The Impact of Second World War Evacuation on Social Welfare in Scotland (incorporating an analysis of oral testimony from Scottish Evacuees)

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Abstract

This thesis examines the social, cultural and emotional welfare of Scottish women and children who were included in the mass evacuation of civilians which took place at the beginning of the Second World War. The first half of the twentieth century was marked by the momentous events of two very bloody and all-encompassing world wars. From the 1920s the British government, through the Committees of Imperial Defence and Air Raid Precautions, speculated on how best to protect the civilian population in the event of any future major conflict. As a result plans were put in place for the mass evacuation of vulnerable people through the appointment of an Evacuation sub-committee. The process of evacuation of millions of civilians has been documented by historians writing mainly from an English perspective. The same level of detailed academic analysis has not been extended to Scotland. The following thesis adds to the breadth of analysis of the evacuation process in Britain.

The work explores the well-established theory that warfare ultimately led to welfare most often associated with Richard Titmuss. This theory has been challenged by a number of revisionist historians, specifically Macnicol and Harris. This thesis upholds the Titmuss theory and provides evidence in support of the claim within the framework of health, education and religion. The research methodology adopted was a qualitative study of oral testimony by Scottish evacuees through a series of interviews. These interviews reflect on the broader evacuation experience from a hitherto somewhat neglected Scottish perspective. The information has been analysed in conjunction with an extensive and contrasting collection of sources. This data, while adding
value to the broad British experience of evacuation, identified a specific Scottish dimension, in particular within the sphere of maternity and child care, child guidance and the extension to educational service. The thesis also examines the way in which the Scottish process brought the Church and state into closer contact.

In conclusion this thesis identified how far the evacuation process contributed to the social welfare developments which took place during and immediately after the Second World War. The oral history interviews contained within the research made it possible to establish that the social well-being of post-war generations was enhanced as a result of the evacuation process.
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I would also like to thank the staff at local and central libraries and archives where my research has been conducted, and to the staff of the Clydebank Press who put me in touch with the Clydebank Lifestory Group. Their help in arranging interviews with Clydebank evacuees proved a valuable source of knowledge.

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he spent reading and rereading my chapters, without his help this project would not have been possible.
### Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ARP</td>
<td>Air Raid Precautions</td>
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<td>CORB</td>
<td>Children’s Overseas Reception Board</td>
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<td>DCA</td>
<td>Dundee City Archives</td>
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<td>EMS</td>
<td>Emergency Medical Services</td>
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<td>ERA</td>
<td>Evacuee Reunion Association</td>
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<td>FWVRC</td>
<td>Friends War Victims Relief Committee</td>
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<td>H of C</td>
<td>House of Commons</td>
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<td>H of L</td>
<td>House of Lords</td>
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<td>ILP</td>
<td>Independent Labour Party</td>
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<td>MO</td>
<td>Mass Observation</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td>NAS</td>
<td>National Archives of Scotland</td>
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<td>NRS</td>
<td>National Register of Scotland</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKCA</td>
<td>Perth and Kinross Council Archive</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTSD</td>
<td>Post Traumatic Stress Disorder</td>
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<td>SACE</td>
<td>Scottish Advisory Committee on Evacuation</td>
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<td>SCA</td>
<td>Scottish Catholic Archives</td>
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<td>SCAS</td>
<td>Stirling Council Archives Services</td>
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<td>SCRE</td>
<td>Scottish Council for Research Education</td>
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<td>SED</td>
<td>Scottish Education Department</td>
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<td>SJAC</td>
<td>Scottish Jewish Archives Centre</td>
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<td>TNA</td>
<td>The National Archives</td>
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<td>V 1</td>
<td>Flying Bomb</td>
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<td>V 2</td>
<td>Rocket</td>
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<tr>
<td>WI</td>
<td>Women’s Institute</td>
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<td>WRVS</td>
<td>Women’s Royal Voluntary Service</td>
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Map of Evacuation, Reception and Neutral Areas in September 1939. 
www.googlemaps.co.uk The Family Recorder; Mappy Monday [Accessed 29 May 2016]
Introduction

As regards the evacuation scheme, I am almost afraid to refer to it as a social experiment, although I have heard those words used about it time and again. It certainly has been a social upheaval...I have seen both sides of the problem and I want to be fair in dealing with it.

Joseph Westwood MP, 21 November 1939.¹

The evacuation process that Joseph Westwood, Labour MP for Falkirk and Stirling, referred to above began on Friday, 1 September 1939, two days before the declaration of the Second World War. It is the story of the evacuation process, which was the mandatory transfer of thousands of vulnerable people to places of perceived safety, referred to above as a ‘social experiment’, that lies at the heart of this study. Evacuation was an attempt by the British government to protect the most vulnerable members of the public, including schoolchildren, mothers with children, the blind and disabled, who were sent away from perceived danger areas of major cities at the outbreak of war. Much of the academic history of the evacuation process, including oral testimonies, has been written from an English perspective. In Scotland the actual experience of evacuation has not been told comprehensively from those who were evacuated. More importantly, as a social history, working from a base of materials derived from first hand

interviews allows us to see that evacuees were more than just recipients of some kind of government policy, they themselves helped shape it.

Using oral testimony in conjunction with a variety of primary source material and historiography, this thesis investigates the development of social welfare and the role of memory within the framework of the evacuation process. It is a thematic exploration and explanation of social and cultural change resulting from this evacuation in three particular fields: education, health and religion. Together, these strands combine to form the overarching theme of the thesis to relate the social history of the Scottish evacuation in which the evacuees were themselves such a fundamental part.

This chapter introduces the motivation for the thesis, its aims and objectives, and the methods used in connection with the collecting of oral testimony. It includes a review of the literary sources which have been used to help create a structured argument that warfare led to welfare within Scotland in the years 1939-1945 and the immediate aftermath. It concludes with a description of oral history as a method of research, a note of the original sources which have been used in the body of the thesis to stimulate and justify the arguments, and a brief résumé of the contents chapter by chapter.

The motivation for the thesis grew from initial research for a Masters dissertation which concerned Scottish children involved in the evacuation process. Scottish children, mothers with pre-school children and helpers numbered 175,000 of the 1.5 million people residing in Britain who were
evacuated at the beginning of the Second World War. Research showed that the Scottish evacuation process along with the children involved in it were substantially overlooked in published works on this episode of wartime history.

The evacuation of vulnerable people from major British cities was put in train at the beginning of the Second World War as a means of protecting the most vulnerable; young children, mothers with children, the blind and disabled. In England, after the initial mass movement of people in September 1939, there were two subsequent evacuation schemes put in place, after the London Blitz, then again in 1944 when London was hit by V1 and V2 bombing raids. Scotland’s situation was quite different in that after the first evacuation scheme there was just one further mass evacuation which took place after the blitz on the town of Clydebank, near Glasgow, during March 1941. Evacuation has been described as ‘a remarkable event in the history of modern Britain’. This process effectively helped create new welfare measures and improved welfare arrangements for the benefit of mothers and children at the time and for future generations.

Much of the work on the relationship between the Second World War and the development of welfare has been written around the English wartime experience, leaving the Scottish experience of war and its social repercussions largely untouched in the historical literature of the period.

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2 Susan J. Hess, Civilian Evacuation to Devon in the Second World War (University of Exeter, 2006), p.2.
This is due to a number of fundamental differences in the Scottish and English systems of education, health and housing. Academic consideration of what happened in Scotland has, thus far, largely been approached in general terms without regard to the social and economic problems which existed within Scotland at the time. William Boyd’s extensive statistical work concerning the Scottish evacuation, collated and written in 1944, was, and remains, the most in depth academic work carried out regarding the evacuation process, and will be used throughout this thesis. In 2006 Stewart and Welshman drew on Boyd’s work, and further contributed to the knowledge of the experience and outcomes of evacuation unique to Scotland. They concluded that evacuation drew attention to the difficulties endured by the Scottish urban working class and argued that as a result of the relative autonomy of Scotland, welfare and education took on a different trajectory in the post-war era. They further argued that differences between Scotland and England were rooted in approaches to poverty and social deprivation which were more structural than behavioural, and that as an example of these differences, child guidance in Scotland was strengthened by its role in the evacuation process. Sociologists and psychologists have shown a keen interest in child welfare and the emotional effects of war and evacuation over the past thirty to forty years. These issues will be discussed in the body of the thesis in relation to how they are pursued in oral testimony, and in measuring the lasting impact of the evacuation process on the health and welfare of children. Alongside the academic work of Stewart

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and Welshman, a few interest groups have produced books and pamphlets particular to local areas around Scotland. These include anecdotal accounts from former evacuees and have been useful reference guides for locating respondents.\(^5\)

\textit{Aims and Objectives}

The aims of this thesis are fourfold. The thesis will assess how far the theory that warfare ultimately led to welfare may be applied to Scottish evacuees. It will test the hypothesis that oral history is necessary in order to observe the wider picture of evacuation from a Scottish perspective. It will help further our knowledge of what happened to Scottish evacuees utilising the help of oral testimony from those who took part in the process. The final objective is to highlight the experiences of former Scottish evacuees and ensure that their participation in the process is appropriately recorded in the history of British evacuation.

The Scottish evacuees suffered equally to their English counterparts in having to adapt to the problems associated with the emotional trauma of family separation. Their experiences have been particularly under explored and deserve equal recognition within the history of the evacuation process. The thesis also challenges the historical stigma associated with those who

\(^5\) Two most notable local histories referred to in the thesis are from: Lorne Wallace, \textit{Here Come the Glasgow Keelies} (Perthshire, 1999), and Clydebank Life Story Group, \textit{Untold Stories: Remembering Clydebank in War Time} (Clydebank, 1999).
took part in the evacuation process. Such stigma, which stemmed from media coverage of the first few days of the war and early wartime social surveys, was the result of unquestioned assumptions about the unhygienic, impoverished, and the generally undesirable conditions in which evacuees had lived. Many of these stories were tenuous in nature and have to be examined within the broader context of the social situation which was prevalent in inner cities at the time. Although the majority of evacuees came from the cities, which was home to predominantly working-class families, the assertions that the majority suffered from head lice and scabies, were bad mannered with dirty habits, were assumptions that required qualification. Challenge will be made to these contemporary attitudes in the body of the thesis. In other words, this thesis questions the discourse of social degeneracy that has historically been associated with evacuees.

The cohort group involved in one-to-one interviews or as focus groups amounted to thirty respondents. This representative sample of respondents have had their experiences recorded in face to face interviews. The sample involved a number of individuals who were involved in the Clydebank blitz and subsequently evacuated. One of the cohort groups involved four respondents similarly evacuated from Clydebank. Other interviewees include one lady who was privately evacuated to Auchterarder from Dundee, and two people from a private school in Glasgow, evacuated with their school group. The remainder of the respondents were evacuated from either Glasgow or Edinburgh, all under the official government evacuation scheme. The testimony of the sample cohort will be used in conjunction with documentary evidence and historiography to demonstrate how evacuation
helped to enhance the development of social welfare during the war and in the early post-war period.

**Method**

During the planning stages of this project the main objective was to base as much information as possible on the oral histories of former evacuees. The oral testimony has therefore played a significant part in the overall framework of the thesis. From necessity, and to lay the foundations on which to build a case for evacuation as an integral part of social welfare development during the war and in the post-war era, it was important to outline the reasons for the process. The complex nature of the evacuation arrangements meant this had to be done over two chapters, with the inclusion of evacuation both home and abroad.

Once the ground work on the evacuation process had been completed it was necessary to consider individual issues chapter by chapter. The main themes related to health, religion and education. Taking each of these fundamental factors as a separate entity will help prove that evacuation was important in achieving the fairly rapid levels of change in social welfare which developed throughout wartime. Positive improvements in this area will support the argument expounded by Richard Titmuss, whose work embodied the belief that warfare ultimately led to welfare. Titmuss’s conviction that warfare led to welfare underpins the argument throughout the thesis.6

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The Scottish topic, once established as a social history project, with an oral history base, meant the search for participants had to be undertaken at some speed, as time was of the essence. It has been over seventy years since the start of the Second World War and finding former evacuees from among the Scottish population was a relatively difficult task. This search involved adverts in local newspapers, and a network of fellow students and friends who, through talking to friends and family found people willing to talk about their experience and have their stories recorded. This part of the project involved extensive travel throughout the central belt of Scotland, taking in places such as Clydebank, East Kilbride, Bishopbriggs and Clarkston in Glasgow. Other interviews were conducted in Stirling and the surrounding areas of Perthshire, down through Edinburgh and the south east.

Sensitivity to age meant the interviews were of a qualitative nature and a relatively casual approach to the interviews had to be adopted. This inevitably meant that on occasion there was a tendency for respondents to stray off topic. As a result not all the conducted interviews have been utilised in the thesis as there were occasions when some of the details were not relevant to the thematic interests of the issues under discussion. The element of trust between the interviewees and interviewer was fundamental from the beginning as the interviews were conducted in the homes of respondents. Once this trust was established the respondent was made aware of the central themes of the thesis which provided a starting point for their narrative. The interview began with a request that the respondent simply tell the story of their evacuation experience as far as possible as he/she
remembered it. It was felt that the presence of a formal questionnaire would be off putting and lead to distraction in the train of thought. This type of interview meant that transcriptions were required to be carried out before any real structured analysis could be undertaken.

Initially respondents were generally slightly restrained, believing that their experience was of very little importance. However, within a short time stories flowed freely and it soon became apparent that by its very nature evacuation lay close to the surface of their memories, and some of them were definitive of their adult lives. In most cases recall was clear and well narrated. This valuable narrative is important for the research project as most respondents remembered distinctive events personal to them. All remembered the people they had been billeted with even when billets were changed two, and sometimes three times. Food and school were common features of the narrative, and occasionally there was a passing reference to their educational attainment and religion. It was from these threads of commonality that the topics for the chapters on education and religion developed.

Parsons pointed out from his experience of interviewing evacuees there was a certain reticence on their part to complain about their circumstance. He believed this to be so much so that material for public consumption made propaganda inevitable. With passage of time and the desire to have their

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7 Martin Parsons, “I’ll Take That One”: Dispelling the Myths of Civilian Evacuation 1939-45 (Peterborough, 1998), p.245.
stories recorded, that reticence has dissipated to a certain extent. Nowadays evacuee testimony and oral history generally has become more acceptable in historiographical terms as an evidence base upon which to build a fairly graphic research structure.

Advocates of the benefits of oral history testimony include Portelli,\(^8\) Abrams,\(^9\) Thomson\(^10\) and Tosh,\(^11\) who, while they believe that by its nature oral testimony is a valuable resource, acknowledge the inherent problems of this type of evidence. Oral history evidence differs significantly from that of biographical and autobiographical accounts. Expressions, gestures, intonation, depth of feelings and enthusiasm in the spoken word is missing from written sources. Yet oral testimony requires to be substantiated by documentary evidence and historiography, although it has to be remembered these too are subjective and require a degree of scrutiny.

**Literature Review and Historiography**

The discussion of the literature which follows comments on a selection of publications central to the argument that war in general, and evacuation in particular, led to significant changes in social welfare. Much of the literature is taken from social and cultural histories ranging from the post-

war era to more recent accounts. The literature is discussed mainly from a social and cultural point of view with social welfare developments the predominant theme in each chapter. For the Scottish evacuation process the major influence has been William Boyd’s research, which was carried out during the war and covers the main aspects of the scheme. As such this material falls into the primary source category and has been evaluated under that heading later in this chapter. A review of the general literature involved begins with the work of Richard Titmuss as this has proved to be central to most historians working on evacuation.

Almost forty years after his death, Richard Titmuss’s definitive work on social policy provision and Second World War social welfare still provides a basis for academic, comparative and critical research surrounding the foundations of the British welfare state. Central to his work on Problems of Social Policy was the handling of the evacuation plans adopted by the government from the early 1930s until the end of the Second World War. His work was, and continues to be, widely quoted by historians and those involved in political and social studies with an interest in social welfare. Critical reviews include work from academics in both the United Kingdom and the United States, which gives some indication of how important his writing has been in helping to form scholarly opinion on social policy, social welfare and social justice.

In 1941 Titmuss was appointed as part of a team of experts charged with writing the official history of Britain in the Second World War. This appointment came from the chief economic historian Keith Hancock, who had been appointed by the Cabinet Office to write a series of twenty-seven
of the twenty-eight official volumes documenting the war on behalf of the
government. The Australian Dictionary of Biography, of which Hancock
was chairman from 1959-1965, highlights his achievements in academia
during the course of his life. He held the chair of modern history at the
University of Adelaide in 1924 and at the age of twenty-six became the
youngest Professor in the British Commonwealth. In 1934 he was chair of
modern history at the University of Birmingham. After the war he and three
others were put in charge of shaping the new entirely postgraduate
Australian National University of Canberra. His achievements led to the
award of honorary doctorate from nine universities.\textsuperscript{12} It was from
Hancock’s appointment of Titmuss that the \textit{History of the Second World
War: Problems of Social Policy} was written. This book was one of many
published works on social welfare and social policy by Titmuss. Other titles
include; \textit{Essays on ‘The Welfare State’},\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Income Distribution and Social
Change},\textsuperscript{14} and \textit{Commitment to Welfare}.\textsuperscript{15} He held the founding chair in
social administration at the London School of Economics (LSE) for twenty
years and obtained honorary degrees from the universities of Wales,
Edinburgh, Toronto, Chicago and Brunel and was appointed CBE in 1966.\textsuperscript{16}

Titmuss’s ultimate aim was to assess the growth of social services, with the
aid of central and local government officials and voluntary agencies both

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Australian Dictionary of Biography}.
\url{www.adb.anu.edu.au} [Accessed 20 September 2012].
\textsuperscript{13} Titmuss, \textit{Essays on ‘The Welfare State, 2nd Edition with a chapter on ‘the Irresponsible
\textsuperscript{14} Titmuss, \textit{Income Distribution and Social Change: A Study in Criticism} (London,
1962).
\textsuperscript{15} Titmuss, \textit{Commitment to Welfare} (London, 1968).
\textsuperscript{16} \url{www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/31763} [Accessed 30 April 2016].
prior to and throughout the war. As an historian working for the government he had free access to official documents that he used to present three main themes in the book. These included evacuation, the hospital services and the care of the homeless.\textsuperscript{17} It is evacuation and the resultant social welfare changes which will be the focus of discussion here.

The structure, statistics, chronology and much of the narrative of the book are in a format useful to the historian. However, the Scottish evacuation process was misrepresented on two separate occasions in the book. Titmuss stated that Scottish schoolchildren were evacuated with their mothers.\textsuperscript{18} The official Scottish line was that family members should be sent together but this was not always possible. On several occasions within the oral testimony it was confirmed that school groups were sent to reception areas as a class and not with their family. This was the case for the three Dennistoun schools in Glasgow when the children were all sent to the village of Dunning. According to Boyd the number of unaccompanied Scottish schoolchildren evacuated in September 1939 was calculated to be 62,059.\textsuperscript{19} These examples suggest flaws in Titmuss’s information gathering.

Titmuss was commissioned by representatives of the wartime coalition government, and was committed to producing a report on the way in which the war was being conducted. His narrative of events levelled very little criticism on the way the government handled the situation. There were some exceptions, for example when Titmuss referred to ‘the backwardness of

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy (London, 1950), p.ix.}
\bibitem{Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy (1950), p.551.}
\bibitem{Boyd, Evacuation in Scotland (1944), p.31.}
\end{thebibliography}
evacuation plans at the beginning of 1939’, or the problems the Health Department faced as a result of ‘the short-range, and admittedly defective measures to be put into operation’ should the situation arise.\textsuperscript{20} He was also critical of the fact that the problems highlighted by the first evacuation scheme were repeated during the second movement and later in the war.\textsuperscript{21}

Titmuss fostered an almost idealistic belief in people’s changing attitudes towards each other as a result of war. He held an altruistic view of society, and hoped that social changes, brought about as a result of war, would lead to the creation of a more egalitarian society. He wrote that total war fused all classes of society together and that death, injury and homelessness caused by bombs were just as likely to affect the rich as the poor. War and welfare, he claimed, went hand in hand, and he emphasised the progress made in areas of welfare during the Second World War. In his summing up of the role of the British government during the war he praised the flexibility of the newly established social services extended to all classes in society.\textsuperscript{22} He credited the evacuation process with advancement in social welfare in Britain in areas of child poverty and neglect, education, health, increased numbers of social workers and enhanced intervention in the problems relating to juvenile delinquency.

Since the 1960s Titmuss’s theory concerning the wartime development of social welfare has been widely challenged by social and political historians.

\textsuperscript{22} Titmuss, \textit{Problems of Social policy} (1950), p.506.
These include such historians as Angus Calder,\textsuperscript{23} John Macnicol\textsuperscript{24} and Pat Thane.\textsuperscript{25} The principle criticism levelled against Titmuss has been that social welfare development was a gradual process instigated long before the outbreak of war. Where rapid change did occur as a direct result of war, these changes, Macnicol argued, did not go far enough to permanently improve the existing conditions of poverty. Titmuss himself acknowledged that changes and improvements in social welfare had taken place long before the outbreak of the Second World War, although he believed that war contributed substantially to the speed with which change took place. Historians opposed to Titmuss’s view attributed many of the developments in wartime social welfare to the rise in employment levels during the war. The rise in employment, it was claimed, partially alleviated poverty concerns and allowed government to focus attention elsewhere, for example on education, health and housing.\textsuperscript{26}

Following the outbreak of war employment figures rose as more women were employed to do the jobs men had vacated when called up for military service. As there were more working mothers the number of day nurseries increased, health care and nutritional requirements improved generally for women and children. Milk and vitamin supplements were given to pregnant and nursing mothers and young children, and the existing milk in schools scheme was extended to all children during the war. Titmuss believed the extension of the milk in schools scheme resulted from evacuation when

\textsuperscript{23} Angus Calder, \textit{The People’s War, Britain 1939-1945} (London, 1992), p.543.
social investigators began writing about the neglect prevalent in child evacuees. Macnicol challenged this and suggested that the extension of milk in schools scheme was simply a natural continuation of services planned in the 1930s.\(^{27}\) It was, he argued, included as part of rationing and wartime food policy, and a way of reducing surplus stocks held by producers, rather than a benevolent gesture on the part of the government.\(^{28}\) Others writing on the subject of evacuation have challenged Macnicol’s view of the wartime situation. Bernard Harris suggested Macnicol had ignored the fact that ‘evacuation acted as a catalyst for social change’,\(^{29}\) and Derek Fraser claimed that evacuation ‘epitomised the impact of the war upon social policy’.\(^{30}\) However both these historians have warned against the idea of wartime solidarity that was part of the Titmuss principle.

Two articles by Welshman relating to the evacuation scheme suggest a more positive approach to the Titmuss theory. In *Evacuation and Social Policy During the Second World War: Myth and Reality*, he wrote Titmuss was ‘undoubtedly correct in arguing that the evacuation altered attitudes to state welfare’ and that on balance evacuation was ‘a forward movement in thinking that was consolidated in important policy changes’. He further claimed that ‘evidence for change seems more powerful than that of continuity’.\(^{31}\) This article focused on four issues which were highlighted as

defective in many city children when they arrived in reception areas, including head lice, lack of clothing and footwear, nutrition and delinquency. Welshman justified his argument by providing examples of the way in which Civil Servants and School Medical Officers changed their approach to poverty, and of the way in which a more critical approach to health services developed in dealing with child hygiene, footwear and clothing, nutrition and child guidance.

On the issue of delinquency, which Welshman discussed only in relation to England, he presented a convincing argument for the growth and development of child guidance as a result of the evacuation process. He acknowledged that the effect of the separation of children from parents during evacuation had ‘a profound impact on theories about child care in the post-war period’. This, he claimed led to improvements in social policy affecting families in the 1950s. He believed that Titmuss had been a key player in the early stages of the evolution of the problem family, and that evacuation had been principally responsible for the move away from social problem groups in the 1930s to the problem families of the 1950s.32

When dealing with juvenile delinquency exacerbated by evacuation it appeared that Titmuss view, it could be argued, was consistent with the rest of his positive theories on childhood behaviour. While he recognised faulty parenting was a contributory factor, Titmuss attempted to rationalise the problem of delinquency taking account of many of the psychological aspects of childcare and separation. In dealing with delinquency he was influenced

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by psychologist John Bowlby’s attachment theory, and considered emotional and environmental conditions fundamental in the first five years of a child’s life. He wrote that if a child is deprived of affection or is separated from parents in his/her early years it could lead to problems in later life.\(^\text{33}\)

Titmuss viewed delinquency from an intergenerational perspective where he perceived that the fundamental problem often resulted from those parents or carers who had suffered separation in the early stages of their own life. From this alternative view of delinquency, it is possible to assume that he was as consistent in his views of the causes of delinquency as he had been about the causes of neglected clothing, bedwetting and head lice.

Titmuss’s belief in universalism also remained consistent not only in his work on the wartime social history but throughout his later life. He was aware that there would be issues arising from his work that would be challenged by those coming after him and that the ‘broad generalisations’ he made would be subject to revision by historians.\(^\text{34}\) Welshman’s article is an example of counter-revisionism as it presented a controversial argument surrounding both Titmuss’s personality and opinions.

Whether in agreement with or opposed to his ideas and opinions, much of Titmuss’s early work provides the framework on which to build a picture of the progress made in social welfare from 1940s Britain until the twenty-first century. Writing in 2011 both Julie Summers’ research concerning the

return of the evacuees, and Juliet Gardiner’s descriptive interpretation of the London Blitz, have taken examples from Titmuss.\textsuperscript{35} At the time of writing, the most recent journal article concerning his ideals and opinions was written from a sociology perspective, published in 2008.\textsuperscript{36} Mann’s article deals with Titmuss’s essays on social welfare division, and implies that the work which originated in the Second World War is still a valid starting point for the critical analysis of social welfare development.

The evacuation process was given scant attention as a significant aspect in the social history of the Second World War during the 1960s. The general histories of the war incorporated a brief mention of evacuation within the wider context of events from the time. Writing in 1968 Marwick was somewhat dismissive of evacuation as important to social welfare developments. He conceded however that while he thought evacuation had been exaggerated, it was an example of war exposing existing institutions.\textsuperscript{37} Addison’s opinion of evacuation written in the early 1980s was similar to that of Marwick, and upheld the received and uncontested opinion of historians writing in the 1960s, that evacuees were generally victims of slum conditions and ignorant of normal domestic conveniences.\textsuperscript{38} Addison’s work largely reproduces the prejudices and the stigma associated with earlier work on the evacuation.

\textsuperscript{38} Paul Addison, \textit{The Road to 1945} (London, 1975), pp.71-73.
Adopting a political perspective, Addison focused predominantly on the victory of the Labour Party in 1945 as the vehicle for improvements in welfare. Arguing for permanent change, he wrote that the rise of the Labour Party, and in turn welfare reforms, was a response to evacuation, the Dunkirk spirit, and total war. He thought that when the working classes were mobilised for total war, they would insist on making change permanent.\textsuperscript{39} The victory of the Labour Party at the end of the war was therefore considered to have been the means by which extended provision of health and welfare was introduced.

On a political level Crosby, whose work focused predominantly on the English evacuation process, believed the collapse of the evacuation scheme in the early months of the war, and the general uncertainty surrounding Conservative intentions, presented the Labour Party in England with an opportunity for action.\textsuperscript{40} Labourites, he said, established themselves as early and severe critics of the Board of Education’s actions during the evacuation. Crosby claimed the Labour Party kept up an attack on wartime educational policy, and suggested that the cynical attitude Conservatives had shown to educational reform gave Labour a political advantage.\textsuperscript{41} Yet Crosby perceived it less likely than Addison that the working classes were mobilised for change as a result of the evacuation process. Instead he speculated on the victory of the Labour Party in 1945 as more of a verdict against the

\textsuperscript{39} Addison, \textit{The Road to 1945} (1975), pp.71-73.
\textsuperscript{40} Travis Crosby, \textit{The Impact of Civilian Evacuation in the Second World War} (Kent, 1986), pp.193, 145 + 148.
\textsuperscript{41} Crosby, \textit{The Impact of Civilian Evacuation in the Second World War} (1986), pp.138-139.
Conservative Party’s ability to lead the wives and children of working class men to safety.  

As a consequence of the renewed attention to the evacuation process since the 1980s by historians, the remainder of this introduction will focus on the historiography from this era and beyond. Historiography surrounding evacuation has focused generally on two main arguments: how far the evacuation process was responsible for social welfare improvements, and to what extent there was a unification of social classes as a result of evacuation. These arguments are pertinent to the overall theme of the thesis and therefore necessitate discussion at this point.

McLachlan held the generally accepted view of historians that diseases such as head lice and scabies among evacuees shocked public health and voluntary workers. He argued that instead of welfare developments continuing along the lines of the 1930s, war had ‘produced the resolution to do what should have been done earlier’.  

He commented that the first evacuation scheme, and the raids on Clydebank in March 1941, had shaken up the social complacency of the local administration of the Department of Health for Scotland. He further argued that evacuation resulted in lasting improvements in welfare provision. It brought the need for health care provision for children to the fore, he said, and was directly related to improvements in the hygiene of school premises, and the extension in child

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guidance clinics by education authorities.\textsuperscript{45} McLachlan’s positive argument towards improved health care as a result of evacuation has been of value to the warfare to welfare argument of the thesis. However, it should be noted that McLachlan was a civil servant and it is possible he modelled his arguments on those of Titmuss.

The belief in a more egalitarian society, and a brighter and better future for all was championed by Titmuss. In 2006 Susan Hess wrote that it was little wonder Titmuss espoused the wartime spirit of universalism in so far as he was writing in what she referred to as the heady post-war early years when belief in Britain’s New Jerusalem was at its zenith and Labour’s post war government in its infancy.\textsuperscript{46} From a Roman Catholic perspective, Fitzpatrick also believed that the shared experience of war helped bring the Catholic body closer than before to the national community.\textsuperscript{47} Fitzpatrick’s work has been particularly useful in the context of Chapter IV on the subject of religion and education. In terms of class levelling it was his opinion that the ghetto mentality changed as war weakened the barriers that had existed between the Roman Catholic minority and the community as a whole, and gave the Catholic population a new sense of belonging.\textsuperscript{48} Politically this sense of belonging may be associated with the rise and sweeping victory of

\textsuperscript{46} Susan J. Hess, Civilian Evacuation to Devon in the Second World War (Doctoral Thesis held at the University of Exeter, 2006), p.21.
the Labour Party, which was, according to Fitzpatrick, the political if not the spiritual home of the majority of the Catholic community. 49

Revisionist historians such as Macnicol argued against the possibility of social levelling of classes and any long-term welfare developments resulting from evacuation. 50 Conflicting opinions exist between Fitzpatrick and Macnicol over the question of class and education. Macnicol argued that welfare reforms did not go far enough and perpetuated the division of class through the continuation of a three tier system of education. 51 Macnicol’s opinion was shared by Thane, although her argument against evacuation as an instrument for social change went significantly further than Macnicol. 52 She believed improved living standards were a result of full employment, and commented that there was little evidence of ‘a heightened government awareness’, if it existed, that drove the war government to enthusiasm for extensive social reconstruction. 53 She questioned many of the government intentions regarding improvements in social welfare. In her opinion change was necessary to maintain civilian support for the war. 54 She argued against the influence of war on educational improvements, believing that Butler’s success with education in 1944 was achieved through his own determination and the uncontroversial nature of his proposals. 55 However, she did agree with Murphy on the subject of child care developments instigated as a result

of evacuation and separation, although she stressed that such developments
were extended along the lines advocated before the war.\textsuperscript{56} She further
acknowledged, as Murphy did, that the neglect and ill-treatment of some
children while in foster care ultimately led to the Curtis and Clyde
Committee enquiry, and eventually the Children Act of 1948. The death of
12 year old Dennis O’Neill as a result of starvation and beating while in
foster care served to highlight the flaws in the existing system of child care
and protection.\textsuperscript{57} Dennis O’Neill’s death was indirectly linked to the
evacuation process as it was on account of the pressure for places for
children due to wartime conditions that led to the boy being placed on a
remote Shropshire farm. Murphy explained that he had been placed by an
untrained school attendance official and there had been no follow up checks
made on his progress between July 1944 and January 1945.\textsuperscript{58} Holman, a
former evacuee, also stressed that the genesis of legislation for the Children
Act of 1948 was shaped by the general experience of war, and in particular
of the experience of evacuation.\textsuperscript{59}

Calder also accredited much of the legislation for social change to the work
which had been done before the war.\textsuperscript{60} He recognised nevertheless that
after the bombing raids began there was a ‘change of heart in the
authorities’, as the need for evacuation success grew more important.\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{56} Thane, Foundations of the Welfare State 2\textsuperscript{nd} Edition (1996), p.244.
\textsuperscript{57} John Murphy, British Social Services: The Scottish Dimension (Edinburgh, 1992),
p.19.
\textsuperscript{58} Murphy, British Social Services (1992), p.19.
\textsuperscript{60} Calder, The People’s War (1969), p.17.
While he agreed there were signs of improvement in the physical condition of children during the war, he questioned the degree of improvement in their psychological and intellectual development.  

Contrary to both Thane and Calder, Virginia Berridge, suggested evacuation may have led to more change than they had thought possible. Taking a longer term perspective it was her opinion that the reassessment of health services for schoolchildren, the growth in attendance at antenatal centres by pregnant women, and the greater emphasis on child guidance and psychology were examples of improved welfare during the war.

The emotional aspect of child welfare was of particular interest to Lucy Faithfull, later Baroness Faithfull, who became a social worker as a result of her work with evacuees. Devoted to the cause of child welfare throughout her life, she realised from the time of the first mass evacuation that evacuated children generally had a greater degree of emotional disturbance than those who stayed at home. Throughout her long career first as a social worker, then as Inspector for the Children’s Branch of the Home Office, followed by her time as Director of Social Services, she worked to keep children with their families. Her biographer wrote that this undoubtedly resulted from her experience of evacuation. The long-term

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63 Virginia Berridge, Health and Society in Britain since 1939 (Cambridge, 1999), pp.13 and 21.
64 Judith Niechcial, Lucy Faithfull: Mother to Hundreds (Beckenham, 2010), pp.xiii and 42.
65 Niechcial, Lucy Faithfull (2010), p.42
psychological and sociological problems inherent in evacuation were manifest by the separation of families during evacuation. These problems caused by separation provided professionals in the field with a valuable source of research into the psychological and sociological health of former evacuees. This aspect of evacuation forms part of the discussion in Chapter VI concerning the long-term emotional health of evacuees.

Rusby’s quantitative study of long-term attachment issues as a result of evacuation, adds considerably to our understanding of the psychological aspects of the ‘social experiment’ which was the evacuation process. Rusby has systematically explored the possible association between a variety of aspects relating to the evacuation experience and the subsequent mental health, marital history and attachment of participants in their adult life. The evacuation experience was believed to be defined by five experience variables, consisting of total period away, frequency of parental visits, care received, number of billets and age at evacuation. As may have been predicted, he found the dominant variables to be age at evacuation and care received, which led to two extremes of positive gain or emotional legacy. A young child with poor care during evacuation led to a negative experience and alternatively an adolescent with good care led to a positive experience. He found that the frequency of visits by parents during a child’s evacuation led to the more self-confident and sociable they were in life and in the quality of relationships. Horizons and interests in adulthood were broader when there were frequent changes of billets.66

Since the 1980s a number of books have been published by former evacuees with recollections and reminiscences of their own and others who were part of the evacuation scheme, and which deal with a variety of issues. Of these text and oral histories Rusby wrote that 50 years had to pass before either those involved, or the general public were able to look honestly at these recollections. Some of these histories, such as Holman’s, offer more than others to historical debate. Holman’s argument in favour of evacuation as a means of accelerating reform, although informative in a number of areas of evacuation, falls short on some important details to back up his assertions. This is especially the case in his discussion on child care and in the escalation in employment of social workers. Ruth Inglis meanwhile maintains the preconceived opinion of the condition of the majority of evacuees as dirty and unkempt. Her approach, which reproduces the stigma associated with the participants of evacuation, does not question the hierarchies embedded in prior historical accounts.

According to Parsons it was difficult to find a typical evacuee. Often geographical location influenced individual experiences. However, from the recollections in the publications by those mentioned above, and in oral history interviews conducted for this thesis, there is commonality of experiences concerning a number of the issues. Education, for example, was cause for concern in a significant number of cases, and for many a source of

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68 Rusby, Childhood Temporary Separation (2005), p.25.
disappointment at the way in which educational attainment was affected by war and evacuation. In the 1960s Marwick and Calder recognised how influential war had been on the British education system. Of the legislation included in the Education Act of 1944 Calder wrote that it was ‘potentially the most important gesture towards democracy in the twentieth century’. For Lindsay Paterson the origins of post-war thinking about secondary education lay earlier in the 1930s. He stressed however, that as in so much of Scottish social life in the 1940s, educational reform became a firmly established route to progress.

Government officials at the time were aware of the importance of education during evacuation and openly voiced concern in this area. For example, Joseph Westwood, MP for Stirling and Falkirk, who went on to become Secretary of State for Scotland in July 1945, spoke out over the postponement of the introduction of the 1936 Education Act. He said that:

The new day school regulations would have brought us nearer to the time when our educational system would be adapted to the capabilities of the child, instead of compelling the children to fit into one or two cast-iron moulds. Now, almost at its beginning, the war numbers

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among its casualties education which is one of the most important of our social services.\textsuperscript{73}

For education historians, evacuation severely disrupted the education system during the war and effectively threw children from different social and cultural backgrounds together in a way they had never been before. This cultural shift for urban children to rural parts of the countryside left long lasting impressions on such children that were themselves formative and influential on their subsequent education. Paterson saw this as symbolising a unity that perpetuated after the war. Progressive comprehensive reforms, he believed, emerged after the 1960s and appeared to narrow the differences in educational progress in relation to class, gender and religion.\textsuperscript{74} Fitzpatrick held with this opinion in terms of Scottish Catholic secondary education, which expanded significantly from the 1950s onwards. He commented that the provision of new schools had kept pace with the massive programme of re-housing for more than twenty years after the war.\textsuperscript{75}

In educational terms evacuation affected religious as well as academic education, and the continuous religious welfare of evacuees is discussed in Chapter IV. The continuation of religious education of evacuees was especially important among the hierarchy of various churches. However, a search through the General Assembly papers for the period and various documents from local Parishes in St Andrews and Glasgow uncovered very

\textsuperscript{73} \textit{H of C} Debate, 21 November 1939, vol. 353, cc. 1088-1089.
little information relating to evacuation within the Church of Scotland. Perhaps because of the lack of primary evidence in this area, much of the historiography relating to evacuation covers religion in very general terms. Holman offers some insight in so far as, in his opinion, there was an almost universal opening up of church services and Sunday schools to evacuees, and, he claimed, in many cases all youth organisations were thrown open to them. His information is inconclusive however as he omitted figures and locations to enable a comparison to be made with pre-war attendance. He was nevertheless one of the few historians of evacuation who made reference to the Commission of the Churches, a religious body who provided guidance to Churches on the problems to be faced by evacuation. The report by the Commission of Churches is a useful wartime source of information concerning the working of various churches and church bodies during the Second World War.

Few social historians have dealt with the religious aspect of evacuation in any depth. Calder believed that there was a degree of religious tolerance during the evacuation. Although his evidence is of a general nature there were instances where a greater understanding and tolerance existed between religious groups during the evacuation process. He claimed that Jews who were received into gentile homes during evacuation helped mix people together providing, what he regarded as, a new degree of mutual respect and tolerance. Evidence from the Glasgow Synagogue in Garnethill does not point to the type of tolerance to which Calder alluded. Chaim Bermant’s

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account of his life during the war leans towards an agreement with Calder only in so far as he found it reassuring to be resented for being an evacuee rather than for being a Jew.\textsuperscript{78} Autobiographical accounts by former evacuees reinforce the importance that was placed on religion in certain quarters during the evacuation, including those by Bermant and Milbourn.\textsuperscript{79} Publications pertinent to religion include those which offer informative testimony of the life and work of Quakers during the war.\textsuperscript{80} The personal testimony in these autobiographical accounts provide important evidence relating to religion within the evacuation process.

\textbf{Sources}

Boyd’s 1944 statistical survey of the Scottish evacuation process ranged from the planning stages, through the first mass evacuation, private evacuation, overseas evacuation and the Clydebank blitz. His research considered the attitude of parents in deciding whether or not to include their children in the evacuation scheme. This included family size, age, gender, class, and religion from a Roman Catholic and Protestant perspective. He took account of billeting problems, teachers, the provision of education, home study groups, residential hostels and homes and camp schools. His work has been widely used throughout the thesis when referring to statistical and documentary evidence relating to the Scottish scheme.

As Boyd’s work was carried out during the war he could not have predicted the long-term effect of evacuation. He did however comment on the lack of provision for any psychological problems which may have resulted from separation caused by evacuation. He offered some insight into his personal thoughts on the evacuation process when he wrote that this lack of provision was ‘another indication of the scrappy nature of the arrangements’.  

Boyd’s opinion was shared by the members of the Commission of Churches.

Ferguson and Fitzgerald’s account of wartime dealt specifically with evacuation in terms of hospital and maternity care. During the war there were a number of social surveys produced on evacuation and the pamphlet by the Scottish Women’s Group on Public Welfare, Our Scottish Towns: Evacuation and the Social Future, has been of particular value to this study. Following these works there was a gap of approximately thirty years before any extensive research on evacuation was undertaken. This later work has already been addressed in the introduction.

A wide range of original sources have been used to add to the evidence from the oral testimony and the existing historiography, in order to assess how far evacuation was helpful in establishing new and improved welfare developments in Scotland. Newspapers including the Glasgow Herald, Daily Record and Mail, Scotsman, Jewish Chronicle and Jewish Echo have

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been used. Records of Parliamentary debates in the House of Commons, accessed through online Hansard, have been thoroughly explored. Minutes of meetings, letters, health records and school log books held at both Glasgow and Edinburgh City Archives have also been used. Sourcing the original school magazines for Whitehill School in Dennistoun, Glasgow, from a private collection, helped provided an insight into the everyday wartime life of an educational establishment. Other important original source material was accessed through archival documentation held at the National Archives, National Archives of Scotland, Jewish Archives, and the Archives of Stirling and Falkirk, Glasgow University, Dundee City, and St. Andrews University and St. Andrews Museum. The individual Parish Church records from St. Andrews and Glasgow provided little of value to the themes in question. They did help to establish that evacuation was of no great importance to the everyday life of some rural parishes. Scrutiny of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland papers for the period of the war uncovered little of any substance concerning the evacuation in Scotland. Library sources included The British Library, the National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh City Library and the Mitchell Library in Glasgow and local libraries in Clydebank, Linlithgow, Stirling and Perth.

This thesis offers a contribution to the field of study explicitly through collection of personal testimonies carried out by the author. The interviews have uncovered aspects of the Scottish experience which have been touched upon only tentatively by past historians of evacuation. An example of this is the setting up and implementing of the home study groups undertaken by teachers in the early years of the war. These interviews constitute the most
systematic consideration of the Scottish evacuation experience since Boyd’s 1944 investigation.

Although the revival of interest in evacuation during the Second World War has been wide ranging there is still scope for further research. This would allow a broader understanding of the subject in local areas. There are still people throughout Scotland whose experience has been left untold. These people may well help historians to uncover areas of evacuation which have as yet been unaccounted for in the general history of the subject. In many of the more recent publications not all of the interviews have been carried out on a face-to-face basis. There is in fact a significant amount of oral histories which have been included in historical works where the recorded experience has been analysed from existing testimony. An example of this can be seen Lyn Smith’s ‘Young Voices’ where most of the work has been taken from a broad range of sources held at The Imperial War Museum. 85

The collection of evacuee experiences held at the Imperial War Museum is fairly extensive and relates mainly to English evacuees. Hess noted that there is also a research centre for Evacuees and War Child Studies within the University of Reading. An Evacuee Reunion Association (ERA) was established in 1996 which, according to Hess is the largest organisation serving the Second World War British evacuees and has helped ex-evacuees to finally find a united voice in the face of the revival of interest in the

subject. There is no equivalent body in Scotland. It is notable that in at least one of the small country reception areas of Perthshire, evacuees celebrated a reunion in 1994. This received national and local television and radio coverage. To show their appreciation for the care they received during their stay in Dunning, the evacuees arranged for a plaque to be placed on the wall of the local church which reads:

This plaque is dedicated to the villagers of Dunning from the evacuees, mostly from Glasgow, of the Second World War, 1939-1945. ‘A Welcome Was Made and Not Forgotten’.

The memories of the Dunning people and the evacuees who stayed there is still very much alive and the research interviews carried out for this thesis indicates that there is a strong and hitherto untapped living memory of evacuation experience in Scotland.

**Chapter Outlines**

**Chapters I and II**

Chapters I and II have been set out in a descriptive tone in order to fully explore the workings of the evacuation process. These two chapters describe how the official evacuation process grew from a suggestion of the

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86 S. J. Hess, Civilian Evacuation to Devon in the Second World War, 2006 (Doctoral Thesis held at Exeter University), p.16.
best way to safeguard vulnerable civilians, through to its implementation at the beginning of September 1939. Much of the content of these opening chapters has focused on existing historiography and primary documentary evidence.

Chapter III

Chapter III considers the various aspects of health and welfare issues raised by evacuation and takes account of the changes introduced directly and indirectly as a result. It deals with the generally received attitude to evacuation which existed early in the war by social surveyors and media. This was principally that evacuees had arrived in reception areas in a dirty and verminous condition, rife with scabies and head lice. These reports, exaggerated as they may have been, effectively influenced changes to the way future evacuation schemes were carried out. School medical inspections, missing from the first scheme, were to be carried out before children could be included in any future evacuation scheme and those children deemed unfit were to be given curative treatment. The chapter also deals with nutritional concerns including school-meals and the milk-in-schools scheme as well as the provision of vitamins and orange juice for children and pregnant women. It also deals with the expansion of maternity care as a result of evacuation.

Chapter IV

This chapter considers the subject of religion with regard to evacuees. It draws on the views of several interviewees. It deals with the problems
which emerged once the first evacuees were settled in reception areas. Discussion focuses on the attitude and reaction to evacuation from within various faiths to the official scheme, and the action taken by the hierarchy of these churches during the war. By its nature evacuation included a mix of social and cultural identities and a range of faiths are considered in this chapter. The chapter utilises material obtained at the Scottish Jewish Archives, contained within the Synagogue building at Garnethill in Glasgow, relating to the evacuation of Jewish children and the work of the Jewish hierarchy in helping to stem the threat of Jewish children being sent to Christian homes. This material suggested that there were basic similarities between Jewish and Catholic responses to evacuation. The chapter also considers how Protestant groups reacted to evacuation.

**Chapter V**

The chapter focuses on the children who stayed at home during the war and those children who returned to evacuation areas within weeks and months of the instigation of the initial scheme. Here the research focuses on what happened to city children when schools were closed in the early months of the war and how the lack of ancillary services affected their health and wellbeing. Documentary evidence fits comfortably here with the historiography and the testimony from respondents in highlighting the way in which social and cultural change was manifest as a result of war and evacuation.
Chapter VI

The final research chapter focuses significant attention on the testimony of the respondents. It attempts to equate their narrative with the received perception of evacuation. While some additional oral history is used throughout the thesis, the final chapter heavily features the pertinent information from former evacuees contained in the original interviews. This helps correlate their experience with the original source material and the documented historiography on evacuation. The six chapters of the thesis are followed by an extended conclusion.
Chapter I

The Evacuation Process: Theory and Practice

The process and planning for the movement of millions of people before and during the Second World War was a major undertaking, on a scale never before exercised by the British government. Evacuation was not a new phenomenon. According to Parsons, preparation for the evacuation of people and livestock had been planned in Dorset in 1803, as a result of a threatened invasion by the French. 88 More than a century later, during the Spanish Civil War, the first evacuation of unaccompanied children took place following the bombing of civilians in Guernica in 1937. This movement of children, separated from family and friends, aroused a degree of public sympathy which was not felt for adult refugees. 89 The difference between these events and the mass evacuation planned in Britain in the 1930s, predominantly for school age children, was in the interpretation of the term. The Evacuation Committee in charge of planning and operating the evacuation scheme used the term to mean the ‘transference beyond the limits of the urban area concerned’. 90 In real terms this meant moving those considered most vulnerable to areas of the countryside where it was perceived to be safe from the threat of aerial bombardment.

Scottish matters, although forming the central component of this thesis, will only be discussed briefly in this chapter. It provides an overview of the

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central administration and implementation of evacuation arrangements, from the inception of the idea until the first wave of evacuees were installed in areas of perceived safety. The Scottish evacuation process followed the guidelines laid down by the British government, but was organised and executed autonomously by the Scottish Departments of Health and Education. These departments were ultimately responsible for setting out an acceptable solution to the problems which evacuation was likely to incur, including the question of selection of those civilians considered most vulnerable. This was a crucial aspect of the evacuation process as a whole throughout the British Isles. For the purpose of evacuation preparations, the safety of vulnerable people from densely populated areas, especially in major cities, industrial areas and docklands, and their dispersal in rural, sparsely populated areas was a priority. The removal of vulnerable people from areas of potential danger, in times of war, stemmed from the changes in warfare adopted towards the end of the First World War when air attack became more widespread.

