

1 **The effectiveness of fallowing strategies in disease control in**
2 **salmon aquaculture assessed with an SIS model.**

3

4 Werkman, M.^(a), Green, D.M.^(a), Murray, A.G.^(b), Turnbull, J.F.^(a)

5 ^(a) Institute of Aquaculture, University of Stirling, Stirling, FK9 4LA, UK

6 ^(b) Marine Scotland Science, Marine Laboratory, 375 Victoria Road, Aberdeen, AB11 9DB, UK

7 Author for correspondence: email: marleen.werkman@stir.ac.uk

8

9

10 Abstract

11 Salmon production is an important industry in Scotland, with an estimated retail value >£1 billion.
12 However, this salmon industry can be threatened by the invasion and spread of diseases. To reduce
13 this risk, the industry is divided into management areas that are physically separated from each
14 other. Pathogens can spread between farms by local processes such as water movement or by long-
15 distance processes such as live fish movements. Here, network modelling was used to investigate
16 the importance of transmission routes at these two scales. We used different disease transmission
17 rates (β), where infected farms had the probability of 0.10, 0.25 or 0.50 per month to infect each
18 contacted farm. Interacting farms were modelled in such a way that neighbours within a
19 management area could infect each other, resulting in two contacts per farm per month. In addition,
20 non-local transmission occurred at random. Salmon are input to marine sites where they are raised
21 to harvest size, the site is then fallowed; in the model the effects of different fallowing strategies
22 (synchronised, partial synchronised and unsynchronised fallowing at the management area level) on
23 the emergence of diseases were investigated. Synchronised fallowing was highly effective at
24 eradicating epidemics when transmission rate is low ($\beta = 0.10$) even when long distance contacts
25 were fairly common (up to $1.5 \text{ farm}^{-1} \text{ month}^{-1}$). However for higher transmission rates, long
26 distance contacts have to be kept at much lower levels ($0.15 \text{ contacts month}^{-1}$ where $\beta = 0.25$) when
27 synchronised fallowing was applied. If fallowing was partially synchronised or unsynchronised then
28 low rates of long-distance contact are required (0.75 or $0.15 \text{ farm}^{-1} \text{ month}^{-1}$) even if $\beta = 0.10$. These
29 results demonstrate the potential benefits of having epidemiologically isolated management areas
30 and applying synchronised fallowing.

31

32 Keywords: Fallowing, disease transmission, Atlantic salmon, SIS-model, epidemiology.

33

34

35 1. Introduction

36 Scottish production of Atlantic salmon was around 130,000 tonnes per year in the years 2005-2009
37 (Marine Scotland Science, MSS, 2009b). In 2006 the worldwide retail value of Scottish Atlantic
38 salmon production was estimated to be >£1 billion (Scottish Salmon Producers' Organisation,
39 SSPO, 2009). Scottish salmon production created 849 full-time jobs and 100 part-time jobs in 2008
40 (MSS, 2009b) in remote areas with few alternative employment opportunities. For these reasons,
41 salmon production is important for the Scottish economy. Diseases such as infectious pancreatic
42 necrosis (IPN) and pancreas disease (PD) can cause anorexia and high mortalities (Bruno 2004a;
43 McLoughlin and Graham, 2007; World organisation for animal health, OIE, 2009), infectious
44 salmon anaemia (ISA) is subject to controls under EU legislation (Murray et al., 2010), and all pose
45 an economic threat to the industry (Murray and Peeler, 2005). For example, the cost of the ISA
46 outbreak in 1998/1999 was estimated to be >£20 million (Hastings et al., 1999).

47 Preventing aquatic diseases is not only important from an economic perspective. Diseases also have
48 an impact on (farmed) fish welfare (Huntingford et al., 2006), which can affect markets given
49 growing awareness of fish welfare among consumers (Ashley, 2007). In addition, it is possible for
50 pathogens of farmed fish to be transmitted to wild fish populations (Wallace et al., 2008).

51 Pathogen transmission between farms can occur on a local level, as hydrodynamic transmission can
52 be responsible for pathogens spreading between farms for short distances (McClure et al., 2005;
53 Gustafson et al., 2007; Amundrud and Murray, 2009; Viljugrein et al., 2009). Close proximity to an
54 infected farm has been indentified as a risk factor for transmission of, for example, ISA (McClure et
55 al., 2005; Gustafson et al., 2007; Lyngstad et al., 2008; Aldrin et al., 2010) and PD (Kristoffersen et
56 al., 2009; Aldrin et al., 2010). Local transmission also occurs through wild fish movement between
57 farms (Uglem et al., 2009). Wild fish may be infected in the vicinity of infected farms (Wallace et
58 al., 2008) and transmit those pathogens from farm to farm (Uglem et al., 2009).

59

60 Anthropogenic activities, such as sharing equipment between sites, visits from well boats, or
61 movement of live fish can increase the risk of transmission of pathogens between farms (Murray et
62 al., 2002; Munro et al., 2003; Munro and Gregory, 2009). Live fish movements can be over long-
63 distance, for more than 100 km (Murray et al., 2002) or even international (Ruane et al., 2009),
64 which can cause more dispersed disease patterns.

65 The effects of hydrodynamic movements were shown in the recent (2008/2009) outbreak of ISA in
66 the Shetland area of Scotland, infecting six farms in a geographically confined area (Murray et al.,
67 2010). This may be contrasted with an outbreak in 1998/1999, which spread between areas through
68 the use of well boats for transporting live fish or for harvest (Murray et al., 2002). Data from the
69 ISA outbreak in Chile (2007/2008), showed clusters of outbreaks appearing around the index case,
70 suggesting hydrodynamic transmission has caused the local spread of the virus. However, at the
71 early stage of the ISA epidemic in Chile, anthropogenic activities were found to be important,
72 which caused a highly dispersed pattern (Mardones et al., 2009).

73 To reduce the risk of local disease transmission in Scotland, management areas were established in
74 2000 based on the maximum spring-tide current speeds (Joint Government/Industry Working
75 Group, JGIWG, 2000). All active farms were divided between 46 management areas (but the
76 numbers change as farms are opened, closed or relocated), with a minimum distance of 13 km
77 between management areas, except for Shetland where it is 7.6 km due to lower tidal currents
78 (JGIWG, 2000). Wild fish movements are also typically at the same scale (Uglem et al., 2009).
79 Separation between management areas is intended to form adequate 'fire breaks' to reduce the risk
80 of pathogen transmission between management areas (JGIWG, 2000). Concentration of production
81 in separate areas may help in the control of pathogens (Green, 2010). Management areas are used
82 for the control of epidemics. For example under current control schemes a new ISA outbreak would
83 result in all the fish on the affected farm being slaughtered and other farms in the same management
84 area would be placed under strict surveillance. Suspected ISA-infected farms would be controlled

85 and fish movements from suspected farms would be restricted (JGIWG, 2000) to prevent spread of
86 pathogens between management areas.

