

Review-Article

*What was the Cold War?**

The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume I: *Origins*. Edited by MELVYN P. LEFFLER and ODD ARNE WESTAD (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 2010; pp. xviii + 643. £100);

The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume II: *Crises and Détente*. Edited by MELVYN P. LEFFLER and ODD ARNE WESTAD (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 2010; pp. xviii + 662. £100);

The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume III: *Endings*. Edited by MELVYN P. LEFFLER and ODD ARNE WESTAD (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 2010; p. xviii + 694. £100);

America's Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity. By CAMPBELL CRAIG and FREDRIK LOGEVALL (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U.P., 2009; pp. 439. £19.95).

We Now Know is the title of John Gaddis's much-discussed overview of Cold War history that was published in 1997.¹ Gaddis has a point, although perhaps not in the way that he intended. It is unlikely that many new sources will come to light that will dramatically change the ways in which we approach the Cold War. As Vojtech Mastny, one of the historians with the best insider knowledge of Soviet and Warsaw Pact archives, observed a few years ago: "The greatest surprise to have come out of the Russian archives is that there was no surprise."² The debates about the Cold War's causes, and about which party was most to blame for its origins, duration and decline, now seem like a thing of the past.³ We can now encounter the Cold War's material remnants in museums: Justinian Jampol has created a unique cabinet of wonders from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in Los Angeles; and plans are afoot to create a museum of the Cold War in Berlin (that iconic Cold War city) to add to the various public or private sites of memory that have sprung up along the former Berlin Wall.⁴ There is even at least

* My thanks go to Anders Stephanson (Columbia University, New York City) for sharing some of his work and thoughts and, not least, to Martin Conway and Catherine Holmes (University of Oxford) for their astute comments on earlier versions of this text.

1. J. Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford, 1997).

2. V. Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years* (New York, 1997), p. 9. This is also the conclusion reached by S. Autio-Saraso, 'A New Historiography of the Cold War?', *European History Quarterly*, xli (2011), pp. 657–64, at p. 663.

3. On these debates see E. Schrecker, ed., *Cold War Triumphalism: The Misuse of History after the Fall of Communism* (New York, 2004).

4. Cf. the discussion forum on a Berlin Cold War museum in: *Zeithistorische Forschungen*, v, no. 2 (2008), and J. Jampol, "'GDR on the Pacific': (Re)presenting East Germany in Los Angeles", *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute*, supplement vii (2011), pp. 113–124.

one *Encyclopaedia of the Cold War*, illustrating that there exists—or appears to exist—a canonical knowledge of Cold War matters.⁵ The key challenge facing research on the Cold War now, therefore, is of an intellectual nature: the main problem is not the availability of sources but the analytical frameworks that we use to make sense of them.

The Cambridge History of the Cold War (CHCW) reflects the state of the field admirably and demonstrates what a vibrant field Cold War studies has become. Fittingly, *CHCW* comes in three massive volumes, all dressed in regal purple. Together they weigh so much that I probably breach my University's health-and-safety regulations by keeping them on the bookshelf above the desk in my office. And yet the objective behind *CHCW* (edited by Melvyn Leffler and Arne Westad, two of the most thought-provoking and influential historians of the Cold War) was emphatically not to produce a collection with canonical and hegemonic knowledge.⁶ The two editors write that the project 'aims at being comprehensive, comparative, and pluralistic in its approach' (vol. i, p. xvi), and it is on those terms that it should be approached and assessed. Consequently, it is above all a project of the present day: taken together, the contributions present readers less with an overall synthesis of the Cold War than with a synopsis of the state of the field at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century.

The quality of the individual contributions is on the whole very high. The contributors include some of the most senior, prolific and influential international historians, most of whom have an Anglo-American background, although several are affiliated to institutions in Europe and elsewhere in the world. In this context, it is especially noteworthy that the editors have included some scholars from China and Russia in their project. This alone sets their aim of coming to a more pluralist understanding of the Cold War apart from other, smaller-scale ventures. The service with which the authors and editors provide readers is also impressive: each volume contains a comprehensive index, while high-quality maps and statistics accompany the text throughout. The annotated bibliographies at the end of each volume contain some of the key works not cited in the individual chapters, and even take account of studies in languages other than English. They provide reliable guides for further reading, although it is a bit surprising that there are, unless this reviewer has missed something, no references at all to the very important Hamburg-based project on Cold War history.⁷

5. R. van Dijk and W.G. Gray, eds., *Encyclopaedia of the Cold War* (2 vols., New York, 2008).

6. The editors' main works include: M.P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, 1993); id., *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York, 2007); O.A. Westad, *Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of our Time* (Cambridge, 2007); id., *Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946–1950* (Stanford, CA, 2003).

7. See B. Greiner et al., eds., *Studien zum Kalten Krieg* (5 vols., Hamburg, 2006–11). For surveys of Cold War History in Europe and the USA, see the themed issue of *Cold War History*, viii, no. 2 (2008).

Most of the longer reviews already published of *CHCW* have discussed this imposing work—in its whole and its parts—from the perspective of how well it achieves what Richard Crockatt, in his review essay, has called ‘historical reconstruction’. Likewise, Geoffrey Warner has examined systematically what *CHCW* might tell us about the origins of the Cold War and the reasons for its long duration and its end.⁸ In doing so, both Crockatt and Warner assume, somewhat against the editors’ intentions, that we can, and do, know what the Cold War was *as a period*. By contrast, in what has so far been the most critical review of *CHCW*, Lawrence Freedman is less certain about how well the *CHCW* achieves this goal of reconstruction. In voicing such doubts, he has raised the important issue of periodisation. He argues that, ultimately, using the label ‘Cold War’ for the whole period and the range of events and processes covered by *CHCW* is ‘misleading’, concluding that the tasks ‘to untangle the Cold War from all the other strands of twentieth-century history, work out what was distinctive and special about it, and then assess how it interacted with all the other strands’ remain unfulfilled by these volumes.⁹ The question of periodisation is, of course, key for the work of every serious historian. The problem is that periodisation is also quite a generic concern, which can be asked of other periods in history along largely the same lines.¹⁰ The real, and at once more interesting and significant, problem that Freedman hints at, but does not really elaborate on, is the fundamental question of what the ‘Cold War’ was. Once this question has been discussed, issues of periodisation can also be addressed in a more convincing and meaningful manner.

This review-article seeks to use the opportunity to assess the state of the field that is offered by the publication of *CHCW* as a starting-point for conceptual reflections on what the ‘Cold War’ was. Its objective is to offer a critique in the Kantian sense of ‘analysis’, rather than criticism. While some of the contributions are better than others, and while one or two may even be disappointing, *CHCW* as a whole is a magnificent scholarly and editorial achievement. Some topics are, perhaps unavoidably, absent from *CHCW*’s pages, and yet the coverage is comprehensive and some individual chapters even break new ground. The core of what follows should, accordingly, be understood as a critique not merely of *CHCW*; it is also intended as a more general critique of the whole field of Cold War studies. In particular, I am

8. R. Crockatt, ‘Review of the *Cambridge History of the Cold War*’, *Cold War History*, xi (2011), pp. 269–90; G. Warner, ‘The Cold War in Retrospect’, *International Affairs*, lxxxvii (2011), pp. 173–84.

9. L.D. Freedman, ‘Frostbitten: Decoding the Cold War, 20 Years Later’, *Foreign Affairs*, lxxxix (March/April 2010), available online at <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66033/lawrence-d-freedman/frostbitten>.

10. D. Diner, ‘European Counterimages: Problems of Periodization and Historical Memory’, *New German Critique*, liii (1991), pp. 163–74, especially p. 166.

concerned that the intellectual and methodological pluralism evident in recent writing on the Cold War, and the consequent ‘decentring’ of the field away from its military and diplomatic core, has come at a substantial cost. The meaning of ‘Cold War’ as a concept has been diluted significantly, so that ‘Cold War’ lurks everywhere and can be applied to almost everything, from high politics to the history of everyday life, from actions of statesmen to the mundane.¹¹ While attracting attention from many different fields and profiting from interdisciplinary inspirations, Cold War studies have lost a clear object of enquiry and a clear conceptualisation of what it is that constitutes their subject. Perhaps most importantly, they might have lost sight of one of the key elements of the ‘Cold War’: its war-like character. I shall first outline the problematic plurality of the Cold War, before suggesting a re-centred reading of the ‘Cold War’ as war in the second part of this article.

I

The methodological pluralism which lies at the heart of *CHCW* is clearly evident from the outset. The editors caution us against using ‘Cold War’ as a totalising concept that might be applied across the world and across different time periods in exactly the same way. As Arne Westad points out in his introduction (i. 1–19), ‘very few’ of the contributors ‘believe that a “definitive” history of the Cold War is possible’ (i. 2). Westad himself provides a number of useful pointers for possible lines of enquiry: he discusses the ways in which subsequent generations of public intellectuals (starting with George Orwell’s first use of the term in its current meaning in 1945) have understood the Cold War and have employed ‘Cold War’ as a concept. He then gives brief outlines of three key areas of the history of the world in the latter half of the twentieth century for which the ‘Cold War’ might contain elements of an explanation: politics and economics, science and technology, and culture and ideas. He also emphasises the importance of recognising change and different chronologies and temporalities as the key parameters of the Cold War.¹² By adopting pluralism and complexity as its defining characteristics, *CHCW* delivers admirably what Melvyn Leffler called for in a conceptual essay some time ago: a view of the Cold War as a ‘complex system’ that was born out of ‘complex interactions between a dynamic international system and its constituent units; between governments operating within that system; between peoples and their governments; between factions, parties, and interest groups’.¹³

11. When I use ‘Cold War’ in quotation marks, it refers to the concept ‘Cold War’ or its use as an explanatory variable rather than to the Cold War as a period in twentieth-century history.

12. Cf. his earlier essay, O.A. Westad, ‘The New International History of the Cold War: Three (Possible) Paradigms’, *Diplomatic History*, xxiv (2000), pp. 551–65.

13. M.P. Leffler, ‘Bringing it Together: The Parts and the Whole’, in O.A. Westad, ed., *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory* (London, 2000), pp. 43–63, at pp. 52 and 58.

