Clio in the Business School:

Historical Approaches in Strategy, International Business and Entrepreneurship

Abstract: On the back of recent and significant new debates on the use of history within business and management studies, we consider the perception of historians as being anti-theory and of having methodological shortcomings; and business and management scholars displaying insufficient attention to historical context and privileging of certain social science methods over others. These are explored through an examination of three subjects: strategy; international business; and entrepreneurship. We propose a framework for advancing the use of history within business and management studies more generally through greater understanding of historical perspectives and methodologies.

Keywords: History; Strategy; International Business; Entrepreneurship; Methodology

Introduction

This article extends the recent, and valuable, contributions made within organisation studies (to establish common understanding of historical methods and approaches) to explore the fields of strategy, IB, and entrepreneurship, in which there have been sustained calls for historical research, but little articulation of how this is to be achieved. Equally, Howard Aldrich has criticised entrepreneurship theory and methods for the “relative neglect of historical and comparative research”; a call that has been echoed by Daniel Wadhwan.1 In their 2011 Journal of Business Venturing article, Forbes and Kirsch identified historical archives as representing a “critical and under-utilized research resource” for the field of entrepreneurship in seeking to understand emerging industries.2 In international business, suggestions for more historical research in the discipline have gone unheeded, with this kind of research remaining rare in the major journals.3 In a well-received special issue of Business History, Peter Buckley made the case for more collaboration between business historians and international business scholars, arguing that history can gain from employing concepts, methods and theories from international business.4 Refreshingly, he viewed this as going beyond using historical facts to test theories, but rather as an opportunity to extend theory by creating stylised facts from primary
archival research. This would make “the new business history”, in his words, “a powerful generator of theory”.

Even though Buckley’s contribution shows a high regard for and understanding of the empirical rigour that exemplifies historical research, in the theory-based hierarchies of management studies the approach he suggests may only integrate a small selection of what constitutes business historical research. Elsewhere, Jones and Khanna similarly argued for more historical research in international business, but from a different angle, suggesting four areas in which history could make a substantial contribution: history as a source of time series variation (‘augmenting the sources of variation’); dynamics matter (‘things change’); illuminating path dependence; and FDI and development in the really long run (‘expanding the domain of inquiry’).

Scholars in strategy, such as Stewart Clegg, Mona Ericson, Leif Melin, and strategy-as-practice (s-as-p) scholars like Paula Jarzabkowski, have repeatedly restated the need for, and importance of, history to the discipline. As the s-as-p scholars infer, to some extent adoption of historical approaches within much classical strategy and strategic management literature has been constrained by epistemological assumptions of those drawing on history. Despite the emergence of the s-as-p school focused “on the processes and practices constituting the everyday activities of organizational life and relating to strategic outcomes”, Robert Chia and Brad MacKay have criticised the absence of history: “The possibility that strategic change and the directions taken may be brought about by culturally and historically shaped tendencies and dispositions acquired through social practices internalized by the actors remains relatively unexamined”. However, Vaara and Lamberg’s recent observations suggests that little real progress has been made: “understanding of historical embeddedness has remained limited in this body of work, which has constrained its potential to deepen our grasp of the social, cultural and socio-political nature of strategy-making”. To an extent, this reflects analogous distinctions within the strategy literature itself between those pursuing more processual approaches (such as s-as-p) and those embracing more classical transaction cost informed perspectives. It is also clear within approaches to strategy between those pursuing more process driven approaches to “strategizing”, and taking up the mantle from earlier strategy scholars like Henry Mintzberg.
The last five years have witnessed a flourishing of discussions over historical approaches and contemporary business and management studies, including in the pages of this journal, most notably in the field of organisation studies\textsuperscript{11}, but also in mainstream business and management journals. For example, several major journals have had, or are having, special issues devoted to historical approaches, such as the *Journal of Management Studies* in 2010, *Organization* for 2014, and *Academy of Management Review* in 2016. *Organization Studies* and *Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal* have closed calls for special issues on historical approaches in 2016. This shows greater critical mass, as well as greater editorial interest, in how history can contribute to a better understanding of business and management. At the European Group for Organization Studies (EGOS), the organisational history track has been a standing group for several years now, underlining its importance as a rapidly institutionalising specialisation within this diverse field, and has become a forum for organisation scholars with interest in historical and longitudinal methods to meet with historians who employ theories and methods from organisation studies. Meanwhile the British Academy of Management has recently revived its business history stream, and the Academy of Management’s Management History Division remains active, suggesting that there is a growing appetite for further engagement between history and business studies, which offers the opportunity for history to contribute novel and innovative approaches to business and management scholarship.\textsuperscript{12} However, the uses of history in the identified fields of international business, strategy and entrepreneurship remain sparse in their frequency. This article is an attempt at providing a way forward to encourage the use of history within these fields and beyond. It is important to recognise that valuable exchange between historians and business scholars requires the former to understand the standards of business disciplines and articulate how historical approaches could further their research agenda. In 1997, Richard Rosenbloom wrote “modes of interaction between history and management theory are surely desirable, but they stop well short of the intimate interconnections that now flourish between other disciplines and certain management fields, to the great benefit of the latter.”\textsuperscript{13} As clear as the value of history to business and management disciplines is within the minds of business historians, the disconnect between historical scholarship and publication in major business journals remains. At
present many of these exchanges have occurred in organisation and management studies, but less so in other business fields. This paper is an attempt to address this imbalance by considering how business history can more effectively engage with subjects where calls have been made for more historical work, but where articulation of how this is to be achieved remains unclear.

