The Emergence and Perpetuation of a Destructive Culture in an Elite Sport in the United Kingdom

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1 2 The Emergence and Perpetuation of a Destructive Culture in an Elite 1 4 2 Sport in the United Kingdom 3 Recent inquiries into elite sports in the United Kingdom has unearthed examples 9 of destructive cultures. Yet, earlier research left destructive cultures overlooked. 4 5 The purpose of this article is to (1) outline the process of how a destructive 6 organisational culture emerges and perpetuates in one Olympic sport in the 7 United Kingdom, and (2) the features that regulate the process. We combined 8 Action Research and Grounded Theory in a 16-month longitudinal study. The 17 9 primary data collection strategies were ethnography and ten focus groups, with 10 athletes, coaches, parents, and the national governing body (NGB). Twenty-six 20 11 individual interviews with stakeholders supplemented these. A destructive culture 12 emerged during radical changes, and antagonism in the power relations between 13 the NGB and stakeholders characterised this process. Denial of responsibility and 14 social weighting neutralised the stigma of perpetuating antagonism. In 15 conclusion, sports organisations should be vigilant of how ignoring and denying 28 16 antagonism could lead to a destructive culture. 17 Keywords: culture; destructive conflict; elite sports; organisational psychology; 18 sports management ł 19

22 Organisational culture used to be an avenue for researching covert power relations and 23 backstage politics. It also used to provide thick analyses of organisational life (Alvesson 24 2017). It is a field that is very much alive in contemporary research. Yet, it is also a very 25 divisive field of inquiry (Mcdougall et al. 2017; Alvesson 2017). In academia, it serves 26 as a vehicle for interest in the symbolic dimensions of organisational life and processes 27 of meaning-making. And for practitioners, culture serves as a toolkit for creating 28 commitment and transforming underperforming or destructive cultures (Cruickshank 29 and Collins 2012).

30 The normative approach to understanding organisational culture in sports has 31 been to conceptualise it through a performance enhancement lens (cf. Maitland, Hills, 32 and Rhind 2015; Cruickshank, Collins, and Minten 2014, 2015). It has been identified 33 as having a significant influence on talent development (see Henriksen and Stambulova 34 2017; Henriksen, Stambulova, and Roessler 2010a, 2011, 2010b), developing a high-35 performance culture (see Henriksen 2015), performance outcomes at the Olympic 36 Games (see Gould et al. 2002; Greenleaf, Gould, and Dieffenbach 2001), and 37 performance leadership (see Fletcher and Arnold 2011).

A recent review by Wagstaff and Burton-Wylie (2018) observe that upwards of seventy per cent of sport research studies culture through an integration lens. Using the integration paradigm centres on the functionality of a culture (cf. Fletcher and Arnold 2011; Henriksen 2015; Cruickshank, Collins, and Minten 2013). Culture is thus an integration mechanism that teaches new members an agreed upon set of appropriate behaviours (Schein 2010). Success or a high-performing culture is, therefore, characterised by a unified and robust culture (Henriksen 2015). Schein (2010) details

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DESTRUCTIVE CULTURE IN SPORT

1		DESTRUCTIVE CULTURE IN SPORT
2	45	that this paradigm assumes that a leader's values are a master blueprint for an
6	46	organisation's culture. In doing so, it delivers culture as a variable that can be
	47	manipulated at the discretion of a charismatic leader.
)	48	Nevertheless, recent management research (e.g. Alvesson 2017; Helin et al.
13	49	2014) has criticised this line of inquiry. This frustration is because only focusing on
-	50	what is shared tends to exacerbate much of the profound cultural understanding.
,	51	Alvesson (2017) highlights that organisational practitioners are often let down by the
	52	inadequacies of this superficial understanding. Reducing culture to a consensus-based
-	53	system (see Wagstaff and Burton-Wylie 2018) does tend to deny ambiguity and
ł	54	inconsistencies (Mannion and Davies 2016). This superficial line of inquiry has even
)) ,	55	led some researchers to comment on organisational culture as a field which is
29	56	'intellectually dead' (see Alvesson 2017; Wagstaff and Burton-Wylie 2018).
•	57	We propose to dive underneath the surface of organisational culture (see
- 	58	Alvesson 2017; Helin et al. 2014) and consider the backstage processes. In denying
36	59	ambiguity, research in sport has tended to overlook the harmful characteristics of
}	60	organisational cultures. One reason might be that the integration perspective only
)	61	considers shared aspects (Maitland, Hills, and Rhind 2015). Yet, athletes are often
43	62	commodified in win-at-all-costs cultures (Mountjoy 2018). Current research has
	63	considered organisational culture as a source of strain for athletes (Arnold, Fletcher, and
;	64	Daniels 2013); underpinning unsuccessful talent development environments (Henriksen,
)	65	Larsen, and Christensen 2014); and cultures that deny, ignore, and accept abuse
• • •	66	(Mountjoy 2018). This latter consideration came in the wake of the Nassar abuse
, ,	67	scandal (Daniels 2017). Other global examples of destructive cultures include a culture
57	68	of not counting the [human] costs in Australian cricket (The Ethics Centre 2018), and
	69	allegations of a culture of bullying in the United Kingdom (Grey-Thompson 2017).

Some might dismiss these as extreme cases. Yet, the Culture Health Check carried out
by UK Sport (2018) stated that there is a 'need to address unacceptable behaviour in the
High Performance System' (p. 14). These applied concerns shed light on the
controversy of how athletes and those who work in sports are treated (Grey-Thompson
2017).

