The Cultural Paradigms of British Imperialism in the Militarisation of Scotland and North America, c.1745-1775.

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Abstract

This dissertation examines militarisation in Scotland and North America from the Jacobite Uprising of 1745-46 to the outbreak of the American Revolutionary War in 1775. Employing a biographical, case study approach, it investigates the cultural paradigms guiding the actions and understandings of British Army officers as they waged war, pacified hostile peoples, and attempted to assimilate ‘other’ population groups within the British Empire. In doing so, it demonstrates the impact of the Jacobite Uprising on British imperialism in North America and the role of militarisation in affecting the imperial attitudes of military officers during a transformative period of imperial expansion, areas underexplored in the current historiography.

It argues that militarisation caused several paradigm shifts that fundamentally altered how officers viewed imperial populations and implemented empire in geographical fringes. Changes in attitude led to the development of a markedly different understanding of imperial loyalty and identity. Civilising savages became less important as officers moved away from the assimilation of ‘other’ populations towards their accommodation within the empire. Concurrently, the status of colonial settlers as Britons was contested due to their perceived disloyalty during and after the French and Indian War. ‘Othering’ colonial settlers, officers questioned the sustainability of an ‘empire of negotiation’ and began advocating for imperial reform, including closer regulation of the thirteen colonies. And, as the colonies appeared to edge closer to rebellion, those officers drew upon prior experiences in Scotland and North America to urge the military pacification of a hostile population group to ensure imperial security. Militarisation, therefore, provides important insights into how cultural imperialism was implemented in Scotland and how it was transferred and adapted to North America. Further, it demonstrates the longer-term interactions and understandings that influenced transformations in eighteenth-century imperial policy.
Acknowledgements

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<tr>
<td><strong>AHR</strong></td>
<td><em>The American Historical Review</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Amherst Papers</td>
<td>Jeffrey Amherst Papers, Official Series 35/43A, Kent County Archives Office, Microfilm Reel 382, David Library of the American Revolution, Washington Crossing</td>
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<tr>
<td>BL</td>
<td>British Library, London</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DCB</strong></td>
<td><em>Dictionary of Canadian Biography</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLAR</td>
<td>David Library of the American Revolution, Washington Crossing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EHR</strong></td>
<td><em>The English Historical Review</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forbes Papers</td>
<td>Headquarters Papers of Brigadier-General John Forbes Relating to the Expedition against Fort Duquesne in 1758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gage Papers</td>
<td>Thomas Gage Papers, American Series, William Clements Library, Ann Arbor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HL</td>
<td>Huntington Library, San Marino</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JAH</strong></td>
<td><em>The Journal of American History</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JBS</strong></td>
<td><em>Journal of British Studies</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAC</td>
<td>Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa</td>
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<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Mount Stuart Archives, Rothesay</td>
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<tr>
<td>Murray Papers</td>
<td>James Murray Papers, MG23-GII1, Microfilm Reel C-2225, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NEQ</strong></td>
<td><em>The New England Quarterly</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLS</td>
<td>National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRS</td>
<td>National Records of Scotland, Edinburgh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ODNB</strong></td>
<td><em>Oxford Dictionary of National Biography</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNA</td>
<td>The National Archives, Kew</td>
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<tr>
<td>WCL</td>
<td>William Clements Library, Ann Arbor</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMQ</td>
<td>The William and Mary Quarterly</td>
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<td>WO 34, Amherst Papers, MG13-WO34</td>
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Introduction

The long eighteenth century, 1688-1815, was marked by a series of prolonged and expensive wars between Britain (England until 1707) and other European powers, most often France. Early in the century these wars were primarily concerned with maintaining the balance of power in Europe and dominating foreign trade markets. However, as British trade to its colonial possessions increased, any perceived threat to British imperial power became a catalyst for war to protect commercial interests. At the same time, the British state also faced an internal threat to its security as Jacobites sought to restore the Stuart monarchy ousted during the Revolution of 1688-89. Whilst the 1715 uprising represented the apex of military support for Jacobitism, it remained a constant threat over the following decades and another significant rising, this time originating in the Scottish Highlands, broke out in 1745.¹ The defeat of the Jacobites at the Battle of Culloden in April 1746 was followed by a violent pacification undertaken by the British Army and the militarisation of the region in an attempt to prevent future hostilities by integrating Highlanders more closely within the British state and empire.

The establishment of Britain’s fiscal-military state² by the early eighteenth century contributed to its victory in the Seven Years’ War, known as the French and Indian War in North America,³ which led to significant British imperial expansion. In North America, the acquisition of Canada and the interior left Britain with two more potentially hostile population groups that required pacification. Again, militarisation was embarked upon as a deliberate process that sought to ensure imperial security and integrate populations within a much-altered empire. Whilst the steps taken by the British Army and ministry prevented further conflict with French-Canadians and Native

¹ For the 1715 Jacobite Rebellion (the Fifteen), see Daniel Szechi, 1715: The Great Jacobite Rebellion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).
³ The conflict began in North America in 1754 but war was not officially declared between Britain and France until 1756, continuing until the Treaty of Paris in 1763. Both terms are used throughout this dissertation. French and Indian War is used when discussing the war in North America whilst Seven Years’ War is used when discussing its progress in Europe, the discussion of it by the ministry, or to refer to the conflict more generally.
Americans (after Pontiac’s War of 1763-65), internal conflict once again broke out in 1775 with the American Revolutionary War, which led to the loss of Britain’s thirteen older colonies. Lawrence Gipson and, more recently, Peter J. Marshall and Fred Anderson, have highlighted the impact of the Seven Years’ War and the resultant territorial expansion of empire in North America and elsewhere on the coming of the American Revolution. The cost of the war, both in financial and manpower terms, contributed to the decision of successive ministries to introduce taxation to recover some of the costs of managing the empire. Such a step illuminated the different interpretations of the imperial relationship fostered by the recent war on both sides of the Atlantic. These interpretations were closely tied to national identity, recent understandings of which have been influenced by the new British history of J. G. A. Pocock and his advocacy of the concept of ‘Greater Britain’ and the work of Linda Colley who persuasively argued that a sense of British national identity was forged through common experiences of warfare, as well as religion and empire building, from 1707.

I. Aims and Objectives

This dissertation draws upon studies that consider the impact of war on national identity and understandings of empire to analyse British cultural attitudes towards indigenous peoples and settlers of the imperial fringe during this transformative period of military conflict and imperial growth. Concerned with the experiences and encounters of the British Army in Scotland and North America, it aims to highlight how these experiences shaped the attitudes of the army officers involved. The main objective of the research is to understand the impact of the Jacobite rebellion of 1745-46 (the Forty-Five) on British imperialism in North America. It considers the cultural paradigms of British Army officers following the Forty-Five as they sought to overcome the challenges of waging war and pacifying hostile peoples in two imperial fringes. Fundamentally, it is a


study of how British imperial attitudes were culturally altered by militarisation in the decades prior to the American Revolution. Exploring the cultural paradigms driving imperialism will develop historians’ understanding of the formation of imperial attitudes and emphasise the role of military interactions on the transformations in eighteenth-century British imperial policy. Significantly, it focuses on a group under-represented in the current scholarship, British Army officers, and considers the attitudes, actions, and impact upon imperial policymaking of these important agents of empire.

II. Research Questions

The main research questions the dissertation will address are concerned with the experiences and encounters of the British Army in Scotland and North America and are based on a hypothesis that, by the onset of the American Revolution, British imperial attitudes had been culturally altered by experiences of warfare, militarisation, and the attempted pacification of hostile peoples. The first research question this dissertation aims to answer is: what was the impact of the Jacobite Uprising of 1745-46 on British imperialism in North America? The Forty-Five set an important precedent for the British Army: informing how officers directed military operations in a geographical fringe, providing a benchmark for the pacification of hostile peoples throughout the empire, and acting as a testing ground for militarisation strategy. This question will consider how the challenges of waging war in Scotland influenced how the British Army approached similar challenges in North America. Although Peter Russell and Matthew Ward made connections between the army’s use of irregular warfare in Scotland and its later adaptation in North America, little work has been undertaken to link the Forty-Five and the French and Indian War. This dissertation will consider a number of operational issues including irregular warfare, logistics, recruitment, and quartering to understand whether the British Army learnt any lessons during the Forty-Five that it then applied in its response to the French and Indian War.

Questioning whether the British Army drew parallels between the Highlands and North America, this dissertation will also consider how army officers’ experiences of pacifying the Scottish Highlands in the aftermath of the Battle of Culloden affected how

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they approached the pacification of hostile (or potentially hostile) groups in North America. Geoffrey Plank illustrated that the Forty-Five raised the political power and public stature of the British Army, allowing officers to pursue a more deliberate imperial agenda where they could take on the role of reformers in the places they were active.7 He explored the difficulties the British had defining groups of ‘others’ within the empire, finding that the army tended to be most violent when classification attempts failed. Investigating both pacification in the immediate aftermath of conflict and the implementation of longer-term militarisation strategy, this dissertation will extend Plank’s work by examining how cultural imperialism was implemented in Scotland and how it was transferred and adapted to North America. In doing so, it will investigate what continuing impact, if any, the Forty-Five had on British imperialism in North America in the years preceding the American Revolution.

The second main research question of the dissertation is: what do interactions between British Army officers and various imperial populations reveal about the cultural attitudes of the British imperial elite in the mid-to late-eighteenth century? Interactions between the British Army and indigenous peoples and colonial settlers were complex, evolving over the period under investigation. Colin Calloway and Geoffrey Plank highlighted that, in the mid-eighteenth century, indigenous peoples in both the Scottish Highlands and in North America were often viewed as barbarous savages and were subject to state-sponsored civilisation and commercialisation programmes intended to promote cultural assimilation.8 In contrast, colonial settlers were generally viewed as civilised Britons at that juncture, although less than three decades after the Forty-Five many would be in open rebellion against the Crown. Interactions between the military and colonial settlers both during and after the French and Indian War highlighted tension between the civil and military spheres in North America and army officers were left frustrated at perceived colonial indifference to, or obstruction of, the war effort. This dissertation will question how interactions between the military and indigenous populations compared to those between the military and colonial settlers. Investigating the cultural paradigms that governed these interactions will illuminate the attitudes of British Army officers towards the various population groups. In addition, evaluating the

militarisation of both imperial fringes will highlight why officers acted as they did and whether any paradigm shifts occurred which altered their attitudes towards those they encountered.

The final research question this dissertation will address is: how did the experiences and encounters of British Army officers shape their attitudes regarding how the empire ought to be governed? Peter J. Marshall found that the French and Indian War caused Britons and colonists to develop fundamentally different attitudes towards the process of empire. Whilst before the war empire had been a process of negotiation between colonial governors and colonial assemblies, the war caused the British imperial elite to believe that an empire of negotiation was neither sustainable nor desirable. Colonists, on the contrary, had had their view of an empire of partnership reinforced by the war.\textsuperscript{9} The formation of such different concepts of empire was a major factor in the crisis that led to the disintegration of empire in North America. Marshall’s work provides the contextual framework for this dissertation. Focusing on a much narrower group, British Army officers, this dissertation will examine their individual experiences implementing militarisation and the army’s role as an instrument of empire. It will examine how these lived experiences influenced both officers’ personal attitudes and the shared understandings of the army as an institution towards the empire. Considering the army officers as agents of empire, it questions what wider influence they had on British imperial policy-making more generally in the pre-revolutionary period.

### III. Definitions, Methods, and Boundaries

This dissertation considers the attitudes of the British imperial elite, who were those involved in the planning and/or implementation of policy and legislation concerning the British Empire. This includes government officials, army and naval officers, members of the Board of Trade, and colonial governors and officials, including the Superintendents for Indian Affairs.\textsuperscript{10} Through biographical case studies, the dissertation primarily focuses on the experiences of select British Army officers and considers how these experiences affected their attitudes towards various imperial


\textsuperscript{10} The Superintendent positions were created in 1755 in an attempt to centralise Indian affairs and diplomacy during the French and Indian War.
populations and regarding the implementation of imperial policy. It further investigates the extent to which the attitudes of these individual officers spread throughout the army as an institution and whether they influenced the attitudes and actions of government officials. The British Army is an appropriate context through which to consider imperial attitudes in the mid-to late-eighteenth century as it was an important instrument of empire, used by governments to implement change in imperial fringes. More significantly, in both Scotland and North America officers also acted as agents of empire, keeping ministers informed of developments far from the imperial centre, deciding how to transform the broad outlines of policy determined at Whitehall into functional measures on the ground, and helping to influence the direction of imperial policy by providing ministers with information and advice. Although other members of the British imperial elite are not the focus of this study, they do feature within it through their correspondence with army officers and more generally in the wider context of the study of militarisation and governance in the eighteenth-century British Empire.

Concerned with British cultural attitudes towards the empire and various groups within it including Scottish Highlanders, Native Americans, French-Canadians, and colonial North American settlers, this dissertation seeks to understand the cultural paradigms that governed interactions between the army and these peoples and to ascertain whether any paradigm shifts took place during the period 1745-75. In the humanities, a cultural paradigm is a framework of the values, assumptions, and beliefs that affect how an individual or group interprets and interacts with aspects of the world or with other groups.\(^{11}\) They are dominant cultural beliefs or prevailing cultural assumptions that project dichotomous perceptions of the self in relation to others, normalising these in ideology. In the context of imperialism, cultural paradigms regulate the interactions of the colonisers, colonised, and colonists but are inherently hegemonic; sustaining imperialism in politics and social organisation and seeking cultural domination of the colonised. A paradigm shift occurs when a fundamental change in the framework of values, assumptions, and beliefs causes an individual or group to interact with the same aspects of the world in a different way. Such shifts do not occur immediately but rather

\(^{11}\) The idea of a paradigm comes from Thomas Kuhn. According to Kuhn, a paradigm is the current dominant example or model within a scientific area that provides a guide for scientists regarding how they ought to carry out research. See Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* 4th ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2012). Others, including Clifford Geertz, have adapted Kuhn’s theory of a paradigm, which he did not recognise to exist except in the scientific field, to fit the social sciences and arts and humanities.
take place over time as inconsistencies within the existing framework cause that framework to be questioned and eventually replaced.

Anthropologist Clifford Geertz influenced the study of culture and cultural paradigms for historians as well as anthropologists. Geertz’s work primarily focused on symbolic anthropology and was based around his belief in a semiotic theory of culture. He believed culture to be a pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, “a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and their attitudes towards life.”

According to Geertz, it is the job of anthropologists to interpret these symbols and the patterns of meanings they represent in order to explain social processes, events, or behaviours within a particular group. Cultural historians have used Geertz’s interpretation of culture as being concerned with understanding the meaning of symbols when studying societies and traditions of the past. Gordon Wood recently demonstrated how Bernard Bailyn’s *Origins of the American Revolution* identified the ideologies and ideas that constituted a “powerful array of accessible meanings that the patriots could draw upon to explain, understand, justify, and rationalize their resistance to British actions.”

Geertz’s work, and the increasing influence of anthropology in general on the study of history from the 1970s, encouraged historians to investigate people’s understandings of transformative experiences as they lived through and made sense of them.

Geertz’s definition of culture as a system of symbols through which people develop and communicate their attitudes towards life informs this study of the cultural paradigms of British imperialism. The cultural paradigms this dissertation will investigate are civility, loyalty, benevolence, and superiority. The civility paradigm was underpinned by the assumption that civility can only be acquired by people if they submit to the British state, which can be achieved through subjugation. The self-perception guiding the civility paradigm on the part of the colonisers was that they themselves, as

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12 Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (London: Hutchinson, 1975), 89.


white, English-speaking Protestants participating in a commercial society, were civilised in contrast to those they encountered who were in a state of barbarity. The civility paradigm has been pervasive in all imperial movements from the Elizabethan era right up to the present day. For example, Nicholas Canny highlighted how it was used as a justification for the subjugation of the barbarous Gaels in Ireland.15 During the eighteenth century, the civility paradigm was influenced by the ideas and values of progress and the development of man being consolidated in the Enlightenment, which contributed to the emergence of theories of stadial development.16 Stadial theory argued that society passed through four separate stages in its progress from savagery to civilisation: hunter-gatherer, pastoral, agriculture, and commerce and it identified the mode of subsistence as the primary attribute for classifying societies.17 It posited that whilst Britons generally had reached the civilised state of a commercial society, others within the British Empire, including Scottish Highlanders and Native Americans, remained stuck at the pastoral and hunter-gatherer stages, although they had the potential to progress to civility. The civility paradigm suggested that those who stood in the way of progress had to be removed, whether through military execution during periods of conflict or through subjugation followed by progression towards civility by way of assisted commercialisation and improvement. The civility paradigm was manifest during the Forty-Five and in the pacification of the Highlands which followed. As such, it is investigated in the first chapter of the dissertation which explores the Forty-Five, but it is also investigated in other chapters which question its role in shaping the British response to conflict with French-Canadians and Native Americans.


The loyalty paradigm equated with submission and adherence to the British state. Underpinned by a belief that loyalty was a necessity for imperial security and stability, it assumed that loyalty could only be achieved through assimilation and Anglicisation. The self-perception guiding the loyalty paradigm on the part of the colonisers was of themselves as Britons participating in the imperial venture, in contrast to ‘others’ who did not imbibe the sense of Britishness and therefore did not benefit from being a member of the British state. The loyalty paradigm demanded the allegiance of all within the empire (colonisers, colonised, and colonists) to the Crown and placed the needs of the imperial state as paramount. Assimilation of the ‘other’ was sought on the coloniser’s terms as Britishness was thought a necessary goal for imperial populations. Disloyalty was evident through rebellion and through the failure of the ‘other’ to adhere to the British state as expected by contributing to the realisation of the state’s aims. Loyalty was thus attained through an initial submission of disloyal ‘others’ and by a process of assimilation whereby those ‘others’ demonstrated continuing adherence to the British state. Submission could be achieved through the military defeat and absorption into the empire of enemy peoples, the prosecution or conquest of internal rebels, or through negotiation where appropriate. Military intimidation and closer regulation over imperial populations likewise sought to secure submission and adherence in the long-term whilst simultaneously encouraging assimilation. The loyalty paradigm played an important role in the militarisation process embarked upon in Scotland and North America, guiding interactions between the military and all imperial populations they encountered throughout the period of this investigation. As such, it is considered in all the following chapters, although it forms a particularly important aspect of the investigations regarding the interactions of both John Campbell, fourth Earl of Loudoun, and Thomas Gage with colonial settlers, examined in chapters two and five respectively.

The benevolence paradigm equated with establishing dominance over a conquered population. It was underpinned by an assumption that imperial security during a conflict could best be achieved by reconciling the conquered to their new masters, even if the conquest proved only temporary. In turn, it posited that reconciliation could best be achieved through a demonstration of the justness of the conqueror. The self-perception guiding the benevolence paradigm on the part of the colonisers was of themselves as honourable conquerors ruling mildly in contrast to those they had conquered who had previously been subject to arbitrary rule. The benevolence paradigm demanded the temporary, or local, allegiance of the conquered as subjects for so long as they continued
to reside within the sovereign’s dominion. Should they chose to leave the conquered territory, or should the territory be surrendered back through arms or negotiation, there was no continuing demand for allegiance. It was inspired by Frances Hutcheson’s theory of moral philosophy, which argued that humankind harboured a natural instinct towards benevolence, and Emmerich de Vattel’s emphasis on moderation in conflict. Reflecting these thinkers, the benevolence paradigm recognised that whilst subjugation was the right of the conqueror as per the law of conquest, moderation and the granting of civil rights to the conquered could affect quicker and more permanent acceptance from that populace, thereby establishing dominance. In practice, this could be achieved through a process of cooperative submission whereby subjugation continued to be threatened, and implemented, as required, but where compliance was sought by exemplifying fairness in rule and allowing the retention of the populations’ prior rights. Acting mildly sought to overcome entrenched perceptions in the minds of the conquered about the conquerors’ barbarity and the expected cruelty of their rule. The benevolence paradigm played an important role in the pacification of Quebec and Canada from 1759 to 1763 after the British victories in the French and Indian War. As such, it is examined in more detail in chapter three, which investigates how it guided the actions of James Murray as he sought to establish dominance over the French-Canadians whilst the wider conflict with France continued.

The superiority paradigm equated with cultural imperialism. The self-perception guiding the superiority paradigm on the part of the colonisers was of themselves as ethnically, morally, socially, culturally, and politically superior as a result of their Britishness. Those they encountered, particularly the colonised, were in contrast perceived as inferior. Underpinned by the assumption that the colonisers’ state of being


21 Regarding the rights of the conqueror, see A. M. Campbell, The Rights of War and Peace Including the Law of Nature and of Nations: Translated from the Original Latin of Grotius (New York: M. Walter Dunne, 1901), bk. 3, 348-50. Sharon Korman highlighted that Vattel’s 1758 The Laws of Nations questioned Grotius’ interpretation that the conqueror could act as they liked. He argued the conqueror did not have the right to deprive the conquered of their lives, liberty, property, or freedom. Sharon Korman, The Right of Conquest: The Acquisition of Territory by Force in International Law and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), 29-40. However, such an interpretation was only just emerging at the time of the conquest of Quebec.
was intrinsically preferable, it advocated the imposition of the colonisers’ culture on the inferior population. The superiority paradigm has been prevalent in every empire from Ancient Rome to the present day, through an active or passive assumption of superiority on the part of the colonisers. It has been used to justify imperialism as a noble venture. In the nineteenth century, Rudyard Kipling’s *White Man’s Burden* epitomised the superiority paradigm, arguing that the white man has a moral obligation to rule the non-white peoples of the earth, who can only emerge from a state of inferiority and incivility with British guidance.\(^\text{22}\) Similar to Edward Said’s depiction of Orientalism, the superiority paradigm depicted the colonised as primitive, violent, and essentially inferior.\(^\text{23}\) Their enlightenment was only thought possible when traditional values and culture were replaced by those of the colonisers. In the eighteenth century, positing that inferior peoples had little choice but to accept subjugation, the superiority paradigm demanded they demonstrate their submission to British imperial authority and protection. Advancement was to be achieved through initial subjugation followed by the forced acculturation of a subject population or that populations’ voluntary embrace of the culture of the colonisers. Closely related to the civility paradigm, advancement was thought a necessary prerequisite for the inferior populations’ eventual assimilation within the empire as imperial subjects. The superiority paradigm was manifest in Jeffrey Amherst’s interactions with Native Americans after the conquest of Canada. As an English Protestant with beneficial family connections and patrons, Amherst had an inherent sense of moral superiority that defined his worldview, evident in his interactions with all the population groups he encountered during his military career. The superiority paradigm was particularly important in guiding Amherst’s strategy for the pacification and militarisation of the North American interior from 1760 to 1763, as well as his initial response to Pontiac’s War. As such, it is explored further in chapter four.

These cultural paradigms represent the meanings that British Army officers drew upon to understand, guide, and legitimise their actions in Scotland and North America. This dissertation will consider how these paradigms guided the British Army in their interactions with imperial population groups. It aims to understand how these cultural paradigms were shaped by the process of militarisation in Scotland and North America.


and whether any paradigm shifts took place over the course of the period under investigation, in turn shaping British imperial attitudes.

This dissertation considers the militarisation of the Scottish Highlands and North America in the mid- to late-eighteenth century. Militarisation is the process by which a society readies itself for, engages in, or responds to conflict and violence (whether internal or external) and it encompasses all levels of society: the army, the government, and the civil sphere. As such, it is not simply the act of engaging in warfare but includes the preparation for war through financial investment and training, the pacification of hostile groups and the subjugation or assimilation of defeated enemies, the recruitment of men into the armed forces and the engagement of different groups of society with the recruitment process, the physical presence of soldiers and their distribution to quell civil disorder, and the ideology that a strong military provides security for a state. In the eighteenth century, Britain relied upon its army and navy for domestic, imperial, and commercial security. The frequent warfare of the period caused Britain to remain in a constant state of war-readiness. Internal security was of paramount importance, both within Britain and the wider empire, at a time when other states would exploit internal divisions such as Jacobitism for their own military and/or imperial aims.

Britain engaged in a deliberate militarisation process in response to conflicts in both the Highlands and North America to ensure imperial security. This process involved the pacification and attempted assimilation of Scottish Highlanders during and after the Forty-Five and of French-Canadians and Native Americans during and after the French and Indian War. In both imperial fringes, violent pacification was undertaken during and immediately after periods of warfare whilst longer-term measures centring around Anglicisation and commercialisation sought to provoke deep structural changes within the societies targeted. A militarisation strategy was implemented to prevent the recurrence of hostilities. Logistics and communication systems were strengthened through the building of forts, roads, and bridges and the improvement of portages in North America. Troops were strategically distributed in forts and towns to secure British interests through intimidation, regular patrols, and mapping endeavours. Some indigenous and colonial figures were integrated within the imperial establishment as military recruiters to further encourage assimilation. Militarisation was a process that ensured the consistent presence of the army in numerous aspects of imperial life: physically through the stationing of soldiers in towns and upon the frontier, economically due to the resultant costs the government either had to absorb or meet through taxation,
politically through an increase in regulations and acts related to military affairs, and socially as a result of an increase in interactions between the military and civil spheres. This dissertation questions how the process of militarisation shaped eighteenth-century British imperialism. Studying the correspondence of army officers documenting their imperial encounters will illuminate the cultural paradigms guiding those encounters and whether these were altered over time. This dissertation will further question whether the experiences of these select British Army officers altered their imperial attitudes and contributed to the transformations in British imperial policy from the 1760s.

Imperial attitudes are the attitudes of a particular group towards the empire and towards peoples within that empire. Whilst these attitudes can be those of the colonisers, the colonised, or the colonists, this dissertation focuses on the attitudes of the colonisers (the British imperial elite). This provides a consideration of the experiences and attitudes driving the imperial crisis from the British perspective, rather than the colonial or indigenous perspectives. Cultural paradigms and imperial attitudes are closely linked as paradigms inform attitudes. Therefore, if a cultural paradigm is altered or there is a paradigm shift this, in turn, affects the attitudes of a particular group. This dissertation will argue that militarisation in Scotland and North America in the mid-to late-eighteenth century caused several paradigm shifts that influenced how British Army officers interacted with various imperial populations. It will suggest that these changes led to an evolution in officers’ own imperial attitudes regarding these populations as well as influencing a fundamental change in the British imperial elite’s conception of the imperial relationship, causing questions to be asked about what exactly the empire represented and how it ought to be governed.

Except for the first chapter, the dissertation employs a biographical, case study approach, collecting data from a variety of sources and using qualitative analysis to answer the stated research questions. It examines four British Army officers who played a commanding role in the military conflict in North America in the mid- to late-eighteenth century: John Campbell, fourth Earl of Loudoun, James Murray, Jeffrey Amherst, and Thomas Gage. A biographical approach allows focus on the specific cultural paradigms that informed the interactions of each officer, all of whom were commanding officers in North America and enjoyed at least some autonomy when implementing militarisation there. As such, their experiences illustrate the attitudes driving imperialism at the highest level of the army in its operational setting. Comparing the attitudes of these officers with the attitudes of others within the British Army and the wider British imperial elite, a
biographical approach enables an understanding of how typical, or atypical, these commanding officers were and whether their imperial attitudes or understandings of empire influenced others within the British imperial elite.

The four officers have been chosen based on the important role each played in the militarisation of North America during and/or after the French and Indian War. Loudoun, Amherst, and Gage all held the position of commander-in-chief of the British forces in North America for different lengths of time (approximately two years for Loudoun, five for Amherst, and eleven and a half for Gage) and in that position were able to oversee and implement militarisation and advise the government regarding North American affairs. Whilst Murray did not enjoy the position of commander-in-chief, after the conquest of Quebec in 1759 he was given much freedom to direct the pacification of that region until the Treaty of Paris in February 1763. He also played an important role implementing militarisation and overseeing governance in Canada as its first civil governor after the treaty and advised the ministry of his opinion regarding its future governance until his recall in 1766. Other British military officers played an important role in North America during or after the war. These included John Forbes, whose focus on overcoming logistical difficulties during the 1758 campaign against Fort Duquesne was influenced by his time as Loudoun’s adjutant-general, Henry Bouquet, who held a key understanding of Native Americans and irregular warfare, and James Wolfe, who commanded the expedition to take Quebec in 1759. Whilst this dissertation does, at times, discuss the experiences of these and other officers in North America, a desire to focus on those who were responsible for directing and implementing policies related to militarisation and governance drove the selection of the four case studies.

All four officers were also closely connected to the Forty-Five, though not all were directly involved in the conflict itself. Both Loudoun and Gage took part in the military campaign against the Jacobites and in the pacification of the Highlands which followed. Amherst spent the majority of the rising on the continent engaged in the War of the Austrian Succession, but he was briefly recalled to England as the army attempted to intercept the Jacobites upon their march to Derby. Amherst was also close to the Duke of Cumberland, who commanded the British Army in Scotland from October 1745 until July 1746, serving upon his staff for a decade, and he shared a similar attitude towards the Jacobites as his superior.24 James Murray was not active in Scotland at any point

24 See Chapter One and Chapter Four.
during the Forty-Five or the pacification that followed it. However, in addition to the indirect experiences of the conflict passed on from those he served with in North America, not least James Wolfe, Murray also had a personal connection to Jacobitism that ensured he was aware of the attitudes driving the actions of the army in the Highlands as two of his brothers were strongly suspected of Jacobitism.25

Information, knowledge, and understandings spread throughout the eighteenth-century British Army as both soldiers and officers frequently moved regiment, taking experiences and attitudes with them. In addition, due to the prevalence of warfare, troops spent most of their time in garrison or on campaign in Scotland, Europe, North America, or the Caribbean.26 Prior experiences, anecdotes, and stories were shared informally whilst the lessons learnt in campaigns were reflected in updated training manuals and drilling techniques. Furthermore, a common sense of the army’s role as a civilising entity was developed during the Forty-Five and quickly came to influence Britain’s military establishment.27 Enlightenment ideas and ideals encouraged the spread of knowledge throughout the army as they refocused attention on the rules of war and notions of ‘civilised’ warfare, contributed to the increase in volume and popularity of newspapers, and encouraged officers to publish tracts on topics including military training, tactics, and discipline which were widely read amongst the officer class. Both the military response to the Forty-Five, and the pacification that followed it, were widely reported in the British and colonial press which would have been read by army officers as well as the public.28 This proved the same during the Seven Years’ War as events from all theatres received press coverage, particularly important campaigns and battles such as James Wolfe’s 1759 victory at Quebec. Officers aspiring to top-level positions within the British Army studied the art of warfare through the hundreds of available books and tracts on the subject by both British and Continental authors throughout the eighteenth century. They not only kept themselves updated with the most recent publications and developments in the art of war but also recommended, and often insisted, that junior officers also studied those

25 See Chapter Three.
26 Soldiers whose regiments were disbanded at the end of one conflict would not necessarily join up to the same regiment if they mobilised upon the outbreak of another war. In addition, during conflicts it was not unusual for men to be drafted from one regiment to another. Officers tended to move regiment in pursuit of advancement.
27 Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, 127-29.
28 The Forty-Five was widely reported in the London Gazette, London Magazine, Scots Magazine, and Caledonian Mercury as well as the Virginia Gazette, Boston Post Boy, and New York Gazette.
books that were thought to be the most authoritative. Other publications read included narratives of specific campaigns and epics describing ancient warfare, which highlights the depth of understanding of warfare amongst the British officer class. Publications ensured officers could keep their troops prepared for war during periods of peace and provided instruction in the art of war that helped officers decide how to conduct campaigns, sieges, and battles during conflicts. These factors combined to ensure that even those who were not personally involved in the Forty-Five, or in other campaigns or theatres, shared the indirect experiences of the army and were part of a common military understanding and ethos.

The term British is used throughout this dissertation to describe the army, government, nation/state, and empire. Whilst some prefer to use the terms Hanoverian or loyalist when describing the events of the Forty-Five, the army of King George II, and Scots/Highlanders who did not join the Jacobites, this has tended to encourage a dissociation between Britain and the actions of the army in the Highlands. The Anglo-Scottish Union of 1707 created the United Kingdom of Great Britain and a single ministry was concerned with policy-making for both England and Scotland. Further, despite the perseverance of local identities and rampant Scotophobia, a British sense of national identity was actively being crafted throughout the eighteenth century. As such, throughout this dissertation Jacobites are termed Jacobites or the Jacobite Army to make clear their difference from the British Army and loyal Britons and Highlanders are only denoted specifically thus because of the difference accorded to them by the majority of the British Army, government, and public throughout the eighteenth century.

Although the 1715 rising (the Fifteen) enjoyed the most Jacobite support, with the army reaching up to twenty thousand compared to a maximum of eleven to fourteen thousand during the Forty-Five, it is not considered in this study. The focus of this dissertation is on two generations of the British Army who were involved in warfare in Scotland and/or North America. Few British Army officers who fought in the Fifteen were still serving when regiments were sent to North America in 1754 and it is unlikely that many remained alive upon the outbreak of the American Revolutionary War in 1775.


Furthermore, the Fifteen was not viewed primarily as a Highland rebellion in the same way that the Forty-Five was, despite more Highlanders enlisting in the Jacobite Army during the Fifteen and despite significant Jacobite support in the North-East and the Lowlands during the Forty-Five.\(^\text{31}\) As explored in chapter one, the British decision to view and label the Forty-Five as a Highland rebellion was vitally important for influencing how the army and ministry reacted to it, ensuring that repercussions were most strongly felt in that region. A similar pacification and subsequent strengthening of British military influence did not follow the Fifteen. Similarly, this dissertation limits its consideration of the British Army to actions in Scotland and North America. Whilst there are parallels with earlier episodes of violence and pacification in Ireland, these again took place outside the lives of the two generations of the army that this study is concerned with. Both the Plantation and the Williamite Wars in Ireland took place before the Anglo-Scottish Union of 1707 and the ‘flight of the wild geese’ saw the majority of Irish Jacobites depart to France in 1691 as part of the Treaty of Limerick.\(^\text{32}\) Whilst a significant military establishment remained in Ireland throughout the period under investigation, and subjugatory rule continued over the Catholic population, these measures had been put in place well before the start date of this investigation. Consideration of the colonies has been restricted to those on the North American mainland because the West Indies remained primarily commercial colonies. Whilst the army was utilised to intimidate slave populations into remaining quiet or to quell rebellions such as Tacky’s Revolt in Jamaica in 1760, it did not implement the same process of militarisation or have the same encounters with indigenous peoples and colonial settlers as it did on the mainland.\(^\text{33}\) Focus on Scotland and North America has been determined to give the study coherence through a concentration on areas where a deliberate militarisation strategy sought to prevent rebellion from imperial, rather than slave populations.


IV. Current Historiography

Investigating the cultural paradigms guiding the actions, attitudes, and encounters of select British Army officers in Scotland and North America between 1745 and 1775, this dissertation brings together three strands of historiography: Scottish history, early American history, and British imperial history, and investigates them through the lens of militarisation. To set the dissertation in context this section will first provide a brief overview of the relevant historiography relating to British imperial expansion in the eighteenth century, highlighting the key themes and findings and explaining their relevance to the dissertation. It will then focus on the scholarship connected to the four cultural paradigms explored in the dissertation and to militarisation in the three historiographical fields. Emphasis will be placed on the key findings of the current scholarship, how this dissertation fits within the current scholarship, and the gaps this dissertation aims to fill.

By 1763, British imperial expansion questioned whether the seventeenth-century imperial ideal of an ‘empire of the seas’ remained fit for purpose. Peter J. Marshall highlighted that this conception of empire desired colonies that were private ventures established for, and dominated by, trade, populated by white, Protestant Europeans, and supported by naval supremacy. Advocation of commercial empire did not disappear in the eighteenth century. However, territorial expansion and population growth, which saw Britain’s North American empire increase from a population of approximately 265,000 in eleven colonies in 1700 to a population of over 2,000,000 in seventeen colonies by 1770, questioned the validity such a conception of empire. Richard Middleton demonstrated that Britain’s victory in the Seven Years’ War rested upon its ability to fund war more effectively than France. It was able to do so due to the creation of a stronger, more stable fiscal-military state than its European rivals. John Brewer argued this was a


result of the Revolution of 1688-89, which curbed the power of the monarch and meant funding warfare relied upon negotiation with Parliament. Britain’s fiscal-military state facilitated the expansion of the navy and the deployment of increased troop numbers, from approximately 30,000 during periods of seventeenth-century warfare (except 1642-59 when numbers were much higher) to approximately 90,000 during the Seven Years’ War. Accompanied by increased government borrowing and taxation, military and naval expansion enabled Britain to continue fighting despite early losses in the Seven Years’ War and victory in that conflict established Britain as the preeminent European military and naval power. The establishment of a fiscal-military state by the mid-eighteenth century was essential to enable the implementation of militarisation strategy in Scotland and North America over the following decades, which this dissertation investigates. Furthermore, the development of Britain’s fiscal-military state caused military officers to become more involved in parliamentary affairs. The percentage of officers sitting in the House of Commons increased from 9.3% in the period 1715-22 to 14.7% in the period 1754-90. This dissertation seeks to understand the impact serving military officers had as agents of empire at a time when the general influence of the military on policymaking can be seen to have been increasing, an area that has not been examined in current scholarship.

Related to British imperial expansion was the move away from the ‘salutary neglect’ of the Walpolean era as Britain began to intervene more directly in imperial affairs. Lawrence Gipson proposed that Britain’s retention of Canada after the conflict


39 Brewer, Sinews of Power, 45.

40 The term ‘salutary neglect’ was first used by Edmund Burke in a 1775 speech urging the conciliation of North America. It refers to the Crown’s avoidance of enforcement of acts that would keep the colonies subservient to the mother- country and limit their growth. Such a policy was followed throughout the first four decades of the eighteenth century as the Navigation Acts were not enforced and little attempt was made to centralise management of the colonies or reform their governance. James Henretta argued that a
was a strategic decision to remove France from North America.\textsuperscript{41} This suggests commerce was no longer the driving force for empire and the British imperial elite were willing to embrace both extensive territorial empire and the absorption of Catholic French-Canadians into the imperial fold; contrary to the ideal of colonies populated by free, white Protestants. John Shy highlighted that the increase in territory to Britain’s empire after the war, alongside the threat posed by its newly absorbed populations, led the Bute ministry to retain a significant standing army in North America to ensure imperial security.\textsuperscript{42} Gipson argued that the cost of the Seven Years’ War and of securing Britain’s much-expanded empire in its aftermath were the driving factors in changes to British imperial policy\textsuperscript{43} and the subsequent imperial crisis as colonists resisted Parliament’s attempts to get them to contribute to the cost of maintaining the army.\textsuperscript{44} However, Andrew Beaumont’s recent book demonstrated that a policy of non-intervention ended with Halifax’s appointment to the Board of Trade in 1748 and that there had been several prior instances of state intervention even before then. Halifax was determined to transform North America from a collection of settlements into a uniform group of colonies subservient to the Crown’s interest.\textsuperscript{45} Although interrupted by the outbreak of war, Halifax’s reform programme highlights an early desire within the British imperial elite to make changes to the relationship between the colonies and the mother-country. Focus on 1763 as a turning point emphasises the cost of war, in both military and monetary terms, on transformations in imperial policy. This dissertation, whilst not

\textsuperscript{41} Gipson, ‘American Revolution’, 90.


questioning the importance of the war in affecting change, seeks to demonstrate some of the cultural reasons for transformations in imperial policy and the imperial relationship.


Colley argued that Britons viewed the North American colonies as an extension of the metropole and the colonists, therefore, as fellow Britons. Likewise, the colonists


thought of themselves as Britons. She suggested that the removal of the French ‘other’ from North America after the French and Indian War caused the colonists to begin to view the state and its agents as an ‘other’ instead and to form their own sense of identity as separate from Britain in the lead up to the American Revolution.  

Historians have developed Colley’s work on national identity, considering how the perception of colonists as Britons changed during the revolutionary era. Eliga Gould argued that after the American Revolutionary War British people began to foster a much clearer definition of what it was that distinguished them (in England, Scotland, and Wales) from others living elsewhere in the British Empire. He argued that during the war most Britons came to accept that American colonists were inherently different to them and, in the aftermath of the war, no part of the empire would be thought of as an extension to Britain in the way that the American colonies had been. Peter J. Marshall dated the change in attitude earlier, arguing that by the time the war began in 1775 most Britons felt the colonists had forfeited their right to be classified as Britons as a result of their resistance during the imperial crisis. Stephen Conway generally agreed with Marshall’s interpretation that the roots of this change in attitude had been laid during the French and Indian War and strengthened during the imperial crisis, although like Gould he concluded that it was the war that caused the majority to make the final break from viewing the colonists as Britons. All of these historians predominantly considered the changing attitudes of Britons living at home who did not regularly interact with the colonists. They did not consider the attitudes of the army officers who had directly experienced the militarisation of that imperial fringe and it is this gap in the current scholarship that this dissertation seeks to fill.

Colin Kidd demonstrated that a vital aspect of the formation of a British identity, both at home and in the colonies, was Anglicisation, arguing that “Britain did not only unite against an external Other, but the emulation of Englishness acted – up to a point –

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as a glue of integration.” Kidd argued that a shared sense of ancestral identity with England existed in the minds of both colonists and Protestant Irishmen, whilst Scots enthusiastically adopted the description North Britons. All groups focused on their natural rights as Britons, which embraced English liberties. T. H. Breen illustrated the ‘empire of goods’ that provided a common framework of experience and consumption amongst colonists and Britons, contributing to the Anglicisation of the colonists and their more complete integration within the British Empire by the 1760s. Whilst Britain encouraged Anglicisation of colonists in North America through consumerism as a way of keeping and strengthening ties between Britons, it was more forceful with regards to disloyal populations in Scotland and North America as Anglicisation was generally viewed as a necessary prerequisite for such populations to assimilate as Britons. Whilst historians including Hilda Neatby and Philip Lawson identified Anglicisation as the guiding principle of the ministry’s initial strategy for Quebec, the connection between Anglicisation and the inculcation of loyalty in Native Americans and Scottish Highlanders requires investigation. Considering this connection, this dissertation questions whether the experiences of British Army officers led to a move away from the belief that Anglicisation was a necessity for the governance of imperial populations.

The cultural paradigm of civility also played an important role in guiding militarisation in Scotland and North America. It is well established in the historiography that classification of Scottish Highlanders and Native Americans as savages led to their brutal treatment during and immediately after periods of warfare. However, little work


56 A. I. Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603-1788 (East Linton: Tuckwell, 1996); Plank, Rebellion and Savagery; Calloway, White People, Indians, and Highlanders; Richard Middleton, Pontiac’s War: Its Causes, Course and Consequences (London: Routledge, 2012); Gregory
has been done to link the pacification of savages throughout the empire, with the notable exception of Geoffrey Plank’s *Rebellion and Savagery*. Plank convincingly argued that the difficulties the British had defining both the Jacobites and Scottish Highlanders, who as a population group were blamed for the Forty-Five, led to the army’s adoption of such violent measures during and after the rising. Plank drew parallels between the struggles of the British to define the Highlanders and later struggles to define the French and native populations in North America.  

Plank identified the importance of eighteenth-century understandings of civility in driving the actions of the British Army in the wider empire. Although an exemplary study, *Rebellion and Savagery* focused on periods of active warfare and the immediate pacification of those involved in conflict. This dissertation seeks to understand how army officers’ understandings of civility, and its role in driving pacification, were altered over time as a result of officers’ experiences of militarisation in Scotland and North America. In doing so, it will further historians’ understanding of the cultural paradigms guiding eighteenth-century British imperialism.

The cultural paradigm of benevolence influenced the pacification of Quebec from 1759, and the rest of Canada after its conquest the following year. Stephen Conway investigated British attempts to establish government in Quebec. Conway argued that, far from having no guide for establishing government over a predominantly Catholic population, the British actively pursued the Irish model of governance in Quebec as demonstrated by the Proclamation of 1763. It was only when it became clear that this would not work that the government instead turned to the Minorcan model, which left the majority population effectively ruled by their own Catholic elite. Conway focused on the establishment of government in Canada post-1763 from the perspective of the British government and did not examine the implementation of British policy on the ground by Governor James Murray. Other studies of the conquest have given some consideration to

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57 Plank, *Rebellion and Savagery*.


Murray’s military governance of Quebec. Whilst most assessed his rule as mild compared to the general standard of an eighteenth-century conquering army,60 some French-Canadian historians, including Francois Garneau, described it as tyrannical.61 Even in these studies, however, little attention has been given to the attitudes and understandings influencing the steps taken by Murray. Addressing this lacuna in the scholarship, this dissertation examines the role of the benevolence paradigm in guiding Murray’s pacification of Quebec from 1759-63, again highlighting the cultural paradigms driving eighteenth-century British imperialism.

The superiority paradigm influenced Jeffrey Amherst’s attempts to pacify Native Americans in the West in the post-conquest period. Matthew Ward’s detailed analysis of the nature and impact of the French and Indian War in the Pennsylvanian and Virginian backcountry examined the role Native Americans played in that conflict and highlighted the war’s impact on both Native Americans and frontier inhabitants. Ward argued it was a turning point in the history of the backcountry that contributed both to Pontiac’s War and the American Revolution.62 Others including Richard Middleton and Gregory Dowd focused attention on Pontiac’s War, a series of pan-Indian uprisings that broke out in 1763. These historians emphasised the failure of the British Army to establish military dominance in the interior and examined the role Amherst’s post-war policies played in sparking renewed conflict.63 Dowd argued that it was the conflicted status of Native Americans in the post-conquest British Empire that led Amherst to treat them as conquered peoples rather than as allies or subjects.64 Whereas these historians examined Britain’s post-war policies in the interior in the context of geopolitical realignment and native politics, this dissertation considers Amherst’s militarisation strategy in the context of the earlier militarisation of the Highlands. Investigating how Amherst’s sense of


63 Middleton, Pontiac’s War; Dowd, War Under Heaven.

64 Dowd, War Under Heaven, 70-75.
cultural superiority was developed by his formative experiences will develop historians’ understanding of why the commander-in-chief pursued a subjugatory strategy that was not universally supported in Britain or in North America and why such a strategy was not followed by Amherst’s successor Thomas Gage.

This dissertation examines British imperialism through the lens of militarisation. Militarisation was a deliberate strategy adopted by the British Army and state in Scotland from 1745, and in North America a decade later, that sought to enable Britain to wage war, pacify hostile peoples, and assimilate ‘other’ populations. Whilst numerous aspects of militarisation strategy in Scotland and North America have received attention from historians, little comparative work has been undertaken to highlight the influence of the army’s experiences in Scotland on militarisation in North America, with the exception of Geoffrey Plank’s study of pacification, discussed above. Jonathan Oates examined the structure, recruitment, and training of the British Army and analysed its response to the two major Jacobite risings. Likewise, important studies by Fred Anderson and Stephen Brumwell investigated the British Army’s role in the French and Indian War. Anderson illustrated the interactions and tensions between regulars and provincials during the war and the cultural lessons that both the British and the colonists took from the war. Brumwell concluded that the British Army did not impose European methods of warfare on the colonial theatre. Rather, the army adapted to the unique conditions they faced, creating a “seasoned American Army” notably different to the British Army that fought on the Continent. All of these studies advanced understanding of how the British Army waged war during the eighteenth century. This dissertation seeks to add to this scholarship by examining whether the British Army learnt lessons engaging in warfare in Scotland that it applied during campaigns in North America.

An important aspect of militarisation in Scotland was the attempted assimilation of Highlanders by the British state. Works by Andrew Mackillop and Matthew Dziennik investigated the recruitment of Highland soldiers into the British Army to fight in imperial theatres and the impact of the recruitment process on the soldiers and their home

66 Anderson, Crucible of War.
67 Brumwell, Redcoats.
communities. Both emphasised the important role of military service on integrating Highlanders more closely within the British Empire, with Dziennik noting that “the Gaels’ uncertain status in the British Isles stood in stark contrast to their own role of oppressors inside the larger boundaries of empire.” While the militarisation process in Scotland appeared to encourage Highlanders’ assimilation within the empire, various historians have suggested that it had the opposite effect for colonists in North America. John Shy explored civil-military relations in North America during and after the French and Indian War. Shy found that although the anti-redcoat tradition, which stemmed from a fear the monarch would use the army against the civilian population, was even more established in America than it was in Britain, there were very few complaints in the colonies about the army in the immediate aftermath of the war. Such objections only began to seriously emerge from 1765 when the British attempted to raise funds to pay for the army by directly taxing the colonists. Ideological objections to the presence of the British Army were neither universal nor permanent and were often influenced by the actions of the army and the direction of British imperial policy. However, militarisation strategy in the post-war era led successive ministries to assert closer regulation over colonial affairs. Jeffrey Archer and Hiller B. Zobel highlighted that the army’s occupation of Boston from 1768 increased both opposition towards the British Army throughout colonial North America and civil-military tension, which culminated in the Boston Massacre.

In the interior, the army was concerned with avoiding renewed conflict with Native Americans by preventing colonial land encroachment and trade abuses. However, Britain’s western policy caused the army to come into more frequent contact with backcountry settlers and Native Americans. Patrick Spero considered the colonial reaction to the army’s involvement in implementing empire in the West. He found that the French and Indian War had fostered Indian hating, which led to the creation of

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vigilante groups like the Paxton Boys and Augusta Boys who pre-emptively attacked Indians throughout the backcountry.\textsuperscript{71} Whilst these groups often blamed the colonial legislatures for failing to protect the frontier, frontier inhabitants also came to believe that the army was protecting Native Americans at their expense. Spero’s study demonstrated the important role the British Army played in the post-1763 interior and how this contributed to stirring up revolutionary sentiment in frontier inhabitants but did not examine how army officers themselves reacted to the militarisation of the interior. Jack Sosin’s \textit{Whitehall and the Wilderness} did consider militarisation from the perspective of the British, highlighting the important role that information and advice from army officers, particularly the commander-in-chief, played in the formation of Britain’s western policy from 1763 to 1775.\textsuperscript{72} This dissertation seeks to increase historians’ understanding of how the militarisation process throughout North America affected British imperial attitudes by investigating Thomas Gage’s response to the developing imperial crisis. It will further question whether his attitudes influenced British imperial policy more widely in the years preceding the American Revolution.

\section*{V. Sources and Structure}

The sources used for this dissertation were primarily official and private papers and correspondence of various British military officers, either published or unpublished, alongside correspondence of government officials, state papers, and military and government dispatches. The main strength of such sources for this project was that they provided a clear record of how the ministry ordered the army to act in its role as an instrument of empire, how officers reacted to, and implemented, their instructions, and the extent to which they kept the ministry updated about the situation on the ground. The main weakness of official correspondence and dispatches was that, as formal documents, their primary purpose was to inform or instruct rather than to provide opinion or influence policy. However, many of these documents contained valuable insights into various officers’ understanding of the militarisation process, particularly in North America, and


\textsuperscript{72} J. M. Sosin, \textit{Whitehall and the Wilderness: The Middle West in British Colonial Policy, 1760-1775} (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961).
their attitudes towards those they encountered. For example, military dispatches from Lord Loudoun illustrated the problems he faced attempting to implement militarisation in North America and his early conceptualisation of the disloyalty of colonists with regards to the war effort. Further, all four of the officers examined in the dissertation’s case studies sought to influence the actions of the ministry in North America through their official correspondence and reports. Far from simply reporting the situation on the ground, all officers proved willing to provide their own thoughts on steps the ministry could take to more effectively implement militarisation or to reform colonial affairs. Whilst such sources do not always demonstrate how these ideas were received, the actions taken by the ministry can give some indication as to whether the opinions of army officers influenced British imperial policymaking.

Personal or private correspondence and private journals provided the clearest evidence of the cultural paradigms guiding British Army officers. The language used in letters from Joseph Yorke and William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, during and after the Forty-Five gave glimpses of their understanding of Jacobite disloyalty and Highland savagery. Comparing these letters with those of government ministers in London suggested that whilst the same cultural paradigms defined how both groups understood the rising, army officers on the ground tended to have more extreme attitudes, although this was not universal. Further, the correspondence of Yorke and Cumberland granted insights into how the commander of the British forces believed the British Army should pacify an uncivil population. Again, the main weakness of such sources was the lack of evidence to show how the ministry received these ideas. However, on several occasions there were return letters from the Duke of Newcastle expressing agreement with Cumberland’s opinion, and the fact that some of his ideas were implemented suggests general agreement with his approach.