In this article, we posit that a way forward may be found in Thomas Andrews and Flannery Burke’s fitting and precise explanation of the distinctiveness of historical perspective. Undertaking research into the discipline, they noted the lacuna in a definition of the historical approach – so implicit in historical work but rarely stated explicitly for those uninitiated into the community of practice – as a major obstacle. This reflects the concerns raised by historians and business and management scholars alike about the lack of clarity over historical methods. Andrews and Burke identified what they referred to as the ‘five C’s’: context; change over time; causality; complexity; and contingency. Many of these are both explicit and implicit in the recent core contributions to epistemological debates over the interaction between history and business and management studies. Of these, causality, context, and change over time, are on the face of it the most familiar to those wishing to deploy history. However, upon closer inspection, as the preceding sections illustrate, understanding of historical context and change over time remains superficial. This is particularly problematic in that both lie at the heart of historical perspective and methods. For without a full appreciation of the historical context in which social actors operate, and how that changes, these lose their ability to reflect the dynamics of social processes and the implicit (and explicit) value of history.

As the discussion that follows indicates, history is underutilised. This is illustrated by a search for “histor*” in the Journal of International Business Studies (JIBS) where there were only eleven articles published that mentioned history in the title or the keywords between 1987 and 2012. Of those, four were published before 2000 and were more or less disciplinary or general histories. Three papers were conceptual, including the contribution by Jones and Khanna, and one was a response to their article, in which the authors highlighted the potential contribution of history in terms of its ability to explain causality. The other conceptual paper, although not directly
related to Jones and Khanna, made the case for longitudinal qualitative research and its ability to tackle issues of complexity and non-linear causation.\textsuperscript{15}

Entrepreneurship’s engagement with history is in an arguably even more parlous state, although this has not gone unnoticed.\textsuperscript{16} Scholarship in entrepreneurship has to a large extent been numeric data-driven with a focus on collection and analysis of panel data, as well as promotion of data collection for example through the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), run by the US’s main entrepreneurship research university Babson College with partner institutions around the world.\textsuperscript{17} The dominance of numeric data combined with the desire to build theory in order to conceptualise and make sense of the data collected means that in recent years entrepreneurship as a discipline has largely ignored business history as a legitimate avenue of research. Entrepreneurship is particularly well-suited to utilising historical research due to its emergence out of historical enquiry\textsuperscript{18}, as well as the strong tradition of research into entrepreneurship within business history, with Chandler’s analysis of the change in control of firms from entrepreneur to family control to professional managers providing what Morck and Yeung termed “the baseline paradigm of business everywhere”.\textsuperscript{19} It is evident that Chandler’s early influence provided a boon to research in entrepreneurship, as well as demonstrating the contribution that business history can make to our understanding of these forms of economic organization. However, that early relationship did not flourish or continue in meaningful engagement although business history continued to cover entrepreneurship in detail and across all time periods and areas.

All of the above highlights a pressing need for greater understanding as a pre-requisite to more profound engagement between history and business and management studies. Firstly, any historian engaging with business and management studies needs to be cognisant of the theory-centred, methodologically transparent approach that lies at the core of social science epistemology dominant in business schools if they want their work to have an impact in these areas. Equally, there is an onus on business and management scholars wishing to engage historical perspective to be attentive to the articulation of historical theory and methods, where it exists explicitly. To this end, drawing on examples from the subfields of entrepreneurship, international business, and strategy, we address what are the perceived weaknesses of historical work by
both historians and business scholars, and the uses (and misuses) of history within business scholarship. We argue for the need to maintain the distinctiveness of historical approaches to the study of business and management, but in a way that makes it accessible to non-historians to use to the benefit of wider and deeper understanding. In order to achieve this, we present a way forward for history and business scholarly disciplines to engage as the final component of this paper.

We posit that for there to be a more efficacious engagement between historians and business and management scholars, it is important to first understand the problems inherent in how history is viewed, and its uses within business and management studies. It is only after this is undertaken that a way forward that seeks to resolve the issues can be identified. In order to engage with other disciplines in the social sciences, the epistemological assumptions of history need to be clearly explained and justified as an alternative research approach. In their recent contribution, Rowlinson et al. seek to do this by reflecting on the epistemological dualisms that both separate and connect history and organisation theory. Amongst historians, they identify a predilection for narrative, “verifiable documentary evidence”, and identification of their own periodization, and amongst organisation theorists a tendency to focus on analysis rather than narrative construction, constructed data, and temporal constancy. In their 2014 contribution, Kipping and Üsdiken identified the contribution to be made by history in informing theory by providing “evidence to develop, modify or test theories” (“history to theory”), or where history is part of the model “as a driver or moderator” (“history in theory”). Finally they identified a group of studies, which seek to incorporate historical context and contingency (incorporating what they identify as “historical cognizance”). While providing a broad taxonomy, these articles represented a significant step forward in seeking to draw distinctions between the ways in which history has been deployed thus far, and has informed a number of the most recent contributions.

In a more recent contribution, co-authored by an experienced group of organizations scholars and business historians, Maclean, Harvey and Clegg identify history as fulfilling a dual role in organisation studies of evaluating and conceptualising theory, and in narrating and explicating. In the case of the former, this involves the deductive use of historical evidence to test, and inductive deployment of history to build new,
concepts; in the latter, providing details of historical context and converging theory with history. In seeking to define “historical organization studies”, as “an organizational research that draws extensively on historical data, methods and knowledge, embedding organizing and organizations in their socio-historical context to generate historically informed theoretical narratives attentive to both disciplines”, Maclean et al have identified five underlying principles. Primary amongst these is the notion of “dual integrity” (an equality of status between both disciplines) and “pluralistic understanding” (the respectful accommodation of both disciplines), allied to “representational truth”, “context sensitivity”, and “theoretical fluency” (bringing together the rigour of historical context and empiricism with a strong theoretical grounding).23 Crucially all of these recent interventions cast critical new light on ways forward in identifying the means of communicating between disciplines, and suggest that a variety of research strategies can be employed in interdisciplinary work.

