Chapter 1: ‘Dressed in a little brief authority’: Authority Before, During, and After Shakespeare’s Plays

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In his epigram ‘To William Camden’ Ben Jonson praised his friend and former schoolmaster in the following lavish manner:

What name, what skill, what faith hast thou in things!
What sight in searching the most antique springs!
What weight, and what authority in thy speech!
Man scarce can make that doubt, but thou canst teach.

(Jonson, 2012, V, pp. 119-20 [ll. 7-10])

Jonson’s anaphoric praise locates Camden’s scholarly merits in both his deep knowledge of the past and his mastery of eloquence; the list of attributes conjoins his attention to ‘things’ with his historical perspicuity and his proficiency in ‘speech’. Camden is celebrated for matter, knowledge, and style, and then finally, as a result of all these, for his virtuoso pedagogy. The anaphora, moreover, suggests an equivalence between these attributes, emphasizing that it is their combination that earns Camden the accolade of the man to whom Britain owes her ‘great renown and name’ (ll. 3-4) earlier in the epigram. As such, the poem is an entirely fitting tribute to a man who was at once pedagogue, grammarian, antiquary, and historian.

Strikingly, Jonson couches this compliment to his former teacher, first and foremost, in terms of authority, with the anaphora culminating in the hypermetrical ‘and what authority in thy speech’ (l. 8). Authority in early modern English commonly denoted the ‘power to influence the opinion of others, esp. because of one’s recognized knowledge or scholarship’ (OED, s.v. ‘authority’, n. III. 5[a]), a usage synonymous with classical learning and acknowledged expertise. This is the sense that pertains in Jonson’s poem: Camden’s authority as a writer and scholar is predicated on his historical learning, his plumbing ‘antique springs’. That authority, moreover, is also inextricably linked with classical and humanist learning: the second line of the second couplet is an imitation of Pliny the Younger’s praise for his friend the Roman lawyer Titius Aristo (nihil est quod discere velis quod ille docere non possit [1.22.2]; see Haynes, 2003, p. 71), mimetically enacting the very combination of matter, knowledge, and style for which Camden himself is praised. In
characteristically Jonsonian fashion, that praise of Camden’s authority also therefore ends up being an act of self-aggrandizement and commendation of his own authority and learning. As Lawrence Lipking has noted, speaking of Jonson’s better known poem ‘To the memory of my beloved, The Author Mr. William Shakespeare: and what he hath left us’, Jonsonian eulogy frequently turns back as much on the poet as on the object of his praise (Lipking, 1981, pp. 142, 144). In the Camden epigram, the hierarchical relation between master and pupil (rather than fellow playwright and poet) is clearer and less contested, but the dynamics of authorization and praise are largely the same – as the opening lines, testimony to Jonson’s own scholarly and writerly authority (‘Camden, most reverend head, to whom I owe | All that I am in arts’ [ll. 1-2]), make clear.

It is hardly surprising that Jonson, the archetypal classicizing poet, would have understood authority in this way. Nor is it surprising that he should have praised his schoolmaster as the source of his own authority and as the national writer par excellence. Nonetheless, few people today, certainly outside the academy, would think of Camden in relation to either ‘authority of speech’ or the nation’s ‘great renown and name’. That honour, when it comes to early modern writers at least, would normally be afforded instead to the man Jonson described in his conversations with William Drummond of Hawthornden as wanting ‘art’ (Jonson, 2012, V, p. 361), and whom he famously said had ‘small Latin and less Greek’ (‘To the memory of my beloved, The Author Mr. William Shakespeare: and what he hath left us’, l. 31). It is Shakespeare, not the Westminster schoolmaster, whose face has adorned Bank of England banknotes, an imprimatur that sets the seal of monumental authority on both the promissory notes themselves and the cultural figure displayed upon them (Holderness, 1988a, p. xi). Furthermore, it is Shakespeare, not Camden, whose texts have provided the archetypal testing material for new media and technologies; when Thomas Edison, for example, tested his inventions, including the electric pen that he patented in 1876, he habitually turned not to the monumental opening of the Britannia, but to the much more familiar, quasi-proverbial opening soliloquy of Richard III (Galey, 2014, pp. 170-2). And it is Shakespearean monuments and inscriptions, not Camdenian ones, that decorate public spaces and buildings across the western world: from Giovanni Fontana’s 1874 marble statue, which stands in Leicester Square in London (Engler, 2011, p. 439), to the motto (misquoted) from The
*Tempest* (‘WHAT IS PAST IS PROLOGUE’ [cf. 2.1.246]), which is carved on a plinth on the Pennsylvania Avenue side of the National Archives in Washington, DC (Garber, 2008, pp. 284-5; Galey, 2014, pp. 49-52). Shakespeare’s words – indeed, his material presence alone – it seems, bestow considerable cultural capital, monumentalizing purpose, and linguistic authority. Camden and Jonson, by contrast, certainly in the modern era, have rarely been put to such edifying purposes.¹

Jonson’s epigram reminds us that Shakespeare’s contemporaries would not necessarily have anticipated these developments. Certainly, for much of the seventeenth century, it would have been by no means apparent that his works would be afforded the position of unique cultural authority that they have come to possess. Indeed, until Nicholas Rowe’s biographical essay, ‘Some account of the life of Mr. William Shakespear’, which prefaced his 1709 edition of the *Works*, Shakespeare’s plays were generally afforded no more authority than those of contemporaries such as Jonson or Fletcher, the other playwrights of the era whose works appeared in Folio collections, and to whom Shakespeare was most often compared (De Grazia, 1991, pp. 33-48). The same went for the fate of the plays on the stage. As Michael Dobson has noted, by the 1630s, just a decade after the publication of the First Folio, the number of plays in regular repertory had been reduced to perhaps just five: *Hamlet, Othello, Julius Caesar, The Merry Wives of Windsor*, and *1 Henry IV* (Dobson, 1992, p. 2). Moreover, even in the Restoration era, when Shakespeare did start to return to the centre of English literary culture, many of the plays were performed only in heavily revised and substantially rewritten versions – a curious coming together that, as Dobson has also observed, reveals ‘that adaptation and canonization, so far from being contradictory processes, were often mutually reinforcing ones’ (Dobson, 1992, p. 5). Initially, at least, perceptions of Shakespeare’s authority (or rather lack thereof) were such that his texts were freely available to later playwrights for adaptation and appropriation; it was only in the early eighteenth century that some kind of recognizable authorial authority began widely to obtain (Dobson, 1992, p. 61).

