No ends, no means, 
just education: 

a kinaesthetic approach to thinking otherwise
Acknowledgements

Thank you to both Julie Allan and Ian Munday for endless amounts of insight and humour.

Thank you to Tom and Lily for driving me out of the house and into the shed.
Abstract

In this thesis I offer an alternative to the hyper-individualistic, hyper-performative means-end dynamic that dominates contemporary educational practice. I foreground dimensions of experience that possibilise an approach that is neither instrumentatlisipo nor instrumentalising; an approach I term (a) (more) just education. The thesis opens with an analysis of how the reduction of education to use-value is both dependent on, and perpetuating of, a conception of subjectivity that overlooks the facticity of embodied life. The prevalence of dualist assumptions in both liberal and critical educational thinking and the persistence of these assumptions despite explicit attempts to think otherwise is mapped out and I draw a link between these assumptions and the privilege accorded to displays of understanding. Alongside this analysis I propose that the seemingly all-pervasive Cartesian legacy might be circumvented by approaching the question of subjectivity from a kinaesthetic perspective.

This kinaesthetic approach is outlined with reference to the somatic dance practice of Skinner Releasing Technique (SRT). The practice of SRT offers up three ‘kinaesthetic provocations’ that invite re-thinking both the dynamics of education and the dynamics of justice. Throughout the thesis I explore an interplay between these provocations and the work of Derrida and Deleuze/Deleuze and Guattari; and through this interplay I unsettle the dualisms of self and other, self and world, and self and work. By approaching the shaping of subjectivity from a bodily, kinaesthetic perspective I submit the bodies called teachers and students, the bodies of practice called teaching and learning, the bodies of knowledge called curricula and the ideal body called justice to processes of deterritorialisation. Untethering education from its ends in this way affords the possibility of approaching education as an experience of passage. I argue that an emphasis on passage offers up educational consequences that are shared in
rather than shared out and that therefore escape the grip of performative categorising trends. Through this account the role of the educator becomes one of affirmation, rather than validation, and I conclude the thesis by examining the particular sensitivities that this demands.
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Chapter 1 - Situations

Introduction

In this thesis I explore the relationship between (in)justice and education through foregrounding the interests of a series of forgotten others: the forgotten others who are overlooked by a dominant discourse oriented by the spectacle of individual achievement, the forgotten others of non-categorisable, intersubjective dimensions of experience and the forgotten other of a sense of passage that we might call education. However, before introducing my research it is perhaps worth situating myself as a researcher as my story offers a fairly direct way of fleshing out dimensions of my focus of investigation and methodology that might otherwise appear somewhat esoteric. My background is that I am a professional contemporary dancer and dance educator within the Higher Education sector, a combined history of over 30 years. As a performer and as a teacher I have always worked with what has now become known as a "somatic" approach wherein my, and my students', articulation of movement (in other words the accuracy and skill of our dancing) was developed through attentiveness to kinaesthetic sensation rather than through the imitation of an objectified ideal form. The inscription of a field of somatics is credited to philosopher and somatic practitioner Thomas Hanna, who identified a number of practices that were loosely connected by their shared privileging of first-person bodily experience:

Somatics is the field that studies the soma: namely, the body as perceived from within by first-person perception. When a human being is observed from the outside - i.e., from a third-person viewpoint - the phenomenon of a human body is perceived. But, when this same human being is observed from the first-person viewpoint of his own proprioceptive senses, a categorically different phenomenon is perceived: the human soma (1995, p. 341, original emphasis).¹

¹ Hanna first used the term in 1970 in his book Bodies in revolt: a primer in somatic thinking, Austin, TX: Holt Rinehart and Winston
More recently the term "somatic practices" has become the common descriptor of the field in order to indicate the diversity of approaches and differing functions of the various disciplines, some of which have a therapeutic focus whilst others were developed for purposes of dance and performance training.\(^2\) Although the terminology of somatics is drawn on in this thesis I more often simply refer to "kinaesthetic experience" in order to underline that I am referring to a dimension of sensorial awareness that can be cultivated in or outside of the context of any given discipline. I use the term "kinaesthetic experience" with the same deliberate imprecision as Joan Skinner (Skinner, Davis, Davidson, Wheeler and Metcalf, 1979; Skura & Skinner, 1990) as it is the specific somatic approach that she instigated that I practise and teach and that I draw from in this thesis. In so doing I acknowledge that her use of this terminology blurs the distinction between apprehensions that are proprioceptive (sensitivity arising from the orientation, position and movement of the body and body parts), interoceptive (sensitivity to stimuli within the body) and exteroceptive (sensitivity to stimuli arising outside of the body).\(^3\) The notion of kinaesthetic experience that I take from Skinner alludes to how our awareness of sensation can be drawn as well as directed, in other words it refers to an attunement to affect rather than a fine-tuning of intention.

In their analysis of Western contemporary dance training Fortin, Vieira and Tremblay (2009) assert that a somatic approach (though increasingly valued) continues to occupy a marginal status and they describe the more dominant discourse as that of ‘pursuing the quest for perfection' (Fortin et al., 2009, p. 60) through the imitation of a pre-ordained


\(^3\) Although Hanna (1995) refers to proprioceptive awareness in his definition, the role of touch in all somatic practices blurs extero/proptoceptive boundaries at the level of experience.
ideal. My own history has involved cultivating the marginal even whilst in the midst of the mainstream as I have danced for conventional as well as experimental choreographers and have both taught and played a leadership role within the traditionally conservative and intensely stratified environment of elite conservatoires.

My experience has been that introducing somatic practices into the conservatoire sector challenges these stratified educational environments in three ways. Firstly, as reflected in the citation above from Hanna (1995), first person kinaesthetic experience escapes third person interpretations and generalisations and therefore disallows pedagogical practices that rely on hierarchical comparisons. Secondly, in somatic practices learning is attributed to a practice of non-doing. Suspending intentional action to allow for heightened attention to kinaesthetic sensation involves pedagogical practices that are not oriented by overt displays of achievement. Thirdly, somatic practices challenge the individualism of these conventionally competitive and hierarchical environments because, perhaps paradoxically, tuning in to the irreducibly personalised realm of kinaesthetic sensation brings to our awareness that we are not isolated and autonomous beings. At a basic level we notice that even a given breath is not "our own" but is a movement between self and environment that happens without our conscious direction. Reflecting on this dimension of awareness Ravn paraphrases the skill of somatically informed dancers as: 'how they work to make themselves "transparent" to what might appear from the environment' (2010, p. 27 original quotation marks). Similarly, Skinner describes the dancers she works with as 'almost in a state of transparency' (Skinner & Dempster, 1996, p. 26), in other words: 'they have a sense of being danced

\footnote{The scope of Ravn's research project included the subjective experiences of dancers from a range of dance disciplines. The comments quoted here were made in relation to dancers who specifically work from a first person somatic perspective, in this instance, practitioners of Butoh and the somatic practice Body Mind Centering® (BMC).}
rather than performing the dance' (Skinner et al., 1979, p. 12). The intersubjective
dimension of experience that Skinner and Ravn are alluding to, which I shall henceforth
refer to as "becoming almost transparent", foregrounds the productive force of affect
and unsettles the notion of a closed and autonomous subjectivity that has historically
been sustained by educational discourses.

I call these three characteristics of attending to kinaesthetic experience the three
kinaesthetic provocations, or strands of provocation, because provocation suggests an
encounter that evokes a bodily response; a "gut reaction" or momentary catch of breath
or increase in muscular tension for example. Yet the dynamic of provocation that I am
suggesting is not antagonistic, heroic or aggressive. Rather than making a grand
gesture or shouting out loud the kinaesthetic provocations are quiet and understated but
nevertheless nudge thought in a new direction. My experience in the dance
conservatoire sector was that these provocations had a significant and positive impact
on pedagogical practice and curriculum design. Finding places in the curriculum to
shift the emphasis from display and comparison to attentiveness and experience not
only changed the atmosphere of the learning environment but also arguably developed
dancers better able to make their way in a fast changing and unpredictable art form
(Clarke, 2010, 2011; Reed 2011; Roche 2015).5

**Ends and means**

The elite contemporary dance conservatoire is not the only highly stratified educational
environment. Much of contemporary UK education at all levels and in various contexts

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5 Although I note the positive impact on employability that the influence of somatics has had on the dance sector my work in this thesis distances the work of education from such external ends.
is firmly embedded in frameworks of categorisation and hierarchical comparison designed to ensure that learning *has happened* and to ascertain precisely *how much* learning *has happened* and it is this broader context that I am concerned with in this thesis. At its most extreme the pre-occupation with validating individual achievements (be they those of students, of teachers, or of institutions) plays out in the discourse of hyper-accountability; a discourse much criticised for the way in which it obscures differences and demands commensurability (Blake, Smeyers, Smith & Standish 1998; Dhillon & Standish 2000) and for the way in which, particularly in the school context, this re-inscribes unjust divisions of status and privilege (Ball, 2006, 2008; Ecclestone & Hayes, 2009; Gillborn, 2008; Gillborn & Youdell, 2000). However, the rightly much maligned dynamic of contemporary performativity merely intensifies a well established and taken for granted enmeshing of display, measurement, comparison and pedagogical practice and the effects of this more fundamental entanglement also deserve critical examination. It is therefore in the midst of this entanglement that I locate my research. In critically examining the emphasis of education on individual achievement I am not claiming that achievement and/or its validation can never be justifiable, I am merely suggesting that approaching education as only a "means" in the service of these "ends" is both un-educational and un-just. With this in mind I extend existing critiques of the dominant discourse both with regards to what I identify as perpetuating the emphasis on measurable "ends" (which I claim inevitably leads to injustice) and with regards to how I approach resisting this tendency. Crucially it is my background as a somatic practitioner that accounts for the uniqueness of my approach to the questions of both what and how and it ultimately plays a decisive role in determining the uniqueness of my contribution to educational theory. With regards to what: I focus specifically on

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6 I shall examine these arguments in detail in the next chapter.
the way in which educational theory and practice is shaped by a rationalist conception of subjectivity that assumes a hierarchical division of mind over body. With regards to how: I resist this persistent mind/body hierarchy by taking seriously insights arrived at through attending to kinaesthetic experience (the aforementioned kinaesthetic provocations) and by drawing on these to theorise a different conception of subjectivity and a different means/end dynamic for education. My contention is that this dynamic shift might afford the possibility of (a) (more) just education. Underscoring this contention is the way in which "just education" has two dimensions which are intimately related and at same time are productive of paradox; for education can only serve the interests of a just society (a [more] just education) if it is disentangled from its function of determining the status of its participants in an existent social order (and therefore is [a] just education untethered from external ends). Put simply, education can only be just education if it lets go of the "end" of justice.