Titmuss, was the leading authority on the methods, implementation and implications of the evacuation process. His work on ‘Problems of Social Policy’, which covers the whole period of the Second World War and has taken account of all aspects involved in the evacuation scheme, will provide the foundation for historic debate. His theory that warfare ultimately led to welfare will form part of the argument for the social welfare changes which were instigated as a result of evacuation. This theory was formed from an observation of the developments in welfare following on from previous wars. This was compounded by the fact that government officials were sensitive to the importance of establishing a method of protection for
civilians in the event of future enemy attack. A brief look at the 1920s will explain how evacuation developed as a means of protection. In addition, this chapter will look briefly at the civilian bombardment which took place in Europe during the 1930s, which was influential to the British government plans for health, transport, accommodation and settlement beyond areas of potential danger. This will involve consideration of financial aspects of the operation and how evacuation worked in practice. Discussion in this chapter will also include the way in which dependence on the voluntary sector grew and developed through evacuation planning and implementation. Various opinions about the nature of the evacuation arrangements, in particular hostile local authority attitudes in receiving areas, and ineffectual parliamentary pressure for compulsory evacuation, will be discussed.

In essence planning for war and evacuation became more realistic as the 1930s progressed and conflict with Germany rapidly became inevitable. In spite of assurances from Germany that no further claims would be made on European territory after the invasion of the Sudetenland in March 1938, in September of that year the German army annexed the rest of Czechoslovakia, and Britain was forced to step up preparations for war.

Through observations of, and reaction to, the conflict in China in 1931 and the Civil War in Spain between 1936 and 1939, the British authorities believed that evacuation of civilians was necessary before conflict began, in order to avoid widespread panic. The Air Raid Precautions Department judged that bombing raids on London would reach levels of seventy-two casualties per ton of bombs dropped. This figure was based on reports of
raids on Barcelona in March 1938.\textsuperscript{91} Government ministers anticipated that evacuation prior to the outbreak of war would therefore avoid widespread panic.

The Official Report by the Committee on Evacuation in September 1938 concluded that:

\begin{quote}
It [was] impossible fully to envisage the horrors of intensive air attack by the forces of a major European power on a densely populated city; but events in Spain and China have at least given some indication of what might befall.\textsuperscript{92}
\end{quote}

The lack of preparedness in the earlier continental European evacuation procedures undoubtedly encouraged the British government to implement an early evacuation programme. Reports from Spain during the Civil War described how thousands of people were having to flee from their homes with nothing but the clothes they stood in, and trek miles across the country to find safety and shelter. Reports also emphasised the chaos in Guernica after the bombing there in April 1937, when the first evacuation of unaccompanied children took place.\textsuperscript{93}

Meanwhile, in Germany during the 1930s thousands of Jews were seeking safe passage out of the country to avoid Nazi persecution. However, with

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{93} Mann, \textit{Out of Harm’s Way} (2005), p.18.
\end{flushleft}
the re-introduction of a visa system for Austrian and German citizens in the spring of 1938, which had been abolished in 1927, this proved extremely difficult. Louise London claimed that the British government’s contribution to helping Jewish adults escape persecution in Germany was exaggerated, orchestrated as a way of encouraging other countries towards greater benevolence of refugees.\footnote{Louise London, \textit{Whitehall and the Jews, 1933-1948: British Immigration Policy, Jewish Refugees and the Holocaust} (Cambridge, 2003).} In spite of this, Mann and London both agreed that the British did more than other European countries in extending a degree of kindness towards the children of Jewish families fleeing Germany. Voluntary organisations were given permission to help bring up to 10,000 Jewish children into Britain without visas. This, London suggested, was an unequivocally humanitarian act.\footnote{London, \textit{Whitehall and the Jews, 1933-1948} (2003), p.121.} It is not possible to tell how many refugees from the kindertransport came to Scotland. Five residential homes were opened for Jewish refugees and evacuees but only two of these kept records. In addition two hostels were opened in Glasgow, one in Hill Street which accommodated 30 boys and the other in Renfrew Street for women and girls which took only 15 people at a time. Between 1939 and 1948 a total of 175 boys had stayed at the Hill Street hostel.\footnote{www.sjac.org.uk [Accessed 15 July 2016].}

In order to avoid, as far as possible, the development of a situation in Britain similar to the chaotic evacuation experienced in Spain, or the panic retreat of Jews from Germany, advanced planning was necessary for the safe passage of vulnerable British citizens from city areas considered to be most volatile. The first evacuation took place during the first weekend of September 1939,
when over one and a half million people were evacuated from major British cities to areas of perceived safety from attack by the German military. This mass evacuation was undertaken based on the assumption that aerial attack by German bombers would follow the instant that war was declared. This anticipatory action was the result of the work and effort of the Committee of Imperial Defence, together with a substantial number of sub-committees. These Committees had been in planning and discussion during the 1920s and 1930s on the way in which any future wars might be conducted. The Committee of Imperial Defence agreed that once any hope of a peaceful settlement with Germany had gone ‘there might well be little or no margin of time between that stage and the outbreak of hostilities’.

Evacuation planning from the mid-1930s, shrouded in secrecy in Whitehall, culminated in the appointment in May 1938 of an evacuation planning committee under the Chairmanship of Sir John Anderson. The Committee reported on the basic principles of evacuation and was completed by July 1938. Once approved by the Home Secretary, Samuel Hoare, it was published in October 1938. The publication of the ‘Anderson Report’, named after the Committee Chairman, was delayed as a result of the Munich Crisis in September 1938. Following discussion of the report in the House of Commons, the administration for evacuation was placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health, as it involved areas of health, education and housing.

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‘The Anderson Report’ on evacuation formed part of the Civil Emergency Defence Scheme. Evacuation arrangements in the Report focused on London and surrounding areas, although the Committee presumed that the details would apply to all other areas of the country. Section nine of the Home Secretary’s memorandum concerned the recommendation that evacuation should be approved, and included a clause which proposed that: ‘the organisation best suited for London should be applicable elsewhere without substantial modification’.\textsuperscript{101}

The Anderson Committee was made up of four (male) Cabinet Ministers. These Ministers were given the task of arranging for the safe passage of those who would ultimately be evacuated from perceived danger areas, particularly around major cities, that were thought would be most at risk in the first instance. The Committee consulted with Ministries of Health, Transport and Education in England, and the Department of Health for Scotland (DHS) and the Scottish Education Department (SED). A network of local authorities worked in conjunction with these departments in designated target areas and safe areas, referred to thereafter as the ‘sending’ areas and the ‘reception’ areas.

Planning involved reaching agreement on where these safe areas and vulnerable areas were likely to be. The country was divided into three areas, sending (the evacuation area), reception and neutral areas. The Anderson Committee concluded that safe areas should be up to 50 miles outside

\textsuperscript{101} TNA. CAB 24/279. \textit{Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Home Department on Evacuation of the Civil Population in Time of War by the Committee of Imperial Defence}. Enclosure No.1 Secret 296-A Copy No. 119, September 1938 p.2.
London. Danger areas, it was agreed, were mainly densely populated urban areas, where, as Calder pointed out, ‘the poorest strata of official evacuees [came] from’. In Scotland danger areas were calculated to be places with an average density of 100 people per square mile, including Glasgow, Edinburgh and Dundee. Scotland’s safe areas came under scrutiny during a House of Commons debate in November 1939 when Neil Maclean, MP for Glasgow Govan, questioned the validity of some of the designated reception areas. He claimed that:

One school was sent down to another school which [was] only half a mile away from the largest explosives factory in Britain…I am naming neither the place nor the name of the firm whose explosives factory is there. [Further]…Gargunnock, a steel factory, manufacturing steel for armaments, plates for shipping, metal for guns, that is supposed to be a safe area and the children of Glasgow are evacuated to that region whose factory gives all the directions that need to be given to enemy aircraft that come over.

These potentially safe areas and the people most likely to be included in the evacuation process had been established at an early stage by the evacuation planners. It was thought that those who would be more of a liability if they

102 TNA. CAB 24/279. Committee of Imperial Defence Paper No 296-A Enclosure No 2. Extract from the Draft Minutes of the 332nd Meeting, held on September 15, 1938.
104 Boyd, Evacuation in Scotland (1944), p.5.
remained in danger areas should be evacuated in the first instance. School age children formed the largest single group, with the remainder comprising mothers with younger children, expectant mothers, the blind and the disabled. The aged and chronically sick who were being looked after at home proved problematic to accommodate under the government scheme and were not included in the initial plan.

Acting on the advice of several women’s organisations, the Anderson Committee felt that parents would be more receptive to sending their children in school units if they had a guarantee that their children would be given a friendly welcome into good homes, that medical services would be available, and that they would be accompanied by teachers, books and equipment.\(^{106}\) It was also believed that the evacuation of schools in school units would give ‘a precise basis for plans which [were] lacking in the case of adults’\(^ {107}\).

In September 1939 there were 62,059 unaccompanied children evacuated in Scotland.\(^ {108}\) A pamphlet by the Scottish Women’s Group on Public Welfare mentioned that in Scotland: ‘Families large or small were to be kept together with no classification of children into primary or secondary school groups.’\(^ {109}\) This meant that siblings were to be evacuated and billeted together as far as possible. Titmuss interpreted this to mean that all Scottish

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\(^{106}\) Titmuss, *Problems of Social Policy* (1950), pp.20, 22 and 551 (Appendix 5, p.551. Footnote clearly states that: In Scotland, schoolchildren did not go out in school parties but were evacuated with their mothers.)


schoolchildren were evacuated with their mothers and not in school groups which was not in fact the case.\textsuperscript{110} Other historians, writing from a purely English perspective, were also under the impression that, in Scotland, all children were evacuated with their families. Ruth Inglis\textsuperscript{111} and Heather Nicolson\textsuperscript{112} have both commented on this point. However, there were children in Scotland evacuated in school units although, where possible, siblings were kept together. Evidence from a number of interviews with former evacuees from Dennistoun and Clydebank, in Glasgow,\textsuperscript{113} verify that they had been sent with their school groups rather than with their families. In the case of pre-school children, this group were evacuated with mothers. The ‘super’ units comprised of primary schoolchildren, pre-school and post-primary school children, mothers, helpers and teachers, who were all assembled and grouped together in their own particular school units on the day of evacuation.\textsuperscript{114}

An operation of such magnitude would inevitably incur substantial costs. The initial transfer costs included travel, predominantly by rail, together with a standard food package which was supplied to each evacuee for the journey. The operation presented the possibility of setting up centres to provide meals at the point of destination. These communal centres were gradually organised in a number of reception areas where evacuees could

\textsuperscript{110} Titmuss, \textit{Problems of Social Policy} (1950), p.551
\textsuperscript{111} Inglis, \textit{The Children’s War} (1989) p.2.
\textsuperscript{113} Interview with Edna, recorded 1 July 2010. Transcript held with author. Interview Les, recorded 4 July 2010. Transcript held with author. Interview Ina, recorded 4 July 2011. Transcript held with author.
have a main meal once a day in the area where they resided. The cost of the meal was deducted from the amount received in payment to householders for keeping evacuees. There was a reluctance, in some cases, to allow evacuees to take part in the communal meal services, as the payment of the two shillings a week required for the provision of five meals was felt to be too expensive, especially as the provision of overall care received for evacuees amounted to only eight or ten shillings a week. By March 1940 only 3 per cent, which equated to approximately 14,000, of the evacuees in England and Wales were receiving communal meals.\(^{115}\)

The organisation and provision of meal services was one of a number of funding issues which evacuation organisers had to consider. Further to this, consideration had to be given to the cost involved in providing for the ongoing health and welfare of evacuees in reception areas for an indeterminable length of time.

The financial arrangements for the operation of the evacuation scheme as laid down in the Report of the Committee on Evacuation stated under section 108 that:

…the Government should bear the entire cost of the evacuation and maintenance in safer districts of school children removed from vulnerable areas.

For all other members of the public who might require to be included in any large-scale evacuation section 109 stated that:

…evacuation covering other members of the community, the cost of transport and free rations at the outset of the transference and the first charge for accommodation, feeding and general welfare arrangements should fall upon the Government.

Recovery was to be arranged when:

…conditions [were] stabilised…the authorities should take steps to ascertain the persons who can afford to contribute wholly or partly to their maintenance, and that they should require from such persons a contribution towards the general expenses which the Government are incurring.\textsuperscript{116}

The financial implications of evacuation were to prove especially difficult in time of war in terms of the strain on fiscal resources on all government departments involved in defence planning. The Anderson Committee’s recommendation was that the government should meet the costs incurred in the evacuation process, with basic medical care for evacuees being met under existing funding for normal welfare schemes. No extra cost was to be incurred by those hosting evacuees. In the case of accompanied children the cost of medical care was to be met by the parents.\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{117} Boyd, \textit{Evacuation in Scotland} (1944), p.20
The first principle of the evacuation process was that any costs incurred by reception authorities would be recovered from the evacuating authorities. While in theory this process may have seemed straightforward, in practice it was highly complex. The process of working out which local authority was responsible for meeting payments incurred in the care and maintenance of evacuees involved a great deal of accounting administration between sending and reception areas. This proved to be even more complex where evacuees moved billets, which, in some cases, could have been at least two or three times.

In October 1939 a scheme was introduced to allow the government to claw back some of the money paid out to householders who looked after evacuees. Effectively this imposed a recovery scheme of means tested payments of up to six shillings a week to be paid by the parents of evacuated children. The problems encountered in the process of recovering the amount due by parents proved as time consuming, and geographically complex, as the administration involved in recovering payments for welfare care between sending and receiving local authorities. As Calder pointed out, voluntary evacuees under the government scheme came predominantly from the poorest urban areas where payment of such sums would have been difficult to meet, although he conceded that the government was ‘far from harsh in its exaction of contributions from parents’. ¹¹⁸

One of the basic problems in the payment of allowances and recovery of costs involved, was due to the lack of uniformity in the system of

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administration between local authorities.\textsuperscript{119} Keeping track of evacuees in reception areas was difficult as substantial numbers of children and mothers returned home in the early weeks and months of the war. Further complications arose in ensuring the correct local authority was charged, or paid, for costs incurred when evacuees changed billets between different local authority areas. Additional complexities included working out how much was due to householders who cared for evacuees. For those prepared to take two or more evacuees eight shillings and six pence per week was paid for each child. Ten shillings and six pence was paid for those of 16 years and over. Payment of five shillings a week was paid to householders where lodging only was being provided to mothers and children over 14 years and three shillings for each younger child. Local authorities had been given an assurance at the outset that any additional costs incurred in receiving areas, as a result of the influx of evacuees, would be met from the Civil Defence budget which would be reimbursed from the Exchequer.\textsuperscript{120}

Cost recovery and medical care were important issues of evacuation. However, initially it was more important to secure enough suitable accommodation for evacuees before the process could take place. This, the Anderson Committee recommended, would be both quicker and more economically viable, if large numbers of people, especially children, could be accommodated in private houses as long as the rural inhabitants were being treated with care and sensitivity.\textsuperscript{121} The use of large houses was considered, if and when some reconditioning could be carried out, in order

\textsuperscript{119} Titmuss, \textit{Problems of Social Policy} (1950), Appendix 2 and Chapter X.
\textsuperscript{121} TNA. CAB 24/279. Report of Committee on Evacuation 1938, p.3.
to make suitable accommodation for evacuees and, where possible, hutted camps would be made available. Boyd mentioned that the raw materials required for building suitable camp accommodation were needed for other ‘essential purposes’ during the war.\textsuperscript{122} The unsuitability of camp accommodation was evident from what happened to evacuees from the Civil War in Spain who had been encamped in holiday accommodation.

Assessing the exact figures for those who would require accommodation was hampered by the fact that evacuation was to be conducted on a voluntary basis. In theory it appeared that there would be sufficient accommodation for 3.7 million people based on one person per habitable room in most of England and Wales. Planners estimated that at least eighty per cent, or 3.2 million of those eligible would be likely to take up the scheme.\textsuperscript{123} These figures were over-estimated as, in reality, when the evacuation scheme got underway, less than half the expected numbers arrived on evacuation days.

A reduction in the estimated number of people included in the official evacuation scheme alleviated some of the problems associated with accommodation, as early in the process it was evident that for businesses, and government departments, to continue to run efficiently some would have to relocate to safer areas away from the cities. These office workers required space in the countryside to work and live and their presence reduced available space. Also, private evacuees had earmarked

\textsuperscript{122} Boyd, \textit{Evacuation in Scotland} (1944), p.11.
accommodation in private homes effectively reducing the space available for government evacuees in some of the designated rural areas.\(^{124}\)

Specific areas where accommodation problems were considered to be particularly acute were in the North of England, and in Scotland, due to the fact that overcrowding already existed in both places.\(^{125}\) The shortage of space in these areas was exacerbated by the fact that almost twenty-one per cent of available accommodation was earmarked for private evacuees.\(^{126}\) Account was also taken of the unsuitability of households where there was no adult presence during the day or where the residents were elderly or infirm. Regulations under the 1935 Housing Act stipulated that there should be no more than five people to four rooms. Due to overcrowding in Scotland this regulation was removed, and when billeting officers were reviewing the total number of rooms available in private homes which could be used for evacuees, even the kitchen had to be included as a potential bedroom.\(^{127}\)

In order to ensure that accommodation would be available for those who registered to take part in the voluntary evacuation scheme, the Anderson Committee agreed in principle that billeting would have to be made compulsory and enforced ‘without regard to class or other distinctions’.\(^{128}\) Compulsory billeting was a contentious issue as the effects of the first wave of evacuation were gradually being realised. As numerous reports were

brought to light of unhealthy, unkempt and badly behaved children in reception areas, householders were less willing to volunteer to take further evacuees. The issue of compulsory billeting became particularly significant when a second wave of evacuation was discussed. As the war went on a number of businesses, factories and offices were compelled to move from potentially high risk areas in order to continue to trade. Those businesses which were required to remain in the cities, and whose employees could be billeted outside the centre at the end of the working day, also required accommodation in rural or semi-rural parts of the country.

The assumption was that individuals involved in the essential work of keeping the country functioning as normally as possible would respect their civil duties and continue working in the cities. Rose wrote that the slogan ‘equality of sacrifice’ was widely used through the war to help boost morale and promote a good work ethic.\(^{129}\) Workers would be ensured:

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\ldots\text{proper shelter accommodation and other measures of air raid precautions to protect and succour those who [would] be expected to continue to live and work in vulnerable areas.}^{130}
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Compulsory evacuation would have to be implemented in the event of air attack, and if it involved essential workers, they were to be ‘accommodated at a reasonable distance from their place of work’\(^{131}\). Titmuss reported that


\(^{130}\) TNA. CAB 24/279. Report of Committee on Evacuation 1938, Section 17, p.5.

in December 1940 the Ministry of Health had extended a scheme for requisitioning unoccupied houses for certain classes of war casualties to include war-workers. The result of these new measures meant, in real terms, by 1942 a total of 15,742 war workers were billeted under the compulsory billeting powers extended to eighty-six local authorities in England and Wales. Other essential workers in bombed out areas either made use of shelters or trekked to and from work each day from temporary accommodation, which was a time consuming arrangement. A study carried out in the Bootle area of Liverpool, after the raids began, revealed that the loss of working time for the 24,000 people who worked there amounted to a total of eight working days for each worker in May 1941. Accommodation was also needed for teachers and helpers, and school closures meant that teachers were often required to move with their classes, whether or not they had family commitments. If there were sufficient numbers of teachers in the receiving areas they could be sent home or moved to other districts.

It was agreed that teachers on evacuation duty be paid an allowance of fourteen shillings per week, calculated on a sliding scale depending on their commitments. They were allowed a flat rate of five shillings per week billeting allowance. Teaching continued in the receiving areas for children, either on a double-shift system or full days, which meant that both local

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133 Interview with Violet, recorded on 17 October 2014. Transcript held with author.
children and evacuees were able to maintain some form of education. Boyd emphasised the invaluable role teachers played in the overall evacuation process both professionally and voluntarily. His research included information on the way in which a number of large houses were converted and used as residential schools under the evacuation scheme. He discussed the demand placed upon the lives of teachers who were called upon to work in such situations. Recognition was given to the fact that teachers gave up much of their leisure time to organise recreational activities for pupils, and were often expected to teach subjects unfamiliar to them by corresponding with colleagues teaching in city schools. He cited an example where a modern languages teacher with only a slight knowledge of Spanish was given the task of teaching pupils in that subject, and where maths teachers were called upon to teach book-keeping and shorthand. In spite of these shortcomings 39 out of 42 pupils successfully completed leaving certificates in the residential schools surveyed by Boyd.\footnote{Boyd, \textit{Evacuation in Scotland} (1944), p.142.}

The whole operation of evacuation planning and preparations from 1938 onwards came to fruition on Friday, 1 September 1939. The organisation of such a major undertaking was relatively well organised in view of the substantial numbers involved. The arrangements and costs involved in securing accommodation at the point of destination, and the organisation and implementation of transport facilities to remove people from the cities, went relatively smoothly. During the three days from 1 September 1939 a total of 1,473,391 people in Britain were evacuated.\footnote{Titmuss, \textit{Problems of Social Policy} (1950), p.103.} Of that number, children made up the largest single group, and anxious parents had to wait to be
informed of the final destination of their child or children.\textsuperscript{136} The \textit{Scotsman} reported on 1 September that:

While the evacuees are setting out for “unknown” centres in the country, it has been arranged that within about 24 hours parents and guardians would be informed of the exact location of their children.\textsuperscript{137}

On arrival in the various reception areas the evacuees were taken to billeting stations and chosen at random by their future carers, a process which Titmuss described as ‘a hit-or-miss chance of a child being placed in a good official billet’.\textsuperscript{138} John Welshman cited a number of examples of random selection recalled by former evacuees: these include the memories of a woman who was nine years old when she was evacuated from Salford to Lancaster. She remembered being taken to Greaves School:

…from there [we] were walked around to find homes. I was the last one – with another girl, and the lady shouted “Doesn’t anybody want them?” Mrs Crosby said “I’ll take them” and she took us straight off to Morecambe on the bus to see if the illuminations were still on.\textsuperscript{139}

Calder likened this undignified selection process to a Roman slave market.\textsuperscript{140} Parsons refereed to it as ‘dehumanising’.\textsuperscript{141}

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\textsuperscript{136} Parsons, “I’ll Take That One” (1998), p.11.
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\textsuperscript{137} The \textit{Scotsman}, Friday, 1\textsuperscript{st} September 1939 p.9.
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\textsuperscript{141} Parsons, “I’ll Take That One” (1998), p.59.
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These problems had not been anticipated during the planning stages of the evacuation scheme. The Anderson Committee had taken advice from a wide range of different organisations, including the relevant government ministries: the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Labour, the Board of Trade Food (Defence Plans) Department and the Transport Services. The teaching unions, including the National Union of Teachers and Association of Head Masters, were also consulted, as well as a significant number of voluntary services. Various representatives from some of these groups were appointed to the Advisory Committee on the Evacuation of Schoolchildren and the Scottish Advisory Committee on Evacuation (SACE). SACE was made up of representatives from reception areas and sending areas, the Women’s Voluntary Service and the Institute of Education.

The success of the operation depended heavily on the involvement of a substantial number of voluntary organisations, the police, and the cooperation of householders and individuals willing to offer their services. The reliance on volunteers before, during and after the evacuation scheme got underway, was evident from the Anderson Committee report which stated that:

Voluntary bodies could probably play a large part in arranging for the communal feeding of refugees, so far as this proves to be necessary, and for general welfare arrangements.

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142 TNA. CAB 24/279. Report of Committee on Evacuation, Covering letter Section 2 and Appendix A.
Just as they had assumed that essential workers would make every effort to carry on under war conditions, the reporting committee expected, rightly as it turned out, that people, especially middle class women, would be willing to provide some level of service in time of stress. On this principle the Women’s Voluntary Service (WVS) was established and organised by Lady Stella Reading as an extension of the Air Raid Precautions (ARP). The WVS together with other women’s groups came to play a crucial role in the organisation of evacuees. An illustration of how essential volunteers were for such an undertaking was evident from the Scotsman newspaper for Friday, 14 July 1939, when it was reported that 300 voluntary staff had been enrolled for the work of billeting evacuees in areas of Stirlingshire, in Scotland. Boyd also paid tribute to the many people involved such as those with ‘good will with leisure and without, householders of all classes’. All involved in helping to make the transition from home to reception areas as painless as possible were invaluable to the organisational success of the evacuation scheme.

Volunteers were also enlisted from domestic and teaching staff to help organise and look after evacuees from the beginning of the journey to the point of destination and possibly beyond that time. Titmuss’s use of the phrase ‘an army’ to describe the number of teachers and volunteers enlisted to help in the initial movement of evacuees, signifies to some extent the numbers of volunteers involved who formed a fundamental part of the

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146 The Scotsman, Friday, 14 July 1939, p.9.
evacuation scheme and of the war effort generally. During the war volunteers helped run youth clubs, and sewing, knitting and cookery classes for evacuees. They also ran mobile canteens, rest centres and clothing depots for the homeless. They provided a wealth of services as fire fighters and ambulance drivers and helped in rescue efforts on the ground after bomb attacks. The work of the Women’s Institute (WI) and the Women’s Voluntary Service helped to stimulate an interest in the development of committees in social welfare progression and identified much of the social deprivation and neglect that existed in British society.

Historiography relating to evacuation has generally perceived its physical process with success. For example, Calder referred to the organisation and transfer of the first wave of evacuees as ‘a triumph of calm and order’ and Brown remarked on the scale of the initial movement as a ‘remarkable event’ in terms of the number of people involved. All those who were involved, teachers, parents, volunteers, transport officials, billeting officers and members of the police force, played an important part in the organisation and mobilisation process. There is little doubt that the voluntary transfer of a million and a half people over one weekend, without a single reported accident, was a great credit to everyone engaged in the operation. This figure excludes a further two million who left privately. Welshman said that in logistical terms evacuation was an ‘unqualified success’ and as Calder pointed out, if the bombs had dropped immediately

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150 Brown, Evacuees (2005), p.16.
151 Welshman, Churchill’s Children (2010), p.44.
on the declaration of war, the complaints that followed the first wave of evacuation would have seemed relatively unimportant.\textsuperscript{152}

Counter discourse on the success of the evacuation scheme points to the lack of consideration afforded to human emotion. Parents were being asked to send their children away to unknown destinations for an indeterminate length of time. In addition, while children who remained in reception areas were kept relatively safe from direct enemy action, there was, for a considerable number, the dramatic impact of family separation that remained with them throughout their lives. Boyd observed that ‘failure was inevitable’, as it asked too much of parents.\textsuperscript{153} Titmuss presented a particularly positive opinion of the evacuation process and attributed it to the rapid development of social welfare which will be dealt with in a later chapter. Nevertheless, he understood the pitfalls and imperfections of the scheme and recognised that evacuation caused ‘a multitude of problems in human relationships’.\textsuperscript{154} The positive opinions advocated by Titmuss had been challenged by a number of leading historians in the years following the Second World War, and from some former evacuees who chose to write about their experience. Former evacuee Heather Nicolson wrote in negative terms of her experience. For Nicolson and her sister, being evacuated during the war was a time in their lives which adversely affected their emotional, physical and psychological health. She tells the story of the ways in which they were subjected to abuse during their evacuation in the first chapter of a book, which developed as a type of therapy when she realised that there was

\textsuperscript{153} Boyd, \textit{Evacuation in Scotland} (1944), p.121.
a part of her life which she could not confront. She was advised to advertise for people to come forward if they had been subjected to abuse during their evacuation. In doing so she found that she and her sister were not alone in what they had suffered during their evacuation, and that the long-term emotional effects of abuse were still present in the minds of a significant amount of former evacuees whose stories are recorded in the book.155

Stories of abuse were not recorded until many years after Titmuss’s work was published. His positive attitude towards evacuation is evident in his belief that while he understood the deep seated prejudice which was inherent in the British social class structure, he felt that evacuation and war had helped to create a ‘more generous society’.156 His opinion was formed from the belief that as the poor condition of many evacuees became apparent, the ‘conscience of the nation’ was aroused.157 However, while making this point he acknowledged that historians coming after him would undoubtedly question his views, a fact that has become apparent in accounts of evacuation by contemporary historians. Rose is one of many historians who questioned the validity of Titmuss’s egalitarian opinion. She argued that rather than war helping to break down class barriers, the issue of class inequality was ‘central to the wartime nation’.158 She believed that the idea of unity of class was a ‘powerful fantasy’.159 The harsh reality of the poor condition of evacuees and the subsequent public responses will be examined here and placed in the context of overall evacuation arrangements.

The creation of a more egalitarian society from the merging of social classes, thrown together as a result of war, was hoped for rather than achieved, as modern day historians have been quick to point out. Boyd’s opinion, stated in 1944, reinforced the fact that far from creating an egalitarian society, whereby a more caring and inclusive consciousness would dominate public opinion as social classes came together under the evacuation scheme, he believed that once the first evacuees had been billeted their future welfare was given very little thought. Recognition and praise was proffered for the efficient way in which the initial movement was carried out. This praise was however conditional in view of the speed with which evacuees returned, and the substantial problems which were brought to light as a result of the operation.

Cracks in the evacuation scheme began to appear almost immediately as the extent of urban deprivation was brought home to rural communities, due to the wide distribution of city children over a vast area of countryside. The first wave of evacuation had drawn attention to the poor condition of a significant number of children. As the first evacuation had taken place during school holidays it had not been practical for the children to have medical inspections before they left the cities. There were reports from householders of head lice, scabies, dirt and disease being spread by evacuees. The problems of hygiene among evacuees was a major cause for concern, especially the scabies and head lice. Both were spread as a result of simply coming into contact with a person who had the condition. Causes of scabies included overcrowding, poor hygiene and population movement.

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to which all evacuees were subjected. One former evacuee remembered that in return for the kindness shown to her by her host family she ‘gave them all scabies’.  

For those evacuees who were settled in reception areas and were enrolled in local schools, hygiene problems became an issue for teachers. During an informal meeting of West Lothian Head Teachers, the head of Broxburn High School announced that evacuation had brought to light the fact that in too many cases children were ‘dirty, ill-fed, ill-slept and ill-clad’. Scabies was such a cause for concern that in 1941 the DHS introduced the Scabies Order (Scotland). This required that, in the case of verminous children, any instructions given by the Medical Officer of Health to parents, guardians or others in charge of children be complied with. The order effectively made it a notifiable disease in Scotland, according to Manfred Green in his work on Epidemiology of Scabies. Green reported that as many as one per cent of the population of Glasgow was infected with scabies in 1939.

Other personal issues that caused concern included the lack of fundamental table manners and hygiene among evacuees and the more serious problem of enuresis (or bedwetting). Evacuation also highlighted problems such as behaviour, moral and religious issues and class differences. Behavioural

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162 NAS. CO1/4/22. Notes from an unofficial meeting of Head Teachers, held in Wellpark, Bathgate, 7 April 1943, to discuss remits by the Secretary of State for Scotland to the Advisory Council on Education.
163 NAS. CO1/4/151. This order was made for the Secretary of State for Scotland under Regulation 33A for the Defence (General) Regulation 1939.
164 Manfred S. Green, ‘Epidemiology of Scabies’, *Epidemiologic Reviews Vol. 11* (1989) p.131
[www.epirev.oxfordjournals.org/content/11/1/126](http://www.epirev.oxfordjournals.org/content/11/1/126) extract. [Accessed 2 February 2011].
problems were such a cause for concern that it prompted the Advisory Council on Education in Scotland to seek advice from County Council authorities of the possibility of citizenship being introduced into the curriculum.\textsuperscript{165}

There were also reports of behavioural problems among some adult evacuees, especially mothers who had been evacuated with pre-school children. The potential to create a tense situation was manifest when mothers and children were billeted in private homes. Less than three weeks after the initial evacuation, the \textit{Scotsman} reported cases where mothers made ‘extravagant demands upon their hostesses [and] threatened them with “the law” if their unreasonable requirements [were] not accorded at once’. These demands, it was suggested, could involve the householder being left all day to look after evacuee children, some as young as three months old.\textsuperscript{166} These claims were reinforced by Boyd’s survey of 89 families hosting evacuee mothers with children. It showed 23 cases where personality clashes between mother and host were apparent. Reported problems included ‘lazy’ or ‘truculent’ mothers, or mothers who had ‘expected breakfast in bed’ or ‘lay in bed all forenoon’.\textsuperscript{167}

The poor condition of some evacuees led to the publication of pamphlets by women’s groups with substantial recommendations for change. These pamphlets claimed that: ‘…through the depth of evacuation…social failures

\textsuperscript{166} The \textit{Scotsman}, Monday, 18 September 1939, p.4.
\textsuperscript{167} Boyd, \textit{Evacuation in Scotland} (1944), p.69.
[could] be appreciated',\textsuperscript{168} and that evacuation had brought the nation’s social problems to the ‘doorstep of the public’, and in order to make better human beings, social conditions needed to be improved.\textsuperscript{169} The pamphlets included suggestions for tackling issues of neglect in health and education, and highlighted the problem of child neglect and cleanliness. It called for an extension of educational facilities to include the teaching of cookery and dietary requirements, and proposed the launch of a public campaign for the promotion of healthy eating.

As billeting officers, members of the WVS, and householders became more aware of the existence of different forms of neglect among evacuees, and, as complaints abounded concerning problems of head lice, lack of proper clothing and bad manners, a review of child welfare policy became a matter of urgency. The extent of this led to some important issues for improvement in education and health being discussed at government level. The issue of vouchers for clothes and shoes to necessitous children, extended free school milk, vitamin supplements and school meals all stemmed from the need to alleviate problems relating to the poor state of some evacuees. The milk and meals in schools programme began in the inter-war period and continued to play an important part in maintaining the health of schoolchildren during wartime. Research has shown that there was a significant improvement in the height and weight of children during the war. Medical inspections of Glasgow children in July 1943 showed an overall height and weight gain for

\textsuperscript{169} The Scottish Women’s Group on Public Welfare, \textit{Our Scottish Towns} (1944), pp, 9 and 45.
both boys and girls when compared with the figures for 1935-1939.\textsuperscript{170} This was, in part, attributed to the extended arrangements for milk and meals in schools. Also, the appointment of a Minister of Food and introduction of rationing helped promote the nutritional value of food, effectively improving the nation’s diet overall. The introduction of any welfare change however was restricted by cost, and budget control for welfare services including education and health lay with each local authority. The quality of service provided by these departments therefore depended heavily on locally-controlled expenditure.

In spite of attempts to encourage people to remain in reception areas the drift back was rapid, especially in the case of mothers with young children. Of the 24,269 mothers evacuated in Scotland during September 1939 only 3,043 were still in the receiving area by January 1940. Of the 175,812 people evacuated in Scotland in September 1939 a total of 129,046 had returned home by January 1940.\textsuperscript{171} Figures taken from an official count carried out by local authorities on 8 January 1940 showed a slight increase in the number of Scottish children remaining in reception areas over those in England. The figures from January, recorded in Titmuss, took account of unaccompanied children where 55 per cent or 420,000 remained in receiving areas in England. The comparative percentage of Scottish unaccompanied children was 61 per cent. The figure for mothers with children in reception areas at the same time amounted to 13 per cent in England with only 9 per cent in Scotland. For groups such as teachers, helpers, disabled, blind and

\begin{itemize}
  \item [\textsuperscript{171}] Boyd, \textit{Evacuation in Scotland} (1944), pp, 31 and 69.
\end{itemize}
others, the number remaining in the reception areas in England was much higher, apart from that of expectant mothers, where the percentage figure for both countries was almost equal.\textsuperscript{172} The rapid drift back to the cities meant that the majority of the evacuated population were back in the danger areas long before the bombing began. In effect, this meant that the operation had largely been in vain. This situation was a source of worry for the authorities as the threat of attack from Germany loomed over Britain.

The fact that large numbers of the priority classes were back in the danger areas before the bombing began was a source of concern among Cabinet members, who believed the evacuation planning and implementation to have been a failure. In a debate in the House of Commons in November 1939 mention was made on several occasions of the lack of planning and consideration given to evacuees. For example, the opinion of Neil Maclean, MP for Glasgow Govan, was that:

\begin{quote}
All that was considered was dumping children from one town into another, which was asked to receive more children than there was either accommodation for in the houses or in the schools. Consequently, it was bound to break down at some time.\textsuperscript{173}
\end{quote}

There were a number of reasons why the drift back to evacuation areas was so rapid. One school of thought among revisionist historians is the undercurrent of class division within British society became much more apparent as a result of evacuation. From the first evacuation scheme there


was a growing awareness of the problems caused by the merging of different social classes. These social problems were so acute that they became cause for concern at government level and formed an integral part of parliamentary debate as early as November 1939. William Gallacher, Communist MP for West Fife, was particularly critical of the government’s handling of evacuation policy. He claimed that:

…the whole character of evacuation [had] been affected, simply because the Government never gave serious consideration to the question beforehand. That was due to the fact… that it was only the working-class who were to be evacuated and that anything is good enough at any time for the working class.

…nothing was done to prepare and no attempt made to get an understanding of the problem of how these thousands of working-class children and mothers were to be protected. But who on the Government benches is interested in them? The Government’s idea is… that anything is good enough for working-class women and children.¹⁷⁴

Boyd’s survey supported these accusations. He conducted an in depth study of Clydebank, after the first evacuation scheme was carried out, in order to establish why so many came back within the first few weeks, why others came back after months and why a few stayed long-term. Part of this study included looking at issues of class structure, the experiences of evacuees sent privately, the presence or absence of family members, and whether

siblings and/or mothers were evacuated together. His research took account of the age and sex of the children, the length of time between parental visits and the house size of the family home in the sending and receiving areas.

Significant emphasis was placed on the class difference as a contributory factor in the early return of children from receiving areas. Research showed that Clydebank evacuees were made up almost entirely of working class children. When these children were billeted with families of a similar social class their stay was marginally more successful, as Boyd’s figures have shown. His calculations showed that forty-two per cent of Clydebank children billeted in working-class households had returned after two months, as opposed to a fifty per cent return over the same period of those children billeted with families which Boyd considered to be households of a better-class.

There were other important issues which drove people back to evacuation areas, as Boyd’s survey has shown. He claimed that in four out of every five cases it was in fact the parents who were responsible for the rapid return of evacuees, especially, as evidenced above, where mothers were evacuated with children. By the end of 1939, according to the survey, only 300 of the original 4000 children evacuated from Clydebank were still in the receiving areas. Evidence of religious differences between guest and host was a symptom of the early return of evacuees. Boyd recorded that Catholic children in large families were less likely to be evacuated than Protestant children and, on average, Protestant children tended to stay away slightly longer than Catholic children. Of the 838 Catholic children evacuated, only
one tenth remained in the receiving areas long-term.\textsuperscript{175} It is evident therefore that class division, the influence of parents and religion were all significant incentives to encourage the early return of evacuees. There were however a number of other important reasons which helped influence their early return. These included such issues as personality clashes, unwillingness of householders to carry on caring for strangers, and the emotional trauma of family separation.

This chapter has outlined why the evacuation process was initiated and its implementation. It included the problems involved in the mass movement of people throughout the country during the first weekend in September 1939. Attention has been given to the dependence placed on the invaluable work of the voluntary services during the war and on the substantial problems encountered in the first evacuation scheme. These included compulsory billeting, the related problems of accommodation and transport, plus various aspects of health and hygiene in the homes where evacuees were billeted. It also highlighted educationalists’ involvement, behavioural problems among evacuees, and class and religious division. A few of these issues were discussed as being contributory factors in the early return of substantial numbers of evacuees.

After the first wave of evacuation the government staged two further evacuation schemes within Britain during the Second World War which were implemented only after aerial bombardment had taken place. For a short time, the government also took advantage of offers from the

\textsuperscript{175} Boyd, \textit{Evacuation in Scotland} (1944), pp, 116 and 120.
Dominions and the United States, to send children to safety overseas. The effect of these events will form the basis of the discussion in the following chapter which will continue with the theme of evacuation planning and implementation.
Chapter II
Evacuation Schemes after 1939

Following the mixed results of the first wave of evacuation, which took place over the three days from 1st to 3rd September 1939, alongside a continuous ‘trickle evacuation’ throughout the early months of 1940, the British government embarked on a second major evacuation scheme in the summer of 1940. The threat of invasion seemed inevitable as the Germans continued to gain control over much of Western Europe. The second evacuation scheme was therefore instigated in September and lasted for twelve months. In September 1941 the government considered entirely ending the scheme, although there is no evidence from parliamentary papers to suggest this was discussed at Commons level.\(^{176}\) In July and September 1944, when the V1 and V2 rockets threatened British cities, a third major evacuation was quickly undertaken.

In May 1940 the German army had successfully invaded the Netherlands and Belgium and began their offensive through northern France. The following month France capitulated. As events were unfolding in continental Europe the British Government engaged in serious discussion concerning a second evacuation scheme. Over the spring and summer of 1940 approximately 300,000 people moved from London and coastal towns around the southeast to areas of perceived safety.\(^{177}\) As the need for a

second concentrated evacuation became clear, it was evident that before anything further could be put in place many of the problems highlighted by the first evacuation scheme would have to be rectified, in particular the need for greater sensitivity in both sending and reception areas.

This chapter will continue the theme of the argument presented in the previous chapter by exploring how far government efforts helped ensure the safety of vulnerable people. The wider context of change in social welfare resulting from the first and subsequent evacuations will also be considered. As the focus of the thesis is on Scotland, these later evacuation schemes will be discussed with a view to establishing how Scotland was affected by social welfare changes brought about by the evacuation process.

The second and third official evacuation schemes within Britain applied mainly to London and coastal areas around the southeast where much of the heavy bombing took place. In Scotland a second official full scale evacuation was launched during March and May 1941, when bombing raids hit Glasgow and Clydebank. Additionally, in the summer of 1940, while the second evacuation scheme was underway at home the government launched a scheme to send children overseas. The overseas evacuation scheme, which took place between July and September 1940, will be discussed here since it formed part of the overall evacuation process and involved Scottish children broadly on a pro rata basis, according to population size between England, Wales and Scotland.
Parsons complained of the lack of historiography relating to the second and third evacuation schemes, and stressed that most text books have tended to concentrate attention on the first official scheme. He also commented on the lack of available information on the ‘trickle’ evacuation in the 1940s. Historiographical argument relating to the second and subsequent evacuation schemes therefore begins here with the work and opinions of Titmuss, as his official version of the social history of the Second World War remains the most in-depth coverage of the subject to date. Titmuss believed in the value of war as a vessel for the promotion and expansion of welfare provision. He acknowledged the existence of poverty and inequality within British society and thought that war and evacuation would lead eventually to a more egalitarian society. He described the evacuation process as the most important subject in the social history of the war, and believed the provision of milk for children on a national level, the provision of school meals and the immunisation of children against potentially deadly diseases such as diphtheria, were all evidence that inequalities highlighted by evacuation made change inevitable. These areas of health and welfare provision will be assessed in order to support or challenge this view. In particular, this will be done with respect to Scotland’s health statistics.

Boyd, writing in 1944 on the Scottish evacuation, claimed that once evacuees had been billeted their future welfare was given very little thought. There is some truth in Boyd’s comment in so far as the

guidelines for the initial evacuation process were laid out. Evacuation was an experiment never before undertaken in Britain and it was a case of ‘trial and error’. The Anderson Committee did not, nor could not, have anticipated some of the problems which the first evacuation scheme brought to light. From the inception of the idea of evacuation the planners took no account of the emotional family ties which led to parents being unable to part with their children when the theory of evacuation became reality. They did not foresee the problems householders would face when children who were billeted with them were in a poor and dirty condition. Nor could they have anticipated the problems caused by the speed with which evacuees returned to the danger areas.

As the purpose of this chapter is to provide an outline of the issues involved in the evacuation process, it should be noted that the educational services in Scotland were alerted to the risks, and some of the possible consequences, of the evacuation scheme prior to the outbreak of war. The SED gave significant attention to educational and moral disruption and provided guidelines to be carried out in the event of the scheme being put into operation. Consideration was given to the implications of evacuation on accommodation, transport, finance, meals, materials, teaching staff and extra-curricular activities. A circular issued in June 1939 pointed to the fact that in the absence of previous experience, the situation called for ‘initiative, resource and adaptability on the part of teachers’. The circular stressed that health and moral welfare would require particular attention under stressful conditions.

conditions as extensive demands would be placed on the medical and social services of the community. The mention of moral welfare and the social services point to the fact that the SED were aware of the possibility of the emotional strain, as well as a physical strain, which would be placed on evacuees.¹⁸²

Early in the evacuation process it was apparent that greater emphasis would have to be placed on behavioural problems which were being highlighted in reception areas as the result of the double-shift system in schools, and in sending areas where schools were closed indefinitely. Economically the first priority for funding was given over to war production and fighting services, manpower and materials. This effectively limited the finance available for other services including welfare.¹⁸³ Nevertheless additional wartime services were established and family centres set up where people could spend time outside the home. Centres for the aged and expectant mothers, more social workers, hostels and nurseries were also put in place. Examples of these additional services include a total of 660 hostels, accommodating 10,000 children, 30 special hostels and 30 camp schools, all set up in England and Wales by July 1941. In Scotland 106 hostels and 5 school camps were established.¹⁸⁴ By the summer of 1942, the 106 Scottish hostels were providing accommodation for 3,500 evacuees.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸² SCAS. SC5/7/25. Circular No. 121, from the Scottish Education Department, 19 June 1939.
¹⁸⁵ Boyd, Evacuation in Scotland (1944), pp.34 and 35.
In subsequent evacuation schemes those children who were found to be unfit to be billeted in private households were placed in hostel accommodation, either on a permanent basis, or until they could be given the care and support they needed and were deemed acceptable to be moved into foster homes. Hostels could also be used as a temporary home for children when the host family wished to go on holiday and for some children of secondary school age. These measures, it was hoped, would help to ease billeting problems. The residential hostels established in Scotland included Barns House for ‘difficult boys’ from Edinburgh, and Nerston House in East Kilbride, on the outskirts of Glasgow, also for problem children. These were both up and running during the summer of 1940. Boyd, writing in 1944, claimed that these were run efficiently and became ‘permanent and integral’ to Glasgow’s Child Guidance Services. Sir Alexander MacGregor and J.G. Craw have endorsed Boyd’s claim in respect of Nerston Residential School. Since Nerston continued to function until 2009 as a residential clinic and school its contribution in the social welfare of the area can be assumed. Barns Residential School was officially closed in 1954 when the original owners of the house required it to be returned to them.

Just as in England and Wales, Scotland’s hostels were used as an alternative means of accommodation for children and mothers who could not be billeted in private households as a result of their poor condition and/or bad

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189 [www.achive.pettrust.uk/survey-barns1.htm](http://www.achive.pettrust.uk/survey-barns1.htm) [Accessed 30 April 2016].
behaviour. Accusations of bad behaviour included bed wetting and running away. Titmuss reported that the original hostels were run on ‘makeshift’ conditions with untrained staff and ultimately became dumping grounds for supposedly difficult children. From forty-eight hostels surveyed more than half were found to contain children who displayed some symptoms of bad behaviour. These centres were generally referred to as hostels for problem children until the services were reorganised in 1941, when attention was finally given to the organisation and care required for resident children. Boyd’s survey was particularly positive on the way camps and mansion houses were organised as residential homes and schools for evacuees. The speed of return, behaviour, manners and health, he believed, all compared favourably to billeting in households especially for older children.

When the second evacuation scheme was mooted in March 1940, parents who had not already subscribed to the first scheme were invited to register school age children for the second wave. This proved to be only partially successful, as Boyd’s figures show that just 3,000 children in Edinburgh and 5,000 in Glasgow were registered to be sent to receiving areas over the following weeks of September. Leaflets were sent to all districts to be distributed to householders. These were to be returned indicating their willingness to host a second evacuation scheme. This scheme was to operate quite differently from the first and would not be undertaken until aerial bombardment had begun. This was quite distinct from the Anderson

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191 Boyd, Evacuation in Scotland (1944), pp.140-141.
Committee discussions influenced by the Spanish and Chinese bombings in the 1930s which stressed the pro-active over the reactive.

The Ministry of Health and the Department of Health in Scotland were well aware of the need to proceed with caution and sensitivity towards the people in the reception areas in order to gain support for a second wave of evacuation. Assurance had to be given to potential carers in reception areas that the problems highlighted the previous September would not be repeated.

One such problem faced by carers in the first wave of the evacuation scheme was that children often arrived in reception areas in a poor physical condition. This was due in part to the fact the evacuation scheme began at the end of the summer holidays and schools were still closed. As a result school medical inspections could not be carried out on the children and any minor ailments dealt with before they were sent away.