Reflecting on the sources discussing the Forty-Five and those discussing North America from 1754-75 enabled comparisons to be drawn regarding how the British Army approached warfare, pacification, and militarisation in two geographically distinct imperial fringes. It was not expected that officers would directly compare the steps they took in North America to earlier precedents, although this was the case when Thomas Gage discussed the treatment of rebels during Pontiac’s War. This direct comparison highlighted that Gage still had a clear recollection of the events of the Forty-Five and was willing to use the earlier precedent to guide his actions in North America two decades later. It suggested that the earlier precedent would also have influenced him on other
occasions in North America. Comparing the actions of the army in Scotland and North America more generally highlighted clear similarities in practices adopted in both fringes. Lord Loudoun’s adaptation of irregular warfare in North America in particular illustrated development of his earlier experiences in Scotland, as did James Wolfe’s adoption of a fire and sword campaign during the 1759 campaign against Quebec.

The chapters that follow investigate the experiences of the eighteenth-century British Army in Scotland and North America and the cultural paradigms driving imperialism in the pre-revolutionary period. Chapter one considers the general experiences of the army in Scotland during the Forty-Five. It sets in context the cultural paradigms that guided the British Army in their campaign against the Jacobites and the militarisation of the Highlands that followed it. It also examines the British response to the Forty-Five, the pacification of the Highlands that followed it, and the longer-term militarisation of that region as the British attempted to ensure imperial security in that geographical fringe. Chapter two is a case study of John Campbell, fourth Earl of Loudoun, that connects his, and the British Army’s, experiences in Scotland and North America. It explores how Loudoun’s experiences during the Forty-Five influenced his command of the army in North America. Delving into Loudoun’s relationships with colonial assemblies and provincial soldiers in North America, the chapter also investigates how the paradigm of loyalty influenced Loudoun’s expectations regarding militarisation in North America and his attitudes towards those he interacted with.

Chapter three, a case study of James Murray, expands upon the links between the Forty-Five and the French and Indian War. Considering Murray’s command in Canada, it investigates how the recent experiences of the British Army in the Highlands indirectly affected Murray when engaging in warfare, pacification, militarisation, and governance in Quebec. Exploring Murray’s pacification of Quebec through the lens of the benevolence paradigm, it questions why Murray adapted pacification strategies from the Highlands for use in Quebec and the extent to which the steps taken by Murray influenced the direction of British imperial policy in Quebec. Chapter four explores Jeffrey Amherst’s command in North America from 1758 until 1763, specifically focusing on his attempts to pacify and govern Native Americans in the post-conquest period, and how he waged war on that population group when these attempts failed. Studying Amherst’s interactions with Native Americans illustrates how the superiority paradigm influenced his adoption of a subjugatory strategy in the interior that received criticism both from ministers in London and imperial agents in the colonies. The final chapter, a case study
of Thomas Gage, focuses on the continuing process of militarisation in North America in the aftermath of the French and Indian War. Focusing again on the paradigm of loyalty which guided Gage’s interactions with colonial settlers and Native Americans, this chapter suggests that earlier experiences of the army in Scotland continued to influence British imperialism in North America over two decades later. Identifying several paradigm shifts resulting from militarisation in both imperial fringes, this chapter demonstrates how these affected British imperial attitudes in the years prior to the outbreak of the American Revolutionary War.
Chapter One: The British Army in Scotland

Figure 1. Map showing the progress of the British and Jacobite armies during the Forty-Five. See table below for a description of the events depicted.¹

¹ The information used to plot this map was taken from: Christopher Duffy, The '45: Bonnie Prince Charlie and the Untold Story of the Jacobite Rising (London: Phoenix, 2007).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Charles Edward Stuart lands in Scotland at Eriskay</td>
<td>23 July 1745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Jacobite Standard raised at Glenfinnan</td>
<td>19 August 1745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lt. Gen. Sir John Cope joins British Army in Stirling prior to setting out against the Jacobites</td>
<td>19 August 1745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cope’s troops reach Garvarmore before turning back amidst rumours of a large Jacobite Army ahead</td>
<td>27 August 1745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Cope’s troops arrive in Inverness</td>
<td>29 August 1745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Cope attempts to beat the Jacobites to Edinburgh via water</td>
<td>11 September 1745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Jacobites capture Edinburgh</td>
<td>17 September 1745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Cope’s army lands in Dunbar</td>
<td>17 September 1745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Battle of Prestonpans, Jacobite victory</td>
<td>21 September 1745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Jacobites capture Carlisle after a siege</td>
<td>9-15 November 1745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Field Marshal George Wade gathers a British Army at Newcastle but fails to challenge the Jacobites at Carlisle</td>
<td>31 October-22 November 1745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Jacobites advance to Manchester having travelled through Preston and Wigan</td>
<td>29 November 1745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Jacobites arrive in Derby, a Council of War makes the decision to retreat to Scotland</td>
<td>4-6 December 1745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Wade’s troops reach Pontefract having travelled down the opposite side of the Pennines</td>
<td>6 December 1745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Skirmish at Clifton Moor</td>
<td>18 December 1745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Lord Loudoun’s Independent Companies are repulsed at Inverurie</td>
<td>23 December 1745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>British Army retakes Carlisle from a Jacobite garrison</td>
<td>30 December 1745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Jacobite Army camps in Glasgow having avoided the three pursuing arms of the British Army</td>
<td>26 December 1745-3 January 1746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Battle of Falkirk, Jacobite victory</td>
<td>17 January 1746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Jacobites fail to capture Stirling Castle during a siege</td>
<td>18 January-1 February 1746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Jacobites capture Inverness</td>
<td>21 February 1746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>The Duke of Cumberland arrives in Aberdeen with the British Army</td>
<td>27 February 1746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Jacobites fail to capture Fort William during a siege</td>
<td>20 March-3 April 1746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Lord Loudoun retreats to Skye with approximately half his troops</td>
<td>28 March 1746</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>British Army reaches Banff</td>
<td>9 April 1746</td>
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<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>British Army reaches Nairn, Jacobite night march to attack British camp fails</td>
<td>15 April 1746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Battle of Culloden, British victory</td>
<td>16 April 1746</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
I. Introduction

The Jacobite rising of 1745-46 took place during the War of the Austrian Succession, which saw the majority of the British Army stationed in Europe. This, alongside the threat of a French invasion capitalising on the internal diversion, eventually abandoned in late December 1745, prevented the army’s full strength from being deployed against the Jacobites until early 1746. The Jacobites took advantage of the British Army’s weakness and advanced rapidly, reaching Derby by early December (Fig. 1). However, they failed to consolidate their position as they progressed or to press the advantage gained by victories at Prestonpans and Falkirk and by February 1746 had retreated to the Highlands. The rising was quelled with the British Army’s decisive victory at the Battle of Culloden in April 1746 and, although approximately 1,500 Jacobites regrouped at Ruthven Barracks after the battle, Charles Edward Stuart ordered them to disband and began his escape from Scotland.

In the aftermath of the Forty-Five, Captain General William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, embarked on a punitive campaign to prevent a renewal of hostilities in the Scottish Highlands and in the longer-term assimilate the Highlanders. Whilst the Forty-Five itself has been thoroughly studied, this chapter focuses on the army’s role in implementing post-war British policies. Extending the work of Geoffrey Plank, it considers the cultural paradigms driving British policy manifest in militarisation strategy. Pacification of the Highlands set an important precedent for the British Army with regards to the acculturation of peoples on the imperial fringe. Heretofore, the army was a reluctant agent of cultural imperialism, but in thwarting the Forty-Five it played a leading role in reconfiguring identities in the Highlands. As agents of cultural imperialism, British Army officers imposed a new set of values upon subjugated peoples, inculcating loyalty, and in the process revealing the paradigms driving militarisation: civility equated with submission to the British state, and loyalty with assimilation. Pacification of the Highlands provided the cultural benchmarks for the British Army’s militarisation strategies in North America, which are explored in subsequent chapters.

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2 Duffy, ‘45, 373-79.
3 It is not within the scope of this dissertation to examine Jacobitism in depth. Two of the most accessible general syntheses are Bruce P. Lenman, The Jacobite Risings in Britain: 1689-1746 (London: Eyre Methuen, 1980); Daniel Szechi, The Jacobites: Britain and Europe, 1688-1788 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994).
4 Plank, Rebellion and Savagery.
II. The Jacobite Rebellion and the British State, 1745-46

Violent, internal uprisings against the state, whether depicted as revolutions, revolts, or rebellions, were commonplace in the early modern world. The Jacobite rebellion evinces several common, overarching features of popular rebellions identified by Jack Goldstone in his framework of state breakdown: intra-elite rivalry, popular unrest, and dissociation from the religion of the state. Jacobite support came from throughout Britain although Highlanders did constitute the majority and there were myriad reasons that prompted men from all levels of society to take up arms for the Jacobite cause. Some joined willingly through family or clan loyalty whilst others were coerced into service. A recent study argued that Jacobite impressment was higher and more significant than the historiography has typically suggested. Intra-elite rivalry stemmed from population growth, which caused a general increase in the number of elites vying to improve their position and left the British state unable to provide for all. Numerous families had suffered a loss of status and influence due to their continued support of King James VII and II during the Revolution of 1688-89, whilst the Anglo-Scottish Union of 1707 had reduced opportunities for patronage and political office for Scottish elites. Many of those who took up the Jacobite cause recognised the opportunities of place and patronage that awaited them if they assisted a successful restoration. Popular unrest was fuelled by opposition to the Hanoverian monarch and the Whigs, who had dominated the British government since the succession of George I. Anti-union sentiment remained widespread in Scotland as some of the promised economic benefits had failed to materialise by the 1740s and Jacobite leaders used the issue as a rallying call to attract support throughout the country. In addition, economic hardship motivated many in the lower classes to support Charles Edward Stuart in the hope of improving their individual circumstances. Religion played an important role in recruiting Catholics and Episcopalians to the cause as many shared the Stuarts’ belief in the divine right of kings and Episcopalians opposed the establishment of Presbyterianism as the governing church of Scotland in the revolution settlement. In sum, Jacobitism proved a popular movement, both culturally and militarily, for a wide range of discontents.


throughout Britain. Although the primary aim of the Jacobite rebellion, the restoration of the Stuart monarchy, was unique, its underlying causes adhere to Goldstone’s general framework of state breakdown.

The Jacobites viewed themselves as a legitimate military force engaged in a just war to restore the rightful sovereign to the British throne. In contrast, from the perspective of the British state, the Forty-Five was not a just war and the Jacobites were rebels guilty of treason. This was notably different from the Fifteen, which had begun in Braemar and enjoyed much popular support in the Lowlands and throughout England and was viewed as more akin to a civil war than a Highland rebellion. As such, British Army officers argued that the Jacobites were not entitled to the protections afforded to legitimate enemy forces through the rules of warfare. The rules of war were codified in the seventeenth century by Hugo Grotius and moderated in Samuel von Pufendorf’s 1672 Of The Law of Nature and Nations and Emmerich de Vattel’s 1758 The Laws of Nations. They imposed constraints upon nations in an attempt to ensure war was only waged by a legitimate authority for a just cause and to limit the actual conduct of war. The rules marked a step away from the fire and sword campaigns that targeted all within an enemy country; forbidding any violence against civilians so long as they did not actively assist the enemy by taking up arms. Further, any ravaging of an enemy’s country was only permitted through military necessity or as a punishment for outrages of the rules of war. The rules also offered protection to surrendering soldiers: stipulating that quarter was to be given to those who laid down their arms during a battle and that a capitulating garrison ought never to be refused their lives. The rules of war emphasised that the main consideration when waging war ought to be moderation and that any unnecessary damage or hostility undertaken against the enemy was condemnable as contrary to the law of nature. Although in practice these rules were often flouted, they provided a blueprint for how civilised, European nations ought to behave when in conflict with one another.

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8 See Szech, 1715, 51-76.


However, when conflict involved rebels who had unjustly taken up arms the rules were less clear on what protection, if any, they were entitled to. Rebellion was viewed as high treason and early iterations of the rules, including Grotius’, argued that no punishment was too severe for those who engaged in it.\textsuperscript{11} Although attitudes were softening towards clemency in the eighteenth century, Grotius’ interpretation underpinned the British response to the Forty-Five. Furthermore, despite Vattel’s formalisation of a policy of moderation and clemency towards rebels in \textit{The Laws of Nations}, few eighteenth-century army officers were prepared to treat rebels as legitimate opponents covered by the rules of war.\textsuperscript{12} The status and rights of rebels remained contested and British Army officers continued to use the classification of a conflict as a rebellion to justify military excesses and violence throughout the empire. The rights of nations classified as savages were similarly contested throughout the eighteenth century. Grotius made no specific mention of savages and, although Vattel urged moderation, emphasising that “whenever severity is not absolutely necessary, clemency becomes a duty”, he believed it was acceptable for warfare against such groups to be conducted on the terms of the savage, rather than the civilised, nation.\textsuperscript{13} Groups who were classified by the British as savages, including Scottish Highlanders and Native Americans, were often accused of unrestrained brutality and of being incapable of adhering to the rules of warfare. As such, the rules legitimised the use of violent tactics against these groups, and army officers justified their targeting of entire communities by referencing the rules of war and arguing they were simply following the example of the savages themselves.

The outbreak of the Forty-Five and the Jacobites’ rapid advance south during its early stages exposed the failure of the British state’s response to the Fifteen. Less than fifty men were executed for participating in the Fifteen, none in Scotland, as there was little appetite amongst the elite to seek punishment for those who had been involved. In Scotland, where support for Jacobitism remained high, severity was thought inappropriate and the state instead sought loyalty through clemency and reintegration. Elites convicted of participation in the Fifteen had their estates forfeited to the Crown, but there was no attempt to implement improvement upon them as would follow the

\textsuperscript{11} Campbell, \textit{Rights of War and Peace}, 50.


\textsuperscript{13} Vattel, \textit{Laws of Nations}, bk. 3, 348.
Forty-Five. Many quickly found their way back into the hands of those families who had forfeited them, and the fact that several would be forfeited again in the aftermath of the Forty-Five highlights the failure of the state’s pacification strategy. Immediate attempts were made to improve military infrastructure in the Highlands, with the construction of barracks at Ruthven, Glenelg, Inversnaid, and Kilwhimen. These garrisons were manned by local Highlanders who had remained loyal during the Fifteen but proved ineffective at deterring crime or implementing the 1716 Disarming Act, which forbade Highlanders from owning weapons. The shock of another attempted rising in 1719, and a petition from Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat, alleging that the Highlands remained in a state of incivility, with thievery and depredation rampant, caused the British to take further action. Fort Augustus was built to replace Kilwhimen and Fort George in Inverness was constructed as the army’s northern base of operations, whilst a new Disarming Act was passed in 1725. Under the direction of General George Wade, commander of the troops in Scotland, Independent Highland Companies were raised to act as a police force in the region and the army embarked upon a road-building programme. Although the Independent Companies successfully confiscated hundreds of weapons, many Highlanders possessed two or three sets of arms, so the steps failed to curb their ability to rebel or engage in criminal activity. By 1745, Wade had overseen the construction of approximately three hundred miles of military roads and several bridges, but many Highland regions remained inaccessible. Further, the formalisation of the Independent Companies into the 43rd Highland Regiment of Foot, or the Black Watch, led to their removal from the Highlands and deployment in Europe during the War of the Austrian Succession. When the Forty-Five broke out, British troops were confined to the five active garrisons in the Highlands and it was the Jacobites who were able to exploit Wade’s newly constructed roads to assist their advance. The perceived failure of the pacification strategy adopted in response to the Fifteen would influence the steps taken after the Forty-Five.


16 Memorial of Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat, Undated, GD224/918/15, NRS.

Military Adaptations

The development of a fiscal-military state left Britain financially better able to wage war whilst the enlightenment influenced the values and ideals of the army and encouraged the spread of knowledge within it, particularly amongst the officer class. These structural and theoretical developments underpinned Britain’s eighteenth-century military adaptations, although the changes themselves emerged because of the direct experiences of the army campaigning throughout the world. The Forty-Five provided an opportunity for the British Army to confront the challenges inherent in keeping an army supplied in a geographical fringe and test new methods of warfare and operational tactics. The lessons learnt during this campaign then influenced how the army approached similar challenges in another geographical fringe during the French and Indian War.

A functioning logistics system was vital to keep the army supplied whilst on campaign but during the Forty-Five the British Army struggled to keep all its soldiers supplied with provisions. The most remote locations were always the most difficult to supply as road and water access was often restricted. As such, the Independent Companies, scattered throughout the Highlands, were particularly affected by the army’s inability to ensure that centralised provisions reached the soldiers. In August 1745 Major William Mackenzie complained that there was “not a single spare firelock in this Garrison [Inverness]” and requested assistance from John Campbell, fourth Earl of Loudoun, to supply his men so they could take to the field. Likewise, although supplies could be obtained locally there was no mechanism in place to allow the distribution of centralised supplies or money to troops in the Highlands. Duncan Forbes of Culloden observed that provisioning the Independent Companies had been a “great hardship” throughout the campaign, although the troops had subsisted by private credit. Soldiers on the march in the Highlands were expected to subsist on the country around them. Whilst provisions could be demanded from local inhabitants, the fire and sword tactics employed by the British Army to try and bring the rebellion to an end also affected soldiers as food became increasingly scarce in the Highlands. This continued to cause problems during the pacification after the Battle of Culloden, and Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell had to end an intelligence-gathering trip in Glen Dessary because “there is scarce a cow left in this

18 William Mackenzie to Earl of Loudoun, Inverness, 13 August 1745, LO (SCO) 12053, HL.
19 Duncan Forbes to Duke of Newcastle, Inverness, 13 May 1746, LO (SCO) 11512, HL.
country to subsist us.”

Little was done to overcome the logistical problems in the Highlands during the rising. However, officers like Loudoun who witnessed the issues first hand gained a clear understanding of the importance of a good logistics system for implementing militarisation strategy, to allow the army to effectively carry out its function and secure victory. This led Loudoun to focus on the development of such a system in North America when he took command of the troops there.

In the eighteenth century, regular warfare encompassed carefully planned marches, sieges, and battles against enemy forces, all centrally organised and carried out by trained and disciplined soldiers in professional armies. In contrast, irregular warfare was undertaken by small groups, sometimes employed by a state and sometimes acting independently, who used their knowledge of the environment to conduct surprise assaults whilst the enemy was on the march and to raid enemy fortresses and camps. Those carrying out irregular warfare sought to harry and weaken the enemy rather than win a decisive battle and irregular soldiers, often outnumbered during raids, tended to rely upon surprise: attacking quickly and then melting into the countryside before their enemy could regroup and stage a counter-attack. Scottish Highlanders and Native Americans both had long traditions of irregular warfare, with Highland clans adopting such methods against other clans as well as government forces and with Native Americans utilising such tactics against both natives and settlers. Eighteenth-century European warfare increasingly consisted of a combination of regular and irregular tactics and European powers often employed frontiersmen who were not trained in traditional combat as irregulars.

During the Forty-Five the British Army waged a campaign of irregular warfare concurrent to its regular campaign. After supporting Sir John Cope in the defeat at Prestonpans in September 1745, the Earl of Loudoun was ordered to Inverness with his 64th Regiment. He was to work in conjunction with Duncan Forbes of Culloden, who had been granted a number of blank commissions to recruit loyal Highlanders under

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Loudoun’s command, to conduct a campaign of irregular warfare.\textsuperscript{22} It was expected that keeping a body of troops in this region would act as a deterrent to those thinking of joining the Jacobites and would ensure a supplementary force was available that could be sent to strengthen the main body of the army if required. Loudoun worked closely with Forbes and numerous clan chiefs during this period of recruitment, quickly gaining a reputation as a good, honest general which he would retain throughout his time in Scotland. He was willing to negotiate with certain Highland elites, recognising that he required their help to recruit effectively in that region. The mathematician Colin MacLaurin, writing in late 1745, noted that Loudoun and Forbes had successfully managed to persuade a number of clans to remain quiet whilst simultaneously raising several hundred men for the Independent Companies.\textsuperscript{23} This important work was credited with hampering Jacobite recruitment. It also gives a sense of Loudoun’s character. Most officers refused to negotiate with Highlanders due to the perception that they were closet Jacobites and therefore untrustworthy. Loudoun, however, took a more open view of the Highlanders and was willing to work with those who professed loyalty to the Crown.

Irregular troops in the Highlands were tasked with securing routes of communication, garrisoning military posts, disrupting Jacobite supply lines, harassing parties of Jacobites remaining in the region, and destroying the settlements of those who had marched south. As early as October 1745 Loudoun was ordered to drive away the sheep and cattle of any clans who had joined the Jacobites, with John Dalrymple, second Earl of Stair, arguing that attacking the homes and families of Jacobites would likely persuade them to abandon the cause and return home.\textsuperscript{24} Such tactics were deliberately designed to dampen Jacobite morale and encourage desertion. In early 1746 the Duke of Cumberland ordered Loudoun to “do all that lays in your Power to annoy the Rebels in their Retreat whilst H.R.H. pursues ’em on to Perth from this side.”\textsuperscript{25} The irregulars continued to be employed in the aftermath of the rising as the army sought to prevent the Jacobites regrouping.

\textsuperscript{22} Stair, Memorial Concerning the Rebellion in Scotland, 5 September 1745, LO (SCO) 7641, HL.
\textsuperscript{23} Colin MacLaurin to Unknown, Morpeth, 14 November 1745, Add MS 35889, ff.41-2, BL; MacLaurin to Unknown, Edinburgh, 14 December 1745, Add MS 35889, ff.66-7, BL.
\textsuperscript{24} Earl of Stair to Loudoun, London, 5 October 1745, LO (SCO) 7636, HL. See also: Report of Argyleshire Men, Dunkeld, 20 February 1746, GD1/90/3, NRS; Duke of Cumberland to Loudoun, Aberdeen, 20 March 1746, LO (SCO) 9504, HL.
\textsuperscript{25} Cumberland to Loudoun (in the Hand of Joseph Yorke), Stirling, 3 February 1746, Add MS 35889, f.81, BL.
The tradition of irregular warfare amongst Highlanders led to the prevailing view within the British Army that they were, by nature, better equipped to handle the challenging Highland climate and explains why it was primarily Highlanders who were recruited in that role. Irregular troops had to be fit as they were expected to climb mountains and navigate the difficult Highland terrain whilst remaining constantly alert for possible ambushes, and local knowledge was an advantage for ambushing the enemy. Irregulars were expected to remain active, scouring the countryside for Jacobites throughout the winter months even after the rising had been extinguished. This was notably different from the regular army which was generally sent into quarters over winter.26 Margaret Campbell, Countess of Loudoun, expressed concern for her son spending so much time in the Highlands and particularly for proposing to spend a second winter with his men where they would be encamped in the hills without tents. Margaret noted Loudoun would be exposed to such “hardships as the most barbarous of Highlanders are only able to support.”27 Despite the poor conditions, Loudoun gained much experience of irregular warfare during his time in the Highlands as a result of spending winters in the field with his men, exposing himself to the same conditions they faced. This would influence him a decade later in North America when he considered what tactics to use during the French and Indian War.

Although only Loudoun, his 64th Regiment, and the Independent Highland Companies carried out irregular warfare during the Forty-Five, accounts of that aspect of the campaign spread throughout the army, increasing the general understanding of irregular warfare amongst the officer class. A number of British Army officers subscribed to newspapers which carried first-hand accounts of the skirmishes between irregulars and Jacobites and military literature increasingly came to discuss irregular warfare during the 1740s and 1750s.28 The regular army also underwent its own adaptation to campaigning in the Highlands over the course of the rising. As Victoria Henshaw highlighted, the army began the campaign adhering to the wide marching formation specified in Bland’s *Treatise of Military Discipline*. However, this was not suitable for the mountainous and

26 Albemarle to Newcastle, Fort Augustus, 1 August 1746 in Terry, *Albemarle Papers*, 1:14-15. Albemarle informed Newcastle that the weather was already growing bad and he hoped to put his own troops into winter quarters soon, leaving Loudoun and the irregular troops to scour the countryside around Fort Augustus.

27 Countess of Loudoun to Loudoun, 14 May 1746, Sorn Castle, LO (SCO) 11259, HL.

often boggy Highland terrain, and when Cumberland adapted the formation to a narrow one as preferred by the Jacobites manoeuvrability immediately improved, allowing the army to engage with the Jacobites twice on the march prior to the Battle of Culloden.\footnote{Victoria Henshaw, ‘A Reassessment of the British Army in Scotland, from the Union to the ’45’, \textit{Northern Scotland} 2, no. 1 (May 2011): 12–13. https://doi.org/10.3366/nor.2011.0002.}

This highlighted that such adaptations were possible during a single campaign and that making changes to formation, strategy, etc. to better suit the specific environment the army was campaigning in could make a clear contribution to victory. It provided an important precedent for further military adaptations in other fringes of the British Empire.

**British Cultural Paradigms in the Forty-Five**

The loyalty paradigm influenced how the British defined the Jacobites during the Forty-Five. Labelling the Jacobites as rebels emphasised their disloyalty to the Crown and provided justification for the level of violence employed against them. Geoffrey Plank explained that by defining the Jacobites as criminals and rebels, the British suggested that they held personal responsibility for acting treasonously against the state.\footnote{Plank, \textit{Rebellion and Savagery}, 22. Regarding the definition of treason and the process of prosecuting those accused of it, see Blackstone, \textit{Commentaries}, bk. 4, 75-93.}

As such, upon learning of the prospect of an imminent rising, the British government offered a reward for Charles Edward Stuart’s arrest and Jacobites were liable to prosecution if taken prisoner throughout the campaign. Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, the Earl of Chesterfield, articulated the British state’s view of the Jacobites’ treason, explaining that “They are not enemies but criminals; we cannot be at war with ‘em”.\footnote{Earl of Chesterfield to Newcastle, 11 March 1746 in \textit{Private Correspondence of Chesterfield and Newcastle, 1744-46}, ed. Richard Lodge, (London: Royal Historical Society, 1930), 122-23.}

Chesterfield suggested that the Jacobites were not entitled to the treatment afforded to enemy forces as set down in the rules of warfare. Cumberland, who took command of the British troops in late November 1745, made it clear that any negotiation with Jacobites was unacceptable. At the Jacobite surrender of Carlisle, his aide-de-camp Joseph Yorke observed that Cumberland refused to make an “exchange of hostages with Rebels”, claiming he had “no power to treat with them” and demanding their surrender to face the legal consequences of their actions.\footnote{Joseph Yorke to Earl of Hardwicke, Carlisle, 30 December 1745 in \textit{The Life and Correspondence of Philip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain}, ed. Philip Yorke, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1913), 492; Plank, \textit{Rebellion and Savagery}, 40-44.}

Cumberland’s actions were widely praised,
resulting in the arrest and trial of hundreds of men. Officers claimed they were following treason law, capturing Jacobites and presenting them to justices of the peace to be prosecuted as criminals. However, the army began to undertake more punitive measures as the rebellion continued whilst continuing to refuse to treat the Jacobites as a legitimate enemy force. In February 1746, Cumberland issued instructions that soldiers should kill any Jacobite who did not immediately surrender to them. 33 During the Battle of Culloden, soldiers killed hundreds of wounded or surrendering Jacobites with impunity, only offering the French soldiers in the employ of the Jacobites the opportunity to surrender. 34 Army officers ordered the killing of Jacobites on the battlefield as a method of sentencing them to death for treason without having to resort to a trial, although such actions went against due process of law. 35 Officers rationalised their actions through the paradigm of loyalty. The rebellion was not a just war and the Jacobites were guilty of high treason, for which the sentence was death. Officers were simply carrying out that sentence on the battlefield rather than awaiting such a verdict in a courtroom.

The British Army and ministry viewed the Forty-Five as a Highland rebellion, even though significant numbers from the North East, and smaller numbers of Lowlanders and Englishmen, joined the Jacobites and despite many Highlanders remaining loyal to the Crown. As such, it was the civility paradigm that played the most important role in informing the British response to the Forty-Five. The civility paradigm led the British imperial elite to view themselves as civilised in contrast to the barbarous Highlanders and to believe that subjugation was necessary to force the Highlanders to submit to the British state, which in turn was the only way that population could potentially progress to civility. The desire to subjugate savages to civilise them was not unique to the Forty-Five, having been implemented in Ireland and even in the Highlands previously, and an understanding of the Highlands as a wild, barbarous region and the Highlanders as a savage race was well-established prior to the rising. 36 The civility

33 Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, 45.
34 Cumberland to Newcastle, Inverness, 18 April 1746, RH2/4/355, ff.176-80, NRS.
paradigm was, however, manifest during the Forty-Five as Highlanders were repeatedly labelled savages and it was implied they were inherently rebellious and that none could truly be trusted. In addition, discussion and development of ideas and values of progress during the Enlightenment encouraged the idea that brutality was a justified necessity when a civilised nation was attempting to bring a savage nation to peace to prevent the savage nation from standing in the way of progress.  

During the Forty-Five, the civility paradigm asserted that all Highlanders were savage, assigning a characteristic to the entire population group that suggested they were inherently backwards and collectively required corrective policies. Plank demonstrated that this caused confusion regarding how to treat both Jacobites and non-combatants during and after the rising and encouraged the British Army to carry out a campaign of violence against the population at large rather than targeting known or suspected Jacobites. The civility paradigm suggested that, when faced with a barbaric population, civil and military spheres could legitimately be blurred and civilians would no longer be guaranteed the protections they could generally expect during conflict. Further, the Forty-Five was widely interpreted as an alien invasion that represented, particularly once the Jacobites reached Derby, a real threat to British liberties and to the British Empire. This encouraged the association of Highlanders and Jacobitism and strengthened the belief that all Highlanders were equally guilty for the actions of those who joined the rising and ought to be punished as such.

Plank detailed the campaign of ‘military execution’ undertaken by the British Army during the Forty-Five. Military execution involved the widescale destruction of houses and resources and the general scorching of the countryside in areas where civilians had refused to comply with the orders of the army or were suspected of doing so.


38 Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, 22.

39 W. A. Speck, The Butcher: The Duke of Cumberland and the Suppression of the ’45 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), 187. Speck argued the rising was a threat more to English, rather than British, liberties. However, the threat it represented to Britain ought not to be neglected. The government was concerned that a Stuart monarch would work closely with Catholic France, potentially ceding territory in North America to Louis XV.
Although such a tactic was relatively common in European warfare it had little legal standing as the rules of war technically protected civilians from military excess.\textsuperscript{40} The civility paradigm, however, provided army officers with justification for targeting all Highlanders during the Forty-Five. Soldiers were ordered to destroy the houses and crops of men they believed were fighting with the Jacobites in the hope it would force them to abandon the cause, although no measures were taken to ensure that those targeted were participating in the rising. Provisions were appropriated from all Highlanders to feed troops on the march or else were destroyed to prevent them finding their way into the hands of the Jacobites. Bridges and roads were likewise destroyed to disrupt Jacobite communications, leaving the Highlands isolated.\textsuperscript{41}

Joseph Yorke, aide-de-camp to the Duke of Cumberland and son of Lord Chancellor, the Earl of Hardwicke, exhibited the paradigm of civility throughout the Forty-Five. Referring to the debate about whether severity or leniency ought to be practised once the rebellion had been quelled, Yorke discussed the Highlanders generally, rather than the Jacobites, and praised Cumberland for refusing to consider any notion of leniency.\textsuperscript{42} That Yorke professed a desire to punish Highlanders for the rebellion is not surprising. His patron, Cumberland, had issued a proclamation the previous month decreeing that any who had taken part in the rising ought to surrender themselves and their arms to their local magistrate or Presbyterian minister and “submit themselves entirely to the King’s Mercy”. Any civilians with information about the rising or knowledge of the whereabouts of Jacobite arms were likewise ordered to inform the magistrates, and Cumberland threatened a policy of “military execution” against any who did not comply.\textsuperscript{43} In addition, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke would preside over the trial of the Jacobite peers in the aftermath of the rising, where “some thought his severity in decreeing death sentences comparable to the ‘butchery’ of Cumberland on the battlefield.”\textsuperscript{44} Yorke, therefore, shared the same understanding of the civility paradigm as Cumberland and Hardwicke, believing subjugation necessary to gain the submission

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{40} Plank, \textit{Rebellion and Savagery}, 62. Plank highlighted that some Jacobite officers also threatened and implemented military execution against Highland communities when recruiting.
\bibitem{41} Duffy, ‘45, 250 and passim; Plank, \textit{Rebellion and Savagery}, 57.
\bibitem{42} Yorke to Hardwicke, Aberdeen, 9 March 1746, in Yorke, \textit{Life and Correspondence of Philip Yorke}, 1:510-11.
\bibitem{43} Quoted in Plank, \textit{Rebellion and Savagery}, 61-62.
\bibitem{44} Peter D G Thomas, ‘Yorke, Philip, First Earl of Hardwicke (1690-1764)’, \textit{ODNB}, 2007, see \textit{ODNB} online.
\end{thebibliography}
of Highlanders to the Crown. The actions of the army during the Forty-Five further highlight that Yorke was typical within the British Army, as the vast majority of officers expressed no qualms about undertaking an indiscriminate fire and sword campaign.

Such attitudes and understandings were also pervasive in the ministry. In March 1746 Secretary of State for the Southern Department, the Duke of Newcastle, argued that it was necessary for the “power of the Highlands” to be “absolutely reduced” to prevent France from playing “the Pretender upon us whenever she pleases”, implying the whole Highland region was a threat to Britain’s security.\(^{45}\) Chesterfield, recently appointed Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, expressed the view that all Highlanders were closet Jacobites. Whilst he determined not to introduce pre-emptive measures against Irish Catholics during the Forty-Five, fearing it may encourage them to join the rebellion, he advocated severity towards Highlanders as they were already in open rebellion:

\[\text{…while that favourall distinction remains of loyall and disloyal, the rebellion will never be extinguish’d. Recall your Scotch heroes, starve the whole country indiscriminately by your ships, put a price upon the heads of the chiefs, and let the Duke put all to fire and sword.}\]^ {46}

Again, the attitudes of Newcastle and Chesterfield towards the Highlanders were informed by the civility paradigm and were widely shared amongst British government officials, who supported the actions of the army in the Highlands during the rebellion. The prevalence of such attitudes within the army and ministry encouraged the adoption of a fire and sword campaign during the rising, which would continue during the pacification.

\section*{III. Pacification}

In the aftermath of the British victory at Culloden in April 1746, the actions of the army in the Highlands became increasingly punitive and indiscriminate. Jacobites and those suspected of Jacobitism were sometimes killed rather than arrested. The day after the battle, British officer James Wolfe noted that “as few Highlanders were made prisoners as possible”,\(^{47}\) whilst the following month Captain Caroline Scott hanged three

\(^{45}\) Newcastle to Chesterfield, 5 March 1746, in Lodge, \textit{Private Correspondence of Chesterfield and Newcastle}, 119.

\(^{46}\) Chesterfield to Newcastle, 20 March 1746, in Lodge, \textit{Private Correspondence of Chesterfield and Newcastle}, 130.

\(^{47}\) James Wolfe to Henry Delabene, Inverness, 17 April 1746 in Beckles Wilson, \textit{The Life and Letters of James Wolfe}, Reprint (Memphis: W. Heinemann, 2010), 48–49. See also: Forbes, \textit{Lyon in Mourning}. 
unarmed men who were suspected of Jacobitism in Lochaber rather than referring them to a justice of the peace.\textsuperscript{48} Women were subject to verbal abuse and physical and sexual assault, whilst children were targeted with threats or violence on occasion. Such tactics were occasionally employed to gather intelligence about the movements of Charles Edward Stuart but often they were simply a method of punishing Highlanders for the rebellion.\textsuperscript{49} Wanton destruction of homes and crops was common, with Cumberland noting that he had sent troops to Badenoch to “burn [and] destroy that Country” as not all had surrendered their arms.\textsuperscript{50} Vast areas of the Highlands were laid to waste with little care taken to save the houses of those who had not been concerned in the rebellion. When the Duke of Montrose complained that his tenants had their farms burnt despite remaining loyal throughout the rising, Cumberland blamed Montrose’s factor, who had failed to prevent all the tenants from joining the Jacobites.\textsuperscript{51} The actions of the British Army had a lasting impact in the Highlands, leading many to suffer famine during 1746 and 1747.\textsuperscript{52}

The association of Highlanders with savagery led to the belief that punitive measures against the population were the only way to prevent a renewal of hostilities immediately, or in the future. In April 1746 Cumberland expressed his belief that: “The Jacobite rebellious Principle is so rooted in this Nation [the Highlands], that this Generation must be pretty well worn out before This Country will be quiet”, illustrating that he felt the army’s actions were vital for British security. Over the following months, Cumberland advocated the deportation of several Highland clans, including “the entire Clan of the Camerons, [and] almost all the Tribes of the McDonalds”, to the West Indies as the only way to prevent future rebellions.\textsuperscript{53} His aide-de-camp Joseph Yorke expressed a similar preference for permanent measures, writing that “we are in the Heart of the vile

\textsuperscript{48} An Account of the Hanging of Three “Rebels”, May 1746, GD14/85, NRS.
\textsuperscript{49} Plank, \textit{Rebellion and Savagery}, 53-76; Duffy, ‘45, 527-49.
\textsuperscript{50} Cumberland to Newcastle, Fort Augustus, 27 May 1746, RH2/4/356, NRS.
\textsuperscript{51} Cumberland to Newcastle, Fort Augustus, 16 July 1746, RH2/4/358, f.194, NRS. See also: Graeme Mungo to Duke of Montrose, 9 June 1746, RH2/4/357, ff.51-4, NRS; Mungo to Montrose, 12 June 1746, RH2/4/357, ff.59-62, NRS; Copy of Answers to the Complaints of the Duke of Montrose’s Factors about the Depredations of the King’s Troops in the McGregor Country, Fort Augustus, 14 July 1746, MS 17527, ff.14-7, NLS.
\textsuperscript{52} Macinnes, \textit{Clanship}, 212.
\textsuperscript{53} Cumberland to Unknown, Inverness, 8 May 1746, RH2/4/357, f.111, NRS; Cumberland to Newcastle, Fort Augustus, 27 May 1746, RH2/4/356, NRS; Cumberland to Unknown, Fort Augustus, 5 June 1746, RH2/4/357, f.112, NRS.
Race now, [and] I wish were to extirpate.”⁵⁴ Although such measures were never implemented, they highlight the clear desire within the British Army to punish the savage Jacobites and explain why the initial pacification was so bloody. Most officers were fully engaged with Cumberland’s vision for the pacification. Major General Campbell quickly complied with the commander’s orders to drive off the cattle of all who had been involved in the rising and articulated his belief that the land of rebels ought to be burnt and destroyed, whilst Caroline Scott quickly gained a distasteful reputation for the vindictiveness and violence with which he pursued the pacification.⁵⁵ In addition, Cumberland had the support of the ministry and, more importantly, the King for his actions as Newcastle informed him that he had the “King’s entire approbation” of his Highland strategy.⁵⁶

Cumberland’s belief in the need for severity to pacify the Highlands was not universally shared, however, and Loudoun’s willingness to negotiate with Highland elites during the rising suggests he was not as focused on the punishment of Highlanders as his commander. Despite Cumberland’s orders to disarm all Highlanders after Culloden, Loudoun negotiated with some elites, allowing them to be answerable for the conduct and loyalty of their men so that numerous Highlanders continued to possess weapons.⁵⁷ Loudoun also entered into discussion with those who had been actively involved in the rebellion, securing a pardon for Simon Fraser, Master of Lovat. Writing to the Earl of Albemarle, Cumberland’s replacement as commander of the army in Scotland, Loudoun argued that Fraser had shown “great remorse [and] repentance for his past behaviour” and had surrendered voluntarily. Asking for guidance as to how he was to treat Jacobite officers who surrendered, Loudoun suggested that if low ranking officers were treated with clemency Albemarle “would have the whole [surrender] immediately.”⁵⁸ Loudoun’s willingness to negotiate illustrates his desire to facilitate the immediate rehabilitation of Highlanders into British imperial society. His experiences working closely with Highland soldiers in the Independent Companies clearly influenced his own cultural paradigms,

⁵⁴ Yorke to Hardwicke, Fort Augustus, 26 May 1746, Add. MS 35354, f.231, BL.
⁵⁶ Newcastle to Cumberland, Whitehall, 12 May 1746, RH2/4/356, ff.70-5, NRS.
⁵⁷ John Farquharson to Loudoun, Invercauld, 4 August 1746, LO (SCO) 11444, HL.
⁵⁸ Loudoun to Albemarle, Fort Augustus, 10 August 1746, RH2/4/359, NRS. Fraser went on to command Highland soldiers for the Crown during the French and Indian War.
leading him to perceive vast differences amongst Highlanders regarding their civility and loyalty to the Crown.

Loudoun also adopted a limited stance with regards to pacifying the country, specifically ordering his men “not to destroy or distress the Country” except as a last resort if Highlanders refused to comply with orders. Even when ordered to burn houses and kill men in Lochaber by his superior Humphrey Bland, Loudoun chose a more conciliatory approach, seizing several men but killing none. It is likely that this approach induced over one hundred Camerons to surrender personally to Loudoun the following day. Whilst he was willing to use violent tactics when he believed they were required, Loudoun consistently favoured a more moderate approach in the Highlands. His “Mildness, Civility and Moderation” was recognised and praised during the pacification, encouraging compliance with his requests for disarming and submission and his reputation led some Jacobites to appeal directly to him for assistance when surrendering. For example, James Winrame pled his case for a pardon to Loudoun in November 1746, stating that he was emboldened to approach him after: “hearing of your Lordps: great Goodness and Humanity to Severals in my Situation by giving them protections.”

Loudoun was not alone in advocating moderation in the Highlands. Letters in the *Scots Magazine* and *Caledonian Mercury* throughout 1746 highlight that there was significant public support for adopting a policy of leniency in an attempt to win the loyalty of Highlanders to the Crown. Highland elites including Duncan Forbes of Culloden and the Duke of Argyll both advocated the use of peaceful measures to disarm the Highlands in the aftermath of Culloden, and Forbes’ constant attempts to persuade Cumberland of the benefit of lenient treatment towards Jacobites led Cumberland to brand him “arrant Highland mad.” As Highlanders themselves, Argyll and Forbes were

59 Loudoun to John Campbell, Instructions, 7 April 1746, LO (SCO) 11829, HL.
61 Janet McDonnell to Loudoun, Keppoch, 28 August 1746, LO (SCO) 11909, HL. See also: Adam Gordon to Loudoun, Ruthven, 20 November 1746, LO (SCO) 11634, HL.
62 James Winrame to Loudoun, Fort Augustus, 6 November 1746, LO (SCO) 12856, HL; William Blair to Loudoun, Kingussie, 2 December 1746, LO (SCO) 10851, HL.
63 *Scots Magazine*, 1746; *Caledonian Mercury*, 1746. The debates surrounding leniency and severity in both newspapers provide a useful case study of British public reaction to the army’s actions in the Highlands.
not guided by the civility paradigm that suggested the subjugation of all Highlanders was necessary to affect their civilisation. They believed that wanton destruction of land would not help ensure peace but rather would lead to the economic ruin of both loyal and disloyal Highlanders, potentially increasing resentment throughout the region. As both would suffer financially from an indiscriminate campaign of destruction it is likely that their desire for moderation arose, at least in part, from self-interest. However, whilst there were some who were in favour of negotiation and moderation, coupled with violence where appropriate and necessary, as the best method of restoring a lasting peace to the Highlands, the prevailing attitude throughout the pacification was that of severity.

The experiences of the British Army pacifying the Scottish Highlands emphasises the importance the British imperial elite placed on submission within the British Empire. Whether they advocated leniency or severity, all British Army officers shared a determination to gain a total submission from all Highlanders. The paradigm of loyalty caused the British imperial elite to demand the allegiance to the Crown of all within the empire. Although clanship was in decline by the time of the Forty-Five, the British imperial elite remained convinced of its potency and believed that the main reason for the rising was the absolute power and tyranny clan chiefs held over their clansmen. They believed that local loyalties at the family or clan level had to be subverted to an overriding loyalty to the Crown. The actions of army officers in the initial pacification of the Highlands were driven by this desire to assert British authority, ensure a formal recognition of King George II, and emphasise the power and reach of the Crown, even in a geographical fringe. As the pacification of the Highlands moved past its punitive phase, this goal remained fundamental to British interests and long-term policies were developed to meet it so that the peace could be consolidated, and the Highlanders would eventually be assimilated within the British Empire as Britons.

**Militarisation of the Highlands**

The militarisation of the Highlands in the decades after the Forty-Five was a deliberate process undertaken by the British Army, under the direction of the government,
driven by the paradigms of loyalty and civility. Fifteen thousand troops were posted to Scotland by September 1746, most in the Highlands, and a year later approximately ten thousand remained. This represented a substantial change from the 1720s and 1730s when only small companies of independent, Highland troops patrolled the region.\(^\text{67}\) Forts and garrisons that had existed prior to the Forty-Five were improved and expanded, enabling them to quarter more troops, whilst new forts were constructed in strategic locations such as Fort George, near Inverness. Proposals were made for a chain of garrisons and barracks to link together throughout the Highlands, allowing a strong military presence throughout the entire region.\(^\text{68}\) As Jeremy Black highlighted, this was unusual in a domestic setting as fort building was normally reserved for overseas locations.\(^\text{69}\) The Forty-Five highlighted that Wade’s earlier road-building efforts had not extended far enough. Extensive road building programmes were advocated as a method of pacifying the population and militarising the region.\(^\text{70}\) Construction began immediately after Culloden and, by 1767, Major Caufield’s roadbuilding parties had constructed approximately nine hundred miles of roads throughout the Highlands, making the most remote areas of the Highlands more accessible to soldiers and providing commercial links between the Highlands and the Lowlands and England.\(^\text{71}\) The army was also expected to act as a police force in the Highlands, ensuring compliance with the legislative measures enacted to prevent a repeat uprising. These measures included the Act of Proscription, 1746, which renewed and re-emphasised the Disarming Act of 1716: banning Highlanders from carrying arms and introducing stricter penalties for those caught violating the act. It also included a Dress Act which prohibited the wearing of Highland dress such as the plaid. Officers’ reports from the region throughout the 1750s noted the active role taken by soldiers arresting men for both offences.\(^\text{72}\) The Heritable Jurisdictions (Scotland) Act was also passed in 1746, abolishing the traditional rights of the clan chiefs so that they could


\(^{68}\) See: Newcastle to Cumberland, Whitehall, 12 May 1746, RH2/4/356, ff.70-5, NRS; Alexander Robertson to Cumberland, Memorial, c.1746, LO (SCO) 9337, HL; Tabraham and Grove, *Fortress Scotland*, 93-98.


\(^{70}\) Memorial by James Erskine of Grange, October 1746, GD124/15/1569, NRS.

\(^{71}\) Tabraham and Grove, *Fortress Scotland*, 108.

\(^{72}\) Extracts of the Officers’ Reports in the Highland Service, 1752, WO1/972, ff.373-87, TNA; John Barlow to Churchill, North Uist, 30 June 1753, Add MS 35891, ff.5-9, BL; John Barlow to Holmes, North Uist, 9 October 1753, Add MS 35891, ff.19-20, BL.
no longer legally call their men to arms or act as a judge in cases of civil or criminal law involving their men.\textsuperscript{73}

The maintenance of a strong military force and the substantial investment in military infrastructure in the Highlands highlights both the continued threat of Jacobitism post-Culloden and the perceived ‘otherness’ of the region and its people. The possibility of another Jacobite rising remained a realistic prospect whilst the War of the Austrian Succession continued should France sponsor a Highland rebellion or invasion as a distraction from the continental war. The Treaty of Aix-la-Chappelle in April 1748 made this less likely, although the British government remained determined to limit Highlanders’ military capabilities. Whilst punitive measures had been considered effective in the short term, the British Army and state believed that deep, structural changes within Highland society were required for long-term peace in the region.

The measures proposed aimed to effect the assimilation of Highlanders into the British Empire and guarantee a continuing submission and adherence to the Crown from them as loyal Britons. Understandings of civility continued to guide the British imperial elite as the civilisation of the Highlanders was generally considered a prerequisite for their assimilation. The emergence of stadial theory in Scotland in the writings of Adam Smith at the same time Britons were considering what measures they ought to take to civilise the Highlands can clearly be seen to have influenced the steps taken. Stadial theory suggested that Highlanders had the potential to progress from their current state as pastoralists, through agriculture, to a civilised state of commercialism.\textsuperscript{74} As such, there were several commonalities in commentators’ plans for civilising the Highlands which drew on emerging enlightenment philosophies. Agriculture was repeatedly identified as the foundation of wealth for a society and the first step towards industry, whilst improvement was lauded as a national objective in which the emphasis ought to be on commerce.\textsuperscript{75} Other proposals argued that government control of property was vitally important to hold power over the inhabitants. Lord Justice Clerk Andrew Fletcher identified this as paramount for civilising the Highlands, stating that:

\begin{itemize}
\item [\textsuperscript{73}] See Lenman, \textit{Jacobite Risings}, 277.
\item [\textsuperscript{74}] Meek, ‘Smith, Turgot and “Four Stages” Theory’; Hopfl, ‘From Savage to Scotsman’.
\item [\textsuperscript{75}] Memorial by James Erskine of Grange, October 1746, GD124/15/1569, NRS; Fletcher and Bland, \textit{Proposals for Civilizing the Barbarous and Rebellious Parts of the Highlands of Scotland}, 1747, RH2/4/366, ff.145-152, NRS.
\end{itemize}
To the best Judgement I can form, of that, Barbarous, Lawless countrey, the shortest and easiest way of civilizing it, and reducing it to the Obedience of the Law, is to Vest the absolute Property in the Crown of as much of it as possible: which, of course, gives his Majesty the absolute Disposal of all the Inhabitants.76

The plans also placed emphasis on eroding the “barbarous customs” of the people and removing their dependence on their clan chiefs, again highlighting that despite the weakening of clanship over the previous decades the British continued to believe it a barrier to peace.77 Finally, a clear link was inferred between Jacobitism and religion, with nonjuring Episcopal meeting houses accused of being “nurseries and schools Of Jacobitism and disaffection.”78 All of these proposals influenced the parliamentary debate regarding the steps to be taken in the Highlands in the months and years following Culloden.

Immediately after the rebellion, forty-one Highland estates belonging to members of the landed gentry who had openly supported the Jacobites were forfeited to the Crown. Whilst the majority of these were sold to pay debts or raise revenue, the annexation of thirteen of them in 1752 “for the better Civilizing and Improving the Highlands of Scotland and Preventing Disorders there for the Future” developed from Fletcher’s proposals emphasising control of property.79 The estates were to act as models for improvement, industry, and commerce throughout the Highlands and profits from the rentals were to be used to affect more general improvements in the region. The Society in Scotland for Propagating Christian Knowledge, SSPCK, had been actively attempting to educate and convert Highlanders for decades. From the 1750s it worked closely with

76 Andrew Fletcher to Newcastle, Edinburgh, 15 November 1746, RH2/4/360, NRS.

77 Some Thoughts Concerning the State of the Highlands of Scotland, Sent to the Earl of Albemarle, 24 January 1747, RH2/4/360, NRS; Fletcher and Bland, Proposals for Civilizing the Barbarous and Rebellious Parts of the Highlands of Scotland, 1747, RH2/4/366, ff.145-152, NRS.

78 Some Hints Humbly Suggested to the Consideration of All Concerned for the More Effectual and Speedy Reformation of the Highlands and Islands of Scotland, without Putting His Majesty or the Government to Any Expense, 1754, Add MS 35891, ff.49-60, BL; Some Hints, Anent Disarming the Highlands and Suppressing the Jacobite Meeting Houses, 30 April 1746, RH2/4/355, ff.250-5, NRS; Andrew Fletcher to Newcastle, Edinburgh, 26 April 1746, RH2/4/355, f.224, NRS; Andrew Fletcher to Newcastle, Edinburgh, 26 April 1746, RH2/4/355, f.224, NRS.

79 Commission Appointing Commissioners for the Annexed Estates under George II, 10 May 1755, E722/1, ff.1-11, NRS. Although the decision to annex the estates was taken in 1752, the commissioners were not appointed until 1755. For a detailed consideration of the annexed estates see: Annette M. Smith, Jacobite Estates of the 'Forty-Five (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1982); Virginia Wills, ed., Reports on the Annexed Estates 1755-1769: From the Records of the Forfeited Estates Preserved in the Scottish Record Office (Edinburgh: Scottish Record Office, 1973); A. J. Youngson, After the Forty-Five: The Economic Impact on the Scottish Highlands (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1973), 25-46.
the Commission for the Annexed Estates, establishing charity schools and placing Presbyterian ministers in Highland parishes. Schools aimed to remove the ‘popish’ influence of Highland parents by converting children and teaching them English.\textsuperscript{80} Cumberland’s belief that disaffection and Jacobitism were firmly entrenched in the older population was widely shared, so focus was placed on ensuring that younger generations grew up as loyal, Protestant subjects.\textsuperscript{81} Other steps taken to gain the loyalty of Highland children to the Crown, rather than the clan, included removing them from the Highlands to be raised by Lowland, Protestant families and the apprenticeship scheme coordinated by the commissioners for the annexed estates, which provided education in crafts, including spinning and weaving, for children from the poorest Highland families.\textsuperscript{82} The purpose of the scheme was twofold. First, by providing them with an education it was hoped the children would grow up loyal to the Crown and, secondly, by requiring apprentices to return to their home parish to practice their craft once their education was complete it was hoped that industry and commerce would spread throughout the Highlands.

