their material need, was paradigmatic of their whole experience of the world and, in particular, of their attitude to time. He contended that working class eating habits manifested a demand for immediate satisfaction, an inability to defer or delay the moment of fulfillment in a rational calculation of possible future benefit:

le goût 'modeste' qui sait sacrifier les appétits et les plaisirs immédiats aux désirs et aux satisfactions à venir s'oppose au matérialisme spontané des classes populaires qui refusent d'entrer dans la comptabilité benthamienne des plaisirs et des peines, des profits et des coûts (par exemple pour la santé et la beauté). C'est dire que ces deux rapports aux nourritures terrestres ont pour principe deux dispositions à l'égard de l'avenir qui sont elles-mêmes dans une relation de causalité circulaire avec deux avenirs objectifs....(201-3)

Bourdieu's reference to 'la comptabilité benthamienne' recalled Marx's critique of Jeremy Bentham's eagerness to endow every subject with a freedom of choice independent of their particular economic circumstances (Marx 1867, 602n.2): his attempt to deduce a specifically working class ethos from a statistical analysis of the consumption of food recalled Halbwachs's La Classe ouvrière et les niveaux de vie. However, his distinction between two different dispositions towards the future, the one immediate, the other deferred and implying the capacity for rational calculation, reflected the influence of the now familiar Husserlian distinction between 'un à venir' and 'le futur'. The working class, it was argued, had internalised their experience of material
necessity into a class ethos based around the immediate satisfaction of present need, an essentially 'practical' habitus which lived for the day rather than investing hopes and energies in unrealisable projects for the future. This practical class ethos constituted a kind of immediate presence in the present:

la présence au présent qui s'affirme dans le souci de profiter des bons moments et de prendre le temps comme il vient est, par soi, une affirmation de solidarité avec les autres [...] dans la mesure où cette sorte d'immanentisme temporel est une reconnaissance des limites qui définissent la condition. (1979, 203, my emphasis)

Just as the Algerian sub-proletariat had been judged incapable of constructing a rational political project for the future and the Kabyles incapable of achieving objective distance on their own socio-cultural practices, so the working class were taken to inhabit a realm of doxa, a kind of pre-reflexive immanence or absolute immediacy which prevented them from ever achieving the reflexive distance necessary to construct a genuine aesthetic. By a classically Romantic gesture, this apparently demeaning portrayal of the working class was used in La Distinction as testimony to their authenticity, to an honesty and straightforwardness which Bourdieu contrasted with the 'cold, calculating formality' of the bourgeoisie. Drawing a direct parallel between what he termed 'le franc-manger populaire' and 'le franc-parler populaire', he argued that in speech, as in food and art, the bourgeois tendency to formalise, to euphemise, and to defer immediate gratification was quite alien to the working class:

Tout se passe comme si le public populaire appréhendait confusément ce qui est impliqué dans le fait de mettre en forme, de mettre des formes, dans l'art comme dans la vie, c'est-à-dire une sorte de censure du contenu expressif, celui qui explode dans l'expressivité du parler populaire et, du même coup, une mise à distance, inhérente à la froideur calculée de toute recherche formelle, un refus de communiquer caché au cœur de la communication même, dans un art qui dérobe et refuse ce qu'il semble livrer aussi bien que dans la politesse
bourgeoise dont l'impeccable formalisme est une permanente mise en garde contre la tentation de la familiarité. (35-6)

Bourdieu's failure to place inverted commas around such semantically loaded terms as 'froideur calculée', 'censure', 'refus de communiquer', on the one hand, and 'l'expressivité du parler populaire', on the other, suggested a slippage away from considering such value judgements as themselves arbitrary cultural constructs towards a personal preference for the 'inherent' qualities of working class speech. More importantly, by juxtaposing the superficially similar expressions 'mettre en forme' and 'mettre des formes', he was able to conflate the very distinct phenomena of formalism and formality, a conflation encouraged by the fact that the French word 'le formalisme' covers both these meanings. For, if it is true that the working class manifests a greater willingness to employ words or expressions excluded from polite bourgeois conversation and that, as such, their speech betrays less formality, a greater sense of freedom from social convention, this does not necessarily equate to a simple expressivity or lack of formal complexity in popular speech. On the contrary, popular speech forms, from Cockney rhyming slang through Glasgow patter to the French 'verlan', manifest an extremely high level of formal complexity, often intended precisely to 'hide the content' of speech, albeit for rather different reasons than those of bourgeois propriety.11

Similar objections could be raised to Bourdieu's analysis of working class eating habits. For it is not necessary to deny the influence of economic factors in this realm in order to question whether the working class diet does reflect in any straightforward way the immediacy of their need for nourishment. As a comparative study of, for example, British and French working class diets would surely demonstrate, at roughly comparable levels of income eating habits and quality of diet vary massively depending on the specificities of history, geography, and national culture. In other words, the diet of the French working class does not reflect, in any mechanical way, the immediacy of their need for nourishment, but rather the whole range of historical, economic, and cultural determinants through which that need is mediated. Once the necessarily mediated nature of working class needs is taken into account then the series of analogies which Bourdieu drew between the supposed immediacy of their material need, the 'expressivity' of their speech, the inherently non-
formal nature of their tastes and lifestyles, and their consequent inability to achieve the requisite
measure of aesthetic distance to construct their own aesthetic no longer hold.

Bourdieu's account of the distinction between working class and bourgeois tastes and lifestyles
thus relied upon a series of theoretically and empirically unsustainable oppositions between the
immediate and the distant or deferred, the realist and the formal or formalist. As David Swartz
(1997, 176) has argued, such oppositions were, in the last instance, grounded on 'the classic
opposition of nature and culture', in a conception of the 'pure', 'unmediated', 'immediate', 'organic'
or 'natural' needs of the working class, which, in accordance with what Garnham rightly identifies
as a 'Rousseauesque movement', justified both a disparaging dismissal of their aesthetic capabilities
and a Romantic paean to their intrinsic authenticity and good faith (in Calhoun et al 1993:181). It
was, of course, precisely the Romantic and ethnocentric assumptions of a theory of commodity
exchange and social distinction grounded in a concept of 'basic', 'natural', or 'unalienated' need that
postmodernists such as Baudrillard and Lyotard had sought to deconstruct. As Lyotard put it in
Economie libidinale: 'L'usage et le besoin ne sont pas des extériorités ou naturalités ou références

To deconstruct the opposition between formalism and realism which underpinned La Distinction
would not imply rejecting all Bourdieu's insights into the logic of social distinction and the
reformulation of tastes and lifestyles under late capitalism. Rather, it would imply shifting the
argument away from Bourdieu's focus on the inherent capacity of certain social groups for formal
invention in the linguistic and cultural domains towards an emphasis on the institutional and
societal constraints which ensure that the richness and formal inventiveness of popular cultures are
so frequently disparaged and denigrated. As Richard Shusterman (1992, 196-97) has pointed out,
the fact that such a formally complex artform as jazz emerged from America's black ghettos proves
that there is no necessary relationship between economic hardship and the capacity for artistic
invention. Further, refusing to conflate the formality of bourgeois taste and manners with the
formalism of certain artforms is necessarily to question Bourdieu's tendency to understand art solely
in terms of its distinctive value, to see that whilst legitimate culture can indeed serve as cultural
capital, bolstering and legitimising the dominant class's sense of innate superiority, it is not
necessarily reducible to that particular social function.
In placing La Distinction in the interrelated contexts of the development of Bourdieu's own thought and of shifts in the French economic and cultural fields, this chapter has sought to emphasise the fundamentally dynamic vision of culture and cultural change to be found in the text. Against the conventional wisdom which sees his work as fundamentally concerned with static cycles of social reproduction involving an unchanging model of 'legitimate culture', this chapter has highlighted the extent to which Bourdieu understood language and culture as contradictory entities, the sites of a constant struggle between classes and class fractions, subject to the pressures of significant social, economic, and political change. Whilst it has been argued that La Distinction was concerned to trace the effects in the cultural domain of certain developments characteristic of late capitalism, this term has not been conflated with the more nebulous concept of 'postmodernism'. This has allowed an examination not only of the key differences which separated Bourdieu's work from that of those thinkers generally considered archetypal postmodernists, but also of Bourdieu's own analysis of the latter's work.

If this chapter has maintained that Bourdieu was working within a profoundly modernist problematic, it has resisted the temptation, prevalent amongst certain of his critics, to portray Bourdieu as the brave defender of the social scientific faith against a band of 'nihilistic' postmodern irrationalists (Pinto 1987; Robbins 1991; Fowler 1997). On the contrary, the work of certain postmodernists has been useful in illuminating two of the most pressing problems in Bourdieu's account of culture, namely his treatment of popular culture and his tendency to understand bourgeois culture purely in terms of its distinctive value. Indeed, his willingness to use the all-encompassing term 'cultural capital' to describe phenomena as diverse as the avant-garde theatre of Brecht, the classical culture of the Parisian haute bourgeoisie, and the newer managerial or neo-liberal culture risked a certain relativism. For, in understanding the 'objective function' of all such cultural forms to be the legitimation of class hierarchy, Bourdieu seemed to be left with no grounds on which to defend the values, however compromised, of a 'humanist' culture against the incursion of market forces under the impetus of a full-blown neo-liberal ideology whose tentative beginnings La Distinction had so presciently identified. The need to defend artistic and intellectual autonomy against just such forces was to become an increasingly pressing concern for Bourdieu throughout the 1980s and 1990s, both in his theoretical work and in his more directly political
pronouncements. It is to a discussion of the problems raised by Bourdieu's attempts to conduct such a defense that the next chapter will now turn.
NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

1. Godin (1996, 67) cites the director of the *Ecole normale d’administration* (ENA) in the 1970s, J.-F. Kesler, who claims that neo-liberal ideas first began to gain currency amongst the school’s students in the 1970s. Pierre Birnbaum (1977) provides a useful account of the liberalisation of both the structures and ideology of ENA over this same period.


3. Delors had himself been at the *commissariat au Plan* in the early 1960s and was closely associated with the notion of democratic planning championed by Pierre Mendès France and the Catholic trades union, the *Confédération française démocratique du travail* (CFDT) (see Hayward 1986, 28-9).

4. A more conventional reading of Giscardian liberalism would place it in an ‘Orleanist’ tradition of liberal capitalism, traceable to the July Monarchy (see Rémond 1982, 290-312).

5. Whilst these data had already appeared in *Un Art mouven*, it was noticeable that Bourdieu’s interpretation of them had undergone a significant shift. In *Un Art mouven*, he had argued that ‘la classe cultivée […] se distingue peu des autres classes sociales lorsqu’il s’agit de hiérarchiser des objets selon la beauté de l’image que l’on peut en faire’ (1965, 133n.28). By *La Distinction*, however, he was emphasising the differences between the aesthetic responses of the various social classes, interpreting them as the expression of a specific class ethos or habitus. No explanation for this change was offered.

6. In *Ce que parler veut dire*, Bourdieu (1982, 18) acknowledged his debt to Bakhtin as follows:

Bakhtine rappelle que, dans les situations révolutionnaires, les mots communs prennent des sens opposés. En fait, il n’y a pas de mots neutres: l’enquête montre par exemple que les adjectifs les plus ordinairement utilisés pour exprimer les goûts reçoivent des sens différents, parfois opposés, selon les classes: le mot ‘soigné’, choisi par les petits-bourgeois, est rejeté par les intellectuels pour qui, précisément, il fait petit-bourgeois, étriqué, mesquin.
7. This was a theme Bourdieu was to pick up again in *La Misère du monde* (see Bourdieu 1993, 605-20).

8. As Berstein and Rioux (1995, 141-42) point out, part of the French state's plans to modernise the economy had been to build up large firms to be internationally competitive in particular sectors. By 1974, businesses with more than 500 employees, although accounting for only 4.2% of all firms, employed 60% of the French workforce and accounted for two thirds of all business turnover. They also trace the beginnings of French industry's increasing dependence on foreign capital to the early 1970s: 'en 1973, le capital étranger en France, surtout américain, est majoritaire dans 1.029 entreprises, représentant au total 14% de la main d'oeuvre employée, 19% de l'investissement industriel et 20% des rentes' (143).

9. This marked a significant shift from the earlier *Un Art de mener* where Bourdieu (1965, 122) had been at pains to emphasise that the dominated classes had a specific aesthetic of their own: 'l'on ne peut pas ne pas reconnaître au goût populaire la dimension esthétique à laquelle il prétend'.

10. Perhaps the most sustained and telling critique of Bourdieu's treatment of popular culture comes from his former close collaborators Jean-Claude Passeron and Claude Grignon:

Nous avons nous-mêmes participé à une entreprise qui, partant du questionnement wéberien sur l'efficace d'un 'ordre légitime', visait à l'élargir de l'Eglise et du pouvoir politique à l'Ecole, de la culture scolaire à la culture savante et, enfin, de la culture savante à la culture quotidienne. Alertés ici par la réapparition, sous une forme symétrique, d'une injustice heuristique à l'égard des cultures dominées, symptomatique d'un abandon du travail empirique, dont le gel de la théorie en doctrine tend à dispenser par avance, nous sommes bien forcés de constater que la théorie de la légitimité culturelle, dans son usage impérialiste, engendre un légitimisme susceptible de régresser, quand il se hasarde à rendre compte des cultures populaires, vers un misérabilisme aussi ambigu que le populisme, et scientifiquement stérile. (Passeron and Grignon 1989, 11-12).
11. William Labov’s *Language in the Inner City* (1973) remains the standard reference for an analysis of the formal complexity of popular speech. In *Méditations pascaliennes* (1997), Bourdieu was to acknowledge the importance of Labov’s work but argued that this: ‘ne doit pas conduire à ignorer, par exemple, que, à la différence du discours des élèves des écoles d’élite, le langage inventif et haut en couleur, donc propre à procurer d’intenses satisfactions esthétiques, des adolescents de Harlem reste totalement dépourvu de valeur sur les marchés scolaires et dans toutes les situations sociales de même sorte’ (1997, 91). There is of course a difference between this assertion that the dominated are capable of considerable aesthetic and linguistic formal inventiveness, but that that inventiveness is not officially recognised, and Bourdieu’s argument in *La Distinction* that the dominated were so impoverished as to be inherently incapable of formal invention.
Perhaps the most frequent criticisms levelled at Bourdieu's account of class, culture, and aesthetics in *La Distinction* concern firstly his apparently unremitting pessimism regarding the potential for 'legitimate' culture to possess any kind of liberating or transformative force and secondly his perceived inability to grasp the specificity of the aesthetic experience over and above its implication in questions of status and social distinction (Wolff 1983, 36-8; Wilson 1988; Bürger 1990).

In the essay he contributed to the *Bourdieu: critical perspectives* volume, Nicholas Garnham gave these criticisms a specifically political coloration. He argued that it was critiques of the class-based, arbitrary nature of high culture, such as Bourdieu's, which had fatally disarmed the British Left when it came to combating neo-liberal demands that institutions such as the BBC or the universities should be 'opened up' to market forces. Garnham was aware that Bourdieu himself had been involved in a public campaign in the late 1980s and early 1990s aimed precisely at securing the creative and intellectual autonomy of French state television by ending its damaging dependence on advertising revenue (see Bourdieu 1988b; 1989a; 1990b). However, Garnham maintained that such political pronouncements could not be reconciled with a body of theoretical work which analysed high culture as a purely arbitrary, class determined, ideological construct. There was, he argued, a troubling 'tension between political practice and theory' in Bourdieu's career (in Calhoun et al 1993, 180).

