A Study looking at the Governance of Community Safety Partnerships in Scotland

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By

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Declaration

I declare that none of the work contained within this thesis has been submitted for any other Degree at any other university. The contents found within this thesis have been composed by the candidate: Catherine Elizabeth Davidones.
Abstract

Partnership working within the domain of the UK public sector has been the subject of academic exploration in modern times. Rhodes has written in relation to tensions around governance i.e. the ‘hollowing out of the state’ (Rhodes, 1997), with a loss of government functions limiting its capacity (Weller and Bakvis, 1997), to alternative delivery systems, such as agencies, policy networks, or partnerships involving the public, private and third sector (Rhodes, 1997; James, 2001); arguably leading to a fragmented service delivery (Powell and Exworthy, 2002). Others have argued that while the state may be fragmented it is not incapacitated (Holliday, 2000) as it uses regulatory levers to steer local government (partnerships) towards outcomes favouring central government policy. In Scotland this is achieved through Single Outcome Agreements (SOA) between central and local government set within a prescriptive framework advancing the notion of community empowerment and long term prevention; as advocated by the Christie Commission (Scottish Government, 2011c).

This thesis explores the concept of partnership working by looking at the governance of community safety in Scotland; principally through Community Planning/Community Safety Partnerships during a period of significant public sector reform. Using a case study approach - data was obtained during a twelve month period (2013) principally through 50 semi-structured qualitative interviews with key stakeholders and 9 non-participant observations of partnership meetings within three distinct localities; and analysis of secondary data (policy documents).

Drawing on theories around governance/partnership working, power and social capital: key themes began to emerge around tensions between central and local policy; power differentials within partnerships – relating to organisational culture and resource dependency; fiscal retrenchment and the de-prioritisation of community safety; Police reform and the impact on localism; and accountability issues relating to participatory democracy, blurred boundaries, and accountability to local communities within the governance of community safety. This thesis concludes that despite the rhetoric of localism within local governance – local communities and local government have less voice/power compared to central government, in relation to the governance of community safety, and in relation to the loss of accountability within local policing.
Acknowledgements

Completing this PhD has been an extraordinary journey, which has been both fulfilling and frustrating in equal measure, and it is in no small thanks to the people I have encountered on my journey that the fulfilment has far exceeded the frustration and anxiety.

First of all I would like to thank all those facilitators within the three case study areas who helped co-ordinate my access and made my journey a lot smoother. Particular thanks must be given to the area Housing Manager for Avon Homes in Avon Isle who went out of their way to accommodate me by finding a central location on the island to conduct the interviews, and of course a big thank-you to the interviewees themselves for giving up their time and allowing me to enter their world.

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A special thank-you must go out to my family; especially my children Georgia and Gabriel who have had to endure ‘Uni-Mummy’ in all her stressed out glory, missing out on trips to the cinema etc., while I worked on my PhD. I promise you – I will make it up to you.

Thanks must also go to my partner Alex, who has had to pick up the slack, and my sisters, Mary and Pauline, brother John, and Mum who have been there when I needed them most, and all my extended family and friends – Kym you have at times been a godsend.

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Finally, I would like to dedicate this work to my beautiful sister Vera who sadly passed away during this process – she was always there to offer support and will be deeply missed.
List of Acronyms

ALEO  Arm’s Length External Organisations
ASB   Anti-social behaviour
CHS   Children’s Hearing System
CIP   Community Improvement Partnership
CPPs  Community Planning Partnership
CSB   Community Safety Burnside
CSPs  Community Safety Partnerships
CDA   Crime and Disorder Act 1998
CDRPs Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships
NWCPP North West Community Planning Partnership
NPF   National Performance Framework
NPM   New Public Management
ODPM  Office of Deputy Prime Minister
PMCA  Police Magistrates and Court Act 1994
PSS   Police Service of Scotland
SPA   Scottish Police Authority
SOA   Single Outcome Agreement
TSO   Third Sector Organisation
VAW   Violence against Women
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Chapter 1: Introduction

The aim of this project is to critically examine the governance of Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) in Scotland. Community Safety Partnerships evolved differently in Scotland compared to England and Wales, in part due to the distinctive character of the Scottish legal system and also because of what many academics have termed as Scotland’s distinctive civic culture (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008; McAra and McVie, 2010; Mooney and Scott, 2012; Croall, 2006; Croall et al., 2010). From 1979 to date there have been many areas of policy convergence and divergence, especially within criminal justice policy and policing (McAra, 2007; 2011; McAra and McVie, 2010; Croall et al., 2010; Donnelly and Scott, 2010a; 2010b; Danson and Whittam, 2011).

The performance management culture inherent within Thatcher’s neo-liberal reform agenda was one such area of policy convergence, conversely, Scotland’s retention of penal welfarism during the Conservative era was also an area of policy divergence (McAra and McVie, 2010), as was the divergence from the deep normative core of Westminster hegemony in relation to policy and decision making (Heclo and Wildavsky, 1981). Yet, despite this in 1999 (post devolution) Scotland seemed to converge with England’s punitive penal agenda, with the adoption of antisocial behaviour legislation and the targeting of young offenders (ibid; Croall et al., 2010; Croall, 2012). However, under the present Scottish National Party (SNP) government it appears that Scotland may once again return to its penal welfare roots (Hazel, 2008; Croall, 2012; Mooney and Scott, 2012; Henry, 2012), and situating CSPs within this changing landscape makes this an interesting area of study.

This has all happened during an era of world-wide recession after the 2007/08 global credit crunch, which has led to an extensive period of fiscal parsimony being enforced on Local Authorities and devolved Governments by Westminster, which may impact on local community services and partnerships. For example, budget cuts have long been a source of conflict and tension within central and local government relations throughout the United Kingdom (UK) (Stoker, 1988; Mooney and Poole, 2004; Mackie, 2005), and many public and voluntary agencies may have to engage in financial juggling acts in order to reassign/maintain dwindling resources in the delivery of local services (Frost, 2005;
Danson and Whittam, 2011). Furthermore, this may lead to increased tensions between agencies as they compete against each other within an “environment of constrained public spending” (Scottish Government, 2011d: vi). This may also have an impact on the role agencies play within the governance of community safety insofar as more focus may be placed on core organisational issues at the expense of a commitment to partnership working in general. Additionally, how will a performance management culture with an emphasis on central strategic objectives/target setting - within central and local government austerity politics - affect the organisational culture of public sector agencies, such as the Police, or the third sector in particular (Hastings et al., 2015).

In answer to the call for restraint, the Scottish Government put in place a number of reform measures including: instituting a reform of Local Authority community planning structures to incorporate key findings from the Christie Commission, and the centralisation of the former eight regional Police and Fire services into separate single national entities. This centralising agenda may in turn have exacerbated fears that this could affect localism despite government rhetoric to the contrary (Donnelly et al., 2002); particularly within policing, and how this may impact on the organisational culture of the Police overall. Tensions may also emerge between the different layers within the governance of community safety, for example, will changes within local governance structures allow for more ‘rowing’ (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) by actors/agencies within CSPs, or will increased Scottish Government regulations determine not only the direction - ‘steer’ (ibid) of local policy objectives, but also perform the ‘rowing’ function as well (ibid). Or, will future strategic policing priorities influence the strategic direction/practices within CSPs, or indeed the cultural aims of different agencies/actors (HMSO, 2012). Furthermore, how will these changes impact on Local Authority accountability to local communities in general? For example, much has been written about community participation in recent Scottish Government social policy, but that participation may be dependent on the capacity/social capital of those involved.

Therefore looking at CSPs during a process of major structural reform of one of its lead agencies offers up a unique opportunity for new academic research, in terms of how do changes to governance arrangements affect the operation of local bodies like CSPs. Therefore this research study aims to explore how robust local CSPs are in Scotland
during this transitional period, by understanding how CSPs work, principally by asking the following research questions:

- What role do CSPs play in the governance of community safety in contemporary Scotland?
- How will the planned governance changes and reform processes affect CSPs in terms of local accountability?
- How will performance management cultures within central/local government, and in particular within the Police, affect CSP priorities and/or goals?
- How do the organisational aims and culture of CSP partners, who possess different levels of power and influence, effect or determine the strategic priorities of CSPs?

These questions will try to be addressed by creating a bespoke framework influenced by Hudson and Hardy’s ‘assessment tool’ for effective partnership working (Hudson and Hardy, 2002). Hudson and Hardy produced this framework as an effective tool for practitioners to use during evaluations of Health and Social Care Partnerships (ibid), however it will be adapted to provide a useful framework for the analysis of qualitative interviews (discussed more in the methods section); as many of the principles within this framework are arguably germane to CSPs. For example, principles surrounding the need for partnership working in the first place, or whether there is a clarity or realism of purpose, or commitment and ownership, or clear and robust arrangements within them (ibid: 53-62). They also identify barriers to effective partnership working that could also apply to CSPs, such as: non-coterminosity of boundaries; fragmentation of service responsibilities across agency boundaries; differences in ideologies and values; organisational self-interest and autonomy, and threats to job security (ibid: 54). Therefore in this study ‘the assessment tool’ will act as a useful framework in order to explore the complexities of partnership working within the context of CSPs.

1.1 The Research Strategy

The original focus for this review was to be directed towards literature based on crime prevention and community safety practice. However, it soon became clear that the centralised policing agenda of the SNP Scottish Government in 2013 would also have an
impact on CSPs. However, Scottish policing and community safety policy is heavily influenced by legislation and policies put in place by the previous New Labour Government, specifically the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (i.e. how the Act enables Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships) and the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003, which led onto the Local Government Scotland Act 2003 and the Anti-Social Behaviour etc. (Scotland) Act 2004.

Therefore, it was decided that the literature review should look at the local governance of crime within a UK context, which involved examining in brief: central government bureaucracy – principally the Westminster model of government; local government reform and the tensions therein. This will be a thematic rather than a narrative based review and it will focus on drawing out key themes in order to try and address the main research questions, for example, themes around organisational change, reform, culture, strategic decision making, localism and the tensions therein.

Therefore, the literature review will look at how central government reform has impacted on crime prevention and community safety in the UK from the late 1970s to date, in an effort to understand how central reform has helped shape the notion of crime prevention and community safety within the UK. Particular attention will be paid to the processes of change leading up to the creation of Crime and Disorder Reduction/Community Safety Partnerships; drawing on concepts such as social exclusion/social capital. The impact of these crime prevention/crime reduction policies in England and Wales will then be examined in context of post-devolution Scotland. For instance, the neo-liberal reform agenda of the Conservative government in 1979 – including the restructure of central and local government, and the impact of private sector managerialism/performance management on the public sector. This was arguably continued under New Labour’s modernisation programme, which incorporated managerialism/best value within partnerships and networks; principally as a key governance tool to address the fragmented service delivery inherent within market individualism. This framework for partnerships was also adopted in post-devolution Scotland, wherein regulatory mechanisms/policy levers have helped shape Community Planning/Community Safety Partnerships. However, these mechanisms may also increase tensions between central/strategic policy direction and local accountability. It may also exacerbate tensions between individual agencies/organisations as they learn to navigate a turbulent changing
landscape incorporating diverse organisational practices, resource constraint, and conflicting ideological aims and objectives. It is within this context that the literature has been chosen, whereby key themes may begin to emerge in support of the research questions and the subsequent research study.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 The Westminster Model

The ‘Westminster model’ of government characterises the British political system as a unitary state\(^1\) with its focus on parliamentary sovereignty, presided over by a Prime Ministerial led cabinet based on a predominantly two-party majority rule electoral system – overhead democracy, typified by the rules of debate (Rhodes, 1997; 2000a; Stoker, 2004b). The most dominant ideological form associated with this model is bureaucratic hierarchy (formally ranked structure of authority, represented by clear lines of accountability, and rational rules or policies) (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 147), typified by vertical top down control. Clarke and Newman (1997) state that since the nineteenth century public administration in Britain has taken the form of ‘rational bureaucracy’, which was intended to foster efficiency and impartiality throughout all public business, typified by the appliance of rules and regulations by trained staff (ibid: 5).

For Weber there were three types of legitimate authority based on: rational grounds - on the principle that society has normative rules, therefore those persons elevated to positions of authority based on those rules are there by legal authority; traditional grounds – based on the sanctity of ‘immemorial traditions’ and on the legitimacy of status (a monarch); charismatic grounds – based on particular character traits inherent within an individual that brings with it a devotional compliance to any order decreed by him (Weber, 1997: 323).

Rational grounds is the legitimate type of authority most associated with a Westminster model of government defined by Weber as “Legal authority: the pure type with

\(^1\) A state in which all constitutional power resides in the centre, however, sub-governmental units may exist, but are subject to change from the top. (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 24)
employment of a bureaucratic administrative staff” (ibid: 324). Weber argued that three institutions were necessary to cope with the modern governance process: “political leadership, party and bureaucracy” (cited in Stoker, 2004b: 22). Bureaucracy is thereby a method used by society to accomplish its goals through “control, organisation and central direction” (John, 2011: 64). However, it can also be associated with charismatic authority in terms of the strong personality of an individual – especially one in a position of authority such as a Prime Minister – in that they can use their will to force change within a one party dominated parliament, as in the case of Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair (ibid).

However, by the 1970s bureaucracy was thought to be inappropriate, inefficient and ill-equipped to respond to the complexities of change inherent within the modern world, especially by proponents of the New Right ideology wherein neo-liberal economics in both the UK and the United States of America were beginning to stress the superiority of market individualism (Clarke and Newman, 1997: 14). Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government of 1979 paved the way for a new lexicon of government parlance when it chose to forgo the dominance of hierarchical control and introduce market individualism throughout the peripheries of government, with the introduction of New Public Management (NPM) principles aimed at transforming the relationship between the public sector, government and society (Hughes, 1994); to be achieved by “across-the-board ‘efficiency’ savings, performance targets and the use of competition to select the cheapest service producer” (Stoker, 2004b: 13). Local government reform in terms of contracting out and partnership working became the order of the day.

2.2 British Local Government Reform Post 1979

“the present cannot be properly understood without some appreciation of how it developed and differs from the past – especially in Britain, where local government has evolved gradually over the centuries, without any codified constitution defining its rights, responsibilities and relationship to central government” (Wilson and Game, 2011: 53).

Local government structural reform began in earnest following the Redcliffe-Maud reports’ published in 1969, which advocated either: structural reform based on “all-purpose unitary Authorities embracing both town and country” (Wilson and Game, 2011:
or a “multi-tier system of provincial Councils, city regions, district and local Councils” (ibid). However, the new Heath Conservative Government of 1970 rejected both systems, favouring instead a two-tier system based on the current Counties, which many argued was pursued not only on philosophical grounds, but also on ideological grounds, as most County Councils were dominated by Conservative party members and supporters (ibid). Partisan politics would play a major part in future reform. For example, the 1972 Local Government Act from 1974 reduced the 58 County Councils in England and Wales to 47, and abolished all County boroughs, which meant that many of the former Labour controlled County boroughs were now relegated to a lower tier status (ibid: 61), this two tier structure could also possibly make the co-ordination of policy and administration challenging (Stoker, 1988). In Scotland, the Wheatley Commission also proposed a two-tier system, which took effect in 1975, courtesy of the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973 (Wilson and Game, 2011: 62).

By the mid-1970s local government in particular began to feel the economic backlash caused by a world-wide recession (Stoker, 1988). Unemployment rose alongside inflation, and public resources were stretched to the limit, and many cuts were targeted at local government (ibid). Nonetheless, as Stoker (1988) points out the cuts were achieved by a “mix of discussion, compromise and conflict within the established machinery of government” (ibid: 14; Mackie, 2005). However, a different picture emerges with the election of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government of 1979. Within weeks of taking office it became increasingly clear that local government was, according to Newton and Karran (1985), viewed as “wasteful, profligate, irresponsible, unaccountable, luxurious and out of control” (cited in Stoker, 1988: 14; Wilson and Game, 2011: 64).

2.2.1 1979 The Conservative Government or the ‘New Right’ are elected

The election of a Thatcher led Conservative Government in 1979 signals an epoch in central and local government relations, characterised by a desire to control Local Authorities – especially Labour dominated ones – partly through a restructure of its institutions and partly through greater control over resources managed efficiently through private sector business practices. The process of structural reform began in earnest in 1986 with the abolition of six metropolitan Counties and the Greater London Council leading to the creation of a “unitary system of local government in the main
urban conurbations” (Stoker, 2004b: 29). At the same time a series of joint boards were created covering for example, the Police and Fire service, which had their own identity and legal status (ibid: 30). By 1998 the number of Authorities in Britain was reduced to 441 compared to 520 in 1976 see table 1 (ibid: 31).

**Table 1: The Structure of elected Local Government in Britain, 1997/1998**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Single Tier (unitary)</th>
<th>Two-Tier (functions split between levels)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>46 English Unitary Councils</td>
<td>34 English County Councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 English Metropolitan Districts</td>
<td>238 English Non-Metropolitan Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 London Boroughs (plus City of London Corporation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Welsh Councils</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 Scottish Councils</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Stoker (2004b:31)*

Crucially the Conservative Government also instigated many changes to the local government financial system. For example, during the financial year 1990/91 non-domestic or business rates were removed from Local Authority control. This constituted a heavy financial blow to Local Authorities as business rates combined with local rates accounted for about half of their income, which was now reduced to a quarter, with central government providing the majority of funding (ibid: 31). This allowed central government to dictate the level of local spending via capping powers (ibid: 31). This led to some Councils initiating drastic cuts, while others chose to engage in financial juggling acts to make figures appear as if they matched government targets, whilst continuing to flow resources to local services (ibid: 31).

A neologism borne out of that period is ‘Thatcherism’ signalling the emergence of the New Right and their neo-liberal reform agenda associated with ‘rolling back the state’. A neo-liberal agenda which advocated the superiority of individual choice set within an economic market exchange system (Heffernan, 2000: 2) as opposed to the collective political decision making of the interventionist state (ibid: 2). It was time for political change, in this case with the adoption of free market liberalism characterised by the notion of individualism, freedom of choice, privatisation and laissez-faire governance, in other words with the adoption of private sector business practices (James, 2001), situated within the “general ideology of managerialism” (Clark and Newman, 1997: 35).
2.3 The increasing influence of Managerialism/New Public Management

Managerialism or NPM is based on improving government performance and can be linked to the launch of the Financial Management Initiative in 1983. This initiative set out the principles of rational decision making, decentralisation, and management as opposed to administration. It was based on an assessment of value for money by measuring the "three E’s", economy, efficiency, and effectiveness (Shafiri and Bovaird, 1995: 469). NPM became increasingly influential during this period, as the promotion of ‘better management’ (Clarke and Newman, 1997: 35) was viewed as the solution to economic decline and stagnation in Western economies in the face of ‘global change and competition’ (ibid: 35). McGarvey and Cairney (2008) state that NPM ideas tend to emphasise mechanisms such as: performance measurement, decentralisation, devolution, managerialism, competition and private-sector management styles, as useful tools in the reform of the public sector (ibid: 151).

Dunleavy and Hood (1994) argue that NPM is mainly used as a summary description to explain the restructuring of public sector bodies in line with those management and accounting approaches related to business practices (ibid: 9). They contend it involves a shift in the “two basic design co-ordinates of public sector organization” (ibid: 9). Using social science ‘jargon’ they describe it firstly as going ‘down-group’, meaning that the public sector becomes less distinctive to the private sector (in terms of how personnel, rewards and business methods are constructed), and secondly, going ‘down-grid’ means limiting the degree to which discretionary power is restricted (in terms of personnel, contracts and money) by standardised general procedural rules (ibid: 9). This contrasted with traditional public administration which was founded on the notion of a “highly distinct public sector ‘group’ and of a dense ‘grid’ of general procedural rules governing the conduct of business” (ibid: 9), see Dunleavy and Hood (1994: 9) for a more specific description.

The most notable use of NPM principles within the Conservative Government era was with the introduction of Next Steps Agencies in the late 1980s, which according to James (2001) exhibits two core functions: to use agencies as separate ‘organisation units’ in order to handle “distinct central government activities on behalf of Ministers” (ibid: 235); and the creation of a ‘regulatory framework’, wherein a chief executive is accountable to
the Minister of his/her department for performance, which the Minister has set within his/her own individual departments/or via central government targets (ibid: 235). In other words policy formulation and implementation are split between Ministers and agencies respectively (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 112).

Hood (1991) has argued that NPM could be interpreted as being borne out of two distinct ideas, one being ‘new institutional economics’ built on the notion of user choice, contestability and transparency (ibid: 5). While the second idea is based on the tradition of the international scientific management movement – grounded on the notion of professional management expertise and discretionary power; basically meaning being free to manage (ibid: 6).

Hughes (1994) argues that there are two main criticisms aimed at the ‘economic basis of managerialism’ (ibid: 78), first that economics is a flawed social science and secondly and more importantly is that whilst it may be appropriate for use within the business sector, applying it to government is ‘ill-conceived’ (ibid: 78) in that public services are more distinctive than any generic consumer model (ibid: 78). For example, the public provider/consumer relations in government are more complex and the consumer is also a citizen and has a “set of unique implications for the transaction” (ibid: 78). Other criticisms have been levelled at managerialism, for instance: it is too politicised, in that political leaders will tend to select agency executives or department heads based on their philosophical or ideological views (Hughes (1994: 82); or there are issues surrounding accountability, as in conflicts between balancing up managerial accountability to a department or to elected politicians, or how do citizens hold a public servant to account (ibid: 83).

Brodkin (2011) states that a strategy used within the NPM toolkit to ‘make policy work’ (ibid: 254) is to link performance and outcome measurement to financial incentives, and is a departure from ‘old’ public management forms of command and control (ibid: 254). This approach constructed around incentives, implicitly accepts discretion as a necessary feature of implementation within a decentralised policy world (ibid: 254). However, they also point out that discretion can be used in a way that can either enhance or thwart policy decisions (ibid). Brodkin further argues, that by using the familiar ‘steering not rowing’ analogy, NPM allows high level officials to produce incentives and ‘set the
destination’ (ibid: 254), which leaves “lower level organizations to figure out how to get there” (ibid: 254).

Steering and rowing was a nautical analogy developed by Osborne and Gaebler, which referred to the states regulatory function as ‘steering’ through monitoring which allowed for alterations to any deviations from a government course or direction, through the setting of explicit goals “to be conveyed to those rowing” (Crawford, 2006: 453). Osborne and Gaebler (1992) contend that steering allows governments to make more policy decisions, by co-opting other organisations to deliver services to the community, which means less rowing – less direct public service provision by the government (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008: 151). These services can in turn be regulated to ensure they are meeting the public demand for efficient services. For example, Osborne and Gaebler contend that governments who steer more and row less are stronger governments, “after all, those who steer the boat have far more power over its destination than those who row it” (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992: 32). Brodkin argues that the bottom line is that by using performance indicators (whether they are attached to penalties or incentives) (Evans, 2009), leaves street-level organisations to try and “determine how best to do the work” (Brodkin, 2011:254). In other words by establishing a performance framework the government is in effect trying to steer public sector behaviour (ibid).

Many academic writers during the 1980s and 1990s expressed their concern that performance management had become a key central government tool that focused on prescriptive government targets favouring economy and efficiency, rather than on more holistic outcomes based on efficacy (see Mackie, 2005). Performance management can also be used as a mode of intervention by central government, which in turn challenges the professionalism of public sector actors (Loveday, 2006). For example, the Police Reform Act 2002 gave the Home Secretary considerable powers to intervene on those forces adjudged to be failing by Her Majesties Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), and one such force - Nottinghamshire Police - were told that senior officers’ jobs were at risk if their performance level did not improve (ibid: 283). This means that senior officers are far more likely to direct their forces to adhere to prescriptive central targets, rather than focusing on priorities intrinsic to policing within their local areas, if their livelihood is threatened by central government regulatory mechanisms (ibid: 283).
The performance management regime inherent in NPM is there according to government to improve efficiency and effectiveness in public sector delivery, but it has often resulted in a results orientation and a cost consciousness focus on public sector reform (Mackie, 2005). Subsequent evaluations on NPM have alluded to improvements in: performance, improved processes, capacity and savings (ibid: 7). But, Pollitt (2000) argues that while there may be savings in one area, this can be offset by increases in expenditure elsewhere, or by a reduction in quality or service provision, or simply by transferring costs somewhere else in the public sector (cited in Mackie, 2005: 7).

The performance management culture was not restricted to the Conservatives as later policies under New Labour would also endorse NPM principles, such as, the use of performance assessment frameworks, performance indicators and a focus on ‘best value’ within partnerships and networks (Mackie, 2005). Upon election in 1997 New Labour also promised to accept many reforms of the previous administration, such as, income tax rates, public spending levels, inflation targets, privatisation and a ‘more selective approach to welfare’ (Mackie, 2005: 12). In fact there was considerable convergence between New Labour and Conservative Government policy, however, Prime Minister Tony Blair argued that he was adopting a ‘third way’ between the ‘New Right’ and the ‘Old Left’ (ibid: 12), and this was most evident within partnership working (Gilling, 2007; Rummery, 2002).

2.4 Governance through Networks and Partnership

Governance can be described as a ‘change in the meaning of government’ (Rhodes, 1997: 46) or as a new method of governing (ibid: 46), primarily from hierarchical bureaucratic control to a new network of governing structures (Cairney and McGarvey, 2013). Newman (2001: 11) refers to governance as a shorthand term to describe a ‘particular set of changes’ within government, which potentially signify deep shifts (located in broader patterns of economic and social transformation) in the way in which Governments seek to govern. A shift that now sees local government sharing decision making responsibilities with other agencies (Fenwick et al., 2012: 406). The concept of governance is essential in order to understand Contemporary policy-making. Government as a term generally refers to the ‘conventional institutions and processes of the public sector’ (Cairney and McGarvey, 2013: 142), whereas governance can be used to describe how direction is
given to the public sector – in essence ‘steering not rowing’ (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Cairney and McGarvey, 2013: 142); Bell and Hindmoor (2009: 149) state governance derives from the classical Greek word Kybernan – meaning to ‘steer, pilot or direct’.

This is most apparent within local government (which for many local citizens means the town hall/city chamber; the local Council and the services they provide – thus local government is ‘what the Council does’ (Leach and Percy Smith, 2001: 1). However, in contemporary society in the UK many decisions and services which affect local communities are not under the control of the local Council but are divided into a number of other public bodies, including the Health Authorities, Skills Councils, Local Housing Associations, and in some cases other non-state actors (ibid: 1). Local governance more and more refers to multi-agency working, partnership, or policy networks, which ‘cut across organisational boundaries’ (ibid: 1).

Leach and Percy-Smith (2001) provide a useful distinction between government and governance; however, Wilson and Game (2011) have expanded on it, which can be seen in table 2 below;

**Table 2: Government and Governance – Differing emphases**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concerned primarily with the <strong>institutions</strong> of the <strong>state</strong></td>
<td>Concerned more with the <strong>processes</strong> of <strong>governing</strong> and with the many <strong>non-state actors</strong> and <strong>agencies</strong> involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primarily about what happens in the public sector</td>
<td>Much more <strong>inclusive</strong>, recognising that policy-making, service provision and problem-solving nowadays involve all <strong>sectors</strong> of society – private, voluntary, community, as well as public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focuses mainly on <strong>structures</strong></td>
<td>Concerned more with <strong>policies</strong>, <strong>outputs</strong> and <strong>outcomes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisations are characterised by <strong>bureaucratic hierarchies</strong>, <strong>authority relations</strong> and <strong>clear lines</strong> of <strong>accountability</strong></td>
<td>About <strong>networks</strong> and <strong>partnerships</strong>, <strong>bargaining</strong> and <strong>exchange relations</strong> between individuals and organisations, and <strong>blurred accountability</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About <strong>providing</strong>, <strong>directing</strong> and ‘rowing’ (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992)</td>
<td>About broader, but less involved, roles of government – <strong>enabling</strong>, <strong>facilitating</strong> and ‘steering’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Rhodes view, the concept of ‘self-organising networks’ (Rhodes, 1997: 53) provide the most meaningful analysis of change within British government (ibid: 53). This is characterised by an organisational interdependence within and out-with government to include non-state actors (ibid). Networks are typically used to describe the relationship between diverse types of actors within different walks of political, social or economic life, who often have to engage in a ‘collective action’ in order to pursue similar goals (Peterson, 2003: 1). John (2011) states that the most powerful networks are the ones that “link decision-makers in government to other actors” (ibid: 139), these actors can be within different levels of government, or beyond the state in terms of voluntary organisations, interest groups, citizen groups or private companies (ibid: 139). John asserts that the most important commodity that links all of these groups together is ‘mutual trust and knowledge’ (ibid), which will hopefully persist over time (ibid: 139).

Kjaer (2011: 103) argues that many other scholars would disagree with Rhodes view that networks are an “unintended consequence of public sector reforms” (Ibid: 102) stating that networks have always existed in the form of a multiplicity of ‘interest groups’ (ibid: 102), and instead view governance to broadly mean “steering, or as managing a government’s resources” (Kjaer, 2011: 103).

Rhodes (1997) however, argues that central government’s ability to act unilaterally has diminished, in that the privatisation/commercialisation of public service delivery combined with a loss of functions to higher tiers of government (for example, the European Union), has meant that it no longer has the knowledge or information required to solve complex public policy problems (ibid: 148). This has led to what he describes as the ‘hollowing’ out of the state, leading to a fragmented public service delivery, culminating in a weakened central government capacity to steer policy networks or partnerships (ibid: 146).

Holliday (2000) refutes this by asserting that the British core is now more ‘integrated and substantial’ than before. While he concedes that it operates within a complex environment, he nonetheless argues that this has always been the case, and while it may be fragmented it is not disabled (ibid: 175). The state still retains the power to control agencies through resource allocation, regulation and legislation (ibid: 175; Marinetto, 2003). Bell and Hindmoor (2009: 150) reject the notion that the state has lost its capacity
to govern and instead argue that governance is about seeking to govern better rather than to govern less. Rhodes acknowledged that central government has extended some power through financial control, by reasserting its control over financial resources, but argues that this may not provide enough leverage for the “centre to steer networks” (Rhodes, 1997: 16). However, he did concede that, although networks are self-organising and enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy, the government can “indirectly and imperfectly steer networks” (Rhodes, 1997: 53).

This was most evident under New Labour and their flag-ship crime control policy, insofar as the government ultimately chose to ‘steer’ local crime prevention policy via target setting, despite the localism rhetoric inherent within local governance of crime control policy (Gilling, 2007; Crawford, 1997). It became increasingly clear that partnership working underlined this New Labour ideology (Rummery, 2002: 229).

**2.4.1 Partnership Working**

Within social policy and political science literature, working in partnership or networked governance, was often linked with New Labour’s promotion of an ‘ambiguous third way’ (Gilling, 2007: 37) rhetoric, - defined by what it was not, neither the old right nor the old left (ibid: 37). For New Labour it moves beyond the ‘old’ philosophical adversarial arguments of the lefts ‘statism’ versus the new rights ‘market individualism’ (Clarke and Glendinning, 2002: 33). Instead it espoused the notion that ‘there was no right answer’ to finding solutions to problems, which did not fit neatly into any one administrative department, but rather crossed boundaries to “provide ‘cross-cutting’ themes for governmental bodies” (Gilling, 2007: 51).

Modernisation and working in partnership were both key terms espoused by the Blair Government, and to collaborate or work in partnership with others is often suggestive of some type of positive action – sounds inclusive (Fenwick et al., 2012), or as one government Minister declared partnership was “one of those nice feely words beloved by politicians” (Boateng, 1999 cited in Hudson and Hardy, 2002: 51). The New Labour government were keen to promote the concept of partnership or multi-agency co-operation within local government as a natural solution to solving those ‘wicked issues’ or long standing policy problems (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008), that no one single agency or department can tackle on its own (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Hudson and Hardy,
2002; Durose and Rummery, 2006). For example, issues such as, drugs, crime and social exclusion, often require the involvement of many individuals and/or organisations working together in a co-ordinated approach to try and find solutions to these ‘wicked problems’, a prime example would be CSPs (Ferlie et al., 2011: 308; McGarvey and Cairney, 2008).

Like the Conservatives before them New Labour set its modernisation process against the backdrop of past political failures, for example, rejecting the command and control of ‘old Labour’, and the market mechanism of the last Conservative government, which arguably led to a fragmented service delivery (Powell and Exworthy, 2002: 15). This was highlighted in the White Paper *Modernising Government*, which suggested that problems inherent within the policy process were in part due to ‘earlier managerial reforms’ (ibid: 61). The White Paper acknowledged that in some areas productivity, quality of service and value for money had improved, but it also asserted that too little effort went into the policy process itself, in terms of ensuring that the needs of the people are met. The report advocated the delivery of policies in an effective way across institutional boundaries, not only between departments but also between different levels of government (ibid: 61).

In other words the report was suggesting that ‘wicked issues’ such as crime and social exclusion could not be tackled on a departmental basis, but rather needed to be tackled in a more holistic fashion:

“Too often the work of Departments, their Agencies and other bodies has been fragmented and the focus of scrutiny has been on their individual achievements rather than on their contribution to the government’s overall strategic purpose” (Cabinet Office, 1999a cited in Newman, 2001: 61).

Consequently, the concept of partnership working or multi-agency co-operation became the order of the day within the New Labour government. Many terms have been used by New Labour to typify this ‘collaborative discourse’ (Powell and Exworthy, 2002: 15), such as: inter-agency working, joined-up government, multi-agency collaboration and networks (ibid: 15), though many academic writers associate most of these terms, including networks with partnerships (ibid: 16).
However, Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) state that analytical differences exist between the term network and partnership as modes of governance. They argue for example, that being a member of a partnership board, does not necessarily infer that an actor has entered into a relationship based on “mutual benefit, trust and reciprocity” (ibid: 314), which are common characteristics associated with a ‘network mode of governance’ (ibid: 314). Rather, partnerships can be associated with many different forms of co-ordination, including hierarchy and market (ibid: 314).

Similarly, partnership or collaboration is often put together in the same sentence to mean the same thing, however Carnwell and Carson (2009: 11) point out that although both define ‘working together’ as a key aim, they do not necessarily mean the same. For example, it is possible to differentiate between the two concepts as in attributing ‘partnership’ to mean ‘who we are’ and ‘collaboration’ to mean ‘what we do’. Huxham (2000) also states that within the New Labour ‘Modernising Government’ initiative a key term used was “collaboration between central and local government” (ibid: 339). However, collaboration can have different meanings for different organisations and individuals within them, you can collaborate with someone or work in collaboration with a particular department, but it does not necessarily mean that you are working in partnership with them. Collaboration also suggests equal relationships, rather than a directive from one collaborative partner to the other, as in the directives set down in legislative form from central government to Local Authorities (ibid).

Partnership in terms of political rhetoric has the virtue of being fairly ‘non-specific’ whilst simultaneously extolling the notion of ‘community’ and ‘collaboration’ – virtuous concepts as opposed to conflict; which no ‘sensible’ person would knowingly choose (Clarke and Glendinning, 2002: 33). Its non-specificity centres around the ‘who’, ‘what’, ‘where’ or even ‘why’ partnerships exist, for example: between organisations; government departments; the third sector and local government; central and local government; or between citizens and government and so on, basically partnerships can exist between and beyond government (ibid: 33). Partnership also suggests a co-operation between actors (Mackintosh, 2007), by working towards specific goals and objectives, managing risk, or sharing resources in order to tackle complex problems, and has subsequently become a useful governance tool within the social welfare arena (Douglas, 2009).
There have been many discussions surrounding the theory of partnerships within governance literature, and Powell and Dowling (2006) tried to match conceptual models of partnership with existing forms, by examining for example: Snape and Stewart’s (1996) three types of partnership (*facilitating, co-ordinating and implementing*) (Powell and Dowling, 2006: 306); Stoker’s (1998a, 1998b) (*principal-agent relations, inter-organisational negotiation, and systemic co-ordination*) (ibid: 306); Mackintosh’s (1992) (*synergy, transformation, and budget enlargement*) (ibid: 306) and Hasting’s (1996), who further developed Mackintosh’s *synergy* and *transformation* concepts (ibid: 307). It is not possible in this review to discuss all of these theories in-depth; however, within the realm of CSPs, some of the above theories are perhaps more pertinent. For example: Snape and Stewarts ‘*co-ordinating partnerships*’, which agree on priorities, but also accept that each partner has their own specific organisational demands (ibid: 306); Stoker’s ‘*systemic co-ordination*’, which characterises partnerships through the development of mutual trust and shared vision leading to the “establishment of self-governing networks” (ibid: 306); Mackintosh’s *synergy* and *transformation* models both have relevance in that the former increases the value of the partnership by combining resources, and the latter stresses that aims and occupational cultures within organisations can change depending on the power of the individual partners (ibid: 306). Similarly, Hasting’s views the *transformation model* as being unidirectional, in that it involves an unequal power relationship, whereby the public sector ‘is transformed against its will’ (ibid: 307).

New Labour ideology proposed that there was only one clear way to tackle social problems and that was to promote the idea of a networked form of governance between the public sector, the private sector and the ‘third sector’ (the voluntary sector). A point supported by Perri 6 who argued that “wicked problems can be solved only by more ‘holistic’ government – that is, horizontal integration and linkage between field and function” (cited in Powell and Exworthy, 2002: 18).

However, working in partnership is not a new concept, and there have been many examples of it in the UK central and local government history (Douglas, 2009), and more recently there has been many examples of problems within partnership working across the social welfare spectrum. For example, Clarke and Rummery (2002) examined front-

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2 The office for the third sector has been renamed, and government policy is now managed by the Office for Civil Society (OCS), (Alcock, 2011).
line Health and Social Care Partnerships and found that problems stemmed from inter-organisational as well as inter-professional issues, in terms of insufficient planning, location of social workers within primary care settings, and an inherent mistrust between the two professions (ibid: 69). A point reiterated by John (2011: 141) who states that although networks may be established on trust, they can also deteriorate through a lack of it. For example, previous cordial relationships may deteriorate due to misunderstandings, or if an action is taken that benefits only one party but not the other (ibid: 141). However, subsequent evaluations found that working together can help overcome historical barriers, through the prioritising of goals aimed at achieving better services for users (Clarke and Rummery, 2002: 69; Hudson and Hardy, 2002).

Lack of communication has often been cited within the Criminal Justice System (and the media) as a reason for many multi-agency system failures (Watson, 2010; Nash, 2010). High profile examples include cases such as ‘Baby P’ who died in 2007 due to months of physical abuse (Watson, 2010; Nash, 2010). The case called attention to the fact that over sixty professionals from different agencies saw Baby P, but singularly failed to join-up thinking and action, leading to a gross breakdown in communication (Watson, 2010; Nash, 2010). What this highlights is that professionals need to be clear about their roles and responsibilities within a partnership setting, opinions need to be voiced and partnership meetings need to be attended on a regular basis, by key workers in order to forward their views (ibid).

Hudson and Hardy (2002) have developed a “working tool – The Partnership Assessment Tool” (ibid: 53), based on empirical research over the past two decades into the success and failure of partnership (principally within the field of Health and Social Care) (ibid). However, it could arguably be applied to any multi-agency partnership within the public sector, especially CSPs. They discuss how overcoming barriers to joint-working is one of the key areas to be addressed within successful partnerships. However, they stress that some barriers may be more difficult to overcome than others, therefore it is necessary to identify them and seek steps to overcome them, by minimising their influence on the partnership process (ibid: 53). Barriers may be external or internal to partnerships, see Table 3 below:
Table 3: Five categories of barriers to coordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>. Fragmentation of service responsibilities across agency boundaries, both within and between sectors;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. Inter-organisational complexity;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. Non-coterminosity of boundaries;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. Competition-based systems of governance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Procedural</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>. Differences in planning horizons and cycles;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. Differences in accountability arrangements;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. Differences in information systems and protocols regarding access and confidentiality.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>. Differences in budgetary cycles and accounting procedures;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. Differences in funding mechanisms and bases;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. Differences in the stocks and flows of financial resources.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professional/cultural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>. Differences in ideologies and values;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. Professional self-interest and autonomy;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. Inter-professional domain dissensus;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. Threats to job security;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. Conflicting views about user interests and roles.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status and legitimacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>. Organisational self-interest and autonomy;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. Inter-organisational domain dissensus;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. Differences in legitimacy between elected and appointed agencies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hudson and Hardy (2002: 54)
Multi-agency collaboration and networked forms of partnership had following recent trends in central government reform focused more on the necessity of local governance as opposed to local government. Both the Conservative Government and the New Labour Government in the past two decades have placed an emphasis on the importance of local solutions to local problems. However, as previously discussed the Conservative solution focused more on freeing up the markets, in terms of ‘rolling back the state’ (Heffernan, 2000). However, within this agenda there appeared to be very little space for manoeuvre for Local Authorities, the Conservatives quickly chose to reduce their powers through a series of reforms, which saw them more as enabler than service provider (Gilling, 2007).

When New Labour came to power they began a modernisation process which sought to reduce the fragmentation inherent within the previous government’s ideology of market individualism (Stoker, 1999). They sought to do this through a process of ‘third way’ politics, which sought to encourage private enterprise whilst simultaneously controlling its excesses by virtue of regulation, evaluation and evidence led practice couched within the ethos of best value (Rhodes, 1997). New Labour intended to return some control back into the hands of local government, but it was to be held in check by the tight reigns of partnership working and the regulatory systems that came with it (Carnwell and Carson, 2009). It could be argued that partnership working in this sense is used primarily to counter the fragmentation caused by previous market reforms in public services, rather than a desire to improve the care and experience of service users (Dickenson and Glasby, 2010).

This was most evident within the local governance of crime control, when New Labour sought to stamp their popular driven penal policy agenda on both policing and local government, in the guise of local Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships. Although at first glance New Labour may have promoted localism, it soon became apparent that it was couched within the rhetoric of a centrally controlled performance management culture, which will now be briefly discussed below, by first looking at the development of British policing, and secondly looking at the impact of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.


2.5 British Policing

The term ‘policing’ can be associated with a plurality of sources insofar as private or public individuals and/or organisations can utilise resources to protect themselves or their property (Emsley, 1996). The primary aim for most of these organisations is to prevent crime and protect property and therefore ‘policing’ as a process is distinct from ‘the Police’ as a public organisation (Mawby, 2008). However, in this review ‘policing’ for the most part will refer to the public Police, which Emsley (1996: 1) defines as those “bureaucratic and hierarchical bodies employed by the state to maintain order and prevent and detect crime” (ibid: 1). They arguably also exist as a form of social control, in that the Police much like the military have the potential to use ‘legitimate force’ when necessary (Reiner, 2010).

Many authors have written about the development of British policing (see for example: Reiner, 2010; Donnelly et al., 2002: Donnelly, 2008; Donnelly and Scott, 2005; 2010a; 2010b; McLaughlin, 2001; Jones, 2008; Dinsmor and Goldsmith, 2010; Newburn, 2002; 2003; 2008; Mawby, 2008; Mawby and Wright, 2003; 2008), all of whom would agree that the Metropolitan Police Act 1829 is generally regarded as the birth of the ‘new Police’ (Emsley, 1996; 2009). Other authors such as, Donnelly and Scott and Dinsmor and Goldsmith however, state that Glasgow established the first locally funded constabulary by Act of Parliament in 1800 (Dinsmor and Goldsmith, 2010: 49).

This review however, will briefly describe the tri-partite structure of policing accountability and then focus on some key policy changes in policing from the 1980s onwards, including how the government’s responsibilisation agenda impacted on the policing of communities and, how their performance management culture had an effect on Police professionalism.

In 1962 a ‘Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Police Service’ report argued for greater Police accountability, Police reform on pay and conditions and an amalgamation of smaller forces with their bigger neighbours (Donnelly, 2008; Reiner, 2010; Emsley, 2009). The report led to major organisational changes within the Police leading to the Police Act of 1964 and the Local Government Act of 1972, which reduced the number of Police forces outside London to forty-one (Emsley, 2009: 254).
The Police Act of 1964 also established the tri-partite partnership wherein policing accountability was shared between: “the Home Office, the local Police Authority and the Chief Constable of the force” (Mawby and Wright, 2008: 241). Marshall (1978) stated that the Act put each force under the control and direction of its Chief Constable, wherein the manner of accountability to external bodies was ‘explanatory and co-operative’ rather than ‘subordinate and obedient’ (cited in Jones, 2008: 698). However, Reiner argues that the Police Act strengthened the powers of the Home Office and Chief Constables “at the expense of Local Authorities” (Reiner, 2010: 79), it also strengthened the powers of the Home Secretary (Jones, 2008: 698). A similar structure existed in Scotland, which was established under the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 wherein: Scottish Ministers retained overall responsibility for policing policy; local Police Authorities and Joint Boards set Police budgets and ensured best value was obtained; and Chief Constables were responsible for all operational policing aspects within their respective areas (Donnelly, 2008: 146; Scottish Government, 2009a: 55).

Further legislation has endorsed the tri-partite structure (although critics have argued that it further reduces local government power in favour of greater central control and direction), for example, the Police Magistrates and Court Act (PMCA) 1994 set the tri-partite structure of Police accountability within a performance management framework, which focused on achieving efficiency and effectiveness on local Police forces (Jones, 2008: 699).

Since the nineteenth century crime prevention has always been at the forefront of government policy. However, since the 1980s the Conservatives and indeed the New Labour Government that followed realised that the Police alone could not cope with nor prevent crime on their own; spiralling crime statistics testified to that fact (Reiner, 2010). Crime prevention was heavily influenced by the neo-liberal policies of Thatcher’s Conservative Government, which advocated and promoted what O’Malley (1992) referred to as ‘private prudentialism’ (cited in Gilling, 2007: 3); insofar as local citizens, communities and businesses should adopt practices conducive to reducing the risk of crime. Practices such as establishing Neighbourhood Watch schemes within communities and “the private consumption of security goods and advice” (Gilling, 2007: 3), setting the scene for the local governance of crime control (Crawford, 1997).
2.5.1 Responsibilisation and Crime Prevention

Responsibility has been a buzzword within criminological and sociological discourse, thanks in part to the continued use of the concept by both the Conservatives and New Labour (Gilling, 2007). The Conservatives first put forward the notion of community responsibility for crime prevention by advocating Neighbourhood Watch schemes (Tilley, 2002; Jones et al., 2009: 286). The Cornish Committee (1965) on the ‘Prevention and Detection of Crime’ first proposed the idea of training ‘specialist’ Police officers in the area of crime prevention, to liaise with other organisations and networks outside the Police, to take on some of the responsibility for crime control (Crawford, 1997: 26; Berry et al., 2011: 2; Hughes and McLaughlin, 2002: 149). Responsibility sits comfortably within a conservative communitarian discourse, where citizens’ rights are commensurate with their civic obligations “conducive to the neo-liberal economic order” (Gilling, 2007: 40).


However, as far as influential publications go, there are arguably none as influential as the Home Office circular 8/1984 not only for the Conservative administration but also on the subsequent New Labour Government, especially the following quote:

“A primary objective of the Police has always been the prevention of crime. However, since some of the factors affecting crime lie outside the control or direct influence of the Police, crime prevention cannot be left to them alone. Every individual citizen and all those agencies whose policies and practices can influence the extent of crime should make their contribution. Preventing crime is a task for the whole community”.


The ‘responsibilisation strategy’ (Garland, 2001) inherent within this circular sat well with a Conservative Government that wished to distance itself from the failures of its own
crime control policy (Hughes and Gilling, 2004: 133), whilst simultaneously maintaining “its rejection of the welfare state” (Edwards and Hughes, 2002:7). The tool for delivering this responsibilisation agenda was primarily within the Five Towns Initiative in 1985 (Liddle and Gelsthorpe, 1994; Crawford and Jones, 1995; Gilling, 2007), followed up by the Safer Cities Projects in 1988 (Gilling, 2007; Crawford and Jones, 1995; Hughes, 1998: 85; Crawford, 1997; 98), which combined the focus on crime prevention with a partnership approach (Rogers, 2006).

The Conservatives were convinced that their approach to crime prevention was successful (despite crime rates increasing significantly) as demonstrated by a 1990 circular ‘Crime Prevention – the success of the Partnership Approach’. However, the Home Office also commissioned James Morgan to review the development of crime prevention partnerships since the 1984 circular to find out why it was not being as successfully adopted as the Conservatives had hoped, which perhaps casts doubt on the veracity of the previous report (Crawford, 1997; Gilling, 2007).

The Morgan Review produced a report titled ‘Safer Communities: The Local Delivery of Crime Prevention through the Partnership Approach’ (Rogers, 2006: 5), which represents an “important milestone” (Crawford, 1997: 39) in the development of crime prevention partnerships, insofar as it recommended that Local Authorities be given ‘statutory responsibility’ (ibid: 39) with regard to Crime Prevention Partnerships aided by sufficient resources from central government (Rogers, 2006: 6). The report also suggested that partnerships should be conceived in the “more inclusive notion of community safety” (Gilling, 2007: 65; Hughes and McLaughlin, 2002: 155).

2.5.2 Performance Management and the Police

Under the Thatcher era performance management was a key ingredient within the governments’ “value for money culture” (Golding and Savage, 2008: 737), and the public sector was an immediate target for reform. However, the Police “remained for some considerable time a privileged sector” (ibid: 737) due in no small part to the Police Federation’s support of the Conservatives in the run up to the 1979 election (ibid: 747). However, by the early 1980s the Police service was no longer immune to public sector reform, this was due in no small part to a perceived ‘crisis on performance’ in that the Police were failing to deliver on the crime front, despite the many financial settlements
bestowed on them (Golding and Savage, 2008: 738). The Conservatives produced a number of circulars designed to increase efficiency within the Police service, for example: Home Office circular 114/1983, which informed Chief Constables and Police Authorities that any future resources would be subject to “improvements in efficiency and effectiveness in achieving objectives” (ibid: 88); and Circular 114/1983 focused on efficiency and ‘resource management’ (Crawford, 1997: 88).

This continued until the end of the 1980s whereupon, the Criminal Justice System as a whole was subjected to a bombardment of inquiries and investigations by the National Audit Office, the Public Accounts Office and the Audit Commission regarding effective practice (ibid: 91). The Sheehy (1993) ‘Inquiry into Police Responsibilities and Rewards’ and a Government White Paper on ‘Police Reform’ (1993) both, “sharpened the managerialist agenda for policing” (ibid: 88; Butterfield et al., 2004), regarding internal restructure, managerial control and flexible working patterns. Similar, reorganisation also occurred along these lines within the probation service, and these organisational changes were met with resistance from both sets of public sector workers (ibid: 88). The Police in particular operate within a hierarchical structure, which in turn is dependent on a degree of operational discretion in lower ranks, which can be hindered if there is a demand to meet operational targets (Butterfield et al., 2004: 399).

Furthermore, the Police Reform Act 2002 initiated a National Policing Plan, which set key priorities and national standards and the operational tools to deliver them over a three year period (Hope, 2005: 377). The plan places priority on achieving Government targets for local Police performance, the first of which was published in October 2005 (Jones, 2008: 708). The Police Performance Assessment Framework allowed for the comparison of ‘similar forces’, which in turn attracts local and national media interest, further increasing the pressure on Police to follow those central government targets highlighted in the media (ibid: 708).

This resultant focus on performance management within the public sector can lead to negative developments, as actors are driven to focus their attention on measurable outcomes, rather than on more holistic (less measurable outcomes) (Jones, 2008). For example, the Police may adopt a simplistic focus on: enforcement and arrest as opposed to the less measureable aspects of problem solving policing; or a focus on relatively minor
crimes to the detriment of those complex cases that may not produce positive results, such as fixed penalty notice offences (Jones, 2008: 708). Jones also points out that there has been an increase in resources devoted to the ‘performance of performance’ and ‘target meeting’, which could result in figures being manipulated rather than an emphasis on improving service delivery (ibid: 708). Lipsky (1980) referred to street-level bureaucrats as those individuals in public services (Police, Welfare Departments, Schools etc.) whose workers have “wide discretion over the dispensation of benefits or the allocation of public sanctions” (ibid: xi). He problematizes the measurement of performance within these street-level bureaucracies insofar as performance is often related to strategic goals as opposed to better performance. For example, are increased arrest rates an indication of success, an increase in criminal activity, or merely changes in the focus of Police policy? (ibid: 51).

The Police operate within an environment commensurate with risk and isolation from the public at large, and therefore develop a strong organisational culture, which has been described as a major “impediment to change” (Hope, 2005: 399). This trend towards the ‘micro-management’ of policing via performance management arguably continued and accelerated under New Labour (Jones, and Van Sluis, 2009). First with the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which put in place national objectives and performance indicators primarily within the statutory setting of Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) (Donnelly and Scott, 2010a), and secondly by the initiation of a Best Value framework, which was applied to Police Authorities and forces from April 2000 (Jones, 2008: 707). However, it is towards a key governance tool within policing that this review now briefly examines – CDRPs.

### 2.6 Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships/Community Safety Partnerships

CSPs in the UK were for England and Wales borne out of, and arguably still are, Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRP), established by New Labour after they came to power in 1997, in part response to the Conservative accusation that New Labour were ‘soft on crime’ (Muncie, 2002: 154), but also in line with their desire to control Local Authority spending (Gilling, 2007). One of the first legislative acts to be created by New Labour was the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA), as Hughes (2002: 128) states it is
perhaps telling to note that we have “community safety in a crime and disorder act rather than crime and disorder in a community safety act”.

The CDA was heavily influenced by many of the Morgan Review’s recommendations – including making it a statutory responsibility on ‘responsible authorities’ (Divisional Police Commanders and Local Authority Chief Executives) to establish a CDRP under section 5 of the Act (Ashby, 2005; Hope, 2005). Crucially, however they decided not to give Local Authorities the lead role arguing that it would “give them undue influence over the resource deployments of other agencies, notably the Police” (Gilling, 2007: 68). It was decided that both the Police and Local Authorities should share responsibility for community safety strategies (Loveday, 2006: 112). Responsibility for the Police would be overseen by a Home Secretary who had the power to set Police targets thanks to the 1994 Police Magistrate and Courts Act (PMCA), which New Labour had chosen to retain (Gilling, 2007: 68). However, the CDA offered a ‘win-win’ solution for the Police by bringing Local Authorities (enhancing community accountability) and other agencies onto the Police side to fight crime, who in turn could share the blame if things went wrong (Hope, 2005: 374-377).

Problems concerning structure and control existed within CDRPs right from the start. For example, CDRPs were to be based on evidence of ‘what works’ or ‘evidenced-based practice’. Consequently, ‘responsible authorities’ were inundated with guidance pertaining to how they would be able to meet those statutory duties placed on them based on a government approved ‘best practice’ guide, such as, ‘Guidance on Statutory Crime and Disorder Partnerships’ (Home Office, 1998).