It is clear from the preceding that there is a desire on the part of historians, and business and management scholars, to engage more and better with each other’s disciplines, but there remains some doubt as to how, and in what way, this can be achieved. Even in organisation studies, which has generated some of the most intense discussions over the interaction between the discipline and history, there remains much to be done in terms of advancing this collaboration.24 Furthermore, there are a number of issues that need to be resolved, including how historians explicate their methodologies beyond their discipline to other areas which often demand methodological transparency in the generation of data and theory.25

The paper is structured as follows: first we show how history as a discipline has been accused of being a-theoretical. This is related to historians’ tendency not to discuss methodology explicitly, and the resultant perception that historical research lacks rigour. Second, we then discuss how history has been used in business studies, focusing explicitly on international business, strategy and entrepreneurship as disciplines that have not received the same level of attention as organisation studies but where calls for more historical research have been made. Third, we provide a potential way forward for furthering the engagement between business historians and contemporary business studies utilising Andrews and Burke’s 5 C’s of context, change over time, causality, complexity, and contingency in historical research as
guiding principles for good historical research practice in business studies. Finally, we conclude with a brief overview of the state of the art of business history and a restatement of the importance of making historical methodology explicit in engaging with business and management studies.

Problematising History
As history is a research tradition based largely on tacit practices as opposed to an explicit method, most historians would struggle to explain their methods in a way that makes sense to management scholars, who view this as an admission that this kind of research in fact lacks rigour. Moreover, historical research is less obviously driven by theory, and historical theorising is, in both form and substance, different from theories in the social sciences, be they qualitative or quantitative. In order to publish historical research in mainstream business and management journals, however, business historians need (and ought) to be able to make their approach intelligible to outsiders. In this section we explore how historians use, and are perceived to use, theory and methods both within and outside of the discipline of history. We then present a conceptual framework that characterises these discussions to capture these perceptions.

The main criticism levelled at history, including by some within the discipline, is that it is a-theoretical. Historian Prasenjit Duara notably accused historians of being “anti-theoretical”. While Chris Lorenz has described practicing historians as resistant to theory, describing theory as “something like an uninvited visitor who is always asking the wrong questions at the wrong time and at the wrong place and, perhaps worse in the eyes of empiricist historians, too often offering bad answers.” Even a cursory glance at the vast discourse on empiricism, Marxism, feminism, post-colonial theory and postmodernism within history suggests that Duara and Lorenz have made somewhat exaggerated, and misplaced, claims. These often long-running debates over the philosophy and methods of the discipline were reflected in leading journals such as Past & Present (1952 –), History & Theory (1960 –), History Workshop Journal (1976 –), amongst others. A second criticism levelled has been that historical methods, such as archival research, are questionable. In its most explicit form, this is seen in the comments of organization studies scholar Antonio Strati who deemed archival research, “not properly a method of empirical organizational research
because data and information are collected, rather than being directly generated in the course of the organizational research”. This suggests that there is some confusion about historical methods amongst business and management scholars which historians, seeking to engage in contemporary business and management disciplines, must be aware of and seek to address. In order for historical researchers to make a contribution, they need to further formalise and communicate a varied catalogue of historical methodologies, and clearly articulate what the integration of historical material and methodology has to contribute to theory in business and management studies. First and foremost among these potential contributions is greater historical contextualisation of the way in which knowledge has been created within business and management studies. A deeper understanding of the temporal context in which business and management theories were developed would promote more and better theory development in the future.

The view of historians as being anti- or at least a-theoretical persists and is implicit in much contemporary discussion of business history and theory such as in the identification of “narrative history” as distinct from “social scientific types of history”. The distinction drawn by Maclean et al is that: “Narrative historians are reticent in revealing the principles underlying their research… favouring the implicit embedding of theory within analysis, while social science history champions hypothesis testing and the explicit articulation of theoretical constructs”. Here the observations of John Lewis Gaddis are apposite. In a call to fellow historians to be explicit about their methods, Gaddis acknowledged:

We normally resist doing this. We work within a wide variety of styles, but we prefer in all of them that form conceal function. We recoil from the notion that our writing should replicate, say, the design of the Pompidou Center in Paris, which proudly places its escalators, plumbing, wiring, and ductwork on the outside of the building, so that they’re there for all to see. We don’t question the need for such structures, only the impulse to exhibit them.

This is about differences in disciplinary approach, rather than history as “a discipline untethered to methodology”; social scientists are trained to write papers detailing their methodology, historians generally are not. This is rooted in the emergence of these different academic traditions. However the effect, as Gaddis acknowledges, of
historians’ “reluctance to reveal our own… too often confuses our students – even, at times, ourselves – as to just what it is that we do”. This failure to adequately explain history to non-historians is evident even in work purporting to do just that, such as in a recent piece by Berridge and Stewart for *Contemporary Social Science*. For, while they point to the methodological treatment of sources, and refer to contextualisation, they offer little in the way of detail to guide social scientists in historical approaches. What makes history distinctive is, therefore, often implicitly assumed. As Decker notes: “historians are not explaining their methodology, and in fact are missing a language and a format to do so that are compatible with the approach in social sciences”.