If Garnham is correct in locating a tension between Bourdieu's theory and his practice, then that tension can only have become more acute over recent years. For the three petitions calling for French public service broadcasting to be protected from reliance on advertising revenue, which Bourdieu signed between 1988 and 1990, were to prove merely the first of a series of increasingly high profile interventions on his part in defence of artistic and intellectual autonomy. In 1989, Bourdieu set up the review *Liber*. Distributed internationally and translated into several languages, it was intended as an open forum for intellectual debate.¹ In 1993, Bourdieu was instrumental in launching 'un appel à la fondation d'un parlement international des écrivains'. The 'parlement' met in November of that year to discuss threats to intellectual autonomy as various as the fatwah against
Salman Rushdie, the assassination of Algerian intellectuals, and the increasing influence of advertising and the media over the intellectual field (see Dutheil 1993). This critique of the negative influence of advertising and the media was to surface again in 1996 with the publication of the pamphlet *Sur la télévision*. Containing the transcripts of two of Bourdieu's lectures to the Collège de France, which had been broadcast on Paris Première in May 1996, as well as an earlier article, 'L'Emprise du journalisme', which had first appeared in 1994, *Sur la télévision* went to the top of the best-seller lists, provoking a lively debate about the role of the French media.2

With the exception of Bourdieu's continuing work in support of Algerian intellectuals,3 these interventions all manifest a concern to defend artistic and intellectual autonomy against the incursions of the market. His most high profile political intervention to date was directed more specifically against neo-liberalism as a political and economic doctrine. In the Autumn of 1995, Bourdieu lent his vociferous public support to striking students and workers protesting against the right-wing government's proposed package of reforms and budget cuts affecting the universities, the nationalised railways, health care, pension rights, and social security provision.4 Several months later, *Le Monde des livres* was to hold up Bourdieu's support for the Autumn strikes, together with three subsequent petitions he had signed against the power of global capital, in favour of equal rights for homosexual couples, and in opposition to repressive anti-immigration measures introduced by Charles Pasqua, as heralding the rediscovery of a French tradition of intellectual engagement and social and political activism (Unsigned 1996). Certainly, there can be little doubt that the strikes of 1995, and to a lesser extent Bourdieu's support for the strikers, played a significant role in the Right's defeat at the legislative elections of May 1997 and their replacement by a Socialist-led coalition.

Bourdieu's more directly political activities have, moreover, been mirrored in his more sustained theoretical works. These manifest an increasing emphasis on analysing the emergence of a specifically French form of neo-liberalism and tracing its effects across the domains of education, culture, politics, and social policy. *La Distinction* had charted the gradual shift to a more individualistic, cosmopolitan, business oriented culture in the beliefs, lifestyles, and class identities of France's bourgeoisie and petite-bourgeoisie. In *La Noblesse d'état*, published ten years later, he analysed the effects of this shift on the field of France's grandes écoles and on the political and
intellectual assumptions of the increasingly homogeneous business, political, and administrative elite they produced. *Les Règles de l'art* (1992) was on one level an analysis of the genesis and structure of autonomous fields of literary and artistic production in late nineteenth-century France; an analysis of the production of autonomous cultural artefacts to complement *La Distinction's* account of their reception. However, the book was also an attempt to recapture a 'heroic' moment of artistic and intellectual autonomy at a time when Bourdieu considered that autonomy to be under threat from the combined forces of advertising, the media, and the market (Rigby 1993).

Two years later, in *Libre-échange* (1994), Bourdieu published a series of conversations with the artist Hans Haacke whose work both charts and challenges the negative influence of corporate sponsorship on artistic freedom. In the huge collaborative volume, *La Misère du monde* (1993), Bourdieu and his co-authors sought to give a voice to all those who had been marginalised and ignored by a political, economic, and intellectual elite in thrall to what, in a more recent article, Bourdieu termed 'le nouvel opium des intellectuels', the dogmas of neo-liberalism and business efficiency (Bourdieu 1996c). Finally, in his most recent work, *Contre-feux* (1998), Bourdieu has collected a series of his more directly political speeches, all of which share a concern to challenge what he termed 'l'invasion néo-libérale'.

On one level, therefore, Bourdieu's recent theoretical writings would appear to be entirely consistent with his more overtly political pronouncements. However, his defence of artistic and intellectual autonomy has necessitated an acknowledgement on his part that such autonomy can possess a value not reducible to issues of class and social distinction. Indeed, Bourdieu has increasingly couched his critique of the unfettered power of the market in terms of a defence of the 'universal' values of art and reason (Bourdieu 1992a, 461-72; 1997, 111-51). This 'universal' is not, Bourdieu has argued, grounded in a concept of transcendental or atemporal value, but rather is seen as the by-product of a specific set of historical circumstances which oblige individuals and groups to work to advance the universal even as they pursue their own partial interests. As Yves Sintomer (1996, 91) has pointed out, this notion of 'un corporatisme de l'universel' may be stimulating, 'mais elle ne va pas sans poser certains problèmes'. This is to return to Garnham's remark about the possible 'tension between political practice and theory' in Bourdieu's work, a tension this chapter will seek to examine in greater detail. Having analysed Bourdieu's account of the emerging neo-
liberal hegemony across the French educational, administrative, political, intellectual, cultural, and social fields, this chapter will examine his efforts to theorise the concept of 'un corporatisme de l'intellectuel' as justification for a particular form of intellectual engagement.

The Grandes Ecoles and the Production of a 'State Nobility'

When considering Bourdieu's analysis of the production of the French business, administrative, and political elite in *La Noblesse d'état*, it will be necessary to remember that France has never undergone a neo-liberal revolution directly comparable to the advent of Thatcherism in the United Kingdom or Reaganomics in the United States. Despite relatively modest privatisation programmes pursued by successive governments after 1986, France has yet to experience an all-out assault on the public sector on the Anglo-Saxon model. As Emmanuel Godin (1996, 64-5) puts it:

> les valeurs néo-libérales françaises qui commencèrent à avoir pignon sur rue à partir des années 70 restent culturellement ancrées dans la tradition française et empruntent peu au néo-libéralisme anglo-saxon. On y trouve une certaine méfiance vis à vis de l'individualisme: la société est toujours perçue comme étant la source, plutôt que le produit de la liberté individuelle. [...] On remarque aussi que l'État, tout auraillé des succès remportés dans le champ de la modernisation de l'économie de l'après-guerre, ne peut être tenu responsable du 'déclin' français comme l'a été son 'équivalent' britannique.

Thus, as its title suggested, *La Noblesse d'état* was concerned with the formation of a 'state nobility', a ruling elite recruited from an increasingly narrow, typically Parisian, haut bourgeois base, educated in the prestigious grandes écoles, and able, thanks to the centralised nature of French politics and administration, as well as the continued existence of major wholly or partly state-owned industries, to move effortlessly between positions of power in the commercial, political, and administrative sectors. This elite still had a considerable vested interest in the existence of strong centralised state institutions. Hence, *La Noblesse d'état* described less the outright rejection by the ruling elite of state intervention as a tool of economic and social policy than a shift in the way the goals of such interventions were perceived. What Bourdieu described was the gradual erosion of an
ethos of public service in favour of the newer demands of business efficiency and the global
départ à une réflexion visant à repenser les modalités de l'intervention étatique, plutôt qu'à remettre
en cause sa légitimité'.

One further peculiarity of the French situation which needs to be taken into account concerns
the direct link between the grandes écoles and the highest reaches of the French civil service. The
best students from the Parisian grandes écoles are guaranteed posts in the Grands corps at the
summit of the civil service, whence they have access to the worlds of politics, through sitting on one
of the various cabinets ministériels, and of business, through involvement with one of the major
publicly-owned or private-public commercial enterprises. As Ezra Suleiman (1978, 17) has argued,
this means that:

France has one of the most clearly established mechanisms for the creation of its elites of any
Western society. This is principally due to the fact that the state takes it upon itself to form
the nation's elites. The state has thus devised a system that is complex and elaborate, tying
as it does the professional training of the elites to their corporate organisations.  

Bourdieu's analysis in La Noblesse d'état thus focused on the formation of a socially
homogeneous ruling elite who had not so much abandoned all faith in state intervention as
reinterpreted the discourse, goals, and methods of neo-liberalism through the medium of a
peculiarly French tradition of centralised state planning or dirigisme. In La Distinction, he had
analysed this shift towards a more cosmopolitan, multinational business culture at the level of
bourgeois and petit-bourgeois lifestyles, making only sporadic references to the role of grandes
écoles such as ENA and HEC in this general phenomenon. La Noblesse d'état provided an
opportunity to focus more closely on the grandes écoles, on the process whereby those schools
offering training more directly adjusted to the worlds of business and the civil service, HEC,
Sciences-po, and ENA, had steadily gained prestige at the expense of the ENS, renowned for its
high academic standards in science and the humanities, and the dominant grande école in the Third
Republic particularly. By following the career paths of former students of the grandes écoles into
powerful positions in politics, business, and the civil service. Bourdieu was also able to trace the relationship, in far greater detail than he had thus far, between the field of higher education and what he termed 'le champ du pouvoir'.

Bourdieu had laid the ground for *La Noblesse d'état* in a series of articles published in the 1970s with Luc Boltanski and Monique de Saint-Martin. ‘Les Stratégies de reconversion’ (1973), ‘Le Titre et le poste’ (1975), ‘La Production de l'idéologie dominante’ (1976), and ‘Le Patronat’ (1978) all anticipated *La Noblesse d'état*’s emphasis on the new discourses of economic liberalism and managerial efficiency espoused by influential graduates of France’s more technocratically and commercially oriented grandes écoles, ENA, Sciences-po, and HEC.

It was no coincidence that this flurry of articles on the issue should have been broadly contemporaneous with the election and presidency of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. Both Bourdieu and Boltanski have subsequently identified Giscard's presidency as a key turning point. Boltanski (1982, 219n.99) has argued that it was under Giscard that the Plan itself first began to be associated with an outdated left-wing corporatism opposed to the economic liberalism espoused by the Giscardians. In *La Noblesse d'état*, meanwhile, Bourdieu (1989, 390) described Giscard's personal trajectory, from the 'fractions les plus traditionnelles, proches du pétainisme' of the French bourgeoisie, through Polytechnique, ENA, the Inspection des Finances and the cabinet ministériel of Edgar Faure, to the political avant-garde of 'la nouvelle bourgeoisie', as typifying 'l'évolution de la bourgeoisie' in the post-war period.

While Giscardian liberalism may appear to have been convincingly defeated by the election of François Mitterrand in 1981, as Bourdieu was to remark in *La Misère du monde*, from 1983 onwards the Socialists themselves adopted a discourse and a set of policies which demanded submission to the 'realités' of the market (Bourdieu 1993, 220-21). This 'ralliement des dirigeants socialistes' to 'la vision néo-libérale' after 1983 was symbolised by the replacement of prime minister Pierre Mauroy, an old-style socialist politician with a power base in the traditional working class, industrial city of Lille, by Laurent Fabius, a young énarque and hence one further personification of Bourdieu's 'noblesse d'état'.

Published in 1989, *La Noblesse d'état* can also be read as an ironic riposte to the extravagant celebrations of the Bicentenary of the French Revolution planned by Mitterrand in that year.
only did its very title highlight the failure of the Revolution to sweep away all inherited power and
privilege, *La Noblesse d'état* also pointed to the complicity of the entire French political class. Left
and Right alike, in that failure. This is not to reduce *La Noblesse d'état* to an act of political
provocation determined by the exigencies of a particular historical moment. Although rooted in the
specific experience of contemporary France, Bourdieu clearly intended his study to constitute 'un
cas du possible', a scrupulously researched test case from which general principles concerning the
formation of elites in all societies could be induced (1989, 20-1). Further, *La Noblesse d'état* was
perhaps unique amongst Bourdieu's studies of French higher education in its historical sweep, its
use of data from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s to trace the evolution of the field over an almost
twenty year time span.

Using correspondence analysis based on data for the geographical and social origins, political
and religious affiliations, sporting, cultural, and leisure activities of the student intake of 1966.
Bourdieu plotted the state of the field of the *grandes écoles* at that time (1989, 222). This would
later serve as a benchmark against which the extent of the field's evolution over the intervening
twenty years or so could be assessed. He argued that in 1966 the field of the *grandes écoles* was
structured chiasmatically, according to a set of oppositions homologous to those he had identified in
*La Distinction* as dividing the different fractions of the dominant class (218). At one pole of the
field stood HEC, whose students were drawn primarily from the offspring of industrialists and high-
ranking businessmen; they tended to be Catholic, have right-wing political affiliations, 'classical'
tastes in culture, and practised sports such as rowing, tennis, or golf. At the opposing pole of the
field was ENS, whose students were frequently the offspring of teachers or lecturers; they were
more often atheist or agnostic, left-leaning with avant-garde cultural tastes and little interest in
sport. Between these two extremes stood schools such as Polytechnique or ENA which recruited
primarily amongst the sons and daughters of the liberal professions or civil servants.

Thus, HEC recruited its students primarily amongst the dominant fraction of the dominant class
which Bourdieu had described in *La Distinction* as being characterised by its high economic capital
and relatively low cultural capital. ENS, on the other hand, recruited principally from the
dominated fraction of the dominant class, the intelligentsia, characterised by its high cultural
capital and relatively low economic capital. However, where in *La Distinction* Bourdieu had
defined these class fractions in the fundamentally neutral terms of the structure and volume of their capital, ('economic capital +/cultural capital -' was opposed to 'economic capital -/cultural capital +'), and their 'ancienneté' in the bourgeoisie. In *La Noblesse d'état* he introduced a set of far less neutral terms which seemed to imply a series of value judgements. Firstly, he identified those establishments, such as ENS or the more technically oriented grandes écoles like Polytechnique or l'Ecole des mines, 'qui mettent au premier plan les exigences proprement scolaires'. These he distinguished from those other establishments, ENA, HEC, and Sciences-po, which dispensed a more technocratic, managerial, or bureaucratic education, 'qui accordent une grande importance à des propriétés moins directement scolaires, comme certaines manières d'être, de se tenir, de s'exprimer à l'oral ou une "culture générale" mal définie dans ses contenus et ses contours' (213-14).

He then linked the extent to which the education dispensed in each establishment followed 'les exigences proprement scolaires' to the relative 'autonomy' or 'heteronomy' of that establishment, defined in terms of its distance from or proximity to the 'field of power', to the worlds of business, politics, and temporal power generally:

Les écoles qui préparent à l'enseignement ou à la recherche (Écoles normales supérieures) ou qui font une part non négligeable à la recherche (Ecole des mines de Paris, Polytechnique) et dont les principes de sélection et d'évaluation sont les plus autonomes et les plus spécifiquement scientifiques, ou, du moins, les plus exclusivement scolaires, s'opposent à des écoles préparant à des positions de pouvoir ou à des fonctions de cadre supérieur ou d'ingénieur dans le secteur privé ou le secteur public (HEC, IEP, Institut national agronomique, ENSIAA, concours interne de l'ENA), qui demandent une réussite scolaire moindre, et qui reconnaissent davantage les critères d'évaluation en vigueur dans les champs économique et administratif. (215)

The introduction of the concepts of autonomy and heteronomy, of properly scientific or scholarly knowledge, represented a significant shift in the terms of Bourdieu's analysis. To distinguish between the amount of properly scholarly or scientific knowledge dispensed by the different grandes écoles implied the existence of an objective measure of scholarly value which was being realised to
a greater or lesser degree in different disciplines and educational establishments. Previously, however, in *La Reproduction*, Bourdieu had defined the content of higher education purely in terms of a 'culture légitime', a culturally arbitrary construct having no objective function other than the reproduction and legitimation of the dominant class: 'la structure et les fonctions de cette culture ne peuvent être déduites d'aucun principe universel, physique, biologique, ou spirituel' (Bourdieu 1970, 22, my emphasis).