87 An important strategy used to reduce the risk of disease emergence is fallowing, whereby sites are
88 emptied and not restocked for a period of time. The hypothesis is that pathogens will die out due to
89 the absence of hosts (Wheatley et al., 1995; Bruno, 2004b). There is strong evidence that fallowing
90 a whole site can reduce the risk or at least the severity of infections (JGIWG, 2000). The
91 effectiveness of fallowing is linked to the persistence of the pathogen in the water with a reduced
92 biomass of hosts and the length of the fallowing period (JGIWG, 2000). However, as diseases can
93 spread from adjacent farms it is important that farmers in a management area make agreements
94 regarding synchronised fallowing. In general, coordinated management of farms at the management
95 area level is recognised as an effective method of managing diseases and parasites. For example
96 coordinated treatments are applied to control sea lice infestation (Code of Good Practice, CoGP,
97 Working Group,(CoGP Working Group, 2010). By 2008, 18 management area agreements had
98 been signed and many include coordinated fallowing (Tripartite Working Group, 2010).

99 The presence of external hosts such as wild fish is also relevant as they can become infected
100 (Wallace et al., 2008) and possibly cause re-infection (Rae, 2002; Plarre et al., 2005; Costello,
101 2009). Fallowing period length is normally at least four weeks, but can be up to a complete year
102 (MSS, 2009b). Fallowing takes place for at least six months when a farm was confirmed with ISA
103 (JGIWG, 2000). A history of infection on a site is not a significant risk factor for recurrence of
104 IPNV (seawater) in Scotland, where farms are commonly fallowed after every cycle (Murray,
105 2006a). This indicates fallowing is effective for these cases. Individual farms may fallow at
106 different times or fallowing of farms in a management area can be synchronised.

107 The objective of this study was to identify the importance of local and long-distance contact for the
108 transmission of pathogens, which we simplified as a network of contacts at these two levels as has
109 been modelled by Watts and Strogatz (1998). In addition, we examined the effectiveness of
110 different fallowing strategies on controlling disease transmission. This study focuses on

111 transmittable diseases in sea water, such as IPN and PD. However, to estimate and validate
112 parameters, data from the last Scottish ISA outbreak were used. This model is flexible and can be
113 used to assess factors that may lead to emergence of new diseases as well. The model does not
114 explicitly include vertical or freshwater transmission and does not allow for change in practices
115 when the pathogen is detected and so best describes marine non-notifiable diseases. This is a
116 theoretical study (and sensitivity analysis), though grounded in real data in the form of the amount
117 and sizes of management areas, which were based on the management area maps compiled by the
118 Fisheries Research Services (FRS), Aberdeen (now Marine Scotland Science, 2009a).

119

120 2. Materials and Methods

121

122 *2.1 Contact structure*

123 A stochastic SIS model (susceptible – infectious – susceptible) was constructed to investigate the
124 effect of local (within a management area) and long-distance contacts (directed movements both
125 between and within management areas) and different following strategies on the spread of diseases
126 between farms. This model was restricted to Scottish marine farms. There were $n = 263$ marine
127 farms dispersed among 53 management areas, each containing 1 to 30 farms (MSS, 2009a), as
128 shown in figure 1. An undirected adjacency matrix A (i.e. wherever there is contact from node i to
129 node j , there is contact in the opposite direction) was constructed of size $n \times n$: an element A_{ij}
130 contains either 1 (potentially infectious contact exists from farm i to j) or 0 (no contact). Matrix A
131 was based on the management area maps compiled by MSS (MSS, 2009a). The basic structure of
132 each modelled management area was a ring model where each farm can infect two neighbour farms
133 (figure 2A) except for small management areas where $n = 1$ or $n = 2$. This resulted in 243 edges
134 (undirected contacts) by hydrographical connections.

135 In this model the transmission rate (β) was defined as the monthly probability of an infected farm
136 infecting a susceptible farm when there was contact between an infected and a susceptible farm. We

137 modelled β for 0.10, 0.25 and 0.50 per month. A minimum rate to cause an epidemic for β is
138 0.028, because otherwise the basic reproductive rate $R_0 < 1$ even in ideal conditions for transmission
139 of the pathogen, assuming an eighteen-month production cycle and transmission in two directions
140 ($0.028 \times d \times 2 = 1.008$). Maximum transmission rate can be high: for example ISA spread from an
141 index case to five other sites in eight months by local spread (Murray et al., 2010), which is
142 equivalent to $\beta = 0.3$ per month, assuming each farm is connected with two others as described
143 earlier.

144 In this model, susceptible farms became infected through potentially infectious contact from a
145 connected infected farm, subject to transmission rate β ; there was no change in status when an
146 infected farm was subject to further infectious contact. The length of production cycles as modelled
147 was eighteen months ($d = 18$) and proceeded through five production cycles (time, $0 < t \leq 90$) with
148 a time step size of one month. Farm infectious status (0 for susceptible sites, 1 for infected) at time
149 t was stored in a vector I of size n farms. At time $t = 1$ one farm was selected at random as the
150 index case. ISA outbreaks, for example, are normally traced back to one index case (Stagg et al.,
151 2001; Mardones et al., 2009; Murray et al., 2010).

152

153 *2.2 Infection between management areas*

154 Long-distance contacts were included in a second adjacency matrix (L). These contacts were
155 directed: contact from node i to node j does not imply contact from j to i (figure 2B). Long-
156 distance contacts were fixed and chosen randomly at the beginning of each simulation. The timing
157 of these contact events was random, but occurred on average once in every cycle (five times per
158 simulation). This means that $L_{ij} = 1$ does not imply a constant connection. The pairwise probability
159 of directed contact between all farms (ν) varied between 0.0025 and 1.00. For $\nu = 0.0025$, there
160 were $\frac{1}{d} 0.0025 \times (n(n-1)) = 9.6$ directed long-distance contacts for the whole industry per month
161 and $9.6/n = 0.036$ directed contacts per farm per month. In addition, when $\nu = 1.00$ every possible
162 connection between farms existed, which resulted in $14.6 \text{ contacts farm}^{-1} \text{ month}^{-1}$. Epidemiological

163 investigations into a recent ISA outbreak on the Shetland Islands (Scotland) showed eighteen farms
164 had a total of seven live fish movements to or from sites in other management areas in 2008
165 (Murray et al., 2010), this equalling 0.03 contacts farm⁻¹ month⁻¹. Other long-distance contacts
166 could have occurred via movements of well boats, however these are less likely to spread infection,
167 even if the boat is contaminated, although the risk is not negligible (Murray et al., 2002; Murray et
168 al., 2010).