Most of the statutory guidance deliberated around issues thought to promote ‘successful partnership working’, such as: informal networking with CDRP partners, sufficient reporting mechanisms, and representation from senior personnel (Home Office, 1998). The Home Office guidance also identified those who they thought to be key players involved in the implementation of the legislation, including local Police Commanders, Chief Officers, Councillors and representatives from the private and voluntary sector (Home Office, 1998: 6.1).
The aforementioned guidance referred to the fact that it was ‘not intended to be prescriptive’ (Home Office, 1998: Introduction) or that it sought to impose a structure on partnerships. Nevertheless, it stated that a CDRP should develop a shared strategy with the right level of people, who are able to put effective and accountable decision making mechanisms in place, which is more or less a recipe for a structural framework (ibid). Similarly, the Guidance gives pointers regarding the levels of representation on the partnerships, stating that it should be left for each agency to decide, providing they have the authority to make decisions (ibid). This brings into question whether it will be a top-down or bottom-up approach to partnership, and if it is a top-down approach, then how will that impact on the capacity of local community representatives in terms of involvement in the decision making process.

The guidance referred to the “Home Secretary's powers under sections 5(2)(c) and 5(3) of the Crime and Disorder Act respectively to specify other bodies which either must themselves contribute directly to the work of the partnerships, or must be invited to do so” (ibid). A diverse range of groups are included within the category of those who must be ‘invited’ to take part ranging from youth and community groups to shopkeepers, Neighbourhood Watch and other groups (ibid). It is within this diversity that structural problems exist, for example, as legislative accountability cannot be enforced on non-statutory groups, which ultimately creates “two classes of CDRP membership” (Gilling, 2007: 73); which is also germane to CSPs in Scotland.

Crawford (1997; 1998) argues that partnership working in general is often subject to ‘differential power relations’. At the structural level there are often deep potentially divisive power relations between different agencies within multi-agency partnerships (Crawford, 1997; Hope, 2005). These differences in power relations often manifest as organisational access to resources, be it human or material, information sharing or ‘claims to expertise’ (Crawford, 1997: 127), which can ultimately affect organisations capacity to achieve their desired outcome (ibid: 127). Crawford (1997) argues that large agencies like the Police can deploy resources in a fairly rapid and flexible manner compared to others who do not have the same hierarchical structure or resources easily at hand (Crawford, 1997: 127). They arguably are perceived to have more social capital in terms of being able to deploy resources quickly (Coleman, 1988). This in turn can lead to conflict as the Police adopt a ‘lead’ agency status, and voice their frustration at the slow decision making
process and resource deployment of other agencies, especially in areas where they have no interest, which can in turn lead to the withdrawal of Police resources (ibid: 127).

Critics such as Gilling (2007) and Phillips, (2002) have also highlighted that when the Crime and Disorder Act came into existence in the summer of 1998, CDRPs were expected to produce their first three yearly crime and disorder reduction strategy by the beginning of the following April. They argue that from the outset this can be viewed as particularly problematic, given that there was a lack of initial funding and public sector resources available to produce an effective strategy within such a short timescale in the first place. The strategy also had to allow for effective communication between all the agencies involved and more importantly with the local community. As Phillips (2002: 173) states it “put an inordinate amount of pressure on partnerships”. Time pressures in particular affected the ability to consult with ‘hard to reach’ (Newburn, 2002: 111) sectors of the community leading to questions regarding the representativeness of community consultation (Phillips, 2002: 173). During an analysis of the first round of audits and strategies the Home Office found that target-setting if it happened at all, was a ‘haphazard affair’, with many CDRPs resorting to the use of ‘umbrella strategies’ that repackaged initiatives already in place under the ‘CDRP brand’ (Gilling, 2007: 80).

By 1999 New Labour initiated the Crime Reduction Programme, which aimed to provide funding over a three year period in support of ‘what works’ projects in crime reduction in a number of ‘distinct themed areas’ (Gilling, 2007: 81; Homel et al., 2004; McLaughlin, 2002b: 47). Projects granted funding were subject to an “overhauled performance management regime” (Gilling, 2007: 79), which required them to set five year targets for the reduction of specific crimes, such as burglary, robbery and vehicle crime (Hope, 2005: 376). This was subject to a best value performance regime and the results used to promote best practice across the country (ibid: 376). One of the major recipients of the fund were to be CDRP’s who could apply for funding on a competitive basis, providing of course that they could demonstrate they had a disproportionate problem within one of the themed area, and an understanding of ‘what works’ principles (Homel et al., 2004). The dilemma faced by most CDRPs was that their strategies had already been conducted, and if they had not included one of the government’s themed areas in their report, then it
would be difficult for them to claim they had a disproportionate problem in that area (Gilling, 2007: 84).

In the end not all CDRPs secured funding from the Crime Reduction Programme, as most of it was given to high crime urban areas (ibid: 83). Those who lost out on funding began to lose enthusiasm and in real terms the programme began to undermine the infrastructure put in place by the CDA (Gilling, 2007: 83). Central government rhetoric advocated a localised approach to crime reduction within CDRPs, and it soon became apparent that continual reforms of the Criminal Justice System often meant that what existed in real terms, was central control couched in the language of localism, which often came with strings attached (Keith, 2004; Gilling, 2007; Crawford, 2008). For example, the White Paper ‘*Strong Leadership, Quality Public Services*’, asserted it wished to allow for more ‘entrepreneurial government’ (Gilling, 2007:113) under the guise of the *Comprehensive Performance Assessment*, which rated Authorities performance; with better performing Authorities earning a degree of autonomy (Wilson, 2004: 117). In other words autonomy is earned if you met central rather than local government or community targets (ibid). Target setting/monitoring was also reinforced within CDRPs by both the *Crime Reduction Directorates created in 2000*, and by the *2004 Prolific and Other Priority Offenders Strategy*, which utilised the National Intelligence Model for CDRPs to find on average 15 to 20 offenders in their areas (Gilling, 2007; Davies, 2009). Many other reforms were enacted during this period which on the face of it often promoted localism. On paper it may have looked like ‘rowing’, however, it was more often than not central government ‘steering’ (Gilling, 2007; Crawford, 2006).

### 2.6.1 Social Exclusion

Addressing and tackling the fear of crime and social disorder became high on the New Labour agenda, set within a discourse of social inclusion. However, as critics such as Crawford (1997) and Gilling (2007) have highlighted social inclusion often translates within the discourse of crime control as the social exclusion of the ‘other’. For example, within CDRPs there is an inherent problem in that, some voluntary, public and private sector agencies have very different organisational aims, priorities and interests to those agencies involved within the Criminal Justice System (Skinner, 2010). Some partner agencies may prefer to adopt a social welfare approach to crime prevention rather than a
more reactive situational based approach, which in turn can lead to tensions amongst partner agencies (Hughes, 2002). The CDA for example, created Youth Offending Teams, to replace Local Authority social workers within social services (Pamment, 2010: 217) primarily to deal with youth criminality, which could lead to an overlap of responsibility and possible conflict with regard to how young people are targeted within the criminal justice arena (ibid:225).

Other fundamental problems exist within CDRPs in terms of how young people in general are often the target of antisocial behaviour enforcement and exclusion (Flint, 2002; Hughes, 2002). New Labour’s crime prevention policies were heavily influenced by Etzioni’s ‘third way’ communitarianism which argued that societies moral values were being eroded as a direct result of social policies from the left and the New Right’s “privileging of self-interest over the needs of social order” (McLaughlin, 2002a: 89). The core message that New Labour took was the need for responsibility and obligation and a return to ‘core moral values’ (ibid: 89). The Coalition Government elected in 2010 also stressed that reforms involve “significant transfers of responsibility from the state to the private sector and to the citizen” (Taylor-Gooby and Stoker, 2011: 4); a trend that has continued under the present Conservative led UK government. But, a question that must be answered is what community or whose community is this based on? Coleman et al., (2002: 101) found that in a study in Liverpool a series of formal and informal networks were established within partnerships, which were directed towards the “construction of a politics of responsibilisation” (ibid: 101), wherein coordinated efforts were made within the partnership to channel funds to those thought to be reliable, responsible and credible partners (ibid: 101). Furthermore, an ‘unwritten and unofficial’ (ibid: 101) condition for inclusion into the partnerships may in fact exclude those organisations and community interests that are vital and in most need of help (ibid: 101).

Many critics argue that not everyone has an equal voice at community meetings, and that they are often attended by the same people, the usual suspects (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004), who often speak for their own narrow agendas, which do not always include notions of security from the perspective of the wider community (Edwards, 2002; Farrow and Prior, 2006). A quote by Hart et al., (1997) discusses the perceived issue of the lack of community empowerment within partnerships and it is worth repeating in full:
“The prime stakeholder who will ultimately determine the success or failure of the project is the community. Yet, at the strategic level, they have little or no real say in what happens to the area. Whilst they were consulted at the beginning of the project to determine what they assessed to be the prime targets for regeneration, time and again they are thwarted in their efforts to exercise real control. In the final analysis of the level of power holding, the inter-dependent relationship between agencies and the citizen is still top down” (Hart et al., 1997: 193 cited in Foster 2002: 186).

How much power you have within communities is often related to the notion of social capital. Bourdieu locates social capital within the fields of cultural reproduction; the field in this sense is a social space where agents are situated with certain resources, defined as four forms of capital: economic, cultural, social and symbolic (Bourdieu, 1986: Flint and Rowland, 2003), and “the field structures actions for control over these resources” (Flint and Rowland, 2003: 214). Coleman (1988) on the other hand locates social capital within the field of economics and rational action, whereas Putnam (2000: 21) has tried to identify two different strands of social capital - bonding (or exclusive) and bridging (or inclusive) social capital. While all theories in relation to social capital are useful in highlighting how elite groups/government utilise all forms of capital to arguably dominate others; in terms of partnership working – bonding and bridging social capital (or lack thereof) is perhaps more useful within the governance of community safety to describe the difference in capacity/power that exists between organisations within the governance of community safety. The following section will briefly discuss the aforementioned concepts.

2.6.2. Social Capital

To have ‘capital’ per se has long been associated with the notion of economics, for example, capital in the sense of property, reified objects and money. Economic capital reproduces other forms of capital, for example, cultural capital and human capital (skills and knowledge embodied in labour). Bourdieu (1986: 6) refers to cultural capital as “in its fundamental state it is linked to the body and presupposes embodiment” – the embodied capital in this sense is intrinsic to the person who holds it; integral to the habitus - “systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to
function as structuring structures...” Bourdieu (1990:53). In other words how the outer social world or externalised structures are internalised resulting in internalised dispositions, which enable individuals or groups to acknowledge the boundaries set within a stratified social world (Swartz, 1997: 103); as a means of communication (Bourdieu, 1991) and how they help shape each other (Maton, 2012).

According to Bourdieu (1986) cultural capital can to varying degrees be acquired, (for example, through academic qualifications) but, internalised dispositions through, for example, language (pronunciations, accent etc.) may determine its value. In essence it takes time to cultivate, and it is often made evident through the use of language and social class. It is symbolic and effective only insofar as how it is appropriated by agents in the various fields of power (economic, political, cultural, scientific etc.).

Social capital is a well discussed concept amongst academics, policy-makers and practitioners (Flint and Rowland, 2003), and there are many ways to measure it, through for example, social networks, participation in organisations, social support and arguably through the most important measure of all – trust (Wallace and Pichler, 2007). It has also been associated with the embedded social norms within a given society, indeed in a report from the World Bank it is referred to as:

“The internal social and cultural coherence of society, the norms and values that govern interactions among people and the institutions in which they are embedded” (Wallace and Pichler, 2007: 29).

Social capital is also as the result of the combined real or possible resources which are related to the association or membership of a resilient network made up of relationships of mutual ‘acquaintance and recognition’ (Bourdieu, 1986). Bourdieu when discussing the ‘forms of capital’ describes these relationships as existing:

“Only in the practical state, in material and/or symbolic exchanges which help to maintain them. They may also be socially instituted and guaranteed by the application of a common name (the name of a family, a class, or a tribe or of a school, a party, etc.)” (Bourdieu, 1986: 13).
James Coleman locates the notion of social capital within the theory of rational action insofar as he states that - every actor has control over a certain amount of resources, and has an interest in particular resources, actions or events. Social capital therefore signifies certain resource availability to an actor (Coleman, 1988: 98). Much like Bourdieu he believes “unlike other forms of capital, social capital inheres in the structure of relations between actors and among actors” (Coleman, 1988: 98). An actor need not be an individual, but can also be a ‘corporate actor’, whereupon ‘relations’ exist in terms of the sharing of information that can lead to a mutual advantage. However, Coleman asserts that while this information exchange may be a beneficial form of social capital for some, it may not be viewed as such by others, for example, it may be used to fix market prices or restrict the production of some goods.

What is critical to social capital is the notion of trust that exists with (varying degrees) within a group or network of individuals. For example, a group that has extensive trustworthiness and trust will achieve far more than a similar group where it is absent (Coleman, 1988). Putnam (2000: 19) also reinforces the notion that social capital refers to the relations between individuals and networks, but also highlights the “norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them”. In relation to informal crime control - social capital can reinforce a strong sense of collective social norms by making possible certain actions whilst restricting others (Rose and Clear, 1998). In this sense a prescriptive norm must be adhered to by a community in the belief that it is in the interests of collectivism (Coleman, 1988). However, this does not take into account the existence of competing sources of community norms; particularly within closed communities where low level criminality is tolerated and in some cases encouraged - drug use, illegal money-lending, distribution of counterfeit goods etc., (Flint, 2002). Notions of trust may still exist within these communities, however, it is more likely to be a ‘narrow radius of trust’ (Fukuyama, 2001: 9) where outsiders are viewed with suspicion. The type of social capital in existence in this case may more readily be associated with bonding social capital.
2.6.3 Bonding and Bridging Social Capital

Some theorists, such as Putnam (2000: 21) when discussing the collapse and revival of the American community have tried to identify two different strands of social capital; referred to as bonding (or exclusive) and bridging (or inclusive) social capital. Bonding social capital is characterised as most prevalent in people who are likeminded in important aspects, most often associated with strong family type groups or groups of ethnic minorities (Putnam, 2000; Campbell and Sacchetti, 2014). It is also associated with smaller dense groups, which are bound together by strong ties (Wallace and Pichler, 2007). Some examples may be homogenous type groups such as faith groups based on gender, Country clubs or ethnic fraternal associations (Putnam, 2000: 21).

Bridging social capital on the other hand is characterised by weaker ties, heterogeneity; and by linking to a broader network of external assets in the course of information sharing etc., (Putnam, 2000: 22). Examples, may include business colleagues, or other interested groups (Campbell and Sacchetti, 2014), or civil rights organisations, youth groups or other politically affiliated groups (Putnam, 2000). Mark Granovetter points out that weak ties that have the possibility of linking a person to a useful social or political contact, are actually more valuable than strong ties that link an actor to family and friends (Granovetter, 1983; Putnam, 2000: 23). This is reinforced by Briggs who points out that while bonding social capital is good for getting by, bridging social capital is vital for getting ahead; and is particularly crucial within diverse societies (Briggs, 2004: 154); especially disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Vidal, 2004; Rohe, 2004; Gress, 2004). Furthermore, he points out that not all forms of social capital are good for everyone – citing the networks that helped facilitate Timothy McVeigh in the bombing of the Federal building in Oklahoma City (Putnam, 2000: 23). This can also be true for mafia type networks, criminal organisations and other groups associated with crime or deviant behaviour (Fukuyama, 2001).

Linking social capital is also associated with bonding or bridging social capital, characterised by relationships of trust and respect between people across networks; or connections to people in positions of authority when there is low access to public or private institutions, for example, relationships between citizens and Council
representatives within community organisations (Woolcock, 2004). Szreter and Woolcock, (2004) describe it as “people who are interacting across explicit, formal, or institutionalised power or authority gradients in society” (cited in Campbell and Sacchetti, 2014: 225). What is apparent from the literature is that social capital is closely associated with relations of trust that exist between individuals, groups or networks and is heavily influenced by the accepted or dominant norms, rules or regulations set within it.

It is clear that social capital exists in many forms, and in terms of networks and partnerships it is a useful theoretical tool to employ to describe the relationships that exist between actors and organisations within them. Within crime and disorder and community safety partnership working, Coleman’s (1988) economic approach is useful to describe how resource dependency may force some organisations to acquiesce to the demands of more powerful partners. Partners who may for example, have more symbolic power within a particular field (Bourdieu, 1986); for instance policing or community planning. However, Putnam’s (2000) concept of bonding and bridging social capital is perhaps more useful in explaining why some actors/organisations may fair better in terms of acquiring resources in the first place through their extensive connections to knowledgeable others.

Although, CDRP/CSP’s previously discussed, did not statutorily apply to Scotland through the CDA enacted in 1998, it nonetheless became increasingly apparent that the newly elected Labour dominated Scottish Executive, were keen to absorb and adapt some of New Labour’s legislation and policy on crime control; in contrast to a previous penal welfare policy divergence from England and Wales, which will now briefly be discussed below.

2.7 Devolution and the Scottish Government

The Scotland Act 1998 set in motion the devolution process in Scotland (Danson and Whittam, 2011). Hazell (2000) described devolution as a series of decisions that transformed “a highly centralised unitary state into a devolved and quasi-federal system of government” (cited in Cairney, 2011: 1). This has allowed for a more consensual style of politics, wherein the Scottish Government (or the Scottish Executive as it was known then) could enact policies tailored to meet the specific needs or interests of Scottish
communities (Cairney, 2011). It was hoped that devolution would reinforce or help maintain those institutions that reflected a particular Scottish identity, such as separate legal, education, church and local government systems (ibid: 1). Therefore devolution also meant the acquisition of the administrative autonomy necessary to put in place policies specific to Scotland with the opening of a Scottish Parliament; replete with the legislative powers to do so (ibid: 2). Cairney argues that this took place “within a wider system of multi-level governance” (ibid: 2), when power was distributed across different levels of government, and it is within this framework that the Scottish Government needs Local Authorities to deliver services in line with ‘national political and financial priorities’ (McConnell, 2004: 211).

McGarvey and Cairney (2008) state that regulation has been one of the main tools used by central government in answer to key governance problems, such as the lack of accountability and control inherent within ‘arms-length’ external organisations in central and local government (ibid: 150). The ‘regulatory state thesis’ (ibid: 150) suggests, that as arm’s length agencies take over from public sector agencies to directly serve the public, there is a shift away from ‘high trust’ to ‘low-trust’ as more emphasis is placed on the use of “authority, rules and standard setting” (ibid: 150). Scrutiny and oversight in Scotland is conducted by a variety of bodies, including the Auditor General and Audit Scotland (Cairney and McGarvey, 2013). Much of this regulation is based on NPM principles such as establishing priorities and targets by use of performance management. In Scotland this has become more apparent within the policing of crime and disorder, especially since New Labour came to power in 1997, which set in motion the devolution process. For example, many academics have commented on how devolution initially circumscribed Scotland’s ‘distinctiveness’ in terms of supplanting Scotland’s welfarist principles’ within the Criminal Justice System, with an increasing punitive approach focusing on targets and objectives (McAra 2007; McAra and McVie, 2010; Croall, 2006; 2012; Mooney and Scott, 2012; Maxwell, 2007).

Although there was an initial convergence with England in terms of criminal justice policy and partnership working, there is evidence to suggest that Scotland was once again returning to a more welfare driven approach, which will briefly be discussed below.
2.7.1 Divergence and Convergence

Scotland it has been argued retained a distinctive civic culture within the UK, despite the dissolution of the Scottish Parliament in 1707 (McAra 2007; McAra and McVie, 2010; Croall, 2006; 2012; Mooney and Scott, 2012; Maxwell, 2007). Scotland’s youth justice system in particular has been heralded for its ‘child centred approach’ (McAra, 2007; McAra and McVie, 2010; Croall, 2006). The most ground-breaking welfarist approach to juvenile justice emerged from the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, which eradicated the existing juvenile courts system and replaced it with the Children’s Hearing System (CHS) (McAra, 2007; Croall, 2006; Mooney and Scott, 2012). The CHS was based on the ‘Kilbrandon philosophy’ (McAra and McVie, 2010: 69), borne out of the Kilbrandon Committee in 1964, which sought to decriminalise and remove children under the age of sixteen from the courts system (Croall, 2006). The philosophy advocated that young people (more often than not) were the victims of social circumstances conducive to offending behaviour, and therefore sought to rectify this where possible, through the care and protection of the child (ibid; McAra and McVie, 2010).

In contrast to this England and Wales (which had initially attempted to follow Scotland’s lead by focusing on child welfare) established the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 (McAra, 2011). Wherein a more punitive stance was adopted despite the welfarist rhetoric enshrined within the Act (McAra, 2011; McAra and McVie, 2010). Scotland differed somewhat from other Criminal Justice Systems in Europe and in the USA during the 1970s until the 1990s, with its continued commitment to penal welfare values. Institutions such as the CHS and Criminal Justice Social Work were according to McAra (2007: 107) “emblematic of a distinctively Scottish approach to crime and punishment”, which was based on an obligation to promote social justice (ibid). Whilst social justice is an ambiguous term to define, in Scotland it has been associated with the need to eradicate poverty and inequality as witnessed by an address to the reconvened Scottish parliament in 1999 by Donald Dewar who stated “we are committed to promoting social justice and equality of opportunity for everyone in Scotland...which lies at the heart of political and civic life...” (Dewar, 1999, cited in Mooney and Scott, 2012:1).

Whilst it is true that the Scottish system tried to avoid the more punitive criminal justice policies driven by Thatcher’s neo-liberal agenda in England, it cannot however maintain
that it was never affected by them. For example, the CHS was criticised for being ‘too soft’ and in 1983 the Health and Social Services and Social Security Adjudications Act allowed for a child to reside in secure accommodation if it was in the public interest (McAra and McVie, 2010). In 1995 the Children (Scotland) Act overruled the ‘child centred’ approach if the child posed a significant risk to the public (ibid; Croall, 2006).

On the whole punitive policies were resisted more in Scotland, partly because tight criminal justice policy networks made up of Directors of the Judiciary and Social Work, and senior civil servants from the Crown Office, were not intrinsically part of the UK government, which had a major impact on policy (Croall, 2006). This was combined with the unpopularity of the Westminster Conservative government, which in turn led to fewer Conservative politicians north of the border, which impacted on Scotland’s ‘ideological climate’ (ibid: 591) leading to a divergence from the more popular driven pressures inherent within English crime policy (ibid: 591).

2.7.2 Convergence

In spite of a creeping managerialist agenda, Scotland for the most part retained its welfarist principles, especially within Criminal Justice Social Work (McAra, 2011). However, from the mid to late 1990s core aspects of penal-welfarism in Scotland were abandoned as a whole new range of institutions were embedded onto the Criminal Justice System, such as: the National Criminal Justice Board, specialist Drug and Domestic Violence Courts, and CSPs (ibid: 281). This became more pronounced in the post-devolution period as the New Labour Westminster government sought to achieve a consensus with the newly elected Labour/Liberal coalition Scottish Executive (Croall, 2006; 2012; McAra and McVie, 2010; Dumbleton and McPhail, 2012). Many argue that the dominance of the Labour party at the UK and Scottish Government level, led to a ‘detartinisation’ of Scottish social policy (McAra, 2011; Croall et al., 2010), partly due to a lack of ‘political will’ to go against the ‘Blair orthodoxy’ (Croall, 2006), and partly from a lack of political capacity within this ‘fledgling’ Scottish Executive (McAra, 2007), which arguably put a brake on innovative policy making (Croall et al., 2010).

This was most evident within policies directed towards crime and disorder reduction, as Scottish Ministers like their English counterparts, began to be driven by a view that antisocial behaviour was on the increase (McAra, 2007: 108). Although Crime and
Disorder Reduction Partnerships were statutorily imposed on Local Authorities in England and Wales, this was not the case in Scotland, and it was not until the Local Government (Scotland) Act 2003 that Community Planning Partnerships (incorporating community safety) were given statutory force in Scotland (Henry, 2009). McAra (2007) argues that this overhaul of the Criminal Justice System placed a (somewhat contradictory) (ibid: 109) emphasis on both centralisation and localisation. On the one hand Local Authorities were being granted greater autonomy and policy freedom in the guise of multi-agency partnerships, but on the other hand, it was also set within a centrally controlled managerialist agenda based on best value (ibid: 109; McConnell, 2004).

It could be argued that convergence with England continued up until and beyond the election of the SNP minority government in 2007, as they too lacked, perhaps not the political will, but certainly the majority support to diverge too far from the previous dominance of Westminster policies. However, prior to the election, there was evidence that Scotland would re-emphasise its penal-welfarist principles. For example, the report ‘Getting it Right for Every Child: Proposals for Action’ once again advocated ‘high quality children’s services’ (McAra and McVie, 2010:73), and the SNP government followed it up with, ‘Preventing Offending by Young People: A Framework for Action’, which contained an uneasy mix of welfarist, risk-assessment, and punitive measures (ibid: 73; Croall, 2012). In spite of this it was becoming clear that the SNP government were more willing to listen to the concerns of ‘policy and practitioner elites’ (McAra and McVie, 2010: 74) and were choosing to adopt a less punitive tone towards young offenders (Croall, 2012). Ministers withdrew the previous administrations performance targets directed towards persistent offenders, quietly set aside pilot youth courts, and more crucially abandoned the more punitive aspects of the antisocial behaviour agenda directed towards twelve to fifteen year olds (McAra and McVie, 2010: 74-76).

It could be argued that an area of policy convergence in the UK was within Community Safety Partnerships, although Scotland did not begin on the same statutory footing as England and Wales, it was nonetheless closely linked to influential New Labour Westminster policy, inherent within community planning and antisocial behaviour legislation (McAra, 2011; Henry, 2009). Community Safety in Scotland has been subsumed under the remit of Community Planning Partnerships since the 2003 Local Government Act, which will be briefly discussed below.
2.8 Community Safety Partnerships within a Scottish Context

As previously mentioned the CDA, which imposed community safety structures in England and Wales (Henry, 2009), called for multi-agency/public co-operation in order to ‘make communities safer’ (Gilling, 2007). Although not a statutory requirement in Scotland its influence was far reaching within central and local government policy such as section 15(1) of The Local Government in Scotland Act 2003, which required Local Authorities to act as ‘facilitators, to consult and co-operate with community bodies and with other public sector bodies as appropriate in a community planning process’ (HMSO, 2003). Although, this put partnerships on a statutory footing in Scotland, it was linked to a ‘broader agenda of good public governance’ (Henry, 2012: 12) rather than focusing solely on crime and disorder (ibid: 12).

Community safety as a concept is hard to define as it encompasses a variety of issues, which means it is covered by a wide range of legislation, such as the Antisocial Behaviour etc. (Scotland) Act 2004 and the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010. Many other Acts contribute to community safety based around for example, Housing, the Environment, Road Safety and Child Protection amongst others (Scottish Community Safety Network, 2012a). It also has to evolve over time to take on board new developments and reports such as the ‘Commission on the Future Delivery of Public Services’ (also known as the Christie Commission produced in 2011), which advocates a stronger focus on outcomes and long term preventative action (Scottish Government, 2011c); or the Strategy for Justice in Scotland outlining the aims of the Justice System to secure the safety of people and communities in Scotland (Scottish Government, 2012g).

Since devolution there have been many key moments which have affected the development of Community Safety Partnerships in Scotland (Audit Scotland, 2000), for example: when the Scottish Executive, and the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (ACPOS), and the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA) agreed an approach in 1998 on how to deliver a partnership model; recommending that they should be under the leadership of Local Authorities and/or the Police (Scottish Community Safety Network, 2012a); the Scottish Local Authorities Community Forum formed in 1998 became the Scottish Community Safety Network in 2005, which provided a forum for officers responsible for the strategic development of community safety at both the local
and national level (ibid); and the Concordat between the Scottish Government and local
government in 2007, which introduced the Single Outcome Agreement within every Local
Authority. The Concordat had a major impact on CSPs insofar as it removed ring-fenced
funding (put in place between 2004-2007), which resulted in a reduction in CSP funding as
partnerships had to bid against other significant Local Authority priorities and statutory
duties. Furthermore, as CSPs became more integrated within Local Authorities, there is an
argument that there is reduced autonomy and more restricted work practices (ibid).

Nevertheless, CSPs have continued to evolve within this process, wherein a number of
agencies work together to resolve community safety issues, in line with National
Outcome nine of the Scottish Government’s National Performance Framework: ‘We live
our lives safe from crime, disorder and danger’ (Scottish Government, 2011d).
Nonetheless, there has also been a continuing emphasis on managerialism, audits,
preparing annual reports etc., which has arguably led to more time being devoted to
bureaucratic administration, rather than time spent on creative community safety
strategies (Henry, 2012: 14). A number of reports have been published, for instance,
relating to how to achieve best value in partnerships, including: ‘Best Value in Public
Services - Guidance for Accountable Officers’ and a number of Audit Scotland ‘Best Value
Toolkits’ (Scottish Government, 2011b; Audit Scotland, 2010). This further highlights the
performance management culture within central and local governance, which could lead
to the adoption of strategies deemed more readily quantifiable, for example, strategies
based on reducing specific crimes already identified on National Policing Plans, rather
than on more holistic social objectives that are difficult to quantify (Henry, 2009).

Henry’s (2012: 14) study on Community Safety Partnerships viewed partnerships as being
transformative over time, he also viewed partnerships as ‘constellations of communities
of practice’, rather than a single ‘community of practice’, for example, focused on specific
domains, such as CCTV, youth initiatives or road safety (ibid: 15). He warns that within
CSPs areas of work have to continue to be valued/and or resourced in order for
people/organisations to maintain a commitment to them. This is further complicated by
the ongoing fiscal crisis and whether or not budget cuts will affect communities of
practice, or how much it will affect an ongoing commitment to partnership working in
general (ibid: 16). However, while highlighting the significant pressures on public
spending, the *Christie Commission* also reinforces that “unless Scotland embraces a radical, new collaborative culture throughout our public services, both budgets and provision will buckle under the strain” (Scottish Government, 2011c: viii); which suggests that partnership working in Scotland is the only feasible way forward (Walklake, 2001).

Partnership working will also have to be viewed in the context of the Scottish Government’s centralisation agenda. For example, as of April 2013 Scotland is the first nation within the UK to have one national Police and Fire Service under the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 (Oag, 2012a); which effectively replaced the previous eight Scottish Forces (ibid). However, the former Chief Constable Sir Stephen House in the Apex Annual Lecture (2013) made clear that while the Police as an organisation were committed to partnership working no ‘partnership should go unreviewed’ (ibid: 9); further stipulating that effective partnerships would be reinforced whilst weak ones (capable of doing good things) would be strengthened. In effect partnerships would need to be ‘proved to be relevant, not simply historic’ (ibid: 9).

One of the main concerns surrounding a National Police Service is how greater central control will affect local policing (Donnelly et al., 2002; Scott, 2013), for instance the shift from a tri-partite structure of policing to a structure that arguably favours more central control. For example, now governance and oversight of Police Scotland will exist under a new Scottish Police Authority (SPA), which will also be responsible for holding the Chief Constable to account, and for the provision of forensic services. The Act also gives Scottish Ministers the power to direct the SPA, but not the Chief Constable (Scottish Government, 2012d).

Scott (2013: 142) highlights that a key comment on policing in the UK is the political neutrality of the Police, however there have been concerns expressed that this could potentially change under a single Police force. Other concerns have been expressed regarding Police accountability and the declining role of Local Authorities, which further fuelled the perception of a loss of localism and a decline in local policing (Scott, 2012). For example, the SPA will be made up of appointed rather than elected members, who will be responsible for the National Policing Plan, which on the face of it signals a move towards greater centralism (Fyfe, 2014). Scott (2013: 142-143) argues that as the SPA chair and membership are chosen by Scottish Ministers and the Police Service of Scotland will be
funded directly by the Scottish Government through the SPA, together with the fact that under the Reform Act the “Authority ‘must comply’ with any direction (general or specific) given by the Scottish Ministers” means that this creates a potential for “political interference in policing”.

Scott (2013: 143) also pointed out that when the new Chief Constable of Police Scotland was appointed by the ‘unelected’ SPA (Terpstra and Fyfe, 2015) (which under the Reform Act must be approved by Scottish Ministers) the SPA board only had in place the Chair, which granted was a unique circumstance, but it also left the appointment open to speculation of political interference from the centre. Under Chapter 7 of the Reform Act local policing has been made a statutory requirement with 32 Police areas aligned to 32 Local Authority areas each with their own Local Commander (although a Local Commander may cover more than one Local Authority area) who will draw up the Local Police Plan (Legislation.gov.uk, 2012).

However, Donnelly et al., argue that larger scale policing does not necessarily mean ‘a weakening of local community links’ (ibid: 301), by citing how the local divisional strategies and community policing initiatives of the largest force in Scotland – Strathclyde Police - successfully operated at the neighbourhood level (ibid: 301). The Scottish Government also state that the new procedures in place will ensure local accountability, by the appointment of Local Commanders and senior officers for each Local Authority, which could arguably lead to enhanced localism (Oag, 2012a:5; 2012b).

The Chief Constable of the new Police Scotland will be given clear authority over the direction and control of officers within the force. Other responsibilities will include helping to prepare the Strategic and Annual Police Plans, and the new Scottish Police Authority’s (SPA) Annual Report. Information on policing and crime will also be sent to the SPA (Oag, 2012a: 19).

This may impact on CSPs in terms of Local Authority and community planning involvement or degree of influence over policing in particular. For example, under the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012, Scottish Ministers will determine the strategic priorities for the SPA; the SPA will in turn prepare a Strategic Police Plan setting out the main objectives for the policing of Scotland (HMSO, 2012: 33-34). On this basis the new Chief Constable of Scotland will then prepare an Annual Policing Plan (ibid: 35). Both the
SPA and the Chief Constable are required to provide a copy of the Plans to Local Authorities, and invite comments, however, it fails to make clear what will happen if a Local Authority or Community Planning Partnership, disagrees with a Local Policing Plan, which opens up debates surrounding local accountability, which may lead to future conflict within CSPs (Oag, 2012a: 5).

It is not clear how far this policy divergence/convergence process will continue, or how it will continue to impact on the community planning process. CSPs in particular, will have to adjust to this new fiscal climate, and also to the centralisation agenda of the Scottish government. Whether they can, or continue to function in partnership with other agencies all ‘singing to the same hymn sheet’ (Nash, 2010) can only be established by future research, which looks not only at how partnership functions within a community safety context, but also why it is necessary to continue to do so.

2.9 Conclusion

Multi-agency collaboration and network forms of partnership has, following recent trends in central government reform, focused more on the necessity of local governance as opposed to local government. Both the Conservative Government and the New Labour Government in the past two decades have placed an emphasis on the importance of local solutions to local problems. However, as previously discussed the Conservative solution focused more on freeing up the markets, in terms of ‘rolling back the state’ (Heffernan, 2000). This neo-liberal agenda advocated individual choice set within an economic market exchange system, which advanced private sector business practices in the guise of new public management principles (Stoker, 2004b). However, within this agenda there appeared to be very little space for manoeuvre for Local Authorities, the Conservatives quickly chose to reduce their powers through a series of reforms, which saw then more as enabler than service provider (Gilling, 2007).

When New Labour came to power they began a modernisation process which sought to reduce the fragmentation inherent within the previous government’s ideology of market individualism (Stoker, 1999). They sought to do this through a process of ‘third way’ politics, which sought to encourage private enterprise whilst simultaneously controlling its excesses by virtue of regulation, evaluation and evidence led practice couched within the ethos of best value (Rhodes, 1997). New Labour intended to return some control back
into the hands of local government, but it was to be held in check by the tight reigns of partnership working and the regulatory systems that came with it (Carnwell and Carson, 2009). Collaboration with central and local government was the order of the day, within a framework of networks, partnerships and joined-up services. For New Labour, one of the most influential forms of legislation geared towards partnership working was the CDA, which made it a statutory requirement for Local Authorities and the Police to work in partnership with other public, private and third sector agencies together with other local community groups and organisations (Gilling, 2007). Borne out of this legislation was the Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships or Community Safety Partnership’s as they have now become known (Crawford, 1997).

Community safety can trace its roots back to the preventive practices inherent within Crime Prevention Partnerships developed during the 1980s, such as the Five Towns Initiative and the Safer Cities project (Hendry, 2012, Liddle and Gelsthorpe 1994; Crawford and Jones, 1995; Rogers, 2006). There has existed since the influential Home Office circular 8/1984 (Hughes and McLaughlin, 2002: 152), and the Morgan Review (ibid; Crawford, 1997; Gilling, 2007) a tacit cross-party agreement that ‘wicked issues’ such as crime and social deprivation can no longer be tackled by single departments or agencies (Gilling, 2007; Crawford, 1997; Edward and Hughes, 2002; Rogers, 2006).

However, it has not been without its problems. There is no doubt that working in partnership may in principal be a ‘good thing’ if it leads to: public sector agencies working together to benefit the public and individual service users; or if it addresses the gaps and overlaps in services; and allows for the development of greater accountability to local communities, while addressing how to tackle crime and disorder for example. It should also be noted that the evidence base for better services for users and communities is small; most benefits appear to be felt by practitioners/agencies (Rummery, 2002). The literature has shown that partnership working is often problematic in terms of, historical distrust between agencies, especially between those agencies that have different perceptions about how to tackle crime and disorder, such as the Police and social welfare agencies (Crawford, 1997; Crawford and Jones, 1995; Pamment, 2010).

In this sense, within the governance of crime control, partnerships need to: find ways to enhance greater collaboration; address the concerns of all agencies involved within a
partnership or network; improve co-ordination and information sharing practices to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort; and above all treat the communities they service as equal partners within the local governance of crime. Of course within the present economic climate some actors/agencies may find it more difficult than others to continue within a collaborative discourse; particularly if negative perceptions on status impact on trust – a defining element of social capital crucial to partnership working. Therefore finding innovative ways to increase capacity/social capital may be advantageous to multi-agency partnership working; or finding ways for a more equitable distribution of resources, perhaps by co-locating agencies (Frost, 2005: 17), although co-locating may not necessarily overcome confidentiality issues when it comes to information sharing (ibid: 31).

The above discussion has focused on how changes within central and local government by both the Conservatives and New Labour have led to an increase in multi-agency partnerships within the UK. CSPs in Scotland are arguably more distinctive than their counterparts in England and Wales; particularly during an ongoing public sector reform process, and it is within this context that the research questions are set;

- What role do CSPs play in the governance of community safety in contemporary Scotland?
- How will the planned governance changes and reform processes affect CSPs in terms of local accountability?
- How will performance management cultures within central/local government, and in particular within the Police, affect CSP priorities and/or goals?
- How do the organisational aims and culture of CSP partners, who possess different levels of power and influence, effect or determine the strategic priorities of CSPs?
Chapter 3: Methodology

3.1 Introduction

Within the governance/criminology field there is a great deal of literature surrounding Community Safety Partnerships/Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships in England and Wales (see for example, Crawford, 1998; Hughes, 1998; Hughes et al., 2002; Carnwell and Buchanan, 2009; Berry et al., 2011). However, there is comparatively less literature on Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) or criminal justice policy in Scotland. This was a point addressed by Croall et al., (2010), in ‘Criminal Justice in Scotland’, when they stated there had been a “general neglect of Scotland in many key criminology and criminal justice texts” (ibid: 6). Henry (2012) has tried to address this by looking at communities of practice in CSPs in Scotland, or more particularly the transformative potential in partnerships (however, this was based on PhD research conducted during 2000-2004).

As a result this PhD study endeavoured to look at the governance of community safety within a broader Scottish context (for example, as part of the wider Community Planning Partnership process), by adopting a comparative case study approach in order to explore how CSPs work within different localities; especially during periods of major structural reform. For example, much has been written around concerns about the loss of local autonomy with respect to an ongoing centralisation agenda (Donnelly et al., 2002; Scott, 2012; Fyfe, 2014; Fyfe and Terpstra, 2015). Other key issues were examined around: agenda setting; organisational culture; co-location; community engagement; third party policing and accountability, which allowed for further theoretical explorations around perceptions on social capital and power, and how this may impact on partnership working within the domain of community safety. Furthermore, the study was conducted during a period of significant change within the governance of community safety in Scotland (namely during a period of sharp fiscal retrenchment; including the reform of the Police and Fire Services into two single services). This allowed participants to put forward their views and opinions based on past and present experiences, and to speculate on how this may affect future partnership working in Scotland, which in turn would help to answer the main research questions.
3.2 Bespoke Partnership Assessment Framework

In order to ascertain how the Partnerships worked an interview schedule/bespoke framework was created to enable questions to be framed within particular contexts. This was influenced by Hudson and Hardy’s (2002) ‘Partnership Assessment Tool’ (ibid: 53), which was produced as an effective framework for the evaluation of Health and Social Care Partnerships (ibid). The framework looked at six key principle areas: acknowledging the need for partnership; clarity and realism of purpose; commitment and ownership; the development and maintenance of trust; clear and robust partnership arrangements and monitoring, review and organisational learning (ibid: 53-61).

This framework was developed with Health and Social Care Partnerships in mind, but, it has been acknowledged that it could be adapted to evaluate many public sector organisations (ibid; Halliday et al., 2004). Although there are acknowledged difficulties within partnership self-assessment tools (see Halliday et al., 2004, regarding lack of reflexivity, and difficulties around ranking), it can however provide a useful framework as a guide for analysis of qualitative interviews. For example, Hudson and Hardy’s six key principle areas, listed above, could be germane to CSP’s; not least, the difficulties/benefits of working with a multitude of agencies. Therefore it was decided to create a similar framework (not for evaluation purposes) but to assist in the analysis of qualitative data, and to provide a more explanatory approach to the research process. Consequently a semi-structured interview schedule was created3 (see Appendix A) to ask questions around the key areas listed below. It also helped increase internal validity by ensuring that each participant within the different case study areas were asked the same initial questions in order to elicit a sort of constant comparison between each case study area (Corbin and Strauss, 2015).

- Partnership Origins
- Power Structure/ control
- Co-ordination and Steering
- Communication/commitment

3 The interview schedule for Burnside used Partnership as a descriptor instead of CSP
Organisational culture

Responsibility/Accountability

Benefits to the community

This semi-structured interview template allowed participants to give more in-depth answers to the questions posed (when appropriate) and encouraged other areas of interest to be brought into the sphere of community safety. It also allowed the researcher to understand more fully this complex governance arena, by ascertaining amongst other things: the types and numbers of partners involved, and who are considered to be the main collaborators; how the command structure is organised; who sets the strategic goals; tensions surrounding distinct organisations with distinct organisational practices; the impact of one national Police service on partnership working; the efficacy of data sharing/communication and commitment; accountability issues; and the benefit (if any) of community safety partnership working to local communities in terms of engagement.

3.3 Design: The Case Study Process

In order to interpret how these complex issues affect partnership working it was decided that a qualitative comparative case study approach was the most appropriate research method. By adopting a comparative case study approach it allowed for an in-depth analysis of the complexities around partnership working within the governance of community safety across three distinct geographical areas thereby increasing validity and reliability (see 3.4 and 3.6 for further discussion). Gerson and Horowitz (2002: 199) state qualitative research involves a “direct encounter with ‘the world’, whether it takes the form of ongoing daily life or interactions with a selected group” (ibid). Yin (2003) argues that although there are several ways to conduct a study, for example, surveys or experiments, in the case of explanatory research that seeks to understand how or why a phenomenon happens, then a case study approach is the more suitable strategy. A case study also allows you to look at a specific ‘institution’ or ‘practice’ in detail (Thomas, 2011), by continually asking “what is this a case of” (Becker cited in Thomas, 2011: 20), thereby allowing for potential explanations or theories to emerge around specific phenomena (ibid: 20).
This involved looking at different kinds of evidence in order to ascertain how local policy and practice - within the different layers throughout organisations and their partner agencies - impact on local CSPs. Consequently this involved: conducting 49 semi-structured qualitative interviews with key stakeholders throughout the case study areas; who were arguably in a position to provide explanations that may answer the research questions (Yin, 2014: 28). This included participants from the public sector, third sector and from local communities (Community Councils); Nine non-participant observations of Community Safety/Community Planning Partnership meetings in order to try and compare the rhetoric of CSPs with the reality; One telephone interview was conducted with a participant from the Scottish Government Community Safety Unit (to principally provide information on useful policy documents to access (such as: the Christie Commission, The Strategy for Justice in Scotland, and links to further Scottish Community Safety Network publications); Documentary analysis of Scottish Government, Local Government, and Community Safety policy documents, in order to understand the policy terrain with respect to governance/partnership working and community safety. This involved using qualitative content analysis; not to interpret every aspect of a policy document, but to look at how particular words (partnership, engagement, community, reform, localism, harm, safety etc.) are being said or expressed within policy documents (Schreier, 2012) - in an effort to understand the ‘strategic intention’ and to compare how ‘intention’ manifests at an operational level. Lipsky (1980) argues that public policy is not best understood as it is made by high ranking administrators, but how it is realised “in the crowded offices and daily encounters of street-level workers” (ibid: xii).

As this study looked at a range of criteria, including how different organisational priorities/and or cultures affect partnerships, it was decided that it would be prudent to conduct a comparison between three CSPs within three distinct geographical Local Authority areas, such as: a large densely populated urban area (Burnside); a smaller urban/commuter – hinterland (Cartside); and a small urban/remote rural/islands dispersed geographical area (Avonside). A comparative case study approach allowed the researcher to look for any differences or similarities within the three distinct case study areas. This provides a more comprehensive analysis in that any thematic conclusions arising from all three case studies would be stronger than ones emanating from a single unique case study. This is especially so if ‘common conclusions’ (Yin, 2003: 53) arise from
all cases to the point that it will have greatly expanded the analytic generalisability of the findings compared to a single case study (ibid: 53). This was done in an effort to counteract claims that a lack of generalisability is a common limitation associated with the case study approach (Zainal, 2007; Flyvbjerg, 2013; Starman, 2013; Yin, 2014). Other limitations include arguments around ‘a lack of rigour’ and possible selection or researcher bias (ibid). The case study areas were ‘selected’ because of their distinct geographic/demographic characteristics in an effort to increase rigour/validity (see 3.4 and 3.6 below for further discussion).

3.4 The Case Study Areas

The case study areas were chosen in order to try and obtain a geographical balance in terms of the types of areas covered by local CSPs. This in turn would increase the generalisability of any similarities/differences found between the different case study areas: for example, examining if complex governance/structural issues are similar within different Local Authority areas despite the diversity/geography of the area; or if actors/agencies respond to a particular phenomenon in a similar way. Consequently, three areas were chosen to represent the distinct geo-political landscape within Local Authority areas, which will be described more fully below.

The three case study areas were all in the process of local government organisational reform; though they were at different stages of reform (Burnside was more advanced than Cartside, but Cartside was more advanced than Avonside). All of the interviews/non-participant observations occurred during 2013; formal interviews within each case study area were digitally recorded and fully transcribed to allow for accuracy and increase rigour, whereas, written notes were used for non-participant observations due to issues relating to consent, for example, taking notes at public meetings (Angrosino, 2004). The advantage of this is it allows the researcher to take notes discreetly, while observing how and what issues are discussed in a public setting (Kellehear, 1993). All place names and names of individuals within the specific case study areas were changed; this included agency names if they contained the name of the case study area (in the bibliography all URL online addresses were deleted if they contained the name of the case study area; however, examiners will be supplied with a separate complete list if requested). In order to further anonymise the identity of the case study areas - only general descriptions will
be given with respect to population and crime. Participant interviews were referenced with the initial of the case study area and given a number in order to identify the participant for research purposes. For example, the first participant interviewed in Avonside = A001.

3.4.1 Avonside/Avon Isle.

Avonside covers a vast (mainly coastal) geographical area with a largely rural population. The population is sparse compared to the Scottish average; with 45% of its population classified as remote rural, and 7% classified as accessible rural (Avonside, 2016); in terms of ethnic diversity 1.2% of the total population is made up of minority ethnic groups (NRS, 2013). The number of recorded crimes by the Police per 10,000 population by Local Authority area in 2013-14 was 1212 (Scottish Government, 2014b). There are 23 inhabited island communities; including Avon Isle, which was chosen for the case study. The main town in Avon Isle is called Viewside; which is included in the 15% most overall deprived data zones in Scotland with a declining population (ibid). Avon Isle was chosen as a case study, not only because of familiarity with the island, but because it had experienced radical economic changes since the late 1970’s. Avon Isle used to be a popular holiday destination for the traditional working classes; however, it had witnessed a rapid decline in tourism, linked in part to the collapse of industrial industries, and to changing patterns in holiday destinations. As a result the main town Viewside had drastically altered, from a bustling, vibrant, economically viable town to one that was visibly in decline and suffering from economic neglect.

Participants were mainly based on Avon Isle (situated in Viewside), however, some participants were based in Troy in the mainland (the largest settlement in Avonside), and covered a number of neighbouring localities; including Avon Isle (ibid). Inter-agency partnerships were generally based in Viewside, and this is where all of the interviews were conducted; apart from the original access interview, which was conducted in a Council office in Troy.

15 semi-structured interviews were conducted (13 face to face, and 2 by phone). Two interviews were conducted with the same person (once as a gatekeeper for access, and then as a formal member of the CSP). Consequently, their interview reference will be
either (A001 -1st) (if the information refers to the first interview) or (A001 – 2nd) (if the information refers to the second interview). Two meetings were also observed: one CSP meeting in June, 2013; and one Area CPP meeting in December 2013 (see Figure 1);

**Figure 1: list of participants and non-participant observations in Avonside/Avon Isle**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Non-participant observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A001) Community Safety Co-ordinator</td>
<td>CSP meeting June, 2013;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A002) Rape Crisis</td>
<td>Area CPP meeting December, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A003) Group Commander Fire Service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A004) Senior Police Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A005) Council Area Housing Officer.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A006) Environmental Health Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A007) Housing Officer – R&amp;S Homes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A008) Local Councillor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A009) Street Scene Warden</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A010) Housing Manager – Avon Homes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A011) Avon Isle Forum for Older Voices</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A012) Avon Isle Community Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A014) Child Protection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A015) Licensing Standards Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**3.4.2 Burnside**

Burnside is a large urban city with one of the largest populations in Scotland. It has a large ethnically diverse population in comparison to the other two case studies; 11.6% of the total population is made up of minority ethnic groups (NRS, 2013). The number of recorded crimes by the Police per 10,000 population by Local Authority area in 2013-14 was 3001 (Scottish Government, 2014b). Burnside was principally chosen because of its size and the fact that it has a unique co-located ‘arms-length’ external organisation, known as Community Safety Burnside, which operates alongside existing crime prevention agencies, such as the Police. Initially it was decided to focus on Burnside’s strategic CSP with regard to interview data etc. However, as this no longer existed and community safety was to be incorporated within the new wider CPP a new plan had to be devised. The new CPP structure included 21 Area Partnerships covering the multi-member wards in Burnside. One Area Partnership was chosen (Burnpark/City) as it bordered the city centre and Burnpark and included community representatives from both deprived and middle class areas. For example, Burnwood is a middle class area
within the city centre populated by a thriving business and night time economy, and representatives from Burnwood Community Council sit on the Burnpark/City Area Partnership. In comparison Burnpark borders the city centre and is characterised as an area of deprivation; 86% of the population are of working age, however, the percentage of people in employment is lower than the average for both Burnside and Scotland, and the ethnic minority population has steadily increased in size from 12% in 2001 to 26% in 2011 – which was double the Burnside average (Understanding Burnside, 2012).

20 semi-structured face to face interviews were conducted (more conducted in this case study in relation to its size and in order to cover the newly formed CPP structure), and 5 non-participant observations of partnership meetings took place within the new CPP structure: 2 Burnpark/City Area Partnership meetings (May and September, 2013); North West CPP (August, 2013); Strategic CPP (November, 2013); and Safe Burnside Group (August, 2013). (See Figure 2);

**Figure 2: List of participants and non-participant observations in Burnside**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(B001) Partnership and Development Manager</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(B002) Principal Officer</td>
<td>Non-participant observations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B003) Police Chief Inspector</td>
<td>Burnpark/City Area Partnership meeting May, 2013; September, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B004) Local Councillor</td>
<td>North West CPP meeting August, 2013;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B005) Area Police Commander</td>
<td>Strategic CPP meeting November, 2013;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B006) Local Councillor</td>
<td>Safe Burnside Group meeting August, 2013;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B007) Burnside Housing Association</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B008) Chair of Community Health Partnership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B009) Senior Officer Fire Service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B010) Chair of Third Sector Forum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B011) Local Councillor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B012) Police Superintendent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B013) Burnwood CC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B014) Performance and Information Manager</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B015) Local Councillor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B016) Chair/Burnpark CC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B017) Burnpark CC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B018) Child Protection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B019) VAW Co-ordinator</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B020) Chair of City Centre Alcohol Action Grp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A number of local Councillors and Police Officers were interviewed in comparison to the other case study areas in order to cover the different structures and services they represented; for example, B005 was the overall Police Commander who sat on the
strategic CPP, whereas B003 sat on the Safe Burnside Group, and B012 sat on the ADP/Licensing Board/One Burnside. B004 sat on an Area Partnership and was the Chair of CSB\(^4\); B006 was the Chair of both the Safe Group and VAW\(^5\) Partnership; B011 sat on the North West CPP; and B015 sat on the Burnpark/City Area Partnership. Similarly, three Community Councillors were interviewed; B013 represented Burnwood CC on the Area Partnership and all CC’s on the NWCPP; and B016 was the Chair of Burnpark CC; B017 represented Burnpark on the Area Partnership.

### 3.4.3 Cartside

The city of Cartside (where most of the research took place) is surrounded by a mix of smaller urban and commuter – hinterland areas. Its population is about one sixth the size of Burnside, but covers a larger geographical area. Cartside was chosen because of its geographic diversity, and locality, in relation to Avonside and Burnside. In terms of ethnic diversity 3.2% of the total population is made up of minority ethnic groups (NRS, 2013). The number of recorded crimes by the Police per 10,000 population by Local Authority area in 2013-14 was 1439 (Scottish Government, 2014b). The Cartside Council area is relatively affluent in comparison to the other case study areas, for example, the level of income deprivation in Cartside is 9% compared to 12% across Scotland as a whole. However, there are some areas of deprivation including Hanes (one participant interviewed represented this area on the Community Council).