Similarly, in *La Distinction*, the autonomy of an intellectual, an artist, or a work of art had been read purely as an arbitrary historical construct whose sole objective function was to contribute to the dominant class's sense of natural distinction and of distance from the realm of material need. Even avant-garde works which seemed to challenge the art institution or the social status quo were read in this light. In *La Noblesse d'état*, however, Bourdieu argued that the relative autonomy enjoyed by intellectuals and artists in the less heteronomous regions of the intellectual or artistic fields meant their actions could possess 'des potentialités de détournement subversif', their accumulated cultural capital serving the ends of social or political critique rather than those of social distinction. The homology between the intelligentsia, the dominated fraction of the dominant class, and the dominated classes *per se*, meanwhile, could encourage 'des alliances subversives, capables de menacer l'ordre social' through a struggle over the imposition of new 'principes de vision et de division' of the social world (1989, 556-57).

Not only was Bourdieu's analysis of education, the forms of capital it granted, and their relationship to economic or political power more nuanced in *La Noblesse d'état* than it had been in his earlier works, but his description of more autonomous and academically rigorous institutions, epitomised by ENS, seemed to amount to a *parti pris* on his part. Indeed, although he criticised the social exclusivity of the *grandes écoles* sector as a whole, it was noticeable that his harshest criticisms were reserved for the least autonomous institutions. Thus, for example, having suggested that the *grandes écoles* were less concerned with transmitting the technical aptitudes to enable their graduates to fulfil their future roles in the public or private sector than with inculcating in their students a sense of their own superiority, he went on to argue that schools such as ENA and Sciences-po were the worst offenders in this respect, comparing them to British public schools (101). Similarly, he argued that the entrance examination to ENA represented the apogee of a test
which rewarded 'culture générale' and rhetorical ability over genuine knowledge. A test destined therefore to favour those endowed with the habitus of the Parisian haute-bourgeoise (118).

It would be wrong to interpret La Noblesse d'état as simply a lament for the passing of an age. Typified perhaps by the Third Republic, when ENS was France's most prestigious educational institution and normaliens like Jean Jaurès or Léon Blum, not énarques, seemed to dominate French public life. On several occasions, Bourdieu challenged the notion that under the Third Republic ENS had been at the summit of a purely meritocratic educational system. Whilst repeating his more general rejection of 'le mythe de l''Ecole libératrice'' (295n.32: 533). Nonetheless, it was possible to discern in Bourdieu a residual faith in the Republican, even peculiarly Durkheimian ideal of a rational, meritocratic system of education in which natural abilities and acquired technical knowledge would stand in an organic relation with the nature of the post or job occupied. Thus Bourdieu bemoaned the fact that the more the relationship between 'titre' and 'poste' remained ill-defined and the more business and the civil service favoured general 'technocratic' aptitudes over specifically 'technical' or scientific knowledge, the more the system favoured bourgeois students and graduates able to exploit their habitus, their social capital, their inherited capacity for rhetorical brilliance and 'le bluff' (172). On a similar note, he acknowledged that education did not merely reproduce and legitimate class hierarchies but could also fulfil a democratic function, 'en ce qu'il garantit un minimum de droits dans les transactions des employés avec les détenteurs du pouvoir économique'. Hence, Bourdieu argued: 'les dominés ont sans doute globalement intérêt à la rationalisation et dans les aptitudes exigées et dans la manière de les enseigner ou de les évaluer et aussi dans la définition des attributs garantis par les titres' (170n.8).

If this residual faith in the Republican ideal had been implicit in Bourdieu's earlier works on higher education, his introduction of the criteria of 'autonomy' and 'properly' scientific or scholarly knowledge had rendered it still more evident. Moreover, Bourdieu's sense of disappointment at the failure of French higher education to live up to this ideal became even more tangible as he traced the evolution of the field of the grandes écoles from the 1960s through the 1970s and into the 1980s. In short, what he concluded was that the least autonomous grandes écoles had grown even more dominant, their graduates were increasingly monopolising the positions of power in French
politics, administration, and industry, whilst the dogmas of managerialism and business efficiency they espoused were having a deleterious effect over the whole intellectual field.

Comparing his data for entrants into the grandes écoles in 1966-67 with data for the academic year 1984-85, Bourdieu noted that the number of successful candidates from modest social backgrounds had actually declined over the period. This he attributed to the massive expansion in the university sector, which, contrasting strongly with little or no increase in the number of places available in the grandes écoles, had rendered the latter even more prestigious, selective, and elitist. The extension of university education to groups previously excluded, notably women and the petite bourgeoisie, had been accompanied by a decline in the rarity value of university degrees, Bourdieu argued. At the same time, the more 'technically' oriented grandes écoles had continued to lose ground to those offering a more general 'technocratic' or bureaucratic training. Hence, institutions which had once offered a chance 'aux fils de la petite-bourgeoisie d'atteindre aux positions les plus élevées de la fonction publique', such as the universities or the less prestigious 'petites écoles d'application, Ecole des P et T, Ecole des douanes, Ecole de la magistrature', had been overtaken by 'les écoles du pouvoir', such as HEC, Centrale, ENA, and Sciences-po. The distance between the 'petite porte' and the 'grande porte', between the universities and the grandes écoles, between civil servants trained on the job, rising through the ranks to take the concours interne into ENA and students who followed 'la voie royale' from exclusive Parisian lycée to grande école and on to ENA, was growing ever greater (271-72).

That ENA had now definitively supplanted ENS as the most prestigious of Parisian grandes écoles was, according to Bourdieu, the most conspicuous manifestation of a more general shift in the balance of power within the field of French higher education. As Anne Stevens (1981, 139) has noted, ENA's founder, Michel Debré, was also responsible for drawing up the constitution of the Fifth Republic. She suggests that the establishment of a regime specifically designed to restore authority to a strong central executive and the increasing dominance of graduates from ENA over that regime are intimately linked. Bourdieu contented himself with attributing ENA's prestige to the conspicuous success enjoyed by its more notable graduates, whilst bemoaning the 'curieuse dérive' whereby the institution had abandoned its democratic, meritocratic vocation to become the preserve of the haute bourgeoisie:
la curieuse dérive d'une institution qui, née d'une intention déclarée, et sans nul doute sincère, de rationaliser et de démocratiser le recrutement de la haute fonction publique en abolissant les dynasties fondées sur le népotisme et l'hérédité larvée des charges, en est venue à remplir une fonction tout à fait semblable à celle qui incombait à HEC ou à Centrale à la fin du XIXe siècle, à savoir de fournir aux enfants de la bourgeoisie socialement destinés aux positions dominantes la caution scolaire que les institutions les plus légitimes scolairement leur refusaient de plus en plus souvent en cette période de concurrence scolaire intensifiée.

(283)

There could surely be no more eloquent expression of Bourdieu's sense of the Republican ideal betrayed.

For Bourdieu, ENA had become the epitome of 'une école de refuge', an institution which demanded relatively little of its students in terms of academic ability above or beyond 'une culture générale' directly attuned not only to their bourgeois habitus but also to the demands of an increasingly technocratically oriented job market. Indeed, one further change Bourdieu identified in the field of higher education was the proliferation of such 'écoles de refuge' in the form of the mass of business and management schools which had sprung up throughout the 1970s, that 'nèbuleuse d'institutions scolaires plus directement ajustées aux demandes d'entreprises' (328). These newer institutions responded to two specific needs on the part of the bourgeoisie. Firstly, in the wake of the events of 1968, the bourgeoisie had become increasingly determined that its offspring should not be educated in a university sector associated with overcrowding, devalued qualifications, student unrest, and political radicalism. Secondly, the increase in the number of qualified graduates, which itself reflected changes in the nature of the job market and the economy as a whole, had rendered possession of some form of higher qualification a prerequisite for the bourgeoisie to retain its economic and intellectual dominance. As Bourdieu put it, 'le titre scolaire' had been substituted 'au titre de propriété en tant qu'instrument d'appropriation légitime des profits du capital économique' (479).
Thus, the changes in the field of higher education Bourdieu identified were attributable not merely to 'le développement d'une nouvelle demande éducative' but also to the changing nature of the job market, itself contingent on 'des transformations du champ économique telles que l'accroissement du commerce international' (310). As the market became increasingly global, so businesses became increasingly dependent on international finance capital and the greater control banks exerted over whole branches of industry was reflected in a change in the balance of power between different management functions: 'un renforcement de la direction financière par rapport à la direction technique, c'est-à-dire des inspecteurs des finances et des anciens élèves de Sciences-po, par rapport aux détenteurs de diplômes techniques comme les ingénieurs de Mines' (468). This 'déclin des titres techniques au profit des titres garantissant une culture générale' was destined not merely to benefit more heteronomous, less academically rigorous institutions such as ENA, HEC, or Sciences-po, but also the sons of the Parisian haute bourgeoisie amongst whom they typically recruited (386).

Bourdieu argued that even more traditional provincial, dynastic industrial enterprises, typified perhaps by Michelin in Clermont Ferrand or the large textile firms of northern France, which would once have avoided the state education system relying instead on private Catholic colleges and passing jobs down through the family, were coming to demand higher qualifications of all their executives. A 'mode de reproduction familial' was being supplanted by 'un mode de reproduction à composante scolaire', and, as a general rule, the older and bigger a firm, the more its management had recourse to 'une forme de consécration scolaire'. This was not to say that 'un mode de domination fondé sur la propriété et les owners' had given way to 'un autre, plus rationnel et plus démocratique, fondé sur la compétence et les managers' (428). Not only were the kind of aptitudes demanded of managers in these 'grandes sociétés à contrôle technocratique' entirely consonant with the bourgeois habitus but, argued Bourdieu, under the 'mode de reproduction à composante scolaire', social capital, sustained by a network of family members in powerful positions, took on an added importance. Where previously family members had been rivals competing for an inheritance, now they could become allies sustaining a collectively held stock of social, educational, and cultural capital (416).
Moreover, this shift in the 'mode of reproduction' was mirrored in the changing nature of bourgeois matrimonial strategies, with parents abandoning 'leur politique dirigiste' over their children's choice of marriage partner. The new educational and economic conjuncture had completely redefined the criteria determining 'la valeur des filles sur le marché matrimonial'. replacing the old emphasis on economic capital in the form of a dowry or on 'capital symbolique d'honorabilité (virginité, maintien, etc.)' with an emphasis on educational or cultural capital. The greater freedom accorded the sons and daughters of the bourgeoisie in their choice of partner concealed the fact that the massive entrance of women into higher education provided an opportunity to meet a socially homogeneous group of possible future partners, hence ensuring 'l'homogamie au moins aussi efficacement, mais de manière beaucoup plus discrète, que l'interventionisme des familles' (390).

Bourdieu was playing with the terms 'dirigisme' and 'interventionisme', here, to draw a parallel between social or sexual liberalisation and the economic liberalism espoused by Giscard. He went on to describe the reforms introduced by Giscard in the domain of divorce, marital law, abortion, and so on as 'l'accompagnement politique, nécessaire pour ajuster les normes aux pratiques, d'une transformation du mode de reproduction en vigueur dans la grande bourgeoisie' (390-91). Economic liberalisation, the liberalisation of social and sexual mores, as well as shifts in the balance of power within the field of higher education, were thus all seen as part of a related process. a process, moreover, which greatly benefitted the Parisian haute bourgeoisie. For, Bourdieu argued, it was this social group which was best placed to take advantage of the post-war economic and educational conjuncture. Not only was their habitus particularly well adjusted to the aptitudes demanded by 'les écoles du pouvoir', ENA, HEC, Sciences-po, but they were closer, both geographically and psychologically, to those institutions than the more traditional, provincial class of industrialists:

C'est ainsi que ces catégories, qui se distinguent par un rapport plus ouvert au monde social, se sont trouvés nettement mieux placées que la grande bourgeoisie catholique de province pour profiter des possibilités d'ascension ou de reconversion offertes par le nouveau mode de reproduction et de la nouvelle voie d'accès aux positions de pouvoir qu'ouvraient les grandes
Previously, Bourdieu argued, the Parisian haute bourgeoisie might have shunned the industrial sector, preferring instead the liberal professions, the *haute fonction publique*, or the worlds of banking and finance. However, the increasing emphasis on financial or marketing functions, where the Parisian bourgeoisie could deploy its characteristic habitus, over more technical or industrial ones removed any such barrier. Further, the increasing concentration of *industrial concerns* frequently as a direct result of French government policy, into what Bourdieu described as the *'grandes affaires fortement liées à l'État, grandes sociétés industrielles (entreprises nationalisées, d'économie mixte ou entreprises fortement tributaires des marchés d'Etat) ou grandes banques'*, provided a stage on which the haut bourgeois could fully exploit his, or less frequently her, cultural, social, and educational capital (428-30).

There was thus, Bourdieu argued, a relation of homology and 'causal interdependence' between the field of higher education and the field of power (373). The distribution of economic and cultural capital in the latter was arranged chiasmatically, with business leaders endowed with high economic capital and relatively low cultural capital at its dominant pole, the intelligentsia, endowed with high cultural capital and relatively low economic capital, at its dominated pole. At the centre of this chiasmus was the *haute fonction publique* (382-83). However, just as ENA had undergone a 'curieuse dérive', slipping from its public service ethos to ever greater accommodation to directly economic forces, so the *haute fonction publique* was increasingly the point of exchange between administrative, political, and economic interests. The existence of huge wholly or partly state-owned enterprises not only encouraged the phenomenon of 'pantouflage', whereby civil servants took up key posts in industry and commerce, it also provided a peculiarly centralised arena of political, economic, and administrative power in which the Parisian bourgeoisie was uniquely equipped to exploit its networks of contacts, its inherited social and cultural capital, as well as the educational capital it had accumulated in the *grandes écoles*.¹⁴

At the nexus of these different forms of power, administrative, economic, political, were those Bourdieu termed 'les grands patrons d'État'. Frequently of Parisian haut bourgeois origin, educated
in a prestigious Parisian lycée, a *grande école*, and ENA, they had typically passed through one of the *grands corps*, as well as a *cabinet ministériel*, to now enjoy an unrivalled amount of power and influence over the economic, political, and social fields:

Les grand patrons d'Etat [...] et aussi, mais dans une moindre mesure, des vieilles fractions de la bourgeoisie (officiers ou propriétaires terriens), étaient en quelque sorte 'prédestinés' à occuper les positions situées à l'intersection entre le secteur public et le secteur privé ou, mieux, entre la banque, l'industrie et l'Etat qui est aujourd'hui le lieu même du pouvoir: tout prépare en effet ces hommes de relations à occuper ces positions éminentes, grandes banques d'affaires, entreprises publiques de l'énergie et des transports, sociétés d'économie mixte, etc., où se négocient, dans la complicité et le conflit, les gros marchés de l'Etat, les subventions publiques aux industries dites 'de base' ou 'de pointe', et où s'élaborent les décisions politiques (en matière de crédit, de logement, etc.) propres à offrir de nouveaux terrains et nouvelles sources de profit. (472)

Bourdieu’s concern was not merely with the socially homogeneous nature of this business and administrative elite, but also with the way in which, moving between the public and private sectors, they brought into the heart of the civil service the dogmas of business efficiency and the market which struck at the heart of a public service ethos.