At the same time as measures were being implemented from above, Highland men from all levels of society continued to become increasingly engaged with improvement ideology themselves. Numerous Highland elites undertook significant work on their estates whilst some tenant farmers even implemented improvements due to changes to the rental system which provided them with longer leases.\textsuperscript{83} Improvers believed that traditional clanship was incompatible with improvement as clanship was viewed as a military, rather than an agricultural, system. Such an understanding had been developing amongst Highland landowners for decades, contributing to the decline in clanship prior to the Forty-Five.\textsuperscript{84} The move from clanship to commerce continued in the decades after the rising, accelerating due to the systematic steps taken by the government.

The measures implemented by the British in the Highlands had mixed results. The Commission for the Annexed Estates made little progress in its attempts to facilitate

\textsuperscript{80} Papers Concerning Villages and Schools, E730/25/1-10, NRS; Notes Concerning Regulations in the Highlands, 1748, RH2/4/367, ff.144-50, NRS.

\textsuperscript{81} Cumberland to Newcastle, Inverness, 30 April 1746, Add MS 32707, ff.128-31, BL.

\textsuperscript{82} Various Papers Related to Apprentices, 1763-1774, E730/11/1-9, NRS; Various Plans for Supporting Manufactures in Badenoch, Strathspey, etc., 1762, E730/14/1-3, NRS; Papers Related to Linen Manufacturing, 1763-1773, E730/15/1-14, NRS.

\textsuperscript{83} Dziennik, Fatal Land, 43.

\textsuperscript{84} See Macinnes, Clanship, 210-46.
widespread improvement throughout the region. Henry Home, Lord Kames, one of the commissioners, admitted that much of the money spent had been “no better than water spilt on the ground.”  

The civilising mission was much more successful and within three years of the commission’s establishment reports were indicating that its intervention had contributed to a decrease in theft and rapine in the Highlands. This downward trend continued so that when the annexed estates were restored in 1784, the act of restoration proclaimed that no inhabitants of Britain were more loyal or dutiful than the Highlanders. Whilst Highlanders had not yet become a commercial society, the British imperial elite believed the annexation had served its purpose and helped to assimilate them more closely within Britain. The measures represented a clear evolution in the approach of the British to pacifying the Highlands away from subjugation towards regulation and commercialisation. This mirrored a more general evolution of the army at this juncture as its purpose became less fixed simply as a fighting force and it increasingly played an important role in promoting and attempting to implement a civilising mission in the places it was active. In North America, the British Army relied upon direct and indirect experiences in the Highlands when implementing militarisation, pacifying hostile peoples, and governing distant geographical fringes of the empire.

**Changing Attitudes towards Highlanders**

At the same time as militarisation strategy was thought to be affecting changes in Highland society, the recruitment of Highland soldiers into the British Army on a vast scale to fight as defenders of empire in imperial theatres of war contributed to a general softening of attitudes towards that population. As noted, Highland recruitment was not a new phenomenon in the post-Culloden period. The Black Watch Regiment had patrolled the Highlands since 1739 and during the Forty-Five Loudoun raised the 64th Regiment in the Highlands. Highland recruitment into regiments serving abroad had been identified in the wake of the Forty-Five as a way of removing men from the region to

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85 Quoted in Lenman, *Jacobite Risings*, 281. Lord Kames was an early proponent of stadial theory and an important figure in the Scottish Enlightenment.

86 Report of the Commissioners and Trustees for Managing the Annexed Forfeited Estates in Scotland for 1758, E723/1, ff.67-72, NRS.


88 Plank, *Rebellion and Savagery.*

89 Regarding the Black Watch, see Mackillop, *More Fruitful than the Soil*, 29.
lessen the threat of renewed rebellion. However, large-scale Highland recruitment only began with the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War in 1756 as Secretary of State William Pitt suggested Highlanders as an alternative source of manpower for the colonial theatre.\(^9\)

Andrew Mackillop illustrated that although the British government did not think of military recruitment as a method of pacifying the Highlands it quickly became the most successful government policy for rehabilitating Highlanders and assimilating them within the empire.\(^9\) This was particularly true for Highland elites who were able to effect recruitment at a local level despite it being a central government policy. The government’s ignorance about the weakening of clanship led to its reliance on clan chiefs to encourage enlistment, who exploited the government’s lack of understanding to obtain patronage through the recruitment process.\(^9\)

Recruitment allowed Highland elites to participate as members of the wider British imperial elite, rehabilitating themselves in the eyes of the state. This was also true for Highland soldiers, and even ex-Jacobites, who had previously been classified as rebels and savages but increasingly came to be viewed as useful soldiers of empire. As Highland soldiers gained a reputation as talented and loyal, attitudes towards Highlanders generally began to soften accordingly.

By the time the British Army was undertaking further recruitment in the Highlands upon the outbreak of the American Revolutionary War, consideration of how civilised the Highlanders were played a much less important role in guiding the army’s interactions with that population than it had previously. Partly, this was because efforts to civilise Highlanders were thought to be working, which caused them to be described as savages less often, although such language did not disappear entirely even into the nineteenth century. Shifts in attitudes were assisted by the publication of the ‘Ossian’ poems in the 1760s which refocused attention on the Highlands culturally rather than politically at a time when the positive image of the ‘noble savage’ was emerging to challenge the negative impression of the ‘barbarous savage’.\(^9\)

The militarisation of the Highlands made the region increasingly accessible and enabled further development of commerce which, in turn, led to increased interactions between Highlanders and Britons.

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\(^9\) Mackillop, *More Fruitful than the Soil*, 41-76. The Duke of Argyll played a central role in Highland recruitment. See Argyll to Loudoun, London, 12 March 1757, LO (AM) 3028, HL.

and an erosion of the perception that the Highlanders and their customs were alien. In addition, there was no continued military threat from the Highlands after the Forty-Five and Highlanders were increasingly integrated into the war effort and imperial venture through their recruitment into the British Army to serve in the colonial theatre.

Most importantly, the loyalty paradigm came to play an increasingly important role in guiding interactions between the British imperial elite and all imperial populations. Uncivilised Highlanders had clearly not fully assimilated into the British state and become Britons. However, they were displaying continuing submission and adherence to the British state, which suggested that loyalty could be achieved without assimilation. Thus, Britishness was not a necessity for imperial populations who could be loyal subjects of the empire without being Britons. As the militarisation process shaped such understandings in the Highlands, a concurrent militarisation process in North America (explored in the following chapters) cemented this paradigm shift in the wake of the French and Indian War and the territorial expansion of the British Empire. Highlanders came to be viewed as imperial subjects with the same rights and responsibilities as others throughout the empire. Their continuing barbarity meant they were not thought to share the developing British identity highlighted by Linda Colley. They would remain on the periphery of both the British state and empire until after the wars of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It would be with the reshaping of empire in the aftermath of the loss of the thirteen colonies that Highlanders would begin to truly be included within the British identity and play a role as Britons shaping the empire rather than one simply as subjects of that empire.

IV. Conclusions

Waging war against the Jacobites provided the British Army with experience fighting an ‘other’ population group in a geographical fringe of the empire. Difficulties supplying the army in remote regions of the Highlands, alongside a recognition that poor access and communication links had prevented a speedy resolution of the conflict, emphasised the importance of a good logistics system to victory, particularly in regions far from the imperial centre. In addition, the Forty-Five provided the army with an opportunity to utilise irregular soldiers to hamper Jacobite recruitment efforts and harry retreating forces. The direct experience of those involved in the Forty-Five contributed

94 Colley, Britons; Colley, ‘Britishness and Otherness’.
to increased knowledge and understanding throughout the army regarding military adaptations to specific conditions of warfare, which would influence army officers a decade later in North America.

In the eyes of British authorities, the association of Scottish Highlanders with the Forty-Five raised questions about the loyalty and identity of population groups within the British Empire. The cultural paradigms of loyalty and civility guided the British Army and state in their response to the Forty-Five. Classifying the Jacobites as rebels and traitors who were acting disloyally served to deny them legitimacy as a military force and acted as a method of justification for the army’s failure to adhere to the rules of warfare when fighting them. Concurrently, the civility paradigm led to the view that all Highlanders were savages who were inherently rebellious and, therefore, were all equally guilty for the actions of the Jacobites and ought to be treated and punished as such. This led to a blurring of the military and civil spheres and both Jacobites and non-combatants suffered as the British Army implemented indiscriminate, punitive measures as they sought to end the conflict and prevent a renewal of hostilities in the future, although some officers did temper their response with moderation.

Imperial security remained the primary British aim and ensuring Highland allegiance and adherence to the Crown was thought to be the best method of achieving this. Whilst punitive measures and a requirement for all to submit to the Crown were thought sufficient for short-term security, militarisation as an implicit threat against rebellion and structural changes within Highland society to assimilate Highlanders within the British state and empire, thereby inculcating loyalty, were considered necessary steps in the long-term. Civilising the population was considered a prerequisite for their assimilation and emerging enlightenment values and ideals influenced the implementation of measures designed to progress the Highlanders from barbarity to civility through improvement and industry.

By the 1770s steps taken to civilise Highlanders were thought to have had some success as they accelerated a shift towards commercialism that had begun decades earlier. Highlanders had also begun to rehabilitate themselves within British society through their participation in the imperial venture resulting from their recruitment into the British Army. Such recruitment, alongside the perception that civilising measures were working and the lack of a continued military threat from the Highlands, helped to reduce the ‘otherness’ of the Highlanders in the eyes of the British imperial elite, although this had not been entirely overcome. The Seven Years’ War led to the territorial expansion of the
British Empire and introduced new, non-Protestant, non-British populations into the imperial fold. This, alongside the concurrent militarisation processes implemented in the Highlands and in North America, caused a shift in understandings of loyalty within the empire as Britishness was no longer thought a necessity for imperial populations. As a result, Highlanders were viewed as loyal imperial subjects, but they remained on the periphery of the empire due to their status as ‘others’ rather than as Britons.
Chapter Two: John Campbell, fourth Earl of Loudoun

I. Introduction

A decade after the outbreak of the Forty-Five, the British Army was again involved in a military conflict with significant imperial implications. Originating as a dispute over trade and settlement rights in the Ohio Country, the French and Indian War quickly developed into a general conflict between Britain and France and their respective Native American allies throughout North America and then into the global Seven Years’ War from May 1756 when Britain officially declared war on France. Many British Army officers and soldiers who fought during the Forty-Five were involved in the conflict in North America as Britain sent an unprecedented number of soldiers across the Atlantic, complementing the shift in foreign policy towards blue water, imperial aims. Edward Braddock, the first commander-in-chief, was sent to the Ohio Country in 1755 with two regular regiments to remove the French from that region but was killed in the battle at the Monongahela River, a military disaster that jeopardised British influence in the region. Braddock was initially replaced by Massachusetts Governor William Shirley before Lord Loudoun was given the command in 1756. Loudoun was tasked with gaining the cooperation of colonial assemblies, provincial soldiers, and civilians in the war effort and obtaining strategic victories against the French. He was recalled on 30 December 1757 after presiding over the worst campaigning year for the British Army throughout the entirety of the war: abandoning an expedition against Louisbourg and suffering significant defeats at Fort William Henry and the German Flatts.

The previous chapter highlighted the British Army’s experiences of militarisation in Scotland during and after the Forty-Five and explored how the cultural paradigms of civility and loyalty governed the British response to that conflict and later perceptions of Highlanders. Loudoun played an important role in the Forty-Five, commanding a campaign of irregular warfare in the Highlands and playing an active role in the pacification of the region, where he favoured a strategy of moderation and negotiation with Highland elites to secure peace and ensure long-term loyalty from the population. This chapter considers Loudoun’s experiences of warfare and militarisation in North America during his time as commander-in-chief, highlighting how his formative experiences in Scotland influenced his actions in another fringe of the British Empire. It

2 Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 143.
challenges the common portrayal of Loudoun, prevalent both in older biographies and recent historiography, as obstinate, hot-headed, and bullying. Although quick to anger at perceived colonial insubordination, this chapter argues Loudoun preferred negotiation inspired by the failed Albany Plan of Union of 1754. It first considers Loudoun’s prior experiences, before exploring the North American context: how British imperial attitudes and militarisation exacerbated British-colonial relations. Loudoun’s attempts to overcome the challenges of waging war in North America illustrate how the Forty-Five influenced British imperialism and how military practices employed in Scotland were adapted to suit North American conditions. The process of militarisation in North America, in its infancy during Loudoun’s command, was driven by considerations of imperial security in much the same way as the militarisation of the Highlands had been, with the cultural paradigm of loyalty to the fore. Loudoun expected Britons in North America to exhibit adherence to the imperial state through enthusiastic engagement with the war effort. The difficulties he encountered with colonial North American settlers led him to question their loyalty, and hence their Britishness, at this early stage in the militarisation process, which continued for the duration of the French and Indian War.

II. Lord Loudoun and the French and Indian War

Born at Loudoun Castle, Ayrshire, in 1705, John Campbell, fourth Earl of Loudoun, was a British Army officer and Scottish representative peer. A noble with ties to two prominent Whig families, Clan Campbell and, through his mother, the Dalrymples of Stair, Loudoun quickly gained place and patronage both politically and militarily. After inheriting the earldom in 1731 he was elected a peer in 1734, which led to his appointment as governor of Stirling Castle in 1741. Militarily he rose through the ranks from his entry as a cornet in 1727 to his appointment as aide-de-camp to King George II in 1743 and as adjutant-general to Sir John Cope at the beginning of the Forty-Five, by which time he held the rank of lieutenant-colonel. The family reputation as staunch loyalists ensured that his Scottish identity did not impede his military progression, although he repeatedly reaffirmed his loyalty throughout his career. Loudoun’s command of the 64th Regiment during the Jacobite Uprising led to his association with the Highland

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soldiers in the British Army, exemplified in a 1747 portrait by the renowned Scottish loyalist, Allan Ramsay. The Lowlander Loudoun sports full regimental Highland dress in celebration of the loyal Highlanders of the 64th whilst reaffirming the Dress Act of 1746, by which only British soldiers could wear the kilt. John Faber’s 1755 engraving of the Ramsay portrait (Fig. 2), commemorating Loudoun’s appointment as commander-in-chief, was a visual reminder of Loudoun’s identification with an area still provoking questions of loyalty. In his own career, it is likely he was driven to excise any suspicion arising from his Scottish origins despite his exploits for the British Army during the Forty-Five.

Loudoun had developed a close relationship with the Duke of Cumberland during the Forty-Five. Cumberland and his political allies Henry Fox, Secretary of State for the Southern Department, and the Earl of Halifax, president of the Board of Trade, secured Loudoun the North American command in January 1756. The British government hoped Loudoun would provide leadership to facilitate colonial cooperation in the prosecution of the war and reverse Britain’s disastrous early defeats. Conflict had ignited in North America in 1754 when competition between Virginia, Pennsylvania, and France over land in the Ohio Country led Virginia to send a party of militia under George Washington to defend their claims (Fig. 3). Washington’s defeat at Fort Necessity caused the Newcastle ministry to send British regulars under Braddock, marking a shift in Britain’s North American military strategy that signified the failure of the policy of colonial self-defence. Prior to 1754, British regulars had had little involvement in conflicts in North America, which were generally conducted by provincial soldiers under the command of colonial governors. Braddock’s commission, which gave him authority over all the troops and expeditions in North America, was a determined attempt by the ministry to centralise control of the conflict in the hands of an imperial agent.

Figure 3. Map showing the progress of the British Army’s campaigns in 1754 and 1755. See table below for a description of the events depicted.\(^6\) Base map used: http://pvhs.info/page/8/

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>George Washington sets off from Williamsburg with approximately 200 Virginia militiamen</td>
<td>2 April 1754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Battle of Jumonville Glen, Virginian victory</td>
<td>28 May 1754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Battle of Fort Necessity, French victory. Washington surrenders the fort</td>
<td>3 July 1754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Col. Robert Monckton sets out from Boston</td>
<td>22 May 1755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Edward Braddock sets out from Fort Cumberland</td>
<td>29 May 1755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Monckton arrives at Fort Lawrence</td>
<td>2 June 1755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Fort Beauséjour surrenders to the British</td>
<td>16 June 1755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Battle of the Monongahela, French victory</td>
<td>9 July 1755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Shirley decides against continuing his expedition against Fort Niagara, orders Fort Oswego repaired</td>
<td>September 1755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Battle of Lake George, British victory</td>
<td>8 September 1755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Johnson decides not to proceed against Crown Point. Orders the construction of Fort William Henry</td>
<td>29 September 1755</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

\(^6\) The information used to plot this map was taken from Anderson, *Crucible of War*. 
The 1755 campaign, and Braddock’s defeat (Fig. 3), highlighted the problems Loudoun would have to overcome to successfully prosecute the war. The difficulties Braddock encountered securing the necessary wagons for his expedition suggested colonial reluctance to participate in a war effort controlled by London, whilst colonial disunity was manifest in his inability to negotiate the establishment of a common war fund. A lack of Native American allies illustrated Braddock’s arrogance and inexperience but, more systematically, demonstrated the failure of British attempts to conduct Indian diplomacy through the Covenant Chain with the Six Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy, on whom they relied to exert influence over client tribes, including the Shawnee and Delaware.\(^7\) The Iroquois’ declining influence in the Ohio Country and tribal grievances centred on colonial land-grabbing (notably the Walking Purchase of 1737 and the Treaty of Lancaster of 1744) left Britain with few supporters,\(^8\) the Delaware half-king Tanaghrisson a notable exception. Moreover, the Iroquois initially stuck to their policy of neutrality. In the wake of the Battle of the Monongahela, the regulars retreated to Philadelphia and frontier security collapsed amidst frequent Indian raiding, with many inhabitants becoming refugees. Tanaghrisson and his followers abandoned the region and most neutral Ohio Indians allied themselves with the French.\(^9\)

Failure to attain any of the campaign’s objectives, except the capture of Fort Beauséjour, which isolated the French garrison at Louisbourg, left Cumberland and Fox determined to assert stronger imperial control over the war effort. Indian diplomacy was centralised with the creation of two new departments of Indian Affairs: Sir William Johnson and Edmond Atkin were appointed superintendents for the North and South, respectively, and subordinated to the commander-in-chief.\(^10\) Loudoun, as both commander-in-chief and governor and captain general of Virginia, was granted two more regular regiments and given permission to raise an additional four thousand regulars in


\(^10\) The Superintendents were appointed to check the “continuation of such abominable Practises” in Indian diplomacy as had been carried on by the colonists. Halifax to Loudoun, London, 11 March 1757, LO (AM) 3018, HL.
the colonies as Britain significantly increased its military commitment. Although the governorship was largely a ceremonial role, Loudoun’s commission gave him military authority over the other colonial governors, who were required to assist him. Neither he nor they could demand the compliance of colonial assemblies; all were obliged to negotiate for “requisitions”, governor’s requests for appropriations to fund recruitment and supplies. Despite the limitations on his power, he enjoyed a greater military authority than either Braddock or Shirley had previously as the ministry sought to install him as its representative for military affairs in the colonies: granting him almost complete control over warrants, provisions, appointments, and discipline.11 Loudoun served early notice of his determination to assert imperial authority in a circular from London to the governors: “What assistance I may depend upon from your Province, in Men or Money? What number of Waggons, Carriage Horses, [Bateaux] [And] what Forage?”12 Upon his arrival in July 1756, he reiterated governors’ responsibilities,13 probably unaware how far governors themselves had to negotiate “requisitions” and the assemblies’ cooperation to supply British forces.14 Loudoun’s benchmark, however, was not the experiences of fellow governors, but his military experiences in Scotland.

Despite his early assertion of royal authority and a historiographical reputation as an imperial bully,15 Loudoun, in fact, replicated the role of imperial negotiator first performed in Scotland during the Forty-Five. Only by negotiating with Highland elites was he able to recruit soldiers in that region, invoking the paradigm of loyalty in interactions with the Highland population. He approached warfare in North America with a similar willingness to negotiate with colonial elites, namely the Indian superintendents and colonial assemblies, whose support and cooperation he recognised as essential. Nonetheless, his interactions were based on the attitudes that informed his imperial

11 Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, 80.
12 Queries to the Governors of North America, April 1756, LO (AM) 938, HL.
13 Loudoun, Circular, New York, 23 July 1756, LO (AM) 1338, HL.
15 William Nester claimed Loudoun alienated “most of his officers and soldiers, along with the populace” and that he “waged war far more effectively against the Americans than against the French”. W. R. Nester, The First Global War: Britain, France and the Fate of North America (Westport: Praeger, 2000), 48; Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies and Tribes in the Seven Years War in America (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990), 297–305.
outlook: his cultural paradigm of loyalty equated with colonists clearly displaying due adherence and subordination to the Crown.

Whilst early studies of the French and Indian War tended to dismiss Loudoun’s command as an abject military failure, recent scholarship, following Stanley Pargellis, challenged that view, arguing Loudoun’s reform of military logistics administration laid the groundwork for subsequent British successes.16 Administrative delays prevented his arrival in time to avert the loss of Oswego in 1756 and he was bereft of patrons when, in 1757, William Pitt became Secretary of State, replacing Fox. Pitt replaced Captain-General Cumberland with John Ligonier, first Earl Ligonier, for signing the Convention of Kloster-Zeven and directly intervened in Loudoun’s campaign plans, ordering him to attack Louisbourg rather than Quebec. Loudoun’s decision not to proceed against Louisbourg that year, a result of poor weather as much as any deficiencies in his command, gave Pitt reason to recall him that December. Loudoun was a political victim of Pitt’s purging of Cumberland’s protégées and allies though he almost survived when Pitt struggled to find a suitable replacement.17 Although he spent less than two years in North America, investigating Loudoun’s time there illustrates how the cultural paradigm of loyalty guided the commander at an integral point in the war effort as Britain officially declared war on France and began implementing militarisation strategy. Further, Loudoun’s close involvement in militarisation in two imperial fringes highlights the common understandings that drove his military adaptations and encounters and the extent to which these influenced the army more generally in North America.

III. Military Adaptations

At the commencement of every war, the modes of fighting the last are immediately outdated. Strategy and tactics are inevitably updated in the light of experience, but, equally, old modes linger on. The Forty-Five witnessed a major British commitment to irregular warfare, which would prove valuable when exploring options for North America, whilst the failure of the army to overcome logistical problems during that campaign taught military officers beneficial administrative lessons. The French and Indian War would provide officers with an opportunity to implement the lessons learnt from the previous campaign whilst concurrently adapting to the new challenges they

faced. As Stephen Brumwell illustrated, the British Army did not impose European methods of warfare on the French and Indian War because of the unique logistical, topographical, and climatic challenges of the North American theatre, together with the problem of maintaining communication with the distant imperial centre in London; the scale of such challenges dwarfed anything that the geography of Europe, or Scotland, had thrown up. Irregular warfare, which had played a limited role during the Forty-Five, was integral to campaigning in North America where pitched battles were uncommon. Close coordination between the army and navy aided amphibious operations in Canada, whilst an unrestrained frontier war continued between Native Americans and interior settlers for the duration of the conflict. The British Army waged war in conjunction with the colonies, relying on colonial recruitment into both the regular and provincial regiments, and the colonies to supply and quarter the troops. The cooperation of colonial assemblies was essential to the war effort. Colonial politics may have seemed an inconvenient barrier, testing the patience of British commanders; they need not understand the internal power struggles, but they could not ignore them when required to negotiate the assemblies’ assistance. The Forty-Five may not have seemed ideal preparation in political terms: for Loudoun it provided experience in the politics of negotiation, albeit from the perspective of subjugating hostile groups. His formative military experiences in Scotland, however, seemed more readily suited to adaptation in North America.

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18 Brumwell, Redcoats.
19 Anderson, Crucible of War, 88 and passim; Brumwell, Redcoats, 137-61.
The principal areas of action during the 1756 and 1757 campaigns have been highlighted on the map including Forts Oswego, William Henry, Ticonderoga, and Crown Point as well as Britain’s military headquarters of Albany.

Logistics

The logistical adaptations pursued by Loudoun were clearly inspired by his experiences during the Forty-Five. Neither Braddock nor Shirley had sought to tackle the army’s deficiencies but the Forty-Five had impressed upon Loudoun the importance of safeguarding transportation and supply prior to and during campaigns. His first task was a survey of military infrastructure and administration, his first reports exposing the need for substantive repairs to many barracks and forts and the tangled state of contracts and payments. “The Expenses here, are immense,” he complained, “the Prices of every thing in the Country are dear, by the management of our Predecessors”.\textsuperscript{21} He accused Shirley of hiding large payments for unknown expenses and illegally filling vacancies in the

service. The backlash that accompanied his reports of Shirley’s indiscriminate spending was a warning to keep his own expenses as low as possible. He strove to create a more centralised system that would both save the army money and better support the troops. He economised on the purchase of provisions, dealing directly with provincial merchants where possible, rather than going through contractors who inflated prices and added commission. He also created a new storehouse system to ease distribution (with two main stores in New York and one at Halifax, supported by smaller stores throughout the interior). Supply levels and the condition of provisions were monitored by a commissary. This ensured plentiful local supplies for the troops stationed in the interior.

As had been the case in Scotland, it was the distribution of centralised supplies that hampered military operations in North America. In advance of the campaign against Ticonderoga (Fig. 4) in the summer of 1757, Loudoun advised Major General Webb that his most arduous task would be “supplying your People with provisions.” His repeated references to maintaining transport supplies over vast distances, particularly in the winter, illustrate that this was a continuing concern. Braddock had built a military supply road for the 1755 campaign from Fort Cumberland to the interior and Loudoun took this a stage further, enabling communication between interior forts and with military headquarters at Albany. Soldiers widened and improved existing roads and built waystations along routes, whilst Loudoun invested in the construction of bateaux and scows and improved portages along routes by rivers and lakes wherever possible. Loudoun’s investment in infrastructure would make it easier for the British to supply the army throughout North America for the remainder of the war.

Loudoun was also determined to overcome the British Army’s dependence on colonists for supplying the wagons necessary for transporting troops and provisions,

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22 Loudoun to William Shirley, Albany, 2 August 1756, LO (AM) 1387, HL.
25 Loudoun to Daniel Webb, HMS Sutherland, 20 June 1757, LO (AM) 3864, HL. Loudoun discussed the difficulties inherent in supplying the army in North America on numerous occasions. See: Loudoun to Cumberland, Albany, 20 August 1756, LO (AM) 1525, HL; Loudoun to Fox, Albany, 3 October 1756, LO (AM) 1961, HL; Loudoun to Pitt, New York, 3 May 1757, LO (AM) 3546, HL. The French called Ticonderoga Fort Carillon.
which had caused delays during Braddock’s 1755 expedition. Braddock and his subordinates tended to view the colonists as an obstruction to the progress of the expedition, rather than as allies they ought to cooperate with. This attitude, coupled with the legitimate concern that wagons would not be returned or compensated for, led many colonists to refuse to cooperate with the army and to refuse their wagons for the service. It was only when Benjamin Franklin intervened in the situation, offering compensation to wagon suppliers and threatening that those who did not would be suspected of disloyalty, that sufficient wagons were produced. Delays in settling these accounts after the campaign made all colonists, particularly Pennsylvanians, more averse to hiring their wagons to the army.

The paradigm of loyalty rationalised Loudoun’s reaction. He was frustrated by the colonists’ failure to cooperate, believing they were duty-bound to do so as subjects of the British Crown. Regardless of law and custom, recalcitrance he equated with disloyalty to the war effort, informing Cumberland that “they have assumed to themselves, what they call Rights and Priviledges, Totally unknown in the Mother Country and are made use of, for no purpose, but to screen them, from giving any Aid, of any sort”. In August 1756, he confessed to the Duke of Cumberland that he was “convinced, that till we have every thing necessary, for carrying on the War here, within ourselves, Independent of Aid from this Country, we shall go on very slowly.” In September, Loudoun was obliged to impress civilian wagons, and even then many of the wagoners simply deserted en route to the army. To circumvent colonial goodwill and impressment, Loudoun created a British Army wagon train consisting of fifty wagons with horses, a wagon house and stables, and an establishment of drivers. These wagons were utilised for the general support of the troops in North America rather than for specific campaigns, where

29 Loudoun to Cumberland, Albany, 29 August 1756, LO (AM) 1626, HL. Other issues, explored below, reinforced Loudoun’s belief that the colonists, and colonial assemblies, were acting disloyally and were willing to act against the British state when it suited their private interests to do so.
30 Loudoun to Cumberland, Albany, 20 August 1756 in Pargellis, Military Affairs, 223-30.
31 Loudoun to Charles Hardy, Albany, 16 September 1756, LO (AM) 1820, HL; Hardy to Loudoun, New York, 20 September 1756, LO (AM) 1856, HL; Loudoun to James Abercromby, Albany, 16 November 1756, LO (AM) 2227, HL.
32 Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, 297-98.
impressment quickly became the only method of gaining the required numbers. By the autumn of 1757, Loudoun had standardised transportation between Albany and Fort Edward using a mixture of bateaux, ox teams, wagons, and scows, significantly reducing the expense of supplying the army in that region.

The changes Loudoun implemented made it easier to supply army operations in the interior. John Forbes gained much experience of supplying the interior as Loudoun’s adjutant-general. He used it to good effect during his 1758 expedition where he spent time investigating the most efficient route to Fort Duquesne and ordered his troops to erect blockhouses every forty miles to secure the route and ensure the safe delivery of supplies. Forbes’ success in 1758 was largely due to his careful preparation and focus on logistics. Even so, provisioning troops in the interior was an arduous and long, difficult, and expensive process at the mercy of the weather, enemy incursion, and deterioration. Officers repeatedly complained about difficulties they had in impressing wagons from civilians yet to be recompensed for previous usage. In Pennsylvania, the failure of the British to impress suitable numbers of wagons in 1759 in part restricted the army to purely defensive measures in the Ohio region. The cost of maintaining an army spread throughout the interior continued to test and trouble British commanders, notably Thomas Gage, charged with the responsibility of militarising the region and pacifying the Native Americans. Logistics presented pressing, sometimes insurmountable problems for the British Army in North America.

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34 Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, 296-99.
35 John Forbes to Pitt, Carlisle, 10 July 1758, GD45/2/52, NRS; Forbes to Abercromby, Carlisle, August 1758, WO 34, vol 44, ff.172-3, Microfilm Reel B-2661, LAC; Forbes to Abercromby, Raystown, 24 October 1758, WO 34, vol 44, ff.187-90, Microfilm Reel B-2661, LAC. The collection of the American Papers of John Forbes, NRS GD45/2, contain a detailed account of the Fort Duquesne expedition and the logistical challenges Forbes faced.
36 Brodine, ‘Civil-Military Relations’, 224; Ward, ‘European Method of Warring’, 263. The British were unable to fully overcome the logistical problems in the Ohio Valley during the war and soldiers were required to perform tasks usually carried out by auxiliaries. Regarding officers’ difficulties procuring wagons see: Forbes to Abercromby, Carlisle, August 1758, WO 34, vol 44, ff.172-3, Microfilm Reel B-2661, LAC; Forbes to Abercromby, Raystown, 24 October 1758, WO 34, vol 44, ff.187-90, Microfilm Reel B-2661, LAC; Henry Bouquet to Jeffrey Amherst, Various, 1759, Add MS 21634, BL.
37 See Chapter Five.
Irregular Warfare

Whilst it is now generally accepted that the British had prior experience of irregular warfare in Europe before application in North America, Braddock’s defeat exposed the extent of the army’s unpreparedness in his matter. 38 Few, if any, of the officers in the 44th and 48th Regiments sent to North America with Braddock had direct experience of irregular warfare against the Jacobites. Whilst some soldiers in these regiments had fought at Prestonpans and Falkirk, none had experience of Loudoun’s irregular campaign. 39 However, despite a lack of direct experience during the Forty-Five, Loudoun’s irregular campaign had been widely reported and the inclusion of irregular tactics in military textbooks had helped to disseminate knowledge amongst the officer class. Matthew Ward argued that British failures in the Ohio Country were less the product of commanders’ naivety of irregular tactics than a failure to quickly train and equip soldiers to conduct irregular warfare. 40 Braddock understood the necessity of employing specific soldiers as scouts and pickets to thwart ambush, though his unwillingness to comply with diplomatic conventions left him with insufficient Native Americans; and he lacked time to train regulars effectively to take their place. 41 Ignorance of irregular warfare does not explain Braddock’s defeat; rather arrogance and inexperience, coupled with the superiority of the enemy.

Loudoun arrived in North America with a clear understanding of irregular warfare. During the Forty-Five, Loudoun’s mixture of regulars (the 64th Regiment) and irregulars (the Independent Highland Companies) were thought the best suited of all British troops to oppose the Jacobites’ interior raids because the majority were Highlanders, familiar with the harsh local climate and difficult terrain. It was immediately clear that Loudoun’s Scottish experience had impressed upon him the benefits of utilising local knowledge for irregular warfare when he requested that Native Americans allied

38 Arguments that the British were utterly unprepared for the irregular warfare they would face in North America were made by Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, 299; Douglas Edward Leach, Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America (New York: MacMillan, 1973), 369. Preston, Brumwell, and Starkey argued that the prior experience the British Army had of irregular warfare from engagements in Europe and Scotland was not enough to prepare officers for the unique challenges they would face in North America. See: Preston, Braddock’s Defeat, 43-72; Brumwell, Redcoats, 200; Starkey, European and Native American Warfare, 37-56.
39 Preston, Braddock’s Defeat, 63.
41 Preston, Braddock’s Defeat, 217-68; Russell, ‘Redcoats in the Wilderness’, 642-44.
with the British and rangers be used for scouting missions rather than British regulars. Native Americans and rangers better understood the local terrain than the regulars arriving with Loudoun, and Loudoun utilised both for reconnaissance on numerous occasions.

Irregular soldiers could also harass the enemy upon the march and disrupt their supply lines, as Loudoun’s Highland troops had hampered the Jacobite retreat northwards. After the fall of Oswego (Fig. 4) in August 1756, Loudoun’s irregular troops defended the British retreat, preventing the advancing enemy attempting a frontal assault on Major-General Webb at the German Flatts. Again, Loudoun expressed his belief that Indians and rangers were best suited to such an undertaking due to their superior understanding of the countryside. During the summer of 1757, when the British were restricted to a defensive campaign, Loudoun favoured irregular warfare, rather than engaging the French fully. In part, this was to avoid further losses after the debacle of Fort William Henry, but Loudoun’s irregulars aimed to harass the French troops on their march through the interior and isolate them from their supply train and thereby delay or prevent an expected assault on Albany (which never transpired). “The keeping a Great Body of the Lightest and Nimblest of your People in the Rear, to harass them [the enemy] as much as possible…you will distress them more than by Fighting their main Body.”

Loudoun adapted the Highland approach in response to the challenges of campaigning in North America. Recognising that his irregulars in Scotland had successfully remained active throughout the winter (thereby mitigating the problems inactivity caused for troop morale and discipline) he likewise hoped to use North

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42 Loudoun to Webb, Albany, 20 August 1756, LO (AM) 1808, HL. Rangers were independent companies specifically employed to engage in scouting and irregular warfare, most often in the interior. They were often made up of frontiersmen who had experience traversing backcountry terrain and fighting Native Americans, although as the French and Indian War progressed such recruits become less readily available and the woodsman-ship of the rangers fell accordingly. See: Grenier, First Way of War, 124-30; Brian D. Carroll, “‘Savages’ in the Service of Empire: Native American Soldiers in Gorham’s Rangers, 1744-1762”, NEQ 85, no. 3 (2012): 383–429. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23251386. Regarding the tactics and training of the rangers, see: Robert Rogers, ‘Methods Used in Disciplining the Rangers’, 25 October 1757, LO (AM) 4701, HL; Stephen Brumwell, White Devil: A True Story of War, Savagery and Vengeance in Colonial America, reprint (New York: Da Capo, 2006), 311–16.

43 Extract from the Journal of Robert Rogers, Fort William Henry, 13 June 1756, LO (AM) 1219, HL; Loudoun to Fox, Albany, 22 November 1756, LO (AM) 2263, HL; Robert Rogers, Journal of a Scout near Fort Edward, 25 January 1757, LO (AM) 2704, HL.

44 Loudoun to Webb, Albany, 20 August 1756, LO (AM) 1808, HL.

45 Loudoun to Benning Wentworth, HMS Winchester, 18 August 1757, LO (AM) 4252, HL.

46 Loudoun to Thomas Pownall, HMS Winchester, 18 August 1757, LO (AM) 4253 HL.
American irregulars for surprise attacks, despite the harsh American winters.\footnote{Loudoun to Cumberland, New York, 17 October 1757, LO (AM) 4642, HL.; Abercromby to Loudoun, Albany, 21 January 1758, LO (AM) 5437, HL.; Robert Rogers Proposal to Take Crown Point, 13 January 1758, LO (AM), 5398, HL.} He proposed an expeditionary force of regulars and rangers against Crown Point and Ticonderoga in the winter of 1757, and to join his men in their wilderness campaign, as he had done in Scotland.\footnote{Loudoun to Cumberland, New York, 17 October 1757, LO (AM) 4642, HL.} Irregulars already performed winter-times intelligence-gathering and he expected the rangers, some equipped with snowshoes, to clear a path for the regulars to attack the French forts. Such an expedition was more ambitious than those his irregulars had undertaken during the Scottish winters although the general principles were the same. The expedition was aborted when the French learned of the plans.\footnote{Loudoun to Abercromby, Albany, 22 February 1758, LO (5637), HL.; Loudoun to Pitt, New York, 14 February 1758, LO (AM) 5598, HL.}

Loudoun firmly believed irregular warfare was vital for campaigning in North America and presided over a marked increase in the number of irregular troops affiliated with the British Army, from approximately three hundred upon his arrival to approximately one thousand by early 1758.\footnote{Grenier, First Way of War, 126-28; Robert Rogers, Memorial to the Earl of Loudoun, 25 October 1757, LO (AM) 4702, HL.; Beating Orders to Robert Rogers, 11 January 1758, LO (AM) 5391, HL.} But he also advocated a move away from employing those with specialist, local knowledge towards training regulars in light infantry techniques so that they might eventually replace the rangers.\footnote{Light infantry was the category used by the army to describe regulars who carried out irregular warfare to distinguish them.} This was not because local knowledge was less important in North America than in Scotland but rather a response to the difficulty the British had attracting and retaining Native American allies and the expense and indiscipline of the rangers.\footnote{Regarding Britain’s difficulty retaining significant numbers of Native American allies see: Paul Kelton, ‘The British and Indian War: Cherokee Power and the Fate of Empire in North America’, WMQ 69, no. 4 (2012): 763–92, https://doi.org/10.5309/willmaryquar.72.1.0099; American Letterbook of the Fourth Earl of Loudoun, 1756-58, LO 12, MS; Loudoun to Cumberland, Albany, 20 August 1756, LO (AM) 1525, HL.; Loudoun to Fox, Albany, 22 November 1756, CO5/48, ff.1-26, TNA.} Despite the diplomatic efforts of the Indian superintendents, the British failed to harness significant Native American support for their cause during Loudoun’s command. This caused Loudoun to rely heavily on the rangers who, as specialist units, were trained, armed, and clothed differently from the regular and provincial soldiers, were paid a premium wage and, although they were subject to British military discipline, were often admonished by British Army officers for
their indiscipline and insubordination. Loudoun turned to the regulars in an attempt to create a reliable, disciplined corps of troops trained in irregular techniques at a lower expense to the Crown, giving Thomas Gage permission to raise a regiment of five hundred light infantry in late 1757. He expressed his thoughts in a letter to William Pitt of February 1758, in which he noted the necessity of rangers for the war effort and stated that Gage’s regiment would not only constitute a great saving to the Crown, but would also allow him to reduce his dependence upon the rangers whilst concurrently allowing him a “Corp of Rangers that would be disciplined, and have Officers at their head on whom I could depend, which except a very few is not the Case at present.”

Loudoun also attempted to spread basic wilderness techniques throughout the regular army. Officers were encouraged to train their soldiers to shoot whilst kneeling or lying down, to fire individually at specific targets, and to take cover from ambush in woodland. Like in Scotland, the army adapted strategy and tactics to surmount the challenges they faced. Loudoun remained committed to adaptation in North America, sending volunteers from the officer corps of the regulars out on patrols with Rogers’ Rangers. However, there were never enough men who benefited from Rogers’ teachings to transform the entire British Army. Whilst some officers enthusiastically adopted the new drills for their men, the practice was not widespread, and most regulars gained little or no training in irregular warfare. Indeed, far from being able to replace them, the British Army had to raise more rangers for the service in the coming years, with Whitehall’s support. Although not entirely successful, Loudoun’s attempts to spread irregular warfare techniques throughout the army illustrate his belief that such methods were essential for waging war on an imperial fringe and were exemplified by the manner in which he adapted military practices learned in Scotland. Officers including John Forbes, Thomas Gage, and George Howe continued to encourage an understanding of irregular

53 James Abercromby complained about the behaviour of the rangers when he joined them on a scouting mission, blaming their lack of due subordination for the mission’s failure to capture a single prisoner. Abercromby to Loudoun, Albany, 29 November 1757, LO (AM) 4915, HL.

54 Thomas Gage, Proposal for Raising a Regiment of Light Armed Foot, 22 December 1757, LO (AM) 5066, HL; Loudoun to Pitt, New York, 14 February 1758, COS49, ff.1-14, TNA; Grenier, First Way of War, 130-36.


56 Brumwell, Redcoats, 212.

57 Loudoun to Rogers, New York, 11 January 1758, WO 34 Amherst Papers, Mg13-WO34, Volume 76, Microfilm Reel B-2680, LAC; Loudoun, Circular, New York, 7 September 1757, LO (AM) 4414, HL; Pitt to Amherst, Whitehall, 17 January 1760, Add MS 32901, ff.114-28, BL.
tactics in the army at large and the use of irregular troops for specific purposes during the war after Loudoun’s recall. This reflected a more general evolution of thought within the “seasoned American Army” described by Brumwell, where irregular tactics became a standard aspect of British operations.

IV. Militarisation in North America

The decision made by the British ministry to send regulars to fight in the French and Indian War alongside colonists, all under a British commander-in-chief, marked the beginning of a deliberate process of militarisation in North America that would continue even after the war ended. Militarisation ensured the necessary systems were in place for waging war in North America, pacifying hostile population groups, and securing territory. The process of militarisation was in its early stages during Loudoun’s command, expanding as the war evolved from a conflict in the American interior into a global war involving European powers, and as Britain’s war aims expanded from the expulsion of France from the Ohio Country to its expulsion from the continent. In contrast to Scotland, where militarisation was a method of subjugation and assimilation, in North America it was initially conceived as a way to enable Britain and the colonies to wage war cooperatively. In the colonies, the British had to undertake local recruitment for the regular and provincial armies, attempt to gain Native American allies, locate quarters for the regulars, and manage large quantities of supplies and provisions. In addition, Britain took an increased interest in reforming colonial government and in the colonists themselves, some of whom they accused of profiteering and trading with the enemy. Militarisation meant that war impinged more directly upon the colonists than previously and increased civil-military tension, although tension was neither universal nor constant.

Recruitment

A key aspect of militarisation in North America during Loudoun’s command was the recruitment of colonists for service in both the regular and provincial regiments and recruitment of Native American irregulars. During the Forty-Five, Loudoun had relied upon Highland elites loyal to the government to encourage enlistment to the Independent Companies and to persuade wavering clans to remain neutral rather than joining the
Jacobites. Loudoun had closely negotiated their cooperation in return for status and, in the case of those given command of Independent Companies, place. He had done this because he recognised that an understanding of, and influence over, the local situation and power structures were important for maximising recruitment. Loudoun had asserted his authority in the Highlands, demanding loyalty, but even when dealing with Jacobites this was carefully moderated to achieve tangible results. In the colonies he recognised that, to a much greater extent than in the Highlands, local politics was a barrier to recruitment.

Loudoun relied upon the Indian superintendents to supply Native American allies and to persuade other nations to remain neutral. Although he retained overall command over the superintendents and was often forthcoming with his opinion on Indian affairs, he left diplomatic efforts in their hands, not attempting to influence negotiations. Even before his arrival in North America Loudoun had written to Johnson to express his hope that the Northern Superintendent would use his “utmost endeavours, to procure as large a body as can be got, to act in Conjunction with His Majesty’s Forces, against the Common Enemy.” He went on to state that he was bringing presents with him for the Indians and would consult with Johnson regarding how they ought to be distributed, accepting the Native Americans as distinct nations who had to be persuaded to join the British war effort. This represented a clear parallel with his earlier experiences in the Highlands: whilst Highlanders were British subjects, Loudoun viewed them as an ‘other’ whose allegiance similarly had to be won. Loudoun relied upon the local expertise of the superintendents and the relationships they had already established with various nations for the recruitment of native allies. As in the Highlands, Loudoun took a keen interest in the progress made by the superintendents and, although distance denied them proximity in working together, he corresponded frequently on diplomatic matters, especially Johnson’s meetings with the Iroquois in early 1757.

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58 See Chapter One.
59 Loudoun to Halifax, New York, 26 December 1756, LO (AM) 2416, HL.
60 Loudoun to William Johnson, Whitehall, 11 March 1756, LO (AM) 905, HL. Regarding Loudoun’s willingness to leave Native American diplomacy in the superintendents’ hands see: Loudoun to Johnson, Albany, 16 September 1756, LO (AM) 1821, HL.; Loudoun to Johnson, Halifax, 1 July 1757, LO (AM) 3889, HL.; Loudoun to William Lyttleton, New York, 13 February 1758, LO (AM) 5576, HL.
61 Johnson to Loudoun, Fort Johnson, 17 March 1757, LO (AM) 3073, HL.; Johnson to Loudoun, Fort Johnson, 15 April 1757, LO (AM) 3358, HL.; Johnson to Loudoun, Fort Johnson, 28 April 1757, LO (AM) 3495, HL.
Loudoun recognised the contribution Native Americans could make to the British war effort, praising the campaign of irregular warfare carried out by Cherokee warriors in the Virginian backcountry during the 1757 campaign, which had helped to significantly reduce the number of enemy raids against backcountry settlements. He referenced accounts he had received of the “Services which were done by the Cherokees” when ordering Atkin, the Southern Superintendent, to raise similar numbers for the 1758 expedition against Fort Duquesne, with the freedom to facilitate this as he thought best. Loudoun further strove to prevent colonial governors and assemblies from interfering in Indian affairs and making their own treaties and arrangements with Native Americans. He believed that the superintendents were best placed to undertake such negotiation and that colonial meddling hampered their efforts. He made this clear in a letter to Henry Fox of August 1756 in which he complained that New Jersey had declared war on the Shawnee and Delaware at the same time as Johnson was negotiating a peace with them. On numerous occasions, Loudoun ordered colonies to desist private negotiations with Native Americans and to leave Indian diplomacy in the hands of the superintendents.

Loudoun aimed to play a more direct role in the recruitment of colonists into both the regulars and provincials, although he recognised he would still need to work closely with colonial elites. During the Forty-Five, the entire Highland population had been accused of savagery and disloyalty and those who failed to submit and demonstrate adherence to the British state through cooperation with Loudoun faced subjugation. As such, Loudoun had little trouble gaining the cooperation of Highland elites anxious to prove their loyalty to the Crown. The loyalty paradigm led him to classify the colonists as Britons participating in and benefiting from the imperial venture, just like Britons at home. In placing the needs of the imperial state as paramount, in this case, successful prosecution of the war effort, the loyalty paradigm demanded the allegiance of the colonists to the Crown. Loudoun assumed the colonies would be willing to act cooperatively for the common prosecution of a war that he, therefore, viewed as being just as important for them as it was for the mother-country, and he expected them to exhibit their adherence to the state through compliance with his requests for assistance.

63 Loudoun to Edmond Atkin, New York, 14 Feb 1758, Forbes Papers, Accession 10034, University of Virginia Library, Microfilm Reel 434 DLAR.
64 Loudoun to Fox, Albany, 19 August 1756, LO (AM) 1522, HL.
He anticipated encountering few problems working closely with colonial governors, hoping that they could persuade the colonial assemblies to agree to his requests for troops. Failure to act as expected would suggest disloyalty, which could be overcome by negotiating adherence or by forcing submission. The situation in North America was much more complex than it had been in Scotland and royal governors had to negotiate “requisitions” with assemblies, who held direct power over them through control of their salaries. Further, the fostering of a different interpretation of their rights and responsibilities as Britons led many colonial legislatures to view demands for assistance from the commander-in-chief as a threat to their individual liberty.

Immediately upon his arrival, Loudoun was introduced to the difficulties he would face negotiating with the assemblies regarding the raising of men for the war effort. The loss of Oswego in August 1756 left Britain’s interior and the military headquarters at Albany exposed (Fig.4). Loudoun requested all provinces raise emergency troops to counter a possible French advance, though the main burden was placed on the New England colonies where the immediate danger lay. All assemblies delayed answering Loudoun’s request or refused to comply with it “considering the year is so far advanced” and they were “exhausted both of Men and Money”. Whilst Massachusetts agreed to draft the troops requested from the militia, the assembly ordered them to be kept in reserve until definite intelligence of a French advance was received, which would prevent them providing timely aid. New York, the most exposed province, was alone in answering Loudoun’s request and it was the governor, not the assembly, who authorised the sending of one thousand militiamen to Loudoun, who kept them in service for just ten days until the danger had passed. Similar difficulties beset Loudoun when he requested the colonies send troops to counter a rumoured French advance that October. The slow response of the colonies mobilising their troops frustrated Loudoun and he admonished the assemblies, arguing that had the rumours proven true the colonial delay would have

66 Loudoun, Circular, Albany, 20 August 1756, LO (AM) 1524, HL.
67 Thomas Fitch to Loudoun, Hartford, 20 September 1756, LO (AM) 1857, HL; Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, 171-77.
68 Vote of the Assembly of the General Court of Massachusetts, 10 September 1756, LO (AM) 1761, HL.
69 Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, 177.
prevented the troops from providing the necessary relief to the interior. His anger stemmed from the recognition there was little he could do in such a situation to furnish the troops, vital though they were for the protection of the interior. Despite his frustration, Loudoun attempted to cultivate goodwill amongst the assemblies by ordering enlistment halted immediately upon realising that the delays would prevent the troops offering any benefit to the service. He recognised that many provinces were already struggling financially due to the war effort and ordered the stoppage, as well as the discharge of troops already raised, in an attempt to save the assemblies money. Loudoun’s early encounters made it clear that negotiating with elites in North America would be much more difficult than it had been in Scotland and illustrated to him that colonial assemblies were willing to ignore or refuse his requests for assistance, thereby failing to show due adherence and submission to the Crown.

Loudoun’s early encounters left him convinced that he could only gain colonial support if he sidestepped the assemblies. He proposed negotiating directly with colonial governors and commissioners empowered to act on behalf of the assemblies at two general meetings for the northern and southern provinces. Military practice in Scotland provided a benchmark for Loudoun’s actions in North America as he sought to simplify the recruitment process by removing the additional, complicating layer of power and negotiation that had not existed in Scotland. He would negotiate with the governors and commissioners, allowing them to enjoy agency and power in the recruitment process as he had in the Highlands, but he saw no role for the colonial assemblies whose members were not acting in the way he expected them to as loyal Britons. Loudoun took inspiration from the spirit of mutual defence expressed in the failed Albany Plan, requesting the New England provinces raise a total of four thousand troops but allowing the commissioners to decide on what proportion each colony ought to raise. He hoped that this would help to eliminate inter-colonial jealousy and that negotiating directly with commissioners would encourage the colonies to comply with his requests quicker, allowing an early start to the campaigning season. Further, his request for four thousand New England troops,

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70 Loudoun to Spencer Phips, Fort Edward, 17 October 1756, LO (AM) 2031, HL.
71 Loudoun to Wentworth, Fort Edward, 22 October 1756, LO (AM) 2068, HL; Loudoun to Phips, Fort Edward, 24 October 1756, LO (AM) 2076, HL.
72 It is worth noting that the four New England governments were Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire. Loudoun negotiated separately with New York and New Jersey. Loudoun to the Governors and Commissioners of the Four New England Governments, Boston, 29 January 1757, LO (AM) 2728, HL.
considerably less than had been raised the previous year, was Loudoun’s recognition of the expense the colonies were put to by the war and an attempt to cultivate goodwill. As he had in Scotland, he attempted to demonstrate that he was willing to do all in his power to make the situation easier for those he encountered, but only if they acted with due subservience to the Crown, complying with his requests.