75 Many wishes these phenomena did not exist. Yet, the sports sector is under more 76 scrutiny than ever before. Earlier research has neglected destructive cultures by denying 77 ambiguity. But, authors have also highlighted a common thread referring to the 78 organisational culture of the organisations involved and the potential institutional 79 culpability (see McCradden and Cusimano 2018; Grey-Thompson 2017; Daniels 2017). 80 It is, therefore, prompt to consider the less desirable aspects of organisational culture. 81 Especially those cultures that have destructive features to them (Grey-Thompson 2017; 82 Mountjoy 2018).

83 Researching Destructive Organisational Culture Processes

84 This article is a part of a more extensive longitudinal study into a change of culture in 85 one sport in the United Kingdom. Building on Alvesson (2017), we seek to illuminate 86 cultural processes as-they-happen. Building on Mannion and Davies (2016) we define 87 culture as a dynamic process of negotiating values and beliefs that, for a time, provides 88 problems and solutions to a defined group. This definition frames this study by taking 89 the position that organisations are cultures. Doing so treats organisational culture as a 90 metaphor of organisation. Meyerson and Martin (1987) explains that this view emphasises inconsistencies and disagreements rather than consensus. Moreover, this 91 92 position stresses 'the importance of various subunits including groups and individuals'

93 (Meyerson and Martin 1987, 630). An organisation is simply an arbitrary boundary

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1		DESTRUCTIVE CULTURE IN SPORT
2	94	around a collection of subcultures. The unique features of organisational culture are,
6	95	therefore, how subcultures meet in negotiating values and beliefs (Meyerson and Martin
	96	1987). Moreover, how this process can influence diversity, ambiguity, and conflict in
)	97	progressive and/or destructive ways.
13	98	Subcultures are groups within an organisational culture. These can have
÷	99	overlapping, at variance, or ambivalent features with those of the broader culture
)	100	(Mannion and Davies 2016). Accordingly, subcultures might represent orthogonal
; ; ; ;	101	subcultures that tacitly accepts another subculture (Mannion and Davies 2016).
	102	Subcultures might be counter subcultures representing disagreements leading to conflict
Ļ	103	or antagonism. Alternatively, enhancing subcultures. These might appear as a response
,	104	to changes that are more fervent to their dynamic process of negotiating culture. Thus
; 29	105	amplifying and supporting other subcultures (Mannion and Davies 2016).
)	106	The unique contribution of this article is that we illuminate the cultural process
	107	of the emergence and perpetuation of a destructive culture. Researching destructive
36	108	cultures is a chasm in academic research. So, we need a lens through which we can start
;	109	to understand what constitutes a destructive culture. We propose that legitimacy may be
)	110	a favourable lens. Pfarrer, DeCelles, Smith, and Taylor (2008) suggest that legitimacy is
:	111	a general perception of an individual's or organisation's actions as appropriate within a
i	112	socially constructed system. Since organisations can have different perceptions of what
)	113	is socially desirable behaviours based on their characteristics, legitimacy originates in a
i I	114	relationship between broader societal norms and the culture in the organisation (cf.
52	115	Pfarrer et al. 2008). A destructive culture violates legitimacy through enacting
}	116	behaviours violating broader societal norms and standards of conduct (Pfarrer et al.
)) ,	117	2008). Examples are a culture enacting behaviours such as fear, intimidation, and
59 I	118	bullying (Phelps et al. 2017; King 2012) and a culture where athletes are commodified;

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1		DESTRUCTIVE CULTURE IN SPORT
2	119	power relationships are abused; and this abuse is denied, ignored, and even the norm
6	120	(Mountjoy 2018; McCradden and Cusimano 2018). Also, Grey-Thompson (2017)
	121	illustrates the relationship between broader social norms and culture by explaining:
)	122	'[s]port cannot think of itself as special or different and able to behave outside what are
13	123	considered acceptable behaviour patterns' (p. 4). Researching destructive cultures
 	124	against this backdrop is a critical addition to the literature. The purpose of this article is
,	125	to (1) outline the process of how a destructive organisational culture emerges and
, , ,	126	perpetuates in one Olympic sport in the United Kingdom, and (2) the features that
	127	regulate the process.
26	128	Methodology
;	129	This study adopts an approach integrating Action Research (AR) and Grounded Theory
)	130	Methodology (GT) (Dick 2007; Teram, Schachter, and Stalker 2005). AR focuses on
33	131	change and collaboration with participants on finding solutions to unwanted conditions
+ ;	132	(see Gergen 2015). And GT focuses on unravelling process-as-it-happens (see Corbin
, ,	133	and Strauss 2015). Integrating these allows us to understand the participative reality of
40	134	change processes (Dick 2007; Heron and Reason 2006). Henceforth, we will adopt the
	135	term Grounded Action to describe this integrated method. We continue by outlining the
Ļ	136	data collection strategies before showing the entanglements of the on-going iterative
47	137	analysis and rigour. The rigour of this study is underpinned by the epistemology of the
;)	138	Participatory Inquiry Paradigm (see Heron and Reason 1997). This paradigm sets the
)	139	tone for how we engaged participants in the research. Besides how the iterative analysis
;	140	helped to unravel process along the way.
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141 Data Collection Strategies

In adopting a participatory approach, we chose ethnographic observations as the
primary data collection approach and focus group interviews as the secondary strategy.
We did so to bring collaboration and dialogue to the forefront of the study (Heron and
Reason 2006). We supplemented these two approaches with semi-structured interviews
and analysis of documents.

147 *Ethnographic observations.*

148 The first author was embedded in a National Governing Body (NGB) as a critical friend 149 (e.g. providing a mirror, asking provocative questions, and providing helpful critiques) 150 for sixteen months. This role included extensive fieldwork to illuminate events as they 151 unfolded (Krane and Baird 2005; Costa and Kallick 1993). These events happened at 152 the department, inter-department, and organisational meetings at the offices of the NGB, 153 Youth National Team camps, Coach Development courses, competitions, public events, 154 and staff outings. Extensive field notes were expressed in memos and diagrams, which 155 is in line with core GT elements (see Holt 2016).