Whilst Bourdieu’s point about the dominance of this socially, culturally, and ideologically homogeneous elite was well made and amply supported by detailed statistical analysis, his definition of the ‘field of power’ remained somewhat vague. His description of the field of power suggested it was merely an all-encompassing arena defined by the balance of power or rate of exchange between different forms of capital at any given historical moment: ‘un champ de forces défini par l'état du rapport de forces entre des formes de pouvoir ou des espèces de capital différents’ (375). However, if the field of power amounted to nothing more than the aggregation of forms of capital accumulated in the various sub-fields, there seemed to be nothing to distinguish it from the social field as a whole. When Bourdieu attempted to map the field diagrammatically, he did so by identifying the social space occupied by a selection of professional groups, from artists and
university lecturers through the liberal professions to business leaders (379; 380; 382). Whilst this implied a more restrictive definition, it was noticeable that Bourdieu omitted to plot the position of professional politicians as a separate group, to say nothing of the various legislative and executive institutions in which those politicians worked and which, in theory at least, are intended to represent and enact the will of the majority as expressed in democratic elections. In short, power is surely more than the sum of the forms of economic, cultural, or educational capital possessed by a nationally defined selection of professionals. If Bourdieu's definition of the field of power seemed unable to account for the complex articulations between the worlds of commerce, the legislature, and the executive on a national level, it was still less capable of theorising the relationship between nationally defined forms of power and those increasingly important supra-national forms, represented by multinational corporations or the European Union.

Further, Bourdieu's use of the notion of 'homology' to describe the relationship between different fields effectively dispensed with the need to explain the nature of the articulation between those different fields; whether specific fields were determined or determining, causally linked or merely correlated. In Réponses, Bourdieu had drawn back from theorising, in Althusserian terms, the 'articulations' between different fields in terms of determination 'in the last instance' by the economy, since, he argued, this had merely allowed 'certains marxistes d'apporter des solutions verbales à des questions que seule l'analyse empirique peut résoudre en chaque cas' (1992, 84-5). However, in the specific, empirical case of La Noblesse d'état, the use of the notion of a 'homology' between the different fields seemed to present an altogether too symmetrical image of the social world on the model of a Russian doll, each sub-field simply representing a mirror image in miniature of the larger field which encompassed it. If Bourdieu was right to fear that the concept of 'last instance determination' might become a theoretical straightjacket, simply failing to theorise the way in which the various fields were articulated was hardly a solution.

Where Bourdieu's analysis of the field of power was more sure-footed was in his use of a combination of biographical detail, statistical data, and ethnographic description to trace the shared background, education, culture, and networks of professional and social activity that characterised the French 'noblesse d'état'. Details of the educational trajectory, the number of company boards or cabinets ministériels sat on, statistical data regarding the prevalence of 'pantoufle', or the number
of political leaders of almost all shades, from the Gaullists to the Socialists, who had passed through ENA, all contributed to a convincing portrait of 'la fermeture sur soi d'un corps que son triomphe social incline d'autant plus à la certitude de soi que rien [...] ne vient troubler son "splendide isolement"' (1989, 369).

Thus, despite the failings inherent in its theorisation of the field of power, La Noblesse d'état must be considered a significant advance on Bourdieu's earlier analyses of class, education, and social reproduction, and this for a number of reasons. Firstly, both in its historical sweep and its attempt to pursue the trajectories of individuals and groups through the educational system and on into positions of power, it offered a vision of 'cultural capital' as a more mobile, conflictual entity, whilst attempting to define more precisely the relationship between specific forms of cultural capital and political, economic, or administrative power. In particular, Bourdieu had emphasised that the older culture of the humanities, which had derived its prestige from rarity value, was being supplanted by more technocratic, bureaucratic, and market-oriented forms of culture (484). It was not so much 'la culture cultivée' which legitimated the bourgeoisie's dominance, he now argued, as the 'façade de pure rationalité technique' afforded them as graduates of ENA or HEC (476). The extent to which this demanded Bourdieu re-think his earlier emphasis on the centrality of 'l'idéologie du don' and 'la culture cultivée' was never clearly acknowledged. However, what was clear was that in introducing distinctions between 'autonomous' and 'heteronomous' educational institutions, dispensing more or less 'properly scholarly' forms of knowledge, he had prepared the ground for the defence of autonomy and the critique of the free market ideologies of the 'noblesse d'état' which were increasingly to characterise his output.

La Misère du monde and 'La Démission de l'état'

If La Noblesse d'état had attempted to trace the emergence of an increasingly socially and culturally homogeneous political, administrative, and business elite, imbued with a specifically French form of neo-liberalism, then La Misère du monde constituted a cry of protest against the social effects of the policies pursued by that elite. The work of more than twenty sociologists published under Bourdieu's general editorship, La Misère du monde took the form of transcriptions of interviews, prefaced by short explanatory commentaries, with subjects deemed to be suffering in
some way from the effects of a neo-liberal consensus promoted by a ruling elite ever more divorced from the social and economic problems faced by significant sections of society. The interviews Bourdieu argued, took the form of a kind of Socratic dialogue in which the sociologist merely enabled the research subjects to 'témoigner, de se faire entendre, de porter leur expérience de la sphère privée à la sphère publique' (1993. 915). This 'forme de maieutique' was opposed not only to the neo-liberal dogmas of the ruling elite but also to the hasty, sensationalist treatment social problems so often received in the media (917).

The scope of La Misère du monde, with its inclusion of sections on the ghettos in American cities, clearly extended beyond the French experience. However, Bourdieu's own contributions, whether individually or jointly authored, concerned France alone and revealed a series of continuities with his earlier areas of interest. One of his recurring concerns was with the role of education and the increasing numbers of students forced to stay in school after the minimum leaving age simply to stave off unemployment. He argued that where prior to the 1950s the educational system had operated by simply excluding students of working class or peasant origin, the expansion and extension of post-college education meant that the dividing line between winners and losers in education had moved inside the education system itself: 'L'Ecole exclut toujours, mais elle exclut désormais de manière continue, à tous les niveaux du cursus [...], et elle garde en son sein ceux qu'elle exclut, se contenant de les réelguer dans des filières plus ou moins dévalorisées' (602). A system which encouraged more and more students to stay on in search of higher qualifications could only have the paradoxical effect of raising expectations it could not meet and hence encouraging a sense of resignation and cynicism amongst its students. Thus, it engendered in its students an attitude which oscillated between 'la lucidité la plus plus extrême sur la vérité d'une scolarité sans autre fin qu'elle même', and some residual belief in the value of the qualifications on offer, 'le parti quasi délibéré d'entrer dans le jeu d'illusion' (601).

Staying on at school despite persistent 'internal' failures, 'redoublements', or re-orientations into the least prestigious 'filières', pursuing educational qualifications they half-acknowledged had little or no real value, these 'exclus de l'intérieur' were caught in a state of suspended animation between the freedoms of childhood and the responsibilities of the adult world of work. Their attitude to time was comparable to that Bourdieu had analysed amongst the Algerian sub-proletariat and like that
sub-proletariat they were forced to live from day to day, from 'stage' to 'stage', from temporary job to temporary job (224).

The very structures which had previously ensured the socialisation of such adolescents were, moreover, in decline. The extension of schooling combined with mass unemployment meant that adolescents were no longer being socialised through immersion in the world of work. At the same time, 'le déperissement ou l'affaiblissement des instances de mobilisation', such as strong trades unions or the political and cultural organisations which characterised the old 'banlieues rouges', signalled the end of organisms which ensured 'une sorte d''enveloppement continu' de toute l'existence (à travers notamment l'organisation des activités sportives, culturelles et sociales) (225).

Adolescents of foreign, particularly North African origin, Bourdieu argued, suffered most from this lack of integration into social, economic, or political structures. Not only were they the most disadvantaged on the jobs market, they also had the greatest cultural and linguistic obstacles to overcome in the domain of education. Their high rate of academic failure meant that they were effectively excluded from the very institution, the school, theoretically charged with ensuring their integration into the Republic: 'L'Ecole est, pour les jeunes immigrés, l'occasion de découvrir et de vivre leur pleine appartenance de droit à la société française [...] et leur pleine exclusion de fait, affirmée dans les verdicts scolaires' (225).

This erosion of the corporate structures and collective rhythms of working class existence was also manifest in the attitudes and behaviour of these adolescents' parents, according to Bourdieu. A series of interviews in a town based around the declining iron and steel industry revealed its inhabitants to be living a similarly precarious existence. Whether they had been made redundant or were still managing to hold onto their job, forced to work longer hours under worse conditions as they watched their colleagues lose their jobs around them, they had all lost the ability to do anything more but live from day to day. Planning for the future or for one's children's future was impossible under such conditions: networks of social and political support both inside and outside the workplace had broken down; the 'cycle of simple reproduction' according to which sons would follow their fathers into the same factory no longer functioned.

Furthermore, Bourdieu argued, these problems were greatly exacerbated by the gulf that separated the political and administrative elite from the problems faced by large sections of the
population. The world of politics was becoming ever more self-regarding, 'fermé peu à peu sur soi.
sur ses rivalités internes, ses problèmes et ses enjeux propres' (941). Politicians were less interested
in expressing the needs and aspirations of their electors than in satisfying 'la demande superficielle
pour s'assurer le succès, faisant de la politique une forme à peine déguisée de marketing' (942).
Journalists and intellectuals were similarly increasingly beholden to the demands of the market
(941). This political vacuum, marked by the absence of any party or institution capable of
representing the needs of the least powerful in society, could all too easily be filled by the populist
demagogery of the Front national: 'tous les signes sont là de tous les malaises qui, faute de trouver
leur expression légitime dans le monde politique, se reconnaissent parfois dans les délires de la
xénophobie et du racisme' (941).

Returning to the Béarn to document the death throes of a peasant way of life whose decline he
had first charted in 1962 in 'Celibat et condition paysanne', Bourdieu interviewed two peasant
farmers who somewhat shamefacedly admitted to a sympathy for the Front national, the only
political party to show any interest in their plight (519-31). An interview with local activists for the
Parti socialiste, meanwhile, revealed an ill-concealed disgust at a leadership increasingly divorced
from and indifferent to the concerns of its grass-roots membership (433-45). However, it was in
the section entitled 'La Démission de l'État' that Bourdieu made his clearest statement of whom he
held responsible for the current situation and the kind of solution he favoured. As its title
suggested, this section took the French state to task for abdicating its responsibilities towards its
citizens. More specifically, Bourdieu attempted to identify the housing policies responsible for the
state of France's notorious 'banlieues', widely stigmatised as places characterised by racial tension,
crime, and social unrest. He argued that the policies pursued by Giscard's housing minister,
Jacques Barrot, which had encouraged private property ownership and shifted emphasis away from
state financing of physical structures towards giving aid to individuals, marked the beginnings of a
process of liberalisation whose effects were only now becoming all too clear:

c'est le retrait de l'État et le déperissement de l'aide publique à la construction, affirmées au
cours des années 70, dans le remplacement de l'aide à la pierre par l'aide à la personne, qui
est responsable, pour l'essentiel, de l'apparition des lieux de rélegation où, sous l'effet de la
In *La Noblesse d'État*, Bourdieu (1989, 436n.8) had identified the new housing policies introduced in the 1970s as a prime example of a policy change which encouraged the 'interpenetration' of the *haute fonction publique*, politicians, and businessmen: a point he and his collaborators had analysed in greater detail in a special number of *Actes de recherche en sciences sociales* dedicated to the housing market (Bourdieu 1990). The housing policies of the Giscardian presidency were thus symptomatic for Bourdieu of a more general move away from the belief in state intervention in the name of the collective good of society towards a liberal or neo-liberal vision of citizens as individual, atomised consumers, recipients of 'une charité d'État, destinée, comme au bon temps de la philanthropie religieuse, aux "pauvres méritants" (deserving poor[sic])' (223).

This 'transformation du peuple (potentiellement) mobilisé en un agrégat de pauvres atomisés, d"exclus" (223), reflected what Bourdieu termed, 'la conversion collective à la vision néo-libérale qui, commencée dans les années 70, s'est achevée, au milieu des années 80, avec le ralliement des dirigeants socialistes' (220-21).

Not only had mainstream left and right-wing parties been converted to this neo-liberal dogma, he argued, it also expressed, 'très directement la vision et les intérêts de la grande noblesse d'État, issue de l'ENA et formée à l'enseignement de Sciences-po' (221). These 'nouveaux mandarins', secure in their guaranteed posts at the summit of the civil service, 'prétendent gérer les services publics comme des entreprises privées, tout en se tenant à l'abri des contraintes et des risques, financiers ou personnels, qui sont associés aux institutions dont ils singent les (mauvaises) moeurs' (222).

This 'démolition de l'idée de service public', meant that the state had adopted an ideology which ran counter to its declared aims and intentions, even to its very raison d'être (221): a contradiction which was experienced most acutely by the 'street-level bureaucracy' at the point of delivery of aid and social services. Bourdieu presented a series of interviews with these 'street-level bureaucrats', a social worker, a drugs outreach worker, and 'un juge d'application des peines' whose efforts received little validation or official backing from the authorities who nonetheless expected them to resolve
ever more pressing social problems (229-56). As a solution, Bourdieu proposed that the state should recognise its responsibilities and he advocated: 'une politique résolue d'un Etat décidé à prendre réellement les moyens des ses intentions proclamées' (228).

In a chapter of *Raisons pratiques* (1994) entitled 'Esprits d'Etat: genèse et structure du champ bureaucratique', Bourdieu offered a more detailed theorisation of his conception of the state, its emergence, powers, and functions. Inflecting slightly Weber's (1968, 54) definition of the state as 'a compulsory political organisation' whose 'administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order', Bourdieu (1994a, 107) defined the state as 'un X (à déterminer) qui revendique avec succès le monopole de l'usage légitime de la violence physique et symbolique sur un territoire déterminé et sur l'ensemble de la population correspondante'. In brief, he argued that the state was the result of the concentration of various forms of capital, 'capital de force physique ou d'instruments de coercition (armée, police), capital économique, capital culturel ou, mieux, informationnel, capital symbolique'. This process of concentration led to the emergence of a specific form of capital, 'proprement étatique, qui permet à l'Etat d'exercer un pouvoir sur les différents champs et sur les différentes espèces particulières de capital, notamment sur les taux de change entre elles' (1994a, 109).

This 'capital étatique' was not, however, purely coercive for, Bourdieu argued, in delegating power to state institutions or personnel, an absolute ruler necessarily endowed the 'bureaucratic field' with a certain limited autonomy. In order both to legitimate and strengthen this autonomy, agents in the bureaucratic field had an interest in giving:

> une forme universelle à l'expression de leurs intérêts particuliers, à faire une théorie du service public, de l'ordre public, et à travailler ainsi à autonomiser la raison d'État par rapport à la raison dynastique, à la 'maison du roi', à inventer la 'Res publica', puis la république comme instance transcendante aux agents - s'agirait-il du roi - qui en sont l'incarnation provisoire. (1994a, 130)

Thus far, Bourdieu had described the 'strategies' adopted by agents or groups within particular fields as being determined by their inherent 'interest' in conserving or accumulating the specific
forms of capital on offer within the field in question. Here, he argued that the relative autonomy of a field such as the bureaucratic meant that agents could only pursue such partial ‘interests’ ‘au prix d’une soumission (au moins apparente) à l’universel’ (1994a, 131). The relative autonomy of the bureaucratic field resided precisely in its ability to determine its own rule of functioning and, in this case, the field was governed by 'l'intérêt au désintéressement', a principle which obliged agents to accord their particular interests with a ‘universal’ interest, namely the pursuit of the public good (1994a, 133). As long as the bureaucratic field retained its relative autonomy from the fields of politics or the economy, agents could only conserve and accumulate the symbolic capital on offer within that field by respecting the public service ethos. This Bourdieu termed 'un corporatisme de l’universel'.