Participants were mainly based in Cartside city centre, however, one participant was situated just outside the city centre, and another was situated in Camber, which was part of NHS Crawley’s Regional Health Board area covering both Camber and Cartside.

14 semi-structured face to face interviews were conducted. One of the interviews was a joint interview (however, each participant responded to the questions independently, therefore, this was recorded as two interviews for analysis purposes). Two interviews were with the same person (once as a gatekeeper for access, and then as a formal member of the CSP). Consequently, their interview reference will be either (C001 – 1\(^{st}\)) (if the information refers to the first interview) or (C001 – 2\(^{nd}\)) (if the information refers to the second interview). Two meetings were observed of the Cartside CSP; both in

\(^4\) Community Safety Burnside
\(^5\) Violence Against Women
September 2013 (the second meeting was called to inform partnership members of a change in structure to the CSP). (See Figure 3);

**Figure 3: List of participants and non-participant observations in Cartside**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Non-participant observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(C001) CPP Manager</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C002) Third Sector Forum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C003) Child Protection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C004) Group Manager Fire Service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C005) Rape Crisis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C007) Addiction Support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C008) Community Safety Projects Manager</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C009) Lead Officer for Cartside ADP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C010) Youth Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C011) Area Commander Police</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C012) Cartside Licensing Forum/Hanes CC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C013) Housing Manager for Crawley Housing Association</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C014) Local Councillor</td>
<td>CSP meeting 2nd September, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CSP meeting 30th September, 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.5 Access

Access was sought for the chosen case study areas after ethical approval for the research process was granted in November 2012 by the Ethics Committee for Applied Social Research in Stirling University. Achieving access was an ongoing laborious process, which involved utilising existing contacts, searching online Council databases, and sending out numerous emails – with follow up phone calls (if necessary). An initial meeting was set up with a ‘gatekeeper’ in all three case study areas – usually a Council officer involved with governance and partnerships - in order to obtain access to Council agencies involved with the partnership process. The research study was explained, and copies of consent forms/information sheets were handed over for their perusal. This was a key element to the research process as the Council through the Community Planning Partnership process, are generally thought to be the key partners (next to the Police) involved with CSPs.

Once access was obtained, ‘gatekeepers’ were asked for a list of other agencies involved in the partnership process; who were then contacted – either by email or phone. A number of agencies/individuals can be involved with different CSPs over either long...
periods or short periods of time, for example, with regards to issue specific or area specific initiatives. Therefore – in order to achieve some sort of parity within the case study areas – agencies were chosen who appeared to have either a statutory basis for attendance, or through longevity/consistence, and relevance: see figure 4 on page 67. Descriptions of the types of participants’ in each Box in figure 4 are provided in the key below:

**Key to figure 4:**

Avonside (A); Burnside (B); Cartside (C).

**Box 1** - represents the main statutory agency participants’ - including representatives who sat on either the Alcohol and Drug Partnership or Partnerships associated with antisocial behaviour within each case study area

**Box 2** – agencies involved in youth services/offending

**Box 3** – Licensing Forum/Board

**Box 4** – overarching connecting structures

**Box 5** – issue specific third sector representatives

**Box 6** – mixed third sector representatives on different case study areas; including Housing in all three

**Box 7** – Community Council representatives
Figure 4: Types of organisations represented in the three case study areas

- Overarching Structures
  - Community Planning Partnership (A) (B) (C)
  - Community Safety Partnership (A) (C)
  - Area CPP (A) (B)
  - Safe Burnside (B)
  - Area Partnership (B)

(A) (B) (C)
- Police Service
- Fire Service
- Senior Council Officers
- Local Councillors
- Alcohol and Drug Partnership
- Antisocial Behaviour Partnership

Youth Services (C)
- Child Protection (A) (B) (C)
- One Burnside (B)

Licensing Forum (A)
- Licensing Forum (C)
- Licensing Board (B)

Third Sector Forum (C) (B)
- Avon Isle Forum for Older Voices (A)
- Addiction Services Cartside (C)
- Community Safety Burnside (B)
- Housing (A) (B) (C)

Avon Isle Community Council (CC) (A)
- Burnpark CC (B)
- Burnwood CC (B)
- Hanes CC (C)
3.5.1 Problems with access

Once initial access was granted a number of agencies were contacted to take part in the research process. Similar problems emerged in all three case study areas, for example, some agencies never responded to emails, or if they did, they did not think they had anything relevant to discuss around the concept of community safety. This was especially the case with agencies associated with Health and Social Care. For example, some participants from Alcohol and Drug Partnerships (ADPs) did not initially link their agency/role to community safety – despite being members of the CSP. However, once the clear links between alcohol/drugs to crime/anti-social behaviour etc. were pointed out, participants from those agencies (in Burnside and Cartside) consented to be interviewed. This was not the case in Avonside. Despite repeated emails/phone calls; no key individual from the Avonside ADP was interviewed formally (a brief email discussion occurred – outlining the ADP structure in Avonside). However, once the interview process started it was clear that a number of participants wore different ‘hats’. For example, participants in Avonside from the Licensing Forum and Avon Isle Forum for Older Voices also sat on the ADP. Therefore, questions were addressed to them about their roles on the different partnerships where relevant.

This was also the case for some other agencies, for example, one representative in Cartside was interviewed from Youth Services, but there were no comparable agencies in Avon Isle or Burnside. However, individuals who sat on the Anti-Social Behaviour Forums (Housing, Child Protection, Police with regard to ‘One Burnside’, ‘Burnside Life’) were judged to be comparable with regard to youth initiatives etc. Where possible parity across the case study areas was sought, however, when this proved impossible, other participants were chosen who wore a number of ‘hats’ who could cover a number of areas.

One other problem occurred during the interview phase regarding Burnside (which was chosen because of its unique co-located ‘arm’s-length’ external organisation - Community Safety Burnside). After the initial ‘gatekeeping’ interview Burnside decided to implement radical changes to its governance structure; including disbanding the CSP groups. After an initial ‘gulp’ moment it was decided to go ahead with Burnside as a case study as it would provide a unique view of how community safety would be dealt with within the
community planning structures as a result of this change; given that CSPs in all case study areas were part of the Community Planning Partnership (CPP) process. In this instance, it was decided to interview agencies/individuals from one of the new local Area Partnership and Safe Burnside structures, and from within the reformed CPP; incorporating those agencies previously involved with the old CSP structure. Interviews in Burnside also had to be deferred until after the summer break, as it was decided by organisational ‘gatekeepers’ that there was too much organisational upheaval to grant immediate access.

Access on the whole (through Council gatekeepers) proved difficult and I had to resort to contacting some participants personally via email and subsequently relying on a snowballing effect; or through utilising an opportunistic approach (Bryman, 1992) via personal contacts within the Council. However, difficulties occurred with respect to accessing Community Council members (who were necessary in order to gain some insight from local communities; albeit a selective viewpoint) who were not immediately identifiable on the Council website. Consequently a number of emails were sent to a Senior Council officer in Burnside asking them for the contact details of Burnpark Area Partnership members. The request was ultimately refused citing data protection with regard to sensitivity issues involved in supplying private addresses as opposed to business ones. However, contact could also presumably be made by email or by phone in which case this would not be an issue; for instance, guidance for Community Councils states that ‘subject to the provisions contained within the Data Protection Act 1998; contact details of Community Council members must be provided’ (Scottish Government, 2009b: 2).

This consequently led to a suspicion that contact with Community Council members was being obstructed in some way by some key officials. Therefore using an opportunistic approach - community representatives were approached directly at a sectoral Community Planning Partnership (CPP) meeting, and asked to participate in the research study. This approach was also used in Avon Isle, whereupon two community representatives were asked to participate in the research after attending a CSP meeting; although this was not principally related to obstructed access; just being in the right place at the right time – particularly as this was an island community.
Cartside had a different difficulty to overcome in that they did not have any community representatives formally represented on the CSP. In this case I tried to contact Community Council representatives directly via information provided online (email addresses); but, no one replied. However, owing to time pressures and utilising the more than one ‘hat’ scenario it transpired that the participant from the Licensing Forum was also a recently retired member of Hanes Community Council. Therefore, their views were sought regarding questions about community engagement.

3.6 Analysing and Presenting the Data

All of the data collected through interviews, non-participant observation, and phone-call/email information were input into QSR Nvivo 10 – a computer assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) programme (Bringer et al., 2006). In total there were 50 (on average one hour duration) interviews: 15 in Avonside; 20 in Burnside; 14 in Cartside; and 1 Scottish Government (phone interview – 30 minutes duration) to the Community Safety Manager. Two pieces of data concerned information on the structure of ADPs: one email regarding the structure in Burnside; and one phone call (notes taken) regarding the structure in Cartside. 9 non-participant observational notes of partnership meetings: 2 in Avonside; 2 in Cartside; and 5 in Burnside. A number of memos were created in NVivo including a research diary and write up notes.

24 of the interviews were transcribed by the researcher (mostly verbatim; except for instances when the participants drifted off track to discuss mainly personal information), however, as this was exceedingly time consuming; the remaining interviews were transcribed verbatim by a University of Stirling approved transcription service. The analysis itself used an interpretivist approach in order to try and understand the collective knowledge of participant’s perceptions, beliefs and organisation/social norms within a particular context (Mason, 2002).

A common critique associated with qualitative research methods usually concerns problems surrounding validity and replicability or the lack of ability to generalise the research findings from a research sample to the wider population, compared to the scientific approach usually associated with positivist/quantitative research (Bryman and Burgess, 1999; Marshall, 1999). However, many qualitative researchers have contested
assertions of the lack of ability to generalise by specifying the positive uses of CAQDAS programmes (such as NVivo), which may enable researchers to generate categories and themes, by looking for patterns within the data (Marshall, 1999). This in turn may allow the researcher to interpret and develop theories based on the aforementioned patterns and themes; including searching for other interpretations/meanings; which in turn could reinforce rigour (Marshall, 1999: 152). Mason (2002) argues that qualitative interviewers should be able to demonstrate to others that the data collection methods used (coding and analysis) were applicable to the research questions and that the data analysis is “thorough, careful, honest and accurate (as distinct from true or correct)” (Mason, 2002: 188).

With this in mind, the interview and non-participant observation data were input incrementally (as it was transcribed) into NVivo 10. The data was then analysed by identifying blocks of text for initial coding (Gibbs, 2007); for example, in relation to particular questions or themes. Nodes and sub-nodes were created in order to categorise the initial codes; including creating sub-nodes for each individual case study. For example, three sub-nodes were created for Avonside; Burnside; and Cartside under themes created during an axial coding phase; when categories were refined and developed further (ibid). This allowed for a selective phase where categories were placed under a general theme in order to connect and relate to each case study area. For example, issues relating to national outcomes, single outcome agreements, or managerialism were coded under the concept of governance; or issues around partnership challenges, barriers to partnership working or conflict were coded under either conflict or tensions. Each category was then systematically analysed in order to look for patterns and themes and to identify commonalities or different perspectives of the same phenomena in each case study area.

3.6.1 Presentation

Explanations and key findings from the data are presented in three key sections; Governance, Partnership Working and Accountability. Key literature relevant to the findings are presented in the introductory text as part of a thematic rather than a narrative analysis, and throughout the findings (including new literature added after the literature review was conducted, which further supported or helped to provide theoretical explanations for the key findings). Direct quotes from participants are left
indent, italicised, and referenced to identify the participant by number and case study area; for example, A001 (Avonside), B001 (Burnside) or C001 (Cartside); including their titles. In some cases short quotes are interwoven throughout the findings, in which case they will be italicised and identified by number and case study area if their title has been given in the previous sentence or paragraph. Notes from non-participant observational data is also identified within the text and referenced with the name and date of the meeting. Participants from Police Scotland and the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service will be referred to as representatives from the Police or Fire.

3.7 Ethics and Safety

All three case study areas or named places were given pseudonyms. Participants were not named in order to ensure anonymity and confidentiality in line with ethical guidelines as set out by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC, 2012). This included protecting participants from harm (ibid) – for example, during the initial access/gatekeeping period it was made clear who I wanted to talk to – therefore great care was taken not to discuss any contributions each participant made with any other participants, nor to identify specifically who I had spoken to. There were occasions where general policy information may have been referred to, for instance, in discussion around the SOA – some participants may have said something along the lines of – well you will have discussed this with others in the partnership. In which case it would be acknowledged, but not discussed. The same care was taken in reference to the identity of the case study areas.

All of the interviewees were key personnel from partner agencies engaged within the community planning/community safety process; and they were sent consent forms and an information sheet informing them of the research study prior to each interview. Participation was optional, and prospective interviewees were informed they could withdraw from the research process at any time, before, during or after the research process. Participants were asked to read and sign the consent form at the initial meeting in order to allow them an opportunity to withdraw or continue with the research study, they were also asked if the interviews could be digitally recorded (all of them consented).
Most of the interviews took place on Council premises (usually in a private room set aside for the interview; two took place in a Council canteen), however, a number of interviews took place in private settings in other areas, such as: a University; Business premises; third sector premises; Police Divisions and Fire Stations. Three interviews took place in the homes of participants (in each case details were given to an external source regarding, the time, address, and expected duration of the interview); including phone calls before and after the interviews took place in order to ensure the safety of the researcher.

As it was not possible to obtain consent from everyone at a public meeting, non-participant observational data was limited to general notes taken around the topics being discussed (Angrosino, 2004); particular note was taken of any themes which may have begun to emerge from initial analysis of previous interview data.

3.8 Reflexivity

It is important within the research process to reflect on any difficulties encountered and any potential biases the researcher may bring to the research process; despite their best intentions towards maximising reliability and validity. For example, many academics have written about the role of the researcher in the construction of knowledge (Gibbs, 2007); or how all research will be influenced by the researcher, including their role and behaviour throughout the process (Ritchie et al., 2014).

Studying formal institutions within local governance structures can often lead to problematic issues; such as access and how to ‘get behind the rhetoric’ of social policy discourse. In my case I initially achieved access in Burnside through personal connections within the Council, Community Safety Burnside and the Police. I had knowledge of the social policy terrain through previous research for example: as an undergraduate in Criminology as part of a ‘Community Links’ project I was assigned to work with the Police to produce a report on ‘designing out crime’. My dissertation was based on ‘actions plans’ within community planning; examining how partners work together to tackle antisocial behaviour within a given area. I later worked as a research assistant on a project looking at the legacy of Enhanced Policing Plans and Dispersal Orders - dealing with youth on-street disorder and violence (Frondigoun et al., 2010). I was also a research assistant on two local government/academic research projects; evaluating two female offender
initiatives designed to provide assistance and routes out of offending behaviour; and my Masters involved looking at Police practice during a period of fiscal austerity. This meant I had established many contacts, and built up considerable knowledge of the terrain I was researching; especially the policy language from a Council and a policing perspective.

This proved advantageous to the research, for instance, while I may have presented as an ‘outsider’ my tacit knowledge of the terrain (Nutley et al., 2007) – and linguistic knowledge of the policies being discussed meant that quite often I could present as a sort of insider/outsider (Mullings, 1999), which in turn allowed me to probe further beneath the exterior of social policy rhetoric or in this case ‘partnership speak’ or ‘jargon’ that has often baffled outsiders (Sparrow, 2008). Mullings (1999: 340) refers to the ‘positional spaces’ researchers can occupy that is - those areas where the ‘situated knowledge’ of both parties allows for the development of a certain level of ‘trust and co-operation’ (ibid: 340). This familiarity of the social policy terrain also allowed me to identify and recognise different reactions, silences, or asides as a point to probe further and ask more pertinent questions, in order to elicit a response out-with the standard normative responses associated with partnership working. Other factors may have helped in breaking down the rhetoric: being a mature student combined with my knowledge of the terrain often helped to establish a rapport between myself and some participants; and quite often the candid responses of participants themselves further enriched the research process.

Although achieving access was at times problematic throughout the case study areas, one of the strengths of the case study approach was that it allowed me to compare attitudes and perspectives towards community safety policy from a number of actors from three distinct geographic locations, who were situated in similar/or the same organisations; thereby increasing the generalisability of key findings. This meant that the participants who took part were in the main limited to those directly involved in the local community planning/community safety process. However, the analysis may have benefited from a central government strategic perspective on community safety via a participant from the office of Community Safety and Legal Affairs; however, I was unable to achieve access during the field work period. Nonetheless, I did manage to make contact with someone from the Scottish Government Community Safety Unit, who provided a background to the community safety policy terrain principally through signposting pertinent Scottish
Government and Scottish Community Safety Network publications; although they were not involved in any strategic decision making.

In hindsight this case study approach may have been strengthened further with data from community focus groups (although this was not part of the original design) with respect to questions around engagement, localism, and community representation. This became apparent halfway through the analysis, however, due to time constraints it was not possible to organise this; although it should be noted that this could provide useful data with respect to any future research involving community planning. Nonetheless, the number of participants who did take part in the research process provided valuable insight with respect to the main research questions.

Participants may have enriched the research process, but it is also pertinent to acknowledge some problematic issues that may have occurred with reference to the types of participants engaged within the study, for example, key actors within the social policy arena (Council, Police, and Fire) may unintentionally revert to a dominant organisational ethos when answering probing questions. Therefore, I was aware from the start of the research process to try and identify early on any contaminating factors – for example, during the interview phase, if participants were resorting to buzzwords, or focusing on specific issues (austerity, Police reform) and veering off track, in which case they would be guided back to the points in discussion. If this happened, although I do not recall it as a particular issue, participants were told that questions on austerity and reform would be covered by particular questions later. Other issues to be aware of was taking on board that some actors from the third sector in particular may feel constrained when discussing partnership working if they are resource dependent on a dominant partner. But, again this did not appear to be a particular issue. Finally, it should be acknowledged that participants from Community Councils do not necessarily offer up a representative view of local communities, as quite often they could arguably be viewed as the usual suspects (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2006); those select few who engage with the public sector (quite often around single issues). However, these were the available actors - who sat on the partnerships, therefore their contributions were valid if arguably unrepresentative.
One other difficulty encountered was the amount of data accumulated to be analysed; not least the amount of policy documents accessed. Transcribing and analysing 50 interviews and 9 non-participant observations is incredibly time-consuming for one researcher, and therefore upon reflection, some relevant points may be missed due to the sheer volume of material. Yin (2003; 2014) has highlighted this as a traditional area of concern within case study research; however, I am fairly certain that I have captured the key issues generated by the data. There were also some occasions when participants may arguably have been given a leading question, for example, if a participant said they did not understand the question, then an explanation would be given, which may upon reflection, have unintentionally guided their response. However, despite these difficulties, every effort was taken during the interview process to project a neutral stance, and to behave in an ethical manner towards all participants.

3.9 Conclusion

Transparency is a crucial element of the research process and every effort has been taken to provide the methodological details of the aforementioned research study. Including, outlining the assessment/interview framework, the case study design process, how access was achieved and the inherent difficulties therein. Every effort has been taken to ensure that the data presented is an accurate and true description of what transpired between the researcher and the researched (Mason, 2002). An explanation and description of the case study areas was also provided, including an explanation on how and why agencies/participants were chosen. A brief description was given on how the data was presented, and potential ethical/safety issues were explored, before, finalising, the methods section with some reflexive points about the research process.
Chapter 4: Governance

4.1 Complexity and the governance of community safety

A central government UK wide policy focus on crime prevention and community safety can be traced back to some key national policies initiated during the Thatcher conservative era of the 1980s referred to in the literature review. This was continued and reinforced under New Labour who made working in partnership a statutory requirement under the Crime and Disorder Act (in England and Wales) wherein the Police and Local Authorities share responsibility for community safety strategies (Loveday, 2006: 112). In this sense the New Labour rhetoric around partnership working reinforced how mutual co-operation (Mackintosh, 2007) between agencies would enable organisations to reach hitherto unachievable organisational goals by working together on overlapping outcomes, thereby increasing efficiency and effectiveness within the realm of crime reduction and community safety.

In Scotland, this was embedded within the Local Government in Scotland Act 2003, which put working in partnership on a statutory footing within a community planning structure designed to reinforce public accountability (HMSO, 2003; Scottish Executive 2004). A Community Planning Partnership is a body led by each Local Authority in Scotland, which brings together key representatives from the public, private, voluntary and community sector, with the aim to adopt a more joined-up approach in the delivery of public services (Audit Scotland, 2013a: 3). However, for Scotland situating community safety within the community planning process allowed for a much broader interpretation of community safety for communities, rather than the much narrower focus of crime reduction as set out in the Crime and Disorder Act in England and Wales (Henry, 2012).

Community safety in Scotland is therefore viewed in terms of a much wider policy arena within Community Planning Partnerships (CPP), and thereafter situated firmly within a prescriptive framework drawn up by central government ministers and civil servants. This makes for a complex governance arena where long term preventative outcomes are a core feature, underpinning a collaborative culture within the existing public sector reform agenda (Cairney and St. Denny, 2015: 36). Collaboration or working in partnership has
long been viewed as the natural solution to tackling difficult or so called ‘wicked issues’, whereby multi-agency partnerships could work together to provide a more joined up or effective service delivery (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008). Partnerships in this sense could improve outcomes by combining resources in order to achieve inter-agency objectives within a drive for efficiency, effectiveness and best value (Scottish Government, 2011b).

There has always been a drive for efficiency within the public sector – a term usually associated with the desire for fiscal restraint – since the latter half of the twentieth century (Stoker, 2004b). However, since the 2008 financial crisis this has become more pronounced. Partnerships are now viewed - more than previously – as the only way to achieve objectives due to severe financial restraint brought about by a dramatic drive in public sector spending cuts. For example, in 2010 the UK Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government announced far reaching state spending cuts with the planned loss of around ‘900,000 public sector jobs between 2011 and 2018’ (Oxfam, 2013: 2).

At the same time in Scotland the report from the Independent Budget Review also highlighted the underlying challenges that faced the Scottish Government in light of the financial and economic crisis. The report pointed out how the pressure on the budget would be intense and unlikely to return to 2010 levels ‘in real terms’ probably for the next fifteen years or so (Scottish Government, 2010). This would have an adverse effect on public spending, which would ultimately affect the people of Scotland in terms of a much depleted public service delivery. The report set out quite clearly the challenges ahead for the public sector in view of expecting more for less, as the following quote highlights – there must be a;

“focus on the most significant priorities of the nation, to reject the notion that lower cost must inevitably mean lesser service and to embrace an ethos of doing more with less”(Scottish Government, 2010:2).

Accordingly, around 51,700 public sector jobs have been lost in Scotland since the financial crisis, with local government taking up 66.7% (34,500) of workforce cuts (Unison Scotland, 2012). Unison have since stated that based on the Office of Budget Responsibility and the Institute of Fiscal Studies – a further 60,000 jobs could be lost in
the next five years (Unison Scotland, 2014). There is no doubt that this has had a significant impact on the public sector's ability to carry out its core functions to the same level prior to the onset of fiscal constraints. Furthermore, being expected to do more with less will also have an impact on those agencies and organisations involved within the community planning/community safety process in terms of available funding, resources and key personnel. This point was highlighted by a number of respondents in both Burnside and Cartside who had commented on their lack of funds for initiatives and on being expected to do more with fewer resources;

“[...] you've got less people doing the same job, but expectations are more and demands are more. So, it's just very difficult [...]” (B014) - Senior Performance and Information Manager CSB – Burnside.

“[...] you know, people are being asked to do more for less and it's having an impact on people’s ability to generally sit down and look at what the kind of issues are” (C010) - Youth Services – Cartside.

In the case of partnership working this may mean that agencies retrench back to their core issues - as this participant from the third sector in Cartside suggests;

“ [...] under the pressures that the - well all public sector agencies are facing at the moment to do more with less -some of the partnership working, which is even more necessary than ever, is tending to get squeezed out, and agencies are retrenching back to what they see as their core stuff (C002) - Third Sector representative on EDG/CSP – Cartside.

It is clear that the public sector in particular throughout the UK and Scotland is facing a period of significant reform in order to cope with the fallout from fiscal austerity measures, not only at the local level, but at a national level too (in Scotland in particular) with respect to key reforms of the Police and the Fire service; both leading agencies within Community Safety Partnerships. In terms of community safety being expected to do more with less may have a significant impact on the effectiveness of partnership working within this policy arena, for example, will cut backs in services and personnel
result in more effective partnership working or a retrenchment back to the core aims and objectives of individual agencies? Therefore it makes sense to examine the policy documents framing the governance of community safety within the three case study areas, in order to put into context how the UK and Scottish Government reform agenda has impacted on Local Authorities and local communities, and what this means in terms of accountability within complex governance structures.

4.2 The Policy Framework for Community Planning Partnerships in Scotland

In recent years many authors have commented on how government governs within the UK; as referred to in the literature review. One key point of discussion centred on the belief that Britain had become a ‘hollowed out’ state (Rhodes, 1997), through a loss of functions limiting its capacity (Weller and Bakvis, 1997), with functions flowing upwards to the European Union, and outwards from central and local government departments to alternative delivery systems, such as agencies, policy networks, or partnership’s (Rhodes, James, 2001). Saward (1997) however, argues that some functions were not lost as such, but given away via privatisation; arguably contributing to a fragmented service delivery (Powell and Exworthy, 2002). A point echoed by Holliday (2000) who argued that while the state may be fragmented, it was not disabled. In effect Britain is now more subject to local governance as opposed to local government (Chandler, 2009). In Scotland, local government is essential to understanding local governance; it has increasingly grown in scale, and employs approximately 45% of the public sector workforce (Cairney and McGarvey, 2013: 135). Scottish central and local government have an inter-reliant association, whereupon central government expects Councils to deliver efficient services in line with their national priorities in return for financial resources (Cairney and McGarvey, 2013).

There has been a potential for tensions to exist in the past between central and local government due to the Council’s subordinate status to the Scottish Parliament, which has the power to restructure, or abolish Local Authorities. It also provides 80% of its finance (Cairney and McGarvey, 2013: 139). This is made more evident as local government in Scotland, unlike other jurisdictions throughout Europe, does not have a constitutional status or protection and remains subject to the will of parliament (McAteer, 2014).
However, there has also been, on the whole, a professed genuine desire to work together, which prompted COSLA and the Scottish Government to enter into the Concordat in 2007 (Cairney and McGarvey, 2013). This promised in the main to reduce ring-fenced funding and the central monitoring of Local Authorities, and in return Councils would deliver on an explicit set of commitments underpinned by ‘agreed national indicators and outcomes’ as set out in the National Performance Framework (Ibid: 140). This arguably significantly altered the accountability mechanisms within the governance framework of community planning.

The National Performance Framework (NPF) as a policy lever is a single framework designed to unite all public services in Scotland in line with the Governments ten year vision to improve public service delivery, whereby success is measured via long-term outcomes (Cairney et al., 2015). However, the outcomes are set within the governments core purpose; to create a more successful country (Cairney, 2015b), and a purpose framework linked to targets set within its five strategic objectives (Cairney, 2015b; Cairney et al., 2015). See table 4 below:

**Table 4: The National Performance Framework**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Scottish Government’s Purpose</th>
<th>Sets out the direction and ambition for Scotland</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Purpose Targets –</td>
<td>Are high level targets that show progress towards the Purpose such as: growth; productivity; participation; population; solidarity; cohesion; and sustainability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Strategic Objectives –</td>
<td>Describe where we will focus our actions - wealthier and fairer; smarter; healthier; <strong>safer and stronger</strong>; and greener.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 National Outcomes -</td>
<td>Describe what the Scottish Government wants to achieve in terms of making a difference to</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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people, business and communities across Scotland – e.g. (Outcome nine) *we live our lives free from crime, disorder and danger* –

| 50 National Indicators | Enable us to track progress towards the Purpose and National Outcomes |


The NPF works alongside another policy lever known as the Single Outcome Agreement (SOA) between the Scottish Government and local Community Planning Partnerships; produced in line with the NPF’s overall vision and strategic objectives (Cairney et al., 2015; Cairney, 2015b), it is stated however, that Local Authorities will have the discretion to determine how they achieve a balance between a range of priorities and meeting those objectives (Cairney et al., 2015:6).

However, within the context of community safety the strategic objective – *safer and stronger*, and the national outcome ‘*we live our lives free from crime, disorder and danger*’ - highlighted in ‘*The Strategy for Justice in Scotland*’ as particularly relevant (Scottish Government, 2012g) - should help determine/or steer the direction that individual Community Planning Partnerships take in respect of community safety issues. Furthermore, this will possibly be directly influenced by at least seven of the listed National Indicators in respect of; alcohol related hospital admissions, problem drug use, perceptions of crime rates in local areas, reconviction rates, victimisation rates, road safety, and improving people’s perceptions of their neighbourhoods. Indirectly, this may also be linked to child deprivation, poverty, housing need, improving mental health, and also improving Scotland’s reputation.7

Therefore a question arises regarding the interpretation of the word ‘discretion’ in policy terms, for example, are Local Authorities truly able to steer the direction of community safety within their own localities, or are they merely rowing in the direction of prescriptive top down central government policy levers that arguably reinforce crime

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7 See Scotland Performs link for list of outcomes, indicators, and objectives: http://www.gov.scot/About/Performance/scotPerforms
reduction as opposed to community safety? Martin and Guarneros-Meza (2013: 586) highlight the role of external steering on partnerships developed to tackle ‘wicked issues’, and make a distinction between hard steering and soft steering. The former refers to how governments dictate how partnerships operate through the use of performance management mechanisms and target setting, whereas the latter refers to the provision of funding, information and knowledge (ibid: 586). It could be argued therefore that local Community Planning Partnerships (CPPs) are subject to both hard and soft steering in terms of having to secure best value within the NPF’s objectives, outcomes and indicators, but set within the language of guidance, discretion and local accountability. For example, although the 2007 Concordat was conceived in part as the Scottish Government taking a step back from control from the centre in terms of local governance (soft steer), it was still set within the regulatory frameworks of the NPF and SOAs (hard steer). However, since the financial crisis there may now be an argument that the Scottish Government has been more inclined towards hard steering (ibid: 586). For example, in 2013 Audit Scotland produced the report Improving Community Planning in Scotland, which makes clear that CPPs could not continue in their present fashion, and listed five areas in need of reform:

- “Creating stronger shared leadership;
- Improving governance and accountability;
- Establishing clear priorities for improvement and using resources more effectively;
- Putting communities at the heart of community planning and public service reform;
- Supporting CPPs to improve their skills and performance” (Audit Scotland, 2013a: 19).

Although the five areas of reform could be interpreted as ‘guidance only’ (soft steer) the reform agenda itself has been heavily influenced by the Christie Commission; which was in turn influenced by the Independent Budget Review (Scottish Government, 2011c). The Christie Commission can be viewed as a major policy lever in terms of community planning and community safety in that it has influenced the Scottish Government’s direction on how to tackle the public sector reform process; including situating reform within a long term preventative agenda (Scottish Government, 2011c). Short term preventative measures have been criticised in the past as outcomes linked to measurable performance, which in terms of so called ‘wicked issues’ such as crime and social
exclusion could be viewed as putting a sticking plaster on a haemorrhage. For example, Deacon (2011) in her ‘Early Years’ report states that if the energy and investment applied to ‘youth justice, antisocial behaviour and criminal justice’, had been applied as early intervention, then it would have been transformational (Deacon, 2011 cited in Scottish Government, 2011c: 55). The Christie Commission will be discussed briefly below.

4.2.1 The Influence of the Christie Commission

Taking on board the recommendations of the Budget Review the Scottish Government commissioned Christie to provide “recommendations about how public services must change to meet the medium and long-term financial challenges and the expectations of the people of Scotland” (SPICe Briefing, 2011: 3), which basically translates as how to achieve more with less. In brief the Christie Commission’s remit involved; sustaining public services whilst at the same time improving the outcomes and quality of those services. Services were to be democratically accountable to local people and communities in Scotland – engagement was the order of the day – and partnership working (incorporating communities, elected representatives and the third sector) was to be redesigned around the needs of those citizens; whilst crucially tackling the “underlying causes of those needs as well as the symptoms” (Scottish Government, 2011c: 81).

To tackle ‘underlying causes’ means that the public sector must adopt preventative approaches aimed at addressing social problems, such as, the increased cost to the economy of addressing violence, and chronic health problems in the community principally from obesity, smoking and substance misuse (Scottish Government, 2011c: 55). Within austerity politics prevention has once again become a buzz word within central government, and in Scotland it is reinforcing a ‘radical’ collaborative culture underpinning the current reform agenda (Cairney and St. Denny, 2015: 36). Consequently, it has become a vague, but nevertheless widely supported solution to: sustainability in terms of service delivery; a way to address inequality by tackling the root causes of societies social problems; and finally as a way to address a governance crisis in terms of the failure of top down centralist driven managerialism in favour of a more holistic approach built around common aims (Cairney and St. Denny, 2015: 37).
In response to Christie’s recommendations the Scottish Government and COSLA advocated that the ‘building blocks’ for that approach currently existed under the “framework of Community Planning Partnerships and Single Outcome Agreements” (Scottish Government, 2012e: 1). Nonetheless, the Government decided to review community planning structures, and in March 2012 published a shared ‘Statement of Ambition’, which reiterated how community planning together with the SOA would underpin effective partnership working, within which a wider set of reform initiatives would be put in place, including the reform of the Police and Fire Service, and the integration of Health and Adult Social Care (Scottish Government, 2012b). As a condition for success all public services must improve outcomes, and play a full and active role in community planning, with Councils taking a lead role (Scottish Government, 2012b).

Within the framework of community safety it could be argued that the Christie Commission and other policy levers such as the SOA are steering local partnerships towards behaving in a certain way – a way that is commensurate with Scottish Government priorities. For example, CPP managers were sent a letter in May 2012, which identified three core proposals comprising of three key elements for implementing the Statement of Ambition (Scottish Government, 2012a), which included strengthening duties on individual partners, placing formal requirements on CPPs, and creating a joint group at national level – to provide guidance and strengthen the capacity of local CPPs (ibid).

The National Community Planning Group was established to provide strategic leadership to drive the change set out in the Statement of Ambition, and it states it will endeavour to find an “appropriate balance between local and national priorities” (Scottish Government, 2012c); this brings into question whether the appropriate balance will be decided locally or nationally? For example, CPPs will not be ‘formally accountable’ to the new National Group, but the Group will nonetheless place a focus on improved outcomes in relation to central government priorities; and one of the initial outputs of the Group was to produce ‘guidance’ for CPPs on the new SOAs (Scottish Government, 2012c).

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The guidance states that it expects a more enhanced form of partnership working within and across different organisational cultures, and a more methodical and concerted approach to improving performance (Scottish Government, 2012f). Each new SOA must be able to demonstrate an ‘evidence-based understanding of place’, in other words CPPs must show that they have engaged with local communities, businesses and the third sector, using evidence from databases such as strategic assessments or needs analysis, in order to outline local priorities (Scottish Government, 2012f: 3).

Christie’s community engagement ethos built around communities of place (street, neighbourhood, estate etc.), and communities of interest (people who come together because of a shared need or interest) (SPICe Briefing, 2011: 30), identified four key objectives to shape a programme of reform:

- “public services are built around people and communities, their needs, aspirations, capacities and skills, and work to build up their autonomy and resilience;
- public service organisations work together effectively to achieve outcomes;
- public service organisations prioritise prevention, reducing inequalities and promoting equality; and
- all public services constantly seek to improve performance and reduce costs, and are open, transparent and accountable” (Scottish Government, 2011c: 23).

4.3 Community Safety Partnerships – Steering/Rowing or De-prioritisation?

The previous section discussed the complex governance arena within which community safety is situated, with a focus on policy levers such as; the NPF, SOA, Statement of Ambition and the Christie Commission, and how these have changed or sharpened the focus of community planning in terms of long term prevention, community engagement and accountability in the shape of best value. They have in turn impacted on how community safety is viewed by others within the current community planning/community safety partnership structure. This next section will examine some of the unintended consequences related to public sector reform within the community planning/community safety process, such as: growing tensions related to public sector reform; leadership;
austerity measures; loss of locality; and a possible de-prioritisation of community safety within the case study areas.

It has been previously highlighted how top down central government policies have often undermined localism in terms of transforming and limiting the capacity of Local Authorities through institutional reform (Rhodes, 1997; Stoker, 2004b; Wilson and Game, 2011). Local Authorities in turn have then had to find a balance between implementing central government reforms, while being accountable to local communities in terms of prioritising local goals or objectives. In Scotland this is to be achieved through obligatory partnership working within Community Planning Partnership’s (CPP’s) as laid out under the Local Government in Scotland Act 2003. Community safety or Community Safety Partnerships sit within this overarching structure, which will be discussed next, in order to outline the policy frameworks that shape each case study area.

4.4 Community Planning Partnerships in Avonside, Burnside and Cartside

The Community Planning Partnership (CPP) provides an overarching framework under which community safety sits. The policy documents on CPP’s state they are Partnership’s led by each Local Authority in Scotland bringing together key representatives from the public, private, voluntary and community sector; for the purpose of a joined up approach in the delivery of public services (Audit Scotland, 2013a: 3). The first CPP was established in 1998, and in 2004 the Scottish Executive set out statutory guidance for CPPs in the Local Government in Scotland Act 2003. This made clear the two main aims of community planning as:

- “Making sure people and communities are genuinely engaged in the decisions made on public services which affect them; allied to
- A commitment from organisations to work together, not apart, in providing better public services” (Scottish Executive, 2004: 1).

This was to be achieved within the context of securing best value in local government service provision, and the ‘power to advance wellbein
communities. Section 15 of the Act facilitates partnership working with other relevant public bodies, and also establishes the leadership role of Local Authorities within community planning (Scottish Executive, 2004: 3); while Section 16 of the Act confers a duty on a number of public sector agencies to participate in the community planning process (Scottish Executive, 2004: 5). Although the Council is identified as the lead agency the Act does recognise that some strategies and themes within a CPP should be a joint task, therefore the leadership role may be taken up by the appropriate agency; for example, in policing the Chief Constable may take the lead on Community Safety Partnerships (CSP) with the support of the relevant key agencies (Scottish Executive, 2004: 12).

For the most part participants within the three case study areas viewed both the Council and the Police as lead agencies within the governance of community safety; especially within CSPs. However, as in line with the legislation the Council was viewed as the partner with overall responsibility for the partnership process;

“CSP process? My understanding is that it reports to the Community Planning Partnership, so ultimately the guardians of that would be Cartside Council” (C007) – Addiction Support – Cartside.

“Council’s the lead. Not as in the most important, but we’re the ones with the statutory responsibility” (A001 - 2nd) – Community Safety Co-ordinator – Avonside.

“I think all partners are responsible to be honest, although the Chair does have a particular responsibility, but it is a partnership, so really in any partnership it’s an equal relationship and you’ve got to take equal responsibility” (B011) – Councillor – Chair of NWCPP – Burnside.

Clearly local government are thought to lead on partnerships within community planning, but, there is also a clear message that each agency has an equal responsibility to deliver services, not only through partnership, but for their own agency as well; as noted by the participant from Burnside. However, within the community planning/community safety framework the Police were also thought of as the lead agency on some thematic
partnerships, for example, those that dealt with antisocial behaviour (Antisocial Behaviour Partnerships/Community Safety Forums). On these partnerships Housing (Council, private and the third sector) also played a key role, as did Health and Social Services (Child Protection) and the Fire Service on Alcohol and Drug Partnerships.

4.4.1 **Structural change within Community Planning/Community Safety Partnerships**

All of these agencies/organisations operate within a complex Community Planning structure subject to change during the public sector reform process. For example, Community Safety Partnerships are themed/critical partnerships within the framework of Community Planning and each structure not only differed within the case study areas, but in the case of Burnside effectively ceased to exist as a result of the reform process. Community safety in Burnside was still ostensibly to be discussed within the wider Community Planning structure; however, exactly where it was to be discussed was often a confusing and contentious issue, which will be discussed later. See Table 5 below for the community planning structures within each case study area during the interview period.
### Table 5: Case study CPP structures 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Avonside Community Planning Partnership Structure</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 Area Community Safety Partnerships/Forums*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Committee (Performance Management)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic CPP</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Burnside Community Planning Partnership Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21 Area Partnerships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supported by 3 Senior Officer Groups -</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cartside Community Planning Partnership Structure</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monthly Multi-agency tasking and co-ordination group (MATAC) – Part of the CSP</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* To be restructured

** May be dissolved

*** Replaced the Executive Delivery Group

When participants in all three case study areas were first interviewed in 2013 the above institutional structures were in place, however, each area was in a state of flux in terms of adhering to and coping with the public sector reform agenda, and what this meant for the strategic direction of community safety. However, it became evident during the reform process that there was a growing tension within partnerships within the case study areas around issues linked to leadership, austerity measures, and local accountability.
In terms of leadership in Avon Isle/Avonside the Chair of the CSP had always remained with the Council (perhaps because it is an Island community), but in Burnside (prior to reform) and in Cartside in particular the Chair of the CSP had historically been held by a Police representative;

“[…] the Police always Chair Community Safety Partnerships - that's the sort of historical way they work in Cartside” (C006) - Community Planning Partnership Manager – Cartside.

It was intimated that the CSP had to cope with the number of changes made by the Police with respect to representation on the CSP, which was possibly viewed as problematic by others;

“[…] I think particularly there's a feeling in terms of Community Safety Partnership there seems to be quite a fluid movement within the Police as an organisation, so you'll just get used to dealing with one person and then they move on, you know, and I think that's the case with the partnership, I think this is the third or fourth Chair” (C010) - Youth Services – Cartside.

Routinely changing key personnel (especially if that person is the Chair) could impact on one of the key features associated with effective partnership working – trust. Trust within partnerships is built up over time, and is a unifying theme built on commitment and the delivery of shared objectives (McCall and Rummery, 2017: 63). One participant (a former Police officer in England) who was now based within Cartside as a community safety project manager volunteered a reason as to why the Police were always the Chair;

“I think my understanding is a little bit of background for you, the reason the Police have always been in the Chair is that that was the way for the Police to engage in the partnership. [...] I think partnership working for the Police was kind of at that point a fairly new way of working for them [...] it was just embedding the line of the Police can’t solve all the crime prevention, crime reduction - we need to engage more broadly with partners; so that was the kind of context and conversations I sensed that were happening” (C008) - Community Safety Projects Manager – Cartside.
However, a senior Council officer added;

“[...] There is also nothing to say that the Police have to Chair it, and both of these things are really up to the CPP to decide - the Police would just have to like it or lump it basically” (C001 - 1st) - Community Planning Partnership Manager – Cartside.

4.4.2 Growing Tensions – leadership/direction

Within Cartside there seemed to be an undercurrent of tension within agencies due to the reform process in general; in terms of a loss of personnel and services. But, there was also an underlying tension between some agencies (most notably public sector agencies) and the Police on the CSP; possibly in part response to a perception that the Police were becoming more dominant on the CSP with the reinforcement of a Police Scotland led performance management regime. This was most notable with regard to the new Multi-agency Tasking and Co-ordination (MATAC) operational group which had been instigated by the new Police Chair of the CSP. This Police led proposal was discussed at a Cartside CSP meeting (2/9/2013) with respect to a questionnaire that had been circulated amongst the partnership seeking views on a new vision for the CSP; a view which would see it split into two; a strategic group and an operational group. The Police Chair reported that there was ‘support to explore this way of working’ (Cartside CSP meeting, 2/9/13).

The Police in this instance arguably have more power to implement changes in that despite austerity they are still heavily relied upon in terms of being able to deploy resources quickly (Skinner, 2010; Crawford, 1997). Tensions may emerge around this Police led initiative as the ‘co-ordination’ and ‘tasking’ model is arguably more in line with a day to day crisis response management of offenders and vulnerable people associated with policing, rather than a proactive multi-agency response associated with Christie’s vision of long term prevention. One participant was not particularly happy about the changes on the grounds that the MATAC as part of a Police Scotland initiative would drive national objectives rather than what was needed locally;

“[...] The Chair was quite clear that this was more or less a dictate from Mr House; is to how Cartside came into line with what they had in Camber (name changed) and the rest of it” (C012) – Cartside Licensing Forum – Cartside.
This was supported by a comment made by a former Police analyst seconded to Community Safety Burnside, which seemed to suggest that MATAC’s may become the norm within the domain of community safety, however, it was argued that MATAC’s were there to enhance not lower local accountability following Police reform;

“It's the Chief says, I mean I think he's been, you know, of all the big concerns, the big questions have been - you know, you're just going to be a big force, you're going to be - less accountability locally, he recognises that, and I think one of the ways of overcoming that is to say - well I've got Multi-Agency Tasking arrangements in place in all these Local Authorities, and we’re delivering community policing jointly through these multi-agency tasking forums” (B014) - Senior Performance and Information Manager CSB – Burnside.

When interviewed a few weeks later the Chair of CSP Cartside had more or less intimated that the new changes were a fait accompli;

“Essentially I’m going to split the Community Safety Partnership in two - on a kind of vertical chain of command, so the Community Safety Partnership will be more of a strategic group to ensure that the work that all the relevant people on the group […] will work more towards the strategy that’s in place or the objectives or the priorities that have been set for these particular groups. There will be a monthly Multiagency Tasking and Co-ordinating group (MATAC) which I intend the representation to be those individuals from that list that I read out there who are more kind of tactical members on the ground” (C011) - Area Commander Police – Cartside.

The list in question was a list of agencies that had been sent the questionnaire from the Police about the reform proposals, which would suggest that the Police had a distinct role in determining what agency sat on either the Strategic CSP or the MATAC. The reform process effectively divides the CSP into two organisations – a steering committee and an operational committee (to meet monthly comprising of those agencies/individuals directly involved with operational matters). It is also clear from this participant that structural reform was viewed as necessary in order to align central objectives with local ones via the SOA in particular, which again despite the rhetoric of localism within the national reform agenda, did appear to bend more towards hard steering - central strategic direction - rather than soft steering – guidance (Martin and Guarneros-Meza,
2013). Featherstone et al., (2012: 178) argue that within ‘austerity localism’ it is usually the default actors “those with the resources, expertise and social capital” (ibid) who become involved in the provision of facilities and services (ibid). In the case of the Police localism may revolve around the analysis of Police data, which is arguably different to a co-production of solutions that come with working and engaging with communities. However, within Police organisational culture rigorous performance management systems are a key function of policing (Mackenzie and Hamilton-Smith, 2011; Hamilton-Smith et al., 2013) and it was clear that the MATAC was created as part of a Police Scotland drive towards performance management via strategic assessments – whose purpose is to ensure everyone is rowing in the right direction (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). For example, the MATAC was discussed by the Chair as being necessary because the original CSP had become backward facing, rather than forward facing;

“[…] it was very much updates from each of the membership about what they individually have done as an organisation, rather than collectively as a partnership, and that’s based on the fact that there hasn’t been a strategic assessment done for Cartside Council area; so we should be working towards a strategic assessment and the SOA, we’re only working towards the SOA at the moment” (C011) - Area Commander Police – Cartside.

When asked what they hoped to achieve from this approach i.e. implementing a strategic assessment it was stated that a ‘tangible document’ (C011) would identify not only where they were now, but, also identify vulnerable people and locations in terms of who the main offenders were and this was essentially what the partnership should be looking towards (C011). This approach perhaps reinforces concerns amongst some non-Police agencies that community safety will be situated within a problem oriented policing approach whereby prevention is linked to specific short term targeted problems (Dinsmor and Goldsmith, 2010) via a Police intelligence/analysis model (Sorg et al., 2013) rather than through long term prevention as envisioned by Christie. It was made clear by the Chair that the objective was to link up analytical products in order to put in place future preventative projects (C011). The language was one of efficiency and managerialism which perhaps helps to decipher a subtle difference between multi-agency and inter-agency partnership working, a point highlighted by Coliandris and Rogers (2008: 119) insofar as the former refers to agencies coming together to discuss common problems
while still retaining their organisational work practices, whereas the latter ‘interpenetrates’ and thus alters the work practices of those involved. This was addressed by the Chair when he discussed how his role was viewed by the other agencies on the partnership;

“*They probably see us in more of an enforcement role rather than a prevention role, but that’s not true, we do look at… Police Scotland has brought a process for tackling problem areas, for instance, (Names Street in Cartside) just now is a problematic antisocial behaviour area; our analysts tell us that based on the number of calls, frequency of call. So, we now have a Community Action Plan which has a suite of options for prevention, a suite of options for enforcement, a suite of options for information and intelligence gathering, and then more tasks about the communication of what we collectively are doing to address the problem itself. So the partners may see the Police as being enforcement only, but we do consider the whole prevention and intervention agenda*” (C011) - Area Commander Police – Cartside.

Having a *suite of options*, or *considering* an agenda however, does not necessarily mean you will implement that agenda; especially in times of fiscal restraint. This was made clear by the Area Commander of Police Scotland in Burnside when asked about prevention with respect to community safety initiatives being given a timescale to work;

“[…], if I’m going to commit to an initiative - then right at the very beginning I want a good business case and I want an interim evaluation probably within three to six months depending on how long it is […] If something is ongoing it’s because it’s proven itself to work, it won’t just be ongoing because it sounds like a good idea, we’ll actually need hard evidence, empirical evidence to prove that it’s working” (B005) - Area Police Commander – Burnside.

Putting in place long term preventative options often appears to be problematic within Police organisational culture, insofar as their rigorous performance management regimes (linked to Police data) often focus on quantifiable measures, rather than on long term qualitative outcomes that are often more difficult to quantify (Henry, 2009; Hamilton-Smith et al., 2013). The Area Commander from Burnside commented that although they
made efforts to do qualitative work around quality of service it was a bit more difficult, but, they did however make an effort to do so, nonetheless it was also stated;

“Yeah sometimes... sometimes we’re a bit too reliant on simply number crunching and actually that quantitative performance measurement is sometimes easy or easier, so measuring the level of crime, measuring detection rates and things like that is a lot easier” (B005) – Area Police Commander - Burnside.

Therefore it remains to be seen whether or not the MATAC group will take precedence over the strategic CSP with regard to long term community safety outcomes. The strategic group may well discuss community safety as an overarching concept, with regard to the environment, local business, the night time economy or any other matters that arise. But, for the most part decisions will be operationalised within the MATAC, which may be steered towards particular outcomes, which in turn will be directed through a Police tasking co-ordinated problem oriented approach, whereby target setting and intelligence gathering are the key focus. It was recognised by the Chair that the dissemination of intelligence (a key requirement within the MATAC) could be problematic for non-Police agencies;

“Some of the organisations, particularly the ones that deal with vulnerable women are a bit reticent to go into great level of detail or identify the individuals that they’re talking about which is probably okay for a Strategic Partnership, but the monthly MATAC that I’m going to introduce, I would want individuals to share those names and the concerns that they have round about them so that we can see what the partnership can collectively do to address those. There’ll be a confidentiality statement read out at the start of the monthly meeting to indicate to all round the table that what’s discussed in the room essentially stays in the room unless there’s grey boundaries for disclosure of that information out-with” (C011) – Area Commander Police – Cartside.

A common complaint voiced by Police officers is that partnership meetings can be nothing more than ‘talking shops’, wherein specific tasking and accountability mechanisms to ensure partners meet their obligations are absent (McCarthy and O’Neill, 2014: 248). Although this restructure was discussed as a necessary measure to improve
partnership working, it also has the potential to create division and increase tension amongst those agencies more suited to a social welfare response to social problems. It is also potentially problematic in that particular agencies may be reluctant to provide information about their clients or service users despite assurances around confidentiality; as has traditionally been the case between Heath and Social Care agencies and the Police (Crawford, 1997; Hope, 2005; Perri 6 et al., 2006). However, the opposite could be true and providing confidentiality statements or information sharing protocols may help to break down those barriers that have traditionally existed between these agencies. Nonetheless, tensions were emerging in Cartside concerning this new approach, which appeared to have the power to change the membership of the partnership in line with a more proactive Police led direction;

“The membership’s going to change to include more individuals on a monthly basis who can actually make a difference to that whole keeping people safe agenda” (C011) – Area Police Commander – Cartside.

The participant from the Licensing Forum (who was not regarded as instrumental to the MATAC) expressed some concerns about the new partnership structure in response to a conversation they had with two other public sector representatives after a meeting they attended on (2/9/2013) had finished;

“It’s become a very - I mean (names person A) and (names person B) walked out that meeting (the one you were at) with me, and I said ‘well what do you think’ and (names person B) said ‘It’s getting too Policey for me’ they said ’I’m going to go to a couple of the meetings and decide who is going to go in my place’ (laughs) - wasn’t happy” (C012) –Cartside Licensing Forum – Cartside.

Although this was a second hand conversation or hearsay, it did help to reinforce an opinion formed through non-participant observation by the researcher at the aforesaid meeting, that there was some unresolved tensions between some actors and the Chair; based on their body language when the new structure was being discussed. Some criticism levelled at partnerships with the Police is that they are too dominant; or too ‘Police-led’. However, a counter-argument to this is that the Police are often the biggest
partner agency involved, with the greater resources at their disposal; and more importantly with the clearest mandate to tackle crime and disorder (McCarthy and O’Neill, 2014: 249).

4.4.3 Growing Tensions – loss of localism

During the interview period the CSP structure in Avonside was as listed (in Table 5), but the Community Safety Co-ordinator for Avonside pointed out that it also was in the process of change;

“So the link has always been Area Partnerships (local CSPs) feeding into the Strategic (Community Safety) Partnership and then the Strategic Partnership would feed into the Community Planning Partnership, but that bit in the middle may change when we have a different body or a different arrangement” (A001 - 2nd) - Community Safety Co-ordinator – Avonside.

Subsequent policy documents have highlighted the restructure of community safety in Avonside from the five Area CSPs, and one strategic CSP to one Community Safety Partnership Tasking and Coordination Group overseen by a Avonside SOA Outcome 6 Lead Officers Group, whose aim is to provide strategic leadership for the CSP Tasking Group, and also to combine community safety partnership working with other groups and ‘strategic partnerships who share SOA Outcome 6 responsibilities’ (Avonside, 2015: 4.8). (see Figure 5);

**Figure 5: Restructure of Community Safety on Avonside**

![Restructure Diagram](image)

Therefore it appears that CSPs within Avonside have (like Cartside), split into a strategic steering group (in the guise of the Outcome 6 Lead officers Group) and an operational – tasking and co-ordinating CSP or MATAC (ibid); but Avonside has also lost local strategic

10 Outcome 6 for Avonside SOA is ‘People live in safer and stronger communities’
decision making. The five areas will still retain their local Antisocial Behaviour Group; which target specific problems related to low level incivility, crime and disorder rather than more holistic notions of community safety in general.