169 For the stochastic model vector B of size n was derived containing the number of inward contacts
170 from infected farms.

$$171 \quad B_i = \sum_j I_{j,t} (A_{ji} + L_{ji})$$

172 Risk depends on the number of contacts and associated probability of transmitting infection,
173 however the probability of infection can never exceed 1.0. Therefore, we define p_i as the
174 probability of receiving pathogens either through long-distance movement or hydrodynamic
175 connections at time t . Variable $Q_i=1$ represents stochastically the receipt of pathogens through
176 contact.

$$177 \quad p_i = 1 - (1 - \beta)^{B_i}$$

$$178 \quad Q_i \sim \text{Bernouilli}(p_i)$$

179 The new infectious status of each farm was stored in the vector $I_{i,t+1}$ of size n .

$$180 \quad I_{i,t+1} = I_{i,t} + (1 - I_{i,t})Q_{i,t}$$

181

182 *2.3 Adding contacts within a management area*

183 In this model all farms in a management area could infect two neighbouring farms within the same
184 management area (see section 2.1). After examining the location of the farms this assumption did
185 not appear realistic in every case, because multiple farms were within close proximity (MSS,
186 2009a) and as a result could potentially spread pathogens to more than two other farms. Therefore,
187 we investigated how the proportion of additional local contacts (within a management area) affected

188 the spread of disease and its persistence. For this an undirected contact matrix was compiled, which
189 represented the contacts within a management area (figure 2C). A pairwise probability of
190 connection between all farms in the same local area (g) was considered. These connections were
191 added to contact matrix A . Parameter g was modelled for values between 0 and 1.00; if $g=1$ all
192 local connections between nodes existed resulting in a total of 1089 additional undirected local
193 connections.

194

195 *2.4 Imperfect management area separation*

196 The previous model (section 2.1) assumed that management areas were perfectly separated,
197 meaning there was no contact between adjacent management areas, except through long-distance
198 movements (see section 2.2). However, diseases can spread between adjacent management areas
199 when the separation distance is not great enough and the pathogen is sufficiently persistent in the
200 environment (Aldrin et al., 2010). For this reason we examined how effective management area
201 boundaries need to be in order to prevent disease transmission by hydrodynamic contact to adjacent
202 management areas. Here, management area boundaries imply sufficient separation by seaway
203 distance to prevent spread of pathogens.

204 In this ring model, all farms had two neighbouring farms as in the other models, except those farms
205 on the boundary of a management area. These farms could transmit diseases by hydrodynamic
206 contact to the adjacent management area (figure 2D). However, such between-management-area
207 contacts were subject to a multiplier h ($0 \leq h \leq 1$). Models were simulated for $h = 0, 0.25, 0.50$ and
208 1.0 , where $h = 0$ means the boundaries are 100% impermeable, while $h = 1.0$ means the boundaries
209 have no effect on transmission rate. We preferred this approach as it keeps the number of
210 neighbouring farms similar to the model as described in section 2.1. Management area sizes were
211 once again based on the management areas maps that were compiled by MSS (MSS, 2009a),
212 however the proximities of the management areas were chosen arbitrarily.

213 We investigated the effects of both extra local contacts (section 2.3) and imperfect management
214 area boundaries for transmission rates $\beta=0.10$ and 0.25 , along with long-distance movements
215 proportions $\nu=0.0025$ and 0.01 (see section 2.2).

216

217 *2.5 Following*

218 Farms were assumed to have an eighteen-month production cycle between input of smolts and
219 restocking the farm. Other species such as rainbow trout do have a shorter production cycle, and so
220 diseases would have less time to spread before harvest. If fish of different species with different
221 production times are farmed in the same management area then coordinated fallowing will be more
222 problematic. However, salmon occupy by far the majority of sea cages in Scotland: there were 256
223 marine salmon farms in 2008 (MSS, 2009b). As a simplification we assumed that all farms
224 had the same production cycle. After harvesting, the farms were fallowed and left without fish for a
225 short period. The fallowing period was one month (one time step). It was assumed that after
226 fallowing, farms were free from infection, as all fish used for restocking were free of disease.
227 Consequently farms were susceptible once more at the following time-step of the simulation. Time
228 since last fallowing at time t is represented for farm i by $m_{i,t}$.

$$229 \quad m_{i,t+1} = m_{i,t} + 1$$

230 At $m_{i,t}=18$ farms became clear of infection so that $I_{i,t+1}=0$ and $m_{i,t+1}=1$.

231 In this model, fallowing occurs after infection and therefore may occur in the same time step. The
232 maximum median prevalence could therefore never be 1.00, as prevalence was counted after
233 fallowing, which means there was a 5.56% chance ($1/d$) that the index case was fallowed at $t=1$.
234 In this case the index case could not infect other farms.

235 The effects of three fallowing strategies were investigated. Timing of fallowing could be different
236 between sites. However, length of production cycle and fallowing period was similar for all sites
237 and all three fallowing strategies: synchronised fallowing (SYN, all farms in one management area
238 were fallowed simultaneously), unsynchronised fallowing (UNS, the start of fallowing period

239 occurred randomly inside management areas) and partial synchronised fallowing (PAR). In this last
240 management strategy, areas with eight or fewer farms were subject to synchronised harvesting and
241 management areas of nine or more farms were subject to unsynchronised harvesting. We used this
242 cut-off point as approximately 50% of the farms were divided over small (or large) management
243 areas. This results in an intermediate strategy between synchronised fallowing and unsynchronised
244 fallowing. Because larger areas may contain multiple companies, agreement to synchronise
245 fallowing is more difficult, for example the 2008/2009 ISA outbreak occurred in a large
246 management area that had never been synchronously fallowed (Murray et al., 2010). Using the
247 Scottish marine farms as a base, there were eight large management areas and 45 small
248 management areas, containing in total 126 and 137 farms, respectively (figure 1). Furthermore, we
249 investigated the differences in epidemic size between initiating an epidemic in a small or large
250 management area for the most realistic scenarios ($\beta = 0.10$ and $\beta = 0.25$ and for $\nu = 0.0025$ to
251 0.01).