Loudoun proved willing to adjust his expectations and understanding of recruitment to the unique circumstances of North America, and he attempted to balance what he believed were necessary assertions of authority with consideration of colonial needs and difficulties to achieve results. However, his attempts to use a quota system to furnish recruits did not overcome all the difficulties he had previously faced as the commissioners failed to agree on quotas, eventually requiring Loudoun to propose these himself.73 Further, as the commissioners did not have the authoritative powers Loudoun had hoped they would, all colonial assemblies had to be consulted before recruitment could begin, causing general delays and leading to a refusal from the New Jersey assembly to raise the troops requested of them.74 The weakness of Loudoun’s position as an imperial agent was illustrated in May 1757 when he received Secretary of State Pitt’s instructions ordering the colonies to raise the same number of troops as the previous year after he had already negotiated the raising of a reduced number. Loudoun was unable to ignore his instructions but, unwilling to cause any further tension with the assemblies when recruitment in many colonies was finally underway, he adapted the instructions, requesting the colonies hold their militias in readiness to assist the service if required.75 Although the majority complied, few took concrete steps to ensure their militia would be able to provide timely and adequate support and New Jersey again refused to comply, even passing a militia act which removed management of the militia from the hands of the governor so that he could not raise it without their approval.76 Adapting his position and expectations in response to local conditions and power structures enabled Loudoun to largely meet his recruitment goals. However, he was left frustrated by the delays to
campaigning resulting from colonial slothfulness and angered by the actions of the New Jersey assembly, which he believed deliberately impeded the service and challenged the royal prerogative.

In attempting to facilitate colonial recruitment, Loudoun had to negotiate with various colonial elites to try and cultivate a good understanding with them whilst simultaneously asserting his authority as an agent of empire to meet his goals for the campaign. He was quick to praise those who complied with his requests and he also actively attempted to reduce the financial burden on the colonies during the campaign: cancelling requests for the raising of provincials after the surrender of Fort William Henry (Fig. 4) due to the arrival of regulars and attempting to ensure that all colonies took responsibility for their proportionate share of the war effort. However, he was also quick to register his displeasure with those assemblies that delayed providing assistance or refused to comply with his demands, informing governors and assemblies alike of his disappointment in an attempt to assert imperial authority and encourage them to reconsider their position. Even when expressing his displeasure, however, Loudoun was measured rather than hot-headed. He again couched his disappointment with reference to the Albany Plan, suggesting that such actions were a desertion of the “common cause of the defence and Security” of the colonies, rather than framing it in terms of imperial disloyalty.

Loudoun’s experiences in North America influenced his opinions on imperial governance, which he did frame in terms of disloyalty. He complained to the ministry about the inaction of the assemblies and argued in favour of imperial reform. In a letter to Cumberland written in late 1756, Loudoun suggested that the problems resulted from the assemblies controlling the salaries of the governors:

…till you find a Fund, independent of the Province, to Pay the Governors, and new model the Government, you can do nothing with the Provinces. I know it has been said in London, this is not the time; if You delay it till a Peace, You will not have a force to Exert any British Acts of Parliament here, for tho’ they will not venture to go so far with me, I am assured by the Officers, that it is not uncommon, for the People

77 Loudoun to the Massachusetts Council, New York, 17 April 1757, LO (AM) 3371, HL; Loudoun to Fitch, Albany, 5 November 1757, LO (AM) 4765, HL; Loudoun, Circular, New York, 7 September 1757, LO (AM) 4414, HL; Loudoun to William Greene, Albany, 20 November 1757, LO (AM) 4873, HL.

78 Loudoun to Jonathan Belcher, New York, 2 April 1757, LO (AM) 3263, HL. See also: Loudoun to Belcher, Philadelphia, 24 March 1757, LO (AM) 3156, HL; Loudoun to Belcher, New York, 3 April 1757, LO (AM) 3279, HL; Loudoun to Horatio Sharpe, New York, 30 December 1757, LO (AM) 5152, HL.
of this Country to say, they would be glad to see any Man, that dare exert a British Act of Parliament here.\textsuperscript{79}  

This highlights that Loudoun increasingly viewed the colonists in a military, rather than civil, light as the requirements of the war effort blurred distinctions. Interpreting the actions of colonial assemblies as insubordinate, disloyal, and contrary to both the service and the empire, Loudoun ‘othered’ the colonists in his letter to Cumberland, perceiving them as significantly different from Britons at home and marking them as a potential threat to British imperial security. Such an understanding was not permanent and was strictly a reflection of the military predicament, but it demonstrates how quickly the militarisation process began to influence British Army attitudes towards the colonists. Further, whilst he proved willing to work within the frameworks currently existing in North America, his experiences led him to strongly recommend a reform of the relationship between the colonies and the mother-country. In Scotland, the British Army had advocated, and implemented, closer regulation over the population as a method of ensuring imperial security and encouraging assimilation and Loudoun believed that such steps should also be taken in North America, expressing similar sentiments to the Earl of Halifax and William Pitt as to Cumberland.\textsuperscript{80} Loudoun hoped that returning power to Crown-appointed representatives would enforce direct control over imperial affairs, encouraging submission and adherence to the state and thereby reaffirming the Britishness of the colonies. The need for significant imperial reform had been highlighted by the Earl of Halifax and the Board of Trade in the 1740s and it was a conclusion that numerous British Army officers would agree with upon serving in that fringe of the British Empire.

\textbf{Military Service}  

Military service was an important aspect of militarisation in both Scotland and North America. However, whilst in the former it eventually acted as a tool of integration for Highlanders into the imperial fold, in the latter military service during the French and Indian War, even with the regulars, did not necessarily correspond to support of the British state during the imperial crisis or the Revolutionary War. In Scotland military

\textsuperscript{79} Loudoun to Cumberland, Albany, 22 November 1756 in Pargellis, \textit{Military Affairs}, 273.  

\textsuperscript{80} Loudoun to Halifax, New York, 26 December 1756, LO (AM) 2416, HL; Loudoun to Pitt, HMS Sutherland, 17 June 1757, LO (AM) 3845, HL.
service underwent two key phases: the first during the Forty-Five when Highlanders were recruited as regulars by Loudoun into his 64th Regiment and into militia companies that fought alongside them, and the second upon the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War when large numbers of Highlanders were recruited into the British Army to serve as regulars in the North American theatre of the war.\(^81\) During the first phase, and to a lesser extent in the early stages of the second, there was widespread hostility towards Highland soldiers within the military and government because Highlanders were viewed as untrustworthy savages; even those who remained loyal to the Crown were suspected of Jacobitism. Loudoun was a notable exception, willing to recruit Highlanders for military service. He did not view all Highlanders as inherently rebellious and, working closely with this ‘other’ population group caused him to view them as less alien than most of the British imperial elite did at that juncture. Unlike those who characterised them as incompetent and untrustworthy, Loudoun came to appreciate the local knowledge that he believed left Highlanders naturally suited to the irregular warfare they carried out. His experiences with Highland soldiers provided Loudoun with experience about how internal population groups could best be utilised by the British Army that influenced not only how he approached irregular warfare but also the general utilisation of colonial troops in North America.

Upon his arrival in North America, Loudoun inherited a provincial army from his predecessor William Shirley, rather than raising it himself as he had done in Scotland. Shirley had facilitated the raising of the provincials on the agreement that they would act independently of the regular troops on an expedition against Crown Point (Fig. 4) commanded by provincial officers.\(^82\) He had agreed to this believing it the only way to gain sufficient numbers of provincial troops as relationships between regular and provincial soldiers were often tense, particularly when the two groups were forced to work in close proximity with one another during joint campaigns.\(^83\) Provincials were particularly frustrated by British regulations that left provincial officers of any rank with less authority than regular officers of the lowest rank, as well as by the 1754 regulation

\(^{81}\) See Chapter One.


\(^{83}\) Shirley informed Loudoun of the problems he had encountered the previous year when regular and provincial soldiers had campaigned together shortly before the latter’s arrival. Shirley to Loudoun, Albany, 24 June 1756, LO (AM) 1246, HL.
that subjected them to the discipline of the regulars whilst on joint campaigns. Regular officers and soldiers tended to view the provincials’ abilities disparagingly and objected to their perceived lack of discipline.\textsuperscript{84} Loudoun was furious at Shirley for putting the fate of the year’s main expedition entirely in the hands of inexperienced and ill-disciplined provincials. It did not fit with Loudoun’s previous experience in Scotland where regular troops had undertaken the bulk of campaigning and the Highlanders raised under Loudoun had engaged in irregular warfare, which he thought best suited their skills and experience.

Loudoun had no choice but to agree that the provincials could remain subject to the terms of their enlistment as the provincials threatened to abandon the expedition en masse if they were forced to work alongside regulars, but insisted they accept his authority as commander-in-chief, the first time the provincials were to acknowledge this during the war.\textsuperscript{85} Fred Anderson highlighted the contractual view New Englanders took of military service. During the dispute, the provincials argued that they had signed up for service upon certain terms and that, if those terms were broken (as Loudoun proposed by forcing them to serve alongside the regulars) they would be within their rights to return to their homes, and escape punishment for desertion.\textsuperscript{86} The situation angered Loudoun as he believed his commission gave him authority to “Command all the Troops raised or to be raised in North America”\textsuperscript{87} and was frustrated that he had to compromise for this to be accepted. Further, he believed his appointment as the King’s military representative in the colonies gave him the power to alter the terms of service for all soldiers to answer campaigning needs.\textsuperscript{88} However, he recognised the necessity of the provincials and chose to negotiate to prevent the issue impeding the service. He had not had to compromise his authority in a similar way in Scotland and this early experience again highlighted that the situation in North America would be much more difficult for Loudoun to navigate.

\textsuperscript{84} Anderson, \textit{Crucible of War}, 139-40; Brumwell, \textit{Redcoats}, 18.

\textsuperscript{85} Pargellis, \textit{Lord Loudoun}, 91-92; Minutes of a Council of War Held at Albany, 16 July 1756, LO (AM) 1314, HL; Loudoun to John Winslow, Albany, 31 July 1756, LO (AM) 1377, HL; Winslow to Loudoun, Albany, 10 August 1756, LO (AM) 1462, HL.


\textsuperscript{87} Loudoun to John Winslow, Albany, 31 July 1756, LO (AM) 1377, HL.

\textsuperscript{88} Anderson, ‘Why Did Colonial New Englanders Make Bad Soldiers?’, 401.
Loudoun’s Scottish experiences continued to provide a benchmark for his actions in North America regarding the military services of the provincials, despite the challenges he encountered. During the Forty-Five he had acted in fairness towards all his Highland troops and had not treated those in the Independent Companies as inferior. Prior to his embarkation for North America, he had similarly attempted to act in a fair manner towards provincial troops by bringing the issue of disparity in rank between regulars and provincials to the attention of the ministry. Loudoun argued that such disparity should be eliminated to remove colonial grievances, highlighting that he recognised the importance of provincial troops and wanted to ensure that they would act as willing contributors to the war effort. His actions prompted a regulation giving provincial officers rank with the eldest regular captains when serving alongside them, meaning that far fewer provincial officers stood to be outranked by their more junior, regular counterparts on joint expeditions.\(^\text{89}\) Although he accepted the situation Shirley had agreed upon for 1756, Loudoun drew upon his prior experience for the 1757 campaign; expressing his desire to recruit provincials of a good standard, preferably with prior military experience, and to employ them to carry out specific tasks. Loudoun believed regulars were best suited for general campaigning whilst provincials could best be utilised by playing a supporting role and manning the interior, as the Highland troops had during the Forty-Five. He thought employing the provincial troops to garrison forts in the backcountry, in conjunction with regulars where necessary and appropriate, was most beneficial for the service as they would provide protection upon colonial boundaries from French assaults and Native American raiding parties whilst freeing up a larger proportion of regulars to engage in direct offensive manoeuvres against the French.\(^\text{90}\) This model influenced his planning in 1757 when he ordered a regular force to attack Louisbourg whilst provincials and a smaller number of regulars defended the interior forts.

Whilst earlier experience influenced how Loudoun approached and managed provincial military service in North America, he also adapted to local circumstances. In response to the general abhorrence of regular discipline amongst the provincial soldiers, he took steps to prevent any provincial soldier from being executed by a regular officer.

\(^{89}\) Pargellis, *Lord Loudoun*, 92. Whilst this removed much of the inequality, many provincials remained dissatisfied until Pitt’s regulation of December 1757 gave provincial officers rank directly under that of a regular officer of the same rank.

in 1757. He hoped that the threat of regular discipline would be more effective for governing the behaviour of the provincials and preventing desertion than imposing the harshest punishments upon them. In a number of cases, provincials were sentenced to death by a mixed court martial, but their sentence was later reduced or they were pardoned.91 Loudoun hoped leniency would have “a better effect upon the Troops than the severity of Punishment.”92 His priority was the successful prosecution of the war and he was willing to forgo the usual punishments for military transgressions if moderate measures were likely to produce better results in provincial behaviour.

Loudoun demonstrated on numerous occasions that he was willing to adapt military service for provincials if the steps he took would improve their performance and allow campaigns to be conducted more effectively, so long as the steps did not represent a threat to royal authority. He recognised the objections of the provincials and viewed them in a much more balanced way than many other British Army officers who served alongside or after him. His willingness to recognise the importance of provincials and seek adaptations best suited to their strengths was unusual within the British Army hierarchy where the contribution and ability of such troops were often dismissed without qualification.93 However, he was typical of British Army officers in North America in that, despite his accommodations for the provincials, he privately complained about their behaviour, talent, and discipline to subordinates as well as ministry officials in London. Loudoun claimed the army’s progress had been delayed “by the Quibbles of the Provincials”94 and expressed frustration that the provincials at Fort William Henry “could not be prevailed on to so far finish the Fort”95 upon the lapsing of their enlistment period. Such actions, he warned, threatened to throw the fort “into the Enemys hands”.96 This illustrates that Loudoun believed the provincials, like the assemblies, were willing to sacrifice British imperial security for their own ends. Whilst service in Scotland alongside the Highland troops had eroded some of the ‘otherness’ of that population in Loudoun’s eyes, service in North America, where he had not campaigned in the field with provincials

91 Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, 96.
92 Quoted in Brumwell, Redcoats, 108.
93 Anderson, ‘Why Did Colonial New Englanders Make Bad Soldiers?’
94 Loudoun to Cumberland, Albany, 20 August 1756, LO (AM) 1525, HL.
95 Loudoun to Winslow, Albany, 5 November 1756, LO (AM) 2159, HL.
96 Loudoun to Winslow, Fort Edward, 21 October 1756, LO (AM) 2056, HL.
as he had in Scotland, had an opposite effect. It caused him, and other British military officers, to view and treat the provincials as notably different from the regulars and, as such, from Britons generally. Such a view would be strengthened during and after the war as colonists’ perceived disloyalty led them to increasingly be classified as an ‘other’ rather than as Britons by British Army officers.97

Quartering

The impact of militarisation in North America was further felt on colonial elites and civilians due to the army’s attempts to secure quarters for the regulars. Quartering was a country-wide problem, as British troops required accommodation whilst on the march and throughout the winter months when campaigning halted. It increased interactions between the army and the populace, whom they were generally quartered amongst, which tended to temporarily increase tension between the two groups whilst the troops were there, as well as causing repeated disputes between British Army officers and colonial assemblies and other elites regarding the provision of suitable quarters and necessities. Quartering invoked issues of space and privacy, forcing colonists to consider questions of difference between public and private houses, civil and martial spaces, and regular and provincial soldiers. At its highest level, it was essentially a dispute over power between British Army officers and colonial assemblies centring around whether quartering ought to be addressed by acts of the colonial assemblies or by the royal prerogative.98

The Mutiny Act distinguished public and private spaces in England, ordering troops be billeted only in public houses and giving the army responsibility for the cost of troop necessities. In Scotland and Ireland, however, where there was a lack of suitable public houses, quartering was allowed in private houses and the costs of necessities were borne by the providers of quarters. During the Forty-Five, soldiers had generally either been quartered in pre-existing forts and garrisons or required to camp whilst on the march. British Army officers had requisitioned some private houses for the use of troops, particularly in the Lowlands, under the Mutiny Act but disputes ended with the rebellion’s failure. Furthermore, the army did not have to deal with civil authorities in Scotland who held significant power themselves and whose cooperation was necessary

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97 See Chapters three, four, and five.
98 Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, 187.
for the quartering of troops as they did in North America. This made the settling of quartering a much simpler exercise in that imperial fringe. The sections of the Mutiny Act relating to quartering were not extended to North America and no separate act was passed to settle the issue until 1765, leaving the situation undefined. Loudoun’s only guidance upon taking the command was a Privy Council ruling of 1756, which disputed the right of the Pennsylvania Assembly to pass a Quartering Act, claiming the colonies did not have the right to legislate on such matters, and his instructions, which ordered him to use the example from Britain when seeking quarters for his men in North America.  

Recognising parallels in the situation in Scotland and North America, particularly regarding the unsuitability of the small, cramped public houses for holding large numbers of soldiers, Loudoun chose to interpret his instructions as widely as possible. He argued the King had rights to “Quarters with proper Conveniences for [his] Troops at all Times”, so he could demand the quarters he required, whether this consisted of barracks, public houses, or private houses if the first two were not available or suitable and he could take them by force if they were not provided willingly. Again, the paradigm of loyalty guided him as he determined the colonists ought to act as loyal Britons; respecting the royal prerogative and, therefore, his authority as commander-in-chief. Further, he recognised that he had little room to negotiate on the issue of quartering because his troops could not survive the winter without adequate shelter and conceding points in one colony would spark further demands, raise costs, and likely precipitate his recall. He was also hampered by the lack of action taken in London to either find a solution or legitimise his authority on the matter. Despite assurances from William Pitt that he would resolve the problems with the Mutiny Bill, neither he nor the ministry addressed the issue of quartering in North America during Loudoun’s command or, indeed, during the entirety of the French and Indian War.

When Loudoun demanded quarters, in private houses if necessary, colonial assemblies were forced to consider whether civil and martial spaces should be separated

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99 Anderson, Crucible of War, 147; Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, 190-91. William Shirley avoided quartering difficulties by spending large sums of Crown money converting blockhouses in New York into barracks for the rank and file and paying officers for their quarters.

100 Loudoun to Lyttleton, New York, 6 December 1757, LO (AM) 4954, HL.

101 Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, 192-93.

102 Pitt to Loudoun, Whitehall, 22 December 1756, LO (AM) 2383, HL; Pitt to Loudoun, Whitehall, 4 February 1757, LO (AM) 2765, HL; Pitt to Loudoun, Whitehall, 19 February 1757, LO (AM) 2859, HL.
or joined. They quickly disagreed with Loudoun’s interpretation, highlighting that the sections of the Mutiny Act related to quartering specifically applied to Britain and arguing that individual circumstances ought to be applied to suit local conditions rather than general provisions being extended across America. The failure of the ministry to craft legislation to support Loudoun’s position encouraged colonial challenges, and numerous assemblies and municipal authorities, including New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts, refused requests for the provision of quarters during 1756 and 1757.

Loudoun attempted to settle the point emphatically the first time it was raised, threatening to seize quarters by force following a refusal by the mayor of the city of New York. The threat of force on this occasion worked, and the mayor and council agreed to provide the quarters. Loudoun believed that, as an imperial agent, he was authorised to make such demands of colonial authorities, viewing them as essential for the successful prosecution of the war and, therefore, the maintenance of British imperial security. He was left frustrated by New York’s initial refusal and, combined with the delays and difficulties he had faced regarding recruiting, interpreted it as an act of disloyalty towards the Crown and an obstruction to the service. However, the experience also led him to believe the colonies would submit to his authority if he utilised the threat of force as and when necessary, informing Henry Fox that “the People in this Country, tho’ they are very obstinate, will generally submit when they see you determined.” His prior experiences in Scotland also influenced how Loudoun handled the disagreement over quartering in New York, leading to his adoption of moderate tactics after his initial assertion of authority. Once the authorities had agreed to quarter the troops he immediately made a conciliatory gesture towards them by not insisting that they provide beer for the troops as a necessity. He insisted it was his right to demand it from them but chose not to in recognition of the financial impact of the war upon the colonies and in an attempt to cultivate goodwill with colonial authorities without compromising his authority.

Loudoun also faced disputes over quartering in Pennsylvania in 1756 and South Carolina and Massachusetts in 1757 and had to rely upon the threat of force to bolster his authority and achieve the desired results. However, problems related to quartering were

103 Message from the General Court, Massachusetts, 16 December 1757, LO (AM) 5021, HL.
104 Loudoun to Cumberland, Albany, 22 November 1756 in Pargellis, Military Affairs, 272; Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, 199-200.
105 Loudoun to Fox, Albany, 22 November 1756, LO (AM) 2263, HL.
106 Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, 199.
neither as many nor as drawn out as has been suggested, and the problems did not disappear after Loudoun’s recall. Indeed, if anything the dispute between Britain and the colonies regarding quartering became even more pronounced in the aftermath of the war when Thomas Gage commanded a standing army in North America. Problems regarding quartering contributed to Loudoun’s frustration with colonial authorities generally, confirming his opinion that the colonial assemblies had too much power and deliberately and consistently acted out of self-interest and in direct opposition to royal authority. Whilst he adapted to the systems of power and authority operating in North America during his command as much as he could without compromising the authority and supremacy of the mother-country, his experiences left him convinced that adaptation of the imperial-colonial relationship was required for the more effective governance of North America.

Loudoun did not regularly interact with colonial civilians, whereas his soldiers and officers quartered in colonial communities increased civil-military tension. The quartering of troops in the Highlands during and after the Forty-Five had similarly increased interactions and tension, but this had not been as disruptive as it would prove to be in America, where larger bodies of troops were involved. Civilian objections to the stationing of redcoats amongst them had numerous roots. There was a general fear of the prospect of a standing army throughout the British Empire. This had been exacerbated in England in the seventeenth century over concern that the monarch might utilise the army to control the populace and ignore Parliament. Whilst American aversion to a standing army would become increasingly important in the post-war period, far more important during the war were prejudicial views about the social composition of the British Army and its propensity for disorderly conduct. Contemporary opinion argued that British regulars were the poorest and least skilled in society and that they were often criminals avoiding prison or vagrants who had no other option than enlistment. Such beliefs were fostered by officers, such as James Wolfe, who regularly complained about the poor quality of men they were forced to recruit. Civilians feared for their safety if criminals

107 Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, 195. See Chapter Five regarding Gage’s quartering problems.
108 See: Shy, Toward Lexington; Anderson, Crucible of War.
109 Brumwell, Redcoats, 55; Archer, As If an Enemy’s Country, xiii.
111 Wolfe to Edward Wolfe, Southampton, 4 September 1755 in Wilson, Life and Letters of Wolfe, 273.
and undesirables were quartered in close proximity to themselves and their families. Such fears were often exacerbated because soldiers in winter quarters were inactive and prone to disobedience, drunkenness, and disorder.¹¹² Accusations against soldiers of theft, destruction of property, and violence were common in areas where troops were quartered for prolonged periods.

However, quartering could also bring benefits to a region when soldiers remained under strict discipline. In the Highlands, the army served as a focus for commercialisation as troops required provisions and supplies and the soldiers used their wages to purchase local goods. This was also the case for some areas in North America as the customer base of merchants and traders expanded due to the war. Albany did very well as a result of the stationing of the army in the town and the trade embargo imposed upon the colonies by Loudoun had little effect there due to the increase in trade from the army.¹¹³ Other frontier towns including Lancaster, Carlisle, and Winchester also benefitted from the war as a result of increased opportunities for commerce but this was not the case universally, and many colonies that quartered troops still suffered economically as a result of both the war generally and Loudoun’s embargo specifically. Overall, civil-military tension increased during Loudoun’s time in command in North America, given the influx of regulars, and continued afterward.

Loudoun’s frustration over the issue of quartering was largely directed towards the colonial assemblies but the attitude of the colonists regarding both that issue and the war effort more generally also angered him. His view of the colonists was shaped by his focus on his military task and he complained they caused delays and added expense to the service. He found “not only, a general backwardness in every Colony, but even, almost in every individual on this Continent, to aid in carrying on the Public Service.”¹¹⁴ To Loudoun, all in North America lacked a proper sense of their duty to the Crown as loyal Britons and the fact they appeared willing to act in opposition to Britain’s war effort if it was in their interest to do so suggested imperial disloyalty.

¹¹² Brumwell, Redcoats, 104-6.
¹¹⁴ Loudoun to Fox, Albany, 3 October 1756, LO (AM) 1961, HL.
V. Conclusions

Loudoun’s prior military experience in Scotland and lessons learnt in that imperial fringe influenced how he approached warfare in North America and left him determined to overcome the obstacles to campaigning in another imperial fringe. The steps he took to create standardised transport and logistics systems were inspired by his formative experiences and adapted to suit the unique challenges and vast scale of warfare in North America. The systems he implemented played an instrumental role in the ultimate British victory, influencing military officers even after his recall. Loudoun similarly applied the knowledge he had gained of irregular warfare in Scotland when organising scouting parties that took advantage of local knowledge and planning campaigns with irregulars in North America. As with logistics, he adapted his earlier experiences in response to North American conditions, attempting to spread knowledge of irregular warfare throughout the entire army and to raise specific light infantry units to remove the army’s reliance on unreliable Native American allies and expensive and ill-disciplined rangers.

The militarisation of North America was also influenced by Loudoun’s prior Scottish experiences. He proved himself willing to negotiate as a first response to conflict with those he encountered including colonial authorities and provincial soldiers, who had different understandings of the imperial relationship than he did as a Crown-appointed army officer and peer. As in the Highlands, however, he also demanded that the royal prerogative be respected and was quick to register his displeasure when individuals or authorities acted in a way he felt subverted it. Loudoun’s North American experiences and interactions illustrate a more nuanced character than the historiography suggests. Whilst he did come into conflict with colonial assemblies and provincial soldiers it would be wrong to conclude that these conflicts were a result of his bullying manner. Where possible Loudoun negotiated with those he encountered and the hard line he took regarding quartering was his only option due to a lack of support from London. Furthermore, Loudoun was not the only commander-in-chief to come into conflict with various groups in North America and after his recall disagreement between military and colonial authorities remained common.

Militarisation did tend to increase tension between the civil and military spheres in North America as the two became blurred because of the impingement of war upon the populace. The British Army was concerned with how best to wage war far from the central power structures of London. As a result, the colonists increasingly came to be
seen by Loudoun, his successors, and his subordinates in a military rather than civil light and frustration grew at their complaints and perceived insubordination as the British felt they did not contribute enough to the war effort and even impeded the service on occasion. Their failure to adhere to the British state suggested that they were not loyal Britons and they were instead classified as an ‘other’ by Loudoun and other British Army officers. This interpretation was not static and was, at this point, confined to military affairs but it provides an early indication of changing attitudes within the army towards the colonists which were consolidated during and after the war. Further, although Loudoun showed a willingness to work within the existing system of governance in North America and negotiate with those who held power in that country, he was frustrated by their failure to recognise what he believed to be the rightful authority of the mother-country and believed the system required adaptation. His suggestions for closer regulation and a redistribution of power from assemblies to Crown-appointed officials highlight that, even whilst the war was ongoing, questions were being asked as to whether the “empire of negotiation” remained fit for purpose or whether steps, such as those being taken in the Highlands at that time, ought to be adopted to enable closer regulation and assimilation in another imperial fringe.

115 Marshall, Making and Unmaking.
Chapter Three: James Murray

Figure 5. Title: James Murray. Artist: Unknown. Date created: c.1765-70. ©National Portrait Gallery.
https://www-npg-org-uk.ezproxy.stir.ac.uk/collections/search/portrait/mw04594/James-Murray?
I. Introduction

The shift in British ministerial focus during the French and Indian War from asserting control over the Ohio Country towards the conquest of French North America continued in the aftermath of Loudoun’s recall with the successful 1758 expedition against Louisbourg and the assault on Quebec the following year. Command of the Quebec campaign was given to James Wolfe, veteran of the Forty-Five, and Wolfe chose Robert Monckton and James Murray as two of his three brigadiers general whilst William Pitt secured the appointment of George Townshend as the third. The campaign to conquer Quebec demonstrated the continuing influence of the Forty-Five on the British Army as the civility paradigm once again encouraged officers to undertake a violent campaign. After the British victory at the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, which left James Murray at the head of a British occupation of Quebec, the army’s first objective was securing its tenuous hold on the region as the wider conflict with France continued. In Scotland, the British were able to attain short-term security through the subjugation of the local population, but in Canada, punitive pacification was impossible because of the continuing military threats from the French-Canadian inhabitants and the French military. Therefore, steps were taken to induce the local population to cooperate with the British Army. Officers were guided by the benevolence paradigm as they sought to establish dominance through cooperative submission.

The September 1760 surrender of Montréal made Canada the newest fringe of the British Empire, although it was generally expected the region would be handed back to France when peace came, either to secure the return of any potential British losses or to acquire more profitable conquests. For now, the French-Canadian population became subjects of the British Crown despite clear differences of nationality, language, and religion, a status they would keep after the 1763 Treaty of Paris confirmed that Canada would remain British.¹ The eventual decision to keep Canada rather than the French sugar colony of Guadeloupe was made for strategic reasons to secure Britain’s empire in North America. Thereafter, British attempts to govern Canada and assimilate the French-

¹ Immediately after the 1760 conquest debates began to emerge regarding whether Britain ought to restore Canada to France at the eventual peace. See Anonymous, ‘The Interest of Great Britain Considered with Regard to Her Colonies and the Acquisition of Canada and Guadeloupe’, Evans Collection. The ministry was also split regarding what conquests Britain ought to retain, although the majority pushed to keep Canada. See Guy Frégault, Canada: The War of the Conquest (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1969), 296-340.
Canadians more closely within the British Empire through militarisation and commercialisation were governed by the paradigm of loyalty that had likewise governed the militarisation of the Highlands after the Forty-Five. But questions of long-term security, religious differences, and the need to accommodate various population groups made the situation in Canada much more complex and left James Murray, first as military and then as civil governor of the region, struggling to balance often contradictory aims whilst asserting British imperial authority.

The previous chapter highlighted how Loudoun’s formative experiences led him to view the colonists in a military, rather than civil, light and to question their imperial loyalty with regards to the war effort. This chapter explores Murray’s attitudes and actions in Quebec from 1759 until his recall in 1766, focusing on his relations with the French-Canadian population in their transition from enemies to subjects. It first considers how Murray’s identity and family reputation shaped his imperial outlook, before examining the conquest, pacification, and governance of Canada. Investigating the themes of subjugation, accommodation, and cooperative submission enables comparisons with British approaches during the Forty-Five. Militarisation in North America continued under Murray and the process led him to question the assumption that assimilation was necessary to guarantee the imperial loyalty of ‘other’ populations, whilst concurrently causing him to question the loyalty of the colonial merchants who settled in Canada after the conquest. As governor of Canada, Murray was granted much autonomy over the direction of policy and the choices he made provided a precedent both for his replacement Guy Carleton and for the Quebec Act of 1774.

II. James Murray and the Burden of Jacobitism

If Lord Loudoun felt it necessary to outwardly demonstrate his loyalty to the British state because he was a Lowland Scot, James Murray had even more reason to do so. Born in Ballencrieaff, in the Lothians, in 1722, Murray was a son of the fourth Lord Elibank and younger brother to Alexander, a main conspirator in the Jacobite Elibank plot of 1752. Upon discovery, Alexander spent two decades in exile with Prince Charles’ inner circle. Murray’s elder brother Patrick, who became fifth Lord Elibank in 1736, was also strongly suspected of Jacobitism, although he was careful to ensure there was no evidence linking him to the Stuarts. Prior to the Elibank plot, the Stuart sympathies of the
two brothers were already so well known that Horace Walpole described them in 1751 as being:

Both such active Jacobites that if the Pretender had succeeded, they could have produced many witnesses to testify their zeal for him; both so cautious, that no witnesses of actual treason could be produced by the government against them: the very sort of Jacobitism that has kept the cause alive, and kept it from succeeding.  

James Murray himself was never accused of Jacobitism and there is no evidence to suggest he supported the Stuarts at any point in his life. His initial military experience was in the Scots brigade of the Dutch Army from 1736, and in 1740 he purchased a commission in the British Army. In the War of the Austrian Succession, he served in Europe and was not present during the Forty-Five. However, the rumours of Jacobitism cast a shadow over Murray’s entire career.

Murray believed his family’s Jacobitism hindered his progress in the army. On numerous occasions, less experienced officers were promoted above him, including Robert Monckton, Thomas Gage, and Ralph Burton, who served with him in North America. Murray was the junior brigadier in the Quebec campaign to Robert Monckton and George Townshend. By 1762 he seemed to accept he had reached the apex of his career unless the British government could finally see past his family’s disgrace. Seeking the support of Secretary at War Charles Townshend in his search for preferment, he offered that:

By the chances of war [and] very extraordinary ones they have been, I have hitherto surmounted the difficulties thrown in my way by the Political Behaviour of two of my Brothers, but perhaps these Chances have already push’d me higher than the true maxims of a well govern’d state will admit...tho’ it would be too much to give Lord Elibanks Brother an old Regiment, I humbly presume it will be right to support the authority of the Governor of Quebec by some distinction...  

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4 James Murray to Charles Townshend, Quebec, 1 September 1762, WO 34, vol 2, Microfilm Reel B-2637, LAC. Despite the association of his family with Jacobitism, James Murray frequently corresponded with most of his siblings, except Alexander, throughout his life. The Elibank Collection at the NRS suggests that Murray did not correspond with Alexander until the latter was granted permission from the Crown to return to Britain in the early 1770s. See Elibank Collection, GD32/24, NRS.
The letter to Townshend implicitly questioned the advancement of Scottish officers, at a time when Scotophobia was rampant in London by dint of the Earl of Bute’s influence over the young George III. An agent of empire he might have been, but Murray remained fully aware of the limits to his and other Scots’ imperial progression.

Murray’s appointment as first military and then civil governor of Canada made him enemies of Scotophobes in London and Canada. John Wilkes was Murray’s most persistent detractor, harbouring his own unfulfilled ambitions to become governor of Quebec. Wilkes’ attacks in the North Briton claimed that the colonies had been left “prey to the rapacity of four hungry Scottish governors” (Murray in Quebec, his nephew George Johnstone in West Florida, James Grant in East Florida, and Robert Melville in Granada) even though the undeserving Murray had almost lost Quebec in 1760. Murray, Wilkes presumed, was part of Bute’s inner circle and one of the “King’s Friends”. The ambitious colonial merchants who settled in Quebec in the aftermath of the conquest disliked Murray’s overtures to the French-Canadians and petitioned for his recall. They used common Scotophobic stereotypes equating Scottishness with Jacobitism to their advantage, portraying Murray as a tyrannical governor. These attacks likely contributed to Murray’s belief that he had reached the apex of his career and encouraged him to continue allying himself with the French-Canadians in recognition of the opposition he faced from other quarters.

Murray was not averse to portraying himself as British, rather than Scottish, to counter the machinations of his opponents. His marriage into the Collier family provided him with a powerful ally, and he recognised that much of his advancement by 1752 had been due to the political influence and financial assistance of his father-in-law. He also developed relationships with those in power and by 1760 he could count the Duke of Newcastle and Jeffrey Amherst as patrons, thanking both for his appointment as military

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8 Reginald H. Mahon, Life of General The Hon. James Murray: A Builder of Canada, with a Biographical Sketch of the Family of Murray of Elibank (London: John Murray, 1921), 52. A lack of independent funds contributed to the slow progression of Murray’s career. He was able to overcome this when his father-in-law bequeathed him a significant sum. See Murray to George Murray, Quebec, 9 June 1763, Murray Papers.
governor. Although Murray did not respond directly to Wilkes’ attacks on his family and identity, he repeatedly emphasised his loyalty to the King and complained of his detractors in the ministry. In a letter to his friend and confidant Ralph Burton, Murray opined:

…for my part I believe our young King is very capable of Governing himself, and I am such a friend to our incomparable Constitution that I shall be sorry ever to see Him reduced to the necessity of Governing by Faction…These are Mr Burton! the Sentiments of an honest Briton who Blushes for the man who makes distinctions betwixt the North, and South of the Tweed, and who in Place, or out of place, elivated, or depressed, will ever think the same, and act accordingly.

Murray’s comments came in the wake of the resignation of the Earl of Bute in April 1763 following the Wilkite campaign. His references to the “incomparable Constitution” of Britain and the evolution of the idea of a “Patriot King” ruling independently above faction highlight a clear identification with the imperialist ideology of King George III himself who gloried “in the Name of Briton” and aimed to unify the people of Britain, Ireland, and the colonies under a paternalistic monarch. Murray’s emphasis on being an “honest Briton” disassociated himself from the images perpetuated by Scotophobia and was an investment in the patriotic ideology of inclusive Britishness above the factionalism.

Did his own experiences lead him to oppose the oppression of the French-Canadian population? In his correspondence, Murray took pains to explain exactly how his policies would help ensure long-term imperial security and general prosperity. The mildness of the pacification was a result of Murray’s personal choice rather than military or ministerial directive. The commander-in-chief only asserted control over recruitment, quartering, and discipline, whilst the Pitt-Newcastle, and later Bute, ministry was focused on the continuing war effort and gave Murray no instructions. Whether he was more predisposed towards mild measures and toleration due to his own experiences or not,

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9 Murray to Newcastle, Quebec, 25 May 1760, ff.259-60, Add MS 32906, BL; Murray to Amherst, Quebec, 1 September ‘1762, WO 34, vol 2, Microfilm Reel B-2637, LAC.

10 Murray to Ralph Burton, Quebec, 7 November 1763, Murray Papers.

Murray exhibited the paradigm of benevolence when balancing subjugation and cooperation, believing it to be in the best interest of the Crown. Likewise, as his understanding of imperial loyalty evolved due to his experiences implementing militarisation in Canada, his refusal to call an assembly during the period of civil government was again motivated by his belief that doing so would undermine imperial security. Murray pursued this course despite the sustained petitioning against him by the mercantile population that would eventually lead to his return to London and to his conduct being investigated, although ultimately sanctioned. Figure 5 depicts Murray at the height of his power and influence in Canada, dressed in the uniform of a Major-General with Quebec City in the background, symbolising his military role in the conquest. It was likely painted after his return to London to celebrate his personal contribution to the conquest of Canada and the exoneration of his conduct as governor.

III. Conquest and Pacification, Canada 1759-63

Subjugation

James Murray’s first years in Canada were concerned with the conquest and the pacification of the French-Canadian population. There were significant differences between the conflict in Canada and the earlier campaign in Scotland, not least that in Canada the British faced an external, rather than internal, enemy. However, there were parallels: regular and irregular warfare was present in both. The British Army in Canada faced regulars (the troupes de terre and the troupes de la Marine) and irregulars (the French-Canadian militia and Native Americans), while also struggling to differentiate non-combatants and combatants amongst the civilian population. Matthew Ward suggested the siege of Quebec represented an early example of ‘total warfare’ in North America, citing the French mobilisation of civilians through male participation in the militia and women and children in transporting supplies and intelligence-gathering. The British Army under James Wolfe actively targeted French-Canadian civilians as well as soldiers, destroying homes, food-stores, and crops.  

the mass mobilisation of civilians on the scale of Quebec, but the campaign of destruction to subjugate French-Canadians was reminiscent of that undertaken against Highlanders.

Undertaking a sustained bombardment of the city in 1759, the British Army destroyed hundreds of houses and large quantities of stores, demoralising the population. Parties were sent to scour the country, with orders to set fire to all buildings except churches, to seize or destroy crops, cattle, and other provisions, and to kill all men they found and take the women prisoner. James Murray took charge of the expedition north of the city, ordering his troops to burn houses to provoke French forces into an engagement. Whilst there is no record of the numbers killed, Matthew Ward highlighted that all settlements and approximately two thousand farms were destroyed in a one hundred mile strip above and below Quebec. As Armstrong Starkey argued, whilst the limits of violence during a campaign were theoretically set by sovereigns and governments, in reality it was the officers on the ground who decided whether to adhere to the rules of warfare and how to treat civilians. Wolfe had direct experience of the effectiveness of the fire and sword tactics employed in the Highlands, which had neutralised the threat of the local population, and his army mirrored these aspects of that campaign in Quebec.

As in Scotland, the army justified a campaign that targeted civilians by accusing that population of savagery. The British tended to associate French-Canadians with Native Americans, because the militia frequently worked in conjunction with Indian scouts and allies, and accused both groups of atrocities. The British used the paradigm of civility to characterise the savage barbarism of these groups in contrast to their own supposedly more civilised warfare. Wolfe, for example, frequently bracketed “Indians and Canadians” in correspondence and his private journal, depicting both together as “the Savages”. In July 1759 he issued orders forbidding the “unhumane Practice of Scalping

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13 General Wolfe’s Orders to Brigadier Murray, 5th August 1759, Murray Papers; Journal of James Wolfe, Quebec, 1759, James Wolfe Collection, MG18-L5, Microfilm Reel M-1910, LAC; Journal of the Siege of Quebec, 1759 by Edward Coates, Microfilm Reel 388, DLAR.

14 Ward, ‘Crossing the Line?’, 53.


Except when the Enemy are Indians [and] all Canadians Dress’d Like Indians.”

Wolfe’s order effectively gave his troops impunity to scalp any French-Canadian they encountered, again blurring the two populations and asserting that previous and continuing barbarities undertaken by both justified the army’s actions. Whilst French-Canadians were not explicitly labelled as savages in the same way as Highlanders and Native Americans, the army’s association of them with Native Americans caused them to be treated as such whilst the conflict was ongoing.

In both Scotland and Quebec, the difficulty the British Army faced defining their enemy, and their association of the population with savagery, rationalised the targeting of the civilian population. Due to the French Army’s reliance upon the French-Canadian militia, and the mobilisation of the entirety of Quebec society in the war effort, the divide between the military and civil spheres in Quebec was already ill-defined. This made it easier for Wolfe and the British Army to justify a campaign that purposefully aimed to subjugate the entire population. When the fleet first arrived in the River St. Lawrence, Wolfe issued a proclamation to the civilians, assuring them that they would not be harmed if they remained at home and took no part in the campaign. He warned that:

The Resolution the Canadians ought to take is by no means doubtfull. The utmost Exertion of their Valour will be entirely useless and will only serve to deprive them of the Advantages that they might Enjoy by their Neutrality. The Cruelties of the French against the Subjects of Great Britain in America would excuse the most severe Reprisals. But English Men are too Generous to follow such Barbarous Examples; they offer to the Canadians the sweets of Peace amidst the Horrors of War: it is left to themselves to determine their Fate by their Conduct.

When French-Canadians continued to serve the French war effort, Wolfe claimed that the civilians had now denied themselves any protection they might have been entitled to. Understanding that the rules of warfare clearly demarcated combatants and non-combatants, Wolfe argued that he had been forced to lay waste to the country and target French-Canadians due to the active role they had taken in the war. He did this to justify his campaign of military execution to the British government and public, despite having planned such a campaign from the outset, informing Commander-in-Chief Jeffrey

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17 Townshend’s General Orders, Quebec, 26 June to 10 October 1759, Northcliffe Collection, MG18, Townshend Papers, vol 8, Microfilm Reel C-369, LAC.

18 General Wolfe’s Orders, 1759, ff.196-7, Northcliffe Collection, MG18, Separate Items, No. 23, Microfilm Reel C-370, LAC.

19 Wolfe to Pitt, Quebec, 9 Sept 1759, Add MS 32895, ff.121-3, BL.
Amherst that if he found it likely Quebec would not fall into British hands, he proposed to “set the Town on fire with shells, to destroy the Harvest, Houses, [and] Cattle, both above [and] below…to leave famine and desolation behind me.”

Wolfe’s campaign targeted civilian morale as much as France’s military capabilities, with Quebec inhabitants noting that the British had “altered the direction of their Bombs” to target the civilians in the suburbs. Wolfe targeted civilian morale to increase pressure on the French Army to leave the confines of the city walls and engage in battle. The British Army also sought to punish the entire population for the actions of those who had taken on a military role in the conflict, even if they had been coerced into that role by the French Army. As it appeared increasingly unlikely that they would be successful in provoking the French to a decisive engagement, the actions of the commander and his troops against the civilian population also marked their frustration at their situation.

Although the campaign of destruction against Quebec ended after the British victory at the Battle of the Plains of Abraham on 13 September 1759 and the surrender of the city five days later, the British Army under James Murray continued the subjugation of the population during the winter and throughout 1760 as they attempted to secure their tenuous hold on the region whilst the conflict with France in North America continued. During the 1759 campaign, Murray had made it clear he believed Wolfe’s actions to be both lawful and necessary and he continued to use the threat and sometimes the reality of violence to secure the British conquest after Quebec’s surrender.

In November 1759, Murray published a manifesto ordering the disarming of the inhabitants, and if they failed to do so “they must expect all the severity which it is in the power of a victorious but justly irritated army to exercise. The blame will fall on themselves. Such a line of conduct will be dictated by human nature, and it will be fully justified by the laws of nations.”

As in Scotland, the army insisted upon total submission from a hostile population group to ensure imperial security. The weakness of the British

20 Wolfe to Amherst, HMS Neptune, 6 March 1759 in Amherst and the Conquest of Canada: Selected Papers from the Correspondence of Major-General Jeffrey Amherst While Commander-in-Chief in North America from September 1758 to December 1760, ed. Richard Middleton (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2003), 26–27.

21 Quoted in Ward, Battle for Quebec, 121.

22 Murray to Pitt, Quebec, 22 October 1760, Murray Papers.

hold on Quebec as they faced a winter with insufficient provisions and just seven thousand troops to maintain control over the city, the surrounding area, and the inhabitants meant this was particularly important. Murray was aware that the conquest of Quebec had not been absolute, and he used the threat of violence to induce compliance from the population. Explicit reference to the rules of warfare illustrates that the population continued to be viewed as an enemy so long as the French Army threatened within Canada. Again, rationalisation of the army’s abandonment of the rules of warfare was attributed to the actions of the inhabitants.


Whilst the British violence of the 1759 campaign had been indiscriminate, Murray was careful to target communities refusing to submit to British authority or which broke their oaths of submission. In February 1760, he discovered that a detachment of the French Army had been concealed at Point Levy (Fig. 6) and sent out parties to destroy houses, publicly excusing the action as retribution for the inhabitants’ failure to inform the British of the French military presence. Murray sought to exemplify the punishment of failing to submit to British authority. His threats of violence, accompanied with occasional instances of destruction, had the desired effect in 1760 as most French-Canadians did not actively assist the French. When the inhabitants of Sorel (Fig. 6) joined the French in August, Murray informed Pitt that he had been put “under the cruel Necessity of burning the greatest part of these poor unhappy peoples houses. I pray God

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this Example may suffice, for my nature revolts, when this becomes a necessary part of my duty.”

With “cruel Necessity”, Murray consciously alluded to state power reluctantly deployed, here against hostile civilians: an aberration. In doing so he implied a preference for leniency rather than the indiscriminate killing Cromwell’s troops visited on the inhabitants of Drogheda in 1649, whilst simultaneously accentuating his own imperial loyalty through his willingness to employ brutality when required. But it was Murray’s preference for leniency and for winning the loyalty of the population that shaped the direction of British policy during and after the military occupation of Canada.

The articles of capitulation agreed to by the British were lenient: the French garrison was granted full honours of war, French regulars were transported to France rather than being made prisoners of war, militiamen were allowed to remain with their families, and civilians were granted protection in their homes and freedom to continue practising their religion. However, militiamen and civilians were required to disarm and swear an oath of fidelity, submitting to British authority. Manifestos were published informing civilians of the terms of the surrender and militiamen were only allowed to return to their farms and gather their harvest after obeying them. Disarming parties were sent into the countryside to take fidelity oaths and gather arms. Whilst these steps were similar to those taken in the Highlands after the Forty-Five, the disarming of the French-Canadians was more problematic for that population: shortages of provisions following Wolfe’s depredations left many dependent on hunting through the winter months; without their weapons they might starve. But, as in Scotland, disarming the civilian population was a precondition of British military security and for securing civilian interests. The fear of a pro-French insurrection took a while to recede, in much the same way that fear of French intervention drove British pacification in the Highlands.


26 The Articles of Capitulation for the Town of Quebec, Conquest of Canada and Louisbourg Collection, MG18N28, ff.32-38, LAC; The Articles of Capitulation Concluded at Montréal, Conquest of Canada and Louisbourg Collection, MG18N28, ff.133-156, LAC.

27 Robert Monckton to Pitt, Quebec, 8 October 1759, CO5/51, f.103, TNA. Regarding the oaths of allegiance see Form of the Oath Administered to Canadians, Montresor Family Papers, G28, Microfilm Reel 695, DLAR.

28 Amherst to Murray, New York, 2 April 1762, WO 34, vol 3, Microfilm Reel B-2638, LAC.
Figure 7. Title: Plan of the Settled part of the Province of Quebec, reduced from the large survey to serve as an index plan to the large sheets. General James Murray’s Map of the St. Lawrence. Date: 1761-1763. © Library and Archives Canada. Online MIKAN no. 4134077.

The legend highlights the number of families and men able to bear arms in every town or parish on the map.
Figure 8. Title: Plan of Canada or the Province of Quebec from the uppermost settlements to the Island of Coudre as surveyed by order of his excellency governor Murray in the year 1760, 61, and 62. Item 77. Date Created: 1761-1763. © Library and Archives Canada, Online MIKAN no. 4134077.

Item 77 highlights the town of Quebec and its surrounding area. The legend in the top left corner provides references for points of interest including the governor’s house, powder magazines, the cathedral, and various bastions. The legend in the top right corner provides references for points of interest relating to the 1759 campaign.
Figure 9. Title: Index of the Roy Military Survey of Scotland. Date: 1747-1755. © British Library Board from Maps K.Top.48.25-1.a-f.

The Roy Military Survey was the first systematic mapping of the Scottish mainland. It was begun in the wake of the Forty-Five, as both a method of pacification and to provide a detailed map of the region to aid the British response should conflict break out again in the future. When the mapping of the Highlands was completed in 1752 the decision was taken to extend the survey to the Lowlands. Each of the thirty-eight rectangles on the index map represents a separate page of the map providing detail of the land, roads, buildings, landmarks, and watercourses in specific areas.
As in Scotland previously, the British undertook a large-scale mapping project of the St. Lawrence Valley region as part of the militarisation of Canada. This provided a detailed picture of the country they had conquered and offered further means of subjugation. Both Murray and his superior Jeffrey Amherst recognised the need for a detailed map of the region, to ensure effective British control of the country should it be retained or to provide them with the military information they would require to reconquer it, should the need arise, were it returned to France. Murray took the lead with the mapping project, ordering surveys of various parts of Canada, under the command of Lt. Spry. Murray also took the decision to include a census that detailed the number of men able to bear arms in each parish, providing useful intelligence for the army.\textsuperscript{29} The survey itself was completed by autumn 1761, with the engineers having mapped the St. Lawrence River from Les Cèdres above Montréal to Île-aux-Coudres below Quebec and had included additional detail of parts of the Richelieu and Chaudière rivers which flowed out of New England (Fig. 7).\textsuperscript{30} The mapping of the region was vital for the subjugation

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\textsuperscript{29} J. S. Murray, \textit{Terra Nostra: The Stories behind Canada’s Maps, 1550-1950, from the Collection of Library and Archives Canada} (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), 41.

\textsuperscript{30} Murray to Thomas Gage, Quebec, 1761, Gage Papers, vol 8; Murray, \textit{Terra Nostra}, 41, 45. In response to complaints about his management and abilities, Murray demoted Lt. Spry but was forced to reinstate him after Spry denounced him to the Board of Ordnance. It is likely Murray’s awareness of his enemies in London induced him to reinstate Spry whilst denying Spry’s accusations, rather than to take the matter further. William Spry to Board of Ordnance, Quebec, 12 November 1761, Amherst Papers; Spry to
of the population as the map not only provided the British Army with a detailed understanding of the landscape but it also had a much more symbolic and powerful resonance as an act of pacification. The physical presence of soldiers upon farms over a year after the conquest provided a clear reminder of the British Army’s total control over the region.\textsuperscript{31} The Murray Map (Figs. 7, 8) was similar to a number of eighteenth-century maps, the most recent example being the Roy Map of Scotland (Figs. 9, 10), which had been drawn between 1747 and 1755 in direct response to the Forty-Five. Both mapped regions over which the British wished to assert dominion. Murray’s Scottish roots, coupled with the fact that the Roy Map was completed whilst he was serving in the army, ensured he was aware of both the earlier precedent and the importance of cartography to pacification.