In fact, to some of Shakespeare’s seventeenth-century readers, his later position as the figure of ultimate cultural authority would have come as a very great surprise. The critic and historian Thomas Rymer, for example, whose trenchant views in his *A Short View of Tragedy; It’s Original, Excellency, and Corruption. With Some
Reflections on Shakespear and other Practitioners for the Stage (1693) are often seen as the embodiment of leaden-footed and rules-obsessed neoclassical criticism, which certainly have been shocked. For Rymer, the problem with Shakespearean drama in large part is its lack of authority, the departure from its classical and modern sources, which leads to what he identifies as its unreasonableness and unnaturalness. Speaking of Othello, Rymer observes that ‘Shakespear alters it from the Original in several particulars, but always, unfortunately, for the worse’; in illustration of this, he cites the description of the titular character as ‘the Moor of Venice: a Note on pre-eminence, which neither History nor Heraldry can allow him’ (Rymer, 1693, p. 87). Julius Caesar fares little better, with Rymer particularly critical of the blooding episode (3.1.106-11) and Brutus’s visceral language there: ‘For, indeed, that Language which Shakespear puts in the Mouth of Brutus wou’d not suit, or be convenient, unless from some son of the Shambles, or some naturall offspring of the Butchery’ (Rymer, 1683, p. 151). The issue for Rymer, then, is a matter of decorum, but also a question of probability and reason: at this moment, he suggests, Brutus speaks less like a member of the Roman nobility and more like a common butcher or slaughterman. He also points out, in a telling parallel with his criticism of Othello, that Shakespeare’s scene is unauthorized by ‘History’ (p. 150): that is to say, by Plutarch’s Lives, his principal source for the play.

Few critics now would now object to Othello on grounds of heraldic probability; nor would many be troubled by Shakespeare’s departure from Plutarch to dramatize the moment when Brutus’s Republican ideals most starkly unravel in the face of political reality. Furthermore, few modern critics would share Rymer’s hotheaded indignation: at the moment when he condemns Shakespeare for departing from ‘History’, he speaks of ‘Shakespear’s own blundering Maggot of self contradiction’ (p. 150). Indeed, the choleric and invective that characterize his criticism have almost invariably met with revulsion and/or ridicule. As John Dryden observed in 1693, in a letter to his friend and fellow critic John Dennis, ‘[a]lmost all the Faults which he has discover’d are truly there; yet who will read Mr. Rymer, or not read Shakespeare? For my own part, I reverence Mr. Rymer’s Learning, but I detest his Ill-Nature and Arrogance’ (Vickers, 1995, p. 86). Nonetheless, Rymer’s views were echoed, albeit in a less strident form, by many who valued the authority of the ancients, and the neoclassical unities of time, place and action. These included
Dryden himself, whose *Essay of Dramatic Poesy* (1668) would set the terms of Shakespearean criticism for at least a century.

Intemperate and ‘pedantic’ as it is (see Eliot, 1932, p. 97), Rymer’s criticism does nonetheless remind us of the extent to which the issue of authority was at stake in the seventeenth-century reading and reception of Shakespeare. One of the principal reasons for this was because, from the First Folio onwards, Shakespeare was very much identified as the poet of nature rather than art, as Margareta De Grazia has compellingly shown (De Grazia, 1991, p. 46). John Heminge and Henry Condell initiated this view, characterizing Shakespeare as a spontaneous author who wrote without revision, and whose ingenuity enabled him to invent without the artfulness customarily associated with conceptions of genius in the early modern era or, indeed, the inkblots linked with scribal and authorial correction: ‘His mind and hand went together: And what he thought, he uttered with that easiness, that we have scarce received from him a blot in his papers’ (Shakespeare, 1623, sig. A3r). Leonard Digges then reinforced this view in his commendatory poem ‘Vpon Master WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, the Deceased Authour, and his POEMS’, written for the edition of the sonnets and miscellaneous poems published by John Benson in 1640. ‘Poets are borne not made,’ Digges observes in the opening line of that poem, and Shakespeare is the prima facie evidence for this: ‘when I would prove | This truth, the glad remembrance I must love | Of never dying Shakespeare, who alone, | Is argument enough to make that one’ (Shakespeare, 1640, sig. *3r, ll. 1-4). With Shakespeare, moreover, the reader finds ‘Art without Art unparaleld as yet’; ‘Nature onely helpt him’, Digges adds (ll. 10-11). For Rymer, it was precisely the lack of art in Digges’s second (punning) sense – that is, in the sense of skill as a result of knowledge or practice (*OED*, s.v. ‘art’, n. 1. 1) – that was the problem, and what lay behind the faults that he identifies in *Othello* and *Julius Caesar*. By 1668, this view of Shakespeare as the poet of nature, rather than art, had become almost a truism, as we can see in Dryden’s *Of Dramatic Poesy*:

He was the man who of all modern, and perhaps ancient poets, had the largest and most comprehensive soul. All the images of Nature were still present to him and he drew them, not laboriously, but luckily; when he describes any thing, you more than see it, you feel it too. Those who accuse him to have
wanted learning, give him the greater commendation: he was naturally
learned; he needed not the spectacles of books to read nature; he looked
inwards, and found her there (Dryden, 1918, p.67).

If seventeenth-century readers increasingly constructed Shakespeare as the
poet of nature, Jonson, by contrast, was almost always figured as the supreme poet of
art – and, as such, also as a more immediately obvious authority figure. Where
Shakespeare’s works, in Heminge and Condell’s, Digges’s, and Dryden’s accounts at
least, are imagined as transcending the strictures of literary precedents and classical
authority, Jonson’s works were widely recognized for their embodiment of those very
things. As Edward Heyward put it in his commendatory poem for Jonson’s own 1616
Folio (‘TO BEN. IONSON, on his workes’):

Words speake thy matter; matter fills thy words;
And choyce that grace affords
That both are best: and both most fitly plac’t,
Are with new VENVS grac’t
From artfull method. (Jonson, 1616, sig. ¶6v, ll. 15-19)