As these changes were not in place (although discussed as a possibility likely to happen) during the interview process there is no direct discussion relating to how local actors and communities involved within the former local Avon Isle CSP perceived this change in terms of a loss of localism. Stoker (2004a: 117) viewed localism as the devolving of power and resources away from the centre towards front-line managers, local structures and local communities, which would be in keeping with one of Christie’s key objectives insofar as public services are built around people and communities (Scottish Government, 2011c: 23). Nonetheless, it was later noted by the Management Committee of the Strategic CPP that concerns were raised by local members within the former five local CSP areas that “local context and focus on local priorities could be lost if the Area Forums are replaced” (Avonside, 2015: 4.6). Therefore clearly there are concerns that local issues will be subsumed within an overarching Avonside SOA and the Scottish Government Statement of Ambition; designed to bring together local and national objectives, outcomes and priorities.

On the other hand CPP managers (as mentioned in the previous section) have been given formal requirements to ensure adherence to the SOA when delivering local outcomes, and if the structure was not in place to ensure compliance then perhaps a re-structure was necessary. For example, the former local CSP’s had been in place since 2000, a point highlighted by the Management Committee of the Strategic CPP, when it noted that there now existed weaknesses linked to a fragmented service delivery, a lack of oversight, insufficient meeting schedule’s to drive community safety work streams, and non-attendance, which impacts on effective partnership working (Avonside, 2013: 4.2).

The solution for Avonside was to integrate the five local and one strategic CSP into one Community Safety Partnership Tasking and Coordination Group (in line with a Police Scotland narrative) within the new overarching CPP framework. Perhaps directing community safety initiatives through one group rather than six was considered a more suitable way to monitor performance and accountability; especially within a tasking and
coordinating framework. This centralised focus could on the other hand be problematic in an area as diverse as Avonside; geographically it covers vast rural areas including twenty three island communities; of which Avon Isle is one. The average population density is just 13 people per square kilometre which may ultimately prove resistant to a one size fits all governance philosophy (Avonside, 2014: 4).

4.5 Changes in the purpose of the Partnership

It could be argued that there appears to be a de-prioritisation of community safety within Avonside Council in the sense that local accountability is arguably depleted with the loss of community voice on local CSPs. While they may still retain local Antisocial Behaviour Partnerships, these tend to be Police led, reactive, and restricted to specific agencies and issues. In Cartside the focus within the new MATAC seems to be heading towards a problem oriented policing model, which may in essence de-prioritise some community safety initiatives that are less quantifiable. This may also resonate with Avonside and Burnside who also appeared to have adopted a multi-agency tasking and coordination Police model. Cartside Council have also cut back on the Noise Team despite noise being high up on the agenda in terms of complaints from local communities, as one participant noted when discussing austerity measures;

“[...] you know, for example they’re cutting back on the Noise Team and that’s not well documented because probably that will cause a bit of a problem” (C013) - Housing Manager for Crawley Housing Association – Cartside.

Previously there had been a Noise Team that responded to and documented late night noise complaints (for evidentiary purposes), but that service is no longer there and noise complaints were now to be covered by environmental services and community wardens; which is fine if it occurs during their working hours and not after 10pm, which is ostensibly when most noise complaints occur;

“[…] We get a lot of complaints about noise issues, even last night at our Community Council meeting of the Burnwood City Community Council, they seem to get the brunt of all the problems because you have a lot of people coming out of pubs and clubs all hours of the night causing a lot of noise” (B015) - Councillor – Burnpark Area Partnership – Burnside.
It could be argued that there is an apparent gradual de-prioritisation of community safety as a concept within both Avonside and Cartside in respect of the withdrawal of key services, and an apparent shifting of priorities within the new structural arrangements that are more in keeping with a Police led centrally driven agenda, which could ultimately raise questions around the core purpose of CSPs in general. However, it may be even more so, within Burnside, for example, whereas Avonside and Cartside have at least retained a CSP structure of sorts, this is not the case for Burnside. They have reformed their whole community planning structure including removing the Strategic CSP and five local Community Planning Safe Themed Groups (See Figure 6).

**Figure 6: Restructure of Burnside CPP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior to Reform April 2013:</th>
<th>Post Reform April 2013:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overarching strategic CPP</td>
<td>Strategic CPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Group of Senior Officers</td>
<td>Executive Group of Senior Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Local CPP’s</td>
<td>Safe Burnside Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Area Committees</td>
<td>3 Sector CPPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic CSP</td>
<td>3 Senior Officer Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Community Planning Safe themed Groups</td>
<td>21 Area Partnerships</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A former analyst to the CSP briefly discussed the previous structure and how he provided intelligence for them;

“So the remit was obviously community safety, so, for example, at this company (Community Safety Burnside) for a lot of the additionality - for community safety diversionary activities, and we’d be going to these Safe Theme Groups trying to bid for monies and they would be using the community safety assessment that I provide as a sort of evidence base to focus resources on communities” (B014) - Senior Performance and Information Manager CSB – Burnside.

Community safety post reform in Burnside appeared to be subsumed within the new structure. However, when the interviews were first conducted the re-structure was at a very early stage and there seemed to be some confusion around where community safety sat within the overarching community planning process. One early interviewee (a principal officer within ‘Partnership and Development’ who acted as a gatekeeper re
access, who was also on the new Burnside Safe Group), when asked if community safety was now discussed at a strategic level and then fed down to the new 21 local Area Partnerships (AP’s) was at first unsure, but then intimated that it may be a bit of both - depending on what was being discussed as they had yet to develop a work plan, which could include things you could describe as community safety in nature. They mentioned there had been a Neighbourhood Management Survey led by Housing;

“[…] they focused on things like I suppose a crime and grime type agenda. It’s not purely from the purpose of community safety; it’s not from a perspective of developing community safety. […] it could be anything like dog fouling to fly-tipping to you know areas where there might be a lot of derelict land that’s causing further fly-tipping or you know, making people feel unsafe in the neighbourhood. But it’s not necessarily saying we are the community safety structure by any means at all” (B002) - Principal Officer – Safe Group – Burnside.

When pushed further with regard to localism, community safety and the role of the new Area Partnerships it was made clear that discussing community safety in this context was difficult;

“The Area Partnerships are not necessarily a replacement for the CSP’s - they will have a wider brief, they wouldn’t necessarily just deal with that, but it has been agreed that they will have a neighbourhood management focus, which I suppose in some way is a community safety focus, but it’s not 100% the same, it’s not like a - there isn’t really a straightforward - this is the team where community safety gets delivered, it’s probably more mainstream within the community planning structures, so there’s been a big shift - a change in community planning structures” (B002) - Principal Officer – Safe Group – Burnside.

When asked if community safety would now be discussed at the strategic CPP in the absence of a thematic CSP, or if there was someone on this committee who could discuss it, it was made clear (with some exasperation it must be said), that there was at that point no set plan for community safety as a concept within community planning, in fact it was stated;
“That's what I'm saying to you they don't talk about community safety in Burnside anymore” (B002) - Principal Officer – Safe Group – Burnside.

Interviewer: “Is it to be one of their outcomes”?

“No - well I mean to me community safety means a really broad brush, it means a whole load of things - it’s not one of the key things that are getting taken forward in either the SOA or within One Burnside which is another themed planning process. So, for example, the three key themes that are getting taken forward from the SOA for Burnside are: alcohol, vulnerable people, and youth employability. So where does community safety fit within that? It’s not a specific theme on its own, but obviously the community safety issues around the use of alcohol in the community, you know excessive alcohol consumption causes problems in any case. Community safety isn’t a theme anymore it's mainstreamed [...]” (B002) - Principal Officer – Safe Group – Burnside.

Mainstreamed apparently meant that most operational work would be taken up by Community Safety Burnside (CSB), which is an Arm’s Length Organisation with a unique status in the UK in that it is a charity with two members – Burnside City Council and The Scottish Police Authority (Community Safety Burnside, 2015). As well as supporting victims of gender based violence, it also provides services to reduce offending and antisocial behaviour, environmental incivility, and a commercial service promoting community safety (ibid). One Burnside (a themed process within community planning) dealing with reoffending and prevention is also situated within CSB (ibid). However, overall it could be argued that community safety as a strategic outcome has become de-prioritised within Burnside City Council, in the sense that it has no specific committees/groups or boards where it would be discussed as an outcome on its own. There was initially some confusion with regards to the role of the Burnside Safe Group (scrutiny structure for the Police/Fire Service within the new CPP) as its name suggests safety is a key issue, therefore it was originally thought that this may be where community safety was discussed. However, some interviewees at the start of the research process were quite definite as to its role;

“The thing about the Safe Burnside Group - the title is misleading, because Safe Burnside does not mean that we are the replacement for a Safety Partnership or
actually at the moment have a broader remit than the local scrutiny and engagement of Police and Fire” (B002) - Principal Officer – Safe Group – Burnside.

However, the Chair of the Safe Burnside Group when interviewed months later seemed to anticipate a wider agenda for the group, which perhaps highlighted awareness at that point that community safety was becoming a somewhat fragmented service delivery, insofar as there was no apparent oversight or direction via a strategic board; such as the former CSP. The strategic direction of community safety was also brought up at a later Safe Burnside Partnership meeting in August 2013. This was interesting insofar as one of the Council officers interviewed months earlier; adamant that the Safe Group’s remit was for scrutiny only, now raised the question that as they no longer had a CSP they ‘needed to look at their role and wider into the Safer Communities work – that they as a partnership had broader responsibilities’ (taken from notes from the Safe Burnside Partnership meeting 22/8/13). Perhaps it had become apparent that issues relating to community safety had become somewhat fragmented of late and lacking direction, and therefore needed more central steering through a strategic group. Interestingly, the actual minutes of the meeting do not mention the full conversation; merely that they will look beyond the role of scrutiny and ‘cover the wider Community Safety agenda’ (Burnside, 2013b: 106).

4.6 Conclusion

Community Safety Partnership’s (CSP’s) set within the governance of community safety in Scotland have developed over time to incorporate new guidelines/legislation. In England and Wales their statutory role was set within the Crime and Disorder Act 1998; a role that arguably focused more on crime reduction rather than community safety (Hughes, 2002; Henry, 2009; 2012). In Scotland, CSPs emerged from a slightly different route. In 1999 the report Safer Communities in Scotland provided guidance for the establishment of CSPs; whose subsequent aims were to establish partnerships with a range of organisations drawn from the public and third sector; emphasising that sustainability could only be achieved if a variety of agencies and approaches were employed to tackle crime and disorder in local communities (Scottish Community Safety Network (SCSN), 2012a: 9). The report gave guidance to Local Authorities and the Police on how to set up partnership structures; including guidance on conducting audits, and how to monitor and evaluate
initiatives – in fact not to dissimilar to guidance issued to Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships in England and Wales (Henry, 2009: 97). Nonetheless, it has been argued that despite a possible ‘detarminisation’ of Scottish social policy (McAra, 2011; Croall et al., 2010) during the New Labour era - which arguably put a brake on innovative policy making (Croall et al., 2010), Scotland for the most part retained its distinctive civic culture with a continued emphasis on penal welfare values.

However, CSPs in Scotland have since the 2003 Local Government in Scotland Act, been inextricably linked with Community Planning and the concept of best value, which means their role is set within the somewhat conflicting aims of centralisation and localisation (McAra, 2007). Community safety as a concept is therefore situated within complex government structures, whereby multi-levels or layers of partnership working interface with an intricate set of rules and regulations designed to increase public accountability (Cairney, 2015a). However, the more crowded the policy arena happens to be the more blurred the boundaries of accountability can become (ibid); and the more likely tensions will emerge between a rhetoric of long term prevention and engagement (espoused by Christie) and the drive to meet performance targets through policy levers such as the NPF and SOA within the Community Planning process – unless of course they overlap (Hughes and Rowe, 2007). Add to this the strain of a reform process promoting an ethos of achieving ‘more with less’ (Scottish Government, 2010: 2) and some unintended consequences may begin to emerge within the case study areas, which may ultimately impact on the role of CSPs within the governance of community safety in Scotland. For example, as austerity measures take hold some organisations – as has been suggested by some participants – may retrench back to what they perceive to be their ‘core stuff (C002), which may mean that the direction of community safety may by default be decided by more powerful partners (those with the most resources and expertise) such as the Police.

By utilising aspects of the Bespoke framework (see chapter 3), based on Hudson and Hardy’s (2002) ‘partnership assessment tool’, questions were addressed to participants in order to try and address some of the research questions. For example, with respect to ‘partnership origins’ and power/structure and control, which allowed the researcher to gain an insight on participants perceptions around strategic decision making practices, for example, the vertical influence (if any) on horizontal strategic decisions. Or, the impact of
austerity measures on local structures, and how lead agencies that may possess different levels of power are perceived. This highlighted increased tensions within the case study areas around top-down decision making practices - especially in relation to policing, and how the reform/re-structure of CSP’s (particularly in Cartside) may lead to a change in focus within community safety partnership working.

In terms of perception (amongst participants) throughout the case study areas - the Council are generally considered the lead agency in terms of partnership working within the CPP structure and within the CSP structure (where it exists), and have in the main been regarded as having overall responsibility for community safety. However, in light of the reform process, both structurally and with an added emphasis on performance it appears that tensions have begun to emerge within the domain of community safety partnership working. In Cartside this was made evident by reactions to the changes to the CSP structure as some agencies believe that the Police (whose representatives have always been the Chair) are becoming too dominant insofar as decisions may be taken using an intelligence led policing model that may (despite Christie) focus on short term quantifiable initiatives in line with rigorous performance management regimes favoured by the Police (Mackenzie and Hamilton-Smith, 2011; Hamilton-Smith et al., 2013). This issue was also highlighted in research on partnership working by the Scottish Community Safety Network; insofar as a number of CSPs in discussion around Police and Fire reform voiced concerns that Police Scotland had shifted their focus from ‘prevention and partnership working to enforcement-driven and performance output-led’ (SCSN, 2013: 6).

This has possibly been the case in both Avonside and Cartside; where arguably the Council have relinquished the desire for a more holistic partnership approach to community safety (whereby a multi-agency solution is sought incorporating the public/private and third sector) in place of a more one dimensional inter-agency policing model, which has the possibility to interpenetrate and change the work practices of those involved (Coliandris and Rogers, 2008: 119). For example, with the creation of Police oriented Multi-Agency Tasking and Co-ordination groups (MATAC’s); whose membership was ultimately selected by the Police. Within ‘austerity localism’ (Featherstone, et al., 2012) the most obvious reason for this may be linked to the reduction in Council services/personnel; thereby necessitating a need to delegate community safety issues into the hands of the one agency with the most capital (human and social) to take the
lead. It may also be linked to the removal of ring fenced funding for CSPs. No funding, may result in Councils (and individual Agencies) returning to a sort of silo mentality with a focus on their own aims and objectives. This is possibly more evident in Burnside with the removal of the CSP structure and the ‘mainstreaming’ of community safety throughout the community planning process – to the point where “they don’t talk about community safety in Burnside anymore” (B002). In fact, from 2007 to 2010 in the Burnside Household Survey, community safety is a main topic area (antisocial behaviour, community safety patrols, safety at night etc.), however, from 2011 to 2014 the priorities change to incorporate topics linked to welfare reform, fuel poverty, community cohesion etc., (Burnside, 2015a), thereby signalling a possible de-prioritisation of community safety as a concept. However, it may also be linked to a perception that people feel safer within their communities (Burnside, 2015a; Scottish Government, 2012g: 29).

It is clear that austerity and the reform process in general is having an impact on strategic decision making within the domain of community safety. Not only has there been a marked reduction in personnel/services within the case study areas, but, structural reform has witnessed a more enhanced focus on performance in line with policy levers such as the NPF, the SOA and Christie. Add to this the emergence of Police MATAC groups as the operational arm of CSPs, and welfare focused agencies may struggle to commit to this type of partnership; as witnessed by the Agency who declared that they had become “too Policey” (C012). Although CSPs are interlinked with CPPs and Best Value they were nonetheless established to deliver efficient integrated local services to meet the needs of specific communities across Scotland (SCSN, 2012a). However, if there is a perception that core issues within the domain of community safety (in relation to long term prevention) are now somehow being diluted or obscured by enhanced performance management regimes; or community safety as a concept is somehow being de-prioritised (loss of local forums – community voice; services; initiatives) then it may raise questions around changes to the role of CSPs within the governance of community safety; as either a multi-agency forum discussing joint problems, or as inter-agency partnership working, whereby a dominant partner alters the work practices of those involved (Coliandris and Rogers, 2008: 119). Therefore, partnership working will be discussed next.
Chapter 5: Working in Partnership within the domain of Community Safety

5.1 Is Partnership Working necessary?

Since the 1980s, as previously highlighted in the literature review, a prevailing opinion within UK public services is that partnership working is essential to crime prevention and community safety. This was reinforced by New Labour through the *Crime and Disorder Act 1998* (Gilling, 2007), and by the Scottish Executive in the *Local Government in Scotland Act 2003* (HMSO, 2003). Partnership working has been deemed necessary within most public policy areas, and is ultimately viewed as ‘a good thing’ – a virtuous concept (Clark and Glendinning, 2002); wherein the ideal partnership involves co-operation between actors working towards common goals (Mackintosh, 2007).

Working in partnership has become increasingly important within public policy over the last forty years, and has been invariably viewed not only as the obvious option, but also as the key implementation tool used to tackle ‘wicked issues’ such as crime and poverty by local agencies (Glendinning, 2002: 115; Martin and Guarneros-Meza, 2013). Nonetheless, working in partnership can also be problematic, for example, a frequent theme cited within partnership working is the interaction between hierarchy and networks (Martin and Guarneros-Meza, 2013: 585); and the role of external or top down rational bureaucratic forms represented by clear lines of accountability (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008); and how this affects partnership working in general. Practitioners of community safety therefore (much like any other public partnerships), have to not only negotiate a path that takes in potentially contentious relationships between local, regional and national policy objectives, but also between inter-organisational cultures with opposing interpretations of community safety/crime prevention discourse; and between conflicting images of community representation (inclusive/exclusive) (Hughes and Rowe, 2007: 323). Therefore, a key question often asked by academics and practitioners within the social policy arena may be - is partnership working necessary, and if so, why? Some academics have asked questions around the benefits of partnership working (Broussine and Miller,
in other words will the benefits of partnership working outweigh the costs (Riggs et al., 2013).

In an attempt to identify if participants within the case study areas viewed partnership working as beneficial or essential; and not just as a ‘buzzword to sprinkle liberally over funding applications’ (McQuade, 2009: 3), questions were asked around the relevance of partnership working – in other words was it essential to the core business practices of their agency. Practically every participant answered quite emphatically in the affirmative (usually with a one word answer – ‘yes’, ‘absolutely’, ‘100%’, ‘definitely’, however, some others expanded on why it was so;

“We can’t do anything without partnership working” (A014) - Child Protection – Avon Isle – Avonside.

“Yes, you know, it can’t be any other way, and by the fact that the third sector is an amalgamation of 2,500 different organisations, if we don’t find ways of working together we’re stuffed” (B010) - Chair of Third Sector Forum/SCPP – Burnside.

“[…] I think partnership working is key and in terms of community safety nobody has got the answer, you know, everybody needs to bring something to the table” (B019) – VAW Co-ordinator – CSB – Burnside.

However, one participant in Cartside acknowledged some limitations of partnership working within the Fire Service;

“It should be but we aren’t there yet. We are working to educate our staff on the advantages and benefits of partnership working. [...] and we still need to work to make sure everybody from the bottom up is aware of what the moral and legal obligations is in partnership working. So, I’d say we’re still not mature as a partner at all levels of our agency” (C004) - Group Manager Fire Service – Cartside.

Most participants were quite emphatic in their responses in relation to how working in partnership was a necessary and core part of their operational practices. This has been supported by other studies which have found that inter-agency partnerships have become a key component towards combating crime and disorder, and promoting
community safety (Shepherdson et al., 2014). However, as the participant from the Fire Service pointed out – you need to ensure that everyone from the ‘bottom up’ understands their obligations about working in partnership with others and what it entails in terms of commitment. In other words individuals in organisations need to understand and agree about the necessity of partnership working, and that it is an inescapable feature of present-day social policy (Weston, 2014: 10).

Understanding other agencies core practices was also cited by two participants as a good way to offset potential conflict in respect of highlighting problematic situations that agencies have to deal with – especially between the Police and other agencies within the public sector;

“I think one time or another in terms of the community safety there was an initiative that was about work shadowing that a couple of our guys took part in, for example, there used to be the Antisocial Behaviour Team that went out on a Friday and Saturday night and a couple of our staff went out with them just to experience that from a Policing point of view [...] I can sit here and talk about the Police all day long but, I don’t fully understand their role and the pressures and the different kind of context, so it’s good to challenge yourself and go out and learn, and it’s probably something that doesn’t happen so much and I think that’s probably a sign of the times in terms of pressures” (C010) - Youth Services – Cartside.

Possibly alluding to how austerity measures (in terms of a reduction of resources across the public sector) could impact on effective partnership work in terms of actually having the resources to shadow or observe inter-organisationally. If this practice and others are stalled due to a lack of resources then it could lead to increased frustration across agencies owing to a lack of understanding about the problems each agency face;

“I think it is always good to have an understanding about what other agencies do. [...] We have an issue in Burnside with people claiming it’s on ‘Standby’ all the time, because they don’t answer calls on time, and they don’t” (B018) - Child Protection – Burnside.

‘Standby’ was in reference to an out of hours service for Social Work (Child Protection)
and the Police in particular complained they had difficulty with the staff not answering the phone on time, or not responding in the way they wanted them to. In an effort to fix things they organised a meeting between those on ‘Standby’ and the Police;

“The Police were shocked to know that there was only actually - I think it was only three or four members of staff on Standby and they thought there was a whole big team. So in that, an understanding of what the service actually did allowed the Police to stop getting so upset about it [...]” (B018) - Child Protection – Burnside.

In this case conflict was avoided in the Child Protection Committee by arranging a separate meeting between Social Work and the Police in an effort to come to an understanding. Conflict avoidance methods have been a key tool used in the past to offset tensions that may surface in partnership meetings between key agencies - particularly between the Police and other partners. This is usually achieved by key agencies meeting outside of formal partnership structures and agreeing informally on future strategies (Crawford and Jones, 1995). While this may have been done to avoid future conflict, it could also have the effect of promoting exclusivity; insofar as not all agencies would be involved in the decision making process (McCarty and O’Neill, 2014).

5.2 Power and Decision Making

Partnership on the whole as a concept is viewed as a positive quality associated with equality and reciprocity, however, partnerships are not necessarily viewed as equal in practice and can become unequal as time goes by wherein powerful partners too often determine the agenda and set the time frames (Mayo and Taylor, 2001). Partnership working often benefits powerful partners (Rummery, 2002: McCall and Rummery, 2017: 59), for example, those partners who it is often argued have more economic social capital compared to others; in this sense social capital would signify certain resource availability to an actor (Coleman, 1988); including material and human capital – skills and knowledge embodied in labour (Nahapiet, 2011). Individuals or groups of individuals may also possess more social capital derived from their network of relationships of mutual ‘acquaintance and recognition’ (Bourdieu, 1986). Putnam (2000) defines social capital further with reference to Bonding (exclusive) and Bridging (inclusive) social capital. In
terms of partnerships therefore it is arguable that the partner with the most social capital defined by; economic capital, human capital, and bridging social capital - links to a broader network of external assets (Putnam, 2000), has the most power. Power in this sense may manifest itself through the decision making process, insofar as powerful actors will have more leverage (social capital) to set the agenda or determine the goals and direction of the partnership.

Lowndes and Sullivan (2004: 64-65) in discussion around decision making, partnerships and public participation argue that in real life partnerships are far from the ideal type; insofar as different actors from different organisations find it difficult to behave outside of organisational norms, and interaction is often characterised by clashes of competing principles rather than notions of reciprocity and interdependence. It could be argued that there are competing principles within community safety networks between; the public and the third sector, or between different public sector agencies, or even between local, regional and central government. However, a key point highlighted in the literature review was that Government (typified by hierarchical bureaucracies) no longer functioned through the same type of command and control from the centre, but neither was it incapacitated as power was still retained through resource allocation, regulation and legislation (Holliday, 2000: 175; Marinetto, 2003); and it is perhaps through powerful regulatory frameworks that tensions may emerge as a result of competing principles within the decision making process (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004).

5.2.1 The Concept of Power

Policy levers within community planning structures, such as the SOA have the power to steer partners towards taking cognizance of national outcomes; while (in line with Christie) still pay attention to one of the main aims of community planning - engaging people and communities in the decision making process (Scottish Executive, 2004: 1). Haugaard (2002: 1-2) argues that it is impossible to define power as a single concept; he prefers to equate power to Wittgenstein’s ‘family resemblance’ concept insofar as while there exist similarities there is no one set of characteristics in common. There is ‘horse power’ and ‘political power’ both have the power to intrinsically make something happen or move forward, but they are not the same. Power is being discussed here in the latter political sense (however briefly) in order to identify some of the different layers and
ideology at play, for example, ‘power over’ (conflictual) and ‘power to’ (consensual) (Haugaard, 2002). For instance, within Dahl’s philosophy A has the power over B to make B do something they may not otherwise have done; it is in essence about ‘prevailing in decision making’ (Dahl, 2002: 6), and not necessarily about power over resources. Bachrach and Baratz (2002:26) while accepting most of Dahl’s perspective nonetheless criticise Dahl for not taking into account ‘institutional bias’- in that while A may exercise power over B in the decision making process, he/she may also do so by limiting the extent of the political process to public deliberation of those issues that are relatively innocuous to B (Bachrach and Baratz, 2002: 30). In essence there are two faces of power – the power to make decisions and the power of non-decision making (or agenda setting).

Lukes (1974; 2005) characterises both Dahl’s and Bachrach and Baratz’s theorisations of power as dimensions of power. Dahl’s theorisation of power – those who prevail in decision making – he refers to as just ‘power’ or one dimensional power (Lukes, 2005: 111), and Bachrach and Baratz’s two faces of power (agenda) as two dimensional power - the power to decide what is decided; by deciding what initiatives will be supported, resourced and in what timeframe (Mayo and Taylor, 2001). Furthermore, he argues that whereas these conceptions of power presuppose that actual conflict is essential to power, it is to ignore - as he states “that the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place” (Lukes, 2005: 27), by securing compliance to domination through the shaping of ‘perceptions, cognitions and preferences’ (Lukes, 1974: 24) into accepting the existing order of things, via institutions such as education, religion, government and the media (Lukes, 1974: 24), this he refers to as his third dimensional view of power.

Power in Foucault’s view is also mutually constitutive (Foucault, 2002) insofar as far from being a conflictual force, it can also produce pleasure, discourse and forms of knowledge (Foucault, 1980: 119). Foucault asks that if power were only ever conceived as a negative, repressive force that only said no, then would people readily obey it? In other words whereas power could be conceived as rules and regulations that are prohibitive, it can also be viewed as a productive network that runs through the whole social body (Foucault, 1980). Mayo and Taylor (2001: 40) argue that the most visible aspect of power in partnerships is the ability to shape outcomes. This perhaps emphasises Lukes (1974; 2005) first two dimensions of power – the power to (first dimension) and the power to
determine or set the agenda/objectives. Within community planning this is evident through the power of the Local Authority to change or create governance structures, establish partnerships, or to align partnerships to Single Outcome Agreements (SOA). Therefore participants were asked a series of questions designed to elicit how power in decision making (in respect of community safety) is viewed within the partnerships, for example, were decisions taken from a top down (vertical/command and control) perspective via the SOA, or from a horizontal perspective – with each organisations input taken into account.

5.2.2 Partnership working, power and decision making

On the whole participants within all three case study areas had mixed views on whether there was a vertical/top down chain of command with respect to the governance of community safety. It was accepted by most participants that there is a hierarchical structure with regards to community planning wherein the Local Authority leads (influenced in part by key central government policy documents). Community safety as a themed partnership (in Avonside and Cartside) sits within that structure. However, in the Avon Isle CSP the command structure was viewed as more localised; flowing more through the Chair. The Chair was an elected local Councillor, therefore power is still flowing through the Council, but perhaps (because of its geographical isolation) it was thought of in a more contained sense in that local issues were decided by the partnership through the Chair;

“I suppose, our legal services department would ultimately be the organisational body, but control is sort of within the hands of the committee of what they’re trying to achieve. Nobody actually hands us an agenda with things to do. We decide what are the priorities for our community and try and work towards these” (A008) – Councillor - Avon Isle – Avonside.

However, this interview had taken place before the structure was reorganised in Avonside in line with the new SOA, which means that with the demise of the local CSP this will no longer be the case. Nonetheless, the Community Safety Co-ordinator for Avonside in general emphasised that decisions would be taken with a ‘bottom up’ approach;
“Yeah, well the SOA and the community plan I’d argue is bottom up because services themselves will identify from their own priorities and their own service intelligence what are the significant issues for Avonside; and it’s those issues that are then fed into the community plan, the formation of the community plan” (A001 - 2nd) – Community Safety Co-ordinator - Avonside.

Interestingly in Cartside opinion was slightly divided, for example, some participants (mainly from the third sector) thought there was a hierarchical structure within the CSP and it came through the Police;

“Aye, definitely hierarchical, and its Police basically [...] when one goes or moves on another one takes his place, that’s been my experience anyway” (C005) – Rape Crisis – Cartside.

“It’s always been a senior police officer that’s led it, so because of the culture of the Police there is quite a clear structure as to who’s got the lead in convening the meetings and taking stuff forward” (C007) – Addiction Support – Cartside.

For others (mainly public sector agencies) it was thought to be more jointly led;

“In terms of the CSP - I mean there is a Chair and a Vice Chair but, I think it’s more people working together collaboratively rather than because they’ve been told to or they’re following orders” (C003) – Child Protection – Cartside.

Basically it’s not so much a linear - it is a horizontal chain, where partners come in - obviously we have our own core issues that we deal with ourselves and it’s only the multi-agency aspects that we will go into partners where other partners can insist - so I wouldn’t say it is vertical, I would say it is more horizontal chain of command” (C004) – Group Manager Fire Service – Cartside.

Although the comment above suggests that decision making is based on collaboration, they do however, add that it is only during the multi-agency aspects where other actors ‘can insist’...the sentence was not finished, but, it could suggest that there are more
dominant actors/agencies within the CSP in relation to multi-agency decision making. Perhaps in Cartside this is in reference to the Police who have initiated the new MATAC structure (previously discussed), wherein ‘competing principles’ (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004) have highlighted some tensions surrounding the new structure;

“I think like anything else there’s certain organisations represented that’ll have a bigger influence in terms of some of the kind of outcomes in the work that we’re doing. It’s trying to be relaxed about that as well and, you know, again it changes in terms of some of the personalities involved as well, you know, there’s been Chairs of the CSP where it’s felt quite a kind of... top down approach and it’s not sat well with a lot of the partners [...] but some of their personnel have... it felt as though you were part of the Police and that was the way in which meetings were conducted and it was quite an unusual situation for some of us as partners who don’t operate in that kind of environment” (C010) – Youth Services – Cartside.

However, they did add that the new Chair “seems quite an approachable guy, quite focused, you know, easy to deal with” (C010). Nonetheless, it was also pointed out that it would be interesting to see in what direction the CSP is heading in light of some other key structural changes. For example, the Community Planning Partnership Manager role (role involved engaging with the wider partnership) was being deleted, which could have a significant impact in terms of engagement with the wider partnership, as opposed to engagement being limited to key players. As one participant put it;

“[...] there have been periods perhaps where, because the Police are in the Chair, it can sometimes, if their priorities aren’t the ones that are driven, then perhaps sometimes make it difficult to deliver in the true context of partnership” (C008) - Community Safety Projects Manager – Cartside.

Burnside was different in that under the new community planning structure accountability for community safety now sat somewhere between the local Area Partnerships and the Safe Burnside Group, which in the end was accountable to the Strategic Community Planning Partnership (SCPP); in other words information was fed up the way and citywide decisions were taken within the SCPP. Within this new structure there did appear to be prima facie evidence that the structure had been changed with
Christie in mind insofar as ‘services were to be democratically accountable to local people and communities in Scotland’ (Scottish Government, 2011c: 81); for example, community representatives on the new Area Partnerships and sectoral CPPs acquiring more power within the decision making process, and more crucially the right to vote;

“I’ve experienced at the meeting... depends who the Chair is, but I’ve found that there is a degree of a vertical chain of command, but it’s quite clear that the process is consensus so far. So it might be vertical, but it’s not dictatorial which I’m pleased at” (B013) – Community Councillor Burnwood CC – Burnside.

“I think that the Council is genuinely grappling through this, but the Council... because it has a statutory responsibility for the leading or coordination of community planning, tends to work with other partners in a way that they’re working with them to their agenda. But I think that they are working very hard at how you develop a more collaborative approach operating; rather than a vertical chain of command” (B010) – Chair of Third Sector Forum/SCPP – Burnside.

Although the previous comments have conceivably emphasised a more collaborative form of decision making within partnership working, they have also highlighted the differential power dynamics within community planning (between the Council and community partners); with respect to Bachrach and Baratz (2002: 30) ‘institutional bias’; or Lukes (1974; 2005) two dimensional concept of power – the power to decide what is decided. While it was accepted throughout the case study areas that there was a strategic hierarchical structure in place, there was also an acknowledgement that the SOA established decision making as a bottom up process; insofar as agencies within the partnership informed the SOA. Nonetheless, it was also pointed out that the SOA - although ostensibly consultative – was still a policy lever linking national priorities to local ones;

“[…] Within the SOA there’s a section on community safety and a number of the key partners got together to work on that to identify shared priorities and also in terms of the National Outcomes because you’ve got to pay cognisance to those as well, to identify what each service would contribute towards achievement of the National Outcomes” (A001 - 2nd) – Community Safety Co-ordinator – Avonside.
“[...] In terms of the SOA, the One Burnside Agenda, they’re all huge drivers and influences, so we have to fit in with those structures, you know, it’s a no choice not to because, you wouldn’t probably get much movement” (B019) – VAW Co-ordinator – CSB – Burnside.

The general consensus amongst participants in this regard is that individual agencies have a definite role in the decision making process, and local areas have to an extent room to manoeuvre in deciding their own priorities; though arguably indirectly steered from the centre - albeit of the soft persuasion – through guidance and suggestion (Martin and Guarneros-Meza, 2013). Nonetheless, direct steering may also occur with respect to particular strategies;

“[...] I think it depends on what the issues are. If it’s something that affects City wide then there may be a steer that comes down that chain, if you want to call it that, from the CPP board level or the sectoral level [...]” (B015) - Councillor – Burnpark Area Partnership – Burnside.

Having a clear role/identity within partnerships is often crucial to its success, thus how individuals judge their relationships to other actors/agencies within partnerships can be important (Hudson and Hardy, 2002; Broussine and Miller, 2005: 381). Therefore participants throughout the case study areas were asked how they thought their roles/identity were viewed within Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) (or within the different partnership structures in Burnside CPP) in order to obtain a reflexive viewpoint on how they thought they were perceived inter-organisationally, and if this may impact on how they work together as a partnership.

5.3 Partnership identity

For the most part the Council throughout all the case study areas - were thought of as the key leads responsible for the governance of community safety, or as strategic facilitators (making sure partners bought into the SOA) to ensure proper governance, or to use a
nautical terminology in line with Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992) concepts – at the helm in order to steer partnerships in one direction;

“[…] There’s obviously ensuring proper governance of the partnership, to a degree obviously getting some of the funding round the table, pulling levers by making sure that the right partners are round the table […]” (B015) – Councillor – Burnpark Area Partnership – Burnside.

“I suppose the Council is seen as the organisation that makes the whole community tick in some way…” (A009) – Street Scene Warden Avon Isle – Avonside.

“I think the Council’s role […] the centre of the organisation where I sit, its role is to provide primarily strategic policy direction and the clerking support, that’s what the centre does” (C001 - 2nd) – Community Planning Partnership Manager – Cartside.

While there were clear perceptions as to the role of the Council within the realm of community safety, this was arguably also the case for those agencies principally involved in preventative activities - most notably the Police and to some extent the Fire Service;

“I don’t know there's a definition what the Police should do, certainly we attend meetings on a multi-agency approach, basically to solving any issues that are in the community that affect community safety” (A004) - Senior Police Officer – Avon Isle – Avonside.

“As a Fire and Rescue Service we have a legal requirement to get involved in the CSP or community planning process, in addition to that the new National Fire Service have basically a policy that they will fully engage with partners […]” (C004) - Group Manager Fire Service – Cartside.

Housing Associations (Registered Social Landlords) – as issue specific partners in the third sector - were also (to some extent) viewed in a preventative role;

“Our role would be defined in that we work with other agencies to reduce antisocial behaviour within the community and address antisocial behaviour issues” (A007) - Housing Officer – Avon Isle – R&S Homes – Avonside.
“[...] Our Community Improvement Partnership (CIP) is a partnership with; BHA (Burnside Housing Association), SFRS, Scottish Police force, and that works in trying to improve community safety [...] but a lot of that’s about the intelligence the three of us gather as well and using that” (B007) - Leader of Neighbourhood Services – BHA – Burnside.

These comments will be explored later (in accountability section) with respect to the growing influence of Housing within the concept of Third Party Policing. Those participants representing community organisations (although it should be noted that there were no formal community representatives on the Cartside CSP); or the third sector, were slightly less definite about how their roles were viewed or defined within the community safety/community planning structure;

“[...] prior to the change (the restructure of the CPP) we were just there to make up the numbers. We were there because ‘we better ask them, you know, they better come along’ [...] they heard and were supportive of us. But when it came to a decision Community Councillors never had a vote. So although we were listened to genuinely and sincerely (said with a wry grin) - and the Chair has made it abundantly clear that, you know, over the years ‘we do listen’ and they do, we never had any real teeth in it” (B013) – Community Councillor Burnwood CC – Burnside.

“I've no idea how it is defined (laughs) we're just there” (C005) - Rape Crisis – Cartside.

"I think it’s a role - I think we have quite an important role in local CSP forums, because we provide, I believe, essential services throughout Avonside, our input is valuable [...] I think we're viewed as quite valuable partners" (A002) - Rape Crisis – Avonside.

“In many ways others are better to answer that than I am. I think what I would hope would be that the third sector is viewed as a hugely significant partner after the Council and the Health Board; it’s the organisation that has collaboratively the biggest budget" (B010) - Chair of Third Sector Forum/SCPP – Burnside.

How you perceive your identity as an individual or how your agency is perceived is arguably different with respect to perceptions on status, which will be discussed next.
5.4 Partnership Working and Status

Much has been written about partnership working in the past in relation to the power differentials between agencies; with respect to central and local relations within networks of power - those who determined strategy (steered) had more power than those who merely rowed in the direction pointed out for them (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992); or power could be determined through resource allocation (Holliday, 2000; Marinetto, 2003). Mayo and Taylor (2001: 41) ascribe the use of resources as a controlling lever by powerful partners (such as Government departments, or the Police) in that they may only be made available for ‘specific types of initiative’. This fits in with Lukes (1974; 2005) second dimensional view of power in terms of powerful partners being able to determine what is up for consideration, via agenda setting, or non-decision making – determining what is not up for consideration. Similarly, there are powerful Government levers at work through regulation (Holliday, 2000). If this is the case then it could be argued that when a power imbalance such as this occurs – especially if there is a prominence/status accorded to some agencies over others within a network (with regards to agenda setting and availability of resources) – then how your status/power or social capital is viewed by others may impact on decisions made within a partnership. Somers and Bradford (2006: 76) for example, argue that power could simply reside in the ability of some agencies to ‘get the ducks lined up’ insofar as being able to link together a network’s constitutive partners with the goals of social policy. However, another possible inhibitor to partnership working is a perception that some agencies/individuals on partnerships are favoured more than others (Broussine and Miller, 2005: 382).

In an effort to understand if there is a view held by participants of an asymmetry in power within community safety/community planning networks (which may ultimately impact on partnership goals); participants were asked a series of questions in an effort to try and determine how they viewed their status within partnership working. There was a mixed response from participants across the case study areas when asked if their agency had an equal status within partnership working. For the most part there was a consensus around statements on equality ‘partners being equal’ etc., which was more evident from Council agencies across all case study areas. Nevertheless, a dichotomy of sorts was also pointed out by some participants with reference to the key stakeholder status of other partners;
“Yeah the Council is probably the lead agency in the Area Partnership [...] the other partner agencies, it’s difficult for me to answer on their behalf, but I would like to hope that they do feel part and inclusive into this whole process, because ultimately it’s for them, and when I say them - that’s probably more targeted towards the Community Reps. But everyone in my opinion should feel part of the process” (B015) - Councillor – Burnpark Area Partnership - Burnside.

“I’m not convinced... as Youth Services I don’t believe that we do, but that’s not... I think it’s a strange one because I don’t think that we do, I don’t know if others would consider us key players, but we make a big contribution and a lot of that contribution’s recognised by the other partners. We do get good feedback, but I don’t know necessarily if we’re seen as, you know, a key player” (C010) - Youth Services – Cartside.

The Police are naturally viewed as key stakeholders within CSP’s in both Avonside and Cartside, (and within the reformed CPP structure in Burnside) based on their knowledge of crime prevention, and consequently they also viewed themselves as equal partners – or in some cases as the main partners;

“Yeah, the Police are one of the main players obviously, one of the main agencies involved in it”(A004) – Senior Police Officer - Avon Isle – Avonside.

“I think we’re all contributors, whether that makes it equal amongst... I suppose at the moment with the structure being as it is and with everybody kind of working in silos then you probably will have people that don’t contribute as much as others because they don’t have a collective goal to work towards at the moment” (C011) - Area Commander Police – Cartside.

The above comment perhaps illustrates a sort of latent frustration on behalf of this Police participant in Cartside; partnership status or equality in this sense is arguably linked to active contribution (the sharing of intelligence/information); which perhaps has not been as forthcoming within the new MATAC structure due to differences in organisational ethos. Therefore working towards ‘collective goals’ is possibly being hampered by a lack of trust and a growing resistance by some agencies (both Council and the third sector) to
engage in the more task oriented practice commonly associated with Police work (McCarthy and O’Neill, 2014).

The Fire Service (apart from Burnside) in Avonside and Cartside also exhibited signs of frustration with regard to perceptions of their status within the partnership. Partly, because relatively speaking they felt they had to prove their worth as partners, or make others appreciate their importance within the structure;

“ [...] being one of the smaller partners there’s very little overlap, so where we have an issue it’s not one of their major problems; it’s one of their minor problems. What we have as a key issue very rarely makes it to a CPP meeting. Purely and simply because of the size of the problems and the dimensions of the problems - Social Work, Police, Health and what other partners can bring to the table. What we bring is a smaller issue.” (C004) Group Manager Fire Service – Cartside.

“I think a lot of people still don’t recognise that we can have a big part in certain things and they still think - you go to fires, you mobilise when the bell goes - but you don’t really have a part and it’s just trying to convince everybody of that, but yeah I think people are seeing that now and the fact that we are committed to community planning, I think they see that you are an equal member yeah” (A003) – Group Commander – Fire Service – Avonside.

Power according to some analysts, is not static, it is fluid as a concept (Mayo and Taylor, 2001: 43) and within networks it can in a Foucauldian sense shift (Clegg, 1997) as each actor learns and internalises the rules to the game. Therefore the Fire Service’s status may change over time as they increase their bridging social capital by developing their knowledge of how to engage, or how to be seen to engage in the decision making process; especially if they have material and human capital that can be adapted to further partnership goals. This was evident within Cartside when one third sector Participant described how they thought the Fire Service’s role had grown in importance;

“[...] Another major partner in the partnership whose role I think has become more important is the Fire and Rescue Service. In the years I’ve been there I’ve certainly
seen probably a more coherent representation than there was before [...] I know for example the Fire and Rescue Service will provide free smoke alarms to people’s houses, what I didn’t know is that they were also giving advice to vulnerable people either because they’re vulnerable because of disability or mobility problems in terms of fire prevention which was good” (C007) - Addiction Support – Cartside.

The third sector overall had quite a pragmatic response to the question of equal status; in terms of how they viewed themselves within the partnership. It could also belie the notion of equality within community planning insofar as it is thought that not all agencies can (or should) be treated as equal in status;

“I don’t think that there’s any partner round the table that is trying to diminish us or don’t think that we’re unimportant, but in terms of what we’re contributing - it’s not an awful lot therefore if we were to, hypothetically speaking, if we were to leave the partnership, I don’t think that would seriously compromise the work of the partnership” (C007) – Addiction Support – Cartside.

Status in this sense is naturally afforded to those organisations that have the power to set the agenda based on available resources, which for the most part will be provided by key stakeholders such as the Council and the Police. Although it can also depend on the type of partnership, for example, issue specific partnerships such as anti-poverty alliances, which bring together a multitude of voluntary and charitable organisations, or Violence Against Women Partnerships (VAW), where power differentials are not so easily defined. For instance, the VAW Partnership relies on the specialist knowledge (knowledge is power) of the third sector, but also the resources of the Council and Criminal Justice Agencies, which can lead to a complex governance arena. In Burnside for example, VAW is situated within Community Safety Burnside (CSB) (an Arm’s Length External Organisation (ALEO) created by the Council and the Police);

“I mean, it’s a partnership organisation in terms of its ownership is with the City Council, Police Scotland, I think and BHA and Health, they’re all stakeholders within Community Safety Burnside [...]” (B019) – VAW Co-ordinator –CSB – Burnside.
Therefore, although CSB may exist at arm’s length incorporating agencies from all sectors, there exists a potential conflict between top down strategic direction and bottom up operational decision making, and who provides the overall leadership – individual agencies within CSB or the CSB Board. The participant from VAW acknowledged the role of CSB:

“I’d say probably Community Safety Burnside has a role in terms of providing leadership for the partnership and I think it does it very well” (B019) - VAW Coordinator – CSB – Burnside.

5.4.1 Are agencies naturally equal?

Conversely, if an agency specialised in one area then their contribution was somewhat limited to their area of expertise, for example, Housing has a prominent role within Antisocial Behaviour Partnerships, but less so on strategic CSPs, which covered a much wider range of community safety issues, thus some Housing participants did not think they had an equal status on partnerships;

“I don’t think it can, because it’s become quite a large field and we’re mainly Housing” (A010) – Housing Manager – Avon Homes – Avon Isle/Avonside.

“I wouldn’t have expected it to be honest. So the answer’s no” (C013) – Housing Manager for Crawley Housing Association – Cartside.

In Burnside where the community planning structure had significantly changed there was a slightly different attitude towards how it is (status), and how it should be, for instance the participant from the Third Sector Forum when asked if they had equal status at first said ‘not yet’ (B010), but then elaborated on his response, which is worth quoting in full as it touches on Lukes (1974; 2005) third dimension of power, which highlights how ideology and hegemony have in the past shaped the framework of debate about ‘what is and what is not thinkable’ (Mayo and Taylor, 2001: 41);

“But I think that when I say not yet, I don’t want the blame for that to rest solely with other partners. I think that part of it actually requires a cultural and organisational
'Presenting as an equal' is perhaps more difficult for some organisations compared to others, this was most evident from community organisations. For example, in Avon Isle where they had a place at the table (but not a vote) status (or social capital) was perceived as being heard;

"Well you get your voice, you know and topics are discussed openly and pretty well, if you ask a question you get an answer" (A012) – Community Councillor – Avon Isle Community Council.

In light of the structural changes to Burnside (wherein local communities now have a vote on Area Partnerships) opinion varied somewhat;

"I would hope so, I would hope so. Do I need to tell the truth (laughs)...The Community Council - our wee bit, is just part of another whole really, but I think that eh, more thingmy (sic) – is paid to the Health board, or Police Scotland or the Fire service, and rightly so, rightly so. But, my wee bit is about Burnpark, we’re just part of the big machine - but if you take it out it will break" (B017) - Community Councillor – Burnpark CC – Burnside.

However, the Burnwood Community representative was more positive in his response;

"It has because we’ve got a vote. I have to be fair to that and say yes, the politicians are pretty good at that" (B013) Community Councillor Burnwood CC – Burnside.

Partnerships are normally created to tackle complex problems, which mean allowing for diversity within its structures, which in turn could create tensions with respect to
perceptions on status and ultimate decision making. On the other hand, it could lead to an appreciation of the range of skills utilised to tackle complex community issues. It could also lead to inter-agency conflict resulting in poorer outcomes for local communities. For example, problems may be addressed through a consensual viewpoint based on perceptions of equality and status, wherein decisions around the long term goals of community safety are discussed and decided as a partnership. But, if this is absent, and decisions are made by those agencies with the most power, then conflict and less commitment to partnership working could be the result (Collins and McCray, 2012: 138).

5.5 Partnership and commitment

There are some documented reasons why some agencies may acquire more status than others on partnerships, for example, commitment to partnership working, or commitment by key personnel who have the ability to drive forward initiatives (Riggs et al., 2013; O’Neill and McCarthy, 2014); or, because they have access to more resources (McQuade, 2009). If some individuals/agencies are thought to be more committed to working in partnership than others then this may affect how representatives are perceived over time. For example, non-attendance by agency representatives may signal to others a lack of commitment to partnership goals – whether this be the case or not. Conversely, those agencies who regularly attend – especially key agencies (Council and the Police) may be deferred to, leading to an asymmetry in power with regards to policy direction. In an effort to understand how commitment may impact on, not only, decision making, and status, but perceptions of the necessity of partnership work in general, participants were asked - if the level of commitment to the partnership was the same from all partners? There was a wide variety of responses across the case study areas ranging from a straightforward yes and no, to some less sure;

“I think all partners have probably found that it’s very beneficial, so I think there’s a willingness there”(A007) – Housing Officer – Avon Isle – R&S Homes – Avonside.

“That’s a hard one, but it’s hard to say that it is equal from all parties - I would say looking at it, that some of us give more time that others and some have more time than others to give” (A011) – Community Representative Avon Isle Forum for Older Voices.
Some participants highlighted the commitment of key agencies and alluded to their overall authority, while also commenting on the absence of notable others;

“I’m not sure who all the partners are... certainly the main agencies that go, regularly attend, you know, but again I’m not in a position to say who should attend and who shouldn’t attend, but certainly if there is a meeting the Police certainly attend” (A004) – Police Inspector – Avon Isle.

“With the honourable exception of Health - and actually interestingly certain Council Services, we were having this discussion recently that Social Work don’t actually attend and Education don’t, and these are some of the key players I think, and I think the membership needs to be revisited and also attendance needs to be. Because I suspect there are nominal members that don’t actually attend. So, it tends to be the same people, who come” (C003) – Child Protection – Cartside.

A possible explanation (linked to austerity) was given by participants as to why some agencies were more committed than others;

“…I think, (pause) with staff changes - I've got to be careful how I’m saying this, with staff changes some of our partners, haven't picked up the piece of work yet. You’ll know Burnside, we’ve had loads of people leaving the Council, you know lots of staff changes, lots of people leaving [...] and that impacts on - we are continually looking for a rep from the Health just now - we used to have - you know we need somebody and we need the right person, and that’s down to staffing” (B018) – Child Protection – Burnside.

“[…] My view is that I think it’s getting harder for Cartside Council to participate to the same level and spread of people that they did, because there’s fewer people around” (C007) – Addiction Support – Cartside.

Senior (2014) in a discussion around Integrated Offender Management has argued that unless there is effective governance in place to allow for a commitment to work together from both the strategic and operational levels then effective partnership working was
likely to fail. This was also commented on by one participant in Avonside who suggested there was a disconnect somewhere between the Strategic and operational levels;

“If you go to the Strategic - yeah, there's definitely a commitment from strategic leaders to actually sit down and discuss things at the table. But, then I think the enthusiasm wanes as you go down, because everybody's got a job to do, and then when you get back to operational I think it starts to get strong again” (A015) – Licensing Standards Officer – Avonside.

This comment possibly highlights a frustration amongst agencies who find that partnership working is time consuming, and time taken to attend meetings, translates as less time spent on the ground actually dealing with problems – especially during times of fiscal constraint. For the most part those participants involved in thematic partnerships such as, Antisocial Behaviour Partnerships or Alcohol and Drug Partnerships, who worked with core agencies such as Housing, the Police, the Council, or the Fire Service generally thought there was commitment from these agencies. However, a lack of resources or funding may affect other agencies commitment to partnership working if there is no obvious benefit for them to do so;

“[...] When initially the money wasn’t ring-fenced I think there was a little bit historically of some partners coming to the table with annual projects they wanted a bit of money for [...] and then I think the partnership said well actually no there’s no more money for you, we did see a little bit of ebb and flow of people” (C008) – Community Safety Projects Manager – Cartside.

Many participants commented on a lack of commitment from Health in particular; although not on partnerships which were specific to Health such as Community Health Partnerships, or those involved in social care, or alcohol and drugs;

“[...]It's more to do with the links between community safety that Health doesn’t sit at the table” (C003) - Child Protection – Cartside.

There was a very real sense that this was a historical lack of commitment, and not necessarily linked to austerity. It was put forward that a possible explanation may be that as Health had their own budget, there was perhaps not the same urgency to work in
partnership compared to others;

“[…] I don’t know whether... and it pains me to say it, but speaking as a Councillor that perhaps because the Health budget’s been protected to an extent, there’s not as much of an urgency to work together with other people. I think others have been forced together, but as I said before, they’re made to realise that they need to work together to share information, share resources” (B011) – Councillor – Chair of NWCPP – Burnside.

This last comment in particular ‘being forced to work together’ or ‘being made to realise that you need to work together’ in order to share information and resources (although made within the overall context of Community Planning) is particularly poignant as it demonstrates a growing awareness of a necessity of partnership working during times of severe fiscal constraint. However, that recognition and commitment needs to be evident throughout the whole community planning/community safety process. Senior (2014) argues that it is no good having commitment at the top if it is not conveyed to those at the operational end of partnerships. O’Neill and McCarthy (2014) commenting on Police culture and partnership working state that positive characteristics shared by agents relate to being part of the group by regularly attending meetings and signing up to the groups goals. Another positive aspect is being able to share resources in the furtherance of a common goal (Armistead and Pettigrew, 2004). However, if commitment to partnership working is affected by a shortage of resources (human capital) in terms of staff time and attendance, then it may be that policy decisions affecting the direction of community safety may be enacted by those key agencies who attend on a regular basis. This could lead to a snowball effect insofar as what is invariably discussed determines the next agenda which could in turn determine attendance;

“I think when you look at the agenda and you look at what’s going on you think ‘there’s no real value for us to go along to this one’. You’ve also got to look at your staff commitments [...]” (C013) – Housing Manager Crawley Housing Association – Cartside.