In the context of this thesis my kinaesthetic work both hangs in the margins and pervades the middle, just as it has throughout in my career as a dancer and educator. The kinaesthetic dimension of the work hangs in the margins for the thesis is not situated in the context of dance education and my focus is not a reflexive engagement with my own teaching or creative practice, albeit that there are reflective and reflexive dimensions to the writing as my own experiences as both teacher and dancer surface throughout. Moreover, from another perspective kinaesthetic experience hangs in the margins because I position myself as a kinaesthetic expert with some reserve. I am perhaps best placed as an expert witness or attendee as I have a long history of attending to my own kinaesthetic experience and of witnessing my students attend to

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7 Kinaesthetic experience also hangs in the margins in that this doctoral study is not positioned as a Practice as Research (PaR) contribution (common to PhD submissions arising from kinaesthetic research) whereby the submission would include a component of live or filmed movement exploration.
theirs. However, both as a teacher and as the writer of this thesis, I side-step the position of expert about kinaesthetic experience as my argument avoids scientific explanations that justify somatic practice through claims of improved well being and/or improved bio-mechanical performance. Similarly I offer an alternative approach to the prevalent usages of kinaesthetically oriented research in the field of education, which seek out improved educational achievement through utilising notions of kinaesthetic intelligence (cf. Gardner, 1983) or kinaesthetic learning styles (cf. Dunn, 1984). The kinaesthetic provocations and my interest in de-composing the means/end dynamic combine to make such instrumentalist and evidence-based approaches highly inappropriate and kinaesthetic experience is therefore not objectified as verifiable data. Kinaesthetic experience thus hangs in the margins because I have deliberately excluded these possible situations. Rather than asking what I can find out about kinaesthetic sensation by objectifying it I am concerned with utilizing insights that surface through attending to it. As such kinaesthetic experience reverberates through the very core of this research by acting as a way of provoking new conceptualisations. To make this claim might at first sight appear somewhat grandiose but there is a useful analogy to this to be found in how Deleuze discusses cinema. Deleuze, whose work is introduced in chapter 3 and is drawn on throughout this thesis, claims that in his books Cinema 1 and 2 he did not theorise cinema rather he theorised the concepts that cinema 'provoked' (Doel 2007, p. 422). The time and movement images created by the cinematic practice of certain film-makers nudged his thought in new directions. In a similar way, my practice of attending to kinaesthetic experience provokes conceptualisations that I bring to language in this thesis and that are drawn on to contribute to the overall discussion.
Situating education, situating justice

As I have already indicated, the research draws on insights arrived at by attending to kinaesthetic sensation but is not located within or oriented towards the frame of dance education. I orient the question of a just education in relation to how subjectivity is conceptualised rather than in relation to a specific institutional context. Yet I acknowledge that much (but by no means all) of the literature from the field of education that I draw upon is located within the specific context of compulsory schooling. The reason I choose not to contain my theorising within this, or any other, institutional frame is that by arguing for a (more) just education I am arguing for just education, untethered from the institutional responsibilities of assigning students differential status. I fully accept that this "sorting" function is one of the existent roles of educational institutions and that there are many justifications for the continuance of such a purpose within an advanced capitalist society. We may well want to know that the surgeon about to operate on us is qualified to do so (in the sense of having the requisite degree of skill, knowledge and experience) but that does not necessarily make the need for verification of qualification per se an educational question. That educational institutions can have different purposes, not all of which are educational, is a point usefully highlighted by Biesta (2009a, 2010b) in his critique of the 'who is better and who is best' agenda (Biesta 2009a, p. 33). Biesta's argument is considered in detail in chapter 4 but it is worth noting here as it raises the question of what makes education educational. Biesta arrives at what education is for (purpose) by first looking at what education, in the context of schooling, functions to do. The functions he identifies are qualification (the skills to do something), socialisation (insertion into an existent social order) and subjectification, which he defines as:
[...] about ways of being that hint at independence from such orders; ways of being in which the individual is not simply a ‘specimen’ of a more encompassing order. (2009a, p. 40).

Biesta argues that qualification and socialisation are geared to maintain an existent social order and therefore serve ends external to education. Subjectification, however, is a truly "educational" purpose for it concerns the bringing forth of unique subjective perspectives, therefore allowing for change and renewal. Although in chapter 4 I depart from Biesta in several significant respects my argument serves to underscore, rather than contradict, that there is a relationship between how subjectivity is conceptualised and the purposes ascribed to education. In addition, my argument highlights that an overemphasis on external ends not only frustrates the educational dimension of education but also frustrates the possibility of students being treated justly. I contend that it is only by first rethinking the subject of education (both the process itself and its human subjects) for education's sake that we can meaningfully discuss the appropriateness or otherwise of the ends ascribed to it. This is why this thesis is concerned with just education.

Yet what do I mean when I say education enacts injustice and what do I envisage as (a) (more) just education? This clarification is necessary for as Fraser (1997) explains justice is a contested concept. It can either be approached as a question of material re-distribution or as a question of cultural recognition. Fraser's claim is that the complexity of how injustice is re-enacted demands that these two conceptions of justice

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8 Cf. Standish (2000) who argues that the relationship between socialisation and what Biesta calls subjectification is different at different stages of life. Socialisation has to come first as ‘criticism needs something to purchase on (2000, p. 175) therefore the challenge for the school teacher is how education can infiltrate these necessary socialising processes.
need to somehow be brought together, as identity politics on its own risks overlooking the impossibility of a just society if economic disadvantage persists while at the same time economic equality is impossible to sustain in a society that re-inscribes cultural hierarchies. While Fraser is undoubtedly right to highlight the complexities latent in calling for a more just society my interest in (a) (more) just education raises slightly different issues. In disentangling education from external ends I disentangle education from the responsibility for (future) social justice that is so often ascribed to it. While wholeheartedly agreeing that social justice is important and that furthering both cultural and economic dimensions of this should be priorities in any democratic society I reiterate that these are not strictly speaking educational questions. Making them so merely shifts the blame for society's inequalities onto teachers and allows politicians and the rest of us to shirk our responsibilities. Nevertheless, Fraser's classifications and her remedial strategies for a just society provide a useful base from which to distinguish the specific relationship between education and justice that I am concerned with. The current dynamic of educational practice, particularly as intensified by the discourse of hyper-accountability, performs what Fraser defines as cultural injustice since teachers categorise and define students in relation to pre-existing norms. Fraser identifies two possible remedial strategies for this type of injustice. The first, affirmation, maintains the existing categories but offers a 'surface reallocation' of respect to all.\(^9\) The second, transformation, destabilises existing categories by 'deeply restructuring' how these are defined (1997, p. 27). In the educational context both of these remedial strategies would leave in tact the educator's job of validating a student's position, however radically redefined the categories might be or however positively the teacher couches the categorisation. Indeed, the strategy she calls affirmation might more fittingly be

\(^9\) Fraser's (1997) conception of affirmation has to be distinguished from how I talk about the dynamics of affirmation later in this thesis. In chapters 6 and 7 I discuss a conception of affirmation that is not remedial nor in relation to lack.
called a strategy of validation because the teacher maintains this categorising power. The kinaesthetic provocations I have outlined unsettle the assumptions that ground not only these remedial strategies but also the underlying dualist propensity to categorise. They thus invite a conception of justice that circumvents systems of stratification, one oriented by what Allan, drawing on Deleuze and Guattari, has described as a continual 're-working of educational spaces as smooth' (2008, p. 55). Justice therefore moves from being an ideal "end" external to the process of education to being a force that is kept alive in and by moments of teaching and learning.

**Vessels and tributaries**

As I have indicated above, this is a thesis that explores the relationship between (in)justice and education. Yet at the same time my claim that education can only be (more) just if it is untangled from external ends, including the "end" of justice, makes proposing a model of good or just practice inappropriate. It would also be antithetical to my purpose to claim that a shift in pedagogical dynamics will promote a more just society. I recognise that to some extent my desire to loosen the grip of ends creates a certain tension when it comes to defining any objectives and I therefore approach the task of structuring this research with the proviso that the objectives lightly contain and hold the research rather than acting as demands to be conclusively met; and with the proviso that I approach my research questions as dimensions to be opened up rather than as problems to be solved.

The focus of my research is to explore whether thinking otherwise than through dualist dichotomies can afford the possibility of (a) (more) just education. Its contribution is to
offer teachers an alternative dynamic to that of achievement and display, one that privileges searching for the small moments when teaching occurs. I make this offer by foregrounding the interests of a series of forgotten others: the forgotten others who are overlooked by a dominant discourse oriented by the spectacle of individual achievement, the forgotten other of non-categorisable intersubjective dimensions of experience and the forgotten other of a sense of passage that we might call education.  

The objectives of my research are:

- To analyse the dualist divisions that have created the de-privileged position of these forgotten others; to explore whether kinaesthetic experience can open up ways of thinking that avoid re-inscribing these hierarchies; and to explore a pedagogical dynamic that offers both an experience of education and an experience of justice.

I approach these objectives through a series of research questions opened up by the kinaesthetic provocations.

The first kinaesthetic provocation, that kinaesthetic experience is irreducible and escapes third person interpretations and generalisations, provokes the research questions:

- What (if anything) can kinaesthetic experience bring to our awareness that is overlooked in discourses dominated by language? How does attempting to bring this to language avoid collapsing into a fragmented and partial account? If a mode of approaching self/world/other can be drawn from kinaesthetic experience how

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10 The relationship of (in)justice to forgotten others is explored in detail in chapter 4.
might it contribute to re-thinking what kind of process education might be?

The second kinaesthetic provocation, attentive non-doing, gives impetus to the questions:

What are the conditions necessary for attention to be drawn as well as directed? Does re-sensing moments of teaching and learning invite re-thinking what kind of interaction education might be? How might this re-sensing avoid re-inscribing hierarchies and circumvent injustice?

The third provocation, becoming almost transparent, prompts the questions:

What is the particular relationship of subjectivity and intersubjectivity offered up by 'becoming (almost) transparent'? How does practising transparency differently affect the relationship between pedagogical practice and its consequences?

Although I have presented the provocations as separate strands that link objectives to specific questions this is a purely provisional arrangement. The distinctions between objectives and method, means and ends, remain volatile and unstable throughout. Nevertheless, the quiet unsettling that these provocations engender keeps its potency, enlivening and extending the arguments that unfold from my critical engagement with relevant literature. In this process the provocations are invigorated as well as invigorating and thus they continually reconstitute their relationship to each other and redefine the questions they generate and the concepts they provoke.
Forging an approach

This thesis is concerned with (a) (more) just education; in the double sense of a process uncoupled from domination by its ends ([a] just education) and a process that does not unjustly stratify its participants (a [more] just education). Oriented by this concern I position this thesis as a philosophical enquiry that draws on kinaesthetic experience to offer an alternative pedagogical dynamic to that of the dominant discourses. The strategy for unfolding my argument is to draw upon kinaesthetic experience as an equal player to the texts that are analysed. What kinaesthetic experience offers is a dimension of experience that places us in a world of fluxing relations, as my earlier comments about breath serve to illustrate. This is a dimension of experience that precedes and escapes the dominant tendency to approach the world as a collection of definable "things" and therefore makes imperative that I reject the objectification of kinaesthetic experience as data. Moreover, kinaesthetic experience is an attunement to the body's capacity for sensation as distinct from our capacity for either intention or action and it is this affective dimension that so powerfully allows for new directions of thought.

This thesis thus maps a movement of thought and I situate this movement of thought as having a poststructuralist inflection. There is a strong affinity between the uncertainty and incompletion with which kinaesthetic experience challenges notions of fixed subjectivity and the challenge proffered by poststructuralism, specifically the work of Derrida and Deleuze/Deleuze and Guattari. Their work helps me articulate the concepts that kinaesthetic experience provokes and at the same time constantly forces me to be vigilant of my own assumptions and predilections. Drawing on the work of Derrida and Deleuze/Deleuze and Guattari is certainly not the only possible route to challenging the means/end dynamic of performativity in the interests of a more just education. Dhillon
and Standish (2000), for example, express a similar disquiet about performativity to that expressed here and argue that Lyotard’s work opens avenues through which to approach the question of ‘just education’. While Lyotard’s foregrounding of indeterminacy and of ‘what does not lend itself to being seen’ (Lyotard, 1971, cited in Smith 2000, p. 125) resonates with the concerns outlined here, the specific parameters of both my critique and my contribution have led me to draw on the work of Derrida and Deleuze/Deleuze and Guattari when building my argument. The critique that I offer is specifically in response to the consequences of dualist constructions of subjectivity and my contribution is generated by the ways in which kinaesthetic experience foregrounds an alternative understanding of self/other, self/world and self/work relationships. Although, as discussed in chapter 3, Deleuze and Derrida differ form each other in significant respects, each discusses the shaping of experience through concepts and quasi-concepts that powerfully interact with the kinaesthetic provocations I have identified above and it is this meeting of their work and the kinaesthetic provocations that allows me to think differently than through dualist dichotomies.