Heyward’s praise emphasizes that Jonson’s poetic powers reside in his mastery of
humanist discourse, his matching of matter and word in the manner requisite for true
eloquent, and that his transformative powers thus rely not on nature, but on art,
method, and knowledge. This contrast between Shakespeare and Jonson was, of
course, in some senses a rhetorical construct: as recent scholars have shown,
Shakespeare’s classical learning, much of which he would have imbibed from his
schooldays in Stratford-upon-Avon, was considerably more extensive than popular
consciousness has often allowed (see, inter alia, Martindale and Martindale, 1990;
Bate, 1993; Miola, 2000; Gillespie, 2001; Martindale and Taylor, 2004; Burrow,
2004; and Burrow, 2013). Furthermore, the familiar narrative of Shakespeare and
Jonson as literary and intellectual opposites and antagonists (as presented in Dryden’s
Of Dramatic Poesy and elsewhere) was, as Ian Donaldson has shown, largely a later
historical invention, which had as much to do with evolving conceptions of genius as
with the reality of the authors’ relations (Donaldson, 2001). Nonetheless, there is little
doubt that the two outstanding dramatists of the Elizabethan and Jacobean eras did
have very different conceptions of literary authority and that those conceptions did
generate divergent attitudes towards prior texts and sources.
In illustration of this, it is hard to imagine Jonson, the poet of ‘artfull method’, complaining about ‘art made tongue-tied by authority’ in the way that Shakespeare does in Sonnet 66 (l. 9). Shakespeare’s complaint has sometimes been understood as an allusion to the fetters of press censorship and as his sole reference to the frustrations of working under such conditions (Clare, 1999, p. 39). But, as the Oxford and Penguin editors of the Sonnets have both pointed out, the line also seems to signal the frustration of being limited, or inhibited, by precedent and tradition (Shakespeare, 2002, p. 512; and Shakespeare, 1986b, p. 257). Of course, there is an irony in Shakespeare complaining about authority in a sonnet, the most codified of all literary forms. That irony, moreover, is only emphasized by the sonnet’s dominant rhetorical scheme: the anaphora which structures the poem’s list of ills, and which results in the word ‘And’ repeated ten times at the beginning of ten different lines. Furthermore, the litany of complaints in the sonnet (including ‘art made tongue-tied by authority’) turns out to be conditional, as the closing couplet makes clear: ‘Tired with all these, from these would I be gone, | Save that to die I leave my love alone’ (ll. 13-14). So the poem is not a straightforward rejection of authority in favour of some notion of unbridled rule breaking and literary freedom: but it does signal the kind of commitment to transformative imitation that, as Margaret Tudeau-Clayton and Colin Burrow have both emphasized, distinguishes Shakespeare’s engagement with classical learning and authority (Tudeau-Clayton, 1998; and Burrow, 2004, p. 16) from that of his most notable contemporary.

* The story of Shakespeare’s eighteenth-century transformation into the paradigmatic authorizing literary figure has been extensively told (see, for example, Bate, 1989b; De Grazia, 1991; Dobson, 1992; Ritchie and Sabor, 2012; and Rumbold, 2016). This story begins with the gradual return of Shakespeare to the stage at the Restoration, and it takes in the construction of Shakespeare as an “author” figure in the wake of the emergence of copyright following the Statute of Queen Anne of 1710. As such, it also tells of the reification of the (now commonly accepted) connection between controlling authorship and authority – a connection at odds, though, with both what we know about the collaborative nature of dramatic production in the early modern era, and the material, textual, and biographical remains themselves. Further
noteworthy developments in the story include the first great age of Shakespearean textual scholarship and the series of editions by Pope, Theobald, Warburton, Johnson, Capell, and Steevens that this produced, all of which followed and built upon Rowe’s 1709 *Works* in what has been described as a ‘dynastic tradition’ (De Grazia, 1991, p. 3). Other landmarks in this story include David Garrick’s formative Stratford Jubilee of 1769, the three-day Shakespearean celebration in the playwright’s hometown, which did much to substantiate his reputation as the national poet, and the emergence of notions of authorial authenticity in the wake of Edmund Malone’s groundbreaking decision to include a textual and critical apparatus in his 1790 *The Plays and Poems of William Shakespeare.* The Ireland forgeries of the 1790s add yet another dimension to the tale of Shakespearean authority in the eighteenth century. The intense excitement generated by the faked deeds, letters and manuscripts that Ireland claimed to have discovered, followed by the crushing disappointment of Malone’s decisive exposure of the forgeries, reveals something of what was invested in Shakespearean authority by 1795. In a letter to George Steevens of 1796, James Boaden based his refutation of the supposed *Lear* on the poor quality of the versification in the manuscript – an argument clearly derived from Shakespeare’s reputation as a writer of genius (Boaden, 1972). For Malone, in contrast, authority primarily depended on historical accuracy – his *Inquiry into the Authenticity of Certain Miscellaneous Papers and Legal Instruments* (1796) proved conclusively that various dates, as well as the handwriting and orthography were incorrect, and hence that the documents must be fraudulent. Authority and *authenticity* thus began to coalesce.

As well as these literary and authorial perspectives, the story of emergent Shakespearean authority also had a significant political dimension, as Michael Dobson has shown: ‘the transformation of Shakespeare’s status from the comparative neglect of the Restoration to […] national, indeed global pre-eminence,’ he observes, ‘constitutes one of the central cultural expressions of England’s own transition from the aristocratic regime of the Stuarts to the commercial empire presided over by the Hanoverians’ (Dobson, 1992, p. 8). More recently, it has also been suggested that Shakespeare’s pervasive presence in eighteenth-century cultural life had a significant moral dimension. Kate Rumbold has argued that Shakespeare emerged in the same era as a source of moral authority: something to which the ‘repeated acts of quotation’
in contemporary novels, such as those discussed in Chapter Fourteen of this volume, which ‘invest him with an enduring emotional and moral authority’, attest (Rumbold, 2016, p. 50). ‘Perhaps the novel’s most significant contribution,’ she adds, ‘is to construct Shakespeare as a personal authority on whom all kinds of individual can call’ (p. 53).