252 An overview of the parameters used and their description is given in table 1. The model was run
253 1000 times for each parameter set and the median prevalence over time, percentage of runs where
254 the epidemic was eradicated prior to $t=90$ and the 90th percentile of the median prevalence at $t=90$
255 was recorded. Analyses were performed in R (R Development Core Team, 2005) and Excel
256 (Microsoft excel, 2008).

257

258 3. Results

259 In this section, we use the term equilibrium, by which we mean the point in the graph where the line
260 visually levelled off, as variation is always present in a stochastic model. Increasing the
261 transmission rate β increased the median prevalence over time (figure 3A and 3B). Similar,
262 increasing the proportion of long-distance movements ν increased the median prevalence.
263 However, β and ν were not related to each other. Increasing β increased the probability of

264 infection when there was a contact, while increasing ν simply increased the number of long-
265 distance contacts between farms.

266

267 *3.1 Median prevalence and eradication of epidemics*

268 Following strategies had a clear effect in reducing the median prevalence and the probability to
269 eradicate an epidemic when the proportion of directed long-distance movements (ν) was between 0
270 and 0.10 (=1.5 movements per farm per month) especially for $\beta=0.10$. For $\nu=0.10$ and $\beta=0.10$,
271 the equilibrium was 0.65 (PAR) and 0.68 (UNS), while the epidemic died out prior to $t=90$ for
272 SYN. For $\nu \geq 0.25$ (≥ 3.6 movements farm⁻¹ month⁻¹) equilibria were established at 0.75 or higher
273 for all three following strategies ($\beta=0.10$). In general, equilibria were established earlier and
274 median prevalence was higher for $\beta=0.50$ compared with $\beta=0.25$ (figure 3A and 3B). For
275 $\nu \geq 0.25$, median equilibria were 0.90 or higher for all the following strategies for both $\beta=0.25$ or
276 0.50, but there were no important differences found between following strategies.

277 We investigated if an epidemic would die out prior to $t=90$ (five production cycles), to examine in
278 which situations an epidemic is likely to be controlled. SYN increased the probability to eradicate
279 an epidemic prior to $t=90$ compared with PAR and UNS, when $\nu \leq 0.10$ for $\beta=0.10$ and $\nu \leq 0.05$
280 (0.073 movements farm⁻¹ month⁻¹) for $\beta=0.25$ (figure 4A). For $\beta=0.10$ the proportion of
281 eradicated epidemics was ≥ 0.90 for PAR and $\nu \leq 0.01$. However, for the same scenarios but with
282 $\nu=0.05$ the proportion of eradicated epidemics dropped to 0.59. Similar reductions in the
283 proportions of eradicated epidemics were seen for the other following strategies for $\beta=0.10$ and
284 $\beta=0.25$, except for SYN and $\beta=0.10$, where the reduction of the proportion of eradicated
285 epidemics was seen between $\nu=0.05$ and $\nu=0.10$ (figure 4A). Probabilities of eradicated
286 epidemics prior to $t=90$ were lower for $\beta=0.50$ compared with $\beta \leq 0.25$. For $\beta=0.50$, 100%
287 (SYN), 54.9% (PAR) and 17.7% (UNS), of epidemics died out prior to $t=90$ when there were no
288 long-distance movements added. For $\nu=0.01$, 44.6% (SYN), 27.2% (PAR) and 14.8% (UNS) of
289 the epidemics died out prior to $t=90$ ($\beta=0.50$); for $\nu \geq 0.05$ less than 14% of the epidemics died

290 out. When $\nu \geq 0.50$, following strategies had no substantial effect on the proportions of eradicated
291 epidemics, therefore there were too many movements.

292 There were no differences in epidemic size between initiating an epidemic in a small or large
293 management area at $t = 90$ for all SYN scenarios ($\nu = 0.0025$ to $\nu = 0.01$) and for PAR and UNS
294 when $\beta = 0.10$. For $\beta = 0.25$ and when PAR was applied, median prevalence was 0 when the index
295 case was in a small management area ($\nu = 0.0025$ to $\nu = 0.01$) and varied from 0.11 ($\nu = 0.0025$) to
296 0.50 ($\nu = 0.01$) when the index case was in large management areas. When UNS was applied,
297 median prevalence was also higher when epidemics were initiated in large management areas
298 (varied from 0.15 to 0.73, for respectively $\nu = 0.0025$ and $\nu = 0.01$) compared to small
299 management areas (varied from 0.02 to 0.68, for respectively $\nu = 0.0025$ and $\nu = 0.01$), however
300 this difference was relatively smaller when ν increased. The chance to eradicate an epidemic was
301 larger when the index case was in small management areas compared to large management areas.
302 The largest difference was noticed when PAR was applied; the chance to eradicate an epidemic for
303 $\beta = 0.25$ dropped from 93.4% to 19.9% ($\nu = 0.0025$); 84.1% to 18.2% ($\nu = 0.005$); 70.8% to
304 16.0% ($\nu = 0.01$) for respectively initiating an epidemic in small and large management areas. For
305 PAR and $\beta = 0.10$, the chance to eradicate a pathogen was between 16% and 18% lower when the
306 index case was in large management areas compared to small management areas. For UNS and
307 $\beta = 0.10$ and $\beta = 0.25$ the chance to eradicate an epidemic was between 5% and 17% lower when
308 the index case was in large management areas.

309

310 *3.2 Worst-case scenario*

311 Worst-case scenarios as defined as 90th percentile (figure 4B) were in general lower for $\beta = 0.10$,
312 compared with $\beta = 0.25$. As seen with median prevalence and epidemic persistence to $t = 90$, SYN
313 has a beneficial effect, especially for $\nu \leq 0.05$ and $\beta = 0.10$. For $\nu = 0.05$, 90th percentiles were 0
314 (SYN), 0.21 (PAR) and 0.55 (UNS) for $\beta = 0.10$, there was no difference seen for this scenario for
315 $\beta = 0.25$. However, following had a substantial effect for $\beta = 0.25$ and $\nu = 0.01$. For this scenario,

316 90th percentiles were 0 (SYN), 0.46 (PAR) and 0.77 (UNS). The required parameters for a 90th
317 percentile below 0.1 for UNS were $\nu < 0.01$ and $\beta = 0.10$, and when no long-distance movements
318 were added for $\beta = 0.25$. There were no substantial differences noticed in the worst-case scenario
319 between initiating an epidemic in small or large management areas, except when PAR was applied
320 and for $\beta = 0.25$. However, this difference decreased when ν increased. Worst-case scenarios
321 increased from 0 to 0.25 ($\nu = 0.0025$); 0.20 to 0.42 ($\nu = 0.005$) and from 0.51 to 0.58 ($\nu = 0.01$) for
322 respectively initiating an epidemic in small and large management areas.