Throughout La Noblesse d'état and La Misère du monde, Bourdieu’s primary concern had, of course, been the erosion of this autonomous principle in the educational, political, and bureaucratic fields as the heteronomous principles of the market gained ever greater sway. Through the notion of a 'corporatism of the universal', which theorised the universal values generated within specific fields as resulting from historically contingent, wholly ‘interested’ forms of practice, he hoped to reconcile the apparently contradictory halves of his output, that is to say to reconcile a critique of the arbitrary nature of autonomous fields and their products with a defence of that autonomy against the incursions of heteronomous market forces.

‘The Corporatism of the Universal’

The bureaucratic field was, then, one field in which Bourdieu posited the existence of a ‘corporatism of the universal’. This notion of a corporatism of the universal has become ever more central to Bourdieu’s work as he has argued that it is only by defending the autonomy of different fields from ‘heteronomous’ political or economic forces that the universal can be not merely safeguarded but advanced. Its increasingly centrality in Bourdieu’s work, to say nothing of its complex, potentially problematic nature, require that the ‘corporatism of the universal’, as well as the notions of ‘autonomy’ and ‘heteronomy’ on which it hinges, be subjected to closer scrutiny.

Bourdieu’s use of the terms ‘heteronomy’ and ‘autonomy’ seemed to mirror Weber’s (1968, 49-50) definition in Economy and Society: ‘An organisation may be autonomous or heteronomous. […]
Autonomy means that the order governing the organisation has been established by its own members on their own authority [...]. In the case of heteronomy, it has been imposed by an outside authority.

As early as the 1976 article, ‘Le Champ scientifique’, Bourdieu had posited a causal relationship between the autonomy of a field and the value, universal or purely contingent, of the activities undertaken in that field. In this early article, he had distinguished between the scientific field, in which a consensus existed regarding the norms of experimental verification such that career advancement could only be achieved by respecting norms of a universal validity, and ‘le champ religieux (ou le champ de production littéraire) dans lequel la vérité officielle n’est autrce chose que l’imposition légitime (c’est-à-dire arbitraire et méconnue comme telle) d’un arbitraire culturel exprimant l’intérêt spécifique des dominants’ (1976a, 100).

Ten years later, in the article ‘La Force du droit: éléments pour une sociologie du champ juridique’ (1986), Bourdieu (1986, 10) had theorised the place of the political field within this schema, arguing that where the field of science was driven according to a distinction between truth and falsehood, the field of politics was the least autonomous of fields since it was driven by a logic of friend versus foe. In the 1995 article, ‘La Cause de la science’, Bourdieu reiterated this opposition between the scientific and political fields, whilst suggesting that sociology was situated at the mid-point between these two extremes: striving for scientific autonomy, its subject matter nonetheless bordered on the political and could thus fall prey to the logic of friend versus foe as well as that of truth versus falsehood. Thus, as a general principle, Bourdieu could argue that the more autonomous a field was, the more its governing principles were determined by its own internal laws of operation, the greater its contribution to the advancement of universal truth and reason.

However, Bourdieu’s notions of field, autonomy, and a corporatism of the universal raised several problems. Firstly, on a theoretical level, it was surely questionable whether a concept of universal value could logically be grounded on purely contingent bases. Secondly, Bourdieu’s account seemed to possess a series of implicitly elitist and anti-democratic assumptions. As Sintomer (1996, 95) correctly points out, if the political field is placed at the antipodes of the scientific field in terms of its autonomy and the universality of its values:
l'idée que l'opinion publique puisse tendre à jouer un rôle arbitral lorsqu'une société se démocratise réellement et que s'instaure un espace publique critique est donc exclue. De même se trouve écartée l'idée que les institutions démocratiques, ou du moins certaines d'entre elles, puissent pousser les agents en lutte à prendre parti pour l'universel.

Perhaps in acknowledgement of this problem, in his more recent work Bourdieu has admitted the possibility of the political field contributing to the progress of the universal. Thus, in Méditations pascaliennes (1997), he argued that the political field, in common with other semi-autonomous fields, was a universe founded 'sur la skholè et sur la distance scholastique à l'égard de la nécessité et de l'urgence, économiques notamment' (1997, 131). In his studies of Kabylia, as in La Distinction, Bourdieu had identified this 'scholastic point of view' as profoundly distorting, the preserve of the leisured bourgeois intellectual. Here, however, he insisted on its inherent ambiguity as both a mark of social privilege and the precondition for autonomous thought and action:

Si l'universel avance, c'est parce qu'il existe des microcosmes sociaux qui, en dépit de leur ambiguité intrinsèque, liée à leur enfermement dans le privilège et l'égoïsme satisfait d'une séparation statuaire, sont le lieu de luttes qui ont pour enjeu l'universel et dans lesquelles des agents ayant [...] un intérêt particulier à l'universel, à la raison, à la vérité, à la vertu, s'engagent avec des armes qui ne sont autre chose que les conquêtes les plus universelles des luttes antérieures. (1997, 146)

Bourdieu now described the political field as comparable to the bureaucratic field in demanding 'la soumission, au moins extérieure, à l'universel' (1997, 148). The failure of politicians to live up to these universal principles was now apparently to be understood as purely contingent rather than intrinsic to the political field and Bourdieu called for what he termed 'un Realpolitik de la raison' which would aim: 'à instaurer ou à renforcer, au sein du champ politique, les mécanismes capables d'imposer les sanctions, autant que possible automatiques, propres à décourager les manquements à la norme démocratique (comme la corruption des mandataires) et à encourager ou imposer les conduites conformes' (1997, 150).
Yet, if Bourdieu now argued that the political field could contribute to the advancement of the universal, his conception of politics remained, albeit unintentionally, profoundly elitist. In insisting that only participants in the political field, who were distanced thanks to their privileged social status from material necessity, could contribute to the universal, he effectively excluded the possibility of a genuinely participatory democracy. As Sintomer (1996, 94) points out, such elitism was implicit in Bourdieu’s continuing belief that the majority of citizens exist in a state of unmediated doxa, incapable of reflecting on their existence unless by means of an ‘epistemological break’ itself the preserve of the bourgeois, the intellectual, or now the politician:

La ‘politique’ dont il s’agit ne peut être le fait que de figures très spécifiques et ne renvoie pas à l’action des citoyen(ne)s ordinaires. Cette approche a des racines profondes dans le corpus bourdieusien. Au nom de la ‘rupture’ que la science introduit nécessairement par rapport au sens commun, la tentative est forte de dénier aux citoyen(ne)s ordinaires tout sens critique politique et de faire l’accès potentiel à la lucidité l’apanage du sociologue.

Bourdieu’s field theory has thus undergone a series of significant shifts as he has sought a coherent foundation from which to mount a defence of those fields he considers most at threat. However, these shifts have rarely, if ever, been openly acknowledged, still less properly worked through. Nowhere has Bourdieu’s thought undergone a more dramatic shift than in his treatment of the fields of literary and artistic production. Identified in the 1976 article, ‘Le Champ scientifique’, as wholly subservient to ‘l’intérêt spécifique des dominants’, by the time of the publication of Les Règles de l’art in 1992, autonomous fields of literary and artistic production were being attributed a primordial importance by Bourdieu in his struggles against neo-liberalism and the heteronomous forces of the market. Artists and writers such as Manet, Flaubert, Baudelaire, and Zola, who had fought to secure creative autonomy for artists and intellectuals in the nineteenth century, had become the archetypes of principled autonomy and hence models for Bourdieu’s own intellectual engagements.
Intellectual Autonomy in the Face of the Market

One of Bourdieu’s most strident appeals to safeguard intellectual autonomy against the incursions of the market was launched in a polemical postscript he appended to Les Règles de l’art. entitled simply ‘Pour un corporatisme de l’universel’ (1992a, 461-72). Here he painted a gloomy picture of an intellectual and artistic field increasingly beholden to the demands of advertising, the media, and commercial sponsors. Claiming that these forces conspired to promote only those artists and intellectuals who were ‘media friendly’, Bourdieu lambasted a whole generation of ‘philosophes journalistes’ who might have been adept at courting the media but whose work was a caricature of genuine intellectual endeavour. Although mentioning no one intellectual by name, his references to a book and television series which had travestied the long French tradition of critical left-wing thought was clearly an allusion to Bernard Henri-Lévy’s notorious Les Aventures de la liberté (1991).

The shadowy figure of Bernard-Henri Lévy could also be discerned behind Bourdieu’s critique in La Misère du monde of the contribution of certain, again unnamed intellectuals to the forging of a neo-liberal consensus and the erosion of the public service ethos:

une démolition de l’idée de service public, à laquelle les nouveaux maîtres à penser ont collaboré par une série de faux en écriture théorique et d’équations truquées […] : faisant du libéralisme économique la condition nécessaire et suffisante de la liberté politique, on assimile l’interventionnisme de l’État au ‘totalitarisme’ ; identifiant le sovietisme et le socialisme, on pose que la lutte contre des inégalités tenues pour inévitables est inefficace […] et ne peut en tout cas être menée qu’au détriment de la liberté… (1993, 221)

Bourdieu’s target here was clearly that somewhat amorphous group of intellectuals known as ‘les nouveaux philosophes’, who had emerged to great media acclaim in the mid-1970s. Perhaps best personified by Lévy himself and the ex-Maoist André Glucksmann, they typically shared a past in the radical politics of the far left groupuscules which they had since publicly and noisily abandoned in favour of an ethical and economic liberalism now seen as an essential defence against an irredeemably totalitarian tradition of Marxist and marxisant thought and politics. Not only were
the careers of the ‘nouveaux philosophes’ advanced by their high media profile, they were also closely associated with Giscard’s politics, with many on the Left seeing their theoretical work as part of a directly political campaign to discredit the ‘common programme’ of the 1970s which united Communists, Socialists, and Radicals around a strongly interventionist agenda.

In addition to the ‘nouveaux philosophes’, Bourdieu (1993, 221) alluded to another group of intellectuals who had contributed to the neo-liberal consensus, ‘les “philosophes” médiatiques’ who had proclaimed the ‘“retour du sujet”’ and the ‘“mort de la pensée 68”’. This was a reference primarily to Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut’s La Pensée 68: essai sur l’anti-humanisme contemporain (1985), in which Bourdieu’s thought had been placed alongside that of Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, and Lacan as representative of a relativist, anti-humanist strain in French thought against which Ferry and Renaut posited the necessity of a return to liberal humanism. It might also have been aimed at Alain Finkielkraut’s La Défaite de la pensée (1987), which had criticised the abandonment of a belief in the universal value of culture by a whole series of French thinkers from Lévi-Strauss through Bourdieu himself to the poststructuralists and had called for the restoration of a liberal humanist tradition in its place.21

What these thinkers, Ferry, Renaut, Finkielkraut, and the ‘nouveaux philosophes’ shared, in addition to their liberal or neo-liberal ideology, was that they owed their fame and influence primarily to the media rather than more traditional academic ‘instances de consécration’. In La Distinction, Bourdieu (1979, 169) had attributed the success of the ‘nouveaux philosophes’, of ‘des producteurs intellectuels plus directement subordonnés à la demande des pouvoirs économiques et politiques’ to the emergence of a mass market for intellectual ideas increasingly controlled by the new media industries. In Sur la télévision, the extent to which the market and the media now constituted an ‘instance légitime de légitimation’ was one of his central targets (1996, 28).

It was, however, in La Noblesse d’état that Bourdieu offered his most detailed account of the imposition of a new model of intellectual labour, subservient to the demands of political, economic, or media power. Here he argued that the rivalry between ENS and ENA was one dimension of a broader struggle over the definition of the role of the intellectual in which those who possessed the greatest political and economic capital, ably abetted by their ‘intellectuels organiques’, sought to impose their models of economic realism and technocratic expertise over the intellectual field.
The rise of the heteronomous ENA at the expense of the more autonomous ENS had, as its inevitable corollary, the disappearance of an autonomous intellectual field structured by its own internal principles of behaviour, legitimation, and reproduction (302). The much vaunted 'victory' or 'revenge' of the liberal Raymond Aron, 'auteur phare de Sciences-po et de l’ENA', over the Marxist existentialist Sartre was, Bourdieu argued, merely one symptom of this general phenomenon. of 'la prétention des technocrates qui, exerçant un pouvoir temporel au nom d’une caution scolaire, se sentent de plus en plus autorisés à exercer une autorité intellectuelle au nom de leur pouvoir temporel' (302-03).

As the symbolic prestige associated with genuinely academic, as opposed to purely technocratic labour declined alongside the relative material wealth of academics, so they began to seek compensation outside the French academic field, whether in the form of paid consultancies, visiting professorships, notably in the United States, or of success in the 'secular' fields of publishing and journalism (297-98). The resulting 'pénétration du modèle américain dans la vie intellectuelle française' and the increasing influence of 'les intellectuels-journalistes' over the intellectual field had contributed to a complete transformation in the figure and lifestyle of the model intellectual (298).

One particularly striking manifestation of this search for 'temporal' compensation for the loss of 'spiritual' power could be seen in the trajectories of those ex-gauchistes and graduates of ENS, such as Serge July, Bernard Kouchner, Gilbert Castro, as well as Lévy and Glucksmann, who had now become successful businessmen or subservient to political power by taking up advisory posts in successive socialist administrations. The desire to dominate the social and intellectual worlds inculcated in an elite institution such as ENS and manifest in a youthful enthusiasm for 'un revolutionnaire autoritaire et […] terroriste', could all too easily find an outlet in a noisy and precipitate conversion to the 'realities' of political and economic power in the changed conjuncture of the 1970s and 1980s, Bourdieu argued (302n.38).

In the field of the natural sciences, meanwhile, the increasing complexity of scientific discovery combined with concentration in the business sector to increase institutional control over intellectuals frequently working in large publicly or privately-funded research organisations. In both the scientific field and the field of the humanities, where an older culture based on its rarity
value was being replaced by the more technocratic disciplines of marketing, public relations, and business studies, an 'artisanat intellectuel' was being supplanted by 'un salariat intellectuel' more directly beholden to economic and political power (482-86). New forms of state patronage were emerging in the fields of artistic and scientific endeavour alike (485). Faced with this situation, Bourdieu suggested intellectuals had a clear choice: either they could accept the new definition of the intellectual as expert and technocrat or they could, 'assumer efficacement, c'est-à-dire avec les armes de la science, la fonction qui fut remplie longtemps par l'intellectuel, à savoir d'intervenir sur le terrain de la politique au nom des valeurs ou des vérités conquises dans et par l'autonomie' (486).