A further method of subjugation employed by the British Army under James Murray was the implicit threat that the British could remove anyone they found disruptive, or even the entire population, transporting them to France or deporting them to other British colonies in North America. Whilst the articles of capitulation theoretically provided the civilian population security that they would be allowed to remain in their homes, the deportation of the Acadians in 1755, over forty years after British control of Nova Scotia had been determined by the Treaty of Utrecht, for refusing to swear oaths of allegiance to the British Crown, was a fearsome precedent. The Acadians had repeatedly refused to swear an oath of allegiance to the British that would require them to take up arms against the French. Geoffrey Plank highlighted that after Cumberland’s plan to transport Highland clans to the West Indies was made public, the possibility of transporting the Acadian population of Nova Scotia became increasingly popular.\textsuperscript{32} Whilst Britain and France were at peace there was no justification for the British to remove the population but upon the outbreak of the French and Indian War, and amidst a belief that Acadians were supporting the French in that region, approximately seven thousand Acadians were removed from Nova Scotia and scattered throughout other

\textsuperscript{31} Murray, \textit{Terra Nostra}, 22.

British North American colonies in the hope that they would be more easily assimilated into colonial society.

Both the British Army and the French-Canadian population were aware of the mass deportation of the Acadians. The French had used the episode to warn French-Canadians that they would meet a similar fate should Canada be lost, encouraging them to join the militia. Murray actively sought to allay such fears after the British victory at Quebec, and again after the arrival of British supply vessels in early May 1760 caused the French Army under François de Gaston, Chevalier de Lévis, that had beaten Murray’s troops at the Battle of Sainte-Foy the previous month, to abandon their siege of the city and retreat to Montréal. Murray repeatedly reassured civilians that they had nothing to fear from the military occupation if they cooperated with the army, issuing a proclamation stating that the King:

…wishes to preserve for the inhabitants, the religion they cherish and the priests, who exercise it, to maintain the communities and private individuals in all their property, laws and customs, provided that, satisfied with sentiments so generous, they submit willingly and promptly to his orders.\textsuperscript{33}

The proclamation was designed to encourage civilians to take the oath of fidelity and to show that the mass deportation of French-Canadians was never considered as an option as it had been elsewhere. Indeed, the ministry was determined not to furnish France with thousands of men for the continuing war. However, although Britain had no intention of repeating the Acadian deportation, the implicit threat of removal remained throughout the military occupation.\textsuperscript{34} The British could effectively remove any uncooperative individual or non-submissive groups simply by accusing them of breaking the terms of their oaths.

\textbf{Submissive Cooperation}

Although subjugation continued in the aftermath of the surrender of Quebec as the British Army embarked upon the militarisation of the region, the occupation has been

\textsuperscript{33} Proclamation at Quebec, 22 May 1760 in Nish, \textit{French Canadians}, 45-46.

\textsuperscript{34} Such a removal would have been harder to effect in practice, as the example of the Jesuits highlights. Despite regularly wishing for the removal of that group, neither Murray nor the government took active steps to secure their removal. See: Report by James Murray on the Province of Quebec, 5 June 1762, Add MS 35913, ff.136-47, BL; Murray to Amherst, Quebec, 2 July 1763, WO 34, vol 2, Microfilm Reel B-2637, LAC.
assessed as moderate, with emphasis placed on the high standard of troop discipline and the freedoms and security granted to civilians. James Murray’s humanity and clemency during this period have been credited with softening French-Canadian attitudes towards British rule. Murray received little direction from the ministry or from Jeffrey Amherst during the winter of 1759 and his actions then, and after the surrender of Montréal in September 1760, were guided by the paradigm of benevolence. The benevolence paradigm sought to establish the dominance of the conqueror through a process of cooperative submission: exhibiting the justness and mildness of the conqueror to remove entrenched perceptions of their cruelty from the minds of the conquered, thereby affecting acceptance and submission. Murray explained that the French-Canadians had been taught to look upon the British as “Barbarians, whose only view was their destruction”, suggesting that the civilians would have submitted earlier in the campaign had such a view not been so prevalent. The British would have to overcome this perception by demonstrating the justness of their rule if they were to reconcile French-Canadians to the conquest. During the winter of 1759, Murray encouraged the population to cooperate with the British Army through employment, provisioning, and by ensuring the army acted in a moderate and fair manner. He did so to ensure the survival of the British garrison and to encourage civilians to remain neutral during the 1760 campaign, exemplifying the benevolence paradigm. His concern for the King’s new subjects was therefore pragmatic in the first instance, arising from the imperialistic ideology of the army as he sought to establish dominance to ensure imperial security.

The seven thousand British troops were greatly outnumbered by French-Canadians and needed civilian assistance to survive the winter in the destroyed city. Without enough troops to fortify Quebec before the winter set in, Murray had to employ civilians and he provided them with provisions in return for their service, despite this exacerbating the shortages in the army. Murray justified his actions to the Treasury as

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36 Murray to Amherst, Quebec, November 1759, Murray Papers.
38 By the beginning of March 1760, the number of British soldiers fit for duty in Quebec City was just 4,800. Ward, Battle for Quebec, 219. See also Kerr, ‘Creation of Empire’, 233-36.
“no other Consideration could engage them to act for us, with any kind of Heart or Spirit, besides a little Generosity was highly requisite to ingratiate ourselves with a People only Conquered in Part.” Murray recognised that the population had not been fully subjugated and believed that leniency would better serve the purpose of preventing civilian opposition the following year. This also emphasises the lack of provisions available in Quebec. Whilst the richer civilians were able to relocate to Montréal, the remainder were left in great need of assistance and Murray was able to exploit this to gain their cooperation. Their dependency on the British for provisions helped reconcile them to British rule, as the army bought these same provisions at a fair price from those civilians who had a surplus. Murray hoped that the army’s generosity, coupled with the threat of violence for any caught colluding with the French Army, would prevent civilians in and around Quebec from assisting the French. He continued to act moderately in 1760, promising security and freedom to all who remained in their homes, swore oaths of allegiance, and disarmed. The French Army believed that this was responsible for the desertion of over seven thousand French-Canadians from the militia in 1760, stating that the British might thank their “humanity more than [their] arms for so great an Acquisition.”

After the final conquest of Canada neither Murray nor Gage nor Burton in Montréal and Trois-Rivières had to resort to wanton destruction to force the submission of the population.

Murray sought the submissive cooperation of the Quebec inhabitants throughout the military occupation. He developed a close relationship with Canon Briand, grand vicar of Quebec, which allowed the church to retain some influence in the province despite it no longer playing a role in the administration. This provided early reciprocal benefit for the British as Briand ordered prayers be said in mass for King George III before the peace had been concluded, encouraging civilian acceptance of British authority. More generally, Murray recognised the importance of religion to the French-Canadians, arguing that they were “extremely Tenacious” of it and that “nothing can

39 Murray to Samuel Martin, Quebec, 28 August 1761, Murray Papers.
40 Ward, Battle for Quebec, 206.
41 John Montresor to James Gabriel Montresor, Quebec, 16 December 1760, Montresor Family Papers, G30, Microfilm Reel 695, DLAR; D. R. Cubbison, All Canada in the Hands of the British: General Jeffrey Amherst and the 1760 Campaign to Conquer New France (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014), 66–87.
42 M. Brunet, French Canada and the Early Decades of British Rule, 1760–1791 (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1971), 4.
contribute so much to make them Staunch Subjects to their Majesty as the new Governments given them every reason to imagine no alteration is to be attempted in that Point.\textsuperscript{43} During the military government, he sought to assure the population that the British would not compromise their freedom of religion, believing that doing so would help to quickly reconcile them to British rule. He allowed some French-Canadians to serve in the administration and, although the civil courts were replaced with military ones, based his court and the laws of the province on those that had previously existed.\textsuperscript{44} Murray also attempted to ensure high standards of troop discipline, issuing proclamations banning alcohol to reduce theft and drunkenness and encouraging civilians to report any violence they encountered from troops.\textsuperscript{45}

The steps Murray took were guided by the benevolence paradigm as he sought to secure Britain’s empire in North America by weakening France’s future ability to wage war in that theatre. It was generally believed that Canada would be returned to France after the war. This encouraged the French-Canadians to accept British authority as a temporary measure and, whilst approximately 1,600 people left (mostly civil administrators, military officers, and the upper-class merchants who would not benefit from the British occupation), the majority either willingly or reluctantly submitted.\textsuperscript{46} The emigration of the French-Canadian elite was a significant contrast to the British Army’s earlier experiences in the Highlands where mass relocation of the elite had not taken place and specific measures were implemented to remove the power of that group and their perceived influence over the Highlanders. In Canada, the voluntary relocation of the elite facilitated the British takeover as there was no need to neutralise that group’s power or compete with their influence over the population. It also left the remainder of the population feeling abandoned by their mother-country. Concerned that if Britain treated civilians punitively and Canada was returned to France then their experiences would cause them to oppose the British even more strongly during any future war, Murray planned to:

\begin{quote}
Do everything in my power to convince [the French-Canadians] how happy they would be under the influence of British laws [and] therefore
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{43} Report by James Murray on the Province of Quebec, 5 June 1762, Add MS 35913, ff.136-47, BL.
\textsuperscript{44} Neatby, \textit{Quebec}, 21.
\textsuperscript{46} Calloway, \textit{Scratch of a Pen}, 114.
nothing shall be wanting in me to exert that Justice [and] Humanity which I hope will ever continue to Characterise the British Government. I shall by this means extinguish the prejudices the Canadians in general were taught to conceive against us and I shall endeavour to cultivate close connections with some of them as hereafter may be of use to Us in case of another war, [and] that this country is restore to France.\textsuperscript{47}

Murray was determined to limit any advantage France might gain from Britain’s occupation of Canada. In addition, his emphasis on extinguishing the prejudices of the French-Canadians demonstrates their cultural difference that Murray felt it necessary to acknowledge and overcome to affect their submissive cooperation during the military occupation.

The fact that the French-Canadians were a conquered population rather than rebels explains why the benevolence paradigm led James Murray and the British Army to seek their cooperation. It took much longer for the British to engage in cooperation in the Highlands, apart from the efforts of select officers. The necessity driving cooperation in Canada did not exist to the same extent in the Highlands as the ongoing threat from France was much less pressing. Further, frustration and a desire for punishment had been vital factors directing the pacification in Scotland as the British sought to punish Highlanders for engaging in another Jacobite uprising. Whilst both frustration and punishment had been factors in the violence of the 1759 campaign, there was not the same sustained desire for punishment in Canada. French-Canadians were not viewed as rebels and they were no longer associated with savagery after their military association with Native Americans had ended; this diminished the desire for punishment that had been so important in the Highlands and contributed to making early cooperation and leniency possible and desirable in Canada. As early as November 1759, Murray explained the benefits of a policy of leniency to Amherst: “Until I have the Honour to receive your orders, I shall follow the natural dispositions of my heart, which dictates Clemency; this Conduct can do no hurt, because the Effects of it may be undone in one week; It may have permanent advantage.”\textsuperscript{48} Murray was convinced that benevolence was the quickest method of winning the allegiance of the French-Canadians, and vital for imperial security. The ministry, hoping to persuade as many civilians as possible to remain in Canada after the conquest, agreed with his strategy. Secretary of State Lord Egremont

\textsuperscript{47} Murray to Pitt, Quebec, 22 October 1760, Murray Papers.
\textsuperscript{48} Murray to Amherst, Quebec, November 1759, Murray Papers.
informed Jeffrey Amherst that it was essential that the French-Canadians remain rather than move to colonies still under the control of the French where they would be of great service to the French war effort. 49 Egremont praised the mildness of the pacification to that point, suggesting it was the best way to persuade civilians to remain, and he urged Amherst to ensure it continued.

The benevolence paradigm not only influenced the measures implemented by Murray in Quebec, but also his attitude towards the populations he was responsible for during the occupation. He and the British Army had to concern themselves not only with French-Canadians but also with the Native Americans who resided in or around Canada. This population was not of as much concern to the British Army as they did not represent the same threat as the French-Canadians or the Native Americans who resided in the Ohio Country due to their being far fewer in number. The difference in the perceived level of threat is illustrated by Murray’s insistence that the French-Canadians remain disarmed in 1761 but his belief that it would be useful to supply the Native Americans with limited quantities of arms and ammunition. 50 Murray recognised that weapons were essential for Native Americans and that such a trade would provide much-needed commodities. After the conquest, Native Americans in Canada who submitted to British authority were treated in the same manner as French-Canadians and the army promised them security and safety so long as they remained peaceful. 51 Aside from overseeing trade disputes and ensuring any murders were compensated for, the British Army did not have much contact with Native Americans in Canada prior to the Treaty of Paris. However, the outbreak of Pontiac’s War led Murray to reconsider the potential threat of that population and in July 1763 he informed Amherst that although he believed that the “Indians in Canada will remain quiet”, further risings were likely unless the British prevented Catholic missionaries from visiting native settlements. 52 Murray did not believe that the Native Americans in Canada were a direct threat to Britain despite the rising, but he did believe steps should be taken to convert them. It was the continuing perception of Native Americans as savages that led to such opinions that were reminiscent of the Highlands after the Forty-Five.

49 Lord Egremont to Amherst, Whitehall, 12 December 1761, Amherst Papers, vol 5, WCL.
50 Murray to Gage, Quebec, 19 March 1761, Gage Papers, vol 7.
51 Copy of a Proclamation by Ralph Burton, Three Rivers, 6 March 1762, WO 34, vol 6, Microfilm Reel B-2640, LAC; Murray to Amherst, Quebec, 11 January 1761, Murray Papers.
52 Murray to Amherst, Quebec, 2 July 1763, WO 34, vol 2, Microfilm Reel B-2637, LAC.
In contrast, the association of French-Canadians with savagery ended entirely after the conquest. That population was viewed by Murray and the British Army as much more civilised than both Native Americans and Scottish Highlanders, although not as civilised as Protestant Britons. Murray claimed they were “perhaps the most ignorant people under the Sun” due to having no communication with any nations apart from the Native Americans. The British Army, under the direction of Jeffrey Amherst, classified the population as having become “the King’s Subjects” immediately after the surrender at Montréal. Such a classification was guided by the paradigms of benevolence and loyalty: establishing dominance through the submission of the French-Canadians by granting them the same rights as others within the British Empire. Both Murray and Amherst argued that the French-Canadians ought not to lose out on trade opportunities due to the occupation. In response to an attempt by some British merchants recently settled in Canada to claim French-Canadian pelts from Montréal, Amherst informed Murray that: “A Monopoly of that Branch of Trade, which [the merchants] seem to Aspire at, is not their due, for, all His Majesty’s Subjects in General have an Equal right with them, to a share in that Commerce, [and] the Canadians are now His Majesty’s Subjects.” Amherst sought to act in a fair manner towards the French-Canadians to encourage their compliance. However, the fact the army also classified the population as subjects, whilst still recognising their difference from Britons, contributed to the belief that the French-Canadians ought to enjoy the same rights and privileges as Britons elsewhere in the empire and, consequently, contributed to the moderation employed by the army in Canada. Although they were ‘others’ within the British Empire, speaking a different language and adhering to different customs and a different religion, James Murray evinced a clear respect for the French-Canadians he governed during the military occupation. This respect, as well as his earlier experiences, informed his civil governance.

53 Murray to Pitt, Quebec, 22 October 1760, Murray Papers.
54 Instructions of Amherst, 15 September 1760, WO 34, vol 8, Microfilm Reel B-2641, LAC. For other, early examples of the classification of French-Canadians as the King’s subjects see: Gage to Amherst, Montreal, 3 November 1760, WO 34, vol 5, Microfilm Reel B-2639, LAC; Amherst to Henry Gladwin, Montreal, 18 September 1760, WO 34, vol 85, Microfilm Reel B-2685, LAC.
55 Amherst to Murray, New York, 20 March 1761, WO 34, vol 2, Microfilm Reel B-2637, LAC.
of the region after the Proclamation of 1763 merged the governments of Montréal, Trois-Rivières, and Quebec into the single province of Quebec from August 1764.56

IV. Civil Government in Canada

The strategic decision to retain Canada at the end of the Seven Years’ War represented a shift in British imperial focus from a commercial ‘empire of the seas’ to territorial empire.57 It followed the deliberate, more authoritative imperial policy which had originated from the Board of Trade in the late 1740s under the Earl of Halifax’s presidency: encouraging the expansion of empire through commercially valuable colonies, uniform in their governance and subservient to the Crown.58 The pacification and militarisation of the Highlands had represented a domestic manifestation of this policy as the British sought to ensure internal security. The extension of empire in North America after the Seven Years’ War left Britain responsible for two populations of ‘others’: French-Canadians and Native Americans. With the Treaty of Paris in 1763, French-Canadians officially became subjects of the Crown like Britons both at home and in the colonies, although those in charge of the military occupation had treated them as subjects from the time of the conquest. As British subjects, they were expected to remain loyal to the Crown and act with due subjection to parliamentary authority, but they could also expect to enjoy the same rights and privileges as Britons. However, they remained an ‘other’ population in the eyes of the British imperial elite, significantly different from those Britons they now theoretically enjoyed the same rights and responsibilities as. The loyalty paradigm suggested that this ‘otherness’ had to be overcome for imperial security and stability to be achieved. The process of militarisation that began during the war continued as a method of military intimidation in areas where potentially hostile groups of ‘others’ resided whilst, as in the Highlands previously, the British ministry sought to assimilate rather than accommodate these groups within the empire.

56 Although the Treaty of Paris was signed on 10 February 1763, its terms delayed the establishment of civil government in Quebec by eighteen months to provide French-Canadians who wished to emigrate to France ample time to do so.

57 See: Gipson, ‘American Revolution’, 86-104; Marshall, Making and Unmaking, 158-81; Brunet, French Canada, 1-3; R. A. Humphreys, ‘Lord Shelburne and the Proclamation of 1763’, EHR 49, no. 194 (1934): 244–45. http://www.jstor.org/stable/553250; Conway, ‘Consequences of the Conquest’, 143-44. The province of Quebec was also described as Canada by British government officials and army officers. As such, the terms are used interchangeably.

58 Beaumont, Colonial America, 41-68.
The primary aim of the British imperial elite upon the establishment of civil government in Canada was the assimilation of the new subjects into an expanded empire as a method of guaranteeing a continuing submission and adherence to the Crown from them as loyal Britons. Anglicisation, the making of the colony English in character, was thought to be a necessary prerequisite for assimilation to replace the French institutions and overcome its Catholic identity. Assimilation of an ‘other’ population had likewise been the goal in the militarisation of the Highlands after the Forty-Five. In that imperial fringe, the population had also been categorised as savage, which led the ministry to attempt to forcibly civilise the Highlanders through strict limitations on religion, the destruction of Highland culture, and significant commercialisation of the region. The French-Canadians were not considered savage, although their Catholicism led to the conclusion that they were not as civilised as Britons, so forcible measures were not thought necessary for their assimilation. Further, the Treaty of Paris prevented punitive measures against Catholicism as it guaranteed the free exercise of religion to the French-Canadians, as far as the laws of Britain permitted. Whilst this effectively excluded French-Canadian participation in public office due to the provisions of the Test Acts, it prevented the banning of churches or attempts to forcibly convert the population. Assimilation in Quebec was broadly an extension of the policy adopted by army officers during the military occupation. However, whilst James Murray had acted in consideration of the unique circumstances of Quebec, the ministry’s plan instead applied general systems of governance from the thirteen colonies with little consideration of how, or indeed if, these would work in practice. It relied upon the timely and sustained settlement of large numbers of Protestants in Quebec, the conversion of the Catholic population, and the establishment of representative government.


60 See Chapter One.

The ministry’s expectations for Canada were set out in the Proclamation of October 1763 and the commission and instructions sent to Governor Murray the following month. The Proclamation restricted the size of the new province of Quebec with the establishment of an Indian “reserve” throughout much of the interior (Fig. 11). The Anglicisation of Quebec was directly encouraged as Murray was ordered to do all in his power to ensure Quebec resembled the other Protestant colonies of North America, with Nova Scotia highlighted as a particular example.\textsuperscript{62} He was to summon and call a general assembly, in the same manner and form as those in the older colonies, as soon as the “state and circumstances” of the colony allowed. Until that point, he was given the power to “make, constitute, and ordain laws, statutes, and ordinances for the public peace,

\textsuperscript{62} Instructions to Governor Murray in \textit{Documents}, 132-49.
welfare and good government of our said colonies, and of the people and inhabitants thereof, as near as may be, agreeable to the laws of England.” 63 The ministry was aware Murray could not immediately call an assembly in Quebec due to the small number of Protestants: just fifty-six families in Montréal and approximately two hundred throughout the whole province. 64 However, the Proclamation made specific reference to governance through an assembly to attract Protestant settlers to the province. 65 Although the Proclamation highlighted the governor’s right not to call an assembly until circumstances allowed it, the failure to specify what these circumstances might be and the expectation that governance through an assembly was to be the norm in Quebec contributed to the deteriorating relationship between Murray and the mercantile community in the province.

Murray’s instructions reminded him that he must ensure freedom of religion for French-Canadians, but they also signalled the ministry’s intention that the Catholic population “be induced to embrace the Protestant Religion, and their Children be brought up in the Principles of it”. 66 He was to effect this primarily through the encouragement of Protestant settlement: conducting land surveys, establishing planned towns with Protestant schools and churches within them, and advertising for settlers: setting quit-rents low but only granting large tracts of land to those who proposed to live in the colony themselves. In addition, the Grenville ministry offered land grants to ex-soldiers to encourage them to settle in Quebec. 67 To encourage conversion in the short-term, the governor requested prayer books and French-speaking missionaries from the Society of the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (SPG). 68 Murray was also ordered to investigate the possibilities for improving the agricultural and manufacturing industries in Quebec, including the cultivation of hemp and flax and the improvement of the timber and iron industries, and to do all he could to improve the province’s commercial situation. 69 The steps encouraged by the ministry to encourage Anglicisation and

63 Proclamation of 1763 in Documents, 119-24.
64 Conway, Britannia’s Auxiliaries, 34. The figure of two hundred families throughout the province comes from Browne, ‘Murray, James’.
66 Instructions to Murray in Documents, 132-49.
67 Conway, Britannia’s Auxiliaries, 148-49.
68 Browne, ‘Murray, James’.
69 Instructions to Murray in Documents, 141-45. At the same time, the ministry was considering how best to govern the Indian trade to prevent the frauds and abuses that had contributed to Pontiac’s War. The
assimilation in Quebec bore a resemblance to the steps taken to assimilate Highlanders after the Forty-Five, although those relating to religion were milder in Quebec. It was hoped the establishment of Protestant schools and churches throughout the province would encourage conversion, particularly of the younger generation, and that commercialisation would make the population more civilised, thereby affecting closer assimilation of the ‘other’ in both imperial fringes.

The paradigm of loyalty rationalised Murray’s approach to the civil governance of Canada. Arguing that the French-Canadians’ adherence to Catholicism was evidence of their ignorance, he shared the ministry’s aspiration for the Anglicisation of the colony to affect the closer assimilation of the population so that they would become loyal Britons. However, his experiences during the military occupation led him to believe that limiting opportunities for Catholics and using any semblance of force to encourage conversion would have an adverse effect on the population. As such, Murray believed that some toleration of Catholicism in the short-term was the best method for encouraging assimilation. This led him to utilise the flexibility within his instructions when implementing civil government in Quebec. He ruled out calling an assembly during his tenure as governor as he was concerned that appointing one from the Protestant population would give that group an unfair advantage ruling over approximately seventy thousand French-Canadians. His instructions had not clarified whether the Test Acts were to be extended to Canada, so Murray chose to interpret them as allowing some degree of toleration. In addition to appointing French-Canadians to the provincial council, he changed the court system to provide a mixture of Canadian civil and English criminal law and he allowed French-Canadians to serve on juries and as lawyers.

Murray also sought the assimilation of the French-Canadians through improvement and the enlightenment of the population. His focus on improvement originated from a family involvement through his father Alexander, fourth Lord Elibank, who was a founder of the Society of Improvers in the Knowledge of Agriculture in

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Plan for the Future Management of Indian Affairs was intended to regulate colonial-native trade and again highlighted the move towards a more authoritative imperial policy. It is examined in Chapter Five.


71 Ordinances Relating to the Civil Courts in Quebec, September 1764 in Documents, 149-52.
Scotland. The interest was shared by James Murray and his elder brother Patrick, fifth Lord Elibank, who was a member of the Select Society and part of the celebrated “literary triumvirate” consisting of Elibank, Lord Kames, and David Hume. Kames was one of the commissioners for the annexed estates in the Highlands, encouraging improvement and enlightenment as a method of pacification and to increase Scottish prosperity. These ideas influenced Murray in Canada where he sought not only to make the colony as profitable as possible for the Crown but also to encourage the natural enlightenment of the French-Canadians. In a 1762 report on the state of Quebec, Murray highlighted the possible advantages Britain could gain if Canada was retained at the peace, noting the agricultural potential of the colony should the peoples’ husbandry skills be improved. He also argued that the French had concentrated too much on the fur trade at the expense of the fisheries, suggesting potential for British growth in that area. Murray’s key observation was that the land in and around Quebec was well suited to growing hemp and flax, suggesting that “It will be right to turn the thoughts of the People towards the Cultivation of this Article so Essential to Great Britain” and encouraging the settlement of skilled Europeans to quickly improve that branch of agriculture. Murray was optimistic about the opportunities available should Canada remain British and he was actively considering improvement as a method of assimilation prior to the Treaty of Paris, which would continue in its aftermath. When procuring slaves for his own property in Quebec, Murray stated that “it is now certain I am to remain in this Country, where I propose doing all the good I can, by exciting the People to industry, and promoting the improvement of Agriculture by setting a good Example.” Similarly to the annexed estates in the Highlands, Murray believed that improvement would spread throughout the province by example. In both imperial fringes, improvement and enlightenment were perceived as methods of naturally leading the population to Protestantism and thereby


74 Report by James Murray on the Province of Quebec, 5 June 1762, Add MS 35913, ff.136-47, BL.

75 Murray to John Watts, Quebec, 2 November 1763, Murray Papers.
assimilating more easily within the empire. In Quebec, the desire to improve the commercial situation of the province further stemmed from a desire to open the region to further Protestant settlement, affecting Anglicisation in the long-term.

Murray requested the toleration he had been practising be formalised through legislation, arguing it was the only way to prevent large swathes of the population from emigrating. At the same time, Murray sent his secretary Hector Theophilus de Cramahé to inform the ministry of the steps he had taken and attempt to affect legislative reform in Canada. Recognition that the system of government proposed for Canada required alteration began during Murray’s tenure in the Board of Trade and, more importantly for affecting change, in the Grenville ministry. The attorney and solicitor general provided clarification over the position of Catholics in Canada in June 1765, stating that they were not subject to the same incapacities, disabilities, and penalties as those in Britain. Murray’s advocacy of toleration and the way he had interpreted his instructions influenced government officials to demonstrate early acceptance of the need for some level of toleration in Canada.

The ministry did not give the problem of government in Quebec sustained attention until Guy Carleton had succeeded Murray as governor in 1766, but Murray’s precedent influenced the steps taken. The Rockingham ministry drafted a report to consider how best to encourage peace and collaboration between the French-Canadian and mercantile populations, stepping back from Anglicisation although questions remained regarding how far toleration should be extended. The report was a result of the recommendations for toleration and changes to government advocated by both Murray and Carleton and it represented the beginning of the legislative process that would

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76 James Murray’s Report on the State of Quebec, August 1766, Add MS 21668, BL.
77 Murray to the Board of Trade, Quebec, 29 October 1764, CO42/2, ff.15-7, TNA.
78 Copy of the Attorney and Solicitor General’s Report, 10 June 1765, Add MS 32982, ff.25-6, BL. The Board of Trade also recognised Murray’s argument for toleration and legislative change, approving the changes he made to the court system. See: Draft Instructions to Governor James Murray Regarding the Establishment of Courts of Judicature, c.1764, Add MS 32982, ff.1-15, BL; Order of the Board of Trade, 15 November 1765, CO42/5, ff.9-10, TNA; Instructions to Governor James Murray, 17 February 1766, Add MS 32982, ff.25-31, BL.
79 Carleton quickly abandoned his hopes to Anglicise Quebec and came to agree with Murray regarding the government of the province. See Lawson, Imperial Challenge, 109.
80 Considerations on the Expediency of Procuring an Act of Parliament for the Settlement of the Province of Quebec, 1766, Add MS 35914, ff.169-86, BL.
eventually lead to the Quebec Act of 1774. The Quebec Act established rule through a governor and appointed council for Canada, although this was still intended to be a temporary measure. It also removed reference to religion in the oath of office so that Catholics could legally participate in public office in Canada. The process of change was slow as the issue was frequently laid to the side in favour of domestic issues, ministerial changes, and other imperial challenges. But the steps taken by the ministry highlight Murray’s, and Carleton’s, influence on imperial policymaking as his assessment that government in Quebec could not simply replicate that of the other North American colonies was eventually enshrined in the Quebec Act.

Murray’s actions as civil governor largely stemmed from practicality as the sustained levels of Protestant immigration the ministry had expected simply did not materialise, which meant Quebec would not be anglicised in the short-term. However, his actions were also evidence of a paradigm shift regarding loyalty in the British Empire. Murray believed the French-Canadians had the potential to become amongst the most loyal subjects to the Crown, informing the Board of Trade that they were:

...perhaps, the best and bravest Race upon the Globe, a Race who would they be indulged with a few Privileges which the Laws of England deny to Roman Catholicks at Home, would soon get the better of every national antipathy to their Conquerors, and become the most faithfull set of men in this American Empire.

Murray continued to believe that loyalty was a necessity for imperial security and stability, but his experiences as military and civil governor in Quebec suggested that assimilation was not a necessary precedent for securing the loyalty of imperial populations. As in Scotland, it seemed that an ‘other’ population could display continuing submission and adherence to the imperial state without being Britons. This encouraged Murray to argue in favour of toleration as an extension of the benevolence he had exhibited during the military occupation to remove the French-Canadians natural distrust and dislike of their British conquerors.

81 James Murray’s Report on the State of Quebec, August 1766, Add MS 21668, BL; Report on the Civil Government of Quebec, Undated, Add MS 33030, ff.226-32, BL; Account of the State of Quebec by Guy Carleton, 25 November 1767, CO42/7, ff.21-8, TNA; Carleton to the Board of Trade, Quebec, 24 December 1767, CO42/7, ff.52-7, TNA.

82 The Quebec Act, 1774 in Documents, 401-5. For a detailed account of the debate leading to the Quebec Act and the impact of the act itself see Hilda Neatby, The Quebec Act: Protest and Policy (Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1972), 33-46.

83 Murray to the Board of Trade, Quebec, 29 October 1764, CO42/2, ff.15-7, TNA.
Murray encountered difficulties attempting to separate the civil and military spheres as a result of the militarisation of Canada. Although he retained command of the garrison of Quebec City, Ralph Burton was given an independent commission as brigadier of the northern department with headquarters at Montréal. This left Burton with overall command of the troops in Quebec, senior in military rank to Murray, and responsible for maintaining military order in Quebec and throughout the lands reserved to the Indians in the Proclamation.\(^{84}\) Mutual jealousy over the other’s position coupled with the incompatibility of the two positions in Quebec where the military and civil spheres could not effectively be separated led to the deterioration of the relationship between the two former friends.\(^{85}\) Burton required the acquiescence of the civil authorities to carry out the service effectively but the complexities of the situation led to accusations from each that the other was interfering in matters out with their authority and left Murray convinced that Burton was conspiring with Commander-in-Chief Thomas Gage to remove his military authority altogether. Murray’s belief in a plot to “turn me out of the army”\(^{86}\) reflects his own insecurity in his position. The poor relationship between Murray and Burton compounded the difficulties faced by both and was a contributing factor in their recall in 1766.

Murray had to contend with the same civil-military disputes that were almost universal throughout North America during and after the war. Quartering was as contentious an issue in Quebec as it was elsewhere, and civilians frequently complained about the billeting of soldiers in private houses without consent.\(^{87}\) This was particularly common in Montréal, where it was accompanied by complaints of military indiscipline and clashes between the military and civil authorities, where merchants dominated the justices of the peace due to the ineligibility of Catholics. These disputes came to a head during the Walker affair: an assault on fur trader and justice of the peace Thomas Walker in December 1764 by soldiers from the 28th Regiment, the subsequent freeing of the


\(^{86}\) Murray to Oswald, Quebec, 16 October 1764, Murray Papers; Murray to Elibank, Quebec, 16 September 1764, Murray Papers.

\(^{87}\) Complaint against Governor Murray in James Munro, ed., *Acts of the Privy Council of England, Colonial Series VI, The Unbound Papers* (London: His Majestys Stationery Office, 1912), 404–6; Documents Related to a Dispute Regarding Quartering in Montreal, November 1764, CO42/2, ff.178-97, TNA.
accused by that regiment, and disputes regarding where the accused were to stand trial.\textsuperscript{88} This incident highlighted the limitations of Murray’s authority as civil governor as he claimed he was unable to answer for the behaviour of the troops due to Burton’s military authority over them.

The difficulties Murray encountered, as well as the process of militarisation more generally, led Murray to believe it was essential that the governor of Quebec retain military as well as civil authority to stabilise government in its early years. He informed Thomas Gage that: “I am very sensible that the Civil and Military are separate branches, but as it appears to me that the situation of affairs here will for some years to come render it expedient that the Governor of this Province shou’d have Command of the Troops in it.”\textsuperscript{89} He argued that the two spheres must overlap until practicable civil governance had been established and the military was no longer required to perform some civil duties, complaining to the Earl of Halifax that the current situation made it impossible for him to obey the ministry’s commands.\textsuperscript{90} Although the balance was not altered during Murray’s governance, the Rockingham ministry implicitly accepted the validity of his argument when they gave his replacement Guy Carleton a commission with command over both spheres. The two spheres had been separated to encourage Anglicisation and representative government, but Murray’s experiences and opinions left the ministry convinced that such a separation of authority was not yet possible in Quebec.

Murray’s governance of Canada brought him into conflict with the mercantile community that had moved to Canada after the conquest in the hope of gaining political power and dominating the trade. The merchants had been left frustrated when Murray and Amherst had refused to let them dominate the trade during the military occupation. After the Treaty of Paris, they were incensed by Murray’s failure to call an assembly that they believed the terms of the Proclamation demanded and were further frustrated by trade regulations that restricted their access to the interior. Drawing on the association of Murray with Jacobitism, the merchants accused him of arbitrary rule, which was so often associated with Catholicism and the Stuarts. They began a sustained petitioning campaign

\textsuperscript{88} See: Wallace, ‘Beginnings of British Rule’, 208-21; Browne, ‘Murray, James’; Murray to Board of Trade, Quebec, 15 July 1765, CO42/3, ff.2-5, TNA; Copy of an Order of the King in Council, 18 October 1765, CO42/5, ff.1-4, TNA; Considerations on the Present State of the Province of Quebec, 1 March 1766, Add MS 35913, ff.20-46, BL.

\textsuperscript{89} Murray to Gage, Quebec, 16 September 1764, Murray Papers.

\textsuperscript{90} Murray to Halifax, Quebec, 30 October 1764, Murray Papers.
in both Canada and London to try and facilitate his recall, eventually succeeding in 1766 when Murray was ordered to London to answer questions about his conduct, although the charges against him were eventually dismissed as “groundless, scandalous and Derogatory”.\footnote{Quoted in Browne, ‘Murray, James’. Many petitions complained about Murray’s governance. See: Petition of the Quebec Traders in Documents, 168-69; Petition to the Board of Trade, London, 21 June 1765, CO42/2, f.223, TNA; Petition to the Board of Trade, London, 21 June 1765, CO42/2, f.223, TNA; Papers Relating to Complaints against Governor Murray, 1767, Add MS 35913, ff.131-2, BL. A very uncomplimentary, anonymous, and undated epitaph to Governor Murray highlighted how badly he was viewed by some. It claimed his “whol Life was one continued scene of Villany, Tyranny, and oppression” and suggested he existed as a “Scourge to mankind, for their Transgressions”. Epitah Uncomplimentary to Governor Murray, Montresor Family Papers, G20, Microfilm Reel 695, DLAR.}

For his part, Murray believed the merchants had little interest in permanent settlement in Canada or in improving the province for the benefit of the mother-country. Describing them as “licentious Fanaticks” and displayers of “malice and envy”,\footnote{Murray to the Board of Trade, Quebec, 29 October 1764, CO42/2, ff.15-7, TNA; Murray to Board of Trade, Quebec, 3 March 1765, CO42/2, ff.132-41, TNA; Murray to Burton, Quebec, 11 April 1764, Murray Papers; Murray to the Board of Trade, Quebec, 3 February 1766, CO42/5, ff.150-1, TNA.} Murray portrayed them as power hungry and desperate for the removal or subjugation of the French-Canadians for the purposes of unbridled ambition. He argued that allowing the merchants to control Quebec’s government would not only result in inequality for the French-Canadians but would also be contrary to the interests of the mother-country. As North American colonists, the merchants in Quebec were originally classified as loyal Britons. However, Murray came to view them as an imperial ‘other’ as their actions led him to believe that they were attempting to subvert his authority and were acting contrary to British imperial interests. With the significant expansion of the British Empire in North America after the French and Indian War, the British were no longer responsible for governing only Britons who had settled in the colonies but also Native Americans and French-Canadians. As militarisation exposed the colonists’ failure to demonstrate adherence to the British state, they came to be viewed not as Britons but simply as imperial subjects who had to be governed not through negotiation but through increased regulation to ensure British imperial security and prosperity.

V. Conclusions

The 1759 campaign against Quebec highlights the continuing influence of the Forty-Five on British imperialism in North America, sharing many similarities with the earlier campaign. As it had in Scotland previously, the paradigm of civility led the British
Army to engage in a campaign of violence against a civilian population during a period of active warfare. Whilst French-Canadians were not defined as savages during times of peace, unlike Highlanders, the association of the militia with Native Americans led to an association with savagery during the Quebec campaign. However, whilst the pacification of the Highlands had become even more violent in the short-term after the British victory at Culloden, the use of violent tactics ended almost entirely after the British victory at the Battle of the Plains of Abraham. This was due to the unique circumstances in Quebec, where the British had conquered an external population group rather than defeating an internal one. Further, although the British had defeated the French at Quebec, the two countries remained at war. As a result, the benevolence paradigm guided Murray’s actions during the military occupation as he balanced subjugation with cooperative submission to ensure the security of Britain’s newest conquest and to prevent lingering resentment amongst the French-Canadians.

With the move towards territorial empire as demonstrated by the decision to retain Canada in the Treaty of Paris, the British hoped Protestant immigration would affect the rapid Anglicisation of Quebec. However, Murray recognised that Anglicisation was not possible in the short-term and he advocated, and implemented, a policy of toleration and accommodation in the short-term, believing that encouraging the enlightenment and improvement of the French-Canadians would naturally cause them to turn to Protestantism over time. His thoughts mirrored those enlightenment thinkers had articulated over the previous decade to encourage the civilisation of the Highlanders. His experiences led to a paradigm shift regarding loyalty in the empire as he came to believe that Anglicisation and assimilation were not necessary precedents for securing the loyalty of imperial populations. His conclusions regarding governance in Canada influenced successive ministries, who gave Murray’s replacement increased powers and gradually moved away from an assumption that government in Canada should, and would, look like government in the other North American colonies, at least in the short-term.

The expansion of British territory in North America after the French and Indian War changed the character of empire there from one that was predominantly white and Protestant, with colonists who were viewed the same as Britons at home, to one that included French-Canadians and Native Americans who were significantly different to Britons. Whilst all these groups were classified as imperial populations, subject to the authority of the Crown, not all were considered equal or enjoyed the same rights as Britons. The paradigm of loyalty played an important role in guiding the absorption of
‘others’ into the empire and governing a new imperial fringe as Murray attempted to ensure imperial security. His experiences as military and civil governor led him to believe that French-Canadians were likely to become more loyal than the colonists if allowed to enjoy some toleration. In identifying a potential threat from the mercantile community, Murray simultaneously ‘othered’ the colonists, classifying them as significantly different to Britons at home and more like the French-Canadians and Native Americans recently absorbed into the empire: another group that had to be carefully governed. The paradigm shift that had begun under Loudoun continued in the aftermath of the war as army officers continued to move away from the concept of an ‘empire of negotiation’.93

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Chapter Four: Sir Jeffrey Amherst

I. Introduction

Whilst James Wolfe’s 1759 campaign against Quebec saw him promoted to acting major-general with an independent command over operations in that region, overall responsibility for the British war effort in North America rested with Jeffrey Amherst. Amherst had been posted to the continent upon the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War before being granted command of the 1758 Louisbourg expedition, replacing James Abercromby as commander-in-chief late that year. Amherst’s early service as a staff officer under Sir John Ligonier and the Duke of Cumberland taught him the value of good administration.¹ His meticulous planning during the winter of 1758-59 contributed to the successful campaign against Ticonderoga and Crown Point under his command, although he still encountered problems ensuring the provincials were in the field when required, preventing desertion, and supplying the necessary provisions, bateau men, and wagons.² Amherst focused on ensuring the security of the army as he progressed, ordering the strengthening of captured posts. This left the British Army in a strong position at the end of the 1759 campaign and the following year Amherst directed the convergence of three separate armies on Montréal, forcing the final capitulation of Canada. His success would see him elevated to the peerage as Baron Amherst and his greatest victory was celebrated in a 1765 portrait by Joshua Reynolds (Fig. 12).

Militarisation continued as a deliberate policy in North America, including the newly conquered Canada, post-1760 as Britain and France remained at war. Amherst had to recruit provincials for garrison duty and campaigns in the West Indies and Newfoundland, whilst British regulars continued to require quarters and supplies. Concurrently, Amherst also sought to prevent illegal trade between colonists and the French, to garrison Britain’s vastly increased territory, and to oversee the pacification of French-Canadians and Native Americans. Under pressure to significantly reduce military expenditure in North America and driven by an overriding sense of cultural superiority, Amherst attempted to subjugate the Native American population in order to secure peace in the interior. When the measures he implemented contributed to the pan-Indian

¹ C. P. Stacey, ‘Amherst, Jeffery, 1st Baron Amherst’, DCB, vol 4, 2003, see DCB online.
Uprisings commonly known as Pontiac’s War, which broke out in 1763, he finally received the permission he had long sought to return to England, although his achievements and reputation were somewhat diminished by the ongoing conflict.

The previous chapter highlighted that the benevolence paradigm led James Murray to balance subjugation and cooperative submission when pacifying the French-Canadians in Quebec after the 1759 conquest. As his experiences led him to reconsider how best to ensure imperial loyalty, he began to ‘other’ not only the French-Canadians and Native Americans who were now part of the British Empire but also the colonial merchants whose imperial loyalty he believed suspect. This chapter investigates Amherst’s experiences of pacification and militarisation in the North American interior between 1760 and 1763. Focusing on his attempts to integrate Native Americans within the expanded British Empire, it first explores Amherst’s formative experiences before considering the cultural paradigms driving his western strategy. Amherst’s formative experiences fostered a deep-seated sense of cultural superiority evident throughout his military career. Investigating the militarisation of the interior demonstrates the continuing influence of the Forty-Five on British imperialism in North America as similar steps were taken in pursuit of British imperial aims of security, assimilation, and prosperity. The paradigms of civility and loyalty influenced how British Army officers interacted with Native Americans, but Amherst’s paradigm of superiority was to the fore throughout the pacification as he sought, but ultimately failed, to ensure peace in the West.

II. Jeffrey Amherst’s Cultural Superiority

Born in Kent in 1717, Jeffrey Amherst was notably different to both the Earl of Loudoun and James Murray. Although he had no family ties to nobility to enable career progression, his father’s position as a well-respected lawyer facilitated Amherst’s boyhood appointment as a page for Lionel Cranfield Sackville, first Duke of Dorset, and his subsequent commission as an ensign in the 1st Foot Guards through Dorset’s connections. Further, as an English Protestant, Amherst was unencumbered by suspicion of his personal or family loyalty or by any association with the Highlands or Jacobitism.


4 William C. Lowe, ‘Amherst, Jeffrey, First Baron Amherst (1717–1797)’, *ODNB*, 2004, see *ODNB* online.
which meant there were no barriers to his advancement in the army. He did not feel the
same pressure as Scottish officers to prove his personal loyalty to the Crown and he
harboured a sense of cultural civility and superiority stemming from his background and
connections to nobility.

As aide-de-camp to Sir John Ligonier, Amherst accompanied his superior to
England in autumn 1745 with ten battalions withdrawn from the continent to confront the
Jacobites. Ligonier’s troops were deployed in North England to try and cut off access to
London but the Jacobites managed to evade them as they advanced to Derby before
deciding to retreat. After the Duke of Cumberland took over the pursuit of the Jacobites
to Scotland, Ligonier’s troops were kept as a reserve guard in case of a French invasion
before being sent back to the continent in June for the 1746 campaign. Although Amherst
did not actively engage the Jacobites, he recorded his thoughts about the rising in his
personal journal. Upon receiving intelligence that Charles Edward Stuart had landed in
Scotland, Amherst shared the common sense of disbelief that the rising could pose any
threat to the Crown, labelling it “the most wild Scheme that ever was hear[d] of”. His
hope that the rebellion would not cause the recall of troops from the continent was
disappointed within a month. Arriving in England, Amherst documented the fear
prevalent amongst the population that led to exaggerated accounts of Jacobite activity
and blamed their advance to Derby on the poor command of Generals Cope and Wade.
Cope’s defeat at Prestonpans was “irresolute”. Amherst suggested that had Ligonier and,
presumably, himself commanded the main British Army the Jacobites would never have
captured Carlisle. Amherst’s journal highlights that his position left him privy to
information about the progress of the rising and the steps taken by the army to extinguish
it, even when Cumberland’s pursuit of the Jacobites into Scotland left him and Ligonier
with the reserve troops in England. His repeated labelling of the Jacobites as “villains”
and “rebels” shows that he shared Cumberland’s opinion that the Jacobites were criminals
and the army’s subjugation tactics were fully justified by the rules of war.

Amherst likely approved of the pacification of the Highlands that followed the
rising and was well-informed about it. His approval of Cumberland’s command during

6 Personal Journal, April 1745 to August 1746, Amherst Papers.
7 Personal Journal, April 1745 to August 1746, Amherst Papers.
8 Personal Journal, April 1745 to August 1746, Amherst Papers.
the rising suggests he would have shared his opinion regarding the measures necessary to restore peace in the region. In 1747, Amherst was appointed to Cumberland’s staff and he formed a close relationship with the duke and his aide-de-camp Joseph Yorke. Both Cumberland and Yorke identified themselves as civilised in contrast to the barbarous Highlanders and believed, if extirpation or mass transportation were not achievable policies, that it was necessary to implement measures to civilise Highlanders in order to assimilate them more closely within the British state. Close association with these officers would have served to increase Amherst’s own sense of cultural superiority. These experiences and associations inevitably shaped Amherst’s attitudes and actions towards those he later encountered in North America.

Figure 13. Map of the British and French forts in the New York and Canadian interior in January 1760. Base map used: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Maps_showing_18th-century_history#/media/File:Forts_in_1750.JPG.
During the 1760 campaign, Amherst was careful to ensure the French-Canadians were not molested in their homes and, after taking Fort Lévis (Fig. 13), he forbade his Iroquois allies from entering the fort, to prevent them from plundering it and scalping the garrison, causing all but approximately two hundred of them to desert. Amherst sought to retain the British Army’s claim of moral superiority and civility that dated from France’s failure to prevent the massacre at Fort William Henry in 1757. With the articles of capitulation, Amherst agreed that the French-Canadians would be treated as equal subjects of the King. However, when it was suggested to him that French-Canadians might be recruited to aid the British during Pontiac’s War, Amherst answered that: “The Canadians I cannot think of Employing on this Occasion: I would not have them entertain an Idea that We must Depend on their Assistance, or do I see that We Do. Nor Do I chuse to Trust them with Arms.”

Despite the success of recruitment as a method of assimilation in the Highlands, Amherst refused to employ the French-Canadians as doing so would require calling upon the assistance of a population he believed to be less civilised and inferior. It was not until Amherst’s recall that formal requests for French-Canadian troops were made by his successor Thomas Gage. In refusing to recruit French-Canadians, Amherst evinced his cultural superiority and arrogance.

Amherst also projected cultural superiority in his interactions with colonists. He expressed frustration over the illicit trade some colonists, particularly in New York, were carrying out with the enemy. Illicit trade had led Loudoun to implement a trade embargo in 1757 to prevent the French gaining intelligence of Britain’s campaign plan. Amherst was convinced illicit trading with the French colonies reduced the effectiveness of British naval blockades, enabled the French to continue to maintain their armies in Canada and the Caribbean, and took necessary supplies away from the army. After the conquest of Canada, Amherst sought to put an end to such activity, imposing a general embargo from April to June 1762. He believed those who engaged in illicit trade were demonstrating

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9 Cubbison, All Canada, 139-87.
10 Amherst to Gladwin, New York, 9 September 1763, Amherst Papers vol 2, WCL.
11 Loudoun to Cumberland, HMS Sutherland, 22 June 1757 in Pargellis, Military Affairs, 372-79; Loudoun to the Governors of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, Connecticut, Rhode Island and Massachusetts, New York, 2 March 1757, LO (AM) 2959, HL; Anderson, Crucible of War, 182-83.
their disloyalty by acting contrary to the imperial interest. They seemed “Determined to try Every means to Carry on a Trade, however Destructive to the Country in General, that promises a Considerable profit to themselves.” Amherst also accused colonial assemblies of delaying or denying compliance with his orders, thereby undermining military campaigns. When the Massachusetts Assembly failed to comply with his request that they vote to raise five thousand troops for the 1760 campaign, Amherst claimed it would be “productive of the worst of Consequences, and perhaps subvert the Wise Measures planned at home for the entire Reduction of Canada, and the giving a lasting peace to this Country”. On numerous occasions Amherst complained that the colonies were subverting British authority and not contributing as they ought to the war effort, highlighting that he was unhappy he had to negotiate with those he believed owed their obedience to the Crown. In May 1760 he complained to Captain-General John Ligonier that colonial sloth in providing provincials had prevented him from embarking for Montréal, and the following year expressed frustration at the “disagreeable necessity” that had caused Governor Bernard to promise that the provincials raised would not be sent south of Albany. The assembly took such a step to prevent the troops being sent to the West Indies, where conditions were poor and mortality rates high, but it left Amherst questioning whether “they should immediately withdraw their aid” should they receive word of a general peace, leaving Britain’s imperial security at risk. Like Loudoun, Amherst tended to ‘other’ the colonists as a result of his interactions with them and, in doing so, again exhibited his cultural superiority. This would also affect his relations and interactions with Native Americans and his attempts to secure peace in the interior would fail as he proved himself unwilling to negotiate in the post-conquest period to re-establish the “middle ground” as was required.

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*Empire: Trading with the Enemy in Colonial New York* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 139-55.


14 Amherst to Pownall, New York, 23 March 1759, WO 34, vol 27, Microfilm Reel C-12841, LAC.

15 Amherst to Jean Louis Ligonier, Albany, 19 March 1760, Amherst Papers.


17 White, *Middle Ground*. 
III. The British Army in the West

Figure 14. Title: A map of the western parts of the colony of Virginia. Date Created: 1754. ©Library of Congress Geography and Map Division. https://lccn.loc.gov/2013593293. The red line illustrates the approximate location of the Allegheny Mountains. In the 1758 Treaty of Easton, the British Army promised to vacate the land west of the mountains after the expulsion of the French.
Barriers to Peace

While France capitulated at Montréal in September 1760, Britain remained concerned about a renewal of hostilities in the western interior. Hitherto, Amherst and other officers tended to dismiss France’s ability to incite Native American insurrections in the region, viewing the tribes there as conquered peoples. Amherst’s priority for the duration of the war was the conquest of Canada, but he gradually came to accept that pacification of the western tribes was also necessary for imperial security. There were numerous obstacles: colonial land hunger, tensions and hostilities between frontier settlers and tribes, tribal ambitions to control the fur trade and the “middle ground”, and conflicting ministerial directives. The appointment of the Indian Superintendents in 1755 had been an attempt to centralise control of Indian diplomacy. The Treaty of Easton of 1758 was a notable success in bringing colonial representatives and tribes together in pacifying the Delaware Valley and borderlands of New Jersey southwards, achieved largely by ceding large tracts of land to the tribes.18 Further promises were made to preserve Native American hunting grounds west of the Allegheny Mountains (Fig. 14) from colonial incursions and to vacate military forts after the defeat of France.19 But by the early 1760s, no British policy had been forthcoming to safeguard promises or prevent westward migration, and the army remained stationed throughout the interior.