The second evacuation scheme was only to be offered to children of school age, and schools were to be evacuated as units. Parents willing to send their children would be required to guarantee that they would leave them in the reception area until the school parties returned. The second wave would not be implemented until medical inspections were carried out in the sending areas to ensure that children were clean and free from disease before being evacuated. This was only possible once schools in sending areas had reopened in the weeks and months after the initial mass evacuation in September 1939. Children who failed to meet the medical requirements for evacuation would not be sent. Clothing and footwear would also be checked to ensure it would adequately meet the needs of the evacuees before they embarked on the scheme. The use of large houses and camps would be used
as clearing stations where possible and could be used to house those who could not immediately be billeted. This would help to ensure evacuees were placed in appropriate billets and would alleviate the need for haste in billeting. Boyd reported on the vigilance of the DHS in ensuring that regular checks were made on those children registered for evacuation, and their clothes and footwear were inspected at regular intervals.193

There was nevertheless a significant problem in planning the second wave of evacuation in that parents in sending areas and householders in receiving areas were less than enthusiastic about a second evacuation scheme. Parsons noted that by April 1940 only 95,000 had registered, 220,000 had refused, and the vast majority, a further 842,000 had abstained from making a commitment either way.194 In Scotland there was unmistakable hostility to a second wave and leaflets sent out by local authorities in receiving areas produced few favourable returns. In Selkirk, for example, the head of the County Council refused to send the leaflets out at all. In a letter of response sent to the Secretary of the County Council Association, the Council leader claimed that, ‘speaking generally nobody now wants evacuees’ and that the ‘general view taken in the landward part of this county is that the Government Scheme is wrong in conception and wrong in practice’.195

In Inverness approximately 6000 leaflets were sent out, with fewer than 100 householders returning a positive response to having evacuees. Inverness

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195 NAS. CO1/4/23. Letter from Selkirk County Council to George Davie, Secretary, Association of County Councils in Scotland, 30 March 1940.
County Council suggested that the only solution in that area for housing evacuees would be in empty shooting lodges as it would be ‘infinitely less troublesome and much more satisfactory’. In Stirling 14,000 leaflets were distributed with only 150 positive returns. These figures give some indication of the cool reception the second evacuation scheme was given. The figures changed very little across other areas of Scotland with householders responding that only in the event of severe and continued bombing raids would they be prepared to take evacuees. This type of hostility towards evacuees in some reception areas was evident from an article in the Stirling Journal and Advertiser. The headlines on 21 March 1940 stated that Bridge of Allan Residents “Would Prefer Jail” than be involved in a fresh scheme. The article stressed that the majority of householders in the area were ‘emphatically’ against the proposal. In response, a representative from the DHS asserted that compulsory billeting could be enforced. This idea was met with hostility from a significant number of local residents.

In the early months of the war non-compliance with billeting regulations carried the threat of householders having to face a complaints tribunal. According to evidence held with Falkirk Archives, a DHS Circular No. 54 was sent out on 27 August 1939 in which local authorities were requested to take steps to constitute billeting tribunals in local areas. Billeting officers were instructed that:

196 NAS. CO1/4/23. Letter from County Council in Inverness to George Davie, Secretary, Association of County Councils in Scotland, 30 March 1940.
197 NAS. CO1/4/23. Letter from County Offices, Viewforth, Stirling to George Davie, Secretary, Association of County Councils in Scotland, 10 April 1940.
198 Stirling Journal and Advertiser, 21 March 1940, p.5
(d) …any person who fails to comply with the requirements of a billeting notice commits an offence. If any person refuses to comply with the requirements of a billeting notice, the case should be reported to the Chief Reception Officer or the Chief Billeting Officer in order that he may submit it to the Procurator Fiscal.199

The fate of those who did not comply with billeting regulations lay with a Complaints Tribunal who were instructed that:

(11) …any person who is aggrieved by the service upon him of a billeting notice…may, subject to and in accordance with rules made by the Secretary of State, make a complaint to the above tribunal. Upon hearing the complaint the tribunal may cancel or vary the billeting notice, as the tribunal thinks fit.200

Householders did not want to host evacuees for many and varied reasons. Apart from the problems connected with strangers living in their homes, residents in rural areas were worried about the pressure extra bodies were placing on the essential amenities. When the residents of Cupar, then a relatively small village in Fife, were approached regarding accepting a

199 Falkirk Archives, File A474.010 1939-1942, Department of Health for Scotland, Emergency Relief Organisation. Summaries of Lectures delivered at an Instructor’s Training Course held at Moray House Training College, Edinburgh, 1 August 1941. Ref: DH 12A.

200 Falkirk Archives, File A474.010 1939-1942, Department of Health for Scotland, Emergency Relief Organisation. Summaries of Lectures delivered at an Instructor’s Training Course held at Moray House Training College, Edinburgh. 1 August 1941. Ref: DH 12A.
second wave of evacuations, one of several reasons given as to why they were hostile to the scheme was the shortage of water in the area.\textsuperscript{201}

Due to the low returns and lack of enthusiasm for a second evacuation scheme, consideration was given to imposing compulsory measures. The views of MPs differed considerably on this issue. The continuation of a voluntary scheme evoked substantial opposition between MPs who felt that enforcing compulsory evacuation was the best way to safeguard children from danger. Government thinking behind the continuation of voluntary evacuation rested principally on the fact that evacuation carried no absolute guarantee of safety. In the Commons, Malcolm MacDonald, Minister of Health, outlined the main arguments both for and against compulsory evacuation.\textsuperscript{202} Although he was in favour of compulsory evacuation, he realised that if compulsion was applied and parents did not adhere to the law, a penalty of some kind would have to be imposed. His argument rested on how unreasonable it would have been to force parents to send their children away. He questioned how parents should be dealt with if they refused to send their children and suggested that if compulsion was imposed:

One lot of police would have to take the children, in many cases out of the very hands of their parents, and take them off to the trains

\textsuperscript{201} NAS. File CO1/4/23. Letter from Cupar-Fife to George Davies, Secretary, Association of County Councils in Scotland, in response to a letter sent to County Councils on the ‘present’ Government Evacuation Scheme, 10 April 1940.  
\textsuperscript{202} H of C Debate, 13 June 1940, vol. 361, cc. 1413-1415.
which would convey them to the reception areas. Another lot of police would have to take the parents and march them off to prison.\textsuperscript{203}

In reply, Thelma Cazalet, Conservative MP for Islington East, believed that persuasion had failed in view of the fact that only one in four children had been registered for evacuation. It was, she said:

\begin{quote}
\ldots the absolute duty of the government to arrange for compulsory evacuation\ldots of all children of school age while it can be done with comparative ease or in an orderly fashion.\textsuperscript{204}
\end{quote}

At odds with the Minister’s suggestion that parents would have to be marched off to prison, she claimed that if compulsion were applied, parents would be ‘only too glad to have their minds made up for them.\textsuperscript{205} Contrasting opinion between compulsory over voluntary evacuation continued between MPs. Ultimately the government did not enforce compulsion at any point in the war.

Since compulsion was not a legal option as a means of removing people from danger, a media campaign was launched in order to encourage parents to send their children to safety. Propaganda posters urged mothers to send

\begin{footnotes}
\item[203] H of C Debate, 13 June 1940, vol. 361, cc. 1419-1420.
\item[204] H of C Debate, 13 June 1940, vol. 361, cc. 1430-1431.
\item[205] H of C Debate, 13 June 1940, vol. 361, cc. 1431-1432.
\end{footnotes}
their children out of danger areas and leave them in reception areas. There were many posters aimed at influencing parents and, indeed, one had a biblical connotation where a mother, representing Eve in the Garden of Eden, was being tempted by Hitler whispering in her ear to take her children back.\textsuperscript{206} The poster propaganda continued and was backed up by other forms of media intervention including a weekly radio broadcast by J.B. Priestley, newspaper articles and a number of films aimed at encouraging both host and evacuee to embrace the evacuation scheme.

Dr Edith Summerskill, Labour MP for West Fulham, criticised the approach Ministers had taken on the issue of compulsion. She spoke of the lack of compassion they had shown towards mothers who were predominantly the target audience. Evacuation she said was ‘one of the biggest social problems which has ever been presented to any government’ yet ‘night after night a man’s voice comes over the ether to all these women, with the same stereotyped speech’\textsuperscript{207} She believed these were the speeches of statesmen which would not reach women who were going to part with their children as they were delivered ‘just as the Chancellor of the Exchequer might be speaking to the nation’.\textsuperscript{208} She said that if women were to be persuaded to send their children away then Ministers must:

Get women from the reception areas, teachers, kind women, women with children, women who [understood] the problem and put them on

\textsuperscript{207} \textit{H of C Debate}, 13 June 1940, vol. 362, cc. 1463-1464.
\textsuperscript{208} \textit{H of C Debate}, 13 June 1940, vol. 362, cc. 1461-1462.
the air. Let their voices go through to the kitchens of the nation where the women listen in.\textsuperscript{209}

In Clydebank near Glasgow, women conducted just such a propaganda campaign. In the \textit{Clydebank Press}, the local weekly newspaper for that area, the WVS produced a column on ‘Evacuation Notes’. In one particular issue encouraging parents to register their children for evacuation they claimed that:

\begin{quote}
Every day, nay every hour, the danger of air attack grows greater…You, yourself, will almost certainly be compelled to bear what Barcelona bore, to feel what France felt and suffer some of the pangs that tore Poland. And your children, what of them? Innocent, and largely helpless, are you going to allow them to be butchered and mangled before your eyes without making some effort to save them?\textsuperscript{210}
\end{quote}

It has not been possible to assess how successful this or any other form of propaganda was in influencing British mothers to send their children away. Parsons has claimed that no research was carried out on the subject by Mass Observation (MO), the independent team of social researchers who documented the everyday lives of Britons from 1937 through collections of

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textit{H of C Debate}, 13 June 1940, vol. 362, cc. 1464-1465.}
\footnote{\textit{Clydebank Press}, Friday, 21 June 1940, p.2.}
\end{footnotes}
letters and diaries. Parsons did observe that former evacuees watching films from the time found them patronising.\textsuperscript{211}

An alternative to the official evacuation scheme was an assisted private evacuation scheme. This allowed people to decide for themselves where they would go and to whom. With the exception of Titmuss none of the historians who have written about the evacuation process have given particular attention to the assisted scheme. The scheme was introduced by the government in June 1940 as part of the second wave of evacuation. The assisted scheme helped mothers with pre-school children to leave London suburbs that were being subjected to intense bombing, and it was extended in October 1940 to include other vulnerable people such as the blind, expectant mothers, mothers with school age children and the homeless, the elderly, and the infirm.\textsuperscript{212} This was of some help to the elderly and infirm who, in the original report issued in 1938 by the Committee of Imperial Defence on Evacuation, were to be ‘dealt with under any general scheme’.\textsuperscript{213}

In effect, the assisted private evacuation scheme provided certificates for free accommodation and free travel vouchers for people who could find their own accommodation and make their own travel arrangements. This arrangement relieved government and local authorities of the pressure of

\textsuperscript{211} Parsons, “I’ll Take That One” (1998), p.138.
\textsuperscript{213} TNA. CAB 24/279. Report of Committee on Evacuation 1938, Section 96, p.23.
having to find accommodation for people other than the original priority classes included in the second wave.

This same scheme helped remove some of the pressure on scarce accommodation in certain reception areas already taxed by the transfer of workers in aircraft industry, new war factories, private firms, banks and insurance societies which had relocated to safer areas of the country. Private hospitals and staff were also moved out of danger areas, as were voluntary organisations and civil servants. Scottish industry remained relatively unscathed by war and housed some English workers evacuated with their firms. The Clyde Anchorage off the coast of Greenock, used for visiting naval vessels, operated an Emergency Port Scheme and 600 dockworkers from stevedoring units were billeted in Greenock. Some factories turned to the production of war materials while others, such as Rolls Royce, built shadow factories for war production. The safe removal of war workers and other vulnerable people from danger areas was part of the problem facing government and local authorities. Ensuring people, especially children, remained in reception areas until their safe return could, as far as possible, be guaranteed, was another.

The lack of enthusiasm for the undertaking of a second official scheme in reception areas was matched in evacuation areas. Titmuss believed that by the time a second mass evacuation was being considered, ‘air raids and shelter life had become part of the everyday life of Londoners’, and

therefore they had no real desire to move to the country.\textsuperscript{215} Evidence of just how reluctant people were to leave London during the bombing can be seen in the official figures. It was estimated that 89,000 mothers and children left London during October 1940, with a further 12,500 between November and December.\textsuperscript{216} These figures compare unfavourably with the 257,000 mothers and accompanied children who left London and the metropolitan area in September 1939.\textsuperscript{217} In order to make the official evacuation scheme more appealing, some additional enticements were being offered. In reception areas additional services were in place such as more hostels, welfare centres and social clubs, where people could escape from rural households during the daytime.\textsuperscript{218} At the same time it was necessary to provide householders in reception areas with additional incentives, which would make housing evacuees more appealing.

The demand for nursery places increased as a result of war and evacuation which was exacerbated by an increase in the birth rate from the early 1940s. In Scotland the birth rate rose from 86,899 in 1939 to 90,697 in 1942, reaching a peak of 95,941 in 1944.\textsuperscript{219} The number of illegitimate births also increased during the war across Britain. Figures show that there were 165,000 illegitimate births between 1941 and 1944. This equates to over 41,000 illegitimate births per year compared with the figure of 26,000 for

\textsuperscript{218} Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy (1950), p.370.
\textsuperscript{219} National Records of Scotland (NRS), email confirmation of figures from Customer@gro-Scotland.gsi.gov.uk. [12 March 2013].
The care of unmarried mothers and their babies was mainly left to voluntary agencies to deal with and their care continued to be a contentious issue during the six years of war. Some progress was made by 1943 in terms of provision of improved care by the appointment of social workers whose main interest was the health and welfare of both mother and baby. This Parsons perceived as being a positive legacy of the evacuation scheme.

It could be argued however, that although social welfare agencies stepped in to give assistance to unmarried mothers, the stigma attached to illegitimacy continued to be a problem beyond the period of the war. Ferguson and Fitzgerald suggested in 1954 that unmarried mothers and their babies remained an embarrassment to both local authorities and voluntary workers throughout the war. In his research on the subject Kynaston has also claimed that unmarried mothers were looked upon as being without status and suggested that marriage was an integral part of acceptable lifestyle in the 1950s. In her study on maternal welfare Ann Oakley commented that illegitimacy was a significant reason for women not attending antenatal

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221 NRS, email confirmation of figures from: [www.Customer@gro-Scotland.gsi.gov.uk](http://www.Customer@gro-Scotland.gsi.gov.uk) [12 March 2013].
While she provides no figures to substantiate her argument she concluded that there was no easing of prejudice against the unmarried mother for at least two decades after the war. Some evidence of this may be found in the continued existence of homes for unmarried mothers in this era.

Taking new public initiatives and additional private initiatives into account, there was little relevant change in the structure between the first and the second evacuation scheme. The difference was that the success of the second scheme depended heavily on public participation, and the lack of response to the countrywide survey on the launch of a second scheme made it impossible to plan accurately for numbers arriving in reception areas. This problem was compounded by the fact that evacuation would only take place when bombs started to fall on Britain. Such a situation presented further complications in so far as there could potentially be very little or no advance warning before evacuation would have to take place. In addition, parents willing to participate had to agree to leave their children in reception areas once they were evacuated and not bring them home early, as had happened in the first evacuation. In terms of the householders in reception areas, they were to have an assurance that only children in a clean and healthy state would be sent, and those who were not were to be placed in other types of accommodation. A very slight rise in the payment scheme was also offered as an incentive to householders willing to billet evacuees.

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Figures were discouraging despite attempts to persuade people to leave cities and remain in the reception areas. England and Wales, including a total of 350,000 unaccompanied children.\textsuperscript{227} In Scotland by early 1942 there were approximately 738,000 evacuees of all classes in reception areas. Although people did move when heavy bombing began, when the German army turned attention on Russia many were disinclined to remain away from their homes indefinitely.

In Scotland the worry over a second mass evacuation was unfounded as plans were only to be enforced in the event of aerial bombardment. The only other extensive evacuation took place following the blitz on Clydebank in March and May 1941. Boyd reported that, following the March bombing of Clydebank and the nearby Glasgow district of Knightswood, a total of 120,000 people were evacuated from the Glasgow area.\textsuperscript{228} This massive bombardment engendered a feeling of wide cooperation. Many of the oral histories of the people who lived through the bombing and subsequent evacuation were testimony to the sense of solidarity which developed among the people of Clydebank. One Clydebank woman described the kindness of a relative who lived on a home farm estate in Callander where:

\begin{quote}
On the Friday evening, twenty six of us went to Callander in a coal lorry. I had an aunt in Callander… she put everybody up, all twenty six from that coal lorry.\textsuperscript{229}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{228} Boyd, \textit{Evacuation in Scotland} (1944), p.35.
The Clydebank Life Story Group collated many such accounts of kindness during those dark days. These reports echoed those of Londoners involved in the blitz of 1940. Holman claimed that once the bombs fell ‘foster parents knew that they were giving essential protection to children’ and that their suffering ‘provoked sympathy, not resentment’. Accounts of generosity and kindness during the blitz showed that in times of crisis people were much more prepared to lay aside their differences. This attitude differed substantially from reports prior to the bombings.

However, these accounts of social unity as a result of shared distress have been subjected to scrutiny and debate among historians mainly from an English perspective. Writing about London’s homeless during the war Calder described scenes where homeless Londoners trekked miles to find homes, only to discover that there were ‘well-to-do people of the suburbs and countryside [who] still revealed the bleak class hatred which had underlain the first response to evacuation’. More recently Harold Smith warned against over emphasising the idea of ‘shared solidary’.

While the second evacuation scheme was in progress, the British government responded to invitations from the Dominions of Canada, Australia and South Africa to send children to these places for safety. The overseas evacuation scheme warrants attention at this point in so far as it formed part of the official evacuation scheme during the summer of 1940. It

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also proved an extremely popular option among the parents of eligible evacuees.

Until the introduction of the Children’s Overseas Reception Board (CORB) the advantage of being able to send children to the safety of the Dominions and the United States was exclusively available to people with substantial means. Overseas evacuations had taken place privately before the outbreak of war and in the few months following war being declared. Approximately 11,000 children were sent overseas during that time by parents who could afford to despatch their children to the safety of relatives and friends abroad.\(^{233}\)

In 1940 negotiations took place in Whitehall with a view to sending a select number of children overseas through the official CORB evacuation scheme. Cabinet approved the CORB scheme on 17 June 1940, and two weeks after advertising the scheme for children between 6 and 16 years of age, some 211,488 applications were received from parents wishing to have their children included in the overseas scheme.\(^{234}\) This figure included 26,900 Scottish applications, of which 5,662 were approved. In fact only 462 Scottish children eventually left for the Dominions by this method.\(^{235}\) This was proportionally fewer than for England and Wales, where departures totalled 18,852.

While domestic evacuation schemes after September 1939 had been met with little or no enthusiasm, the response from parents to send their children overseas was, by comparison, overwhelming. Although no definite guarantee could be given for the safety of the children, or specific arrangements made for their return, there was no need for persuasion or propaganda campaigns to entice parents to send their children abroad. A number of explanations were suggested as to why parents gave their willing support for the CORB scheme. These ranged from the rapid changes in the war situation after France capitulated, to the perceived feelings of hostility from the working classes towards the privileges of the middle class. Yet none fully explain why parents would rather have sent their children abroad, when travel such as crossing the Atlantic was particularly dangerous.

The CORB scheme was restricted to unaccompanied school children from both state and private schools and parents were required to pay a means tested maintenance contribution. Class division was recognised as a significant issue in overseas evacuation prior to the CORB scheme and formed part of parliamentary debate on the subject from the time of its inception. A number of MPs were critical of the way in which this was arranged. James Griffiths, Labour MP for Llanelli, was outspoken against the principle of class distinction which was evident in overseas evacuation. He was against the government allowing children of the ‘well-to-do’ being able to send their children abroad. He referred to the 1,454 children who had left for the Dominions, and the 298 children sent to the United States in June 1940, and argued that that was unacceptable. His objection centred on

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the unfairness of the situation as children of the poor were being left behind simply because parents could not afford to send them so far afield. He spoke of the need to ensure that the government made it ‘impossible for any impression to gain ground in this country that class distinction is to operate at a time like this’.237 Churchill was also critical of the overseas scheme and, while he did not agree with it in principle, he gave an assurance that the government would:

…take pains to make sure that in the use that is made of…offers [for overseas evacuation] there shall be no question of rich people having an advantage, if advantage there be, over poor.238  

Media reports regarding the CORB scheme tended to show that, if anything, attempts were being made to ensure children from working-class families were being given a fair opportunity for inclusion. A report in the *Glasgow Herald* on 3 July 1940, for example, stated that fit and healthy children would be chosen for evacuation to the Dominions with a ratio of 75 per cent from grant aided schools and 25 per cent from non-grant-aided schools in England and Wales. In Scotland, 49 out of every 50 children to be evacuated overseas were to come from local education authority schools and the remaining 1 of 50 from private schools.239 Fethney’s study confirmed that children from working class backgrounds were given as fair an

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239 *Glasgow Herald*, Wednesday, 3 July 1940, p.4.
opportunity as possible in the selection process and that the largest percentage of children included in the official overseas scheme came from households where the father was employed in some kind of manual labour.\textsuperscript{240}

While Churchill advocated equal access to overseas evacuation, the Prime Minister’s general disapproval of the CORB scheme was expressed in the Commons during the same debate quoted earlier, when he said that:

\begin{quote}
It [was] most undesirable that anything in the nature of a large-scale exodus from this country should take place…the full bearings of this question were not appreciated by His Majesty’s Government at the time when it was first raised. It was not foreseen that the mild countenance given to the plan would lead to a movement of such dimensions…\textsuperscript{241}
\end{quote}

Writing about the situation later, Churchill claimed he entirely ‘deprecate[ed] any stampede from [the] country.’\textsuperscript{242}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{240} Fethney, \textit{The Absurd and the Brave} (2000), Appendix V6, p.299. \\
\textsuperscript{241} \textit{H of C} Debate, 18 July 1940, vol. 363, cc. 394-5. Civil Defence on Children’s Overseas Evacuation Scheme. \\
\end{flushright}
In spite of Churchill’s lack of enthusiasm for the scheme it went ahead led by Sir Geoffrey Shakespeare, Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the Dominions. Organisation and planning for CORB began on 7 June 1940. The Dominions Office and the Ministry of Health were responsible for the scheme, together with an Inter-Departmental Committee representing twelve different departments. An Advisory Committee was appointed that included representatives experienced in children’s care, education and migration.

As numbers that could be accommodated were limited and the volume of interest was so great, no more applications were taken after July 1940. Nevertheless, permits were still granted to those evacuees willing to go privately. The CORB scheme was hampered by the problem of limited availability of necessary escort shipping. The danger was, until America joined the war, ships could not refuel in American east coast ports, and convoys travelling from Britain had a naval escort only as far as 300 kilometres west of Liverpool, after which they were on their own. The scheme went ahead in spite of an initial postponement imposed as a safety precaution when escort ships could not be provided in sufficient numbers to protect the convoys.

Cabinet decision to implement the scheme when there were not enough escort ships available is somewhat contentious. Fethney argued that it may not have been voted for unanimously but was pushed through by the Cabinet Secretary at a time when, as an incoming Prime Minister, Churchill was
preoccupied with the news of the German occupation of France. Whether or not CORB had the unanimous approval of Cabinet, the scheme was short lived when tragedy struck on the 17 September 1940. The *City of Benares*, left Liverpool docks on 13 September 1940 carrying 90 CORB children and ten private evacuees to Canada in a convoy of nineteen ships. Parsons wrote that until the early hours of the 17 September the convoy had been protected by the destroyer HMS Winchelsea. Left unprotected the ship was hit by a torpedo in the North Atlantic 600 miles from Liverpool. Lifeboats were filled with children and adults fleeing the sinking ship but rescue ships were slow to reach them. It was in the lifeboats in the cold waters of the North Atlantic that many of those who had survived the sinking ship eventually perished. The heavy death toll from the *City of Benares* included 77 CORB children and 179 adults and crew.

The *Daily Record and Mail* on Monday, 23 September 1940, published a list of those evacuees who had tragically lost their lives, and from that list it appeared that there were no Scottish schoolchildren among the dead. Eyewitness accounts of the disaster have said that the main cause of such a heavy death toll was not the result of the sinking of the *City of Benares*. From the testimony of survivors it seems that the high death toll was partly due to the lack of available lifeboats and also the length of time it took for those who had managed to secure a lifeboat to be rescued. Lyn Smith’s book includes a significant amount of oral testimony from survivors of the

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244 Parsons, “*I’ll Take That One*” (1998), p.169.
246 *Daily Record and Mail*, Monday, 23 September 1940, p.8.
*City of Benares.* She wrote in association with the Imperial War Museum, where many of the original letters, diaries and oral testimony is held regarding evacuation generally and which includes harrowing accounts from those who were among the passengers of the stricken ship. Many of these accounts describe the fight for survival in lifeboats in the icy waters of the Atlantic.247

This tragic event put an end to the official overseas evacuation scheme which, during its operation, had successfully delivered a total of 2,664 children to the safety of the Dominions for the duration of the war, with approximately a further 11,000 by private arrangement.248 Writing in 1998 Parsons stressed the serious omission of the CORB within the historiography on evacuation. He argued that, through their experience, the overseas evacuees were more affected sociologically and psychologically than those children who had been evacuated within the United Kingdom.249 Smith’s work in 2008 does not sufficiently meet the shortfall in the historiography relating to the issues Parsons raised.

While the overseas scheme was abandoned in 1940, the voluntary and assisted evacuation schemes within Britain remained open, and in June 1944, following the V1 bombing raids on London, a final evacuation plan was instigated. This third evacuation which lasted two months did not affect Scotland. This final scheme differed little from the second. One of the most

247 Smith, *Young Voices* (2008), pp.136 and 156.
noticeable variances within this third scheme was the record number of expectant mothers evacuated. Areas affected by both V1 and V2 bombs centred round London and the south east of the country. As evacuees headed to the north and midlands, some districts originally designated as neutral or sending areas had to be redefined as reception areas.

The V1 and V2 attacks were experienced first-hand by a former evacuee who had spent some time billeted with foster parents in Rothesay. His wartime experiences expand far beyond the confines of his months in Rothesay. After a few months as an evacuee he was taken to live in Ilford where he experienced the severity of the raids over London when the V1 and V2 weapons struck during the last few months of 1944. He recalled that the bombs came three or four nights a week and how, as a deaf person, he could still feel the vibration of the explosion. He told the story of a cinema being bombed, killing everyone inside and of a bus he had been travelling on being hit by a bomb. He said of the V1’s:

…when one came you stopped what you were doing and took shelter…if a V1 passed overhead then you were okay, but if it stopped very near you or just above…you covered your head with your arms and waited, if it came down on you then you were dead, wounded or saved by things falling around you leaving you safe.²⁵⁰

²⁵⁰ Interview with Jack, 10 July 2012. This interview was not recorded but taken in note form. Transcript held with author.
In the Commons, debate centred on the allegation that the government had known of the German flying bomb threat to Britain six months before the first attack took place and had instigated no evacuation preparations. When questioned on the subject, Florence Horsburgh, the Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Health, and MP for Dundee, whose job it was to arrange the evacuation of schoolchildren from major cities claimed that the delay until attacks occurred was intentional:

…if we had evacuated the children when flying bombs were not falling six months ago, we should have had them all back before the flying bombs came.251

This was possibly the right decision given the very high numbers of returning children in the weeks and months following the first evacuation. In fact, while the flying bombs were still targeting London and surrounding areas, evacuees were making their way back to the danger areas.

Historiographical research into the final official evacuation is very limited. To date, the most in-depth report on this third evacuation scheme remains in the work of Titmuss. Other reports by Padley and Cole for England and Wales,252 the Cambridge survey by Susan Isaacs,253 the Women’s Groups on

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Public Welfare in both Scotland and England,\textsuperscript{254} and William Boyd’s report,\textsuperscript{255} were issued prior to the launch of the third scheme. Historians such as Welshman\textsuperscript{256} and Parsons\textsuperscript{257} have tended to link the third scheme with the return of evacuees rather than study these events in isolation. Parsons commented that as historians of evacuation have tended to focus on the first evacuation scheme there is a distinct lack of historiography relating to subsequent schemes.\textsuperscript{258} The lack of historiography concerning the third scheme possibly results from the fact that there was a drift back to London while bombs were still falling. However, from Jack’s detailed account of the damage and destruction caused by the V1 and V2 bombings, it is difficult to understand why more people did not leave the cities which were under attack. Bell claimed that there has been a relative silence around the V1 and V2’s, and offered an explanation in the fact that after six years of war, and with victory in Europe in sight, although morale was fragile, people had grown more resilient.\textsuperscript{259}

The official evacuation scheme was suspended on 8 September 1944, although it did take some time before the system was dismantled and all the evacuees returned. In assessing the evacuation scheme as a whole it is not possible to measure its success in terms of the number of lives that were saved by the process.

\textsuperscript{255} Boyd, \textit{Evacuation in Scotland} (1944).
\textsuperscript{256} Welshman, \textit{Churchill’s Children} (2010).
\textsuperscript{257} Parsons, “I’ll Take That One” (1998).
\textsuperscript{258} Parsons, “I’ll Take That One” (1998), p.246.
\textsuperscript{259} Bell, \textit{London Was Ours; Diaries} (2011), p.203.
Looking back to the initial evacuation planning and implementation in 1939, Boyd argued that it was based on limited research and took no account of basic human nature.\textsuperscript{260} Little regard was given to family bonds and how difficult it would be for parents to make the decision to send their children to strangers in unknown destinations and for an indeterminate length of time.

Prior to the implementation of the evacuation scheme in 1939 no one appeared to have considered the possibility of the early return of evacuees.\textsuperscript{261} Nor had it been anticipated in the early stages that such large numbers of people would relinquish their commitment to the scheme and choose instead to remain in the danger areas. In essence, this meant that when the bombs dropped there were greater numbers of civilians in the danger areas than was originally anticipated. In the second and third scheme a similar situation existed, where evacuees returned while cities were still suffering the effects of bombing. Furthermore, planning of the overseas evacuation was difficult as children were exposed to dangerous sea crossings due to insufficient numbers of available escort ships.

With the exception of the assisted private evacuation scheme, planning and implementation of the second and third evacuation changed little from the first. Availability of accommodation continued to be problematic and early return of evacuees to sending areas remained cause for concern. However, the evacuation process may be defended not only as a means of keeping

\textsuperscript{260} Boyd, \textit{Evacuation in Scotland} (1944), p.121.
people relatively safe but also for the advancement of social welfare throughout Britain. It was this process which brought people together and effectively raised the profile of child poverty and neglect to an audience which hitherto would likely have been oblivious to its condition. In the face of total war, government had little choice other than ensure that some measure of improvement be seen to be undertaken in order to maintain the morale and support of the people. Such initiatives as the extension of the milk-in-schools programme, the extension of maternity care, the creation of nursery places for young children and clothing vouchers for children in need, were all positive extensions to the care and protection of vulnerable people. Importantly the introduction of the Education Act of 1944 in England and 1945 in Scotland was a permanent and progressive welfare measure. There were of course some issues which evacuation could not help improve in the long-term, such as the division of class which existed in Britain and continued to exist in the post-war period. These issues will be dealt with in more detail in a later chapter.

It could be argued that in view of the speed of the return of the first wave of evacuees in 1939, and the relative lack of enthusiasm for any subsequent schemes, the whole evacuation process was a failure. However, the long-term welfare initiatives which were instigated as a result of the process reflect its ultimate success. When the evacuation scheme was being put into operation the official thinking was that bombs would be dropped as soon as war was declared. Had the government not acted in response to the advice of experts it would undoubtedly have been criticised for having done nothing to ensure the safety of vulnerable people in the cities, as it was predicted that
they would be the main target of enemy action. At the time evacuation seemed to be the only really acceptable alternative open to the government, and it had appeared to work for the vulnerable people in Spain during the Civil War. Titmuss believed that evacuation was inevitable and explained that bombing raids would send people from their homes in panic. Therefore government required to take firm control otherwise chaos and confusion would ensue.\footnote{Titmuss, \textit{Problems of Social Policy} (1950), p.23.}
Chapter III

The Impact of Evacuation on Scottish Health Care

They have looked at him...with shame and a burning sense of neglect and wrong, and they have sought to suggest means whereby this degradation of childhood can be avoided and a home of the future made, even at its humblest, a better place.263

The previous two chapters outline the structure of the official evacuation process run by the British government prior to and during the Second World War, from its inception in September 1939, until the last evacuees left London in response to the threat from V1 and V2 rockets during 1944. The remainder of the thesis will explore the impact of evacuation on the development of wartime and post war welfare. This chapter will cover the way in which evacuation influenced developments in health provision. With a focus on Scottish health care this chapter will argue in support of Titmuss and Addison in so far as evacuation and its consequences increased the pace of mass health care provision.

Analysis of primary source material, including media coverage and parliamentary debate from the period, will be taken into account in order to support this argument. Such evidence will be used in conjunction with a range of historiography relating to the subject of health care provision both before and during the Second World War. A selection of this material will

be considered from historians such as Derek Fraser, who agreed in principle with the Titmuss theory, and those who opposed it, such as Macnicol and Thane. The central argument focuses on how far war impacted on changes in health and welfare. Fraser’s view emulated that of Titmuss in so far as he believed evacuation led to a greater degree of universalism.\textsuperscript{264} It is noteworthy that this agreement with the Titmuss philosophy may have stemmed from the fact that, in chronological terms, the distance between these two authors was relatively close. Further to this social history techniques were uncommon at the time and therefore history from below was not widely considered. Fraser, like Titmuss, believed that of all the problems associated with war, evacuation more than any other influenced social policy, since:

Evacuation comprised the two factors which were the crucial characteristics of the social policy of the war years...[it] required a much greater involvement of the state in social affairs...Evacuation [also] acted as a mirror to society and revealed the blemishes that still remained, so generating a greater degree of universalism.\textsuperscript{265}

Universalism and the creation of a more egalitarian society was something Titmuss believed had evolved through the process of war generally and evacuation in particular. For Addison, the warfare to welfare theory was based on the argument that post-war reconstruction, and the future of social services, was very much tied to the conduct of the war. He claimed that the years of war, ‘gave way to a spirit of greater welfare and more confident

management’. This chapter will support this argument by showing that because evacuation drew public attention to the existence of a level of poverty and deprivation that had hitherto been left uncovered, the evacuation process was directly linked to the principle most associated with Titmuss, that of warfare leading to welfare.

Addison subscribed to the Titmuss theory through the medium of reconstruction. He stressed that reconstruction could only be planned when there was a degree of certainty that ‘the long tunnel of defeat was at an end’. For Addison such an upturn occurred following the British success in the battle of El Alamein in November 1942.

Addison’s theory has been challenged by a number of historians who have questioned the priority given to permanent social welfare change by top rank officials. This is due in part to two specific observations. Firstly, Jose Harris argued that during the war Churchill failed to attend any of the reconstruction committee meetings which therefore diminished its level of importance. Secondly, Pat Thane questioned the validity of the government’s intentions towards post-war social reconstruction with the appointment of Labour M.P. Arthur Greenwood as head of the War Aims Committee. In her opinion the appointment was an indication of the low priority placed on social reconstruction. Thane substantiated her claim by

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the fact that Greenwood’s War Aims Committee met only four times between January 1941 and February 1942, when he was dismissed from his post and replaced by ‘the equally ineffective Sir William Jowitt’. Greenwood’s ability came under scrutiny from the Labour Minister Hugh Dalton who revealed much about his personality and ability in his extensive wartime diaries. Dalton regarded him, especially in the early years of the war, as unimpressive. His diary entry for 18 June 1940 said that Greenwood was:

…very slow and unimperative [and] in danger of being run by his officials.271

Dalton’s diary records continued in the following months and years to make further scathing comments concerning Greenwood. For example:

Thursday, 8 August 1940: Greenwood made a long and very dull and unimpressive speech yesterday…

Sunday, 22 December 1940: I dropped a passing hint that Greenwood is being much criticised for inactivity….

Arthur Greenwood was deputy leader of the Labour Party from 1935-1945, and Minister without Portfolio in Churchill’s wartime cabinet. As head of reconstruction and post war planning he was ineffective. Greenwood, as part of the wartime Coalition government, was described by Addison as: “…the victim still of a sad drink problem [who] proved ineffectual”. Addison, The Road to 1945 (1975), p.113


Wednesday, 28 October 1942: Greenwood...had done extremely well at the outbreak of the war, never before or since had he reached the same high standard...

Tuesday, 15 June 1943: Of Greenwood it used to be said in Whitehall, when he was a minister, that ‘the poor old chap couldn’t even sign his name after midday’.²⁷²

Although these diary entries may have been throw away remarks from a disgruntled colleague, they help reinforce Thane’s opinion. Addison also questioned the suitability of Greenwood as head of the War Aims Committee, and acknowledged that by the time of his appointment he was; ‘a sad figure whose career was sinking’, and his department had ‘no powers to compel action’. The admission that Greenwood was ineffectual did not undermine Addison’s argument on reconstruction. He believed that the ‘Labour team’ dominated the ‘powerful Reconstruction Committee’ after Greenwood was dismissed.²⁷³

Addison’s argument on the principle of wartime social reconstruction as a vehicle for welfare reform was questioned by Macnicol who argued that wartime welfare reforms were ‘something of a myth’,²⁷⁴ and claimed that there was a ‘qualitatively ambiguous nature [to] welfare innovations’.²⁷⁵ Thane too questioned the principle of universalism used by both Titmuss and

²⁷³ Addison, _The Road to 1945_ (1975), p.167.
Fraser. She concluded that there was no clear way of defining the extent of public acceptance of redistributive policies during the war, nor was it decisive that there was a unanimous enthusiasm within government for social reconstruction.\textsuperscript{276}

In spite of such criticism, this chapter will set out to prove that looking at the history of Scottish evacuation, the theory of warfare to welfare is a convincing one. It will take account of the wide range of contemporary media coverage which evacuation attracted and the resultant independent social investigations. Such analysis will allow an assessment of both coverage of the evacuation process and the impact of social investigations on healthcare provision in Scotland.

The warfare to welfare argument advocated by Titmuss was exemplified by the way in which attempts were made to improve the delivery of health care as a result of previous wars. The British defeat by the Boers in South Africa 1899-1902 highlighted the necessity for national efficiency. This was addressed with particular emphasis on improvements in child and maternity care. The physical education of children, school meals for necessitous children, better nutrition for a healthier urban working class all came into question, as did infant and maternal mortality rates. Improvements in these areas of social care were perceived as the most important way forward in creating a healthier population.

There followed a series of legislative improvements such as the Education (Scotland) Act 1908 which made school medical inspection compulsory and allowed for school meals to be made available to necessitous children. The Act also made it obligatory for physical education to be taught in schools.\textsuperscript{277} The Midwives Act passed in 1902 for England and Wales and eventually extended to Scotland in 1915, made midwifery training and registration compulsory.\textsuperscript{278} The Notification of Births Act 1907, and the Notification of Births (Extension) Act 1915 gave local authorities in Scotland the power to provide health care, where they felt it necessary, for mothers and children under five years old. It was anticipated that early notification of births would help improve the chance of survival of babies and mothers in need of medical care, which would, in turn, reduce the infant mortality rate which was particularly high in Scotland.

The 1927 Midwives and Maternity Homes (Scotland) Act was introduced in response to the somewhat high maternal mortality rates in Scotland. The intention of this Act was to increase the number of maternity beds in hospitals, abolish uncertified midwives and allow for the inspection of maternity homes to be carried out together with a check on their administration records. Reid pointed out however, that although the Act kept maternal mortality rates in the public eye it was a decade later before there was any noticeable difference.\textsuperscript{279}

\textsuperscript{277} archive@worcestershire.gov.uk Ref: 834/9339/13/iv/8 Education (Scotland) Act 1908 [Accessed 30 April 2016].
\textsuperscript{278} Lindsay Reid, \textit{Scottish Midwives: Twentieth-Century Voices, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Edition} (Dunfermline, 2008), p.ix.
The warfare to welfare theory fell short to some extent in the 1920s as post First World War economic problems and high unemployment were compounded by the effects of the Wall Street stock market crash which caused a worldwide depression in the early 1930s. Effectively this meant healthcare provision in the inter-war period was ‘unable to tackle problems on a scale which lay beyond its powers’.  

Scotland in the 1930s was suffering from particularly poor levels of health compared with much of the rest of the British Isles. Poor health was caused by high levels of unemployment, low wages, poor housing conditions, with housing shortages leading to overcrowding, especially in major urban areas. These longstanding social problems were given a new focus when city children were removed from their homes due to the dangers of war.

The Department of Health for Scotland report for 1936 stated that almost one-quarter of working-class homes in Scotland were overcrowded. The report also showed that there was overcrowding in at least 35,000 local authority houses, representing 22.7 per cent overcrowding. This figure compared unfavourably with the 3.8 per cent of overcrowding in England according to McCrae. He claimed that the worst overcrowding was in the industrial towns of Clydebank, Coatbridge, Port Glasgow and Motherwell. Poor housing and overcrowding led to disease which was greater in areas without proper sanitation. In the 1930s at least one third of Scottish housing lacked either toilets or baths.

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Improvements in health care provision continued to be discussed in parliamentary debates in the early 1930s, although lack of funding prevented much constructive work being undertaken to improve the delivery of health care or eradicate the associated problems. A letter from the Scottish Office to the DHS advised that:

…as the Scottish Health Services were being investigated it was inadvisable to encourage hopes that drastic alterations would be made in the medical service at present available for either the insured or the general public.\textsuperscript{284}

Scottish health reform was nevertheless an ongoing topic for investigation. In 1933 the DHS appointed a Health Services Committee to review Scottish healthcare. This committee became better known as the Cathcart Committee, named after Edward Cathcart, Professor of Physiological Chemistry at Glasgow University, who headed the committee in its latter stages. The committee was charged with reviewing:

…the existing health services of Scotland in the light of modern conditions and knowledge, and to make recommendations on any changes in policy and organisation that may be considered necessary for the promotion of efficiency and economy.\textsuperscript{285}

\textsuperscript{284} NAS. 8709. Ref: MH58 238, Letter from the Scottish Office in Whitehall, 28 February 1934.  
\textsuperscript{285} \url{www.parlipapers.chadwyck.co.uk} Committee on Scottish Health Services Report [Accessed 7 March 2014].
The Committee report, published in 1935, made substantial recommendations for the extension of health care provision. These included the promotion of maternity care, education in food nutrition for a healthy diet, a comprehensive and coordinated system of health care, hospital provision and improved laws on sanitation.\(^{286}\) The only recommendation that was acted upon in the short term was the extension of the maternity services. This was undoubtedly due to the fact that Scotland suffered from a consistently higher infant mortality rate (IMR) than the rest of Britain.\(^{287}\) For example, in the ten year period 1930-1940 IMR figures per 1000 births ranged from 83.0 to 78.3, with a substantial dip in 1938 to 69.6 and in 1939 to 68.5. These figures are inclusive of the whole of Scotland although regional variations existed with the larger urban areas of Aberdeen, Dundee, Glasgow and Edinburgh suffering higher IMR than many rural areas. Comparatively, the IMR figures for England and Wales in the same period ranged from 60.0 to 57.4 per 1000 births.\(^{288}\) The remainder of the recommendations in the Cathcart Report were considered too expensive to be pursued in 1936.

A series of speeches by successive Scottish Secretaries between 1936 and 1939 showed that health care considerations were still on the agenda despite the economic restraints of this period, but again little or nothing was done. Those involved included three successive Scottish Secretaries: Sir Godfrey Collins, Scottish Liberal MP and Secretary of State for Scotland from 1932

to 1936,\textsuperscript{289} Walter Elliot, Conservative MP, and Scottish Secretary from 1936 to 1938,\textsuperscript{290} and John Colville, Scottish Unionist Party member and Scottish Secretary from 1938 to 1940.\textsuperscript{291} All believed that healthcare in Scotland was steadily improving but were acutely aware that much more was required to eradicate the poor state of health of the Scottish population. By way of example, Walter Elliot, speaking in the House of Commons in June 1937, encompassed the views of all three Scottish Secretaries of the period when he acknowledged that:

…no one in Scotland is completely satisfied with the position that our country occupies, either actually or relatively. We feel that there are a great number of improvements that could be made and will have to be made in our health services and in our housing, and…in some respects we compare unfavourably with the great nation south of the border.\textsuperscript{292}

The outbreak of war led to the implementation of considerable changes in healthcare through such bodies as the Emergency Medical Services (EMS). The EMS were responsible for helping to overcome the deficiencies in hospital provision by expanding hospital services. These services included the provision of an extra 20,527 hospital beds, and ensured patients received specialist care where necessary. The EMS were responsible for the seven new hospitals which were built across Scotland, from Raigmore in the North

\textsuperscript{289} \textit{H of C} Debate, 10 March 1936, vol. 309, cc.1938-1939.
\textsuperscript{290} \textit{H of C} Debate, 24 June 1937, vol. 325, cc.1399-1400.
\textsuperscript{292} \textit{H of C} Debate, 24 June 1937, vol. 325, cc.1399-1400.
to Peel in the South.\textsuperscript{293} The EMS also helped improve opportunities for research and specialised practices in areas of medicine such as neurosurgery, anaesthetics and plastic surgery.\textsuperscript{294} The Titmuss theory is significant here as, in political terms, long delayed healthcare improvements now being implemented could be seen as an expedient of the wartime situation.

Titmuss’s warfare to welfare argument is particularly effective in terms of the health care initiatives which resulted from war generally and particularly as a result of the evacuation process. The wide media attention attracted by the evacuation of poor and unhealthy mothers and children from the cities, particularly after the first wave during September 1939, helped reinvigorate policy initiatives in health and welfare, especially those relating to the wellbeing of mothers and children. In this respect, action came both during and immediately after the Second World War.

Reports of evacuees arriving at their destination without proper clothing, and in a poor and unhealthy state were published in the press. The \textit{Scotsman} published letters from householders on the 14 September 1939 and provided two examples where complaints had arisen concerning the care of evacuees. The first concerned an evacuee mother with three small children of whom it was written that she was:

\begin{quote}
…never about till half-past eight in the morning, but long before then the children are up and getting in the way of the morning’s work; Her
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{293} McLachlan, (ed.), \textit{Improving the Common Weal} (1987), p.84
husband has been long out of work; she has brought no money; she
expects to be waited on as an invalid; she expects too, that she and a
delicate child shall immediately receive free all the medicines and
special foods they have been receiving in the city.

The second complaint recorded concerned children who had been sent
without proper clothing. It read:

…a working-class woman has received two children whose father is
in a well-paid job with no possibility of being out of work. The
children were sent to her with a fair supply of pocket money and
decent upper clothes. But their underclothing was almost entirely in
holes, they have no warm things, and they were so dirty that she was
glad of an offer to scrub them in a fixed-in bath, her own house not
having such a convenience.²⁹⁵

These are just two of many reports of the poor condition of evacuees whose
state of health, when it became known, shocked the public at large, and
when the Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, learned of the state of some
evacuees he wrote to his sister saying:

The stories I have heard about evacuees are awful and there is no
doubt that the dwellers in the country districts have had a shocking
revelation of the manners and customs of their town cousins.

²⁹⁵ The Scotsman, Thursday, 14 September 1939, p.9.
He went on to quote from his daughter Dorothy who related the feelings of one hostess who said:

I never knew that such conditions existed, and I feel ashamed of having been so ignorant of my neighbours… For the rest of my life I mean to try and make amends by helping such people to live cleaner and healthier lives.296

Economic hardship was a significant reason that evacuees often turned up at their destination without many of the prescribed requirements. This was undoubtedly due to the fact that often children did not possess many of the essential items laid down by the evacuating Committee. It was unlikely, Titmuss believed, that children would have been sent away with insufficient clothing while their best clothes were left at home.297 For the unemployed who did not receive unemployment or health insurance payments, public assistance payments would not run to buying more than basic needs and therefore did not allow for the luxury of the extra shoes and clothes which evacuees were required to have been provided with before leaving home.

The presence of evacuees, predominantly from urban working class housing, who were billeted in middle class homes, helped emphasise the differences in the social classes that became a prominent issue in wartime. Fraser agreed with Titmuss that as total war included the whole of society, the

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296 Letter from Neville Chamberlain to his sister Hilda on 17 September 1939 is in the Neville Chamberlain papers, University of Birmingham Library, NC 18/1/1121. Quoted in Welshman, Churchill’s Children (2010), p.87.
barriers of class distinction between the rich and the poor were broken down in terms of social welfare. However, the class argument has been the subject of substantial debate among historians. Macnicol, for example, believed that rather than break down social barriers, evacuation helped reinforce the division between social classes. A general observation of middle class opinion, especially of some of the mothers evacuated with their children, was referred to in the social survey conducted by the Scottish Women’s Group on Public Welfare. The report commented on the existence of ‘a parasitic attitude’ and claimed that some mothers were ‘utterly reckless’ in the use of household supplies. Newspaper reports from the time tend to support the opinion that mothers evacuated with their children were lazy and dirty. An article in the Daily Mail on 24 April 1943, reviewing the ‘Our Towns’ book reinforced this idea and claimed that:

…what stirred the hostesses to bitterness instead of pity here are those mothers, dirty and verminous like the children, idle, drunken, bullying and profane…The mothers who had never held a needle or cooked a square meal for their families, the mothers who had allowed their children to grow up like animals, who had given their children indeed far less care than their unwilling hostesses would have given to a dog.