It was this call for intervention in the political field in the name of intellectual autonomy that Bourdieu was to pick up in Les Règles de l'art. For, as Bourdieu himself put it, to return to the struggles of artists and writers like Manet, Baudelaire, and Flaubert to secure their creative autonomy against the powers of the courts, the Salon, and the Académie:

C'est aussi, en revenant aux 'temps héroïques' de la lutte pour l'indépendance où, face à une répression qui s'exerce dans toute sa brutalité (avec les procès notamment), les vertus de révolte et de résistance doivent s'affirmer en toute clarté, redécouvrir les principes oubliés, ou reniés, de la liberté intellectuelle. (1992a, 76)

In struggling to establish an autonomous field of artistic production, or rather a field of restricted production whose products were destined, initially at least, to be consumed not by a mass market but by an audience restricted to their peers, these artists and writers gave the field an important measure of autonomy, Bourdieu argued. The fields of restricted artistic and literary production functioned according to a set of principles directly opposed to the laws governing the political or economic fields. In this 'économie à l'envers', immediate temporal reward, whether in the form of economic success or political favour, was regarded with suspicion and the price of gaining symbolic capital within the fields was precisely renunciation of the rewards of immediate wealth or fame (1992a, 121-26). A 'dual' or 'bipolar' structure emerged in which the field of restricted production was opposed to a field of enlarged production, subservient to the demands of the market.
It was precisely the erosion of this principle of bipolarity in the intellectual field that Bourdieu had bemoaned in La Noblesse d'État (1989, 302). For, if the field of restricted production demanded of its participants a certain autonomy or distance from the realm of material necessity whilst predisposing its products to become the preserve of a leisured social elite, it also, according to the principle of the corporatism of the universal, opened a space in which 'universal' values could be articulated and advanced. Indeed, Bourdieu argued, it was in the name of such universal values, guaranteed by the autonomy of the artistic and literary fields, that Zola was able to intervene directly in the political field of his day:

Par un paradoxe apparent, c'est seulement à la fin du siècle, au moment où le champ littéraire, le champ artistique et le champ scientifique accèdent à l'autonomie, que les agents les plus autonomes peuvent intervenir dans le champ politique en tant qu'intellectuels [...]. C'est-à-dire avec une autorité fondée sur l'autonomie du champ et toutes les valeurs qui lui sont associées, pureté éthique, compétence spécifique, etc. Concrètement l'autonomie proprement artistique ou scientifique s'affirme dans des actes politiques comme le 'l'accuse' de Zola et les pétitions destinées à le soutenir. (1992a, 464-65)

Manet, Flaubert, Baudelaire, and particularly Zola thus became models for Bourdieu of a tradition of principled autonomous intellectual engagement which he considered threatened by the developments he had traced in La Noblesse d'État and elsewhere. In both Libre-échange and Sur la télévision he would invoke the example of these nineteenth-century artists again, opposing them to 'philosophes journalistes' such as Lévy, Ferry, and Finkielkraut. Zola, in particular, served Bourdieu as a model of the autonomous intellectual:

Selon le modèle inventé par Zola, nous devons et nous pouvons intervenir dans le monde de la politique, mais avec les moyens et les fins qui sont les nôtres. Paradoxalement, c'est au nom de tout ce qui lui assure l'autonomie de son univers que l'artiste, l'écrivain ou le savant peut intervenir dans les luttes du siècle. (1994, 38)
The paradox referred to here reflected Bourdieu's belief that it was only by distancing themselves from the world that artists and intellectuals could gain influence over the world, only by resisting the temporal rewards of the market could they retain their critical force. 'Ce qui faisait la grandeur des intellectuels à l'ancienne,' were, Bourdieu argued, 'les dispositions critiques qui trouvaient leur fondement dans l'indépendance à l'égard des séductions temporelles' (1994, 59). Indeed, the new breed of 'philosophes journalistes' were, he claimed:

des Zola qui lanceraient des 'J'accuse' sans avoir écrit L'Assommoir ou Germinal ou des Sartre qui signeraient des pétitions ou mèneraient des manifestations sans avoir écrit L'Être et le néant ou La Critique de la raison dialectique. Ils demandent à la télévision une notoriété que seule, autrefois, une vie, souvent obscure, de recherche et de travail pouvait donner. (1994, 58)

Bourdieu's emphasis on autonomy as the pre-condition for intellectuals contributing to the advance of 'universal' values of science, reason, and hence freedom drew on at least two distinct sources. Firstly, the notion that intellectual authority derived from a renunciation of temporal rewards in favour of a life of obscurity and cloistered study recalled Weber's description of the 'charisma' of religious prophets whose asceticism or renunciation of the world paradoxically increased their influence over worldly matters (see Gerth and Mills, eds. 1948, 323-59). Secondly, Bourdieu's concept of a 'restricted field' of artistic or intellectual production and reception, in which works were judged not by the wider market but by an audience of one's peers, recalled Bachelard's notion of 'une cité intellectuelle' composed of suitably qualified scientists whose judgement of the work of their colleagues would ensure it met communally accepted criteria of epistemological validity. As early as Le Métier de sociologue, Bourdieu (1968, 347) had invoked this vision of 'une cité savante homogène et bien gardée' as a defence against the temptation for social scientists to be influenced by the 'worldly' concerns of intellectual fashion. Citing Bachelard's analysis of the direct influence of fashion and the search for prestige within the Court over the work of eighteenth-century physicists, he had suggested that the contemporary equivalents
of such physicists could be found working in ‘la psychanalyse, l’ethnologie et même la sociologie’ (103).

In *Homo academicus*, Bourdieu seemed to give a clearer indication of precisely who he had in mind by associating thinkers such as Barthes, Derrida, Foucault, and Deleuze with the increasing interpenetration of the fields of journalism and academe. In *La Distinction*, meanwhile, he had suggested that the emphasis of such thinkers on desire and ‘jouissance’ revealed their complicity with the new discourses of consumerism and economic liberalism (1979, 431). By the time of the publication of *Libre-échange*, however, Bourdieu (1994, 50) was defending Derrida and Foucault against the criticisms of Ferry and Renaut: ‘La Pensée 68 vise à dire que tout ça c’est dépassé, c’est fini, que les années 60, mai 68, Sartre, Foucault, Derrida, et quelques autres, ça n’a jamais existé: qu’il faut revenir à Kant, à la démocratie, aux droits de l’homme’. Moreover, in *Sur la télévision* he cited Deleuze’s *A propos des nouveaux philosophes et d’un problème plus général* (1978) as an exemplary critique of the ‘nouveaux philosophes’ (1996, 11).

The sense that the targets of Bourdieu’s critique were shifting was strengthened by his treatment of Régis Debray. Debray’s 1979 *Le Pouvoir intellectuel en France*, a critique of the ‘nouveaux intellectuels’ and of the increasing importance of the mass media in the consecration of French intellectuals, had anticipated Bourdieu’s later critique in important respects. Indeed, Debray had listed Bourdieu as one of a number of colleagues who had helped him in the writing of the book (Debray 1979, 17). However, by the time of *Sur la Télévision*, Bourdieu (1996, 58) was describing Debray, who had since pursued a series of studies of the media or of ‘médiologie’, as one of those ‘détenteurs auto-désignés d’une science qui n’existe pas, la “médiologie”’, who proposed ‘avant même toute enquête, leurs conclusions péremptoires sur l’état du monde médiatique’ (1996, 58). The strength of Bourdieu’s critique of the ‘philosophes journalistes’ was surely weakened by both uncertainty about precisely which intellectuals he included under that rubric and the sense that he was not so much attempting an objective analysis of a sociological phenomenon as settling scores within the French intellectual field. To use Bourdieu’s own terminology, at times a ‘scientific’ logic of true and false seemed to have given way to a ‘political’ logic of friend and foe.

If Bourdieu’s understanding of precisely which figures posed the greatest threat to intellectual autonomy seemed unclear, his conception of autonomy was itself not without problems. He seemed
to posit a direct causal relationship between the autonomy of the field of artistic or intellectual production, the inherent value of the works produced in such a field, and the political morality of their producers. However, it was not clear whether the values advanced in the restricted field of artistic production were ‘universal’ in purely aesthetic terms, or in political and ethical terms also. Bourdieu seemed to suggest that participation in an autonomous field was enough in itself to ensure respect for ‘les normes d’universalité éthique et cognitive et d’obtenir réellement les conduites sublimées conformes à l’idéal logique et moral’ (1997, 146). Yet not every participant in the nineteenth-century field of restricted artistic production, for example, supported the cause of the Dreyfusards. Edgar Degas was a notorious anti-semite and anti-Dreyfusard. Bourdieu’s notion of a direct causal link between autonomy and the ‘universal’ not only seemed incapable of accounting for individuals like Degas or those other nineteenth-century artists who were anti-Dreyfusards, it also had little to say about the nature of the relationship between Degas’s objectionable politics and the aesthetic value of his paintings.25

Similarly, it was not immediately clear how a body of ‘legitimate’ works which, Bourdieu had argued in his earlier work, represented nothing more than the expression of a social elite’s distanced relation to the social world and could thus only be appreciated by that elite, could now be attributed a ‘universal’ value. As in his description of the political field, there was an implicit and unintended elitism at work here: the ‘universal’ could apparently only be appreciated or advanced by those lucky enough to enjoy the benefits of a leisurely ‘scholastic distance’ from the realm of material necessity. Anticipating such an objection, in Sur la télévision Bourdieu argued that at the same time as defending the autonomy of those fields in which the ‘universal’ was advanced, ‘il faut généraliser les conditions d’accès à l’universel, pour faire en sorte que de plus en plus de gens remplissent les conditions nécessaires pour s’approprier l’universel’ (1996, 77). In more specific terms, he advocated a classically Republican solution to this apparent paradox, namely education:

Les fondateurs de la République, au XIXe siècle, disaient. on l’oublie, que le but de l’instruction, ce n’est pas uniquement de savoir lire, écrire, compter pour pouvoir faire un bon travailleur, mais de disposer des moyens indispensables pour être un bon citoyen, pour être en mesure de comprendre les lois, de comprendre et de défendre ses droits, de créer des
associations syndicales... Il faut travailler à l'universalisation des conditions d'accès à l'universel. (1996, 77)

On one level, this call for a return to the founding values of French Republicanism was entirely consistent with Bourdieu’s championing of Zola, with his critique of the deleterious effects of neoliberalism over the fields of education, politics, bureaucracy, and culture, as well as with his typically Republican, even Durkheimian faith in the liberating potential of ‘universal’ scientific knowledge. However, on another level, Bourdieu’s evident Republicanism remained highly problematic. Much of Bourdieu’s earlier work had been given over to undermining the claims that French education and culture might make to the universality of their values by demonstrating the historically arbitrary, partial, and class based nature of those values. Faced with a growing neoliberal consensus and the increasing influence of market forces over the cultural and intellectual fields, Bourdieu had turned his attention to the defence of artistic and intellectual autonomy. The notion of a ‘corporatism of the universal’ was clearly intended as a means to reconcile these two potentially contradictory halves of his work by grounding ‘universal’ artistic and intellectual values on entirely contingent, historically arbitrary bases. However, the fact that, by Bourdieu’s own definition, access to the ‘universal’ values articulated in the restricted fields of artistic and intellectual production remained the preserve of the privileged few suggested that he had ultimately failed to square the circle and that, as Garnham has argued, there remained an unresolved ‘tension’ between his theoretical work and his political practice.

From the late 1980s, Bourdieu’s theoretical work and his more directly political pronouncements have shown a remarkable consistency, concerned as they have been with the emergence of a neo-liberal consensus and the concurrent limitations placed on educational, intellectual, and artistic freedom. Although he was by no means the first to criticise the political and social homogeneity of the French ruling elite or the effects of their brand of neo-liberalism over social policy and intellectual autonomy, Bourdieu’s interventions in these debates were marked, particularly in the case of La Noblesse d’état, both by their interpretative scope and by the immense detail of the statistical data they brought to bear. The reception accorded La Misère du monde in France, meanwhile, suggested that its focus on social deprivation and marginalisation had struck a
chord with large sections of the French public, articulating widespread fears and anxieties. Bourdieu’s principled support, in *Libre-échange*, of Hans Haacke’s campaigns against the kinds of censorship imposed on artists by corporate sponsors or reactionary politicians such as Pat Buchanan and Jesse Helms should also be applauded. However, if Bourdieu’s analyses of the nature of the neo-liberal consensus and of the threats it posed to artistic and intellectual autonomy were both detailed and convincing, the vision of autonomy he sought to defend seemed less well grounded theoretically. To point to the contradiction between Bourdieu’s critique of French culture and education and his avowed Republicanism is, of course, to return to a problem which has been implicit in his work since his very first studies of class, culture, and education in the mid-1960s. The political and economic conjuncture of the 1980s and 1990s had merely rendered this contradiction more acute.
NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN

1. For an account of the foundation of Liber, its editorial stance, and the problems it encountered during its first years of existence see Collier (1993).

2. See, for example, Audétat (1997); Debray (1997); Rémond (1997); Weill (1997). See also the heated exchange of articles which followed Bourdieu's appearance on the programme 'Arrêt sur images' on La Cinquième on 23 January 1996 (Bourdieu 1996a; Schneidermann 1996).

3. Bourdieu is president of the Comité international de soutien aux intellectuels algériens (Cisia).

4. The strikes, what became known as 'la pétition Bourdieu', and an opposing petition, launched by Alain Touraine and the editorial team at Esprit, which supported the need for reform, were the subject of numerous articles both in the mainstream press and in academic journals. For a useful summary of events, as well as copies of the 'pétition Bourdieu' and the 'pétition d'Esprit', see the 'dossier' in French Politics and Society (1996). For an account of the events sympathetic to the signatories of the 'pétition d'Esprit' and critical of Bourdieu, see Touraine et al. 1996. Bensaid (1996) provides an account far more sympathetic to Bourdieu's position.

5. For a useful account of the history of the grandes écoles, their relationship to the universities, and their role in the formation of the French ruling elite, see 'Part One: Foundations' (in Suleiman 1978, 17-92). Suleiman's earlier study, Politics, Power, and Bureaucracy in France (1974), provides a detailed, if now somewhat dated account of the relations between grandes écoles, administrative, political, and economic power in France.


7. Pierre Birnbaum (1977, 116-26; 151-83) has emphasised the influence of Giscard's liberalism in changing the tradition of centralised Gaullist planning and increasing the power of hauts fonctionnaires over French politics, administration, and business.

8. As Suleiman notes, with the accession of the Socialists to power, 'the Left has learned to use, and allowed itself to be used by these elites, more often than not to the detriment of the moral and ethical values with which the Left was long associated'. This has led to a situation where 'in critical ways, the elite has become indistinguishable from the political class in France. The barriers between serving the state, serving one's personal interests, and serving political interests have been
blurred to the point of becoming, for all practical purposes, non-existent’ (in Flynn ed. 1995, 161-79).

9. The book’s epigraph was a revolutionary verse dating from 1789.

10. This was a point which Bourdieu was to make even more forcefully in Méditations pascaliennes. Having argued that art and literature could offer the dominant ‘des instruments de légitimation très puissants’, he qualified this by stating: ‘mais il arrive aussi que les artistes et les écrivains soient, directement ou indirectement, à l’origine de révolutions symboliques de grande portée (comme, au XIXe siècle, le style de vie d’artiste, ou, aujourd’hui, les provocations subversives des mouvements féministe ou homosexuel) capables de bouleverser les structures les plus profondes de l’ordre social [...] à travers la transformation des principes de division fondamentaux de la vision du monde (comme l’opposition masculin/féminin) et la mise en question correlative des évidences du sens commun’ (1997. 126-27).

11. For a discussion of the increasing power of an administrative elite composed of énarques under the Fifth Republic, see Birnbaum (1977, 67-114).

12. For a more detailed analysis of the increasingly ‘general’, ‘technocratic’ training dispensed by grandes écoles such as ENA, see Suleiman (1978, 158-92).


14. Wickham and Coignard (1986) have provided a detailed, if somewhat anecdotal account of the networks of patronage and personal acquaintance which sustain this nexus of educational, political, administrative, and economic power.

15. Unless otherwise stated, all quotations from La Misère du monde are taken from passages attributed to Bourdieu’s sole or joint authorship.