By drawing on Deleuze, Derrida and the kinaesthetic provocations I move from analysing the influence of dualism on the prevalent discourses of education towards suggesting an alternative way of thinking about what education might offer. To this end I also draw on a range of literature that explores the experience of tuning into the flux of life, most notably the work of the anthropologist Tim Ingold and accounts of heightened sensorial awareness from Kuppers (2011a, 2011b) and Baggs (2007). I therefore traverse several fields of literature in the course of this thesis but my research is propelled by an educational problem and the contribution I offer rests securely in that domain. The central part of the thesis looks more closely at the dominant, dualist
conception of subjectivity by examining three tributary dichotomies: self/other, self/world and self/work. These dichotomies structure my exploration of the work of a number of educational theorists who grapple with these divisions and offer an alternative to the dominant trend. I draw on the aforementioned philosophical and somatic literature to subject these texts from the field of education to critique but also draw on kinaesthetic experience to tease out new dimensions to their arguments that might otherwise be overlooked. This process of thinking differently leads into a series of affirmations and hesitancies, offering an alternative pedagogical dynamic while contending with questions of consequence and accountability.

Before going on to give a more detailed description of the structure of this thesis through a chapter outline it is worth pausing to underline that the form of the "body" of this thesis (like our own body) is not only determined by issues of structure but also by issues of movement and tone. In this respect the form of this thesis offers certain challenges when set against the conventional expectations of the academy and of doctoral work. In the context of a thesis a process of re-searching is expected to give rise to the claim of a secure position, yet a hyper-capacity to sense foregrounds flux and constant re-negotiation. If you spend a moment really attending to the sensation of standing still, for example, you discover you are not standing "still" at all but are engaged in a process of constant micro-adjustments in response to gravitational forces. Similarly in this thesis, the relationships between the constituents: kinaesthetic experience, education and justice, and the roles of content and methodology, are subject to ongoing renegotiation in the course of elaborating and sustaining my "stance". Moreover, my commitment to affirming the murky side of sentience affects not only the "what" and "why" of what is said but also the "how" of the saying, for my arguments
are partly drawn from almost indiscernible realms of experience and there is a tension in trying to formulate what escapes formulation. There is a pull between openness and specificity that is characteristic both of kinaesthetic sensation and of the interplay of analysis and affect that permeates this thesis. This tension invites a use of language that attempts precision while leaving space for ideas to reverberate. There is thereby a poetic inflection to the writing style employed in this thesis; for example, I choose titles for chapters and sections (and for the thesis as a whole) that are brief and non-explanatory but that hopefully emit a resonance through which their significance becomes clearer as the section, chapter and thesis progresses. Similarly, neither the concepts that I examine nor those that I create are exhaustively introduced at the outset in order that their possible meanings can reverberate rather than be rendered complete. I hope that each time a concept is revisited new aspects of what it opens up will come into the foreground. There is also something to say about the particular ways in which the wayward gropings of kinaesthetic experience bring the analysis and emerging argument to life. There is, at times, a metaphoric dimension to how accounts of kinaesthetic experience illustrate the argument (as can be seen in the discussion of standing still above) but restricting the role of kinaesthetic imagery to that of representing the arguments being made would leave the privilege of analytical thinking still in force. As Munday (2011) explains, the effectiveness of a metaphor depends on it being both close to and distinct from the original it represents and this gap between "reality" and its representation creates a hierarchy. Metonyms, however, generate their poetic resonance from the way in which things meet and they thus establish connections between things without assuming a hierarchy. Munday uses the example of how the word "crown" is used as a metonym for the role of the monarch. Whereas a metaphor would describe something like a monarch the word "crown" conjures an enlivened
sense of royal power through a relationship of interdependence rather than comparison. A crown touches the monarch's head and its evocative power comes from the image of this meeting (2011). My use of kinaesthetic experience in this thesis taps into the power of touch on multiple levels. Firstly, I explore how touch is one way of heightening awareness of sensation. Secondly kinaesthetic experience can be described as an engagement with how affect touches our conscious awareness, drawing our attention in new directions. Thirdly, in writing this thesis I bring kinaesthetic experience on to the page in order to touch the process of analytical thinking and in so doing act as a provocateur.

**Chapter outline**

In chapter 2, my analysis of how education re-inscribes existent hierarchies highlights a specific hierarchy that aggressively pervades educational discourses and practices and yet is often implicit and unknowingly re-inscribed: that of the mind over the body. A problem (education functions to perpetuate injustice) and an intuition (kinaesthetic experience provokes a thinking otherwise that might afford [a] [more] just education) come together through my analysis of how education is implicated in, and continues to sustain, the dichotomisation of the psycho-physical network of energy that we might call a self into a hierarchical mind-body duality. This disembodiment of thought is protective and exclusionary. Such dualism seeks to render subjectivity immune to the vulnerability of the body and the uncertainties of life. The analysis of the relationship of education to dualism, offered in chapter 2 of this thesis, reveals deeply held assumptions that latently shape educational practices, specifically with regard to a desire for certainty. One side of this desire is the certain future that education secures
for its subjects and the other side of this desire is a need to make certain that education has happened. Caught in the middle of these two sides of certainty the educational present becomes a task of validation, yet an embattled and well-protected subject can only be validated if they display their worth. Pedagogy thus becomes oriented by spectacle. I explore how the enmeshing of spectacle, individual sovereignty and a quest for certainty is historically embedded in educational discourses and yet becomes intensified in the context of contemporary accountability. I position this tangled web as frustrating the interests of both justice and education and particularly examine how it produces a tendency towards hyper-individualism and hyper-instrumentalism. In an attempt to escape the grip of the dominant discourses I turn to the irreducible reclusiveness of kinaesthetic experience. However, my analysis of the field of somatics, ostensibly a field that privileges kinaesthetic ways of knowing, reveals that it too is pervaded by assumptions of sovereign subjectivity and is seduced by a quest for certainty.

In chapter 3 I situate my response to sovereignty, certainty and injustice in relation to poststructuralist thinking while at the same time underlining that the terminology "poststructuralist" is not indicative of a homogenous school of thought. I examine the ways in which Derrida and Deleuze/Deleuze and Guattari challenge categorical thinking and outline how they offer an alternative to the humanist conception of sovereign, rational subjectivity. I then examine my own practice, Skinner Releasing Technique (SRT), in relation to their concepts and quasi-concepts. While somatics is already a marginal field SRT is in some respects on the margins of this margin. Most somatic practices (despite Hanna's assertion of irreducibility) firmly situate themselves

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11 Derrida views the terminology of concept to be suggestive of something closed and complete, hence the notion of quasi-concept as a more appropriate descriptor for his ideas. This is discussed in more detail in chapter 3.
within frameworks of proof, asserting the evolutionary or physiological necessity of their methods. Skinner, however, steps outside this frame of justification and explanation by arriving at her principles and modes of practice through attention to sensation alone. Skinner's work is introduced in some detail in chapter 3 but it is important at this juncture to note her disavowal of mediation through other means. Her courage to affirm the experience of the body without validation from a third person methodology plays a significant role in defining the focus of my investigation and in determining my approach. The chapter concludes by exploring how the principles and practice of SRT generate the three strands of kinaesthetic provocation.

I devote chapter 4 to considering how relationships between self and other are conceptualised, in particular in the context of relationships between teachers and students. I first examine Gert Biesta's (2006, 2009a, 2010b) response to the hyper-individual, hyper-instrumental dynamic of current practice. Biesta's notion of subjectification, whereby the teacher witnesses the emergence of the student's unique perspective, destabilises the teacher/student hierarchy and challenges the ability of the teacher to predetermine what will count as a demonstration of student achievement. Biesta describes this process as a 'pedagogy of interruption' (2009c, p. 785) and he outlines this with reference to Derrida's quasi-concept of suspension: a dynamic of infinite deferral or "not yet" that disavows the possibility of interpreting another's experience with any certainty. I consider Biesta's conception of unpredictable and emergent subjectivity in relation to both aspects of just education. As well as exploring how the dynamic of self/other relationships that he outlines facilitates or obscures an interest in education for its own sake ([a] just education), I explore the extent to which his conceptualisations of these relationships might circumvent the assumption of a
responsibility for ordering and categorising students (a [more] just education). My critique of Biesta distinguishes his "interruption" from Derrida's "suspension" both through textual analysis and by drawing on the kinaesthetic provocations to revisit the notion of suspension from a kinaesthetic perspective. The dynamic of "interruption" forces the teacher to wait; yet the notion of suspension that I explore also foregrounds the importance of the student waiting. Keeping the interests of a (more) just education in view I specifically consider how Derrida suspends the possibility of a just "result" by approaching justice as a quality of sensitivity that brings to awareness contradictory pressures. I draw on the kinaesthetic experience of suspension to elaborate new understandings of this sensitivity.

In chapter 5 I examine how instrumentalism and self/world dualism perpetuate each other and I draw on Deleuze and on the kinaesthetic provocations to think otherwise than through these boundaries. I then go on to consider how approaching the self/world relationship differently impacts on how the function and process of education are conceptualised and how this shift in attitude might be significant in furthering the interests of (a) (more) just education. For this I turn to another critique of contemporary education's hyper-individualism, that of Simons and Masschelein (2008), and to the alternative approach to what education might do and how it might do it that is offered by Masschelein (2010a, 2010b) and Vlieghe, Simons and Masschelein (2010). Their offer challenges the hierarchies of mind over body and subject over world that dominate educational discourses and they position education as a quality of experience rather than a collection of outcomes. However, the kinaesthetic provocations and my reading of Deleuze allude to dimensions of experience that Masschelein and his colleagues
overlook and I elaborate the significance of these with reference to the particular self/world relationship afforded by Tim Ingold's (2011) notion of inhabitation.

Although the relationship between means and ends is subject to scrutiny throughout the thesis it is in my exploration of the self/work dualism in chapter 6 that this relationship becomes the central focus. Here I consider the work of education and contrast pursuing the achievement of a series of destinations with experiencing a sense of passage. In the course of this discussion I examine Vansieleghem's (2009) resistance to the pull that serial destinations have on contemporary learners. Vansieleghem disentangles education from the promise of a better future by claiming teaching as a care for the present. I look more closely at this responsibility to attend to here and now by considering it in relation to Deleuze's entreaty 'not to be unworthy of what happens to us' (1990, p. 129) and in relation to the practice of attending to kinaesthetic experience. By honing in on how each present is passing I re-orient teachers, students and the curriculum and bring into focus alternative relationships between them, alternatives that I argue are more sensitive to moments of (a) (more) just education.