The main problem that is connected with this approach as presented in *CHCW* is, however, that by uncoupling the Cold War as an event from the Cold War as a period *CHCW* makes the Cold War ubiquitous, if not hegemonic. Of course, it would perhaps be a bit odd to find chapters in *CHCW* that argue for a non-Cold War reading of the subject at hand. But one still would have wished for an at times more explicit engagement with what was *not* the Cold War, or with the limits to a 'Cold War' understanding of the history of the period. Given the quasi-imperialist mentalities of some of the Cold War's principal actors, it is ironic that some of the contributors to these volumes seem overly concerned to demonstrate the relevance of the Cold War to almost everything. This is what Matthew Connelly appears to suggest, when he urges 'scholars ... to work harder to explain [the Cold War's] importance to future generations' (iii. 466). Approached in this way, 'Cold War' risks becoming a means of academic self-promotion, a cheap advertising gimmick without any intellectual content. While this might well explain the proliferation of Cold War studies as a field of inquiry over the last few years, such an aggrandising approach presents two difficulties. Firstly, when 'Cold War' is applied to all sorts of historical phenomena beyond warfare and diplomacy (such as science and technology, popular culture, the environment, and protest movements) and is extended to describe and analyse processes and politics throughout the world, there potentially emerges a lack of analytical and conceptual precision. There is now, for example, research on the Cold War 'on air', and on the Cold War in the kitchen, and the weapons in these Cold Wars range from nuclear missiles to fridges and Beatles records. In particular, social and cultural historians have used 'Cold War' as a convenient label to write themselves into the wider trends of post-1945 history. Yet, in most cases, such usage of the term refers to anti-Communism, or pro-Communism, or both; or is used to describe apocalyptic fears of nuclear technology. None of these was necessarily a product of the Cold War.¹⁴

Secondly, as a consequence, the Cold War becomes a rather tame creature, as not only the 'coldness' of the war becomes a metaphor, but also its warlike character. Reading all of the chapters of *CHCW* in one go over three to four days, one after the other, readers might be forgiven for feeling what a pleasant war the Cold War was. Soldiers only rarely emerge as actors, and the military has little to do in any concrete way. There are crises involving weapons with massive destructive powers, but they can be resolved at the last minute. There are also no chapters on the two alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and their role in

14. R. Oldenziel, *Cold War Kitchen: Americanization, Technology, and European Users* (Cambridge, MA, 2008); M.H. van Pelt, 'The Cold War on the Air', *Journal of Popular Culture*, xviii (1984), pp. 97–110; T. Shaw and D. Youngblood, *Cinematic Cold War: The American and Soviet Struggle for Hearts and Minds* (Lawrence, KS, 2010). For predecessors see K. Willis, 'The Origins of British Nuclear Culture, 1895–1939', *Journal of British Studies*, xxxiv (1995), pp. 58–89.

organising force and violence for the purposes of waging war.¹⁵ Nor is there much on other military matters and on the *practice* of violence and warfare by normal soldiers who were deployed in battles around the world.¹⁶ In the pages of *CHCW*, then, ‘war’ is either primarily a matter of diplomacy (against the view, first systematically expressed by Carl von Clausewitz, that it implies the end of diplomatic endeavours); or ‘war’ becomes a pure metaphor for a sense of ideological competition between competing world-views. In a shrewd article that was published in the mid-1980s, John Gaddis did, of course, argue for such an interpretation: the Cold War, he pointed out, was really a ‘long peace’, if one approached the conflict from the perspective of the international system. But, writing from the perspective of the post-*détente* world of the 1980s, Gaddis—unlike some of the scholars who have used the phrase since—was well aware that stability in the international system went hand in hand with an unprecedented level of military armaments, and that it was precisely this paradoxical constellation that historians and political scientists had to explain.¹⁷ Since the end of the super-power conflict in 1989/91, however, such an awareness of the fractured nature of that stability has been somewhat lost, not least in Gaddis’s own work, as historians marvelled at what they regarded as the peaceful conclusion of the Cold War.¹⁸

This fundamental tension, between the plurality of approaches and the emphasis on diversity on the one hand and the ubiquity of ‘Cold War’ on the other, is especially obvious from the ways in which the editors and authors tackle the problem of periodisation within the Cold War. The individual contributions achieve the editors’ objective of highlighting the different temporalities of the Cold War around the world. There was never a moment, it seems, when the world was completely dominated by the Cold War in exactly the same way. Nonetheless, the assemblage of the individual chapters in *CHCW* provides elements of an overall narrative, so that the Cold War comes to resemble a classic drama in three acts, with origins, a middle period of crisis and relaxation (*détente*), and endings in the 1980s and the early 1990s. It was global in scope, and affected all areas of politics, society, economics, technology and culture at least to some degree. But some issues were more relevant to one period than to others, so the chapters are placed where they appear to matter most. Thus, Frédéric Bozo’s

15. T. Diedrich, W. Heinemann and C.F. Ostermann, eds., *Der Warschauer Pakt. Von der Gründung bis zum Zusammenbruch, 1955–1991* (Berlin, 2009); G. Schmidt, ed., *NATO. The First Fifty Years: From ‘Security of the West’ towards ‘Securing Peace in Europe’* (3 vols., London, 2000).

16. On the importance of such a perspective see the plea by M.A. Stoler, ‘War and Diplomacy: Or, Clausewitz for Diplomatic Historians’, *Diplomatic History*, xxix (2005), pp. 1–26.

17. J.L. Gaddis, ‘The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System’, *International Security*, x, no. 4 (1986), pp. 99–142.

18. Cf. the slight re-interpretation in J.L. Gaddis, ‘The Cold War, the Long Peace, and the Future’, *Diplomatic History*, xvi (1992), pp. 234–46.

excellent analysis of French foreign policy under de Gaulle, the only dedicated contribution on France in the *CHCW*, appears in Volume II (ii. 158–78), although the author also has something to say on the preceding and subsequent periods. Most of the chapters that discuss questions of development or ‘hot wars’ around the world have been placed in Volume II, although almost all authors highlight questions of continuities beyond their period. Rather curiously, the conceptually oriented chapters by Gaddis, on grand strategy (ii. 1–21), and Robert Jervis’s slightly odd piece on ‘identity’ (his social-scientific term for what contemporaries might have called ‘national character’) (ii. 22–43), can also be found in Volume II, although it might have made more sense to have included them as introductory matter in the first volume.

Taken together, the contributors demonstrate that the military and political confrontation between the two super-powers that defined the Cold War at its beginnings mattered less and less as the conflict reached its endings: environmental and human-rights issues, as well as the kind of transnational activism that crossed the ‘Iron Curtain’ and which Matthew Evangelista outlines in an expert manner in his chapter (iii. 400–21) can no longer be meaningfully pressed into the framework of the ‘Cold War’, and the individual authors acknowledge this.¹⁹ The same is true for the processes of mass consumption which Emily S. Rosenberg analyses in her precise and very informative chapter on ‘consumer capitalism’ around the world and its role in the demise of the Cold War (ii. 489–512). Jussi Hanhimäki, in his intellectually engaging chapter on ‘détente in Europe, 1962–1975’ (ii. 198–218), introduces the notion of a ‘middle cold war’ (ii. 198) but has little to say about what that might imply for the study of international relations—which, he himself argues, were increasingly characterised by diplomatic co-operation, or at least institutionalised channels of communication that provided effective means for the regulation of conflicts.²⁰ Poul Villaume and Arne Westad have, for this very reason, argued elsewhere that, at least for Europe, it might make more sense to talk about the continuation of *détente* into the 1980s rather than ‘Cold War’, despite the breakdown of super-power *détente*.²¹

In terms of the topics covered in *CHCW*, the contributions that focus on the core issues of war and diplomacy are, on balance, better at providing conceptual insights into what the ‘Cold War’ was than those

19. D.C. Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton, NJ, 2001), and the review article by J. Eckel, ‘Human Rights and Decolonization: New Perspectives and Open Questions’, *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development*, 1 (2010), pp. 111–35.

20. As was noted at the time by political scientist H. Haftendorn, ‘Bedingungen einer Politik der Entspannung’, in M. Funke, ed., *Friedensforschung. Entscheidungshilfe gegen Gewalt* (Bonn, 1975), pp. 241–5, at p. 242.

21. P. Villaume and O.A. Westad, ‘Introduction: The Secrets of European Détente’, in eid., eds., *Perforating the Iron Curtain: European Détente, Transatlantic Relations, and the Cold War, 1965–1985* (Copenhagen, 2010), pp. 7–17, at pp. 7 and 13.

focusing on economic, social and cultural history. And those chapters tackling issues relating to the period from the end of the Second World War to the early 1960s—when the establishment of a direct telephone line between the White House and the Kremlin, as well as the conclusion of a Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, re-established diplomacy as a mode of communication between the two super-powers—are conceptually more convincing than those on later periods.²² Leffler's chapter on 'the emergence of an American grand strategy' between 1945 and 1952 is an excellent example of what can be achieved (i. 67–89). Anne Deighton's brilliant and razor-sharp analysis of how the Cold War came to Britain is, if anything, even better at highlighting the character of British foreign and defence policies as specifically Cold War policies (i. 112–32). She explicitly addresses the question of how the 'Cold War'—and officials' perceptions of it—influenced the ways in which policy-makers saw the world and constructed their policies. She has also included a small section on perceptions of the Cold War and cold warfare in British society that breaks new ground. Bob McMahon, writing on US national-security policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy (i. 288–311), Frank Costigliola on US foreign policy from Kennedy to Johnson (ii. 112–33) and Marc Trachtenberg on the transformation of the structures of the international system between 1963 and 1975 (ii. 482–502) have contributed articles on a similarly high analytical level. Likewise, James Hershberg's minute reconstruction of the Cuban missile crisis (ii. 65–87) demonstrates the elements of stand-off and mutual perception that the 'Cold War' involved, and the kinds of negotiation which were required to resolve the conflict. Piers Ludlow (ii. 179–97) provides an incisive and analytically precise overview of European integration in a Cold War context and carefully seeks to untangle to what extent the institutional process of European integration might (or might not) be explained by reference to the Cold War.²³

As most of the more analytical contributions make clear, the 'Cold War' did not come about suddenly and out of nowhere. Rather, policy-makers had actively to create it—and they had to believe in it as a way of understanding the world around them. While there are three chapters on nuclear weapons policies and proliferation by the foremost experts in the field (David Holloway on nuclear weapons and the escalation of the Cold War, i. 376–97; William Burr and David Alan Rosenberg for the period between 1963 and 1975, ii. 88–111; Francis

22. For an argument in favour of even further conceptual contraction of 'Cold War' see E. di Nolfo, 'Der Kalte Krieg: Definitionen und Chronologie', in P.R. Weilemann, H.J. Küsters and G. Buchstab, eds., *Macht und Zeitkritik. Festschrift für Hans-Peter Schwarz zum 65. Geburtstag* (Paderborn, 1999), pp. 465–76. On the specificity of diplomacy under conditions of détente, cf. the contributions in Oliver Bange and Gottfried Niedhart, eds., *Helsinki 1975 and the Transformation of Europe* (New York, 2008).

23. Cf. also N.P. Ludlow, ed., *European Integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik – Westpolitik, 1965–1973* (London, 2009).

