Unsettling the Language of Settlement: Imaginaries of Race and Experiences of Settlement in Contemporary Bolivia

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Abstract: This article seeks to bring into question some of the assumptions that lie behind what constitutes ‘settlement’ in settler colonial theory by focusing on the case of the recent history of Indigenous mobilisations in Bolivia. The first part of the article discusses two of the defining features which have characterised settler colonialism as a specific type of colonialism in the literature: the transformation of the land and the settler-native binary. I show that whilst most of the Latin American and Caribbean region has rightly been disqualified as settler colonial on both accounts, a closer look at the assumptions behind what constitutes settlement for settler colonial theory and the uneasy place of the Latin American and Caribbean region within this framework reveals a need to create a more nuanced, differentiated understanding of settlement which can help to analyse such cases. Focusing on the shift in racial discourses that took place with recent Indigenous mobilisations in Bolivia from the 1960s onwards and the legacy of discourses of racial mixing or mestizaje, the article seeks to show how narratives of race served to underpin and legitimise processes of settlement in this Andean country.

Key words: Bolivia; settler colonial; Latin America; indianismo; katarismo; mestizaje

The language of ‘settlement’ has marked a shift in terms of how we think about the postcolonial situation of a number of different regions throughout the globe today.
Settler colonial theory has been used to analyse the specificity of the colonial experience and its aftermath among certain postcolonial states, particularly those states which experienced colonialism as a widespread ‘land grab’ by settler populations during an intense new phase of capitalist accumulation in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, in which the aim of settlement was not to exploit the Indigenous populations for labour but rather to erase them from the newly settled geopolitical space entirely.¹ It is a testament to the power of this recasting of colonial relations that there are an ever-increasing number of cases to which settler colonial theory is today ‘applied’. In the words of Lorenzo Veracini, one of the most prominent scholars of settler colonial theory, ‘[settler] colonialism can now be seen where it had not previously been detected’.²

Whereas the empirical case studies to which settler colonialism is put to use is increasingly expanding, however, theorists of settler colonialism insist on the specificity of its framework for describing only certain types of historical colonialism. A tension appears to arise between the apparent applicability of the insights of settler colonial studies to shed light on and transform our understanding of case studies of colonialism from across the world, and the specificity that the term itself is presumed to possess.

This tension is a result of the fact that two of the central tenets of this theoretical framework do not necessarily go hand-in-hand. On the one hand, settler colonial theory comes into force precisely where ‘postcolonial theory’ had supposedly failed; that is, in order to shed light on how forms of colonialism persist in those countries which up until recently had officially denied the continued existence of its Indigenous populations (presumed to have already been annihilated by a colonising ‘other’), and had celebrated its separation from the metropolis under colonial rule as marking the formal end of
colonialism. Thus countries such as the United States and Australia might be considered postcolonial according to the countries’ official national narratives, but only in the sense that they had once been subject to colonial rule. Official state historiography in many such countries lamented the extinction of Indigenous populations as a thing of the past, ignoring the oppression of those Indigenous groups that continued to struggle for a space of political and territorial sovereignty. On the other hand, the sets of tools that were developed in the context of settler colonial theory have been used to analyse the mechanisms by which settlers transformed the use of the land and institutionalised powerful narratives which excluded native populations from spheres of power and made invisible their own struggles for recognition. As an analytical tool which focuses on the complex mechanisms that underlie processes of settlement, however, the term ‘settler colonial’ has come to be used to describe and analyse processes of settlement in countries which would not normally be considered settler colonial in the first, stricter sense of the term. In the literature on settler colonialism, the fact that these two quite different understandings of the term are often implied is not always recognised, and it is taken for granted that the mechanisms by which settlement takes place only apply as tools of analysis in those countries which are strictly speaking ‘settler colonial’ in the first, stricter sense of the term. This has perhaps been the case because many of those contexts in which settler colonial theory was first applied do appear to conform to this general pattern. This may go some way to explaining why Latin American states are often excluded from settler colonial analyses. However, the use of settler colonial theory to analyse situations very different from these contexts, where the existence of Indigenous populations in the country and the continuing effects of colonialism are not always
denied, may indicate that some of the analytical assumptions behind what is presumed to be specific to settler colonialism may in fact describe much broader aspects of settlement which apply to different kinds of colonial and postcolonial contexts. What I argue is that this fact creates the need to reconsider the limits of what has been considered under the notion of ‘settlement’ within settler colonial theory. This article proposes to offer a contribution to this discussion by offering contemporary Bolivian narratives of race as a case study.

National narratives of racial mixing or *mestizaje* were officially promoted by the government which took power after Bolivia’s national revolution in 1952.⁴ They were used to promote an idea of a homogenous national identity and citizenship based on belonging to a mixed race or *mestizo* population, whose ideal was grounded on a sense of modern development that actually denied access to citizenship rights for Indigenous populations whilst at the same time celebrating the Indigenous past as the root of Bolivia’s modern national identity.⁵ This discourse was later to be challenged by grassroots Indigenous movements from the 1960s who reclaimed the word ‘Indian’ in order to render visible the continued exclusion of Indigenous people from the political sphere. What these Indigenous movements reveal is that the discourse of *mestizaje* or racial mixing actually denied full participation in political life to Indigenous peoples on the basis of their heritage. Indigenous activists began to re-imagine what it meant to belong to such Indigenous groups in order to make visible this exclusionary practice. By focusing on the shifting discourses of race in recent Bolivian history, the aim of this article is to show that Bolivia shares many characteristics with what is considered to define the discourses that form an important feature of settler colonial states. The shifting
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Semantics of race in Bolivia reveal how racial narratives have legitimized continuing practices of settlement which involve simultaneously *both* the transformation of land *and* the exploitation of labour. My point is not to argue that Bolivia should be considered a settler colonial state, however; both Lublin and Verdesio’s articles included in this Special Issue effectively argue for the usefulness for countries such as Argentina and Uruguay respectively to be considered settler colonial in a much stricter, more limited sense. Unlike these two River Plate countries, Bolivia does not deny nor has ever denied the existence of its Indigenous populations (which has historically accounted for more than half of the country’s total population). Indeed, following the landslide electoral victory of Evo Morales in 2005, Bolivia has been defined as an ‘indigenous state’ with an ‘indigenous-popular hegemony’, and, as other scholars have noted, identifying as Indigenous in Bolivia today offers significant symbolic capital in the public domain, a fact which continues to be relevant even after Morales’s deposition in late 2019.6 Nevertheless, the fact that certain forms and degrees of settlement did take place throughout Bolivian history, and that this settlement has not only affected the current configuration of its national narratives but has also contributed to the enduring legacy of colonialism in the country, means that a study of the Bolivian case offers food for thought on how to think about the limits, or the potential diversity, of what settler colonial theory could understand under the term ‘settlement.’ It allows us to rethink what settlement means from the perspective of the lived experiences of colonialism (and of resistance to colonialism) that escapes the dichotomy assumed by settler colonial theory between settler colonial types and more extractive colonial types, and encourages us to understand processes of settlement as internally diverse, marked by different stages of
(in)completion, and as prior to the binary settler-native which underpins so much scholarship on settler colonialism. In other words, I suggest that putting settler colonial theory and the contemporary Bolivian case into dialogue can offer an important contribution insofar as it asks us to question some of the foundations of settler colonial theory, as well as allowing us to consider Bolivian experiences of colonialism from a new light.