Chapter 7 deliberately gathers and continues more than it concludes. A final word or absolute conclusion would be antithetical to the thrust of my argument. Therefore although I gather together the argument that the thesis makes I also engage with the new questions that this gathering process opens up. The thesis, through its method as well as its argument, demonstrates that passage and achievement can be concurrent poles of experience and that keeping the dimension of passage active reveals the insufficiencies of measuring education by its ends. The pedagogic task thus becomes one of remembering and enlivening the dimensions of experience that it is so easy to
forget when we rush towards achieving the next set of ends. This attention to what is occurring shifts the responsibility of the educator from the performance of validation to the practice of affirmation: *this* is what is happening here and now. Yet, affirmation is just one dimension of the practice; the other is hesitation, or holding back from habitual assumptions and from imposing our desired conclusions. Part of my contribution is that this shift in responsibility not only invites the teacher to hold back but also affirms the learner's hesitancy. In addition to considering how this shift in dynamics affects the roles of teacher and learner this final chapter considers the questions that "just education" raises for the wider aspiration of a more just society.
Chapter 2 - The Subject of Education

Introduction

This thesis is concerned with (a) (more) just education; in the double sense of a process uncoupled from domination by its ends ([a]just education) and a process that does not unjustly stratify its participants (a [more] just education). Historically, however, education has served not only to sustain the Enlightenment "ends" of critical reason, individual freedom and progress but also to intertwine these ideals in a dynamic of mutual propulsion. In the first section of this chapter I trace how the process of excarnation at work in the humanist conception of autonomous rationality weds educational practice to an ethos of diagnosis that engenders injustice. Although reaching an extreme through the performativity demands that orient contemporary policy and practice this ethos is already at work in deeply embedded assumptions about the very basis of education. My analysis raises the question of whether thinking otherwise than the mind/body dichotomy might allow for thinking otherwise than the diagnostic approach. In the second section of the chapter I examine how the prevalent contemporary sociology of the body claims to champion an embodied perspective but yet collapses back into, or even intensifies, the demand for diagnosis; thus sustaining the very norms that are claimed to be resisted. The third section of this chapter draws these two strands of critique together with a view to elucidating and substantiating the methodology that the remainder of this thesis employs to approach the question of (a) (more) just education.
The somewhat sacred subject\textsuperscript{12}

A desire to suppress corporeal experience can be found in Plato and permeates Christian theology\textsuperscript{13} but it is the particular conception of a mind/body split proffered by Descartes in the 17th century (the infamous \textit{cogito ergo sum})\textsuperscript{14} that is credited not only with shaping the rationalist conception of subjectivity that fuelled the Enlightenment project and continues to underpin contemporary education; but also with giving rise to the related and equally influential positivist ethic that unbiased, impersonal enquiry (a view from nowhere) yields universal truths. However, perhaps paradoxically given the assumptions of objectivity and universality his dualism gave prominence to, it was the commitment of Descartes to a first person perspective that led him to a notion of disembodied mind, or more precisely, \textit{disenminded} body. For Descartes, inner experience represents the workings of a soul conceptualised as the conscious thought of a rational mind. The "life" of the body is external to thought and wholly mechanical in structure (1960 orig. 1637).

In spite of the way in which Descartes explicitly disavows corporeal experience Leder (1990) makes the claim that how we experience our body to some extent invites the track taken by Descartes. Leder makes his claim in relation to the body's tendency to disappear and he charts three kinds of bodily disappearance. Firstly, our vegetative, metabolic functions are inaccessible to our awareness; secondly, our sense organs cannot be perceived by themselves (we cannot see our own eye, for example) and thirdly, data from any given sense organ fades into the background when other sensory

\textsuperscript{12} The title of this section draws on Foucault's observation of 'the somewhat sacred priority conferred on the subject, which has become established in Western thought since Descartes' (Foucault 1994, p. 3).
\textsuperscript{13} For a detailed account of attitudes to the body in Christian theology See Turner (1996).
\textsuperscript{14} "Je pense donc je suis" first appears in the fourth section of \textit{Discourse on Method} (1637) but is most commonly cited in its Latin expression, which appears in \textit{Principles of first philosophy} (1644).
data comes to the fore. Leder connects this phenomenon of sensory withdrawal to the mechanistic view of corporeality championed by Descartes, for if the body is to a large extent already absent to inner experience then it can only be made known from the third-person perspective of opening it up and dissecting its parts (1990).15 Although Leder overlooks the more bizarre aspects of the absolute mind/body split that Descartes envisions (for example that movement was accounted for by animal spirits travelling along our nerves to and from muscles and brain) his discussion of the body's disappearance underlines how the conception of subjectivity proposed by Descartes, along with his distrust of his senses, arises within an overall project of eliminating doubt. Concluding his Discourse on Method Descartes notes:

I shall simply say that I am resolved to spend the remaining years of my life in endeavouring to acquire a certain knowledge of nature which will enable me to establish rules of medicine far more assured than we have had so far (1960, p. 97).

While his de-mystification of corporeality undoubtedly allowed for significant advances in medical science (formerly illness was attributed to an act of God in response to the wrongdoing of the sufferer) his methodology of privileging certainty led to the exposable materiality of the dead body giving rise to assumptions about the invisible processes of the living one. His separation of subjectivity from corporeity was achieved by reducing the complex systems, inter-dependencies and processes of corporeal life to a question of structure.16 The legacy of Descartes has thus been a series of boundaries: around the material body (and each of its parts); between the mind and the body; and between subjective experience and the world. From the perspective

15 Leder, while keen to recognise the phenomenon of the disappearing body, does not take a Cartesian viewpoint. His project is to extend the discussion of embodiment to include the autonomous workings of the body.

16 See Meetha, N. (2011) for an account of how this mechanistic approach, despite its initial advances, has had a confining effect on the development of Western medicine.
of Cartesian dualism we are of course conscious of the body, others and the world but we are conscious of them as external objects. Autonomous rational subjectivity is thus protected from the vulnerability of the body and the contingencies of the world and education has historically functioned as a technology that sustains this ideal and ensures these protections. As Usher and Edwards observe:

The very rationale of the educational process and the role of the educator is founded on the humanist ideal of a certain kind of subject who has the inherent potential to become self-motivated and self-directing, a rational subject capable of exercising individual agency (1994, p. 24).

The above relationship suggests that autonomous rationality is something that has to be achieved; otherwise we would not need education. Given that the subjectivity of the autonomous subject is conceived of as exclusionary and exclusive it follows that this achievement will have to be demonstrated in some easily recognisable way, through words or action, so that it is possible to ascertain whether or not (or the degree to which) education has fulfilled its purpose. Just as Descartes reduced the living body to a question of structure so that its infirmities could be known through dissection, educational discourses have historically been shaped by the solidity of individual entities and have overlooked the dynamics of complex inter-relationships. Education, like medicine, thus becomes a technology of exposure and diagnosis. I recognise that to attempt to disentangle the complexity of the Cartesian legacy and its relationship to education for the purposes of critique is merely to perpetuate the diagnostics I am attempting to subvert, yet the attempt paradoxically illustrates the futility of the endeavour (and here I talk of the workings of the legacy rather than the development of

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17 The entwining of education and rationalism is wound tighter still by the way in which the demystification of religion effected by Descartes re-casts religious experience as a cognitive process and therefore dependent on literacy (Turner, 1996).
his thought). In the following summary I do not use the nomenclature of an order to suggest that there is a clearly demarcated linear ordering to the way in which these conceptualisations interact, it is solely to indicate an order of listing; the list itself demonstrates that the ideas are mutually propulsive.

Firstly, the separation of subjectivity from engagement in the world privileges an ideal of objective knowledge. Secondly, although it is impossible to sustain a complete banishment of the body from subjective experience a hierarchy of mind over body is valorised, sustaining the ideal of objective knowledge and privileging an ethos of mastery. Thirdly, the sanctity of subjective experience coupled with the fiction of objective knowledge necessitates a demonstrative action from which (more knowledgeable) third parties can infer knowledge has been mastered. Fourthly, the interpretation (by more knowledgeable parties) of performed actions as demonstrating knowledge (or of not doing so) sustains the ideal of objective knowledge and the desirability of its mastery. Fifthly, that a diagnosis of mastered knowledge is reliant on demonstrative action sustains the ideal of the autonomous rational subject, whose subjectivity stands above both body and world. Sixthly, the above web of relationships sustains and is sustained by educational processes that secure teacher and student in an asymmetrical relationship whilst simultaneously rendering them mutually dependent. Finally, this asymmetrical relationship, coupled with the ideal of mastery, brings with it an ideal of progress which in turn implies the student’s deficiency and sustains the asymmetrical relationship.

Yet must the certainty of "who has achieved what" determine the dynamics of education? Undoubtedly some sense of this is necessary for some of the functions of
educational institutions to be met. At the most benign level how else can a teacher know their teaching has been successful? At the level of qualification, how else can student achievement be rewarded? At the level of governance, how can a teacher or school be judged as performing well unless the student achievement is "performed" and made calculable in some way? Yet none of these reasons are educational ones. They merely demonstrate that making subjective experience public is necessary for purposes of verification or measurement. The question arises whether there is educational merit in the subjective experience of the learner being laid bare, or whether such disclosure is merely an assumption born out of the lingering influence of the Enlightenment ideals of autonomous rationality, mastery, progress and objective knowledge.

On Lyotard's (1984, 1992) analysis the postmodern moment is one in which performativity replaces Enlightenment ideals as what orients behaviour. Lyotard rejects the meta-narratives of 'the progressive emancipation of reason or freedom' (1992, p. 17) reflecting that their universal legitimacy permits totalitarianism and concluding that: 'We have paid dearly for our nostalgia for the all and the one, for a reconciliation of the concept and the sensible, for a transparent and communicable experience.' (1992, p. 16).

For Lyotard these meta-narratives inevitably act as universalising forces that overlook the most vulnerable, demanding a level of consensus that makes justice "impossible" (1992, p. 77). He views them as not only dangerous but also defunct; for as technology proliferates knowledge, their universal authority becomes no longer sustainable and their justificatory function is overthrown by the demand for performativity – still a force towards certainty and progress - but one that seeks no legitimacy outside itself (1984). Although Lyotard's critique of the injustice of universalising forces is forceful and pertinent, and his prediction of the force of performativity has undoubtedly played
out in the educational context, his claim that therefore the Enlightenment ideals have no influence is less easy to sustain. The complex web of assumptions underpinning the humanist construction of subjectivity not only persists in, but is also essential to, the certainty that performativity demands.

In the context of contemporary education the 'search for calculability and the certain' (Allan 2008, p. 25) reduces the multifaceted and interacting "bodies" of students, teachers, schools, universities and bodies of knowledge to structures capable of diagnosis (Gillborn & Youdell, 2000; Ecclestone & Hayes 2009). The resulting self-propelling cycle of display, diagnosis and intervention has been extensively critiqued both for reducing pedagogy to instrumentalism and for the way in which it thwarts the possibility of education meeting its social responsibilities (Allan, 2008; Ball, 2008, 2006, 1994; Gillborn & Youdell 2000; Strathern 1997, 2000). Although the hyper-accountability now prevalent in education is often assumed to have been imported from commerce (Green 2011), Strathern (1997) traces the beginnings of this trajectory to education, specifically to when the University of Cambridge introduced written examinations in the 19th century for the express purpose of publicly demonstrating and validating achievement. Strathern's point is that business got the idea of public accountability from education, not the other way around, and that the escalating performative drive that educators and their managers currently find themselves beholden to simply serves to continue a trajectory that students have long been obliged to tread. My argument extends her observations by claiming that the demand for public accountability merely intensifies assumptions that lie at the very heart of the rationale ascribed to education. An emphasis on showing so that others can judge has evolved from being a dimension of pedagogical practice into a governance device and as Smith
points out: ‘The embodied encounter between teacher and taught, meanwhile, receives comparatively little attention’. Although the discourse that circulates through contemporary policy technologies is predominantly one of effectiveness and is undoubtedly fuelled by political will, it is not easy to extricate the demand for ever increasing levels of transparency from the complex web of assumptions about subjectivity that underpin it and that similarly shape deeply embedded beliefs about what counts as pedagogical practice.