J. Gavin on nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation, ii. 395–416), one could have pushed the analysis even further to discuss the question of the character of warfare that their acquisition and potential use implied.²⁴ Gaddis's magisterial chapter on 'grand strategies' might have been the place to discuss at least some of these concerns (ii. 1–21). But the author prefers to keep the issues general: he repeatedly refers to Homer and Thucydides, and the latter's conceptual insights into what 'grand strategy' means and why it matters. As a consequence, he does not explore the nuts and bolts of the location and meaning of strategy-making within US government in the second half of the twentieth century. It might well be the case that the framework of 'grand strategy' itself is an inappropriate analytical tool, as the Second World War had led to the emergence of concepts of 'international relations' within the US government which regarded 'grand strategy' as 'a sign of the old and corrupt European state system that had produced war in the first place'.²⁵ Hew Strachan has recently discussed the politics of strategy during the Cold War and argued that it was the focus on nuclear strategy-making as a response to Cold War super-power confrontation that led to a fundamental uncoupling of communications between politicians and the military. Because of the destructive power of nuclear weapons and the emergence of a seeming stalemate of 'mutually assured destruction' from the 1960s onwards, strategy-makers and politicians began to conceive of themselves as anti-warriors, which made it difficult for them to interact with the military more generally and to think about military campaigns such as Vietnam.²⁶ Only Fredrik Logevall's excellent chapter on the escalation of the war efforts in Indochina from the 1950s onwards (ii. 281–304) allows us to perceive how domestic decision-making procedures and bureaucratic routines in US government agencies which had developed in response to the Cold War might explain the escalation of the war.²⁷

The question of how and why the Cold War might relate to the other conflicts which developed elsewhere in the world during the latter decades of the twentieth century is, however, never directly addressed. A number

24. Cf. on the multiple meanings of nuclear-weapons proliferation in a Cold War context, see G. Hecht, 'Nuclear Ontologies', *Constellations*, xiii (2006), pp. 320–31 and her 'Hopes for the Radiated Body: Uranium Miners and Transnational Technopolitics in Namibia', *Journal of African History*, li (2010), pp. 213–34

25. A. Stephanson, 'War and Diplomacy', *Diplomatic History*, xxv (2001), pp. 393–403, at p. 401.

26. H. Strachan, 'The Lost Meaning of Strategy', *Survival*, vii (2005), pp. 33–54, especially pp. 43–4; and id., 'Making Strategy: Civil-Military Relations after Iraq', *Survival*, xlvi (2006), pp. 59–82, especially p. 69. Cf. the recent literature on some of the organisations affected by and created for Cold War strategy-making: F. Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon* (Stanford, CA, 1983); A. Preston, *The War Council: McGeorge Bundy, the NSC, and Vietnam* (Cambridge, MA, 2010); Z. Wang, *In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America* (New Brunswick, NJ, 2008); N.J. Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989* (Cambridge, 2008).

27. See also his excellent *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam* (Berkeley, CA, 2001).

of the authors argue, implicitly or explicitly, that 'Cold War' is really a Eurocentric and transatlantic framework of analysis, ill-suited to a more global history. They therefore issue a plea for a geographic decentering, beyond this transatlantic–Eurasian framework, in order to embrace a number of phenomena across the world, so that 'the global Cold War' can come more clearly into view. This concept of a global approach to the Cold War is, however, problematic. In practice, most of the authors assume that the violence generated by the 'northern' Cold War began to transfer elsewhere in the world, rather in the manner of a plumber's model of communicating pipes, as *détente* emerged in continental Europe.

The fundamental questions of how exactly real violence outside Europe and the Atlantic area was related to the Cold War, and whether it can meaningfully be discussed under the rubric of 'Cold War' at all, are not addressed analytically, with the exception of Mark Philip Bradley's excellent chapter on Vietnam (i. 464–85). Used as a concept to explain developments across the world, across different issues and geographical areas, 'Cold War' thus remains an empty signifier. A key component of the metaphor 'Cold War' is precisely that the conflicts remain cold. Using it as a concept for global developments makes it meaningless: either the metaphor has to perform its work on mass violence in hot wars or 'global Cold War' simply becomes synonymous with efforts at planning and modernisation, as in Michael Latham's otherwise very insightful overview of 'The Cold War in the Third World' (ii. 258–80). Merely *asserting* that these hot wars in 'the global south' were directly linked to power politics in the 'global north' elides the problem. Such a move merely replaces the hegemony of the Eurocentric 'Cold War' with an anti-hegemony which argues, entirely against the historical emergence and relevance of the concept 'Cold War', that the 'Cold War' was really about military interventions in the developing world.²⁸ We might well conclude that these developments remained more or less immune to the pulls of the 'Cold War', as they responded to different logics, such as the impacts of capitalism and technocracy.²⁹ Matthew Connelly raised this very problem some time ago in a seminal article that urged us to 'take off the Cold War lens' in order to see the world beyond super-power relations more clearly and to assess the social, political and cultural struggles for power in locations outside Europe and the north Atlantic, at least initially, on their own terms.³⁰

28. This is the potential conceptual problem of Westad's pathfinding *Global Cold War*. For an attempt to determine a clear impact, especially with regard to governmental structures and environmental history, see J.A. Engel, ed., *Local Consequences of the Global Cold War* (Washington, DC, 2007).

29. D.C. Engerman, 'The Anti-Politics of Inequality: Reflections on a Special Issue', *Journal of Global History*, vi (2011), pp. 143–51. This is also brought out very clearly by K. Brown, 'Gridded Lives: Why Kazakhstan and Montana are nearly the same', *American Historical Review*, cvii (2001), pp. 17–48 and K.K. Patel, 'The Paradox of Planning: German Agricultural Policy in a European Perspective, 1920s to 1970s', *Past & Present*, no. 212 (2011), pp. 239–69.

30. See M. Connelly, 'Taking off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North–South Conflict during the Algerian War of Independence', *American Historical Review*, cv (2000), pp. 739–69. In his chapter on migration, public health and population control in the *CHCW* (iii. 466–88), by contrast, Connelly is far less interested in discussing these issues in an analytical way.

That these phenomena around the world might not be linked to the 'Cold War' at all becomes clear, somewhat against the author's intentions, from Richard N. Cooper's otherwise excellent chapter on 'economic aspects of the Cold War' (ii. 44–64). Cooper *asserts* that 'The real "battleground" of the Cold War after the early 1960s was [the] competition for influence in developing countries through trade, financial and technical aid, and military assistance in the form of equipment and training' (ii. 64). But he fails to *demonstrate* why and how the Cold War mattered to this process of competition. This dovetails with some more recent research on sub-Saharan Africa that has registered doubts as to whether we need the concept of 'Cold War' to explain domestic political developments.³¹

This problem of the lack of analytical precision in applying the concept 'Cold War' emerges even more acutely from the contributions on economics, society and culture throughout *CHCW*'s three volumes. In most, if not all, of these essays, the 'Cold War' tends to explain everything and nothing. The Cold War thus appears as a period that is, within itself, timeless: the Cold War is always there, and what changes, changes because of its influence. Charles Maier provides an excellent overview of intellectual, macroeconomic and institutional developments related to the world economy 'in the middle of the twentieth century' (i. 44–66). But his claim that 'Economics ... was crucial to the history of the Cold War' (i. 45) still remains an assertion more than a proven argument.

A lack of conceptual clarity about what the 'Cold War' was leads to confusion in discussions of the characteristic features of the post-Cold War period. G. John Ikenberry, writing on 'the restructuring of the international system after the Cold War' (iii. 535–56), argues that 1989/91 should be considered as a post-war moment, but what exactly this implies and, in particular, whether this means post-Cold War or post-Second World War is never discussed. Instead, Ikenberry conceptualises the 'Cold War' as one phase in the development of the international system, stable and static within itself. The only possible conclusion for what happens after 1989/91, then, is one of system breakdown, confusion and chaos. We are already familiar with this story from the daily news feeds on 24-hour news channels.

Overall, then (although not necessarily in all of the individual contributions), the 'Cold War' that has been assembled in the pages of *CHCW* looks a bit like the Cheshire Cat from Lewis Carroll's *Alice in Wonderland*. Everyone has seen it, but it is not really there. The Cheshire Cat is able to disappear 'quite slowly, beginning with the end

31. See D. Speich, 'The Kenyan Style of "African Socialism": Developmental Knowledge Claims and the Explanatory Limits of the Cold War', *Diplomatic History*, xxxiii (2009), pp. 449–66, especially pp. 451 and 465. For a research agenda that emphasises the role of the Cold War as a moral resource for developing countries see T. Smith, 'New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War', *Diplomatic History*, xxiv (2000), pp. 567–91.

of the tail, and ending with the grin, which remained some time after the rest of it had gone'. This not only bewilders Alice, but also annoys the royals. When the cat appears on the Queen's Croquet Ground, the king wants to behead the cat, which, given the disappearance of the cat's body, is not unproblematic.³²

II

By assembling such a pluralistic array of contributions, the editors and authors have reproduced the state of the field: as Cold War studies have become more complex and varied, the conceptual clarity of the concept 'Cold War' has significantly declined. This rather expansive concept of 'Cold War' owes much to a history that is written from the perspective of the Cold War's endings, and the experience of European and super-power *détente* since the 1970s as well as the Cold War's peaceful end. This interpretation very much mirrors the expansion of conceptions of 'national security' as they emerged from the 1970s onwards: they no longer included purely military matters, but also came to refer to issues relating to human rights.³³ It is therefore important to ask how the 'Cold War' might work as a historical concept for explaining and understanding post-1945 history.³⁴ Walter Hixson's claim that the Cold War was 'a cultural construction devoid of ontological status'³⁵ might not get us very far, although it is helpful in highlighting the specific resonance of Cold War politics in the context of US history and political culture. The Cold War (*pace* Hixson) was a reality, not least because people around the world believed in its existence. An even more radical option for tackling the conceptual problems of the Cold War is not to use the concept 'Cold War' at all, as different topics and problems require different methodological and conceptual tools. Martin Conway has recently demonstrated very powerfully how the stability of West European politics around a Christian Democratic model of democracy can be explained without significant reference to

32. Lewis Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, ed. H. Haughton (Harmondsworth, 1998), pp. 74–7.

33. See S.B. Snyder, *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network* (Cambridge, 2011) and A. Wenger, V. Mastny and C. Nünlist, eds., *Origins of the European Security System* (London, 2007). On the conceptual issues cf. O. Wæver, 'Securitization and Desecuritization', in R.D. Lipschutz, ed., *On Security* (New York, 1995), pp. 46–86.

34. This is a question raised and answered very powerfully by A. Stephanson, 'Cold War Degree Zero', in D. Bell and J. Isaac, eds., *The Cold War in Pieces: Narrative Frames for Postwar American History* (Oxford, forthcoming). Stephanson elaborates on this from a slightly different perspective in his 'Fourteen Notes on the very concept of a Cold War', 2007, available at <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/essays/PDF/stephanson-14notes.pdf>. For a brief overview of the genealogy of a previous global conflict see the excellent article by D. Reynolds, 'The Origins of the Two "World Wars": Historical Discourse and International Politics', *Journal of Contemporary History*, xxxviii (2003), pp. 29–44.