156 Focus group interviews.

157 The first-author carried out ten focus groups lasting from 40 - 130 minutes (Table 1).

158 These aimed at engaging participants in dialogue to explore the different narratives and

159 being sensitive to the interpersonal communication to highlight subcultural

160 understandings (Kitzinger 1995). The first focus group was with the Talent Team (see

161 **Reconnaissance**). This discussion aimed at identifying essential stakeholders and critical

162 areas of inquiry (e.g. what do I need to know to understand your sport? What is the

163 history of your sport?). Doing so grouped other participants (Parents of Athletes,

164 Coaches, Athletes aged 18-23; Table 1) to identify key areas for the ethnography (e.g.

- 165 what should I notice about your sport?).
 - 166 Semi-structured interviews.

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- 167 This study also included twenty-six semi-structured individual interviews (35-75 min;
- 168 Brinkmann and Kvale 2018). These probed perceptions of the elite sports context, the
- 169 emergence of antagonism, and how inside and outside factors influenced the process.
- 170 The Talent Team and the first-author developed the interview guides from field notes,
- 171 open coding, and data from the focus groups (Brinkmann and Kvale 2018). We
- 172 identified participants via theoretical sampling (see procedure).
- 173 Documents.
- 174 We collected documents and web pages to garner contextual depth of the NGB and the
- 175 community of the sport. Documents included training programmes, official papers
- 176 describing the mission and structure of the NGB, and public communication documents.
- 177 Procedure, Analysis, and Rigor

Five NGBs were contacted via email in May 2017 after obtaining ethical approval. The first-author held phone meetings with three respondents. We agreed with one NGB to take part. So, the present study was carried out from July 2017 – November 2018. In understanding organisations as cultures (see Meyerson and Martin 1987), we define the organisational culture under study as an organisation consisting of an NGB of a multi-event sport, and the community within the sport. This sport is a longstanding part of the Summer Olympic Games. The organisation was also comprised of approximately 15000

185 members carrying out the sport in clubs or with personal coaches. The NGB and

1		DESTRUCTIVE CULTURE IN SPORT
2	186	individuals are anonymous. Yet, we strive to provide a vivid description of the context
6	187	in the findings section.
	188	Meyerson and Martin (1987) also emphasise the salience of influences from
)	189	outside the organisation. We will therefore also consider the governance relevant to
13	190	talent development in the UK. This context includes a plurality of support agencies (see
- -	191	Grix and Phillpots 2011). Including the English Institute of Sport (EIS) that provides
, ,	192	sport science and medical support services; the Talented Athlete Scholarship Scheme
i I	193	(TASS), which is a partnership between talented athletes, education institutions, and
	194	NGBs supporting dual-career athletes; and UK Coaching, which supports coach
+	195	development. Rather than having a dispersed funding system through a plurality of
,	196	agencies, it is concentrated around two organisations, Sport England and UK Sport (cf.
29	197	Houlihan & Green, 2009). Grix and Phillpots (2011) explain that the influence of this is
	198	that: 'most National Governing Bodies of sport (NGBs) are hidebound to their
	199	paymasters' (p. 9).
, , ,	200	Grounded Action Cycles
40	201	Figure 1 summarises the participatory Grounded Action process. The procedure
	202	included a reconnaissance phase and four double-cycles of an implementation and
45	203	monitoring phase, and a reflection and review phase.
; ; ;	204	[Please insert Figure 1 near here]
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	205	Reconnaissance
•	206	The reconnaissance lasted from July 2017 – November 2017. It aimed to establish an
, ,	207	understanding of the context with the view to identify later collaboration (Gilbourne &
}	208	Richardson, 2005). The first step was to negotiate consent for the longitudinal study
)	209	(Iphofen 2013). Following this, we established a research group to integrate a group of

210	participants as co-researchers throughout the study (Kildedal and Laursen 2014). We
211	label this group the Talent Team. It consisted of the Talent Manager, the Head of Coach
212	Development, the Talent Administrator, and the first author. During this process, we
213	agreed that the first-author should act as a critical friend in the Talent Team to provide a
214	mirror (Costa and Kallick 1993; Duus et al. 2014). The Assistant Talent Manager and
215	the Head Talent Coach were recruited into the group in September 2017. This group
216	oversaw talent development and the senior elite programme. Our ambition was to move
217	participants from being passive vessels to engage them into dialogue on what was
218	meaningful in their context (Sbaraini et al. 2011).
219	The first author began open coding as soon as the first data was collected. This
220	process focused on describing the preconditions and agreeing on a meaningful future
221	state (Holt 2016). Memo-writing as well as introducing the conditional/consequential
222	matrix and the paradigm aided the process (Kelle 2007; Corbin and Strauss 2015). All
223	concepts were discussed in the Talent Team. We identified anomalies during this
224	collaborative process. Anomalies included athletes in underserved areas (Theoretical
225	sampling 1) and how external stakeholders influenced the outside conditions. These
226	stakeholders included other NGBs, and the following Governing Sports Organisations
227	(GSO): UK Sport, Sport England, UK Coaching, EIS, TASS, and a University Sports
228	Programme (Theoretical sampling 2; Table 1). Each participant in Theoretical sampling
229	2 took part in two individual Skype interviews. We allowed for at least two months
230	between the first and second interview to increase the contextual depth and help to
231	explore the fluid nuances of culture change (Culver 2012; Maitland, Hills, and Rhind
232	2015). Using Skype eased geographical constraints and the hectic schedules of upper-
233	echelon employees (Deakin and Wakefield 2014; Janghorban, Roudsari, and Taghipour
234	2014; Table 1).
	 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233