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300 Scottish Women’s Group on Public Welfare, Our Scottish Towns (1944), p.11.
301 Daily Mail, Saturday, 24 April 1943, p.2.
It is important to note here the existence of newspapers’ establishment bias which may have produced a certain amount of prejudice in such articles. However, it was generally accepted that some evacuee mothers did expect more than they should have from their hosts. Nevertheless there are no statistics to prove that these type of mothers were in the majority. It is unlikely that all the mothers evacuated with their children fell into the lazy and dirty category, although no successful billeting stories appear to have been published relating to evacuee mothers. The fact that mothers were not included in subsequent official evacuations meant that there were sufficient negative reports received to encourage government officials, in charge of the evacuation scheme, to approach the second scheme with caution.

Further evidence that the evacuation of both mothers and children was unpopular was clear from surveys carried out throughout the Scottish evacuation areas during the early part of 1940. The project was undertaken in order to ensure that householders would be willing to take evacuees whenever a second wave was launched. The results gave a clear indication that householders would not welcome a further evacuation scheme unless the country was under aerial attack. One example of this came from the County Offices in Viewforth, Stirling on 10 April 1940. The results of the survey there showed that of the 14,000 leaflets sent to householders only 150 were returned with a positive response to take evacuees. The County Officer commented that:

…the attitude of householders in this county to the government evacuation scheme ranges from apathy to marked hostility…in the
event of sustained aerial bombardment, however, it is possible that the mood of householders would change.\textsuperscript{302}

When the social classes collided under the cloud of evacuation, it sparked a series of investigations by independent researchers concerned about the problems of poverty and neglect. Newspapers were quick to report on the large numbers of vermin infested and neglected children within days of the first evacuation. For example the \textit{Scotsman} reported complaints from local residents on 7 September 1939, just after the evacuees had arrived in the Perthshire countryside. It said:

\begin{quote}
…the evacuees billeted throughout the county had come extensively from the poorer quarters of Glasgow, and it was unfair that so many had been sent out in such a filthy and verminous condition.\textsuperscript{303}
\end{quote}

It is not possible to accurately gauge just how many evacuees actually arrived in such an unhealthy condition. There is a likelihood that reports may have been exaggerated, especially in rural locations such as Perthshire where evacuees were clearly not universally welcomed. According to the \textit{Scotsman} on 20 March 1940, Bridge of Allan residents held a meeting to protest against the sending of further Glasgow evacuees to that area and of the proposed compulsory billeting. They objected on account of the condition and behaviour of the evacuees who had arrived in September 1939. Residents argued that there was a pressing need to protect the ageing

\textsuperscript{302} NAS. Files CO1/4/23. Letter from County Offices, Viewforth, Stirling. Dated 10 April 1940.
\textsuperscript{303} The \textit{Scotsman}, Thursday, 7 September 1939, p.3.
population of the town, many of whom were seventy or over, from the badly behaved Glasgow evacuees. The presiding officer, Provost L.A.M. Suttie said that:

…in Bridge of Allan…there were many aged and retired people who were living in the burgh for health reasons. [and]…they were not prepared to enforce compulsion on their residents and if such were required by the Department of Health they would require to find some other parties to work this particular scheme.³⁰⁴

There were other important reasons why Bridge of Allan residents were opposed to accepting a further wave of evacuees. This was explained by the Town Clerk at a meeting of the Civilian Evacuation Committee on 5 January 1940, he explained that:

Bridge of Allan was a health resort well known throughout Scotland and England, and at the outbreak of war its accommodation had been taxed to almost full capacity by the inrush of private evacuees who had come to the town at their own expense and reserved accommodation either in Boarding houses, or Hotels…quite a number of residents also, had taken relatives from the vulnerable areas.³⁰⁵

The outcome of this meeting was that strong representation be made to the DHS that:

³⁰⁴ The Scotsman, Wednesday, 20 March 1940, p.10.
³⁰⁵ SCAS. Minutes of Meeting of Civilian Evacuation Committee held in the Council Chambers on Friday, 5 January 1940, p.29.
Owing to its proximity to one of Scotland’s most important military objectives – the Forth Valley – and to exceptional local circumstances…. [Bridge of Allan] should be regarded as an unsuitable area for the reception of evacuees.\(^\text{306}\)

The objection was accepted which meant Bridge of Allan residents had successfully fought against inclusion in any further government evacuation scheme.

Objection to billeting evacuees was raised in other areas. In the Scottish borders around Galashiels and Roxburgh there were numerous complaints of children having arrived in a dirty condition with the minimum of personal necessities. The local newspaper, the *Southern Reporter*, printed an article four weeks after the first evacuation, clearly in response to a build-up of local anger, convincing Roxburgh residents that their complaints had been noted. The article attempted to assure readers that the local authorities were taking steps to ensure something was being done to prevent the continuation of the situation. Householders were told that:

…it was only fair to those who were responsible for those children who were brought into the county that they should know the official attitude the County Authority had taken up, and that people of the

\(^{306}\) SCAS. Minutes of Meeting of Civilian Evacuation Committee held in the Council Chambers on Friday, 5 January 1940, p.30.
county, whose hospitality had been abused in many cases, should be satisfied that they had not been crying in the wilderness.\textsuperscript{307}

In West Lothian too, residents had to be given an assurance that any future evacuation would only take place once children had been medically inspected. The West Lothian Courier published an article from the West Lothian Billeting Committee giving public assurance that:

\begin{quote}
\ldots the householder may ask what protection he has against the unfortunate experiences of the first evacuation. Naturally, he wants to know whether the children to be received are clean. Will they be clothed and properly booted? Will they in a word be fit to be received into a clean house?

[The article continued]

In each case the answer is Yes. No child will be evacuated who is in an unclean state. Over 50 doctors in Edinburgh have been working at this job alone. Dirty children or doubtful cases will be segregated in outlying hostels and retained there until they are absolutely clean.\textsuperscript{308}
\end{quote}

Moving on from these local reports and local newspaper articles, the argument in favour of warfare to welfare is broadened by the wider response the first evacuation elicited, of unclean and unhealthy children in reception areas throughout Britain. The National Federation of Women’s Institutes

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{307} Scottish Borders Archive and Local History Centre, \textit{Southern Reporter}, Thursday, 21 September 1939, p.5.
\item \textsuperscript{308} Linlithgow History Library, \textit{West Lothian Courier}, Friday, 24 May 1940, p.9.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
requested the Women’s Group on Public Welfare in England to explore, ‘the
domestic habits and customs of a minority of town-dwellers, disclosed by
evacuation’.

The report was published in 1943 and was followed by a
similar publication by the Scottish Women’s Group on Public Welfare.
The editor of the Scottish Women’s Group report, M. Galbraith Cowan, was
an active member of the Unionist Party and an influential campaigner in
helping to ease the burden of women’s lives. She had been part of the
Edinburgh School Board after the First World War, and successfully
campaigned for smaller class sizes and school meals during holidays. She
worked for the Ministry of Food during the Second World War and her
influence on the pamphlet may have had some bearing on the success of its
recommendations.

The foreword to the report, written by the Scottish Secretary, Thomas Johnston, confirmed the importance placed on the issues
highlighted by evacuation. Johnston wrote that evacuation had forcibly and
dramatically brought attention to the extent of poverty and neglect in some
of Scotland’s larger towns, and that:

…while there [was] no one single simple solvent, but many required,
and while we shall require to draw upon all the goodwill and
forbearance we can muster among us in the process of achievement, I
believe we are going to create cleaner, worthier and healthier
conditions in which good citizenship will thrive and flourish.

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311 Elizabeth Ewan, Sue Innes, Sian Reynolds, Rose Pipes (eds.), The Biographical
312 Women’s Group on Public Welfare, Our Towns: A Close-up, Foreword by Thomas
Johnston, Secretary of State for Scotland, 13 July 1944.
The recommendations of the two reports were based on the problems the initial evacuation scheme had highlighted. Some of these issues had also been raised in Cathcart’s report of 1935. These included: poor hygiene, insufficient knowledge of proper nutrition and nutritional values, lack of understanding of basic childcare, and behavioural and educational problem children. These reports were part of a wave of enquiries into welfare issues during the war.

An evacuation survey conducted in Scotland by Boyd, assisted by a team of students from Glasgow University, produced a detailed account of the Scottish evacuation process in 1944. Richard Padley and Margaret Cole had earlier carried out an evacuation survey for the Fabian Society for England and Wales that was published in 1940. A regional survey was also carried out in Cambridge by a team of experts on the effect of evacuation in that area. The 1941 Cambridge Evacuation Survey gave a detailed account of the first evacuation scheme as it happened and offered a range of recommendations for future evacuation schemes. These surveys taken together with the surveys by the women’s groups: *Our Towns: A Close Up*, published in 1943, and *Our Scottish Towns: Evacuation and the Social Future* published in 1944, made recommendations for significant change in the delivery of care and welfare for children and adults.

The Scottish Women’s Group on Public Welfare recommended changes in education that would help to ensure both parents and children were taught the basics of healthy eating and proper dietary requirements, following reports of bad eating habits and the poor diet of some evacuee mothers in reception areas. In Glasgow, according to former Medical Officer of Health for the city, Sir Alexander MacGregor, this type of education was already in place in 1939. He reported that teachers from the School of Domestic Science carried out a successful scheme whereby they gave cookery demonstrations and advice to women either in their own homes or welfare centres.\textsuperscript{318} The *Our Towns* report clearly demonstrated that much more required to be done throughout the country to ensure that educating people in the importance of diet and nutrition was being channelled where it was most needed.

Promoting the health of mothers and children was also an important factor in the English women’s group on public welfare survey. Their ‘Our Towns’ report suggested that an interdepartmental committee of the Ministry of Health and the Board of Education be set up to work together to monitor, control and supervise health and hygiene matters among both children and adults.\textsuperscript{319}

Some of these important issues were already being addressed by the government. Sir John Boyd Orr, who was a pioneer in the field of nutrition, health and welfare, studied the impact of nutrition on health and stressed the value of milk as an important food source. In the 1930s Boyd Orr worked

with the Reorganisation Commission for Milk. He believed in, and promoted, the nutritional value of milk that became part of the ‘milk in schools scheme’.\textsuperscript{320} This scheme meant that milk was made available to schoolchildren on a daily basis, through the local education authorities, either free or at a reduced rate, and during the war schoolchildren continued to receive free milk.\textsuperscript{321} The Ministry of Food was established in 1939 which made available valuable basic daily nutritional requirements such as milk, fruit juices, cod liver oil and vitamins for children and nursing mothers.\textsuperscript{322} However, as the evacuation process had shown, these were not always taken up in areas where they were most needed.

The importance of free milk for school children during the war as a perceived benevolent measure has been countered by Macnicol. He argued instead that there were three very different reasons for its distribution. He observed that although milk was a valuable source of nutrition its importance was over stressed.\textsuperscript{323} His argument was based on the fact that free milk helped reduce surplus stocks held by producers and, as milk provided a source of protein, it helped cut down the amount of meat required by children during rationing. It also reduced the necessity for means testing which defined those children deemed eligible for free milk. Nevertheless, Thane argued, and it is generally accepted, that war rationing helped to improve nutritional standards nationally and of the working class in particular.\textsuperscript{324}

\begin{footnotes}
\item Macnicol, ‘The evacuation of schoolchildren’ (1986), p.22.
\item Macnicol, ‘The evacuation of schoolchildren’ (1986), p.22.
\end{footnotes}
Wartime social research, particularly as a result of evacuation, had led to an increased awareness of the importance of sustaining the health of mothers and children, through improved nutrition. Pregnant and nursing mothers, babies and young children were already a government priority and were given access to high value nutritional food and vitamins.\textsuperscript{325}

The publicity afforded to the promotion of the importance of a healthy diet, supplemented by milk and vitamins was included in the Secretary of State for Scotland’s speech to the Commons in 1944. Quoting John Boyd Orr, he said that:

…a survey of working-class homes in industrial towns in Scotland had shown that there was a definite improvement in the health value of their diets; the average intake of some of the important vitamins and minerals was over 20 per cent higher than in pre-war years.\textsuperscript{326}

Milk and free or subsidised meals were included as part of the daily ration requirements for schoolchildren. However, the costs involved in providing school meals was complicated by the evacuation process. Each local authority was responsible for its own budget and had to apply for payment of meals for evacuees from the sending authorities. The extent of the administrative complexities involved in collecting small amounts between

\textsuperscript{325} Olive Checkland and Margaret Lamb, (ed.), \textit{Health Care as Social History: The Glasgow Case} (Aberdeen, 1982), p.133.
\textsuperscript{326} \textit{H of C} Debate, 8 March 1944, vol. 397, cc. 2082-2083.
local authorities is evident from a communication to teachers by the Headmaster of Bothkennar School, near Falkirk. This may be taken as an example of the way in which all schools in reception areas had to deal with fiscal matters regarding evacuees. The Headmaster had requested that two Glasgow evacuees be allowed school meals at the expense of the Glasgow authority and said that these two children were:

…unable by reason of lack of food to take full advantage of the education provided for them… (the teachers were required) to keep a note of the meals supplied to the children in question and to send me particulars, say, at the end of each month so that I may recover the cost from the Glasgow Authority.  

Nevertheless the growth in administration was undoubtedly outweighed by the fact that children benefitted from nutritional improvements during the war. This was confirmed in 1944 when MacGregor, Glasgow Medical Officer of Health, reported that there had been an overall improvement in height and weight of school children in Glasgow. A study of school inspection reports showed that children of 5 years old, starting school in 1944, were taller and heavier than those in the 1930s. Boys were on average an inch taller and two pounds heavier, and girls approximately 0.8 of an inch taller and just less than two pounds heavier. This was in spite of the poor quality and presentation of the food served to children according to Harold

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327 SCAS. SC/5/7/27. Letter from the Headmaster, Bothkennar School, By Falkirk, 22 December, 1941.
Smith in *Britain in the Second World War*. Among those former evacuees interviewed for this thesis none had any real complaint about the food they were given during their evacuation.

Returning to policy recommendations made with evacuation surveys, the Scottish Women’s group report included a call for a better trained medical staff, improvements in child welfare services, more child welfare clinics with more home visits and an increase in the home help service. This service had started in Glasgow and the surrounding areas in the 1920s and some of the recommended changes were put in place before the end of the war. In spite of war budgets and shortages of medical staff as a result of call-ups, there was an expansion in the number of health centres and antenatal clinics in and around the city of Glasgow by 1944. MacGregor claimed that at the start of the war there had been only 8 doctors and 40 health visitors, working in 14 health centres. These figures had increased to include 17 health centres, employing 15 medical officers and 75 health visitors. MacGregor quoted that attendance at these centres reached up to 75 per cent of expectant mothers. These figures compared favourably with attendance at clinics in Scotland overall which had reached only 51 per cent by 1946. This evidence suggests that the problems highlighted by evacuation and given further attention via social service reports, were already being addressed in the war years.

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The Scottish Women’s Group on Public Welfare reiterated the recommendations included in John Boyd Orr’s 1943 *Report on Infant Mortality in Scotland*. It recommended increased hospital accommodation and improved maternity and childcare which had been highlighted as lacking by the evacuation process.\(^{332}\) Although official recognition had already been given to the necessity for improvement in this area with the introduction of the Maternity Services (Scotland) Act in 1937, Jenkinson noted that its implementation had been slow due to the wartime situation.\(^{333}\)

During evacuation, arrangements for pregnant women, whether married or unmarried, proved problematic. Hospital care in many rural areas struggled to meet the influx of pregnant evacuees in September 1939, and householders were often reluctant to provide them with accommodation as they did not want the responsibility of looking after pregnant women in their homes, especially if they went into labour and did not have ready access to a maternity home or hospital.\(^{334}\)

Oakley suggested that the Second World War was the best thing that happened to pregnant women.\(^{335}\) Her observations were determined by the progressive nature of maternity care from the evacuation of pregnant women. When pregnant evacuees arrived at reception areas it was clear that rather than billeting them in households, alternative means of accommodating them would have to be found. In the case of unmarried

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pregnant women, they were very often dependent on charitable institutions for their maternity care. In evacuation areas, local authorities were forced to increase the number of social workers to help find pregnant women accommodation.

In 1943 an Advisory Committee appointed by the Ministry of Health recommended the appointment of one social worker for every 200 to 300 illegitimate babies. Holman has claimed that evacuation played an important role in the growth and development of this particular area of social service in the post war period. The increased number of social welfare workers between 1931 and 1951 substantiates these claims. In 1931 the number of male social welfare workers employed in Scotland was 676, by 1951 that figure had risen to 1,028. The number of female social welfare workers during the same period rose more significantly from 316 in 1931 to 1,122 in 1951. These figures suggest that care of evacuee unmarried mothers and their children helped account for the growth in employment of social welfare workers. Further proof of the expansion in social welfare workers was the subject of a document produced by Birmingham University in 2008, to celebrate the centenary of teaching and researching in social work. This paper claimed that the Second World War gave rise to new and improved opportunities for social workers. It further claimed that social workers emerged with a highly positive profile in the eyes of the public and

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politicians, as a result of their involvement with the evacuation scheme and their help with homeless families after the bombing raids. In the immediate post-war the social work course expanded from a two year social studies diploma to a three year course in social studies, with six months of practical work spread over the length of the course.339

Social welfare services established during the war included an emergency maternity service which resulted from the evacuation process. The need for such a service was exacerbated by the lack of enthusiasm from householders to give shelter to pregnant evacuees. Large houses were acquired and hostels were set up to accommodate those women in the final stages of pregnancy. These included 125 maternity beds in Lennox Castle in Perthshire,340 and 25 maternity beds in Airthrey Castle in Stirlingshire.341

In Aberdeen and surrounding areas a number of cottage hospitals were given over to maternity care and, in some places, buildings had to be converted for increased numbers of maternity cases. Haddo House, for example, was used as a maternity unit for the duration of the war and served Glasgow evacuees as well as some local mothers. In 1940 Haddo House had 11 maternity cases, in 1941 that number had increased to 239. During 1944, at the peak of its use as a maternity unit, Haddo House staff cared for 426 pregnant

The emergency maternity service proved popular in Scotland, and the annual number of births in maternity hospitals or maternity homes increased from 40 per cent in 1939, to approximately 60 per cent by 1940. Statistically the number of available maternity beds in Scottish institutions had risen from a total of 1,460 in 1938 to 2,178 by June 1944. Ferguson and Fitzgerald described the growth in the maternity services around Britain during the Second World War as ‘an indispensable extension of the social services’. The rise in institutional care for pregnant women was associated with the evacuation process which also afforded women who resided in reception areas the opportunity for improved maternity care.

Throughout the war pregnant women continued to use the facilities provided by the emergency maternity services. While the great majority of women had opted for home confinement prior to the outbreak of war, the popularity of hospital and hostel care of pregnant women grew and developed during the early 1940s. The 1939 figures for the Maternity Units of Stirling and Falkirk infirmaries show that, from a total of 2000 deliveries, only 440 took place in hospital. Figures for Airthrey Castle demonstrate how popular hospital births had become with over 600 admissions in 1946. The Medical Officer of Health report for Dundee for 1941 to 1945 noted the

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342 Grampian Archives. GRHB E2/4/20. Report on the war years from Aberdeen County Medical Officer of Health and statistics compiled from the County’s registers of notification of births.
344 NAS. Summary Report by the Department of Health for Scotland for the Year ended 30 June 1944, p.5.
increased wartime tendency for confinement to take place in institutions. This was due, in part, to the fact that mother and baby could be assured of expert care and attention. Hospital confinement also allowed the mother a minimum period of two-week complete rest.\(^{348}\) The wartime maternity homes continued to be used in peacetime. Airthrey Castle, for example, continued to function as a maternity unit into the 1960s and Lennox Castle until 1964. These hospitals, hostels and nursing homes provided a safe and clean environment for women who might otherwise have had their babies in their own homes where wartime conditions may not have been so favourable.

The increase in maternity care during wartime evacuation helps to substantiate the Titmuss argument for warfare leading to welfare. From the above figures it is evident that there was an increase in the number of pregnant women seeking, and receiving, hospital and hostel care in the late stages of pregnancy. These figures include both evacuee mothers and local women living in reception areas, who in peacetime may not have enjoyed the benefit of a hospital or hostel confinement. This situation had a twofold benefit in that it helped pregnant evacuees while, at the same time, effectively created employment in the form of additional social workers, who worked to secure accommodation and care for these women in reception areas. This was a further extension of the maternity welfare services rooted in the evacuation process.

\(^{348}\) Dundee City Archives, DCA. Medical Officer of Health Report 1941-45, p.129.
Proof that the welfare and wellbeing of mothers and children continued to progress can be seen from the Scottish Home and Health Department who reported in 1964 that there were now:

…some 500 child welfare clinics to which mothers [might] bring their babies and pre-school children, for advice, medical examination and protective inoculation.349

The evacuation process had elicited the problems and responses in the care of mothers and children. It also brought to the attention of a wider audience the problems of delinquency, deprivation and neglect. These problems were significant symptoms in the formation of the Children Act of 1948. John Murphy commented that from the ‘crucibles’ of evacuation a picture emerged of the conditions in which some children were forced to live.350

Evacuation planning did not take into account how families would cope with the emotional trauma of separation or the potential breakdown of family life. Nor was any attention given, during the planning stages, as to how evacuation might affect the mental wellbeing of children who were sent away. In reception areas the only pre-requisite of householders was the number of rooms they had available in their homes and their willingness to billet evacuees. There were no checks and balances on the suitability of individuals to take care of other people’s children.

349 Scottish Home and Health Department, Health and Welfare Services in Scotland Report 1964. Section 7 (Cmd. 2700), p.27.
While in *Problems of Social Policy* Titmuss accepted the problem of juvenile delinquency, exacerbated by evacuation, he recognised the need to exercise caution on the subject. He warned that youth crime required to be dealt with cautiously, as high spirits and hooliganism were more noticeable in small communities. He was sceptical of the interpretation of delinquency by local authorities in reception areas where the evacuation scheme had been unpopular. By interpretation this meant that householders who did not want evacuees would find ways of ensuring that they would not be obliged to play host to them.

Delinquent, neglected, or deprived children were the responsibility of a number of different government departments at the beginning of the Second World War. The Ministry of Health was responsible for deprived children, and the control and management of juvenile delinquency was the responsibility of the Home Office. The number of reported cases of juvenile delinquency was increased by evacuation, which led eventually to deeper government involvement in, and the progress of, the child guidance movement.

The re-education of parents was perceived as the best way forward in tackling juvenile delinquency. In the House of Commons, debate surrounding juvenile delinquency centred on the importance of teaching mothercraft as a means of attacking the problem. During a sitting in July

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1941 a report by the National Association of Maternity and Child Welfare Centres was raised by Sir Francis Fremantle, Conservative Party member and MP for St Albans. He claimed that:

…teachers, probation officers, doctors and social workers [were] generally anxious for the teaching of mothercraft to be given to schoolgirls as the best means of attacking juvenile delinquency… [as] a matter of national importance and not merely a question of health.354

Scotland was at the forefront of this experiment prior to the parliamentary debate in July 1941. In April of that year mothercraft, or parentcraft teaching, as it became known, was included in the curriculum of a junior secondary school in Aberdeen. This began with the appointment of a full time mothercraft teacher and continued to grow and develop throughout the 1940s.355

Mothercraft was one of the issues which was dealt with in Whitehill School in Dennistoun, Glasgow. The working and daily routine of this inner city school can be observed from the original magazines produced during the war. Written accounts by pupils and staff provide an original source of information of how school life in the city carried on during the war. They uncover some of the inherent problems which pupils and teachers were faced with on a daily basis and how they were overcome.

Teachers attempted to maintain educational standards as far as possible under wartime conditions, living constantly with the threat that air raid sirens could disrupt lessons at any time. Although not directly an oral history source, the school magazines from Whitehill School in Dennistoun, gives some insight into the difficulties of creating conditions which resembled the normal daily school routine as far as possible.

Whitehill School was the largest senior secondary school in Scotland as it had merged with Onslow Drive School due to the war and as a result of evacuation. The articles in the 1941-42 magazines show how attempts were made to carry out the rigours and routine of school activities in the face of adversity. The extra-curricular activities such as football practice and hobby clubs continued as far as possible. An article announcing that the annual school sports day had continued in wartime read:

We cannot escape the war altogether, and we were reminded of the international situation when we saw the bare table where the prizes should have stood. But what is the value of a material prize in comparison with the honour of winning?

Lack of prizes for sports day was just one of the many sacrifices which Whitehill and other schools had to sustain as a result of war. Lack of staff was evident from an article advising that teachers had gone with evacuees to Altachorvie, Lamlash on the Isle of Arran, at the beginning of the war. Later

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357 Whitehill School Magazine, Number 43, summer 1941, p.29.
in the war the school lost other teachers to evacuation duties in Lanark, Perth and Cally House in Kirkcudbrightshire.\textsuperscript{358}

The loss of teachers to reception areas and the shortage caused by war and national service did not significantly affect children’s educational attainment levels. This issue was discussed in Chapter III concerning the trends in educational standards as a result of war and evacuation. Whitehill’s magazine boasted in 1941 that:

If anyone should ask you how Whitehill School is standing up to the difficult conditions of wartime, refer them to the recent examination held by the Corporation of Glasgow for the Selection of Junior Clerks. There were vacancies for 188, and our School secured no fewer than 35 of these places. Of the successful candidates 13 were girls and 22 boys. So far as we can find, this is very easily a record performance.\textsuperscript{359}

Performance levels continued to rise and the school congratulated itself for its advancement. In 1944 the magazine reported that:

Both quantitatively and qualitatively, Whitehill has worthily upheld the best traditions of Scottish education, as demonstrated once again by the fact that in this difficult year when the examinations reverted to the national standard, after six years of war during which they had

\textsuperscript{358} Whitehill School Magazine, Number 49, summer 1944, p.3.
\textsuperscript{359} Whitehill School Magazine, Number 43, summer 1941, p.20.
been conducted on a regional basis, 72 of the 97 pupils presented gained the Senior Leaving Certificate.\footnote{Whitehill School Magazine, Number 49, summer 1944, p.5.}

The re-introduction of leaving certificates was important to teenagers in their attempt to find employment. It helped give prospective employers some measure of their capabilities at a time when media and social surveyors were producing reports of widespread problems of juvenile delinquency.

The thought behind mothercraft classes lay principally with the way some mothers and children had conducted themselves in reception areas. These classes would help prepare girls for their future as housewives and mothers.

Mothercraft classes were established in Whitehill School during the war. An article in the magazine demonstrates the success of these classes. This article demonstrates that there may have been a slight lessening of old fashioned and entrenched patriarchal values, and slightly more progressive ideas among certain elements of the male school community concerning established gender roles, if an article in the magazine is to be taken as meaningful. The essay written by a male pupil complained of the unfairness of the Mothercraft classes saying:

\begin{quote}
We, the fathers of that better Britain of the future…it does seem rather unfair that while our sisters are given free explicit instruction in their corresponding matrimonial obligations, we should be left entirely ignorant of our patrimonial duties.\footnote{Whitehill School Magazine, Number 49, summer 1944, p.16.}
\end{quote}
This type of article shows that school children were perfectly capable of progressive thoughts, ideas and ideals.

Tackling delinquency through the introduction of mothercraft classes was simply one way of dealing with the problem. The report by the Scottish Women’s Group on Public Welfare stressed the need for a social focus for young people in order to alleviate some of the problems associated with youth crime and delinquency. This could take the form of the establishment of youth centres and playing spaces in towns. The report confirmed that juvenile crime had risen substantially and claimed that in 1942 these figures were approximately 25 per cent (or 4,000 cases) higher than in the first year of war.\footnote{Scottish Women’s Group on Public Welfare, Our Scottish Towns (1944), p.40.} Of this total over half were charges of petty crime caused mainly by teenage boys. As the increase in juvenile delinquency was tied to both war and evacuation and the consequences ultimately led to the introduction of the Children Act of 1948, it substantiates Titmuss’s warfare to welfare theory.

Bad behaviour, as a manifestation of evacuation, resulted in the establishment of hostels and homes for children who could not be billeted in private homes. Nerston House in East Kilbride, on the outskirts of Glasgow, was opened as a residential school for such evacuees. From 1884 Nerston House had been used by the Glasgow United Evangelist Association to give underprivileged children a holiday in the countryside more commonly known as the fresh air fortnight. It was taken over in 1936 by Glasgow Corporation as a home for deprived children and opened during the war as a
residential school. According to the local historian for East Kilbride, ‘Nerston Residential School blazed a trail in Child Guidance’ when in 1950 it hosted a symposium entitled ‘International Course in the Psychological Treatment of the Problem Child’. Throughout the years the school was open it accommodated up to 40 children, both boys and girls, between 5 and 15 years old whose stay could be anything from six months to one year. The success of this founding institution for delinquent children may be observed from the fact that it continued to function as a residential unit and school until 2009.

Barns House in Peeblesshire was an institution formed as part of the evacuation scheme. Set up and funded by Peeblesshire County Council, the house was used as an evacuation hostel and school for up to 50 wayward Edinburgh boys, whose behaviour restricted them from being billeted with householders. Technically the boys were to be sent to Barns from unsuccessful billets, but it became so successful during the war that they were sent directly through the Edinburgh Evacuation Officer. The school was closed in 1953 as the original owners required repossession.

Recognition of childhood problems enhanced by the evacuation process helped strengthen and develop the Child Guidance Movement which had been in existence in Britain since the 1920s. In 1939 there were 60 child guidance clinics in operation, by 1945 the number had increased to approximately 100 and, as Stewart pointed out, child guidance became

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embedded in the post-war welfare state.\textsuperscript{366} Stewart claimed that child guidance practitioners came to recognise the importance of family and environment on the mental and physical condition of evacuated children.\textsuperscript{367} Murphy too has said that child guidance was a progressive move towards positive developments in childcare, deviance and family problems. He felt however that Scotland had lagged behind England and Wales in implementing the terms of the Children Act of 1948, mainly in connection with institutional care which took longer to phase out in Scotland.\textsuperscript{368} Murphy claimed that the speed with which the wartime government intervened on the issue of childcare and neglect resulted from two important issues. These were not specifically connected to Scotland but profoundly impacted on welfare development throughout the country. The issues were the death of Dennis O’Neill while in foster care and a letter to the \textit{Times} in July 1944 by Lady Marjory Allen, an influential figure in the promotion of child welfare. She focused especially on the care of children in institutions and the inner cities and was chairman of the Nursery Schools Association of Great Britain, and founder of the World Organisation for Early Childhood Education. Her influence extended to government circles by association, as she was married to Baron Clifford Allen of Hurtwood, who had been Treasurer and Chairman of the Independent Labour Party (ILP) and Director of the \textit{Daily Herald} newspaper.\textsuperscript{369} Her letter to the \textit{Times} called for a public inquiry to assess the out of date conditions in which neglected,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{367} Stewart, The scientific claims of British child guidance, 1918-45, \textit{The British Journal of History of Science}, 42:3 (2009), p.410.
\item \textsuperscript{368} Murphy, \textit{British Social Services} (1992), p.124.
\item \textsuperscript{369} www.archives@warwick.ac.uk [Accessed 1 December 2013].
\end{itemize}
destitute and orphaned children lived. Allen stressed the need for adequate and trained staff, a central administration fully responsible for the care of children, and assessment of each individual child’s needs before they were placed in foster care. She wrote that:

The social upheaval caused by the war… increased this army of unhappy children [and presented] the opportunity for transforming the conditions. 370

The public interest stimulated by the evacuation scheme, Lady Allen’s letter to The Times and the death of Dennis O’Neill resulted in the formation of two committees, set up in 1945, to investigate the extent of child deprivation and neglect, especially among orphaned children and those left orphans as a result of war. 371 The reports produced by these committees, headed by Myra Curtis in England and James Clyde in Scotland, led to the Children Act of 1948.

The Children Act of 1948 may be perceived as a direct result of war and evacuation in terms of the speed with which it was administered. It was designed for the protection of children and essentially changed the way care was administered to children up to and including those aged 17 years old, who were abandoned, orphaned or required to be in care as a result of parental neglect. It effectively replaced the Poor Law for children in public

370 Marjory Allen and Mary Nicholson, Memoirs of An Uneducated Lady (London, 1975), p.178. Also cited in Murphy, British Social Services (1992), Lady Allen’s letter was followed up by others well known in the public sphere, such as George Bernard Shaw, p.19.
care. Under the terms of the Poor Law orphaned or abandoned children would have automatically been placed in institutional care.

The new legislation allowed local authorities the discretion to implement the act in the best interest of the child and extend care and welfare accordingly, either as institutional care or boarding out in foster homes. It also gave local authorities the power to decide if and when such children were in a fit and healthy state to return to a safe family environment. Provisions within the Act included recommendations by Curtis and Clyde:

...to provide a comprehensive service for the care of children who have not the benefit of a normal home life. It will contain new provisions replacing those of the Poor Law, as respects such children, and will implement the main recommendations of the care of Children Committee (Cmd. 6922) and the Scottish Committee on Homeless children (Cmd. 6911). [Known respectively as the Curtis Committee and the Clyde Committee].

Murphy referred to these changes in the care and welfare of children as ‘revolutionary’ and to the act itself as a ‘liberal and great Act’. He considered it to be the cornerstone of the future of social work in Scotland. On a less positive note, he pointed out that while the Children Act of 1948 offered protection to deprived children, there was no provision made for the

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373 Murphy, British Social Services (1992), pp.32-33.
practice of preventative work.\textsuperscript{374} However, the Act effectively led to the Kilbrandon Report of 1964, on which the whole approach to the care issues for children and youth justice is based.\textsuperscript{375}

Social surveys, conducted as a result of wartime evacuation, helped reinforce the case for the warfare to welfare argument, which leads to the conclusion that evacuation and some of its consequences did indeed help to ensure the health and welfare of children. An indication of the success of the work and recommendations of social investigators, concerning children, can be gleaned by making a comparison with the care and welfare provided for the elderly during the war. Where improved maternity and child care resulted from war and evacuation, elderly care was a glaring omission from the process during the war. With the exception of Murphy, there is an absence of historiography surrounding care for the elderly in Scotland during the Second World War.

Generally, elderly care during the evacuation process was left very much in the hands of voluntary organisations and they, as a group, were given little priority in terms of social planning. There was not the definitive plan for the evacuation of the elderly that there had been for children. Children were the future, and the main focus of the evacuation scheme was school age children, young children with their mothers, and expectant mothers.

\textsuperscript{374} Smith, \textit{Britain in the Second World War} (1996), p.83. Lady Allen’s letter was followed by others well known in the public sphere, such as George Bernard Shaw. Murphy, \textit{British Social Services} (1992), p.33. 
\textsuperscript{375} Grace.Shipley@scottish.parliament.uk email dated 2 July 2010.
The plan for the infirm and aged was that they be dealt with under the general scheme.\textsuperscript{376} When the assisted evacuation scheme was introduced it included those old people who lived in their own home. The plans for the elderly followed the same administrative arrangements as for all others included in the scheme, whereby, those who had relatives or friends they could go to, if the need arose, would have their travel and accommodation paid by the government.

In contrast, and in concluding this chapter on Scottish health during the war, child health care changes were speedily implemented during the early 1940s. This can be attributed, in part, to the substantial amount of adverse media coverage which wartime evacuation attracted, and through the impact of the many social surveys conducted. These changes included increased maternity care and a wider focus on childcare and child neglect. Longer term goals such as ensuring proper diet were also given renewed attention.

Evacuation made an immediate and longer term impact on welfare policy and provision. The war and welfare argument of Titmuss and Addison is supported by the fact that without evacuation there would potentially have been no visible, or immediate, need to employ the extensive health care changes that were introduced for mothers and children during the Second World War. There is no doubt that evacuation served to highlight the extent of the poverty and deprivation that existed in Scotland, and indeed throughout Britain, in 1939. The high profile of evacuation in the early

\textsuperscript{376} TNA. CAB 24/279. Report of Committee on Evacuation, July 1938, p.28.
stages of the war prompted social investigators to work towards finding a solution to the problems evident among some child and adult evacuees. Evacuee mothers and children drew attention to the need for better nutrition, health and hygiene. One of the most significant developments during wartime was the growth in child guidance clinics, and the advancement in the care of neglected or deprived children, which was once left in the hands of voluntary workers. The practice of promoting health in clinics, and in schools, which had begun long before the outbreak of war, continued long after the war ended, although this area of care was generally accepted as the role of the female and was very much gender driven.

Although there had been improvements to maternity services in the 1930s, the care plans implemented for evacuated mothers helped to draw attention to the pressing need to extend maternity and childcare. These services continued to grow and develop substantially in the post war period. The growth in the number of health and antenatal clinics, and an extension to maternity care in rural and urban areas, were all consequences of the mother and child evacuation policies that helped improve post war welfare. Where home confinement was often the only option available to working class women, the evacuation of pregnant women helped impress upon mothers the benefits of hospital births, and in the post war era hospital births increasingly became a popular option for women generally.

The publicity that wartime evacuation attracted, through substantial media coverage and social surveys, and the resultant improvements in the health and welfare system put in place for mothers and children, give particular relevance to the warfare to welfare theory. The future depended on ensuring
a nation of healthy children who would grow into strong healthy adults, therefore their health and welfare was strategically important.
Chapter IV

Religion and Evacuation

...Whittingehame I consider the happiest year of my life in retrospect: the camaraderie, simplicity, and last unaffected and carefree year of my youth, the Chaluzik spirit with its enthusiasm, singing religious services, dancing and emerging puberty.377

This quote was from a Jewish evacuee who was sent to Whittingehame House in East Lothian during the Second World War. The house was opened as a residential school which allowed Jewish children to continue their academic and religious education during their evacuation. The continuance of religious education and affiliation during the Second World War, and in particular during the evacuation process, was of paramount importance to religious leaders, while among the evacuees interviewed for this thesis there was a seeming lack of concern about religion. Jewish writer Ruth Inglis pointed out, during the planning stage of the evacuation scheme no consideration was given to the religious implications of placing Jewish children with Catholics, Catholics with Protestants or atheists with the devout.378 This was a significant problem for religious leaders and parents of all faiths, and led eventually to some parents making the decision to bring their children home.

377 www.eastlothianatwar.co.uk [Accessed 7 December 2013]. The words of an ex-pupil of Whittingehame House in the Scottish Borders. Whittingehame House was the family home of the British Prime Minister, Arthur J. Balfour, and was opened as a residential school for Jewish refugees and evacuees during the Second World War.

Religious organisations sought, by different means, to address this by attempting to tailor Scottish evacuation measures in order to preserve the faith of their congregation and it is that which forms the basis of this chapter. This chapter will carry out a comparative study focusing on the way in which religious organisations dealt with evacuation and their efforts to ensure the continued religious welfare of evacuees. The main intention of this exploration is to establish how far Church leaders in Scotland were able to influence and/or strengthen religious control over this aspect of the evacuation processes. Protestantism and Roman Catholicism, the two main religious denominations in Scotland at the time, will be the principal focus of attention. Smaller religious groups, namely Judaism and Quakerism, will also be considered. These two smaller religious organisations were equally committed to sustaining the religious welfare of evacuees. Comparison will include consideration of the ways in which these organisations dealt with the aspect of religion during the evacuation process.

This evaluation of religious responses to the challenges of evacuation extends the broad theme of the Titmuss argument that warfare ultimately led to welfare. The theory here differs slightly as war and evacuation was effectively more beneficial to the Roman Catholic community than other faith groups as Fitzpatrick pointed out, ‘War-time exigencies tended to weaken the barriers that still existed between the Catholic minority and the community as a whole.’[^379] The education reform Acts passed at the end of the First World War and towards the end of the Second World War show that in terms of educational provision the welfare Catholic school children

advanced. Evacuation and war was moreover instrumental in bringing people of different faiths together in a way that would not have been possible in peacetime. The particular focus here is on the progress and development of the religious welfare of evacuees and the way in which the evacuation process resulted in a greater degree of collaboration between Church and State.\textsuperscript{380} The argument in favour of warfare to welfare in relation to improvements in religious education was evident at the end of the First World War with the introduction of the Education (Scotland) Act 1918. The Act was particularly favourable to the continuation of religious teaching especially for denominational schools. The provisions of the Act included arrangements to bring denominational schools into the state system. This was particularly helpful to Catholic schools as they had been financed, built and run by the Catholic Church until that time. According to Fitzpatrick the Act effectively rescued them from ‘the Slough of Despond into which they were in danger of sinking’, and helped initiate ‘major developments at every level of the formal educational structure’.\textsuperscript{381} While the introduction of the Act took some of the financial pressure away from the Church, it maintained control over the recruitment of teachers and ecclesiastical teaching. This situation remained unchanged at the outbreak of the Second World War when the evacuation process threatened to disrupt the control of religious teaching of Catholic children. The Catholic Church hierarchy became politically involved in affairs relating to evacuation after September 1939.

For Roman Catholic schoolchildren any evacuation issues which arose were particularly acute. Fitzpatrick’s study of Catholic secondary education

\textsuperscript{380} Fitzpatrick, \textit{Catholic Secondary Education} (1986), pp.98 and 150.
\textsuperscript{381} Fitzpatrick, \textit{Catholic Secondary Education} (1986), p.43.
revealed that at the beginning of the Second World War 70 per cent of Scotland’s Catholics lived in the industrial and congested centres of the south-west, with the majority living in the city of Glasgow, which was the main centre of Catholic secondary education. He claimed that receiving areas were ‘almost totally devoid of Catholic population, and would be terra incognita to evacuated Catholic families’.\(^{382}\) He believed this inevitably resulted in the vast majority of Catholic evacuees being taught in non-denominational schools.\(^{383}\) Fitzpatrick’s work is important here as it covered the role of religion in education in the inter war years and during the evacuation process, finishing with religious changes in education in the 1970s. Fitzpatrick’s analysis shows that Roman Catholic clerics strove to maintain a high level of religious teaching in schools in the 1930s, with children under instruction from Catholic teachers as far as possible.\(^{384}\) Catholic clerics reacted negatively to the evacuation process due to the fact that they feared exposure to other religions would influence Catholic children to stray from their faith. Their views are evident from the somewhat acrimonious correspondence between the Catholic hierarchy and Scottish government Ministers during the war which will be discussed later in the chapter.

The broader aspect of religious education during this time has been considered by several historians of evacuation. Writing during the war, Boyd dealt with religion in statistical terms in the Scottish evacuation survey. From a religious perspective the survey focused on the Protestant

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and Roman Catholic divide in order to assess how far religion impacted on the return of evacuees from reception areas. These figures will be used later in this chapter with a view to determining whether there was a correlation between the return of evacuees and the actions of the Catholic Church hierarchy, which were designed to ensure continuity of Catholic adherence among evacuees. Titmuss had noted that Roman Catholic Church leaders were eager to ensure facilities were put in place to allow evacuees to continue their religious education in reception areas. Lloyd’s study of Scottish schools during the Second World War is a valuable contribution to the consideration of the continuity of religious education during the evacuation process. His research described the effect modern war had on educational welfare and stressed that in Britain war had an impact on educational reform. For Lloyd educational change, in the form of the passing of the Education Act in 1944 in England and 1945 in Scotland, helped reinforce the importance of the warfare to welfare theory as it was inclusive of progressive education, health and religion. The Act stated that it was:

…the duty of every education authority to secure that adequate and efficient provision [be] made throughout their area of all forms of primary, secondary and further education.

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385 Boyd, Evacuation in Scotland (1944), and Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy (1950).
387 The Education (Scotland) Act, 1945, Part 1-(I).
Adequate and efficient provision of all forms of education included providing for Roman Catholic children. On the subject of Catholic secondary schools, Fitzpatrick pointed out, ‘post-primary schooling would be organised in institutions equipped to meet the needs of all pupils for the period of their compulsory schooling’.\textsuperscript{388} This at once transformed and expanded the Catholic secondary sector, which had suffered from lack of accommodation and staff, to cater for the growing Scottish Catholic population.\textsuperscript{389} War had driven home how important education was to the preservation and survival of the British people, and the raising of the school leaving age to 15 years prescribed secondary education for all.\textsuperscript{390}

Religion, as an aspect of the British rather than Scottish evacuation process, has been included in the work of Holman, Welshman and Summers.\textsuperscript{391} In addition, historians such as Vera Fast have helped to demonstrate the parallels that existed between Jews and Roman Catholics during the evacuation process.\textsuperscript{392} Her work will be discussed here in conjunction with archival material collected from the Jewish Synagogue in Garnethill in Glasgow, which also provides some oral testimony from Jewish evacuees. The available documentation from Quakers, or the Society of Friends, relating to evacuation is sparse. However, the related work by Roger

\textsuperscript{389} Fitzpatrick, Catholic Secondary Education (1986), p.103.
\textsuperscript{390} Fitzpatrick, Catholic Secondary Education (1986), p.115
Wilson, David Wills and Louise Millbourn has been drawn on here for comparative purposes. 393

The discourse will initially focus on Roman Catholicism and the efforts of Church leaders to ensure that the religious welfare of Catholic evacuees was given due consideration during the war. Research shows that the Roman Catholic hierarchy were the leading protagonists on issues of planning and the instigation of the evacuation process. These arrangements had taken place without any consultation with church leaders. Their interventions helped influence the future religious welfare of Roman Catholics.

The second religious organisation which is the subject of this research will be Judaism. Archival material concerning Scottish Jews is used here to compare with other faiths’ responses to the evacuation process. Historiography relating to the Jews in wartime Britain confirms that the Jewish hierarchy tried to intervene to ensure Jewish children went to Jewish homes. Their work and effort to sustain the religious welfare of evacuees to some extent mirrored that of the Roman Catholic community. 394

The Church of Scotland, although the largest religious denomination to be discussed, appeared less concerned with continuity in religious adherence among evacuees. As Fitzpatrick pointed out, receiving areas were ‘almost

Barry Turner, And the Policeman Smiled: 10,000 Children Escape from Nazi Europe (London, 1990).
totally devoid of Catholic population’, therefore there was every likelihood that Church of Scotland children would be placed in homes with families of that faith.

An initial search of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland papers for the Second World War shows no sign that the Committee involved was particularly concerned over the continued religious adherence of evacuees. A further search of the Kirk Session records for individual presbyteries in a number of reception areas, and at least one evacuation area, was slightly more informative.

The response of other faiths in dealing with religious welfare during the evacuation process will conclude with the Society of Friends, or Quakers. Quakers played an active role in overall emergency relief work during the war, both at home and abroad. Historiography relating to their work and effort to maintain the religious adherence of their congregations, will be discussed in conjunction with the Roman Catholic, Jewish and Church of Scotland organisations.

The religious interests of Church leaders on issues relating to the evacuation process involving Scottish children has been left comparatively under researched. With the exception of Fitzpatrick and Lloyd, both of whom have used the religious aspect of the evacuation process in conjunction with educational changes, little analytical written work exists concerning the relationship of religion with evacuation during the period, especially in

Scotland. Holman’s work briefly touched on this connection and suggested that evacuation was, in part, responsible for a degree of unity between the churches during the war. This collective conscience, he believed, led churches to proclaim the need to work together for ‘spiritual renewal and the fight for social regeneration’. The media attention attracted by the poor, and often unhealthy, condition of evacuees in reception areas prompted church leaders to believe that ‘Christians must battle for a better Britain’.

Welshman, who discussed religion in association with the evacuation process, noted that the Catholic Church hierarchy in England reacted in the same way as the Scottish Catholic clerics when Catholic children were evacuated to Protestant homes. He referred to a letter from Arthur Hindley, the Archbishop of Westminster to Sir Maurice Holmes, Permanent Secretary of the Board of Education. This letter requested the removal of Catholic children from scattered villages so they could be relocated to more appropriate areas.

Welshman commented that this had been a problem in the case of children evacuated to North Wales from Liverpool and Merseyside. Other than this Welshman said very little regarding the problem of religion in connection with evacuation other than those included in the testimonies he collected from evacuees. This would indicate that church policy regarding the evacuation process has been largely neglected.

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mixing different faith groups was touched upon by Summers, in her account of evacuation in England. She recorded the oral testimony of an evacuee whose post war conversion to Catholicism caused a permanent split from her strict Methodist family. The process began when she realised how much she enjoyed the experience of being taken to mass by her foster parents during her evacuation.\textsuperscript{400} Felicity Goodall wrote of a different type of association between religion and evacuation, including an account of parents of a child, who, as she was evacuated to Canada missed her First Communion.\textsuperscript{401} These are just two brief examples of how discussion on faith matters focused on individuals with anecdotal evidence, rather than church policy.