35. W.L. Hixson, *The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven, CT, 2008), p. 166.

the Cold War.³⁶ Likewise, Mark Mazower has shown that one of the key agencies of the international system, the United Nations, was, in essence, a post-imperial organisation rather than a Cold War one.³⁷

Alternatively, Prasenjit Duara, arguing from the perspective of a global historian, has proposed the opposite solution: he suggests accepting the hegemonic and potentially totalising nature of the concept 'Cold War' by embedding the Cold War as a period in the history of imperialism and nationalism. The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union thus appears as a conflict between two imperial, albeit not necessarily colonialist, powers. According to such an account, the Cold War was a 'hegemonic formation' that tended to 'channel and restrict the imagination of the social, the political, and selfhood', but never had a total claim to such imaginations. Nationalism, especially of the kind encouraged by Communist China in the developing world from the 1960s onwards, appears in this interpretation as the key counter-hegemonic movement and ideology.³⁸

Other scholars, especially in Germany, France and Italy, have suggested replacing the concept 'Cold War' with a different one: 'East–West conflict'. This term is able to highlight the ideological nature of the battle between liberal-capitalist and communist claims over the shape of the political and international order since the Russian Revolution of 1917, but the term cannot explain (*pace* Alexis de Tocqueville's Delphic predictions from the mid-nineteenth century) why these two ideologies should have clashed on such a massive scale after 1945.³⁹ Some have, therefore, suggested combining 'East–West conflict' with 'Cold War' to form a conceptual super-weapon.⁴⁰ But, like many super-weapons, this one lacks precision—in this case, the precision to analyse historical specificities.

Among the *CHCW* contributors, however, it is only Adam Roberts, in his judicious and crisp 'Reflections on the End of the Cold War' (iii. 513–34), who addresses the question of what the 'Cold War' was in an analytical manner. He develops two elements of a response: the existence of only two major powers throughout 'the entire period 1945–1991', each of which 'had inherited from its revolution a rejection of

36. M. Conway, 'The Rise and Fall of Europe's Democratic Age, 1945–1973', *Contemporary European History*, xiii (2004), pp. 67–88; id., 'Democracy in Postwar Western Europe: The Triumph of a Political Model', *European History Quarterly*, xxxii (2002), pp. 59–84; M. Conway and P. Romijn, eds., *The War for Legitimacy in Politics and Culture, 1936–1948* (London, 2008).

37. M. Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton, NJ, 2009).

38. P. Duara, 'The Cold War as a Historical Period: An Interpretive Essay', *Journal of Global History*, vi (2006), pp. 457–80, quoted at p. 457.

39. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, ed. J.P. Mayer, trans. G. Lawrence (Garden City, NY, 1969), pp. 412–13; W. Link, *Der Ost-West-Konflikt. Die Organisation der internationalen Beziehungen im 20. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart, 1980); A. Fontaine, *La Guerre Froide, 1917–1991* (new edn., Paris, 2006); G.-H. Soutou, *La Guerre Froide, 1943–1990* (new edn., Paris, 2011).

40. J. Dülffer, *Europa im Ost-West-Konflikt 1945–1991* (Munich, 2004).

colonialism and a claim to embody universal values' (iii. 513, 514); and the existence of the nuclear confrontation (iii. 514) between these two powers. But, given the remit he was assigned for his contribution, he has little space in which to elaborate on how exactly this implied a Cold War. Anders Stephanson has suggested that the 'Cold War' should be radically recentred by focusing on its origins as an American project for creating an international order after the Second World War, by concentrating solely on governmental policy-making, and by highlighting the period between the end of the Second World War and the re-emergence of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union as the core period of the Cold War.⁴¹

Some noteworthy suggestions for a slightly more expansive, yet still clear, conceptualisation of 'Cold War' as war are made by the second item under review here: Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall's recent wide-ranging book on US foreign policy since 1945. Building on an important conceptual point made by Robert McMahon, they argue for the importance of the writing of national foreign-policy history, rather than international history, as a way of achieving conceptual clarity. It is only in this realm, they point out, that political processes can be discussed meaningfully with some level of accuracy; it is only here, in other words, that we can see how the 'Cold War' was created and what its impact was.⁴² The result is a very impressive, well-written and intellectually stimulating survey of US foreign policy from 1945 to the present day. The early chapters in particular give a very clear outline of how the 'Cold War' emerged as a paradigm for US foreign policy, as policy-makers sought to adjust to the post-Second World War world; 1949 was the key moment: the revolution in China and the development of the USSR's atomic bomb provoked a 'massive expansion of [the USA's] Cold War foreign policies' of military build-up and internal 'political repression' in the form of McCarthyism.⁴³ As a consequence, international Cold Warfare was increasingly accompanied by domestic propaganda efforts, campaigns that Kenneth Osgood called 'total cold war'—a theme that Craig and Logevall develop in Chapter Four.⁴⁴

However, Craig and Logevall's analytical instruments might, ultimately, be too blunt to achieve their aims. While, initially, they seek to highlight the struggles for different notions of 'security' within successive US administrations, the role of the *process* of politics remains a bit vague. Throughout the book, the party-political and domestic

41. Stephanson, 'Cold War Degree Zero'.

42. C. Craig and F. Logevall, *America's Cold War: The Politics of Security* (Cambridge, MA, 2009), p. 8. Cf. R.J. McMahon, 'The Study of American Foreign Relations: National History or International History', in M.J. Hogan and T.G. Paterson, eds., *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (New York, 1991), pp. 15–16.

43. Craig and Logevall, *America's Cold War*, p. 105.

44. K. Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence, KS, 2008).

calculations remain rather subdued in a survey that is primarily about the matrices through which the chief decision-makers in the White House, in the Pentagon and at Foggy Bottom reacted to the world around them. Party-political calculations are often mentioned (e.g. pp. 8–9, 134, 191–2, 251) but not always effectively traced, especially with respect to the independent dynamics of Congressional politics.⁴⁵ Ultimately, this is the consequence of the authors' adoption of a relatively rough idea of the 'militarisation' of US foreign policy that is not always made explicit and which cannot do justice to the dynamics, subtleties and intricacies of these processes. In particular, they neglect the key fact that arguments about 'militarism' and 'militarisation' were themselves the products of these domestic political battles.⁴⁶ Fundamentally, the result is to focus on US foreign policy from the perspective of 'containment', without thinking through the implications of what this might mean. Hence, their important theme of a 'politics of insecurity' remains a rather static and unwieldy instrument that almost appears to be an existential condition of foreign and defence policy-makers rather than the result of complicated, historically specific (and contested) definitions.⁴⁷ Nonetheless, the chief importance of their book lies in its idea of conceptualising the Cold War as a war. Craig and Logevall hint at, but do not sufficiently elaborate on, a second way in which one might discuss the Cold War as war, not from the perspective of governmental policy-making, but from the perspective of domestic politics and society. Wars—and the build-up of armaments to be used in them—do not only depend on governments that make the means of fighting war available. They also depend on populations that make these policies their own. The authors' concept of the 'politics of insecurity' is useful for thinking further about this—especially because it highlights the importance of the post-1945 perception of the United States as a fundamentally vulnerable country.⁴⁸

A good conceptual starting-point for thinking through the implications of the 'Cold War' as war is the buoyant scholarship on the First and Second World Wars, which, in common with research on the Cold War, has undergone a transition from highly politicised debates about war-guilt questions towards greater analytical refinement, and

45. Cf. R.D. Johnson, *Congress and the Cold War* (Cambridge, 2005).

46. They follow here the rather overdrawn, yet highly stimulating, arguments by M. Sherry, *In the Shadow of War: The United States since 1930* (New Haven, CT, 1995) and A. Bacevich, *New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War* (New York, 2006). Research on the nineteenth century has pointed out that 'militarism' was itself a political argument: N. Stargardt, *The German Idea of Militarism: Radical and Socialist Critics* (Cambridge, 1994).

47. This point is highlighted even more strongly by Anders Stephanson in his review that appears as part of the *H-DIPLO Roundtable* on the book, xi, no. 33 (2010), pp. 14–26, available at: <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-XI-33.pdf>.

48. For a different suggestion in this vein, see M.B. Young, "'I was thinking, as I often do these days, of war": The United States in the Twenty-First Century', *Diplomatic History*, xxxvi (2012), pp. 1–15.

which has only recently begun to focus on the centrality of violence and warfare.⁴⁹ In his recent international history of the arms race that preceded the Second World War, Joe Maiolo has demonstrated the potential of such an approach. He highlights the ways in which images of warfare and actual policy decisions influenced not only countries' political, economic and social fabrics, but also left deep imprints on the ways in which they organised their bureaucracies, and how these bureaucracies interacted with citizens.⁵⁰

Wars usually involve two aspects—the breakdown of diplomacy, and the accumulation of the means of violence on two levels: the generation and production of arms by governments, often in co-ordination with industry, and the appropriation of violence by societies, the so-called 'socialisation of violence'.⁵¹ All of this provides much material for a more sophisticated conceptualisation of the Cold War as a war. The interaction of the two levels of governments and societies had significant implications for the ways in which conflicts were addressed within the international system, and that, in turn, influenced domestic politics and societies.⁵² Moreover, 'Cold War' meant the collapse of what had been one of the defining features of international politics since the seventeenth century: the acceptance, by the powers, of each other's territory. The United States and the Soviet Union came to see each other's territories as threats to their own mode of societal organisation; they therefore fundamentally rejected them as legitimate units in the international system, at least until 1963.⁵³ This element of the war-like character of the Cold War also explains what made it 'cold' in Europe and the North Atlantic area: it led to an almost complete breakdown of direct communications between the governments; diplomatic cables came to be replaced by secret intelligence reports. As Anders

49. See the argument by M. Geyer, 'Eine Kriegsgeschichte, die vom Tod spricht', in T. Lindenberger and A. Lüdtke, eds., *Physische Gewalt. Studien zur Geschichte der Neuzeit* (Frankfurt am Main, 1995), pp. 136–61. Good examples for the First World War include S. Audoin-Rouzeau, *Combattre. Une anthropologie historique de la guerre moderne (XIX–XXI^e siècle)* (Paris, 2008).

50. J. Maiolo, *Cry Havoc: How the Arms Race Drove the World to War, 1931–1941* (New York, 2010), p. 7.

51. M. Geyer, 'Der zur Organisation erhobene Burgfrieden', in K.-J. Müller and E. Opitz, eds., *Militär und Militarismus in der Weimarer Republik* (Düsseldorf, 1978), pp. 15–100, here p. 99; id., *Deutsche Rüstungspolitik 1860–1980* (Frankfurt am Main, 1984), p. 9.