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1		DESTRUCTIVE CULTURE IN SPORT
2	235	The Talent Team and Management (i.e. upper-echelon staff) formulated a goal
6	236	of a change of culture in the sport. This change was understood as a transformation of
	237	the prevailing culture in response to a growing deficiency (Mannion and Davies 2016).
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	238	Implementation and Monitoring Phase
	239	The implementation and monitoring phase shifted the focus from describing the
17	240	prevailing context to describing the culture processes. The iterative process held this
;	241	critical shift together. And the Talent Team engaged in constant comparison (see Weed
	242	2017) of new data and concepts to the understanding of the preconditions. Doing so
24	243	helped expand and create analytical diversity (Smith and McGannon 2018). The
;	244	practical approach was to discuss the data and analysis at monthly meetings. Constant
3	245	comparison was also used to check that all insights were grounded in all parts of the
)	246	analysis (Weed 2017). The shift helped analyse how a destructive culture emerged by
33	247	probing under the surface of organisational life (Alvesson 2017).

248 *Reflection and Review Phase*

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249 The last phase of the cycle entailed reflecting on and reviewing the emerging concepts. 250 Here, we assessed the structural, process, and contextual fit (Mannion and Davies 2016). Engaging the researcher and the Talent Team in thinking theoretically helped 251 252 open unique cultural nuances and insights. Both in the patterns of the process as well as 253 between and within each phase of the study (Holt 2016). The iterative analysis showed that counter subcultures were crucial. Thus, we invited three individuals to take part in 254 255 individual interviews to probe the findings from the fieldwork. One agreed to take part 256 given the sensitive nature of engaging in disagreements and antagonism (Theoretical 257 Sampling 3; Table 1).

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Terminating the research enterprise.

259	Interrogating for theoretical saturation was a critical task for the Talent Team. It
260	happened as a collaborative judgment on the clear relationships between the concepts
261	and categories from the analysis. Moreover, whether collecting new data would be
262	counterproductive (Holt 2016). We carried out two meetings with parents of athletes in
263	September 2018; three individual interviews in September, October, and November
264	2018; and one Focus Group with the Talent Team in November 2018 as a part of this
265	process (Table 1). The last step was one meeting with three participants from
266	Theoretical Sampling 2 (i.e. two Talent Leads and one GSO representative) in
267	November 2018. Doing so aimed to engage more participants in the interrogation and
268	assess the fit and relevance of the findings. The first author's direct engagement with
269	the NGB ended in November 2018.
270	Findings
	Findings We propose a framework (see Figure 2) which outlines the <i>Process of the Emergence</i>
270	
270 271	We propose a framework (see Figure 2) which outlines the <i>Process of the Emergence</i>
270 271 272	We propose a framework (see Figure 2) which outlines the <i>Process of the Emergence</i> and Perpetuation of a Destructive Culture. Preconditions and Ongoing structural
270 271 272 273	We propose a framework (see Figure 2) which outlines the <i>Process of the Emergence</i> <i>and Perpetuation of a Destructive Culture. Preconditions</i> and Ongoing structural conditions underpinned the dynamic process. Figure 2 shows the process of changing
 270 271 272 273 274 	We propose a framework (see Figure 2) which outlines the <i>Process of the Emergence</i> <i>and Perpetuation of a Destructive Culture. Preconditions</i> and Ongoing structural conditions underpinned the dynamic process. Figure 2 shows the process of changing stages of culture. These stages included a <i>Challenge to survival</i> and <i>Emergence of a</i>
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 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 	We propose a framework (see Figure 2) which outlines the <i>Process of the Emergence</i> <i>and Perpetuation of a Destructive Culture. Preconditions</i> and Ongoing structural conditions underpinned the dynamic process. Figure 2 shows the process of changing stages of culture. These stages included a <i>Challenge to survival</i> and <i>Emergence of a</i> <i>destructive culture.</i> Finally, our analysis suggested an <i>Organisational outcome:</i> <i>Perpetuation of a destructive culture.</i> The overlapping circles denote the core concept
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 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 	We propose a framework (see Figure 2) which outlines the <i>Process of the Emergence</i> <i>and Perpetuation of a Destructive Culture. Preconditions</i> and Ongoing structural conditions underpinned the dynamic process. Figure 2 shows the process of changing stages of culture. These stages included a <i>Challenge to survival</i> and <i>Emergence of a</i> <i>destructive culture</i> . Finally, our analysis suggested an <i>Organisational outcome:</i> <i>Perpetuation of a destructive culture</i> . The overlapping circles denote the core concept of ongoing power relations and subprocesses of legitimising and rationalising the stigma of destructive behaviours. Power relations denote an interdependent capacity saturating
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282 Entanglement of Preconditions and Ongoing Structural Conditions

The prevailing conditions were an entanglement of *Preconditions* and the *Ongoing Inside* and *Outside Structural Conditions*. The iterative nature of the analysis enabled
this finding since this approach was a new tool for understanding the alternative logic of
the processual enactment of culture.

287 Preconditions

288 We found that the sport was loosely coupled to the external context. This was the case 289 since most subcultures in the sport argued that their sport was 'special' and 'not like 290 other sports' (see Figure 2). Most participants also explained how they perceived 291 GSOs—particularly Sport England and UK Sport—as the source of earlier hardships. 292 Recent funding changes (December 2016) had necessitated retrenchment to core 293 services (i.e. membership, coach education, safeguarding, and competitions). 294 The NGB had reduced staff as they took immediate actions to ensure short-term 295 survival and financial stability. Reducing the scope also required a restructuring of the 296 talent and senior elite performance programmes. These went from full-time professional 297 to volunteer-based services. This occurred with no NGB oversight. Instead, non-NGB 298 individuals set up unofficial talent and senior elite initiatives. 299 The NGB hired new staff (i.e. the Talent Team) after receiving ring-fenced 300 funding for talent development from Sport England in April 2017. The funding was 301 awarded on a two-year basis with the possibility of a two-year extension in April 2019

302 provided the NGB met certain targets. Yet, the new staff's lack of specialised

303 knowledge of the sport delegitimised their systemic power with subcultures. In

304 general, the preconditions described how the changes increased uncertainty and a

305 fragile symbiosis between subcultures.