Historical methodology requires clarification to foment understanding of its integrity, and challenge misconceptions. For example, Hargadon and Douglas’s study of strategy and innovation (published in one of the leading business journals, *Administrative Science Quarterly*), focusing on Thomas Edison and electric light, argued for “careful analysis of moments in history”, asserting that the use of historical data in contemporary business and management studies was problematic: “…because historical accounts often neglect the concrete details that shape and constitute actions, favouring instead the more abstracted details that render those actions timeless. And they often neglect the spirit of the time that was an essential but mainly invisible background against which these events unfolded”. Hargadon and Douglas sought to reassure their audience by detailing the complementary sources and methodological rigour which they undertook to address what they considered to be a weakness in using historical research to underpin their findings and assertions.

This misunderstanding stems from the fact that historians have tended to be less proactive in sharing across disciplinary boundaries, and in explaining historical methodology. The importance of clarifying historical methods and perspective has been underlined by Berridge and Stewart in relation to the use of history within the social sciences more broadly:

One of the dangers of using history is that the field can be crowded. History is perhaps unusual as a discipline in that many people think they can practise history without formal training or understanding. Historical examples are plucked out of
the air to provide “context” or to show that “nothing has changed” or that there are “historical parallels”.  

This may go some way to explaining why historians are often not recognised as engaging with theories from business and management. When historians do engage with these conceptual frameworks, they often use theories in a distinctly historical way, which does not contribute to theory-development in a manner that social scientists would recognise. Jones et al aver that “business historians have not made a habit of explicit hypothesis testing or the use of standardised social science methodology”\(^39\), suggesting that there is room for improvement amongst business historians in approaching their work in a similar vein to contemporary business and management scholars.

As there is a dearth of historiography oriented towards the current social science terminology, the question arises of whom would a business historian cite as a manual for historical methodology? Case study researchers can point to Eisenhardt and Yin, but business historians do not really cite canonical methodological texts, which are often considered undergraduate student knowledge.\(^40\) An illustration of how this can lead to the uncritical absorption of methodological approaches affecting a school of thought is the debate over British entrepreneurial failure, an argument often accompanied by a broader political agenda. In Charles Harvey’s 1979 study of the Rio Tinto Company in this journal, he detailed the main methodological criticisms that McCloskey and Sandberg proffered of the approach used by Aldcroft and others in the 1960s, as an explanatory factor in British entrepreneurial “failure” as a major factor in British economic decline in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.\(^41\) McCloskey and Sandberg’s main issue was that the case study approach used by Aldcroft and others to build this argument was not representative enough, arguing that:

A case, after all, is merely a case, and little effort has been expended in constructing a truly random sample of British behaviour, properly weighted for the importance of each industry . . . One swallow . . . does not make a summer, nor do scattered cases of entrepreneurial success or failure make or break the hypothesis of general entrepreneurial failure.\(^42\)
Implicit within McCloskey and Sandberg’s criticism above is their view that case study based research in history are largely shaped by the preferences of the individual historian. It also exposes a failure to acknowledge how history is written. In the words of the late Cambridge historian Edward Carr:

Study the historian before you begin to study the facts... When you read a work of history, always listen out for the buzzing… The facts are really not at all like fish on the fishmonger's slab. They are like fish swimming about in a vast and sometimes inaccessible ocean; and what the historian catches will depend partly on chance, but mainly on what part of the ocean he chooses to fish in and what tackle he chooses to use – these two factors being, of course, determined by the kind of fish he wants to catch... 43

McCloskey and Sandberg’s main contention was that single case studies are too narrow and subject to individual bias to be considered appropriate for understanding broader phenomena. In their minds, quantitative evidence and analysis provide a “more satisfying approach to the study of entrepreneurship” (i.e. a broader sweep of understanding). This, Harvey suggested, “implicitly cast doubt on the ability of business historians to add significantly to our understanding of the role of entrepreneurship in economic development”. 44

What most “history-friendly” business scholars highlight about history is that it is empirically rigorous and offers significant potential for the development of predictive theory. 45 This may be a good starting point, and one that can contradict those who believe that historical narrative is mostly anecdotal and therefore lacks wider applicability, or the ability to improve and generate theory. Nevertheless historical approaches should not be restricted exclusively to empirical or methodological contributions; these are just a first step to create a greater understanding of historical research. For this to occur the field needs a discussion about its own methodologies and theories, and how to articulate them more clearly, which then needs to be translated into terms that both scholars from the humanities and the social sciences can understand. For those interested in engaging with business and management studies (or indeed other fields in the social sciences), this will require some adaptation of how historical work is presented – explicitly describing methodology, and perhaps limiting or dispensing with narrative – when publishing in non-historical journals, to
capture the “dual integrity” “pluralistic understanding”, whilst safeguarding “representational truth”, “context sensitivity”, and “theoretical fluency”, that Maclean et al have rightly identified as integral.46

Whilst we do not concur with the perceptions of history as presented above (as a-theoretical and/or lacking in methodological rigour), it is nevertheless important to understand how historical enquiry is viewed both by historians and business and management scholars if we are to find ways to engage more effectively with each other. In this sense it is incumbent on historians to communicate more effectively what their methodological approaches are. Historians cannot complain that others misuse or misunderstand history if they are not prepared to engage outside the disciplinary confines of their work to explain its value and methods. The next section considers the use of history in business and management specifically focusing on strategy, organisation studies, international business and entrepreneurship. This is not intended to be an exhaustive review of the literature, but as an indicator of how history has been used and misused, as well as understood or misunderstood, within these sub-fields in order to better understand what needs to be done to advance engagement between historians and business and management scholars.