Yet the relationship between education and the Enlightenment ideal of autonomy not only persists through postmodern performative demands; it even intensifies. This intensification arises from the way in which, detached from their teleological horizon, autonomy, rationality and progress have become hyper-individualised. The loss of the horizon of universal norms and the all pervasiveness of performativity have brought with them a shift in how educational purpose is conceived or, on some accounts, a loss of purpose altogether (Biesta 2006, 2009a; 2010b; Blake, Smeyers, Smith, & Standish 1998, 2000; Vansieleghem 2009). Biesta (2006) identifies an epochal shift in the language of educational theory and practice over the last two decades; a shift from a discourse of education to a discourse of learning. For Biesta the omnipresence of the language of learning stems from at least four different trends that to some extent undermine each other and therefore the shift itself is devoid of any purposeful intent. Firstly, psychology has produced new theories of learning which position learning as a predominantly active rather than passive activity. Secondly, Biesta asserts that the loss of the horizon of Enlightenment ideals means that "education" has no ideal beyond learning. Thirdly, Biesta draws on Field's identification of a 'silent explosion of learning' (Field, 2000 cited in Biesta, 2006, p. 18), which denotes not only an increase
in formal learning activities throughout adult life but also, and more importantly, a growth in non formal adult learning through "self-improvement" activities such as gym membership, self-help and therapeutic counselling etc. What Field (2000) crucially identifies, and Biesta picks up on, is that these informal learning contexts are highly individualised in terms of form, content and purpose. Fourthly, the rise of the language of learning can be attributed to the rise of neo-liberalism and the concomitant marketisation of education. 'T]he demise of education as a public good' turns the student into a consumer and as Biesta muses: 'What could be a more suitable name for such a consumer than "the learner"' (2006, p. 19).

Although Biesta recognises that the concept of the learner/consumer has some useful functions, for example in achieving improved access to educational opportunities, he problematises the language of learning as both reducing the teacher/student relationship to one of exchange and occluding the possibility of a publicly agreed purpose for education. For this reason Biesta sets himself the task of re-inventing a language of *education* that can re-invigorate pedagogical practice with an underlying rationale; a task that he relentlessly pursues through many publications variously enlisting the help of Levinas, Derrida, Arendt, Rancière, and thermodynamics (for example: 2006, 2008a, 2009a, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b; Osberg and Biesta, 2007). In chapter 4 I look more closely at Biesta's project of restoring educational purpose but here I want to focus a little more closely on what is at stake in the language of learning. Biesta cites rejection of Enlightenment ideals as a factor that contributes to the emphasis on learning but I propose that the trend that he identifies stems from an *intensification* of the Enlightenment ideal of autonomy. Disentangled from the grand narratives of universal

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18 The list is exemplary, not exhaustive.
reason or emancipation autonomy becomes intensified within the constraints of our own horizons. The hyper-individualised language of learning hyper-individualises autonomy, creating the illusion that autonomy is a function of 'getting what we want' (Brecher, 1998, p. 2). Yet paradoxically this intensification within our own horizons narrows the reach of our autonomy still further, reducing the satisfaction of needs and wants to the horizon of here and now.

Simons and Masschelein (2008) examine what factors propel the appetite for learning to become so insatiable. They share with Biesta the desire to expose the omnipresence of the learning discourse but their ambitions are more muted. Following Foucault (1980) they identify the aim of their paper as curiosity: 'to regard who we are and what we do (facilitating learning processes) as no longer obvious' (2008, p. 688). Simons and Masschelein argue that the turn from education to learning is indicative of a shift in our understanding of ourselves in relation to the world. They describe modernity's organisation of schools as reflective of an understanding of time and place that is predominantly historical whereas the structure of today's "learning environments" reflect a predominantly environmental or spatial understanding. Their argument is that the first person experience of time and space has altered and they argue that tracing this shift in experience is a means of exploring and articulating the transition from modernity to postmodernity. Their use of the term experience is specific and Foucauldian and is distinct from the self-understanding of 'consciousness' :

It refers to a mode of seeing and a way of speaking (about ourselves, others and the world) that emerges in a particular moment and context, and that gradually becomes the (evident) horizon of what we do and think (Simons & Masschelein, 2008, p. 689).
Their analysis reveals that when we foreground an experience of time we assume space as an extension from a localisable centre and we are oriented by a horizon of progress. When we foreground an experience of space, however, our environment is our horizon and therefore time is constrained to the here and now. Following Foucault (1977), they identify the disciplinary and administrative technologies of the modern school as foregrounding a linear concept of time through which one progresses in a series of cumulative stages towards a stable (normative) destination. This arrangement allows the individual to measure herself against the norms for each stage of her development; she always knows where she stands in relation to a rank order of generalised others. In contrast to this, Simons and Masschelein’s (2008) analysis of the individual in the postmodern moment is that learning has become an individualised trajectory that has no normative end. They envision learning as still ostensibly driven by notions of progress and development but in the hyper-individualised setting of learning needs no learner can compare themselves to any norm or any other. Although Simons and Masschelein recognise that external norms persist in, for example, benchmarks, they see these as only momentary interruptions of an otherwise self-oriented and self-competitive trajectory. Learning is left with no external end to reach towards and thus holds value only in this moment; and since this moment always passes our appetite for learning becomes insatiable (2008).

Simons and Masschelein (2008) consider the consequences of an environmental horizon. Firstly, all that matters in an experience of environment is me! here! now! The past has no value unless it is useful to me now, and what is useful to me now will safeguard my future opportunities. The past and future are therefore constrained by the

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19 This does not preclude that the norms are active in how institutions and practices are organised, as discussed below with reference to Gillborn and Youdell (2000). Simons and Masschelein (2008) are here talking specifically about the first person perspective of the learner.
here and now and thus the only future possible is one that is already calculable. They interpret this as leading to a particular self-understanding, which drawing on Deleuze they define as: 'the experience of being permanently in a condition with limited resources' (Simons & Masschelein, 2008, p. 697). Whereas the self-understanding of modernity was that of progressing towards a vision of human freedom, the hyper-individualised freedom of postmodernity constantly confronts us with the challenge of maximising the limited resources of each moment. We have to keep on learning as each moment runs out. As Simons and Masschelein explore, pedagogic concerns become supplanted by concerns of monitoring and feedback because a self-understanding dedicated to self-sustenance needs constant feedback in order to monitor how to most optimally meet ever-changing needs. Their analysis therefore suggests that the learning environment intensifies the discourse of diagnosis in education. They conclude by noting the danger that the learner therefore finds herself in. Since feedback and monitoring are also hyper individualised they too have no norms against which they can be measured. The learner is thus at the mercy of unsubstantiated ad hoc judgements and diagnoses (2008).

The potential injustice of such ad hoc judgements extends beyond the circumstances of their pronouncement, for diagnostic processes of discerning, judging and discriminating not only order people into existing categories but can also operate to enact previously unforeseen categorisations (Kraeftner & Kroell, 2009). Gillborn and Youdell (2000) observe this capacity for manufacture operating in the diagnostic strategies devised to meet the accountability and enhancement demands of contemporary schooling. Their research exposes how Cartesian values circulate through the discourse of performativity propelling a demand for diagnosis and effecting discrimination and injustice. They
examine how the demand for "transparency" (in this case league tables) applies a performative pressure, in this instance on head-teachers, teachers and students to maximise the proportion of students achieving 5 A* - C grade GSCEs. What is pertinent about their analysis in the current context is their revelation of a pervasive conception of "ability" as fixed, measurable and unequal, and the way in which this (mis)conception categorises students as specific "types" of learners. These fixed identities shape the strategies employed to predict A-C achievement (setting, how option choices are guided, internal student league tables or extra help to motivate D - C conversion). Their conclusion is that these strategies produce the effects they claim to predict, and that: ‘this form of triage reinforces and extends existing inequalities especially those associated with social class and ethnic origin' (2000, p. 204).

Yet, the creation of categories and the positioning of students need not necessarily be a deliberate action or only undertaken to meet accountability demands. Usher and Edwards hint at how the positioning of students can be enacted even where a teacher’s intentions are entirely pedagogical:

As educational practitioners if we seek to meet the needs of individual learners, a position which is at the heart of much liberal humanist and 'progressive' educational discourse, we are operating within a power knowledge formation which discursively constructs the person in [a] particular way. When persons are constructed as particular kinds of learner they are inscribed as having characteristics which 'belong' to them; essentially they become a person of that type (1994, p. 96).

However, the mere lack of intention does not make the re-inscription of hierarchical divisions accidental, as is emphasised by Gillborn (2008) in his examination of how

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20 Gillborn and Youdell's (2000) research examines the specific league table system in England at that time. Although league table computation has gone through changes since the time of their writing their research nevertheless serves to underline the point I am making about how performativity exacerbates existent hierarchies.
racism operates in educational contexts. Gillborn's detailed analysis reveals racism to be a function of structural patterning, which means that although racism is only intentionally (re)enacted by individuals in extreme and exceptional cases its occurrence is nevertheless far from random. Similarly, in the Usher and Edwards scenario referred to above, neither teachers nor students are consciously bringing forth the consequences that ensue from the students' positioning but they are nevertheless implicated in their realisation. Gillborn (2008) draws a distinction between identities (or inequalities) being performed and being performative. The former suggests some kind of deliberate enaction while the latter suggests a self-propelling dynamic. The relationship between transparency and injustice therefore not only springs from the pressures of meeting targets; the pedagogically motivated demand to make subjective experience public can be equally effective at performing a hierarchy of winners and losers. Moreover, those who do not or cannot act or speak or show on demand are excluded altogether, catapulted back to the status of wrongdoers or outsiders; diagnosed as beyond the scope of pedagogical practice and beyond the reach of the ideal of freedom that grounds the rationale of education.

As Gillborn's (2008) scrutiny of racism exemplifies, educators are often inadvertently implicated in how deeply embedded assumptions are continuously re-inscribed. While the adjective "Cartesian" is commonly invoked to describe a mind/body, inner/outer dichotomy, the full complexity of the intertwined assumptions that both influence and stem from dualist thinking are easily overlooked. This allows these intertwining assumptions and ideals to remain a remarkably persistent force in contemporary educational practice, and in the discourses that shape that practice, often remaining so in spite of "Cartesian dualism" being explicitly resisted. Given that the Cartesian
worldview sustains divisive practices and power hierarchies even in well-intentioned pedagogical interactions it seems at once imperative and impossible to circumvent it. Allan makes an observation that is pertinent to this double-bind. She advises that when a powerful force is 'omnipresent and insidious’ then subversion of it is only possible if one is 'cunning' (2009, p. 2). From a Cartesian perspective the body is difficult and dangerous, but it is precisely this instability that makes it a potentially productive source of cunning subversion. Moreover, as the later chapters of this thesis examine, it is also this very volatility that makes the body such a rich source of questioning with regard to the purpose and dynamics of pedagogical practice.