306 Ongoing structural conditions

allegations and destructive culture) in sports. These events influenced the politicaltowards letting sports carry on without oversight. Loose coupling between this sport	ort and
309 towards letting sports carry on without oversight. Loose coupling between this spo	
	h
310 outside structural conditions worked as a buffer. The primary coupling was throug	
311 formal funding relationships with Sport England and UK Sport. However, the	
312 perception of these organisations as the root of many previous problems devalued	their
313 systemic power with the community. Buffering limited the influence of changing	
314 societal norms, values, and beliefs; economic and social resources; and the evolvin	ıg
dependency between GSOs and NGBs (see Figure 2).	
316 The inside structural conditions were an evolving process anchored in the	
317 history of the sport. This history included antagonism from athletes, coaches, and	
318 subcultures. This antagonism had previously led to legal cases contesting decision	s
319 made by the NGB and to athletes changing nationality. It had also led to the failing	sof
320 two former short-lived (sixteen months and fourteen months) talent programmes. Ma	<mark>ny</mark>
321 stakeholders also criticised the previous performance programmes for favouritism	
322 nepotism, and superimposing incompatible working practices on this sport (e.g.	
323 perceived Eastern European authoritarianism).	

324 Stages of a Destructive Culture

The Preconditions and Ongoing structural conditions influenced the stages of anemerging destructive culture.

327 A challenge to Survival or Social Position

328 Systemic power relations influenced this stage. First, Sport England engaged in

329 employing their formal authority through imposing targets and deliverables. Here,

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1		DESTRUCTIVE CULTURE IN SPORT
2	330	described by a Talent Team member:
6	331	I just came from a meeting with Sport England. We have all these
	332	targets that we basically have to live up to. But I don't know if they are
)	333	fit for the new programme because we basically just inherited them
13	334	from the old one. So, I am trying to change them. But it's a bit hard.
÷	335	(Field Notes, October 2017)
) ,	336	Being hidebound to funding, the Talent Team experienced that Sport England
)	337	used their systemic power to prescribe changes. This relationship was explained by a
	338	participant from another GSO: 'They are being pushed. You know governing bodies are
•	339	being pushed by UK Coaching, by Sport England. To make sure they have these things
,	340	in place' (Lead Officer, GSO). These prescribed changes included changing
29	341	normative coaching practices and more oversight of how the NGB spent their funding.
•	342	GSOs shared a consensus that funding and the NGBs relationship with them
}	343	could provide the Talent Team with a set of armour when negotiating changes within
36	344	the sport. However, the Talent Team experienced funding as an offer they were
}	345	compelled to accommodate to receive funding. Instead, the resource rigidity led to the
)	346	Talent Team experiencing ambiguity between external funding restrictions and internal
÷	347	pressures challenging their social position.
;	348	The Talent Team limited coaches from carrying out normative practices in their
) ,	349	efforts to comply with funding conditions. They asserted their formal authority by
;	350	terminating coaches who did not readily integrate. However, most subcultures perceived
52	351	this as a threat to the sport's essence and as a challenge to subcultural survival. A
i L	352	notable observation was that sudden radical changes worsened the symbiosis. The
;	353	knock-on effect was that subcultures were destabilised further. The following is a quote
59	354	from an interview with a coach who openly engaged in antagonist behaviour. Here, he

2	355	addresses his experience of this ambiguity:
6	356	And after I explain to [Talent Manager] how it works in a sports life, that
	357	the coach setup the programme. Doesn't matter what coach. Football
)	358	coach, rugby coach, [any] coach. [The coach] sets up the programme and
13	359	the one who is responsible for the whole thing like the manager, needs to
	360	do everything to make the programme happen. (Member of Counter
, ,	361	Subculture)
;)	362	Our analysis of systemic power indicated that it denotes a perception of an
-	363	organisation, a group or an individual's right to prescribe adaptive change or create
) 	364	conditions that might warrant adaptive changes. We found that it was an enduring and
,	365	impersonal system of control. Often enacted in routines, policies, hierarchies (e.g.
; 29	366	performance director, talent lead, head coach), or between organisations (e.g. Sport
	367	England and an NGB). These features made it difficult to bypass.
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;	368	The Emergence of a Destructive Culture
;	369	The ambiguity between the funding conditions and the internal pressures was the
40	370	starting point for a process where severe antagonism infected the negotiation of culture.
	371	The radical changes imposed by the Talent Team led to a sense of loss of position and
	372	resource, and to behaviours to counter their perceived loss. Early signs of a destructive
47	373	culture were mostly individual behaviours exhibiting open antagonism. Left unchecked
;	374	these behaviours spread within and across subcultures and magnified in severity and
	375	scope:
	376	a lot of feedback from the community, and to start with, quite
56	377	aggressive kind of assaults on us. "You just don't know what you're
;	378	doing. This is rubbish. What's going on?" When we hadn't even started,
)	379	which made the start quite challenging (TT2)