Hudson and Hardy’s (2002: 53) ‘Partnership Assessment Tool’ recognised partnership commitment as one of the key principle areas necessary for partnership working,
however, commitment is not just about attendance, it is also about actively taking part in discussions around local community issues, or having the capital to provide resources (either in kind – time etc., skill – human capital) or actual resources (equipment, facilities, etc.,) or through economic capital (funding) towards initiatives. Since ring-fenced funding was withdrawn in 2008 (Scottish Community Safety Network, 2012a), the availability of resources was variable amongst participants, ranging from practical material resources to what has been described as specialised knowledge. One third sector participant from Cartside summed it up in respect of the overall community planning structure throughout the case study areas;

“[...] In practice there is no bespoke funding that goes into any of the critical partnerships and so each organisation contributes the time of the staff that are involved in the partnership and is expected to modify the use of overall organisational resources to try and take forward the agenda” (C002) – Third Sector Representative – Cartside.

This is arguably the overall purpose of partnership working, nonetheless, there were some variances, which may in part be influenced by ‘the agenda’, in other words, if the policy aims of the partnership does not intrinsically alter or impact on an individual agencies core goals, or meets their organisational ethos then resources for initiatives – whether they be in kind, material, or economic may not be forthcoming;

“[...] There's been one or two initiatives where, through the partnership, there was an attempt to try and fast track people with alcohol and drug problems into our services quicker, which I thought was a useful initiative. It was an initiative done by the Police who identified through profiling a small cohort of repeat offenders, many of whom had substance misuse problems, so through the partnership there was an attempt to try and get these people into services quicker than you would normally have to wait. My agency was certainly up for that but, I don’t think other agencies went along with it, so that idea floundered sadly” (C007) – Addiction Support – Cartside.

The Council as a key partner and facilitator throughout the case study areas provided a number of resources ranging from accommodation for meetings to general secretarial
and clerking support;

“The meetings are arranged and held in Council buildings and the secretarial work is done by the Council” (A008) – Councillor – Avonside.

Local Authorities (much like other partners in the case studies) referred to providing resources in kind, for example, through attendance, or in terms of disseminating information/intelligence both organisationally or as the voice of the community (Community Councils, third sector etc.);

“Knowledge I’d say, and really just information sharing, there’s no financial implication for us at all, there couldn’t be (laughs) they’d ask us for money, (laughs) no chance” (C005) – Rape Crisis – Cartside.

“Our resources that we bring to the partnership would be that we have two members of staff, myself and another Housing Officer that regularly attend the meeting and both of our backgrounds is as Housing Officers, so I suppose we’re kind of bringing that skill to it” (A007) – Housing Officer – R&S Homes – Avonside.

“Engagement with the local community, feelings and feedback from the local community […] So the biggest thing you can give them is actual on site intelligence […] we’re very good at identifying crime and criminality and we’ve got a very good reporting system going back into that and to the Police as part of that […]” (B013) Community Councillor Burnwood – Burnside.

Practical material resources were mostly on offer from the Police or the Fire Service, or in some cases Housing Associations such as Burnside who provided a number of resources for the Community Improvement Partnership; including office space;

“We use our premises for the CIP as well. The premises were in offices that we had a lease for, they were lying empty, so again that’s partly what we brought to the table” (B007) – Burnside Housing Association – Burnside.
It is clear that commitment to partnership working has been exacerbated due to financial constraint. This may impact on how community safety initiatives are implemented to the extent that they were in the past; which may in turn dilute the overall purpose of the partnership. It may be the case that resources for more innovative initiatives may be sacrificed in place of those initiatives that match up to policy goals in support of both local SOA’s and national objectives; especially initiatives that are quantifiable as opposed to long term preventative community safety initiatives in line with the ethos of the Christie Commission. Therefore participants were asked about the types of community safety initiatives available in each locality.

5.6 Partnership and Community Safety Initiatives

Across all three case study areas there have been a number of key initiatives in place over the years with regards to community safety. However, in keeping with the climate of austerity some of them have ceased, while others have continued. It has become a case of devoting resources to initiatives which are conceivably more quantifiable, which in turn may satisfy organisational performance management regimes. Fyfe (2014: 11) commenting on the first year of Police reform in Scotland, has stated that despite the rhetoric on long term prevention there has been a renewed focus on enforcement; linked to the introduction of a national performance management system. O’Neill and McCarthy (2014: 157) commenting on partnership work within Neighbourhood Policing in England and Wales have also stated that pressures on resources may cause the Police to revert back to addressing more pressing matters; rather than dealing with projects and initiatives that require longer-term interventions. This is not unique to Scotland and the UK, Shepherdson et al., (2014) commenting on their study of CSPs in New South Wales in Australia stated that there was frustration towards local government insofar as there was a perceived withdrawal from some crime prevention initiatives in favour of others less complex, such as graffiti removal etc., (Shepherdson et al., 2014: 112). Strong performance management regimes often make it difficult for innovative schemes/initiatives to be put into action, not just within the Police service, but also within other public sector agencies, which could ultimately impact on the overall purpose of the partnership, which is to put in place long term preventative measures.
In an effort to try and understand the effect of austerity on community safety within the case study areas, participants were asked a series of questions designed to elicit information around the types of initiatives favoured, with regards to timescale, what was prioritised, and more importantly, what was being de-prioritised.

One area of priority across two of the case study areas was with regards to the night-time economy. Burnside in particular as the largest urban area has a night-time economy (defined as activity from 6pm to 6am) that is worth around £2.16 billion per annum; it also supports 16,200 full time jobs (Moffat Centre for Travel and Tourism, 2016). It stands to reason therefore that a lot of attention will be directed towards this area, especially as it arguably covers all three main themes within Burnsides SOA; alcohol, vulnerable people, and youth employability. Cartside, although considerably smaller also generates in excess of £68 million on the food and drink industry in 2014; and overall the total economic impact from tourism for 2014 was £463 million (Invest in Cartside, 2015). Austerity politics have arguably driven the actions of Local Authorities in recent years (Hastings et al., 2015), therefore a number of participants in both Burnside and Cartside talked about initiatives associated with the night-time economy, for example, both areas had ‘safe zones’ in operation during the weekend. In Burnside it operated every Friday and Saturday night between 11pm and 4am;

“[...] We have the Nite Zones which is the designated taxi ranks and they are where the Home Safe Marshalls are, so they operate every weekend’ (B020) - Chair of City Centre Alcohol Action Group – Burnside.

A similar initiative operates in Cartside called Safe Base, however, it usually only runs for five weeks during the festive period, but due to economic uncertainty that initiative was under scrutiny;

“[...] Safe Base is one of these things that’s developed year on year in terms of that kind of cycle of continuous improvement, you know, but we had a meeting a couple of weeks ago about Safe Base and again, you know, budgets are reducing so there needs to be hard decisions made over the next few months about whether we’ve got the resources to run like we did last year or if we’ve not, what can we run with what we’ve got” (C010) – Youth Services – Cartside.
Burnside also operates what is called an SOS Bus or ‘Cool it Off’ Bus as some participants have referred to it;

“[...] it’s nothing more complicated than a bus with medical provision there for people who drink a little bit too much on a Friday and Saturday night [...] it’s had a significant impact on people getting arrested for low level disorder offences, people getting quick access to medical attention and over the last few years it’s no doubt been one of the contributing factors to reduction in violent crime and disorder in Burnside City Centre [...]” (B005) – Local Police Commander – Burnside.

Best Bar None is a national award scheme promoting responsible management within the Licensing trade, and it was developed by Greater Manchester Police as part of a City Centre Safe Project in 2003 (Best Bar None, Scotland, 2016). Its remit is to tackle alcohol related crime and disorder and both Burnside and Cartside promoted this scheme. There were also a number of initiatives targeting specific problems for short periods of time, and these were mostly associated with diversionary activities aimed at young people in particular, which according to some critics further reinforces social exclusion (Hughes, 2002; Gilling, 2007; Pamment, 2010).

5.6.1 Youth Initiatives

The terminology associated with some of these initiatives is mostly set within a constructive framework insofar as the titles suggest they are designed to help young people rather than to hinder them;

“‘Positive Changes’ looks at first time offending or individuals that we perceive may be in the periphery of offending and we bring them into that whole environment, there’s obviously a structure behind it and there’s analytical support, but there’s various activities either funded or voluntarily that are provided for those youths to try and change their path so to speak” (C011) – Area Commander Police – Cartside.

The fire Service in Burnside also had a programme called ‘Fire Reach One’, which worked alongside Community Safety Burnside identifying “Youths on the cusp of becoming...
involved in some sort of minor criminality [...]” (B009) – Senior Fire Officer – Burnside.

There were other more generic activities designed to keep young people out of trouble, such as; ‘Create’ in Cartside;

“[...] Basically multi-agency shows for children during the summer holidays [...] every agency, such as ourselves and the Police, the Local Authority set up a single individual stall or activity and then the children rotate round it [...]”(C004) – Group Manager Fire – Cartside.

However, one Councillor in Burnside was fairly critical about community safety initiatives targeting young people;

“A lot of these have been in diversionary programmes which I’ve never been entirely happy about, I see that as an old person’s agenda - gets young people off the streets” (B011) – Councillor/Chair of NWCPP – Burnside.

Since the late 1990s the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 in England and Wales and successive Antisocial Behaviour legislation throughout the UK (Hodgkinson and Tilley, 2011; Bannister and Kearns, 2012; Kelly, 2012; Neary et al., 2013) has presented a broad interpretation of what constitutes antisocial behaviour, which can include anything from littering to dog fouling, and allows the public to subjectively identify and label problem behaviour such as ‘teenagers hanging about’ (Hodgkinson and Tilley, 2011; Bannister and Kearns, 2012). This perception has quite often been reinforced by the mainstream media who advocate for a toughening up of the Criminal Justice System (Hough, 2013); especially in relation to ‘troublesome youth’ (Hodgkinson and Tilley, 2011: 290), which further plays its part in the public stereotyping of already vulnerable young people in disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Bannister and Kearns, 2012).

This association of youth with crime and incivility has led to an increased emphasis being placed on the management of risk as opposed to crime prevention per se (Goddard, 2012: 351). Farrington (2000: 1) refers to this neo-liberal agenda as the ‘Risk Factor Prevention Paradigm (RFPP); basic premise is to identify key risk factors associated with offending and implement methods to counteract them. Barry (2013: 348) asserts that RFPP is
thought to be the basis of the youth justice system in the UK; despite the fact that early intervention is not only difficult to justify, but potentially ‘stigmatising and exclusionary’, nonetheless, many diversionary programmes have been put in place throughout the UK – particularly within the governance of community safety. Kelly (2012: 102) conducted a study on a diversionary project in England and Wales called ‘Positive Futures’ (project aims to contribute to both ‘crime reduction’ and ‘social inclusion’) and found that in times of financial constraint initiatives often have to compete for short term funding sources, which can often mean that there is an added pressure on project managers to ‘emphasise’ the risk associated with their target groups, thereby contributing to a negative representation of young people. ‘Positive Futures’ is similar to the initiative mentioned above in Cartside - ‘Positive Changes’.

In Burnside most of the initiatives directed towards young people were also diversionary in nature, or designed to keep children off the streets and ‘out of trouble’, and again this was mostly associated with young people from deprived neighbourhoods, which perhaps further reinforces negative stereotypes - as one Councillor said in reference to securing some funds for a summer play scheme in Burnship (deprived neighbourhood in Burnside);

“It’s not huge sums of money we give them, but it can help, because otherwise kids are kicking around in the street and they do get into bother” (B004) - Councillor – Safe Group/CSB Chair – Burnside.

This form of social crime prevention (Darke, 2011) was also prevalent in Cartside as youth workers engaged in ‘Outreach Projects’ with young people out on the streets in an effort to reduce antisocial behaviour. However, the concern around antisocial behaviour and young people varied within the case study areas; for example, in Avon isle it was identified but not prioritised within CSPs. There had previously been initiatives for young people in Avon Isle (Disco’s etc.) but, as resources dwindled, priorities changed, and community safety initiatives have mostly been directed towards identifying risks for the elderly;

“[…] We have run safety events which are open to the public; especially we were very concerned about elderly people and their safety at home” (A008) – Councillor Avon Isle – Avonside.
“Yeah, we’ve always had things like, you know, Discos, young person’s alcohol free Discos. I have to be honest; I think as resources get tight these are the areas that have suffered” (A001 - 2nd) – Community Safety Co-ordinator - Avonside.

Funding youth initiatives or activities has always been problematic in terms of the availability of resources; a point made worse by austerity measures imposed on Council services throughout the UK (Hastings et al., 2015). As resources diminish a welcome source of income was enabled through the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. Since 2008 the ‘CashBack’ for Communities Programme has invested money into community programmes and facilities; mostly but not exclusively directed towards young people (Scottish Government, 2015b). In Cartside there were growing concerns that it was becoming increasingly difficult to access this funding stream, a point echoed in Avonside;

“[…] ‘CashBack’ is cutting back as well, but we’ve managed to retain most of the ‘CashBack’ activity cause it’s benefiting our young people” (C001 - 2nd) – Community Planning Partnership Manager - Cartside.

“[…] ‘CashBack’ has helped a little bit and then you’ve got organisations that are funded from the Council and various other sources of money providing Youth Services in Avonside. But, I think it’s unquestionable that certainly diversionary activities and community safety led initiatives have lost out because of the funding situation” (A001 - 2nd) Community Safety Co-ordinator – Avonside.

Burnside, will also have access to ‘CashBack’ funding, but, most of the operational initiatives are driven by Community Safety Burnside (the ALEO part funded by the Council and the Police). For example, Initiatives such as: ‘One Burnside’ (which looks at early intervention/prevention); CCTV (mobile CCTV units to monitor crime and antisocial behaviour); Community Enforcement Officers (Fixed Penalty Notices for littering, dog fouling etc.); Graffiti Removal etc., which may on the face of it target more quantifiable short term initiatives, as opposed to the long term preventative measures advocated by Christie. However, one Burnside Councillor (who is also the Chair of CSB) insisted that initiatives directed towards young people were not all about enforcement;
“[...] It isn’t just about saying stop it, but it’s about actually having positive things in place. The Police get involved in some of these things as well, and CSB do positive work as well as having the Enforcement Officers. Because a lot of the time young people get into bother because they’ve got nothing to do, so it’s about ensuring there is things to do” (B004) – Councillor/Chair of CSB – Burnside.

There is no doubt that austerity measures have had a marked effect on public services, and this next section will look at how participants viewed its effect on partnership working.

5.7 Partnership Working and the impact of Austerity

Partnership working as previously discussed has a long history within the UK public sector (Lamie and Ball, 2010: 109), and inter-agency partnership working or multi-agency collaboration is considered necessary to tackle the multitude of issues linked to crime, community safety, and crime prevention (Shepherdson et al., 2014). However, effective partnership working may be affected by the impact of austerity on organisations in general. A recent report by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation titled ‘The Cost of the Cuts: The Impact on local Government and Poorer Communities’ (Hastings et al., 2015) identified a number of areas of concern related to ongoing austerity measures. This included much greater retrenchment in terms of Local Authorities withdrawing services from areas they have traditionally been involved with, and staff being overwhelmed by the scale and nature of the problems they face, which ultimately means that deprived communities suffer disproportionately as they are more reliant on public services - leading to greater inequality (Hastings et al., 2015: 118). Therefore participants in the case study areas were asked if austerity measures had affected partnership working and/or services;

“I think the cut backs and the financial climate have had a major effect on every partner that sits round that table [...] I know that they have a couple of events every year that involve elderly or could involve young people in schools, you know safety events, and they’re actually struggling to fund these events. So, there is a knock on effect” (A002) – Rape Crisis – Avonside.
“[...] I think austerity is impacting both in terms of we have less money to do what we used to do and so we need to do more, because there is less money out there” (C003) – Child Protection – Cartside.

Effective partnership working is routinely associated with sufficient staff levels, continuity of staff, and the availability of resources (Hudson and Hardy, 2002), conversely, the opposite could result in poor partnership working (Petch et al., 2013: 628); and a number of participants across all three case study areas commented on how it may impact on partnerships;

“[...] I think we have all witnessed staff not being replaced. When I first came into this job I was part of a team of five, now there’s me [...] whereas before, we had quite dedicated individuals, but as people have moved on they’ve not been replaced” (B019) - VAW Co-ordinator – CSB – Burnside.

“Well I suppose in a way, because I can no longer attend and I have to send somebody that’s subordinate, and even they can’t always attend, because we’re under such pressure due to organisational pressures, but the staffing issues aren’t really to do with austerity measures, they’re just to do with people being ill and things like that, and therefore having gaps in our team. And then you have to prioritise and unfortunately attending the Antisocial Behaviour Group is not top of the priority tree” (A014) - Child Protection - Avon Isle – Avonside.

The above comment is quite interesting insofar as this participant relates staff shortages to illness rather than austerity measures. However, a report by UNISON Scotland on the impact of austerity on the public sector states that cuts to services has led to stress levels soaring amongst employees who now have to endure longer hours and unpaid overtime, which in turn has an impact on sickness levels leading to more pressure on the existing workforce, which in turn leads them to prioritise their workload (UNISON Scotland, 2014);

“[...] Some of the areas of the ADP for example the recovery work and the delivery of, say for example the Alcohol Brief Interventions, we were behind with some of those things because people just weren’t there to do it, so we’ve had to look at how they
would re-do that, and revisit, and what are the key priorities that we need to do” (B020) - Chair of City Centre Alcohol Action Group – Burnside.

It is clear that austerity measures have impacted on funding and the availability of resources (material and human), but it can also impact on the efficacy of partnership working through the loss of key personnel. Some personnel can be pivotal in ensuring that effective intra-organisational communication remains open (Riggs et al., 2013: 787), and it is often key players that drive partnerships forward (Hudson and Hardy, 2002; O’Neill and McCarthy, 2014: 151);

“Cartside Council have had to make very significant cuts in their budgets and that’s reflected in the reduction of key personnel. So one manager who I thought was very influential in the partnership, when he retired his post was not replaced and he commanded several teams which have since broken up [...] So that is beginning to have an effect on the partnership in that there’s less influential representatives from Cartside Council there, it’s got smaller” (C007) - Addiction Support – Cartside.

“You can never underestimate the importance of people in all this. You can have all the organisational charts in the world, but if you don’t have the right people in place who are determined to make it work, the charts don’t mean anything” (B008) - Burnside Health Board/Chair of CHP/SCPP – Burnside.

Other participants particularly within the Police were slightly cautious about the effect of austerity on partnership working;

“I don’t think there’s been a significant change, but then Police Scotland [...] have always had a seat at the partnership table and we’ve always taken it very seriously and always had a lot of commitment to it, so it certainly hasn’t changed our approach and I think it’s far too early to say if it’s going to have an impact, that’s probably a question for... we’re only two and a bit months into Police Scotland, we’re week 11 as it is just now” (B005) - Area Police Commander – Burnside.

Participants from the Fire Service also reiterated their commitment to partnership working, but also highlighted how difficult it had become to engage effectively;

“ [...] the move to a single Fire and Rescue Service means we’ve had to trim our staffing
levels, so we can’t contribute as much as we’d been able to. However, because of the - I suppose austerity, we have got to be more focused to ensure we are achieving what we can with the limited resources, which is driving us down the pathway to partnership working [...]” (C004) - Group Manager Fire Service – Cartside.

The last sentence in this comment is quite poignant as it highlights an opinion held by many that there could be some positive outcomes related to austerity and partnership working, for example, forcing partners to be more focused, leading to less duplication of effort, which in essence may bring more people to the partnership table;

“there’s less opportunity to duplicate things and people are having to have hard discussions with each other, and that’s not necessarily a bad thing in terms of this is what we can do [...]” (C010) – Youth Services – Cartside.

“[…] So, it might positively influence partnership seeking, whether in the long run it will negatively affect what we are actually able to deliver - I think that’s probably going to be the case, but it’s certainly brought a lot more agencies together who realise we can’t afford to do what we’ve done in the past [...]” (B003) - Police Chief Inspector – Safe Group – Burnside.

“I think in many respects, you know, it’s been positive austerity, in the sense that it has focused the minds [...]” (C014) - Councillor – Community Planning and Regeneration Committee – Cartside.

“I think a lot… well in one sense I think that austerity measures have actually helped to drive more effective partnership working, because I think we are now left with a clear realisation that we can’t operate on our own and work with others when it suits us, but in actual fact there needs to be a pooling of shared resources.” (B010) - Chair of Third Sector Forum/SCPP – Burnside.

Fiscal austerity measures have provided a focus for some agencies towards more partnership working in general, therefore it would be interesting to find out what (if any) barriers existed that may prevent organisations working towards common community safety goals or objectives. The next section will examine issues related to possible barriers to effective partnership working within the case study areas.
5.8 Barriers to effective Partnership working

Multi-agency partnership working may be viewed as more necessary than ever during times of austerity within the governance of community safety, and McCarthy and O’Neill (2014: 248) argue that in order to achieve effective operational outcomes the pooling of information, intelligence and data is vital in order to do so (Senior, 2014). However, it can be a major task to establish a common language within local partnerships as various partners come to the table with different perceptions on how to tackle issues, find solutions to problems, and what if any information should be shared, which could ultimately lead to conflict (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2006: 65). It has been well documented that there has existed a number of barriers to effective partnership working in the past, mostly related to differing organisational cultures and work practices; especially between Health and Social Care, and the Police (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2006; Petch et al., 2013; McCarthy and O’Neill, 2014; Senior, 2014; Weston, 2014). Nonetheless, it has been pointed out by a number of participants that partnership working is now more necessary than before, which would suggest that some barriers to effective partnership working may be overcome. Therefore, participants were asked if there were any barriers to effective communication within partnerships. For the most part participants did not initially conceive of any barriers, but on reflection a number of themes began to emerge across the case study areas ranging from willingness to participate, jargon (Council Speak) (Sparrow, 2008), and how to secure I.T. systems;

“I suppose the barrier is about people’s participation and willingness to participate. I think that the people who are active members of the CSP communicate fairly well, so I suppose it’s a bit about services and agencies that don’t step up to the table” (C003) - Child Protection – Cartside.

“[...] We’re doing a whole load of work on the city centre - team are involved in stuff around street begging and the homelessness, drugs and alcohol issues, and there’s some national campaign, the person who’s in the street along the road from us is speaking to folk nationally, but not speaking to us, and I’m worried for the city for that specific piece of work. So I think there’s different drivers that haven’t yet come together to make that joined up” (B020) - Chair of City Centre Alcohol Action Group – Burnside.
“[...] Well it's about allowing other folk to have a voice and sometimes I think it's not a fair representation of people on the islands if we're going to spend forever talking about dog fouling [...] so for me and I know for some others it can be at times quite frustrating” (A002) - Rape Crisis – Avonside.

“I think one of the big things to me is about people’s time, you know, just people seem really busy and the pressure on people’s time can always have an impact in terms of taking the time to either send out stuff or lift the phone or send an email or catch up, you know, people’s time’s precious” (C010) - Youth Services – Cartside.

A lack of capacity amongst local communities/Community Councillors was also cited as a barrier;

“[…] they've got voting rights and they're now there in an enhanced role. They may feel that they don't have the right to pick up the phone to the Police representative or the Fire service, and they may only feel that they're only there as a conduit between the information that is given here to the local Community Councils [...] if they're less confident of feeling that they have the right to make enquiries about certain things, that's maybe the only barrier I can foresee” (B015) - Councillor – Burnpark Area Partnership – Burnside.

However, that may be related to having to decipher ‘partnership speak’ or Council jargon (Sparrow, 2008);

“[…] There are people sitting there saying what’s this, what’s all this outcomes. I mean in all honesty, the jargon that has come out of that bloody place” (C012) - Cartside Licensing Forum – Cartside.

A number of other issues emerged related to data protection concerns;

“Where we have an issue just now is we do not have a secure email system, so the police have a pnn, or a gsi., or a gsx. [...]” (C004) - Group Manager Fire Service – Cartside.

“Occasionally personalities, but in my experience there sometimes is the occasion when people will say ‘I can’t tell you that because of data protection’ or ‘freedom of information says that I don't need to tell you that’ and they hide behind it [...] it’s a
good barrier to hide behind, data protection” (B005) - Area Police Commander – Burnside.

For the Police, those agencies ‘hiding behind data protection’ were more likely to be Social Work or Health in particular. One senior Police officer in Burnside pointed out how it was more problematic for Health who had not got their act together in terms of information sharing protocols, even in discussions around community safety, wherein, they (the Police) would ‘pretty much share everything’. However, he claimed to understand their reasoning;

“[…] because there's patient confidentiality sort of fits in there, so there is a kind of, you know, problem that Health haven’t quite worked out so much. Social Work on the other hand, you know, between Police and Social Work has come an awful long way” (B012) - Police Superintendent – NWCPP/ADP/ ‘One Burnside’

However, one third sector participant in Cartside summed up why they thought barriers still existed between organisations purportedly working in partnership;

“The reality is - it's a group of discrete organisations and inevitably those organisations become focused on their - are focused on their own organisations activities and that can sometimes mean that people forget to communicate with and involve everybody within the partnership because we all default back to our own institutional behaviours, so I think it’s (pauses) organisational structures can and organisational imperatives can always get in the way of a shared endeavour” (C002) - Third Sector representative on EDG/CSP – Cartside.

Despite a number of participants claiming that there were no barriers to partnership working that they were aware of, a number of themes began to emerge, however, the most cited barrier to partnership work was issues around data protection and the sharing of information.
5.9 Partnership working and Information sharing

A number of participants indicated that the sharing of information is often a contentious issue amongst organisations involved within the domain of community safety, or indeed within partnerships in general. How information is shared has often proven to be problematic in the past and has long been cited as an inhibitor to effective partnership working (Perri et al., 2006) as each organisation struggles to adhere to their individual aims and objectives, which can lead to a clash of priorities and a barrier to effective information sharing (Lennox et al., 2012: 132).

There has been an increased pressure in recent years on the public sector within the UK to share information particularly within Health and Social Care, Child Protection, Crime Reduction and protecting the public from dangerous offenders (Perri et al., 2007: 406). In Scotland reports such as: the Christie Commission; the McClelland report on IT infrastructure in Public Services in Scotland; and Scotland’s Digital Future Strategy have all identified many organisational/technical barriers that need to be broken down to allow for the efficient sharing of information in order to support collaboration across partnerships (Scottish Government, 2015a: 7).

Third sector participants in particular perhaps struggle with the pressures to share information, while maintaining their structural integrity, and often have to find a balance between what is shared and meeting their organisational and partnership aims, and maintaining confidentiality and trust within communities. This could be more problematic within small rural communities where identification may become an issue;

“[…] Confidentiality is a huge issue when you’re living in these wee small communities where we have to be able to do our level best to ensure the confidentiality of our service users, so, no we certainly wouldn’t be sharing. Basic stats - yeah stats that are available at the end of the year […]” (A002) – Rape Crisis – Avonside.

This can also be the case for some public sector agencies dealing with alcohol and drug related problems;

“[…] I have to be very careful, particularly in a place like Cartside where numbers aren’t always huge for specific issues, that we don’t start to identify people within the
partnership, particularly sometimes if we have more lay members [...] So there's information that can be shared but, from a personal point of view, I do have to be cautious around particular stuff like overdose data and stuff like that” (C009) - Lead Officer for Cartside ADP.

Cultural or organisational issues in relation to the sharing of information between particular agencies such as the Police and Health and Social Care have often been cited as problematic (Barton and Quinn, 2002; Hunt and Van der Arend, 2002; Irvine et al., 2002; Richardson and Asthana, 2006; Perri 6 et al., 2007; Lennox et al., 2012). Within the case study areas there was some evidence of organisational tension within the domain of community safety. However, there was also evidence that certain relationships have developed between the Police and others in relation to particular issues, for example, child protection and dealing with low level crime and disorder, or antisocial behaviour, particularly in relation to drugs and alcohol, as long as the information shared is used appropriately;

“Yeah, I mean, I would’ve thought that the two sets of organisations that might be most guarded would be myself - Social Work, and the Police and we’ve always been okay with sharing on the basis that the information is used within appropriate limits” (A014) – Child Protection - Avon Isle – Avonside.

One way to ensure the co-operation of agencies within a partnership is via Information Sharing Protocols, and a number of participants commented on them;

“There's information sharing protocols in place, I mentioned the Antisocial Behaviour Subgroup, so if there's information that needs to be shared then there's protocols in place” (A004) - Senior Police Officer – Avon Isle – Avonside.

“Well we get good information, when you’re dealing with the cops, well you can imagine what it’s like at times, but the Council’s been fortunate that we’ve had the CSB, who share a lot of information and intelligence with the Police under specific protocols that they’ve now got in place. So they’ve been sharing information for years. It’s something that’s really helped in Burnside to get the crime numbers down” (B006) - Councillor – Chair Safe Group/Chair VAW – Burnside.
Having information sharing protocols in place is not without its problems as one participant from Burnside pointed out regarding information they receive from the Police;

“[...] We get a daily briefing every day which is electronic and it’s restricted, so that can’t be printed or downloaded or... I can read it. The effectiveness of that depends on me remembering what’s in it; including images of people” (B020) - Chair of City Centre Alcohol Action Group – Burnside.

This is problematic when the circle of trust only extends to those individuals who have direct access to information within a partnership, which could lead to a disconnect between the strategic and the operational;

“I mean, I think if you’ve got somebody that’s excluded from a park, there’s no point showing me his picture cause I’m not in the park, you know, but the people that work in parks are in the park, and they can’t get to see the pictures and know that this person’s... so there’s complex issues there that I think have yet to be resolved to get the best out of partnership working [...]”(B020) - Chair of City Centre Alcohol Action Group – Burnside.

Information protocols have been put in place within a number of thematic partnerships within the case study areas, but one organisation in particular was cited by a number of participants in Burnside and Cartside as still resistant to the sharing of information;

“I mean, the player that’s always a bit difficult is Health, we still don’t have Health round the main Community Safety Partnership table. They attend some of the sub groups, they attend the ADP - they’re not great at sharing” (C001 - 2nd) - Community Planning Partnership Manager – Cartside.

“Well it’s like all big institutions, for instance the Health Board and people like that who as soon as you mention data sharing the barricades go up, but it’s a matter of just trying to batter them down and explain that we’ve already done it with the cops, right so, why can’t we do it with you!” (B006) - Councillor – Chair Safe Group/Chair VAW – Burnside.

A study conducted by Lennox et al., (2012: 132) found that many Health professionals did not share information because they were often fearful that they would be in breach of professional codes of practice. Lennox et al., (2012: 132) assert that many of these
obstacles could be overcome if all organisations provided their staff with unambiguous information sharing policies and appropriate training. This was commented on by one participant in Avon Isle who thought people were reluctant to openly discuss some issues in the (ASB and CSP) Partnership, because in their opinion they were not fully conversant on legislation such as, the Data Protection Act;

“I don’t want to use the word ignorance, but I think in a lot of cases representatives of the partners aren’t very sure what they can and cannot say. And sometimes it could be the Housing association saying to the Police at the meeting ‘you know who I’m talking about, remember, last week?’ and the Police will go ‘oh right okay’ but that’s not - the rest of the meeting doesn’t know what it is because they don’t know, they’re not very sure” (A009) - Street Scene Warden Avon Isle – Avonside.

Co-locating services has been thought of by some as one way to break down organisational barriers – especially those related to data protection issues between Health, Social Care and the Police.

5.10 Partnership Working and Co-location

Co-location refers to the physical placement of different services, agencies or organisations in the same location/same space (Grace and Coventry, 2010), either to work independently within a geographic location, or as a multi-disciplinary approach directed towards a specific goal such as the management of offenders (Senior, 2013). Co-locating agencies can also help tackle so called ‘wicked issues’ related to poverty and crime, domestic violence, or alcohol or drug misuse, which go beyond the capacity of a single agency (Stanley and Humphreys, 2014). Other benefits include the sharing of resources to reduce costs, or to avoid a duplicated service delivery (Plax et al., 2015). Co-location can - according to Hoyle and Palmer (2014) - empower victims of domestic violence to make informed decisions about their future; this was in reference to the creation of a Family Justice Centre in Croydon in 2005, which brought thirty three agencies under one roof to allow for a consumer led service which responded to individual needs. McGuire et al., (2009) in their study on homeless veterans in the USA (with serious mental health or substance misuse issues) found that co-located services allowed them to deal more effectively with this hard to reach group. A similar study in the
USA by Plax et al., (2015) which targeted hard to reach high risk youths in relation to sexually transmitted infections (STI), found that co-located community health and social services proved instrumental in reducing the burden of STI’s in this population.

Co-location or co-located service delivery is not a panacea to multi-agency partnership working, as it also can prove to be problematic in relation to issues around organisational culture or trust – especially in relation to data protection and the sharing of information (Chermak et al., 2013; Diemer et al., 2015; Hoyle and Palmer, 2014; Stanley and Humphreys, 2014). Co-location as a concept brought forth a variety of opinions from all three case study sites, most notably from Avon Isle and Cartside in relation to its necessity based on geographical location and size. For example, geography could be used to define a smaller island community almost as a co-located entity in and of itself;

“[…] I think the locality thing, the size of Avon Isle makes the locality thing a given” (A014) – Child Protection - Avon Isle – Avonside.

“Well on an island we do work from the one location really so it does, yeah and it does work, cause we not only just meet for the meetings, we know each other, albeit that some of the Council members have got to travel to us, but we all know each other and I think we genuinely are working towards the end that we hope we’ll be able to achieve” (A008) - Local Councillor – Avon isle – Avonside.

However, having to travel to meetings was also cited as an issue in support of co-location, by one participant who covered not only the island communities, but also the wider geographic area - on the grounds that the area was too vast;

“It’s such a wide geographical area and there are offices here and there […] I have staff that trapes up and down this road [laugh], whether it be to Social Work, Housing Benefit offices, Avon Homes offices, Homeless service; I think that would be really very useful” (A007) - Housing Officer – Avon Isle – R&S Homes – Avonside.

Cartside had similar issues and concerns to Avonside; however, they were perhaps slightly less reticent about giving their opinions on the issue of co-location; including advocating the use of technology instead;

“I think with technology and all this sort of stuff I don’t think it’s necessary, no” (C013) - Housing Manager for Crawley Housing Association – Cartside.
“I mean Cartside City Council now has three different office areas, I mean it’s not a hindrance” (C012) - Cartside Licensing Forum – Cartside.

“No. I don’t think it’s practically possible. It might do for some agencies [...] When you think about a large complex organisation like a Council, it’s not always clear that there is effective inter-departmental working between Council departments despite the fact that they’re in the same building, so I don’t think it necessarily makes a difference” (C002) - Third Sector representative on EDG/CSP – Cartside.

The comment from the third sector representative from Cartside perhaps suggests there is some discord between Council Departments in Cartside, which would make co-location difficult. This contrasted with opinions in Burnside where more people (especially statutory agencies) were in favour of co-location – especially co-location within Community Safety Burnside (CSB);

“I’ve seen some fantastic examples of co-location having an impact and in fact one good example would be our approach to domestic abuse. We work together with social work, with Women’s Aid, with a group called ASSIST (advocacy service), ourselves, the National Domestic Abuse Task Force; some of those agencies have been co-located for a wee while [...] it’s absolutely to the common good; so, there’s a great example of co-location having a big, big impact” (B005) - Area Police Commander – Burnside.

However, not all Burnside participants were as enthusiastic about co-located service delivery, particularly the participant from the Third Sector Forum who was more critical about the aims of co-location in the sense that it factored in agency needs ahead of local needs;

“I think the principle of hub working in local neighbourhoods would actually be of real value, but I think you need to co-locate around a common task or goal...But not necessarily around saying - what we need to do is, we need to get the Health Board and the Council and the Police and the third sector and Housing all in there, because I don’t know that that necessarily serves local communities particularly effectively, it just means that those institutions come together. I want to see co-location, but I want
to see co-location driven by local communities rather than institutions” (B010) - Chair of Third Sector Forum/SCPP – Burnside.

“I think that would be helpful if Social Work was based next to the Health Centre or whatever and such like, but city wide or sector wide, I don’t think that’s necessary, but certainly locally I think that would be a good idea” (B011) - Councillor – Chair of NWCPP – Burnside.

The above response from a city Councillor perhaps highlights a pervading fear amongst public sector workers about job security during a recession. In that co-location in some instances could be used as a cost saving exercise to reduce staffing levels, or it could be as a result of ongoing tensions between Health and Council Social Care services within Burnside. Three participants in Burnside also mentioned (as evidence of ‘best practice’) an award winning purpose built Hub in the East Coast of Scotland, that was created more out of structural necessity, rather than a desire for co-location;

“[…] So they pooled them all (resources), and they built a Court, a Police office, a Fire station, and Council office all in the one place - all co-located. […] I think it’s the first one” (B003) - Police Chief Inspector – Safe Group – Burnside.

However, one participant although enthusiastic about the co-located service mentioned above, also pointed out that post reform this could lead to difficulties within other localities;

“Prior to reform the Police estate was owned by the Police Authority, which was co-terminous with the Local Authority, so in essence if we wanted a new Police office, we go to the Police Authority who were funded by the Council [...] Now it’s the SPA, which is different from the Local Authority areas. So how we would be able to sit down with Burnside City Council for talking sake, the Fire service and NHS and say right let’s build one huge community office, I don’t know if that would work now, but if there’s a will there will be a way” (B003) - Police Chief Inspector – Safe Group – Burnside.

This highlights a number of issues, which could lead to increased tension between what is perceived as local or central areas of responsibility. For example, as the previous comment makes clear – in the past elected local authorities together with the Police
authority for that area - could make decisions and allocate resources based on local need. Now, however, in terms of policing - any decisions on an expansion of the Police estate could potentially by-pass Local Authorities altogether, which brings into question Local Authority accountability in terms of policing. One participant in Avonside commented on some negative aspects of co-location in reference to a previous experience of co-located service delivery centred on child protection;

“One of the experiences I had in that respect was - from a policing point of view - where the partnership became Child Protection, and it was Social Workers and Police Officers working in the same office. And to be honest the views I got back on that - it got kind of blurred as to who was doing what, and who was responsible for what, and at the same time who was the Social Worker and who was the Police” (A015) - Licensing Standards Officer – Avonside.

The participant was of the opinion that there was good and bad points to co-location, however, it was all a matter of balance. This point was also reinforced by a senior performance and information manager/analyst within CSB who had a positive opinion on co-location, but added that agencies/individuals have to have “clear roles and responsibilities” (B014) - Senior Performance and Information Manager CSB – Burnside. The participant discussed the Persistent Offender Model project as a good example of co-located service delivery; where police officers and addiction support staff work together. They work with around one hundred individuals who commit around 2400 crimes a year pre-engagement. Post engagement the figures were down to around 1700 crimes a year; which an economist worked out to be around £10 million in savings for the Criminal Justice System a year (B014). These were clear benefits according to the participant - not only from a policing perspective, but also in terms of better care outcomes for offenders (stable methadone programmes, accommodation etc.). However, roles had to be clear in order to avoid blurred lines of responsibility, but it also had an impact on mainstream service delivery;

“[…] Ultimately you’re taking a Police Officer off the street, so they’ll not respond to a radio or an Addiction Worker who’s not working in Addiction Services and dealing with clients as they come in, but what we’re doing is we’re making significant - potentially
cashable savings - if it's non-cashable then it's efficiencies and it's harder to buy into, but if there's cashable benefits then I can't see why we wouldn't do more of that [...], and there is lots of that goes on so, it's not just a case of putting partners into a room like this and just hoping the magic will happen - it has to be clear” (B014) - Senior Performance and Information Manager CSB – Burnside.

This perhaps highlights the previous comment from the participant in Avonside in relation to Police Officers working within a co-located entity – that potentially accountability and responsibility becomes a blurred issue. Not only has there to be clear lines of responsibility within policing, but, it is important to acknowledge that the third sector or private sector may operate under different guidelines. This can be problematic insofar as retaining autonomy may become difficult for some organisations reliant on outside resources, which in turn may force charities or social enterprises to abandon oppositional forms of practice (Tyler et al., 2014); thereby limiting choice or advocacy on behalf of vulnerable individuals or communities. Another factor may also be added to the pros and cons equation insofar as the provision of services within an ALEO, such as CSB, may also take into account their obligations to the commercial aspect of their organisation. This point is highlighted by Garrow and Hassenfeld (2014) on their exploration of social enterprises, which they argue operate within two distinct organisational fields, which were perhaps touched on previously by the senior performance and information manager when he discussed the drive towards cashable and non-cashable savings.

In Cartside some potential problems related to Police reform and co-location were also commented on. This was in reference to the daytime economy; more specifically within the ‘Cartside Partners Against Crime’; insofar as the building they were referring to housed third sector Partners ‘Retailers Against Crime’. It also housed a ‘One Stop Shop’ for Council services, and the new Safer Communities Team;

“Yeah, I mean, we've tried very hard as a partnership to create some of this co-location. The office you are in now, this is a third sector not for profit organisation. There are two desks in the bottom office which are linked to Police computers, so the Police can come in and work from there. Now that was done prior to the reform of policing, so perhaps again that'll change their priorities, and I don't think the Police are
here as often as they might like” (C008) - Community Safety Projects Manager – Cartside.

Trust is a key issue linked to effective partnership working (McCall and Rummery, 2017) and this can only be achieved incrementally through repeated encounters – especially if it leads to successful outcomes, which may fail to happen if key partner’s decrease their attendance (ibid). There is also the issue of cost, for example creating a co-located space, or housing compatible I.T. systems costs money, so who pays the bill? It may also be resisted by other organisations (particularly the third sector) if it is thought to contravene organisational commitments to service users – such as total confidentiality, as one participant in Avon Isle discussed with respect to co-location;

“I don’t think it would work, because I think the range of partners are way to diverse, so I don’t think it would work at all, especially with - well voluntary and statutory organisations there is an element of confidentiality, and I don’t think it would work. Certainly not for us, because our organisation - in certain parts of Avon Isle anyway is a bit cloak and dagger, and it has to be to maintain your service users confidentiality, because if they’ve been abused by their next door neighbour or a guy that lives two doors away, or somebody that still lives in that community...” (A002) – Rape Crisis – Avonside.

Maintaining confidentiality is a major stumbling block to co-location for some organisations, and it is probably more significant within small rural or in this case island communities, where agency representatives may work and live alongside victims and offenders. It also highlights a general reluctance from some agencies – especially those dealing with sensitive information – to co-locate their services based on data protection concerns. This could be linked to ignorance of data protection laws (as previously highlighted) about what you are allowed to share, or perhaps it is linked to issues of trust.

5.11 Trust and Partnership Working

Trust or lack of trust has been described as a key issue in relation to the success of inter-organisational work practices. Bunger (2012: 1167) in reference to their USA study on - inter-organisational co-operation, competition and trust - amongst the non-profit
children’s behavioural health sector - found that ‘trustworthiness directly and positively impacts administrative co-ordination’. In other words the more organisations perceive each other as trustworthy then the more likely they are to co-ordinate their services. The development of trust is also linked to an organisations commitment to collaboration; especially if they share similar goals and values (Kyle et al., 2012). Rekers and Hansen (2015) refer to a ‘two community problem’ or ‘two community gap’; whereupon organisations have to overcome cultural or language differences – most commonly found between the natural sciences and humanities. This they argue can be achieved by mutual trust built on the knowledge that each organisation knows what they are doing. Treloar and Rance (2014) conducted a study on trust (using Halls Framework of trust) around clients and Health workers in a co-located setting in Australia; dealing with Hepatitis C and Opioid Substitution Treatment (methadone etc.). They argue that in order to develop trust - amongst workers and service users alike – then sources of mistrust must first be understood within existing Health services, therefore allowing for the appropriate policies and procedures to be put in place; chief amongst which are issues around confidentiality. Confidentiality problems were a key issue cited by third sector participants in Avonside and Cartside in particular. Trust issues could also be linked to the perception that other agencies such as the Police may use co-location and ‘information sharing’ as an intelligence gathering tool;

“We’re ensconcing a police officer in the Municipal Buildings in Cartside to work with the Safer Communities Team. So there’ll be a morning tasking meeting chaired by that officer who brings to the table all the antisocial behaviour calls, events, locations in the last 24 hours and discusses them. They’ll also have access to our top offenders in Cartside; they’ll have access to our most vulnerable people in Cartside in terms of victims; they’ll have information easily at hand in relation to our problematic locations based on analytical work. […] And then likewise, the Council, the Safer Communities Team, will bring their own data to the table, because some individuals/members of the public phone them direct, so we wouldn’t capture that information, […] but, co-location is going to completely streamline that flow of information” (C011) - Area Commander Police – Cartside.

This policing viewpoint perhaps highlights a more reactionary form of problem solving
policing; that has more relevance to performance management, rather than a proactive long term holistic approach to community safety. Coleman (1988) argues that having social capital signifies certain resource availability to an actor, and if that resource is built around trustworthiness, then it perhaps highlights why some agencies may be reluctant to engage in co-located service delivery if it means that they will lose the trust of service users/clients who may distrust police motives. That’s not to say that every organisation will distrust Police motives, for example some partners within the Safer Communities Team (dealing with antisocial behaviour) may share similar goals and therefore trust increases as co-ordinated services increase (Bunger, 2012). However, if the generation of social capital/trust within partnerships is built on reciprocity (Hutchinson, 2004), as in paying off obligations, such as the sharing of data or intelligence, then social capital/trust may decrease between the Police and other agencies if information exchange is not reciprocated. In an effort to understand if or how trust facilitates co-operation within the case study areas, participants were asked how they built and sustained a level of trust within the partnership. A number of participants across all three case study areas believed trust was generated by building relationships and in essence people doing what they said they would do;

“I think it’s about relationships - I think it’s about people doing what they say they will do, and it’s about reciprocity there […]” (C003) - Child Protection – Cartside.

“That’s about personalities again and it’s about being open and transparent in everything you do. And it’s about building relationships, it doesn’t happen overnight. […] a lot of it’s about building trust and confidence and it’s not easy won, it’s easy lost, but I don’t have an issue with it” (B005) - Area Police Commander – Burnside.

“Professionalism - people actually delivering what they’ve promised they’ll do […]” (A005) - Council Area Housing Officer for Avon Isle – Avonside.

“I have never engaged with anybody on the partnership before February, so I’ve had to build that level of trust with them and I suppose communication and the information sharing process and action has led people to trust me. […] if I say I’m going to deliver something then I do it” (C011) - Area Commander Police – Cartside.

Networking or attending meetings was thought to be another way to generate trust;
“You have meetings (laughs) I mean everybody says - 'Oh no, not another meeting', but until you look somebody across a table and get to know that person - I mean I can send all the emails and all the phone calls I want, but you don't really know a person from an email or a phone call [...]” (B003) – Police Chief Inspector – Safe Group – Burnside.

“Well I think sometimes that’s about the work that you do outside of meetings rather than simply in meetings. So, it’s actually about the amount of time that you’re willing to spend with the different partners really working together, rather than just meeting up once every couple of months for a board meeting, and it’s also about being able to disagree [...]” (B010) - Chair of Third Sector Forum/SCPP – Burnside.

Commitment from senior managers was also thought to be important, as was being held accountable for your agencies actions;

“[...] true trust can only be built by goodwill or working over a period of time, so we need to get the correct processes in place, and the correct people in place to take that forward” (C004) - Group Manager Fire Service – Cartside.

Community organisations tended to view trust more through the lens of other organisations, for example, how they were viewed by others, or what was required of them;

“By actually doing things for them - you know bringing them the information” (A011) - Community Representative - Avon Isle Forum for Older Voices.

“Delivering targets and be impartial on all matters if you can. And only, only represent the views of your Community Council when you go there” (B013) - Community Councillor Burnwood CC – Burnside.

In Avonside being part of a small rural/island community like Avon Isle was thought to generate trust through familiarity and professionalism;

“[...] I think because you’re all on an island you quickly know each other through normal day to day working and the benefit of that is you don’t wait until, like, quarterly Community Safety Forum meetings, you know, I could phone any of the partners on any day of the week saying ‘look, we’ve got an issue here [...]” (A004) - Senior Police
Officer – Avon Isle – Avonside.

However, generating familiarity with your fellow partners was not limited to island communities, for example, this was also thought to happen in smaller Local Authority areas, such as Cartside;

“[..] People within the CSP primarily do work well together, they know each other well because we are a fairly small Local Authority area […], you can only really build up trust if you’re working with people can’t you, and I think it’s through that that helps us” (C001 - 2nd) - Community Planning Partnership Manager – Cartside.

Familiarity could also have its downside in small communities insofar as new faces may not achieve the same amount of access compared to faces that are known – it took time;

“[..] When I moved here in 1993 it was hard to get any information because I was told that I had to integrate myself into all these partnerships […] but it was like pulling teeth for about a year – not because people didn’t know that they could tell me things, but they didn’t really know me […]” (A009) - Street Scene Warden Avon Isle – Avonside.

Clearly trust in this sense is viewed – not only in terms of reciprocity – but, also through sustainability, commitment, and delivering on your promises.

5.12 Conclusion

Using the Hudson and Hardy (2002) inspired partnership assessment framework - the concept of partnership working within the governance of community safety was explored in-depth with participants throughout the case study areas, with respect to co-ordination and steering, communication and commitment, and organisational culture. Although participants generally held a positive view on partnership working in line with public policy; key implementation tool in order to tackle ‘wicked issues’ (Glendinning, 2002: 115; Martin and Guarneros-Meza, 2013), nonetheless a number of themes germane to all the case study areas began to emerge in relation to: asymmetrical power relations; status; the impact of austerity; and barriers to effective partnership working. These themes could in turn help to answer some of the points raised by the research questions; with respect to the impact on CSP priorities or goals in terms of performance management and
organisational culture (particularly the Police). Other themes that emerged with respect to co-location and trust may help identify more positive aspects of partnership working. But, first we turn to possible negative aspects of partnership working (highlighted within the data) in relation to power and status.

5.12.1 Power and Status (social capital)

Throughout the case study areas there was a general acceptance by most participants that there is a hierarchical structure with regards to community planning wherein the Local Authority leads. However, the Council are in turn influenced by key policy levers such as the single outcome agreement (SOA) between central and local government. This means that decision making revolves around a balance to make local priorities in line with national objectives. McCall and Rummery (2017: 59) argue that too often partnership working tends to benefit powerful partners, and within the realm of community planning/community safety the most powerful partners are arguably the Council (agencies) and the Police; influenced in part by national priorities. There were somewhat mixed viewpoints as to the extent of the influence of lead agencies (Council/Police) or central government on decision making processes. In Avon Isle decisions on local issues were thought to be taken through the Chair (Local Authority Councillor) of the local CSP; although, this has now changed with the removal of the local CSP, resulting in a regional (as opposed to local) strategic focus on community safety via the new SOA/Community Safety Partnership Tasking and Coordination Group (MATAC - Intelligence led policing model).

In both Cartside and Burnside decision making on the whole was perceived to be more horizontal in nature. However, decisions were thought to be taken in line with the SOA (taking cognisance of National Outcomes) - emphasising perhaps an ‘institutional bias’ (Bachrach and Baratz, 2002:26) insofar as the power dynamics with respect to decisions around what is, or is not, regarded as a priority remains with powerful partners such as the Council/Police (who are in turn influenced by central government policy). Furthermore, a lack of dissent may coincide with Lukes (1974; 2005) third dimensional view of power – insofar as actors/agencies within the partnership process have been shaped into accepting the existing order of things. For some participants this meant that dominant agencies on the partnership are favoured over others, or there was an unequal
weighting of priorities. In Avon Isle it was thought to favour the Council, and in Burnside it was thought to favour both the Council and the Police, whereas in Cartside it was thought to favour the Police. In this instance the Council and the Police have clear roles to play within the governance of community safety – they have a clear identity/role within the partnership process; which is often crucial to its success (Hudson and Hardy, 2002; Broussine and Miller, 2005: 381). Thus how individuals judge their relationships to other actors/agencies (status/social capital) can be important in terms of how decisions are made with respect to the strategic direction/goals of the partnership.

Status in this sense was arguably linked to perceptions of power in terms of what agencies actively contributed towards the partnership (governance, resources and symbolic social capital). The Council symbolised authority - they were above all viewed as facilitators (providing resources for meetings etc., and administrative staff); or as having the most salient voice; they could pull levers. In essence they have the electoral mandate to serve, and have the power to form links between the central and the local (Shepherdson et al., 2014). The Police were also viewed as a key agency – especially in relation to specific issues; they were the ‘go to partner’ for resources related to crime, disorder and security – keeping people safe as per their mandate (Bradford and Loader, 2015).

Within the domain of community planning/community safety these two agencies were naturally afforded higher status as key stakeholders, both by themselves and others. They in turn have generated not only bridging social capital via inter-organisational links to the wider community; especially in relation to information sharing (Coleman, 1988), but also a strong intra-organisational bonding social capital as seen through the lens of a dominant Police culture (Putnam, 2000). However, the Fire Service, although strongly identified/linked within the field of community safety in terms of prevention, was perhaps viewed as having less social capital than both the Council and the Police. For example, although they had developed bridging ties within the partnership, they were generally thought of as issue specific and linked to the Housing sector. They did have however, much like the Police, strong intra-organisational bonding social capital (Putnam, 2000). Nonetheless, the Fire Service as an organisation was keen to expand its influence, and was actively trying to increase their bridging social capital (Putnam, 2000); by establishing wider links throughout the community.
The third sector and Community groups were the organisations who were the most unsure of how they were perceived as partners. For the most part community groups saw themselves as necessary to the process, but, were perhaps unsure of their importance. Within their own communities they had more bonding social capital through close ties to both friends and family (Putnam, 2000); more links to people like them (Briggs, 2004), but perhaps less bridging social capital to individuals and organisations outside of the partnership process (Putnam, 2000). In Avon Isle community groups had arguably more linking (Woolcock, 2004) than bridging social capital insofar as their links were more vertical to people in positions of authority (such as the local elected Councillor).