The Case for History in Business Studies
This section addresses the case for better use of history within business and management studies, highlighting examples of sensitivity to historical perspective – and the added value of that – alongside misuses of history and the limitations of such uncritical approaches. The misunderstanding of history, and its misuse, has been an issue raised across a variety of social science disciplines.47 And yet, as Bryant and Hall have observed, “the social sciences are, inherently and irreducibly, historical disciplines”; history is essential to robust social science:

… It is the transformative movement of history — a relentlessly creative and destructive social dynamic that is ever fashioning the new and the contemporary out of the old and the established — that constitutes their shared subject matter. The manifold realities investigated by anthropologists, economists, psychologists, sociologists, and other students of the human social condition, can thus find
comprehension only through a full engagement with historical modes of analysis.48

There is a long tradition of engagement between history and the social sciences, especially economics and sociology.49 Despite Bryant and Hall’s view, history has not been intrinsic to all fields, and even in those where it has, it has been subject to various types of use and misuse. This is evident from some of the examples provided from the use of history within international business, strategy, and entrepreneurship, which follow.

In recent years, international business as a field has discussed the role and potential contribution of qualitative research methods. This has led to the publication of two major handbooks and a special issue on qualitative methods in the *Journal of International Business Studies* (JIBS) in 2012.50 However, historians have not contributed to this debate, despite the fact that a large part of research in business history falls into the qualitative-interpretative category of social science research methods. And while an influential handbook on qualitative research methods in international business contained a chapter on doing research in corporate archives, this was not written by a historian, but by organisation studies scholars with archival research experience.51

In strategy scholarship, a decade ago, Charles Booth accused strategy research of being “profoundly ahistorical”, and “significantly impoverished as a result”.52 Despite a welter of criticism by strategy scholars over the last decade about the neglect of history within the sub-field, Vaara and Lamberg have recently averred that, “strategic management research, like management research more generally, has lacked historical comprehension and sensitivity”.53 This failure to grasp the significance of historical context and change has implications for future projections. As Martin Kornberger has observed, the implication of historical perspectives to strategy and strategic management, for example, is not restricted to past and current decision-making but strategy’s determination of future behaviours:

Strategy reties that Gordian knot of power and truth. On the one hand, strategy appears to be a scientific endeavor that provides theories, propositions, models
and frameworks to master the future. The strategist is a technocrat who claims jurisdiction over the future… On the other hand, strategy is an engine of change, a mechanism to transform the present and mold it in the image of a desired future to come.  

In this Journal, Kornberger has demonstrated the interconnection between past events and future projections, in relation to Von Clausewitz’s *On Strategy.*  

Chia and Holt’s recent observation about the unconscious acquisition of “social and managerial skills” by many business leaders not trained by business schools has underlined the importance of history, as a vital critical lens, to the strategy literature.  

Even amongst those business and management scholars who profess to be more contextually sensitive, such as those associated with more processual approaches to strategy, history’s potential remains unfulfilled; Vaara and Lamberg have commented that: “Although strategy-as-practice research has argued that practices take different forms depending on context, there is a paucity of knowledge of the historical construction of these practices and their enactment in situ”. Their contribution, prompted by their desire to integrate history into the theory of strategy “rather than serve ‘merely’ as empirical context”, focuses on “highlighting the historical embeddedness of strategic processes, practices and discourses” to advance the s-as-p literature building on the Mintzberg and Waters models of deliberate and emergent strategy. In this, they see comparative historiography, as well as micro-history, as invaluable. They cite Kipping and Cailluet’s study of Alcan, and Popp and Holt on the Shaws, as valuable illustrations of how history can both test and drive theory. Popp and Holt’s work also brings added value in its wider social location of business actors.  

However, this is not simply a matter of the neglect of historical approaches but also about how history is used and misused. History is often misused when case studies uncritically derive narrative from secondary sources with no attention to historical context. In strategy, Mary Tripsas’s study of innovation focusing on typesetting is illustrative of how secondary sources are sometimes used uncritically. Tripsas uses sources descriptively, to strive towards an understanding of “dual integrity”. However,
her study uses history only partially to provide evidence, relying heavily and selectively on Chandler, while remaining wedded to a Schumpeterian framework. This is problematic, given both the methodological flaws identified in Chandler’s work, as well as the criticism of his key works for oversight of organisational capabilities (something which Chandler later acknowledged). In relying on Chandler for context, Tripsas overlooks not just a relevant economic and business historiography but also that of science and technology, which could have provided stronger contextual integrity to the analysis and strengthened the argument.61

Erwin Danneels’ study of Corona Smith deploys history more reflexively but it too remains constrained by the limited historical contextualisation and avoids analysis of sources despite a detailed account of their collection.62 Similarly to Hargadon and Douglas, Danneels seeks to reassure the reader that his rigorous collection of thousands of pages of reports, news articles and filings, as well as several interviews with company employees, is enough for contextual integrity, but does little to consider the temporal development of the company or industry to the point where his analysis begins. These examples illustrate what Vaara and Lamberg identify as the tendency to use history “as empirical evidence of context” while lacking the social embeddedness necessary to fully comprehend and analyse strategic decision-making. Central to these constraints is the way in which history is used both as limited and uncritical contextual decoration and a predilection for one facet of the historical perspective, causality. Peter Buckley has argued: “Both international business and business history struggle with causality versus correspondence (or correlation). The role of chance – risk and uncertainty in business, fortune or fate in history is often underrated in a search for determinism.”63