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1		DESTRUCTIVE CULTURE IN SPORT
2	380	Antagonism turned more hostile to counter the Talent Team's perceived abuse
6	381	of systemic power. We found that the beneficiaries of antagonism were mainly the
	382	transgressors. Moreover, defying the Talent Team increased the transgressors'
)	383	informational power as well as weakened the Talent Team's systemic power.
13	384	Antagonism increased as adverse behaviours spread to other subcultures and
i	385	apprehension faded. Achieving more informational power in the culture allowed
)	386	individuals to draw favourable inferences from their work. Influential transgressors or
)	387	subcultures engaged in informational power to mobilise and briefly amplify their power
	388	through manipulating or coercing individuals or groups into supporting them:
•	389	I was away on competition last week alone with 12 [athletes]. None of
;	390	them had ever been to the talent camps. So, the talking went into that.
; 29	391	Why they hadn't been. They just went: "[Community Leader] tells us
)	392	not to go, so we don't bother" (Excerpt from Field Notes, December
	393	2017).
36	394	At this stage, the power relations were characterised by how individuals
}	395	challenged the systemic power of the NGB. Informational power was an interdependent
)	396	capacity existing between individuals, groups, and organisations. It differentiates from
:	397	systemic power by being relatively discrete (e.g. rarely formalised by organisational
↓ i	398	charts or policies). This feature gives it the appearance of being brief and short-term.
)	399	Informational power existed tacitly between individuals. It was not a possession to be
}	400	wielded. Instead, informational powers appeared in interactions to produce movement
52	401	and change.
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402 **Organisational Outcome – Perpetuation of a Destructive Culture**

403 The significant difference between this outcome and the earlier stages was that antagonism and behaviours in violation of societal norms were common in the 404

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2	405	organisational culture. Open antagonism, deception, and manipulation were routinised
6	406	responses to communications from the NGB, as evidenced by this quote from a coach:
	407	I can help to attract the better juniors and bring in some of the top-
)	408	ranked seniors. This will provide these juniors with an excellent
13	409	experience, which will draw them into the system. I can tell you now
;	410	that as things stand the best [athletes] won't attend in September. And
,	411	you'll be left with a choice of omitting them from team selection,
)	412	damaging the results and alienating the [event] community. Or backing
	413	down and picking them anyway. (Excerpt from Field Notes, July 2018)
Ļ	414	We also found that the loose coupling between this sport and other sports
,	415	channelled ambiguity to the borders. This loose coupling fed an Impression of a cultural
; 29	416	'bubble'. Upholding this cultural bubble was critical since idiosyncratic beliefs of what
)	417	was acceptable (e.g. antagonism and manipulation) buffered outside influences further.
	418	Subcultures came to see antagonism as acceptable an as successful responses to their
36	419	problems.
}	420	Moreover, most stakeholders within the sport carried out antagonistic behaviours
)	421	as taken-for-granted. The paradox was that we found that individuals mentioned similar
:	422	behaviours from other sports as unacceptable in the light of societal norms and general
÷	423	standards of conduct. Yet, they did not perceive themselves as antagonistic nor
)	424	destructive. The stigma of antagonistic behaviours was shadowed by the subprocesses
;	425	of legitimising and rationalising destructive behaviours.
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426 **Rationalising Destructive Behaviours**

427 The subprocess of Rationalising destructive behaviours neutralised the stigma in the

428 cultural bubble. Rationalising allowed individuals to carry out antagonistic behaviours

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DESTRUCTIVE CULTURE IN SPORT

429 and distance themselves from a socially undesirable label. This worked through *Denial*

430 of responsibility, Malleability of euphemistic language, and Social weighting.

431 Denial of responsibility

432 Our analysis showed that denial of responsibility worked as a rationalising strategy. 433 Both on its own and in combination with all other strategies. The hierarchy in the NGB 434 led lower-level employees to rationalise that it was not their responsibility to provide 435 oversight. Furthermore, upper-level employees denied responsibility by appealing to 436 higher loyalties (e.g. if I punish [individual] the event will terminate). Also, the 437 insecurity of external funding led individuals to convince themselves that some 438 behaviours were necessary 'for the good of the sport'. And punishing powerful 439 volunteers might further fragment or disengage the community.

440 Malleability of euphemistic language

The malleability of language was a strategy to create perpetual uncertainty. Most individuals in this sport used the malleability of language to neutralise stigma by packaging behaviours as appropriate or less severe. They also used euphemistic language to create uncertainty around professional titles (e.g. psychologist) such as 'Talent', 'Director of Sport', and 'Performance Programme'. Doing so allowed individuals to challenge the formal authority of the Talent Team and performance pathway.

You know [community leader] calls himself Director of GB [event]?
They have basically set up a competing programme under the banner of
a GB Senior Programme. And they can promise all these things. But we
can't. Because we have to live up to regulations. And [Sport England]
targets (Excerpt from Field Notes, March 2018)

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453 Social weighting

454 Social weighting was the most popular way to neutralise stigma. It occurred daily through otherwise harmless comments, such as 'He is a bit weird' and 'they are not 455 456 trustworthy'. Most members of the sport aimed to establish doubt or uncertainty around 457 other individuals. Doing so placed doubt at the core of negotiating culture. 458 Intensification occurred when subcultures voiced distrust over the integrity of 459 individuals who raised concern over open antagonism. Individuals reported that 460 questioning their legitimacy delegitimised their concerns. 461 Moreover, some individuals felt pursued: 'I feel like [individual] puts things in 462 place to try to catch me out' (NGB personnel). Individuals also made selective social

463 comparisons (e.g. everybody knows the former performance director was [a tyrant]).

464 Doing so made their behaviours seem insignificant or less socially undesirable.

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Legitimising destructive behaviours

466 Legitimisation denotes how antagonism (e.g. manipulation, threats, or bullying) was 467 embedded in subcultures by ignoring and denying its occurrence. This subprocess 468 worked in two ways. First, subcultures focused on establishing doubt around the Talent 469 Team. The influence of this was that they experienced being distanced from the rest of 470 the NGB. This distance decreased their systemic power and ability to assert it. This 471 process was an institutional approach to social weighting. 472 [I] attribute most of the [fallout with NGB] to the problems that we've 473 had with [conflict]. And that [the NGB] has given me absolutely no 474 support. And saying that [they] would prefer to support the other 475 person. Because they were the person who is in it for the long run.