By 1814, Jane Austen could describe Shakespeare as ‘part of an Englishman’s constitution’. Her character, Henry Crawford, continues, ‘His thoughts and beauties are so spread abroad that one touches them everywhere; one is intimate with him by instinct.’ In response, another character agrees: ‘His celebrated passages are quoted by everybody; they are in half the books we open, and we all talk Shakespeare, use his similes, and describe with his descriptions’ (Austen, 2005, pp. 390-1). But, as Gail Marshall has argued, Shakespeare’s pervasive presence in the nineteenth century in fact points to a contested legacy: ‘Shakespeare was not just the darling of civic bodies looking to advertise their cultural credentials, but belonged just as much to the ordinary people of Britain who used his voice to contest contemporary power distribution’ (Marshall, 2012, p.2). Evidence collected by historians of reading such as Andrew Murphy and Jonathan Rose certainly supports this point. As Murphy points out, the increasing availability of cheap editions of Shakespeare’s texts made his works ever more accessible to working-class readers (Murphy, 2010, pp. 58-94; see also St Clair, 2004, pp. 140-157 and 692-714), and such readers sometimes saw in Shakespeare’s texts a legitimisation of their own challenges to authority. For example, Rose discusses a number of readers for whom Shakespeare ‘was a proletarian hero who spoke directly to working people’ (Rose, 2001, p.122-3). For some working-class readers, Shakespeare’s own obscure birth and ‘small Latin and less Greek’ – his supposed lack of learning and ‘natural’ genius – was inspirational. And they found in his plays ‘a language of radical political mobilization’, an anti-authoritarian stance that allowed them to co-opt Shakespeare for their own purposes. J. L. Clynes, a textile worker who later became deputy leader of the House of Commons, for example, ‘drew inspiration from the “strange truth” he discovered in Twelfth Night: “Be not afraid of greatness (“What a creed! How it would upset the world if men lived up to it, I thought” […] Reading Julius Caesar, “the realization came suddenly to me that it was a mighty political drama” about the class struggle’ (Rose, 2001, p.123). While such responses seem willfully to ignore such negative representations of political
rebels as the plebeians in *Julius Caesar* and Jack Cade and his rebels in *2 Henry VI*, it is nonetheless significant that two competing notions of Shakespearean authority came into being in the nineteenth century. The idea of the ‘People’s Bard’ allowed many to see Shakespeare as an anti-hierarchical, anti-authoritarian role model authorizing radical left-wing political ideologies, while its polar opposite – what Marshall calls the ‘monumental civic Shakespeare’, memorialized in Establishment heartlands and invested with all the trappings of high art – implicitly opposed all such ideas (Marshall, 2012, p.2).  

The story of Shakespeare’s complex relationship to questions of national identity has been well told elsewhere (see Klett, 2009, Tudeau-Clayton & Maley, 2010, Ivic, 2017), and is discussed in Chapters Five, Six and Fourteen of this volume, but it is important also to note that relationship here, and its effects in investing Shakespeare with ever greater literary authority.

Scholarship has also started to recover Shakespeare’s significance as a figure of authority in more recent periods. Topics to have attracted attention range from Shakespeare’s importance as an authorizing figure for the emergence of English Studies as an academic discipline in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries (Hawkes, 1986) to the rise of bardolatry and the so-called Shakespeare industry, focused from Garrick’s Jubilee onwards, on Stratford-upon-Avon and the supposed Shakespearean associations of its buildings and places (Holderness, 1988b). Studies have also begun to show the importance of Shakespeare’s cultural authority beyond England or Britain. Doug Lanier, for example, has recently drawn attention to how Union voices in the American Civil War appropriated Shakespeare, drawing on and claiming kinship with his long established status as a ‘transcendent, vatic, even quasi-divine’ figure of English literary authority, while at the same time also explicitly Americanizing him (Lanier, 2015, pp. 146, 157-8). Rather like the eighteenth-century novels discussed by Rumbold, the website of New York’s Shakespeare Society ([www.shakespearesociety.org](http://www.shakespearesociety.org)) continues to figure Shakespeare as personal moral authority, while directly aligning him with that most American of cities: ‘Shakespeare teaches us all how to be better human beings and citizens. A great city like New York needs The Shakespeare Society’ ([http://www.shakespearesociety.org/who-we-are](http://www.shakespearesociety.org/who-we-are) accessed 06/04 2017). And recent studies of Shakespeare in Japan, Africa, China, India, Korea, Brazil, the Arab world, Latin America and elsewhere (see, for example, Ryuta, Carruthers and Gillies, 2001; da Cunha Resende, 2002; Levith, 2004; Banham,
Gibbs and Osofisan, 2013) demonstrate the various ways in which Shakespeare is appropriated and into different national cultures in diverse and sometimes unexpected ways. MIT’s Global Shakespeares archive (http://globalshakespeares.mit.edu/about/) bears tribute to the ubiquity of performances of Shakespearean plays and the complexity of Shakespeare’s cultural authority in the global economy.

The essays in *Shakespeare and Authority*, jointly and individually, are further contributions to this story. What sets the volume apart from previous explorations of the topic is its chronological and generic scope: essays extend across the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries, and examine topics from performance and acting style to architecture, cinema, lexicography, and visual culture. What also sets the volume apart is that it places its discussions of Shakespeare as an authority figure alongside a series of the essays in the first two parts of the book, which explore conceptions of authority in and for Shakespeare. These essays, which range from discussions of the monarchy to investigations of the household, and from explorations of the law to examinations of linguistic, financial, and material accountability, consider the construction, performance, and questioning of authority across the Shakespearean canon. They also include a series of re-examinations of Shakespearean sources, both from a methodological perspective and as case studies. What this three-fold organization and content enables is a more rigorous examination of the significance of Shakespeare for both the history of authority as a concept and the shift from *auctoritas* to more modern understandings of the word – one of our principal aims in this book. This tripartite approach, moreover, underscores that both the plays themselves and their reception are essential to the story.

That authority is a central concern of Shakespearean drama has long been recognized. As Robert Weimann notes, the word ‘authority’ occurs no fewer than 60 times across the canon as a whole (Weimann, 1995, p. 201). The plays in this way responded to one of the great shifts in sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century England: the reconceptualization of authority, in the wake of the Reformation, as something no longer accepted and received automatically as a given, but something instead to be ‘negotiated, disputed, or reconstituted’ through acts of representation.
(Weimann, 1996, p. 5) – through speech, performance, and various forms of textual inscription. For Weimann, moreover, the Elizabethan theatre was the most important place for this exploration of authority and its associated political, religious, and juridical discourses; he attributes this to both the indeterminacy of the Elizabethan theatre and its different spatial modes of performance and representation and to the location of the playhouses themselves in the liberties just outside the city’s jurisdiction (Weimann, 1995, pp. 204-6).