323

324 *3.3 Adding contacts at local level*

325 Adding contacts at a local level decreased the chance of eradicating an epidemic prior to $t = 90$ for
326 $\beta = 0.10$ when PAR and UNS was applied (figure 5A). Adding 54 undirected local contacts on the
327 whole network ($g = 0.05$, equivalent to 0.2 extra local out contacts per farm) reduced the chance of
328 eradicating an epidemic compared with the original model where every farm has two local contacts
329 (except for small management areas, see section 2.1). For example, for $\beta = 0.10$, using PAR and
330 UNS decreased the chance of eradicating an epidemic prior to $t = 90$ by 0.15 to 0.20 ($g = 0.05$,
331 figure 5A), for this scenario, compared with the original network with two contacts per farm
332 ($g = 0$). However, when applying SYN, additional contacts at a local level had no substantial effect.
333 Conversely, with $\beta = 0.25$ and $\nu = 0.01$ the proportion of eradicated epidemics was reduced from
334 0.98 (no extra local contacts) to 0.89 when local connections were added ($g = 0.05$) and SYN was
335 applied. No reduction was observed for this scenario and $\nu = 0.0025$ (figure 5B). Using PAR or
336 UNS showed no substantial reduction in the probability to eradicate an epidemic for $\beta = 0.25$ and
337 $g = 0.05$.

338

339 *3.3 Imperfect management area boundaries*

340 Weakening the management area boundaries with constant h had no substantial effect on
341 eradicating epidemics for $\beta = 0.10$ and for the three different following strategies (figure 5C).

342 However, for $\beta=0.25$, the proportion of eradicated epidemics at $t=90$ decreased from 0.54
343 ($h=0.25$) to 0.36 ($h=0.50$), for PAR and $\nu=0.0025$ (figure 5D). For SYN and $\beta=0.25$ the
344 proportions of epidemics that were eradicated prior to $t=90$ was 0.91 when $h=0.50$ and
345 decreased to 0.69 when $h=1.00$. Similar, for UNS harvesting the ability to control an epidemic
346 became smaller when the management area boundaries were weakened, although less dramatically
347 (figure 5D).

348

349 4. Discussion

350 The significance of long-distance movements in disease transmission has been shown before in for
351 example, foot and mouth disease (Green et al., 2006) and for ISA in Atlantic salmon (Murray et al.,
352 2002). Movement of live fish between sites would almost certainly transmit pathogens if the source
353 site was infected, but movement of fish infected with a notifiable disease such as ISA is prohibited
354 (JGIWG, 2000). However, subclinical infections might go undetected (Murray and Peeler, 2005).
355 IPNV is often subclinical (Bruno, 2004a) and there is evidence that even ISAV may persist for
356 months on sites sub-clinically (Murray et al., 2010) which makes it harder to detect pathogens. In
357 such circumstances long-distance movements can spread pathogens without knowing (Murray and
358 Peeler 2005). Contact by vessels might be a low risk, but there may be many of such contacts.
359 Long-distance contacts are likely to be rare relative to local spread and therefore lower values of ν
360 will be more realistic. For example, ISA tends to occur in clusters, indicating higher rates of local
361 spread compared with pathogen transmission over long-distances (Mardones et al., 2009). In this
362 study we found that the amount of long-distance movements should not exceed 0.073 per farm per
363 month assuming synchronised fallowing is not commonly used in all Scottish marine farms. Higher
364 probabilities of long-distance movements (ν) decreased the chance to eradicate an epidemic
365 substantially with high transmission rates $\beta \geq 0.25$. This emphasises the value of epidemiologically
366 isolated management areas. Even pathogens with slow rates of local spread being managed by

367 synchronised fallowing were unlikely to be eradicated if long-distance transmission events were
368 more common than 3.6 movements per farm per month.

369 The higher median prevalence and decreased chance of eradicating an epidemic when an epidemic
370 is initiated in large management areas compared to small management areas when unsynchronised
371 fallowing is applied is because pathogens can spread more easily between farms and persist longer
372 at a local level. Local spread will be more important if long-distance movements occur less often
373 than two movements per farm per month. Because large management areas have simply more
374 farms, there is a higher prevalence when the index case is in large management areas. The
375 difference between median prevalence and the chance to eradicate an epidemic is larger between an
376 index case in small and large management areas when partial synchronised fallowing is applied.
377 This is because synchronised fallowing is only applied in small management areas and large
378 management areas apply unsynchronised fallowing.

379 Local contacts should be fewer than 2.2 local contacts per farm, for the Scottish marine sites.
380 However, it is likely that the results are different when the number of farms within a management
381 area differs, since reducing the same number of contacts in small management areas and large
382 management areas results in a too small reduction of contacts in large management areas. In this
383 study we assumed that neighbouring farms within the same management area were assumed to have
384 an equal risk of infection. We did not take into account the seaway distance, currents or wind
385 direction. The direction of spread is complicated as described in Amundrud and Murray (2009).

386 The importance of local contacts is also seen in the ISA epidemic in Chile where long-distance
387 movements and local transmission were both found contributory in the transmission of the virus
388 (Mardones et al., 2009). In addition, it is likely that if pathogens are persistent in the environment or
389 wild hosts that they would re-infect farms (Rae, 2002; Plarre et al., 2005), which makes it harder to
390 eradicate pathogens. Synchronised fallowing can increase the probability to eradicate an epidemic
391 as synchronised fallowing quickly removes local spread.

392 Moreover management areas must have epidemiologically appropriate boundaries. If separation
393 does not prevent at least 75% of spread then eradication becomes substantially less likely for
394 pathogens with high rates of spread ($\beta \geq 0.25$) as described in section 3.4.

395 In the model, the first production cycle after a disease outbreak is critical for control. If the
396 pathogen is not eradicated during this time period, it is likely that a large number of farms will have
397 been infected (figure 3). In this case, the disease is likely to become established as an endemic
398 disease and eradication is unlikely or at least expensive. The Scottish ISA outbreaks of 1998/1999
399 which became widespread before detection (Murray et al., 2002), and 2008/2009 which was
400 localised due to early detection, illustrate this point (Murray et al., 2010). During the British FMD
401 outbreak in 2001, there was a delay in detecting the index case which resulted in a major epidemic
402 (Gibbens et al., 2001). For this reason it is necessary to control emerging diseases at an early stage.