18 Bouquet’s Correspondence with the Delaware Chiefs, Pittsburgh, 1758, Add MS 21655, BL.
19 Ward, Breaking the Backcountry, 129-45; Anderson, Crucible of War, 267-85.
Indian-settler tension was exacerbated by the French and Indian War. After the British construction of Fort Pitt in 1758, many of the frontier inhabitants who had fled the Ohio Country (Fig. 15) in response to Indian raiding returned with fresh determination to settle the interior, whilst other colonists were encouraged to migrate westwards in response to the expulsion of the French. These colonists took no notice of war-time treaties with Native Americans they considered conquered peoples. The brutal frontier warfare had fostered hatred of Indians, leading to reciprocal attacks by frontier settlers and Native Americans, which was a main cause of the Anglo-Cherokee War of 1758-

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Geopolitical realignment in the wake of the French and Indian War undermined the “middle ground”, further threatening the peace. The expulsion of the French from the Ohio Country meant Native Americans had no choice but to trade and deal solely with the British, which dramatically reduced their diplomatic and political influence. Recognising the threat to their agency, Native Americans immediately began to call for the establishment of a confederacy to challenge British dominance and reclaim their lands. They also retained ties to the French in the Illinois Country and attempted to persuade the French Army to return to challenge the British. When the Treaty of Paris made it clear that there would be no restoration of French power, many Native Americans believed they had no choice but to go to war with Britain to try and re-establish the “middle ground”.

Despite British promises during wartime negotiations with Native Americans in the Great Lakes and Ohio Country (Fig. 15) that the army would vacate the interior once the French had been removed, construction was immediately begun to replace the abandoned Fort Duquesne with the imposing Fort Pitt after General Forbes’ 1758 victory. After the conquest of Canada, Amherst pursued militarisation of the interior and pacification of the tribes, aiming to remove any prospect of French intervention. Once the terms of the Treaty of Paris became clear, but with no official British ministerial policy for the interior forthcoming, Amherst displayed no desire to halt or adapt these plans and established settlements and garrisons in key British posts.

Amherst was given considerable freedom to direct policy in the West, for ministerial priorities lay elsewhere as the war drew to a close. Having decided to retain ten thousand troops in North America in late 1762, of which Amherst was informed in February 1763, the government left Amherst to distribute them as he wished. His only prescribed aim was to preserve the peace; how he did so was largely his choice. The only point the secretary of state repeatedly emphasised was that Amherst must reduce

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24 Bullion, “‘The Ten Thousand in America’”, 647-49.

military expenditure, running at £7.5 million for the duration of the war. With such leeway, Amherst’s own cultural paradigms and attitudes indubitably shaped the militarisation policy he devised and pursued. The parallels with Scotland were not obvious, but significant: pacification had been dependent upon a large standing army and a deliberate process of militarisation, and rationalising measures to maintain British security involved civilising “savage” indigenes. Amherst knew that many tribes in the Great Lakes region had not truly supported the British Army even when they had abandoned the French. Consequently, although he viewed them as a conquered people like the French-Canadians and Scottish Highlanders, he recognised they remained a potential threat to imperial security if they were not properly pacified, as the Anglo-Cherokee War seemed to demonstrate. He believed intimidation and subjugation were vital for security and he had no intention of vacating the interior. Britain’s wartime promises were abandoned, causing resentment amongst the Native Americans of the Great Lakes.

**British Cultural Paradigms in the West**

As with other populations within the empire, British attitudes towards Native Americans were informed by the cultural paradigm of civility. Native Americans, like Highlanders, were stigmatised throughout the eighteenth century by a characterisation of the entire population as savage. Commentators used comparable terminology to describe Native Americans and Highlanders believing there to be clear similarities between both groups, although emerging stadial theory placed Native Americans at the very lowest level of civility, as hunter-gatherers, with Highlanders placed one level higher, as pastoralists. As such, Native Americans were considered less civilised than Highlanders, more frequently labelled “savages” or “barbarous”, terms generally applied to Highlanders during a war. Other dehumanising terms (uncommonly applied to Highlanders) were “beasts” and “Hell Hounds,” used by Amherst in 1761 and 1763 respectively; other officers, including James Murray and Henry Gladwin, made mention

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29 Amherst to Gage, Albany, 27 May 1761, WO 34, vol 7, Microfilm Reel C-12838, LAC; Amherst to Gage, New York, 27 October 1763, WO 34, vol 7, Microfilm Reel C-12838, LAC.
of a “cowardly” and “worthless” race.\(^{30}\) The use of such language emphasises the incivility of that population in the eyes of British Army officers who conversely viewed themselves as civilised. It reflects both the perceived alienness of the Native Americans and the terror they induced amongst colonists and Europeans, such as in the aftermath of the 1757 massacre at Fort William Henry. Members of the British Army could, therefore, claim that any brutality carried out by them against Native Americans was fully justified by the rules of war, which legitimised the use of violent tactics against savages.\(^{31}\)

Jeffrey Amherst was careful that British troops adhered to the rules of warfare in subjugating French-Canadians during the 1760 campaign. But he had no qualms in sending Major Roberts and his rangers to destroy the Abenaki missionary settlement of St Francis in revenge for their capturing a British officer, spurning peace overtures.\(^{32}\) Amherst had ordered Rogers to spare women and children but expressed no concern about those Rogers killed or left to starve.\(^{33}\) Amherst, as well as the British Army more generally, was willing to view whole villages, nations, or even confederacies of Native Americans as equally guilty for the actions of any individuals who perpetuated violence against the British Army. Punishment, he believed, should “fall heavy on the whole nation that is accessory to the crime.”\(^{34}\) In such cases, targeting local populations indiscriminately was rationalised by their state of savagery and barbarity.

Although the British Army viewed all Native Americans as savages in theory, in practice they did make distinctions, particularly with the Iroquois because of their signal diplomatic and military presence. Clan Campbell had an analogous position in Scotland, as a loyal, dependable clan, avowedly more civilised than the rebel clans.\(^{35}\) Although the influence of the confederated tribes was much reduced after the French and Indian War, the British continued to view them differently from the rest of the Native Americans. When the Seneca participated in Pontiac’s War, Amherst did not condemn all the Iroquois.

\(^{30}\) Murray to Amherst, Quebec, 15 September 1763, WO 34, vol 2, Microfilm Reel B-2637, LAC; Gladwin to Amherst, Detroit, 19 November 1763, Amherst Papers, vol 7, WCL.

\(^{31}\) See Chapter One.

\(^{32}\) Amherst to Pitt, Crown Point, 22 October 1759, Amherst Papers.

\(^{33}\) Amherst to James De Lancey, Crown Point, 13 November 1759 in Middleton, Amherst and the Conquest of Canada, 136-37.

\(^{34}\) Amherst to Gladwin, New York, 29 May 1763, WO 34, vol 85, Microfilm Reel B-2685, LAC.

\(^{35}\) See: Martin Rackwitz, Travels to Terra Incognita: The Scottish Highlands and Hebrides in Early Modern Travellers’ Accounts c.1600-1800 (Berlin: Waxmann, 2007), 233-34; Some Thoughts Concerning the State of the Highlands of Scotland, Sent to the Earl of Albemarle, 24 January 1747, RH2/4/360, NRS; Some Thoughts Concerning the State of the Highlands, c.1747, Add MS 35890, BL.
and, in reprisal targeted only the Seneca’s settlements and inhabitants.\textsuperscript{36} In contrast, although several groups of Ottawa Indians remained neutral during the conflict, Amherst argued that anyone belonging to any of the western nations ought to be put to death as “equally guilty of the late depredations...deemed our enemies and used as such not as a generous enemy but the vilest race of beings that ever infested the earth”.\textsuperscript{37} In effect, Amherst singled out the five nations of the Iroquois Confederacy for special protection despite their close connection to the Seneca whilst condemning all western Indians as guilty by association and subject to collective punishment. The Iroquois, however, were a major exception and the attitudes of Amherst generally towards Native Americans was one inspired by the cultural paradigm of civility that defined them as savage.

\textsuperscript{36} Amherst to Gamble, New York, 15 August 1763, WO 34, vol 97, Microfilm Reel B-2692, LAC.
\textsuperscript{37} Amherst to Gamble, New York, 15 August 1763, WO 34, vol 97, Microfilm Reel B-2692, LAC; White, \textit{Middle Ground}, 286-89.
Figure 16. Map of the interior during Pontiac’s War, 1763-65. See table below for a description of the places labelled.\(^{38}\) Base map used: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pontiac%27s_war_region.png.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Fort Sandusky captured 16 May 1763</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Fort St. Joseph captured 25 May 1763</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Fort Detroit, unsuccessful Native American siege, May-September 1763</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Fort Ouiatenon captured 1 June 1763</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Fort Miami captured 2 June 1763</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Fort Michillimakinac captured 2 June 1763</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Fort Venango captured 16 June 1763</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Fort Le Boeuf captured 18 June 1763</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Fort Presque Isle captured 19 June 1763</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Fort Edward Augustus abandoned June-July 1763</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Fort Pitt, unsuccessful Native American siege, June-July 1763</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Battle of Bloody Run, 31 July 1763, Native American victory</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Battle of Bushy Run, 5-6 August 1763, British victory</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Battle of Devil’s Hole, 14 September 1763, Native American (Seneca) victory</td>
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\(^{38}\) The information used to plot this map was taken from Dowd, *War Under Heaven*, 22-147.
The paradigm of superiority also played an important role in defining Amherst’s attitudes towards Native Americans in the post-conquest period. As highlighted, Amherst considered Native Americans to be conquered peoples, subjugated by Crown forces but unworthy of, and unentitled to, any rights as subjects of the Crown. Whereas inhabitants of Canada, the Floridas, and the Illinois Country Amherst accepted as imperial subjects following the Treaty of Paris, Native Americans, he believed, were an inferior group: both reliant upon and subject to British authority with no practical or legal alternative but to accept subjugation. During the Anglo-Cherokee War and Pontiac’s War, Amherst defined Native Americans who fought against the British as rebels, as were the Jacobites. Decrying the “barbarous”, “treacherous”, and “vain” schemes of these “villains”, he saw a clear legal and cultural parallel with the “villains” and “rebels” he had described during the Forty-Five. Whereas Jacobites were subjects failing to show due submission to the Crown and the actions of the army were therefore guided by the loyalty paradigm, Native Americans were not subjects but, as an inferior, conquered population they were also expected to demonstrate submission to the Crown. In Amherst’s mind, both populations owed their allegiance to the Crown yet were manifestly disloyal and as savages denied themselves the benefits of the rules of war. He encouraged the targeting of entire tribes whose warriors had attacked British posts, advocating the killing of women and children, and reintroduced monetary rewards for scalps. It was as if Amherst was realising Joseph Yorke’s chilling apothegm of wiping a “vile race” of rebels, when ordering Henry Bouquet “to Extirpate this Exercrable Race” of Shawnee, Delaware, Mingo, and Seneca with smallpox to end the siege of Fort Pitt (Fig. 16).

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39 Amherst to Johnson, New York, 9 September 1763, Amherst Papers, vol 3, WCL; Various Documents Regarding the Cherokee Rebellion, 1760, CO5/7, TNA; Amherst to Monckton, Albany, 12 July 1761, Monckton Papers, MG18-MSérie1, Volume 16, LAC; Amherst to Richard Montgomery, New York 6 March 1760, WO 34, vol 48, Microfilm Reel B-2663, LAC; Amherst to James Grant, New York, 15 December 1760, WO 34, vol 48, Microfilm Reel B-2663, LAC.

40 Personal Journal, April 1745 to August 1746, Amherst Papers.

41 Amherst to Richard Montgomery, New York 6 March 1760, WO 34, vol 48, Microfilm Reel B-2663, LAC; Amherst to Grant, New York, 15 December 1760, WO 34, vol 48, Microfilm Reel B-2663, LAC.

42 Yorke to Hardwicke, Fort Augustus, 26 May 1746, Add. MS 35354, f.231, BL.

43 Extract of Amherst to Bouquet, Undated, Add MS 21634, f.241, BL.
In 1761 Secretary of State Lord Egremont had urged that all in North America (British colonists, French-Canadians, and Native Americans) be treated “upon the same principles of humanity and proper indulgence”,\(^44\) whilst the Proclamation of 1763 demarcated Native Americans living west of the Allegheny Mountains to be under British

\(^{44}\) Lord Egremont to Amherst, Whitehall, 12 December 1761, Amherst Papers, vol 5, WCL.
“Protection” (Fig. 1).\textsuperscript{45} However, British protection remained conditional on the maintenance of peace, military control of trade, and Indian acceptance of a vague legal status akin to suzerains of the Crown.\textsuperscript{46} Thus, British officers, including combatants Henry Gladwin and Henry Bouquet, instinctively depicted Indians as rebels when engaged in violent resistance against the army or colonists.\textsuperscript{47} “Indian Insurrections”, as Egremont’s successor Halifax termed native resistance,\textsuperscript{48} demanded nothing less than their subjugation, and at worst, in the mind of Amherst and others, their extirpation. It was generally thought that the Native Americans now had little choice but to accept the British as their “protectors” or “father” in place of the French.

But that was not how Native Americans viewed their relationship to the Crown. As William Johnson later noted, it “has been very customary for many People to Insinuate that the Indians call themselves Subjects, altho I am thoroughly convinced they were never so called, nor would they approve of it.” The Indians had no word that could convey the meaning of subjection, Johnson explained, and the very idea of it would “fill them with horror.”\textsuperscript{49} They viewed themselves not as subjects but as allies of the British, unconquered neutrals who had negotiated British guarantees for future trading and land rights. Native subjection in the interior was not just anathema, but an illusion. The British military presence there was weak: garrisons were depleted, fortifications in disrepair, and outposts vulnerable to assault.\textsuperscript{50} Whatever Amherst might think about their cultural superiority, soldiers stationed in the interior lived in dread.

\textsuperscript{45} The Proclamation required any settlers in the interior to remove themselves, reserved the purchase of Indian lands to the Crown, and required all Indian traders to be licensed by a colonial governor or the commander-in-chief. Proclamation of 1763 in Documents, 119-24; Dowd, War Under Heaven, 177-80.


\textsuperscript{47} Gladwin to Amherst, Detroit, 19 November 1763, Amherst Papers, vol 7, WCL; Extract of Bouquet to Unknown, 28 June 1763, Add MS 21653, f.169, BL


\textsuperscript{49} Johnson to Gage, Johnson Hall, 31 October 1764, Gage Papers, vol 26.

Policy implemented by Amherst between 1760 and 1763 was largely reflective of his prevailing cultural superiority which denied Native Americans independent diplomatic agency or moral equality, presuming their predisposition to French conspiracy. Amherst steadfastly refused to negotiate with Native Americans to ensure peace. A savage conquered people, culturally and militarily inferior, their submission and allegiance to the Crown he considered non-negotiable. Amherst probably underestimated the Indians’ military worth, having little actual field experience working with them, and those Iroquois allies he deployed in the Montréal campaign had promptly deserted when he denied them an opportunity to plunder. Alliances, for what they were worth, did nothing to dilute his firm sense of the superiority of British regulars in all situations. His long-nurtured paradigm of superiority reigned supreme. With the Duke of Cumberland, he learned how to pacify and subjugate inferior indigenes. After the conquest of Canada, he applied for himself those lessons in pacifying the Ohio Country, without actually experiencing the terror of frontier warfare.

IV. Pacification and Conflict

The Militarisation of the Interior

By 1760 the Highland example seemed to suggest the concurrent processes of a punitive pacification and the militarisation of an imperial fringe could ensure long-term peace and lead to the closer assimilation of a hostile population within the empire. It provided a recent blueprint for Amherst to model his western strategy on. Whilst in Canada James Murray advocated a policy of cooperative submission and toleration when pacifying that population, Amherst’s cultural paradigm of superiority led him to implement a subjugatory strategy that sought to militarily intimidate Native Americans and force their acculturation. Such a strategy sought to improve that population so that they might eventually be assimilated within the empire as subjects.

51 Anderson, Crucible of War, 545-46; Watson, ‘Holding the Line’, 134-35; Dowd, ‘French King’, 259. Dowd highlighted that during Pontiac’s War the Native Americans themselves spread rumours the French had induced them to act against the British in an attempt to persuade the French to enter into the conflict.

52 Amherst to Gage, New York, 19 February 1759, Amherst Papers, vol 4, WCL; Amherst to Rogers, New York, 20 February 1759, Amherst Papers, vol 4, WCL; Amherst to Pitt, New York, 28 February 1759, Amherst Papers.
Given control over the distribution of troops, Amherst chose to station the bulk of those available in the interior and Canada to counter the continuing threat to British imperial security. Following the Highland example, the interior troops were spread amongst several garrisons including impressive structures at Fort Pitt, Niagara, Detroit, Michilimackinac, and Crown Point and smaller stockades including Miami and Presque Isle.53 Troops were expected to improve fortifications and construct or improve roads and portage routes to open up access both to and throughout the interior.54 As in the Highlands, the army sought not only to provide an implicit threat to Native Americans regarding British military might but also to enable the army to respond more quickly to future disorders and to keep the garrisons properly supplied. However, Amherst had to try and extend control over an area more than four times larger than the Highlands whilst simultaneously providing troops for the continuing war effort. Over half of his sixteen thousand troops were campaigning in the Caribbean whilst seventeen battalions were stationed in Canada, leaving approximately seven hundred and fifty troops from Bouquet’s Royal Americans distributed amongst all fourteen interior garrisons.55 Recognising that the limited numbers left the troops vulnerable, Amherst encouraged the development of small settlements around garrisons. By April 1761 approximately 330 were living in a semi-permanent settlement that included crop fields, a quarry, and a sawmill in the vicinity of Fort Pitt.56

To ministers, Amherst reiterated the necessity of retaining a large military force in the interior. When his opinion was sought regarding the best distribution for the twenty battalions to be kept in North America after the peace, Amherst identified the Mississippi Valley as an ideal location for a secure frontier to keep the “Indians in a proper Subjection” and prevent France or Spain making inroads into British territory.57 There would not be enough troops to sufficiently garrison the principal interior forts, however, without abandoning “all the inferior Forts, [and] the Posts of Communication”. These, Amherst suggested, should be granted to “proper People”, likely disbanded soldiers or

55 Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 473; McConnell, *Army and Empire*, 24. The number of troops in the interior would increase after the Treaty of Paris to a maximum of four regiments in 1765.
57 Amherst to Henry Ellis, New York, 26 April 1763, Amherst Papers.
trusted colonists, on the condition that they be returned to the Crown if required. Such an arrangement would bolster British interior security by keeping disbandet soldiers close to areas of likely disruption, as their settlement upon the annexed estates in the Highlands had done previously.

As in the Highlands, soldiers in North America were utilised as a police force. Due to the continuing conflict and the lack of civil legal structures in the interior, Native Americans were subject to military law and liable to be tried by court martial or subject to wanton violence from soldiers or officers. Again, this reflected their contested status within the empire. As Native Americans were not considered subjects they did not enjoy the same legal rights as settlers, but they were still expected to be bound by colonial and military legal frameworks. Amherst demanded that Indians accused of crimes be surrendered to stand trial and he supported a death sentence for those found guilty of murder. When Henry Gladwin sentenced an Indian slave woman to death for her role as an accomplice in the murder of her British master, Amherst ordered that the execution be public to deter others “from Committing such Cruelties for the Future.” To Amherst, the imposition of military justice on a savage, inferior, and conquered population was necessary and lawful. For Native Americans, however, the failure of the British Army to vacate the interior as promised was a betrayal of trust and the imposition of military justice appeared to them as an overt threat that the British intended to begin a war of annihilation.

Mirroring the militarisation of the Highlands, the British Army sought to regulate commercial interactions in the interior. Restricting gifts of arms and ammunition sought to subjugate Native Americans in the short-term, whilst emphasis on developing and regulating colonial-native trade and a desire to civilise the hostile population sought to achieve acculturation and, in the longer-term, enable Native Americans’ assimilation within the British Empire as subjects. Limiting the diplomatic policy of gift giving Amherst believed a sensible and simple way of achieving his ministerial orders to reduce expense. The conquered Native Americans, he thought, would have no choice but to

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58 Amherst to Henry Ellis, New York, 26 April 1763, Amherst Papers.
59 Middleton, Pontiac’s War, 26; Watson, ‘Holding the Line’, 63.
60 Amherst to Johnson, Albany, 24 June 1761, WO 34, vol 38, Microfilm Reel C-12843, LAC.
61 Quoted in Dowd, War Under Heaven, 65.
62 Johnson to Amherst, Johnson Hall, 21 June 1761, WO 34, vol 39, Microfilm Reel B-2657, LAC; Dowd, War Under Heaven, 64-70.
accept such a change. He also sought to limit native military capabilities, ordering his officers to limit the amount of ammunition they gifted Native Americans. The war had caused ammunition shortages which British traders were slow to respond to, whilst Native Americans struggled to provide enough skins to re-establish their side of the trade. Many visited garrisons for assistance, requesting ammunition to enable them to hunt and trade. Amherst ordered officers to be “sparing” with ammunition to prevent the Indians from causing “mischief”. Like the disarming of the Highlanders, limiting ammunition sought to limit the populations’ ability to rebel. In North America, however, Native Americans relied upon European arms to hunt and would struggle to subsist under Amherst’s restrictions.

Amherst’s aim was not the total disarmament of Native Americans, nor did he intend to end gift giving entirely. Rather he viewed it as a method of rewarding those who remained peaceful. Any who behaved “ill”, were to “be punished, but not bribed”. Johnson warned Amherst that reducing gift giving would be received badly by Native Americans. Gifts were a symbol of status for tribal leaders whilst many Indians had been unable to plant crops due to the war and suffered from the loss of the French market and the failure of the market economy to recover in the early 1760s. Amherst, however, believed his policy fair and was convinced that British military superiority meant that any Indian rebellion would end in their destruction. Arguing that “these people are certainly not to be attached by indulgence”, Amherst emphasised that so long as they accepted their subjugation and displayed due submission to the Crown, Native Americans would be treated fairly.

In restricting gift giving, Amherst also sought to force the Native Americans to become more civilised in the long-term by overcoming the inherent laziness he perceived

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64 Amherst to Walters, Oswego, 9 August 1760, WO 34, vol 23, Microfilm Reel B-2649, LAC; Amherst to Walters, New York, 2 November 1760, WO 34, vol 23, Microfilm Reel B-2649, LAC.
65 Amherst to Johnson, Albany, 22 February 1761, WO 34, vol 38, Microfilm Reel C-12843, LAC.
66 Dowd, War Under Heaven, 76-77; Ward, Breaking the Backcountry, 204.
67 Amherst to Egremont, New York, 18 August 1763, Amherst Papers. Regarding Amherst’s belief that his policy was fair see: General Amherst’s Address to the Several Tribes and Nations of Indians, Fort George, 27 April 1760 in Middleton, Amherst and the Conquest of Canada, 172-74; Amherst to Frederick Haldimand, Lake George, 13 July 1759, WO 34, vol 9, Microfilm Reel B-2642, LAC; Amherst to Haldimand, Oswego, 6 August 1760, WO 34, vol 9, Microfilm Reel B-2642, LAC; Amherst to Johnson, New York, 11 July 1761, WO 34, vol 38, Microfilm Reel C-12843, LAC.
to be a result of their savagery. This reflected eighteenth-century understandings of progress and emerging enlightenment ideas of stadial theory that suggested uncivilised societies could become more civilised through engagement in commerce. Amherst believed that a reduction in gifts would force Native Americans to become more self-sufficient and to hunt more, thereby providing them with skins to trade for other necessities. In order to facilitate this, he sought to provide a fair, free, well-regulated colonial-native trade. Commerce was to be managed by the army as interior garrisons were to become trading posts and officers were expected to prevent colonial merchants engaging in fraud. Amherst expected the Indian Superintendents to work closely alongside the army and planned to appoint a governor for the interior at the Detroit to oversee trade and regulate disputes, although this plan was not implemented.

Amherst also sought to encourage the civilisation of Native Americans by banning colonial merchants from selling alcohol. Amherst sought to overcome the very “Bad Effects” of allowing traders to carry rum, which was believed to encourage Indians’ drunkenness and idleness and was blamed for many instances of violence. Similar steps had been taken during the war as Amherst and other officers tended to blame Native American drunkenness for any disturbances within the camps, forbidding the sale of alcohol to natives and segregating natives in their own encampments. Many Native American leaders and the Indian Superintendents supported the measure, agreeing that alcohol increased native violence. Violence was thought natural to uncivilised, warlike peoples like Native Americans and forbidding the sale of alcohol aimed to encourage them to become more industrious and civilised. By March 1762, Henry Bouquet could comment that the “Salutary Effects of the prohibition of Rum are Sensibly felt” around Fort Pitt. Commercialisation drove militarisation in both North America and Scotland.

68 See Chapter One.
69 Amherst to Johnson, Albany, 22 February 1761, WO 34, vol 38, Microfilm Reel C-12843, LAC; Amherst to John Stuart, New York, 16 April 1763, Amherst Papers, vol 3, WCL.
70 Orders of Jeffrey Amherst, New York, 16 January 1762, Add MS 21678, f.13, BL; Garrison Orders, Fort Niagara, 30 March 1762, WO 34, vol 22, Microfilm Reel B-2649, LAC.
71 Brumwell, Redcoats, 164-68; J. Amherst, The Journal of Jeffrey Amherst: Recording the Military Career of General Amherst in America from 1758 to 1763, ed. J. C. Webster (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1931), 173; Amherst to Rogers, New York, 20 February 1759, Amherst Papers, vol 4, WCL.
72 Amherst to Johnson, New York, 16 January 1762, WO 34, vol 38, Microfilm Reel C-12843, LAC; Discussion between the Principal Warriors of the Shawnee and the British, 1st March 1761, Add MS 21655, BL.
73 Bouquet to Amherst, Fort Pitt, 7 March 1762, WO 34, vol 40, Microfilm Reel B-2658, LAC.
as the army sought to secure long-term peace and civilise a savage population and earlier experiences in the Highlands both directly and indirectly influenced the actions of Amherst and the British Army in the North American interior.

Other civilising measures encouraged by Amherst in the interior focused on introducing Protestantism and the English language in native communities, reflecting both earlier action in the Highlands and measures taken since the beginning of European settlement in North America. Amherst encouraged the civilising missions of the Society in Scotland for Propagating Christian Knowledge (SSPCK) and the Society for Propagating the Bible in Foreign Parts (SPG).\(^\text{74}\) He highlighted his approval of ministers and schoolmasters being placed amongst the Indians but took no steps himself to provide them as he continued to focus on reducing expenditure in the interior.\(^\text{75}\) As in Scotland, such measures were encouraged because civilisation was thought a necessary prerequisite for the assimilation of hostile peoples into the Empire, which in turn was assumed to be the only way to ensure continuing loyalty to the Crown. Although such an assumption was starting to be questioned, particularly in Canada, it continued to influence Amherst’s western strategy in the post-conquest period. North America provided a testing ground for enlightenment ideas about civilised societies, with earlier experiences pacifying and attempting to civilise Highlanders providing models to guide army officers and missionaries in their interactions with Native Americans.\(^\text{76}\) However, in North America, the continuation of violence in the interior and Amherst’s superiority paradigm ensured that measures aiming to civilise Native Americans remained secondary to those aiming to subjugate them during his command.

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\(^{75}\) Amherst to Johnson, Albany, 22 February 1761, WO 34, vol 38, Microfilm Reel C-12843, LAC. Amherst’s belief that civilising Native Americans was beneficial to British imperial security was shared by other army officers, including James Abercromby. See Abercromby to Pitt, Albany, 24 May 1758, COS/50, ff.75-96, TNA.

\(^{76}\) Calloway, *White People, Indians, and Highlanders*, 77-78.
Conflict

Despite the militarisation of the interior, Amherst continued to receive regular reports of Native American violence during the post-conquest period. Indian traders and backcountry families were frequently murdered by Indians, whilst officers at Fort Pitt and elsewhere reported the killing and scalping of soldiers and the general criminality of the Indians at British garrisons. This encouraged Amherst to continue his subjugatory strategy, believing it the only way to ensure the total submission of the savage and inferior population. As well as frequent violence, Amherst received regular reports of Indian discontent from Superintendent Johnson, who warned him that the Indians were “very Jealous [and] uneasy at the coolness and indifference which they think is shewn towards them”, leaving Johnson “apprehensive that something not right” was brewing amongst them. Rumours that the Indians were plotting an attack on British garrisons were common but Amherst’s cultural paradigm of superiority led him to dismiss such reports. “Mischief,” would “fall on their Own hands with a powerfull and heavy hand” and the Indians, he thought, were “not so blind, as not to see the protection they Enjoy from the King”. Whilst Amherst thought it unlikely that the Native Americans would choose to refute British authority, which he believed they were reliant upon, he remained convinced that British military superiority meant that even if a united attack was staged it would not represent a serious challenge to British imperial security.

When general conflict did break out, in the Anglo-Cherokee War of 1758-61 and Pontiac’s War, 1763-65, Amherst once again demonstrated his determination to subjugate those involved. After the Cherokee broke a peace concluded with South Carolina in 1759, Amherst ordered British regulars to “punish these Savages so as to deter them from Commencing Hostilities, and Exercising their Barbarities on His Majesty’s Subjects.” Colonel Montgomery was ordered to destroy Cherokee towns, stores, and crops and when his expedition failed to force Cherokee submission, James

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77 Amherst to Bouquet, New York, 4 April 1762, Add MS 21634, f.116, BL; Amherst to Gladwin, New York, 13 September 1762, WO 34, vol 49, Microfilm Reel B-2664, LAC; Amherst to Egremont, New York, 30 November 1762, Amherst Papers; Amherst to Ligonier, New York, 11 June 1763, Amherst Papers.
78 Bouquet to Amherst, Fort Pitt, January 1763, Add MS 21634, BL; Amherst to Ellis, New York, 11 June 1763, Amherst Papers.
79 Johnson to Amherst, Johnson Hall, 21 June 1761, WO 34, vol 39, Microfilm Reel B-2657, LAC.
80 Amherst to Johnson, Albany, 24 June 1761, WO 34, vol 38, Microfilm Reel C-12843, LAC.
81 Amherst to Ligonier, New York, 8 March 1760, Amherst Papers.
Grant was ordered to continue the fire and sword campaign the following year so that the “savages” were reduced “to the absolute necessity of suing for Pardon and peace”. Amherst was determined that neither Montgomery or Grant negotiate an end to the hostilities, the inferior population was to be made to surrender in order to demonstrate their acceptance of British authority. He was concerned that acting leniently would encourage others to join a pan-Indian movement against the British. However, British success in forcing the Cherokee to sue for peace did not prevent the pan-Indian uprisings Amherst had been determined to prevent as the Indians of the Great Lakes and Ohio Country attacked British garrisons during the summer of 1763.

Upon the outbreak of Pontiac’s War, Amherst’s cultural superiority not only encouraged him to continue his policy of subjugation but also to refuse offers of Native American military assistance. Sir William Johnson and his deputy George Croghan informed Amherst that many Native Americans remained in the British interest: the Iroquois, excepting the Seneca, the Canadian Indians, and the Stockbridge Indians, with the latter two offering military service. Amherst refused all such offers, informing Henry Bouquet that all he desired from the Canadian Indians was “their Remaining Quiet, for I never will put the Least Trust in any of the Indian Race.” In a letter to Johnson, he emphasised his belief of the military inferiority of Native Americans, ordering him not to assemble the Canadian Indians as it would “give them Room to think themselves of more Consequence than they really are.” He did not think the British required their aid and did not trust their proclaimed loyalty to Britain, believing they would turn on his army as soon as it was favourable to do so. Johnson warned Amherst that if he did not utilise the Indians he risked their joining Pontiac’s rising. Amherst’s over-reliance on British regulars elicited criticism at home. Secretary of State Halifax delivered a thinly veiled criticism stating that whilst he was sure Amherst had good reasons for declining

82 Amherst to Montgomery, New York 6 March 1760, WO 34, vol 48, Microfilm Reel B-2663, LAC; Amherst to Grant, New York, 15 December 1760, WO 34, vol 48, Microfilm Reel B-2663, LAC.
83 Amherst to Ellis, New York, 21 December 1759, WO 34, vol 34, Microfilm Reel B-2654, LAC; Amherst to Ligonier, New York, 8 March 1760, Amherst Papers; Amherst to Grant, New York, 15 December 1760, WO 34, vol 48, Microfilm Reel B-2663, LAC.
84 Amherst to Bouquet, New York, 25 September 1763,WO 34, vol 41, Microfilm Reel B-2659, LAC.
85 Johnson to Amherst, with Reply, Johnson Hall, 1 July 1763, Amherst Papers, vol 6, WCL.
86 Johnson to Amherst, Johnson Hall, 4 August 1763, f.391, WO 34, vol 39, Microfilm Reel B-2657, LAC.
the services of willing Indians, in his “inferior” judgement they seemed useful to the service.\textsuperscript{87}

Amherst’s subjugation of Native Americans and his militarisation of the interior failed to keep the peace because the inferior population refused to act as they were expected to, and Amherst’s policies encouraged them to unite against British authority rather than keeping them in a state of due submission. Amherst returned to England whilst Pontiac’s War remained ongoing, without having managed to chastise the Indians into suing for peace as he had intended. His failure did not diminish his belief in British superiority, however, and he left his successor Thomas Gage with instructions for “crushing the Indian Insurrection [and] punishing those Tribes who have so ungratefully Attacked their Benefactors.”\textsuperscript{88} However, Gage’s own cultural paradigms led him to view Native Americans, and the reasons for Pontiac’s War, differently from Amherst and to push for a strategy of accommodation, not acculturation, in the interior.

V. Conclusions

Jeffrey Amherst’s brief experience of the Forty-Five, documented in his personal journal, highlighted that he shared the common perception of the Jacobites as “rebels” and “villains” against whom the British Army was fully justified in using violent and repressive tactics to force their submission. A decade serving under Cumberland likely strengthened both this understanding and Amherst’s personal sense of British cultural superiority that led him to comparatively view all those he encountered in North America as morally, militarily, and culturally lesser. This included the French-Canadians whose assistance he refused during Pontiac’s War and the colonial settlers he ‘othered’ through accusations they failed to display due adherence to the Crown by subverting the war effort. It was, however, particularly relevant for his interactions with Native Americans as Amherst attempted to secure peace in the interior.

Questions about the loyalty and identity of population groups within the British Empire, raised due to the association of Highlanders with the Forty-Five, continued to be asked after the conquest of Canada as Britain claimed a vast extension to its territory in the North American interior and assumed responsibility for the Native Americans who resided within it. Various barriers to peace in the West including colonial land

\textsuperscript{87} Halifax to Amherst, Whitehall, 11 November 1763, Amherst Papers, vol 7, WCL.

\textsuperscript{88} Amherst to Gage, New York, 17 November 1763, Amherst Papers, Box One, WCL.
encroachment, the realignment of the “middle ground”, and the army’s continuing presence ensured the Native Americans remained a potentially hostile people. As the British Army sought to pacify that population, the cultural paradigms of civility and superiority were to the fore in guiding Amherst’s western strategy.

The labelling of Native Americans as savages led to a parallel in the treatment of them and Highlanders during periods of warfare. As the rules of war provided justification for employing the tactics of savages in warfare against such peoples, Amherst and other army officers rationalised their use of fire and sword tactics by highlighting the savagery of their opponents. Further, as the civility paradigm posited that a savage population collectively required punitive measures, the army felt vindicated in classifying entire nations, groups, or confederacies of Native Americans as guilty by association for hostilities carried out. Officers encouraged the use of systematic violence to force their submission. Native Americans were not only considered savage, they were also thought to be an inferior population, subject to British authority but unentitled to any rights as imperial subjects. Although few British Army officers or government ministers shared Amherst’s conviction that Native Americans, as a conquered population, posed little threat to British security, his denial of imperial rights to that population was broadly accepted. Further, as Amherst was given freedom to direct the militarisation of the interior as he saw fit due to other ministerial priorities in London, his paradigm of superiority was very important for shaping the strategy adopted.

Militarisation in the North American interior mirrored the earlier militarisation of the Highlands as the British Army retained a significant military presence in an imperial fringe to assert control over a hostile population whilst concurrently seeking to regulate commercial interactions and civilise savages. Civilisation was thought to be a necessary prerequisite for the eventual assimilation of ‘others’ within the British Empire. Although James Murray’s move towards accommodation in Canada at the same time suggested the beginning of a move away from the assumption that assimilation was a necessity for imperial populations to be able to demonstrate continuing loyalty, Amherst’s militarisation of the interior highlighted that it remained common at that juncture. However, the superiority paradigm ensured that the subjugation of Native Americans remained Amherst’s priority to force their acceptance of their subjugated status, so civilisation remained a secondary, and much longer-term, aim.

Amherst’s primary aim was to ensure imperial security in a fringe that was vulnerable both to internal attack from Native Americans and external attack from France
or Spain. That his subjugatory strategy was unable to prevent conflict breaking out in the West highlights the failure of his cultural assumptions and left his successor, Thomas Gage, no choice but to reconsider British strategy in the interior in light of his own cultural paradigms.
Chapter Five: Thomas Gage
I. Introduction

When Jeffrey Amherst was granted leave to return to England in late 1763, Thomas Gage was given temporary command of the British troops in North America. His position was made permanent the following year when Amherst was chastised for failing to contain Native American rebellion throughout the Great Lakes and Ohio Country and confirmed he had no desire to return to America. Pontiac’s War was ongoing when Gage assumed the command and therefore his first major task was to end the conflict and pacify the Native Americans. The previous chapter highlighted the difficulties the British Army faced when attempting to ensure peace in the backcountry and govern the disparate indigenous populations. Amherst’s attempted subjugation of the Native American population, influenced by the earlier pacification of the Highlands and driven by his cultural paradigm of superiority, had failed, provoking Pontiac’s War. Gage continued the process of militarisation but not Amherst’s subjugation strategy, moving towards accommodation and diplomacy in an attempt to bring long-term peace to the interior and to bring Native Americans into the imperial fold. At the same time, Gage struggled to assert imperial authority in the older colonies as colonists balked at successive British attempts to tax them. He was recalled in June 1775 after failing to prevent the outbreak or spread of rebellion, sailing for England that October.

This chapter considers Gage’s experiences of pacification, militarisation, and governance from 1763 until the eve of the American Revolution, taking the study of the British Army’s experiences in North America in the pre-revolutionary period to its conclusion. It first considers Gage’s military experience, before exploring the problems the British faced in pacifying the western interior and the impact of militarisation on British relations with the colonists in the face of a deepening imperial crisis. Gage’s formative experiences illuminate the enduring influence of the Forty-Five on British imperialism in North America. As commander-in-chief, considerations of identity and loyalty were as important as imperial security in driving the pacification of Native Americans and the militarisation of colonial governments, as they had been twenty years earlier in the pacification and militarisation of the Scottish Highlands. Gage’s pacification of Native Americans aimed to bring them under military governance, but the cultural paradigm of civility was altogether less important than it had been for Amherst in Gage’s efforts to reconcile the ‘otherness’ of the Indians to British imperial authority. In military affairs, British officers had learned to tolerate the independent-mindedness of the
colonists, so long as their insubordination in the ranks and truculent resourcing of the provincial regiments did not undermine the war effort. The controversies over parliamentary taxation complicated matters, however, and demonstrated colonists’ failure to display due adherence to Parliament. Throughout the late 1760s, Gage came to view the colonists as a potential military threat, which required strong management: colonists were expected to submit to imperial authority, whilst Gage and other British officials called for reform of colonial government. From a military perspective, Gage’s advocacy of tighter imperial control mirrored his understanding of the pacification and militarisation of the Scottish Highlands and reflected earlier calls of British officers who had begun to ‘other’ the colonists in response to their lacklustre war effort. When challenged on and by the imperial fringe, Gage reiterated the paradigm of loyalty as he sought to assert British authority.

II. Thomas Gage, the Forty-Five, and the French and Indian War

Born at Highmeadow, Gloucestershire, in 1719 or 1720, Thomas Gage was the second son of Viscount Thomas Gage, Member of Parliament for Tewkesbury. The Gages of Firle were Roman Catholic recusants whose continued adherence to Catholicism led to a loss of status and wealth during the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Despite being fined and imprisoned for recusancy, John Gage was created a baronet in 1622 by James I in return for maintaining a regiment of foot.¹ Thomas Gage senior converted to the Church of England in 1715 to enable his appointment as an MP and was given the title Viscount Gage in 1720. Although he raised his children Anglican, Viscount Gage converted back to Catholicism shortly before his death, suggesting he personally continued to adhere to the faith.² Whilst there is no evidence to suggest Thomas Gage ever practised Catholicism, the legacy of the family’s financial hardships and rejection from public life due to their faith likely had a lasting impact on him. Like James Murray, whose family ties to Jacobitism haunted him throughout his career and affected his attitudes and actions, it is likely Gage felt compelled to prove his personal loyalty to the Crown through assertions of imperial authority in the places he was active.

A thirst to prove personal loyalty, as well as a focus on upholding the authority of the Crown, is depicted in John Singleton Copley’s 1768 portrait of the general (Fig. 18) that Christopher Bryant suggested deliberately recalled the earlier pacification of the Highlands and was intended as a warning to the colonists. Gage commissioned the portrait himself at a time when he and the army had taken up residence in Boston to prevent expected rebellion and a paradigm shift had led him to view the colonial settlers as potentially hostile ‘others’. Bryant noted the similarities in the Gage painting and the widely disseminated engraving of the Battle of Culloden by Luke Sullivan (1746), after Augustin Heckel, including civilian settlements placed upon a hill in the background (representing the local population), the distinctive line of three regiments of infantry, and the mounted dragoons facing the viewer in the foreground. The lack of an enemy in the Copley portrait points towards the success of British arms in Scotland where the rebellion was crushed, the region occupied, and the population pacified, hinting that Gage was ready to crush the population and suppress rebellion in Massachusetts.

Gage’s advancement in the army was typical of younger noble sons. Joining the army in 1741 he was aided by the patronage of his elder brother William, second Viscount Gage, and William’s political allegiance with Secretary of State, the Duke of Newcastle. He was appointed a captain of the 62nd Foot in 1743 and served on the continent as aide-de-camp for William Anne Keppel, second Earl of Albemarle, during the War of the Austrian Succession. His regiment was recalled to Britain in November 1745 to meet the Jacobite threat, and Gage was present at the Battles of Falkirk and Culloden, and in the aftermath. He typified the “Old Cullodeners” as fellow officer Eyre Massey labelled them in personal letters penned in North America. By 1751, Gage was lieutenant-colonel of the 44th Foot, one of two regiments of regulars sent to North America in 1755 to join Braddock’s expedition against the French in the Ohio Country. Gage attracted some unjustified criticism of his handling of the advance guard following the Battle of Monongahela, attributing the disaster to a failure to deploy irregular troops on the column’s flanks.

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4 Bryant, ‘Copley’s Portraits of General Gage and Adams’.

5 Quoted in Alden, General Gage, 14.

6 John W. Shy, ‘Gage, Thomas (1719/20-1787)’, ODNB, 2004, see ODNB online; Preston, Braddock’s Defeat, 284-85. Preston’s recent work highlighted that the criticism levelled at both Braddock and Gage
He also drew lessons from his earlier experiences in the Highlands. Gage saw little military action during Loudoun’s command, but the challenges of adapting to warfare in North America preoccupied him. He was aware of the important role Loudoun’s 64th Regiment had played in the Forty-Five securing roads and routes of communication throughout the Highlands, scouring the countryside for intelligence, and harrying Jacobites. Loudoun’s men were primarily Highlanders, familiar with the harsh local weather and difficult terrain, and perhaps the best suited of all British soldiers to deal with Jacobite raids from the interior. Gage favoured training regulars in irregular techniques in North America and creating light infantry capable of harassing the enemy and protecting the main bodies of troops. Gage and Loudoun were both firm advocates of irregular warfare and, in December 1757, Loudoun gave Gage permission to raise the 80th Regiment of Foot of five hundred light infantry, to be trained in irregular warfare by experienced officers. Raised at his own expense, the regiment provided Gage with his long-sought-after colonelcy and reiterated his commitment to developing irregular warfare.

Gage’s military experience in North America exposed him to numerous logistical problems and the frustrations of dealing with civilian authorities, from which, like many officers, he emerged an advocate of closer imperial regulation. Braddock had diplomatic and administrative powers in the colonies alongside his military command, as did Loudoun, Abercromby, Amherst, and Gage in succession. The colonies were clearly made subordinate to the commander-in-chief, in keeping with the reformist agenda of the Earl of Halifax, president of the Board of Trade, as they were ordered to contribute to a war fund administered by Braddock. In the wake of Braddock’s defeat, Gage called for the reform of the governments in Pennsylvania and Maryland, like Braddock favouring direct taxation to preclude the necessity of negotiating requisitions from the colonial assemblies that preoccupied his superiors. By the time he was appointed commander-

was unjustified. He argued that the British defeat reflected the weakness of the British Empire attempting to engage in warfare so far from its centre. See p.8.

7 See Chapter One.
9 Thomas Gage, Proposal for Raising a Regiment of Light Armed Foot, 22 December 1757, LO (AM) 5066, HL; Loudoun to Pitt, New York, 14 February 1758, CO5/49, ff.1-14, TNA.
11 Preston, *Braddock’s Defeat*, 76.
in-chief in 1764, Gage had a wealth of military and political experience and his early conduct of military affairs in North America was shaped by his formative experiences.

In the Forty-Five, Gage learned about pacifying hostile populations as aide-de-camp to the Earl of Albemarle, Cumberland’s replacement as commander of the British troops in Scotland from August to December 1746. Albemarle shaped the early stages of pacification, disdainful of the Highlanders and in favour of a punitive, repressive policy. Gage remained in the Highlands for some time, likely stationed in Inverness with Batereau’s 62nd Regiment under the command of Major General Blakeney, and during that period he would have been engaged in efforts to capture Jacobite fugitives and Charles Edward Stuart. Gage’s close association with Albemarle meant he would have been aware of the latter’s rationale that the subjugation of the Highland population was necessary to prevent future risings but also that cultural assimilation was required to ensure future loyalty. Gage drew upon these lessons when, as military governor of Montréal, he pacified French-Canadians following the conquest of 1760. Unlike the Highlanders, the French-Canadians were not rebels; nor did Gage initially expect Canada to be retained after the peace. Thus, his earlier experiences from Scotland required adaptation to these new circumstances. However, both were defeated peoples, and both required pacification to ensure imperial security. Gage’s moderation boded well with the town’s inhabitants, as had James Murray’s in Quebec, and pacification seemed likely to avoid the repression the British had deemed necessary in the wake of Culloden.

Pontiac’s War of 1763-65 and the protests of the colonial settlers from 1765 to 1774, presented quite different challenges in military governance although, as in Montréal, Gage’s cultural paradigm of loyalty demanded all imperial populations display due submission and adherence to the Crown.

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13 Taylor, *Military Roads in Scotland*, 178. Taylor highlighted that Batereau’s were one of two regiments kept at Inverness, but he did not specify how long the regiment remained there. Certainly, they would have returned to the continent with Albemarle in early 1747 if they had not returned previously.

14 Wise, ‘Gage, Thomas’; Alden, *General Gage*, 55-58. Gage, Murray, and Ralph Burton were given freedom to govern autonomously and did vary in their administration of justice, with Murray implementing the Canadian system and Gage and Burton ruling through military courts. There were, however, no radical differences in the governance of the three Canadian regions and all governors followed a general policy of moderation.
III. The Problem of the West

Pontiac’s War: A Changing Attitude to Pacification

Gage’s priority as commander-in-chief was to end Pontiac’s War and pacify those Native Americans who had participated in it. He took command of the 1764 campaign, acting on Amherst’s instructions to strike into the interior, sending detachments under Henry Bouquet and John Bradstreet against Indian settlements. However, Gage adapted Amherst’s plans in accordance with his different approach to pacification, requesting two hundred French-Canadians for the provincial corps and Native American recruits from Superintendent Johnson. Whilst the deployment of French-Canadians mirrored the British Army’s raising of Highland regiments after the Forty-Five, raising Native Americans was a stark break with Amherst, who had refused all offers of Indian assistance. Unlike Amherst, Gage had significant battle experience fighting alongside and against Native Americans, at the Monongahela and Ticonderoga, and had worked closely with Indian allies who ranged the forests and screened regular columns whilst on the march. And, unlike Amherst, Gage was well aware of the Indians’ de facto independence. He repeatedly referred to Pontiac’s War as a “conflict” or “war” rather than a rebellion or insurrection, both when discussing the army’s progress with his subordinates and in letters to the ministry. This suggests Gage recognised the independent status of the tribes and nations, accepting they were unconquered and a genuine military threat. Writing to Henry Bouquet, Gage discussed the case of a colonial settler, Gershom Hicks, who Bouquet believed had been living voluntarily with Indians following his captivity and had joined in their depredations. Gage noted:

Both he and his Brother has been in Arms and You will endeavour to get what proofs you can of this, that they may be tried as Traitors to their Country. But then Tryals must be in the Country below by the

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15 Other commanders also advocated recruiting French-Canadians and Native Americans, the former by James Abercromby and the latter, not unexpectedly, by Superintendent Johnson. Regarding French-Canadians see: Gage to Amherst, Montreal, 12 July 1763, ff.299-300, WO 34, vol 5, Microfilm Reel B-2639, LAC; Abercromby to Amherst, London, 10 Jan 1764, COS/565, ff.87-90, TNA. Regarding Native Americans see: Orders Sent to the Officers Commanding on the Communication to Fort Pitt, 8 March 1763, Add MS 21656, f.7, BL; Johnson to Amherst, Johnson Hall, 4 August 1763, f.391, WO 34, vol 39, Microfilm Reel B-2657, LAC; Johnson to Gage, Johnson Hall, 30 December 1763, Gage Papers, vol 11.

16 Preston, Braddock’s Defeat, 269-322; Anderson, Crucible of War, 240-49.

17 Gage to Johnson, New York, 26 December 1763, Gage Papers, vol 11; Gage to Johnson, New York, 12 January 1764, Gage Papers, vol 12; Gage to Bouquet, New York, March 1764, Gage Papers, vol 16; Gage to Bouquet, New York, 4 April 1764, Add MS 21638, ff.293-4, BL.
Civil Magistrate to whom they should be given up. The Military may hang a Spy in Time of War. But Rebells in Arms we tried by the Civil Courts at least I saw this Practised in Scotland by General Hawley and the Duke of Cumberland.\textsuperscript{18}

To Gage, it was not the Indians who were rebels, but renegades like Hicks, who should suffer the penalty of law. He had similarly written to Henry Gladwin regarding Jesuits accused of stirring up the Indians to act against the British. Gage argued that “future peace and tranquillity requires that examples should be made of the most guilty of those, who have acted traitoriously in any shape, against their Sovereign, you must bring the most guilty to trial and execute them if condemned.”\textsuperscript{19} Colonial settlers and French inhabitants who aided Native Americans militarily were, in Gage’s eyes, traitors to the King. No mention was made of Native Americans suggesting that, at that juncture, Gage did not view them either as subjects of the Crown or as conquered peoples subject to British authority. Unlike Amherst, whose superiority paradigm drove his interpretation, he did not see a legal parallel between Native Americans in arms and the Jacobites.

Gage recognised Native Americans’ agency in the decision to go to war with the British. He understood the Indians would blame French influence when suing for peace, but in a letter to the Earl of Halifax of January 1763 explained the Indians’ own reasons for going to war.

The Savages have been induced to combine so readily against us, not only by their Attachment to the French, and the Jealousies infused in them by that People, of our bad Designs against all the Indian Nations; But thro’ Motives of Policy, which would have engaged More enlightened Nations to take Measures, tho’ perhaps better concerted, of the Same Nature. They saw us sole Masters of the Country, the Balance of Power broke, and their own Consequence at an End. Instead of being courted by two Nations, a Profusion of Presents made by both, and two Markets to trade at, they now depend upon one Power.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{18} Gage to Bouquet, New York, 15 October 1764, Add MS 21636, ff.43-5, BL. General Henry Hawley replaced Sir John Cope as commander-in-chief of the British troops in Scotland in December 1745. He kept his title despite Captain General Cumberland’s arrival in Scotland the following month but served under Cumberland at Culloden and during the pacification that followed, before returning to the continent in July 1746. Alastair W. Massie, ‘Hawley, Henry’, \textit{ODNB}, 2006, see \textit{ODNB} online.

\textsuperscript{19} Gage to Gladwin, New York, 25 April 1764, Gage Papers, vol 17.