In Shakespeare’s plays, perhaps the most obvious dramatization of this Reformation redefinition of authority occurs in Act 3 Scene 1 of *King John*, when the king disputes papal sway with Cardinal Pandulph and disavows the legate’s authority as a mere earthly commission (3.1.73-86). ‘What earthy name to interrogatories | Can task the free breath of a sacred king?’ (3.1.73-4), John asserts in anachronistic lines that clearly echo the language of the Henrician Reformation and the discourse of Tudor divine right. The rest of John’s speech, including his striking references to tolling and tithing (‘no Italian priest | Shall tithe or toll in our dominions’ [3.1.80]), largely reiterates the equivalent speech in the play’s most important dramatic source, the avowedly Protestant and anonymous history play *The Troublesome Raigne of Iohn King of England* (1591). However, in one significant way, Shakespeare departs from his source, and that is by framing the dispute explicitly in terms of authority. Where in the earlier play John concludes his rebuttal of Pandulph with a rejection of papal supremacy (‘so wil I raigne next vnder God, supreame head both ouer spirituall and temprall: and hee that contradicts me in this, Ile make him hoppe headlesse’ [The Troublesome Raigne, 1591, sig. E1r]), Shakespeare’s John ends also with a reassertion of his own divine authority and rejection of the Pope’s mere ‘mortal’ authority: ‘Where we do reign, we will alone uphold | Without th’assistance of a mortal hand. | So tell the Pope, all reverence set apart | To him and his usurped authority’ (3.1.83-6). Pandulp’s response is not only to excommunicate John (3.1.99), but also to legitimize rebellion against him: ‘blessèd shall he be that doth revolt | From his allegiance to a heretic’ (3.1.100-1). This time there is a parallel passage in the earlier play (‘1 Pandulp of Padoa […] pronounce thee accursed discharging euery of thy subiectes of all dutie and fealtie that they doo owe to thee’ [The Troublesome Raigne, 1591, sig. E1r-v]), although Shakespeare’s blunter
wording again makes the exploration of sovereignty and monarchical authority much more prominent.

Some of the clearest evidence of the extent to which conceptions of authority were in flux at the time comes from contemporary wordlists. Glosses are multiple, and often not synonymous, and as such they are testimony to the process of redefinition and recalibration that Weimann describes. In his *Bibliotheca Eliotae* (1542) Sir Thomas Elyot glossed authority in a number of different ways: ‘Authoritas, authoritie, credence, puyssaunce, iugement, the inioyeng of possession’ (Elyot, 1542, sig. E8r). Importantly, his dictionary also foregrounds the connection (conceptual as well as etymological) between authority and author, and his definition of the latter goes some to way explaining why one individual rather than another might garner the warrantable expertise, the ‘credence’ and ‘puyssaunce’, requisite to operate as an authority figure: ‘Author, the first inue[n]tour or maker of a thing also a reporter of newes. also a ruler or tutor also he that dothe sell or delyuer a thynge on warrantise. also he whom a man foloweth in doyng of any thynge’ (Elyot, 1542, sig. E8r). The conjunction here between author and authority, and the implicit relation to textuality and inscription, anticipates one of the more striking aspects of Shakespeare’s own treatment of authority. As Richard Wilson has observed, in Shakespearean politics, authority and authorship are ‘synonymous’; speaking of Jade Cade’s revolt in 2 Henry VI, he notes that ‘[t]o the writer of these scenes, rebellion is the rage of the illiterate against the written word’ (Wilson, 1993, pp. 27-8).

Later lexicographers tended to be more explicit about the identification between authority and sovereignty. Authority was what the holder of high office possessed and thus frequently a synonym for the monarch’s (or, for that matter, any other official’s) power and rule. John Florio, for example, defined the Italian word *autorità* in his *Worlde of Wordes* as ‘authoritie, power, free will, command, swaie, rule’ (Florio, 1598, sig. C6r), a more delimited and politically more specific list of synonyms than Elyot’s gloss, while Henry Cockeram then substantiated this association between authority and the exercise of power through a series of glossarial examples in his *English Dictionarie* (1623):

the Authority of a King. *Regallity.*
Cockeram’s *lemmata* emphasize that authority was a spiritual as well a temporal matter and a concept that was at once legislative and dispositive. Other wordlists from the period also suggest that authority started to be understood not necessarily as an innate quality, but as something that could be adopted or put on, and as such a question of performance rather than essence – an insight to which Shakespeare, as we shall see, turns out to have been especially important.

Shakespearean drama, at different moments, entertains, examines, and explores all these different senses of the word. In *Pericles*, for example, authority is very much equated with sovereignty and the rightful exercise of the law. When Lysimachus, governor of Mytilene, enters the city brothel, he promises Marina that he will not abuse his power either to prosecute her for prostitution or to take advantage of her: ‘Oh, you have heard something of my power and so stand aloof for more serious wooing, but I protest to thee, pretty one, my authority shall not see thee, or else look friendly upon thee’ (4.6.77–80). In similar fashion, in *All’s Well That Ends Well* the Countess speaks of the Clown remaining at the court of Roussillon by her son’s ‘authority’, and of him taking that as a ‘patent’, or license, ‘for his sauciness’ (4.5.55–6), while in *2 Henry IV*, after he has read over and acceded to the rebels’ demands, Prince John confesses that his ‘father’s purposes have been mistook, | And some about him have too lavishly | Wrested his meaning and authority’ (4.1.223-5). All three instances reinforce the connection between authority, legislation, and license implicit in Florio and Cockeram’s definitions, while the third also underscores the essentialness of inscription to the exercise of sovereign authority. As Prince John ruefully notes, the king’s authority resides in his words, but that also leaves it open to abuse, as interpreters may twist his ‘meaning’ to fit their own purposes. The king’s authority thus emerges as oddly fragile and peculiarly limited, subject to both the vagaries of language and the good will of his subjects, an idea also central to Joseph Sterrett’s argument in Chapter Eight of this volume.
Few Shakespearean rulers are quite as aware of the evanescence of authority as Marlowe’s Barabas after he has ‘gotten, by […] policy’ the governorship of Malta (Marlowe, 1969, 5.2.28-34). But Shakespeare does, on various occasions, stage governors and rulers made strikingly aware of their own fragility. In Antony and Cleopatra, for example, he dramatically stages Antony’s realization of his impotence following his humiliation at the Battle of Actium, figuring this explicitly as a melting away of authority. ‘Approach there!’ Antony commands Caesar’s messenger Thidias; almost immediately, though, he recognizes that his words no longer carry sway and reflects grimly, ‘Now gods and devils! | Authority melts from me. Of late, when I cried, “Ho!” | Like boys unto a muss kings would start forth | And cry, “Your will?”’ (3.13.90-4). Divested of authority by his dishonour in battle, the man who could once render kings schoolboys is reduced to the object of a pert servant’s scorn.