**Thinking Settlement from Latin America and the Caribbean**

It is difficult to sustain that there is any consensus over what settler colonialism is, though some have attempted to clearly delimit it from other kinds of colonialism. Nevertheless, we can identify two important features that characterise settler colonialism in most of the literature on the subject. The first is the importance of the transformation of the land as an attempt by settlers to annihilate Indigenous populations in their own territories whilst at the same time making it a new ‘home’ for the settlers themselves. The second is the settler-native binary as the axis upon which to understand the endurance of colonial relations (as opposed to the coloniser-colonised binary that was more prominent in earlier literature on the British and French postcolonial contexts). I would like to suggest that whereas experiences of colonialism in Latin America and the Caribbean have often been considered as outside the purview of settler colonial theory because they disqualify for the definition on both of these accounts, a closer look at the history of the region reveals that understanding colonialism as part of a process of settlement, albeit internally differentiated and in many cases quite unlike what has been described for the
case of more ‘typical’ settler colonial states, can help us to understand and analyse the persistence of neo-colonial structures in the area. Let us take a look at both of these two central features of settler colonial theory in turn.

**Land versus Labour**

As is well known, Lorenzo Veracini has offered the most systematic definition of settler colonialism properly speaking and opposed it to another, more extractive type, which is often what we commonly imagine when we speak about colonialism. On the one hand, settler colonialism properly speaking for Veracini is based on the denial of the pre-existence of Indigenous populations on the part of the settlers, who seek to annihilate them as part of a generalised land grab whose aim is to turn the land into a new home for the settlers, who eventually cease to consider the metropole as their homeland. On the other hand, what Veracini describes as a more extractive kind of colonialism is based upon the exploitation of native labour for the profits of a place perceived as the ‘homeland’ by a foreign force which never fully integrates with the native population and does very little to change the basic social and economic structure of the exploited society. This is why, according to Veracini, this second kind of ‘exploitative’ colonialism is so easy to overcome comparatively; once the alien forces have been banished, the exploited society is able to take back control of the forces of production and restore power. Because it so profoundly transforms the use of the land, and because the settlers have nowhere to ‘return home’ to, Veracini considers settler colonialism as a much more pervasive form
of colonialism, and one that from a historiographical perspective has not even been properly considered as colonialism up until relatively recently.

The territories of the American continent that had once been part of Spanish and Portuguese empires are uneasily situated within this framework. At first sight, the Spanish American colonies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries appear to be an example of (non-settler) colonisation par excellence. The most important Spanish settlements were indeed built on top of an infrastructure left behind by the two dominant imperial civilisations that the Spanish encountered: the Aztec triple alliance and the Inca empire. Given that Spanish colonisers were still caught up in the values of a feudal society and sought to possess the land rather than to work it, sources of labour were drawn from native populations (though also on African slaves whose ‘importation’ into the New World greatly transformed the structures of native societies). The colonisers depended (at least in part) on native labour for their own reproduction, although, as we shall shortly discuss, the labour system was quickly adapted and the sources of labour became increasingly heterogeneous. Finally, except for in the cases of the Catholic missions (which deserve a separate treatment in their own right), Spanish settlement remained focused only on those areas which already demonstrated a highly centralised system of social, political and economic organisation (basically the central valley of Mexico and the Andean high plains). Where those forms of social organisation were more disperse, for example in the Amazon region, settlers from Spain made few efforts to establish large permanent settlements (suggesting perhaps that they were not attempting to transform the land into a new home, but simply to occupy an existing social structure in order to extract labour from it).10 Despite all of these undeniable features of Spanish
American colonialism, however (and accepting that there are numerous exceptional cases and historical caveats that would need to be added to do full justice to this general view), it seems difficult to argue that the ‘settler colonial present’ which Veracini describes in his latest book is not also the Latin American present.\textsuperscript{11} All of those characteristics that are generally used to describe settler states – the settlement of colonisers in new land whose descendants remain politically dominant throughout long historical periods; the transformation of the use of land, now geared towards production in the economic interests of the settlers and not the colonizing ‘homeland’; projects for national unification and hegemony which seek to erase or assimilate Indigenous cultures, etc. – could be used as a framework for describing the history of Latin American states, for all of their internal differences.