Geoffrey Jones recently reiterated the opportunities from such collaborations: “The discipline of International Business, which has long been receptive to historical approaches, and faces its own methodological roadblocks in addressing big issues, would be a natural audience and partner in this terrain.”64 However, in the same contribution, he also identified the obstacles to greater engagements between the two fields: “… fields such as International Business are struggling precisely because of slavish commitments to orthodox social science methodology, which limits the range
of issues that can be addressed.” The limitations in the way in which history is used in IB, as W Mark Fruin highlighted (in a response to Jones and Khanna’s article), has not only been confined by time but also place and culture:

IB is a field constrained not only in time, but also in economic model (institutional, country-level, and developmental variation) and intellectual direction. IB regularly portrays the universe of business as the activities of Western firms during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In this view, only a narrow slice of business worldwide qualifies as ‘IB’. Consistent with the narrowness of this vision, not one historian of non-Western business was cited in Jones and Khanna’s otherwise groundbreaking article. To their credit, they do mention business groups in emerging economies, British and Japanese trading companies, and the effects of colonialism in India and China, and they do enlarge the slice timewise, adding the seventeenth, eighteenth, and all of the nineteenth centuries to the twentieth and twenty-first. Yet, a slice – even a nice, long, historical slice – should not encompass IB.

Considering the increasing number of scholars researching non-Western business history, this further underlines the potential importance of historical research to IB. The trend towards 2 approaches since the 1960s meant that business research focused on areas and subjects that offered fully accessible data as a precondition for rigorous sampling and controlled observation. Neither historical research, nor non-Western settings, offered this level and quality of data to management and business researchers and were thus side-lined. As a result, many areas of the world, and many topics, appear to be excluded from research in international business simply because the kind of statistical economic data is either not available or of dubious quality. At times this can legitimate qualitative approaches such as fieldwork, but archival research and oral history interviewing certainly merit to be considered as more than just subsidiary methodologies to quantitative data analysis. These are important issues that affect business historians as much as other regional and qualitative scholars working in the field of IB. As international business is by far the larger community, this is perhaps a greater problem for historians than vice versa. However, if there is to be any move towards “dual integrity” and “pluralistic understanding”, then IB scholars and historians will need to identify areas of research and types of contributions where
historical research may add to theory. Conversely, concepts from IB that improve historical understanding of the past are equally valuable to historical research.

History continues to be under-utilised in many areas of business and management studies. More crucially though is the misunderstanding of historical perspective and methods, which leads to the limited use of history as narrative padding often reliant on an uncritical reading and selection of secondary texts which compromises rigour. Even more problematically this means that much business and management literature deploying historical material is decontextualized from the wider historical environment. At the heart of these obstacles to greater understanding lies a pressing and urgent need for historians wishing to engage with business and management subjects to be transparent about their methods, as well as introducing greater clarity about historical perspective. For business and management studies scholars wishing to use history effectively, it is imperative that they fully comprehend historical perspective and methods. This requires historians to be more explicit about historical approaches. Only by doing this will we achieve the accommodation explicit in Maclean et al’s call for “dual integrity” and “pluralistic understanding”. In what follows, we propose a framework for greater understanding of historical perspective, with potential benefits to accrue to future research for both historians, and business and management scholars.

A way forward

A significant obstacle to realising the full potential of the use of history across business and management disciplines remains one of methodology, in particular the impression of a false disparity between history and business and management over the use of sources. Indeed, as we venture here, perhaps misunderstanding of historical methodology is the significant obstacle to greater accommodation. The continuing distinctions drawn between the primary data created by social science research, through the design and conduct of interviews and surveys, for example, with the collection of “secondary” documentary evidence in archives, are misleading. In its most extreme form, this is represented by Strati’s rejection of historical archival research. However, the view is also evident in the synthetic typologies of “narrative”
and “social science” history. Rather, as outlined above, this is a question of greater transparency over methods and “pluralistic understanding”.69

What privileges social science methods over archival documentation in contemporary business and management scholarship? As numerous historians have outlined, reading sources requires the historian to understand the provenance of sources, to read them against the grain, and consider them in the context in which they were produced. Ludmilla Jordanova for one has explained, “texts are not transparent documents but elaborate creations, parts of discourses and hence implicated in the nature of power. … [They] tell us not what happened but what witnesses and commentators believed”.70 The view of social science as a creator of primary data ignores powerful variables within the conduct of interviews and surveys, such as the “cultural circuit” – the reinforcing of collective narratives within that of the individual, and vice versa – and the “intersubjectivity” between questioner and respondent.71 Consequently, any such claims of the “creation” of these documents by social science researchers should acknowledge these variables in the construction of these sources. Incidentally, as Rowlinson et al. note, oral history, both conceptually and methodologically, appears more acceptable to fields like organisation studies, principally because of familiarity with interviewing as a data collection method and its disciplinary engagement with memory studies. This is a delicious irony for oral historians, who remain accused by a small coterie of empiricist historians of a flawed methodology because of its “subjectivity”.72 Equally sociologists of work have found in oral history a familiar method, likening it to semi-structured interviewing.73

The recent canon of work such as Decker, Kipping and Üsdiken, Maclean et al, Rowlinson et al, has provided valuable proposals for a way forward to facilitate discussion and understanding between history and business and management studies. They have also been complemented by the welcome publication of Marcelo Bucheli and Daniel Wadhwani’s Organizations in Time, bringing historians and business and management scholars together in an edited collection, which has an invaluable contribution to make both in teaching and research. Here we propose a framework for understanding historical perspective as a means of allowing for more effective use of history by business and management scholars. Alongside encouraging greater reflection amongst business and management scholars on the distinction between
historical writing and writing of history, discussed in the previous section, we provide tangible ways in which those seeking to realise the full value of history to their disciplinary field can deploy it.