Gage clearly ascribed agency to the Native Americans, accepting they had “Policy” and were acting rationally in response to the fear the British were now “sole Masters” and in control of trade. At the same time, he was being pressed by Secretary of State Halifax to put a “Speedy End to the Hostilities of the Indians.” Halifax was open to “Opinion” in both Britain and America suggesting that “neglect” of the Indians, “owing to an apparent Contempt of their Consequence, either as Friends or Foes”, was behind “present Hostilities.” This offered an indirect criticism of Amherst, following his return to Britain, and Halifax took pains to stress that Gage should be his own judge of the matter. Of course, should Gage fail to pacify the tribes he could expect similar condemnation.

It was the paradigm of loyalty that influenced Gage’s interpretation of the situation and drove his pacification strategy. His recognition of the Indians’ autonomy left him aware that the army first had to secure their submission to the Crown. Gage believed this would be best achieved through military intimidation during the war: forcing the Indians to sue for peace and obtaining proper satisfaction for the murders they had committed. This again highlights the continuing influence of the Forty-Five on the British Army, as the primary aim of the army in the Highlands had been to obtain the submission of those involved in the rising. However, whilst the long-term pacification of the Highlands focused on civilisation, improvement, and assimilation to ensure Highlanders demonstrated continuing submission and adherence to the Crown, in the North American interior Gage believed accommodation of Native Americans would be the most effective strategy to ensure long-term peace. This reflected a paradigm shift regarding loyalty within the British Empire that was a result of the interactions of the army in Scotland and North America over the previous two decades, as well as the transformation of a predominantly Protestant, British Empire into a much more diverse empire after the French and Indian War. The loyalty paradigm had assumed that assimilation of ‘other’ populations into the empire as Britons was vital to achieve loyalty to the Crown. By the mid-1760s, however, such an assumption was being questioned, leading Gage to believe that the assimilation of Indians was not essential for that population to display continuing submission. As such, he hoped reform of Britain’s Indian policy might serve to accommodate the Indians by removing grievances related to colonial land encroachment and trade, thereby encouraging them to remain loyal.

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21 Halifax to Gage, Whitehall, 14 January 1764 in Carter, Correspondence of Thomas Gage, 2:9-10.
Whilst Gage was convinced that military action alone would never reduce the Indians’ military capabilities, their submission during Pontiac’s War was considered essential. Gage ordered Bouquet to progress as far into the Native American settlements as he could. He demanded that no ceasefire be made unless the hostile nations gave satisfaction for the murders they had committed, surrendered all captives, and attended a congress with Johnson to sign a treaty.23 The peace Johnson concluded with the Delaware, Shawnee, and Mingo expressed the Indians’

…desire to be admitted as Children of the Great King of England and to be stiled such for the Future, deeming themselves thereby closer
Linked to the British Crown to whom They will pay all due Submission
and Subjection, so far as the same can be consistent with the Indians
native Rights.24

The Indians attempted to ensure continuing agency with the assertion that subjection ought to be consistent with native rights, but the British viewed the treaty as a full acceptance of British authority.25 Although the Native Americans were still not considered subjects, Gage, Johnson, and the British Army now viewed them as being more closely linked to the British than ever: an imperial population of ‘others’. Just as James Murray was recognising the extent to which the French-Canadians, now British subjects but still imperial ‘others’, had to be accommodated and negotiated with to ensure loyalty and imperial security, Thomas Gage and the British were coming to a similar conclusion regarding the need to accommodate Native Americans within the governance of the empire. They were to be considered when policies were made and protected from colonial ills and, in return, they were expected to obey the authority of the King and his imperial agents.

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23 Gage relaxed the demand for satisfaction later in the campaign. Middleton, *Pontiac’s War*, 167-82; Gage to Bouquet, New York, 4 April 1764, Add MS 21638, ff.293-4, BL; Bouquet to Gage, Fort Pitt, 26 September 1764, Add MS 21637, ff.64-7, BL; Bouquet to Gage, Fort Pitt, 30 November 1764, Add MS 21637, ff.77-80, BL.

24 Copy of a Conference and a Treaty with the Shawnese, Mingoes and Delawares of the Ohio, Johnson Hall, 4 July 1765, COS/65, ff.276-90, TNA.

25 Middleton, *Pontiac’s War*, 181-82. Middleton highlighted that Superintendent Johnson said nothing about the Indian’s assertion that subjection ought to be consistent with native rights, suggesting he recognised the conflict between how they and the British would interpret the treaty but chose to let each interpret it as they would.
The main lesson of Pontiac’s War was that diplomacy was required to pacify the Native American population, not subjugation as Amherst believed. The British government and British military commanders, including Gage, appreciated the military threat that Native American nations and tribes posed individually, and more so if united in a confederacy. The Indians represented a much greater active threat to the British Army and to imperial security than the Scottish Highlanders or French-Canadians had previously. Recognition of the weakness of British military power on the imperial fringe favoured accommodation in British-Indian relations. Diplomacy, gift-giving, and negotiation were the preferred tools in the army’s occupation of the West, as demonstrated by the strategy advocated by Gage to secure the French forts in the Illinois

27 Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 634.
Country. The commander believed a quick occupation necessary to bring an end to Pontiac’s War and ensure future peace. The Indians had been supplied with provisions and ammunition from the French inhabitants in that region and Gage thought a British presence would sever that supply line and make it impossible for the Indians to continue the war.28 After the failure of the first military expedition to occupy Illinois in early 1764, Gage encouraged the distribution of presents rather than the use of force to enable the army’s progression. Despite his commitment to diplomacy, Indian hostility during Pontiac’s War ensured the continued failure of British expeditions.29

It was only after Britain had made peace with the Shawnee and Delaware Indians that a 1765 expedition under Lt. Fraser and Indian agent George Croghan took possession of Fort de Chartres (Fig. 19). Croghan was eventually able to secure a peace with Pontiac and the warring nations at Detroit (Fig. 19) in September 1765 (where once again the Indians were addressed as ‘children’ rather than ‘brothers’ of the British). The Indians, however, continued to assert their agency in negotiations by arguing that although the British had claimed possession of the land through the French cession, the French had never bought or won the territory from the Indians. Whilst they would permit the British to take control of the French forts, they expected gift-giving to continue and would not accept settlement in what they continued to consider their land. Richard Middleton highlighted that such a situation was unprecedented in the British Empire: the British hitherto had never negotiated permission to occupy a region that they felt it was their right to occupy, as they did with the Illinois Country under the Treaty of Paris.30 The laboured British attempts to occupy Illinois highlights the limits of Britain’s imperial reach in North America. Gage’s orders that his officers provide presents and request permission to take control of the posts shows he recognised the army’s weakness, which further cemented the shift away from subjugation, acculturation, and assimilation and towards accommodation for guaranteeing the long-term loyalty of Native Americans to the Crown and, thereby, ensuring imperial security.

28 Gage to John Bradstreet, New York, 30 April 1764, Gage Letters.
30 Middleton, Pontiac’s War, 188.
The Army as an Instrument of Empire

The end of Pontiac’s War meant the British were no longer at war with any Native Americans, although some remained hostile. Thomas Gage retained responsibility for integrating tribes within the empire, encouraging their loyalty and obedience whilst providing the protection they were due as “children” of the King. Throughout the pre-revolutionary period, the army retained control over Indian affairs, with superintendents John Stuart and William Johnson subordinate to Gage, although regularly consulted by him, Johnson more than Stuart.¹¹ This meant the army had to absorb the expense of Indian management which, although only approximately 3 percent of army expenditure in North America in 1767, still accounted for approximately £20,000 p.a.¹² Gage was ultimately responsible for implementing policies regarding Indian affairs and the West that were agreed upon in London, including militarisation and later retrenchment.

As Peter J. Marshall highlighted, imperial issues were never more important than domestic or European issues which meant the ministry was often distracted from setting colonial policy. Further, responsibility for colonial affairs was split between a number of departments and ministers (including the Board of Trade, Secretary of State for the Southern Department/Secretary of State for the Colonies from 1768, and the Secretary at War) which meant there was frequent disagreement regarding policy decisions.³³ Between 1763 and 1775 frequent changes of government meant seven different men filled the secretarial post responsible for the colonies, several of whom had very different views regarding issues such as the regulation of commerce and western settlement. As such, it took several years for the formulation of a general plan. The ministry sought information from a wide range of imperial agents in the colonies and in London, but Thomas Gage remained their main source of intelligence and his opinion was sought frequently. Ministerial priorities and disagreements, alongside the lack of an obvious revenue stream in the wake of colonial opposition to taxation, meant Gage also had considerable freedom to direct government policy as he saw fit, with the ministry providing strategic direction and leaving Gage to provide details on the ground.³⁴

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¹¹ Watson, ‘Holding the Line’, 162.


Gage was fully aware that the primary reason for Amherst’s recall was his failure to prevent an Indian war and the resultant increase in military spending Pontiac’s War had occasioned. Gage’s decisions regarding Indian affairs were therefore influenced by concerns of imperial security and economy. His priorities were to prevent future conflict with Native Americans and reduce military expenditure and he managed to achieve both. Expenditure for the army in North America fell from £437,125 in the 1763-64 financial year to £363,319 in 1774-75 and showed a general downward trend over that period, except for two years of high costs in 1770-71 and 1771-72. Peter D. G. Thomas suggested that in those years the Treasury was trying to meet colonial arrears.³⁵ Gage also successfully prevented another Native American conflict involving the British Army, as Dunmore’s War of 1774 broke out after the army had been removed from the interior.

The map highlights that in 1765, twenty companies were stationed in the interior: nine at Illinois, two at Michillimakinac, seven at Detroit and Niagara, and two at Oswego. Three regiments plus twelve companies were stationed in Canada, two regiments in West Florida, and seven companies in East Florida. The remainder of the troops were kept throughout the older colonies with the majority in Nova Scotia, New York, and Pennsylvania.

Gage believed there were several steps the British could take to prevent future conflicts, largely accommodating Native Americans within the empire whilst continuing the process of militarisation. Like Amherst, he favoured establishing military settlements at British forts to advance pacification of local populations, securing tracts of land as part of the peace negotiations during Pontiac’s War. Writing to Halifax in April 1764, Gage noted that Johnson had persuaded the Senecas of Chenussio to cede a tract of land around Fort Niagara and sought another at Fort Pitt. Gage granted the land to British soldiers to enable a permanent military presence around the forts; the garrisons were intended to

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36 Gage to Halifax, New York, 14 April 1764 in Carter, Correspondence of Thomas Gage, 1:24–2; Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness, 72.
intimidate Indians in the interior and grow much of their own food, saving costly portage. The creation of settlements at strategic locations had also occurred in the Highlands. Disbanded British soldiers and sailors had been settled upon the annexed estates of the Jacobite rebels, ensuring a permanent military reserve in the region that echoed the Roman Empire. The peace treaties signed by the Shawnee and Delaware included land cessions and the Delaware were required to allow soldiers to pass through their territories, further opening the region to the British military. Gage believed military settlements would entrench the British Army in the backcountry. In 1766 he suggested to Secretary of State Henry Seymour Conway that a military governor be appointed to oversee the distribution of land grants in Illinois to anyone willing to transport themselves with a year’s supplies on condition they undertake military service when required. Gage also organised exploration and surveying of the interior, both for logistical reasons and to intimidate the native and French inhabitants. Concurrently, he recognised it was not possible for the British Army to hold all their interior forts. He proposed a policy of limited retrenchment: abandoning the smaller posts the Indians had overrun at the beginning of Pontiac’s War. Recognising the limits of British military power, Gage concentrated his troops in the most defensible garrisons (Fig. 20). In March 1765 he made it clear to Governor Penn that regulars would not be deployed to Fort Augusta after the provincial garrison was disbanded. Limited retrenchment would be a main pillar of Gage’s militarisation strategy over the following years and influenced the ministry’s eventual adoption of a general policy of retrenchment.

37 Middleton, Pontiac’s War, 181.
38 Gage to Henry Seymour Conway, New York, 9 November 1765 in Carter, Correspondence of Thomas Gage, 1:86.
39 McConnell, Army and Empire, 18-21.
40 Gage to John Penn, New York, 30 March 1765, Gage Papers, vol 33.
Gage only supported the construction of interior settlements for military purposes and where the British Army had the consent of the Indians to create them. He was against the purchase of Indian lands and western expansion of the colonists, believing there to be plenty of opportunity for settlement within colonial boundaries and particularly in the new British territories of Canada and the Floridas. Gage recognised that land encroachment increased native discontent, causing violence and making it more difficult to maintain law and order in the interior. As such, he supported the creation of a permanent boundary line separating the two populations and protecting Indian hunting grounds. Whilst the temporary boundary line established in the Proclamation of 1763 was in force, part of the army’s role in the West was to remove those illegal settlers and

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41 Gage to John Penn, New York, 30 March 1765, Gage Papers, vol 33; Gage to John Reid, New York, 9 June 1765, Gage Papers, vol 37; Gage to John Brown, New York, 13 November 1768, Gage Papers, vol 82; Gage to John Stuart, New York, 24 July 1774, Gage Papers, vol 121.
attempt to police the interior, bringing to justice natives and settlers guilty of attacking one another. The army employed force to remove colonists at Redstone Creek and Post Vincent (Fig. 21) amongst other places, destroying encampments.\textsuperscript{42} Whilst the army was generally successful at removing illegal settlers, Gage was aware that they would likely simply return the following year in larger numbers, better prepared to defend themselves. Limited numbers meant the army could only react to established settlements, by which time they had often caused discontent and violence. Removing the settlers showed that the army was willing to accommodate Native Americans within the empire by protecting native land rights but the failure of the British to find a permanent solution to land encroachment ensured it remained a consistent source of tension throughout the pre-revolutionary period. Colonists were left believing that the British Army was protecting Indians at their expense whilst illegal settlements caused reciprocal violence between natives and settlers.

It was impossible for the army to prevent interior violence and officers found it difficult to identify perpetrators and bring them to justice. Few colonists believed a settler ought to be punished for murdering an Indian, so communities rarely surrendered suspects. When someone was arrested they were often either found not guilty or were sent to stand trial in the east, leaving the Indians without satisfaction.\textsuperscript{43} Recognising that attacks on Indians and a perceived lack of justice jeopardised peace, Gage expressed his regret at the situation. In a letter to Superintendent Johnson of 1766 regarding a disturbance in which several Indians had been killed, Gage stated that he had “desired Capt. Murray to tell them [Indians at Detroit] that I am very sorry they could not get up with them [the murderers] after they committed the vile deed, and put them to death, which would have given me as much satisfaction as themselves.”\textsuperscript{44} Seeking to accommodate the Indians, Gage began to suggest that the army would not complain if the Indians took their own revenge upon those who attacked them, so long as any revenge was proportionate. He ordered his subordinate Captain Murray not to “retaliate upon the Indians”\textsuperscript{45} if they caught and killed those responsible for several murders near Fort Pitt.


\textsuperscript{43} Watson, ‘Holding the Line’, 198-205.

\textsuperscript{44} Gage to Johnson, New York, 9 June 1766, Gage Papers, vol 52.

\textsuperscript{45} Gage to William Murray, New York, 7 July 1766, Gage Papers, vol 54.
explaining that “it is always best when they [Native Americans] take immediate satisfaction [for murder]: For we must expect they will at length be roused by so many repeated murders, for which they have never been able to get any satisfaction, or probably ever will.”

He hoped that if the British ignored acts of revenge it would prevent frontier violence from spilling into a general conflict involving the army.

The ministry had signalled its intention to accommodate Native Americans within the empire with the Proclamation of 1763 and had long been considering a wider Plan for the Future Management of Indian Affairs. The details of the Plan closely resembled the proposals drawn up by Halifax in 1754 when president of the Board of Trade and were presented to the Indian superintendents and colonial governors in the summer of 1764.

The Plan aimed to create a trade that was open to all British and French-Canadian subjects in North America and regulated by the Crown through a new Indian department in full control of Indian affairs: colonial laws relating to trade were to be repealed and the military’s role in the commerce was to be limited to garrisoning trading posts. Slightly different rules were to govern commerce in the northern and southern districts but, generally, trade was to be fixed at certain towns or garrisoned posts and carried on under the direction of the superintendents or their subordinates assisted by commissaries, smiths, and interpreters. Traders would require licences, credit for Indians was strictly limited, the sale of alcohol banned, and tariffs were agreed upon for goods. The Plan proposed to give Indians greater rights than they had previously enjoyed by allowing their evidence to be admissible in both criminal and civil courts, allowing them to seek redress for fraud and violence, as was already the case in New England. Indians were still not viewed as subjects, but such a proposal highlights that they were less often viewed simply as savages and increasingly as an imperial population who were not only considered subject to British authority but were also to be accommodated within imperial structures.

With assimilation no longer assumed necessary for imperial populations to demonstrate continuing loyalty to the Crown, the civility paradigm was altogether less important in the militarisation of the interior. The 1764 Plan highlights that imperial

46 Quoted in Watson, ‘Holding the Line’, 209. See also O’Toole, White Savage, 268–70.
49 Plan for the Future Management of Indian Affairs, CO5/65, ff.123-134, TNA.
control of commerce continued to be thought essential in the pacification of Native Americans, as it had been in the pacification of the Highlands. In the interior, however, its primary aim was to remove Indian grievances relating to the trade, thereby preventing hostilities by accommodating Indians within the empire and encouraging their imperial loyalty. Civilising the savage population did remain a secondary aim and was encouraged in the 1764 Plan. Point eight stated that it should be recommended to the Society for Propagating the Gospel in Foreign Parts (SPG) to appoint four missionaries in each trade district to reside at the trading posts. Just as the Society in Scotland for Propagating Christian Knowledge (SSPCK) was expected to build schools and churches to encourage the spread of Protestantism and the English language, the SPG was similarly expected to convert and civilise Native Americans at trading posts.

The Plan for the Future Management of Indian Affairs was never official British imperial policy, nor was it even debated by Parliament, and it was sent to the colonies for consideration and comment only. It had been expected that the Plan would be financed through a duty imposed upon the fur trade, which required an act of parliament for authorisation. However, by late 1765, following the controversy over the Stamp Tax, there was little enthusiasm for introducing further colonial taxation. No other policy on Indian affairs was issued until 1768 and so Gage directed the implementation of an ad hoc strategy that reiterated both the 1764 Plan and the Proclamation of 1763, imposing regulations which did not require parliamentary authorisation or significant financial investment. These included: confining trade to specific towns or posts, continuing the requirement for traders to apply annually for a licence, and setting tariffs on goods being sold. Gage remained in favour of regulating the Indian trade, despite the opposition of

50 Plan for the Future Management of Indian Affairs, CO5/65, ff.123-134, TNA.

51 The Plan was sent to various colonial governors, as well as the Indian superintendents and some army officers. Reception was mixed. Some colonial governors, including James Murray and Francis Bernard, objected to the removal of control of Indian affairs from individual colonies. See TNA CO323/20 for the various responses. Johnson’s detailed response unsurprisingly fully endorsed it as it would grant the superintendents full control over commerce. See Johnson to Board of Trade, Johnson Hall, 8 October 1764 in Alvord and Carter, Critical Period, 1:321-42.


53 Regulations for the Indian Trade around the Province of West Florida, 10 April 1765, CO5/66, ff.35-8, TNA; Regulations of Trade with the Indian Tribes in the Southern District, Undated, CO5/68, ff.110-1, TNA; A Review of the Trade, Politics and Proceedings of the Indians in the Northern District, 15 November 1767, CO5/68, ff.176-214, TNA.
traders and many Indians. By 1767, however, he realised that long-term regulation of commerce would require considerable military expenditure and the expansion of the military throughout the interior, which would contradict his policy of limited retrenchment. In letters to the Indian superintendents and the ministry Gage noted that regulation of commerce as per the 1764 Plan was likely impossible, though he still believed some regulation both possible and necessary to prevent hostilities resulting from colonial mismanagement of trade.

As Gage implemented an ad-hoc strategy in the West, various ministers and the Board of Trade, an advisory government body on colonial affairs, reconsidered Britain’s American priorities in the wake of colonial opposition to taxation. Gage’s policy of limited retrenchment influenced the plans of Secretary at War Lord Barrington, Secretary of State, the Earl of Shelburne (1766-68), and Secretary of State, the Earl of Hillsborough (1768-72) as well as the advice given to ministers by the Board of Trade, all of whom requested his opinion on the future direction of western policy. All were in favour of the removal of the army from the West, either through its withdrawal behind the 1763 boundary line as per Barrington’s 1766 plan or through further retrenchment, advocated by Shelburne in 1767. Eventually, a policy of retrenchment was settled upon and in 1768 Gage was ordered to abandon most forts in the interior and station the bulk of his army in Quebec, Nova Scotia, East Florida, and the middle colonies. He was to decide for himself which forts were necessary for British security and to manage the timing of the removal of the troops. The Grafton ministry failed to decide whether to keep a military presence in Illinois, requesting Gage’s opinion on that matter. Despite him immediately

54 Marshall, ‘Colonial Protest’, 1-17; Letter Concerning the Indian Trade, Quebec, 10 November 1766, Add MS 35913, ff.203-6, BL; Letters Relating to the Indian Trade, 29 December 1766, Add MS 35913, ff.228-233, BL.


57 Hillsborough to Gage, Whitehall, 15 April 1768 in Carter, Correspondence of Thomas Gage, 2:61–65.
expressing a preference for its abandonment, and the forming of its inhabitants into a militia for protection, it was not until late 1771 that the North ministry came to a positive decision to do so.\(^{58}\) Ministerial preoccupation with reducing American expenditure led Barrington, Shelburne, and Hillsborough to ignore Gage’s opinion that the army should play a role in the regulation of commerce. Although Shelburne had wanted to disband the Indian department entirely before his removal from office, it was decided in 1768 to task the department with continuing Indian diplomacy, overseeing land purchases, and agreeing upon a permanent boundary line.\(^{59}\) Management of Indian trade, however, was returned to individual colonies. The issue of the establishment of interior colonies divided ministers. Although some shared Gage’s opposition to western expansion there were few concrete steps taken to rule out the establishment of new colonies, even after the Indian superintendents were ordered to fix a boundary line in 1768.\(^{60}\)

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\(^{59}\) Hillsborough to Gage, Whitehall, 15 April 1768 in Carter, *Correspondence of Thomas Gage*, 2:61-65.

\(^{60}\) The boundary line was agreed between the Indian superintendents, colonists, and various Indian peoples. Violating his orders, Johnson acted on behalf of land speculators to secure a large cession of Shawnee land from the Six Nations in the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768. Shawnee resentment of the treaty contributed to Dunmore’s War of 1774. The boundary line was finally settled in 1770 with the Treaty of Lochaber. See: Peter Marshall, ‘Sir William Johnson and the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, 1768’, *Journal of American Studies* 1, no. 2 (1967): 149–79; O’Toole, *White Savage*, 268-79.
The forts highlighted in yellow had been abandoned by 1768. One regiment remained at Illinois, abandoned 1772, but most British troops were in New York, Nova Scotia, and Canada. In 1768 troops would be moved to Boston.

Gage implemented the official policy of retrenchment from 1768, abandoning posts at Louisbourg and Forts Amherst, Frederick, Cumberland, and Annapolis within months of receiving his instructions (Fig. 22). 61 However, his abandonment of the West was hindered by the ministry’s indecision regarding Illinois and by the failure of the colonies to take control of the Indian trade. This meant the army had to continue absorbing the costs of Indian management and accommodation. 62 That expense,

61 Gage to Hillsborough, New York, 18 April 1768 in Carter, Correspondence of Thomas Gage, 1:186–88; Gage to Hillsborough, New York, 16 June 1768 in Carter, Correspondence of Thomas Gage, 1:175-79.

alongside rising discontent in the eastern seaboard colonies, left the North ministry convinced that the status quo was not sustainable by the early 1770s. In 1774 the final troops were removed from the interior as the British abandoned the West. At the same time, the perceived failure of the colonies to jointly manage Indian trade and control the frontier left the ministry in favour of returning control to the Crown by annexing the Indian reserve to one colony.\textsuperscript{63} The Quebec Act granted it to Quebec (Fig. 23), explaining that due to the Royal Proclamation “a very large Extent of Country, within which there were several Colonies and Settlements of the Subjects of France, who claimed to remain therein under the Faith of the said Treaty, was left, without any Provision being made for the Administration of Civil Government therein”.\textsuperscript{64} It is likely the ministry also favoured granting the territory to Quebec due to the Crown having more direct control there because the Quebec Act had formalised government through a council rather than an assembly. This would save the necessity of convincing assemblies to grant money for regulating Indian trade and preventing land encroachment. This step signalled the ministry’s agreement with Gage that some level of trade regulation was necessary to accommodate Native Americans within the empire and ensure their loyalty to the Crown. Gage’s experiences implementing successive British policies in the West from 1763 had a significant effect on shaping the commander’s attitudes towards both the Native Americans and the colonial North American settlers the army encountered in the interior.

\textsuperscript{63} See: Lawson, \textit{Imperial Challenge}, 115-16; Sosin, \textit{Whitehall and the Wilderness}, 239.

\textsuperscript{64} Quebec Act, 1774 in \textit{Documents}, 401-5.
Figure 23. Map of North America in 1774 highlighting the area put under the management of the Province of Quebec. Base map used: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NorthAmerica1763-A.png. By 1774 the army had completely abandoned the West.

“Lawless Banditti”: The ‘Othering’ of Frontier Settlers

During the French and Indian War, British military officers had often viewed colonial settlers in a military, rather than civil, light. This was because the conflict impinged upon civil life in a variety of ways and to a much greater extent than previous conflicts had. Ordinary civilians played an important role in the war effort: fighting as

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65 Neatby, *Quebec Act*. 
regulars or as part of the provincial or militia units, supplying the army with food, wagons, ammunition, etc., and building roads. Colonists on the frontier were at frequent risk of Indian raids. This fostered their hatred of Indians and the creation of groups, including the Paxton Boys of Pennsylvania and Augusta Boys of Virginia, who indiscriminately attacked Indians, enjoying widespread popular support for their actions. All colonists were expected not to trade with the French during the war but widely ignored such orders. British Army officers generally regarded the colonists as insubordinate and selfish as they were thought willing to hamper the British war effort for personal gain. They firmly believed the colonies had not contributed enough to the war effort and a paradigm shift caused them to view the colonists as significantly different from Britons at home, an ‘other’ within the empire. The continued militarisation of the backcountry in the aftermath of the war and the increasing violence between Native Americans and frontiersmen destabilised relations between the army and the colonists, entrenching such an understanding.

During and after Pontiac’s War, many frontiersmen made it clear they viewed all Indians as an enemy and believed pre-emptive attacks necessary for their own protection. William Johnson noted they were willing to act not only against Indians but against any who traded with them, provided them with presents, or protected them in any way. Johnson’s assessment highlights the fragility of Gage’s pacification plan in the interior, which relied upon accommodation. Colonists’ hatred of Indians rendered violence inevitable and left the pacification in danger unless the army could keep it in check. Backcountry settlers believed the British Army was protecting Indians at their expense, whilst traders complained about the restrictions placed upon the Indian trade between 1764 and 1768. They argued the restrictions made it impossible for them to participate and gave French traders living in the interior an advantage as the latter were not restricted to trading at specific posts and could wander amongst Indian villages to sell their goods.

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66 Anderson, Crucible of War, 410-14.


68 Johnson to Board of Trade, Johnson Hall, July 1765 in Alvord and Carter, Critical Period, 1:522–24.

69 Letter Concerning the Indian Trade, 10 November 1766, Add MS 35915, ff.203-6, BL; Letters Relating to the Indian Trade, Add MS 35915, ff.228-33, BL.
Other colonists and land speculators were frustrated by British attempts to restrict western settlement. Gage, meanwhile, was convinced such steps were necessary to maintain peace.

Gage was angered by the perceived inaction of assemblies. He had expressed frustration at the shortcomings of the assemblies during Pontiac’s War when only New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania provided any troops. Gage had further been enraged by accounts of the violence of frontiersmen whilst the British were attempting to negotiate an end to Pontiac’s War. He had informed the governors of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia that:

I must leave to your Determination what Steps it will be Necessary to take to pacify the Indians, and to give them Satisfaction for the Murder of the Shawnee in Augusta County. Something will be proper to be done in it, or We shall be in Danger of losing all the Fruits of our Expeditions and Treaty’s.

Gage was concerned the violence might make it impossible to come to a peace with the Indians. He further believed the actions of the Paxton Boys (who attacked and killed twenty Conestoga Indians in two separate attacks in December 1763 before marching towards Pennsylvania the following month to protest the government) and the fact they faced no punishment for their actions, instead gaining concessions from the assembly, had encouraged similar violent acts.

Frustration continued after Pontiac’s War. Although some assemblies passed laws forbidding settlement on Indian lands they made no effort to remove those who disobeyed either their own laws or the Proclamation of 1763. A law enacted by the Pennsylvanian assembly in 1768 threatened execution to anyone illegally occupying Indian lands, but Gage doubted it would have any effect unless backed by a strong military presence to forcibly remove those breaking the law. The failure of the colonies to take responsibility for the management of Indian trade after 1768 led to further Indian discontent and forced the army to absorb most of the costs of Indian affairs. To Gage, the assemblies were displaying imperial disloyalty and he urged the government to persuade

71 Gage to Francis Fauquier, New York, 2 June 1765, Gage Papers, vol 37. Gage informed Henry Bouquet that there was no point treating with the Indians if the settlers continued to kill every defenceless Indian they encountered. Gage to Bouquet, New York, 26 February 1765, Add MS 21638, BL.
them to contribute, exclaiming that “if the Americans will not pay, to save their own Scalps, they deserve to lose them.” Colonial assemblies did not want to begin absorbing the costs of managing a system that had, since the war, been covered by Parliament. Further, the legislatures were motivated by self-interest. Those who had little contact with Native Americans saw no value in contributing to a common fund or agreeing regulations for Indian affairs, whilst others believed they could strike the best deal if negotiating individually with the various tribes and nations. Colonial governors did not believe that the assemblies could be induced to create a uniform system of Indian management, and in the wake of opposition to the Townshend Acts and the reestablishment of colonial non-importation, the ministry proved unwilling to encourage them to hold a general congress regarding the issue. Indian complaints about trade continued, while the British continued to bear the expenses of managing Indian affairs and compensating Indians to prevent a rupture in British-Indian relations. Gage, in common with other British officials, regularly complained of the inaction of colonial assemblies, accusing them of being self-interested and ignorant about imperial security. Accusing colonial authorities of purposefully disrupting the service, Gage exhibited the paradigm shift that caused the colonists to be seen not as Britons but as disloyal ‘others’ within the empire. Such a shift had begun under Loudoun during the French and Indian War and was solidified in its aftermath. At the same time as frontier settlers believed the British were failing to respect their rights as Britons by protecting the Indians at their expense, Gage and the British Army were ‘othering’ the colonists as they failed to display the necessary subjection and obedience to imperial authority.

Thomas Gage placed much of the blame for frontier violence on the colonists, not only due to their Indian hating but also for continuing land encroachment which enticed the Indians to violence. On several occasions both Gage and Johnson highlighted the ill-conduct of the settlers, suggesting their actions threatened to bring on a general conflict. In 1771 Gage claimed that “The Inhabitants on the Frontiers I think in general, have occasioned almost every Serious Quarrell we have had with the Indians, by encroaching upon their Lands or intruding in their hunting Grounds.” He did not think the Indians

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73 Gage to Barrington, New York, 4 June 1771 in Carter, Correspondence of Thomas Gage, 2:580.
74 Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness, 215-16.
75 Gage to Stuart, New York, 5 February 1771, Gage Papers, vol 99. Regarding British imperial agents blaming colonists for violence see: Johnson to Gage, Johnson Hall, 23 December 1771, Gage Papers, vol
had been blameless in disputes, as repeated theft of settlers’ livestock had increased suspicion of Indians. However, often the British placed blame upon the colonists for causing disputes in the interior, arguing that if the colonists caused a war then the British Army ought to stay out of it. In 1774 Gage noted his approval of the removal of the army from the interior, as “If the King has no posts in the interior country the vagabonds must themselves support the mischief they are creating and which our posts cannot prevent.”

Gage supported colonists and natives settling disputes amongst themselves. He encouraged his officers to treat the Indians with civility and kindness, hoping that if they were provoked to conflict they would “let their resentment fall upon the guilty.” This suggests that Gage believed the frontiersmen who attacked Indians and illegally settled in the interior had forfeited the rights and protections they were due as British subjects. If the colonists failed to demonstrate adherence to the Crown by enabling the army’s accommodation of Native Americans, Gage felt no responsibility to protect them should their actions provoke war. Both he and other British imperial agents began to equate frontier settlers more with Native Americans than with Britons at home, as highlighted by the language adopted. Illegal settlers were “lawless banditti” whilst Indian traders were often labelled “lawless and licentious”. In contrast, Indians were less often described as “savages” than as “drunken and insolent”. Language reminiscent of rebellion and savagery, previously used in both Scotland and North America, although never to describe colonial settlers, was also used to describe both groups. All who committed murders in the interior, whether Indians or settlers, were described as “villains” who acted in a “wantonly cruel” or “barbaric” manner. The British Army labelled both groups as uncivilised, suggesting that the frontier inhabitants had regressed from a state of civilisation to barbarism.

Gage had been explicitly clear that he did not view the backcountry settlers as Britons but rather as disloyal ‘others’ failing to show due submission to British authority

108; Gage to Haldimand, Salem, 18 August 1774, Add MS 21665, ff.298-9, BL; Wright to Haldimand, Georgia, 18 April 1774, Gage Papers, vol 119.

76 Gage to Haldimand, Salem, 18 August 1774, Add MS 21665, ff.298-9, BL.

77 Gage to William Murray, New York, 7 July 1766, Gage Papers, vol 54.

78 Gage to Haldimand, New York, 3 June 1773, Add MS 21665, ff.141-2, BL; Gage to Stuart, 22 June 1772, Gage Papers, vol 112; Gage to John Penn, New York, 10 March 1766, Gage Papers, vol 49; Gage to Johnson, New York, 5 May 1766, Gage Letters.

79 Gage to Johnson, New York, 3 June 1772, Gage Papers, vol 111; Gage to Guy Johnson, 18 July 1768, Gage Papers, vol 79.
in his response to frontier violence in Pennsylvania that had been sparked by the Paxton Boys’ murder of the Conestoga Indians in late 1763. He had informed Governor Penn:

> If any Shadow of Law or Justice remains in Pennsylvania, I am confident that you will leave no Method untried, to bring these Lawless Villains to condign Punishment. I have not heard that any Man has been killed, and it may therefore be better that the Officer prevented His Men from Firing; but if he had returned the fire of those Ruffians, and killed as many as he was able, I conceive He would have Acted consistent with the Laws of his Own, and of every other Civilized Country.  

Gage suggested that the Pennsylvanian frontiersmen were rebels and traitors and that, as such, the army officer involved in the incident would have been within his rights to punish them with death whilst they were openly in arms. By emphasising that such action was within the laws of all civilised countries, he further suggested that the frontiersmen themselves were not civilised and were acting in a way consistent with savagery. To Gage, this again justified the use of lethal force as he had witnessed earlier in his career in Scotland and North America. As the army continued to encounter problems with interior settlers, colonial governors and government officials also highlighted the settlers’ failure to act with due submission to the Crown, describing them as being guilty of inhuman barbarities. When they could not restore order through legal methods such as the arrest and trial of those suspected of murder or illegal settlement, British imperial agents appeared willing to use troops against settlers, utilising similar tactics as they had previously against Scottish Highlanders and Native Americans to try and gain the total submission of groups of disloyal ‘others’. Whilst the colonists generally were still viewed as subjects of the Crown and Native Americans still did not enjoy the full rights of subjects, Thomas Gage and many within the British Army demonstrated the paradigm shift that influenced how they identified colonists. Lines of distinction between frontier inhabitants and Native Americans were blurred as colonists were treated as having forfeited the rights and protections they were due as British subjects. Further, both groups were viewed as distinct from Britons and rather were viewed as populations of ‘others’

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80 Gage to Penn, New York, 13 December 1765, Gage Papers, vol 46. Gage had earlier complained to Penn that the people of Cumberland County appeared to be in “an actual state of rebellion”. Gage to Penn, New York, 16 June 1765; Gage Papers, vol 38.

81 Penn to Gage, Pennsylvania, 6 March 1766, Gage Papers, vol 49; Lord Dartmouth to Johnson, Whitehall, 1 December 1773, Superintendent of Indian Affairs Fonds, MG19-F-35, Microfilm Reel H-2943, LAC.
whom the British had to effectively manage to prevent a conflict which threatened imperial security.

IV. The Imperial Crisis, 1765-75

Calls for the reform of colonial affairs had originated in the late 1740s, with initial steps taken by the Board of Trade during the Earl of Halifax’s presidency. War interrupted the Board of Trade’s programme, and its powers were curtailed by Secretary of State William Pitt in the early 1760s, but the difficulties faced by various commanders-in-chief during the war led to further calls for the implementation of a uniform system of governance and a more authoritative imperial policy. This continued in the aftermath of the war as Thomas Gage and others hoped to strengthen royal authority in the colonies. However, the ministry’s imperial priorities in the aftermath of the war centred on security and economy: protecting Britain’s territorial gains by stationing regulars in North America and reducing military expenditure through a colonial contribution to the cost. In addition, the post-war period was one of political instability with five men holding the position of First Lord of the Treasury in the seven years after the fall of John Stuart, Earl of Bute, in April 1763.\(^82\) As such, rather than a root and branch reform of colonial affairs, various ministries focused their efforts on economy, seeking to tax the colonists to contribute to imperial defence.\(^83\) Colonial opposition to the 1765 Stamp Act, combined with a change of ministry, caused Parliament to repeal the measure whilst simultaneously asserting its authority to legislate for the colonies through the 1766 Declaratory Act. The legislation of 1764 and 1765 forced colonists to consider constitutional questions, leading them to re-evaluate the imperial relationship.\(^84\) Although opposition to British measures was not universal, it was widespread, and the belief that Parliament did not have the authority to tax the colonists because the colonists were not represented in Parliament

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\(^82\) Frederick North, Lord North, was the fifth man appointed to the position in 1770. As well as political instability, the 1760s were marked by domestic radicalism pressing for political reform. See H. T. Dickinson, ‘Radicals and Reformers in the Age of Wilkes and Wyvill’, in *British Politics and Society from Walpole to Pitt, 1742-1789*, ed. Jeremy Black (London: Macmillan, 1990), 123-46.


drew protests. Recognising that the cost of keeping the army in the colonies had been an important contributing factor to the decision to tax the colonists, opposition to the army also began to increase from 1765. Colonists argued that the late war had been fought for British, not colonial, aims and that the presence of the army was of no benefit to the older colonies, so they ought not to be expected to contribute towards its upkeep. Further attempts to tax the colonists were met with opposition, influencing the decision to move soldiers to the east, ensuring that militarisation impinged more directly upon colonists’ lives. The initial aim of militarisation in the eastern seaboard colonies was notably different from that in Scotland, Canada, and the interior as the colonists had not been at war with Britain and therefore did not require pacifying. However, as Parliament attempted to assert its sovereignty, Thomas Gage came to view the colonists as a potential threat to imperial security and over the following decade the British Army was expected to pacify hostile colonists to ensure imperial security, although by late 1774 Gage had actively begun to prepare for the possibility of conflict.

**Thomas Gage and Imperial Reform**

Thomas Gage was responsible for continuing the process of militarisation in North America from 1764, which increasingly focused on the eastern seaboard colonies due to the developing imperial crisis and the adoption of a policy of retrenchment in the West. In addition, he was expected to keep the ministry informed of the political situation in the colonies. Throughout the pre-revolutionary period, as well as acting as an imperial agent, Gage acted as an imperial reformer. His earlier experiences with a hostile population in Scotland and working with recalcitrant colonists in North America led him to believe that reform of the relationship between the mother-country and the colonies was necessary to ensure imperial security and guarantee colonial loyalty. Both this belief and Gage’s ideas regarding the steps the government ought to take were developed throughout the imperial crisis in response to his experiences implementing militarisation and the army’s interactions with colonists. Gage’s ideas for reform were similar to those of Massachusetts governor Francis Bernard as well as the earlier ideas of reformers that

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had inspired Halifax. All these imperial reformers warned that Britain was in danger of losing the colonies if action was not taken to impose a uniform system of governance, strengthen the hand of royal authority, and assert parliamentary authority.

The ideas for reform emerging in the post-war period had their origins in Halifax’s earlier programme but the developing constitutional crisis and personal preference led to variations in the ideas put forward. Francis Bernard, in a pamphlet written in 1764 and adapted the following year, emphasised Parliament’s supremacy and proposed the extension of royal authority through the establishment of a civil list. Whilst Bernard accepted the colonies were virtually represented in Parliament he embraced the possibility of giving them formal parliamentary representation, and he also raised the possibility of an inter-colonial union. Likewise, although he acknowledged Parliament had the right to tax colonists, Bernard suggested it would be prudent for the provincial legislators to be given the responsibility of raising internal taxes. Although some of Bernard’s suggestions received the support of individual ministers at various points during the imperial crisis, most of his ideas were quietly ignored in London. Other key imperial reformers, including Bernard’s lieutenant and successor Thomas Hutchinson and his predecessor Thomas Pownall, agreed with some aspects of Bernard’s plan whilst putting forward ideas of their own. Neither agreed that the colonists were virtually represented. Hutchinson believed this meant Parliament ought not to impose taxes on the colonies, whether internal or external, and rather should defer to the colonial legislatures for such matters, whilst Pownall emphasised that colonials were entitled to the same rights as Britons at home.

87 Halifax took inspiration from the ideas of Robert Dinwiddie, governor of Virginia, James Abercromby, Vice-Admiralty officer in South Carolina, and Henry McCulloh, collector of royal revenues in North Carolina.


emphasised by Hutchinson and Pownall but his focus was on Parliament’s supremacy over the colonists and its right of taxation, even if he felt it imprudent to introduce taxation in 1764. This led Bernard to view colonial assertions of no taxation without representation and challenges to parliamentary authority as precursors to rebellion.

Thomas Gage’s understanding of the imperial relationship was much closer to that of Bernard than of Hutchinson or Pownall and was influenced by the cultural paradigm of loyalty. Gage favoured asserting colonial dependence on the mother country and strengthening royal authority to encourage colonists to demonstrate due submission to the Crown. He was convinced of the supremacy of Parliament and was therefore of the opinion that Parliament had the right to tax and legislate for the colonists as it saw fit.92 Unlike Bernard, he had no qualms about the timing chosen to implement taxation and saw no reason for inter-colonial union or parliamentary representation for colonists. Gage was more explicit about the colonial situation and his beliefs for imperial reform than is generally suggested in the historiography, where he is often accused of weakly presiding over the imperial situation and failing to properly inform the ministry about colonial opposition. He was guarded in his communications as he knew he would be held accountable if an idea he suggested failed. Further, he was aware of the unstable nature of British politics at that time and recognised that extreme views could lead to his recall upon a ministerial reshuffle. Despite these challenges, Gage repeatedly emphasised Parliament’s supremacy and right of taxation. He also argued in favour of strong legislative measures and a show of military strength to keep the colonies properly subjected and remove colonial opposition.

During the Stamp Act crisis of 1765-66, Gage first hinted at three separate, yet connected, themes regarding the political situation in the colonies and the issue of imperial reform. These themes, again influenced by the loyalty paradigm, would be developed throughout the imperial crisis as he returned to them repeatedly in his correspondence. The first theme was Gage’s concern that the colonists were attempting to assert their independency from the Crown and taking steps towards an open rebellion against imperial authority. Writing to General Robert Monckton, outgoing governor of New York, Gage asserted that:

The Province never declared their Sentiments of Independency so openly before and they state their Grievances, (if in reality they have

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any) in such a way that I do not see how it will be possible to relieve them. They push matters so closely to the Point, that the Subject seems to be, whether they are Independent states, or Colonys dependent on Great Britain.93

Gage believed the Stamp Act riots were evidence of colonial disloyalty and required a strong response from the ministry to assert parliamentary authority and colonial dependency. Gage remained in favour of Parliament imposing taxes upon the colonies rather than allowing the colonists to establish their own revenue collection measures. He would continue to warn imperial agents in the colonies and government officials about the independency in the minds of the colonists throughout the imperial crisis.

The second, related theme of Gage’s correspondence was his frustration at the civil authorities for not calling for military aid and his desire for a punitive response to episodes of colonial disorder. He believed military intimidation would cause the colonists to demonstrate imperial loyalty, informing Barrington that:

No Requisition has been made of Me for assistance, which I, must acknowledge I have been sorry for, as the disturbances which have happened, have been so much beyond riots, and so like the forerunners of open Rebellion, that I have wanted a pretence to draw the troops together from every post they cou’d be taken from, that the Servants of the Crown might be enabled to make a stand in some spot, if matters should be brought to the Extremitys.94

Gage believed it was only a short step from the present rioting to rebellion. Reliant upon information from Bernard to gauge the situation in Boston, Bernard’s fatalistic reporting of the two Stamp Act riots led the commander to believe that, even at that early stage, Bostonians were ready to rebel. As such, he wished for a strong military presence in the affected colonies to react if conflict did break out. Further, he believed the presence of the troops would intimidate the colonists into submission and would enable the implementation of the Stamp Act. This belief was strengthened by his experiences in the Highlands, where the presence of the military in potentially hostile regions had contributed to the restoration and continuation of peace since 1746. Whilst the colonists continued only to riot, Gage could not legally act without a request from civil authorities or a ministerial order. He was clear the colonists had not yet crossed the line into open rebellion that would allow him to act upon his own initiative and send in troops without

93 Gage to Monckton, New York, 28 September 1765 in Carter, Correspondence of Thomas Gage, 2:307.
94 Gage to Barrington, New York, 16 January 1766 in Carter, Correspondence of Thomas Gage, 2:334-35.
the approval of civil magistrates. Instead, he implicitly hinted to the ministry about the need for a military strategy to force the colonists to submit to parliamentary authority.

The third theme first hinted at by Gage during the Stamp Act crisis and developed over the following decade was his understanding of the colonists’ identity. When highlighting the thoughts of independency amongst the rioters he inferred that the colonists did not view themselves as Britons but as Americans. He himself labelled them as Americans throughout the imperial crisis. 95 Gage also suggested that the situation of governance in the colonies had been an important factor in causing the colonists to identify, and act, so differently to Britons at home. Amid the crisis he remarked to James Grant, governor of East Florida:

I sincerely wish the Lands you have lately obtained may be settled by another Race of People, than those who inhabit the other parts of the Continent; And that Your present form of Government [by a governor and council], may never be changed to any that Shall Incline more to the Side of Democracy, We may then hope, that the Mother Country may in Time reckon, that She has One Loyal, and Affectionate Colony in America.96

Emphasising colonial disloyalty and disaffection allowed Gage to make implicit reference to the inherent differences between the colonists and Britons, ‘othering’ the former. He believed that preventing governance by assembly in the new colonies was the best way to prevent those who settled in them from developing a similar disconnect with the mother-country. During the imperial crisis, and even after the Battles of Lexington and Concord, Gage viewed the colonists as subjects of the Crown. As subjects, he believed colonists were required to demonstrate their subjection and submission to the Crown and their failure to do so influenced the reforms he advocated. The fact he viewed the colonists as subjects also led him to proclaim that any attacks by colonists upon soldiers would be treated as an act of rebellion. However, subjecthood was not synonymous with Britishness, as interactions with Scottish Highlanders and French-Canadians had previously demonstrated. Prior to the war, colonists had generally been classified as Britons, the same as those living in Britain. However, Gage’s formative experiences led him to question that interpretation as early as 1765 and his attitude and

95 This is evident throughout the Gage Papers, American Series, at the William Clements Library.
96 Gage to Grant, New York, 26 April 1766, Gage Papers, vol 51.
understanding would be developed further during the imperial crisis and reflected in the advice he gave the ministry regarding imperial reform and pacification.

**Militarisation**

Militarisation had begun in the older colonies during the French and Indian War, causing colonists to begin to question their place within the empire in response to requisitions for troops, supplies, etc. and to define their understanding of military and civil spaces in response to British requests for quarters. A backlash against the billeting of regulars, but not provincials, in private homes suggested the colonists viewed British soldiers as unwelcome aliens in their civil space and led to sustained barrack building efforts in numerous colonies throughout the course of the war. This separated regulars from the civilian population but in turn blurred the division between military and civil spheres within the city at large. Although this led to tension and instances of violence between soldiers and colonists, it also ensured the colonial cities and towns that played a sustained role in quartering the troops became martial spaces, largely reconciling themselves to the presence of soldiers.97 After the war, most troops were stationed within the newly conquered territories, Nova Scotia, or throughout the interior. However, the army’s headquarters remained at Albany, New York, and small numbers of troops also remained in Philadelphia, Charleston, and New York City. These troops had to be quartered and supplied by the province and all colonies were expected to quarter and supply regulars passing through. Whilst Pontiac’s War continued Gage also requested the colonies raise provincials and provide and transport supplies to the interior posts.

The Proclamation of 1763 signalled that the British Army had taken control over the interior, but Thomas Gage and the ministry believed the colonies continued to share responsibility for protecting it. In addition, Gage believed the colonies ought to support those troops who remained garrisoned in colonial towns as the wider purpose of retaining the army in North America was to secure the region, which benefitted the colonists as well as Britain. Colonial assemblies and civilians, however, recovering from a long and economically damaging conflict, did not consider it their responsibility to provide men or supplies to overcome rebellion in a region that the Proclamation banned them from

settling in or reaping financial reward from.\textsuperscript{98} They likewise generally disagreed that they should be required to quarter or supply troops stationed in their own colonies when they did not believe there was any need for them to be there: the threat lay in the newly acquired territories and in the interior and so British troops ought to only be kept in those regions.\textsuperscript{99}

The army had frequently encountered difficulties securing quarters for the regulars during the French and Indian War. The threat of taking quarters by force had proved successful, if contentious, under Loudoun whilst in the later years the ministry allowed the colonies to pass their own annual Mutiny Acts which, combined with the fact regulars were generally stationed in towns boasting barracks, removed many complaints. Gage did not think such a solution was sustainable in peacetime as the older colonies felt secure enough to refuse to pass annual bills.\textsuperscript{100} This was apparent in both Albany and New York City as early as 1764. In Albany, the colonists pulled down buildings and objected to the presence of troops in the city, whilst in New York City the mayor refused to provide firewood for troops waiting for ships to return them to England, citing the lack of a Mutiny Act for his action.\textsuperscript{101} As such, Gage recommended the alteration of the Mutiny Act and its extension to North America, or the drafting of a new law specifically for the colonies that would allow him to quarter troops in barracks, public houses, or private homes depending on the army’s requirements. His desire to include a section permitting the quartering of troops in private homes stemmed from a wish to have one law governing quartering in all the North American colonies, old and new, and a recognition that in areas without barracks or sufficient public houses, like Montréal and St. Augustine, billeting in private homes remained a necessity. The ministry responded with the American Mutiny Act or Quartering Act, in 1765, although they removed any reference to the quartering of troops in private homes in response to opposition from colonial agents and members of parliament. As such, the act failed to answer the purpose Gage had hoped it would. The Quartering Act explicitly ordered colonial civil authorities to quarter the troops in barracks where available and, where not, first in public houses

\textsuperscript{98} Middleton, \textit{Pontiac’s War}, 131; Dixon, \textit{Never Come to Peace}, 246-47.


\textsuperscript{101} Shy, \textit{Toward Lexington}, 168-69, 176-79.
and then in uninhabited houses, barns, and buildings. Its seventh provision ordered assemblies to pay for certain necessities for soldiers whilst they were quartered within the colony. Quartering represented the militarisation of North America, and it would become a more difficult aspect of the process as colonial opposition to the presence of the army increased in response to British taxation.

Colonists were against the Quartering Act as they feared it was a method of forcing upon them troops they did not believe they required. Further, when details of the Stamp Act became widely known colonists linked the two acts, claiming both sought to collect taxes to finance a standing army that threatened their liberty. Until 1766 only approximately one hundred soldiers were garrisoned in the old colonies in New York City, Albany, and Charleston. That year another three regiments were sent into garrison in Philadelphia, New Jersey, and New York. Pennsylvania immediately complied with the Quartering Act whilst New Jersey complied with most of its provisions. Gage continued to encounter problems in New York, however. In 1765 he informed Secretary of State Henry Seymour Conway that whilst the assembly had not directly rejected the act, they were doing all in their power to evade it: refusing to pay for supplies for troops quartered in barracks they argued belonged to the Crown, agreeing to pay marching expenses but only after the expense had been incurred, and agreeing to pay for firewood but ignoring all the act’s other provisions.