52. B. Stöver, *Der Kalte Krieg. Geschichte eines radikalen Zeitalters 1947–1991* (Munich, 2007); G. Niedhart, 'Der Ost-West-Konflikt. Konfrontation im Kalten Krieg und Stufen der Deeskalation', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 1 (2010), pp. 557–94; J. Dülffer, "'Self-sustained Conflict"—Systemerhaltung und Friedensmöglichkeiten im Ost-West-Konflikt', in C. Hauswedell, ed., *Deeskalation von Gewaltkonflikten seit 1945* (Essen, 2006), pp. 33–60 as well as P.W. Schroeder, 'The Cold War and its Ending in "Long-Duration" International History', in J. Mueller, ed., *Peace, Prosperity, and Politics* (Boulder, CO, 2000), pp. 257–82 and R.N. Lebow, 'The rise and fall of the Cold War in comparative perspective', *Review of International Studies*, xxv (1999), pp. 21–39.

53. Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* (Princeton, NJ, 1999).

Stephanson has reminded us in a number of publications, ‘Cold War’ can be used most meaningfully with regard to the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union during the period between 1945–7 and 1963.⁵⁴ None of these developments—military mobilisation, societal self-mobilisation and the emergence of a new regime of territoriality—could have occurred without the massive mobilisation of arms and manpower that the Second World War entailed, a process that was initially independent of the emerging conflicts and ideological differences between the United States and the Soviet Union.⁵⁵ In the United States, the Soviet Union and elsewhere around the world, the Second World War led to the ‘sweeping transformation of national government’.⁵⁶ Experiences of the Second World War, at least for the USA, the European countries and the Soviet Union also constituted a potential ‘break in the whole structure of “war”’: a clear distinction between war and peace, as it had emerged within the European system of states since the seventeenth century, no longer appeared possible. In methodological terms, this also means that the classic distinction between diplomatic and military history might no longer be an appropriate tool to investigate the ‘diplomacy of war’ and the social and political mobilisations that accompanied both the Second World War and the Cold War.⁵⁷ The centring of the Cold War as a *war* should therefore go hand in hand with more sustained communication between military, diplomatic and international historians.

III

Based on these observations, future research on the Cold War might take four possible directions. The first strand of research might focus on those organisations that produced and thus made the ‘Cold War’: the formal organisations and bureaucracies that were created or re-created after 1945 which came to be engaged in cold warfare, and how their procedures and routines came to (or did not come to) follow Cold War ways of thinking and how these were fed by experiences and memories of the previous world wars.⁵⁸ Here, continuities with the Second

54. Stephanson, ‘Fourteen Notes’; id., ‘The United States’, in D. Reynolds, ed., *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives* (New Haven, 1994), pp. 23–52. Robert Jervis has argued that this situation of mutual distrust and of fundamental disrespect for each other’s position held until the Soviet Union decided that it would no longer interpret the international system as part of the class struggle: see R. Jervis, ‘Was the Cold War a security dilemma?’, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, iii (2001), pp. 36–60.

55. See the critique by W.F. Kimball, ‘The Incredible Shrinking War: The Second World War, Not (Just) the Origins of the Cold War’, *Diplomatic History*, xxv (2001), pp. 347–65.

56. J.T. Sparrow, *Warfare State: World War II Americans and the Age of Big Government* (Oxford, 2011), p. 4.

57. Stephanson, ‘War and diplomacy’, pp. 394 and 398.

58. R. Buzzanco, *Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era* (New York, 1996), offers elements of such a study for the Vietnam War, as does B. Greiner, *War without Fronts: The USA in Vietnam* (London, 2009). The importance of the transfer of ideas within alliance systems is stressed by I. Trauschweizer, *The Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence for Limited War* (Lawrence, KS, 2008).

World War are particularly important, as much of the mobilisation in the United States and the Soviet Union for waging the ‘Cold War’ followed in the wake of the massive expansion in the military elements of statehood that occurred during the Second World War. Likewise, Chinese state-building after 1945 can only be understood in the context of war experiences and civil war.⁵⁹

From this perspective, the processes by which governments were able to achieve such dominance in the Cold War era would be particularly interesting avenues of research. Scholarship on this aspect of Cold War history is probably most advanced for US history, but this line of inquiry can be applied to other countries across the world equally productively. For the United States, it is especially remarkable that the almost unthinking acceptance of the federal government’s authority to regulate society emerged from the Second World War and was strengthened further during the period of the Cold War. The war also led to the gradual re-emergence of big corporations and corporate figures at the centre of public life.⁶⁰ The result was a conception of statehood and government in which the sources of power remained obscure; a conception that was firmly anchored in the experiences of having waged a ‘good war’ in the Second World War and continuing to fight a legitimate, and morally just, conflict against the Soviet Union in which US military action appeared as merely ‘reactive and defensive’. Thus, drawing on nineteenth-century traditions of settler colonialism, cold warfare could be portrayed as legitimate military mobilisation, as the violence this entailed was merely ‘regenerative’.⁶¹

Almost all contributions in *CHCW* skirt this key issue of a potential transformation of statehood under the auspices of cold warfare and what this meant for the dynamics of political legitimacy.⁶² The gradual acceptance by citizens of the regulating and welfare-dispensing capacity of states was, at its core, a necessarily post-1945 development that had its origins in the Second World War—and it was directly linked to the fact that welfare and (cold) warfare were both sold to initially sceptical populations as necessary evils.⁶³ As Jan-Werner Müller demonstrates

59. P.A.C. Koistinen, *Arsenal of World War II: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1920–1939* (Lawrence, KS, 2004); Sparrow, *Warfare State*; D. Edgerton, *Britain’s War Machine: Weapons, Resources, and Experts in the Second World War* (London, 2011); R. Mitter, *A Bitter Revolution: China’s Struggle with the Modern World* (Oxford, 2005); Westad, *Decisive Encounters*; G. Xu, *War Wings: The United States and Chinese Military Aviation, 1929–1949* (Westport, CT, 2001).

60. Sparrow, *Warfare State*, p. 4.

61. E.S. Rosenberg, *A Date which will Live: Pearl Harbor in American Memory* (Durham, NC, 2003), p. 13, and R. Slotkin, *The Fatal Environment: The Myth of the Frontier in the Age of Industrialization, 1800–1890* (New York, 1985), pp. 435–78.

62. This question is raised powerfully, but answered disappointingly for the USA, by J.E. Zelizer, *Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security – from World War II to the War on Terrorism* (New York, 2010).

63. On the US: M.J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954* (Cambridge, 1998); A.L. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism and its Cold War Grand Strategy* (Princeton, NJ, 2000); and id., ‘Why

astutely in his excellent chapter on Cold War intellectual history from the 1970s to the early 1990s (iii. 1–22, especially 9–11), the gradual decline in the legitimacy of the state as an institution was not accidentally linked to the period of *détente*. But we also need to be aware of the limits of state expansion which existed from the very beginning: Rebecca Lowen has highlighted this for Stanford University's involvement in Cold War research and development and Peter Mandler has demonstrated it very clearly in the case of the anthropologist Margaret Mead: we have to be careful not to link all technological, scientific and scholarly developments during this period back to the all-encompassing power of the cold warfare states.⁶⁴ David Reynolds's excellent overview of the history of technology (iii. 378–99) makes this point very clearly as well.

The emergence of cold warfare states was not simply a direct product of developments in the international system. It was a complex process that policy-makers and civil servants—as well as populations—actively drove through their actions. Anne Deighton uses the concept 'mindset' (i. 119) in order to grasp the ways in which policy-makers and the general population in Britain came to understand the world around them. The late Ernest May proffered the slightly more elegant term 'axiom' to denote the set of calculations which underline foreign-policy calculations, while Frank Ninkovich has suggested calling them 'paradigms'.⁶⁵ Yet, apart from the few aforementioned articles, we get very little sense from the contributions in the three volumes of *CHCW* of what policy-makers thought 'cold warfare' meant and how these perceptions changed over time. Rather curiously, this is true even for Christopher Andrew's essay on the 'intelligence services in the Cold War' (ii. 417–37)—which, even more curiously, entirely neglects the

didn't the United States become a garrison state?', *International Security*, xvi (1992), pp. 109–42; J.T. Sparrow, "Buying Our Boys Back": The Mass Foundations of Fiscal Citizenship in World War II', *Journal of Policy History*, xx (2008), pp. 263–86; W.M. Wall, *Inventing the "American Way": The Politics of Consensus from the New Deal to the Civil Rights Movement* (Oxford, 2008). On the breakdown of this arrangement cf. L. McGirr, *Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right* (Princeton, NJ, 2002). On the UK, see D. Edgerton, *Warfare State: Britain 1920–1970* (Cambridge, 2006); T. Geiger, 'The British Warfare State and the Challenge of Americanisation of Western Defence', *European Review of History*, xv (2008), pp. 345–74; P. Hennessy, *The Secret State: Preparing for the Worst, 1945–2010* (London, 2010).

64. Cf. the theme issue on 'New Perspectives on Science and the Cold War', *Isis*, no. ci (2010), pp. 362–6; D. Kevles, 'The Cold War and Hot Physics: Science, Security, and the American State, 1945–1956', *Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences*, xx (1990), pp. 239–64; R. Lowen, *Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford* (Berkeley, CA, 1997); J.S. Light, *From Warfare to Welfare: Defense Intellectuals and Urban Problems in Cold War America* (Baltimore, MD, 2003); J. Isaac, 'The Human Sciences in Cold War America', *Historical Journal*, 1 (2007), pp. 725–46; P. Mandler, 'One World, Many Cultures: Margaret Mead and the Limits of Cold War Anthropology', *History Workshop Journal*, lxxviii (2009), pp. 150–72; id., 'Margaret Mead amongst the Natives of Great Britain', *Past & Present*, no. 204 (2009), pp. 195–233; S. Gerovitch, *From Newspeak to Cyberspeak: A History of Soviet Cybernetics* (Cambridge, MA, 2002).

65. E. May, 'The Nature of Foreign Policy: The Calculated and the Axiomatic', *Daedalus*, xci (1962), pp. 653–67 and F. Ninkovich, *Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago, 1994), p. 326, n. 24.

field of human intelligence which surely belonged to the core business of cold warfare.⁶⁶

Investigating the making of cold warfare and cold warfare states would also be an especially interesting research agenda for countries outside Europe and the transatlantic world—how were warfare bureaucracies exported to African, Asian and Latin American countries? We do, of course, already have studies of bureaucracies during the Cold War, but rarely have they been written from the analytical perspective of warfare. Here, Cold War historians could profit significantly from an engagement with the ways in which historians of other wars have engaged with these issues, such as Isabel Hull's innovative organisational history of the military culture of the German army and its role in enabling the violence that was meted out against the local population in German south-west Africa.⁶⁷ This work could also build productively on research on cultures of government and 'national security'.⁶⁸ John Dower, in his comparative treatment of US reactions to Pearl Harbor, the use of nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 9/11 and the US military intervention in Iraq, has recently proposed the concept of 'cultures of war' to tackle this issue. While this concept does have the potential to bring the cultural background to certain logics of US decision-making to light, it runs the risk of presenting a homogeneous reading of decision-making processes as being direct consequences of such 'cultures of war', even though Dower emphasises the nature of his concept as a condition of possibility that prioritised certain decisions over others.⁶⁹ Moreover, there are important synergies with the burgeoning research on conceptualising American foreign and defence policies as 'imperial', not as a way to pass moral judgement, but as an optic that allows us novel insights into the workings and paradoxes of power in Cold War international politics and societies around the world.⁷⁰

66. See, for Germany, S. Creuzberger, *Kampf für die Einheit. Das gesamtdeutsche Ministerium und die politische Kultur des Kalten Krieges 1949–1969* (Düsseldorf, 2008), p. 531. For Britain, see M. Grant, ed., *The British Way in Cold Warfare: Intelligence, Diplomacy and the Bomb, 1945–1975* (London, 2009).