Indeed, in historiographical terms, one of the difficulties that emerges with these two distinctions is in terms of how to think about the temporality of (post)colonialism in Latin America. If we are to accept that Spanish American imperialism was based on a more extractive type of colonialism (Portuguese American imperialism was quite different in this sense and would need to be considered separately), then this would mean that colonialism, properly speaking, effectively came to an end during the early nineteenth century following the Spanish American Wars of Independence. The question therefore becomes: what comes after? The question takes us back to debates in the early nineties around whether or not Latin America can be considered properly ‘postcolonial’.\textsuperscript{12} The latter term might seem appropriate to describe the ongoing aftermath of colonialism long after imperial presence has vanished. But then how do we understand the continued plight of Indigenous peoples and Afro-descendent populations
in the region? Are they problems of ‘development’ that continue to aggravate differences in wealth distribution and equality? One of the most important interventions of settler colonial theory in the public domain has been to challenge official narratives of certain countries which celebrate the ‘end of colonization’ whilst ignoring the contemporary struggles of Indigenous peoples. It would seem that by being unable to confront this question in the case of Spanish America, settler colonial theory keeps in place that ambiguity which it actually seeks to call into question in other cases. In that sense, theories of ‘internal colonialism’ and ‘decoloniality of power’ that have emerged in the Andean context seem to be much more useful for identifying and denouncing those continued effects of colonialism in the region.\footnote{13} What I would suggest, however, is that settler colonial theory may still be useful for a Latin American framework insofar as it stresses processes of settlement that emphasize the transformation of land and labour regimes simultaneously, allowing for an analysis of the material relations of power and those discourses that sustain them, as opposed to other theories which remain more epistemological or cultural in character.

One of the possible responses to this problem is to put forward that Latin America experiences a different kind of colonialism \textit{after} independence, and that this is the real moment of settler colonialism, now under the influence of British and French imperial interests, rather than the Spanish or Portuguese. This is the argument that has been made by Richard Gott, who rightly points out how, during the nineteenth century, countries across Latin America began an explicit policy of \textit{blanqueamiento} or ‘whitening’, with pro-European immigration policies of settlement and assimilative education policies to create a European-style citizenship based on liberal-bourgeois institutions. ‘My
argument,’ writes Gott, ‘is that Latin America should not be seen as a continent conveniently set apart — as the outcome of its long experience of Spanish and Portuguese settlement since the sixteenth century — but should be included in the general history of the global expansion of white settler populations from all over Europe in the more recent period’.

There are various problems with this argument when considering the Latin American experiences of colonialism as a whole, however. The first is that it does not account for the continuities and discontinuities of the experiences of colonialism across the region, which includes various phases of imperialist expansion, from Spanish and Portuguese to English, French, and Dutch and, finally, US and Chinese imperial expansion, all going hand-in-hand with processes of internal colonialism. Nobody would dispute that the effects of Spanish and Portuguese colonialism have profoundly marked social relations in Latin American states up until today and that, despite some clear differences, the legacies of historical continuities between, say, Argentina and Peru are much closer than between Argentina and other countries which are considered to be more properly settler colonial states. The second is that it does not help to account for the differences between the numerous Latin American states. Although Gott’s argument fairs reasonably well in the case of Argentina or Venezuela, it does not help to explain the same features of modern Latin American societies that he analyses in places such as Bolivia, where even though such Europeanising institutional forms and values existed, they did not manage to significantly transform the social composition and traditional land holdings in the same way as took place elsewhere. In fact, I would argue that these two issues are connected; given that similar social and political problems between Indigenous
and non-Indigenous populations are taking place in ways more or less similar in countries as diverse as Mexico, Argentina and Peru, it suggests that forms of settlement must have been profoundly marked by institutional forms and historical changes that affected the whole region and that, to some extent at least, pre-dated the policies of nineteenth century Latin American republics.

In contrast to this strict distinction between a more traditional ‘extractive’ colonial moment and the more recent settler colonial moment in Latin America as suggested by Gott, recent historical research suggests that the early Spanish and Portuguese imperial ventures in the ‘New World’ can and should be considered as processes of settlement. John Coatsworth has argued that research over the past quarter of a century ‘has called into question the idea that the colonial economies functioned always and everywhere for Europe’s benefit, or even that Europeans resident in the Americas always and everywhere centered their interests on Europe — that Europe was “home”’.15 Coatsworth argues that the ability of Spanish settlers in the Americas to develop a somewhat centralized network of power cannot only be explained by the way in which the Spanish were able to take advantage of the already existing imperial systems that they toppled, based as they were on urban centres and expansive trade networks. He suggests that at least as equally important was the fact that settlers were able to adapt these urban centres and extensive trade networks to systems of agriculture and husbandry that were imported from Europe, aided by the initiative of native populations who were able to adapt to the usage of new crops and livestock, as well as to the new conditions of political rule. For Coatsworth, the success of these imported species, introduced through the local knowledge of Indigenous populations, meant that ‘the Spanish colonies in the Americas were, from the beginning,
far more than administrative outposts of alien empires: they were settler societies’.  

When Shannon Speed points out in a recent issue dedicated to the question of settler colonialism in Latin America that colonialism in the region has been characterised ‘by both land dispossession and labor extraction, to which indigenous peoples were simultaneously subjected’, I understand her to be referring to precisely the way in which the transformation of labour regimes also entailed the transformation of local ecosystems, the eradication of previous social structures and ways of life and the dispossession of land (and social and political relationships to that land). In other words, the extraction of labour under Spanish American colonialism formed part of a logic of settlement which cannot be reduced to a merely extractive colonial economy, and in fact blurred any easy distinctions between settlers and natives. This claim seems to be further justified when one considers that, wherever the reorganisation of labour regimes led to the devastation of native populations such as took place in the Spanish Caribbean, the exploitation of the land did not cease, but rather was continued through the importation of African slaves, with the organization of land and labour specific to colonial Spanish America otherwise remaining in place.

In sum, although the Latin American region, with a few notable exceptions, does not conform entirely to the settler colonial logic of native assimilation through the transformation of land and denial of the pre-existing Indigenous rights to that land, it is equally impossible to interpret the history of colonialism in the region as a kind of extractive colonialism carried out by people who considered their home to be elsewhere. A certain type of settlement did (and, indeed, continues to) take place in the region, albeit different to that kind which is often described in the literature on settler colonialism. It is
for this reason that Latin America shares a good many of the characteristics that often define analyses of settlement in studies on other, more ‘typical’, settler colonial contexts. It may also go some way to explaining the endurance of relationships in the region heavily marked by the legacy of colonialism. It seems to me that it is important in this respect to try to understand how analyses of settlement processes as given in some of the literature on settler colonialism can help us to understand some of the recent history of Latin American states, as I will shortly try to show for the case of Bolivia. As John Coatsworth’s essay helps to show, settlement in the region was not a one-way process, but was the result of a complex process of collaboration and resistance from Indigenous populations who attempted to find their place in the newly emerging social conditions. What this means is that it is much more difficult to separate the categories of ‘settler’ and ‘native’ in the Latin American and Caribbean case, especially given the widespread miscegenation that took place shortly after the arrival of Spaniards in particular to the ‘New World’. In Mexico, Central and South America, the kind of racial exclusion and territorial containment that makes such a dichotomy between settlers and natives (to some extent) workable in the North American contexts did not take place in Latin America, where race has been more culturally than territorially grounded, as demonstrated by Karen Engle’s comparative study of Indigenous rights in the Americas. Indeed, this is one of the main reasons why Latin American states have largely been considered not to belong to the category of settler colonial, as the extent of miscegenation from the earliest years of colonialism blurred the boundaries between the settler and the native populations.
Beyond the Settler-Native Binary