However, in Burnside in particular, this view was changing. For instance, Community Councils on local Area Partnerships have arguably more power now compared to the past (more voice through the power of a vote), which means that their perceptions of their identity/role may change; as they gain more knowledge/capacity about how the new structures operate. Community Councillor Participants from both Burnpark and Burnwood sat on the Burnpark Area Partnership, which covered a geographically distinct area – it bordered the city centre/commercial district (which included Burnwood a recently developed upmarket area inhabited by mainly the professional/middle class); and Burnpark – bordering the city centre (denoted as an area of high deprivation). There was a distinct difference in attitude about status between both participants – the Burnpark participant perhaps lacked the capacity to fully engage with the partnership at the strategic level (which possibly explains his reticence in perceiving himself as an equal partner), whereas the Burnwood participant (a local businessman) was fully conversant in how the structures operated and represented the Area Partnership in the sectoral CPP. In essence both Community Council representatives had both bonding and bridging social capital; for Burnpark (area of high deprivation) bonding social capital was perhaps greater (more social integration within the local community) than their bridging social capital (less capacity to link/integrate into wider organisational groups). Whereas Burnwood was lower on bonding social capital (less social integration within the local community), but exhibited higher bridging social capital in both the local business area and within the wider community planning structure.

The perceptions of the third sector on their role/status is possibly linked to future funding (insofar as services offered by the third sector are issue specific), therefore their role may
be viewed in terms of necessity. For example, Housing and their skill and capacity to deal with antisocial behaviour could possibly be thought of as more necessary in a partnership than other third sector organisations whose role and resource availability is not immediately linked to policy goals (Coleman, 1988); especially if the partnership is following the multi-agency tasking and co-ordination model (MATAC) favoured by the Police. However, as one participant argued – the third sector as an organisation “[...] has collaboratively the biggest budget” (B010) therefore, their social capital may increase as public sector resources decrease; in terms of being able to provide necessary services to local communities. Though for some third sector organisations the opposite may be true - especially if they have been resource dependent on the Council. For example, as competition increases for scarce Council resources (funding), those organisations with more capacity (in terms of bridging social capital) may succeed in securing funding at the expense of smaller organisations with similar (but different) programmes leading to organisational failure (Bunger, 2012); which could ultimately impact on the type and quality of services available to local communities.

Partnerships are normally created to tackle complex problems, which mean allowing for diversity within its structures, which in turn could lead to an appreciation of the range of skills utilised to tackle complex community issues. However, tensions could arise with respect to perceptions on status and the role of powerful partners to ultimately make strategic decisions. Participants on the whole alluded to aspects of horizontal decision making practices; nonetheless, it was also made clear by some participants that decision making was also heavily influenced by the dominant agenda of both the Council and the Police (influenced in turn by national priorities and a desire to meet key performance indicators). If partnership working within the domain of community safety is thought to benefit the goals of some agencies over others then this could ultimately impact on the effectiveness of the partnership. For example, problems may be addressed through a consensual viewpoint based on perceptions of equality and status, wherein decisions around the long term goals of community safety are discussed and decided as a partnership. But, if this is absent, and decisions are made by those agencies with the most power, based on short term quantifiable goals, then conflict and less commitment to partnership working could be the result (Collins and McCray, 2012: 138). One other
problem may influence the efficacy of community safety partnership working – the impact of fiscal austerity measures.

5.12.2 The Impact of Austerity on Partnership Working

Partnerships in general are thought to not only garner improved communication but, also to engender information sharing, reduce inefficiency, avoid duplication and identify how to effectively share resources (Broussine and Miller, 2005: 379). However, as some participants have pointed out partnership working is only effective if it is fully resourced, which is problematic during periods of significant public sector reform. For example: within community safety less money means less community safety events; a reduction in staffing levels means there is an added pressure to produce more services with less resources; if key personnel are not replaced then partnership commitment can flounder (key point highlighted in Hudson and Hardy’s (2002: 53) ‘Partnership Assessment Tool’); and engagement may grind to a halt. This point was also highlighted by research carried out by the Scottish Community Safety Network (SCSN) on CSPs, which found that a number of events were cancelled as a direct response to the ‘withdrawal of key personnel, which was in turn directly linked to the reform process’ (SCSN, 2014: 11).

Across all three case study areas funding has become a major issue in respect of, not only implementing, but in some cases continuing with some community safety initiatives. This opens up the question on what will be prioritised/or de-prioritised in terms of community safety. In Burnside there is a continuing focus on initiatives associated with the night-time economy; this is also the case in Cartside; but to a lesser degree. Youth diversionary initiatives are also still in place in both Burnside and Cartside, but, more in line with risk management, and early intervention in an effort to reduce offending in line with national objectives – or as Darke (2011) contends as a form of social crime prevention more akin to social control (Garland, 2001). In Avon Isle initiatives directed towards the elderly population have been prioritised ahead of others, including diversionary activities for young people. While there are some positive associations by young people towards diversionary activities; particularly those associated with sport (Coakley, 2011; Kelly, 2012), there are also many criticisms associated with the public ‘intolerance of youth’ (Bannister and Kearns, 2012: 381) and the negative labelling (Becker, 1963) of young people ‘hanging about’ as antisocial behaviour (Bannister and Kearns, 2012; Neary et al.,
Nevertheless, it appears that quantifiable projects (focusing on risk management/youth offending) that match up to local and central government objectives continue to be prioritised ahead of more generic initiatives. Kelly (2012) argues that this has the potential to draw more young people into the Criminal Justice System through a net widening effect, rather than steering them away from it.

It is clear that fiscal austerity measures have had a major impact on partnership working across all three case study areas, in terms of the reduction in personnel, which in turn has impacted on attendance at partnership meetings. This has the potential to generate a knock on effect insofar as commitment was not only linked to attendance, but also to the type of services that could be provided to a partnership. For example, resources for most agencies were viewed of as ‘in kind’ – attending meetings, and linking queries or sign-posting problem individuals onto the relevant agencies. Other resources entailed providing specialist knowledge, information, or on-site intelligence, which is considered a crucial resource to be accessed - mostly by the Police and some key Council agencies dealing with antisocial behaviour, alcohol and drugs, or child protection issues.

In the past there has existed a somewhat sceptical attitude towards partnership working from the Police (particularly during the 1990s and early 2000s). Scepticism was somewhat focused on the belief that non-police agencies not only lacked a proficient command structure, but that they were intruding on traditional policing functions; compounded by an organisational ideology that viewed community policing as ‘soft policing’ (O’Neill and McCarthy, 2014: 144). However, recent research has highlighted a change in attitude towards partnership working from a policing perspective (O’Neill and McCarthy, 2014: 148). This has been supported by the evidence within the case study areas wherein partnership working, especially during times of austerity, is now viewed as a necessary tool within crime prevention and community safety (Apex Scotland, 2013). However, it has also been acknowledged that commitment to it has become more difficult to maintain, for example, a recent Audit Scotland (2016) report highlighted some major fiscal challenges affecting policing in Scotland including; “working more closely with other organisations, inside and outside the public sector to ensure community safety” (ibid: 9).
It has been suggested by the Home Office that pooling resources in the mixed economy of policing will always be an advantage to both the Police and the public sector (ibid). This has been recognised somewhat by participants within the case study areas who have acknowledged that severe cut backs may encourage agencies/organisations to pool their resources, and possibly force some recalcitrant agencies to return to the partnership table; such as Health, Education and Social Work. However, this also highlights a dichotomy of sorts, insofar as, while austerity may encourage partnership working ‘anecdotally’ or ‘on paper’, evidence throughout the case study areas has also shown that it has the potential to force agencies to retrench back to their core activities – highlighting a possible barrier to partnership working.

5.12.3 Barriers to effective partnership working

Despite a number of participants claiming that there were no barriers to partnership working that they were aware of, it has become clear from the data that there were a number of contentious issues that proved contrary to that opinion. For example, time pressures were cited by some, as was a lack of commitment or willingness to participate; also referred to by a Community Councillor as a general apathy amongst local communities to attend community meetings. A lack of capacity by community organisations was also cited as a barrier to partnership working; which may be exacerbated by non-Council organisations having to cope with deciphering Council ‘jargon’ (Sparrow, 2008). But, the most enduring barrier to partnership working cited throughout all the case study areas was in relation to issues around data protection and the sharing of information.

A number of participants commented on issues around ‘data protection’, which tended to hamper co-operation. In smaller geographical areas (Avon Isle; Cartside) this was thought to pose more of a problem insofar as agencies were reluctant to discuss individuals within an open forum; despite the use of ‘information protocols’. Irvine et al., (2002: 199) writes that some inter-professional relationships are typified by ‘conflict rather than co-operation’. Conflicts may arise out of who has power and authority over a particular jurisdiction in terms of service delivery (Irvine et al., 2002) and information has long been cited as a source of power. This was possibly viewed as an issue between the Police and other social welfare based agencies (particularly in Avon Isle and Cartside).
Barton and Quinn (2002: 36-42) also contrast the role of confidentiality and consent to the growth of ‘risk’ and ‘risk management within the Criminal Justice System in the UK in respect of DTTO’s. For example, there is a concern between the rights of the individual with respect to confidentiality and consent, and a Criminal Justice System that is more concerned about measuring, identifying and classifying offenders. Hunt and Van Der Arend (2002) have also written about the reluctance of Health workers to share information with the Police due to concerns around patient confidentiality, and possibly violating professional codes of practice. This was a point highlighted by some participants, with one Councillor from Burnside stating “[...] as soon as you mention data sharing the barricades go up [...]” (B006). Richardson and Asthana (2006: 659) argue that numerous codes of practice, or practice frameworks in relation to information sharing, can lead to problems in terms of perceptions on what can and cannot be shared between agencies, a point highlighted by one participant in Avon Isle “representatives of the partners aren’t very sure what they can and cannot say [...]” (A009). Lennox et al., (2012: 136) argue that this can be tackled by ensuring that all personnel are given adequate training and clear information sharing policies.

5.12.4 Co-location

It has been argued that one possible solution used to overcome barriers to effective partnership working may rest in agencies working on ‘shared and agreed goals’ (Grace and Coventry, 2010: 159); based in a single location (Stanley and Humphreys, 2014). However, evidence within the case study areas suggests that there exists some resistance to the concept of co-located service delivery. This could be based on geography (Avon Isle) wherein an island community was thought to be more or less a co-located entity; or the effect of institutional ‘silo mentalities’ that exhibit an unwillingness to share information or to give partnership working much support (Hunter and Perkins, 2012); or structural difficulties with respect to reform (accountability and cost awareness); or with respect to problems associated with access to computer data bases. However, there was some support in relation to operational Hubs within local areas; although these were usually associated with reactive services in relation to prevention most often associated with antisocial behaviour, drugs or alcohol abuse.

11 Drug Treatment and Testing Order’s
There are also issues in relation to blurred lines of responsibility/accountability. For example, Community Safety Burnside (CSB) is a co-located service, which houses a number of agencies (third and public sector), which has been cited as having a big impact on crime reduction in Burnside. CSB as an organisation is funded by both the Police and Burnside City Council; however, accountability issues may emerge in relation to different organisational work practices. Audit Scotland (2011) in their report *Arm’s-length external organisations (ALEOs): are you getting it right?* points out that while ALEO’s may take responsibility for service delivery, the Local Authority is responsible for ensuring that they are held to account on how they use public funds. CSB is also accountable to the Police. However, where policing was once aligned with Local Authorities, it is now bypassed and the Police estate is overseen by the Scottish Police Authority – a centralised structure. There is also accountability to the CSB Board (made up of representatives from the Council, the Scottish Police Authority, and independent Directors). The board ostensibly meet six times a year in order to scrutinise performance (Burnside, 2015b), but it is difficult to ascertain just how much time or diligence is allocated to this process by busy city Councillors or members of the Scottish Police Authority.

Nonetheless, co-location may encourage trust (instrumental to building social capital) between agencies. Trust may also be achieved through other means in partnerships, for example, it may grow through time as actors come to know each other, or through a shared commitment to partnership goals. Fukuyama (1995: 26) asserts that trust arises within communities based on co-operative behaviour, and shared norms by members of that community; and social capital arises “from the prevalence of trust in a society or in certain parts of it” (Fukuyama, 1995: 26) - including networks. Tonkiss (2004: 20) asserts that to take an “instrumental view of trust as an element of social capital” requires actors to consider how “trust can be capitalised” (ibid: 20), in other words how it is used to access resources, economic capital, or indeed opportunities to work together in partnership – providing of course that it is to everyone’s mutual benefit. Co-location may improve trust amongst some agencies; however, enduring concerns regarding blurred boundaries and accountability persist, which will be discussed in the Accountability Chapter in relation to partnership working, Police reform, and perceptions on localism within the case study areas.
Chapter 6: Accountability

A key aim of CPPs is to improve the delivery of public services in a way that is inclusive of the Single Outcome Agreement (SOA) - incorporating best value while achieving the Scottish Government’s national objectives (Fenwick et al., 2012). Signatories of the SOA will thereby be held accountable for the delivery of national outcomes. However, CPP/CSPs involve a number of agencies/actors, and not just the two key statutory organisations involved in the governance of community safety (Local Authority and the Police). This means that a number of actors/organisations must adhere to their own internal and external accountability mechanisms. Consequently, actors have a statutory responsibility to the SOA (in turn accountable to the Scottish Government); individual accountability for certain areas (for example, key performance indicators within policing); and accountability towards a successful partnership (ibid: 413). There is also, some may argue, the ultimate democratic accountability; being held accountable to local communities through engagement and service delivery.

Accountability is therefore a complex issue within local government partnerships, which can lead to increased tensions with regard to the blurred lines of responsibility between the centre and the local, and between the public sector and third sector organisations. This next section will examine some contentious issues that have possibly arisen within the case study areas with regard to: Third Sector Organisations; Third Party Policing; Police Reform, and Community accountability.

6.1 Third Sector Organisations

The third sector is a term used to describe organisations that are generally independent from government – within governance they are according to Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992) analogy those organisations with expert knowledge who do the ‘rowing’ as opposed to ‘steering’ through monitoring; the function associated with Government (ibid). However, many problems have begun to emerge within partnership working, which may support the argument that Government is not only ‘steering’ but trying to ‘row’ (ibid) through the use of target setting, and funding which may force some organisations to adapt their core aims (Hastings et al., 2015). Third sector organisations are thought to be value driven in the sense that their broad remit is to improve social goals (environmental or health and wellbeing) and are commonly known as not-for-profit organisations.
(National Audit Office, 2010). There are a number of third sector organisations throughout the UK who operate alongside the public sector either as support services for Employment and Welfare, Health and Social Care, Housing, Education and Learning or as part of a wider framework for the Criminal Justice System/community support and community safety – (Home Office, 2005). The third sector are ‘closely related to the public sector, at both national and supranational levels’ (Sgueo, 2015: 9), and this relationship has grown increasingly stronger in recent decades as more functions are delegated to the third and private sector (Sgueo, 2015: 9).

According to the Scottish Government website the third sector in Scotland is wide and varied and includes; charities, social enterprises, community groups, voluntary organisations, co-operatives and individual volunteers, who each have an important role to play in the creation of a more successful country with equal opportunities for all (Scottish Government, 2015d). It states they not only have a substantial part to play in terms of Scotland’s economy, but also have a direct impact on its public services and on the wellbeing of its citizens, and are equally important at the local level in terms of the development of SOA’s within Community Planning Partnerships (Scottish Government, 2015d).

A number of Third Sector Organisations (TSO’s) operate as standalone agencies within the community safety domain across the three case study sites, although some of them are more involved with the public sector than others; in the sense that a TSO may be approached on an ad hoc basis depending on a particular initiative. However, two key themes identified by the Scottish Government as areas of concern are Violence Against Women\(^\text{12}\) and Alcohol and Drug Misuse\(^\text{13}\). Consequently these two central government areas of concern have also been prioritised within Local Authority areas via the community planning/community safety agenda.

A number of agencies operate under the heading of Violence Against Women (VAW) within the case study areas, for example, Women’s Aid, Rape Crisis (TSOs), and Child


Protection (public sector). However, although these organisations may share similar aims, it became apparent that there exists an underlying tension in terms of differing organisational values, goals or culture between two of these agencies. One representative from Rape Crises thought that this was due to a politically gendered view on VAW in particular; which meant that some organisations fared better than others in terms of government funding.

As multi-agency partnership working became the dominant discourse (especially under New Labour); Carmel and Harlock (2008) argue that there has been an attempt by central government (UK) to institute voluntary and charitable organisations as a ‘single governable terrain’ (ibid: 156); under the umbrella of the third sector. This has been achieved through ‘discourses, strategies, and administrative and policy changes’ (ibid: 156) – through governance (regulation and performance management). The effect of which is to establish and enact an ‘institutional and normative order’ (ibid: 156) onto an otherwise distinctive terrain. They further argue that in so doing the third sector is often then viewed as generic service providers rather than distinctive organisations with specific goals and ethos (ibid: 156).

For example Rape Crisis tackle sexual violence towards any victim (or any survivor as they prefer to call victims of sexual violence), whereas Woman’s Aid focused mainly on violence against women within a domestic environment. Consequently, it was asserted they receive more funding from the Scottish Government in comparison to Rape Crises, which the TSO participant for Avon Isle/Avonside found to be short-sighted;

“I think for Rape Crisis centres and there is thirteen centres throughout Scotland now, we have always been the very poor relation to Women’s Aid who have masses of mega bucks thrown at them; because domestic abuse is the thing of the day. But I tend to think that a lot of people are horrendously short sighted because - have they actually considered what domestic abuse consists of? Sometimes it consists of the worst possible kinds of sexual abuse and violence. But, I think people are much more comfortable in thinking that domestic violence is about shouting or emotional abuse or the odd slap here or there, because that’s what’s in their comfort zone. But, when we take it to the next level, we’re just not as comfortable, so we tend not to get money thrown at us the same way as Women’s Aid do” (A002) – Rape Crisis – Avonside.
Since 2010 funding has become a key issue for both the public and the third sector (Hastings et al., 2015), but it has arguably affected smaller to medium sized organisations more than others. According to the Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations (SCVO) cuts to small grants programmes are mainly affecting small (around 12,000+ organisations with annual budgets under £25k) and medium (around 5500 organisations between £25k and £1m annual budgets), for example, 83% or four in five small organisations receive no funding from statutory sources – in total 69% of TSO’s receive no statutory funding at all (SCVO, 2014). However, while the larger organisations (around 800 with a turnover over £1m) are also experiencing cuts they seem to benefit the most; in terms of 50% of this groups income is from the public sector (SCVO, 2014).

Over the past decade TSOs have had to compete against each other for funding (Brandsen and van Hout, 2006), and post 2008 (in a climate of austerity); the prospect of having your budget cut may in some cases be used as a way to force change on some smaller TSOs (Hastings et al., 2015). The previous respondent discussed how they once had access to three different Scottish Government funding streams; including the Rape Crisis Specific fund – which is part of the VAW stream; each Rape Crisis organisation receives a core fund of £50,000 from the Scottish Government and in every centre it funds different things;

“We had the Violence Against Women fund, we had the Rape Crisis Specific fund and we had the Survivor Scotland fund. We only ever got £30,000 from the Violence Against Women fund and we lost that last year - that wasn’t continued” (A002) – Rape Crisis – Avonside.

Although funding streams are discontinued for a number of reasons, it was however intimated that the loss of the £30,000 in funding, may be linked more to a difference in organisational ethos (or arguably a refusal to change core values);

“I think that it was something to do with us opening our doors up to men. We only ever got £30,000 from that funding stream, and last year we weren’t successful. Woman’s Aid in Avonside were given £359,000 from that funding stream and we got nothing” (A002) – Rape Crisis – Avonside.
The potential loss of funding has become problematic for many TSOs; as highlighted by a study conducted by the Joseph Rowntree Organisation on the impact of cuts on local government and poorer areas (Hastings et al., 2015); insofar as there was an added pressure on TSOs to adapt bids and grant applications to specifications that did not fit their core purpose in order to secure or continue to secure funding, which ultimately has the potential to stifle creativity and innovation (Hastings et al., 2015). For example, more time may be spent chasing funding streams and ‘justifying’ yourself (Brandsen and van Hout, 2006: 542) than performing core functions. The participant from Rape Crisis in Avonside discussed how they often had to spend time chasing funding streams - which had a strict criteria attached to them - and often had to tailor their services in order to access them; although it was pointed out that they would not however apply for anything that was way out of their remit;

“But, if I can look and say well actually there is a specific project that we could do that will meet our service users needs and theirs, then absolutely” (A002) – Rape Crisis – Avonside.

A Burnside Local Authority Councillor acknowledged that TSOs would have to change their work practices in order to meet the prerequisites for funding;

“[...] we conditioned grants on some of the voluntary sector organisations [...] - You know it’s all very well doing youth work with small children during the week, I mean it’s good because its preventative, but we said they needed to be doing work on a Friday and a Saturday night when most of the issues are arising, to be out doing street work and so on, and that was a condition of the grant that they also have to do that in conjunction with ‘Burnside Life’ and talking to each other - you know the joined up approach between youth agencies [...]” (B004) - Councillor – Safe Group/CSB Chair – Burnside.

This could prove problematic for some organisations relying on volunteers for frontline services, for example, asking them to go out on Friday and Saturday nights in areas where violence may occur, may impact on their decision to volunteer. Relying on volunteers could also generate tensions between the public and third sector as each sector competes for limited funds. For example, ‘Burnside Life’ is the operating name of Culture and Sport Burnside; an ALEO - with Burnside Council being the sole member (Burnside, 2014a), and
its staff may feel resentment towards some voluntary organisations if it is thought they are replacing trained paid staff. This was the case in Hastings et al.’s., (2015) study when public sector staff objected to unpaid volunteers taking over a service; in this instance a library service in England, and subsequently refused to support them. Although this was not mentioned directly within the case study areas, one participant who worked within the VAW Partnership discussed cut backs and the use of volunteers within frontline women’s organisations;

“I think what organisations are doing is relying heavily on volunteers now to coming in and help shore up elements of the business that they’re in and the way of delivering to support them to do that” (B019) - VAW Co-ordinator – CSB – Burnside.

Consequently the tensions that arise out of disparities in funding or service provision could lead to a division amongst services culminating in a fragmented service delivery (Hastings et al., 2015). Trying to retain your autonomy could also lead to increased tensions between TSO’s and between TSOs and statutory organisations, for example, with reference to the comments made above about TSO’s having to work with ‘Burnside Life’ – would this be as equal partners, or would ‘Burnside Life’ be the lead agency, thereby setting the agenda. Grix and Phillpots (2011: 12) discuss this in relation to their case study on 49 County Sport Partnerships in England; they argued that although outwardly it appeared as if the partnerships conformed to a governance narrative based on equality and consensus, in reality there was an asymmetrical power relationship between ‘Sport England’ (the political arm of the Government’s sport policy) and other partners. For example, if a TSO wished to obtain funding for a local project, they must first sign up to the partnership’s mandatory Public Service Agreement (much like the SOA in Scotland), which works to ensure the “uniform delivery of Government-set policy and targets” (ibid: 11); which is more about ‘enforced co-operation’ rather than autonomy within an equal partnership (ibid: 12).

In essence this highlights the difficulties some TSOs may face in the future, with regards to remaining autonomous, while being reliant on public sector funding; especially funding with strings attached. In order to survive TSOs may have to adapt their services in line with the overarching aims of community planning, rather than focusing on their core
aims, which may ultimately impact on the types of services available to local communities.

For smaller organisations there is the added problem associated with trying to keep pace with TSO’s who are better funded and subsequently have more resources. For instance, TSO’s, such as Rape Crisis, have to divert much needed resources (staff, time, funds), in order to access funding streams in the first place, and in order to do this they must first become known. One such way to do this and gain access was through presentations to partnerships to promote their organisational aims; which again requires utilising scarce resources. However, it was thought to be crucial by Rape Crisis in both Avonside and Cartside that their organisations became known within the domain of Community Safety Partnerships - despite the obvious financial hardships;

“[...] I think I invited myself onto the partnership and then eventually I gave a presentation about TESSA and we shared some of the workshops that we do with the partnership and as TESSA became better known and more established in Avonside then TESSA was kind of fed into the strategic plan” (A002) – Rape Crisis – Avonside.

TESSA (To explore sexual exploitation and sexual abuse) was in reference to a youth prevention programme that was established in 2009. The programme was currently (2013) funded for three years by Comic Relief to deliver a prevention workshop in ten secondary schools in Avonside (covering quite a wide geographical area). In a discussion around status and equality within the CSP the participant returned to the topic of TESSA;

“I’ll just go back to what I said about TESSA and the youth prevention, it is very obvious to me that that’s where the interest lies, and again it doesn’t surprise me because prevention work is very proactive - it concerns young people, whereas our core work is not something everybody is comfortable with and they are least likely to want to know about that” (A002) – Rape Crisis – Avonside.

Measuring performance has become a key factor in terms of partnership working throughout the UK - the majority of Local Authority funding comes from central government, therefore accountability to the centre is established through ‘performance and financial audits’ (Fenwick et al., 2012: 407). Therefore some initiatives – especially those directed towards youth prevention – are often favoured more than others within
the community safety agenda; especially when it meets both partnership and organisational outcomes. For instance, the Police had decided to duplicate the youth initiative around internet safety in schools previously undertaken by Rape Crisis (TESSA);

“I thought this is a bit strange - why are they doing that, because we are in every secondary school, but they were going into do it as well, but not nearly as good as we were I have to say. It was covered in much more detail by us, but because you know, it seems to be a good idea that that’s what they should do” (A002) – Rape Crisis – Avonside.

They were asked if this duplication of services was perhaps down to a lack of communication between themselves and the Police, or was it down to strategies being put in place;

“I think they had a strategy and they were keeping to it. Because it wasn’t a case of a lack of communication, because they knew precisely - because of me feeding back what we were doing, and I thought it was absolutely bizarre” (A002) – Rape Crisis – Avonside.

In this sense genuine partnership working is perhaps superseded by the fact that other agencies are still accountable to their own organisations, to the point that they will duplicate activities in order to meet their own organisational aims and objectives within performance management regimes - like the one that exists within Police Scotland;

“[…] Within Police Scotland there’s a very, very rigorous performance regime which looks at everything from the way we’re performing round about crime, disorder, antisocial behaviour, road traffic etc. […]”(B005) - Area Police Commander – Burnside.

In partnerships such as the CSP – generating trust is often associated with effective partnership working (McCall and Rummery, 2017). However, this could be eroded if it is thought that by providing information (around initiatives such as TESSA) it may lose an organisation its competitive advantage (Brandsen and van Hout, 2006); insofar as larger organisations (such as the Police and the Council) may duplicate their distinctive service provision, or in the case of Cartside try to take it over;

“[…] at one point, certain bods (sic) that were on the - and still are on the CSP wanted to do it in-house at Cartside Council, and needless to say they never bloody got it
(laughs). If they had wanted to do it, they could have done it at the same time that we did it, so we refused to allow them to have it” (C005) – Rape Crisis – Cartside.

The conflict around the youth project was principally between the Council and Rape Crisis and was put down to the youth project being successful and to particular “petty personalities” (C005), and it was later claimed that when the youth project had first started they had been threatened over comments they had once made in an annual report which suggested that “bullies sometimes came in the guise of teacher’s” (C005). They were chastised for this by some Council representatives and more or less warned that they were thought to be operating out-with their remit and were effectively given a warning to stop;

“[…] And then we were threatened - they wouldn't minute it - but we were threatened, it was a case of - well if you don't work in our way - we will close you down. I said 'I beg your pardon, could you make sure that that threat is minuted', but it wasn't. It was just a certain few that wanted it […]” (C005) – Rape Crisis – Cartside.

Although this incident had occurred in the past it perhaps highlights how smaller organisations reliant on Council funding (the TSO had originally been given a one off payment to fund their pilot), have constraints exerted on them by more powerful partners. Fenwick et al., (2012: 413) discuss this in relation to partnerships within local governance in England and Scotland in terms of while there may be internal accountability within local partnerships; ultimately there is accountability towards the centre. This may explain why statutory organisations such as the Police and Council agencies pay more cognizance to what is required of them as organisations internally or externally (accountability to the centre) rather than to what may be expected of them with regards to peer accountability within the partnership (ibid: 413).

It also resonates with Lukes (2005) second dimensional view of power in the sense that the Council were trying to exercise their control over this agency through decision making – or non-decision making (setting the agenda on what is reported in the minutes) or as Luke would argue making sure that grievances “have not reached expression in the political arena” (ibid: 111). It also resonates with Lukes (1974: 24) third dimensional view of power – to prevent conflict through the shaping of perceptions; or in this case preventing future conflict through the shaping of reports and minutes.
The TSO’s in (Avonside and Cartside) commented on above perhaps emphasise an asymmetry in power within partnership working within the domain of community safety, insofar as they have arguably less status compared to other more dominant statutory agencies. However, in Burnside – how TSO’s are viewed – was thought to be changing insofar as the third sector are now represented at the strategic level of decision making within the Community Planning Partnership;

“For a number of years it wasn’t represented, and when the Third Sector Forum came into being and I was elected as its Chair; that was the first time for a number of years that we had representation at city wide level […]” (B010) - Chair of Third Sector Forum/SCPP – Burnside.

The participant went on to point out just what the third sector had to offer local communities;

“We bring, I think, somewhere between 2,100 and 2,400 organisations that are part of the third sector in the city, which represents a billion pounds in terms of the city’s economy. Those organisations operate at different scales, so some are quite large third sector organisations dealing with multi million pound budgets and contracts, and others are very small, very location or issue specific, and that as an entity it seems to me, brings an opportunity for the partnership to deeply connect into the web and wharf of local community life” (B010) - Chair of Third Sector Forum/SCPP – Burnside.

It is clear that there are a number of organisations operating within different spheres of public life, and most of them will have clear internal or external accountability frameworks in place. However, not all organisations that operate alongside public sector agencies are linked into those strategic frameworks, and therefore lack external scrutiny, which could also prove problematic in terms of accountability. One such organisation which has grown in number in the UK over the past few years is called the ‘Street Pastors’; a faith based TSO affiliated with The Ascension Trust, which was first pioneered in London in 2003 (Barton et al., 2011).
6.1.1 Third Sector Organisations/scrutiny

In both Burnside and Cartside ‘Street Pastors’ are in operation, although they are perhaps more involved in Cartside. The Pastors were referred to many times in response to discussions around key Local Authority cross cutting priorities (SCSN, 2014: 12), such as the night-time economy and antisocial behaviour; and usually in a positive manner. Another TSO participant (from addiction services involved with the Community Safety Partnership), said the ‘Street Pastors’ go out every Friday and Saturday night and had done for about the last five years – looking after people;

“Particularly people leaving clubs late at night or whatever who may be vulnerable because of alcohol misuse, or because they’re stranded, or they can’t get home or whatever, so that’s been quite a useful initiative” (C007) - Addiction Support – Cartside.

They were also associated with the control of antisocial behaviour insofar as certain agencies often co-ordinated their services;

“[…] We work with the wardens and the ‘Street Pastors’ and we also do a lot of work with the Police on that, just kind of co-ordinating things and sharing information” (C010) - Youth Services – Cartside.

It would appear that the ‘Street Pastors’ are an organisation that are growing in influence in terms of the night-time economy, and in other areas linked to the prevention of antisocial behaviour. This is not a new phenomenon, as religious organisations have a historical legacy in terms of delivering services to those in need (Green and Johns, 2011).

However, as previously stated the ‘Street Pastors’ are not linked into a formal strategic accountability framework compared to other partners within the CPP/CSPs, and therefore lack external scrutiny or accountability with regard to their work practices compared to others (Green and John, 2011; Barton et al., 2011). For example, Green and Johns (2011) have commented on their continued lack of secular or non-Christian faith based group involvement within the ‘Street Pastor’ movement; despite this being one of its original stated aims. Other areas of concern include: the efficacy of their crime prevention role; or that they may be used as a substitute for policing; or anecdotal evidence that suggests
they preach more than they prevent (ibid). One Community Council participant in Burnside had this to say about ‘Street Pastors’;

“Yeah, they’re becoming more and more prevalent, and I was very keen on the ‘Street Pastors’ until we done a wee bit more work on them and we decided that we had to watch our affiliations with different organisations, but again we have a role with them and we want to encourage them” (B013) - Community Councillor Burnwood CC – Burnside.

The reticence he described could be centred on perceptions that the ‘Street Pastors’ (members of an evangelical faith based organisation) may have a censorial attitude towards some sections of society. For example, this Community Council represents an area that is inhabited and frequented by large sections of the LGBT (lesbian, gay, bi-sexual, trans-gender) community. A similar reserve came from disabled respondents in a study conducted by Green and Johns (2011) which looked at levels of trust in ‘Street Pastors’; disabled respondents exhibited low levels of trust towards ‘Street Pastors’, however as the study was principally directed towards student attitudes, it did not explain why. If the ‘Street Pastors’ identity and vision is in contrast to secular viewpoints based on inclusivity and equality, then perhaps this organisation and others like it should be open to more scrutiny.

A further criticism levelled at the ‘Street Pastors’ is their focus on ‘vulnerable young women’, suggesting censorious views on women and alcohol consumption within the night-time economy. The ‘Pastors’ assert that their prime focus is centred around antisocial behaviour and at risk groups within the night-time economy, although the label of vulnerability is mostly attributed to young women (Green and Johns, 2011). A focus on ‘young women as vulnerable’ also became apparent in Cartside through discussions with two participants around a report that was presented to the Community Safety Partnership by the ‘Street Pastors’.

However, there are some problems with the data, in that volunteers within the ‘Street Pastor’ movement will be making personal judgements on who is judged to be at risk or who they perceive is vulnerable. It could also be problematic insofar as the volunteers
decide on whom to help, and it may be considered safer to approach women as opposed to men late at night (Cartside Street Pastors, 2013). A European study analysing the financial accountability of community sector organisations (a term attributed to all voluntary sector organisations within Europe) states that a criticism levelled at these organisations is that they lack the ‘experience and capability in monitoring and evaluating their own activities’ (Sgueo, 2015: 15).

In terms of the night-time economy in Cartside and Burnside it would also suggest that the ‘Street Pastors’ are insinuating themselves within areas of concern traditionally associated with policing and social services, despite the fact that they are not specifically trained to work in these areas, and are therefore less accountable to existing regulatory bodies. One other unintended consequence may concern net-widening (Mazerolle and Ransley, 2006), for example, contacting the Police to report people who are aggressive when approached - who may only have become aggressive because they were approached, may bring more young people into the Criminal Justice System who may otherwise have escaped police attention (Kelly, 2012); which may in turn further reinforce social exclusion (Crawford, 1997; Gilling, 2007).

6.2 Responsibilisation and Third Party Policing

With the advent of neo-liberal policies from the 1970s onwards advocating major structural and financial reform within both the public and private sector (Gilling, 2007), there has existed to some extent a laissez-faire attitude from the government in Britain (most notably the Conservatives and New Labour) in terms of crime prevention, whereby the government takes a step back and promotes an individualistic notion of responsibilisation (Garland, 1996; 2001).

In consequence there has arguably been a rise in ‘private prudentialism’ (Gilling, 2007: 3), whereupon local communities, individuals and groups together with the private and third sector have been persuaded to adopt practices to reduce crime and disorder (Neighbourhood Watch, alarms, CCTV, locks/grills etc.). This situational approach to crime prevention eliminates causation by restoring liability onto a rational actor (victim or offender) and further adds to the crime debate by reassigning responsibility for crime control out of the domain of the Police and onto individuals and communities (Hughes et
al., 2002: 326; Tilley, 2002). According to Garland (1996: 453) this sends out a message that the ‘state alone is not, and cannot effectively be, responsible for preventing and controlling crime’. It also addresses the problem of an unwanted extension of policing measures due to cost (Garland, 1996), for example, there are fiscal limits to the amount of Police resources available not least regarding the amount of Police officers employed and deployed in problem areas (McLaughlin, 2007).

For the Police much attention had been focussed on the notion of community policing characterised by high visibility in communities in an effort to promote public reassurance (Hamilton-Smith et al., 2013) through crime prevention. However, the reassurance, crime reduction agenda was only one half of the coin, the other half included adopting a holistic approach to crime prevention, which included the promotion of community safety through partnership working for the co-production of security (Gilling, 2007). One of the biggest developments in this field (not limited to, but especially in the UK and the USA) was the desire to combine the informal crime control practices of some non-state actors with the more formal activities of the Police themselves, particularly if it could be presented in the guise of community safety (Garland, 2007: 124).

This responsibilisation agenda has been aligned to the development of the ‘third governmental sector’ (Garland, 2001: 170) comprising a range of crime prevention/community safety organisations/networks, such as multi-agency Community Safety Partnerships, which occupy an “intermediate, borderline position, poised between the state and civil society” (Garland, 2001: 170). This networked community of crime prevention connects criminal justice agencies to the activities of local communities and citizens (Garland, 2001: 170).

This extension of the governance of crime control advocates that non-state actors/organisations take responsibility for the control of some forms of incivility by governing the conduct of others (Flint and Nixon, 2006: 940). The governance of conduct in this sense is arguably based on what Rose (2000) refers to as ‘ethopolitics’, whereby conduct is subject to wider political discourses around a type of moral and ethical behaviour expected from communities. Flint and Nixon argue that antisocial behaviour presents a clear challenge to the constructed norms and values of society, and therefore opens up a channel for a range of governance interventions, and wider debates
surrounding the ethics that underpin ‘citizenship, civility and government’ (Flint and Nixon (2006: 940).

One key concept linked to the notion of responsibilisation is Third Party Policing. Mazerolle (2014: 342) describes it as a “a partnership between the Police (as the first party) and an external entity (the third party) where the legal powers of the third party are used to prevent or control a crime problem” (Mazerolle, 2014: 342). In this sense civil remedies beyond the control of the Police are used as an effective and additional tool to add to the policing arsenal (Mazerolle and Ransley, 2006). This may be through the use of co-operative partnerships in the sense that the third party is a voluntary partner. It can also be used as a coercive tool whereby non-offending third parties are forced to use their civil remedies ‘outside the scope of their normal routine activities’ (Buerger and Mazerolle, 1998: 301) to reduce or minimise disorder caused by others; usually by the threat of legal sanctions. For example, Mazzerolle and Ransley (2006: 104) refer to a number of legal levers utilised by the Police in the USA to force landlords to deal with antisocial tenants, such as; Health and Safety, Fire, Building, and Housing Codes. In Scotland similar legal levers exist under the Housing (Scotland) Acts and the Antisocial Behaviour etc. Scotland Act 2004, whereby landlords can be ‘persuaded’ through the threat of legal sanctions against themselves to take action against offending tenants. The Police in this sense return to a compliance model in policing (Mazzerolle and Ransley, 2006). This approach by the Police is often used in conjunction with other policing strategies, such as problem oriented policing which analyses crime problems and then implements a solution tailored to reduce those problems (Sorg et al., 2013: 92).

### 6.2.1 The Role of Housing in the Third Party Policing of antisocial behaviour

Problem oriented policing (POP) is an analytical tool used within the arsenal of community policing (in both the USA and the UK) as the Police move away from a more incident driven response to a crime prevention model (Cherney, 2008). Cherney argues that POP motivated Police agencies to re-think how they addressed those problems the public routinely expect them to deal with, and one such way is to harness the capacities of third parties in the ‘furtherance of crime control’ (ibid: 232). Within the case study areas a number of references were made to the use of third parties, for example, using

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14 http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2004/10/20146/45685#7
Licensing legislation. Participants from all three case studies discussed how Licensing laws were being utilised to tackle underage drinking/alcohol related disorder, or to object to new licensed premises. In Cartside one participant discussed advice that was given to the Alcohol and Drug Partnership (ADP) on how to frame their objections to the Licensing Authority with regards to a new pub being granted a licence in an area both the ADP and the Police considered to be oversubscribed, which in turn could add to existent problems related to alcohol fuelled antisocial behaviour;

“because the ADP is now a statutory objector, they can object the same as the Health Boards can now, the Public Health can now object to licensing applications, and so too can the ADP” (C012) - Cartside Licensing Forum – Cartside.

Licensing levers were routinely used to coerce third parties (landlords, licensed premises etc.,) to control their premises more effectively. However, other third parties such as Housing Associations did not appear to be coerced and readily worked with their Police partners in order to reduce antisocial behaviour within their communities. Within the three case study areas Housing Associations operate across diverse geographic and demographic areas. Crawley Housing Association in Cartside operates in a small urban/commuter area and has approximately 730 homes (CHA, 2015), while Avon Homes have approximately 5000 homes and cover a wide geographical area throughout Avonside (including island communities); covering both smaller urban and rural communities (AHA, 2015). Burnside Housing Association is the largest Housing Association in Burnside and one of the largest across the UK with over 43,000 tenants and operates mainly within dense urban areas (BHA, 2015).

Throughout the UK Housing Associations have been described as independent not for profit organisations, governed by voluntary boards, to provide low-cost social housing for people in need (Mullins and Murie, 2006). In Scotland they are registered with the Scottish Housing Regulator under the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001, and regulated under the Scottish Charity Regulator, which operates independently, and furthermore is a Non-

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15 Scottish Housing Regulator
http://www.esystems.scottishhousingregulator.gov.uk/register/reg_pub dsp.home
Ministerial Department and part of the Scottish Administration via the Charities and Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act 2005\textsuperscript{16}.

In all three case study sites Housing Associations have become a key partner in crime prevention, mostly concerned with the policing of antisocial behaviour, however it was taken a step further in Burnside with the creation of a new ‘Community Improvement Partnership’, which will be discussed more fully below. As a consequence of legislation such as the Local Government in Scotland Act 2003 there now exists a statutory requirement for the Local Authority, the Police and other relevant agencies to participate in community planning; part of which includes the Community Safety Partnership and subsequent thematic partnerships such as Antisocial Behaviour Partnerships – according to local need (Donnelly, 2008; Fyfe, 2010). One driver towards the policing of antisocial behaviour rests within the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003, which placed a new duty on the Police and Local authorities to produce and publish antisocial behaviour strategies (Fyfe, 2010: 193). The Police tend to be the lead agency in terms of tackling antisocial behaviour throughout the UK, however, other actors in the public and private/third sector also help to co-ordinate or devise strategies;

“[…] If there’s any issues of antisocial behaviour it’s tackled on a multi-agency approach, whereas before, maybe going back a few years, the Police would be the lead agency on that, and I suppose we’re still the lead agency, however, we do it now in partnership” (A004) - Senior Police Officer – Avon Isle – Avonside.

Noise pollution (noisy neighbours/loud music etc.,) has long been a source of complaint by tenants throughout the UK and a typical third party measure - targeting antisocial behaviour in social housing, for example - is eviction or the threat of eviction. Many Housing Associations in response to antisocial behaviour legislation have put in place measures to tackle disorder;

“Yes, we worked closely with the ASBO group (Antisocial Behaviour Partnership) and we managed to... we were successful in evicting a tenant for prolonged antisocial behaviour. We evicted another one for growing cannabis – the group all helped with

\textsuperscript{16} OSCR ‘About us’ \url{http://www.oscr.org.uk/about/about-oscr}
that, you know, were supportive, especially the Police” (A010) - Housing Manager – Avon Homes – Avon Isle/Avonside.

Discussions around partnership working and antisocial behaviour within all three case study areas was mostly linked to Housing; however, this was more prominent in Burnside insofar as a unique partnership was established between the Housing, the Police and the Fire Service called the Community Improvement Partnership (CIP).

6.2.2 Community Improvement Partnership (CIP)

In 2010 Burnside Housing Association (BHA) established what has become known as the Community Improvement Partnership (CIP) alongside the former Burnside Police and Burnside Fire Service (now known as Police Scotland and the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service). The purpose of the partnership was to deal with antisocial behaviour and other safety related matters concerning not only the tenants of BHA, but also wider environmental issues affecting their properties such as fly-tipping, vandalism and graffiti;

“[...] at first when we set it up it was just BHA and the Police, and we also brought the Fire in through a different route, we were looking at asset management, and Fire Services were part of that. Then we realised to make a better partnership the three of us had to work together and so that’s that partnership there - it’s a tri-partite partnership if you like” (B007) – Burnside Housing Association – Burnside.

Currently the CIP has eighteen Police personnel seconded to it; twelve constables, two sergeants, an inspector and three intelligence officers including an analyst (B007). A senior Fire Officer from Burnside also discussed their involvement with CIP;

“We second two officers into the CIP. We’ve got a Station Commander in there and a Watch Commander. Now we’re paying for one, and BHA are paying for the other” (B009) - Senior Officer Fire Service – Burnside.

In terms of resources all three agencies ‘put different things into the pot’ (B007); and funding had been agreed between the partners up to January 2015. When asked who set the organisational strategy for the partnership it was stressed that Housing were at the forefront of the partnership – tasking meetings were held in each of BHA’s local offices, and they “are actually hosted and driven by Housing” (B007). One of the reasons given for this was;
"[...] One of the statistics that we know is, when the Police asked people ‘who would you tell or report crime to’ and not just crime – ‘nuisance and things that were going on in your neighbourhood’, and 60% said they would tell their Housing Officer and only 30% said they would tell the Police” (B007) - Burnside Housing Association – Burnside.

The BHA participant indicated that the information passed onto Housing Officers from local communities was beneficial to the Police in the sense that it was intelligence they otherwise would not have had. They emphasised this by reporting on an ‘Away Day’ for staff - where they were joined by the Police. At one seminar Housing Officers and Police Officers were asked to write up where they believed their ‘hotspots’ (of crime, antisocial behaviour etc.) were to see if it was in the same areas. It turned out they did not match as both the Police and Housing were working on different sets of intelligence. The Police based their analysis on recorded crime, whereas Housing more likely reported on ‘dark crime’ – unreported crime (Hope, 2009).

“So, Housing Officers were going with what tenants told them which was unreported, and they (the Police) were going with what was reported. So that was the interesting bit for us to say - right there is something here then” (B007) - Burnside Housing Association – Burnside.

A Senior Fire Officer also praised intelligence sharing within the CIP. He said that Station Commanders go to tasking meetings either weekly or once a fortnight to the Housing Office in their area where they just discuss issues and share information (B009). Some statistics were given to support the success of some of the preventative work of the CIP. For example, prior to the partnership BHA experienced approximately eight to ten fire deaths a year within their housing stock, which was tragic in itself, but also led to high costs economically;

“Each fatality on average cost you about a million and a half pounds. Now the reason for that is because of - apart from somebody dying - the ferociousness of the fire for that to happen as well, will mean that you’ve got a lot of work needed done in your
property. It could be surrounding properties, taking in Housing officer’s time - everybody’s time that’s what they say. The last fire that happened in BHA property was the 14th of July 2011. So, since the partnership has been established with the Fire Service, there has been no fatalities since that date, so that’s twenty three months with no fatalities” (B007) - Burnside Housing Association – Burnside.

The sharing of information between these organisations is arguably linked more to a neoliberal economic assessment of risk as opposed to a responsibilisation ethos (Carrabine et al., 2009), however, a number of crime statistics were listed on the BHA website (6671 (stop and searches, drug seizures, warrants, ASBOs etc.), which could attest to it also being linked to social control strategies (Garland, 2001). Jonathon Simon refers to new strategies of control as the ‘actuarial regime’ (cited in Hudson, 2002: 367) – wherein those identified as ‘different or dangerous’ (ibid: 367) are excluded from Housing, streets or shopping malls.

The website states that more than 450 home fire safety visits to vulnerable tenants had been carried out since July 2011 (BHA, 2015). Furthermore, it was suggested during a discussion on effective communication between agencies that staff should be trained to spot hazards or issues for other agencies;

“So for instance, me as a Fire Officer going through the front door the first thing I would look at would be the front door - can it lock, is it safe, is it secure, is it fit for purpose. Then you would look at the general layout of the house, you would look to see if there was poverty issues, health issues and anything else right, then you could feed that back” (B009) - Senior Officer Fire Service – Burnside.

Intelligence about local crime is also passed onto the Police by Housing Officers during the weekly tasking meetings; where decisions are made on how to tackle pertinent areas of concern. However, it was pointed out that once the intelligence was passed on to the Police - Housing effectively ceased to have any more to do with it. This type of information from Housing Associations has proven to be invaluable to the Police as evidenced by the crime statistics listed in the BHA website. It was also reinforced by an Article in Inside Housing - reporting on a CIH (Chartered Institute of Housing) conference in Manchester, whereby a former Police Scotland Chief Inspector (who had previously worked for the CIP) ‘called for stronger partnerships to be forged between Housing
Associations and local Police Forces’ (Douglas, 2014). He argued that Housing Associations held information that was of incredible value to Police Forces, and indicated that he wished he had forged a relationship with them at the beginning of his career (Douglas, 2014). Stating that further assessment had to be made on the information Housing Associations held as “there might just be a little golden nugget that they don’t recognise the value of” (Douglas, 2014).

Although there are obvious benefits to information sharing within the CIP, there could also be a downside; especially within the domain of Third Party Policing. Mazerolle and Ransley (2006) for instance assert that there are some social side effects to Third Party Policing which are often difficult to measure. For example, while sharing information may seem beneficial to some organisations or networks such as the CIP, for other actors this may produce some unintended consequences. For instance, Housing Officers passing on hearsay evidence on drug dealing, antisocial behaviour or low-level incivility may increase intelligence on neighbourhood crime, but it could also draw the attention of the authorities onto individuals who may otherwise have escaped attention (Kelly, 2012). This net-widening effect further disadvantages certain individuals/groups who are drawn into the criminal justice net simply because they live in a targeted area (Mazerolle and Ransley, 2006).

This resonates with labelling theory (Becker, 1963) insofar as it could stigmatise and label certain sections of the community, and in the worst case scenario lead to eviction for the whole family; not just an offending parent or child (Mazerolle and Ransley, 2006). One evaluation on a new system of on the spot fines in England and Wales supported this assertion by finding that between half and three quarters of notices listed as ‘new business’, were given to people who would not have been otherwise cautioned or prosecuted (Halligan-Davis and Spicer, 2004). Other negative aspects include arguments that the Police are usurping resources and agendas away from their primary roles and purposes, for example by co-opting other agencies to deal with crime instead of focusing on their core roles (Mazerolle and Ransley, 2006). Other problems surround the disproportionate allocation of policing resources in some areas while ignoring others, which could lead to accusations around the legitimacy of the Police (ibid). This is possibly
pertinent to the policing of social housing under the remit of BHA in terms of having a dedicated policing team.

There is also the problem that agencies intent on improving the safety of some citizens may inadvertently increase further victimisation. For example, in some cases some service providers are tasked with noticing other problems in households, such as social workers assessing risks associated with domestic or child abuse. This holds true for other service providers, such as the Fire Service who enter properties principally to assess fire risk, but may also look for other intelligence to ‘feed back’ as noted above (B009). Not only has this the potential to net-widen, but it may also lead to retaliation from a violent offender who thinks his/her spouse/partner has reported them to the authorities. This leads to obvious ethical questions surrounding placing someone in harm’s way, or possible violations of the right to privacy; or questions around accountability in view of asking untrained actors to assess risk leading to net-widening (Mazerolle and Ransley, 2006), which would also be the case in terms of passing on information or ‘intelligence’.

While it was clear that the Police had ease of access to information, this may not be the case for the other agencies within CIP. For example, if BHA wanted to have access to certain Police intelligence (regarding their properties/tenants) then they would have to conform and change their work practices in line with the dominant policing model. This created some tension amongst staff within BHA, for instance, in order to comply with data protection laws and policing practice an intelligence hub had to be created on BHA property. This entailed creating a secure room to store data. While this was not structurally insurmountable, the next request has possible repercussions in terms of eroding trust within the Community Improvement Partnership;

“The Police wanted to do vetting of the staff that worked for BHA, because they were in the partnership. Now we've come to an agreement through the partnership, that actually the way the office is laid out and everything we don't need to go through that. [...] it was something we had to think about - it was all about the data and how did we make sure that all the data was protected” (B007) - Burnside Housing Association – Burnside.
They were asked if this may have caused some conflict within BHA in terms of members of staff being reluctant to being vetted by the Police;

“There was a wee bit of that. I think it was because of the partnership that we were able to come to a sort of solution, which did mean the way we are working just now is fine. [...] What we’ll do is we’ll agree if anybody new comes into the partnership (CIP) to work in that particular location, before they come we will explain that they will need to be vetted” (B007) - Burnside Housing Association – Burnside.

Working in close concert with the Police also arguably has the potential to change community perceptions around the role and identity of Housing Officers. Flint (2002: 634) commenting on a previous study (around the role of Social Housing Agencies in the governance of antisocial behaviour) found that concerns were expressed by some Housing Officers in relation to providing information to the Police. Especially if it led to direct interventions; insofar as, not only was there a need to protect sources, but also in relation to agency identities and legitimacy being maintained (ibid: 634).

A key criticism directed towards Third Party Policing tactics concerns the notion of accountability. The Police have a legitimate monopoly over the use of force and are held accountable by various regulatory bodies both in policing and in government. The mechanisms for accountability for policing in Scotland has traditionally been based on a balance of power between central, local government and the Chief Constable, however, under the new Police Reform Act, this balance may change, which will be discussed next.

6.3 The Reform of the Police

The Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012; established on the 1st of April 2013 (now referred to as the Reform Act) created the single Police Service of Scotland (PSS) – or Police Scotland as it is now known (Scott, 2013). Police Scotland takes overall responsibility for policing in Scotland and upon its creation was led by Chief Constable Stephen House; it is now led by Philip Gormley. Previously governance of the Police Service existed under the tripartite arrangement and responsibility was split between eight Police forces, the Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency (SCDEA), and the
Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland, which are now abolished together with the Scottish Police Services Authority (SPSA) (Scottish Government, 2014a). The functions of the SCDEA and the SPSA will now be absorbed by Police Scotland (Oag, 2012a: 17). This previous structure allowed for a form of accountability based on an equilibrium of interests, between central, local government and the Chief Constable (Scott, 2013: 142), whereas now, governance and oversight of Police Scotland will exist under the new Scottish Police Authority (SPA).

Some early evidence from a qualitative study (in progress) jointly conducted by the Scottish Institute for Policing Research (SIPR) and by ScotCen Social Research, as part of the highly regarded annual Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, has indicated that reform has brought with it some significant changes in ‘style and approach’ especially for Local Authorities (Anderson et al., 2014:6). For example, as Local Authorities have now lost their statutory responsibilities for policing, the perception is that they are now in a weaker position in terms of influence. The study found that Local Authorities are still trying to develop their new roles in terms of local scrutiny and engagement, especially in “relation to the production of Local Police Plans” (Anderson et al., 2014:6). There are also issues emerging surrounding national policing priorities and local priorities. For example, the study highlights how in some areas national and local priorities appear to be closely aligned, while in some other areas a tension has arisen between what is perceived as a national agenda compared to a local one. For instance, a national agenda focused on crimes of violence as opposed to some local concerns about other types of criminality, such as property crime (Anderson et al., 2014:6).