As to the connection between authority, office, and person, Shakespearean drama is characteristically ambiguous. On the one hand, the Duke of Alençon’s words in Act 5 Scene 5 of 1 Henry VI associate authority with both the office of kingship and the power of the monarch himself. In response to Winchester’s command that the Dauphin and the French ‘shall become true liegemen’ to Henry VI’s crown, and that the Dauphin shall ‘pay him tribute and submit’, the Duke indignantly replies: ‘Must he then be a shadow of himself, | Adorn his temples with a coronet, | And yet in substance and authority | Retain but privilege of a private man’ (5.5.133-6). Authority, these lines suggest, is what makes the king a king. Constituted through the ability to legislate, it signifies, in particular, the status of not being subject to another. True monarchical authority, then, is more than just what the material crown signifies; it is also, Alençon’s words imply, what inheres in the body of the king. As Colin Burrow points out in Chapter Two of this volume, that same sentiment is even more apparent in King Lear, when the disguised Kent tells Lear ‘you have that in your countenance which I | would fain call master’, that is, ‘Authority’ (1.4.23-4, 26) – lines that lend themselves readily to an absolutist reading and a defence of the divine right. Lear may have abdicated, but to the loyal Kent he retains the marks of sovereign authority, which transcend the external trappings of rule and are signalled by his body itself. On the other hand, though, Shakespeare also provides a series of moments that seem to deny any innate connection between authority and a ruler or governor’s person. In
Coriolanus, for example, the titular character contends the tribunes of the people ‘[f]or they do prank them in authority | Against all noble sufferance’ (3.1.23-4).

Whilst Coriolanus’s words here maintain the hierarchical order essential to notions of absolutist government, the charge also recognizes the portability of authority and the fact it was something seemingly as easily put on as embodied; to prank in Shakespearean English meant to dress up or embellish (OED, s.v. ‘prank’, v. 4.1[b]).

This is also, of course, the point of Isabella’s famous words in Measure for Measure, from which we take this chapter’s title, when she inveighs against Angelo’s unstinting and unbending exercise of the law: ‘man, proud man | Dressed in a little brief authority, | Most ignorant of what he’s most assured’ (2.2.118-20).

All these senses of authority are, to a greater or lesser extent, still current today. They were also very much current in the age when Shakespeare himself became the archetypal authority figure, as the various definitions in Dr Johnson’s Dictionary (1755) attest. The most famous of all English lexicographers, Johnson defined authority successively as ‘1. Legal power’, ‘2. Influence; credit’, ‘3. Power; rule’, ‘4. Support; justification; countenance’, ‘5. Testimony’, and ‘6. Weight of testimony; credibility’ (Johnson, 1755). There was, however, one sense of Shakespearean authority that Johnson did not include, and that is barely current today, but which has considerable significance for our understanding of both Shakespeare’s method of composition and the relation of the plays to their source materials. That is the peculiarly (but not exclusively) early modern sense of authority associated with books, reading, and humanist theories of knowledge production. Authority in this sense constitutes what we take from others’ books to authorize our own writing and knowledge – a variant, of course, of Jonson’s use in his epigram to Camden with which we began this chapter. The most striking Shakespearean example of authority in this sense occurs in Love’s Labour’s Lost, when in response to the King of Navarre’s foreswearing of women in favour of study and books, Biron observes: ‘Small have continual plodders ever won, | Save base authority from others’ books’ (1.1.86-7). Authority here is associated with commonplace books and commonplace learning – methods that are apparently fit only for the dullest, most plodding of writers and scholars.
Biron’s remark, however, is not quite the straightforward trenchant dismissal it initially appears. For while his observation does demonstrate that Shakespeare’s attitude towards textual authority was more than just unthinking reverence, as Colin Burrow notes below (p. 000), the joke ends up being as much on Biron himself as on the dullards he berates. The irony, as the King points out shortly afterwards (‘How well he’s read to reason against reading’ [1.1.94]), is that Biron’s larger claim that spiritual enlightenment comes not from books, but from gazing into a beautiful woman’s eyes (1.1.72-93) is itself built upon the very literary method that he disavows here. Not only is Biron’s argument a commonplace in the Petrarchan tradition, but the speech itself (the last fourteen lines of which constitute a sonnet) is made up of commonplace learning and of phrases culled from the authority of others. As such, it is a model of the very humanist textual practice it ostensibly rejects. Instances in the speech include the world-weary ‘all delights are vain’ (1.1.80), a commonplace that repeatedly turns up in early modern literature, including Middleton’s The Nice Valour (3.3.36) and Book 2 of The Faerie Queene (II.v.27.2). A further notable example from later in the speech is the analogy ‘Study is like the heavens’ glorious sun | That will not be deep-searched with saucy looks’ (1.1.84-5), an (appropriately transformative) imitation of the proverb ‘He that gazes upon the sun shall at last be blind’ (cf. Dent, 1981, S971.1). The joke, then, is partly on Biron and partly on humanist methods of reading, but also an implicit recognition that those very methods are essential to literary composition. Authorities are what produce eloquence – even if they need skillful hands to transform them from slavish mimicry to true imitation.

*It is with this literary sense of authority that Shakespeare and Authority begins. The next two chapters in this volume revisit the question of Shakespeare’s sources, and both suggest that we need a more capacious term to reflect his range of influences and his mode of literary composition. In Chapter Two, Colin Burrow proposes that we speak not of Shakespeare’s ‘narrative’ sources, but of his authorities, arguing that Shakespeare’s ‘narrative’ sources have been explored at the expense of discursive texts. Burrow suggests that we should pay attention to a wide range of texts including narrative works, rhetorical treatises and works of philosophy, which provide the contentious seeds of thought within Shakespearean drama. He discusses examples from 1 Henry
IV, which shows how Shakespeare used Cicero’s *De Oratore* to enhance Prince Hal’s political and rhetorical authority, and ends by arguing that in *Hamlet* and *King Lear* a hybrid mingling of ‘authorities’, ranging from Cicero and Seneca to Melanchthon, come to the fore in speeches by characters within the drama who are themselves suffering crises of authority. In Chapter Three, Drakakis also suggests that the terms of ‘source study’ are unsatisfactory, proposing the term ‘resources’ in response to Burrow’s ‘authorities’. Theorised through Roland Barthes, Gérard Genette, and Jacques Derrida, and providing a close reading of *Hamlet* in this context, Drakakis presents a radical questioning of the nature of the ‘text’ itself, and offers an account of the palimpsestic nature of Shakespeare’s dramatic texts.