As many studies have shown, part of the particular characteristics of settlement in Spanish America included a level of miscegenation that is not associated with British processes of colonialism which are considered properly ‘settler colonial’. Shannon Speed astutely notes in her own article dedicated to this issue that ‘[another] matter often raised to avoid a common framing of Abya Yala as settler is that processes of racialization, particularly the question of mestizaje (racial mixing) in Latin America, blur the settler-settled divide’. Speed rightly points out, however, that this argument actually ends up accepting at face value the official narratives of nation-state building that formed part of the very mechanisms of settlement throughout most Latin American states in the twentieth century, where nations were often dressed up by official narratives as ‘mestizo’ nations or even as ‘post-racial’ (meanwhile, of course, racialised forms of social exclusion continued to take place). Indeed, recent studies of racial discourses have demonstrated how such narratives can form part of exclusionary regimes which can work to downplay certain social distinctions whilst at the same time making others hypervisible. The legibility of racial regimes can therefore offer insights to the ways in which settler structures are legitimated and reproduced. One of the most significant contributions of settler colonial theory is to have studied how patterns of settlement are made invisible by those nation-state narratives that work to justify and reproduce the inequalities that exist between settlers and natives. In Lorenzo Veracini’s book Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview, the author dedicates an entire chapter to the question of narrative, strongly suggesting the extent to which narratives form a fundamental part of the structures that underlie and legitimate processes of settlement. Through these narratives, there emerges a hegemonic vision of the geopolitical space in which settlement is reproduced, what Mark Rifkin has called a ‘settler common sense’. Rifkin explains that ‘[the]
phrase suggests the ways the legal and political structures that enable non-native access to
Indigenous territories come to be lived as given, as simply the unmarked, generic conditions of
possibility for occupancy, association, history and personhood’.23 There is thus a biopolitical
dimension to these narratives over the question of who has access to full subjectivity and even to
recognised humanity. One of the more recent ways in which those narratives have been shown to
be inscribed into and internalized by those who occupy the geopolitical spaces of settlement is in
terms of race. I suggest that these recent contributions can help us to recontextualise the question
of racial narratives such as mestizaje in some Latin American states. This suggest that we should
not read such racial narratives as simply negating the existence of settlement practices in those
regions, but instead understanding them as forming part of the very narrative structures through
which processes of settlement were carried out and justified.

Patrick Wolfe, for example, has recently explored the ways in which, from a perspective
highly influenced by his own seminal work on settler colonialism, ‘regimes of race have
reflected and reproduced different forms of colonialism’.24 He adds that race ‘is a trace of
history: colonised populations continue to be racialised in specific ways that mark out and
reproduce the unequal relationships into which Europeans have co-opted these populations’,25 a
reflection which is coherent with other recent analyses of the imaginaries of race in postcolonial
contexts.26 In this understanding, race is not a static question of biology but rather about the way
in which anthropological difference is historically mapped out across physical and cultural traits,
which in turn reflect the history of how social inequalities have been reproduced within that
particular geopolitical space. Curiously, as an important element of settlement narratives,
discourses of race do not always seek to highlight racial difference but rather to obfuscate the
real causes of social difference and inequalities, to efface the origins of its own violence or, in
other words, to hide the colonial wound that marks its conditions of possibility. Wolfe demonstrates this point in reference to regimes of race in Brazil where, unlike in the United States, blackness was not separated absolutely from whiteness but rather forms part of a racial spectrum which is highly mobile, what he refers to as the Brazilian ‘baroque’ of racial categories. What Wolfe shows in his analysis of the categories of ‘blackness’ in Brazil is that the apparently flexible categories of race in that country in actual fact serve to efface the social hierarchies which continue to reproduce forms of settlement in the country. ‘Rather than describing an inherently precarious situation in which a few people exercise privilege over most people with consent’, writes Wolfe, referring to a comparison with the situation of black populations in the United States ‘the Brazilian baroque misdescribes that situation – which is to say, it safeguards it’. In other words, Wolfe argues that white settler hegemony is reproduced in Brazil by creating a kaleidoscope of racial categories which allows relative social mobility, giving the illusion of a post-racial society whilst making sure that symbolic ‘whiteness’ retains the highest social capital. Such discourses of race explain, for Wolfe, how a particular historical system of settlement becomes able to reproduce itself without the constant recourse to coercive violence.

Such analyses highlight the fact that discourses on race should not be taken at face value; in the same way that an absolute distinction between settler and native forms part of the discursive matrix through which settlement is justified and made invisible in contexts such as the United States and Australia, equally, discourses around racial mixing have formed in Latin America a mythic social glue with which to obfuscate social differences and exclusions that in reality were never entirely overcome by the ‘official’ end of colonialism. Of course, I do not deny that the actual level of social integration between native and settler populations, discourses
of racial mixing and the recognition of the existence of Indigenous populations, make the majority of Latin American states very different to those states which have been traditionally identified as settler colonial such as the United States or Australia. Nor do I wish to suggest that we necessarily use the term settler colonial to describe states such as Bolivia, where the term clearly has important strategic uses in those states which continue to deny the existence of its Indigenous populations. Nevertheless, it is essential to recognise how discourses around racial mixing in many Latin American contexts are not simply the result of a historical miscegenation, but ideological narratives which actually share common characteristics with what has been analysed elsewhere as settler colonial narratives or settler ‘common sense’. Indeed, what I seek to argue is that if this is the case, it is because these racial narratives are the result of complex and internally differentiated processes of what settler colonial theory has identified as ‘settlement’, however incomplete or different these processes are from other, strictly ‘settler colonial’ contexts.