**Cunning subversions**

The influence of Cartesian dualism is so complex and omnipresent that to think beyond its limits is to think a "beyond" that is "out of reach of" rather than "following on from". Allan's (2009) suggestion that the subversion needs to be cunning is an apt one for traces of dualist thinking persist through many approaches that claim to champion an embodied perspective. The problem is not necessarily one of inconsistency for etymologically the terminology "embodiment" both perpetuates the possessive individualism at the heart of Cartesian thinking and re-inscribes the status of inner/outer boundaries. The anthropologist Tim Ingold (2011) confronts the traces of dualism inherent in the notion of embodiment and points out that the problem with conceptualising life as enclosed in a body is that it that it renders active materials inert

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21 "Holistic" is another term that is used to suggest an alternative to the Cartesian worldview, but it is equally problematic as its sense of completion leaks traces of universalism and is suggestive of an ideal state to be achieved or returned to.
(thus the logic of Descartes dissecting dead matter). For Ingold (2011) the relation of environment to organism is not between an outside and an inside but rather that of a trail *along which* a life is lived. Thus when one talks of, for example, embodying sound then what is really being described is a process through which the body is *ensounded*:

> Sound, like breath is experienced as a movement of coming and going, inspiration and expiration. If that is so we should say of the body, as it sings, hums, whistles or speaks, that it is *ensounded*. It is like setting sail, launching the body *into* sound like a boat on the waves, or perhaps more appropriately, like a kite in the sky (2011, p. 139)

It follows that much of what is described in the literature of somatics, performance theory or the sociology of the body as "embodied practices" might be more usefully described as practices of traversal, however I will retain the terminology of embodiment where that is the terminology used in the literature referred to. Ingold's undoing of the enclosed organism is returned to in chapter 5 but for now the task is to examine the persistence, and indeed redoubling, of dualist possessive individualism in contemporary sociologies of the body that claim to challenge dualism. Rather than offering an exhaustive review limited to the educational field I sketch the pervasiveness of Cartesian assumptions more broadly. I particularly note the affinities between medical and educational approaches to the notion of embodiment and their shared methodology of intervening therapeutically to address a presumed deficit. Evans, Davies, and Rich (2009), writing in the field of education, argue that education, sports and medicine share the same histories of the body and the same challenge of developing a discourse that engages with the realities of embodied living. They do not mention dance but it would also fit well with their argument.
Turner (1992, 1996) examines the contemporary sociology of the body in some detail and claims that we live in a 'somatic society' that he describes as 'a social system in which the body, as simultaneously constraint and resistance, is the principal field of political and cultural activities' (1992, p. 12). The somatic society is thus structured around regulating bodies though Turner (1996) considers that society has moved beyond a system of predominantly external surveillance towards a system in which self-regulation of the body plays a bigger role. The picture he paints is of two predominant tendencies in sociological theory: the first constructs the body as a condition for action rather than as a feature of an embodied actor and the second interprets the body as a system of signs either expressing meaning or expressing relations of power. The body is thus defined either by its actions or its image and for Turner both these approaches overlook the sensuality of everyday living. Turner offers a possible explanation for this oversight by suggesting that the emphasis on intentionality and meaning is an attempt to avoid the determinism of social Darwinism, however he notes that these emphases inadvertently perpetuate a conception of objective rationality. He underlines the tenacity of the rationalist stance by reviewing its persistence in spite of a number of powerful philosophical critiques levied against it and he examines a lineage of thinking from Feuerbach (1804-1872) through Husserl (1859-1938) to Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) that draws on the facticity of corporeity to expose the futility of the Cartesian notion of a view from nowhere. For Merleau-Ponty (2002 orig. 1954), for example, our perceptions are always situated and always arise in relation to our movement. Since all basic perceptions involve bodily movement and thus cannot be separated from it then all mental functions are somatic activities. Yet Turner (1992) admits that from a sociological perspective Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is constrained by grounding
intentionality in the (individual) body, a grounding that still preserves the status of a knowing subject albeit that cognition is somaticised.22

Turner's analysis of the sociological field concludes that in the somatic society the cognitive knowing subject remains in tact, however cognitive rationalism becomes superseded by cognitive emotionalism (1992). In the context of education Ecclestone and Hayes (2009) consider this a dangerous move as it merely adds another dimension of experience that can be diagnosed as lacking and whose lacking therefore needs to be overcome. They view the new emphasis in education on therapeutic concerns as diminishing our sense of human potential and encouraging the need for an explicator in areas of life that were previously private or considered autonomous. They offer a detailed critique of the creeping encroachment of diagnostic and therapeutic technologies into ever more dimensions of living and convincingly expose "wellness" to be no longer considered a quality of experience but instead to have become a status that can be conferred or withheld by a more dominant group. Yet their commitment to what they describe as radical humanism has some problems. Curiously, it is their strength of feeling against feeling that weakens their argument as they interpret the shift from intellect to emotion as a shift of concern from the mind to the body, as if thought somehow functioned outside of corporeal life. Their critique thus collapses into a Cartesian pure rationalism that is difficult to sustain without assuming the dualisms of a mind/body hierarchy and a fixed and objective world "out there" to be mastered and made known. Their warning of the dangers of an ever expanding diagnostic domain is an important one but by equating all affect with gross emotional states that can be easily

22 In his final (unfinished) work Merleau Ponty similarly critiques of his earlier Phenomenology of Perception for positioning the body as a null point of intentionality and therefore failing to circumvent the knowing subject of Cartesian dualism. See Merleau -Ponty, M. (1968) The visible and the invisible, Evanston ILL: Northwestern University Press
identified, displayed, named and managed they leave in tact the ethos of mastery that propels the diagnostic drive.

Ecclestone and Hayes (2009) are not alone in reducing affect to the easily displayed, named and easily instrumentalised grand emotions. As Mulachy points out in her socio-material critique of the educational landscape: ‘The received view in education is that affect is tantamount to emotion or feeling and that materials, such as bodily affectivity, technologies and texts, are used by teachers and learners to support and advance teaching and learning’ (2012, p. 13).

Mulachy's point is astute, for even where affect is championed as a means of resisting the therapeutic legacy so passionately critiqued by Ecclestone and Hayes it is often equated with emotions, which are primarily feelings about something; in other words they are feelings invested with meaning. Zembylas's (2007a) detailed consideration of the various functions of affect in the classroom is a case in point. Although Zembylas (2007a) draws on Deleuze (1988a) to stress an intersubjective dimension of affect and to wrest his concept of emotion away from the status of private, psychological (and perhaps assumed to be inappropriate or inconvenient) states of being, it is nevertheless the intersubjective dimension of emotions about something that Zembylas puts to work.\^23 \^24 He argues that when, for example, anger sparked by injustice is displayed in the classroom it can be interpreted as demonstrating a hope that the present state of affairs can be transformed. By making visible that a more equitable alternative is hoped for it therefore functions as furthering the cause of equality. Important as this may be it

\^23 A detailed discussion of Deleuze's concept of affect is explored in the next chapter
does not involve moving beyond the traditional pedagogical dynamic in which the student displays and the teacher interprets. Elsewhere Zembylas (2007b) introduces dimensions of unknowability and silence into his pedagogies of affect, but he construes these as emotional stimuli rather than dimensions of affect. The unknowability Zembylas is concerned with is, pace Levinas, the unknowability of the Other that we encounter, not the unknowability of the sensation that such an encounter evokes.25

Zembylas argues that making bodily affectivity visible can subvert the injustices wrought by rationalist assumptions. However his association of affectivity with visibility somewhat limits the success of his venture as it ties "feeling" to an investment of meaning and overlooks other kinds of bodily affectivity such as somatic sensations which arise from the body's own movement (and movement need not be a visible action, it can include the journey of a breath or micro adjustments in the tone of connective tissue). The question that now needs to be asked, and is asked specifically by this thesis, is whether sensitivity to the affectivity of somatic experience, as distinct from the display or interpretation of emotion about something, has a specific contribution to make to how one might approach the project of subversion that Zembylas purports to support. Kraeftner and Kroell (2009) touch upon the importance of this distinction, although in a very different context. Kraeftner and Kroell's research is concerned with patients in a long term vegetative state, patients who are subject to multiple medical diagnoses of their condition all of which serve to emphasise their disabilities. Kraeftner and Kroell (2009) are interested in whether the day to day quality of life of these patients can be improved through specific nursing practices that involve sensory stimulation and their research is undertaken in partnership with the

25 Levinas’s conception of the absolute Other is discussed in chapter 4.
nurses responsible for these patients' care. The bathing of patients provides an example of the kind of practice that Kraeftner and Kroell are interested in. When a nurse washes a patient he/she guides the patient's hand, which holds a washcloth, over the patient's face and body so that he or she becomes aware of his or her own body. The nurses approach this task as a shared bodily experience and their usual communication to each other regarding the patient’s experience of the washing ritual would be descriptive of bodily states (such as he/she was tense, relaxed, congested or not). Kraeftner and Kroell note that in order to record and analyse the impact of such practices for the purposes of the research the nurses have to infer cognitive states from bodily expressions, identifying and assessing levels of wakefulness, awareness or arousal and similarly categorising the patient's actions as spontaneous, reflexive or intentional. They note that this implicitly attributes the value (or not) of the nurse's actions to (assumed changes in) the patient's cognitive states, a privileging of mind over body that troubles the nurses and shifts their role in the washing ritual from being one who engages in a shared bodily experience to being one who diagnoses and assigns varying degrees of worth to differentiated subjective states. The challenge faced by the nurses, and by Kraeftner and Kroell (2009), is how to attempt to comprehend the patients' reality without imposing on them a deficit position within a reductionist perspective and the argument of the nurses is that this can only be approached by attending to their patient's bodily sensations rather than interpreting them.

Educators, like nurses, have to navigate the relationship between comprehending another’s reality and imposing a deficit position and this is also the challenge engaged with by practitioners in the field that Thomas Hanna (1970, 1995) inscribes as 'somatics'. As indicated in chapter 1, Hanna defines somatics as a field that privileges
our proprioceptive sense of movement, in other words kinaesthesia or kinaesthetic experience. Kinaesthetic experience is not limited to an awareness of movement of part or all of the body through space, but includes awareness of touch, balance, and gravitational force and of an ever-changing bodily landscape of shifting relations and micro-adjustments. For Hanna, a crucial dimension of a somatic approach is that kinaesthetic experience cannot be reduced to a third person interpretation of it - the soma and the body are categorically different. This dichotomy enables Hanna to offer the enormously useful insight that the soma is nothing other than a process of experience, effectively demonstrating that categorisations of mind and body are inaccurate and inappropriate as there is no dividing line in how we live through what Hanna describes as the 'unconscious core' of the body and the 'conscious cortex' of the mind (1987a). As Hanna puts it, in characteristically unequivocal terms: 'In its essence, a soma is experience. It is not a “mind,” nor does it have one. It is not a “body,” nor does it have one. Nor is it a “spirit” or “soul”' (1987a). On Hanna's reckoning somas are therefore not functions of substance or structure but are, rather, processes of differentiation that inevitably arise from and continue within the differentiating forces of the expanding cosmos. However, he limits the radical openness of this process of differentiation by interpreting somatic processes as biased towards synergy and in doing so he adopts a strongly normative and idealist stance. In spite of his disavowal of the third person privilege of substance and structure Hanna characterises synergy by claiming innately preferred human movement and structural patterns of upright posture, forward directionality and an adaptive manoeuvrability realised through rotating left and right on the sagittal plane (1986b). Hanna claims that this optimum state, which he asserts gives rise to a sense of ease and well being, is achieved through the unifying efforts of a central organising core of awareness. Hanna sees awareness as a selective
power and compares its function to a cell membrane protecting the internal synthesis of a cell by controlling what enters and exits it. Awareness protects the synergy of the individual soma, maximising efficiency by opening the somatic process up to some experiences while excluding others. Hanna's rationale is that by cultivating awareness through exclusively focussing on specific sensory data we can move closer to his ideal state of synergy. He views the goal of all 'human education' to make this optimum state possible, a state he at times calls 'osmotic openness' and at other times more revealingly refers to as 'efficient process' (1987b).

Although Hanna maintains allegiance to rationalist ideals of progress and human perfection his identification of a field of somatic practices does challenge the dominant tendency to marginalise kinaesthetic sensation and in doing so foregrounds the psychophysical entity that we call a self as an ongoing process rather than a fixed subject. However, as Eddy observes, the inscription of "field" to somatic practices is perhaps a misnomer:

The field of 'somatics' is barely a field. If necessarily seen as one, I liken it to a field of wildflowers with unique species randomly popping up across wide expanses. How did individual experiences of, and with, the living body become a field? (2009, p. 6).