Chapter Four (re)turns to linguistic authority, comparing Shakespeare and Nashe, and considering the idea that Shakespeare’s cultural authority can be indexed by the number and placement of Shakespearean citations in the *Oxford English Dictionary*. Giles Goodland suggests that various changes in editorial policy and the development of electronic resources in the past three decades have had important effects on that authority. This research raises important warnings about Shakespeare’s pre-eminent position as an authority for lexicographical and historical linguistic research, and highlights the transformative potential of digital resources in re-writing narratives of linguistic authority. In Chapter Five, Margaret Tudeau-Clayton continues the discussion of Shakespeare’s linguistic authority, exploring the relationship between ‘Englishness’ and linguistic authority in *The Merry Wives of Windsor* through a discussion of the phrase ‘the King’s English’ in the Folio version of that play. Tudeau-Clayton argues that this phrase is commonly used as a rhetorical/ideological tool to produce by exclusion the centre of ownership and authority it represents, but is specifically interrogated in the Folio version of *Merry Wives*, which sets against it an inclusionary idea of ‘our English’ as a ‘gallymaufry’ without a centre. Eric Heinze also touches on the relationship between national identity and Shakespearean authority in Chapter Six. As post-Renaissance Europe created modern concepts of statehood and sovereignty, figures like Bodin, Grotius, and Hobbes undertook ‘constructive’, system-building theories of sovereign authority. Dramatists, in the meantime, de-constructed sovereignty by unsettling the divergent bases of authority and legitimacy claimed for it. Concepts like ‘rule of law’, ‘popular consent’, or ‘natural law’ often serve to characterise rival legitimacy claims, but such
concepts’ scope and interrelationships can be vague. Through a reading of Shakespeare’s historical tetralogies, Heinze’s essay proposes a vocabulary and topology of legal and political authority within early modern drama.

Part Two of the volume contains five chapters that directly focus on Shakespeare’s own representations of authority within the plays. In Chapter Seven, Angus Vine considers 1 and 2 Henry IV as plays that are all about the construction, questioning, and acceptance of authority – paternal authority, monarchical authority, divine authority. This chapter argues that central to their engagement with the idea of authority is a persistent rhetoric of financial reckoning and fiscal responsibility, a language of debit and credit. He connects this language with a broader discourse of reckoning, financial, but also metaphorical, that was emerging in early modern England. The chapter demonstrates that in 1 and 2 Henry IV – and elsewhere, as Eleanor Lowe also shows in her analysis of Twelfth Night in Chapter Ten – Shakespeare invokes an emerging discourse of accountability, which is both spiritual and financial, metaphorical and actual, first to examine notions of personal and public responsibility, and then to explore what those notions mean for the constitution of political, and more particularly, monarchical authority. Joseph Sterrett’s essay examines the material and social effects of an exchange of trust between a king, Henry VIII, and his counsellor, Thomas Cranmer in Shakespeare and Fletcher’s All is True. The ring that the King gives Cranmer is both nothing and everything: nothing in that it could be anything, any ring, and everything because it is the King’s and is declared to be so. Such a performance of trust not only protects the King’s favoured minister, it dares and threatens Cranmer’s enemies to do or say something that would jeopardise the King’s trust in them. It is thus a uniquely assertive form of trust, a site where material, political, and social values meet. Daniel Cadman returns to the notion of Shakespeare’s authorities (in Burrow’s sense), considering Measure for Measure as a response to De Constantia and Politica, the two major works of the Flemish neo-stoic philosopher and political theorist, Justus Lipsius. Cadman highlights that Duke Vincentio’s methods of exercising his authority are two-fold: the Duke commends and seeks to inspire the virtue of constancy in his subjects (as recommended in De Constantia), whilst, at the same time, using questionable methods to strengthen his own political power (similar to the often underhand political pragmatism advocated in the Politica). The representation of such strategies is part of the play’s sustained
interrogation of Lipsian statecraft and the effects of the tensions generated through the co-existence of the two principal tenets of constancy and governmental prudence.

Like Joseph Sterrett’s, Eleanor Lowe’s chapter focuses on the materiality of authority. Her analysis of Malvolio’s authority as steward in Chapter Ten is viewed through the prism of Viscount Montague’s Household Book of 1595. Montague lists his servants, their duties and his rules for the management of them and the household. It provides a detailed description of the activities and responsibilities of his servants, particular to their specific role, and prioritises the steward as most important in the household. Lowe examines Malvolio’s interactions and conduct in *Twelfth Night* in the light of the steward’s ambiguous position between responsibility and authority, concentrating on the performance of domestic authority on the early modern stage. In Chapter Eleven, Laetitia Sansonetti considers the authority of the poet-playwright-actor, a theme that is also explored by James Harriman-Smith in Chapter Twelve. Sansonetti analyses *Julius Caesar*. In that play, the character of Cinna-the-poet in *Julius Caesar* is often considered to represent a form of poetic counter-authority. Far from taking the murdered poet as a figure of self-identification for Shakespeare, this chapter argues that Cinna deserves to die. The two poets in *Julius Caesar* fare so ill when it comes to convincing others (the plebeians not to kill him for Cinna in Act 3, Brutus and Octavius to patch up their quarrel for the anonymous camp poet in Act 4) because they fail at composing and delivering effective rhetorical speeches. By showing the failures of uninventive poets on stage, Shakespeare is actually staging the triumph of a more rounded figure of authority, that of the poet-playwright-actor.