Revisiting Settlement in Latin America and the Caribbean

Together, the working distinction between a settler colonialism proper and a more extractive type of colonialism, on the one hand, and an insistence on the binary of settler and native, on the other, have worked to effectively obscure the utility of understanding the history of colonialism in Latin American in terms of ‘settlement’. As I argued above, one of the main reasons for this is the collapsing of two quite different understandings of what settler colonial theory does: as a descriptor for a specific type of colonialism, on the one hand, and as a set of tools for understanding processes of settlement more broadly, on the other. These two characteristics which I have analysed and attempted to deconstruct on the basis of the experience
of colonialism in Latin America and the Caribbean are in reality not two separate considerations, of course, but form part of the structural relations of power which defined colonialism in the region. Narratives around racial mixing are the result of a process of ongoing settlement in the region, of both the entrenchment of a process of transformation of the land for capitalist production and the resistance to that process which has been a feature of the region for hundreds of years. Settlement, understood in this sense, is a broader descriptor than the notion of the settler colonial state, which is so often used to describe very specific historical instances of such colonialism. As I hope to show, understanding settlement in this way can help us to better understand recent Bolivian history from a settler colonial framework.

**Settlement and the Imaginaries of Race in Contemporary Bolivia**

Similarly to what Patrick Wolfe describes for the case of Brazil, in Bolivia the discourse of *mestizaje* or racial mixing was not simply the result of recognising the mixed heritage of the Bolivian population, but actually worked to obfuscate social differences that resulted directly from the country’s colonial heritage. In fact, in Bolivia this discursive regime of race formed part of a project of national modernisation which sought to break down communal ties among Indigenous communities in order to promote the formation of peasant unions which were subordinate to state hegemony. It was not only that racial discourses served to render society blind to the realities of colour in Bolivia after 1952; it was moreover the dispositif through which the simultaneous transformation of land and labour regimes were enacted, deepening processes which had begun during the colonial years. These are precisely those processes which are normally described within settler colonial theory in terms of ‘settlement’. Ironically, the same reforms by which the 1952 government sought to expand participatory citizenship through
universal education and the modernisation of the labour process, particularly through agrarian reform, were the same reforms which demanded the Indigenous populations to be assimilated to the mestizo cultural norm. The fact that discursive regimes of race were immanent to these processes of deepening settlement is confirmed by that fact that, from the 1960s onwards, Indigenous activists began to reclaim the word ‘Indian’ in order to render visible the social differences that had been obscured by discourses of mestizaje, challenging the assumptions of a mestizo modernity that had formed one of the cornerstones of the National Revolutionary discourse after 1952. By taking these two moments of the shifting semantics of race in turn, we shall see how the discourses of race in Bolivia can be read as a deepening of, and as resistance to, processes of settlement in the country.

**The National Revolution and the Mestizo Nation**

The National Revolution of April 1952 represented an important historical conjuncture which opened access to, at least in principle, universal citizenship rights and political participation in the country. Among some of its most important and enduring policies of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (*Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario*, MNR) who took power after April included the granting of universal suffrage in the same year of the revolution and the extensive agrarian reform which was implemented the following year. The formation of the so-called National Revolutionary state or state of ’52 should also be regarded as part of a process that had been unfolding since at least the years directly preceding the Chaco War (1932 – 35); namely, the construction of a modern national-popular state in Bolivia. New material conditions in the country had created the possibilities for mass participation in political processes in a country where a small political elite had traditionally dominated the seats of
power. A fundamental part of this process was the development of a modern printing press and its concomitant culture industry, which established a new community of literate readers and writers who were actively engaged in the affairs of the state. To this extent, Benedict Anderson’s assessment of the nation as an imagined community is very much in line with the developments that took place in Bolivia throughout those years.²⁹ Indeed, Luis Tapia makes the same observation: “Benedict Anderson’s idea that the novel and the press were the medium for representing the nation as an imagined community, corresponds to the Bolivian process,” he writes,³⁰ an interpretation of the modern nation-building process which can be complemented, in the Latin Americanist tradition, by Ángel Rama’s reflections on the Latin American city as a lettered city.³¹ The printing press and new literary trends created the conditions for a kind of participation on the national scene by a sector of the population who had never before been able to have such influence.

Yet it was not only a newly emerging middle-class or petit-bourgeois class which made the conditions of modern national-popular state building possible in Bolivia. Many such new intellectuals depended, for their support, on the worker’s and peasant’s unions and institutions that had been developing since the 1920s, but whose proliferation was accelerated following the Chaco War.³² The 1940s also witnessed an explosion of modern political parties such as the MNR, many of which were closely tied to and depended on the support of the peasant and syndicalist movements. The popular masses and their organizations, notably peasant-Indigenous ones, would eventually be the forces that made the national revolution in 1952 possible, building on previous mobilisation such as the peasant-Indigenous insurrections of the 1940s and the 1944 Indigenous Council under Gualberto Villarroel.³³ The leaders of the MNR would simply take up the President’s abandoned seat thereafter. The MNR leaders were ultimately dependent on the
support of those sectors of society without which it would have never obtained power. The result was a kind of pact between the unions and the government and, within only a few years, a concerted effort by the government to co-opt the initial radical nature of those organisations to bring them under the government’s wing. The establishment of the Bolivian Workers’ Centre created a national union for those who would be a kind of proletarian aristocracy up until the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s; the miners. In the countryside, the government sought to take control over the peasants’ appropriation of land through the formation of peasant unions which were ultimately subordinate to the state and formed part of its vision of national development.