16. As early as La Distinction, Bourdieu had noted the increasing prevalence of the educated middle classes amongst the personnel of all the major political parties from the RPR to the PS. the only notable exception being the PCF (1979, 475-76). In La Noblesse d’état, he had noted the dominance of énarques over the leadership of these same parties (1989, 304n.43). Bourdieu’s support for Coluche’s presidential candidacy in 1981 must also be seen in the light of his growing disillusionment with professional party politics. Although criticised as being based on populist, even Poujadist principles, Bourdieu (1981, 7) defended his decision to support Coluche’s
presidential bid by describing it as ‘une bévue intéressée’ which effectively undermined the rules of
the party political game.

17. Many commentators would question the pretensions of science to universality, pointing to the
huge influence of specific military, strategic, economic, and political interests over the development
of the natural sciences. Acknowledgement of the importance of such contingent or particular
interests does not imply acceptance of the wholesale relativism implicit in the ‘strong programme’
in the sociology of science, which Bourdieu has quite rightly rejected (Bourdieu 1995a, 3). On the
contrary, it is possible to acknowledge that a set of shared experimental protocols do indeed ensure
the universal validity of scientific discovery whilst emphasising that the kinds of experiment
undertaken, the areas of research pursued, are subject to entirely contingent issues of state or private
funding which, in turn, reflect particular economic, political, and strategic interests. A distinction
therefore needs to be drawn between the internal regulation of shared principles of experimental
verification and the external determination of which experimental projects will be funded and hence
subjected to those principles. Bourdieu’s straightforward opposition between autonomy and
heteronomy risked overlooking this important distinction.

18. This account is greatly indebted to Sintomer’s (1996) useful summary of Bourdieu’s
theorisations of the varying degrees of autonomy and heteronomy in the different fields.

19. Bourdieu’s emphasis on the need to respect certain ethical values within the political field
might be read, in part at least, as a reaction to successive high profile corruption cases involving
powerful French politicians of both Left and the Right.

20. In Réponses, Bourdieu (1992, 192) compared his current role as sociologist to that of Manet
and Flaubert in the nineteenth century: ‘le sociologue est aujourd’hui dans une situation tout à fait
semblable - mutatis mutandis - à celle de Manet ou de Flaubert qui, pour exercer à plein le mode de
construction de la réalité qu’ils étaient en train d’inventer, l’appliquaient à des objets exclus de l’art
académique, exclusivement consacrés aux personnes et aux choses socialement désignées comme
importantes’.

21. In Sur la télévision, Bourdieu cited Finkielkraut as typical of the new generation of media
intellectuals (1996, 32).
22. Bourdieu's analysis of the trajectories of these ex-soixante-huitards seemed to owe much to Guy Hocquenghem's *Lettre ouverte à ceux qui sont passés du col mao au Rotary* (1986), which, albeit in a far more malicious, sardonic tone, had pointed to the parallels between the machismo evident in the ex-gauchistes' early politics and their later enthusiasm for the rigours of the market.

23. Thus, in *Sur la Télévision*, Bourdieu (1996, 66) argued that 'l'hétéronomie commence quand quelqu'un qui n'est pas mathématicien peut intervenir pour donner son avis sur les mathématiciens quand quelqu'un qui n'est pas reconnu comme un historien (un historien de télévision par exemple) peut donner son avis sur les historiens, et être entendu. Avec "l'autorité" que lui donne la télévision'. The ability of journalists and media personalities to impose their criteria of judgement on the intellectual field had been the subject of Bourdieu's earlier article 'Le Hit-Parade des intellectuels français ou qui sera juge de la légitimité des juges' (1984), which he included in an appendix to *Homo academicus* (1984, 275-86).

24. For Debray's angry response to Bourdieu, see Debray (1997).

25. For an analysis of Degas's anti-semitism and its relation to his aesthetic, see 'Degas and the Dreyfus Affair: a portrait of the artist as an anti-semite' (in Nochlin 1991, 141-69). It is also not certain that the autonomy of nineteenth-century artists like Manet, Flaubert, and Baudelaire was really gained by a rejection of temporal reward. A number of critics have argued that the emergence of the figure of the autonomous artist needs to be understood as being imbricated in complex ways with politics, commercial issues, and the commodification of art forms rather than being understood in terms of a straightforward opposition between the artistic and the narrowly economic or political (Moriarty 1994; Woodmansee 1994; Roos 1996).
CONCLUSION

One of the principal aims of this thesis has been to demonstrate the extent to which Bourdieu’s most significant works have been centrally concerned with describing and analysing the dynamics of social and cultural change in postwar France. Indeed, Bourdieu has often shown considerable prescience in such matters, anticipating the future development of socio-cultural phenomena or crystallising a more general or vaguely perceived sense of malaise. This was particularly true of the works on French higher education he co-authored with Jean-Claude Passeron between 1964 and 1970, which both diagnosed with great acuity the travails of the French universities as they struggled to adapt to their changing role and set the agenda in the domain of the sociology of education in the years preceding and immediately following 1968. Similarly, Bourdieu was surely one of the first commentators to grasp the contradictory effects of the postwar expansion in higher education, anticipating as early as La Distinction the now well documented phenomenon in France whereby even the most apparently menial of jobs demands some form of post-secondary educational qualification. His analysis, in the same text, of the new forms of bourgeois and petit-bourgeois culture and manners which accompanied what he termed ‘le conservatisme reconvertis’, the emergence of a dominant liberal or neo-liberal political ideology should also be credited with considerable prescience. Later works such as La Noblesse d’état and La Misère du monde traced in still greater detail the rise of this new ‘dominant ideology’ and the networks of educational, bureaucratic, political, and economic power which sustained it.

To argue for the importance of Bourdieu’s work as a source of insights into the development of postwar French society and culture is by no means to suggest that its significance is limited to that specific national or historical context. On the contrary, it might be claimed that the reverse is true. For instance, once it has been grasped that Bourdieu’s analyses of French universities turn upon the contradictions provoked by rapid expansion in a previously elite sector, those analyses gain an increased relevance when considering the current state of British universities. Bourdieu’s descriptions of what happens when new categories of university entrant encounter a teaching body imbued with a set of cultural, intellectual, and linguistic assumptions engendered under an earlier, more selective system cannot help but have a particular resonance for all those working in British
universities in the wake of the mass expansion in student numbers of the early 1990s. Similarly, when considering Bourdieu's analysis of the formation of an intellectual, social, political, economic, and administrative elite in *La Noblesse d'état*, a detailed understanding of the role of the French *grandes écoles* in the formation of a 'Republican elite' and of the way in which neo-liberalism has been mediated through a long French tradition of state interventionism will be essential before any attempt is made to apply Bourdieu's insights to an analysis of the equivalent role of, say, Oxford and Cambridge Universities in Great Britain or Harvard, Yale, and Princeton in the United States.

In short, by reading Bourdieu's major works in their social and historical context this thesis has not sought to offer the definitive, final reading of those works, to imply that Bourdieu's work on higher education, for example, is really about the state of French universities in the postwar period and about nothing else. Rather, it has attempted to suggest that understanding the context in which Bourdieu's works were written is the necessary precursor to the application of his immensely provocative insights and concepts to other contexts, other national or historical settings. If an adequate grasp of the historical and social phenomena on which Bourdieu comments forms one such necessary precursor, another is surely a critical and objective assessment of the theoretical apparatus he brings to bear on those phenomena. As this thesis has traced the development of Bourdieu's theoretical apparatus, a series of potential contradictions or problemss inherent in some of his most central concepts have emerged.

'Doxa' and the 'Habitus'

At the heart of Bourdieu's understanding of the workings of the habitus is what, following Husserl, he terms the 'doxa' or the 'doxic relation' to the world, that pre-reflexive, pre-predicative orientation towards the future, understood as 'un à-venir' rather than a rationally apprehended 'futur', an implicit or 'practical' sense of what can and cannot be reasonably achieved, of what does or does not fall within a particular historically and culturally determined 'horizon of possibilities'. With the exception of those sporadic moments of 'crisis', during which agents' investment in the apparent self-evidence of the doxa is subjected to a 'mise en suspens', une rupture', or a collective 'époche', it is this 'doxic relation' to the social world, Bourdieu argues, that gives actions their 'sens', their sense of purpose and meaning, that ensures there is a time and a place for everything.
that naturalises and legitimises the social roles adopted by different classes, age groups, and genders by placing them beyond the sway of a rational, reflexive critique.

The importance of the notion of the doxa or the doxic relation and its centrality to Bourdieu's understanding of structure agency first became evident in the essays he wrote on the Algerian peasantry and sub-proletariat at the very beginning of his career. Its influence could also be seen behind his account of the way different classes internalised their objective chances of educational success into their different habitus. However, it was with Bourdieu's elaboration of a theory of practice in his works of Kabyle ethnology that the notion of the doxa began to take on an absolutely key role in his sociological theory. It was the doxic relation to the social world which pre-disposed not only the Kabyles to accept without question the collective rhythms of their 'pre-capitalist' universe but also French academics to acquiesce to the rigid hierarchies and long wait for promotion that characterised the 'traditional' system of higher education prior to its rapid expansion in the 1960s. Bourdieu's description of the rigidity of gender divisions in Kabylia and of their perpetuation in the West also turned on the notion that such roles were internalised at the doxic, pre-predicative level. His highly contentious assertion that the working class had no culture as such relied on the assumption that their material conditions rendered them incapable of staging that break with the realm of necessity, of doxic immediacy, which was the pre-condition for any aesthetic experience.

If, by this notion of the doxic relation at the heart of the habitus, Bourdieu seeks to describe the way a historical process of social, cultural, and intellectual inculcation becomes occluded so that a series of culturally arbitrary conventions and norms become naturalised and hence legitimised, then this appears to be a convincing account of the process of acculturation. The habitus, in this case, describes the process whereby a set of norms and conventions becomes sedimented into a structure of dispositions and expectations, of 'practical taxonomies', of ways of seeing and doing in the world that are neither entirely conscious nor wholly unconscious but rather 'practically' oriented towards certain implicit goals. By this definition, it is possible to see that the concepts of practice and habitus attempt, with some success, to mediate between subjectivist and objectivist modes of thought and offer a potentially powerful and persuasive tool for the analysis of social action.
However, Bourdieu also frequently implies that the internalisation of social imperatives into the habitus occurs in an immediate, mimetic way, by a process of incorporation, 'a sort of symbolic gymnastics', 'from body to body, i.e. on the hither side of words or concepts' (1977a, 2). Here, Bourdieu invokes the notion of doxa or the doxic relation to distinguish his approach from Marxist or marxistant theories of ideology, which he considers to be too rationalist, too concerned with the inculcation of ideas and not sensitive enough to the incorporation of bodily dispositions. It is because social imperatives are incorporated at this doxic level, he argues, that they are not amenable to a straightforward reflexive critique; they are more profoundly rooted and hence more enduring than a conventional theory of ideology might suggest.

This emphasis on the doxic, the embodied, the immediate nature of practice and habitus risks transforming the latter from a structure that has been historically determined into one that is merely culturally arbitrary. It is here that a certain pessimism, determinism, and stasis enter Bourdieu's work. The habitus may engender a range of relatively unpredictable outcomes and strategies but these will always be determined by the imperatives of social reproduction or of the conservation and accumulation of stocks of symbolic or material capital, imperatives of which agents themselves remain, by definition, unconscious. Intellectuals, such as feminists, may criticise inequalities between the sexes but these criticism will always fall wide of the mark since they are addressed to gender as an ideological construct rather than an embodied practice. Significantly, Bourdieu never convincingly explains what kind of politics might address inequalities of class or gender at that embodied level.

This thesis has, therefore, sought to question the adequacy, at both the empirical and the theoretical level, of the notion of the doxa or the doxic relation to the world wherever Bourdieu used it. Whether to analyse the politicisation of the Algerian masses, the aesthetic practices of the French working class, or the endurance of 'la domination masculine' in Western societies. Ultimately, Bourdieu's assertion as to the importance of this doxic relation in the inculcation of social norms and imperatives relies heavily on his use of Kabylia as the archetypal instance of the doxic, the realm of what, following Husserl, he terms 'la doxa originaire'. The role of 'traditional' Kabylia with regard to the 'developed' West is thus defined in terms of both contrast and comparison. In terms of comparison, Kabylia serves as an extreme example of a doxic relation to the social world.
which is reproduced in developed societies such as postwar France. In terms of contrast, Kabylia
serves as a benchmark against which the extent of the breakdown of the doxic relation at moments
such as May 1968 can be judged, just as in Sociologie de l'Algérie the upheavals of the Algerian
War were assessed in relation to an ‘ideal-typical’ portrayal of ‘traditional’ Algerian society, or in
Un Art ménov the photographic practices of the aspirational urban classes were judged against
those of ‘traditional’ Béarnais society, or finally in La Reproduction the nearly ‘critical’ state of
French universities was contrasted with the ‘organic’ state characteristic of a ‘traditional’ system of
higher education.

In the case of Kabylia, in particular, it is extremely difficult to identify with any certainty a
historical period which might correspond to Bourdieu’s notion of ‘the state of originary doxa’ and it
thus becomes unclear whether this state of doxa was one which he himself observed empirically
during the course of his fieldwork, whether it represents a historical reconstruction of a state now
long passed, or whether it is intended merely as an ideal-type, a purely theoretical limiting case or
‘point zéro’ from which he analyses a broader series of historical and cultural changes. This
uncertainty is reflected in his shifting definitions of the concept of habitus and the doxic relation at
its heart. Sometimes the notion of doxa seems to refer to the occlusion or forgetting of a historical
process of inculcation. At other times, it refers to the immediacy with which social norms and
conventions are incorporated without apparently ever being objectified in discursive or codified
form, an immediacy which seems to deny any real history whilst placing those norms and
conventions definitively beyond the sway of a reflexive critique. There is thus a need for Bourdieu
to be more explicit both about the historical status of his accounts of Kabyle society and to clarify
more precisely the nature of the close correlates doxa, habitus, and practice.

Of Science and Scientificity

If the problematic notion of doxa has a clear impact on Bourdieu’s understanding of agency,
since if agents are a priori assumed to enjoy a pre-reflexive relationship to their social world then
their capacity to act on that world through rational action must be considered severely limited. it is
also intimately connected with Bourdieu’s claims to the scientificity of his sociological theories.
For it is precisely by dint of his ability to achieve an objective distance on social phenomena not
available to agents on the ground that Bourdieu can claim the scientificity of his own work. As he argued in *Le Métier de sociologue*, sociology’s claim to scientificity is inseparable from what he termed ‘le principe de la non-conscience’, the assumption that society is ruled by a set of laws of which native agents remain unconscious and which can only be laid bare by an epistemological break which is the preserve of the social scientist: ‘le principe de la non-conscience, conçu comme condition *sine qua non* de la constitution de la science sociologique, n’est pas autre chose que la reformulation dans la logique de cette science du principe du déterminisme méthodologique qu’aucune science ne saurait renier sans se nier comme telle’ (1968, 38).