With the exception of Fitzpatrick and Lloyd, historians who have mentioned religion in their respective studies of the war years have generally overlooked the fundamental importance of religion in the evacuation process. Where religion is included in the historiography of the Second World War, it is usually emphasised in relation to the importance of prayer as a comfort in times of danger. It is also mentioned in connection with the involvement of the Churches in helping the war effort, often linked with the work of other voluntary agencies. Calder, for example, referred to religion during the war from the point of view that it created some sort of public solidarity. One other point noticeable in wartime Britain was the growth of Catholicism. There had been a steady growth in Catholicism in the 1930s and Calder claimed that Catholic priests had ‘found converts at a steady rate of eleven or twelve thousand a year’. Numbers increased during the war as

\textsuperscript{400} Summers, \textit{When the Children Came Home} (2011), p.91.
\textsuperscript{401} Felicity Goodall, \textit{Voices from the Home Front: Personal Experiences of Wartime Britain 1939-45} (Devon, 2004), pp.76-77.
‘…every labourer from Eire and every Italian prisoner of war who decided to settle in Britain was more grist to the Papist mill’.

Gardiner, in her book on the London Blitz, attributed this growth to the influx of Irish immigrants and the demand to convert for anyone marrying a Catholic. Catholic families tended to be generally larger than families of other faiths and devout Catholics tended to follow the strict teaching of the Catholic Church which prescribed regular attendance at services, especially Sunday Mass. Fitzpatrick recorded an increase of six per cent in the Scottish Catholic population from 662,000 in 1931 to 702,000 in 1941. The long-term growth in Catholicism recorded by Brown, whose research, from a Scottish perspective, showed that between the years 1941 to 1972, 116 new Catholic parishes were created. These were most numerous in areas where new towns were built after the war and this figure equates to a rate of four new parishes per year.

A contentious area covered by the evacuation process was the Protestant/Catholic divide in Clydebank, which was included in Boyd’s survey. In this work statistics were recorded of the numbers of Roman Catholics and Protestants, the two most popular faith groups living there, to find a link between religion and the number of evacuees sent from the town and the speed of their return. Clydebank’s population was 48,000 and was made up predominantly of working class families. The study was carried

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out between Catholic and Protestant children from the eight schools in the area. Six schools were Protestant with an inclusive role of 5,280 and two schools were Catholic with a combined role of 2,360. The total number of children evacuated under the government scheme from the Protestant schools was 1,814, and there were 838 from the Catholic schools. Boyd’s survey of returning evacuees was taken from a random sample of both Catholic and Protestant school children on a pro-rata basis. It included issues ranging from the attitude of parents to evacuation, aspects of housing, family size, age, gender and religion. Boyd found that in both Catholic and Protestant households, there was a direct relationship between family size and the numbers evacuated. The study showed that the larger the family the greater the tendency for the children to be evacuated. Catholic mothers were evacuated with their families in greater numbers than Protestant mothers, therefore a smaller number of unaccompanied Catholic children were evacuated.

Gender studies revealed a greater number of boys evacuated than girls amongst both Catholic and Protestant school children. Where mothers were evacuated with their children, Boyd confirmed that they were more likely to return earlier than unaccompanied children. Making the decision to return could be taken and arrangements made more quickly than if a child was unaccompanied, and the frequency of parental visits also had a bearing on the speed of return. Boyd found that Catholic children returned home sooner than Protestant children and suggested that this was due, in some part, to the

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difficulties encountered when evacuee and host had different religious beliefs.

Crucially, Boyd’s survey suggested that when Clydebank parents, both Catholic and Protestant, made the decision to have their children included in the evacuation process, the question of religion was not initially a high priority.\(^{407}\) However, the religious welfare of evacuees became a fundamental issue of evacuation due to the reaction of the Roman Catholic Church. Titmuss recorded that in the eyes of the church spiritual health was more important than physical safety. He based this remark on correspondence between the Catholic Church hierarchy and the Scottish Secretary. In a footnote he referred to an encyclical, issued by the Archbishop of Edinburgh, which urged Catholic parents to bring their children back from reception areas where there was no access to Catholic Church or school.\(^{408}\) An article in the *Glasgow Observer and Scottish Catholic Herald* in October 1939 confirmed that Catholic clerics believed:

> The soul is more important than the body, and if Catholic parents find that the religion of their children is going to suffer, no one can condemn them if they prefer the risks of the evacuated areas and seek to return to their churches and schools.\(^{409}\)

This was a fairly extreme measure, adopted only after priests in reception areas had done all that they could to place as many Catholic evacuees as

\(^{409}\) *Glasgow Observer and Scottish Catholic Herald*, 6 October 1939, p.1.
possible in homes where they would have access to schools and churches of their own faith. Examples of the work done by priests is evident from reports printed in the Observer and Scottish Catholic Herald in September 1939. These included:

The evacuees who have been settled in a number of Fife villages, where there is no Catholic Church or school, are likely to change their quarters this week. …parish priests in the district have not been idle in this respect, working to get Catholic children settled in Catholic houses, where they can attend their church and school.410

Working towards a satisfactory solution to the question of continued religious education was similar in the Border areas. A quote from an East Lothian evacuation area states:

In answer to Fr. Connolly’s query concerning facilities for Catholic religious instruction, the Director of Education said he thought that some arrangement would require to be reached but…there would be difficulties where there were mixed classes.411

And in the north arrangements had been made where:

…two classrooms [have] been set aside in Carnoustie public school for the use of Dundee Catholic evacuees from St. John’s. Thirty

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410 Glasgow Observer and Scottish Catholic Herald, 15 September 1939, p.3.
411 Glasgow Observer and Scottish Catholic Herald, 15 September 1939, p.7.
junior pupils [have] been provided for in the subscription school, and 25 infants are being taught in St Anne’s Church.\textsuperscript{412}

Immediately after the first evacuation, and while priests were trying to help Catholic children to be re-billeted, the Church hierarchy was in consultation with Scottish government representatives. During one of the first meetings of a fairly lengthy debate, Archbishop McDonald of St Andrews and Edinburgh voiced his annoyance that:

Evacuation carried out in September 1939 had been arranged by a Committee on which the Roman Catholic Church had no representation and in this evacuation the interests of Roman Catholic children had been disregarded.\textsuperscript{413}

Catholic Church leaders were anxious that the Church would be represented in any future discussions on evacuation to ensure that the religious welfare of Catholic evacuees would be given due consideration. The \textit{Glasgow Observer and Scottish Catholic Herald} carried many front page stories alerting people to the potential danger to the religious welfare of evacuees. In the article of the 6 October 1939, referred to above, it said that:

\begin{quote}
Strong criticism of the manner in which the evacuation of Catholic school children has been carried out by the authorities is made by
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{412} \textit{Glasgow Observer and Scottish Catholic Herald}, 29 September 1939, p.8.
\textsuperscript{413} Scottish Catholic Archives (SCA). DE124/8/5. Evacuation Edinburgh and General, 1940 January-February. Refers to a meeting between Captain J. McEwen, Under Secretary of State for Scotland, and Archbishop McDonald, of St Andrews and Edinburgh, 2 February 1940.
Mgr. McGettigan, V.G. …The breaking up of Catholic schools and the subsequent separation of the pupils miles from each other in areas far from Catholic schools and Churches and the placing of Catholic children not only in non-Catholic homes but also in non-Catholic schools will lead…to a lessening of the prime need of Catholic schools for Catholic children in the eyes of parents and the public authorities.\textsuperscript{414}

Roman Catholic clerics were concerned that Catholic evacuees would lose their faith, especially if they were encouraged to take part in other types of religious ceremonies. Another newspaper article in November reiterated earlier concern for the religious educational welfare of Catholic evacuees. The Archbishop of Glasgow, Donald Mackintosh, said that:

Many of these children…are scattered up and down Scotland in relatively small groups. This makes it most difficult, if not almost impossible to attend to the Catholic education and to the spiritual welfare of the children.

The Archbishop went on to argue that:

By the arrangements now being made by the civil authorities for the education of evacuee Glasgow Catholic children, what was formerly a rare and temporary exception is being made the rule, namely, the frequenting of non-Catholic schools by Catholic children.\textsuperscript{415}

\textsuperscript{414} Glasgow Observer and Scottish Catholic Herald, 6 October 1939, p.1.
\textsuperscript{415} Glasgow Observer and Scottish Catholic Herald, Friday, 24 November 1939.
This type of situation was also the subject of correspondence between the Archbishop McDonald of St Andrews and Edinburgh and Monsignor McDonald, the priest in charge of the Catholic Church in Buckie. The Archbishop claimed that there was a workable centralisation scheme operating in Fife and he encouraged Monsignor McDonald to put pressure on parents to demand a similar centralisation scheme for Catholic children evacuated to areas in the north of Scotland. The Archbishop claimed that in Fife:

We got a number of parents to complain and to demand re-billeting. They demanded, failing this, that their children should be sent home…this was a matter of conscience and supreme importance, and that the parents and the Ecclesiastical authorities would be compelled to drive it to extreme limits. This [created] much feeling at the very time when the government [was] anxious to have the whole country with it…

The Archbishop went on to say that:

When parents found that reasonable facilities for the practice of their religion and for religious instruction of their children were denied them they returned home. Now a mere handful of children remain.


Monsignor McDonald, from Buckie, had managed to find good homes for forty children within easy access of Catholic Church and school. However, in reply to Archbishop McDonald, he set out his fears regarding seven Catholic children in the surrounding countryside of Portknockie who were not prepared to move to a central area close to these facilities. He noted that the parties involved, including parents, children and Protestant guardians, were unwilling to allow children to move to a more accessible area for the continuation of their religious education. He was concerned that a situation would develop whereby:

…if the children [were] left in the Protestant homes…many of them [would] lose the faith. Some of them are being taken to the kirk and to prayer meetings and when you protest you are told the children want to go.\(^{418}\)

A circular from the Guild of Catholic Teachers to Catholic teachers and head teachers, in October 1939, stressed that it was not acceptable for Catholic children to be scattered in small units where they would be absorbed into non-Catholic schools without a Catholic teacher. It emphasised the fact that Catholic evacuees should, if possible, be billeted with Catholic families, with access to a Church and school of their own faith. If this were not possible then an acceptable solution would be to open centres where Catholic children could continue their religious education:

Where there [was] a Church and no school but possible accommodation for classes… where there [was] neither a Church nor school but which evacuees could be placed in sufficient numbers to warrant a priest and teachers being sent to them…

Following on from this the Archdiocese of Glasgow issued a questionnaire for use in reception areas, to assess the viability of sending priests and teachers to areas where evacuees had no access to their own school or Church. Where it was not possible for them to have access to both and be billeted with Catholic families, the Archbishop suggested that Catholic evacuees should be accommodated in hostels. The Church’s enquiries estimated only 198 Catholic children were without access to either their own church or school in northern districts such as Ballater, Inverurie, Braemar and Fraserburgh. These numbers were insufficient to make building a separate hostel viable in a central reception area.

In conjunction with the work of ensuring schoolchildren were given the opportunity to continue their religious education, Catholic clergy also worked towards the continuation of the religious welfare of nursery age children, evacuated with their mothers. Where possible they wanted pre-school children to have access to Catholic nursery schools with Catholic teachers fully trained in religious teaching in evacuation areas.

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The aim of the Catholic nursery school system, whose expansion had been ongoing since the 1930s, was to provide at least one Catholic nursery school in each diocese of Scotland. This intention was debated into spring 1939 when it was decided that the Catholic Ecclesiastical Authority would provide nursery schools in all the populous centres throughout Scotland. A minute of the Committee investigating the issue noted:

Neutral nursery schools would be the thin end of the wedge of secularisation. [In] Glasgow the authorities were establishing four nursery schools. In Edinburgh the authorities were establishing six nursery schools. Neither corporation was making special provision for Catholic children.

The expansion of non-denominational nurseries during the war, in the cities and in reception areas, alerted Catholic clergy of the need to carry on with the expansion of Catholic nurseries and to employ more fully trained Catholic teachers. Wartime nursery classes were opened in primary schools and mothers’ clubs also ran nurseries. In and around the city of Glasgow 16 nursery schools were established, 22 in Edinburgh, with a further 4 opened for mothers working in industry. The feeling among the Catholic clergy was that Catholics could not accept nondenominational nursery schools and felt that:

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422 SCA. DE126/4/6. Special Committee Minute 5. A meeting of the Special Committee held at the Vicariate, Glasgow, 27 April 1939.
423 SCA. DE126/4/3. Special Committee Minute 3. A meeting of the Special Committee was held in the Vicariate, Glasgow, 9 February 1939.
Though attendance at such schools was voluntary…the tendency was
towards compulsion and worse still, towards schools,
undenominational in character.\textsuperscript{425}

The struggle to ensure continuance of the Catholic faith amongst evacuees
was acknowledged by local government. However, neither the DHS nor the
SED could guarantee that Catholic evacuees could definitely be placed in
receiving areas with access to a Catholic Church and school. The best that
could be done under the circumstances was to request evacuation officers in
all sending areas to meet Roman Catholic requests, as long as this did not
mean unfair treatment for Protestant children. The under-Secretary of State
for Scotland, Captain McEwen, was also prepared to consider, where
appropriate, the appointment of Roman Catholic billeting officers, although
he doubted whether it would be wise in cases where the receiving
householders were Protestant.\textsuperscript{426} This gave the Scottish Catholic clergy
some reassurance that the local authorities in reception areas were prepared
to relocate Roman Catholic evacuees where possible. This had been done in
all but one Scottish local authority reception area which has not been named
by the Scottish Office since the local council had refused to co-operate. The
remaining local authorities agreed that where possible Catholic billeting
officers would be appointed in reception areas.\textsuperscript{427}

\textsuperscript{425} SCA. DE126/4/1. Nursery and Special Schools Minutes 1938-39. Minutes of meeting
held in the Vicariate, 160 Renfrew Street, Glasgow, 3 November 1938.
\textsuperscript{426} SCA. DE124/8/5. Evacuation Edinburgh and General 1940, January-February.
Department of Health for Scotland Meeting, 2 February 1940.
\textsuperscript{427} SCA. DE124/8/5. Meeting between Scottish government officials including the Under
Secretary of State for Scotland, Captain McEwen and Representatives of the Roman
Catholic Church including: Archbishop Mackintosh, Archbishop McDonald and Bishop
Maguire, 2 February 1940.
For Catholic evacuees who were billeted in camps, Captain McEwen was prepared to make some provision for:

…the religious instruction by Roman Catholic teachers, and facilities…for the holding of services in the camp by any of its clergy whom the Roman Catholic Church may designate for this purpose.⁴²⁸

Catholic clergy were not satisfied with the way in which camp schools were to be organised. The situation would have been more acceptable had there been at least one for Catholics only. In spite of all their protests, when the dangers of bombing became a reality and parents had to move their children to safety, the problems raised by religious bodies such as the Roman Catholic Church were never seriously raised again during the remainder of the war.⁴²⁹ Nevertheless, the complaints of the Catholic hierarchy during the early years of the war demonstrated how far they were prepared to go at that time to ensure the continued religious welfare of their congregation.

In contrast to the Catholic clergy, some Roman Catholic evacuees seemed unconcerned about their religious wellbeing. During interviews about their experience of evacuation conducted for this thesis no significant fears were expressed over religion. This is also reflected in the interviews collated for the ‘2000 Glasgow Lives’ project. Of the thirty-two people, who were children during the war, and who mentioned their evacuation experience,

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none made any significant reference to religion. This implies that religion was not a major part of their overall experience. Among Roman Catholic evacuees interviewed who did express an opinion on religion, being billeted with families of other faiths was considered unimportant. One evacuee who remembered being billeted at the home of her teacher in Aberdeen said:

The schoolteacher was very good to us. We were Catholics, they were Protestants and we were made to kneel down and say our prayers. We never did that at home. At home my daddy would say ‘come on get into bed and say your prayers’ and that was it, you know, but they were very good that way. There was never any strife there and we got on well, we loved the school and had a happy, happy time…

Another evacuee remembered her religious education being carried out in school. She had the opportunity to go to mass once a week thus allowing her to continue her religious education. She said:

The school we were at, what we were told, it was a Catholic school we could go to Church once, one afternoon a week and that was for our religious education. But we didn’t have to go, I was one of four and I went because I like it, you know!

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431 Interview with Ina, recorded on 4 July 2011. Transcript held with author.
432 Interview with John and June, recorded on 20 July 2011. Transcript held with author.
In the case of two Glasgow sisters billeted in Balendoch House near Blairgowrie, their religious experience, in keeping with their whole evacuation period, was very positive. An interview recorded by Summers, tells of how the two sisters escaped a particularly unhappy home life when they were evacuated to Balendoch. Balendoch House, which was home to evacuees from ‘the slums of Glasgow’, was run by three members of the Christian Guider’s from Kent. There the sisters found love and friendship which they had never known at home. At Balendoch, one sister was ‘christened and confirmed’. She ‘celebrated her first communion on Christmas Day 1944, and remembered the experience with deep and lasting affection’.  

For Jewish children attention to religious observance was a significant feature of the evacuation process. Fast noted that some Orthodox Jewish children who were billeted in non-Jewish homes made a valiant effort to follow the rules of their Orthodox Jewish teaching. Fast wrote predominantly from an English perspective with relatively few references to Scottish Jews. Indeed the religious interests of the Scottish Jewish community is absent in much of the historiography relating to war and evacuation. In contrast, religion was one of the most important issues for historians dealing with the German Jewish refugees who arrived in Britain during 1938 and their subsequent evacuation from English towns and cities at the outbreak of war.

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Historiography relating to the kindertransport in 1938, whereby 10,000 Jewish refugees were given passage from Germany and German occupied territory to Britain, is extensive and detailed.\footnote{Fast, Children’s Exodus (2011), p.109.} Much of what has been written gives an insightful account of the interests of the Jewish hierarchy, and the way in which they dealt with the religious aspect of the refugee movement.

Rabbi Schonfeld, Chief Rabbi of the Orthodox Jewish community based in east London, wanted Orthodox children evacuated to Orthodox homes where their religious observance could be preserved. Like Roman Catholic priests, Rabbi Schonfeld fought to ensure that Jewish refugees be provided with facilities for the continuation of their religious welfare. Fast believed Schonfeld felt strongly that there was little purpose in saving a child’s physical life ‘only to lose its Jewish soul and identity’.\footnote{Fast, Children’s Exodus (2011), p.64.}

The billeting of Jewish refugees with Jewish families was not achieved in Scotland. Only 27 children were placed in Jewish homes compared to 147 in non-Jewish ones.\footnote{Fast, Children’s Exodus (2011), p.64.} Aaron Haas has claimed that for some Jewish parents the fear of their children losing their faith was worse than death. One extreme case reported by Haas on the subject of conversion to Catholicism revealed that a Polish mother, who was an Orthodox Jew, claimed that she

would ‘rather see [her] daughter die as a Jew than to grow up as a Catholic’.

There is limited evidence of the reaction of Scottish Jewish parents whose children were evacuated under the official scheme. One case which was recorded however gives an account of a young Jewish evacuee who had been so impressed by the ‘Band of Hope’, a Christian organisation for Protestant children, she wanted to join. She claimed that once her parents were made aware of this they immediately brought her back to Glasgow. This incident demonstrates the parallel reaction to proselytization which was shared by both Jews and Roman Catholics.

Among other Christian denominations, the fear of conversion also caused concern. Rev. W.W. Simpson, a Methodist Minister, contributed extensively to developing Jewish-Christian relations. He worried about acceptance of those who wished to convert by both Christian and Jewish communities. In a letter printed in the *Jewish Chronicle* entitled: ‘The Conversion Menace: A Christian’s Observation, he warned that:

> There have been cases [where] Christian foster-parents of Jewish refugee children have done their best to influence those children towards the acceptance of Christianity…The Jew who becomes a Christian turns against everything Jewish, is not only a loss to his own

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439 Scottish Jewish Archives Centre (SJAC). F0009 *Serving Their Country 4: World War Two – Personal Stories and Memories*.
community but must also be something of an embarrassment to the community with which he has associated himself…the Jewish community is left with the problem as to how to safeguard itself against such loss in the future.\textsuperscript{441}

Safeguarding the religious future of Jewish children was of particular importance to Jewish educationalists. Professor Selig Brodetsky, at a meeting of the Joint Emergency Committee for Jewish Education stressed that:

\textit{…the most important function of the community was to educate the next generation, but up to the present it had been treated as a sort of incidental event in communal life… The most effective way of dealing with the boys and girls was to introduce them to traditional Jewish life at a very early stage. …a Jewish boy or girl who did not understand Jewish hopes and aspirations for the future was not really taking full part in Jewish life.}\textsuperscript{442}

Problems relating to the continuation of their faith was compounded by feelings of anti-Semitism in some areas of the country. Ben Braber has said that although Glasgow Jews could count on strong public feelings of fairness, they had also to deal with vicious prejudice.\textsuperscript{443} Anti-Semitism was fairly widespread and there were reports of difficulties in housing Jewish

\textsuperscript{441} \textit{Jewish Chronicle}, Friday, 19 January 1945, p.6.  
\textsuperscript{442} \textit{Jewish Chronicle}, Friday, 16 March 1945, p.5.  
children evacuated from Garnethill Hostel in Glasgow to Perthshire. The extent of the problem was such that the Glasgow Education Authority was prepared to meet the costs involved in sending these children elsewhere. The *Jewish Chronicle* stated that:

Difficulties regarding housing of the 27 children evacuated from the Garnethill Hostel….should be transferred to the proposed Skelmorlie Hostel. The Glasgow Education Authority have indicated that they are willing to convert the proposed hostel…into a special school. They would provide teachers, furniture, beds, and bedding but responsibility for rent, rates, heating, lighting, would fall upon the Glasgow Jewish Education Board.444

A contrary report on the same day claimed that Jews and Christians were forming a new understanding as a result of evacuation. The President and Chairman of the Society of Jews and Christians, the Very Rev., the Dean of St Paul’s and Rabbi I. I. Mattuk, noted in the Bulletin for January 1940:

…the placing of many Jewish mothers and children in Christian homes as a result of evacuation has made possible new understanding. One “symptom” of what is happening, it is declared, has been the interest shown by Christian billeting hosts in the correspondence religion lessons sent out to the children from the Synagogues in London.445

444 *Jewish Chronicle*, Friday, 26 January 1940, p.17.  
445 *Jewish Chronicle*, Friday, 26 January 1940, p.15
Safeguarding evacuees from potential outside religious influence could be ensured by means of private evacuation. For Jewish families living in and around Glasgow whose children were not evacuated under the official evacuation scheme, the Ayrshire coast was a popular destination for sending their children to safety. There was a very active Jewish community in that area and in the twenty years between 1931 and 1951 the Jewish community in Ayr rose from 37,000 to 42,000.\footnote{Nathan Abrams, \textit{Caledonian Jews: A Study of Seven Small Communities in Scotland} (North Carolina, 2009), p.43.} This was a fairly substantial growth in an area which had a total population of 285,217 in 1931.\footnote{These figures were from the Carnegie Library, Local History Department, Ayr. Census of Scotland 1931: Report on the Fourteenth Decennial Census of Scotland, Volume 1, Part 8, County of Ayr, published by H.M. Stationery Office, Edinburgh, 1932, p.306. [Accessed 31 March 2014].}

Religious worship and the celebration of special Jewish festivals carried on in Ayr for the growing community of Jewish evacuees. Events such as Chanucah continued amongst the Jewish community in Ayrshire during the war. These events were catered for at the Invercloy Hotel, which was a popular venue for this and other special celebrations.\footnote{\textit{Jewish Echo}, 3 January 1941 p.8.} The Ayr Masonic Halls was another popular venue where teaching took place for four hours every Sunday.\footnote{\textit{Jewish Echo}, 3 November, 1939, p.4.} By arrangement with the Jewish School, the Talmud Torah, Hebrew classes were held in Largs High School, another popular venue.\footnote{\textit{Jewish Echo}, 19 September 1941, p.12.} Meanwhile Synagogue premises were acquired at Sandgate.\footnote{\textit{Jewish Echo}, 4 April 1941, p.9.} These arrangements meant that the Jewish congregation, including evacuees, in and around the Ayrshire coast could continue to practise their religious
observance without undue fear of outside influence. Arrangements were also put in place to have kosher meat and unpasteurised milk sent from Glasgow until these could be supplied by local butchers and farmers.\textsuperscript{452}

In the Scottish Borders, Whittinghame House, another location given over for Jewish refugees and evacuees, was opened in January 1939. The house and the estate were leased to Whittingehame Farm School, a non-profit organisation. Educational tuition included English and Hebrew classes, religious education and agricultural skills. Opening with a roll of 51 children the numbers rose very quickly to 160. Between January 1939 and September 1941 three to four hundred children passed through the school.\textsuperscript{453} As evacuees returned home numbers diminished and the school was closed in 1942. However, a measure of its success was recorded via a letter printed in the \textit{Jewish Chronicle} on its closure in February 1942 where it was noted that:

\begin{quote}
…of the boys and girls who completed their training at Whittinghame since its inception in 1939, 16 went to Palestine and about 110 (representing a big percentage of those trained and suitable for an agricultural life) have settled on the land in this country.\textsuperscript{454}
\end{quote}

Ernespie House, in Castle Douglas, then a fifty year old mansion house, was opened as a residential school for Jewish evacuees from Glasgow. Chaim

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{452} SIAC. F00025. \textit{Serving Their Country: World War Two – Personal Stories and Memories.}
\textsuperscript{453} \url{www.eastlothianwar.co.uk/refugees.html} [Accessed 8 August 2013].
\textsuperscript{454} \textit{Jewish Chronicle}, Friday, 6 February 1942, p.20
\end{flushright}
Bermant, a Jewish evacuee from Glasgow who was sent to Ernespie House after a spell in Annan described it as being rather like a public school. This was made available by the Glasgow Jewish Board of Guardians when accommodation for Jewish evacuees became inadequate in Annan.\textsuperscript{455} The history of Ernespie House in relation to its use as a residential school for evacuees has been relatively under researched.

Boyd’s survey paid little attention to Jewish evacuees, possibly due to the fact that, by comparison to Catholics and Protestants, their numbers were relatively few. He briefly mentioned Ernespie House in his account of evacuation, where he discussed the takeover of large houses to be run as schools during the war, but overall his coverage of education and religion was not comprehensive. His survey presented detailed information of some of the other residential schools, for example, Catholic, Protestant and non-denominational establishments acquired for evacuees, but he gave no specific details of Ernespie House.\textsuperscript{456} Whittingehame House was also overlooked in Boyd’s study possibly as his main focus was on the Catholic/Protestant divide. The results of this research into the evacuation of Jews in Scotland during the Second World War helps fill this gap.

Bermant, who went on to become a Rabbi, has recounted his experience as an evacuee both in Annan and at Ernespie House. He spoke frankly about his approach to religion during his life in Glasgow and in Annan before being sent to Ernespie. He claimed he had:

\textsuperscript{455} Bermant, \textit{Coming Home} (1976), p.84.
…no intention of renouncing Judaism…and certainly no wish to do anything which would have estranged me from my family…but I wanted to be one of the lads, a boy among boys, and did not want to be separated from them by religious externals.⁴⁵⁷

Bermant had been bullied at school in Glasgow for being Jewish, but when he was sent to Annan he was particularly pleased to have been bullied for being an evacuee, or one of the ‘Glasgow khillies’ (his spelling), rather than a Jew.⁴⁵⁸ Despite being the son of a Rabbi he expressed no strong feelings over any challenges to his religious adherence, hence his approach to religion was similar to that of Roman Catholic evacuees interviewed for this research. Although Bermant followed the Jewish faith throughout his life he questioned some of the strict rules and regulations which were required of Orthodox Jews.⁴⁵⁹ Other Jewish children were less able to do this and there are accounts of Jewish children who were deeply concerned that during the evacuation process they would not be upholding their faith if they were to carry gas masks on the Sabbath.⁴⁶⁰ There was a further threat to the spiritual welfare of Jewish evacuees during the war when their kosher diet came under threat. When Jewish children were placed in non-Jewish homes hosts often had either little or no knowledge of their dietary requirements, although this problem was solved in some reception areas where canteens were set up and served kosher food.

⁴⁵⁹ Bermant, Coming Home (1976), pp.75 and 89.
There are many similarities between the Roman Catholic and Jewish communities which were highlighted by the evacuation process. However, one visible difference was in the importance placed on the quality of religious teaching. For Roman Catholic clergy there was an overwhelming desire that only those teachers schooled in the Catholic faith during their teaching practice should be allowed to teach children in Catholic nursery, primary and secondary schools. The importance Church leaders placed on these teachers was evident from the minutes of a special Committee meeting in the Vicariate in Glasgow before the outbreak of war. This Committee worried that not all Catholic teachers were suitable for teaching Catholic children and it was essential that they should have good Catholic teachers, as ‘they [came] next in importance to priests’. The Committee saw a danger in student teachers being assigned to non-Catholic tutors and they believed that ‘teachers finishing their training were often insufficiently instructed in Dogma…even amongst nuns and Brothers dogma was woefully insufficient’. This, they believed, should render them unacceptable to teach Catholic children. The call to national service during the war adversely affected the number of Catholic teachers, and indeed teaching staff generally, whereby retired teachers and young graduates were called on to fill the gap.

By comparison, according to Bermant, while Jewish leaders insisted that Jewish evacuees were placed in households where they could continue their

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461 SCA. DE126/4/6. Special Committee Minute 5, A Meeting of the Special Committee was held in the Vicariate, Glasgow, 27 April, 1939.
462 SCA. DE126/4/6. Special Committee Minute 6, A Meeting of the Special Committee was held in the Vicariate, Glasgow, 1 June, 1939.
religious education, there was considerably less emphasis placed on the standard of teachers. Bermant drew on his experience at Ernespie House as a pupil and eventually as a teacher to support this allegation. He stressed that Jews had little regard for teachers, whom he declared were ‘unfortunate’ and who were ‘not much use at anything else, and even where teachers had considerable knowledge, they had no sort of training’. According to Bermant, in places like Glasgow, religious teaching was mainly done by boys in their last year of school or first year of university. Bermant’s statement relating to the teaching practice of Jewish children is in sharp contrast to the ideal the Glasgow Catholic hierarchy was working towards on the eve of the war.

Focus thus far in this chapter has surrounded Roman Catholic and Jewish organisations. Both these organisations were active in working for the continued religious adherence of their communities during the evacuation process, particularly the Roman Catholic hierarchy. For Church of Scotland evacuees there was less importance placed on their being billeted where they would have access to their own church and school. A 1950s study estimated that approximately 2.1 million adults in Scotland were members of a Christian Church and the Church of Scotland accounted for 63.5 per cent of that total which made it the largest organised religious body in Scotland. As the majority of the evacuees were Church of Scotland it was therefore more likely they would be placed in homes of the same faith.

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Another established church, the Church of England, acknowledged evacuation as a potential cause of disruption to the religious life and education of evacuees. Together with the Free Church movement (Christian Church which dissented or seceded from an established church), the Church of England, through the Commission of Churches, appointed a Committee to survey the extent of disruption being caused by evacuation. The Committee reported that:

…the grave defect in the official evacuation scheme that…took no account of the religious needs of those concerned and ignored the bodies whose function it is to supply them.\textsuperscript{466}

It further claimed that:

Evacuation struck hard…at the organised church life of the sending areas. The departure of so many children, mothers and teachers disrupted congregations no less than homes. It destroyed or seriously depleted Sunday schools and youth societies, the nurseries of the Church; subtracted workers and leaders; left dismal gaps in the pews; decimated choirs; torpedoed budgets…Congregations carried on as best they could in this sorry state of things and strove gradually to build things up again as the tide of evacuation began to turn.\textsuperscript{467}

\textsuperscript{466} The Report of a Survey Committee appointed by the Commission of the Churches for International Friendship and Social Responsibility, \textit{Evacuation and the Churches} (1941), pp.14 and 15.

\textsuperscript{467} The Report of a Survey Committee appointed by the Commission of the Churches for International Friendship and Social Responsibility, \textit{Evacuation and the Churches} (1941), p.34.
Brown’s study of Scotland confirmed a fall in the average total of Church attendance between 1931 and 1941 by almost 5 per cent. He estimated that from this figure 63 per cent was due to ‘a steepening decline in Sunday-school enrolment…during war-time child evacuation in 1939-41’.  

The post-war growth in Church membership and the new housing developments in Scotland resulted in a church extension programme. The result of research into Protestant Church Extension Ministers by Reverend H. Stanley Wood highlighted a drive to improve and renew church adherence after the Second World War. New churches were erected alongside the new towns built on the outskirts of the cities. Wood described these church extensions as the ‘greatest boom of abstract new Churches in the twentieth century’.

Historians who expressed an opinion on religion during the war mentioned a decline in church attendance and Gardiner believed that Church membership had been in decline since the First World War. Holman also mentioned the decline in church attendance noticeable since before the outbreak of war, but he believed that during the war people were more ‘receptive to the concept of a protecting God’. He explained this in terms of the Christian way in which people cared for evacuees, although this did not always involve them in the process of taking them to church.

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Church attendance was hampered by wartime conditions as Kirk Session records confirmed. In a number of sending and receiving areas afternoon and evening services often had to be cancelled due to the enforcement of the blackout. Records also show that, in a number of reception areas, Sunday schools were being cancelled predominantly through lack of teachers. In some places, such as St Michael’s Parish Church, Lithlithgow, in West Lothian, attempts were made to overcome the problem with the introduction of training classes for Sunday school teachers. Arrangements were also made to have afternoon services during the blackout.472

The Commission of the Churches reported that circulars and leaflets were issued by the Church of England’s Central Council for Religious Education, the Free Churches and the Council of Christian Education, giving guidance on dealing with supplementing the work of Sunday schools by teaching in the home. To help foster parents a special scheme of home religious teaching was developed and aids supplied. The Commission believed the techniques put in place were successful.473

Leaflets entitled ‘The Church and the Children in Wartime’ offered advice and guidance for dealing with wartime issues under such sub-headings as: Children’s Fears, Nursery Schools for Children under Five, How to Teach Children to Pray, Occupations for Winter Evenings in Reception Areas and The Difficult Child. All surrounded the power of prayer in helping children

472 NAS. Ch2/740/15. Kirk Session Records for St Michael’s Parish Church, Linlithgow, 17 September 1940.
through the separation caused by evacuation. Notes on religious teaching for children in neutral, evacuation and reception areas were contained in the leaflet *Sunday Teaching in the Homes of the People*.\textsuperscript{474} This emphasised the opportunity presented by war and evacuation to enhance the spiritual welfare of children through religious teaching in the home. It outlined the way forward in achieving this and stressed that what had happened was something:

…often contemplated of Home Religious teaching and of the gaining of a closer co-operation between parent and teacher where the child’s spiritual welfare is concerned.\textsuperscript{475}

One priest who carried out an experiment on home religious teaching for secondary school pupils claimed that classes had a positive effect on the children and their families.\textsuperscript{476}

From this information it is evident that the various Churches were alert to the need to ensure the continuous religious education of children in evacuation areas. Within the wider ministry of the Church of Scotland


however, there was no discussion in the Kirk Session records concerning any need for secularism during the evacuation process. Church records for the evacuation areas of Cupar and St Andrews, in Fife; Dunning, in Perthshire; and Linlithgow in West Lothian, say little on evacuation in any of these presbyteries. Kirk Session minutes from Dunning Parish Church intimated to the Session House that ‘evacuees [and] members of the church were invited to communion’.477 In the six years of war these Kirk Session minutes made no further mention of evacuees, in spite of the fact that there were 300 Glasgow children billeted there in September 1939.

There was no evidence in any of the Kirk Session records from the presbyteries mentioned, to suggest that Church of Scotland ministers had a direct objection to Protestant children being billeted with families outside the Protestant faith during their evacuation. The Church of Scotland magazine ‘Life and Work’ for Battlefield West Church in Langside dated September 1940 printed an article in the Minister’s Notes section which welcomed Guernsey evacuees to Glasgow, and invited them to join the church. This article professed to ensure that, ‘…as long as the good folks of Guernsey are with us they will find a warm place in our hearts, homes and church’.478 The article makes no mention of denominational distinction or the need to accept only Protestants into Battlefield homes and church.

478 Langside Parish Church Records, Battlefield West Parish, Life and Work Magazine, September 1940, Article No. 28. Held by the Session Clerk at Battlefield.
The only direct reference in the Kirk Session minutes reviewed regarding evacuated people was recorded on 30 March 1941 at the same Battlefield West Church in Glasgow. It confirmed that the magazine supplement should be sent to members of the congregation who had been evacuated. In this case it was to inform evacuees of the news of a new Moderator-Designate which was included in the magazine. In St Michael’s Parish Church, Linlithgow, a reception area for Glasgow children, the Kirk Session records contain no mention of evacuees. General schooling issues were raised; for example, there were a number of complaints included in these records concerning cancellation of Sunday school due to the blackout and lack of teachers. However, throughout the six years of war and evacuation there are no records as to the religious affiliation of evacuees in any of the Session minutes of the aforesaid church.479

At national level, there is no evidence of Church of Scotland concern for the religious adherence of Protestant child evacuees. When day to day concerns are examined for areas where evacuees were placed, very few comments were made about them. For example, the records for St Leonard’s Church in Dairsie, in Fife, where a number of Edinburgh children were sent, refer to the children only in connection with arrangements for badminton. Initially the invitation to play was for children who were members of the church but was soon extended to ‘outsiders’. This would suggest that the sport was opened to both evacuees and local children of other faiths living in the area.480

480 St Andrews University, Special Collections, Kirk Session Records for St Leonard’s Parish Church, Dairsie, 1939-1945.
During the war the Church of Scotland, like other churches, worked to maintain the religious welfare of its congregation, and like other religious organisations, it played a leading role in many areas of war emergency relief.\textsuperscript{481} Kirk Session minutes from Battlefield Church also recorded the way in which practical relief was extended by parishioners during the war. This took the form of the provision of ambulance classes, helping to coordinate Air Raid Precautions (ARP) squads under the leadership of an ambulance section, fire section and wardens. Churches generally helped those rendered homeless by the blitz, providing emergency shelter and food. Quakers were particularly active both at home and throughout Europe helping the war effort without actually taking part in military action

Barns House, in Peeblesshire, was home to 40 boys evacuated from areas in and around Edinburgh who could not be billeted in private homes. The boys who resided there were from various religious backgrounds. David Wills, who ran the home, was a Quaker. He confirmed that he held Sunday morning service in order to dispel the myth of the ‘bogey-man which they [thought] of as God’.\textsuperscript{482} Sunday service was entirely voluntary. Wills hoped it may have turned the boys towards that religion although there is no evidence to suggest it did.

For Wills, as for Quakers generally, pacifism was fundamental to their daily and religious life and conscience. Although they did not take part in the fighting, Quakers played an active role in the many and varied emergency

\textsuperscript{481} Langside Parish Church Records, Battlefield West Parish, Kirk Session Records, 3 June 1940. Held by the Session Clerk at Battlefield.
\textsuperscript{482} Wills, \textit{The Barns Experiment} (1945), p.86.
relief efforts during the Second World War. These included activities such as fire watching, ambulance driving, and organising and running hostels for the elderly and evacuees. On the wider stage Quakers also helped the refugee movement of both Jews and Christians throughout Europe.

Comparative study thus far has included the involvement of the Roman Catholic, Jewish and Church of Scotland clergy with the evacuation process. This line of enquiry has not been possible for the Society of Friends, or Quakers, as they have no ordained clergy and no hierarchical structure. This meant that, where Roman Catholic clergy raised an objection to their Church being overlooked in evacuation planning, there was no equivalent rank or voice among the Quakers. There is no evidence of Quakers attempting to influence children in religious belief beyond the vague suggestion from Wills noted above.

There is a wide range of historiography available relating to the history of Quakerism, its establishment, and the role of Quakers in the emergency relief work carried out during the Second World War. However there is a distinct lack of secondary or archival material which accounts for the way in which Quakers dealt with the evacuation process. The Quaker libraries in Glasgow and London hold no account of any involvement Quakers may have had in the evacuation process in Scotland.

The work of Roger Wilson, who was General Secretary of the Friends Relief Service during the war, provides the main source of information on the subject of evacuation. He recorded the involvement of Quakers organising hostels for evacuee children and the elderly, and, in some instances, for the
occupation and renovation of houses for the purpose of accommodating evacuees. However, this work omitted any account of Scottish Quaker involvement in the evacuation process.\(^{483}\)

Gardiner also described the involvement of Quakers in sending supplies and workers to the East End of London but she too neglected to quantify any Scottish involvement by Quakers in the evacuation scheme.\(^{484}\) The work of David Wills is therefore significant in identifying that Quakers did, in fact, play a role in the Scottish evacuation scheme through his experience of running Barns House. He described Quaker services as being led by a group of elders with no figurehead as in other religious organisations.

For Quakers, the religious welfare of the family is therefore in the hands of the parents, and there is no concrete evidence to suggest that there were any similarities between Quakers and the Roman Catholic or Jewish organisations during the evacuation process. Only one piece of evidence of a Quaker family wishing to secure accommodation with another Quaker family comes from an account by Louise Milbourn. The reason behind this did not come from a threat of outside influence, but rather a letter written by her father which stated, ‘…we take a rather pacifist view of things and there are many who would not wish to take the child of a Quaker’.\(^{485}\) With the exception of this letter there is no evidence available to suggest that people would have objected to having Quaker children billeted with them.

\(^{483}\) Wilson, *Quaker Relief* (1952).
The absence of material concerning Quaker involvement in the evacuation process gives an added importance to personal testimony. This helps piece together the ways in which Quakers, like other religious denominations, worked through the evacuation process and how far warfare led to an increased awareness of the need to maintain religious welfare for its congregation.

This chapter has focused on the continued religious welfare of evacuees during the Second World War with particular regard to the Titmuss theory of warfare to welfare in relation to religion. Within the overall framework of continued and progressive welfare developments this was most apparent in the Roman Catholic community, with the fairly rapid expansion of Catholic Churches and Catholic schools in the post-war era. This evidence fills a gap in the historiography concerning the relationship between religion and evacuation.

The chapter set out to make a comparison of the ways in which different religious organisations handled the evacuation process. The aims were to consider the available material relating to four religious organisations within Britain: Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism and Quakerism, in order to establish how far these groups had been successful in helping to maintain the religious welfare of evacuees during their evacuation. The Roman Catholic Church was especially forceful in its attempt to ensure that the religious welfare of its congregation was upheld during the war. Through media coverage and meetings with the Secretary of State for Scotland it attempted to ensure that as many Catholic children and adults as possible had the benefit of continuing to uphold their religious adherence in
reception areas. Their campaign was somewhat unrealistic in so far as there was a distinct lack of accommodation in some reception areas to enable Catholic children to fulfil their religious obligations. There was also a shortage of Catholic teachers as young men were being called up for military service. Furthermore, Catholic clerics failed to take account of the emotional strain of removing children who had settled comfortably in non-Catholic homes. The Catholic Church was prepared to put faith before the safety of their congregation until faced with the reality of bombing. However, once the bombs fell on Clydebank the Catholic Church fell silent and accepted the fact that in the short term people’s safety was paramount and took precedence over religious welfare.

There was a significant gap in the knowledge of the Scottish Jewish refugees and evacuees. This was piecemeal throughout the substantial historiography of the kindertransport and the evacuation process. It had been dealt with predominantly from an English perspective and, with the exception of secondary source history relating to Jewish evacuees, oral history testimony recorded few individual evacuees who strove to retain their own particular faith during their evacuation. Jewish people had been stigmatised, imprisoned and killed in Germany because of their faith. These atrocities undoubtedly influenced the work and effort of religious leaders, in particular the Chief Rabbi Schonfeld, who fought hard to retain the religious affiliation with their own particular denominations.

Where historiography has dealt with religious welfare it contained predominantly anecdotal evidence. Boyd’s study of evacuation in Scotland unusually included a religious case study, this focused on measuring how
quickly evacuees returned to their homes in Protestant and Roman Catholic families. Quakers were never mentioned in the historiography relating to Scottish evacuees and Jews were mentioned only very sporadically. Lloyd’s research, although valuable in so far as it recorded the correspondence between the Catholic Church and the government in Scotland, related to evacuation from a purely educational perspective. Fitzpatrick’s study was also limited to measuring the effect of evacuation on Catholic secondary education.

The argument that religious welfare was fundamental and integral to the wider story of evacuation during the war is evident from the level of Church involvement, especially by the Roman Catholic Church and the Jewish community, as this chapter has shown. War and evacuation brought a new level of understanding and tolerance within those communities forced together by war and evacuation. As Fitzpatrick pointed out:

> The Catholic population acquired a new sense of “belonging” in the national life, and a new sense of unity with its neighbours. The ghetto mentality, in so far as it continued to exist, suffered a sea-change.\(^{486}\)

The legislation contained in the Education (Scotland) Act of 1945 effectively helped strengthen and promote further integration of the Roman Catholic sector into the wider community as Catholic schools and churches were built in the vicinity of the new towns of the post-war era. The new towns were built to replace the slum tenements and the provision of new

Catholic schools helped give Catholic children equal academic opportunities while allowing them to continue their religious education.
Chapter V

The Effect of War and Evacuation on the Children Who Stayed in the Cities

*Those children who stayed behind may have rejoiced at the closing of their schools but hunger soon blunted their sense of euphoria.*

This chapter will assess the effect of emergency wartime conditions on the education, health and welfare of stay-at-home children. It will include those who effectively opted out by returning home within the first few weeks of the war.

At the beginning of the war schools in major cities were closed. In Glasgow, Edinburgh and Dundee many schools were closed for weeks or months, which meant that the children who stayed at home went without education and its associated ancillary services. In reception areas evacuees continued to benefit from some form of formal education and were assured of free or subsidised meals and milk-in-schools programme as discussed in Chapter III. These services were unavailable to children who stayed at home in the initial stages of the war, and as Oddy and Miller indicate above, after the initial euphoria of school closure settled down, the reality was that city children missed out on weeks or, in some places, months of school welfare services.

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487 Derek J. Oddy and Derek S. Miller (eds.), *Diet and Health in Modern Britain* (Beckenham, 1985), p.197.
The argument running through this thesis is that warfare ultimately led to welfare and in order to assess the viability of this theory it is necessary to look at the effect of wartime measures on stay-at-home children. In order to reach a valid judgement on how far the argument is sustained with regard to stay-at home children, there will be some focus on parliamentary debates from the period. These will be used together with School Medical Officer reports and the results of intelligence tests from the Scottish Council for Research in Education carried out in 1931 and 1947.\textsuperscript{488} Boyd’s 1944 social survey will be beneficial in understanding why children and parents opted out of the evacuation scheme.\textsuperscript{489} Interviews with former evacuees will help provide a personal narrative of life in vulnerable city areas during the war.

The fate of the children who remained in the cities and were exposed to life in war conditions has been particularly under researched in the context of the evacuation scheme. In the main, historiography on the subject of evacuation is dictated by what happened to evacuees while they were in reception areas. Historians whose work included research into evacuation, such as Parsons, dedicated a few pages to the early return of evacuees but said nothing in particular about those who stayed at home.\textsuperscript{490} Brown,\textsuperscript{491} Inglis\textsuperscript{492} and Welshman\textsuperscript{493} all concentrate their final chapters on the children returning home, and Inglis looks at the effects of evacuation on later life. The lack of consideration afforded to those stay-at-homes was undoubtedly due to the

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{489} Boyd, \textit{Evacuation in Scotland} (1944).
\textsuperscript{490} Parsons, \textquote{I’ll Take That One} (1998), pp.176 and 183.
\textsuperscript{491} Brown, \textit{Evacuees} (2005).
\textsuperscript{492} Inglis, \textit{The Children’s War} (1989).
\textsuperscript{493} Welshman, \textit{Churchill’s Children} (2010).
\end{footnotes}
high number of evacuees who returned within weeks of the scheme being implemented, therefore the fate of both groups merged in the war narrative on evacuation.

Secondary literature on related areas of research of children’s health and nutrition include historians such as Bernard Harris. His work on the subject relates to the period between the wars and during the Second World War and includes analysis of the School Medical Service in England and Wales.494 This work will be used as a comparison with Scotland in the provision of welfare services. Alongside this, Jacqueline Jenkinson’s book on Scotland’s health provides some important information concerning the impact of war on the health of schoolchildren.495 James Rusby’s psychological study of war and evacuation is particularly valuable here as it compares the long-term impact of stress on both evacuees and stay-at-home children.496

The significant number of stay-at-home children had not been anticipated during the planning stages of the evacuation process. The Evacuation Planning Committee, referred to in Chapters I and II, had been aware of the possibility of parents being reluctant to part with their children. Nevertheless there was an expectation that when the danger of children being exposed to war conditions was explained to parents, and the evacuation scheme placed before them, they would ‘probably be willing to

496 Rusby, Childhood Temporary Separation (2005).
agree to part with their children’. The reality of the situation was very different.497

The number of Scottish children eligible for inclusion totalled 273,450.498 This figure excluded mothers, teachers and helpers. Boyd calculated that the number of Glasgow evacuees totalled 120,000 during the mass evacuation of September 1939, approximately 30,000 fewer than expected. In Edinburgh the figure was 32,000, a third of the registered number, and in Clydebank only a quarter of those who registered turned up on evacuation days.499 Boyd’s figures for evacuees include unaccompanied children, pre-school children accompanied by mothers, teachers and helpers. The official Scottish evacuation figure recorded by Boyd was 175,812, although there is a small differential in figures between Boyd and Titmuss by over 700 Scottish evacuees. Titmuss recorded the number to be 175,066.500

Boyd’s 1944 survey on Scottish evacuation included stay-at-homes. This was as important at the time as it is now as it helped to ‘understand the personal side of evacuation’.501 Boyd used Clydebank as a case study and for comparative purposes looked at the evacuation areas of Glasgow and Dundee.502 Research included looking at the personal, social and emotional reasons parents gave for keeping children in the cities. Questions ranged from family size, number of available rooms per household, through to

religious affiliation. The survey also took account of private evacuation and the evacuation of teachers and helpers.\textsuperscript{503} Boyd also included details of home study group sessions, which were prompted by the lack of educational provision in the cities. The scheme was unofficial, initiated by teachers and head teachers on a voluntary basis.