403 Pathogens may transmit vertically through ova, as well as horizontally. For vertical transmission to
404 be important after introduction the risk of transmission has to be significant relative to horizontal
405 transmission. In Norway the spread of ISA did not appear to be related to vertical transmission
406 (Lyngstad et al., 2008). In Scotland parent fish are screened for key pathogens and ova are
407 disinfected (Bruno et al., 2004a). This model can be applied to diseases where vertical transmission
408 is a relatively small risk compared to horizontal transmission, although vertical transmission, even
409 at low risk, might be a source of infection to the index case. Not including vertical transmission is a
410 limitation of this model; however this model is on site level rather than fish level. Therefore, not
411 including vertical transmission is appropriate in this case.

412 Moreover, farms owned by the same company do have an increased risk of infection when a farm in
413 that company is infected as shown with the ISA outbreak in Chile (Mardones et al., 2009). The
414 random transmission in this model was a simplification and did not include the network structure.

415 Clearing farms has been proven to reduce the risk of re-infection of *Salmonella* infections in poultry
416 (Namata et al., 2009) and in pigs (Beloeil et al., 2004; Lo Fo Wong et al., 2004), where all-in/all-out
417 systems are commonly used. There are few studies of the effectiveness of fallowing strategies in

418 aquaculture. Wheatley et al. (1995) demonstrated a reduced mortality rate in cycles where farmers
419 applied fallowing strategies. Furthermore, it is believed that fallowing helps to control the sea louse
420 *Lepeophtheirus salmonis* (Bron et al., 1993; Rae, 2002), however, it seems that fallowing is less
421 effective in the control of the other sea louse species *Caligus elongatus* (Bron et al., 1993; Revie et
422 al., 2002). From the experience of ISA outbreaks in the past, the time between diagnosis and
423 clearing and fallowing the farms seems to be highly influential on subsequent spread (Mardones et
424 al., 2009). So far, Scotland is the only country where an ISA outbreak has been eradicated. During
425 the ISA outbreak in Scotland (1998/1999), farms were cleared within one month after confirmed
426 diagnosis of ISA (Stagg et al., 2001). However, time between confirmed diagnosis and
427 depopulating the affected farms has been estimated to be four to five months in the ISA outbreak in
428 Chile (Mardones et al., 2009). In this study the fallowing time was one month, which is realistic
429 when pathogens are not diagnosed (MSS, 2009b), as may occur when there are no clinical signs.

430 The use of this simple SIS model was valuable for showing the effectiveness of different fallowing
431 strategies and the importance of reducing long-distance movements. However, the real-life situation
432 is more complex in both pattern of contact between farms and disease characteristics. Long-distance
433 movements occurred at random in this study, while reality is more complex and shows a high
434 variance in the number of contacts between farms (Thrush and Peeler, 2006; Munro and Gregory,
435 2009; Green et al., 2009). Heterogeneity, i.e. variance in the number of contacts, is likely to affect
436 the transmission pattern of disease significantly. It has been suggested that 80% of the infections are
437 in general caused by 20% of the population (Anderson and May, 1992). The assumption of
438 homogenous spread has been used to model the spread of IPNV through the salmon farming
439 industries of both Scotland (Murray 2006b) and Ireland (Ruane et al. 2009). In this study, we
440 assumed that long-distance movements were homogenous as unpublished data showed that variance
441 in the number of contacts is substantially smaller between sea water contacts compared to contacts
442 between fresh water sites.

443 Live fish movements do not occur at random, but are dependent on the size of the fish and the
444 season. Timing of movements will be important for disease transmission. For example BKD
445 outbreaks are more likely to occur during spring (MSS, 2010) and IPN outbreaks occur mainly after
446 transfer to sea (May-August) (Bruno, 2004a). Therefore movements during spring may be more
447 risky for BKD transmission compared with other periods of the year.

448 Different model types could be more appropriate for diseases with different characteristics, different
449 modelling objectives, or different management systems. In this study we choose an SIS model,
450 however, an SEIS (susceptible-exposed-infectious-susceptible) can take into account the variations
451 of latent periods, which may vary largely between different diseases. In our SIS model a farm
452 becomes infectious after one month. However, in the real-life situation this varies. For example,
453 IPN outbreaks occur mainly after transfer to sea (Bruno, 2004a). During this vulnerable stage,
454 transmission rates of IPN could be higher, and it is likely that this effects the time for a farm to
455 become infectious. Furthermore, our model assumes that all farms were similar, excepting their
456 membership of a particular management area, whereas Scottish farms have different stocking sizes
457 (from <50 to >1000 tonnes, MSS, 2009b) and stocking densities. Stocking density can be important,
458 as an outbreak of a viral disease is sensitive to a minimum effective concentration, which is
459 influenced by stocking densities in farms (Hammell and Dohoo, 2005; Thrush and Peeler, 2006).

460

461 5. Conclusion

462 This simple model demonstrates the importance of long-distance movements in the spread of
463 pathogens. In this model, even applying synchronised fallowing in combination with a low
464 transmission rate could not prevent an epidemic when there were high numbers of long-distance
465 movements between farms. However, when long-distance contacts are rare compared to local
466 contacts, synchronised fallowing greatly improves the chance of controlling outbreaks. Therefore, it
467 is important both to reduce the number of long-distance movements and to implement good bio-

468 security measurements to reduce disease spread and to synchronise fallowing to enhance
469 eradication.

470

471 Acknowledgements

472 Marleen Werkman and Darren Green's contribution to this work was funded through Marine
473 Scotland.

474

475 Tables


476

477 Table 1. Description of the model parameters used in this stochastic SIS-model to describe the
478 spread of pathogens between Scottish marine fish farms.

Parameter symbol	Description
β	Transmission rate per month.
ν	The pairwise probability of directed contact between all farms, both between and within management areas.
g	A pairwise probability of connections between all farms in the same management area.
h	Permeability of management area boundaries ($0 \leq h \leq 1$). Boundaries are 100% impermeable when $h = 0$ and ineffective for $h = 1$.


479

480



482
 483 Figure 1: Frequency of number of farms per management area. Management areas with eight or
 484 fewer farms were classified as small management areas, while management areas containing nine or
 485 more farms were classified as large management areas.


486



487
 488 Figure 2: Graphic representation of the models used in this study: basic structure (A), adding long-
 489 distance movements (directed) to basic structure (B), adding local contacts (undirected) to basic
 490 structure (C), imperfectly sealed management areas. The grey arrows represent the weakened
 491 boundaries between management areas (D).