67. I. Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (Ithaca, NY, 2005); M. Geyer, *Aufrüstung und Sicherheit. Die Reichswehr und die Krise der Machtpolitik 1924–1936* (Wiesbaden, 1980). We already have a few studies for Germany: B. Thoss, *Nato-Strategie und nationale Verteidigungsplanung. Planung und Aufbau der Bundeswehr unter den Bedingungen einer massiven atomaren Vergeltungsstrategie 1952–1960* (Munich, 2006), and K. Naumann, 'Machtasymmetrie und Sicherheitsdilemma. Ein Rückblick auf die Bundeswehr des Kalten Krieges', *Mittelweg* 36, xiv, no. 6 (2005), pp. 13–26.

68. Cf. J. Agar, *The Government Machine: A Revolutionary History of the Computer* (Cambridge, MA, 2003) and, from a political science perspective, P.J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York, 1996).

69. J.W. Dower, *Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, 9/11, Iraq* (New York, 2010), especially pp. xx–xxi for an attempt at definition.

70. P.A. Kramer, 'Power and connection: Imperial histories of the United States and the world', *American Historical Review*, cxvi (2011), pp. 1348–91, as well as the case-studies in C. Lutz, *Homefront: A Military City and the American 20th Century* (Boston, MA, 2001) and M. Höhn and S. Moon, eds., *Over There: Living with the U. S. Military Empire from World War Two to the Present* (Durham, NC, 2010).

The second strand of research that takes the war-like character of the Cold War more seriously might focus more directly on attempts to appropriate armaments and violence in different societies, as well as with the rejection of these attempts. From this perspective, historians would do well to avoid the totalising concepts of ‘militarism’ and ‘militarisation’.⁷¹ Reflecting on this strand of research, Bernd Greiner has suggested conceptualising Cold War societies as dominated instead by a ‘total politics’, a notion of the political that is all-encompassing and characterised by calls for, and feelings of, permanent preparedness.⁷² Greiner’s suggestion risks going too far in reading governmental utopias of military and societal mobilisation of the 1950s as representative of a broader political reality. Nevertheless, analysing the transformations of politics which occurred in the Cold War might open up novel questions to help Cold War scholars engage productively with social and cultural historians. How did this socialisation of violence occur? Most of the research in this field has so far focused on civil defence as a way of rehearsing the Cold War.⁷³ But we need much more work on the social relevance and, especially, the exact locations within society where ‘Cold War’ mattered and where it did not. Here it might be productive to analyse more closely how political and social actors—often prompted by their governments—manufactured the world around them as a Cold War world.⁷⁴ Tim B. Müller has, in his original work on the intellectual history of the early Cold War, spoken of the need to take a closer look at the Cold War’s ‘machine room’ and the people who operated in it.⁷⁵ We could also extend this approach to politics and society more generally.⁷⁶

We can only find a sprinkling of chapters that tackle this issue in *CHCW*. David Engerman’s essay on communist and liberal-capitalist

71. For a critique, see B. Ziemann, ‘Der “Hauptmann von Köpenick”—Symbol für den Sozialmilitarismus im wilhelminischen Deutschland?’, in V. Precan, ed., *Grenzüberschreitungen oder der Vermittler Bedrich Loewenstein. Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag eines europäischen Historikers* (Prague and Brno, 1999), pp. 252–64.

72. B. Greiner, ‘Zwischen “Totalem Krieg” und “Kleinen Kriegen”. Überlegungen zum historischen Ort des Kalten Krieges’, *Mittelweg* 36, xii, no. 2 (2003), pp. 3–20.

73. T.C. Davis, *Stages of Emergency: Cold War Nuclear Civil Defense* (Durham, NC, 2007); G. Oakes, *The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture* (New York, 1994); L. McEnaney, *Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the Fifties* (Princeton, NJ, 2000); M. Grant, ‘“Civil Defence Gives Meaning to Your Leisure”: Citizenship, Participation, and Cultural Change in Cold War Recruitment Propaganda, 1949–54’, *Twentieth Century British History*, xxii (2011), pp. 52–78.

74. For first attempts in this direction, see P. Galison, ‘The Ontology of the Enemy: Norbert Wiener and the Cybernetic Vision’, *Critical Inquiry*, xxi (1994), pp. 228–66.

75. T.B. Müller, *Krieger und Gelehrte. Herbert Marcuse und die Denksysteme im Kalten Krieg* (Hamburg, 2010).

76. See, for example, L. Golgia, R. Moro and L. Nuti, eds., *Guerra e pace nell’Italia del Novecento. Politica estera, cultura politica e correnti dell’opinione pubblica* (Bologna, 2006); H. Nehring, *Politics of Security: The British and West German Protests against Nuclear Weapons and the Cold War* (Oxford, 2012); id., ‘The British and West German Protests against Nuclear Weapons and the Cultures of the Cold War’, *Contemporary British History*, xix (2005), pp. 223–41.

ideologies in the 1920s and 1930s (i. 20–43) provides us with an expert prehistory to these debates, as he is able to bring out how ideologies of ‘one world’ came to stand in opposition to each other and why this opposition only turned into a ‘Cold War’ after 1945. Laura McEnaney for the United States in the 1950s (i. 420–41) and David Priestland for the Soviet Union during the same time period (i. 442–63) bring this out wonderfully clearly for the post-1945 period.⁷⁷ The coverage on similar developments in other countries is rather thin, however.⁷⁸

From the angle of societal mobilisation and self-mobilisation, the Cold War was an ‘imaginary war’ that was nonetheless very real to people and reached them through their yearnings for security and their feelings of fear.⁷⁹ It crucially affected the ways in which the military conceptualised future warfare in the ‘global north’ in the second half of the twentieth century—drawing increasingly on systems theory and cybernetics to investigate the probability and nature of future wars. From this perspective, the Cold War was primarily a war that was waged through war scenarios and that sought to influence people’s minds.⁸⁰

This, then, is the context in which peace and anti-nuclear-weapons activism should be understood: activists reflected more widespread concerns about the fundamental lack of security generated by these scenarios.⁸¹ Especially in the 1950s, societies around the world were very receptive to images of nuclear apocalypse and foreign bombs and rockets, as these societies remembered, especially in continental Europe and Japan, the scares of aerial bombardment of the 1930s and the real strategic bombing campaigns of the Second World War.⁸² Jessica Gienow-Hecht’s chapter on culture and the Cold War in Europe (i. 398–419) and Nicholas Cull’s chapter on popular culture in the early

77. See also his excellent *Red Flag: A World History of Communism* (London, 2009).

78. The restrictive nature of the ‘Cold War’ for the struggles of the left is emphasised by G. Eley, *Forging Democracy: A History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000* (Oxford, 2002).

79. See M. Kaldor, *Imaginary War: Interpretation of East–West Conflict in Europe* (Oxford, 1990), which somewhat lacks analytical rigour. Much more precise is M. Geyer, ‘Der kriegerische Blick. Rückblick auf einen noch zu beendenden Krieg’, *Sozialwissenschaftliche Informationen*, xii (1990), pp. 111–17. On the role of fear, cf. B. Greiner, C. Th. Müller and D. Walter, eds., *Angst im Kalten Krieg* (Hamburg, 2009); F. Biess, ‘“Everybody Has a Chance”: Civil Defense, Nuclear Angst, and the History of Emotions in Postwar Germany’, *German History*, xxvii (2009), pp. 215–43. For a polemical attempt, see C.G. Appy, ed., *Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945–1966* (Amherst, MA, 2000).

80. S. Ghamari-Tabrizi, ‘Simulating the Unthinkable: Gaming Future War in the 1950s and 1960s’, *Social Studies of Science*, xxx (2000), pp. 163–223; Agar, *Government Machine*; H. Strachan and S. Scheipers, eds., *The Changing Character of War* (Oxford, 2011).

81. Cf. J. Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’, *Journal of Peace Research*, vi (1969), pp. 167–91.

82. See J. Mieszkowski, ‘Great War, Cold War, Total War’, *Modernism/Modernity*, xvi (2009), pp. 211–28. For air-war fantasies in the 1930s, see P.K. Saint-Amour, ‘Airwar Prophecy and Interwar Modernism’, *Comparative Literature Studies*, xlii (2005), pp. 130–61, and I.F. Clarke, *Voices Prophesying War: Future Wars, 1763–3749* (Oxford, 1992). For hints at parallels in China, cf. R. Mitter, ‘Modernity, Internationalisation, and War in the History of Modern China’, *Historical Journal*, xlviii (2005), pp. 431–46. For Japan, see L. Yoneyama, *Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialectics of Memory* (Berkeley, CA, 1999).

Cold War (ii. 438–59) miss a trick here, as they fail to demonstrate the importance of cultural productions and consumption (which contributed to the percolation of enemy images and perceptions of impending future warfare) for the mobilisation of societies.⁸³ Frequent reports on nuclear testing in the Polynesian islands made these scares real and constant until the overground and underwater tests were banned in 1963.⁸⁴ But nuclear missile bases served as reminders of the dangers of nuclear warfare, where visitors such as the novelist W.G. Sebald (in *Rings of Saturn*) could imagine themselves ‘amidst the remains of our own civilization after its extinction in some future catastrophe’.⁸⁵

Thus, even people who lived far away from the test sites and far away from military installations experienced the ‘Cold War’ increasingly as a constant pre-war situation: war, they feared, might happen at any moment. Such perceptions of profound insecurity had significant implications for the relationships between societies and their governments, and for the ways in which political legitimacy was framed. To an unprecedented degree (and this was especially true for the United States), people came to accept the role of states in guaranteeing not only their security from military attacks, but also their social and material well-being. This went hand in hand with an enormous economic mobilisation in preparation for waging war.⁸⁶ Peter Galison has argued for the United States in the 1950s that urban planners considered suburbanisation as a form of dispersal and, at the same time, as training for Americans to regard themselves as potential targets of a Soviet missile attack.⁸⁷

Third, we might connect such an analysis of the interplay between governmental efforts at mobilisation and societal self-mobilisations by analysing the historical career and significance of the metaphor ‘Cold War’ itself. Rather than asking for ‘origins’, this approach would help to bring the genealogy of the ‘Cold War’ into view, thus bringing the constitution of knowledge about the world as Cold-War-world into

83. See, from a literary history perspective, E. Horn, *Der geheime Krieg. Verrat, Spionage und moderne Fiktion* (Frankfurt am Main, 2007) and, on societal and scientific images of containment, C. Pias, ed., *Abwehr. Modelle, Strategien, Medien* (Bielefeld, 2009); A. Piette, *The Literary Cold War, 1945–Vietnam* (Edinburgh, 2009); D. Seed, *American Science Fiction and the Cold War* (Edinburgh, 1999); T. Shaw, *British Cinema and the Cold War* (London, 2006).