It is here where ideology meets material practices of power in the case of the construction of a modern nation-state in Bolivia. In order to create a solid base of popular support among the masses upon whom the MNR depended, the government promoted the erasure of ethnic differences, officially replacing the vocabulary of ‘Indian’ and speaking in more general terms of the ‘peasantry’. As other national-popular states had done such as in Mexico and Peru, the official state historiography encouraged the idea that Bolivia was a ‘mestizo’ nation, celebrating the Indigenous past but at the same time claiming that this past was to be superseded by a universal citizenship based on the ideology of racial mixing, or mestizaje. As Javier Sanjinés notes for the Bolivian case, ‘mestizaje is the paradigm letrado elites sometimes employ to describe and interpret the mechanisms that govern society at the sociopolitical and cultural levels. In this sense, mestizaje attempts to impose a hegemonic order upon a totality, whose internal coherence is built vertically by the structures of power’. An official state discourse of mestizaje was thus promoted in the immediate years after the revolution in order to consolidate hegemonic power in the hands of a middle-class mestizo elite in the name of constructing a modern national body politic. In the name of consolidating a modern mestizo nation, the
intellectual movement of indigenismo simultaneously adopted an idealized image of a glorious Indigenous past which, in place of reclaiming Indigenous autonomy, actually served to further subordinate the Indigenous populations of the countries concerned, where the Indigenous were expected to assimilate to the mestizo norm. This mestizo norm, which included the adoption of a modern, industrial lifestyle and literacy in Spanish, were the bases of access to modern citizenship, requiring a process of assimilation from Indigenous members of society. In the case of the Indigenous-peasant population, this included abandoning traditional forms of landholding and organisation in order to become members of unions which would modernize the countryside whilst at the same time subordinating social organisation to a centralised, corporatist system as part of the 1953 Agrarian Reform.\textsuperscript{38}

Narratives of mestizaje therefore formed part of institutionalized discourses in post-revolutionary Bolivia which reproduced a regime of modernization that worked in the interests of the elites who administered the revolutionary government. In this sense, the Bolivian national revolutionary state echoed discourses of race in other settler states, where the continued plight of Indigenous populations became obscured by institutional narratives which neutralized ethnic differences by emphasizing national solidarity. The Bolivian state of the 1952 revolution adopted a linear narrative of transformation which, according to Veracini, is typical of settler narratives, as opposed to other kinds of colonial narratives which still think of the geographical space as somehow ‘belonging’ to an outside colonizer considered ‘home’.\textsuperscript{39} As mentioned above, we must thus be critical of the idea that the level of miscegenation that historically took place in countries like Bolivia make it difficult to conceive of the country in terms of settlement. Instead, it is more accurate to say that official discourses of mestizaje actually formed
part and parcel of the logic which legitimated and reproduced settler colonial structures in the country. Indeed, insofar as official discourses of mestizaje operated in Bolivia (as it did in some other countries in the region) as a form of denying the contemporaneity of different ethnic identities, such discursive elements can be considered to form a constitutive part of the narrative gap which, according to Veracini, ‘contributes crucially to the invisibility of anti-colonial struggles in settler colonial states’. Narratives which obfuscated social differences within the country therefore formed part of a biopolitical programme of governance that maintained settler hegemony by extending notions of national citizenship and belonging to traditionally disenfranchised groups, whilst at the same time creating the ideal of nationhood within an ethnic spectrum where whiteness was the unspoken ideal (a process which runs parallel to Patrick Wolfe’s analysis of race in Brazil described above). Equally, the institutionalization of the modern mestizo ideal became the attempt to eradicate what was perceived as a non-modern, primitive Indigenous presence, whilst all the time rhetorically celebrating the Indigenous past as part of the mestizo reality. The parallels between Bolivian mestizaje and Brazilian racial regimes may also go some way to explaining why mestizaje became a dominant discourse in areas like Bolivia which had been home to the great Indigenous empires.

Wolfe recognizes that the key difference regarding notions of blackness between Brazil and the United States has to do with the different demographics of each place. Whereas in the United States a one-drop rule maintained the dominance of a white majority, the colour kaleidoscope of Brazil’s racial system meant that a white minority could hold onto power by preventing the always-present possibility of united black solidarity. By the same token, it is reasonable to suppose that the demographic imbalance in areas
which had once been the home of vast Indigenous empires made it necessary to celebrate racial mixing as the only basis for national unity in a country where the white population still remained a minority.41 At the same time, it is important to remember that notions of mestizaje had been important for regimes of race in Spanish America since the earliest years of colonial rule, and had been far from representing official discourses of national unification. In other words, it is perhaps nowhere clearer than in the case of discourses of mestizaje how discourses of race carry within them the traces of settlement histories that are centuries old and internally diverse and contested. This becomes all the more apparent when we consider the effects that reclaiming ethnic identity in late-twentieth century Bolivia had on such institutionalised discourses of race.

**Indianismo and the Legibility of Race**

Indeed, it is only in light of understanding official discourses of mestizaje as part and parcel of a logic of settlement in Bolivia that it becomes possible to appreciate the importance of the processes of re-ethnicisation that took place in the country from the 1960s onwards. It is around this time that highland Aymara Indigenous groups that had been only partially integrated into the national system of peasant unions, which formed the backbone of state hegemony after 1952, began to challenge state discourses of mestizaje. The way in which they did this was to identify themselves in the strongest terms as belonging to the ‘Indian’ race, thereby rejecting the state’s official erasure of such ethnic differences and reclaiming an ethnic identity separate to that of the white-mestizo minority. One of the earliest and most influential expressions of this ethnic
discourse is found in Fausto Reinaga’s work and teachings, particularly in his *La revolución india* (*The Indian Revolution*), published in La Paz in 1969. In this work, Reinaga proposed to re-read Bolivian history as the silenced struggle of the millennial Indian race against what he pejoratively called the Bolivian *cholaje* (roughly analogous to the idea of *mestizaje* in Bolivia), his word for the white Bolivian elite. By reclaiming the historical role of ‘Indian’ caciques such as Tupac Katari and Zárate Willka, Reinaga argued that the government from 1952 onwards had been explicitly silencing the role of those who were the true, historic owners of the land. Overlooking for a moment the binary that is established by Reinaga’s discourse between native Indians and white settler ‘cholos’, clearly problematic in both historical as well as political terms, what Reinaga’s systematic re-reading of Bolivian history offered for a new generation of Indigenous activists was forms of subjectivation which at the same time undermined those official racial regimes of the 1952 government which had been used to reproduce and legitimize a specific historical system of power. In this context, less important than the historical reality of Reinaga’s discourse was its ability to see the state narratives of race from an entirely different perspective. This process of re-ethnicisation, which was also a process of subjectivation, where actors began to identify as ‘Indian’ in historical novel ways, reverberated among emerging Indigenous political movements and activism which became known collectively as *indianismo* (Indianism) and *katarismo* (Katarism) and was to become an increasingly important conduit for voicing Indigenous claims in the Bolivian public sphere from the 1970s onwards.