As Jacques Hoarau (in Bidet ed. 1996, 105-16) has noted, it is precisely this founding assumption of Bourdieu’s sociology that Luc Boltanski, formerly one of the latter’s close collaborators, has sought to challenge. Focusing on the sense of justice which agents regularly employ in their everyday disputes and quarrels, Boltanski has emphasised that this sense relies on a capacity for critique and reflexive distance which Bourdieu’s sociology seems to exclude *a priori*. For Boltanski (1990, 54), this exclusion is characteristic of a long tradition in sociological thought he names ‘la sociologie critique’:

> Depuis la perspective qui est la sienne, la sociologie critique ne peut constituer comme objet de ses analyses les opérations critiques réalisées par les acteurs. Or cet objet est essentiel pour une compréhension des sociétés qui sont les nôtres, et qui peuvent être définies comme des sociétés critiques au sens où les acteurs disposent tous de capacités critiques, ont tous accès, bien qu’à des degrés inégaux, à des ressources critiques, et les mettent en œuvre de façon quasi-permanente dans le cours ordinaire de la vie sociale; et cela même si leurs critiques ont des chances très inégales de modifier l’état du monde qui les entoure selon le degré de maîtrise qu’ils possèdent sur leur environnement social. Nous appartenons à une société dans laquelle les opérations de critique et les opérations de justification, rendues nécessaires pour répondre à la critique ou pour la prévenir, interviennent constamment.

As Boltanski’s remarks about the unequal chances of agents’ critical capacities having purchase on the social world make clear, to emphasise the importance of such capacities is neither to slip into
a naive subjectivism nor to deny any role to the sociologist in the elucidation of the specific structural constraints on critically inspired political or social action. Rather, it is a matter of questioning the absolute distinction between the scientific knowledge of the sociologist and the doxic, pre-reflexive, or purely practical knowledge which Bourdieu attributes to 'ordinary' individuals in their everyday behaviour. Moreover, as Yves Sintomer (1996, 94) has pointed out, in its continued reliance on the opposition between science, the preserve of the detached sociological observer, and doxa, the realm of pre-reflexive immediacy inhabited by other agents, Bourdieu's sociology finds it difficult to theorise the possibility of a genuinely participatory democracy and, albeit unintentionally, implies a certain elitism.

Bourdieu's recent articles and speeches collected in Contre-feux suggest that in practice he has a very modest vision of the role of the critical intellectual as someone who helps workers, the unemployed, or illegal immigrants in their struggles for justice by providing the theoretical bases for a critique of the dominant neo-liberal discourse. However, these directly political pronouncements seem to sit uneasily with a body of theoretical work in which he has constantly asserted the inherent incapacity of the most dominated groups to gain any reflexive or even aesthetic distance on their social environment.

‘Field’ and ‘Strategy’

Inseparable from Bourdieu's positing of 'le principe de non-conscience' as the sine qua non of a scientific sociology is his assertion that the actions of individuals or the policies pursued by institutions can only be understood by placing those individuals and institutions within their respective fields, within a structure of differential relations. As he put it in Le Métier de sociologue:

> le principe de la non-conscience impose [...] que l'on construise le système des relations objectives dans lesquelles les individus se trouvent insérés et qui s'expriment plus adéquatement dans l'économie ou la morphologie des groupes que dans les opinions et les intentions déclarées des sujets. Loin que la description des attitudes, des opinions et des aspirations individuelles puisse procurer le principe explicatif du fonctionnement d'une organisation, c'est l'appréhension de la logique objective de l'organisation qui conduit au
There can be no doubting that the metaphor of the field as a magnetic force field with its poles or attraction and repulsion is a peculiarly persuasive one, particularly when applied to the artistic or intellectual domains. Indeed, Bourdieu’s contention that artistic or intellectual productions can neither be attributed to the workings of an individual creative genius nor simply read as the reflection of ‘external’ historical or social conditions but need rather to understood as the result, in part at least, of the mediating force of a field, with its own characteristic structure and specific historical genesis, is surely one of his most valuable insights. Similarly, his use of correspondence analysis as a means for plotting the different poles of opposition and affiliation which characterise a particular field can prove a powerful heuristic tool.

The problem arises, however, when Bourdieu seeks to claim some kind of ontological status for the fields he ‘constructs’ by means of correspondence analysis, arguing in Réponses, for example, that this is an analytical tool ‘dont la philosophie correspond exactement à ce qu’est, à mes yeux, la réalité du monde social’ (1992, 72). However, his use of correspondence analysis to construct the ‘field of power’ in La Noblesse d’état, for example, raises questions about whether this can really account for the ‘reality’ of the different forms of power affecting French society. For the ‘field of power’, as Bourdieu plots it, amounts to nothing more than a nationally selected sample of job functions in a way which seems to overlook the complex question of the articulation of this particular national form of intellectual, cultural, or economic power with the political power of democratic institutions, the power of the judiciary, the bureaucracy, or the increasingly important sources of supra-national power, whether in the form of political and bureaucratic institutions such as the E.U. or the multinational business corporation.

What Bourdieu’s field theory seems to lack is any convincing account of the articulations between firstly different national fields and sub-fields and secondly those national fields and the increasingly important supranational fields, whether economic, political, or cultural. Typically, Bourdieu will describe the relationship between fields as being one of ‘structural homology’. Thus, he will point to a structural homology between the ‘field of power’, in which group A. endowed
with high economic capital and relatively low cultural capital, dominates over group B, endowed
with high cultural capital and relatively low economic capital, and the sub-field of artistic
production, say, in which group A', commercially successful artists close to temporal sources of
power, dominate over group B', avant-garde artists who 'compensate' for their lack of commercial
success by accumulating prestige within the 'field of restricted production'. However, whilst this
may describe the relationship between different fields at a given moment, it does not explain the
nature of that relationship. Does the dominance of group A in the field of power determine the
dominance of group A' in the artistic field or is the dominance of the two groups in their respective
fields merely correlated? Could a situation be imagined in which group B' gained dominance over
group A' in the artistic field and, if so, would this have any effect on the nature of the relationship
between groups A and B in the field of power?

Bourdieu has been extremely reluctant to make any general theoretical statements about the
nature of the articulations between fields, citing his desire to distance himself from an Althusserian
vocabulary of 'articulations' between different 'instances' and concluding 'il n'y a pas de loi
transhistorique des rapports entre les champs' (1992, 84-5). However, this has not prevented him
from asserting that there is a transhistorical law governing the internal functioning of fields,
namely that tendential law which demands that every participant in a field seeks, in accordance
with an internalised 'interest' or 'sens du jeu', to conserve or accumulate the capital on offer within
that field. Indeed, Bourdieu has posited the existence of such an inherent interest as 'le principe de
raison suffisante [...], qui est constitutif de la science même: ce principe veut en effet qu'il y ait une
cause ou une raison permettant d'expliquer ou de comprendre pourquoi telle pratique ou telle
institution est plutôt que de ne pas être et pourquoi elle est ainsi plutôt que de toute autre façon'
(1980a, 34). Bourdieu's recourse to a Leibnizian vocabulary here, the 'principle of sufficient
reason', and his re-casting of Leibniz's famous question 'pourquoi y a-t-il des choses plutôt que
rien?' is indicative of the determinism underlying the notion of 'interest'. For in Bourdieu's
sociology it is the inherent tendency to accumulate capital that has replaced Leibniz's God as the
ultimate determinant of human action, of the 'strategies' adopted by agents in specific fields.

The concept of 'interest' which Bourdieu places at the heart of agents' 'strategies' and his
failure adequately to theorise the articulations between different fields combine with his belief in the
'reality' of the model of the field provided by correspondence analysis to encourage a view of social action as being solely determined by struggles to accumulate capital within particular fields rather than by a much broader, complex range of determinants. Thus, in the case of his reading of the Barthes-Picard Affair, Bourdieu could argue that the 'true principle' behind Barthes' theoretical innovations lay not in the content of his work but rather in the structural constraints of the French intellectual field at a given historical moment and in Barthes' implicit or strategic interest in accumulating the new forms of intellectual capital on offer there. There was a danger here, however, of confusing cause with effect. To argue that certain theoretical developments were destined to be well received in a particular historical conjuncture does not prove that those theoretical developments were determined by Barthes' 'interest', whether conscious or otherwise, in taking advantage of that conjuncture. Further, even supposing Barthes' work had been determined by the new forms and sources of academic prestige available to him in the postwar French intellectual field, this does not necessarily say anything about the inherent strengths or weaknesses of that work.

There is, thus, in Bourdieu's field theory a constant danger of reductionism, of failing adequately to acknowledge that struggles for the accumulation of symbolic capital within a field may simply be one of a number of determinants of a particular strategy, or perhaps merely the side-effect of that strategy, rather than its true hidden principle. The question of whether the fact that strategies frequently lead to an accumulation of symbolic capital means that those strategies are reducible to an inherent tendency to accumulate such capital leads naturally to an analogous question with relation to Bourdieu's key concept of 'cultural capital'. For there can be no denying the persuasive nature of Bourdieu's analyses of the importance of legitimate culture in perpetuating forms of symbolic domination and social distinction. Although these symbolic forms of domination had already been noted by thinkers such as Veblen, Weber, Durkheim, and Halbwachs, Bourdieu is surely unique in terms both of the detail of his analysis and of the sophistication of the theoretical apparatus he has brought to bear on such phenomena. However, just as his theory of field and strategy risks reducing all social action to the search for symbolic capital and nothing more, so his emphasis on the distinctive nature of legitimate culture risks ignoring the possibility that culture
might have a role over and above its implication in issues of class stratification, that it might function both as cultural capital and as something else besides.

It is, of course, these two closely related issues, of whether all strategic action is purely ‘interested’ or all legitimate culture purely distinctive, that have come to dominate Bourdieu’s more recent work as he has sought a theoretical justification for his directly political interventions in defence of the autonomy of artistic and intellectual production. The solution he offers to this problem, in the form of the notion of a ‘corporatism of the universal’, according to which the relative autonomy of certain fields will ensure that the pursuit by agents of their own particular interests will paradoxically concur with the advancement of ‘universal’ values of art, culture, reason, and science, has merely served to highlight Bourdieu’s continuing adherence to a specifically French Republican vision of both politics and sociology. Bourdieu’s Republicanism, implicit in works as early as Les Héritiers, has thus come to increasing prominence, as has the question of that Republicanism’s apparently contradictory relationship with a body of work so critical of the Republican ‘myths’ of democratic and meritocratic access to culture and education.

Republicanism and the ‘Universal’

Both French- and English-speaking critics have tended to play down, if not entirely to ignore the importance of the French Republican tradition to an understanding of Bourdieu’s work. In part this reflects both the severity and the timing of Bourdieu’s critiques of French schooling and culture which have encouraged critics to focus on his possible affinities with Marxist theories of education, class, and culture. However, this thesis has sought to demonstrate the extent of the theoretical and political differences between Bourdieu’s work and that of his contemporaries who drew on Althusserian or Gramscian theories of ideology. The inherent reformism of his proposals for change in the educational and cultural domain, the immensity of his debt to the Durkheimian tradition, his continued faith in the power of a scientific sociology to emancipate agents from the mystified vision of art and culture which keep them in their place, and his more recent invocations of ‘the universal’ all point to the extent of Bourdieu’s allegiance to the Republican tradition. Indeed, on one reading, the severity of his critiques of the institutions of French culture and
education might be seen as a measure of his disappointment at these institutions failure to achieve their meritocratic and democratic Republican mission.

Nonetheless, as early as Les Héritiers and Un Art moven there appeared to be at the very least an imbalance, if not a straightforward contradiction, between Bourdieu's criticisms of the 'arbitrary' nature of the legitimate culture inculcated in French universities or exhibited in art galleries and the reformism of his proposals for widening access to this wholly arbitrary culture. His more recent theorisation of 'un corporatisme de l'universel' has done little to resolve this apparent contradiction. Much of the force of Bourdieu's work derives from precisely his ability to uncover the particularisms of class and history which lie behind the claims of aesthetics, culture, and education to a universal status. Indeed, in his La Défaite de la pensée (1987), Alain Finkielkraut (85n.1: 88n.1) identifies Bourdieu's work on education as part of a more general assault on the 'universal' values of culture and reason he associates with a dominant post-1968 mood of relativism, multiculturalism, and postmodernism. Against this mood, Finkielkraut calls for a return to the 'universal' values of the French Republican tradition.

Jill Forbes (1995) has argued that Finkielkraut's championing of the 'universal' needs to be understood as part of a wider reaction to fears regarding the 'integration' of France's large immigrant population, multiculturalism, and the waning of the powers of a centralised French nation state in face of global economic and political forces. She reads Finkielkraut's work alongside a more generalised nostalgia for the glory days of French Republicanism under the Third Republic manifest in the popularity of films such as Jean de Florette (1985), Manon des sources (1986), and Germinal (1993). If the 'universal' values of reason and culture embodied in French Republicanism have been challenged, it is because that supposed universalism proved, in practice, incapable of accommodating certain particularisms of class, race, gender, and sexuality. This is, of course, something of which Bourdieu is well aware. In his recent Contre-feux, he has acknowledged the importance of challenging this 'faux universalisme occidental' (1998, 25). However, the precise nature of the 'universal' defended by Bourdieu and its distinction from 'le faux universalisme occidental' trumpeted by the likes of Finkielkraut remains under-theorised. Moreover, Bourdieu's own returns to the examples of Zola's 'J'Accuse' or of those whom, in Sur la télévision, he termed 'les fondateurs de la République, au XIXe siècle' (1996, 77), for models of
intellectual autonomy and the principles of a democratic education come perilously close to reproducing the more generalised Third Republic nostalgia identified by Forbes.

One final question relates to Bourdieu’s invocation of the ‘universal’, namely the extent to which his own theoretical works have accommodated those particularisms of race, gender, and sexuality so frequently excluded by a supposedly universal tradition. Bourdieu’s interest in gender as a significant determinant of social stratification dates from as early as Les Héritiers. However, as Swartz (1997, 154-57) has demonstrated, the relationship of gender to social class remains ambiguous in Bourdieu’s work. Sometimes gender is identified as the paradigm of all forms of symbolic domination, as in ‘La Domination masculine’. At other times, however, it is attributed a secondary status in relation to class, as was manifest in his proposals for a ‘rational pedagogy’ to be introduced in French universities, proposals which addressed the inequalities of class he had uncovered but not those of gender.

The essays in Contre-feux offer a useful insight into the extent of Bourdieu’s political involvement in campaigns in defence of France’s immigrant populations and against the spread of racism (1998. 21-4; 27-9; 93-4). Similarly, in recent articles and in his support for the legalisation of same sex marriage, he has shown his sensitivity to issues of sexuality (see Bourdieu 1997b). However, the question of the influence of ethnicity and sexuality on lifestyle, social distinction, and forms of domination, both symbolic and physical, remains largely untheorised in Bourdieu’s work.

In summarising some of the most significant problems, contradictions, even lacunae which have surfaced in this critical investigation of Bourdieu’s work, this conclusion has not sought to imply any straightforward ‘failure’ on Bourdieu’s part. On the contrary, the pre-condition for any appropriation or application of the immensely fruitful theoretical apparatus Bourdieu has elaborated over the course of his career is surely a genuinely critical understanding of that apparatus’ strengths and weaknesses. Bourdieu’s work is rich both in insights concerning the postwar development of French culture and society and in provocative and powerful concepts which can and have been fruitfully applied to other social and historical contexts. It is to be hoped that in seeking to place Bourdieu’s work within both its historical and its intellectual context this thesis has made some contribution to understanding the conditions under which that work can continue to be applied to other contexts in the future.
BOOKS AND ARTICLES BY PIERRE BOURDIEU

The following includes only those books and articles consulted in the course of researching the foregoing thesis. For a complete bibliography of Bourdieu’s work up until 1988, see Delsaut (1988). A detailed bibliography of his work up until 1994 can be found in Mørh and Fröhlich eds. (1994).

In keeping with convention, Bourdieu’s journal, *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, will be abbreviated in the form ‘ARSS’ throughout.


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(1959b) ‘Le Choc des civilisations’, *ibid*, pp.52-64.


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