492

493



494

495




496

497


498 Figure 3: Median prevalence over time for three different following strategies: synchronised (SYN),
499 partial synchronised (PAR) and unsynchronised (UNS) and for transmission rates, $\beta=0.25$ (A) and
500 $\beta=0.50$ (B). Median prevalences are shown for the probability of long-distance contact,
501 $\nu=0.0025$ to $\nu=0.05$.

502

503




504
505



506
507


508 Figure 4: Proportion of runs where the epidemic died out prior to $t=90$ (A) and worst-case
509 scenarios presented by the 90th percentile at $t=90$ (B). Both are represented for different
510 proportions of long-distance movements ν and different following strategies synchronised (SYN),
511 partial synchronised (PAR) and unsynchronised (UNS) and two different transmission rates
512 $\beta=0.10$ and $\beta=0.25$.

513




514

515




516

517



518

519



520

521

522

523

524

525

526

527

Figure 5: Percentage of runs where the epidemic died out prior to $t = 90$ in order to investigate the effects on epidemics when adding extra local contacts (in addition to the two neighbours). For the proportions of long-distance movements, $\nu = 0.0025$ and $\nu = 0.01$ and different following strategies synchronised (SYN), partial synchronised (PAR) and unsynchronised (UNS) and for $\beta = 0.10$ (A) and $\beta = 0.25$ (B). The effects of weakening the management area boundaries on the amount of epidemics that die out prior to $t = 90$ for $\beta = 0.10$ (C) and $\beta = 0.25$ (D).

528
529

References

- 530 Aldrin, M., Storvik, B., Frigessi, A., Viljugrein, H., Jansen, P.A., 2010. A stochastic model for the
531 assessment of the transmission pathways of heart and skeleton muscle inflammation, pancreas
532 disease and infectious salmon anaemia in marine fish farms in Norway. *Preventive Veterinary*
533 *Medicine* 93, 51-61.
- 534 Amundrud, T.L., Murray, A.G., 2009. Modelling sea lice dispersion under varying environmental
535 forcing in a Scottish sea loch. *Journal of Fish Diseases* 32, 27-44.
- 536 Anderson, R.M., May, R.M., 1992. Heterogeneity within the human population. *Infectious Diseases*
537 *of Humans: Dynamics and Control*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 541-549.
- 538 Ashley, P.J., 2007. Fish welfare: current issues in aquaculture. *Applied Animal Behaviour Science*
539 104, 199-235.
- 540 Beloeil, P.A., Fravallo, P., Fablet, C., Jolly, J.P., Eveno, E., Hascoet, Y., Chauvin, C., Salvat, G.,
541 Madec, F., 2004. Risk factors for *Salmonella enterica* subsp *enterica* shedding by market-age pigs
542 in French farrow-to-finish herds. *Preventive Veterinary Medicine* 63, 103-120.
- 543 Bron, J.E., Sommerville, C., Wootten, R., Rae, G.H., 1993. Following of Marine Atlantic Salmon,
544 *Salmo Salar* L., farms as a method for the control of sea lice, *Lepeophtheirus Salmonis* (Kroyer,
545 1837). *Journal of Fish Diseases* 16, 487-493.
- 546 Bruno, D.W., 2004a. Changes in prevalence of clinical infectious pancreatic necrosis among fanned
547 Scottish Atlantic salmon, *Salmo salar* L. between 1990 and 2002. *Aquaculture* 235, 13-26.
- 548 Bruno, D.W., 2004b. Prevalence and diagnosis of bacterial kidney disease (BKD) in Scotland
549 between 1990 and 2002. *Diseases of Aquatic Organisms* 59, 125-130.
- 550 CoGP Working Group, 2010. A code of good practice for Scottish finfish aquaculture. pp. 1-114.
- 551 Costello, M.J., 2009. How sea lice from salmon farms may cause wild salmonid declines in Europe
552 and North America and be a threat to fishes elsewhere. *Proceedings of the Royal Society B-*
553 *Biological Sciences* 276, 3385-3394.
- 554 Gibbens, J.C., Sharpe, C.E., Wilesmith, J.W., Mansley, L.M., Michalopoulou, E., Ryan, J.B.M.,
555 Hudson, M., 2001. Descriptive epidemiology of the 2001 foot-and-mouth disease epidemic in Great
556 Britain: the first five months. *Veterinary Record* 149, 729-743.
- 557 Green, D.M., Gregory, A., Munro, L.A., 2009. Small- and large-scale network structure of live fish
558 movements in Scotland. *Preventive Veterinary Medicine* 91, 261-269.
- 559 Green, D.M., Kiss, I.Z., Kao, R.R., 2006. Modelling the initial spread of foot-and-mouth disease
560 through animal movements. *Proceedings of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences* 273, 2729-
561 2735.
- 562 Gustafson, L.L., Ellis, S.K., Beattie, M.J., Chang, B.D., Dickey, D.A., Robinson, T.L., Marengi,
563 F.P., Moffett, P.J., Page, F.H., 2007. Hydrographics and the timing of infectious salmon anemia
564 outbreaks among Atlantic salmon (*Salmo salar* L.) farms in the Quoddy region of Maine, USA and
565 New Brunswick, Canada. *Preventive Veterinary Medicine* 78, 35-56.