In Chapter Twelve – the first of Part Three of the volume, which considers Shakespeare as authority – James Harriman Smith distinguishes two ways in which the authority of actors with regard to Shakespeare was articulated during the playwright’s seventeenth- and eighteenth-century rise to the status of a national poet. From the reopening of the theatres to the early 1700s, actors appeared as apostles, handing down Shakespeare’s intentions from generation to generation as part of an independent performance tradition. The career of David Garrick, from 1741 to 1776 was marked, however, with the claim that, rather than inheriting a connection to Shakespeare, this new star was Shakespeare reborn. Resurrection had replaced succession as a mode for articulating the actor’s authority. Harriman-Smith explains this paradigm shift with an
analysis of the rise of textual editing between the death of Betterton and the debut of Garrick, showing how it destabilised the transmission of theatrical practice while also justifying Garrick’s claim to bring Shakespeare to life through a close study of his writing. The chapter then concludes with a brief study of theatrical authority beyond Garrick, focusing on the critical writing of John Philip Kemble. Andrew Rudd considers Shakespeare’s authority in the field of architecture, examining the authority Shakespeare provided in the eighteenth century and Romantic period as a rule-breaker whose genius transcended both Classicism and the Gothic. Specifically, it considers his appeal to the architect John Soane, who referred to Shakespeare’s plays (not always accurately) in his lectures to the Royal Academy and whose house in Lincoln’s Inn Fields exemplified the eclecticism Shakespeare’s ‘infinite variety’ (*Antony and Cleopatra*, 2.2.248). supposedly mandated. It discusses Shakespeare criticism by Alexander Pope, Elizabeth Montagu and Samuel Johnson, as well as the ideas of Soane’s associates John Britton, Joseph Gandy and Barbara Hofland. Rudd argues that Shakespeare acted as an authority for Soane to reconcile both personal crises and stylistic divisions between Neo-Classicism and Romanticism. Benedicte Seynhaeve and Raphaël Ingelbien revisit the question of Shakespeare and national identity, discussing Shakespeare’s identity as the national ‘Gothic Bard’ in the context of Irish appeals to his authority in the Romantic period. Invocations of Shakespeare in English Gothic helped situate the genre in a native tradition. However, Shakespeare’s status as a national ‘Gothic Bard’ was complicated in the Irish context. Chapter Fourteen shows how Charles Robert Maturin (1780-1824) used Shakespeare to justify a distinctly Irish aesthetics of Gothic excess. His deployment of Shakespearean horror and hyperbolic emotion is contrasted with Ann Radcliffe’s Shakespearean blend of terror and melancholy, simultaneously revealing very different interpretations of Burkean aesthetics. Like the Shakespearean work of the Irish painter James Barry, Maturin’s Gothic writings were condemned by British commentators, whose sense of a Gothic Shakespeare was incompatible with the Irishmen’s perceived extravagance. The debates surrounding their works show that Shakespeare was a contested national icon within British Romantic culture.

The volume concludes with two essays that consider Shakespeare in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In Chapter Fifteen, Paul Tyndall and Fred Ribkoff discuss Peter Brook’s film version of *King Lear*. Brook’s film dramatizes a
paradigm shift from the discretionary authority and divine right of Kings to a
recognizably modern rule of law governed by instrumental rationality. When Lear
begs his daughter to ‘reason not the need’ (2.2.445), he is unknowingly asking her to
act counter to brutally rational divisive forces he himself has set in motion. The
rupture of bonds between power and authority, and between family members, is a
result of the emergence of a modern sensibility. In Brook’s hands, the Lear story
becomes a malleable myth chronicling the transition from a primitive, patriarchal
culture into a culture reflective of Brook’s own post-war, existential sensibility.
Brook’s Lear evokes the primitive world of Shakespeare’s King Lear as well as the
inevitable collapse of civilization characteristic of ancient Greek tragedy, while at the
same time embodying the apocalyptic vision of post-war avant-garde theatre and film.
Thus Shakespeare’s Lear, although clearly the source for Brook’s film, is one of
many ‘authorities’ operating as an intertext. Brook forwards the tragic consequences
of the modern act of giving up personal freedom and power – thus authority – to the
state for the sake of security and social order, an act culminating in the erasure of all
signs of civilization. In the final chapter of this volume, Jane Partner examines the
ways in which Shakespeare’s authority is constructed and represented in
contemporary visual culture, and places a diverse selection of contemporary artworks
in the longer history of the interpretation of Shakespeare in painting, sculpture and
printed media. The first section examines the presentation of Shakespeare himself,
examining modern portraits and memorabilia in the context of earlier visual
constructions of Shakespeare’s ‘genius’. The second section considers contemporary
paintings and video art that take on Shakespearean subjects, interpreting them as
responses to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century usages of these same subjects in the
genre of ‘history’ painting. The final section examines artists who use Shakespeare’s
text itself as their material, either in graphic projects or in the form of digital
sculpture.

If one of the purposes of this book is to examine how Shakespeare became the
archetypal figure of English cultural authority, another is to illuminate why – a
question that, as David Hopkins has observed, has received rather less attention
(Hopkins, 2004, p. 263). Two different answers to that question, and two different
strands, emerge from the essays here: first of all, the way in which Shakespeare freely
adopts, adapts, translates, and transforms his own sources and authorities; and second,
the extent to which his plays forensically examine the nature of authority itself. But to worry at authority (political, historical, or literary) is not the same thing as to reject it outright, and in Shakespearean drama, as Stephen Greenblatt has recently noted (Greenblatt, 2010, p. 17), the exercise of authority is not something easily evaded or laid aside lightly. Instead, Shakespeare’s plays insistently emphasize the notion of authority, only to destabilize straightforward understandings of it. Such complexity inevitably colours the ways in which actors, readers, and audiences respond to Shakespearean authority, as well as the ways in which the author’s reputation is forged in the following ages. Shakespeare and Authority therefore enables a new understanding of Shakespearean authority by foregrounding both its historical precedents and its subsequent effects.

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NOTES

1 For images of Jonson (including his own statue in Westminster Abbey), see Hearn, 2014.
2 While this is partly explained by neoclassical dogma and the growing influence of French critics, Rymer himself, as Fred Parker has emphasized, ‘grounds his criticism in an appeal to the common sense of the reader’; see Parker, 1988, p. 18.
3 In the same place, his essay ‘Four Elizabethan Dramatists’, Eliot also observed (surely with his tongue in his cheek) that Rymer still ‘makes out a very good case’ (Eliot, 1932, p. 97, n. 3).
4 For the connection between Shakespeare’s education and his classical learning, the most thorough account remains Baldwin, 1944.
5 For eighteenth-century editing of Shakespeare, see Parker, 1989; Seary, 1990; and Jarvis, 1995; for the Stratford Jubilee, see Rumbold, 2012; and for Malone and the emergence of notions of textual and critical authenticity, see De Grazia, 1991.
6 Although this is not the place for a rehearsal of the Shakespearean authorship controversy, it is worth noting that the refusal to believe that a Stratford grammar boy could have written the plays of Shakespeare, and subsequent attributions to Bacon, the Earl of Oxford *et al* is directly related to these contested notions of Shakespearean authority.
In our range and scope, we, of course, follow Taylor, 1989, the exemplary multitudinous account of Shakespeare’s afterlife.