The extent of the problem was emphasised by Neil Maclean, Labour MP for Govan. Two months into the war he claimed that in the area around the Clyde, 7,000 children were ‘running the streets and getting no education’, and that teachers were ‘doing their best to draw up plans to teach the children in their homes’.\textsuperscript{504} He said that:

\begin{quote}
In many parts of Glasgow teachers have taken the children into their houses, and are giving tuition there. If that can be done, it is high time that something was done by the government to provide education for those children who are running loose in the streets.\textsuperscript{505}
\end{quote}

The home study scheme was successful in that it provided for approximately 9,000 Glasgow children. In Dundee there were eventually over 800 home study groups catering for thousands of children. Meanwhile in Edinburgh, according to Lloyd, group teaching for stay-at-homes attracted positive media coverage.\textsuperscript{506} One such account was printed in the \textit{Scotsman}:

\textsuperscript{503} Boyd, \textit{Evacuation in Scotland} (1944), p.83.
\textsuperscript{504} \textit{H of C} Debate, 21 November 1939, vol. 353, cc. 1101-1102.
\textsuperscript{505} \textit{H of C} Debate, 21 November 1939, vol. 353, cc. 1143-1144.
Throughout the city…individual pupils were receiving instruction for periods varying from four to seven hours per week and in some cases even more…some interesting and beneficial results…attended the group experiments. The smaller numbers of children have made it possible to devote more attention to individuals.\textsuperscript{507}

This view was supported by Barbara who recalled coming home to Edinburgh after a short evacuation to Banff and being involved in a home study group. She believed the experience was beneficial to her and she enjoyed the group. She could not recall how many children were included or where it took place, although she remembered ‘it was in a big room in someone’s house’, and that the home study group lasted for at least a year.\textsuperscript{508} Group teaching was an ad hoc arrangement, although its provision indicated a growing awareness of the need to ensure that children left in the cities should, where possible, be helped to achieve their full potential.

In forming these home study groups teachers were doing what they could for children to maintain some contact with education. Continuing a limited education programme would have been helpful to ease children back to full time education when the possibility arose. As a welfare measure home study groups helped develop new relationships between parents, teachers and children and provided teachers with an understanding of some of the social problems children were coping with in their personal lives.\textsuperscript{509}

\textsuperscript{507} The Scotsman, Thursday, 28 November 1939, p.12
\textsuperscript{508} Interview with Barbara, dated 30 June 2014. Transcript held with author.
\textsuperscript{509} Boyd, Evacuation in Scotland (1944), p.215.
According to Boyd there were 57,485 children in Edinburgh Corporation schools and of that 17,811 were included in the official evacuation scheme. He estimated that a total of 23,000 of those who had opted out had taken advantage of the home study scheme in some way. Returning evacuees, he believed, also took advantage of the home study programme. A difficulty with these group sessions was that they were confined to certain subjects such as English and arithmetic, and where possible, history and geography. Sessions were mainly held once or twice a week and were conducted in private houses, with between 7 to 30 primary and/or secondary pupils taking part in a group. In academic terms it is difficult to assess the overall effectiveness of the home study programme other than to say it did keep children in touch with education.

Boyd’s educational assessment centred on three sections of the school population in his Edinburgh study; infant, primary and secondary sectors and found that the infant group responded well to the programme and benefited from it. They were found to be at their correct level or advanced for their age when a measure of their intelligence was recorded once the schools reopened. Results from the primary sector, which had the greatest number of children, showed that the older and brighter children were less badly affected by the experience than those less able. Teachers found that less able children fell behind in direct proportion to their intelligence. In the secondary sector the brightest pupils advanced and progress was stable for those with average grades.510

The decision making process by parents of children eligible for evacuation formed part of Boyd’s research. This research was conducted by sending question cards to the parents of every seventh school child in his sample areas. From the 674 respondents, Boyd calculated that in Clydebank Catholic boys were sent away in greater numbers than Catholic girls. Combined figures for Glasgow and Clydebank also show that more boys were evacuated under the official evacuation scheme than girls. Private evacuees included marginally more girls than boys although there were fewer private evacuees among Catholic families.\footnote{511 Boyd, Evacuation in Scotland (1944), p.85}

Economics, Boyd suggested, played a significant part in the decision making process with better off families being less willing to send their children away. The size of home and family size were also important factors. In larger families parents were more willing to send their children away than in smaller families. Contrary to this, the study showed that overall religious affiliation accounted for 62 per cent of Roman Catholic families unwilling to send their children away, as opposed to 35 per cent of Protestant families.\footnote{512 Boyd, Evacuation in Scotland (1944), p.87.} Catholic families were faced with an additional problem as Fitzpatrick pointed out. He noted that approximately 70 per cent of the Scottish Catholic population lived in industrial towns and cities, the majority of whom lived in and around the Glasgow area. As a result most Catholic primary and secondary schools were located in these areas. As stated before it was not always possible therefore to guarantee that Catholic children
would be taught in Catholic schools in reception areas. This, he claimed, was especially disruptive to secondary education.\textsuperscript{513}

A comparative study of reasons for evacuation and non-evacuation in Dundee revealed a similar pattern. One important issue which was more pronounced there than in Clydebank or Glasgow, for non-evacuation, was that older siblings were needed in the home. These children were given greater responsibility for taking care of the home and their younger siblings, when married women went to work in the city mills.\textsuperscript{514} It is perfectly feasible to assume that this was the case in other cities, especially as jobs for women gradually expanded in wartime industries. When considering the issue of stay-at-homes in England and Wales, Titmuss demonstrated his reliance on the findings of surveys carried out, especially by Boyd. His discourse on the subject was interspersed with the language of possibility. Commenting that:

\begin{quote}
The factors responsible…were no doubt as varied and inexplicable as human behaviour in general… [and] The amount and intensity of poverty in some of the evacuation districts may have contributed to this confused statistical pattern.\textsuperscript{515}
\end{quote}

There was of course the emotional aspect of separating parents and children, and when the plans for evacuation became reality many parents simply could not be parted from their children. These emotions Titmuss referred to as

\textsuperscript{514} Boyd, \textit{Evacuation in Scotland} (1944), p.89.
being reflected in, ‘the revolution in standards of child care which divides the nineteenth from the twentieth century’.

An expert on child care, Charles McNeil who was wartime Professor of Child Life and Health at Edinburgh University regarded the process of evacuation as ‘a great social earthquake’. This underlines the seismic effect it had on families in the first weeks of war. His description was appropriate in the short-term as the evacuation scheme disrupted the lives, health and education of evacuees. For children who were not included in the evacuation process, the closure of schools meant that they suffered from a lack of education and the benefits of the ancillary services connected to it including free milk, school meals and medical inspections.

A few days after McNeil’s comments Colville, (Scottish Secretary) played down the impact of evacuation. In a Commons speech he stated that:

…our educational system is adjusting itself to the abnormal conditions in which we are living. It has had to sacrifice a good deal, but there is no suggestion of wreckage.

In spite of attempts by the Scottish Secretary and the SED to reassure people how well the school system was adapting to war conditions in the aftermath of evacuation, according to Lloyd, education in the Scottish sending areas

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517 The Scotsman, Friday, 3 November 1939, p.9.
‘completely collapsed’. Lloyd based his argument on the severe disruption to the educational system in and around Glasgow where, he believed, many disadvantaged children failed to receive a sufficient education, including supplementary services, for the duration of the war.

Abnormal conditions affecting the educational system began with the instigation of the evacuation scheme. Furthermore, the day on which war was declared coincided with the appointed date for the school leaving age to be raised from 14 to 15 years. This promised reform was included in the 1936 Education Act but was postponed indefinitely on the declaration of war.

Education historians such as Paterson and Lloyd are generally in agreement that the Second World War caused considerable damage to Scottish education. Paterson, for example, believed that war had a ‘disastrous effect on education’. This ‘disastrous’ effect included school closure in evacuation areas and overcrowded classrooms in areas where schools remained open. While overcrowding and a double-shift systems was in operation in many rural areas, schools in reception areas remained open throughout the period of the war, which gave evacuated children an advantage over stay-at-home children in terms of education. However, these

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521 Lindsay Paterson, Scottish Education in the Twentieth Century (Edinburgh, 2003), p.103.
areas suffered from a shortage of staff through the enforcement of national service.

Staffing in evacuation areas was problematic as teachers were required to accompany their class to reception areas and remain with the children for the duration of hostilities. This effectively left a shortfall in available teachers when city schools were eventually reopened. When the initial survey was carried out by evacuation planners it was found that only 50 per cent of teachers showed a willingness to take part in the process. Lloyd calculated that approximately 3,500 Scottish teachers were included in the evacuation process. Their tasks extended beyond the classroom and included making sure the children were active in leisure as well as academically, they were effectively to be in loco parentis. It is not possible to assess how far the constant presence of teachers was helpful in maintaining an educational balance in the lives of evacuees. Non-teaching staff were included in similar arrangements to that of teachers. These included school medical officers, school nurses, school attendance officers and administrative staff who were sent to evacuation areas, again leaving city schools without the benefit of a quota of ancillary staff when schools reopened.

The evacuation of teachers and the closure of schools in evacuation areas caused severe disruption to the broader welfare of stay-at-home children. Government officials were well aware of the problems as Colville, in a

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statement to the Commons, pointed out. He commented that he understood the problem and confirmed that the sending areas of Edinburgh, Glasgow and Dundee were providing meals and/or clothing for 11,000 in receiving areas, and that the milk in schools scheme had been available throughout. The situation was that:

…the lack of the usual distributing centres, that is to say, the schools…in the sending areas, has [mitigated] to some extent against the operation of the scheme for children who have not been evacuated.\(^{524}\)

Schools in the centre of Glasgow forced to close due to evacuation included Notre Dame Primary where the school log book recorded on 1 September 1939 that:

School closed as evacuation begun. All teachers of this school have accompanied children who are being evacuated for various parishes.\(^{525}\)

The next entry does not appear in this school’s log book until 6 October 1939 when it seems that efforts were being made to accommodate stay-at-home children in school. The note said ‘Groups of 20 children taken in various rooms left to our disposal’.

Similar entries appear in the log books for other schools in and around Glasgow city centre. Garscadden Primary school, in the north-west of the city closed on 1 September 1939. It was not until 27 November 1939 that the next entry was recorded noting that: The school re-opened today with a limited attendance of 40 pupils.\textsuperscript{526}

The children of Quarry Brae School were assembled early on 29 August 1939, the log book noted that:

\begin{quote}
The School re-opened today instead of September as intimated. Owing to the very serious international situation. Scholars, pre-school children and parents assembled in school at 7 a.m. and were evacuated to Stricken, Aberdeenshire on Sunday 3 September.\textsuperscript{527}
\end{quote}

At St Paul’s Junior Secondary Roman Catholic School in Whiteinch, 424 pupils and all members of staff were evacuated to Prestwick in Ayrshire on 2 September. The school did not re-open until 28 November when a group system of attendance was introduced for stay-at-home children. It was not until 19 February 1940 that sufficient air raid shelters were provided to allow full time instruction for ‘senior and top junior pupils’ with the low junior and infants in half-time attendance.\textsuperscript{528} The pattern was almost

identical for Scotland Street School, Gorbals Public School, Govan High School, and at the Junior Department of Hillhead High School, where registration ceased between 1 September 1939 and 12 February 1940.

In a number of Dundee schools, such as Morgan Academy, Harris Academy and Grove Academy, the aim was to have at least 60 per cent of the roll accommodated as quickly as possible, provided they could satisfy the ARP authorities that there was adequate shelter accommodation. Opening the secondary schools was the top priority with fifth and sixth year pupils having first claim on the available space for full-time instruction and the lower school having a minimum of half-day teaching. Primary schools in the city were to be arranged in such a way that premises could be shared between at least two schools in some areas. This was the case for such primaries as Butterburn and Hill Street, Clepington and Dens Road and St. Martin’s and SS Peter and Paul. In October schools opened for medical inspections and, where possible, feeding necessitous children providing ‘the numbers assembling at any one time [were] small’.

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533 Dundee City Archives (DCA). Summary of Meetings of the Education Committee held at Dundee, 29 September and 6 October 1939.
534 DCA. Summary of Meeting of the Education Committee held at Dundee on 24 October 1939.
In and around Edinburgh school records show that the situation was very similar. The most significant difference was that most Edinburgh schools recorded an association with the group study programme. South Bridge School log book showed that on 1 September 1939, from a roll of over 1000 children, 840 were evacuated, 600 to Newport and the others to Wormit. By 2 October staff were visiting stay-at-homes to arrange for group instruction which by that date amounted to 730 pupils. The scheme was underway by 9 October for groups of 12 children at a time, to be taught in various rooms put at the disposal of the school by such places as the public baths, the Royal Scottish Museum, Pleasance Church and the Total Abstinence Society. Pupils from the school on average received four to five hours instruction per week. A total of between 80 and 90 per cent of children attended. The last of this outside accommodation was given up by 5 February 1940 when all pupils were accommodated in the school.\textsuperscript{535}

North Merchiston School log book recorded the departure of 477 children and adults at the start of September. Again by October a group teaching scheme was in place. This school was re-opened on 8 January 1940 with a double shift system in operation. By March attendance levels had reached almost the full quota with 590 pupils in attendance.\textsuperscript{536} Dean, Liberton, Cannonmills and Castlehill schools adopted similar patterns.\textsuperscript{537} Each of

\textsuperscript{535} Edinburgh City Archives (ECA). SL214/1/4, South Bridge School Log Book 1935-1948.
\textsuperscript{536} ECA. SL202/1/3, North Merchiston School Log Book, 1933-1956.
\textsuperscript{537} ECA. SL180/1/5, Dean School, no date given. SL196/1/4, Liberton School, 1936-1965. SL173/1/6, Cannonmills School, no date given. SL174/1/3, Castlehill School, 1931-1951.
these Edinburgh schools had air-raid accommodation in place by early 1940 to allow teaching to resume on the school premises.

These are just a few examples of city schools where teaching had ceased at the beginning of the war. These log books demonstrate the sense of urgency shown in getting as many schools as possible re-opened. It should be noted however, that attendance could not be made compulsory in time of war for children in sending areas, and the reopening of city schools depended entirely on how far the safety of children and staff could be guaranteed. The potential for air raid strikes to cause significant damage and incur casualties was especially problematic in Glasgow due to the age and design of the buildings; many of these old city school buildings had school rolls ranging from 1,000 to 2,000 children. It was important therefore that air-raid protection criteria be met before any school could be reopened.\footnote{Lloyd, The Scottish School System and the Second World War, Thesis for Doctor of Philosophy, October 1979 (held at Stirling University Library), p.65.} Colville advised members of the Commons that:

> A school may open subject to certain conditions [for example] that it is not in a vulnerable spot, and that satisfactory air-raid protection is available….expert advice is taken from the officials of the Ministry of Home Security as to the amount of protection that is required…the A.R.P. authority have to be satisfied before a school can be reopened.\footnote{H of C Debate, 21 November 1939, vol 353, cc. 1097-1098.}
Glasgow’s private schools faced the same challenges in ensuring the safety of pupils and maintaining some form of continued education. There was a distinct difference in the evacuation situation for private school pupils when compared with other official evacuees. This was apparent from interviews with two former pupils of Laurel Bank Girls’ School. The school was offered accommodation in Auchterarder House and Strathallan Castle, with some seniors and staff being housed in surrounding areas. Research into the situation within the private schools environment shows that these children were not forced into cold church halls, or suffer the humiliation of being lined up for inspection before being chosen by benevolent householders. For those girls from Laurel Bank School who were not evacuated, classes were organised in a similar way to the home study groups in Edinburgh until suitable shelters were built at the school. One former pupil of Laurel Bank School remembered being evacuated to Strathallan Castle and being brought home after six weeks. She recalled:

The juniors were all in Strathallan Castle…I was only there for, at the very most six weeks, but I don’t think I was even that length of time. …ex-Headmistress reopened the school, she was retired…and she ran it for the whole war. …We used to have an air raid warning parade every day. …They sent us home when the sirens went off. …School days were shortened or lengthened depending on the blackout time. As the war progressed we more or less went back to our normal time. 540

540 Interview with Honour, recorded on 13 November 2014. Transcript held with author.
Laurel Bank School was re-opened within less than two months of war being declared. Shelters were built and the retired Headmistress and former teachers came back and remained at the school for the duration of the war.

Park School was fully re-opened by 4 October 1939 with sufficient air raid shelter accommodation and the majority of the 270 pupils on the school roll were once more being taught in Glasgow. The girls from Hutcheson Grammar School were evacuated to Sandquhar, near Ayr, and the boys’ school was closed but not evacuated. It quickly re-opened with fifteen air raid shelters built in the playground. At Glasgow Academy pupils were not evacuated and arrangements were made to teach children in private houses until shelter accommodation could be constructed. It has been estimated that by late September 1939 over four hundred pupils were being taught in this way. By the end of the year there were at least seven hundred boys being taught at the Academy which equated to 85 per cent of the original school roll.

The re-opening of state schools in evacuation areas was hampered further by the fact that a number of schools had been taken over for military and first aid purposes. For example, Colville mentioned in the November debate that 77 schools had been occupied for military or civil defence purposes, and that 222 were partially occupied and available only in part for teaching purposes. He did not name the schools in question. He claimed that attempts were

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made to have some schools which had been requisitioned returned to the Education Authorities. These schools were in vulnerable areas where fewer children took up the evacuation offer than anticipated.544

Vulnerable or sending areas included Glasgow, Edinburgh, Dundee, Rosyth and Clydebank. After 1941, Dumbarton, Greenock and Port Glasgow were added to this list. Reception areas for children from Edinburgh were in the north such as Banff and Inverness or in the borders, including Peebles, Roxburgh and Selkirk. Glasgow children were sent north to areas around Aberdeen and Perthshire, or further south-west to such places as Kirkcudbright and Dumfries. Neutral areas which had the potential to become danger zones included areas around Ayr, Lanark, Renfrew and some of the burghs in Aberdeen, Inverness and Midlothian.545

By November 1939, in 9 of the 12 neutral areas schools had been wholly or partially reopened and the needs of necessitous children were being met, but 19 schools in the neutral areas of Dumbarton, Fife and West Lothian remained closed. Some of these buildings were being used for defence purposes and Colville confirmed that as far as possible the government was doing all it could to counter the educational problem of school closure in the cities. He said that:

…in evacuation areas, many of the secondary schools [had] been open for several weeks, and work [was] going on, in the way of air-raid

protection, to enable other schools, including the primary schools, to reopen where at all practicable.\textsuperscript{546}

Although mass school closures had been temporary at the outbreak of war, evacuation forced children into a compromised educational situation. In the reception areas schools were often overcrowded and many operated a double-shift system. In cities when schools were closed, children were left without education for an indeterminate time and when they re-opened there were often classes of up to 40 or 50 children. In Glasgow class sizes were particularly high. The number of primary classes with over 50 children rose from 62 in 1939 to 83 in 1945. In the secondary sector the number of classes with over 40 children rose from 50 to 167.\textsuperscript{547}

When schools did re-open it was not possible to make attendance compulsory. With too much free time and lack of structure and discipline provided by the educational system, there emerged a heightened awareness of delinquency problems among juveniles. The Scottish Women’s Group on Public Welfare associated some of the problems connected with juvenile delinquency to evacuation. It also attributed delinquency to a decline of discipline in the home, due in part to the absence of patriarchal control when husbands/fathers were called up.\textsuperscript{548}

\textsuperscript{546} H of C Debate, 21 November 1939, vol. 353, cc. 1096-1097.
Members of Parliament were sensitive to the issue of youth crime associated with school closure in the cities. Thomas Cassells, Labour MP for Dunbartonshire, said he feared for the future of children where schools in evacuation areas were closed indefinitely. He believed education and/or environment was to blame for juvenile delinquency. His worry was that:

If these children are to be left to run loose and wild in the streets, what will be the position in the years to come? …I have been going about from court to court in Scotland dealing with questions relating to juvenile crime. …juvenile delinquency [traced] back to its origin [found] either that the environment has been largely responsible or that the child has not received the educational opportunities to which it was legally and morally entitled.\(^549\)

Joseph Westwood, Labour MP for Stirling and Falkirk, also felt it was:

…a tragedy that so many children who were evacuated to areas which were considered comparatively safe, should have returned and that large numbers of them should be running wild in our streets without guidance or discipline, without educational and physical instruction…something must be done and done speedily, to arrest the damage which is being caused in this way to the child life of the nation.\(^550\)

\(^{549}\) *H of C* Debate, 21 November 1939, vol. 353, cc. 1137-1138.

The subject of juvenile delinquency was dealt with in chapter III. It is mentioned here as it concerned educationalists and government sufficiently to push to reopen secondary schools in evacuation areas as a priority. A SED circular from February 1940 expressed government concern over the damage to social, medical and educational provision, caused in the five months of school closures. It said that:

…Authorities should set themselves the ultimate goal of providing full-time education for all children, including infants. …where physical difficulties make it impossible to provide full-time schooling in present circumstances, less formal occupations, eg on the lines of the home service scheme and educational visits, should be organised for the remainder of the school day.\footnote{NAS. ED44/1/12. Circular No. 155 Scottish Education Department, 7 February 1940.}

The home study groups in both Glasgow and Edinburgh helped to keep some children in touch with education, although the lack of discipline and loss of opportunity also applied to children aged 14 who had left school at the beginning of the war. Continuation classes for school leavers had been suspended due to lack of teachers, and accommodation and their employment prospects were hampered by the suspension of Senior and Junior Leaving Certificates. This meant that prospective employers had no measure of attainment reached on leaving school. Some level of understanding of the situation can been gleaned from the situation in Edinburgh, where there were approximately 1,400 young teenagers unemployed in the first few months of the war.\footnote{H of C Debate, 21 November 1939, vol. 353, cc. 1127-1128.} The situation was eased...
for some when the Senior Leaving Certificate was re-introduced. However, the Education Department continued the suspension of the Junior Leaving Certificate. This effectively meant that juveniles, which included 14 year olds who had left school at the start of the war, could still be discriminated against by employers.

Staff shortages and lack of accommodation prevented young teenagers from taking advantage of the benefits afforded by youth services such as continuation classes or attending junior instruction centres. The fact that teenagers lacked suitable facilities for employing their spare time in a useful way was the subject of a circular issued November 1939. The circular followed Colville’s request to the SED that there was an urgent need make provision for the welfare of young people over 14 years. The circular stressed that:

…the need for action [had] become more urgent as a result of the inevitable dislocations and strain of war. Young people [were] affected by changes in employment, by the long dark evenings and by the absence of one or both parents.

Behaviour was a subject included in Boyd’s 1944 survey although he was sceptical about the results which he claimed presented possibly a more ‘flattering’ picture of stay-at-homes than in reality. He felt the questionnaire was too vague on the issue and claimed that no parent would have specified

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553 *H of C Debate*, 21 November 1939, vol. 353, cc. 1127-1128
554 NAS. ED/44/1/12. Circular 142, Scottish Education Department, 27 November 1939.
the ‘badness of bad behaviour’. Yet Boyd concluded that no school could escape the effects of total war and that:

…the general impression left on the observer was that the conduct of those set free from schooling in the early months of the war was surprisingly good.  

In contrast Titmuss believed that makeshift lessons, crowded classrooms and severed relationships with teachers were contributory factors in the rise in juvenile crime, in both stay-at-homes and evacuees. However, when it came to passing judgement, he believed, people were quick to forget the circumstances children had forced upon them. They were no longer regarded as children who had spent their formative years escaping bombs and living in improvised conditions, but as young criminals. Writing in 1950, Titmuss stated his belief that such children had been let down by home and school, and expressed disappointment that little account was taken of the fact that they had endured six years of war.  

For stay-at-homes conditions continued to be problematic even after schools reopened. Shortage of accommodation, materials and teachers, coupled with overcrowded classrooms allowed little opportunity for any meaningful individual teaching.

Ultimately a measure of how educational standards were affected by the challenges of war, evacuation and non-evacuation, is shown in the outcome  

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of a series of tests by the Scottish Council for Research in Education (SCRE). The SCRE was established in 1928 by the Scottish teachers’ union (the Educational Institute for Scotland), and the Association of Directors of Education, to measure attainment levels in children of 11 years old. Attainment levels in children was recorded in 1932 and a similar test was carried out in 1947, to detect any discernible changes in intelligence levels during the 15 years. Their cohort group in 1932 comprised of 80,000 children of 11 years of age. In 1947 the total number of 11 year old children tested was 70,806. Allowances were made for changes in the Binet Intelligence Test, (a cognitive ability and intelligence test used to diagnose development or cognitive deficiencies in young children) which was carried out in 1932, to the Terman-Merrill test of 1947.\textsuperscript{557} The research found evidence of a slight rise in intelligence levels in Scottish schoolchildren in the period, with the average score for 1932 recorded at 34.5 rising to 36.7 in 1947, in a test with a maximum of 76 points. This was counter to the SCRE hypothesis that war could have had a disturbing effect on the results.\textsuperscript{558} This survey may be used here as a very rough guide to educational attainment of Scottish children during the years of war. The 1947 survey took account of the fact that children had been subjected to six years of war and that many of the children were suffering from emotional disturbance related to evacuation. The 1947 survey adopted a more sociological approach with a random-sample group being sent a questionnaire which included a few questions on evacuation as it was thought that such a separation could cause ‘confusion and unhappiness’ and might ‘retard the

\textsuperscript{557} \url{www.onlinelibrary.wiley.com} . [Accessed 18 May 2014].
educational progress of the child.\textsuperscript{559} In both the original 1932 survey and the 1947 survey family size and position of the 11 year old in the family were taken into consideration. The similarity of the sets of results between the two surveys was due, according to the surveyors, to the fact that while the education of the children tested in 1947 had been disturbed by war, this was, they considered, counterbalanced by the fact that the 1932 cohort may have been adversely affected from the years of depression following the Wall Street Crash in 1929.\textsuperscript{560} This experience was considered equal to the trauma of evacuation during the war. The explanation put forward for this conclusion is somewhat surprising, as it is difficult to equate severe financial hardship impacted on families by the depression of the 1930s with the trauma of family separation involved in evacuation. Taken in the context of the time, with school closure, double shift systems, overcrowded classrooms and home study programmes, it would have been unsurprising if the Scottish survey had shown a decline in educational attainment in 1947. Comparative English school test result findings support the view that Scotland suffered less disruption in educational attainment levels than children in England and Wales during the war.

The Scottish results can be compared favourably with the intelligence test carried out between 1924 and 1946, conducted by the Education Committee of London County Council, on children in England and Wales between 13 and 14 years old. Tests concluded that in general the attainment levels in that age group in 1946 were significantly lower than children of the same

\textsuperscript{559} The Population Investigation Committee, \textit{The Trend of Scottish Intelligence} (1949), p.29.
\textsuperscript{560} The Population Investigation Committee, \textit{The Trend of Scottish Intelligence} (1949), p.4.
age in 1924. As with the Scottish test results, the two English surveys were not identical. Differences include the fact that in 1946 London children involved in the survey would have been seven or eight years old when war began. As teenagers they had just emerged from six years of war, the memory of which was evident in and around the bombed areas of London. This was coupled with significant disruption to the educational system especially in the early months of the war.

There are a number of potential reasons for the discrepancies between the two sets of results for English school children. Examples include the fact that the First and the Second World War were staged very differently; the First World War was not fought on the Home Front; children tested in 1924 had lived through six years of peace and the majority of the cohort would have been eight years old at the end of the First World War. Furthermore, unlike the argument used in the Scottish test where the first cohort had lived through the years of depression in the early 1930s, this would not have been a factor in the 1924 English test results. The significant disruption to the educational system in England as a result of war was emphasised in Titmuss’s research. He reported that of the 72,000 young army recruits in 1946, who would have been in school during the early part of the war, there was an ‘all-round drop in the level of scholastic attainment, and a serious increase in the numbers graded educationally backward’. \(^{561}\)

For Scottish children in 1947, the positive attainment levels meant that education had suffered less than had been anticipated as a result of war and

evacuation. Nevertheless these results cannot be seen as conclusive proof that the education of schoolchildren generally did not suffer unduly from the disruptive effects of war. As the cohort group consisted of 11 year old children only, there is a possibility that had younger or older children been tested the results may not have been as favourable, with the English survey of 13 and 14 year olds providing an indication of uneven development.

In terms of the physical welfare of Scottish school children the gradual reopening of schools meant that medical inspections could resume. From Harris’s study of the growth rate in children between 1939 and 1945 there appears to be no apparent decline in the physical wellbeing of children due to lack of school ancillary services in the period when schools were closed. He found that in Glasgow there was a slight increase in height in girls and boys, in all stages, i.e. entrants, intermediates and school leavers, during the six years of war. In Dunbartonshire, he claimed, there was a slight drop in height ratio for school leavers, attributed, it was thought ‘to a change in the age at which the children were measured’. Harris argued for the importance of anthropometric ratios since height, he claimed, proved a ‘powerful index of social and economic disadvantage. He stressed that nutritional standards for children in England and Wales had improved during the Second World War. In 1943 Tom Johnston, Secretary of State for Scotland indicated increased budget levels for education, which included

additional spending on food for schoolchildren and youth welfare. Setting out items of enhanced expenditure to parliament he noted:

£9,021,790, an increase of £187,520 over the estimates for 1942. Spent on school meals and milk, the development of youth services, the supplement to teachers on war service.\(^{565}\)

The scale of increase in the provision of school meals can be observed from the City of Edinburgh School Medical Officer of Health report for 1940. It was estimated that the number of school meals provided, either free or at a cost of 2s.6d, between January and May 1940 amounted to £848,308, and milk had been supplied to 14,800 school children, representing 103,124 gallons.\(^{566}\) The number of dinners increased from 35,000 in July 1941, to 78,000 in May 1942. By June 1943 the number of children taking school meals had risen to 140,000.

Efforts to expand access to school meals and milk resulted in an average weight gain among school children according to figures produced in 1942. In his speech to parliament in 1943 Johnstone reported that boys on average were 2.5lbs heavier and girls just over 2lbs heavier than those aged five years ending with the outbreak of war. Scotland as a whole, he said, had 16 per cent of children receiving school dinners and 19 per cent receiving dinners, lunches or soup meals, where in the previous year only 8 per cent of


children were receiving school dinners.\textsuperscript{567} The rise in height and weight of schoolchildren was confirmed for Glasgow where the 1940s average increase for thirteen year old boys amounted to a weight increase of 2.90 lbs, and height by 0.75 inch. For girls of the same age weight increase was 2.94 lbs and height increase was 0.72 inch, as compared with the pre-war five year period 1935-1939.\textsuperscript{568} (See Chapter III for figures for the overall improvement in the height and weight of schoolchildren during the war).

The notion that warfare led to extended welfare is evident from the wartime observations of Sir Alexander MacGregor, Glasgow Medical Officer of Health. He noted an almost 9 per cent improvement in the overall health of school entrants compared with the pre-war figures.\textsuperscript{569} Arguably enhanced nutrition was coupled with improvements in children’s dental health. This can be observed from the Medical Officer of Health Reports for East Lothian towns which show a decline in the number of extractions of temporary and permanent teeth between 1939 and 1950. In the 12 months from June 1939, 310 children were inspected in Haddington, West Barns, North Berwick, Prestonpans and Tranent Public Schools. Of that number there were 184 extractions of permanent teeth, 341 extractions of temporary teeth and 134 fillings. By March 1949 in these areas the number of children inspected was 1583 and the number of permanent teeth extracted was 92 for caries (or cavities) and 35 for regulation purposes, 245 extractions for

\textsuperscript{567} H of C Debate, 21 July 1943, vol. 391, cc. 927-928.
\textsuperscript{569} MacGregor, Public Health in Glasgow 1905-1946 (1967), p.156.
temporary teeth and 175 fillings.\footnote{John Gray Centre, Haddington. County Public Health Department, Haddington. School Medical Services, County Medical Officer of Health Reports for 6 June 1940 and 6 April 1949.} These figures show a marked improvement, especially in the number of permanent teeth extracted. Areas around Perthshire produced similar figures. Statistics from the Medical Officer of Health Report for Perth and Kinross showed a marked improvement in the number of permanent extractions; down from 1415 between 1938/39 to 785 between 1944/45.\footnote{Perth & Kinross Council Archive, PKCA. CC1/9/2/9. Perth & Kinross County Council Medical Officer of Health Annual Reports 1937-1947.} More broadly this report noted:

…judging from the figures for nutrition, height and weights, there is no evidence that wartime conditions have affected adversely the health of school children…In the case of evacuees from large cities, significant improvements in weight and general health were seen in those who remained in the area…\footnote{PKCA. CC1/9/2/9. Perth & Kinross County Council Medical Officer of Health Annual Reports 1937-1947.}

In the capital, Edinburgh Medical Officer of Health report submitted in 1941 showed that dental checks were carried out on 13,427 children, of whom 10,820 required treatment. Patients treated at the school dental clinic amounted to 6,615.\footnote{NAS. HH62/60. City and Royal Burgh of Edinburgh Public Health Department, Annual Report on the Health of the City during 1940, by the Medical Officer of Health, Submitted August 1941.} These figures show that while improved dental checks and treatment was being administered there was nevertheless much
work still required to make people, especially parents, aware of the great importance of oral hygiene.

Evacuated children were not alone in benefitting from wartime health improvements. In Edinburgh the results of clinical inspections for cleanliness and childhood contagious diseases showed a similar upward trend. Inspections were carried out on 27,333 children in Edinburgh schools in March and June 1940. Of the 13,581 with reported defects in the initial examination the figure was reduced to 12,894 on re-examination.574

The results of the intelligence test, health surveys and dental inspection discussed so far in this chapter implies that generally there was minimal long-term damage to the education and/or health of children during the war. However, issues of equal importance relate to the emotional stress of war on both stay-at-homes and evacuees. Foster et.al, noted that the percentage of stay-at-homes who received psychological therapy for distress in adulthood was 9.3 per cent as opposed to 29 per cent of evacuees.575 Positive results were countered by a different type of problem suffered by stay-at-homes. In 2007 Waugh et. al., investigated the levels of post-traumatic stress in both evacuees and stay-at-home children. They found that stay-at-home children

574 NAS. HH62/60. City and Royal Burgh of Edinburgh Public Health Department, Annual Report on the Health of the City during 1940 by the Medical Officer of Health. Submitted August 1941, p.21.
who had been exposed to the impact of air-raids and the aftermath of bombing showed higher levels of PTS than evacuees.\textsuperscript{576}

There were no significant psychological studies carried out on Scottish adults who were children during the Second World War. However, qualitative research conducted for this thesis indicated that the effect of bombing on those children who lived through the blitz on Clydebank were no less traumatic than being evacuated. The memory of air raids and bombing is vividly recalled by the people of Clydebank who, as children, lived through the constant air raids and the blitz of March 1941. Over seventy years on Charlie has never forgotten how he rescued his brother from their home when it was hit by an incendiary bomb. He said:

\begin{quote}
Alistair was screaming his head off and wouldn’t come out of the corner. I jumped back in and we both jumped out together. By this time the whole house was on fire and the bombs just kept falling all around us.\textsuperscript{577}
\end{quote}

The clear recall related to the trauma of bombing is countered by the fact that he remembered very little of the time spent in Coatbridge when he, with his mother and brothers, were evacuated there after the raids. His only memory of that time was the cramped conditions where the whole family lived in one room.


\textsuperscript{577} Interview with Charlie, recorded on 17 October 2014. Transcript held with author.
Dennis also lived through the two nights of bombing in Clydebank. He recalled what he described as ‘the horrible recurring nightmare’ and of being ‘stressed out’ with nights of broken sleep for months afterwards and never having ‘a doctor come up and give you a wee sedative’. Dennis and his family were taken to Coatbridge after the blitz and spent two nights sleeping in a primary school on the floor in one of the classrooms.

The years have not diminished memories of the traumatic effect the bombing raids had on the people who lived through them. Violet, was 18 years old when Clydebank was bombed. Aged 91 when interviewed, she still remembered vividly how she and her mother attempted to stay in Clydebank after the first of the raids. Forced to evacuate, they eventually got to Helensburgh and stayed there until their home was rebuilt in Clydebank. Measured against the trauma of separation suffered by evacuated children, the experience of being bombed-out among these stay-at-home children had similar short and long-term emotional impact.

This chapter set out to assess the effect of emergency wartime conditions on stay-at-home children. The initial problems connected with the closure of city schools at the beginning of the war provided the impetus for urgent official intervention to ensure as many schools as possible be reopened. Yet the results of Scottish intelligence tests have shown that there was no significant long-term damage to children’s education during the war. This may have been due to the action of teachers and local authorities rather than

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578 Interview with Dennis, recorded on 17 October 2014. Transcript held with author.
579 Interview with Violet, recorded on 17 October 2014. Transcript held with author.
any government initiative. The fact that teachers in evacuation areas were pro-active in the delivery of group teaching sessions provided children with a continuous link with education.

Any immediate physical deterioration in nutritional levels, due to the lack of ancillary services while schools were closed, was eventually made good when schools reopened and city children could take full advantage of extended provision of the school meals and milk-in-schools schemes. The warfare to welfare theory is particularly apparent here. School closures due to war and evacuation had helped to provide a tool for greater official input into improvements in education and the eventual passing of the Education Acts of 1944 and 1945 which provided for an expanded and inclusive school health and educational service. Positive health implications of the legislation included early intervention by experts in the diagnosis and treatment of childhood diseases and improved dental care and dental hygiene.

Arguably the passing of the Education Act in 1944 in England, and 1945 in Scotland was in part a response to the need for reform brought about by the war and evacuation. Responsibility for the passing of the Act lay in the hands of Lord Butler. R. A. Butler was appointed President of the Board of Education in 1941. In his memoirs he claimed to have been given, ‘the opportunity to harness to the educational system the wartime urge for social reform and greater equality’. Evacuation, he commented, had caused ‘a severe shock to the national conscience’, and that it had ‘brought to light the conditions of those unfortunate children of the ‘submerged tenth’ who would also rank among the citizens of the future’. He described his particular
pleasure in the passing of the Education Bill at a time when ‘no other Minister on the home front had been able to bring his plans to fruition’.  While it may well have been that this remark simply referred to the pride he felt in his own personal achievement, there is no doubt that war and evacuation had indeed helped create a platform for change. This was substantiated by the speed with which the Act was passed and its progressive nature helped validate the warfare to welfare theory.

The 1944/45 education legislation effectively gave every child a right to free secondary education lasting four years (later extended to five years), although this did not take effect until 1947. The legislation has had varied responses from historians who felt that the 1944/45 directives did not go far enough in ensuring equality of opportunity. Macnicol noted that this legislation did not break down class barriers in education. Instead, he argued, that at the end of the 1940s secondary education for all was still ‘qualitatively differentiated, with selection by and large on the grounds of social class.’ This referred to the tiered system of education which existed well into the second half of the century. Counter to this Harris believed that the introduction of the Education Act of 1944/45 meant wide reaching improvements in the physical and mental well-being of children. He acknowledged that war brought social policy and welfare reforms to the political stage in a way which had been absent during the inter-war period, although much debate had already taken place concerning the school medical service over the previous thirty years.  

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Act medical treatment for school children had been limited to certain minor ailments, such as tonsils and adenoids, plus defects of eyes, ears and teeth.\textsuperscript{583} The concept of continuity in welfare planning was also supported by Jenkinson, who used the proposals brought forward by such bodies as the DHS, the Political and Economic Planning and the British Medical Association in the 1930s to challenge Titmuss’s warfare to welfare approach.\textsuperscript{584}

Addison has argued that government motives for passing the Education Act were driven by economic and political strategy in order to ‘eclipse Beveridge by a Tory project’, rather than promoting a better education for children in the future.\textsuperscript{585} Looking beyond the period of the war, whatever the motives were for passing the Education legislation of 1944/45, there is no doubt that the improvements in education and health it elicited did enhance the argument that warfare led to welfare.

The fact that the 1944 Education Act was a wartime measure, serves to reinforce the importance of the link between evacuation and progressive educational reform. The turnaround is clear when it is remembered that at the start of the war the raising of the school leaving age was delayed. The long-term psychological condition of post-traumatic stress in stay-at-home children, especially those who experienced bombing raids and lived with the threat of bombing, was as manifest as the stress of separation suffered by

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{585} Addison, \textit{The Road to 1945} (1975), p.238
\end{flushleft}
evacuees in later life. Stay-at-home children had the security of familiar surroundings and family life, albeit diminished by the threat of air raids and in many cases by the absence of fathers on National Service duties. In the short-term, stay-at-home children lacked the benefits of a continued education and associated services at the beginning of the war. However, as schools were reopened in evacuation areas within months of war being declared, the welfare services were quickly reinstated. The enhanced school wartime welfare arrangements led to an overall improvement in the general health of most school children. Moreover, the war had no noticeably detrimental effect on the overall educational performance of stay-at-home city children.

This thesis is not making a judgement on the whole Act, but views the enhanced school medical examination part of it as a move forward. There can be little doubt that the argument that through the process of war social welfare was brought to the fore and that evacuation gave a renewed focus to the educational system; the Education Act, passed in 1944 and 1945 in Scotland, was testimony to this. The Education Act effectively extended school medical inspections to include secondary pupils. The Act helped widen the scope of medical provision which encompassed new availability of hospital treatment for children as both in-patients and out-patients. This was to treat those children who suffered from a broad range of diseases and conditions including speech therapy and rheumatism. It also included provision for child guidance and early intervention for children with a
physical or mental disability. Early surgical or medical intervention had the potential to improve the wellbeing of children.\textsuperscript{586}

In summary, this chapter has shown that the lives of stay-at-home children and those who returned early were different to that of evacuees but similarly traumatic during the war.

... according to where the scales tip between life and times, oral history shifts between performance-oriented narrative and content-oriented document, between subject-oriented life story and theme-oriented testimony. In practice, oral history stays mostly in between: its role is precisely to connect life to times, uniqueness to representativeness, as well as orality to writing. The key word in life and times is the one in the middle.  

The key focus of this chapter will centre on the oral testimony of evacuees concerning how war and evacuation affected them. It will consider whether or not social welfare developments can be assessed through the use of oral history. The structure of the chapter will be arranged along the broad themes of health and education. Changes to the way in which the personal and emotional welfare of children was controlled had roots in the evacuation process and these issues, together with the warfare to welfare theory which has continually been argued for throughout this thesis, will be considered through the evidence given by Scottish evacuees. The body of evidence which helps to reinforce the part played by evacuees and the evacuation process in promoting social welfare changes will be considered from documentary and historical records, in order to substantiate the oral

testimony. Almost without exception, those former evacuees interviewed were, and remain, oblivious to the part they played in the history of the Second World War and of their contribution towards achieving improved and permanent social welfare changes. The evacuation process formed a significant part of the social history of the Second World War and evacuees had an impact on the growth in child care and welfare developments, in child guidance and extended nutritional care for children, pregnant women and young mothers. In the case of Clydebank evacuees, the rapid restoration of homes and the building programme after the bombing in 1941, helps demonstrate the priority given to reconstruction (in this instance in a very physical sense) as part of the broader commitment of warfare to welfare.

Portelli, and others, including Lynn Abrams588 and John Tosh,589 have highlighted the benefits and pitfalls of oral history as a methodology. This includes what Portelli refers to above as performance-oriented narrative and content-oriented document. He acknowledges that there is more than likely to be a significant difference between the narrator’s story and the documentary evidence. Oral history falls short of written history in the precision of dates and times and sometimes in muddled chronological recollection of events. Paul Thomson believes that through oral history the scope of historical writing is enriched and history becomes more democratic, and the oral historian shares experiences of the past at a human level.590 In order to establish a ‘democratising approach’ to the interview it is important

to secure a bond of trust between the narrator and the interviewer, this Abrams has referred to as intersubjectivity.\textsuperscript{591} For the qualitative methodological approach adopted here it has been necessary to establish this intersubjectivity from the outset. This began with a brief introduction by phone to each of the respondents in order to arrange an interview, and to ensure they were comfortable about having a stranger visit them in their home. At all times they understood the nature of the visit and welcomed the opportunity to relate their experience.

The problems referred to above have been addressed within the thesis by ensuring that oral testimony has been substantiated by the use of primary evidence. One of the identified pitfalls of the interview process, chronological discrepancy, was apparent at the beginning of an interview with a former evacuee who was quite insistent that war was declared on 9 September 1939. He was quick to point out that there were some details surrounding his evacuation experience which were not so clear in his memory, he could not remember for instance:

\begin{quote}
…getting off the train or anything like that, I don’t remember it…it may well be it was because the journey was quite so long because it took some time to get from Glasgow to Aberdeen in those days.\textsuperscript{592}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{592} Interview with John and Joan, recorded on 1 July 2011. Transcript held with author.
For John the subjective memory was predominantly feelings of isolation which resulted from living on a farm in a remote district far away from the friends he had travelled with from home.

Chronology and minute discrepancies tend to be fairly common in recounting the narrative of the past. It is the discrepancy between the real and perceived events that is derived, as Abrams explained, from subjectivity.\textsuperscript{593} In John’s case, his subjectivity was shaped by his experience of life and work on the farm. Often there is a danger of a merger of the importance of the personal experience of particular incidents with the written and reported narrative. This can transmit to a somewhat distorted picture of the truth which, as Abrams pointed out, led to a mistrust of the reliability of oral history among historians in the past.\textsuperscript{594} Like Abrams, Ludmilla Jordanova warned of the need for critical reflection of oral history and its reliance on memory. However, Jordanova believed oral history to be a ‘democratising approach’, where human relationships can be brought to life.\textsuperscript{595} Therefore, while acknowledging the limits of oral history as a source of concrete information, and its deficiencies with precision, oral history can also be the source of compelling, richer narratives about the past that have left no written trace.

Collecting oral history testimonies for the purpose of this thesis has proved Jordanova’s point on almost every occasion. Giving a voice to former

evacuees has provided a human element to the evacuation story and speaking freely about their experience can have a liberating effect. Respondents often display a shyness coupled with an underlying pride in recounting the experience of their part in the history of the Second World War. Initially most respondents believe they have very little to say on the subject, however within a short time, inhibitions are forgotten and they bring forward narratives of the past they had thought and reflected on ever since the War. When Pat and Joan began their story they believed they had nothing to say of any consequence. In both cases, with over an hour of recording time, they realised they remembered clearly their whole experience.596

This chapter strives to give former evacuees the opportunity to exercise the democratising approach to history, referred to above, in their account of what happened during the time of their evacuation. The significance of personal traumatic events, such as the separation from parents, siblings and home life at a young age through evacuation was, in many cases, so profoundly memorable that, over seventy years on, the experience has left a deep and lasting impression. Retelling the story of their war and evacuation captures the social and emotional side of the evacuation scheme on a personal level. Most of the interviews were recorded and took place in the homes of the respondents in Glasgow, Edinburgh, and areas around Perthshire. In the main these interviews were recorded, although there were a few who had hand written their story and once or twice the recordings

596 Interview with Pat, recorded on 20 July 2010. Transcript held with author. Interview with John and Joan, recorded on 1 July 2011. Transcript held with author.
failed and the interview had to be transcribed on the spot as far as possible, and verified with the respondent. In order to protect the identity of the respondents first names only have been used throughout the chapter. Where the finite details may be lacking in accuracy, as in dates and times, and in some cases the series of events are slightly distorted, the picture of the main events is embedded clearly in the memory, and the details may be verified with documentary evidence and historiography.

Minor details such as the worry over having to be picked from a line of children arriving in reception areas, in a dishevelled state after a long journey, as many evacuees did, may now seem almost incidental but was profoundly important to children at the time. In the introduction to his work on ‘Churchill’s Children’ Welshman asked why it was that evacuees who have told the story of their evacuation invariably say that they were the last to be picked?\(^{597}\) This was especially true in the case of Les, an evacuee to Dunning. Les had said he remembered arriving and being in the church hall and that he was the last child to be picked.\(^{598}\) Jim, who was interviewed earlier on the same day, and who has now known Les for many years, said that although Les thought he was the last to be picked he was not and that ‘...they all thought they were the last to be picked’.\(^{599}\) Les’s subjective experience was largely shaped by the initial fear of being left alone when all the other children had been taken by foster carers. The psychological effect

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\(^{598}\) Interview with Les, recorded on 4 July 2010. Transcript held with author.