- 566 Hammell, K.L., Dohoo, I.R., 2005. Risk factors associated with mortalities attributed to infectious
567 salmon anaemia virus in New Brunswick, Canada. *Journal of Fish Diseases* 28, 651-661.
- 568 Hastings, T., Olivier, G., Cusack, R., Bricknell, I., Nylund, A., Binde, M., Munro, P., Allan, C.,
569 1999. Infectious salmon anaemia. *Bulletin of the European Association of Fish Pathologists* 19,
570 286-288.
- 571 Huntingford, F.A., Adams, C., Braithwaite, V.A., Kadri, S., Pottinger, T.G., Sandoe, P., Turnbull,
572 J.F., 2006. Current issues in fish welfare. *Journal of Fish Biology* 68, 332-372.
- 573 JGIWG, 2000. Final Report of the Joint Government/Industry Working Group of Infectious Salmon
574 Anaemia (ISA) in Scotland. Fisheries Research Services, Aberdeen, pp. 1-142.
- 575 Kristoffersen, A.B., Viljugrein, H., Kongtorp, R.T., Brun, E., Jansen, P.A., 2009. Risk factors for
576 pancreas disease (PD) outbreaks in farmed Atlantic salmon and rainbow trout in Norway during
577 2003-2007. *Preventive Veterinary Medicine* 90, 127-136.
- 578 Lo Fo Wong, D.M.A.L., Dahl, J., Stege, H., van der Wolf, P.J., Leontides, L., von Altrock, A.,
579 Thorberg, B.M., 2004. Herd-level risk factors for subclinical *Salmonella* infection in European
580 finishing-pig herds. *Preventive Veterinary Medicine* 62, 253-266.
- 581 Lyngstad, T.M., Jansen, P.A., Sindre, H., Jonassen, C.M., Hjortaas, M.J., Johnsen, S., Brun, E.,
582 2008. Epidemiological investigation of infectious salmon anaemia (ISA) outbreaks in Norway
583 2003-2005. *Preventive Veterinary Medicine* 84, 213-227.
- 584 Mardones, F.O., Perez, A.M., Carpenter, T.E., 2009. Epidemiologic investigation of the re-
585 emergence of infectious salmon anemia virus in Chile. *Diseases of Aquatic Organisms* 84, 105-114.
- 586 McClure, C.A., Hammell, K.L., Dohoo, I.R., 2005. Risk factors for outbreaks of infectious salmon
587 anemia in farmed Atlantic salmon, *Salmo salar*. *Preventive Veterinary Medicine* 72, 263-280.
- 588 McLoughlin, M.F., Graham, D.A., 2007. Alphavirus infections in salmonids - a review. *Journal of*
589 *Fish Diseases* 30, 511-531.
- 590 MSS, 2009a. Management Area Maps - April 2009. Marine Scotland Science, Aberdeen, pp. 1-7.
- 591 MSS, 2009b. Scottish fish farms: Annual production survey 2008. Marine Scotland Science,
592 Aberdeen, pp. 1-55.
- 593 MSS, 2010. Bacterial Kidney Disease.
- 594 Munro, L.A., Gregory, A., 2009. Application of network analysis to farmed salmonid movement
595 data from Scotland. *Journal of Fish Diseases* 32, 641-644.
- 596 Munro, P.D., Murray, A.G., Fraser, D.I., Peeler, E.J., 2003. An evaluation of the relative risks of
597 infectious salmon anaemia transmission associated with different salmon harvesting methods in
598 Scotland. *Ocean & Coastal Management* 46, 157-174.
- 599 Murray, A.G., Peeler, E.J., 2005. A framework for understanding the potential for emerging
600 diseases in aquaculture. *Preventive Veterinary Medicine* 67, 223-235.
- 601 Murray, A.G., Smith, R.J., Stagg, R.M., 2002. Shipping and the spread of infectious salmon anemia
602 in Scottish aquaculture. *Emerging Infectious Diseases* 8, 1-5.

- 603 Namata, H., Welby, S., Aerts, M., Faes, C., Abrahantes, J.C., Imberechts, H., Vermeersch, K.,
604 Hooyberghs, J., Meroc, E., Mintiens, K., 2009. Identification of risk factors for the prevalence and
605 persistence of Salmonella in Belgian broiler chicken flocks. *Preventive Veterinary Medicine* 90,
606 211-222.
- 607 OIE, 2009. *Manual of Diagnostic Tests for Aquatic Animals 2009*. The World Organisation for
608 Animal Health (OIE).
- 609 Plarre, H., Devold, M., Snow, M., Nylund, A., 2005. Prevalence of infectious salmon anaemia virus
610 (ISAV) in wild salmonids in western Norway. *Diseases of Aquatic Organisms* 66, 71-79.
- 611 Rae, G.H., 2002. Sea louse control in Scotland, past and present. *Pest Management Science* 58,
612 515-520.
- 613 Revie, C.W., Gettinby, G., Treasurer, J.W., Rae, G.H., 2002. The epidemiology of the sea louse,
614 *Caligus elongatus* Nordmann, in marine aquaculture of Atlantic salmon, *Salmo salar* L., in
615 Scotland. *Journal of Fish Diseases* 25, 391-399.
- 616 Ruane, N.M., Murray, A.G., Geoghegan, F., Raynard, R.S., 2009. Modelling the initiation and
617 spread of Infectious Pancreatic Necrosis Virus (IPNV) in the Irish salmon farming industry: the role
618 of inputs. *Ecological Modelling* 220, 1369-1374.
- 619 SSPO, 2009. *Scottish salmon farming: Industry research report*. Scottish salmon producers'
620 organisation.
- 621 Stagg, R.M., Bruno, D.W., Cunningham, C.O., Raynard, R.S., Munro, P.D., Murray, A.G., Allan,
622 C.E.T., Smail, D.A., McVicar, A.H., Hastings, T.S., 2001. Epizootiological investigations into an
623 outbreak of infectious salmon anaemia (ISA) in Scotland. *FRS Marine Laboratory Report No 13/01*,
624 Aberdeen.
- 625 Thrush, M., Peeler, E., 2006. Stochastic simulation of live salmonid movement in England and
626 Wales to predict potential spread of exotic pathogens. *Diseases of Aquatic Organisms* 72, 115-123.
- 627 Tripartite Working Group, 2010. *Area Management Agreements*.
- 628 Uglem, I., Dempster, T., Bjorn, P.A., Sanchez-Jerez, P., Okland, F., 2009. High connectivity of
629 salmon farms revealed by aggregation, residence and repeated movements of wild fish among
630 farms. *Marine Ecology-Progress Series* 384, 251-260.
- 631 Viljugrein, H., Staalstrom, A., Molvaer, J., Urke, H.A., Jansen, P.A., 2009. Integration of
632 hydrodynamics into a statistical model on the spread of pancreas disease (PD) in salmon farming.
633 *Diseases of Aquatic Organisms* 88, 35-44.
- 634 Wallace, I.S., Gregory, A., Murray, A.G., Munro, E.S., Raynard, R.S., 2008. Distribution of
635 infectious pancreatic necrosis virus (IPNV) in wild marine fish from Scottish waters with respect to
636 clinically infected aquaculture sites producing Atlantic salmon, *Salmo salar* L. *Journal of Fish*
637 *Diseases* 31, 177-186.
- 638 Watts, D.J., Strogatz, S.H., 1998. Collective dynamics of 'small-world' networks. *Nature* 393, 440-
639 442.
- 640 Wheatley, S.B., McLoughlin, M.F., Menzies, F.D., Goodall, E.A., 1995. Site management factors
641 influencing mortality rates in Atlantic salmon (*Salmo salar* L) during marine production.
642 *Aquaculture* 136, 195-207.