The Reform Act may have a significant impact on local government accountability with regards to local policing, which in turn may impact on local community accountability with regard to community engagement. Therefore those sections of the Reform Act that have an impact on local scrutiny and accountability will be briefly examined below.

6.3.1 The Reform Act – Policing Principles

For the first time in Scottish policing history the new Police Service of Scotland (PSS) will have to abide by a set of guiding principles designed to recognise the significance of
partnership working as a key element of policing\textsuperscript{17} (Scott, 2012: 136; Apex Scotland, 2013: 9). The principles will also underpin the importance of localism, and improve the safety and wellbeing of citizens within localities and communities (Terpstra and Fyfe, 2015: 531). Furthermore, the principles highlight that the PSS should be accessible to and engage with local communities, although how accessibility and engagement is to be determined is very much in the hands of the Chief Constable and Local Commanders. The PSS already consult with local communities through annual consultations and what they describe as Police and Communities Meetings (PACTS);

“Yes, well it starts at the ground level with Police and communities meeting, where community Police officers - Constables will meet with members of the community on a daily basis and work out what their issues are. So that will either - at a Police community officers surgery, or one of these things that we call PACTS and basically you can have one of these on a street corner if you want” (B003) – Police Chief Inspector – Safe Group – Burnside.

In light of the speed of the reform process it could be argued that the new Police plans have been put together fairly quickly, which could raise issues around the consultation process. Newburn (2002: 111) commenting on Police consultations in England and Wales\textsuperscript{18} states that when they are conducted quickly ‘time pressures’ often make it difficult to consult with ‘hard to reach’ groups, which in turn raises questions regarding social inclusion and representation within communities (Phillips, 2002; Myhill, 2007; Harkin, 2015). Especially, representation from groups of young people that seem to be the target of stop and search initiatives, or for noise complaints related to antisocial behaviour, or indeed those on the fringes of society, such as the homeless, or people with a disability (Myhill, 2007). As one senior Police officer admitted;

“It’s getting meaningful consultation, I think that’s probably the issue, you know, do we consult enough” (B012) - Police Superintendent – NWCPP/ADP/One Burnside.

However, another senior Police officer from Burnside seemed to suggest that consultations were representative;

\textsuperscript{17} Section 32: Policing Principles \url{http://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2012/8/section/32/enacted}

\textsuperscript{18} In reference to Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships
“we don’t just ‘willy nilly’ go along to all the groups that are the Police fans and ask them to give us - or ask people to tell us how good we are, that’s not going to achieve anything” (B003) – Police Chief Inspector – Safe Group – Burnside.

There has been much written surrounding the apparent lack of community involvement in local policy decisions which may have a direct impact on local communities. Many reasons have been cited ranging from public apathy to the difficulty of breaking down organisational/cultural barriers within multi-agency partnership working. Head (2007: 443), states that there has been an international trend towards a more society centred form of social democracy since the late 1980s. At the national level it is linked to a more participatory approach as governments recognise the need to share responsibility for a myriad of complex social issues, or so called ‘wicked issues’. This has culminated in the belief that there are benefits associated with involving local citizens in identifying and tackling local problems, which in turn helps to build social capital (Head, 2007: 443).

One Police participant in Burnside had mentioned that one obvious route for consultation was through Community Councils, or through elected representatives or surveys (B005), which may take place within local communities, or through the CPP process. This could be problematic on two counts: firstly, in terms of Community Councils/PACTS opinions (as previously suggested) may be based on a small unrepresentative sample of local communities (Myhill, 2007; Harkin, 2015: 736); and secondly at more formalised procedures, such as CPP/CSP meetings, there are arguments around an inequality of power and knowledge that tends to favour the Police above citizens, insofar as community representatives may bow before the wisdom of the Police (Harkin, 2015: 737). This comment about community consultation from a senior Police officer in Avon Isle, would suggest that the Police already have solid opinions on what the problems are within a given locality;

“It’s literally Police officers with clipboards standing in prominent locations once a year asking the public questions; ‘what do you see as being the issues that affect your community’, basically they’re asked what do they see... the Police know, well we think we know what we should be addressing, however, we ask the public to see - and they’re generally - to be honest the same, they’re very close” (A004) - Senior Police Officer – Avon Isle – Avonside.
It has been argued that consultations (either through surveys, focus groups, or through e-participation etc.,) as a form of participatory democracy within complex governance structures, often amount to little more than tokenism (Pollock and Sharp, 2012). Ercan and Hendriks (2013: 427) argue that tokenism is embedded in a particular form of localism usually associated with local citizen committees constructed from ‘self-selected’ volunteers (Community Councils), which arguably are devoid of any real power, or are used to “rationalise established power through some degree of shared governance”. The concept of tokenism is mostly associated with Arnstein’s (1969: 2) ‘Ladder of Citizen Participation’ in which rungs three, four, and five out of eight (informing, consultation, and placation) refer to citizens being allowed to hear and be heard but lack the power to ensure that their views will be taken into consideration by the powerful – rung eight being citizen control.

This resonates with comments from Taylor (1998) when he wrote about the 1968 Town and Country Planning Act in the UK, whereby a special parliamentary group was set up to examine how to secure participation from the public. Taylor argued that the conclusion reached by the committee was that decisions must remain with trained officers (planners), which basically meant that participation translated as peripheral consultation rather than active decision making (cited in Astrom et al., 2011: 573). The same could arguably be true for Police consultations. Police consultations may genuinely try to engage with local communities, or they could be as suggested by some, a ‘tick the box’ exercise, based on the assumption that the Police have already decided what their priorities will be. Under the Reform Act the Police must follow a particular legislated path with regards to Strategic Priorities, and the Strategic and Annual Police Plans, which in turn will arguably have an impact on Local Authorities in terms of consultation and contribution.

For example, Government Ministers set the strategic priorities for the SPA (taking into account the Policing Principles) and consulting with both the SPA, the Chief Constable, and ‘such persons as appears to them to be representative of Local Authorities’; and ‘such other persons as they consider appropriate’. Ultimately, a copy of the strategic priorities, the Strategic Police Plan, and the Annual Police Plan must be laid before the Scottish Parliament (Legislation.gov.uk, 2012). This is a significant change in terms of Police
accountability, for instance, it means that unlike the previous tripartite arrangements, the Scottish Parliament has a statutory voice in terms of Police accountability. They can if they so wish, summon the Chief Constable and the SPA to be questioned on any relevant matters that may arise (Scott, 2013: 143). Furthermore, the Strategic Police Plan must also obtain the views of ‘persons whom it considers likely to have an interest in policing’ and involve the Chief Constable (Legislation.gov.uk, 2012). A draft copy is sent to each Local Authority, and persons it considers likely to have an interest in the plan, whereupon recipients are invited to comment within a reasonable period the SPA specifies. The plan is then given to Scottish Ministers for approval and a copy is laid before the Scottish Parliament. The Annual Police Plan (prepared by the Chief Constable) must take into account the Strategic Police Plan and once prepared send a copy to the SPA for comments within a specified time, thereafter the published plan is also laid before the Scottish Parliament (ibid).

There have been questions around just how local will local policing become, and how much input will Local Authorities have in setting the strategies and priorities for their local areas. Traditionally Local Authorities have been linked to policing since the late 18th century, however now that Police Boards have been abolished the task of holding the Chief Constable to account, and overseeing resources for policing within a local area has passed onto the SPA, leaving the Local Authority, some would argue, with very little voice (Scott, 2012; Fyfe, 2014).

6.3.2 Local Authorities

Under the previous tripartite arrangements Local Authorities had a say in the direction of policing within their local areas, they not only ensured that resources were made available for policing, but they also conveyed policing concerns from the local electorate to the Chief Constable of the local force area (Scott, 2012: 137). Now however, the extent of how much input they may have in local policing has become a source of tension. For example the Reform Act states that a copy of the Strategic Police Plan must be sent to Local Authorities whereupon they are invited to comment (Legislation.gov.uk, 2012), however, it does not specify what will happen if they disagree with the plan, a point also highlighted by Oag, (2012a) and Scott, (2012;2013). Fyfe (2014:10) also point to another potential area of tension with regards to Local Policing Plans which have to take into
account the national Strategic Police Plan, but also any priorities identified by CPPs. A tension potentially exists “around the balance between a ‘bottom up’ and a ‘top down’ approach to setting local priorities and objectives” (Fyfe, 2014: 10).

There exists under section 45 of the Reform Act a scrutiny role for Local Authorities whereupon they can ‘monitor and provide feedback to the Local Commander on the policing of its area’ (Legislation.gov.uk, 2012). Feedback may include forwarding their views of any local policing matters, recommend improvements, and specify measures it wishes the Local Commander to include in the Local Police Plan. However, under subsection (6) a request may be referred up to the Chief Constable if the Local Commander thinks the requirement ‘might prejudice the carrying out of any operation by the PSS or the prosecution of offenders’ (ibid). This means in effect that any Local Authority requests can essentially be vetoed by the Chief Constable if he so wishes, further removing some oversight from Local Authority purview. Terpstra and Fyfe (2015: 532) argue that although the Reform Act entails ‘local policing’ the ‘institutional infrastructure’ in place for the local governance of the Police is weak. It has in effect moved from governance to what is now referred to as scrutiny and engagement (ibid: 534).

6.3.3 Scrutiny of the Police

A scrutiny committee has been established under the new remodeled community planning structure in Burnside, called the Safe Burnside Group, and it is a sub-group of the of CPP Strategic Board, and able to co-opt suitable persons to assist in its function. Its main role is to scrutinize and review the Police and Fire and Rescue plans and the Safer Communities plans (Burnside, 2014b). When the Safe Burnside group first came into existence there was some confusion amongst its members as to its specific function. A number of participants when asked if it was to replace the function of the now defunct CSP within Burnside; often referred to it in relation to scrutiny of the two services only. However, at the Safe Burnside Group meeting on the 22nd of August 2013, it became apparent that not everyone was clear on their new roles within the remodeled CPP structure, including the roles and remit of those involved on the Safe Burnside Board; discussions took place regarding the changing role of the group and how they would have to think beyond the role of scrutiny (Safe Group Partnership meeting 22/8/13). This is
probably related to a lack of guidance within the Reform Act, as local scrutiny structures and processes have been left up to each Local Authority to decide on; with the result that different layers and forms of scrutiny now exist across the 32 Local Authority areas (Terpstra and Fyfe, 2015).

For example, in Cartside scrutiny of the Police, Fire and public safety now exists under the “Public Safety Sub-Committee” (C011). In Avon Isle there appeared to be some confusion regarding the existence of a scrutiny committee or its function, for instance, the local Councillor at first said they did not have one, and then was unsure if they did saying “[…] If they have they haven’t told me, but then they haven’t told me a lot of things” (A008). In this case there appears to be a disconnect between the local and the local - between a mainland Council area in Avonside and this Councillor on Avon Isle itself, who seemed to be operating within a sort of silo mentality, insofar as they all had their own committees and jobs to do, and generally left the policing to the Police – albeit with perfunctory consultation within the CSP and through its thematic groups. However, the local Community Safety Co-ordinator stated that the Local Authority and its elected members would perform this function through the “Performance Review and Scrutiny Committee” (A001 – 1st).

There appeared to be some ambivalence towards the new scrutiny arrangements amongst some elected members within the case study areas around the perception of a loss of localism. The following quote is quite lengthy, but it may explain some of the disquiet amongst Local Authorities;

“[...] in the past you had separate Police authorities that would then be responsible for scrutinising and holding the Chief Constable and a force to account…the Police Authority would then hold the Chief Constable ultimately and the force to account for any budgetary demands, also for operational issues etc., without going into detail of individual operations of course but in a general term. Now with the single force you’ve still got a Scottish Police Authority, but that’s not really accountable to Local Authorities or to the communities, it’s more accountable to the Scottish Parliament […] But, the scrutiny is completely on a different level, it’s not that we can decide what their budgets are, we can’t determine what they should be doing. Obviously what we can do is try and sit down and agree what we believe for the City and on a localised
level, the Local Policing Plans and Local Fire Plans, and make an input in that sense, but a proper scrutiny I would say is lacking from the current set up” (B015) - Councillor – Burnpark Area Partnership – Burnside.

The Councillor did say they had an input up to a degree to get their point across about certain issues, but it was the Police who finalise the document that they believe reflect the greatest needs of a specific local area (B015). It is clear that Local Authorities have lost significant input in terms of local accountability when it comes to setting local priorities and improving funding for specific policing initiatives. There was also a concern that Police priorities may not converge with Council priorities and if this is the case how will an agreement be obtained. However, the Chair of the Safe Group intimated that the Police could change their plans if asked;

“When they were drawing up the first plans for Burnside under the new structure [...] they got a lot of comments, and they changed it, believe it or not. One of the big ones was hate crime; we felt there wasn’t enough priority given to hate crime [...] So, the cops took it away and came back and said they would reword it to make sure that was in there, which was good” (B006) - Councillor – Chair Safe Group/Chair VAW – Burnside.

It was clear that some form of Scrutiny Committees and Groups were being established within the case study areas, however, there were still concerns being expressed around accountability and a loss of localism with regard to the governance of policing in particular.

### 6.3.4 Local Policing and Multi-Member Ward Plans

The topic of ‘local policing’ had become an area of tension, with some participants expressing concerns about the possible loss of local accountability. This perceived loss of localism was highlighted by a number of participants within the case study areas. For instance, a Licensing Standards Officer in Avonside (who was also a former senior Police officer) admitted he was against a national Police service;

“[...] For me there is a lot of negatives about going national in my personal opinion...basically, it is with the point of view that everything is determined from the
...there's no kind of local decision making at all, there's no autonomy” (A015) - Licensing Standards Officer – Avonside.

However, according to the PSS they have taken into account local sensibilities, and they have in essence gone a step further than what was required within the Reform Act, and this was pointed out by a senior Police officer in Burnside who discussed how the former Chief Constable Stephen House had volunteered to provide Multi-Member Ward Plans alongside Local Policing Plans – a point also highlighted in the Apex Scotland Annual Lecture (Apex Scotland, 2013: 3);

“[...] So what you've got is a Police Scotland Plan for the whole of Scotland - a strategy. You've got 32 Local Policing Plans for each individual divisional area to cover the Councils, and then Multi-Member Ward Plans. So there's 36 Multi-Member Ward Plans for the Burnside Police area [...]” (B003) Police Chief Inspector– Safe Group – Burnside.

In essence the PSS will have 32 Local and 353 Multi-Member Ward Plans (MMWP) alongside the Annual Plan (ibid; SPA, 2013), which also take into account the Scottish Government Strategic Priorities and the SPA three year Strategic Police Plan (Legislation.gov.uk, 2012). See Table 6; which lists out the priorities for each plan during 2013-14. As you can see many of the objectives match up, with a couple of slight variations or outliers in the MMWP, but even then, they are ostensibly similar priorities. Avon Isle for example, has road safety as one of its priorities; despite the fact it has been acknowledged as not an issue on Avon Isle (Police Scotland, 2014a).

**Table 6: Annual, Local and Multi-Member Ward Policing Plans 2013-14**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police Scotland Annual Police Plan 2013/14 Five ‘Golden threads’ affecting all communities</th>
<th>Reducing violence crime and antisocial behaviour (ASB)</th>
<th>Reducing road casualties and fatalities</th>
<th>Protecting people at their most vulnerable (particularly victims of domestic abuse and children)</th>
<th>Dealing professionally with major events and crimes</th>
<th>Contributing to a resilient Scotland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Objectives of Annual Police Plan</td>
<td>Violence, Disorder and ASB</td>
<td>Protecting the public</td>
<td>Road safety and road crime</td>
<td>Serious organised crime and Terrorism</td>
<td>Major events and resilience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td></td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Avonside LPP 2013-2014</td>
<td>Violence, Disorder and ASB, Protecting people, Acquisitive and road crime, Serious crime and responding to national events, Increase public confidence and local engagement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avon Isle MMWP Nov 2013</td>
<td>Violence and ASB, Public Protection, Road Safety and Enforcement, Major crime and Terrorism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burnside LPP 2013-2014</td>
<td>Tackling violence, disorder and ASB, Protecting People, Tackling Serious Organised Crime, and responding to National Events, Increasing Public Confidence and Local Engagement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burnpark and City MMWP Nov 2013</td>
<td>Assault and violent crime, Drunk and disorderly behaviour, Drug use and drug dealing, House-breaking and theft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartside LPP 2013-2014</td>
<td>ASB, Disorder and violence, Tackling Domestic abuse, Protecting the public, Road policing and road crime, Serious Organised Crime Groups, Community confidence and engagement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cartside East MMWP Nov 2013</td>
<td>ASB, Violent crime, Protecting people and places, Making roads safer, Disrupting organised crime, Crimes of dishonesty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The PSS have said that they consult with the local public and Local Authorities in terms of setting their strategic priorities and objectives. It has also been highlighted by some Police participants that they would not put in place a ‘one size fits all’ type of plan - also highlighted in the Apex Scotland Annual Lecture (Apex Scotland, 2013: 2) - though on the face of it, the plans are fairly similar. The three case study sites are a mixture of dense urban, smaller urban/commuter, and small/urban remote/island communities, and it was quite clear that some participants were concerned that the new single service may not take this into account; particularly in Avon Isle. There was also a perception by some that as the former Chief Constable was from Strathclyde – the largest force in Scotland, and one of the largest forces throughout the UK, that what was happening to the PSS was a form of ‘Strathclydification’ (Fyfe, 2014), insofar as the Strathclyde model of policing had become the template for the whole of Scotland or as the former Police officer from Avonside now referred to it as;

“*It is kind of Strathclyde versus the rest of the world now - it's kind of StrathGlasgow that runs Scotland if that makes sense at all*” (A015) - Licensing Standards Officer – Avonside.

However, in Avonside ‘a one size fits all’ policing approach was generally thought not to be possible due to the difference in geographic areas; especially island communities. One representative from the voluntary sector on Avon Isle CSP claimed;

“*I don't think in an area like Avon Isle they can allow that to happen, because I worked with the Police for nine years in the island and local knowledge is absolutely everything. Especially on the islands, because Police officers can't disappear at night to go and live somewhere else the way they can in the mainland, they have to live side by side, so they could be standing having a quiet drink in a bar next to the guy that they'd locked up the night before*” (A002) – Rape Crisis – Avonside.

When you have a hierarchical organisation such as the Police then performance management can become an issue, with many commentators asserting that policing in many aspects has become performance by numbers, or a tick the box exercise. Fyfe (2014: 11) argues that over two thirds of Local Authority areas have since the 1st of April
2013 increased substantially their stop and search activity, with some areas having an increase of 400%. This in turn prompted the SPA to launch a scrutiny review on the practice, which recommended that the PSS must ensure a balancing act between search powers and the rights of individuals (Fyfe, 2014: 11). Trying to find a balancing act between reactive policing and community engagement was discussed by a representative of the third sector in Burnside;

“I think there are likely to be a number of national policing initiatives which will then show up in many localities. So if I could take as an example of that - Strathclyde Police had for a number of years quite a proactive strategy around stop and search. […] we probably see an increase of that stop and search strategy now being rolled out across Scotland. Now that obviously has implications on a localism agenda because if you’ve got a national strategy which is around stop and search and maybe quite proactive, while at the same time you’re trying to develop a localism community engagement strategy, then those don’t always match easily with one another […]” (B010) - Chair of Third Sector Forum/SCPP – Burnside.

Although there has been a renewed scrutiny on the role of stop and search activity it has none the less still been rolled out across Scotland, and as you can see from table 7 below, only a small percentage of the searches were consensual. The positive searches were in the main related to drugs or alcohol and a total of 226 weapons were found, and only one non-positive search was related to terrorism (Police Scotland, 2016);

**Table 7: Stop and Search Quarterly report April-Sept. 2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Statutory</th>
<th>Consensual</th>
<th>Positive Search</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avonside</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burnside</td>
<td>7503</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>1822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartside</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force total</td>
<td>20665</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>6708</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Police Scotland (2016)
In terms of community engagement this could have a negative impact on local communities as one participant from Burnside stressed;

“[… they can have something like one in five of the people they stop are carrying an offensive weapon. Now I have said or would say back to that, that means that four out of five aren’t and you wouldn’t get elected on being 20% right. So we should be able to be more intelligent” (B010) - Chair of Third Sector Forum/SCPP – Burnside.

The re-structure of PSS was also thought to affect some communities more than others, for example, plans to restructure policing in Avon Isle caused a lot of upset within the local community. One major cause for concern was the removal of the senior Police Inspector post from the island. Policing was to be dealt with remotely from the mainland. This annoyed most of the islanders who thought they were being treated unfairly in terms of a) they would be losing a valuable colleague/neighbour, and b) a senior Police officer to deal with any major incidents.

This issue was discussed at a packed Area CPP meeting on the 3rd of December 2013, whereupon the Police officer in attendance tried to assure the islanders that they would be perfectly able to direct policing from the mainland. This angered more than a few local Community Councillors at the meeting, who thought that the Police were trying to change their borders without informing or consulting locally, one Community Councillor declared that this sounded like the issue was already a ‘fait accompli – despite consultation’ (Avon Isle Area CPP meeting, 2013).

They argued that the Police were failing to take into account the stretch of water or boats being cut off if they had an incident (the island is 30 minutes from the mainland by ferry); particularly if the weather was bad, which highlights the difficulties of commanding an emergency remotely (Avon Isle Area CPP meeting, 2013).

However, the Police spokesperson said they had a Police Officer trained in response, and they were confident that they could deal with emergencies and remote control; further adding that this was not about one man – it was about the whole structure. Nonetheless, it was felt by the community that a desk sergeant was not a suitable replacement for an experienced Police Inspector (Avon Isle Area CPP meeting, 2013). Furthermore, Police
Scotland admits in their Local Policing Plan for the area that incidents happening in remote areas and islands, which are only ‘accessible during the day in good weather present unique policing challenges’ (Police Scotland, 2013a: 14). This was discussed by the former Police officer in Avonside, who had previously worked on the island;

“It’s a busy, busy island, and although it doesn’t appear to be on thousands of calls, they are busy - the officers there - and they do need leadership, and the sergeants need leadership as well, and they’re not going to get that from somebody that stays in Ridgeway (on the mainland), and that’s from personal experience [...]” (A015) - Licensing Standards Officer – Avonside.

An elected Councillor in Cartside who at first praised the new structure on the grounds that is was questionable as to just how effective the old Board structure actually was, nonetheless also criticised a lack of consultation between the Police and the Council over actions taken on Public Counters in particular;

“[...] when Police Scotland took the decision to review the Public Counters I don’t think there was enough advance consultation on that with elected members, and indeed when they’re talking about withdrawing Wardens in terms of parking [...] there wasn’t enough consultation regarding that and that is to be regretted [...]” (C014) - Councillor – Community Planning and Regeneration Committee – Cartside.

It is clear that there are a few teething problems in terms of the new structures, which could result in some increased tension between the national and local governance of community safety, both in terms of accountability and a perceived loss of localism, which was more apparent in Avonside and Cartside. However, one elected Councillor in Burnside thought communities would now have more of a chance to discuss Local Police Plans;

“Under the old structure where we had Area Committees we didn’t see the local plans so this is new that they are going to have these Local Police Plans and discussed at that level, and I think that’s really positive, because it does bring community voices in more to sit round the table, to be discussing those things. They did previously do questionnaires to ask the public and they still do that, but there wasn’t really a forum
for discussion about the outcomes before they were finalised, so I think that is really positive” (B004) - Councillor – Safe Group/CSB Chair – Burnside.

Nonetheless, bringing community voices round a table to discuss things will only be pertinent if they are actually heard and their concerns are duly noted and acted on in Local Police Plans. One other area of concern was highlighted in Burnside in relation to tensions that may occur between national and local agendas, not so much around a disagreement of priorities, but more to do with a national policing agenda failing to engage with localities, which does further add fuel to the fire around a loss of localism;

“One of the things that I’ve noticed that has kind of happened is that some officers I think have been moved to a Police Scotland perspective and what we’re getting is there’s a bit of a... how would you put it, there’s a bit of a kind of gap in partnership working between what’s happening at a national level and what’s happening at a local level, and the impact of that can be quite significant [...] So for example the ‘No Knives Better Lives’ campaign, they were doing street stencilling which we’ve a zero tolerance for in Burnside, but it’s almost like there’s a national agenda now and that’s not filtering down to a local level” (B020) - Chair of City Centre Alcohol Action Group – Burnside.

Prioritising national agendas ahead of local ones could lead to a perception that there is less local accountability, less local input, which could have consequences in terms of an erosion of trust between communities and local partnerships. The PSS may argue that this is not the case. However, this last section will examine some areas of concern with regard to community accountability in the governance of community safety.

6.4 Community Accountability

Pollock and Sharp (2012: 3063), point out that there has been a desire from central government throughout the UK to ‘revive civic society’ by putting power and control in the hands of communities. In Westminster in 2008 there was the launch of ‘Communities in control: real people, real power’, followed in 2009 by the Scottish Government when they launched their action plan on ‘community empowerment’. These initiatives grew from deep concerns regarding citizen apathy and the belief that including communities in
decision-making would have a real impact on society; hence the push towards active citizenship especially within the confines of community planning, crime and disorder or Community Safety Partnerships.

However, despite the political rhetoric there has been widespread criticism directed towards the extent of any real community engagement. In Scotland, for example, one of the key findings of the Christie Commission was that there is a need to put ‘communities at the heart of community planning and public service reform’ (Audit Scotland, 2013a: 19), this was aimed towards CPPs in particular. Not only were services to be redesigned around the needs of citizens, but they were also to involve local communities and their elected representatives, and above all be democratically accountable to the people of Scotland (S.G., 2011b: 81). Christie was not advocating for a new direction within community planning, rather he was identifying that one of the key aims from the original statutory guidance for CPPs was not being met, for example, ensuring people and communities are genuinely engaged around decisions on public services, which may have a direct effect on them (Scottish Executive, 2004: 1).

6.4.1 Community engagement/consultation

Davidson and Elstub (2014) writing on deliberative and participatory democracy in the UK have argued that people are becoming disillusioned and disenfranchised by the prevailing political institutions and decision making practices; this has been evidenced by the marked decline in voter turnout and trust in politicians in general (ibid). If Politicians are to regain the trust of local communities then there would have to be a real effort to encourage citizens to engage more in political decision making. For this to happen, it has been implied that power has to be decentralised from the top levels of government down to the Local Authority/community level, at which point individuals may be able to influence issues which affect their local community (Patsias et al., 2013).

It could be argued that within the concept of participatory democracy there are varying degrees or levels of community engagement within local governance structures. Many policy documents post Christie refer to the importance of engagement, but are quite ambiguous in terms of its implementation. For example the Scottish Government Statement of Ambition stresses the value of solid foundations for CPPs based on
understanding their communities by being able to “provide genuine opportunities to consult, engage and involve them” (Scottish Government, 2012d), however, it does not comment on the extent or level of engagement this should entail. The same could be said for the Audit Scotland report ‘Responding to Challenges and Change – An overview of Local Government in Scotland’ (Audit Scotland, 2013c). However, while it does not go so far as to suggest how CPPs should engage, it does assert that there is a variability in the effectiveness of community engagement whereupon there is a failure to link up engagement activity and consultation with decision making in order to improve services (Audit Scotland, 2013c: 10).

This was evident within some of the case study sites when key stakeholders were asked about the levels of community engagement within CSPs. The concept of engagement took on various forms ranging from direct engagement to it being indirectly facilitated through various actors/groups or agencies, as this participant from Avonside explained;

“So for example, Avonside Police they carry out community surveys, they attend local Tenants’ and Residents’ Groups in relation to local neighbourhood issues, so that’s intelligence and information that they will feed into the community safety planning process. Housing Associations obviously through their work with Tenants’ and Residents’ Groups and their own service delivery will feed in their knowledge and information, so it’s based upon community engagement, but in some ways is maybe indirect [...]” (A001 - 1st) - Community Safety Co-ordinator – Avonside.

Key community safety issues were incorporated within the Avonside SOA, which were adjudged to have been selected through a ‘bottom up’ process (A001 - 1st). However, in terms of engagement ‘bottom up’ can be quite an ambiguous term. For example, it could imply that there is direct engagement with the community or it could be through various street level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980). When asked if it was bottom up in terms of a community group being involved with the CSP it was stated that various partners provided data and added information from their own individual perspectives and that information was then analysed. However, they also took into account engagement via the local Area Community Planning Groups (through which it was thought led to a strong decentralised community focus on services) and by individual services with groups such as Tenants’ and Residents’ Association’s in Community Councils and so on. Community
engagement in this sense is basically being filtered through third party organisations or the public/private sector, as the previous participant states;

“[...] engagement isn’t necessarily the CSP as an entity directly engaging, but it’s fed into - rather than replicating engagement that takes place already in different shapes and forms” (A001 - 1st) - Community Safety Co-ordinator – Avonside.

The CPP Partnership Manager in Cartside stated that community consultative groups engaged with communities at the early level of the CPP; because they needed to engage strategically. This took place through Area Community Planning Forums; which are made up of representatives from Community Councils, Regeneration Groups, Development Trusts and other local groups. Community engagement did not seem to take place through these forums in a structured or consistent fashion, for example, it was stated;

“We would use them if we want to talk to our communities, we would use then as a stepping off point if you like [...] i.e. If we wanted to go and talk to them about the new SOA, we would request through the local group whether or not they want to hear it basically. And that very often is a jumping off point” (C001 - 1st) - Community Planning Partnership Manager – Cartside.

When asked how they specifically consult around community safety it was stated “What we do around community safety is pretty much reactive actually” (C001 - 1st). In other words if a local community wanted to find out what was happening in terms of alcohol and drugs in their local area, then a member of the Alcohol and Drug Partnership would go out to speak to them;

“I think it does need to be a little much more proactive and that’s very much where we see our implementation of the next SOA, is much more about where we’ve got to this point, we think these are areas of activity we need to get better at, how can we work together to improve those [...]” (C001 - 1st) - Community Planning Partnership Manager – Cartside.

Community engagement in Avonside and Cartside (with respect to community safety) was arguably based more on the occasional consultative level, as opposed to a more fully
devolved form of participatory democracy/active citizenship. One criticism levelled at this type of engagement views it as merely ‘tokenistic’ in gesture (Arnstein, 1969; Ercan and Hendriks, 2013). In Burnside, as previously reported, organisational reform within the community planning process had attempted to improve community engagement insofar as local communities (at least in terms of representation from Community Councils) were not only being heard, but that they also had a voice and a vote on local planning decisions;

“I think if it beds in and you get that engagement, in other words people can see that what they say locally does happen [...] you can change the way services are by the way Police are in there, or Fire and Rescue whatever, because you've got them round that table” (B006) - Councillor – Chair Safe Group/Chair VAW – Burnside.

Having discussions round a table may improve communication between different actors/organisations and local community representatives, but it does not necessarily mean that those organisations will change their strategic objectives. For instance, in Burnside Community Council representatives have voting rights on Area Partnerships and sectoral CPPs (but not at the strategic level). However having a voice and a vote and being able to exercise that privilege is very much dependant on the capabilities (or social capital) of each individual, particularly if the vote is not always left open to deliberation;

“The last meeting the non-Council reps didn’t have a lot to say, and I think they need to sort of find their voice as well, cause (sic) they’ve got an equal say and they’ve got a vote” (B011) - Councillor – Chair of NWCPP – Burnside.

“I've only been involved in two occasions so far where we've went to a vote [...] but they’ve made it quite clear that... if we’re going to have votes on issues that are extremely small all the time we’re going to be there all day and all night, so a lot of it will be literally put through on round the table nod [...]” (B013) - Community Councillor Burnwood CC – Burnside.

It is clear that Community Councillors have a voice in Burnside (to an extent), however it can also potentially be shaped by knowledgeable others;
“We are all instructed basically to avoid a vote at all costs, because we’ll need to go ahead on the basis of consensus [...] so what we do is we try and get agreement of a way forward is probably the best way to describe it” (B011) - Councillor – Chair of NWCPP – Burnside.

Pollock and Sharp (2012:3066) comment on how the institutional mechanisms in which communities are engaged and empowered in the first place, often act as a mode of subjection, in that they ‘encourage alignment with institutional and government objectives’ (ibid: 3066). If community representatives within Burnside CPP framework truly mean to affect change and become active citizens then they will need to develop a stronger voice at partnership meetings in order to ensure active participation within the decision making process. Nonetheless, they did appear to have more of a voice within the community planning process in Burnside compared to Avonside and Cartside, who did not (at the time of the interviews) have a vote at any level of the community planning process. In the Cartside CSP there did not appear to be any representatives from the community, and the Area Commander for the Police in Cartside (who also chairs the CSP) confirmed that currently no Community Council were represented on the CSP, but added;

“For the Partnership Group of the new CPP there's going to be ten community representative groups and five elected members. So the elected members essentially are the Chairs of the Community Councils in the main, and if that's not the case then the community partners themselves will, so essentially the Community Councils will be represented on the groups that report to the Community Planning Partnership” (C011)
- Area Commander Police – Cartside.

There may well be an increase in community participation (to the extent that they are represented by a select few) within CPPs in Cartside, however, it remains to be seen if this will actualise as genuine participation to the point that they can affect the decision making process. However, allowing citizens to attend and take part in partnership meetings is one thing, but actually achieving that could be another, for example, you cannot force citizens to turn up and actively take part in formal discussions. Van Steden et al., (2011) found in their study in Amsterdam that active citizenship is difficult to achieve, for example, it may be unrealistic to establish informal crime prevention
mechanisms in urban areas due to the fact that “strong homogenous groups of people have never existed” (van Steden et al., 2011: 436).

This statement finds some foothold within some of the case study areas in terms of a perceived apathy by certain sections of the community to actively engage with agencies or Community Councils about matters that may concern them. At an Area Partnership meeting in Burnside it was noted that there was no members of the public present to observe what was happening (Area Partnership meeting 30/5/13). A Chief Inspector of Burnside Police later stated;

“that's replicated all over the areas in Scotland that I've worked in [...] we'd have our quarterly local Area Partnership meeting, where it would be the full Council representation of elected reps (sic) for five wards and very seldom did we ever even get the local newspaper turning up and no members of the public” (B003) – Police Chief Inspector – Safe Group – Burnside.

In instances like this more importance may be placed on the views of street level bureaucrats (front line workers) who in their capacity to engage with hard to reach groups may possess first-hand knowledge of local community need when there is no obvious representation from local communities (Lipsky, 1980; Durose, 2011). This is thought to be particularly difficult in areas where there are mixed communities within a mixed economy of Council houses, homeowners and private lets. It was suggested that in the past when Housing schemes were predominantly Council owned there was a sort of unity of purpose compared with today – stronger bonding social capital (Putnam, 2000), whereas now, if there is a unity of purpose it is usually single issue based.

Van Steden refers to studies in the UK and the USA that have shown that active participation is more likely to take place in neighbourhoods that are defined as middle class with low crime rates and strong community networks. This means that paradoxically active citizenship flourishes in privileged low crime communities compared to high crime under-privileged communities who arguably need it the most. This was also noted by Patsias et al., (2013) in their study on participatory democracy in Montreal. Consequently, middle class communities and residents generally have a greater capacity to connect with
formal institutions and thus are able to ‘exploit wider resources of power’ – ‘bridging’ social capital (van Steden et al., 2011: 436).

In Avon Isle consultation or direct engagement often meant the same thing for some agencies. There were ‘events’ organised twice a year in the local Pavilion, with various agencies taking part; they basically set up stalls and waited for the community to come and engage with them, which was then reported as a form of community consultation. Engagement was also thought to occur when draft community plans or the draft SOA went out for public consultation. However, this could quite often be described as tokenistic in gesture (Arnstein, 1969) as it is arguable that the strategies have already been decided. Furthermore, it is often reliant on the wider community being able to access consultation documents online;

“I know there are some people that haven’t even got access to online to view, and that kind of thing. But, there probably is, but I can’t remember, hard copies in some of the libraries, or available at your Council office. But that’s just for the big ones the SOA and what have you” (A003) - Group Commander Fire Service – Avonside.

Consultation in this sense is left in the hands of the public, or in the hands of Community Councils; a recognised mechanism in terms of accountability within local governance structures. Their views must accurately represent the views of their local community, and accordingly they must try to represent and secure the involvement of all sectors of the community (Scottish Government, 2009b). However, this leaves open to question the effectiveness of Community Councils – for example, how well attended are they? How well organised are they? And how is the wider community they represent consulted in general? For instance, does the wider community realise that a Community Council exists within their neighbourhood, and if they did, how is this form of consultation viewed? For instance, some consultation events have been referred to as little more than ‘tick the box’ exercises by some participants. One participant in Cartside described (in great consternation) how a civil servant came from Edinburgh to speak about ‘community empowerment’ but then informed them that they only had one month for the consultation exercise;
“Once again you're here on a box-ticking exercise, it's all done and dusted'. I said, 'My Community Council is meeting right now, and we will not meet again for another month, this is holiday time, I couldn't possibly call a special meeting between now and then' and I heartily got a clap for saying what I said. A lot of the stuff is box-ticking exercises to say (bangs table), we've said it to them [...]” (C012) - Cartside Licensing Forum – Cartside.

Levels of consultation will vary between different agencies and actors ranging from local events to online self-participatory surveys as a form of wider community engagement. However, this means that some hard to reach communities or communities in general largely fail to take part, either through a lack of knowledge of the process, or through a lack of capacity to engage in the first place. There is also the added problem of how representative are Community Councils as some participants in the case study areas pointed out;

”[...] the bigger question is - are Community Councils the most representative around? - They ought to be, but they aren't always” (B004) - Councillor – Safe Group/CSB Chair – Burnside.

6.4.2 Active Citizenship

Carr (2012: 398) argues that community action is essential for improving civility and for strengthening control, and writes about the benefits of collective efficacy in two US cities, which he describes as the linkage of ‘trust and cohesion’ to mutual prospects for control. However, he argues that there has been no real attempt to analyse the different levels of action or how much agency an individual has within a community in terms of negotiating order, or how or when it varies. He views negotiated order as a mixture of aims and inputs, whereby individuals residing in communities, have a say on defining what order is, and actively try to achieve these aims. Order in this sense is negotiated because there is a clear attempt by citizens to campaign for safety and act together with institutions and other individuals to create it. However, not all citizens have the same input in negotiating order. Carr (2012) refers to four ideal types; citizen partner, citizen associate, citizen bystander and citizen opponent. The first two possibly resonate with the descriptions of some active participants within the case study areas;
“I think what historically has happened with Community Council’s is, without being disrespectful, it’s a typical member of the community that comes forward, so it tends to be people either who have had an issue or maybe have a community development background, or something like that, so they’re used to kind of raising issues about the community, but there’ll be members of the community that’ll go nowhere near a Community Council and it would be interesting to hear their opinion [...]” (C009) - Lead Officer for Cartside ADP.

This was possibly the case in Avon Isle, where one respondent from the Avon Isle Elderly Forum (white, middle class) was the only consistent representative on the local Community Safety Forum. Furthermore, they had been asked to join the Forum by the local Councillor and then asked to sit on the local Alcohol and Drug Partnership (ADP) despite the fact that they had little knowledge around drug and alcohol issues. The respondent commented on being on both partnerships;

“Personally I get more out of the Safety Forum meetings - the ADP the Councillor asked me to take that and he asked me to come along - I did say to him that’s it’s not my - you know - I’ve no...but the more you get into it you realise you could be helping people with your input, because I could be the actual member that lets them know the things that are going on in the town” (A011) - Community Representative - Avon Isle Forum for Older Voices.

This resonates with Carr’s (2012: 408) description of a citizen associate in that this community representative was in the position to pass on their subjective local knowledge as an objective assessment of a local community; “to be the eyes and ears of the police” (ibid: 408). This raises questions about how organisations such as the Police view the representativeness of the wider community in general. Harkin (2015) in his study on public consultation forums in Edinburgh found that there were concerns that the Police viewed Forums (sometimes with as little as three community members in attendance) as a ‘proxy for the wider community’ (ibid: 736). Van Steden comments that some active local residents are drawn into the culture of the Criminal Justice System in order to contribute to the control of individual behaviour. This often benefits the Police and other
agencies (information/intelligence), but can lead to what is described as a “Big Brother society colonised by spies and snitches” (van Steden, 2011: 437).

Burnwood Community Council (CC) in Burnside was one of the Councils on the Burnpark/town centre Area Partnership; representing a largely middle class area in the city centre (the other being Burnpark). Their representative (a local business person) also represented the other Community Councils in the sectoral CPP, and in the Community Council Liaison Group; which worked with the democratic services on Burnside City Council. Burnwood CC was proactively involved with the Local Authority and the Police regarding licensing applications for pubs, restaurants and fast food outlets, and also provided local intelligence on crime and criminality. Crime was associated with low level drug dealing as the area is dominated by upmarket cafe/bars and restaurants; therefore cocaine was the drug of choice amongst some city revellers. Begging was regarded as a major issue either from ‘junkies’ or ‘organised’ Romanian beggars;

“[…], but Romanians in particular, we can feed that back into say ‘look, this is the vehicle they drive, this is how they arrive at the city, you know, they rotate the beggars every week […] so we can feed that back into them’ (B013) - Community Councillor Burnwood CC – Burnside.

Burnwood CC’s participant according to Carr’s (2012: 408) assessment would more likely be described as a citizen partner in view of the fact that they not only report back on crime, but actively take part in solving local problems within their area. In contrast to Burnwood – Burnpark CC lies on the outskirts of the city in an area which could be described as socially disorganised as it consists mainly of part Council/part private let flats within a working class or for some a deprived working class area. This Community Council was started by the Chair (and her husband who represents the CC on the Area Partnership); because they had an issue with a derelict site opposite them. Since then they have been content to deal with local concerns where and when they arise – if at all, however, they seemed quite put out by the new governance arrangements, which they felt was imposing more on their time, compared to when they first started;

“we got together with people, like minded that wanted to sort of kind of get in, and at that point it was going to be for our wee comfort zone, but gradually you get more and
more people imposing on your time [...]’ (B016) - Community Councillor – Chair of Burnpark CC – Burnside.

This was in reference to planners asking to come along to meetings to give presentations and the amount of extra work this entailed via the Area Partnership. Under the old Area Committees they did not have much input, but now under the new structure they were expected to take more responsibility and have a more active role, which these elderly respondents found particularly off putting;

“That’s the paperwork he took to his last meeting, now he’s got to sit and go through all that before he actually goes to a meeting. To us that’s never been involved in all of these [...] I mean I know it impacts on the area, but to me it’s setting up committees, and people’s voluntary time, and the other people are getting paid thousands of pounds to do all these jobs” (B016) - Community Councillor – Chair of Burnpark CC – Burnside.

Burnpark CC appeared to be weaker compared to Burnwood CC in terms of capacity, commitment, and connections to the local community, and they did not have a set process of contacting the community (unlike Burnwood who have their own website and facebook pages), it seemed to occur on an ad hoc basis – “in the local dairy” (B017) as it was half-jokingly suggested. Burnpark CC participants could be described as citizen associates’ (Carr, 2012), however, they could also be described as citizen bystanders’ in that they accept the role of the Police in producing law and order and only provide information when asked. On the face of it, they have less bridging social capital than Burnwood CC both in terms of capacity, commitment and connections to other organisations (Putnam, 2000). Putnam asserts that the “touchstone of social capital is the principal of generalised reciprocity” (ibid: 2000: 134) and an effectual type of generalised reciprocity is strengthened by solid networks of social exchange, for example, co-workers, friends within a tight knit community. However, there is a difference between meeting and trusting someone in the local ‘dairy’ because you've been acquainted for years, and trusting someone you meet on a casual basis (in partnerships). Trust that is embedded in strong social ties and wider networks is referred to as thick trust, whereas, thin trust in the generalised other (a casual acquaintance) also requires some form of shared network and notions of reciprocity, but, thin trust is judged to be more valuable insofar as it
expands our notions of trust beyond the list of people we know personally (Putnam, 2000: 136). Therefore, Burnwood CC’s extensive social networks arguably built on thin trust are more effective compared to Burnpark CC’s dense networks of thick trust in securing more resources for their local community.

**6.4.3 The Usual Suspects**

A key criticism levelled at community organisations, such as Community Councils, Residents’ Associations, Community Partnerships etc., is that it attracts the usual suspects (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2006), typified either by their backgrounds in community development, or social class (van Steden, 2011; Patsias, 2013), and age. This resonates within the case study areas wherein all of the community representatives interviewed (or observed at partnership meetings) have been between the ages of 50 to 75 years old, all of them were white, and most of them were middle class. In terms of representation Community Councils are supposed to make efforts to encourage under–represented groups, including young people to either participate or attend (minimum age to be a Councillor is 16 years). However, in reality this was not the case within the case study areas;

“age wise they tend to be all retired, our secretary he's young - he's in his thirties, there are one or two there that are maybe late fifties early sixties [...] we don't have a teenager or even anyone in their twenties” (A012) - Community Councillor – Avon Isle Community Council.

Other hard to reach groups (homeless) would also not qualify as Community Councillors as you must have residency within the area you represent and be named on the electoral register (Scottish Government, 2009b). In terms of engagement young people and other minority groups often feel that they are talked at rather than talked to, and community safety initiatives are not often planned with input from these marginalised groups, who are quite often the targets of initiatives. According to Carr (2012: 408) they can be described as citizen opponents’ – defined as generally alienated from the accepted norms of law and order, this smallest group potentially has a top-heavy effect on criminal justice policy and on negotiated order. Consequently, according to van Steden (2011: 437) the quest for community safety is in danger of doing more harm than good in terms of
exacerbating conflict through enforcement rather than looking for solutions amongst all members of a community (van Steden, 2011: 437).

Participation is also inhibited by local government legislation, for example, to take part in Community Councils or Area Partnerships – you must be registered on the electoral roll. This rules out a lot of people who either have never voted or are not registered because of past debts incurred during the poll tax years. The Scottish Government has stated that it plans to bring in legislation banning Councils from using the electoral roll to chase historical debts (Carrell et al., 2014). Burnside Council have written off arrears or have a five-year cap on pursuing debtors, whereas other Scottish Councils have recovered £400,000 in unpaid poll tax arrears. Carrell et al., (2014) writing for the Guardian said a majority of the Councils plan to use the updated electoral roll to chase other debts in an effort to offset some of the cuts to Council budgets enforced on them through austerity measures. Bureaucracy and a lack of capacity may be another factor inhibiting local residents from taking part in participatory democracy;

"With the Burnpark City Partnership and with the Northwest Sector Partnership they’re making the representatives put forward a register of interest. I’ve no problem with that and my colleagues they’ve no problem with it, however, if you’re a wee family living in social housing [...] and somebody says to you that you have to fill out a register of interest, the first thing they’re going to say is ‘what?’ and you say ‘well you have to tell us if you’ve got any directorships or shareholdings or if you’ve got any conflicts, do you work in any businesses that’s got a conflict?’ You’ve then lost those people completely, you’ve just lost them, they’re gone and they’ll just tear up anything you’ve got and throw it away” (B013) - Community Councillor Burnwood CC – Burnside.

It is clear there are a number of issues which may deter community participation in local democratic processes ranging from the exclusion of youth (owing more to a lack of active engagement rather than deliberate omission), to institutional mechanisms that may act as a mode of deterrence (register of interests) to participatory democracy (Pollock and Sharp, 2012). In turn this may lead to more active reliance on Carr’s (2012) citizen partners’ and citizen associates’ – more reliance on the usual suspects (Lowndes and
Sullivan, 2006) in negotiated order; rather than active engagement with all members of the local community.

6.5 Conclusion

Within the governance of community safety a number of issues have emerged, which may ultimately impact on local service delivery and community accountability. Due to fiscal austerity measures a number of governance changes have been put in place (influenced by the Christie Commission), which has instituted a reform, not only of, Local Authority Community Planning Partnerships (CPP’s), but also the centralisation of eight regional services (Police and Fire) into two separate national entities. There are concerns that the Scottish Government’s intensive centralisation agenda (focused on national outcomes and objectives) may impact on localism; especially with respect to policing (Scott, 2012; 2013; Fyfe, 2014). Furthermore, regulatory policy levers such as the National Performance Framework and the Single Outcome Agreement call for local CPP’s to pay cognizance to the Scottish Government’s overall vision and strategic objectives (Cairney et al., 2015; Cairney, 2015b); they do however state that Local Authorities have the discretion to determine how to achieve them within a localised setting (Cairney et al., 2015). However, achieving this balance is arguably difficult when attention is focused on an ‘ethos of doing more with less’ (Scottish Government, 2010:2), which may ultimately force a hard pressed public sector to focus not only on quantifiable measures (or initiatives) in line with the national agenda, but also have an impact on the types of services available to local communities.

Accountability is therefore a complex issue within the governance of community safety, and consequently questions were asked around themes (based on responsibility/accountability, and benefits to communities) set within the bespoke framework influenced by Hudson and Hardy’s (2002: 51) ‘partnership assessment’ tool. This in turn allowed the researcher to ask the case study participants about the overall responsibilisation process, which in turn may help to address some of the research aims with respect to how the reform process in general impacts on local accountability. Further issues were examined around consultation practices, perceptions on localism (post reform), and the impact of community safety strategies on local communities.
Consequently, a number of issues arose within the domain of community safety, with respect to problems around blurred lines of accountability with respect to Third Sector Organisations (TSO’s), Third Party Policing, Police Reform, and Community Accountability, which will be commented on in turn.

6.5.1 Third Sector Organisations

TSOs can make a significant contribution to the lives of the most vulnerable people within our communities, however, the ‘continuing move from small, no-strings-attached grants to large contracts and service level agreements’ (SCVO, 2014), may create tensions around the financial accountability of TSOs in relation to reliance on one donor (in this case the public sector). This in turn could lead to donor dependency; which could arguably result in less accountability to local communities if organisations align themselves to a dominant policy position (in order to obtain funds) rather than advocating on behalf of wider societal interests (Sgueo, 2015: 11). Agencies are obliged to pay cognizance to what is required of them as an organisation, however, within complex governance arrangements they are often in partnership with a broad range of state and non-state actors who also have their own internal and external regulatory frameworks in place (Fenwick et al., 2012), which may impact on the core aims of smaller agencies to the point that they may feel obliged to change their own organisational goals/organisational form (Carmel and Harlock, 2008).

This was evident to some extent within some of the TSO’s in Burnside in particular, who had been informed that, not only, would they have to change their work practices in order to secure Local Authority funding, but they would also have to align themselves to the Council’s ‘arms-length’ external organisation (ALEO) ‘Burnside Life’. In this case tensions may also emerge with respect to perceptions of asymmetrical power relations (McCall and Rummery, 2017), and ‘enforced co-operation’ (Grix and Phillpotts, 2012:12) as opposed to equality in partnership working. There are also issues with respect to ALEO’s being potentially one step removed from Council control (apse, 2011); as could be the case for Community Safety Burnside – are they accountable to the Council, the Police, their Board, or other private interests?
There were also concerns expressed in Avonside and Cartside with respect to the difficulties smaller TSO’s have in keeping pace with larger organisations in order to secure funding in the first place. For example, Rape Crisis received far less funding than Women’s Aid from the Scottish Government, and had to adapt their services and utilise scarce resources in order to access other funding streams, which could have an impact on the type and number of services available to local communities. According to the SCVO policy manager; charities will have to adapt or ‘think outside the box’ in order to secure more funding sources as existing (and predicted future cuts) from the public sector are already having an impact on services (Burne, 2014). TSO’s on the whole may struggle within the domain of community safety based on perceptions of a lack of status. For example, in Avonside and Cartside Rape Crisis had problems around their youth programme – TESSA – with respect to dominant agencies such as the Police (in Avonside) and the Council (in Cartside) either duplicating their service, or trying to take it over due to its apparent success. This is further compounded by a lack of voice for the third sector on strategic decision making, which arguably goes against the principles of ‘community planning’. However, this may change in Burnside as the Third Sector Forum now has a seat at the strategic community planning level; nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether or not their voices will be heard.

Within the governance of community safety organisations (including the public sector) should be held accountable for the types of services available to the public. For the most part there is scrutiny around performance management, best value, but this does not always equate with good value in terms of what is available to local communities in terms of tailored services. What it may do however is create an ‘institutional and normative order’ on an otherwise distinctive terrain (Carmel and Harlock, 2008: 156). On the other hand, there is often a lack of scrutiny for some organisations – particularly those who do not buy into service level/single outcome agreements, such as religious organisations like the ‘Street Pastors’ who have internal accountability to their own organisational ethos, but lack accountability to Local Authorities and more crucially to local communities.

6.5.2 Third Party Policing

There are a number of issues around the concept of Third Party Policing - partnership between the Police as the first party and an external entity as the third party, whereby,
legal powers of the third party are used to control crime and disorder (Mazzerolle, 2014: 342). And a number of key aspects were highlighted including the ‘individualistic notion of responsibilisation’ (Garland, 1996; 2001), whereby, citizens’ rights are commensurate with their civic obligations (Gilling, 2007: 40). Although a number of third sector legal powers were utilised throughout the case study areas with respect to Licensing laws, the concept was predominantly associated with the Housing sector. In this case responsibilisation lies with Housing with respect to the extension of the governance of crime control over some forms of incivility by regulating the conduct of others (Flint and Nixon, 2006: 940). Rose (2000) referred to this as ‘ethopolitics’, whereby the moral standards of local communities are subjected to scrutiny in line with constructed norms of what is deemed acceptable behaviour. Foucault refers to the construction and targeting of particular populations to be governed as a “key aspect of governmentality” (cited in Flint, 2002: 620). Power for Foucault is not always expressed in an overtly negative form, in this sense it can be conceived as prohibitive rules and regulations, which nonetheless could also be viewed as productive in terms of the wider social network (Foucault, 1980), through the setting of ‘normative standards of behaviour’ (Flint, 2002: 620; Lukes, 1974; 2005). However, there is arguably a debate around what is an accepted norm with respect to the classification of antisocial behaviour. Flint (2002: 631) argues that there are limitations to the extent to which Housing Officers can advocate a responsibilisation ethos on social housing tenants. He cites one Housing Officer in his study, who questioned the ethics of demanding social housing tenants wash common stairs, when increasingly this is not required in owner-occupied properties (ibid: 631). However, non-compliance can often result in eviction in cases where prolonged bouts of ‘perceived’ antisocial behaviour are deemed to violate tenancy agreements (Flint, 2002).

All of the Housing agencies within the case study areas had used eviction as a legal lever in particular cases.