Eddy's (2009) observations come in the context of her detailed historical overview of "the field". She begins by claiming that theoretical support for sensory research burgeoned through the twentieth century 'as rationalism was influenced by existentialism and phenomenology' (2009, p. 6) and she singles out Dewey, Merleau-Ponty and Whitehead as theorists of particular importance. She notes that each somatic practice emerged from the discrete bodily explorations of individuals, often in response to their own ill health or injury and in some cases with influence from eastern mind-
body disciplines such as martial arts and yoga. She notes, however, that Hanna was the outside eye who identified their shared concern to attend to emerging bodily sensations and that he also identified some common ground in the methodologies by which these sensations are brought to the fore. For example, practitioners generally lead their participants into a gravity-reduced state by inviting them to lie down, take time to breathe and engage in some sort of guided relaxation. Their participants then move, perhaps initially subtly but also possibly in complex ways, while attending to proprioceptive data and perhaps receiving additional stimuli either verbally or through touch (Eddy 2009). Eddy traces a family tree of somatic practices spanning back to the early pioneers who include F. M. Alexander (1869-1955), founder of the Alexander Technique; Moshe Feldenkrais (1904-1984) who developed The Feldenkrais Method®; Mabel Todd, who published the seminal text *The thinking body* in 1935; and Irmgard Bartenieff (1900-1981) (who developed her Bartenieff Fundamentals™ from Laban's system of movement analysis). Eddy (2009) considers the world of somatics to then branch off into three related fields: somatic psychology, somatic bodywork and somatic movement and she notes the prevalence of dancers in the second generation of somatic movement practitioners. She concludes that dance departments have become the academic homes for somatic research but observes that the potential of both dance and somatics remain largely overlooked by academics from other fields.

What is fascinating about Eddy’s (2009) detailed account is that despite her assertion that the various practices that have developed all define and share a non-Cartesian worldview she inadvertently reveals that both the development of the field and her own relationship to it are infused with values tainted by a Cartesian shadow. Firstly, Eddy (who is the founder of a discipline called Somatic Movement Therapy) asserts the main
trajectory of dancers' influence on the development of somatics has been the evolution of Somatic Movement Education and Therapy, with The International Somatic Movement Education and Therapy Association (ISMETA) working to define the shared principles of discrete somatic disciplines. While ISMETA is a highly respected and professional organisation, the grouping of education and therapy into the same project with the same principles raises questions about the extent to which the influence of the Cartesian legacy has really been avoided. Secondly, in defending dance and somatics against their continuing marginalisation Eddy (2009) falls into the trap of instrumentalising them within a performative framework rather than arguing for the value of their elusive quality *per se*. She contends that the rigours of dance training develop discipline and cultivate one's ability to 'achieve more' (2009, p. 22) and that:

*The somatic paradigm supports a hypothesis that awakening the body expands the mind and beckons somatic dance professionals to become strong of both body and mind. Within the academy more somatic research can be shaped with this fortitude* (2009, p. 23).

This attitude seems at odds with her earlier assertion that somatic practices are disciplines that eschew attachment to a single truth as humanism's single truth of the autonomous rational subject 'strong in both body and mind'(2009, p. 23) seems alive and well in Eddy's vision of somatics. By collapsing back into Enlightenment ideals Eddy, like Hanna, misses the opportunity to consider how the practice of attending to kinaesthetic sensation, by suspending goal centred activity and foregrounding ever-shifting relationships, *can* offer a powerful challenge to the dominance of dualism and its legacy of diagnosis, performativity and possessive individualism. The confusion of message is not merely an oversight by a prominent somatics scholar, it is endemic throughout much of the field and is perhaps partly a function of the attempt to make explicit the value of somatic experience by naming and placing it (a similar problem to
that encountered by the nurses in Kraeftner and Kroell's research) and partly a function of the history of the predominant practices. As Eddy’s (2009) account details, many of the first generation pioneers in the first half of the twentieth century originated their somatic explorations in search of a way to heal themselves from a specific incapacity or injury, thus the practices were therapeutic in function. Yet by starting from first person kinaesthetic experience they differed radically from a therapeutic intervention involving diagnosis from a third party; for whilst in the act of attending to kinaesthetic experience one can make no assumption about the cause of a given pain or restriction of movement and therefore no projection of a "correct" course of action. Attending to what is happening kinaesthetically in response to breath, movement, touch and verbal stimuli invites us to suspend any pre-judgement of what or how to achieve. Attending to kinaesthetic sensation is therefore always an experimental process, even when performing a pre-defined action. It is thus perhaps not surprising that the philosopher and educationalist John Dewey (1859-1952) so well known for his advocacy of scientistic experimentation and experiential learning, was an avid student of arguably the best known somatic "pioneer": F.M. Alexander.

Although participants of somatic practices might experience therapeutic benefits such as less pain and/or more freedom of movement, the experimental attitude and first person perspective of the practices led the somatic pioneers to perceive their work as predominantly educational. For example, Alexander Technique sessions, though usually in a one on one context and often sought to remedy an ill, are known as "lessons" and the professional is known as a teacher rather than a therapist. In some other practices the terms practitioner and participant are used as indicators of the professional and their student to emphasise that privileging first person experience
disrupts the usual expert/client or student/teacher relationship. When dancers began to participate in somatic practices, initially in response to being injured, they quickly realised that the model of learning challenged their traditional training and many were grateful to find an approach to finding more freedom of movement that circumvented both the "no pain, no gain" and the deeply hierarchical and diagnostic culture of the dominant approach. However, to some extent the influx of dancers into the field of somatics functioned to instrumentalise attentiveness to kinaesthetic sensation. The educational merit of an adventure of uncertainty and radical openness was soon overshadowed by the significant gains to be made in one's range and articulation of movement.

The philosopher Richard Shusterman, like Eddy and Hanna, asserts the philosophical importance of the somatic challenge to Cartesian dualism while at the same time accommodating a Cartesian worldview. Shusterman (1999, 2008) criticises Western philosophy for largely ignoring somatic experience, and outlines a discipline of somaesthetics as part of his call to reposition the body as central to philosophical discourse.26 In his detailed elucidation of somaesthetics (2008) he uses the term somatic to refer indiscriminately to third person and first person perspectives on the body and although he is a qualified Feldenkrais Method® practitioner he appears unaware of Hanna's (1970, 1995) specific usage of the term to denote a field of practices that privilege a first person perspective and the subsequent wide adoption of

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26 Shusterman first introduced the idea of somaesthetics in 1999 in: Somaesthetics: a disciplinary proposal, Journal of aesthetics and art criticism, 57,3. 29-33. However the most fully developed and detailed exposition of the proposed discipline is offered by his 2008 text: Body Consciousness: A philosophy of mindfulness and somaesthetics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The book includes chapters on Michel Foucault, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Simone de Beauvoir, Ludwig Wittgenstein, William James, and John Dewey. Shusterman proclaims each a somaesthetic philosopher and critiques and supplements their work through his elucidation of the discipline.
"somatic" as denotive of such a field. Shusterman (2008) describes somaesthetics as concerned with self-cultivation and he divides his new domain into three branches. *Analytic somaesthetics* is descriptive in purpose and explains the nature of our bodily perceptions and functions and their role in our knowledge and construction of the world. *Pragmatic somaesthetics*, which is normative in function, denotes methods concerned with self-improvement. Shusterman distinguishes between what he calls atomistic and holistic approaches to bodily enhancement; an atomistic approach addresses a specific perceived deficit - for example putting on lipstick - but a holistic approach, while addressing the whole system, need not be somatic in Hanna's or Eddy's definition of the term since Shusterman's categorisations are outcome led rather than indicative of the process or approach. Pragmatic somaesthetics can be representational (concerned with appearance) or experiential, but in both cases are generally assumed to be performative (disciplines devoted to greater strength or skill which themselves may be motivated by representational or experiential concerns). *Practical somaesthetics*, is the actual doing of the pragmatic methods with and for the body. *Practical somaesthetics* can include any kind of bodily enhancement; be it having cosmetic surgery, body building or participating in a first person perspective practice such as the Feldenkrais Method. Shusterman's main concern is the normative function of somaesthetics, the ways in which the actual doing of somaesthetics and our analysis of somaesthetic experience can be utilized in pursuit of self-improvement and enhanced well being. He frames this concern for self-mastery as an ethical practice and claims that it implies an essential regard for others, a claim he only very vaguely attempts to substantiate with the statement: 'our normal feelings of our body ground our form of

27 The adoption of Hanna's 'field' is evidenced through Eddy's (2009) historical analysis; through the holding of conferences such as Dancing in the Now: Somatic Practices in Higher Education; and through publications such as the Journal of Dance and Somatic Practices.
life, which in turn grounds our ethical concepts and attitudes towards others' (2008, p. 127).

Shusterman's overtly pragmatist project of self-improvement positions the subject as knowing and in control. He notes that in a Feldenkrais Method lesson a participant learnt to rise and sit in a new way, using the forces of gravity and momentum to move the skeletal structure with more ease:

Enhanced performative agency is here achieved not by building the body’s autonomous power but by learning a more intelligent method of utilizing the larger powers of nature that intersect and inhabit the individual whose body and self are always more than one's own’ (2008, p. 109).

At first sight this seems to substantiate Shusterman's claim that somaesthetics challenges the Cartesian worldview. Yet the challenge is limited because for Shusterman the larger powers of nature must be harnessed by reason and never allowed to misdirect through affect. The depth of his attachment to rationalist values is indicated by his claim that the affect of emotions is a misdirection and that more subtle kinaesthetic sensations are non-affective (2008, p. 53), thus he re-inscribes the ideal of mastery of and the hierarchies of mind over body and of self over world.

Isabelle Ginot (2010) reads Shusterman's outcome oriented somaesthetics as an example of how the discourse surrounding somatic practices is all too often seduced by the temptation of proof. In her extraordinarily insightful exposition of the under-theorisation of somatics she notes that on the one hand somatics 'is not entirely free

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Her claim is additionally supported by Shusterman's criticism of F.M. Alexander's failure to engage more deeply with scientific analyses in the development of his technique and his praise for Feldenkrais in adopting an evidence based approach. Shusterman is in favour of a 'pragmatic pluralism' (Shusterman, 2008, p. 203) in which science contributes to his somaesthetic project of self-improvement.
from a tenacious *doxa* that physical sensations must irrevocably elude language' (2010, p. 13) and on the other hand the discourses surrounding somatics have been largely concerned with *legitimating* what is fundamentally an elusive, unstable and subjective experience. She identifies that two framings of legitimation are commonly used, the first being scientific method and the second being personal accounts 'of recovery' (2010, p. 13), including that of the original pioneer, case studies from his/her practice, or accounts offered by his/her participants. Although these framings may appear contradictory Ginot demonstrates that the latter approach also operates to rationalise somatic experience as it emphasises the wisdom and expertise of the practitioner and seeks to universalise the efficacy of their method. In doing so the discourse of individual narrative joins scientific method in overlooking that a given somatic experience is always specific to the individual, the moment and the circumstances of encounter and can never be generalised from. At the same time, the device of personal framing puts the claims of these accounts beyond the possibility of interrogation. Ginot therefore asserts that neither records of the founders' experiences, case studies nor exemplars can do what they set out to do, that is verify the legitimacy of the practice, but like scientific discourse they contribute to a continued fostering of belief in the scientific, universal and demonstrably provable nature of experience (2010).

Ginot summarises Shusterman's particular contribution to this discourse as: 'the question of the body in philosophy lets itself be taken in by the temptation of proof, and, reciprocally, the performative function of somatic belief obtains a normative function' (2010, p. 19). She attributes this in part to Shusterman’s exclusive use of the Alexander Technique and the Feldenkrais Method as his examples of kinaesthetically led practice. Ginot's reasoning is that both of these techniques invite attention to
kinaesthetic sensation in order to re-pattern how movement gestures are initiated. In
the language of Feldenkrais (1972), they work with the nervous system and their
outcome is improved motor command. Ginot observes how they thus differ markedly
from other techniques that aim, for example, for the transformation of the tensegrity of
connective tissue (e.g. Rolfing) or which emphasise the relational or intercorporeal
dimension of somatic experience (for example Body Mind Centring® or Contact
Improvisation). Interestingly Ginot makes no mention of Skinner Releasing Technique
in her categorisations, perhaps because Skinner eschews scientific discourse and makes
no claims about "how it works" either in her teaching of students or her training of
teachers. Skinner's work is examined in some detail in the next chapter, but it is worth
noting here that, despite Ginot's powerful critique of how somatic discourses are
fostering a belief in scientistic verification, she too is tempted by a need to analyse and
categorise, in pseudo scientific terms, how various practices "work". Nevertheless her
point that Alexander Technique and the Feldenkrais Method are primarily directed
towards self-control is well made, though she arguably goes too far equating this self-
concern with being exclusively inward. As Shusterman demonstrates through his
example of a participant rising with greater ease by harnessing gravitational forces,
attentiveness to kinaesthetic sensation is never solely an inward activity.