\(^{599}\) Interview with Jim, recorded on 4 July 2010. Transcript held with author.
of perhaps not being ‘picked’ was significant to the personal and emotional morale of evacuee children.

Those evacuees who have kindly retold their stories here have displayed what can only be described as a quiet acceptance of, and resilience to, adversity which runs like an invisible thread through their personalities. There is no way of knowing whether this fundamental part of their character was formed as a result of their evacuation experience or if that aspect of their personality would have been such if they had not encountered war and separation.

Comparatively there is a significant gap in the existing historiography dealing with oral testimony between Scottish and English evacuees. To some extent this is understandable in so far as statistically there was a greater proportion of English rather than Scottish evacuees. English evacuees in the initial wave including unaccompanied children, adults, mothers and children, teachers and helpers amounted to a total of 1,298,500 and in Scotland the figure for evacuees of all categories was 175,000. Furthermore in England mass evacuation took place on three separate occasions. The existing academic work on oral history testimony relating to evacuee experiences include that of Summers, Welshman and Smith. Summers based her research on a collection of oral histories, used in conjunction with interviews compiled for the Museum of English Rural Life and from material held at the Imperial War Museum. Her oral testimonies

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did not include any Scottish evacuees directly and mentioned the country briefly in relation to a family whose connection with Scotland was simply that it was where they spent their summer holidays. Welshman used a core of thirteen former evacuees to tell the story of the evacuation experience. Nine of the thirteen were child evacuees from working class backgrounds. The thought behind this was undoubtedly that the majority of children involved in the official government evacuation scheme were from poorer areas in and around the cities. The remainder of Welshman’s cohort were adults. These testimonies were collated from written and autobiographical accounts and through newspaper requests for former evacuees to tell their stories. This study of thirteen people included the experience of two Scottish brothers who were evacuated from Glasgow to Fife.

Smith’s research cohort was taken almost entirely from the collections held by the Imperial War Museum. Her approach was simply to introduce the topic to be discussed at the beginning of each chapter and let the oral testimony speak for itself. Of the 416 pages in Smith’s book on recollections from evacuees only one direct reference to Scotland is mentioned. There is no other direct Scottish link in her work on evacuation although she did record a significant number of accounts from survivors from the sinking of the City of Benares whose nationalities were not established.

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603 Smith, *Young Voices* (2008).
Of the techniques used by these historians for collection and analysis of oral testimony, Summers’ method is most akin to the way in which qualitative data has been compiled for this thesis. The most significant factor here is that Summers carried out all of the interviews personally and concentrated on individual experiences from a wide range of evacuees irrespective of class. Social class was a significant issue at the time and has been of some importance to historians of evacuation since. It is evident from some of these interviews that the children were very much aware of their social status and of class division. When Colin was evacuated from Clydebank after the bombing raids, he and his family stayed in several different billets. He was aware of the social differences among his peers at school and understood that there were children who were ‘better off’ than he was as, he said, they always had ‘a proper play piece’ (play time snack). This type of social awareness was perceptible to Colin on more than one occasion. In one particular billet while they were in Helensburgh, he described the house as being ‘as near as we would get to living like toffs!’ As compared to where they had lived in Clydebank, it was ‘like a palace’.604 For Colin and others there was no real evidence of a breakdown in the social class barriers either during or immediately after the war.

The cross section of interviews in Summers work included a wide geographical area including the Far East, with stories of families interned in the Philippines, of civilians escaping from Malaya, of husbands and fathers being held as prisoners of war in Hong Kong, of returning fathers and those whose fathers did not return.605 From the stories recounted here of absent

604 Interview with Colin, dated 4 February 2015. Transcript held with author.
605 Summers, When the Children Came Home (2011), pp. 218 and 221.
fathers, Colin’s story is the most acute in terms of the way in which it is flecked with the emotional turmoil of separation and some of the joys of reunion. He described his father’s homecoming on leave from the army during the war. In his absence he said the younger members of the family had all but forgotten him. He recalled that when his younger brother was sent to answer the door of their billet in Helensburgh, where they had been evacuated after the Clydebank blitz, he announced to their mother that there was a soldier at the door. That soldier was in fact their father. He said ‘truthfully, some of us were not too sure either’. He did not recall how long their father had been away but thought it must have been long enough for his family to have forgotten him. This type of reception would undoubtedly have been particularly upsetting for the fathers as well as for the children. However, Rusby’s study has suggested that there was no significant long-term effect on the mental health of wartime children as a result of absent fathers.

In academic terms the Scottish experience was dealt with in an article by Stewart and Welshman. They compared the process with that of England and Wales on the issue of evacuation as a constituent of Scottish welfare history, which they believed was under-investigated. They concluded that more local and regional work was required to establish what happened to evacuated children and with what consequences. They used written testimony from a Billeting Officer, but did not include any oral history from former evacuees in this journal article. They based some of their findings on

606 Interview with Colin, dated 4 February 2015. Transcript held with author.
the work of Boyd and on that of the Scottish Women’s Group on Social Welfare.\textsuperscript{608}

The Scottish Women’s Group on Social Welfare had highlighted the defects present within Scottish society, which the evacuation process had accentuated. Evacuation essentially raised an awareness of the condition of poverty some children were forced to endure. Physical and mental health developments progressed from this in the form of government intervention in the provision of extra nutrition, clothing for necessitous children and an extension of child guidance clinics. The physical and mental state of children’s health as a result of evacuation has provided psychologists and sociologists such as Rusby and Stewart with a unique opportunity of study from a very different perspective. For the first time children were being removed from their homes for protection, for reasons other than as a result of separation from abusive parents or carers.

The long-term separation, which for some spanned six years of war, had, in a number of cases, a detrimental effect when returning to home life after such a lengthy absence. The transition from evacuee to part of the family was not always a particularly easy process. Among those evacuees interviewed here who had spent the duration of the war in reception areas, there was a great deal of affection and regard for the people who had cared for them during their evacuation. The stress of separation at the end of the war was for them as significant as that felt on leaving home.

This was the case for Les who had spent the duration of the war in Perthshire in the village of Dunning. He explained that he went back to Glasgow only briefly. When war broke out he had been living with his grandparents in Glasgow. He said:

I went…to stay with my grandparents because my mother died when I was two and my father was killed in the war. They (the grandparents) came up to Dunning occasionally…I came back to Dunning in September 1955. I liked the country. I liked the way of life here. 

After joining the army and completing his National Service Les moved permanently to Dunning to be with the people who had been his foster parents during the war. He settled there and still lives in the village.

Edna had been evacuated in September 1939 and spent all six years of the war in Dunning. Being awarded dux medal at the end of primary school while she was evacuated was a measure of how well she had done educationally, and she got on really well with her peers in the little school in Dunning. When she returned to Glasgow she had difficulty settling down to school life. Secondary School in Glasgow was very upsetting. She said:

When you have stayed in a village for five years you get to know people and then you come back to Glasgow…and you just didn’t

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609 Interview with Les, recorded on 4 July 2010. Transcript held with author.
know anybody, it was awful. This is the bit I remember. I remember going to Whitehill School. I got into the classroom and nobody would sit beside me. I didn’t go to their primary school. Everybody was sitting with people from their primary schools and I knew nobody, and at playtime I just thought I have had enough of this…I’m going home! I never really settled after that. It was quite harrowing.610

Edna’s lengthy evacuation meant the children in secondary school were strangers to her and she felt very much alone. Honour too recalled that when the evacuees returned from Auchterarder House and Strathallan Castle it was very much a case of ‘them and us’ in the classroom. One other former pupil from Laurel Bank School confirmed this. She said that when she returned from Auchterarder to Glasgow for sixth year she felt very excluded and confirmed ‘it was definitely a ‘them’ and ‘me’ situation’.611

While official histories of evacuation focused on physical health, interviews with evacuees indicated that it was their emotional wellbeing rather than their physical health that was important to them. There were some whose affection shifted from family attachment before the war to a more lasting attachment to foster parents during their evacuation. There were in fact some children who never settled back into their former life.

610 Interview with Edna, recorded on 10 July 2010. Transcript held with author.
Generally evacuees interviewed here have shown no sign of the type of neglect or hardship which was expressed in the 1940s surveys. These surveys were carried out by groups and individuals including the Scottish Women’s Group on Public Welfare, Padley and Cole, and Susan Isaacs. Much of what was written made claims of child poverty and neglect which necessitated official intervention in order to protect the health and well-being of children. These surveys slowed down after the initial enthusiasm in the psychological study of evacuation and there was a dearth of work in the field until the 1980s. Evidence of child neglect, which came to the fore in official circles with the arrival of evacuees was addressed in Chapter III.

Work continued on separation and attachment theory through the work of John Bowlby, eminent Psychiatrist, Psychologist and Psychoanalyst, one of the co-authors of the Cambridge Survey. He recognised the danger of separating young children from their mothers. Bowlby also connected childhood mental health and social life. Bowlby’s work in this field continued through to the early 1950s.

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On the specific question of the long-term effect of evacuation as it relates to separation and attachment, a number of stories have been told of the trauma of separation where siblings could not be accommodated together. Brown described the terrifying effect on families when they had to be billeted separately. It was years later that interviewee Ina thought of how she and her sister had been separated from her brother who was sent to live on a farm with an elderly couple who had no children. She spoke of their separation saying that:

> When we were evacuated to Dunblane our young brother John had just turned 7…He was sent to a farm 3 miles away…He must have attended the local school as I don’t remember seeing him again except for one visit when my mother came to Dunblane and we visited the farmhouse…Years later…he said that he had felt so lonely and abandoned and resentful of our parents. I would say that he grew up with a chip on his shoulder and was argumentative and contrary at times.

She went on to say:

> When I look back over our lives then I feel ashamed that neither my sister nor I gave him a second thought or even missed him at all…My only excuse is that we were only 9 and 11 and were happy with our lives… I’m truly sorry that no one ever talked about the war and evacuation and how it has affected families over the years

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617 Brown, Evacuees (2005), p.77
since…When I watch the news on TV these nights about the wars in the Middle East and see the evacuees I despair for all of them.\footnote{618}{Interview with Ina, recorded 4 July 2011. Transcript held with author.}

Abandonment was one of many issues surrounding the evacuation. The reality was that children were exposed to all kinds of danger during evacuation, mentally, physically and sexually, some of which were not formally recognised or recorded until the early 1980s. Heather Nicholson’s oral based account published in 2000, is fraught with explicit accounts of abuse recounted by former evacuees who had been placed in foster care.\footnote{619}{Nicholson, \textit{Prisoners of War} (2000).} Reports of such abuse have been less well documented in Scotland. One of the few Scottish examples in Welshman’s book pointed briefly to an area where child neglect was evident. In St Andrews in Fife a number of children evacuated from Glasgow stayed in the Priory where it was suspected they had not been treated very well as they could be ‘picked out’ as Priory children due to the condition of their hygiene and clothing.\footnote{620}{Welshman, \textit{Churchill’s Children} (2010), p.65.} The Priory in St Andrews was run as a home for orphaned children and during the war it was used to accommodate evacuees from local areas as well as from Glasgow. In this particular instance the social class divide was evident as the locals in St Andrews could physically identify the Priory children.

Echoing the 1941 Cambridge Evacuation Survey findings, Stewart and Welshman have argued that evacuation served to demonstrate the need for more child guidance clinics, where emotional and mental health issues could
be dealt with. They also believed that it highlighted the psychological health of children in general.\textsuperscript{621} Rusby noted that the work of wartime researchers brought the inadequacies of child care to the attention of the post-war government, and it was the outcome of these studies which influenced the provision and content of the improved social welfare services after the war.\textsuperscript{622}

Some of the evacuees who returned home early to Clydebank were subjected to bombing raids and further evacuation and suffered long-term mental and physical trauma which went undetected and therefore untreated. Dennis recognised that he had suffered a type of post-traumatic stress, but as he pointed out, nothing was done to help him with the recovery process.\textsuperscript{623} Another blitz survivor pointed out that counselling was not part of the vocabulary of the 1940s.\textsuperscript{624} It was not until much later that the stress of living through years of war, separation, sirens, black-outs and major disruption to everyday life was recognised as a significant cause of emotional attachment problems in the adult life of former evacuees.

In March 1941 after the devastating raids on Clydebank, 15,000 people were evacuated under the evacuation scheme and a further 25,000 left without any government assistance. This meant that 40,000 people from a population of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[623] Interview with Dennis, recorded on 21 November 2014. Transcript held with author.
\item[624] Clydebank Life Story Group, \textit{Untold Stories} (1999), p.27.
\end{footnotes}
50,000 left Clydebank after the raids.625 There had been approximately 38,000 children and adults in reception areas in Scotland at the end of January 1940.626 The figures for those left in reception areas in September 1945 amount to just 5,500 which would suggest that the Clydebank residents had returned in significant numbers in the four years since the bombing had taken place, hence while the war was ongoing.627 The damage to property in Clydebank as a result of the bombing was extremely severe. From a total of 12,000 homes in the area only eight were left undamaged and 4,300 had been damaged beyond repair.628 Yet, Dennis, Isa and Charlie stressed that they were able to return to new homes in Clydebank before the end of the war. Dennis returned to Clydebank in 1943. He said: ‘Well by that time the actual house had a huge team of joiners. Houses that were fixable were fixed.’629 Isa described her mother’s joy when she returned from Alexandria to Dumbarton and then eventually to a new home in Clydebank:

We were away from Clydebank for two years and then we came back and were in Old Kilpatrick till we got a prefab house and my mother thought she was in heaven.630

626 Boyd, Evacuation in Scotland (1944), p.31.
629 Interview with Dennis, recorded on 21 November 2014. Transcript held with author.
630 Interview with focus group, recorded on 30 March 2015. Transcript held with author.
Charlie was also back in Clydebank by 1945. During his stay in Whitecrook he remembered his father’s attempts to secure a council house in Clydebank. He said:

…they were arguing about building a house, rebuilding it, building it. So they rebuilt our house and …I reckon we came back in 1945 into our house that they rebuilt.  

Some accounts of how these raids and the evacuation affected the people of Clydebank have been recorded by the Clydebank Life Story Group. Stories from the collection describe how difficult it was to come to terms with family separation. Local studies of Clydebank concluded that there was no official date when residents began to come back to Clydebank. Some people came back right after the Blitz, others stayed out of the town but travelled in to work every day until they were able to find accommodation. Others made lives outside the area in places where they were evacuated to, and never returned to Clydebank. It is Colin’s opinion that ‘the rebuilding of the town took decades and to an extent has been a work in progress ever since’.

One woman interviewed for the Life Story Group had no recollection of how long it was before damaged homes were repaired and ready for occupancy,

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631 Interview with Charlie, recorded on 17 October 2014. Transcript held with author.
632 Clydebank Life Story Group, Untold Stories (1999).
633 Interview with Colin, dated 4 February 2015. Transcript held with author.
or how long it took for new homes to be built in Clydebank. She did remember that her family all came back together and although they were:

…scattered by evacuation…they all came back and we all settled within about a hundred yards of each other. We were all in the one street or just round the corner. We were really quite close.  

Among the Clydebank evacuees there was evidence of a close community and family ties. Pat, who had been evacuated at the beginning of September 1939 with her brother, was brought home after just two weeks. She had been very upset at being separated from her family. She and her brother were brought home to Clydebank and were at home when the town was bombed. Having to be evacuated for a second time was not so traumatic because the family were all together.

Pat’s early return from evacuation was caused by her unhappiness at being parted from her family. This was the cause of many of the children being brought back early. For parents the separation had an equally profound effect and, as Honour recalled, her parents brought her back from Strathallan Castle after possibly only six weeks. Her brother had not been evacuated from Glasgow Academy and therefore her parents made the decision that the

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635 Interview with Pat, recorded on 20 July 2010. Transcript held with author.
family should all be together no matter what happened. Close family ties was one of the many and varied reasons why children were brought back from reception areas and these have been discussed in detail in Chapter V.

While mothers with young children also tended to return early, expectant mothers in reception areas helped draw attention to the need for extended maternity care. The fact that more women were opting for hospital and hostel care rather than home births was discussed in chapter III. Attendance figures for Lennox Castle, Airthrey Castle and Haddo House in Aberdeen, quoted on page 151, were a reflection on the popularity of hospital births. The extended maternity care facilities were also available to women in reception areas as well as evacuees and proved popular to both. Jenkinson pointed out that these services helped improve the life chances of Scottish mothers and babies.

Analysis of the interviews from former evacuees revealed the fate of some of the children who were evacuated with their pregnant mothers and which has been somewhat overlooked in the past. Two of the evacuees interviewed here had been accompanied by their mother and the rest of their siblings. James and his brothers and sisters had been evacuated with their pregnant mother to Kilmun in Dunoon. When her baby was due, his mother was sent to Airthrey Castle and Jim and the rest of the family were taken to Cardross Park Children’s Home where they stayed for six weeks until their mother came out of hospital. Cardross Park had been a convalescent home for

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636 Interview with Honour, recorded on 13 November 2014. Transcript held with author.  
members of the Scottish Horse and Motorman’s Association, before it was leased by Dumbarton County Council in 1941 and used as a refuge for people from Clydebank after the blitz. James and his brothers and sisters knew they had been sent to Cardross Park Children’s Home as their mother had to go to hospital to have her baby.\footnote{Interview with James, dated 4 February 2015. Transcript held with author.}

Not all children were kept as well informed as were James and his family. Colin, who was five years old when he and his family were evacuated, spoke of the time he and his siblings spent at Cardross Park Children’s Home. He said his mother had taken them there and left without telling them why they were there. This has remained something of a mystery to him since. He said that, ‘…for part of the time my mother simply disappeared …[and] not knowing where she had gone was the worst part’.\footnote{Interview with Colin, dated 4 February 2015. Transcript held with author.}

Unfortunately for Colin, and others who have spoken on the subject, there was no follow-up counselling available at the time. Instead Colin has lived all these years with the assumption that his mother must have had some sort of breakdown and that was why she had left the children at Cardross Park. Children, he said, were not given any information about what was happening. Now, because the family who were there have all passed away, he has no one to ask what really happened at the time. Retelling his story of war and evacuation, Colin uncovered a range of social and emotional factors, of family attachment and class differentiations.
Recognition of the long-term psychological trauma attached to evacuation is of particular importance in the argument that warfare led to welfare. The trauma of separation led to a period of bed wetting and was in part the cause of his unhappiness at having to go to school as an evacuee. On reflection he considered that his dislike for attending school had much to do with missing his mother.\textsuperscript{640}

For parents too, separation was difficult to come to terms with and, as Dennis recalled, when he returned to his home after the Clydebank blitz his mother worried constantly when he was out of the house. He said that it was difficult for her to ‘let him out of her sight’ and of how he had to be home as soon as it began to get dark.\textsuperscript{641} There were also attachment issues evident among the people who cared for evacuees. Living with a family for an extended period often meant that the child or children became part of the family. There are accounts of lasting friendships continuing well into adulthood and of the effect of how separation at the end of the war led to profound sadness when the evacuees returned home.

Jim, who has lived in Dunning all his life, fondly remembered the two Glasgow evacuees his mother took in to their home at the beginning of the war. Undoubtedly the boys who came as evacuees shared the same fondness for the family and the countryside. Jim described how they became part of the family and how sad it was when the time came for them to go back to Glasgow. He said:

\textsuperscript{640} Interview with Colin, dated 4 February 2015. Transcript held with author.
\textsuperscript{641} Interview with Dennis, recorded on 21 November 2014. Transcript held with author.
John and Billy lived with us for two and a half years…as part of the family. John…still associated himself with Dunning [and joined] the Blackwatch [regiment]…the Blackwatch barracks was in Perth and during his training [he spent] all his spare time…in Dunning.642

Life in the countryside was a learning curve for some city children, and for country residents having evacuees could be something of a trial, as stories from rural areas attest. These include complaints that some city children had to be taught to respect the environment and the wildlife it contained. Children like David who had grown up in the countryside remembered being shocked and surprised by the attitude of city children when they came to Dunning. David’s story included an account of some Glasgow boys he encountered during their evacuation to his village. He said:

…I got four (boys) up the wood there and they stole a duck from the farmer and lit the fire up the den, and chopped its head off with a chopper and [were] roasting the duck on the fire.643

Their behaviour upset and angered David and he recalled having many arguments with them about their treatment of the countryside. In a wider context significant praise was bestowed on the benefits of country living open to evacuees. In the House of Lords the Archbishop of Canterbury

642 Interview with Jim, recorded on 4 July 2010. Transcript held with author.
643 Interview with David, recorded on 4 July 2010. Transcript held with author.
praised the impact of the Devonshire countryside for evacuees, although his comments applied to country living generally. He said:

…the children in these reception areas have had some benefits from their experience. There has been a greater variety of teaching, there has been a widening of their horizons, and in some cases there has been given to them, I think…a real love of the country, which may have important consequences in the future.644

This was true in Ina’s case. Being sent to Aberdeen in September 1939 opened up a new and exciting world which she had never known in Glasgow. She loved life in the country and spoke with great affection of the time she spent away from home. She recalled climbing trees for the first time, eating raw beetroot from the fields, and getting sick from eating Laburnum pods. She said:

…we loved the school and had a happy, happy time. …it was the first time in my life I saw the stars properly. …when the nights were a bit darker and the schoolteachers were telling us about the stars…I was fascinated. You live in the city! We lived right in the city, you never saw that.645

645 Interview with Ina, recorded on 4 July 2011. Transcript held with author.
Margaret, who was in her final year at Laurel Bank School, a private school for girls, was sent with her class to Auchterarder to board. Her aspirational status was revealed when she noted her concern about the lack of science teaching in school as she wanted to study medicine. However, Margaret appreciated the beauty and freedom of the countryside during her year as an evacuee: She described how:

It was very cold that autumn and winter and very beautiful, lovely clear skies, we had a lot of freedom…I had never been in the country for that long. It was so easy to get around…at the weekend we would go off on bicycle rides for five to ten miles. We were free, it wasn’t like a standard boarding school. We were fed stories: Angela Brazil and the Chalet Girls, but it was much more fun than that because we knew everyone and we were trusted in a way, quite rightly I think because we weren’t too silly.646

Margaret and Ina both enjoyed their individual experiences of living in the country. They both felt it was therapeutic to have lived in such a carefree environment. As a health measure, Margaret’s sister was sent to stay with them in Auchterarder ‘because she hadn’t been very well’, and stayed there for three years. Margaret and her sister, with about six other girls, were billeted with a local lawyer in the town and went to Auchterarder House for classes. For those children who enjoyed a happy evacuation, living in the

646 Interview with Margaret, recorded on 29 December 2014. Transcript held with author.
healthy conditions of the countryside meant there was very little exposure to what was going on in the war. The evacuees in Auchterarder Margaret said ‘...didn’t get much in the way of newspapers’ and, she said, ‘I don’t remember that we heard the radio so we were insulated in a way’.

She believed that as a result of her age she ‘didn’t feel any kind of homesickness at all’ and enjoyed the experience of evacuation. As Margaret was in her last year of school, and therefore an older evacuee with a comfortable billet, her situation and attitude to being away from home was very positive.

Margaret’s happy account of life in the country corresponds with that of the teachers who were sent with the girls from fee-paying Laurel Bank School to Strathallan Castle and Auchterarder House. They too appreciated the natural beauty of the countryside, of the changing seasons, and the pleasure of being able to enjoy the laughter which ‘grew naturally out of the incongruities of [their] existence’. The Perthshire countryside was, by their account, a unique experience in happy living built into the fabric of world-wide war. Of the changing seasons it was said that ‘we were city dwellers walking between rows of houses and in noisy streets…none of us had seen anything like it…every imaginable variety of lily covered the green banks around the castle’. Being evacuated as a private school pupil and being ‘fairly

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647 Interview with Margaret, recorded on 29 December 2014. Transcript held with author.
cosseted’ in her living conditions in a large and beautiful country house, Margaret’s situation was somewhat different from the majority of evacuees.\textsuperscript{650}

The circumstances surrounding countryside living that Margaret described reflect the opinion of such surveyors as Padley and Cole who commented on the improvements in the physical and mental health of children as a result of a structured life. Evacuees, they said, were subject to better sleep patterns and better food. Children learned the pleasure of roaming the countryside freely and the boys especially provided helpful work for farmers.\textsuperscript{651} In spite of this, country and town people learning to live together under the exceptional circumstances of war and evacuation often proved difficult. Margaret said that if the girls from Laurel Bank School had been from the east end of Glasgow they would not have lasted long in Auchterarder and would have gone back pretty quickly. She did not elaborate on this point but simply smiled.\textsuperscript{652} This was possibly an acknowledgement of the fact that the majority of the first wave of evacuees had returned home within the early months of the war.

Private billeting, as Boyd pointed out, did not always work for evacuees, and idyllic recollections were, of course, not universal. His wartime research showed that residential schools and hostels worked better for children with

\textsuperscript{650} Interview with Margaret, recorded on 29 December 2014. Transcript held with author.
\textsuperscript{651} Padley and Cole (eds.), \textit{Evacuation Survey} (1940), p.227.
\textsuperscript{652} Interview with Margaret, recorded on 29 December 2014. Transcript held with author.
problems. This type of accommodation was most beneficial to children over 12 years old, as the routine of attending school and smaller classes helped develop their character and personality. Rose suggested the evacuation process became the focal point of tension between two opposing ways of life. This was evident from the lack of response from residents in designated reception areas around Scotland when the prospect of taking in evacuees after the mass movement of September 1939 was mooted, as discussed in Chapter III.

Rose believed evacuation had aroused a social awareness which she referred to as having been the central lens through which the British focused on the social question. According to Hendrick it was the moment when liberal democracy faced its greatest challenge. The result, he believed, was that social welfare dominated politics throughout the 1940s and 1950s, and evacuation was a reminder to rulers of their primary duties: to feed, clothe, shelter and look after the health and welfare of Britain’s citizens. This was manifest in the extension of milk-in-schools and school meals programmes, improved medical inspections and of child guidance (and eventually an expanded education system) all mentioned in Chapter V.

The extension of the school leaving age in 1945 was important in helping to fill the gap which the interviewees felt was lost by their evacuation. Joan

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expressed her concern over her own education, and of the void that she felt existed in her sister’s education which had been lost to her through evacuation. Joan explained that, while she and her three sisters were evacuated, it was her thirteen year old sister who looked after them, rather than the women whom they were billeted with. She said that:

She (the householder) didn’t look after us at all, my sister looked after us, she took us to school and brought us back, so she lost her education then because she’d been out of it so long, she was a very clever girl too. She did well but she did actually die very young but she didn’t get her education back. …My sister was capable of really good things. She was a very intelligent girl but she probably thought she was doing her war effort.\textsuperscript{657}

The extension to the school leaving age came too late for her sister to benefit from it. However, the other members of the family, although affected by the disruption in continuous education during the war, were able to make up the short-fall when they came back home. She confirmed that:

…I wasn’t so bad because I made it all up eventually you know but certainly you lost your confidence when you came back. So although it was just months and the summer went into it, you’d missed quite a lot of your friends, and your education, your exams, and you just felt different. You just felt you had missed a lot…\textsuperscript{658}

\textsuperscript{657} Interview with John and Joan, recorded on 20 July 2011. Transcript held with Author. \textsuperscript{658} Interview with John and Joan, recorded on 20 July 2011. Transcript held with author.
Charlie had experienced first-hand the trauma of the Clydebank blitz after which he and his family were evacuated. First to a house in Coatbridge, in North Lanarkshire, then soon after they went to live with relatives in Renfrew where they stayed for two years. The final two years of the war were spent in the Whitecrook area of Clydebank before they returned to their home, by which time Charlie had left school. He explained:

I remember all the schools being shut and the army was in the schools and you ended up either in a church hall getting slightly, I would say, educated part of the day and that fell away. I felt I had lost a lot of schooling.659

Colin had been able to stay in school until he was fifteen. However, having a disability meant his secondary education was hampered as educational facilities did not extend to the provision of transport, and other means necessary to support children with minor physical problems. As a result of his disability Colin found it difficult to negotiate the rigours of getting around a large High School. The nature of his disability resulted in him having to return to a Junior Secondary School after having spent the whole of his first senior year at Clydebank High. It was a particular source of disappointment as he had been happy in High School.

Although the change in legislation, as a result of the Education Act of 1944/45, extended the school leaving age, historians such as Deborah

659 Interview with Charlie, recorded on 17 October 2014. Transcript held with author.
Thom\textsuperscript{660} and John Macnicol\textsuperscript{661} have argued that the Act departed little from the old style. They believed that it perpetuated a class based society by retaining the three tier system of education. The entrenched values of private education can be seen to be upheld from observing the Laurel Bank School pupils and teachers who were evacuated to Auchterarder and Strathallan. Their somewhat ‘cosseted’ and privileged surroundings highlight the inherent differences in the educational systems. Thom commented that ‘different forms of education perpetuated the hierarchy of demand’\textsuperscript{662}. According to Lloyd the negotiations surrounding the proposals for the Education Bill left many unconsidered aspects of Scottish education. His assumption was that education reform was more important to England than Scotland, and that the 1945 Scottish measure contained an unremarkable set of improvements\textsuperscript{663}. Smout has also argued that Scottish education remained a class based structure until the 1950s. He believed that once the needs of the middle classes had been attended to, only a limited number of working-class children would be privy to some upward social mobility\textsuperscript{664}.

The continued popularity of a system which perpetuated private education was evident from the number of parents who applied for places for their children in private schools during and after the war. In 1942 Glasgow Academy had 763 boys on the school role, approximately 100 more than in

\textsuperscript{660} Deborah Thom, The 1944 Education Act: the ‘art of the possible’? in Smith (ed.) War and social change (1986).
\textsuperscript{661} Macnicol, ‘The evacuation of schoolchildren’ (1986).
\textsuperscript{662} Thom, The 1944 Education Act: the ‘art of the possible’? (1986), p.117.
\textsuperscript{663} Lloyd, The Scottish School System and the Second World War, Thesis for Doctor of Philosophy, October 1979 (held at University of Stirling Library), p.422.
\textsuperscript{664} T. C. Smout, A Century of the Scottish People 1830-1950 (Glasgow, 1986), p.223.
1941. As a result of the continuing rise in applications throughout the rest of the war only one in three boys could be admitted, with a total of 840 boys on the school role in September 1944. In other private schools around Glasgow after the end of the war the story was the same. By 1948 Allan Glens and Hillhead could take only one in two applicants; the High School one in six; and Hutchesons’ School could accept one in three.\(^{665}\) Glasgow Academy had anticipated the possibility of changes in the educational system as a result of war and, in order to safeguard the independent schools, the Public Schools Governing Association was established.\(^{666}\) In spite of the fact that the three tier system was perpetuated, the warfare to welfare principle was evident through the educational reforms of the 1940s, when the changing attitude of government led to what Titmuss referred to as the ‘universal character of…welfare policies’. The difference between the pre-war and wartime instigation of policy was the speed at which decisions were acted upon and the ‘unanimity underlying policy’.\(^{667}\)

In Chapter V the effect of total war on the educational system was discussed in connection with returning evacuees and stay-at-home children. From an oral history perspective the daily routine of an inner city school can be observed from the original magazines produced by Whitehill School in Dennistoun, Glasgow during the war. Written accounts by pupils and staff provide an original source of information of how school life in the city carried on during the war. They uncover some of the inherent problems

which pupils and teachers were faced with on a daily basis and how they were overcome.

The warfare to welfare theory present in the developments and progressive nature of education and child guidance can also be applied in religious terms. There was some significant recognition and respect afforded to children in reception areas where they were billeted on families of different religions. Religion had not been included in the initial discussions on the evacuation process but had quickly become a fairly major issue once the process had come to fruition. Religion was the focus of Chapter IV and was mentioned in Chapter II to describe how evacuation had brought families of different faiths together during the Clydebank Blitz, and the element of surprise when people realised that both Catholics and Protestants were helpful, kind and welcoming to each other in a time of need. Fitzpatrick alluded to the fact that, as a result of the Education Act of 1944/45, Church and State agreed to recognise the dignity of all people, the social dimension in education, the importance of moral values and cultural inheritance.⁶⁶⁸

Religion was not a significant aspect of evacuation for the majority of evacuees interviewed. The most important facet was the billeting situation, closely followed by school life. For Catholic evacuees Pat, Joan and Ina, religion did play a significant part in their lives and during their evacuation they had the opportunity to continue their religious education. Whether children were conscious of their religious affiliation or not, schools of all denominations were involved in the religious welfare of pupils and

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were obliged to ensure that religious education continued through the war. At Whitehill, children’s bible period was replaced by religious instruction in the form of a short service every Tuesday morning at Rutherford Church.\(^{669}\) The senior girls of Laurel Bank School who were evacuated to Auchterarder were free to choose which service they attended on Sundays. Margaret and her friends chose the Episcopal Church service simply because it was quicker than the others, although she thought there was much more of a ritual than they were used to.\(^{670}\) Joan had a choice whether to go to mass or not, and chose to go. Ina was made to kneel down and say her prayers every night by her foster parents, in order to maintain her religious observations.

Colin’s religion was important to him and he enjoyed hymns and prayers, possibly as his mother was what he referred to as a ‘Salvation Army songster’. He remembered being happy to take part in the morning hymn and prayers every day in school, when the partition between two classrooms was opened so that both sets of children could join in the service.\(^{671}\) For Dennis too, being evacuated with his family to Helensburgh meant that he could continue his religious education. The problem was that when he returned to Clydebank he had to travel to East Dunbartonshire as there was no Catholic Senior Secondary in Clydebank. It was not until 1961 that St. Columba’s Secondary school was built in Clydebank.\(^{672}\) Fitzpatrick argued that when the austerity of the post-war years passed, the Catholic secondary sector was expanded and transformed in accordance with the overall

\(^{669}\) Whitehill School Magazine, Number 49, November 1943.
\(^{670}\) Interview with Margaret, recorded on 29 December 2014. Transcript held with author.
\(^{671}\) Interview with Colin, dated 4 February 2014. Transcript held with author.
restructuring of Scottish secondary education, following on from the
Education Act of 1945.  He further alluded to the fact that the acceptance
of an expansion in Catholic educational provision was helped by the Labour
Party coming to power in 1945, and claimed it was ‘the political if not the
spiritual home of the majority of the Catholic community’. From this
discussion it may be considered justifiable that religion was chosen as one of
the three major themes of the evacuation process under discussion in this
thesis.

The concluding analysis of the themes under discussion here, in conjunction
with the oral testimony, highlight the fact that it was predominantly the
emotional and educational aspects of evacuation that were uppermost in the
minds of former evacuees. The trauma of separation was a particular factor
that had to be overcome by evacuees such as Colin. His experiences fitted
with the parameters of psychological studies of long-term attachment theory.
Alternatively, Les was so attached to his foster parents and life in the
country that he never settled into life in Glasgow after the war. Ina lived the
rest of her life with the knowledge that her brother had felt abandoned
during his evacuation and no one had ever attempted to address the problem
of resentment he felt towards his family for many years after the war.

This chapter looked at the way children coped with readjustment when they
returned from reception areas, their attempt to adapt to school life, to fitting
in to home life and family in the unfamiliar surroundings of their own home

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and, for the Clydebank evacuees especially, in new homes or homes that had been repaired after war damage. There was no significant media coverage of returning evacuees at the end of the war as the majority had returned early, and those who remained in reception areas for the duration came back quietly. Readjusting was not always easy, as Edna recalled. She had felt so bad about going to High School when she returned to Glasgow that she ran away due to an overwhelming sense of loneliness. Honour also found readjusting to school in Glasgow after just six weeks in Auchterarder very awkward. She was very aware that pupils who returned to Laurel Bank School after being evacuated were treated as outsiders by the pupils who had stayed at home. She said it was very much a situation of them-and-us. Life as an evacuee and as a stay-at-home had equal problems in dealing with the disruption caused by war. The effects of dealing with school life in the city was recorded in the various magazines from Whitehill School, where teachers and pupils responded to the conditions of war.

In the main there was little to substantiate the warfare to welfare theory among the respondents. Only Isa and Charlie had appreciated that repairing and rebuilding of homes in Clydebank had begun before the end of the war, and that families were able to return to the area reasonably quickly in spite of the devastation the town had suffered. None of the respondents were particularly conscious of the extended welfare benefits introduced during the war, such as school meals and milk, although Charlie did concede that he felt children were healthier as a result of rationing.675 None of the respondents were aware of or required the support of child guidance which

675 Interview with Charlie, recorded on 17 October 2014. Transcript held with author.
was established before the war. Child guidance facilities developed and extended throughout the war and in the post-war period. However, children who were affected by the emotional trauma of separation often kept their feelings hidden till many years later. Ina commented that children did not tend to discuss their feelings as openly as they should have at the time, and in the case of wartime, children including her own brother and interviewee Colin, they kept their own counsel till later in life.

The human element of evacuation is demonstrated in the honest way each of the respondents told their story. Unintentionally, and almost without exception, they displayed a strong sense of independence, developed possibly as a result of the resilience that it was necessary to adopt to help them face the reality of a traumatic and life changing situation, often undertaken alone and at a relatively young age. In spite of this there is no bitterness evident in any one of these people concerning what happened to them. None of the respondents had any real interest in the political side of the evacuation scheme or how the government dealt with arrangements and cost involved. None were aware how much was paid to billeting families or assisted schemes. They, as a group, are particularly unaware of the important role they played in the history of the Second World War, or the welfare improvements they helped to establish through their wartime experience. They did not recognise that their evacuation helped create a new and permanent awareness of the importance of the child within society. The growth and development of child guidance, more inclusive health care for pre-school and school children, improved school medical inspections, the
expansion of education for all and the growth and development of child and maternity care, all followed as a result of war and the evacuation experience.

As a group, the general consensus was that they considered the experience to be looked upon as a process in their life which they could do nothing about and have appreciated the life experience it gave them. The value of oral testimony lies with the fact that these stories provide the human side of evacuation. While none of the interviewees who took part in this research suffered from the type of conditions which were presented by the Scottish Women’s Group on Public Welfare, it could be argued that, as the evacuation process highlighted the conditions in which some people were forced to live, it created a climate for political intervention and change, which made welfare a primary element of post-war liberal democracy.\textsuperscript{676}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{676} Scottish Women’s Group on Public Welfare, \textit{Our Scottish Towns} (1944).}
Conclusion

It was all happy memories...and in the winter they got a lot of snow there compared to the city and there was a big field just across from this house and we used to go sledging. I loved it! I just loved it!\(^{677}\)

In this concluding chapter attention will focus on the theoretical framework of the thesis and the way in which it was carried out, with a brief outline of the aims, objectives and methodology. The chapter will include suggestions for further research which are beyond the remit of this study. It will summarise the principal argument and discuss how this was developed and addressed in the body of the thesis.

Overview of aims, objectives and methodology

The aim of the thesis was to assess how far the warfare to welfare theory most often associated with the work of Richard Titmuss applied to the administration of evacuation in Scotland.\(^{678}\) The thesis objective was to show that oral history was the most appropriate approach to explore the picture of Scottish evacuation in relation to issues of health, education and religion. A further objective was to deepen the knowledge of what happened to Scottish evacuees with the help of oral testimony, in turn providing enhanced evidence for the hitherto under recorded Scottish evacuee experience within the wider history of evacuation. The method of analysis for the arguments both for and against this theory have been provided from

\(^{677}\) Interview with Ina, recorded on 4 July 2011. Transcript held with author.
documentary evidence of welfare developments and through accounts of the governing process.

**The Theoretical Framework**

The foundation for the thesis was based on the fact that Scottish evacuees had been substantially overlooked in the history of evacuation after Boyd’s official record of Scottish evacuation was completed in 1944. The Scottish evacuation process had been treated in non-specific terms in much of the academic literature since the revival of interest in the subject in the 1980s. The major focus of academic attention had been predominantly on issues of health and education from an English perspective. Religion features infrequently in this literature and again predominantly from an English viewpoint. Hence this study has introduced a fresh perspective on the wartime evacuation experience.

The warfare to welfare theory is most clearly defined by the Second World War, in particular through the evacuation process following which a much broader and substantial welfare system was introduced with the extension to education, child welfare and child guidance. As Titmuss explained, evacuation gave rise to a much greater understanding of the need for social justice. He wrote of evacuation that:

…for five years of war the pressures for a higher standard of welfare and a deeper comprehension of social justice steadily gained in

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strength. …and despite all the handicaps of limited resources in men and materials, a big expansion took place in the responsibility accepted by the State for those in need.680

This theory has been much debated among historians. Thane and Rose, for example, while in agreement that war helped accelerate changes in welfare, believed post war improvements were along the lines advocated before the war.681 Rose wrote that the Second World War helped amplify the concern about social and economic inequality.682 Holman’s opinion accorded with the Titmuss theory that it was war and evacuation that prompted local and central government to extend the scope and nature of its welfare services. He believed evacuation heightened awareness of the importance of child care.683 Policy enactments of the post-war Labour administration directly link the warfare to welfare theory. Addison pointed out, it presented Labour with the opportunity to complete and consolidate the work of the wartime coalition government.684 During the Labour government’s term in office, policy initiatives which were planned in 1930s, such as National Insurance, were brought to fruition; the nationalisation and housing programmes were achieved, and in 1948 the National Health Service was established.

The political history of the period has been dealt with briefly in the body of the thesis but it was the social history which was the principal motivation.

684 Addison, The Road to 1945 (1975), p.73.
Once the gap in the knowledge regarding Scottish evacuation was identified the questions were threefold; to find out why Scotland had been overlooked to a great extent in the history of evacuation, where it fitted into the existing academic work on evacuation, and how the improvements in social welfare affected Scottish evacuees. From the outset it was intended to see how and why the Scottish evacuee arrangements and the experience of evacuees supported or contradicted a revision of broad based British evacuation history.

Metropolitan research methods used by previous historians overlooked the ‘celtic fringe’ and focused on south east England. Reasons for this may be identified as a result of two specific factors. Firstly, Scotland’s population was much smaller than England. Secondly, the only other major evacuation in Scotland took place in March 1941 after Clydebank was bombed, whereas in England there were two further major evacuation schemes undertaken. However, on reflection comparative figures of evacuees in the first instance equate to similar numbers for Scotland and England and therefore deserve equal discourse in the historical narrative. Scotland had a population of approximately five million people as opposed to England’s population which at the time was over forty-two million. The number of Scottish evacuees amounted to approximately 175,000 and English evacuees amounted to 1.2 million in the first instance. In percentage terms these figures equated to 3.3 per cent and 2.6 per cent respectively. The difference in the numbers remaining in reception areas in Scotland and England was more pronounced by January 1940. In Scotland approximately 23 per cent, representing 30,972 schoolchildren, 4,182 pre-school children and 3,043 mothers,
remained in reception areas. By comparison, in England over half a million, or approximately 42 per cent remained in reception areas during the same period.

Once the decision was made to explore Scottish evacuation through personal accounts, finding people who were involved in the evacuation process meant advertising locally in newspapers, public libraries, and speaking to local historians. Interviews were qualitative in nature as a lengthy questionnaire would have been less favourable to the by now, elderly respondents. Telling their story in their own words helped create a more relaxed atmosphere and in turn produced a more rounded account of their experience. In the case of the collection and analysis of evidence there is very little which could have been done differently, as a quantitative study would have yielded less definitive answers on the research themes. The personally conducted interviews amounted to thirty, which included two focus groups of three and four people respectively. Additional existing oral accounts have also been included from among the respondents for the ‘Glasgow 2000 Lives’ project. There were over sixty respondents to the project who mentioned their evacuation experience. Of that number twenty-three of those interviews were pertinent to the themes of this thesis and their testimony has been used in the overall analysis.

From these interviews it was possible to assimilate an extensive range of issues relating to the theoretical concepts under scrutiny. Oral history as a research tool was fully explained to respondents who each gave consent to

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their story being used in further research and for their stories to be stored with the University of Stirling library. The respondents were from a range of backgrounds and the majority were included in the official evacuation scheme. Two interviewees were from private schools and one person had been evacuated under private arrangements. Three others were resident in reception areas and their families had taken in evacuees. Among the group only two evacuees had remained in the reception areas for the duration of the war. All the others had spent only weeks or months in reception areas during the early period of the war. Seven of the interviewees from Clydebank had been evacuated at the beginning of the war and again after the bombing in March 1941.

The conceptual framework designed around the oral testimony made it possible to observe the way in which the Scottish evacuation process evolved and the lasting effect the experience had on those involved. It also helped to draw a justifiable conclusion to the hypothesis that oral history was necessary in order to determine the wider picture of the Scottish evacuation process.

Parsons wrote that it was very difficult to find any semblance of a ‘norm’, and impossible to find a typical evacuee because their personal experiences were so different.\(^{687}\) However, from the testimonies collected for this thesis there are a number of distinct similarities especially among the Clydebank evacuees. Through the use of collective, cultural and trauma memory, it was clear that all faced similar emotions such as fear, happiness, sadness, and

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upset, while, at the same time, discovering that a different type of life existed than the one to which they had been accustomed.

An awareness of their individual status, level of poverty and class was first realised among evacuees when they were settled in the countryside, although none of the respondents here fitted with the stereotypical dirty, verminous, ill-trained and ill-mannered evacuees from the slums identified in 1944 by the Scottish Women’s Group on Public Welfare.⁶⁸⁸ The myth of poor ill-kempt evacuee children from the inner cities, as Parsons has complained, is perpetuated by modern day textbooks which tend to rely on previously published generalised material.⁶⁸⁹ A definite social division in some reception areas caused complaints and objections to be raised by residents who had no wish to have anything more to do with evacuees after the first wave. Colin and Violet mentioned their awareness of class within their billets, although this did not mean they felt they were deprived or impoverished by their situation.

**Chapters I**

Chapter I of this thesis centred on the construction and implementation of evacuation planning in the 1930s. It dealt with the central administration for evacuation from the appointment of the Anderson Committee charged with the task of organising and planning, the role of the Scottish Health and Education Departments and the input of the voluntary sector. The Anderson Committee was required to identify those districts likely to be most

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vulnerable, those groups of people who should be included in the official scheme and to locate the potentially safe areas. The Committee was also responsible for accommodation arrangements and the logistics involved in the movement of large numbers of people to areas of safety. Deficiencies inherent in the original plans became evident in many of the basic requirements of the daily life once the evacuees arrived in reception areas and these problems and outcomes were discussed in Chapter II.

Chapter II

This chapter continued the theme of central administration and the way in which government agencies dealt with the outcome of the first evacuation scheme. It explored evacuation in terms of educational provision, nursery and maternity care, and the possible enforcement of compulsory billeting. This chapter identified that planners had failed to take account of problems related to religious and cultural difference between host and evacuee. Other issues discussed in this chapter were the use of propaganda as a tool for encouraging parents to leave their children in reception areas, the incentives involved in the assisted evacuation schemes and the overseas evacuation process. This chapter concluded that the implementation of the first evacuation was perceived as a failure due to the substantial numbers who returned to danger areas before bombing began. However, the public attention aroused by this initial evacuation of mothers and children accelerated welfare provision for vulnerable sections of society.
Chapter III

This chapter substantiated the argument for warfare leading to welfare developments providing empirical evidence that the evacuation of pregnant women and young children was followed by effective and rapid wartime developments in child and maternity care.

The Department of Health for Scotland’s Cathcart Report of 1936 had recommended a wide ranging provision of public health care by the state, but only the delivery of maternity care had been expanded by the outbreak of war. However, the relatively vulnerable situation in which pregnant evacuees were placed directly led to rapid and progressive changes in care arrangements. Writing a decade after the end of the war Ferguson and Fitzgerald wrote that war and evacuation impressed upon the nation the active need to take measures to maintain the health of babies and young children, and had shown up serious gaps that had existed in the pre-war services.\textsuperscript{690} They further stated that the emergency maternity scheme was one of the government’s most successful ventures during the war and became a catalyst for progress in areas of the country which had previously ignored the needs of expectant mothers.\textsuperscript{691} In Scotland this was exemplified by the opening of seven new maternity homes between 1939 and 1941, which raised the number of available beds in Scottish institutions from a total of 1,460 in 1938 to 2,178 by June 1944.\textsuperscript{692} After the war hospital confinement continued to grow in popularity in Scotland as the preferred

option for pregnant women, a trend only made possible due to the expanded wartime provision just noted.

In support of the Titmuss theory the chapter noted there was a marked increase in the provision of wartime health and welfare delivered via health centres, medical officers, health visitors and social workers. The chapter also focused on wartime child neglect which became more apparent through evacuation and, as a result, the number of child guidance clinics increased substantially after the war. One such clinic was established in East Kilbride, near Glasgow. By 1948 Nerston Child Guidance Clinic had treated upwards of 550 children suffering from emotional disorders.693 This chapter therefore substantiates the argument that the acceleration of healthcare changes afforded to mothers and young children was a direct result of war and evacuation.