476 (Excerpt from Field Notes)

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1		DESTRUCTIVE CULTURE IN SPORT
2	477	Second, some acts lead the NGB to make it critical to update whistleblowing
6	478	policies and ethical guidelines. They did so to send a signal to external stakeholders. In
	479	updating policies, the NGB created an impression of handling the emergence of
)	480	antagonism. To the outside, individuals were held to the highest standards of integrity.
13	481	But antagonism was rationalised in the culture. Especially individuals holding high
;	482	informational power and low substitutability could carry out increasingly antagonistic
,	483	acts. The quote is evidence of how the NGB led destructive behaviours occur by
i	484	ignoring or confounding the nature of the behaviours:
	485	[Management] wanted to make clear that it was not [destructive act], and
• 	486	that the whole matter had been looked over by disciplinary committees
;	487	[Management] also acknowledged that [transgressor] had done
; 29	488	something wrong which could not be condoned. However, it was made it
	489	clear that it was not the intention to fire or relieve [transgressor] from
	490	post. (Field Notes, December 2017)

491 **Discussion**

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492 The purpose of this study was to explore the process of how a destructive culture 493 emerges and perpetuates in one sport in the United Kingdom. We found that antagonism 494 and conflict in the power relations shaped the emergence of a destructive culture. Also, 495 stigma was removed via two subprocesses. First, rationalising included using the 496 malleability of euphemistic language to deny any responsibility and foster uncertainty. 497 Second, legitimising denotes how subcultures institutionalised destructive behaviours. 498 They did so by ignoring and denying the occurrence. We also found that changing 499 structural conditions had a profound influence. Changing funding conditions had a deep influence creating ambiguity and uncertainty within the sport. 500

501	As suggested by Maitland, Hills, and Rhind (2015), we have identified the
502	organisation as a culture to examine the cultural processes. Our findings further the
503	understanding of culture as a dynamic succession of changing events. Here, culture is
504	temporal and contested through everyday interactions (Maitland, Hills, and Rhind 2015;
505	Alvesson 2017). Our findings show that capturing culture over time as successive
506	events focus ambiguity and change. Doing so also gives us a deeper understanding of
507	the logics behind process-as-it-happens (Helin et al. 2014).

508 Most earlier research viewed organisational cultures through an integration 509 perspective and cross-sectional research (Maitland, Hills, and Rhind 2015). This view 510 assumes an implicit understanding of culture as stasis in a relatively closed system. But 511 it does not account for how culture could move with events. How things are is how they 512 will remain. Many definitions may alert to some kind of 'dynamic process'. Yet, asking 513 the question: 'what is culture?' would most likely result in descriptive accounts. Gergen 514 (2015) explains that describing or mirroring in research is subject to a receding span of 515 application. Providing descriptions of values and beliefs in the search for the proposed 516 ultimate source of culture-basic assumptions (see Schein 2010)-could, therefore, be 517 limited in potential. Instead, the uptake of process in our study contributes to new ways 518 of understanding covert organisational life (Alvesson 2017). Doing so underscores that 519 culture is more than what is shared since it includes ambiguity and diversity (Mcdougall 520 et al. 2017). And capturing findings along the way holds the Grounded Action method 521 as suitable for theorising change processes.

522 Our findings draw attention to the dynamic succession of change. We find it
523 appropriate to discuss our contribution through a lens of organisational change.
524 Cruickshank, Collins, and Minten (2014, 2015), suggests that gaining an understanding
525 of the context underpin driving culture change. Our findings support this idea. Yet, we

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1		DESTRUCTIVE CULTURE IN SPORT
2	526	also found that the context relates to both preconditions and ongoing structural
6	527	conditions. Carrying out one analysis of the context before a change process might not
	528	be sufficient for organisational practitioners (Helin et al. 2014).
)	529	In the light of our study, we suggests that we can have stronger confidence in
13	530	their suggestion that a change process is underpinned by ongoing power relations or
	531	'power flows' (Cruickshank, Collins, and Minten 2014, 2015). But, our findings also
) ,	532	suggest that the findings of Cruickshank, Collins, and Minten (2014, 2015) and Cole
)	533	and Martin (2018) are limited since all three studies overemphasise a leader's ability to
•	534	manage culture change proactively. Instead, we emphasise that power is relational.
•	535	Culture change is thus subject to ambiguous and diffuse sources (e.g. funding or
))	536	antagonism). Not just leader-led.
; 29	537	Mannion and Davies (2016) suggest that few large, complex organisations are
	538	characterised by a single dominant culture. Likewise, we found that the organisation
	539	was a boundary of multiple subcultures. The unique feature of this organisation was
36	540	how subcultures negotiated culture. We can-based on these findings-have increased
;	541	confidence in the robustness of Mannion and Davies (2016). The significance of this is
	542	that it leaves cultural leaders with fever levers to control culture and produce predicted
	543	results (Alvesson 2017).
•	544	The present study provides first insights into how a culture denies and ignores
) ,	545	the emergence of less socially desirable behaviours. Mountjoy (2018) expresses the
	546	importance of safeguarding policies and procedures to protect those working and
52	547	participating in sport. Contrary to her point, we found that updating safeguarding and
 	548	whistleblowing policies were perceived as a tick-box exercise. Only serving as
) ; ;	549	protecting the reputation of NGBs and sports in general and reassure the public that the
}	550	sport adhered to societal norms and standards. The implication is that it serves as

550 sport adhered to societal norms and standards. The implication is that it serves as