Gage also had problems requisitioning supplies from the southern colonies. The Quartering Act left the British Army responsible for the costs of quartering and supplying the army in the interior but required the colonies in closest proximity to pay for the transportation of men, provisions, and military stores to the forts. Georgia’s assembly initially refused compliance with the Quartering Act, relenting only when Gage threatened to remove the regulars from the province. South Carolina, meanwhile, refused to comply with the Quartering Act and pay transportation costs, but the assembly did obey its own quartering law which provided salt, clothing, and military stores for the regulars in its interior forts at a great saving to the Crown. It also provided regular grants


103 Shy, Toward Lexington, 140–43.

104 Gage to Conway, New York, 21 December 1765 in Carter, Correspondence of Thomas Gage, 1:78–79.

105 Quartering Act in English Historical Documents, 656–58.
to maintain the posts. The cost of militarisation in that region was partly met by the colonies but the experience highlighted colonial willingness to undermine British authority. At that juncture, Gage was willing to accept colonies like South Carolina and New York subverting parliamentary authority as he was still able to continue the militarisation of the country. However, Gage was worried that no colony would continue to cover quartering costs for much longer. This helped convince him of the necessity of imperial reform that would force the colonies to adhere to parliamentary legislation. Warning Secretary at War Lord Barrington that the colonies continued to test the limits of imperial authority in January 1766, he urged the vigorous implementation of acts of parliament to assert authority over them.

Gage had ultimate authority, and therefore bore ultimate responsibility, for decisions about the army taken in the colonies. He could station troops wherever he thought appropriate but could not set his troops against civilians without explicit instructions from the magistrates. As such, he sent troops to Albany in 1765 at the request of Lieutenant Governor Cadwallader Colden to quell disorders, although the civil magistrates did not call for their use during the Stamp Act crisis. The following year New York’s civil magistrates did request a regiment to quell riots in Duchess County. Informing Secretary of State Conway of an incident in July 1766, Gage noted a skirmish had taken place between soldiers and rioters, with a small number killed or wounded on either side. The ringleaders were imprisoned, and the magistrate commended “the Regiment greatly, as well for their Spirit and readiness in Apprehending the Rioters as for the Strictness of their Discipline.” By September the presence of the army had helped pacify the province and Gage removed the extra troops he had sent there the previous year. Generally, however, civil magistrates and even colonial governors refused to request the use of troops to quell disorders in case doing so provoked violence.

As well as his legal responsibility, Gage had orders from Whitehall only to use force as a last resort and to encourage civil, rather than military, resolutions to disturbances. This left him largely powerless to act in response to the disturbances over

106 Shy, Toward Lexington, 163-81; Gage to Ellis, New York, 27 April 1765 in Carter, Correspondence of Thomas Gage, 1:283–85.
107 Gage to Barrington, New York, 17 January 1766 in Carter, Correspondence of Thomas Gage, 2:406.
109 Gage to Conway, New York, 15 July 1766 in Carter, Correspondence of Thomas Gage, 1:99-100.
110 Conway to Gage, St James’s, 24 October 1765 in Carter, Correspondence of Thomas Gage, 2:27–29.
colonial taxation in 1765. Gage was, however, proactive in ordering his subordinates to act should the colonists cross the line from mobbing and rioting into open rebellion. In 1766 he instructed Major Browne in New York:

…if these Sons of Liberty fire upon You, You will not then trouble yourself about Orders, [and] I am to desire if they dare fire upon the King’s Troops, [and] become Rebels that You will give them a good Dressing, [and] beat these Sons of Liberty into Loyal Subjects.\footnote{Gage to John Browne, New York, 2 July 1766, Gage Papers, vol 53. Gage expressed similar sentiments in a 1768 letter to Secretary of State Hillsborough, noting that if “open and declared Rebellion makes its appearance, I mean to use all the Power lodged in my Hands, to make Head against it.” Gage to Hillsborough, New York, 26 September 1768, CO5/86, ff.180-2, TNA.}

Gage was explicit that if colonists attacked the army in its role as an instrument of empire then they were rebels and the army was justified, in accordance with the rules of warfare, in killing or capturing them as the situation allowed. Highlighting their disloyalty, he emphasised the need for swift, punitive measures, as the army had pursued in the Highlands, as the best method of restoring peace and bringing the colonists back into a state of due submission. The apparent success of such measures ensuring peace in the Highlands and encouraging the loyalty of that population provided a clear precedent for Gage in North America. His advocation of military intimidation, which would continue over the following years, suggests he believed the Rockingham ministry had erred in its decision to repeal the Stamp Act and that it ought to have been enforced by the army. However, Gage was determined not to provoke rebellion and ordered his troops to behave with the strictest regard to discipline. He was also determined that the troops would not be used by civil authorities for their own ends. When Lieutenant Governor Colden was forced to take shelter in Fort George with a military guard, where he was repeatedly surrounded by Stamp Act rioters, Gage warned Colden that ordering the soldiers to fire upon the mob would likely provoke a general insurrection.\footnote{Gage to Cadwallader Colden, New York, 5 November 1765, Gage Papers, vol 45.} He was determined not to risk a general conflict stemming from the army being used improperly by civil authorities and to ensure his troops only responded to incidents that directly threatened imperial authority.

By 1767 the Chatham ministry was ready to move further away from an empire of negotiation and towards one of closer regulation with parliamentary supremacy established, like imperial reformers such as Gage and Bernard had been advocating. Aware of New York’s continued resistance to the Quartering Act, Parliament
implemented the New York Restraining Act and signalled its desire that any disobedient colonies be pacified through legislative measures, militarisation and, if necessary, military action.\textsuperscript{113} The move towards punitive measures in London emboldened Gage in his demand for full compliance with the Quartering Act and by 1768 most colonies were requisitioning supplies for troops stationed within them, even if they refused to admit parliamentary authority when doing so. Many colonists were angry at being forced to comply with the Quartering Act through the threat of their assembly being suspended and when the Townshend Acts (1767-68) introduced new taxes on various items they again protested being asked to finance the stationing of regulars amongst them when such troops threatened their liberty.\textsuperscript{114} The colonial disorders in the wake of the Townshend Acts solidified Gage’s opinion that the colonists were acting disloyally and moving towards independence and he informed Barrington that he believed they would only acknowledge the King of Britain as their King as long as it remained convenient to do so.\textsuperscript{115}

During the period 1765-68, Gage came to believe that Boston was the centre of colonial unrest and supported Massachusetts Governor Francis Bernard’s calls for troops to be sent there. Discussing recent attacks on customs commissioners in Boston in June 1768, Gage suggested that if the people of England reacted to the news with indignation then he believed the ministry could “not Act with too much Vigour…the Moderation and Forbearance hitherto shewn by Great Britain, has been Construed into Timidity, and served only to raise Sedition and Mutiny, to a higher Pitch”\textsuperscript{116} Claiming moderation had failed, he advocated a strategy of military intimidation and, if required, punitive measures to gain colonial submission. Based in New York, Gage relied upon the reports of governors as to the state of their provinces, so his opinion about the generally rebellious state of Boston was shaped by Governor Bernard. Bernard’s manufacturing of a sense of


\textsuperscript{114} The Revenue Act of 1767 imposed duties on glass, lead paints, paper, and tea to generate revenue to pay the salaries of Crown officials in North America, removing some power from colonial assemblies. It, alongside the Indemnity Act, New York Restraining Act, and Commissioners of the Customs Act of the same year, and the Vice Admiralty Court Act of 1768, were labelled the Townshend Acts by colonists. Colonists interpreted them as an attempt to assert parliamentary authority and induce compliance with trade regulations. See Thomas, \textit{Townshend Duties Crisis}, especially 20-32.

\textsuperscript{115} Gage to Barrington, New York, 10 March 1768 in Carter, \textit{Correspondence of Thomas Gage}, 2:450–51.

\textsuperscript{116} Gage to Barrington, New York, 28 June 1768 in Carter, \textit{Correspondence of Thomas Gage}, 2:479-80.
crisis was instrumental in influencing Gage’s opinion that Bostonians were ready to stage an armed insurrection and required military pacification to restore order, as well as the ministry’s decision to send troops to the town.\textsuperscript{117} Bernard had wanted to use troops to reassert royal authority during the Stamp Act crisis, although he ultimately decided against such a move. He continued to petition the ministry with reports of the failings of royal authority in his province and again requested troops to restore order in the wake of opposition to the Townshend Acts in 1768.\textsuperscript{118} The ministry ordered Gage to send two regiments from Nova Scotia and sent another two regiments from Ireland in the wake of the attacks on Boston’s customs commissioners. Demonstrating agreement with Bernard’s assessment of the situation in Boston, Gage praised the ministry’s decision to send the troops, claiming it had caused the Bostonians, and the colonists more generally, to calm their protestations. He also used it as evidence to support his developing strategy of military intimidation, and force if necessary, arguing that such a response was the best way to quell the “Spirit of Sedition, which has so long and so greatly prevailed here.”\textsuperscript{119}

The British occupation of Boston led colonists to question why so many British troops were quartered there rather than in the new colonies or in the interior, increasing opposition to the presence of the army. This encouraged further disobedience of the Quartering Act and increased civil-military tension.\textsuperscript{120} This was not limited to the New England colonies as although South Carolina was no longer at the expense of supplying the interior forts due to retrenchment, in 1769 the assembly refused to quarter regulars in Charleston as per the stipulations in the Quartering Act.\textsuperscript{121} Bostonians meanwhile, who had rarely been troubled with the necessity of quartering troops, argued that the British decision to station troops in the town was designed to oppress them. Whilst the assembly ignored the Quartering Act and refused to pay for necessities, the council invoked it to their advantage to frustrate the army. They refused to find buildings to quarter the troops, arguing the act stipulated they were to be housed in public inns after the barracks were

\textsuperscript{117} The Papers of Francis Bernard: Governor of Colonial Massachusetts, 1760-1769, ed. Colin Nicolson, vol. 3 (Boston: The Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 2013), 1-32.

\textsuperscript{118} Nicolson, ‘Infamas Governor’, 109-97. Regarding Bernard’s decision not to request the troops offered to him by Gage in 1765 see Bernard to Gage, Boston, 13 September 1765 in Nicolson, Papers of Francis Bernard, 2:450-51.

\textsuperscript{119} Gage to Hillsborough, New York, 26 September 1768 in Carter, Correspondence of Thomas Gage, 1:195–97.

\textsuperscript{120} Archer, As If an Enemy’s Country, 104-22.

\textsuperscript{121} Gage to Hillsborough, New York, 7 October 1769 in Carter, Correspondence of Thomas Gage, 1:238–40.
full. Gage refused to utilise quartering in inns due to concern it would cause violence between civilians and soldiers, but his seizure of disused buildings led to complaints he had ignored the act and arbitrarily quartered his troops amongst the populace. In 1769, Gage highlighted his lack of trust in the civil authorities to act in the imperial interest, suggesting disloyalty was inherent in all levels of colonial society. He claimed that he “foresaw from the Beginning the Oppression and Tyranny that would be exercised over the troops by the Civil Magistrates; and was not without Apprehension that it might be carried such lengths as to drive the soldiers to an open Revolt.”

Newspapers reported the damaging impact of the occupation on the city and played an important role in exporting colonial grievances from province to province. They were often guilty of exaggerating reports and focusing entirely on violence on the part of soldiers. In 1769 Lt. Col. William Dalrymple, commander of the troops in Boston, informed Gage of a quarrel between civilians in which no soldiers had been involved. Gage noted it gave him: “very great pleasure that you say none of the military were concerned in the fray, though the newspapers would make people believe they were, and that swords were drawn.” Such articles added to the narrative of the oppression of the army which remained a feature of colonial discontent during the imperial crisis. In both Boston and New York, the posting of troops as sentries increased the visibility of the army and, correspondingly, increased interactions and tensions between soldiers and civilians without helping to maintain order in the city. Colonists and soldiers frequently mocked and jeered one another, and violence regularly broke out between the two groups.

The difficulties the army faced in Boston during its occupation of the city left Gage convinced of the need for stronger measures to remove what he perceived as entrenched colonial disloyalty. He encouraged Parliament to give the King power to nominate the members of the governor’s council in Massachusetts and to appoint colonial magistrates. He believed this would make the holders of these positions loyal subjects who would do their duty and call on the aid of the military when necessary. When Parliament did not adopt the measures he suggested, and in fact partially repealed the

122 Archer, As If an Enemy’s Country, 107-15.
123 Gage to Alexander Mackay, New York, 18 June 1769, Gage Papers, vol 86.
124 Gage to William Dalrymple, New York, 18 September 1769, Gage Papers, vol 87.
125 Zobel, Boston Massacre, 135; Archer, As If an Enemy’s Country, 58-59.
126 Gage to Barrington, New York, 14 May 1769 in Carter, Correspondence of Thomas Gage, 2:509-10.
Townshend Duties, Gage accused the Grafton and North ministries of ceding to all colonial demands and failing to apprehend the leaders of the “Seditious” movement in Boston. It would not be until 1774, after he had returned to England on leave and discussed the situation in the colonies in person with the King and several ministers, that Parliament would implement measures that resembled some of the strategies Gage had been advocating.

The colonists’ reaction to the Townshend Duties also solidified Gage’s understanding that they were not Britons but rather potentially hostile ‘others’ who represented a significant threat to the British Empire. Discussing the non-importation agreement and a concern that colonists might attack British merchant ships, Gage informed Lt. Col. Dalrymple in Boston that:

If any Accident happens to the Goods, the Proprietors will from their Consequence at Home, be better able to procure redress, and shew the British Nation the American Provinces are no longer British, for French or Spaniards would do no more upon the Eve of a War with Great Britain, than to prohibit all Trade with her.

Gage had already made it clear that he believed the colonists were not Britons and he had come to view and treat them simply as one more group of imperial ‘others’. However, this letter not only provides explicit evidence of his own attitude but also his hope that the people of Britain would come to accept this interpretation. It suggests Gage believed a change in attitude amongst the ministry and public was required before the ministry would pursue the punitive path he believed necessary to subjugate the colonists and restore imperial order. He continued to emphasise the ‘otherness’ of the colonists throughout the imperial crisis, making it clear he did not view them as partners in a negotiated empire as the colonists had believed they were, but rather as subordinates equal in status to the French-Canadians and Native Americans who also comprised Britain’s North American Empire.

Civil-military tension culminated in the Battle of Golden Hill, New York, on 19 January 1770 and the Boston Massacre of 5 March 1770. Whilst no one was killed in the earlier engagement, in Boston British soldiers killed five civilians after firing upon them without orders in a state of confusion whilst under attack by clubs, stones, and snowballs.

127 Gage to Barrington, New York, 14 May 1769 in Carter, Correspondence of Thomas Gage, 2:509-10; Gage to Barrington, 8 September 1770 in Carter, Correspondence of Thomas Gage, 2:556-57.
128 Gage to Dalrymple, New York, 9 October 1769, Gage Papers, vol 87.
from a mob. It led to the immediate removal of the troops to Castle Island and eventually out of Massachusetts altogether. The Boston Massacre was the bloodiest episode of military-civilian violence prior to the outbreak of the American Revolution and both it and the Battle of Golden Hill contributed to growing anti-redcoat settlement. Whilst it did not lead to the removal of troops from all cities in the older colonies, it caused most colonists to view the British Army as a foreign presence and increased resistance to the Quartering Act. In turn, Thomas Gage increased the number of troops quartered in the new colonies and threatened to remove troops from colonies including New Jersey and New York if the assemblies refused to supply them. The army had been sent to Boston to police the city and pacify the colonists in the wake of demonstrations against British authority. Whilst it seemed they had achieved this aim by 1769, Bostonians remained opposed to their presence and the massacre provided the spark to facilitate their removal. Gage was left frustrated at the situation in Boston, but he remained convinced that the presence of the army in the thirteen colonies was necessary to ensure imperial security.

The Boston Massacre, and the anti-redcoat sentiment it encouraged, strengthened Gage’s belief that the colonists were but one step away from rebellion and he suggested it was necessary that the military authorities in North America be granted increased powers. He claimed the current situation left the army of little use in any colony for quelling disorder due to the reluctance of the civil magistrates to employ them for that purpose. He informed Hillsborough that:

When the Troops first arrived indeed at Boston, the People were kept in some awe by them; but they soon discovered, that Troops were bound by the Constitutional Laws, and could only Act under the Authority, and by the Orders of the Civil Magistrates; who were all of their Side. And they recommenced their Riots, tho’ two or three Regiments were in Town, with the Same unbridled Licentiousness as before.

Gage’s initial hope that the sending of troops to Boston would be enough to intimidate the colonists into displaying due submission to the Crown had proven false. He complained that civil authorities were often on the same side as the rioters and refused to

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131 Gage to Hillsborough, New York, 7 July 1770 in Carter, *Correspondence of Thomas Gage*, 1:262–64.
call for military aid to maintain or restore order. This suggests a desire for greater powers, so the military could bypass disloyal civil magistrates. Gage had previously made it clear he would have no hesitation ordering the troops to fire upon rebels in accordance with the rules of war, but his correspondence highlights he continued to feel unable to act pre-emptively whilst colonists remained on the side of rioting rather than rebellion. Instead, he requested a ministerial order that would provide military authority to bring the colonists into line. The cultural paradigm of loyalty ensured that his primary concern, as an agent of empire, was the management of various populations within the empire, their submission to the Crown, and their compliance with imperial directives.

The Coercive Acts of 1774 were implemented in response to continuing colonial refutations of parliamentary supremacy and the Boston Tea Party of December 1773, when colonists protested the 1773 Tea Act by dumping tea from East India Company ships into the harbour. The Coercive Acts closed the port of Boston and removed the customs house to Salem until the town agreed to pay compensation for the tea. The acts also moved powers from the assembly to the governor, asserted imperial control over the selection of assemblymen, provided Gage with further powers regarding quartering, and allowed trials for certain crimes to take place in England. The assertion of imperial control and the removal of powers from the hands of the assembly to the governor were steps that Gage and other imperial reformers had repeatedly urged. Gage’s appointment as Governor of Massachusetts merged the military and civil commands, giving him greater powers to use the troops to curb colonial violence, although the ministry continued to advocate violence only as a last resort. However, by 1774 the situation had deteriorated, and disaffection was far more general than the ministry, and even the commander-in-chief, recognised. The colonies united in their opposition to what they termed the Intolerable Acts and re-established their continental congress and non-importation agreements. Taking up residence in Boston, Gage concentrated approximately two thousand troops in that city in response to Massachusetts’s failure to adhere to the Massachusetts Government Act. Delaying pre-emptive military action, he nonetheless prepared for hostilities, requesting more troops from Britain. Informing

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Secretary of State Lord Dartmouth that the people of Boston were talking of setting up their own government, he blamed the situation on the failure of successive ministries to take vigorous action and suggested that nothing less than the total conquest of the New England provinces would ensure obedience to the Coercive Acts.\textsuperscript{136} As he awaited reinforcements, Gage questioned how many French-Canadians and Indians Guy Carleton, governor of Quebec, would likely be able to raise if war broke out,\textsuperscript{137} exhibiting a willingness to use ‘other’ imperial populations to pacify hostile colonists.

At the same time as Gage consolidated his forces in Boston, he once again ‘othered’ the colonists. In 1774, a committee ordered by the continental congress accused the British Army of preparing for war against the colonists. In response Gage claimed that it was “highly exasperating, as well as ungenerous even to hint that the Lives, Liberties, or Property’s of any Persons except avowed Enemies are in Danger from Britons; Britain can never harbor the black Design of wantonly destroying or enslaving any People on Earth.”\textsuperscript{138} Disputing the accusations of the committee with comments about Britain’s virtue and justice as a nation not only emphasised that the colonists were not considered Britons but also served as a warning that their lives and liberties would be in danger if they took their protests to the next stage and became enemies to the Crown. Gage’s militarisation of the eastern seaboard and his ideas for imperial reform were influenced by the paradigm shift that had caused him to view the colonists as ‘others’, and as potential rebels, by the late 1760s. Whilst the attitude of most Britons to the colonists only changed during the course of the Revolutionary War,\textsuperscript{139} the attitude of Thomas Gage, and many within the British Army in North America, had been significantly altered well before the conflict broke out.

\textbf{V. Conclusions}

Thomas Gage approached the pacification of Native Americans during and after Pontiac’s War in a different manner to his predecessor because he had a different understanding of that population’s place within the post-conquest British Empire. Whilst

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{136} Gage to Dartmouth, Boston, 12 September 1774 in Carter, \textit{Correspondence of Thomas Gage}, 1:373–75.
\item \textsuperscript{137} Documents Concerning the Discontent in Boston, 1774-5, COS/7, ff.279-80, TNA.
\item \textsuperscript{138} Copy of Governor Gage’s Answer to a Committee Ordered in the Provincial Congress, 13 October 1774, Gage Papers, vol 123.
\item \textsuperscript{139} Conway, ‘From Fellow Nationals to Foreigners’, 65-100.
\end{itemize}
Amherst had viewed Native Americans as militarily and culturally inferior and a conquered population, Gage recognised both the threat they posed and the independence from the Crown they continued to enjoy. Gage did not draw the same parallels of rebellion between Native Americans and Jacobites as Amherst, which left him with the understanding that a full military submission was required from those hostile Native Americans to tie them to British authority through recognition of the British King as their “father”. Recognising that diplomacy, not subjugation, was the best method of securing long-term peace in the interior, Gage sought to accommodate Native Americans within the expanded British Empire through the implementation of a fair Indian policy after the war. At the same time, militarisation of the interior provided a continuing threat should Native Americans attempt to renew the conflict. Whilst the British Army had not felt the need to accommodate Highlanders within the empire, militarisation, commercial reform, and steps designed to improve and enlighten the population bore resemblance to those taken in Scotland, highlighting the continuing influence of the Forty-Five on British imperialism in North America.

Gage’s militarisation and governance of the West was driven by concerns of security and economy but was hampered by the ministerial indecision and rising colonial discontent. Gage kept the ministry informed of the situation in the interior and had some influence on ministerial policy, although his advice was by no means the only influencing factor. His advocacy of a policy of limited retrenchment in the West influenced the eventual decision to adopt a policy of retrenchment from 1768, which saw the army fully evacuated from the interior in 1774. The civility paradigm played a less important role in governing how the British defined imperial populations as a paradigm shift led to a different understanding of imperial loyalty that suggested populations could demonstrate continuing submission and adherence to the Crown without assimilation. Such a shift came about as a result of the army’s engagement in militarisation throughout the empire and in reaction to the changing composition of the empire in the wake of the French and Indian War. As such, whilst Native Americans continued to be viewed as ‘others’, they increasingly came to be regarded as an imperial population that had to be considered and accommodated and as generally equal in status to Highlanders, French-Canadians, and even colonial settlers. At the same time, another paradigm shift, begun under Loudoun, led Gage to view the colonists as fundamentally different from Britons at home. Whilst the British Army attempted to accommodate Native Americans by preventing colonial land encroachment and regulating settler-native trade, they failed to accommodate
colonial settlers within an imperial framework that did not accept their claims for western expansion. Gage blamed those who attacked Indians and illegally settled upon Indian lands for interior violence and believed that they had forfeited the rights and protections they were due as British subjects, further entrenching the view of colonists as ‘others’ in the eyes of the British Army in North America.

Both paradigm shifts also influenced Gage’s attitude towards colonial settlers in the eastern seaboard and his opinion regarding how Britain ought to respond to the imperial crisis of 1765-75. Colonial opposition to the introduction of taxation caused Gage and the British Army to view the colonists as a potentially, and sometimes overtly, hostile population group that had to be successfully pacified to restore order and imperial authority in the British Empire. As early as 1765, Gage asserted the ‘otherness’ of the colonists when warning that they were taking serious steps to assert their independency from the Crown. He strongly supported Parliament’s decision to tax the colonists, firmly believing it had the authority to do so and he advocated strong legislative measures, as well as a show of military strength, to prevent rebellion. Suggesting the subjugation of the colonists was necessary to reassert parliamentary authority and encourage colonial loyalty, Gage demonstrated that he viewed the colonists as being but one step away from rebellion. The attitudes of Thomas Gage and the British Army were shaped by the process of militarisation in North America and their encounters not only with colonial settlers but also with French-Canadians and Native Americans. In addition, earlier experiences of militarisation in the Scottish Highlands provided a precedent for pacifying such population groups that represented a potential threat to the British Empire. When the British Army first went to North America the colonists were firmly viewed as Britons and were not thought to pose a threat to the future security of the empire, although there were some who warned of the possibility that the colonists would begin to make moves towards independence. The experiences of warfare, pacification, and militarisation over the following two decades had a profound effect on the army officers who lived through them. The colonists emerged from the French and Indian War believing that they had been partners in the great victory and with renewed confidence in the concept of empire by negotiation. However, years before the American Revolution broke out Thomas Gage and the British Army were determined that the colonists were ‘others’, not Britons, and firmly believed in an empire of parliamentary supremacy, not one of negotiation.
Conclusions

This dissertation set out to examine how militarisation influenced the attitudes of British military officers towards various imperial population groups in the period from the Jacobite Uprising of 1745-46 to the outbreak of the American Revolutionary War in 1775. Using a biographical, case-study approach, it examined the experiences and encounters of British Army officers in Scotland and North America, discussing the cultural paradigms that influenced their encounters with Scottish Highlanders, French-Canadians, Native Americans, and colonial North American settlers. A qualitative investigation of private and official correspondence, military and government dispatches, and state papers illustrated the paradigm shifts affecting officers’ attitudes towards those they encountered, their opinions regarding imperial reform, and how they implemented empire in imperial fringes. Changes in attitude led officers to develop a markedly different understanding of imperial identity, and particularly the identity of colonial settlers, long before such a change became widespread in Britain. At the same time, paradigm shifts led officers to reconsider their conception of the imperial relationship and to advocate imperial reform whilst also affecting how they implemented militarisation, particularly pacification, on the ground as they sought to ensure imperial security. Focusing on the army’s implementation of militarisation rather than the financial and manpower costs of warfare provides a cultural understanding of the role these important agents of empire played in eighteenth-century imperial transformations.

Militarisation strategy in North America during and after the French and Indian War highlights the lasting impact of the Forty-Five on British imperialism in North America. Fundamentally, the experiences of the Forty-Five provided a precedent for the army to draw upon and adapt in response to the unique conditions and challenges they faced in another imperial fringe. Waging war in Scotland provided the army with lessons about recruitment and military service, tactical adaptations and the use of irregular warfare, and supplying an army in a remote region that they took with them to North America during the French and Indian War. John Campbell, fourth Earl of Loudoun, found it necessary to negotiate with Highland elites to achieve his campaign goals in the Highlands and he used this principle in North America to try and encourage colonial
participation in the war effort through recruitment, military service, and quartering. Other officers and the Indian Superintendents likewise negotiated with Native Americans to persuade them to ally themselves with the British or to remain neutral, illustrating the impact of the Forty-Five on British actions during the French and Indian War.

Army officers drew parallels of savagery between Highlanders, French-Canadians, and Native Americans during periods of combat. Guided by the civility paradigm, characterising their enemy as savages sought to justify the army’s failure to adhere to the rules of warfare during fire and sword campaigns that did not distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. Such campaigns aimed to end conflicts, punish the entire population for the actions of those who had taken part, and force the total submission of the population to the Crown. Whilst the association of French-Canadians with savagery was only temporary, direct and lasting parallels were drawn between Highlanders and Native Americans. This led to the encouragement of indiscriminate violence and subjugation during war and as a method of pacification and the adoption of state-sponsored commercialisation and improvement measures in the longer-term.

Cultural imperialism was implemented in the Highlands through militarisation. The maintenance of a significant military force in the region, coupled with the building and improving forts, roads, and bridges, ensured a military threat remained should the hostile population renew hostilities. Concurrently, opening the region to commercial and social influences from the Lowlands and England and establishing improvement initiatives sought to assimilate the population more closely within the British Empire, and thereby become and remain loyal to the Crown. Likewise, in North America militarisation first sought to prevent renewed hostilities from French-Canadians or Native Americans and mirrored the earlier process undertaken in Scotland. Adapted to suit the circumstances the army was confronted with after Pontiac’s War, Thomas Gage attempted to use militarisation strategy to accommodate Native Americans within the British Empire by controlling the actions of frontier inhabitants before removing the army from the interior altogether. Gage also attempted to control the actions of the colonists in the older colonies and prevent them from engaging in hostilities against the Crown when extending militarisation there from the mid-1760s, although this ultimately proved unsuccessful at preventing rebellion.

Thomas Gage’s belief that militarisation was the best strategy to ensure hostile populations demonstrated continuing submission to the Crown led him to make repeated suggestions that troops ought to be stationed in the older colonies to intimidate colonists
into remaining peaceful. It also influenced his belief that military action ought to be used to pacify colonists should they engage in further disorders or cross the line from rioting to rebellion. Considering the role of militarisation in both imperial fringes in the decades before the American Revolution, this dissertation found that the Forty-Five influenced how the British Army waged war and pacified hostile populations during the French and Indian War and Pontiac’s War. Further, the army’s formative experiences in Scotland affected officers’ actions during the pre-revolutionary period in North America. Although militarisation was adapted in response to American conditions and the changing circumstances in that imperial fringe, it clearly took inspiration from the Highland precedent. This extends the analysis of Geoffrey Plank, who found that pacification in Scotland influenced how the British Army pacified populations throughout the British Empire, by highlighting the various ways that the army drew lessons from the Forty-Five and by demonstrating that its influence continued at least until the American Revolution. Future studies could extend this investigation both geographically and chronologically. This dissertation did not examine the influence of the Forty-Five on the West Indies or India, for example, nor did it consider its influence during the Revolutionary War itself. Comparisons could also be drawn with the militarisation process embarked upon in Ireland during the seventeenth century to further demonstrate the development and adaptation of such processes throughout the British Empire.

Interactions between British military officers and the imperial populations they encountered in Scotland and North America illustrate the cultural attitudes of individual officers in the mid-to late-eighteenth century. Interactions were guided by various cultural paradigms that influenced how officers viewed themselves and the world around them. Most officers and government ministers shared a common understanding of the civility paradigm during the Forty-Five, and it guided reaction to the rebellion. Characterising all Highlanders as savage, the civility paradigm suggested that subjugation during and after the conflict was necessary to secure Highlanders’ submission to the British state. As highlighted, the civility paradigm also influenced the army’s reaction to warfare against French-Canadians and Native Americans. As civility was thought necessary before a population could assimilate within the empire and become loyal, long-term militarisation strategy aimed to affect the civilisation of Highlanders and Native Americans. However, the importance of the civility paradigm for

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1 Plank, Rebellion and Savagery.
guiding the interactions of military officers decreased over the period under investigation. In part, this was because steps taken to civilise Highlanders were perceived to be working by the 1760s, which led to them being classified as savages less often, whilst the emergence of the ‘noble savage’ in poetry and literature posited savagery as a positive state as such populations had not been corrupted by commercial society. More importantly, though, it was the changing understandings of imperial loyalty and identity that led to the reduction in the importance of the civility paradigm for guiding interactions in both Scotland and North America.

The loyalty paradigm had also played an important role during and after the Forty-Five. British Army officers viewed the Jacobites as disloyal ‘others’ who failed to display due submission to the Crown. Loyalty was thought essential to guarantee imperial security and stability. ‘Others’ were only thought able to become loyal if they assimilated into the British Empire as Britons, participating in the imperial venture and demonstrating adherence to the Crown. Britishness, then, was thought a necessary goal for imperial populations in the mid-eighteenth century. The first step to guarantee loyalty was the initial submission of disloyal ‘others’, which drove the army’s determination to gain the total submission of Highlanders, French-Canadians, and Native Americans during conflicts. The loyalty paradigm also played an important role in encouraging the civilisation of Highlanders and Native Americans as a first step to affecting their assimilation within the empire, and the Anglicisation of French-Canadians for the same reason. However, army officers’ experiences of militarisation in both imperial fringes, as well as the changes to the constitution of the empire in the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War, caused a paradigm shift that affected officers’ understandings of loyalty. Highlanders and French-Canadians demonstrated continuing submission and adherence to the Crown without having fully assimilated as Britons, suggesting that assimilation was not a necessary prerequisite for imperial populations to be considered loyal. In addition, the Highland example had shown that empire did not need to be a process of negotiation with imperial populations but rather ought to emphasise parliamentary supremacy. As such, it did not matter if imperial populations were not British so long as they displayed due submission. To achieve loyalty Parliament could, and did, impose regulation and militarisation implemented by imperial agents. However, the shift also encouraged the accommodation of ‘others’ within the empire as a method of strengthening their ties with Britain. As army officers sought to accommodate French-Canadians and Native Americans, however, they failed to effectively accommodate
colonial North America settlers who continued to view themselves as partners in empire rather than simply imperial subjects.

Army officers played an important role as agents of empire, with officers on the ground often given freedom to implement militarisation, although as Jeffrey Amherst discovered they would quickly be recalled if their efforts were judged to have had an adverse effect. This freedom allowed officers’ own cultural paradigms to influence their encounters with imperial populations. Whilst Amherst’s superiority paradigm failed to keep the peace in the interior, the paradigm of benevolence caused Murray to balance subjugation with cooperation in Quebec to encourage the conquered French-Canadians to accept British rule. Reflecting the paradigm shift regarding loyalty, and his own experiences, Murray believed that some toleration of Catholicism to allow French-Canadians to participate in the empire would cause them to become, and remain, loyal imperial subjects. The paradigm shift also led Thomas Gage to abandon Amherst’s subjugatory strategy in the interior in the aftermath of Pontiac’s War in favour of accommodating the Native Americans within the empire. Protecting Indians from colonial land encroachment and trade abuses would encourage them to continue to demonstrate their submission to the Crown. From the 1760s, Highlanders, Native Americans, and French-Canadians all came to be identified as imperial ‘others’ who were to be governed in such a way as to ensure their loyalty to the Crown, therefore guaranteeing imperial security.

When the British Army was first sent to North America in 1755 in response to the French and Indian War, the colonies were thought of as an extension of Britain, and colonists were part of the inclusive British identity. However, studies by Peter J. Marshall and Stephen Conway demonstrated that colonists came to be viewed as significantly different from Britons at home. Although the roots of this change were dated to the French and Indian War, its solidification for the majority of Britons was argued to have occurred during the American Revolutionary War. This dissertation found that such a change in attitude had solidified in the minds of those British military officers implementing militarisation and governance on the ground in North America well before the outbreak of the Revolution. It did so because of a paradigm shift regarding colonists’ identity which had its roots in the earliest stages of the militarisation process in North America.

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2 Colley, *Britons*.

3 Marshall, ‘A Nation Defined by Empire’; Conway, ‘From Fellow Nationals to Foreigners’
America and influenced how numerous military officers viewed and interacted with colonial settlers. As colonists were viewed as Britons, army officers expected them to act as loyal imperial subjects and respect the royal prerogative to facilitate the war effort. When officers encountered difficulties gaining colonial compliance, they came to characterise the colonists as disloyal with regards to the war effort. In doing so, they consciously began to ‘other’ the colonists, viewing them as significantly different from Britons at home.

This was initially confined to the military sphere as Britain attempted to successfully prosecute the war against France. However, the absorption of populations that were viewed, to some degree or another, as imperial subjects but were identified as being significantly different to Britons at home made Britain’s empire much more diverse. As Britain sought to govern and accommodate these disparate populations, colonists increasingly came to be viewed simply as one more imperial population that had to be governed and accommodated within this expanded empire and who were expected to submit to British authority. This crystallised the paradigm shift that left colonists viewed not as Britons but as ‘others’. And, as colonists failed to demonstrate due submission and adherence to the Crown during the imperial crisis, they came to be viewed as potentially hostile ‘others’ who were close to rebellion. The paradigm shift that led the British Army to view colonists as ‘others’ rather than as Britons influenced army officers’ interactions with that population throughout the entire period from the French and Indian War to the American Revolutionary War. Whilst histories of the American Revolution have tended to focus on the French and Indian War, and the resultant changes to Britain’s empire, to explain transformations in British imperial policy, this dissertation has demonstrated the longer-term, cultural roots that influenced the understandings and attitudes of British military officers during the imperial crisis.

The paradigm shifts regarding loyalty within the empire and the identity of colonists affected officers’ understanding of the imperial relationship and their opinions regarding the management of imperial populations. Peter J. Marshall’s investigation of the unmaking of empire concluded that the French and Indian War caused Britain and the colonies to develop divergent understandings of empire. Whilst the latter had their belief in an empire of cooperation and negotiation confirmed by the joint enterprise, Britons came to reject that concept due to the perceived failure of the colonies to pull their weight during the conflict, although there had been calls for imperial reform, and even some
steps taken to affect change, even prior to the war. Closer regulation of a potentially hostile population appeared to have been successful in the Highlands by the mid-1750s as no further Jacobite risings had occurred. From the beginning of the French and Indian War, British Army officers began to question whether the ‘empire of negotiation’ in fact encouraged colonists to act disloyally and fail to pull their weight in the war effort. Reacting to the perceived disloyalty, officers began to advocate closer regulation of the colonies, similar to that affecting positive change and ensuring imperial security in the Highlands. Arguing that colonists were close to asserting their independence from the Crown, such calls were made by successive commanders-in-chief as well as other army officers throughout the duration of the war. When colonists objected to Parliament’s attempts to introduce taxation and closer regulation from 1764, Thomas Gage encouraged ministers to enforce regulation. He implied his disappointment with Parliament’s repeal of the Stamp Act and encouraged legislative measures to limit the powers of disloyal colonial assemblies. Further, Gage argued that military force ought to be used to restore order if required. Gage’s position hardened as he came to believe that resistance was moving towards open rebellion and he suggested that subjugation was required to reassert parliamentary authority and force the colonists to display due submission to the Crown.

Army officers sought to influence ministerial policy both regarding the imperial crisis and the governance of the empire more generally. Some of their suggestions do appear to have affected the steps taken by the ministry. Whilst further research is required to fully investigate the influence of army officers on imperial policymaking, some initial assessments can be made. James Murray’s military and civil governance of Quebec seems to have played an important role in influencing ministerial thought regarding that province. Murray repeatedly argued that the civil and military spheres could not be separated in the short-term and the ministry granted his successor, Guy Carleton, control of both. It seems likely, therefore, that Murray’s argument and experience were important for convincing the ministry to make this change. Further, Murray’s opinions regarding the proper method of government for Quebec, and his early advocacy of toleration and accommodation, rather than Anglicisation and assimilation, were shared by Carleton and set in motion the debates that would eventually result in a policy of accommodation with the Quebec Act of 1774. Numerous army officers were forthcoming with their opinions regarding the need for closer imperial regulation from 1755 onwards. Likewise, they

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documented their changing attitudes towards colonists in their correspondence with government officials. This means the government was aware how those on the ground in North America assessed the situation both during the war and throughout the pre-revolutionary period. Thomas Gage expressed frustration when successive ministries failed to follow his advice about what steps should be taken both in the interior and the eastern seaboard colonies, demonstrating that ministers certainly did not always act upon officers’ suggestions. The strength of officers’ attitudes and understandings, however, likely did influence ministers generally as they moved away from an empire of negotiation in the post-war period towards an assertion of parliamentary authority. This dissertation has highlighted several areas where the evidence suggests that army officers did manage to play a role in affecting changes to imperial governance in the post-conquest period. Further research is required to investigate the extent of their influence compared to other imperial agents at home and in the colonies as well as in comparison with other factors contributing to ministers’ decision-making process.

This dissertation investigated how militarisation was implemented in Scotland and adapted in North America and how it influenced the army officers who implemented it, both with regards to their attitudes towards imperial populations and their understandings of what empire was and how it ought to be implemented. Considering the cultural paradigms that drove the actions of the army has highlighted the prevailing beliefs and assumptions that underpinned British imperialism in the mid-to late-eighteenth century. It concluded that militarisation caused paradigm shifts that fundamentally altered how British Army officers understood the concept of imperial loyalty and how they identified colonial settlers. In doing so it illustrated the enduring influence of the Forty-Five on the British Army in North America. The cost of the Seven Years’ War and the extent of Britain’s victory in it is often credited with causing the imperial crisis which led to the Revolutionary War.\(^5\) This dissertation found that longer-term, military interactions dating back to the Forty-Five also played an important role in causing transformations in eighteenth-century British imperial policy through the actions and influence of army officers who acted as agents of empire. It has provided historians with a deeper understanding of how this important group understood, and reacted to, the imperial crisis.

Appendix One: British Regiments in Scotland and North America

Regiments of foot that served in Britain during the Forty-Five and in North America between 1755-75 (prior to the outbreak of the Revolutionary War)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regiment name and number during the Forty-Five¹</th>
<th>Regiment name and number during the Forty-Five¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st St Clair’s, 1st (Royals)</td>
<td>14th Price’s 14th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Harrison’s 15th</td>
<td>27th Blakeney’s 27th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th Bragg’s 28th</td>
<td>42nd Murray’s 43rd Highlanders (Black Watch)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44th Lee’s 55th</td>
<td>46th Murray’s 57th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47th Lascelles’ 58th</td>
<td>48th Ligonier’s 59th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62nd Second battalion of Barrell’s 4th</td>
<td>69th Second battalion of Houghton’s 24th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Until 1751, regiments in the British Army were commonly named after their colonel. In the early 1740s, numbers were allocated to each regiment based on length of service to prevent confusion when regiments changed hands.² As such, during the Forty-Five regiments were known by either name or number. The move from name to number was completed by a royal warrant of 1751, which also saw the regiments renumbered, accounting for the discrepancies in the above table for the 43rd, 44th, 46th, 47th, and 48th regiments. When the army was expanded upon the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War,

¹ The Regiment names were taken from Stuart Reid, *Cumberland’s Culloden Army 1745-46* (London: Osprey, 2012), Kindle.
² Reid, *Cumberland’s Culloden Army*, loc. 51.
several existing regiments were split, and their second battalion became an independent regiment. This accounts for the discrepancies for the 62nd and 69th regiments in the table.
### Appendix Two: Timeline of the French and Indian War¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1753</td>
<td>French soldiers begin constructing forts in the Ohio Country to prevent British settlement in the region claimed by both countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>October–December 1753</strong></td>
<td>Virginia sends George Washington to order the French to vacate the Ohio Country, but Washington is rebuked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>April 1754</strong></td>
<td>The French take control of the Forks of the Ohio and begin construction of Fort Duquesne.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>May 1754</strong></td>
<td>A Virginian expedition, under George Washington, to remove the French from the Ohio Country defeats a French force in an engagement at Jumonville Glen. Washington constructs Fort Necessity at Great Meadows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>June–July 1754</strong></td>
<td>The Albany Congress fails to repair the Covenant Chain with the Iroquois Indians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 July 1754</strong></td>
<td>Washington’s force is defeated at the Battle of Fort Necessity. The French destroy the fort and Washington and his force retreat to Wills Creek.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>September 1754</strong></td>
<td>The Newcastle ministry secures approval for two regular regiments, under Major General Edward Braddock, to be sent to North America the following year to remove French fortifications in the Ohio Country and other areas of the interior claimed by Britain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>May–June 1755</strong></td>
<td>Colonel Robert Monckton sets out for Nova Scotia, forcing the French surrender of Fort Beauséjour on 16 June before embarking on the removal of the suspect Acadian population. Over seven thousand Acadians are removed and dispersed throughout Britain’s North American colonies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>May–July 1755</strong></td>
<td>Major General Braddock and 1,300 British regulars and colonial militia set out against Fort Duquesne but are defeated at the Battle of the Monongahela on 9 July. Braddock succumbs to his wounds from the battle four days later and the British force retreats to Philadelphia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>September 1755</strong></td>
<td>William Shirley, governor of Massachusetts, becomes commander-in-chief of the British troops as a result of Braddock’s death. Shirley decides against continuing his campaign against Fort Niagara. He orders the strengthening of Fort Oswego and returns to military</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ The information for this timeline was taken from Anderson, *Crucible of War.*
headquarters at Albany, New York, to plan the following year’s campaigns.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 September 1755</td>
<td>Colonel William Johnson’s force has several engagements with the French that come to be known as the Battle of Lake George. The British emerge victorious, but Johnson decides against continuing to challenge the French at Crown Point.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1756</td>
<td>The Newcastle ministry appoints John Campbell, fourth Earl of Loudoun, as commander-in-chief to replace Shirley. The British war effort is expanded as two more regular regiments are ordered to North America and four new battalions of regulars are ordered to be raised in the colonies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1756</td>
<td>General Montcalm arrives in Quebec with several hundred troops to take charge of the French war effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 May 1756</td>
<td>Britain officially declares war on France as fighting spreads to Europe, the West Indies, and India. The loss of Minorca to the French sets in motion the fall of the Newcastle ministry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 July 1756</td>
<td>Lord Loudoun arrives in New York to take control of the British war effort, but the 1756 campaigns are already underway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14 August 1756</td>
<td>The French, under Montcalm, lay siege to Fort Oswego and its outpost Fort Ontario, forcing the British to surrender on the 14th August. Montcalm’s Indian allies kill and scalp between thirty and one hundred soldiers and civilians, taking more captive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1756</td>
<td>Major General Daniel Webb, dispatched to reinforce Fort Oswego, hears of its surrender. Believing rumours that the French intend to advance further, Webb orders the destruction of Fort Bull and retreats to the German Flatts. Britain’s anticipated expedition against Crown Point is abandoned and Loudoun orders the provincial soldiers to strengthen Fort William Henry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 September 1756</td>
<td>Colonel John Armstrong and 300 provincial soldiers destroy the Delaware town of Upper Kittanning as revenge for the Indians’ destruction of Fort Granville, killing Captain Jacobs and recovering approximately eleven captives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1757</td>
<td>Lord Loudoun orders an embargo on all colonial ships leaving port to prevent the French learning of British plans for an attack upon Louisbourg. The embargo causes economic difficulties throughout the colonies and increases colonial discontent. It is lifted on 27 June.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 June 1757</td>
<td>Loudoun and a force of 6,000 troops embark for Halifax intending to lay siege to Louisbourg. Its capture is the campaign’s primary aim.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-9 August 1757</td>
<td>The French, under Montcalm, lay siege to Fort William Henry, forcing the garrison’s surrender. Major General Webb decides against sending reinforcements from Fort Edward during the siege in case both forts are lost, which would threaten Albany. The day after the surrender, France’s native allies kill approximately 185 soldiers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and civilians and take 300-500 prisoner in what would become known as the ‘Massacre of Fort William Henry’.

4 August 1757  Loudoun’s offensive against Louisbourg is abandoned when he and Admiral Francis Holburne learn it is guarded by three French squadrons. Loudoun returns to New York to begin planning the 1758 expeditions.

30 December 1757  Secretary of State William Pitt recalls Loudoun, replacing him as commander-in-chief with his deputy James Abercromby. Jeffrey Amherst is given the temporary rank of Major General in America and granted control of a renewed campaign against Louisbourg, whilst Brigadier John Forbes is granted command of an expedition against Fort Duquesne. Pitt also encourages colonial cooperation with the war effort by agreeing to subsidise colonies for soldiers and supplies and by giving provincial officers rank directly under that of regulars with an equivalent rank.

8 July 1758  Abercromby’s force is defeated at the Battle of Ticonderoga (Carillon) and fails to take the French fort at Lake Champlain. However, Montcalm’s French troops cannot take advantage of the British defeat as they are short on provisions after successive harvest failures.

26 July 1758  Louisbourg surrenders after a six-week siege. Amherst refuses to grant the garrison honours of war, citing the massacre of Fort William Henry. Brigadier General James Wolfe takes charge of an expedition to destroy French villages along the St. Lawrence to prevent them supplying the French at Quebec. Although most inhabitants escape, approximately one hundred are taken prisoner and sent to France.

27 August 1758  Lieutenant Colonel John Bradstreet and a force of approximately 3,000, mostly provincials, capture and destroy Fort Frontenac at Lake Ontario. Abercromby refuses to grant Bradstreet permission to launch a further expedition against Fort Niagara.

26 October 1758  Negotiations between British colonial governors and the representatives of thirteen Indian nations conclude in the Treaty of Easton. Large tracts of land are ceded to the Indians in return for promises of neutrality in the conflict against France. Indian diplomacy leading to the Treaty of Easton is a vital aspect of Forbes’ campaign against Fort Duquesne, enabling his army’s progress.

October 1758  At least thirty Cherokee warriors are killed by frontiersmen on their return from service with Forbes. These murders are a major contributing factor in the Anglo-Cherokee War of 1759-61.

23 November 1758  The French abandon Fort Duquesne and the British occupy it the following day, renaming the area Pittsburgh. British troops begin the construction of Fort Pitt on the site of the old French fort the following spring.

1759  The Cherokee declare war on Britain. William Henry Lyttleton, governor of South Carolina, sends a provincial force of 1,100 men
against the Cherokee, taking twenty-nine chiefs hostage, but fails to secure peace.

**July 1759**

A British force under Brigadier General John Prideaux sets out to capture Fort Niagara. The Iroquois Indians provide aid to the British. Although they refuse to take an active role in the siege, their presence encourages France’s Indian allies to abandon them. Command passes to Sir William Johnson upon the death of Prideaux and the British capture the fort on 25 July.

**July-August 1759**

General Amherst, now commander-in-chief of the British forces, stages an attack on Fort Ticonderoga, capturing it on the 26 July. His troops progress to Lake Champlain and Amherst orders the construction of Fort Crown Point upon the site of Fort St. Frédéric, which the French had destroyed upon their retreat.

**June-September 1759**

A British force of 8,500 troops, under Wolfe, lays siege to Quebec. Despite suffering defeat in the Battle of Montmorency on 31 July, Wolfe’s troops are victorious in the Battle of the Plains of Abraham on 13 September. Both Wolfe and his opposing commander, Montcalm, are killed. France surrenders the city on the 18 September and Brigadier General James Murray takes control of the British garrison.

**4 October 1759**

Rogers’ Rangers attack the Abenaki village of St. Francis, killing many of the inhabitants and destroying the settlement. The raid was revenge for the Abenaki capturing a small British party led by Captain Quinton Kennedy and refusing overtures of peace.

**20 November 1759**

The British win an important naval victory at Quiberon Bay, establishing British naval supremacy and ending the threat of a French invasion of Britain. This victory enables Britain to prevent France from reinforcing the army in Canada with men or supplies.

**January-March 1760**

Cherokee warriors lay siege to Fort Prince George in an attempt to free the captive chiefs, whilst concurrently raiding frontier settlements. The garrison of Fort Prince George massacres the Indian chiefs after their commander is killed and Cherokee warriors extend their frontier raiding.

**28 April 1760**

The British are defeated at the Battle of Sainte-Foy, outside of Quebec, during which both armies have an effective strength of approximately four thousand. The French lose 22% of their force killed or wounded whilst the British lose 28%. As a result, Murray orders his troops to retreat into the city and the French lay siege to it.

**April-July 1760**

1300 regulars, under Colonel Archibald Montgomery, respond to the Anglo-Cherokee War. Montgomery’s troops attack the Lower Towns, burning five villages and killing or capturing over one hundred warriors. The Cherokee retreat to the Middle Towns and Montgomery’s expedition fails to force their surrender. The regulars return to Charleston in July and Fort Loudoun is captured by the Cherokee the following month.

**13 May 1760**

French commander François Gaston de Lévis,
Chevalier de Lévis, raises the siege of Quebec when British supply ships reach the city carrying provisions and reinforcements.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>July-September 1760</strong></td>
<td>Murray’s force travels up the St. Lawrence River towards Montréal, gaining the submission of the settlements en route. Arriving below the town on 1 September, the fleet awaits the arrival of Amherst and Brigadier General William Haviland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>August 1760</strong></td>
<td>Haviland and his force of 3,500 troops lay siege to Île-aux-Noix from 19-28 August before continuing overland towards Montréal. At the same time, Amherst successfully lays siege to Fort Lévis from 16-24 August before progressing towards Montréal by boat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>8 September 1760</strong></td>
<td>Marquis de Vaudreuil, governor-general of New France, surrenders Canada to the British.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>25 October 1760</strong></td>
<td>King George II dies, and his son George William Frederick succeeds him as King George III.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>January-July 1761</strong></td>
<td>An expedition of regulars under Lieutenant Colonel James Grant marches against the Middle Towns of the Cherokee. His troops burn all fifteen towns and destroy vast swathes of the country before returning to Fort Prince George.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>August 1761</strong></td>
<td>The Cherokee sue for peace, negotiating a treaty with Grant in Charleston.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>May-September 1762</strong></td>
<td>France captures Newfoundland but an expedition under Lieutenant Colonel William Amherst reconquers it on 18 September.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>10 February 1763</strong></td>
<td>After Britain and France agree preliminaries in November 1762, the Treaty of Paris formally ends the Seven Years’ War.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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