The visibility of these new racial regimes which emerged as a form of contesting official state narratives were fundamentally important for changing public discourses
and perceptions at the national level. This took place along at least two different lines. On the one hand, the *katarista* movement developed this language of re-ethnicisation through the nationally coordinated peasant union network, through leaders such as Jenaro Flores and Felipe Quispe. On the other hand, both *indianistas* and *kataristas* developed various electoral party platforms which had a significant influence on party politics despite most of these making very small real gains in parliament. Particularly notable in this respect was the decision of presidential candidate Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, who represented the reformed neoliberal MNR party, to nominate Victor Hugo Cárdenas of the *katarista* party Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaq Katari de Liberación (Revolutionary Liberation Movement Tupaq Katari, MRTKL) to the vice-presidency in the 1993 elections.\(^{45}\) Their election gave unprecedented political presence to minority Indigenous parties that had worked their way up from grassroots movements since the 1960s. By reclaiming the word Indian and re-activating senses of ethnic difference that the 1952 state had sought to erase, the Indianist and Katarist movement rendered visible the exclusion of a sector of the Bolivian population, undermined the national-popular state’s claim to universal citizenship, and brought to the fore of public discourse issues such as territorial autonomy and cultural rights. This would have an enormous influence on the future developments which would eventually bring Evo Morales and the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement Towards Socialism, MAS) to power.\(^{46}\) In other words, therefore, it becomes possible to closely study the way in which current discourses of decolonization that are advocated by the Morales regime under the MAS government in Bolivia today owe, in part, to a shift in the public perception of racial
regimes and how they challenge the narratives which were underlying ongoing processes of settlement.

The Bolivian case is perhaps uniquely able, in this sense, to help us understand how it is possible to account for this narrative deficit that Lorenzo Veracini describes in reference to settler states. In line with Patrick Wolfe’s recent defence of binary thinking in postcolonial regions, the reactivation of ethnic sensibilities in Bolivia actually contributed to bringing attention to the violence that were covered over by apparently inclusive discourses of racial mixing. What the reactivation of ethnic discourses in late-twentieth Bolivia demonstrates is how the imaginaries of race are so intimately tied up with processes of the entrenchment of, and resistance to, colonial and neo-colonial forms of violence and exclusion. This coincides, in the Bolivian case, precisely in those instances where the state had attempted to transform both land and labour regimes for a new aggressive phase of capitalist accumulation whose aim was to assimilate – which is also to say, exterminate – its Indigenous populations.

**Race and Settlement**

We should not necessarily take the discourses that were promoted by *indianista* and *katarista* activists in Bolivia at face value; although the discourse of *indianismo* insists on the purity of a millennial Indian race which could be entirely distinguished from the white and mestizo population, we know that in reality the history of miscegenation in the region, particularly in the Andean high plains, makes any such absolute distinctions highly questionable and problematic. Yet what this reactivation of a racial binary thinking, so close to those same terms which settler colonial theory itself employs,
shows, is that the discourse of racial mixing effectively worked to mask social exclusions, between those whose land and labour continued to be exploited to generate profit, and those who benefited from that land and labour. What the reactivation of ethnic discourses in late-twentieth Bolivia demonstrates is how the imaginaries of race are so intimately tied up with colonial and neo-colonial forms of violence and exclusion. As Lorenzo Veracini shows for the case of settler colonial narratives in general,\textsuperscript{48} discourses of race after 1952 became the narrative structure through which the settlement of the land by interests of capital and the reorganisation of labour power were both enacted and legitimated. This is the structure that within settler colonial theory is normally thought about in terms of settlement, and the narrative structures which are in place by which that settlement is carried out and legitimated by a minority elite. Settlement can and should, in this sense, be considered a much broader phenomenon which does not only take the form of a ‘land grab’ whose discourse is legitimised through the rhetorical erasure of Indigenous populations. The narrative forms by which such legitimisation takes place can be vast, and the combination of land and labour regimes can differ greatly from case to case.

**Conclusion**

This article has addressed two different, but interconnected, issues. On the one hand, it has suggested ways in which narratives of race in contemporary Indigenous struggles in Bolivia should not be considered separately from material practices of power which are colonial in nature. Rather, these narratives are thoroughly embedded in the ways in which transformation of land and labour regimes go hand-in-hand with
state-led processes of national and racial ideologies, as well as the resistance to these. By analysing the process of construction of a state-led ideological politics of mestizaje following the 1952 National Revolution, it becomes possible to understand articulations of Indigeneity in the 1960s and ’70s as a form of contesting a political imaginary which was part of, and at the same time legitimated, processes of national development after 1952 which sought to erase the language of Indigeneity in order to modernise the country’s agrarian sector, where traditional Indigenous practices were considered antagonistic to such aims. By reclaiming the word “Indian” against its neutralisation by a language of national peasantry, indianistas and kataristas interrupted the state’s unquestioned, hegemonic logic of national-mestizo unification, demanding recognition for this historical erasure as a call to justice. This became the basis for a mass movement whose effectiveness is evidenced by the continuing legacy of those political movements in contemporary discourses of Indigeneity in Bolivia today.