Andrews and Burke’s 5 Cs of context, change over time, causality, complexity, and contingency provide a degree of utility which is often already found in qualitative research in business and management studies, albeit not necessarily all together. Bringing them all to bear on work utilising historical approaches therefore should not be as much of a challenge to qualitative scholars than it may, at first, seem. However, by explicitly articulating the meaning and application of the 5 Cs, it may clarify this method further both for qualitative and quantitative researchers.

The recognition of the value of a deeper appreciation of context and change over time has been explicitly commented upon by both Jones and Khanna in relation to the contribution of time and dynamics variables to IB. Similarly Jeff Fear has underlined the value of historical context to elucidating business decision-making:

If one only examines everyday occurrences at one point in time without a comparative sense of time and space, the danger is that one develops universalizing theories based on the present, or at one period of time in one culture, missing the ‘time bound’ and ‘place bound’ dimensions of theory. By targeting those crucial events, identifying controversial internal debates, or tracing the more subtle but organizational shifts over time, we might mine yet more insight into this double-looped learning process, which cannot be captured as abstracted variables or causes that eliminate human behavior and time…

Thus the work of Hargadon and Douglas, on the back of a limited reading of secondary accounts of Edison’s historical context, loses the complexity of the myriad of other forces and networks shaped by and shaping his achievements. There is little mention of any non-financial help Edison received in setting up his new venture (for example; lawyers, scientific expertise, business or personal help), relying instead on secondary analyses that privilege financial support provided by Vanderbilt and J. P. Morgan. A more historically robust analysis could have included such information, particularly as Edison clearly did not act in complete isolation. Furthermore, a substantial archive of his papers was and remains available, with several million
documents held and accessible to the public. In Hargadon and Douglas’ work historical rigour is secondary to theoretical development.

Similarly, Danneels’ limiting of the study of Smith Corona to one aspect of their business in a brief snapshot of time confines understanding of the historical forces and actors that exercised a profound impact on the business. A more insightful understanding of historical context and change over time aids greater understanding of the potential of two of the other “five ‘C’s” as proposed by Andrews and Burke; complexity and contingency. These not only offer potentially valuable insights but also act as an antidote to the preoccupation within much business and management literature that purports to adopt historical perspective but does so with a narrow historical causality. As Andrews and Burke note, “[contingency]… offers a powerful corrective to teleology, the fallacy that events pursue a straight-arrow course to a pre-determined outcome, since people in the past had no way of anticipating our present world. Contingency also reminds us that individuals shape the course of human events”. This focus on human agency and its sometimes structural significance offers opportunities for further theorizing in areas such as agency theory or institutional work. Similarly, complexity provides a sharp reminder of the constant flux of everyday life: “Moral, epistemological, and causal complexity distinguish historical thinking from the conception of ‘history’ held by many non-historians. Re-enacting battles and remembering names and dates require effort but not necessarily analytical rigor.” Consideration of “complexity” and “contingency” are critical to providing the sort of “context integrity” called for by Maclean et al.

Indeed, there is a potential complementarity of combining business history’s deep understanding of causality, complexity and the development and importance of context with more contemporarily focused work and data collection beyond euphemistically used terms such as “longitudinal” to offer up new insights into what are still contested concepts and practices, and perhaps more importantly in seeking to build new theory. An example of this is demonstrated by Harvey et al.’s 2011 paper in Business History on the historical development of entrepreneurial philanthropy through an analysis of Andrew Carnegie’s activities. Harvey et al. developed a theoretical model to understand current phenomena in philanthropic giving such as “venture philanthropy” building on and extending earlier work by others on
“philanthrocapitalism”, which then formed the basis for further work on the subject in contemporary entrepreneurship and management journals. The role of history in developing the model was a result of a collaboration between business historians and entrepreneurship scholars where history was a driver, Kipping and Üsdiken’s “history in theory”. Similarly, Andrew Popp’s work on the Shaws, Matthias Kipping and Ludovic Cailluet on Alcan’s strategic decision-making, as well as Geoffrey Jones and Christina Lubinski’s work on political risk management at the pharmaceutical firm Beiersdorf, are all exemplary historically contextualised studies reflecting complexity and change, while contributing to theory within business and management.

However, the above are examples of business historians deploying history, rather than business and management scholars deploying it. So how can business and management scholars utilise history to broaden and deepen knowledge of business? The 5 C’s offer a framework that can be used when considering historical developments in contemporary studies. History, through the use of contingency, change over time, context and complexity, and causality, has much to contribute if utilised effectively. This is a point demonstrated by Jones and Khanna who highlight the opportunities that complexity and contingency offer in understandings of the dynamics of strategic decision-making and more specifically over questions of “path dependence”, a point made by Terry Gourvish some thirty years ago.

Returning to Kornberger’s earlier observations, consideration of historical contingency and complexity are not simply an abstraction but offer business scholars, and managers, the enhanced tools to scan for and “forge novel solutions to cope with the complex and ever-changing processes of flux”. Context, contingency and complexity also offer the opportunity to further elaborate on such issues as “path dependence” (in particular, exploring “organizational path dependence” as identified by organizational sociologists) and “bounded rationality”. Contingency, in particular, may appeal to scholars of entrepreneurship who seek to focus on individual behaviour in order to observe wider phenomena. Similarly, for business and management scholars seeking to take a step back to observe and comment on wider phenomena, accepting and seeking to make sense of context and complexity are not uncommon. We maintain that the 5 Cs represents a valuable tool for those seeking to use history judiciously. Similarly, the more that business historians articulate their
methodologies the clearer the similarities between the different disciplines will become, which will facilitate deeper integration of rigorous historical approaches.