84. On the different experiences of danger and different meanings of ‘nuclear things’, cf. G. Hecht, ed., *Entangled Geographies: Empire and Technopolitics in the Global Cold War* (Cambridge, MA, 2011).

85. W.G. Sebald, *The Rings of Saturn* (London, 1999), p. 237; R.W. Lotchin, *Fortress California, 1910–1961: From Warfare to Welfare* (Urbana, IL, 2002); B. Hevly and J.M. Findlay, eds., *The Atomic West* (Seattle, WA, 1998); J. Masco, *The Nuclear Borderlands: The Manhattan Project in Post-Cold War New Mexico* (Princeton, NJ, 2006); W.D. Crockford, et al., *Cold War: Building for Nuclear Confrontation 1946–89* (London, 2005).

86. B. Greiner, C. Weber and C. Th. Müller, eds., *Ökonomie im Kalten Krieg* (Hamburg, 2010).

87. P. Galison, ‘War against the Center’, *Grey Room*, iv (2001), pp. 6–33, and M. Farish, ‘Disaster and Decentralization: American Cities and the Cold War’, *Cultural Geographies*, x (2003), pp. 125–48.

view. This would help us understand much more clearly the attitudes and structures that made the term 'Cold War' possible. In particular, we need to consider how 'Cold War' emerged as a dominant, albeit never hegemonic, metaphor that evoked fears, threats and dangers, at least in 'the global north', but also alluded to the creation of security. Discourse analysis as a methodology does not suffice here. We need to know also about the actors, processes, procedures and organisations that promoted and practised these discourses.⁸⁸ Metaphors influence the way in which people think about events and processes, and people had to work actively to understand the world around them as 'Cold War'. Despite all the scholarship on the culture of the Cold War, we still know very little about how 'Cold War' performed its metaphorical work.⁸⁹

A central, but frequently forgotten, element of early contemporary uses of 'Cold War' was that it was principally used by its opponents. George Orwell famously defined what he regarded as the emerging 'cold war' between the United States and Soviet Union as a 'peace that is no peace'. While this meant, he argued, an end to large-scale wars, it also implied that two or three great powers would divide the world up between themselves.⁹⁰ Likewise, for Walter Lippmann, 'Cold War' was initially a concept used to criticise what he saw as the Truman Administration's intransigent attitude towards the Soviet Union in the early negotiations about the control of nuclear energy at the United Nations. Lippmann had adopted the term from Herbert Bayard Swope, a journalist and speech-writer for Bernard Baruch, the US representative at these negotiations.⁹¹

In the noncritical uses that emerged over the course of 1946/7, the metaphor 'Cold War' often appeared in tandem with that of an 'Iron Curtain', a term that the former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill most famously introduced into political discussions at his Commencement Address at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, on 5 March 1946, but that was already circulating prior to this speech.⁹² And it often came to be linked

88. For an overview of the most recent research: G. Johnston, 'Revisiting the Cultural Cold War', *Social History*, xxxv (2010), pp. 290–307; H. Wilford, *The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America* (Cambridge, MA, 2008), and H. Laville and H. Wilford, eds., *The U.S. Government, Citizen Groups, and the Cold War: The State-Private Network* (London, 2006).

89. G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago, 1981). See, however, the important contribution by S.L. Carruthers, *Cold War Captives: Imprisonment, Escape and Brainwashing* (Berkeley, CA, 2009); A. Nadel, *Containment Culture: American Narrative, Postmodernism, and the Atomic Age* (Durham, NC, 1995).

90. *The Tribune*, 19 Oct. 1945, 'You and the Atom Bomb'.

91. W. Lippmann, *The Cold War* (New York, 1947); B.M. Baruch, *Public Years* (New York, 1960), p. 80.

92. C. Koller, 'Der "Eiserne Vorhang". Zur Genese einer politischen Zentralmetapher in der Epoche des Kalten Krieges', *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, liv (2006), pp. 366–84; P. Wright, *Iron Curtain: From Stage to Cold War* (Oxford, 2007); W. Glaser, 'The Semantics of the Cold War', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, xx (1956/57), pp. 691–716.

to other metaphors of inclusion and exclusion that reflected images of a bipolar world within domestic politics. There is already some exciting work emerging on the ways in which these forms of rhetoric made themselves felt for imagining and building real borders between the 'East' and the 'West' in Germany, and how these complicated processes mapped onto questions of state-building and the history of local communities.⁹³

Not least, and this is the fourth possible approach for conceptualising 'Cold War' more precisely as war, we might use this opportunity to reflect on the nature of 'the global' and its connection to 'Cold War'. Here, Cold War historians might profit from a more detailed engagement with the vigorous debates about 'globalisation' taking place among imperial historians. The history of 'the global' during the Cold War might be slotted into the continuities of efforts to reconstruct 'political projects' of rule.⁹⁴ The emergence of the world as truly global had a very specific political context and concrete location in the efforts of the United States to create world order in the form of a 'global imaginary of integration' that could be made visible and, therefore, become accessible to projects of planning, order and rule as an integral part of cold warfare.⁹⁵

This conceptual move would tie the 'Cold War' directly to the history of US nationalism and warfare since the nineteenth century.⁹⁶ The trope of 'one world'—and the connected idea that the enemy, allegedly present in many different guises within, had set out to destroy this 'one world'—had powerful resonances with self-images of American universalism and nation-building since the end of the Civil War era.⁹⁷

93. Cf. E. Scheffer, *Burned Bridge: How East and West Germans Made the Iron Curtain* (Oxford, 2011); S. Schaefer, 'Hidden Behind the Wall: West German State Building and the Emergence of the Iron Curtain', *Central European History*, xlv (2011), pp. 506–35; M. Pittaway, 'Making Peace in the Shadow of War: The Austrian-Hungarian Borderlands, 1945–1956', *Contemporary European History*, xvii (2008), pp. 345–64; M. Blaive and B. Molden, *Grenzfälle. Österreichische und tschechische Erfahrungen am Eisernen Vorhang* (Weitra, 2009). Similar information can be gleaned from B. Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War* (2 vols., Princeton, NJ, 1992).

94. See the important intervention by G. Eley, 'Historicizing the Global, Politicizing Capital: Giving the Present a Name', *History Workshop Journal*, no. lxxiii (2007), pp. 154–88, especially p. 157, and P.M. von Eschen, *Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957* (Ithaca, NY, 1997), as case-studies of how the dialectic of power and resistance worked itself out. Cf. also M.P. Bradley, *Imagining Vietnam & America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919–1950* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2000), especially pp. 7–8, although Bradley seeks to de-emphasise American exceptionalism during this period.

95. Quotation from: C. Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945–1961* (Berkeley, CA, 2003), p. 19. For this argument, see G. Steinmetz, 'The State of Emergency and the Revival of American Imperialism: Toward an Authoritarian Post-Fordism', *Public Culture*, xv (2003), pp. 323–45.

96. See, in particular, A. Stephanson, 'Liberty or Death: The Cold War as US Ideology', in Westad, ed., *Reviewing the Cold War*, pp. 81–100, and Walter Hixson's important but rather confused attempt, *The Myth of American Diplomacy*. See also J. Fousek, *To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2000), and, albeit with more or less implicit references, D. Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order, 1914 to the Present* (Princeton, NJ, 2010).

97. W. Wilkie, *One World* (New York, 1943); D. Masters and K. Way, *One World or None: A Report to the Public on the Full Meaning of the Atomic Bomb* (New York, 1945). On the background, see D.A. Hollinger, 'How Wide the Circle of "We"? American Intellectuals and the

‘The only truly peaceful and secure world would henceforth be one in which outlaws and dictators were extinct and everyone adhered to the fundamental principles of humanity, which, as [President Woodrow] Wilson had always said, were those embodied by the United States.’⁹⁸ This attitude had obtained powerful resonances during the 1940s as, faced with the dual threat from Nazi Germany and Japan, and in an uncomfortable alliance with the Soviet Union, both Roosevelt and his internationalist opponents around Wendell Wilkie created the imaginary of ‘one world’ that they initially regarded as being under threat from the National Socialists and the Japanese government.⁹⁹ The experience of appeasement of National Socialism and Japanese imperialism in the 1930s suggested that there were certain governments with whom one could not do business; and these governments could be described as fundamentally inferior.¹⁰⁰ Visions of international relations—and of the global reach of the opportunities for US foreign policy and the threats to it—thus came to reflect domestic visions of ‘civility’.¹⁰¹ For American missionaries and development planners of the post-war era, villages around the world (and their stability as bulwarks against communism) could thus come to signify the stability of American civilisation and order.¹⁰²

Not only ideological zealots, but many ordinary Americans (and gradually citizens from different countries around the world) could slot groups on the margins of society easily into the Cold War battle: ethnic minorities, political dissidents and homosexuals easily became enemies of the natural order that the official rhetoric wished to create and could easily be seen as irrational agents, enslaved by opposing power.¹⁰³ Such

Problem of Ethnos since World War II’, *American Historical Review*, xcvi (1993), pp. 317–37; E.J. Sandeen, *Picturing an Exhibition: The Family of Man and 1950s America* (Albuquerque, NM, 1995). On the predecessors, see F. Ninkovich, *Global Dawn: The Cultural Foundations of American Internationalism* (Cambridge, MA, 2009).

98. Stephanson, ‘Liberty or Death’, p. 93.

99. One of the first to spot this, although with a different accentuation, was M.P. Leffler, ‘The American Conception of National Security and the Beginning of the Cold War’, *American Historical Review*, lxxxix (1984), pp. 346–81, at p. 350.

100. P.T. Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West* (Ann Arbor, MI, 2006); J.L. Harper, *Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan and Dean Acheson* (Cambridge, 1994); Ninkovich, *Modernity*, ch. 5; and, for Britain, J. Später, *Vansittart. Britische Debatten über Deutsche und Nazis 1902–1945* (Göttingen, 2003).

101. This linkage is developed conceptually by R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge, 1993), especially p. 5 and ch. 6 on territoriality, and is explored brilliantly by C. Bright and M. Geyer, ‘Where in the World is America? The History of the United States in the Global Age’, in T. Bender, ed., *Rethinking American History in a Global Age* (Berkeley, CA, 2002), pp. 63–99.