	551	outward communication and less as inward oversight. Thus, an ineffective approach to
	552	curb antagonism or unacceptable behaviours. Instead, our findings second the voice of
	553	six-time Olympic medallist, Aly Raisman: 'Their [USA Gymnastics] biggest priority
)	554	from the beginning and still today, is their reputation' (Mountjoy 2018, 2).
	555	Interestingly, the Duty of Care review (2017) recommends a greater emphasis
-	556	on such policies. The psychological impact of this study, however, is that sports
	557	organisations should introduce wider measures to protect athletes and staff. Our
)	558	findings reinforce that introducing a Sports Ombudsman to provide independent
	559	oversight and assurance that welfare is addressed should be an immediate priority
•	560	(Grey-Thompson 2017). In fact, the Swedish Sports Confederation has already
,	561	introduced a Sports Ombudsman in November 2018 to reinforce safe sport for children
	562	(Riksforbundet 2018).
) -	563	Finally, discrediting and creating uncertainty about individuals was at the core
	564	of rationalising and neutralising antagonism. Looking beyond sports, this type of social
	565	weighting involves impugning the legitimacy of those who would raise questions about
}	566	destructive working practices (Campbell and Göritz 2014; Ashforth and Anand 2003).
)	567	Anand, Ashfort, and Joshi (2005) describe this as a type of rationalisation where the
	568	legitimacy of the individual/entity is made questionable. Thus, also their argument.
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, ,	569	Strengths and limitations
;)	570	A strength of this study is that it unravels how a destructive culture emerges by studying
	571	processes along the way rather than in retrospect. Doing so reinforces integrating AR
	572	and GT as a suitable method. The limitations of this study might be that sharing control
	573	over the research enterprise might threaten the technical adequacy. Here, the first-author

574 had to honour the inputs of the participants outside just delivering data. However, the

575 epistemology of this study is explicitly participative. In turn, we recognise the possible

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1		DESTRUCTIVE CULTURE IN SPORT
2	576	bias of being dependent on people (Smith and McGannon 2018). This study employed
6	577	all the core elements of GT. However, we did so in a new epistemology. Some
	578	researchers may interpret this as a limitation. On one side, Weed (2017) asserts that GT
	579	should only be used in one of the established epistemological variants (i.e. realist
13	580	positivist, realist Interpretivist, or constructivist interpretivist). Yet, other studies have
	581	used GT in other epistemologies such as critical realism (Redman-Maclaren & Mills,
) /	582	2015) and feminist constructivist (Allen 2011). The critical consideration here is that the
i	583	method is employed coherently with the epistemological assumptions (Sparkes and
•	584	Smith 2009). An example of how this is a strength in this study is the process of
• - :	585	interrogating for theoretical saturation. We meet with many different stakeholders, both
,	586	inside and outside the organisation, to discuss the findings as per the ethical approval of
; 29	587	this study (Corbin and Strauss 2015). Future research could focus on scrutinising our
•	588	findings of how destructive cultures emerge by employing different epistemological and
	589	methodological lenses.
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;	590	Concluding Thoughts
40	591	The destructive culture in this study developed in a context of a fragile symbiosis. It
	592	was characterised by how individuals perpetuated doubt and uncertainty. They did so by
Ļ	593	packaging antagonistic behaviours in euphemistic language or denying its occurrence.
47	594	First, ambiguity arose from conflict between systemic and informational power. One
;	595	example of this was how the NGB felt compelled to follow funding conditions to
	596	impose change. However, subcultures combated this through manipulating and coercing
	597	others. Second, we suggest that the lack of oversight and supervision made the sport
56	598	susceptible to the normalisation of antagonism. And later the normalisation of a
;	599	destructive culture.

2	600	Protecting participants and the sport was a paramount consideration. We
6	601	emphasise that we conducted the study at a specific period. And findings are not
	602	generalisable beyond the context of the study. Yet, the transferability of the findings is
)	603	at the grace of the reader.
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1		DESTRUCTIVE COLTORE IN SPORT
2	807	Table 1. Overview of participants
	808	Figure 1. Grounded Action Cycles
	809	Figure 2. Empirical model of the process of the emergence and perpetuation of
)	810	destructive culture
	811	

Table 1.

Overview of participants.

Initial Sample	Group Label	Ν	Gender	Approach
Focus groups				
Talent Team	TT1	4	1 female, 3 males	
Athletes	A1	7	3 females; 4 males	
	A2	8	4 female, 4 males	
Coaches	C1	3	3 males	
	C2	3	1 female; 2 males	
	C3	2	2 males	
	C4	2	2 males	
Parents	P1	10	6 females; 4 males	
Individual Interviews		10	o temates, 4 mates	
		1	N 1	
Assistant Talent Manager	ATM	1	Male	
Youth GBR Head Talent Coach	GBR	1	Male	
Talent Manager	TM	1	Male	
Theoretical Sampling 1	Group Label	Ν	Gender	Approach
Focus groups				
Parents of athletes in underserved areas	P2	2	1 female; 1 male	
Theoretical Sampling 2	Group Label	Ν	Gender	Approach
Individual Interviews				
Talent Leads from other NGBs		3	All males	Skype
Talented Athlete Scholarship		1	Male	Skype
Scheme Advisor		1	M 1	C1
UK Coaching		1	Male	Skype
UK Sports		1	Male	Skype
Sport England		1	Female	Skype
English Institute of Sport		1	Male	Skype
UK University Sports Scholars Programme		1	Female	Skype
Theoretical Sampling 3 Individual Interviews	Group Label	N	Gender	Approach
Members of counter subcultures		1	Male	Skype
Theoretical Sampling 4	Group Label	_ <u>N</u>	Gender	Approach
Focus Groups				
Talent Team	TT2	5	All males	Focus Group
Individual Interviews				
Talent Manager		1	Male	Skype
Head of Coach Development		1	Male	Skype
Management		1	Female	Skype

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




Figure 1. Grounded Action Cycles 231x180mm (300 x 300 DPI)





253x125mm (300 x 300 DPI)

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