At the same time, I have suggested that the logical consequence of regarding the racial narratives of recent highland Indigenous mobilisations in Bolivia this way is the need to reframe our understanding of settlement within settler colonial theory, which is so often used to address only one particular pattern of colonial expansion. If we are not to deny the validity of these Indigenous movements’ claims and accept that processes of internal colonial settlement are indeed ongoing in Bolivia, then we must address the inevitable question of how to define colonial settlement at all. The case of Bolivia indicates that, coherent with my analysis of settlement in Latin America as a whole in the first part of this article, settlement can involve the simultaneous transformation of both land and labour regimes, as was the case for the unionisation of the Indigenous-
peasants after 1952. It also suggests that settlement can and should be understood as transcending the settler-native binary, which becomes an extremely problematic distinction in the Bolivian case. I suggest that in this sense ‘settlement’ could refer to a wider process of racialised capitalist accumulation which places the focus on the transformation of land and labour and its effects. In this sense, settler colonial theory could benefit from analyses from Latin America which focus more directly on the insertion of the region in the emergence of global capitalism. Nevertheless, in its emphasis on the question of material practices of imperial power, the language of settlement remains a very useful one in which to render visible ongoing struggles for power that have been marked by colonial relations, as well as to study and critique those discourses by which those struggles for power are rendered invisible.

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Ibid., 56.
3 Lorenzo Veracini identifies this narrative erasure of the Indigenous presence as a key aspect of the narrative structure of settler colonial societies, as part of what he identifies as a settler ‘consciousness’ (2010: 75), whereas Mark Rifkin identifies vanishment and erasure as an important feature of what he calls settler colonial ‘common sense’ (2013: 322-3).
4 For a detailed study of this ideology of nationalism see Sanjinés, Javier. 2004. Mestizaje Upside-Down: Aesthetic Politics in Modern Bolivia. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. The Indianist writer Fausto Reinaga refers to the same ideology by the term “cholaje”. A summary of these arguments can be found in Reinaga, Fausto. 1969. La revolución indio. La Paz: PIB Editores, or the biographical study of this author’s work: Cruz, Gustavo. 2013. Los senderos de Fausto Reinaga: Filosofía de un pensamiento indio. La Paz: Plural Editores.
8 Ibid.; see also Lucy Taylor’s contribution to this special issue.
10 For a general comparative history of these imperial formations, refer to: Elliott, J.H. Empires of the Hispanic World: Britain and Spain in America 1492-1830. New Haven: Yale University Press
16 Ibid., 113.
19 The historical evidence which supports these levels of miscegenation in Spanish and Portuguese America seems unquestionable (see for example Elliott, J.H. Empires of the Hispanic World: Britain and Spain in America 1492-1830. New Haven: Yale University Press). Stephanie Smallwood notes how scholars have often compared the Spanish model of two Republics as ‘benign’ in comparison to the English expulsion of natives in North America, and insists that evidence points to the fact that it ‘is impossible not to conclude, then, that all European colonizing projects across the Americas were settler colonial projects’ (2019: 412). Most post-revisionist scholarship of race and ethnicity in Latin America and the Caribbean shows overwhelmingly to what extent the reality of historical ethnic relations in the region defy any easy and stable categorisations (e.g. Di Giminiani et al., 2019: Chaves & Zambrano, 2006).
22 See Veracini, Lorenzo’s chapter on the narrative structures of settler colonialism (2010: 75-94).
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As James Dunkerley comments, after the 1952 Agrarian Reform ‘[it] soon became apparent that the sindicato [union] would replace the hacienda as the central mechanism of social control and become the principal interface between government and the rural masses’ (1984: 74).

36

This has been commented on consistently in general histories of Bolivia, but for a more specific account of this refer to: García Linera, Alvaro. 2000. Los ciclos históricos de la formación de la condición obrera minera en Bolivia. Revista Umbrales. 7: 65-82. One can also refer to Fausto Reinaga’s objection to the use of the word ‘campesino’ (peasant) in his article ‘Ministerio de indios, no ministerio de asuntos campesinos’ (1953: 55-62).

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This process was of course neither linear nor evenly distributed geographically. Whereas the Altiplano were broken into individual land parcels, in the eastern lowlands the reform stimulated, ironically, the growth of capitalist Agro-business, creating a divide which still effects the country’s economy and politics today. On the other hand, as Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui has argued, the unevenness of this process, where unionization was more successful in the lowlands of the Altiplano and the aylu remained a strong economic unit around the Department of La Paz, explains in part why it was the Aymara speakers of the latter region who became more politicized during the 1960s and ‘70s rather than the largely Quechua-speaking peasants around Cochabamba. See Rivera Cusicanqui, Silvia. 1986. Oprimidos pero no vencidos: luchas del campesinado aymara y qhechwa de Bolivia, 1900-1980. Informe / Instituto de Investigaciones de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo Social. Ginebra: Instituto de Investigaciones de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo Social, 1986. Print.

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Ibid.

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Reinaga, Fausto. 1969. La revolución indígena. La Paz: PIB Editores.

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Julían Apaza Nina, better known as Tupac Katari, was one of a number of caciques or Indigenous leaders who led a rebellion against the Spanish in the Viceroyalty of Peru and Río de la Plata during the years 1780-81, and helped lead a siege of La Paz. Pablo Zárate, known as Willka, was an Indigenous leader who led a rebellion during Bolivia’s Federal War from 1898-99. Both are celebrated by political Indigenous movements today in Bolivia as antecedents to contemporary Indigenous political struggles.

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The terms indianismo and katarismo are contentious terms which have been used at times in the history of Bolivian Indigenous mobilizations of the late 20th century to mark ideological differences, but roughly designate the same general movement and are at times used interchangeably. See Hurtado, Javier. 1986. El katarismo. La Paz: HISBOL; Rivera Cusicanqui, Silvia. 1986. Oprimidos pero no vencidos: luchas del campesinado aymara y qhechwa de Bolivia, 1900-1980. Informe / Instituto de Investigaciones de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo Social.

Alvaro García Linera has emphasised the importance of the movement to the ideological shape of the MAS government, which has been partly reflected by the publication of Indianist Fausto Reinaga’s work through the Vicepresidency of the Plurinational State of Bolivia. See García Linera, Álvaro. 2009. Indianismo y marxismo. El desencuentro de dos razones revolucionarias. La potencia plebeya: Acción colectiva e identidades indígenas, obreras y populares en Bolivia. Buenos Aires: CLASCO. The influence of kataristas through their syndical work in the national union of peasants (CSUTCB) in the 1990s has also been studied extensively in Bolivia. See: Escárzaga, Fabiola. 2012. Comunidad indígena y revolución en Bolivia: el pensamiento indianista-katarista de Fausto Reinga y Felipe Quispe. Política y cultura. 37: 185-210.