**Chapter IV**

Religious adherence and attitudes of religious hierarchies to the evacuation process was the focus of chapter IV. The religious aspect of evacuation has been somewhat overlooked by evacuation historians. This thesis has shown that catering for the needs of children during wartime extended beyond their physical health and wellbeing. The maintenance of their religious welfare also played a pivotal role in the success or failure of the evacuation. The chapter compared and contrasted the opinions of evacuees to their religious

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observance at home before and during the time they were evacuated. It also compared attitudes of Roman Catholic, Protestant and Jewish hierarchy to religious adherence during the evacuation process.

Research for this chapter revealed that while majority faith groups were active in making special provisions for evacuees, local Church of Scotland parishes were less vociferous about the maintenance of their religious welfare. The report from the Commission of Churches in 1941 observed that evacuation had depleted the numbers involved in youth societies and Sunday Schools, and caused a significant fall in the congregation which left a shortfall in the budget of the Church.694 Church records from Battlefield Church, in Glasgow, plus records from Linlithgow, Fife and St Andrews, including the Priory in St Andrews, in tandem with the papers from the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, showed no evidence of particular concern for the continued religious welfare of evacuees among their congregation.

The warfare to welfare argument was prevalent here as it brought religion and welfare administration into closer collaboration. In the post-war world of the 1950s, as Fitzpatrick pointed out, Church and state were brought closer together by legislation contained in the Education Act of 1945. This made possible the expansion of Catholic education after the war as adequate and efficient provision was to be made for free primary, secondary and further education.695

694 Commission of the Churches, Evacuation and the Churches (1941), p.33.
Chapter V

This chapter concerned children who stayed at home and those evacuees who had returned within the first weeks or months of their evacuation. Here too the warfare to welfare theory is evident in the way schools dealt with the problem of ensuring the continuation of children’s education.

War and evacuation had a detrimental effect on education when schools in evacuation areas were closed in the early months of the war. Teaching staff evacuated with their class had been replaced with retired teachers and the call-up to national service affected the supply of male teachers. In reception areas where a double-shift system operated, children received only half a day of teaching every day. When city schools were in a position to reopen, accommodation was hampered by the fact that some schools had been occupied by military personnel. Junior and senior leaving certificates were suspended at the beginning of the war. The raising of the school leaving age to 15, which was due to be implemented the day war was declared, was also temporarily set aside. Teachers attempted to combat some of these negative aspects with the establishment of home study groups in evacuation areas. These sessions helped bring teachers and pupils closer together, with both groups experiencing a renewed understanding of the other.

This chapter also discussed the psychological aspect of evacuation and included extracts from interviews with the people who lived through the bombing raids on Clydebank. The conclusion of the research showed that there was no long-term effect of school closure on educational attainment levels. Furthermore, the modifications in education resulting from war and
evacuation had gradually and permanently changed the lives of children, which meant people like Edna were able to enjoy the effects of the new educational policy legislation when the school leaving age was raised.696

Chapter VI

This chapter was based on the oral testimonies of former evacuees in conjunction with documentary evidence and secondary sources. It sought to demonstrate how their involvement helped shape the ensuing welfare developments which resulted from war and evacuation.

The cumulative evidence from the oral interviews led to the conclusion that whatever way evacuation is remembered, and no matter how brief a period that was spent away from home, the experience is forever imprinted in the memory of those who took part. There were no bravery medals given out to evacuees, or any particular recognition given to their courageous efforts to withstand the disruption and losses of war. For people like Dennis, Charlie and Isa, who witnessed their homes being bombed and had to flee from Clydebank with nothing more than the clothes they wore, their stories have until now been left untold.697 For them, as for many of the Clydebank residents, the warfare to welfare theory is evident in the way in which they were able to rebuild their lives within a relatively short time after the blitz. Each of these evacuees had either returned with their family to their

696 Interview with Edna, recorded on 1 July 2010. Transcript held with author.
Interview with Isa, recorded on 30 March 2015. Transcript held with author.
697 Interview with Dennis, recorded on 21 November 2014. Transcript held with author.
Interview with Charlie, recorded on 17 October 2014. Transcript held with author.
Interview with Isa, recorded on 30 March 2015. Transcript held with author.
refurbished or rebuilt homes, or been placed in new homes, often before the end of the war. They shared the benefits of a renewed welfare system of medical care and, while they were unable to take advantage of an extended educational system, in time their children were able to enjoy what their parents had helped to achieve. From the interviews it was evident that there was a quiet acceptance of what happened to these evacuees.

**Conclusion**

In sum this thesis has argued that evacuation was instrumental in alerting government and the public to the profound necessity for action in health, education and living conditions of the children from the cities. It touched upon the policy implications of evacuation and its impact on the political climate in the aftermath of the war and of the Labour Party’s rise to power. The thesis did not cover the actions of the Labour government in the post-war years, the coming of the National Health Service, Insurance Services or the extent of the implementation of Beveridge’s Report of 1942 on the fight against the five giants of want, disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness, since these were beyond the focus of this research topic. What this thesis has done is to help illuminate Scotland’s social history of wartime evacuation and place it within that of the rest of Britain. It has helped to qualify and exemplify the theory that war ultimately led to improved provision in the areas of health, welfare and education of the Scottish people. It did not make a judgement on the overall success or failure of the evacuation scheme as a wartime expedient, instead it judged the extent to which it was a substantial contributory factor in the resultant social welfare developments.
The significance of interviews conducted and the theoretical framework were provided to support a wide ranging consideration of the three main issues of health, education and religion. It is evident further local and regional studies on the subject of the fate of evacuees from within Britain and abroad would be beneficial. Moreover research into residential hostels and nurseries, the sick and the elderly, and the developments in adult, technical and university education, for those who lived through the evacuation experience, would also further enhance the knowledge of the evacuation process.

The evidence contained in this collection of oral histories has proved that even seventy-five years on, the memory of events remains clear in the minds of those who took part in it. Their willingness to help establish the framework for this thesis by agreeing to be interviewed and having their stories recorded and used as a reference for future researchers, is testimony to the value they place on their wartime experience. A key component of this thesis therefore lies in the collection and collation of oral testimony from Scottish evacuees.

When the narratives are viewed alongside the comprehensive written research material, it is clear that the recorded experiences within the evacuation process display a recognition of the need for social reforms in a number of areas. This principle was touched upon by the Commission of Churches which reported in 1941. Their study, *Evacuation and the Churches*, inferred that within the evacuation process the seeds of social
good might be cultivated.\textsuperscript{698} It was also hoped they would be wisely cultivated as valuable compensation could be reaped by a future generation. In agreement with the findings of the Commission of Churches this thesis concludes with the view that the amalgam of activities affecting evacuees, exemplified by this study of the Scottish experience, led to an improvement in the quality and quantity of social welfare provided to post-war generations.

\textsuperscript{698} Commission of the Churches, \textit{Evacuation and The Churches} (1941), p29.
Appendix 1

Interview with Ina, recorded on 4 July 2011.

Evacuated: Coull, Aberdeen, 1 September 1939.
Duration 2 months.
Dunblane, Perthshire, March 1941.
Duration 2 years.

This interview was part of a small focus group of three people, Ina and two relatives: Chrissy and David. All three had been evacuated at the beginning of the war. Ina and Chrissy were evacuated again after the bombing raids on Clydebank.

Ina’s recollection of events was most vivid. She had been evacuated to Coull in Aberdeen at the beginning of the war with her two sisters and her brother. In Aberdeen she recalled how much she had enjoyed being there. She said there was ‘never any strife there and we got on well, we loved the school and had a happy, happy time’. She spoke of having experienced the stars for the first time saying:

…it was the first time in my life I saw the stars properly. …when the nights were a bit darker and the schoolteachers were telling us about the stars and I was fascinated. You live in the city, we lived right in the city, you never saw that!

Ina and one sister and brother were evacuated again in March 1941. This time they were sent to Dunblane in Stirlingshire. There she also enjoyed her life as an evacuee. It was her opinion that they had a better life in Dunblane than they had had in Glasgow. She explained the family situation in
Glasgow where they lived in a room and kitchen in Gallowgate. Their family situation was such that all four children shared a bed, and mother and father slept in a bed recess in their kitchen. They had a shared toilet with the neighbours which was located on the tenement landing. She said of Dunblane, ‘…it was all happy memories and in the winter they got lots of snow there compared to the city’. She remembered sledging there, ‘I loved it. I just loved it!’ She said they were so happy in Dunblane and they never felt homesick. So much so that they did not want to go back to Glasgow.

Religion played a part in Ina’s evacuation. The two years they spent in Dunblane Ina and her sister had lived in two different billets, both of which they had settled into well and enjoyed. Ina, a Roman Catholic, pointed out that in both places the family were Protestants although they made sure Ina and her sister Jessie went to mass every Sunday. While they were there they were made to kneel down and say their prayers at night. The family, she thought, had been very kind to them.

She realised that they never spoke about the evacuation when they went home, nor did she ever think to ask her parents what had happened to them while the children were away. She never found out where her parents had lived when their home was uninhabitable after the bombing raids.

Issues of separation and abandonment discussed in the thesis was a focus of Ina’s testimony. They did not see their brother at all in the two years they spent in Dunblane. He had been sent to live with a family on a farm in Sheriffmuir. Years later she said John told her, ‘I quite liked living on the farm Ina but I was so lonely. I just felt I’d been abandoned’.
Ina said, ‘…he had always kind of resented my parents for a long time and I
never knew this was what it was’. She said that when she looked back over
their lives then she felt ashamed that neither she nor her sister had given
John a second thought or missed him at all. Her only excuse, she admitted,
was that they were just nine and elven years old at the time and they were
happy with the life they were living. It was, she said, ‘a case of out of sight
out of mind’.
Appendix 2

Interview with John and Joan, recorded on 1 July 2011.

Evacuated:  
John - Drumoak, Aberdeenshire, September 1939  
Duration 4 weeks.  
Joan - Cumnock, East Ayrshire, Easter 1940  
Duration – Two or three months.

Husband and wife John and Joan were interviewed together. John had been evacuated at the beginning of the war under the official evacuation scheme. John’s stay away from home lasted four weeks while Joan thought she was away for a number of months at least. Joan had a very different evacuation experience from her husband. She had been sent privately with her siblings around Easter 1940, after her aunt and cousins had gone to Cumnock, and reported back that the neighbour of the family they were staying with was taking in evacuees.

John was slightly confused about the date of the war starting and the date of his evacuation. He remembered going from Glasgow to Aberdeen by train and that he and his sister had been billeted on a farm in a fairly isolated part of the countryside. He recalled that there had been two other evacuees, a mother and daughter, who shared the room with them.

John’s evacuation was relatively short and he had continued to go to school while he was in Aberdeen. Coming home was also quite easy as he said, ‘…most of the people in the school that we were at were people who were from the original school that we were evacuated from’.
John and his sister never really settled in Aberdeen, partly due to the isolation and the two mile walk to school and back each day. Every week a letter came from their parents and in the letter there was a sixpenny piece. His sister saved these until they had enough to send a telegram home asking that their parents collect them. When John and his sister returned to Glasgow their school was still closed and they had no education for a while.

Joan had been evacuated with her sisters and brother to Cumnock and she felt her education had suffered while she was there. None of the others in the class were evacuees. She was in a class of children of varying ages who were all taught together, and she was annoyed by the fact that she had already been taught fractions and decimals and had to go through the process again. She felt the teacher never spoke to her and that she had learned nothing while she was evacuated.

Joan spoke of her sister having missed out on an education much more than she or her brother. Joan’s sister had looked after the family rather than the people they were billeted with. Joan said:

…my sister looked after us, she took us to school and brought us back, so she lost her education then because she’d been out of school for so long, she was a very clever girl too. She did well but she did actually die very young but she didn’t get her education back.

Joan continued:
I wasn’t so bad because I made it all up eventually…but certainly you lost your confidence when you came back. So although it was just months and the summer went into it, you’d missed quite a lot of your friends, and your education, your exams and you just felt different. You just felt you had missed a lot.

On the issue of religion Joan, who was Roman Catholic was told that they could go to Church one afternoon a week for their religious education. She said, ‘…but we didn’t have to go, I was one of four and I went because I liked it. But I remember my two big sisters and my brother didn’t want to go’.
Appendix 3

Interview with Edna, recorded on 1 July 2010.

Evacuated: Dunning, Perthshire, September 1939.
Duration: Five/six years.

Edna was six years old when she was evacuated at the beginning of the war and spent between five and six years in the small village of Dunning on the outskirts of Perth. She had three different billets during that time and felt happy and settled there. When she went home she had some difficulty fitting back into school life in Glasgow.

At the beginning of the interview Edna insisted she did not remember very much about her life as an evacuee. However, as the interview progressed it was clear she remembered a great deal.

Edna spoke about her family circumstances and of the fact that her father had died the year before war broke out. Her mother stayed in Glasgow to look after her own father, and they had made plans for air raids in an attempt to secure the life of at least one or other of them in order that there would be someone to look after the children if the war ended. She said:

…there were shelters built in the back court and a shelter in Alexandra Park so my Grandad would go to one and she (mother) would go to the other. That was always the case…that they split up so that one would be left.
Edna and her two brothers were evacuated with their school in Dennistoun, Glasgow to the small village of Dunning in Perthshire, and she has very happy memories of the time she spent there. Her memory is of having to be chosen from a line of children and of her mother’s insistence that the family stay together. In her opinion this had been very difficult especially as the Dunning farmers had wanted boys. When they had to move from their second billet to make way for Canadian soldiers her older brother was sent to a dairy farm and she and her younger brother were sent to live at the local manse.

She remembered that many of the Glasgow children left Dunning and supposed this was when the bombing raids had died down. When her second brother returned to Glasgow she stayed on in Dunning. She recalled that when she finally went home it had been difficult to settle. She said:

It was just a tiny wee school. It was very strict…which I suppose we were quite used to. But coming back I think that would be more, you know when you have stayed in a village for five years and you get to know people and then you come back to Glasgow and you just don’t know anybody.

She continued:

It was awful…I remember going to Whitehill School and going into the classroom and nobody wanted to sit beside me because I didn’t go to their primary school, everybody was sitting with people from their primary school. I felt as if I knew nobody and at playtime I just
thought, I have had enough of this I am going home…I only knew you took the number seven tram not realising it went to Riddrie and Bellahouston and I took it the wrong way. Looking back…I don’t think I really ever settled at secondary school because of that. We made friends eventually. It was just never the same, it was a bit sad.

She remembered with some sadness that:

There was nobody around that had been evacuated, my brothers of course had left school by that time. I just didn’t know anybody at all. Whereas if I had been in Dunning, I was the Dux of the Dunning School…if you had gone on to secondary school you would have taken all this with you. Whereas you were just nobody when you went to this school and nobody wanted to know. I felt that was quite harrowing.

Edna has fond memories of Dunning and has returned many times.
Appendix 4

Interview with Barbara, 30 June 2014.

Evacuated: Banff, Aberdeenshire, 1 September 1939.
Duration: Four months.

There was a technical failure during this interview and it did not record. Barbara’s story was transcribed verbatim in order that she could read and verify it at the time.

At the beginning of the war Barbara was evacuated with her mother to Banff in Aberdeenshire, she was five years old. She remembered there were children from her school and children from other Edinburgh schools who were all evacuated together. Barbara and her mother were billeted in a house with a family of five children and settled reasonably well, although her mother was quite homesick.

Most of Barbara’s recollections were of coming back to Edinburgh in January 1940 and of how her education developed. This information was pertinent to the educational issues involved in the thesis. Barbara recalled that:

When we came back home the schools in Edinburgh were all closed and the teacher came and taught us in a room in someone’s house. There were quite a few of us being taught together but I don’t remember whose house it was. From what I remember I think we were taught there every morning.
She continued:

I think it was about a year until the schools re-opened and the home study programme kept going all the time the schools were closed so we never missed any of our education.

When schools reopened teachers had seemed quite old, although she believed:

After the schools re-opened life carried on as normal. Classes were just the same…the only difference was that while the war continued the German planes flying back to Germany, after bombing in Glasgow, would drop bombs indiscriminately, just to lighten their load for flying back home.

Barbara did not remember much about what happened at the end of the war although she remembered rationing and thought people were healthier as a result of it and said, ‘…on the whole people were fitter and healthier than they are now’.
Appendix 5

Interview with Jack, 10 July 2012.

Evacuated: Rothesay 1940.
Duration: Four months.

Jack has been deaf from birth and his interview was not recorded. He had given a series of talks to various school groups on his wartime experiences. He passed on these printed notes which included a section on his evacuation to Rothesay in the summer of 1940.

Jack and his mother were evacuated to Rothesay with his cousins (he refers to them as hearing cousins). Jack could not go to school in Rothesay as there was no deaf school there. As a result he felt he missed out considerably on his education. He stayed in Rothesay until September 1940 and while he was there he missed his friends who started leaving him out when he returned to Glasgow.

The family had to move to Ilford in 1943 and Jack went to a hearing school there. It was Jack’s opinion that war had temporarily affected his education, although he felt that once the teachers understood his handicap he began to get on well at school with the other pupils and staff. By the end of the war he felt he had managed to attain a high level of education, and on leaving school he was given a good report and recommendations from the Head Teacher. This helped him gain employment as a printing apprentice.

It was in Ilford that Jack really suffered the effects of war as he witnessed the death of friends and neighbours when their homes suffered direct hits by
German bombers. These traumatic events have stayed with Jack throughout his life and in his personal testimony he freely admits that it affected every part of his life as a result of witnessing bombing and death at first hand.
Appendix 6

Interview with Les, recorded on 6 July 2010.

Evacuated: Dunning, Perthshire, 1 September 1939.
Duration: Five years.

Les was evacuated to Dunning, Perthshire, with his school in Dennistoun, Glasgow, at the beginning of the war. He moved back to Dunning and the people he had been billeted with after completing his National Service. He has lived there ever since. He said:

I went…to stay with my grandparents because my mother died when I was two and my father was killed in the war. They (the grandparents) came up to Dunning occasionally…I came back to Dunning in September 1955. I liked the country. I liked the way of life here.699

Arriving as an evacuee his lasting memory was the fear of being left behind when all the other children had been picked. His testimony reflected the worry expressed by evacuees generally concerning being the last child left when all the others had been billeted.

When Les was chosen however it was to be completely life changing. The couple who had chosen him were to become his family not just for the duration of the war but forever. This was in spite of the fact that in the beginning he felt the locals and the evacuees did not really mix much. He said:

699 Interview with Les, recorded on 4 July 2010. See full transcript in Appendix 6.
We had our own school and teachers and a bit of banter kind of thing. We called them Country yokels they called us Glasgow Keelies.

Les settled into country life and it suited him so much more than living in Glasgow. He felt much more at home in Dunning and discussed the class structure surrounding his Glasgow home. He explained:

Actually the part that I lived in Glasgow you can say it wasn’t a rough area it was a snobby area. It is a rough area now. More or less it is, apart from they have made the old school into luxury flats. So that’s the kind of area but I like the country. The man that I was evacuated with, he was a haulage contractor. The Army took the lorries off him when Dunkirk happened. They gave him a couple of long lorries. He got fed up with them and started travelling for a living and that’s where I come in. That’s what I liked about here. That was one of the main reasons I came back here. I liked the way of life.

When asked if that was why he went back to Dunning after the Army and after school he replied:

I got sent to a public school Chingford in Essex and I hated it. My auntie put me there. …I hated it. I didn’t fit in there at all coming from here. I talked my Granny into signing my papers and joined the Army to get out. …I joined Boy Service in the Army. I went into the Army on 15 January 1947. The Army was different in those days. I was in Tripoli and Libya. …when I was only 15.
From the Army Les came straight back to Dunning in 1955 and settled there.
Appendix 7

Interview with Charlie, recorded on 17 October 2014.

Evacuated: Coatbridge, Lanarkshire, 1 September 1939.
Duration: One year.
Helensburgh, March 1941.
Duration: Three years.

Charlie had been evacuated at the beginning of the war and again when Clydebank was bombed. He gave a personal interview and was also part of a small focus group of four who were all involved in a writing group in Clydebank. His story is included in the Clydebank Lifestory Group, Untold Stories: Remembering Clydebank in War Time (Clydebank: Clydeside Press, 1999).

Charlie and his family were evacuated after the bombing in Clydebank near Glasgow. He believed that until the day he dies the memory of that time will stay with him. He said:

You sort of grew up with the thought of the whole of Clydebank, out of the 47,000 houses there was only 7 not touched. To see the bodies at that age!

His family home suffered a direct hit from an incendiary bomb and Charlie described saving his brother. He said:

This one came right in and hurt my mother on the foot and it fell over and burst into flames. It would have set anything on fire but because it was concrete it didn’t… It was like putting a fluorescent light on
and you couldn’t see it. My dad just pulled my mother out, lifted the baby out…I jumped over the bomb and then my brother wouldn’t come out, he was in the corner screaming his head off. I had to jump back in and take him and we both jumped over the bomb and that was it…it was an incendiary bomb but if it had been a bomb we wouldn’t be here today to tell the story.

The children had to leave their bombed out house bare footed and wearing only their pyjamas. When the family got to an air raid shelter another incendiary bomb blew up three feet away from them. Charlie’s fear at this time was that they would be buried with the earth from the explosion.

Directly after the bombing Charlie and his family were evacuated to Coatbridge for a short time. They had a room in someone’s house which all six of them shared for at least a year. Two further years were spent in Renfrew with relatives before the family moved to Whitecrook, eventually returning to their Clydebank home which was rebuilt in 1945.

During his evacuation Charlie felt his education suffered. He felt cheated when, having turned fourteen before the war ended, he had had to leave school. This meant he was unable to make up the time that had been lost when schools were closed at the beginning of the war. He said:

I remember the schools being shut and the army was in the schools. You ended up either in a Church Hall getting slightly educated part of the day and then that fell away and I felt I had lost a lot of schooling,
you know with shifting from Coatbridge to Renfrew, from Renfrew to Whitecrook and finally getting back to our own house.
Appendix 8

Interview with Violet, recorded on 17 October 2014.

Evacuated: Helensburgh, Dunbartonshire, March 1941.
Duration: Six months.

When the advertisement was placed in the Clydebank Post for volunteers to give an account of their evacuation experience during the Second World War, the assistant at the newspaper office had a contact at the Clydebank Life Story Group. She gave them the details and the organiser of the group helped locate a number of people willing to re-count their wartime experience. Violet was eighteen when she was evacuated and was keen to tell her story. Her experience of the Clydebank Blitz appears in Untold Stories: Remembering Clydebank in War Time (Clydebank: Clydeside Press, 1999).

When the war arrived in Glasgow, Violet’s family home in Clydebank was destroyed by a bomb, a home her widowed mother had saved for and they had lived in for only six weeks. After their home was bombed Violet’s brother went with some of her relatives to Helensburgh. She and her mother stayed on until further air raids forced them to make their way there too. They had to walk part of the way and tried to hitch a ride from passing cars. It was at that time Violet was very aware of her social status as she described what happened. She said:

…this big posh car stopped, chauffeur driven car, and the man who was the passenger, he opened the door and says ‘are you from Clydebank?’ and we said ‘yes’. He asked where we were going and
we told him we were trying to get to Helensburgh...so they took us in a chauffeur driven car from Dumbarton to Helensburgh.

Violet, with her mother and brother, remained in Helensburgh for six months and Violet travelled daily to the Singer Sewing Machine Company, in Clydebank, where she worked as a shorthand typist. The family were billeted in upper Helensburgh with a lady whom she described as ‘very posh’ in a ‘great big house’ but, she added, she had ‘no feelings whatsoever’.

The awareness of the social division between host and evacuee was evident in much of Violet’s testimony. During the interview she mentioned that on her return to Helensburgh, after a particularly long day, she thought she would walk the quick way along the drive to their room in the servant’s quarters, when she was stopped by one of the servants. She described what happened saying:

…it was a long day cause you were away about seven in the morning and not maybe back to about seven at night. Anyway, I decided instead of going straight up I would go in the big drive…so I cut off this big corner you see. …she came to the front door and said ‘don’t you ever use this drive again’. So I had to go back down and come away back round again and go in the servant’s entrance.

Violet stressed how annoyed she was about the servant’s attitude as she shared a room with her mother. She said:
My mother and my brother, who was fifteen, he was three years younger than me, were allocated, must have been one of the servant’s rooms, and there were only two beds in it, two single beds, like hospital beds. Well we didn’t mind that if they had been free but my mother and I had to share a bed and she was getting paid for three people. …you know she really wasn’t a nice person.

In spite of the billeting arrangements and having to travel back and forward to work daily Violet enjoyed much of life in Helensburgh. She said that:

It was a lovely summer and you had the bathing pool and my chum, they lived up in Mill Road. She was quite well off, her father was a manager in Yarrows so they paid for their accommodation at Craigendoran. Erin and I were in the swimming pool and out on the rowing boats and all the rest of it. We were having a great time but my brother was absolutely fed up.

As a result, when her mother returned to Clydebank Violet stayed on in Helensburgh and continued to enjoy the sporting activities.
Appendix 9

Interview with Honour, recorded on 13 November 2014.

Evacuated: Auchterarder, Perthshire, 7 September 1939.
Duration: Six weeks.

Honour was a pupil at Laurel Bank School in Glasgow and one of two privately educated pupils who were interviewed. She was evacuated with her school at the beginning of the war. The week after war was declared Honour’s parents had taken her to Strathallan Castle where the juniors were staying. The senior pupils from the school were billeted in Auchterarder. She was there for just six weeks as she said:

My parents brought me home because they didn’t see the sense in me being evacuated and Alistair (her brother) being in town. They thought we might as well all be together and so I spent the rest of the war at home.

Her parents were of the opinion that if anything happened to one of the family, it might as well happen to all of them. Honour had not really enjoyed being at Strathallan. The girls all slept in camp beds and there was no privacy whatsoever. When she returned to school in Glasgow she thought there was a definite divide between those who had stayed behind and those who had been evacuated. She said:

I can remember them (the evacuees) coming back to school when they were about, must have been 14 or 15 I think. It was the evacuees and the rest of us. They were obviously friendly with each other but it
was very much Auchterarder and Lily Bank. I think some of them, depending probably on their age, in fact I know some of them were still Strathallenites or Auchterarderites until we left school. They made their friends and I think they just carried on with them and we had ours but we were very, initially, we were pretty much divided. Auchterarder sat there and Lily Bank sat there sort of thing.

The fact that Laurel Bank School re-opened so soon after war being declared meant Honour felt she had not missed out on her education. She said:

…our education really didn’t suffer in any way at all. It was a relatively short space of time although we were three classes in one initially and just in house four which was the end of the terrace, but by the end of the war we were using all our houses and we had all gone back to individual classes.

Honour’s school and home life were fairly back to normal before the war ended and she did not remember anything about the end of the war. Most of Honour’s interview surrounded her return to Glasgow and to Laurel Bank School which had been re-opened by an ex-headmistress within the first month of the war. The site of the junior school was Lily Bank Terrace where the school had three houses. As war progressed the school got more or less back to normal. They carried on playing sport all through the war, travelling from Botanic Gardens to Scotstoun Hill to the playing fields once or twice a week for games. They travelled by tramcar or bus and latterly it was her opinion that they would not have known there was a war on apart from the air raid warnings. She recalled they had, ‘…an air raid warning
every day initially and we all had to foregather, I think in our classrooms initially, but I then think laterally in the cloakroom’.
Appendix 10

Interview with Jim, recorded on 4 July 2010.

Jim is a resident of Dunning, Perthshire. Jim began his testimony with the memory of the day the evacuees arrived in the village. His narrative is representative of the way in which evacuation was responsible for the development of lasting friendship:

I would be 9 when they arrived in September. All I can mind is the bus bringing them up from the railway station. I think they were a rough lot. A lot of them were really wee…

There was as many of them gone away home just within a month because nothing had happened then. I think they did a re-evacuation after Clydebank. …It was amazing how quickly we all managed to fit into the school again. They actually used what was the cookery, as what we talk about which is now the Community use hall up the top of Dregan, at the top of the Brae. By that time they still had two of their own teachers here I think… We didn’t have a lot to do with them in that respect. Now their teachers were in in the morning our teachers were in in the afternoon. That was it you just never the twain shall meet kind of thing. There was no cross purposes. They were half days. I cannot tell you how long as the memory doesn’t… they had half days. Because that was you free in the afternoon if there wasn’t any tatties.

Jim spoke of the two Glasgow evacuees who were billeted with his family:
Well John, Billy and us became very friendly all the way through. Because John as I say went to Middle Third you didn’t go to the first. Him and Billy and they were brought back from Middle Third and went into St. Paul’s Church Manse. Their sister was with them as well but it was after that that they came to us. They were with us for about two years. They were among I would say among the last of them to be back.

…They lived as part of the family. The mother used to come up and visit and after they left us they went to Balgowan House near Methven. I don’t think they were that long there because by that time things had died down a bit as far as evacuees were concerned and they were just away back home.

When the war was over the family stayed in touch with their Glasgow evacuees and they remained lifelong friends.
Appendix 11

Interview with David, recorded on 4 July 2010.

David has lived in Dunning in Perthshire all his life. He was a schoolboy of eight when approximately 300 evacuee children from Glasgow arrived in the village at the beginning of the war.

When the evacuees arrived with some of their teachers the little school with about 100 pupils was suddenly crowded. They had to work a double-shift system where the Dunning children were taught in the afternoon and the evacuees in the morning session. David complained that he would rather have been taught in the forenoon. He said:

…we had to stay clean until the afternoon where I’d rather have been in the forenoon and get away playing …but apart from that we got on fine.

It was his opinion that some of the Glasgow children had no idea how to treat the wildlife they found in the village and that:

…one or two of them were wildish, I got four up the wood there and they stole a duck from the farmer and lit the fire up the den and chopped it’s head off with a chopper and was roasting the duck on the fire…

He remembered that a lot of the children went back to Glasgow quite quickly only to return when the bombing raids began in Clydebank.
Private evacuees from the South of England were also in Dunning and there were some borstal boys from Glasgow who were billeted in Auchterarder. David met some of these people again when he did his national service. Overall David had no problem with the evacuees who came to live in the village and understood how they were kept sheltered from the events of the war.
Appendix 12

Interview with Dennis, recorded on 21 November 2014.

Evacuated: Helensburgh: 1 September 1939.
Duration: Four months.
Helensburgh: March 1941.
Duration: Two years and two months.

The above dates are loosely estimated. Dennis had been evacuated at the beginning of the war and, like the other Clydebank evacuees interviewed for this thesis, he returned to his home before the town was bombed.

Dennis did not remember much about his first evacuation at the beginning of the war. What he remembered most was what happened after the bombing in Clydebank when he and his family were taken to a primary school in Coatdyke, a little village which lies between Coatbridge and Airdrie, in what is now north Lanarkshire. The family, he recalled had to sleep on blankets on the floor in one of the classrooms. After a few weeks the family were moved to a friend’s home in Helensburgh.

Dennis had no problems having to be evacuated and thought the experience was generally good. He remembered his teacher as ‘a wonderful person. …she had a soft touch with the evacuees but she treated everybody the same’. Going back to Glasgow in 1943 he said:

…life went on, it was terrific, the orange juice and cod liver oil, you don’t take anything for granted. No, it was great.
On the subject of his continued education he explained that he was Roman Catholic and there was only one Catholic school in West Dunbartonshire that offered a higher education. He said that:

…you had to score on a four hour exam, two hours in the morning and two in the afternoon. You had to score over 75% to get the higher education. I can remember that there was 7 of us, out of close on 70 in the class. All the classes were muddled but that was it, I thought it was disgraceful myself. Very clever kids getting deprived for one or two marks. …you could leave when you were not quite fourteen.

He remembered his mother was very nervous when the family returned to Clydebank and, in his words, ‘wouldn’t let me out of her sight’. He said:

That was the same for all the other brothers. They didn’t let you off the leash too far. You had to be in at night as soon as it was starting to get dark… Eventually the war was going well for us. …parents were able to relax then. We knew that after D-Day that it was just a matter of time.

Some of what Dennis said in his interview pointed to the fact that the emotional trauma children suffered during the war went undetected. Dennis’s happy memory of being evacuated was overshadowed by the dramatic and fearful events he experience during the Clydebank blitz. He had recurring nightmares and remembered being stressed out with broken sleep for months afterwards. He said:
…that affected you and you don’t get any doctor to come up to you and give you a wee sedative or anything like that, you had to just grin and bear it you know.

Dennis recognised that what he suffered at the time was a type of post-traumatic stress. This was never discussed with his family and therefore the problem had never been addressed.
Appendix 13

Interview with Margaret, recorded on 29 December 2014.

Evacuated: Auchterarder, Perthshire. 1 September 1939.
Duration: One year.

Margaret was the second pupil from Laurel Bank School in Glasgow who agreed to be interviewed. She was a senior in her last year of school when war broke out. The senior school girls were evacuated to Auchterarder and the junior school girls were sent to Strathallan Castle. At seventeen Margaret recalled not being at all homesick when she was sent to Auchterarder and rather enjoyed the time she spent in the countryside. She described where they stayed and the surrounding area:

Half a dozen of us were billeted up in the village with the local lawyer who was a very respectable bloke and had a large house with a garden sloping down to the river… It is very full of Churches which I have never really worked out, but it has a big history connected to the Disruption, so you have a choice of Churches.

As far as Churches go, two of my fellow students, I suppose you would call them fellow pupils, were still doing Greek so they had to go to one of the Ministers of one of the Churches who had enough Greek to do a little teaching. So they used to go down to him, but for Sunday we were always expected to go to Church. We found out that the service in the Episcopal Church was shorter. Our English teacher was an Episcopalian so half a dozen of us unreligious lot said we would go…
On health care during evacuation Margaret said:

The girls who were up with me were supposed to be in need of special care. My sister came because she hadn’t been well and she stayed on for three years and I was there for one year.

She thought the girls had:

…a very cushy billet I must say although it wasn’t terrifically comfortable. We had camp beds and it was rather cold. …the unfortunate people were landed with us you see. If we had been from the east end of Glasgow we would have gone back as quickly as we could. But we stayed on.

Margaret enjoyed the fresh air and the outdoor activities. She said:

It was very cold that autumn and winter and very beautiful, lovely clear skies and I had never been a whole year long in the country, and I thought it was really rather good because it is lovely country round there. It was so easy to get around on a bike. There was little traffic and we had a lot of freedom. At weekends we would go off on bicycle rides for five or ten miles, something like that, which was really very nice, we were very free.

It wasn’t like the standard boarding school on which we were fed stories of course, all of us had read school stories like Angela Brazil, the Chalet Girls, that kind of thing, but it was much more fun than that. We knew everybody. We were trusted in a way and quite
rightly I think because we weren’t too silly, and so we went roaming round that area…
…we had a regular run on school work. We more or less followed the same curriculum that we would have done. In some ways I should say it was rather like a kind of school that… in the mid nineteenth century a young lady would have gone to in terms of academic rigour but it wasn’t bad actually, we got a lot of individual attention but it was limited by the fact that there weren’t an awful lot of subjects available.

The Laurel Bank girls were sheltered from the effects of war while they were in Perthshire. Margaret said:

We didn’t get much in the way of newspapers and I don’t remember we heard a radio so we were kind of insulated from the news of the day which at that time was the phoney war anyway. But as far as school work went we could carry on quite well with languages but we never had very good science teaching.
Appendix 14

Interview with Pat, recorded on 20 July 2010.

Evacuated: Tighnabruaich, 1 September 1939.
  Duration: Two weeks.
  Dumbarton, March 1941.
  Duration: 10 months.

Pat was evacuated with her twin brother at the beginning of the war. She was extremely unhappy and very homesick although the people they were billeted with were very good to them and treated them well. Pat described how she first realised that being evacuated was more than just a temporary arrangement. She said:

  …it was a brother and two sisters…they were very friendly. …they were lovely people. They had hens and all that in the back yard, and they had fruit trees. Of course then you didn’t know how long you were going to be there for. To us, we thought it was part of a holiday, you were so young…and then it dawned on you really, here I am, staying here.

Pat’s surprise and excitement about being able to return to her home in Clydebank was described in emotional terms. Her description of what happened possibly reflected the feelings of many of the children who were sent away in the first wave of the evacuation scheme. She said:

  I was walking along the sea front…feeling sorry for myself …and I could see two women each carrying a child in their arms and another
woman, but I wasn’t paying attention to them. …the next minute I heard a voice shouting ‘Trisha’ and when I looked over it was my mother. …my heart just lifted.
So that must have been that, two weeks it must have been but to me it felt like eternity.

Pat was settled back in Clydebank when the town was bombed. She and her sister remembered with sadness the loss of friends and neighbours when a shelter near their home was bombed and all the women who were sitting on one side of the shelter were killed. The men sitting on the opposite side all survived. After the raids the family moved to Dumbarton for ten months until they could return to Clydebank.
Appendix 15

Interview with Colin, 4 February 2015.

Evacuated: Cardross, Argyll, March 1941.
   Duration: unknown.
   Helensburgh, date unknown.
   Duration: unknown.

Colin’s interview was brief and not recorded as he had spent some considerable time writing out the story of his life during the war. He was happy to pass on his story to be used in this thesis.

The family evacuation to Cardross after the bombing in Clydebank was a lasting memory of the time. Colin and his siblings were separated from their mother for six weeks during their stay in Cardross and his story helps reinforce the personal trauma of separation which has, to some extent, been missed from existing accounts of the history of evacuation. Colin’s account of life as an evacuee also drew attention to how aware children could be of their social status. Colin freely admitted he remembered very little about war until after the family were settled in Cardross. He said:

   I am not sure exactly where we were taken to after leaving Cardross. We were to stay in various places following our evacuation from Clydebank. My instinct tells me we were taken to Helensburgh, to a place up in Queen Street. As near as we could get to living like toffs!

He goes on to give a description of where they were billeted in Helensburgh and compared it with his home in Clydebank:
Our living accommodation was in a large room above which could have been stables or perhaps a garage. The room was huge and we were only using half of it. Compared to Gordon Street it was like a palace.

… You can imagine that we thought that we were in heaven.

Colin’s awareness of the social divide was evident in his school life too. When the family were finally settled back in Clydebank and he was enrolled into Junior Secondary School he wrote that:

In our class you could easily tell the ones who were better off. They always had a proper play piece. If we had a buttered scone we thought we’d won the pools.

Colin’s narrative was also concerned with the problem of separation and abandonment he felt at the time. The family lived in various places during their evacuation although Colin has no recollection of how long they spent in each place. All this he had been able to deal with until he and his siblings were separated from their mother suddenly and without explanation. This was something he would never forget. He said:

…the family were split up for some time, and for part of that time my mother simply disappeared. This was a constant worry to me and I think the not knowing where she’d gone was the worst part.

During the interview Colin looked at a photograph of himself with his family when they were all evacuated. With regret he said that there was no
one left to ask what had happened to their mother during the time she had disappeared. He thought she may have been admitted to Airthrey Castle Maternity Home but he has no way of verifying this.

Colin’s testimony also drew attention to absent fathers and gave some indication of how difficult it would have been for parents to reintegrate with their family. His father had enlisted in the army and he wrote about his homecoming when some of the family believed he was a stranger. He said while they were in Helensburgh there was a knock on the door:

My brother Bobby was sent to answer it. Back he comes to tell mother that there was a soldier at the door. Mother hurries to the door only to return with the said soldier. ‘You silly beggar’ she said ‘that’s your father’. …I had no idea how long he was away, but it was long enough for his family to have forgotten him.
Appendix 16

Interview with James, 4 February 2015.

Evacuated: Kilmun, Argyll, 1 September 1939.
Duration: Approximately one year.
Helensburgh, March 1941.
Duration: unknown.
Cardrosspark Children’s Home, possibly April 1941.
Six weeks.

James’s narrative failed to record and therefore had to be written out and verified on the day of the interview. A significant part of James’s story focused on events in his life after the war. There were however issues raised concerning education and separation which were particularly relevant to the themes discussed in this thesis.

At the beginning of the war James was evacuated to Kilmun and stayed there until the autumn of 1940. Throughout the time he was evacuated he did not feel that his education had suffered. He recalled:

The school was still closed and the local teacher decided she was going to start a class for us. There were probably about a dozen boys in the morning and the girls in the afternoon. She was a wonderful teacher.

The problem was that when James returned to Clydebank he was in his final year of school. He said:
I went to High School for my final year but I couldn’t get a leaving certificate. I left school at thirteen and began work as a window cleaner then eventually I worked with my father as a chimney sweep.

James accepted the fact that he was unable to continue his education beyond the age of thirteen, and that he missed out on job opportunities due to the curtailment of the junior leaving certificate during the war. This demonstration of acceptance continued in James’s narrative as he explained what happened when the family were once again evacuated after Clydebank was bombed. At that time the family were evacuated to Helensburgh and his mother was pregnant and spent time in Airthrey Castle where she had the baby. He said, ‘…the rest of the children were taken to Cardrosspark Children’s Home and we stayed there for six weeks’. As a result of being told what was happening James did not suffer from any separation or abandonment issues when he and his siblings were sent to the Children’s Home.
Appendix 17

Interview with Christine, recorded on 21 July 2010.
Evacuated: Draffin Farm, Forfar. 1 September 1939.
Duration: unknown (possibly two years).

Christine’s narrative began from the time she arrived in Forfar with her
mother and aunt and four children. Christine admitted that there was not
terribly much she remembered about her evacuation as she was just six or
seven years old at the time. She did remember that the place where she and
her family were billeted was fairly remote and was relatively primitive
compared with her home in Glasgow. She said the place was ‘very derelict’.
There was no running water and bathing was done in a zinc bath once a
week, a process which took place in the scullery. Bathing was followed by a
process of hair combing with a nit comb.

There were no buses to take the children to school and the children had a
long walk through country lanes to get there every day. Nevertheless she
was not unhappy as an evacuee.

Life in the country was very different for Christine than the one she had
known in Glasgow. However, when the family returned from Forfar life in
Glasgow had changed in the aftermath of the Clydebank bombing and she
had to get used to this. She recalled the dangers involved in the process that
was adopted in case of an emergency. She said that:
…in front of the close there was an air raid shelter. There was a barricade thing so that if any bombs fell they wouldn’t go in …the debris wouldn’t go into the close …we were always told to go to the low down houses. When you think about it we would have been trapped but nobody knew.
Appendix 18

Interview with Isa, Charlie, Colin and Liz, recorded on 30 March 2015.

This was a focus group interview where three of the respondents had been evacuated after the Clydebank Blitz. All respondents are involved with the Clydebank Life Story Group who hold a writing workshop once a month. They kindly offered to tell their story collectively although Charlie and Colin had given separate interviews. From among this group Isa’s testimony is the one which had not been heard on a previous occasion and Liz had not been involved in the evacuation process at all. She had come to the group in the hope of being able to add something of value to the story of Clydebank in wartime.

The interview began with a discussion concerning the Clydebank blitz. All the members of the group questioned the validity of the statistics in relation to the number of Clydebank residents who were killed during the blitz and of the number of homes that were damaged or destroyed. They believed collectively that more had died than was reported. They were also in agreement with Colin that it was what he called, ‘…these urban myths that grow up’. Colin questioned the statistics relating to the blitz and asked, ‘…who found out that there were only five houses undamaged?’

Isa’s memory of the blitz is still clear. After seventy-five years she said:
…at night when I am lying in bed and I wake up and hear a plane going over it brings it all back. It is just as though it happened yesterday. Oh! Yes, you don’t forget.

Isa and her family had to be evacuated after their home was bombed in March 1941. She explained that her family lost everything her parents had built up from twenty-seven years of marriage:

…we were left with not a teaspoon. …we joined the queue and we got on the bus and they were not allowed to tell us where we were being taken. We travelled through all the fires and passed the Singer wood yard which had burnt for weeks and the Esso tanks. …we got to Alexandria and we were taken into a church hall and we were there for a fortnight sleeping on the floor. …the people of Alexandria couldn’t have been better. They helped us such a lot. …there was a Mission Hall in Alexandria and they owned a row of old people’s cottages…they cleared out two attics and gave us these. …people of Alexandria came with bedding and china and cutlery because there was absolutely nothing…

After two years the family returned to a new home in Clydebank and afterwards Isa’s parents never talked about what happened. She said:

…We just took it, it had happened and we had to get over it and I think sometimes they must have wanted to forget about it.
Charlie and Colin agreed. Colin said: ‘…I think a lot of our parents…just shut it out completely’.
## Appendix 19

### Respondent List

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
<th>Date of evacuation and age when evacuated</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>David</td>
<td>6 July 2010</td>
<td>Not evacuated but lived in Dunning when the evacuees came – age 8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Sheila</td>
<td>6 July 2010</td>
<td>September 1939 – Privately evacuated</td>
<td>Dunning, Perthshire</td>
<td>Two weeks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jim</td>
<td>6 July 2010</td>
<td>Not evacuated but lived in Dunning when the evacuees came and his family provided accommodation to two evacuees</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Les</td>
<td>6 July 2010</td>
<td>September 1939 – age 7</td>
<td>Dunning, Perthshire</td>
<td>Five/six years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edna</td>
<td>20 July 2010</td>
<td>September 1939 – age 6</td>
<td>Dunning, Perthshire</td>
<td>Five years</td>
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<td>Mary</td>
<td>24 July 2010</td>
<td>Not evacuated but had evacuees stay at the family home for two years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date of Birth</td>
<td>Date of Evacuation</td>
<td>Evacuation Details</td>
<td>Other Details</td>
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<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Irene</td>
<td>25 July 2010</td>
<td>September 1919</td>
<td>Alloa, Clackmannan Stirling</td>
<td>Unknown Two years</td>
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<td>John</td>
<td>1 July 2011</td>
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<td>Drumoak, Aberdeen</td>
<td>Four weeks</td>
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<td>Joan</td>
<td>1 July 2011</td>
<td>September 1939 – age 9 - Privately evacuated</td>
<td>Cumnock, Ayrshire</td>
<td>Nine months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ina</td>
<td>4 July 2011</td>
<td>September 1939 – age 8 March 1941 – age 9</td>
<td>Coull, Aberdeen Dunblane, Perthshire</td>
<td>Two months Two years</td>
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<td>Chrissie</td>
<td>4 July 2011</td>
<td>September 1939 – age 8 March 1941 – age 9</td>
<td>Inverurie, Aberdeenshire Girvan, Ayrshire</td>
<td>Unknown duration Unknown duration – mother missed her and brought her home</td>
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<td>Lanark</td>
<td>One year</td>
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<td>Pat</td>
<td>20 July 2010</td>
<td>September 1939 – age 5</td>
<td>Tighnabruaich, Kyles of Bute</td>
<td>Two weeks</td>
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<td>Christine</td>
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<td>September 1939 – age 6/7</td>
<td>Draffin Farm, Forfar</td>
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<td>Jack</td>
<td>10 July 2012</td>
<td>September 1939 – age 9 Privately evacuated</td>
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<td>Three months</td>
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<td>Barbara</td>
<td>20 June 2014</td>
<td>September 1939 – age 5</td>
<td>Banff, Aberdeenshire</td>
<td>Four/five months</td>
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<td>Charlie</td>
<td>17 October 2014</td>
<td>March 1941 - age 11 March 1942 - age 12 March 1944 - age 14</td>
<td>Coatbridge, Lanarkshire Renfrew, Renfrewshire Whitecrook, Clydebank</td>
<td>One year Two years One year</td>
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<td>Violet</td>
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<td>Helensburgh</td>
<td>Six months</td>
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<td>Honour</td>
<td>13 November 2014</td>
<td>September 1939 – age (unknown)</td>
<td>Strathallan Castle, Perthshire (Juniors of Laurel Bank School, Glasgow)</td>
<td>Six weeks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date of Birth/Death</td>
<td>Date of Evacuation/Dating of Arrival</td>
<td>Location of Evacuation</td>
<td>Length of Stay</td>
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<td>--------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dennis</td>
<td>21 November 2014</td>
<td>March 1941 – age 6</td>
<td>Helensburgh</td>
<td>Two years and eight months</td>
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<tr>
<td>Margaret</td>
<td>29 December 2014</td>
<td>September 1939 – age 17</td>
<td>Auchterarder, Perthshire (Seniors of Laurel Bank School, Glasgow)</td>
<td>One year</td>
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<td>Colin</td>
<td>4 February 2015</td>
<td>March 1941 – age unknown</td>
<td>Cardross, Helensburgh, Rhu, Cardross Park Children’s Home</td>
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<td>James</td>
<td>4 February 2015</td>
<td>September 1939 – age unknown</td>
<td>Kilmun, Argyll and Bute Helensburgh and Cardross Park Children’s Home</td>
<td>One year</td>
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<td>Focus Group of Isa, Charlie, Colin and Liz</td>
<td>30 March 2015</td>
<td>March 1941</td>
<td>Alexandria, Dunbartonshire</td>
<td>Two years</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rosa</td>
<td>13 July 2016</td>
<td>Evacuated to Britain on the first Kindertransport – December 1938 – age 13</td>
<td>London – then Scotland</td>
<td>Rosa never went back to Germany – she is now 90 +</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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