**Conclusion**

Recent contributions by leading practitioners have restated and further expanded upon what their business and management sub-fields have to gain from integrating historical approaches. These contributions to the debate have started a more fruitful discussion about how history and business scholarship might more effectively engage with each other. We venture that the clearer articulation by historians, and the adoption by business scholars, of rigorous historical methods and perspectives may well help to inform theoretical turns within the business and management fields in a way which allows both to work more effectively together. Furthermore, there are clear benefits to historians from this approach. An open debate about methodologies and practices in history would open the doors for non-historians to better understand the rigour required in historical research, making the discipline more transparent and engaging. The necessary transparency and articulation of methodological rigour in social science research is often missing from historical research. A debate bringing it to the fore amongst historians would have the dual benefit of the aforementioned transparency, and exploring ways forward for the discipline which will require new ways of working as archives change and masses of data generated through the proliferation and adoption of communications technology continues apace. A debate around methodologies in historical research would ensure that the discipline keeps pace with these changes.

This is particularly relevant for business history at present, because as the subject finds itself at a cross-road as to which disciplinary influences to incorporate. At present there are at least three principal approaches in business history which are vying for attention: the mostly US-based “History of Capitalism”, which seeks a rapprochement with history proper; the self-proclaimed “new business history” that focuses on economics, or in some cases specifically on evolutionary economics and other heterodox approaches; and the emerging field of “Management and Organizational History” which seeks to historicize management studies. For any or all of these approaches to be successful, each is required to more clearly articulate the methodologies adopted by historians to show the value of history to business and
management studies and salve any lingering doubts over the rigour which historians
treat their research. If further meaningful engagement between historians and business
scholars is to occur, it is incumbent upon historians to show what we do and how we
do it to explain its value.

We may be some way away from the ultimate “legitimating text”, in the words of Roy
Suddaby, or the “elevator speech”, as Geoffrey Jones termed it, that will make history
acceptable as just that: history. Ultimately we share Maclean et al’s, and Greenwood
and Bernardi’s, respective views that future collaboration must be based on “dual
integrity” and “pluralistic understanding” for each field with some understanding of
the distinctions and traditions of both, and that these fields may be closer than some
have led us to believe. But we need to start by being clear about what are the features
of good historical research practice, whether that is business history or mainstream
history.

For this to occur, business history needs discussion about its own methodologies and
theories, which then needs to be translated into terms that both scholars from the
humanities and the social sciences can understand. For those interested in engaging
with management studies, this will require some adaptation of how historical work is
presented – explicitly describing methodology, perhaps limiting or dispensing with
narrative – when publishing in non-historical journals, to capture the “dual integrity”
“pluralistic understanding”, accommodating “representational truth”, “context
sensitivity”, and “theoretical fluency”, that Maclean et al have rightly identified as
integral. The recent contributions to this debate have started a more fruitful
discussion about how this might be done, and in starting to unpick the contribution of
historical perspectives and methods. Hopefully in the long term greater collaboration
will lead to greater appreciation for what historical narratives really are: not
anecdotal, but a careful synthesis that combines evidence, analysis and interpretation
in an explanatory, retrospective account. Moreover, we venture that the adoption of
rigorous historical methodology and perspective will help to inform theoretical turns
within the fields of international business, entrepreneurship, and strategy, as well as
organisation studies.
For overviews of these debates published in the last three decades: Green and Troup, *The Houses of History*; Brown, *Postmodernism for Historians*; Dworkin, *Class Struggles*; Laura Lee Downs, *Writing Gender History*. The literature on each one of these areas of debate is voluminous and far too extensive to quote in full here. For overviews of these debates published in the last three decades: Green and Troup, *The Houses of History*; Brown, *Postmodernism for Historians*; Dworkin, *Class Struggles*; Laura Lee Downs, *Writing Gender History*.
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On the scientific turn in US business research and education in the late 1950s, see Usdiken and Kipping, "History and organization studies: A long-term view", 37-38. For an explicit statement about the need for “an emphasis upon current and immediately observable organizations in the interests of full and rigorous data”, implying that “historical research, while not ruled out, is given second-level priority and rigorous comparative studies substituted at the first-priority level”, see Delany, "Some Field Notes on the Problem of Access", 449.

Maclean et al, “Conceptualizing Historical Organization Studies”

Jordanova, History in Practice, 85-6; See Carr, What is History?.


See, for example: ‘This much I know: Niall Ferguson,’ The Guardian, 18 January 2009.

Jones and Khanna, “Bringing history (back)”; Fear, “Mining the past,”

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Andrews and Burke, “What Does It Mean to Think Historically”.


Peng et al., “The Institution-based View,” 64.

Jones and Khanna, “Bringing history (back)”; Gourvish, “British Business and the Transition to a Corporate Economy”.

Burt et al., “Managerial hyperopia,” 3.

Despite Terry Gourvish’s identification of “bounded rationality” as an area worthy of exploration over twenty years ago, this has been little explored in business history: Gourvish, “British Business and the Transition to a Corporate Economy,” 18-19; See also Burt et al., “Managerial hyperopia”; Levinthal and March, “The myopia of learning”; Chikudate, “Collective hyperopia”; Vaughan, “The dark side of organizations”.


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