Housing Officers are increasingly expected to ‘police’ the behaviour of their tenants. This was particularly relevant in Burnside when a Community Improvement Partnership (CIP) was established by Housing, the Police, and the Fire service – in an effort to not only assess risk, but to arguably control tenant’s behaviour. This raises a number of issues with respect to blurred lines of accountability. For example, within the CIP agencies are trying to co-opt others to assess risk (Fire Service acting as a social worker; or Health agencies
assessing fire risk). Housing Officers now also operate as part of an informal intelligence service – passing on information to the Police (often based on hearsay evidence), which could lead to net-widening as more individuals are drawn into the Criminal Justice System. This could result in a lessening of bonding social capital within particular communities; brought about by a decline in social trust (Wallace and Pichler, 2007) and the social exclusion of the ‘other’ (Crawford, 1997; Gilling, 2007).

However, the single most fundamental accountability issue concerns who is ultimately held responsible for policing - the Police or those co-opted into policing functions. Ad hoc Police partnerships in this sense do not sit well with conventional notions of democratic governance. The institutional and legal apparatus set up to control and make accountable how the Police use their powers do not necessarily affect how other actors use them, especially if they are not state agencies (Mazerolle and Ransley, 2006: 185). For example, this is evident amongst private security firms employed to patrol Housing estates and/or other business premises. Similarly, in Britain the Access to Justice Act 1999 has devolved some policing powers to non-Police actors involved in amongst other things the transport of prisoners, immigration centres, and prison custody (Mazerolle and Ransley, 2006: 184). In this sense agencies that employ coercive policing tactics are not subjected to the same strict protocols and their actions lack accountability.

**6.5.3 Police Reform**

With the advent of the Police Reform Act It is clear that some tensions have emerged in the case study areas with respect to a loss of localism, consultation practices, and a perceived erosion of Local Authority accountability mechanisms. For example, Community safety was situated within CPPs in the form of CSPs and their associated thematic partnerships. The Police have been traditionally viewed as lead agencies within CSPs, however within the new national policing agenda, local Police Commanders have also to take into account national priorities, which had raised some concerns amongst a number of participants in the case study areas. In the past Local Police Authorities had the power to hold the Chief Constable and the (local) Force to account (with respect to budgetary demands/operational issues in general terms). However, Police Scotland was now answerable to the new Scottish Police Authority; who in turn is answerable to the Scottish Parliament, leading to perceptions of a loss of accountability to Local Authorities.
and local communities; and implications for political interference in policing (Scott, 2013). Terpstra and Fyfe (2015: 532) have pointed out how the ‘institutional infrastructure’ in place for the local governance of the Police is weak, it has in effect moved from governance to scrutiny and engagement.

A number of participants discussed the scrutiny arrangements with respect to Local Police Plans; one elected Councillor from Burnside thought they did have room for manoeuvre and discussed how they had asked the local Police Commander to change their local plan to incorporate more on ‘hate crime’ (B006). One other Councillor also reiterated that they could sit down and discuss what should be prioritised at the local level – they had input to a point, but added that “proper scrutiny is lacking from the current set up” (B015), and that ultimately the Police will finalise the document. Within the Reform Act local Councils are ‘invited to comment’ on Local Plans, however, this is potentially problematic, as it does not stipulate what will happen if they disagree (Scott, 2012; 2013; Fyfe, 2014). Furthermore, any requested changes to Local Police Plans can be vetoed by the Chief Constable – if it is thought to interfere with national priorities – removing further oversight from Local Authorities. There was evidence of Scrutiny arrangements being put in place throughout the case study areas; however, there appeared to be some confusion around exactly what this entailed (especially in Avon Isle), possibly related to a lack of guidance within the reform act (Terpstra and Fyfe, 2015).

Other issues emerged around national priorities superseding local ones – further reinforcing perceptions around the loss of localism. For example, this was most evident with respect to fears that Police Scotland may adopt a ‘one size fits all’ approach. However, they have tried to allay those fears by putting in place structures to produce not only Local Police Plans, but Multi-Member Ward Plans (MMWP) for all 353 wards in Scotland (Apex Scotland, 2013: 3); a point reiterated by one participant in Burnside. Nonetheless, Anderson et al., (2014: 6) point out that Local Authorities do appear to be weaker in terms of influence, and in some areas national and local priorities appear to be aligned. There is evidence of this in Table 6, which appears to show that on the face of it, MMWP are fairly similar to both the Local and the Annual Police Plan (based on national strategic priorities). There were other concerns expressed around an apparent gap between local and national priorities. For instance, with respect to the ‘No Knives Better Lives’ campaign in Burnside (B020), and the impact of increased ‘stop and search’
activities on local community engagement initiatives (B010). One participant in Avonside thought local policing was now based on the former Strathclyde policing model – a Strathclydification (Fyfe, 2014), which raised concerns on how this apparent ‘one size fits all’ approach would impact on island communities (particularly Avon Isle).

Participants in Avon Isle were also very vocal in expressing their annoyance towards the restructure of local policing at a packed Area CPP meeting (held in December 2013), with respect to the loss of the of the Senior Police Inspector post; with policing on the whole to be directed from the mainland – this they argued was decided without proper consultation. A lack of advance consultation was also commented on in Cartside with regard to the review of Public Counters and the possible withdrawal of Parking Wardens.

Within the Policing Principles (Reform Act) it is stated that partnership working is a key element of policing (Scott, 2012: 136; Apex Scotland, 2013: 9), it also underlines the importance of localism (Terpstra and Fyfe, 2015). However, if it is thought that consultation is little more than tokenism (Pollok and Sharp, 2012) insofar as citizens are heard, but lack the power or knowledge on Police reform (Fyfe, 2014) to ensure their views will be taken into consideration (Arnstein, 1969), then it may impact on trust – a key component required to build social capital, which is a key social policy aim with respect to encouraging citizens to be involved in local decision making (Head, 2007).

6.5.4 Community Accountability

The Christie Commissions desired more accountability within local governance structures, and argued that one of the key aims of CPPs were not being met - ensuring people and communities were genuinely engaged (Scottish Executive, 2004: 1). Davidson and Elstub (2014) argue that in order to regain trust and be accountable to local communities then politicians must make a real effort to engage with citizens. However, as previously highlighted policy documents can be quite ambiguous in terms of how engagement is implemented. For example, while they may advocate that opportunities should be provided to consult, engage or involve communities, they generally do not state the extent or level of engagement required.

Consequently, although there was an effort to engage with local communities within the case study areas - by both the public sector and other organisations, it was often
haphazard in the sense that reliance was placed on local communities to engage with them; rather than the other way round. Consultation when it happened could be interpreted, and was interpreted by some participants as ‘tokenistic’ in gesture (Arnstein, 1969; Ercan and Hendriks, 2013); ‘a tick the box exercise’. For instance, engagement events in Avon Isle generally took place twice a year in the local Pavilion – in essence they waited for the community to come to them. Or as one participant pointed out the community could access documents online – provided of course they have the capacity, or the resources (social capital) to do so (A003). This was also the case in Cartside where engagement (if it took place at all) was through Area Community Planning Forums – provided local communities declared they wished to know more about particular policy decision making processes. One participant in Cartside reinforced a belief that consultation was tokenistic in gesture, when he described how Community Councils were asked at short notice (within a month) to consult their local communities on the concept of community empowerment – during a holiday period, which they declared was just not possible stressing “[...] a lot of the stuff is box-ticking exercises to say (bangs table) – we’ve said it to them [...]” (C012).

Interviews had taken place during a period of structural reform within all of the case study areas; therefore, how communities are engaged in the future may change. However, community engagement as a priority seemed less visible in Avonside and Cartside, compared to Burnside, who had put in place new governance structures designed to include local communities within a more participatory decision making process. However, this was arguably through the direction of knowing others, set within institutional mechanisms whereby communities are encouraged to vote a certain way (Pollock and Sharp, 2012). For instance, in Burnside, Community Councils now had a vote on Area Partnerships, and on sectoral CPP’s (but not at the strategic level of decision making), but one Community Councillor pointed out how it was made quite clear by knowledgeable others that deliberation took too long, and therefore voting “[...] will literally be put through on round the table nod” (B013). This highlights how community representatives perhaps lack the capacity (social capital) to actively participate within local governance structures. Pollok and Sharp (2012: 3066) comment on how ‘institutional mechanisms’ in which communities are engaged in the first place often act
as a mode of subjection, in that they encourage ‘alignment with institutional and government objectives’ (Ibid: 3066).

One other cause for concern was how representative were Community Councils in general. Community groups for the most part were peopled by the ‘usual suspects’ – white, middle aged/elderly, middle class (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2006). Therefore, they often precluded those who would have a vested interest in community safety initiatives (homeless, ethnic minorities, targeted young people etc.), who either did not know about the structures; were not interested according to some; or were precluded through legislative means (election roll, register of interest). This means that community consultation/representation is often contingent on the viewpoints of those select few who often have a desire to take part in local governance, or as van Steden (2011) argued those active local residents who have a desire to control the behaviour of others. This was arguably the case for one participant in Avon Isle who sat on two partnerships, and expressed how they could “be the actual member that lets them know (the Police) the things that are going on in the town” (A011). Harkin (2015) highlighted how Community Forums (often with as little as three in attendance) were often viewed by the Police in particular as a ‘proxy for the wider community’ (ibid: 736), and this appeared to be the case within the case study areas.

A disparity also appeared to exist between local community participants with respect to capacity (social capital) to engage in local governance (in Burnside in particular). For instance, in deprived areas often with diverse ethnic communities, and a mix of private lets, social housing, and home ownership, it is perhaps more difficult to establish strong bonding social capital (Putnam, 2000) with homogenous groups of people, who may share the same aims with respect to community safety (van Steden et al., 2011). This appeared to be the case in Burnpark. Community Council participants in this area appeared to lack the knowledge and capacity to engage effectively on behalf of their local communities. Two participants (husband and wife) railed at the amount of policy documents they were expected to read and more importantly understand; claiming people in the Council got paid thousands for this, and they were expected to do it for nothing. There was a sense that these Community Council members were not only lacking in capacity, but also bridging social capital (Putnam, 2000), insofar as they did not have sufficient contacts, resources, or technological prowess to aid them in their endeavours.
In this case more importance was perhaps placed on the viewpoints of those street level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980) in attendance (Police, elected Councillors etc.) who may claim to speak for hard to reach groups (Durose, 2011). This was in contrast to the Burnwood community participant (a local businessman) who represented a middle class area populated in the main by a professional class. This participant not only had the cultural capital (skills and knowledge) to advance his community needs (online forums/websites etc.), but crucially more bridging social capital (Putnam, 2000); links to other organisations/agencies to ensure their voices are heard. In other words privileged low crime communities often benefit the most from active citizenship compared to high crime neighbourhoods who arguably need it more (Patsias et al., 2013); those who possess more social capital have the capacity to exploit wider resources of power (van Steden et al., 2011: 436).

It is clear that the planned governance changes within the governance of community safety and the Reform Process in general have not met the stated aims of the Christie Commission – a desire for more accountability within local governance structures. This is most evident in perceptions of a loss of localism/local autonomy/consultation with respect to Police Reform throughout the case study areas. This is possibly exacerbated by the blurring of accountability within some partnerships – in particular the Community Improvement Partnership in Burnside, where actors take on policing/social work roles despite their lack of training to the contrary. However, more crucially, community trust could decline further if the reform process in general adopts tokenistic measures with respect to active community consultation/engagement (relying on the usual suspects); or in the case of policing adopts a ‘one size fits all’ philosophy that neglects to take into account the diverse nature of local communities, both with respect to geographical location, and community capacity to engage in the first place.
Chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusions

7.1 Introduction

Community safety partnership working evolved differently in Scotland (see chapter 2) compared to England and Wales (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008; McAra and McVie, 2010; Mooney and Scott, 2012; Croall, 2006; Croall et al., 2010). This was partly related to Scotland’s distinct legal system, but arguably stemmed more from its’ distinctive civic culture (ibid). Nonetheless, there have been many (ideologically driven) areas of policy convergence in Community Safety Partnerships; (as previously stated in chapters 2 and 4) with respect to managerialism, and the adoption of a punitive penal agenda directed towards young offenders, and the targeting of antisocial behaviour within local communities. Similarly, within the Criminal Justice System there have been many areas of policy divergence; the Children’s Hearing System (McAra, 2007; McAra and McVie, 2010; Croall, 2006), and the retention of penal welfarism (McAra and McVie, 2010) during the Thatcher era in particular. However, post devolution this divergence was arguably tested under a New Labour inspired Scottish Executive who encapsulated the Blairite responsibilisation ethos (McLaughlin, 2002a: 89) around crime prevention and community safety, by situating it within the statutory framework of Local Authority Community Planning Partnerships (Henry, 2009). This arguably placed a somewhat contradictory emphasis on both centralisation and localism (McAra, 2007), which has continued to an extent under the current SNP government. In this case through the simultaneous promotion of community empowerment/local accountability, within the austerity-driven centralised reform process, which has witnessed the amalgamation of eight regional Police and Fire services into two distinct, and arguably contested national entities within local governance structures.

The purpose of this study was to look at the governance of community safety in Scotland during a period of central and local government fiscal/structural reform; principally through the role of Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) embedded within the community planning structure of three geographically distinct Local Authority areas – known as Avonside, Burnside and Cartside. A comparative case study approach was adopted and a bespoke interview framework was created based on Hudson and Hardy’s
(2002) ‘partnership assessment tool’ (PAT) for effective partnership working (see Chapter 3), and the following research questions were posed:

- What role do CSPs play in the governance of community safety in contemporary Scotland?
- How will the planned governance changes and reform processes affect CSPs in terms of local accountability?
- How will performance management cultures within central/local government, and in particular within the Police, affect CSP priorities and/or goals?
- How do the organisational aims and culture of CSP partners, who possess different levels of power and influence, effect or determine the strategic priorities of CSPs?

Although constructing these research questions within a bespoke framework helped the researcher to focus on the main aims of the thesis; looking at the complexities of partnership working during a period of significant reform. They were nonetheless meant as a guide that allowed the researcher to look at the impact of policy on practice within the governance of community safety in Scotland. The questions within the interview schedule were developed in line with the seven headings constructed within a bespoke framework (see chapter 3.2), which allowed us to focus on particular areas of partnership working in relation to governance structure, strategic decision making, power, organisational culture, commitment and accountability mechanisms; which in turn allowed us to address the research aims. Consequently, a number of contemporary themes began to emerge (throughout the case study areas); in relation to the reform process in general, for example, with respect to the changing role of CSP’s within planned governance changes, and the pressures this has placed on multi-agency partnership working. After briefly commenting on the themes that arose from the empirical data collected within this thesis, this chapter will then comment on and summarise the key findings to emerge within the case study areas, before reflecting on the implications of these for policy and practice at both the local and national level for policy makers. This thesis will then close by highlighting future opportunities for further research. But, first this chapter will consider the usefulness of the thesis’s theoretical framework, notably with respect to the influence of Hudson and Hardy’s PAT; and especially with respect to
their six so-called ‘partnership principles’, and how these principles may apply within the domain of community safety partnership working (Hudson and Hardy, 2002: 52).

7.2 Hudson and Hardy’s six principles of partnership working

As has previously been stated a bespoke framework was developed not for evaluation purposes but, to act as a useful framework to guide the direction of qualitative interviews, in an effort to address the research questions/aims. Nonetheless, Hudson and Hardy’s six key ‘partnership principles’ highlight what they believe to be the success (or failure) criteria for generic partnership working (ibid). When examined within the context of community safety partnership working within the case study areas - a number of issues appear to surface, and a number of key points will be briefly commented on under each principle heading.

7.2.1 Principle one: Acknowledgment of the need for partnership

Some of the key points reflected in this principle refer not only to recognition for the necessity of partnership working, but also recognition that partners must appreciate their interdependency for collaboration to be successful, and awareness by partners that some ‘core’ business of agencies does not require partnership working; otherwise there is a danger that one agency may step into the domain of another in a manner that is perceived as unacceptable or threatening (ibid: 54). However, despite all this some barriers may be too formidable to overcome than others, even if some partnership working is achieved; leading to the necessity to identify and address ways to overcome them (ibid: 53).

The points raised here were addressed and answered to some extent throughout the thesis, for example, with respect to participants acknowledging the need for partnership working; especially in relation to tackling ‘wicked’ issues such as crime and disorder (chapter 2 and 5) hence the need for CPP/CSP’s in the first place. Although, in Burnside community safety as a concept was relegated to ‘other matters’ to be discussed within the new community planning structure, signalling the demise of this particular thematic partnership. Interdependency was also evident; especially within issue specific
partnerships/co-located hubs etc. (chapter 5 and 6), particularly with respect to the management of risk. However, this also highlighted some areas in need of development with respect to attracting key partners (Health/Education), but also engaging more substantially with community organisations in particular. As to ‘not stepping on an agencies toes’, and being aware of an agencies ‘core’ aims and obligations, this was perhaps highlighted with respect to TESSA a successful youth initiative duplicated by the Police (in Avonside), and its attempted takeover by Council actors (in Cartside). Also, the development of MATAC’s throughout the case study areas (in Cartside in particular); mostly associated with a general unease about the direction their partnerships were taking, and with confidentiality issues in terms of information sharing (chapter 6 and 4). This highlights one of the formidable barriers to partnership working still to be negotiated throughout the case study areas (chapter 5).

7.2.2 Principle two: Clarity and realism of purpose

This highlights the need to identify shared values and principles, and if agencies have enough in common to sustain a long term relationship. Once this is agreed more specific aims and objectives need to be defined; goals, aims and objectives that lack both clarity and obtainability will diminish enthusiasm and commitment. The notion of collaborative capacity is relevant here; which refers to the level and amount of action a partnership arrangement can endure without a loss of commitment. This is relevant to both tangible resources (i.e. funding) and those less tangible (i.e. status or autonomy). ‘Embryonic partnerships’ can be a delicate process at the organisational, professional or individual level, and there needs to be awareness of perceived threats to boundaries and practices (ibid: 55).

For the most part shared values and objectives were usually identified in the case studies (mainly by statutory agencies) through the SOA; usually described as a bottom up process (chapter 4 and 5). However, this potentially created an imbalance within the decision making process not only between statutory signatories required to pay cognizance to a prescriptive framework, but also between others not required to do so (third sector and community organisations); which sometimes proved problematic with respect to accountability (Chapter 6) or shared visions - especially when partners with more
status/power often set the course and strategic direction of community safety (chapter 5).

7.2.3 Principle three: Commitment and ownership

Partnership working is only sustainable if the understandings and agreements developed through principles one and two are not only supported, but reinforced. This includes from the top level down. Ideal inter-agency commitment reflects not only the development of connections between key decision makers; leading to greater trust, but also commitment needs to be consistent and seen to be so. This does not imply that wider ownership is any less significant, but well-developed strategies still need clear links between the macro and micro levels of organisational practices to ensure that operational staff adhere to shared agreements; especially if there is a perception that shared activities may encroach on traditional organisational boundaries. This highlights, not only, the importance of key personnel (who have the ability to drive forward change), but also how the loss of key individuals could potentially damage the ongoing commitment and purpose of a networks existence (ibid: 56).

Commitment to partnership working is arguably reinforced by legislation such as the Local Government in Scotland Act 2003 (Scottish Executive, 2004) and other policy levers (Christie etc.) that remind some partners of their statutory obligations (chapter 4). However, as the evidence throughout the case study areas has shown (chapter 5), commitment is not easy to maintain within ‘austerity localism’ (Featherstone et al., 2012); especially if there is a perceived gap between the local and the national (chapter 6) in terms of national priorities superseding local ones to the point that some organisations may retrench back to their core activities.

7.2.4 Principle four: Development and maintenance of Trust

This is viewed as arguably the most obvious and most elusive of principles to reinforce effective partnership working, although joint working is still possible with very little trust, more successful partnerships endure longer where trust is present. However, its generation is often hindered by disputes around territorial boundaries, or claims to professional competencies, or access to resources. Trust is not easily won, which means
its maintenance is an ongoing and reciprocal task, and a key aspect of this is in relation to sensitivities on status; which means avoiding perceptions around ‘senior or junior partners, or ‘core’ or peripheral groups’ (ibid: 58), which could lead to a lessening of commitment. Maintaining commitment means trying to avoid situations where one or two partners set the agenda, or define the language within partnership working, which is sometime unavoidable when there are lead agencies, however, being sensitive to all agencies requirements and beliefs can offset areas of tension and mistrust, together with acknowledging their existence in the first place (ibid: 57-59).

The problems and maintenance of trust was discussed by participants in relation to a number of issues, for example: doing what you say you will do; reciprocity; personality issues; building relationships; overall commitment, with one participant in Burnside highlighting how building trust and confidence was not easy won, but easily lost (chapter 5). However, a number of issues emerged which could hinder its development in relation to perceptions of ‘core’ partners within a peripheral group (MATAChapter 4), or with respect to unequal aspects of status/power within decision making (chapter 5). Nonetheless, the fact that most participants acknowledged potential barriers to partnership working - information sharing/confidentiality in particular – exist in the first place (chapter 5), means that there is scope to address this throughout the case study areas.

7.2.5 Principle five: Establishment of clear and robust partnership arrangements

This refers to the need that partnership working is not encumbered by overly complex structures and processes, which may reflect a partner’s defensiveness about their own interests and insecurity about points of mutual trust. In consequence too much bureaucracy may result in frustration among partners leading to a further decline in commitment to partnership working; especially if it is seen as marginal to organisational interests. Partnership working should therefore be as clear and unambiguous as possible, with each partner knowing, not only, what they are responsible for, but the accountability of their actions. Furthermore, there needs to be an understanding around the types and availability of resources each partner brings to the table, not just financial/material resources, but those less tangible – experience, knowledge, power and legitimacy;
especially in relation to community groups whose involvement confers a local legitimacy, which may otherwise be lacking (ibid: 59-60).

The reform process throughout the case study areas involved the reorganisation of complex governance structures (chapter 4), which may prove cumbersome for some partners more than others. This was possibly more evident in Burnside (chapter 4 and 6) as some community participants seemed to struggle with the added burdens brought on by excessive governance bureaucracy (Burnpark Area Partnership). Accountability practices within the case study areas were not often clear, leading to blurred lines of accountability (chapter 6); especially between the public and the third sector (different accountability mechanisms), and its impact on localism (centralisation and the impact of police reform), which could detract from the overall partnership process.

7.2.6 Principle 6: Monitoring, review and organisational learning

Finally, this refers to the more reflexive elements of partnership working, wherein review is viewed as integral to individual agency planning and management processes, which may lead to discussions around levels of commitment, or the costs and benefits of partnership working to individual partners; especially if it is not viewed as core work. Monitoring, reviewing and learning are therefore viewed as a vital part, not only, in relation to performance assessment, but also with respect to ongoing commitment and the generation of trust. Success criteria needs to be made clear and agreed upon by the partnership itself. If evaluations do not occur then valuable lessons may be missed that could inform partnership working elsewhere. Furthermore, being open about possible problems may demonstrate awareness and a desire to overcome potential barriers to future partnership working (ibid: 61-62).

Monitoring has existed within the Scottish Community Safety Network since its inception; especially in relation to guidance, with the creation of ‘partnership toolkits’, and research (chapter 4) highlighting problematic areas in need of attention (SCSN, 2012: 2013). However, this is often left up to key actors related to ‘Partnership and Governance’ to access and review. Within the individual case study areas, performance and review was often discussed in relation to key policy levers (chapter 4), or commitment to organisational strategies (policing in particular). However, it was highlighted (in Cartside) that local strategic assessments (in relation to community planning) were absent, which
reinforced the necessity of the MATAC policing model in order to marry up local and central strategic priorities. However, there did not appear to be any generic review on the overall efficacy of community safety strategic decision making within partnership structures (especially Avonside and Cartside who still retained a CSP), with respect to successful active community engagement, and consultation, or whether partnerships were meeting the key aims of the Christie Commission (chapter 6).

Utilising aspects of Hudson and Hardy’s (2002) PAT as the basis for a bespoke framework, allowed the researcher to probe into areas deemed not only essential, but also potentially problematic within partnership working in order to ascertain how community safety as a concept, is not only maintained, but also viewed within the three case study areas. This in turn has highlighted some enduring themes, but also led to the emergence of some key themes, which will be highlighted within the conclusions. This next section will address some of the points raised within the research questions.

7.3 Partnership working within the governance of community safety

Much has been written around the concept of governance (chapter 2) with respect to how public policy delivery has shifted from ‘big’ government to governance (Grix and Philpott, 2011: 4) through networks and partnerships, which has arguably led to an erosion of central Government power (ibid); leading to a fragmented public service delivery, wherein Government capacity to steer public policy is weakened – the state has essentially become ‘hollowed’ out (Rhodes, 1997). New Labour’s modernisation process, sought to reduce the fragmentation inherent within the previous Conservative Government’s ideology of market individualism (Stoker, 1999), by returning some measure of power and political autonomy back into the hands of local government. However, this re-investment in local authority control was to be held in check by the tight reigns of partnership working, often set within prescriptive regulatory systems (Carnwell and Carson, 2009).

This was most evident within the domain of Crime and Disorder Reduction/Community Safety Partnerships in England and Wales (Hughes, 2002; Hope, 2005; Loveday, 2006; Gilling, 2007). This thesis did not set out to compare CSP’s throughout the UK – that is not its aim. However, as the literature has highlighted, post-devolution - CSP’s in Scotland arguably developed from New Labour’s flag-ship crime control policies (Crawford, 1997;
Gilling, 2007; Henry, 2009), wherein central government ultimately ‘steer’ (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) local crime prevention/community safety through regulatory frameworks (in this case the NPF, SOA, and Statement of Ambition). This would support Holliday’s (2000) assertion that while the state may operate within an often fragmented, complex environment, it is nonetheless, not as disabled as Rhodes (1997) ‘hollowed’ out thesis would suggest.

This assertion is supported to some extent within the case study areas. For example, CSP’s have since the 2003 Local Government in Scotland Act, been inextricably linked to local community planning structures. These structures are in turn shaped by central government policy levers (chapter 4), which have the power to make actors/agencies behave in a particular way (Dahl, 2002; Bachrach and Baratz, 2002; Lukes, 2005). In this case the roles of CSP’s within the governance of community safety in Scotland are not only conditioned by the necessity of partnership working (Hudson and Hardy, 2002; Powell and Exworthy, 2002; Rummery, 2002; McConnell, 2004; Gilling, 2007; Carnwell and Carson, 2009; Henry, 2009), but also set within the contradictory aims of centralisation and localisation (McAra, 2007). This was apparent within the case study areas when a number of participants commented on local community safety objectives being ostensibly bottom up. However, powerful statutory agencies also had to take cognizance of national outcomes, which meant that quite often an ‘institutional bias’ (Bachrach and Baratz, 2002) occurred in that strategic agendas were quite often set within time frames (Mayo and Taylor, 2001) benefitting the most powerful partners in the partnership (Rummery, 2002: McCall and Rummery, 2017: 59); the Police in particular.

During the research process, all three case study areas were in the midst of a centrally directed reform process linked to fiscal austerity. Featherstone et al., (2012: 178) argued that within ‘austerity localism’ it is usually the default actors with the most ‘resources, expertise and social capital’, who routinely provide facilities and services; and this was supported to some extent within the case study areas. This meant that some community safety partners (third sector/smaller agencies/organisations) who participated within the partnership process, quite often bowed (Harkin, 2015) to the wisdom/authority of powerful organisations with respect to ‘shared’ priorities and goals. In essence this could be perceived more as a compliance model of partnership working, rather than a partnership based on equality. That is not to say that all partners had disparate goals, on
the contrary co-located issue specific partnerships, with respect to antisocial behaviour, alcohol and drugs, Housing (Community Improvement Partnership), for the most part worked well (barring enduring problems related to information sharing/confidentiality, and blurred lines of accountability). However, within the new structures Police Scotland intelligence-led MATACS (chapter 4) had become the operational template for community safety, which had the potential to alienate those agencies more focussed on long term welfarist approaches to prevention, rather than short term reactive approaches favoured by the Police. The planned governance changes within a fiscal austerity driven reform process highlighted a number of issues within the governance of community safety and much has been discussed in chapters 2-6, however, some issues pertinent to the main aims of the research will be briefly commented on below, in relation to the impact of: reinforced top-down performance management regimes; organisational culture; and local accountability.

7.3.1 The impact of performance management cultures on community safety

Many commentators have discussed the impact of private sector managerialism on the public sector (Hood, 1994; Hughes, 1994; Shafiri and Bovaird, 1995; Clarke and Newman, 1997; James, 2001; Newman, 2001; Heffernan, 2002), – more specifically as a departure from ‘old’ public management command and control (Brodkin, 2011), to forms of governance focusing on the three E’s (Shafiri and Bovaird, 1995) – economy, efficiency and effectiveness (see chapter 2). Loveday (2006) argues that it is used as a mode of intervention by central government through the use of monitoring, which in effect challenges the professionalism of public sector actors, in this case by establishing performance management frameworks – which effectively steer public sector behaviour (Brodkin, 2011).

This is arguably the case within the case study areas; especially within CPP/CSP’s. For instance, although policy levers such as the Christie Commission and the NPF/SOA were ostensibly to be viewed as a balance between local and national priorities, this was, more often than not, difficult to achieve by public sector organisations beset by cuts to personnel and services. This was most likely to impact on Council agencies that may – through expediency – focus on key performance indicators deemed achievable in the short term, as opposed to long term proactive community safety solutions advocated by
Similarly, this was also the case within Police Scotland as rigorous performance management regimes, more often focused on reactive short term measures rather than proactive long term initiatives (Mackenzie and Hamilton-Smith, 2011; Hamilton-Smith et al., 2013; Fyfe, 2014) within the governance of community safety.

For example, priority may be given to short term initiatives focusing on antisocial behaviour, or on more quantifiable aspects of risk management; as was the case in Burnside and Cartside in relation to intervention and the management of young offenders (chapter 5). Building social capital is a key social policy aim with respect to active citizenship/participatory democracy, but if local communities’ feel they are targeted unfairly by reactionary initiatives such as ‘stop and search’ then this may impact on trust - a crucial component essential to building social capital (Head, 2007). Consequently, community safety partnership working may be viewed with suspicion, resulting in less participation from those communities who arguably need it the most. Participation may also be affected if negative opinions persist around equality and status within partnership working.

7.3.2 The impact of organisational culture/power differentials within CPP/CSP’s

As has previously been discussed partnership working (chapter 2 and 5) is often espoused within social policy arenas as a positive concept associated with trust (McCall and Rummery, 2017), equality and reciprocity (Mayo and Taylor, 2001) and to a large extent this was how it was viewed within the case study areas (especially by statutory agencies). However, it was also clear that there existed an imbalance of power throughout the community planning/community safety structure with respect to strategic decision making, resource allocation, and active participation.

There exists a hierarchy within CPP/CSP’s and it is generally accepted by most participants that whilst Local Authorities are the lead partners, the Police have the greatest resources available, and a clear mandate to tackle crime and disorder (McCarthy and O’Neill, 2014: 249). Nonetheless, the concept of partnership working evokes notions of equality and working towards common goals; especially during times of fiscal crisis. However, commitment to it may falter if it is perceived that strategic decision making is to the benefit of some partners (particularly the Police) over others; especially if it is linked to
centrally driven performance management frameworks (Mackenzie and Hamilton-Smith, 2011; Hamilton-Smith et al., 2013; Fyfe, 2014).

As previously discussed (in chapter 4) this was evident in Cartside with respect to MATACS, wherein social welfarist actors/agencies involved with the public/third sector were asked to comply with a centrally driven intelligence led policing model with respect to decision making. In this sense powerful agencies with a strong organisational culture/identity (such as the Police) arguably benefit more than others from partnership working (Rummery, 2002: McCall and Rummery, 2017: 59), especially if they have jurisdiction in terms of service delivery (Irvine, et al., 2002), and social capital in terms of resources (Coleman, 1988). However, non-police agencies may retrench from the partnership process if it is believed that their organisational aims conflict with, rather than complement the strategic aims of a partnership. This was a possible outcome in Cartside, when some participants voiced their disquiet about the new CSP structure being too Police led; which may resonate in other Local Authority areas it was being rolled out to. However, while non-police actors/agencies may not totally withdraw from the partnership process (given the stated desire to increase partnership working within social policy); they may nonetheless fail to effectively engage with its strategic objectives.

A dominant organisational ethos is not restricted to the Police. The Council have put in place governance mechanisms, which may unintentionally reinforce an ‘institutional bias’ (Bachrach and Baratz, 2002), that favours governmental aims ahead of others. This may be achieved through resource allocation. This was evident in Avon Isle, Burnside and Cartside when TSO participants acknowledged they often had to adapt/change their services to access funding streams with strict criteria attached to them (chapter 6). This could be viewed as an exercise in efficiency insofar as Local Authorities are ensuring that local communities have appropriate services in place. It could also be viewed as problematic in that the appropriate services are ones deemed essential by a local Council (driven by austerity) as opposed to what is deemed necessary by local communities. Or that resources are awarded to those organisations with the necessary skills to “put together partnership bids” (Rummery, 2002: 242) based on social capital, rather than their capacity to deliver services to communities in need.

Much has been highlighted in social policy/academic literature with respect to community
engagement/active participation; or its lack thereof. Local communities – despite social policy protestations to the contrary - are routinely marginalised within Local Authority decision making processes. Or as Coleman et al., (2002) argued engagement is often directed towards those considered reliable and responsible. For the most part those deemed responsible are those who attend community meetings; who are often there with respect to furthering their own narrow agendas (Edwards, 2002; Farrow and Prior, 2006). This was apparent within the case study areas to some extent, when many community participants discussed community safety more often in relation to a narrow personal perspective, as opposed to notions of security from the wider community (ibid).

For the most part active participation was assigned towards a particular type of community representative within the case study areas usually identified through age and social class (generally elderly, white, middle class ) – commonly described as the ‘usual suspects’ within academic literature (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004; van Steden, 2011; Patsias, 2013). This was compounded further dependent on capacity to engage effectively, which was more evident in Burnside, in relation to social background and demographic area. Active participation was more prominent in Burnwood (middle class business area) possibly in relation to greater bridging (inclusive) social capital (Putnam, 2000; Campbell and Sacchetti, 2014); insofar as this participant was more assured and had more connections to the wider community planning network in general, compared to the participant from Burnpark (deprived area) who focused on much narrower local community connections; bonding (exclusive) social capital (ibid).

Although Burnside had put in place governance structures to let community representatives actively engage in participatory democracy (Patsias et al., 2013; Davidson and Elstub, 2014); for instance, allowing them to vote on the Area Partnership/Area CPP, it nonetheless, did not include active participation at the strategic level. Avonside and Cartside had far less community engagement, insofar as engagement was restricted to being heard (no vote) on local structures, but no participation at the strategic level. Community engagement appears to be an enduring problem within social policy, as Hart et al.,(1997) have previously argued – the success or failure of local projects, is often determined by local communities, yet they often have little or no say at the strategic level (cited in Foster, 2002: 186).
A number of themes have been highlighted throughout this thesis in relation to partnership working within the governance of community safety, including some enduring themes in relation to barriers to effective partnership working (chapter 5) – associated with information sharing (Perrie et al., 2006; Lennox et al., 2012: 132). However, there was evidence that some of these problems were being negotiated to some extent through co-location (chapter 5), and issue specific partnerships (Child Protection; Community Hubs; CIP). However, some historical difficulties in relation to engaging Health as a statutory partner remain (Clarke and Rummery, 2002), and a number of participants commented on this with respect to community safety throughout the case study areas, insofar as Health “[…] doesn’t sit at the table” (C003). Some contemporary themes also began to emerge related to austerity and the reform process in general, which will now be summarised in the conclusions below.

7.4 Conclusions: Key Themes, Implications for policy and practice, and future research

7.4.1 The changing role of Community Safety Partnerships

Evidence from the data has shown that CSPs (in Avonside and Cartside) had arguably changed their role from a more proactive social welfare model to a reactionary intelligence led multi-agency tasking (MATAC) model favoured by Police Scotland. Burnside also appears to have adopted a tasking model within Community Safety Burnside. Two competing arguments appear to have developed as to why this change has emerged. For example, one participant within Community Safety Burnside (former Police analyst) intimated that MATAC’s had been implemented in accordance with the former Chief Constable’s (Stephen House) desire to improve local accountability; perhaps influenced by his opinion that no ‘partnership should go unreviewed’ (Apex Scotland, 2013: 9). In this sense community policing was to be delivered locally through multi-agency tasking forums. MATAC’s emerged in the case study areas in direct response to Police reform; effectively by dividing the functions of existing CSP’s into two distinct areas - steering/strategic planning and operational (see chapter 4). However, concerns were expressed by participants in Cartside that this Police Scotland initiative would essentially drive national objectives ahead of what was needed locally. This was reinforced by a prevailing opinion that the Police had only ‘invited’ those actors/agencies onto the MATAC who could operationalise objectives in line with both the SOA, and Police
Scotland’s national priorities. This possibly chimes with Coleman et al.’s, (2002) study (chapter 2) insofar as there appears to be a construction of responsibilisation directed towards those partners thought to be more ‘reliable’ in relation to furthering Police performance management regimes as opposed to the partnership as a whole. This could lead to some unintended consequences for CSP’s if this is rolled out across all Local Authority areas (included those highlighted in this study); insofar as those actors/organisations more supportive of proactive community safety type initiatives, may withdraw from the MATAC if it is perceived to be – in the words of one participant – “too policy” (C012).

7.4.2 A dichotomy within the ethos of partnership working

Austerity measures had created a dichotomy within CPP/CSP’s that simultaneously exalted the necessity of partnership working while forcing agencies to retrench back to their core activities, which in turn reduced attendance and trust; a necessary component within partnerships and networks. The global financial crisis has had a major impact on public services throughout the UK principally in the form of deep spending cuts (Oxfam, 2013). As a result the UK and devolved Governments have had to put in place a number of austerity measures (see chapters 4 and 5); which have impacted on all three case study areas with respect to partnership working in general. This has created a dichotomy of sorts insofar as a number of participants have espoused the efficacy of partnership working, which is in keeping with the dominant public policy discourse mentioned in chapter 2 – with respect to the necessity of solving ‘wicked issues’ (McGarvey and Cairney, 2008; Ferlie, et al., 2011) that no single agency should tackle on its own (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Hudson and Hardy, 2002; Durose and Rummery, 2006). A number of participants have also asserted that fiscal austerity measures have added to this necessity by ‘forcing’ agencies to work together due to a lack of resources. However, a significant number of participants also claimed that the opposite was true – insofar as a lack of resources would also impact on their ability to engage in partnership work in the future; especially if it did not meet their immediate aims. This could result in a snowball effect in that those partners who do attend on a regular basis will invariably have the power to set future agendas (Bachrach and Baratz, 2002: Lukes, 1974; 2005) possibly in line with their own goals, which may reduce trust and dissuade cash strapped agencies from taking part. If austerity measures continue to put pressure on overstretched
agencies already under a burden to ‘do more with less’ (chapter 4), then this could squeeze out partnership working, as agencies retrench back to deal with core issues.

**7.4.3 Partnerships more likely to adopt national initiatives in a localised setting**

Partnerships were more likely to adopt national initiatives in a localised setting in an effort to meet key targets through the ethos of achieving more with less. Key targets were often set within prescriptive performance frameworks (NPF, SOA, *Statement of Ambition* etc., see chapter 4), which could result in making Local Authorities/partnerships operate in a particular way. A hard pressed public sector may find it easier to adopt a centrally driven direction (steer) with regard to national priorities and the management of risk, rather than setting an innovative direction that navigates a course between localism, engagement, consultation and social inclusion. For example, with respect to the SOA – utilising an outcome approach is often difficult to achieve within a system focused on performance measurement and best value. How, for instance, can you prove that a long term community safety initiative is having the desired effect or that you are measuring what matters? For a strained public sector it is often easier to measure what you can visually see or experience (graffiti removal, stop and search, ASBOs etc.), or, meeting quantifiable targets through the management of risk with respect to reoffending (Innes, 2004) through diversionary initiatives, signposting, cautions etc. This was evident throughout the case study areas as short term initiatives were often utilised to target local antisocial behaviour (which could involve cautions or dispersal tactics); described by one elected Councillor in Burnside as ‘*an old person’s agenda*’ (B011) designed to get young people off the streets. In both Burnside and Cartside youth initiatives were often framed within the language of deterrence – *Positive Changes* in Cartside and *One Burnside* in Burnside - both initiatives were aimed at targeting young people who were first time offenders or on the periphery of offending. The Persistent Offender Project in Burnside reportedly saved the Criminal Justice System in excess of £10 million a year (Chapter 5), which may explain why a focus on the assessment of risk, which may provide ‘cashable benefits’ is more attractive within the governance of community safety as opposed to more generic youth initiatives that are harder to quantify, but more conducive to community engagement. The same focus on risk was apparent within Avon Isle – although in this case initiatives were directed towards the elderly; with more generic youth initiatives losing out (disco’s/sports/youth events).
7.4.4 De-prioritisation of community safety within the case study areas

Within the governance of community safety there appeared to be a de-prioritisation of community safety within Burnside in particular, but also throughout all the case study areas in light of cuts to local community safety initiatives. There appeared to be a slight shift within the governance of community safety that perhaps signalled the de-prioritisation of community safety as a localised concept (chapter 4). For example, in Avonside there was a loss of local voice on community safety issues when all five local CSPs were disbanded in favour of one overarching strategic and operational MATAC. This arguably will have considerable impact on rural communities within this geographically diverse case study area; especially island communities such as Avon Isle, who may prove resistant to a ‘one size fits all’ approach – particularly with respect to policing (Fyfe, 2014). In Burnside reform went further and the CSP was removed from the overarching CPP structure in its entirety. In effect community safety as a thematic concept was no longer to be discussed – it was to be mainstreamed throughout the newly reformed structure, with most operational work being taken up by Community Safety Burnside (arms-length external organisation), which could raise issues with respect to blurred lines of accountability, scrutiny and a fragmented service delivery (chapter 6). Further concerns were highlighted with respect to the loss of key services (noise team in Cartside) and an apparent focus on short term reactive quantifiable police led initiatives throughout the case study areas in comparison to longer term preventative initiatives supported by the Christie Commission.

7.4.5 Blurred lines of accountability

Within the governance of community safety a plurality of actors were involved in policing antisocial behaviour, which in turn created blurred boundaries with respect to scrutiny and accountability (chapter 6). This was most apparent in the social housing sector, wherein residents were subjected to a responsibilisation ethos (Garland, 1996) set within a moral discourse on the regulation of the conduct of others (Flint, 2002; Flint and Nixon, 2006). In essence, Housing Officers were more often than not responsible for the policing of antisocial behaviour within the environment of their tenancies, by utilising legal levers to ensure compliance – often referred to as Third Party Policing (Mazzerolle and Ransley, 2006; Mazzerolle, 2014). This was evident throughout the case study areas, but most
apparent in Burnside (Community Improvement Partnership); wherein other actors also stepped out of their traditional roles with respect to the management of risk; for example, Fire Officers assessing social housing not just for fire risk, but for domestic abuse, or signs of neglect. In Cartside and Burnside Street Pastors (a religious based third sector organisation) also reported on risk (vulnerable women in particular within the night time economy); and reported to the Police any behaviour they judged to be aggressive and antisocial. While this has proven to be advantageous to the Police in particular, and to those tenants plagued by incivility, it nonetheless, opens up questions with respect to blurred lines of accountability; for example, the Street Pastors are not subject to public scrutiny unlike the Police and other public sector organisations. However, a more fundamental question with respect to democratic governance is at issue here – who is ultimately held responsible for policing – the Police or those co-opted into policing functions (Mazzerolle and Ransley, 2006). As more actors are subsumed into private policing roles, this also raises important questions around the social exclusion of marginalised groups, and democratic accountability within the governance of community safety.

7.4.6 The Impact of Police Reform on Localism

The creation of a National Police Service appeared to have had a major impact on CPP/CSPs within the case study areas; in terms of a loss of Local Authority accountability, loss of local services, perceptions of a loss of local accountability and community engagement. Under the new Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 accountability for policing has now moved from the local to the national (see chapter 6); wherein accountability has in effect moved from governance to scrutiny and engagement (Terpstra and Fyfe, 2015). This move was met with scepticism from some participants throughout the case study areas; particularly elected representatives who were yet to be convinced that local priorities would not be superseded by national ones. In a move to offset local community fears a framework had been put in place to create not only Local, but also Multi-Member Ward Police Plans. However, as previously highlighted (in table 6) the local priorities outlined in each case study area are ostensibly similar to those outlined in the Annual Police Plan. This perhaps reinforces concerns amongst local communities that Police Scotland (despite consultation) were not fully taking into account
local concerns, and instead were relying on ‘a one size fits all’ approach germane to national objectives; despite assurances to the contrary (Apex Scotland, 2013).

This was most evident in Avon Isle when local residents voiced their concerns around a loss of localism at a packed Area Community Planning meeting in December 2013. A perception seemed to persist that Police Scotland had adopted a dominant former Strathclyde Police Model – ‘StrathGlasgow’ now effectively ran Scotland – or a Strathclydification had occurred (Fyfe, 2014); which is perhaps more germane to large urban conurbations rather than rural communities. Concerns were also expressed in Burnside about an apparent gap between the local and the national with respect to Police Scotland implementing national initiatives without local consultation. A lack of consultation was also cited in Cartside with respect to the removal of Police counters. It appears that fears exist throughout the case study areas, despite Police Scotland assurances, that local concerns – while noted – may be superseded by national policing priorities, which ultimately has the potential to reduce, not only, local accountability, but community trust in the long term.

7.4.7 Potential decline in community engagement/community trust

Community engagement or community trust could decline further if the reform process (particularly in policing) adopts a ‘one size fits all approach’ and neglects to take into account- not only the diverse nature of local communities, but also geographical location, together with aligning engagement to the usual suspects (Chapter 6). As previously stated there are concerns particularly with respect to Police reform that community consultation in particular is merely tokenistic in nature (Arnstein, 1969). For instance, given the speed of the reform process, one could possibly question the robustness of community consultation in general. For example, a number of participants associated public consultation with community groups, for example, Resident Associations, or Community Councils. However, evidence from the case study areas suggests that these were in the main unrepresentative of the wider local community. This was a point echoed by Harkin (2015: 736) who found that some groups with as little as three members of the public in attendance were often held by the Police as a ‘proxy for the wider community’. This holds true for government (both local and national) consultations, which were also in the main conducted through Community Councils. This raises questions around representation,
community engagement, and local accountability. Throughout the case study areas there were genuine concerns expressed by most participants (including the Police) around community engagement, or to put it more precisely – the lack of it. For the most part this was put down to the apathy of the public, but, it could equally be associated with a lack of awareness of social policy in general – particularly in relation to Police Reform; a point echoed by Fyfe (2014). If ‘informed’ decisions are made by select members of local communities, or in their absence by knowing street level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980) around community safety issues, then this can potentially lead to a decline in trust by those members of the community who need to be engaged with the most; young people, hard to reach groups, or those who are usually the target of initiatives in the first place.

7.5 Implications for future policy

The findings of this thesis have shown that there are enduring problems associated with ongoing austerity/reform and engaging communities in a meaningful way. Policy levers such as the Christie Commission and the ten year SOA have tried to ensure that partnerships genuinely engage with local communities in an effort to tackle long standing ‘wicked issues’ such as crime and poverty. However, this research has demonstrated that while there may be a ‘will’ for partnership working to succeed, quite often this is not backed up with a ‘way’ for it to happen. The ongoing fiscal crisis has had a significant impact on all sectors involved in partnership working, which may have an impact on future social policy aims built around effective collaboration, partnership working, community engagement and local accountability; as espoused by the Christie Commission, and latterly by the Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act 2015.

For example, evidence from the case study areas has demonstrated that effective collaboration is often restricted to local issue specific co-located partnerships (Hubs, Community Improvement Partnership, etc.), which have a distinct focus and are usually Police led in terms of analysis and local intelligence. However, this usually attracts those actors who share similar aims. Within CSP’s - MATACs have emerged as the operational arm of CSPs, which are a national initiative based on intelligence led policing. While this may favour national priorities, it may also impact on local collaboration insofar as some agencies/actors may withdraw from the process due to trust issues, with respect to confidentiality, and fears that their core aims are not being met. Consequently, efforts
must be made at the local and the national level to address some of the issues raised by non-policing organisations; especially with respect to ensuring measures are put in place to adopt Christie’s long term preventative agenda – as opposed to short term Police led initiatives that favour measurable national objectives.

The Christie Commission advocates partnership working as an answer to achieving ‘more with less’, as a necessary function within the constraints of contemporary public finances. However, while many participants shared this sentiment - attempts to participate were quite often thwarted by ongoing cuts to the public sector. Many participants stated that they neither had the time nor the resources to adequately engage in partnership working, which created a dichotomy of sorts. This raises questions for policy makers with respect to, not only, the efficacy and quality of partnership working, but also in relation to the types of services available to local communities. It is clear that partnership working remains a key concept within the Scottish Government and much is expected of it within the framework of local community planning. However, one area needs to be addressed with respect to an apparent disconnect between top down strategic direction, and bottom up implementation in terms of resources and continued commitment within local structures.

Another key area to be addressed is with respect to local community engagement. If it happened at all, it was mostly related to those select few who attend Community Councils, or through organisational survey’s, which arguably do not gather opinions from all sections of the community. Community engagement is a key governance theme; however, it is often left up to localities on how this is achieved. This has led to a fragmented approach throughout the case study areas with some CPP’s engaging more than others. This may be resolved if there were clearer directions by policy makers at the national level – outlining specifically how communities were to be engaged, and within what time limit; particularly hard to reach groups. However, this also requires resources, which may be problematic in terms of ongoing fiscal austerity measures impacting on Local Authorities. However, unless significant work is done to ensure that local communities – particularly communities who lack the capacity to engage – are truly involved in the planning process, then the issues highlighted in this study will continue to be problematic.
It is clear that there is a desire within Scottish social policy at the national level to increase community ownership, community engagement, active citizenship etc. and this is to continue under the Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act 2015, wherein Local Authorities are now required to prepare and publish Local Outcome Improvement Plans (LOIPs), which must set out their local outcomes to be prioritised for improvement (SCSN, 2016). However, LOIPs much like Single Outcome Agreements must also take cognizance of national outcomes. This in effect means that the same problems (highlighted in this thesis) may persist; especially in relation to a focus on short term quantifiable outcomes related to centralised key performance targets, rather than investment in long term proactive approaches more difficult to quantify. This is also the case for Community Justice Outcome Improvement Plans (CJOIPS) as set out within the Community Justice (Scotland) Act 2016 (Scottish Government, 2016). This has implications at the local level in that local communities may have services provided out of fiscal necessity rather than local need.

7.5.1 Key challenges for policy makers

From the findings of this thesis one can present a number of key challenges for policy makers going forward, principally:

- To define and outline a standardised community engagement framework within social policy in an effort to actively increase community participation within local community groups and local community planning structures.
- To put in place structures that will increase the capacity of local communities in order for them to participate in the above.
- To signpost more clearly how, where, and why it is important to engage in local participatory democracy.
- To increase participation at the strategic level for those actors/agencies most affected by strategic policy decisions.
7.5.2 Implications for future research

This research study adopted a comparative case study approach, which looked at the implications of policy and practice with respect to community safety partnership working at the local level. An emphasis was placed on engaging with those key stakeholders most likely to offer explanations around policy and practice within a partnership setting; including those community representatives available for the study. However, policy makers and practitioners may appreciate research based around the implementation of LOIPS and CJOIPS and the Community Empowerment Act that seeks to identify and formalise emerging best practice that addresses some of the challenges posed above. For example, researchers may be interested in utilising a mixed methods approach (quantitative surveys, focus groups, individual interviews) that seeks to identify why active participation is difficult to achieve within local communities. Practitioners could also engage in practice-led or action research (McNish, 2013); to critically reflect if they are achieving the required statutory aims based around active community participation.
Appendix A

Interview schedule for CSP’s/CPPs in Case Study Areas

Partnership Origins
How many partners are there on the CSP and who are the Lead agencies?
Have you worked in partnership with any of these agencies/organisations before?

Power Structure/ control
Is there a vertical chain of command?
Who sets the organisational strategy/targets of CSP’s?
Are chosen strategies based on vertical or horizontal inter-organisational decision-making practices?
How much bureaucracy is involved within the CSP structure and process?
How is the CSP/or your input into the CSP financed?
Has austerity measures affected partnership working and/or services?

Co-ordination and Steering
What resources can/does your organisation bring to the partnership?
What if any community safety initiatives are there?
Are initiatives allowed a specific timescale or are they ongoing?
Do you have a commonality of purpose with other organisations in the CSP?
How is your organisations role defined within the CSP?
Given that the police are a lead agency, how will their amalgamation into one police force this April, affect working arrangements within the CSP?

Communication/commitment
How do you share information with other organisations?
Are all organisations willing to share specialised knowledge with other organisations within the CSP?
What barriers are there to effective communication within the CSPs?
Who organises and sets the agenda for partnership meetings and do you always attend them?
Is the level of commitment to the partnership the same from all partners?
Would your agencies commitment to the CSP be affected if a key individual changed their role within the organisation/or left the organisation?
How do you build and sustain a level of trust within the partnership?

**Organisational culture**

Does your agency have an equal status within the CSP?

Is partnership working relative to the ‘core business’ of your agency?

Has your agency ever been in conflict over the setting of strategies/goals within the CSP?

Are CSP strategy/goals driven by any one agency?

Has your agency ever experienced any difficulty in working with other agencies, and if so how was this resolved?

In your opinion would partnership working benefit if agencies worked from the same location?

How beneficial would it be to see how other agencies conduct their ‘core business’?

**Responsibility/Accountability**

Who is responsible overall for the CSP process?

Who is your organisation accountable to internally?

Who are they accountable to externally?

How is performance measured?

Is it difficult to measure all types of performance?

Do you consult the local community and if so how are they consulted?

How much input do local communities have on CSP strategies?

Are community groups represented in partnership meetings, and if so by whom?

How are they chosen?

Are young people engaged in the CSP process?

**Benefits to the community**

Are local communities given any feedback on CSP success or failures?

Have local communities experienced a drop in crime/anti-social behaviour?

How else have CSPs benefitted local communities?

Would you say the strategies chosen by the CSP are given the same level of importance by local communities?

How is success measured?

Have any initiatives been put in place for young people?

Have any initiatives been put in place for other members of the community?

In your opinion is there a question I have not asked you that I should have asked?
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