102. N. Sackley, ‘The Village as Cold War Site: Experts, Development, and the History of Rural Reconstruction’, *Journal of Global History*, vi (2011), pp. 481–504; J.R. Carter, *Inventing Vietnam: The United States and State Building, 1954–1968* (Cambridge, 2008); B.R. Simpson, *Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968* (Stanford, CA, 2008).

103. T. Mergel, ‘The Unknown and the Familiar Enemy: The Semantics of Anti-Communism in the USA and Germany, 1945–1975’, in W. Steinmetz, ed., *Political Languages in the Age of*

alleged under-development or lack of ‘natural behaviour’, defined as a lack of civilisational norms, was thus endowed with concrete locations in countries around the world as well as within the United States; and once the locations had been identified, this knowledge could be used to devise schemes of improvement and subordination.¹⁰⁴ Mark Philip Bradley’s excellent essay in *CHCW* demonstrates the utility of such an approach for understanding the role of the ‘Cold War’, thus defined for the making of post-1945 Indochina in its transition from French imperial rule to American influence (i. 464–85). And William Stueck’s chapter on the Korean War (i. 266–87) shows how the Korean peninsula could emerge as the first real Cold War battlefield. This, then, gets us to the core of what the Cold War was about, as Adam Roberts points out at the end of his chapter, modifying a statement that Henry Kissinger had made about the Soviet Union in 1984 that the United States and the Soviet Union were both ‘a cause’ (or a project) and ‘a country’ (iii. 534). These competing visions existed before 1945, but they achieved their historical importance in the light of attempts to create order in the wake of the Second World War.

As the Soviet Union developed its own version of ‘one world’ and, after 1945, propagated it with growing vigour, the Soviet Union replaced Nazi Germany as the United States’s main enemy, which had to surrender unconditionally before the one world could be created.¹⁰⁵ While policy-makers in the Soviet Union possessed equivalent conceptions of ‘one world’, we still need a more thorough discussion about whether ‘Cold War’ can meaningfully be applied to it. For there, official contemporary readings defined ‘Cold War’ as a tool of world domination wielded by the United States against the Soviet Union in order to prevent people throughout the world from following its socialist model of development.¹⁰⁶ The status of China in these discussions also

Extremes (Oxford, 2011), pp. 245–74; L.R.Y. Storrs, ‘Red Scare Politics and the Suppression of Popular Front Feminism: The Loyalty Investigation of Mary Dublin Keyserling’, *Journal of American History*, xc (2003), pp. 491–524; R. Robin, *The Making of the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the Military-Intellectual Complex* (Princeton, NJ, 2001); and F. Costigliola, “Unceasing Pressure for Penetration”: Gender, Pathology, and Emotion in George Kennan’s Formation of the Cold War’, *Journal of American History*, lxxxiii (1997), pp. 1309–39.

104. A. Goldstein, ‘On the Internal Border: Colonial Difference, the Cold War, and the Location of “Underdevelopment”’, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, l (2008), pp. 26–56. On the genealogy of this interpretation, see C.E. Pletsch, ‘The Three Worlds, or the Division of Social Scientific Labor, circa 1950–1975’, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, xxiii (1981), pp. 565–90.

105. Cf. A.M. Johnston, *Hegemony and Culture in the Origins of NATO Nuclear First Use, 1945–1955* (New York, 2005); M. Selverstone, *Constructing the Monolith: The United States, Great Britain, and International Communism, 1945–1950* (Cambridge, MA, 2009). For developments on the ground, see P. Goedde, *GIs and Germans: Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945–1949* (New Haven, CT, 2003).

106. See, for example, *Slovar russkogo iazyka* [The Russian Dictionary], ed. S.I. Ozhegov and S.P. Obnorskii (Moscow, 1953). Thanks to Dariusz Stola for this reference. On the background, see S. Wiederkehr, ‘Die Verwendung des Terminus “Kalter Krieg” in der Sowjetunion und Russland. Ein Indikator für den Wandel der marxistisch-leninistischen Ideologie und ihrer Überwindung’, *Forum für osteuropäische Ideen- und Zeitgeschichte*, vii (2003), pp. 53–83, especially pp. 55–7.

needs to come into view more concretely. Lorenz Lüthi's recent work on the Sino-Soviet split demonstrates, much more powerfully than the relevant contributions assembled in *CHCW*, how China developed a competing notion of civilisational modernity on a world scale from the late 1950s into the 1960s.¹⁰⁷

Political projects of 'the global' with explicit Cold War connections were not restricted to high politics. Even after the initial efforts for creating this 'one world' seemed to have failed in the period after the Second World War,¹⁰⁸ the real and imagined threats of nuclear weapons turned the idea of the world as one globe into a reality.¹⁰⁹ Thus, the idea of 'one world' found its way into the rhetoric of nuclear-disarmament movements, who bemoaned the lack of a real global community.¹¹⁰ Likewise, those groups who were discriminated against as internal enemies, such as peace protesters or African American civil-rights activists, paradoxically wrote themselves into the framework of 'one world' as well and connected it with the real crossing of borders, both across East and West, and in terms of their position within society.¹¹¹

The editors and all the authors of *CHCW* have provided us with an excellent starting-point for a discussion about what we might mean by 'Cold War' as a concept. They highlight how important it is to define the terms of one's trade—and they are honest enough to admit that the answers we get depend on the questions we ask, on the methodologies we apply and the sources we consult. History is a complex process, and we need concepts to make sense of it in order to deal with this complexity.¹¹² This is why it is important to be clear about what a concept might be good for, and where it might fail to explain what we seek to analyse. While attempts to decentre the Cold War away from the super-powers and its chronological core in the 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s have been, on the one hand, intellectually stimulating, they have, on the other hand, contributed to diminishing the clarity of our methodological and conceptual tools. It might well be time for conceptual contraction.

107. L. Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split, 1956–1966: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton, NJ, 2008). Cf. also Engerman, 'The Second World's Third World', p. 185; J. Friedman, 'Soviet Policy in the Developing World and the Chinese Challenge in the 1960s', *Cold War History*, x (2010), pp. 247–72.

108. See on this moment E. Rothschild, 'The Archives of Universal History', *Journal of World History*, xix (2008), pp. 375–401.

109. R. Koselleck, *Kritik und Krise* (Frankfurt am Main, 1973), p. x; J. Herz, 'The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State', *World Politics*, ix (1957), pp. 473–93.

110. H. Nehring, 'The National Internationalists: Transnational Relations and the British and West German Protests against Nuclear Weapons, 1957–1964', *Contemporary European History*, xiv (2005), pp. 559–82.

111. Cf. M. Höhn and M. Klimke, *A Breath of Freedom: The Civil Rights Struggle, African American GIs, and Germany* (Basingstoke, 2010); C. Anderson, *Eyes off the Prize: The United Nations and the African American Struggle for Human Rights, 1944–1955* (Cambridge, 2003); Eschen, *Race against Empire*.

112. Max Weber was one of the first to alert us to this in a systematic fashion. See D. Peukert, *Max Webers Diagnose der Moderne* (Göttingen, 1989).

It is after such contraction and a focus on the war-like character of the Cold War that we can meaningfully return to the questions of why no major war occurred between the two super-powers between the end of the Second World War and 1989/91 and how the Cold War as a period in twentieth-century history related to previous configurations of the international system.¹¹³

Some of the discussions in the field might have been conducted much more productively if the participants had not fought ‘zero-sum’ battles.¹¹⁴ We need to accept the plurality of approaches, methodologies and also answers as given—and interpret them as responses to different kinds of questions. But this also means that we should stop using the term ‘Cold War’ as an academic label, as Matthew Connelly proposes in his chapter (iii. 466), that allows us to market our research effectively. Instead, we should combine methodological openness with a focus on the clarity of the concepts we employ. It might be useful, then, to conceptualise Cold War studies as a ‘field of investigation’. ‘Field of investigation’ is a metaphor that is helpful in expressing what this review-article has attempted to achieve: like electromagnetic fields, social and political fields pushed and pulled actors in particular directions; but their actions were not predetermined by it; nor was the Cold War the only relevant field. The relationships between actors in these political fields—their distances from each other, their directions of movement—mattered as well. Cold War history could be productively practised in such a fashion.¹¹⁵

Such an approach would avoid the conceptual fuzziness and methodological vagueness that has characterised some of the more recent approaches to the study of Cold War culture in particular. There was no single Cold War; there were many ‘Cold Wars’, and, occasionally, we might have to ‘take off the Cold War lens’, as it might help us to grasp more clearly what the Cold War was (and what it was not).¹¹⁶

As the late Reinhart Koselleck has pointed out, history, when it unfolds as events, is nonsensical. It is human beings—and historians in their wake—who make sense of history.¹¹⁷ What we still need, therefore, is a sustained debate across the traditional boundaries between diplomatic, political and social and cultural history, between area studies,

113. Cf., for two different approaches, R.M. Siveson and M.D. Ward, ‘The Long Peace: A Reconsideration’, *International Organization*, lvi (2002), pp. 679–91, and Michael Geyer’s lecture on ‘War and violence in the long twentieth century’, given in Vienna City Hall, 4 Oct. 2011, as well as H. Nehring and H. Pharo, ‘Introduction: A Peaceful Europe? Negotiating Peace in the Twentieth Century’, *Contemporary European History*, xvii (2008), pp. 277–99.

114. W.C. Wohlforth, ‘A Certain Idea of Science: How International Relations Theory Avoids Reviewing the Cold War’, in Westad, ed., *Reviewing the Cold War*, pp. 126–45, at p. 131.

115. See P. Bourdieu, *Le sens pratique* (Paris, 1980).

116. See the important contribution by Connelly, ‘Taking off the Cold War Lens’.

117. R. Koselleck, ‘Vom Sinn und Unsinn der Geschichte’ (1997), in id., *Vom Sinn und Unsinn der Geschichte* (Frankfurt am Main, 2010), pp. 9–31. Koselleck follows T. Lessing, *Geschichte als Sinnergebung des Sinnlosen* (1919; Munich, 1983).

imperial history and international history, as well as between historians, sociologists, political scientists and anthropologists. This is not a plea to establish 'Cold War' as a hegemonic category. Rather, conversely, it is a call to be inspired by different approaches and methodologies, and different subjects, to question preconceived assumptions—but with the aim of centring the field of Cold War history. Now that scholarship on the Cold War has been so finely assembled in *CHCW*, we are ready to get to the business of re-assembling the 'Cold War' as a historical concept and category of analysis.¹¹⁸ Melvyn Leffler's remark, in his brilliant critique of Gaddis's *We Now Know*, still holds true: 'the story of the Cold War is likely to become more contentious as it becomes more interesting and complex. The Cold War will defy any single master narrative.'¹¹⁹ The intellectual journey of discussing what the 'Cold War' was has only just begun.

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118. On the assumptions behind this see B. Latour, *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory* (Oxford, 2005).

119. Leffler, 'The Cold War', p. 501.