Ginot's (2010) critique of the discourses of somatics and their failed project of
legitimation is important, but even more interesting are her observations about the
dangers posed by the normative stance that somatic discourses (including Shusterman's

29 The writings of both Alexander and Feldenkrais exhibit their commitment to the humanist quest for
ever more mastery and control. See for example Alexander, F. M. (1932). The use of the self: Its
contribution) often take. The valorisation of slow gentle movement and a minimum of muscular effort coupled with the assertion that the techniques realise a more natural posture and way of moving do nothing to unsettle the Enlightenment legacy of a hierarchical structure that marginalises and excludes difference and measures individuals against a pre-ordained universal norm - a norm of health, vitality, upright bodies and least resistance. Ginot concludes with a rallying cry to resist this ideological norm:

We must ask how to value perceptive modes of low intensity, control, tranquility and detachment, without renouncing a frenzied uncontrollable warrior body. We must inquire whether the values dear to somatics should not be reconsidered, given that they ring strangely with the overshadowing ideological phobias of the powers that be (2010, p. 26).

**Just sensation**

Ginot (2010) invites searching for new ways of theorising somatics. A concern for Justice invites searching for new ways of theorising the rationale of education. Both invitations require a re-conceptualisation of the subject that no longer valorises norms of autonomous rationality, mastery, progress and fixed-truths. Both require a step beyond certainty and a willingness to embrace contingency. For rather than being a deficit that has to be fixed the volatility of life invites engagement with endless experimentation, new relationships and what we might call learning. Although eloquent voices rightly offer powerful critiques of the injustices caused by the performative framework that dominates current educational policy and practice, it is important to remember that performativity merely intensifies a set of norms and values that are already embedded in the very rationale of education and its relationship to the subject. These norms and values are complexly intertwined with a mind/body,
self/other, self/world set of hierarchical dualisms that are so ubiquitous in their influence that attempts to subvert them often inadvertently collapse back into sustaining the dominant norms. However, it is not that the constraints of normativity and conception of subjectivity that the Enlightenment spawned cannot be subverted, it is merely that our attempts at subversions have to be more cunning.

To be cunning one has to be canny and as O’Neil (2009) writing in the context of medical ethics reveals, bodily knowing is uncannily canny. O'Neil, drawing on Moyal-Sharrocks (2004) analysis of Wittgenstein, distinguishes between certainty and surety. The former is open to doubt, it is a propositional reasoning directed towards establishing facts and is validated by reflective learning. Certainty asserts a truth about the world. Surety though, is founded on non-epistemic belief and is therefore not open to doubt. Worthiness is not an issue for the canniness of surety for the affirmation of the body comes from trust in the world. As a non-propositional, habitually absorbed know-how canniness is a function of bodily automatisms that normally remain recessive and O'Neil adds to Moyal-Sharrocks analysis and Wittgenstein's distinction by demonstrating that canniness is not only a function of proprioception and sensory intermodality but that it also extends at a cellular level to our body's most deeply recessive systems, such as our immunological responses to invasion from bacteria and viruses. Thus O'Neil defines "embodiment" as a canniness about the limits of our biological self; that is to say “embodiment” denotes a sense of security which underdetermines our epistemic decision-making.

For O'Neil the canny is rendered uncanny by coming to presence; it is the revealing of something that normally remains hidden that gives rise to a feeling that is both strange
and familiar; an intertwining of the canny and uncanny that provokes disquiet. The anxiety of the un/canny is one where we are sure that we feel disquiet and yet are unable to articulate why. It is therefore difficult to put feelings of un/canniness into words without evoking the supernatural, which in turn leads to a disavowal of bodily experience (O’Neil, 1999).30

O’Neil's concluding remarks are as pertinent to educators as they are to medics. She notes that evidence based protocols seek certainty and overlook the common bond of trust that is tacitly acknowledged in bodily knowing and she therefore places on practitioners a responsibility to engage with both forms of certitude (1999). However, O'Neil's medical context appears to limit her observations to moments of un/canniness that arise from dysfunction and/or from the treatment of dysfunction (such as prosthetic technologies not feeling as if they belong to our bodies) and this constraint makes her argument take a diagnostic turn, focussing on how the canny knowing of patients can be communicated to (or explained by) medical professionals who in turn must recognise and give space to the disquiet that this 'making known' provokes. However, with this diagnostic turn O'Neil is in danger of reducing the intertwining of the un/canny to a relationship of linear succession and therefore overlooking the significance of her own observations about how our sub-personal processes subsist in and make possible our intentional activities. The disquiet of the un/canny is not limited to attempted rationalisations or to situations identified as dysfunction, as Munro and Belova's (2009) analysis of our experience of affect serves to demonstrate. Munro and Belova (2009) argue that most of the time we overlook sensation in our day to day living, allowing us to experience the world as a smooth and largely uninterrupted sequence of successive 

30 Given that Descartes sought to dismiss superstition and to rationalise religion, it is possible that the difficulty of putting bodily knowing into words without evoking the supernatural contributed to the absoluteness of his disavowal of bodily experience.
events that they describe as 'illusions of continuity and decision' (Munro & Belova 
(2009, p. 88). They contend that when sensation stands out it acts as an interruption, 
freeing us from anticipating the future and bringing the present more forcefully into 
view. They describe this as moments where bodies 'take place', which they describe as 
'foregrounding themselves, if fleetingly, rather than remaining recessively as 
background' (2009, p. 88). Although Munro and Belova do not distinguish between 
kinaesthetic sensation and emotions in their discussion of affect (and the examples they 
cite of shock, shame embarrassment, awe, elation and euphoria are all emotions) their 
discussion of how sensation is world-shifting has relevance to education:

Body instances the shifting enmeshments of person and world, a 
circular moving of body from one form of relational extension to 
another that obliterates conventional divisions of subject and object, 
or active and passive. This circular movement of body and world 
does not end up with 'getting nowhere' as logic has it, but comes to 
'place' anyone in ever new beginnings, new connections and meanings 
(Munro & Belova, 2009, p. 93 - 94).

Crucially, by movement Munro and Belova do not only refer to action. They explain 
there are two possible types of movement: mobility, which involves action or 
movement through space; and motility, where affect shifts a body's comportment to the 
world. Their point is that the body never arrives as a knowing thing; it is continuously 
exploring how to be.

Whereas O'Neil's un/canny interface of the sure and the certain arises from attempting 
to render the sure certain, for Munro and Belova (2009) the un/canny mingle in the 
fleeting bodily surety that what was once certain is now uncertain. The fleeting nature 
of sensation keeps "what is happening" beyond the grasp of certainty but the disquiet is 
sure and it enacts an experience of world-shifting rather than a diagnosis of
dysfunction. That surety is both before and beyond certainty points towards a way of approaching Ginot's (2010) call to re-theorise somatics and in doing so hints at the potential relevance of somatics to thinking differently about education. Applying Wittgenstein's terminology to Ginot's analysis suggests that the prevailing somatic discourses either assert that surety closes down interrogation or else they engage in a futile attempt to stabilise the canny in order to render it certain. Somatics and education therefore both suffer from the same category mistake in their attempts to legitimate themselves. In the case of education this takes the form of orienting education towards the disclosure and interpretation of (the making-certain of) subjective experience. However, if somatics is to meaningfully contribute to how education might cunningly (and cannily) subvert the Cartesian legacy then Ginot's (2010) invitation has to be reversed. The question is therefore not one of how to re-theorise somatics as a means of resisting exclusion and injustice and then (in this instance) how to apply that theory of resistance to education. Rather, the question is how can attending to kinaesthetic sensation, as an experimental engagement with the volatility of living, contribute to the theorising of (a) (more) just education.

The distinction between these two questions clarifies and substantiates the parameters and approach of this research as laid out in the first chapter. Kinaesthetic experience is not the focus of investigation, but it nevertheless permeates how the literature is engaged with and how the arguments are made. I contend that reading and writing is generally situated by bodily experience to some extent but that in this instance the influence of kinaesthetic awareness is brought to the fore more than it usually might be. Kinaesthetic experience thus seeps between context (my background as a dancer and dance educator) and methodology. These traces of kinaesthetic experience, however,
are not presented as data for analysis. Firstly, because kinaesthetic experience is not the focus of investigation and secondly, because to do so would be to attempt the kind of rationalisation and universalisation of individual experience(s) so powerfully critiqued by Ginot (2010) and exposed by O’Neil (1999) as a category mistake.

It is therefore important to distinguish an engagement with the volatility of living from simply replacing a privilege of “mind” by a privilege of “body”. As Bardet and Noceti point out, ‘any grand renunciation of dualism may altogether miss somatics’ real power to generate a new model, by simplifying the complexity of the relationship through a binary option’ (2012, p. 196). They distinguish somatic practice from ‘a “return to the body” as a new source of truth’ (2012, p. 197, original quotation marks), which would merely reverse the hierarchy but maintain the opposition inherent in dualism. They assert that somatic practice is always concerned with relationships (to gravity, to environment) and is therefore a mode of exploration through the body rather than on it. As such it is a mode of research that is theoretical and practical at the same time. Bardet and Noceti give an example of this by describing how in a Feldenkrais session one might discover the articulation between the tangible/material and the intangible/immaterial through an exploration of weight when lying down and scanning the body. When lying on our backs scanning where, and with what degree of pressure, we are in contact with the floor we can pay attention to weight; we might notice how much weight is in the back of the head; we might notice the curve of the neck that is not in contact with the floor, perhaps noticing some unevenness of the weight through one shoulder blade in comparison to the other, or one side of the ribs in comparison to the other, or one side of the back of the pelvis. If the legs are lying straight maybe one leg rotates out more than the other so that each leg has a slightly different surface in contact
with the floor. We might notice how much pressure is on each anklebone, or each wrist or unexpectedly our attention might return to our shoulders and discover the distribution of contact with the floor is slightly different than it was before. As Bardet and Noceti point out, in such an exploration we experience weight as neither inside nor outside the body. We cannot - and are not seeking to - prove the existence of gravity but we can nevertheless explore its variations. They therefore consider somatic practice as an approach that has the potential of avoiding the binary oppositions that position the body/mind self/world questions as questions of separation or unity; asserting somatic exploration offers up a paradoxical in-between of activity and passivity that is continually articulating differences rather than seeking their resolution.\(^{31}\)

In the next chapter I explore some resonances between attending to how kinaesthetic experience continually articulates difference and the work of Derrida, Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari, with a view to later sketching an alternative approach to subjectivity that brings with it an alternative approach to legitimating education; one that foregrounds justice. However, in attempting to foreground justice I need to take care not to stabilise and universalise it; for to do so would render it impotent. Justice, therefore, has to be understood cannily. For this reason I approach the responsibility of education towards justice as a responsibility towards a singular quality of experience: elusive, incalculable but not open to doubt.

\(^{31}\) Bardet and Noceti's analysis is particularly refreshing because they find traces of this paradoxical in-between in the thinking of Descartes, in his letters to Princess Elizabeth of Boheme between 1643 and 1649 see Descartes, R. (1989), *Correspondance avec Elisabeth*, Paris: Flammarion
Chapter 3 - Can they Dance?

Introduction

This thesis considers the conditions necessary for (a) (more) just education and draws on kinaesthetic experience to offer an alternative pedagogical dynamic to that of the dominant discourses. In chapter 1 I explained how the concept of (a) (more) just education has two interrelated dimensions. Firstly it implies conceptualising and practising education in an otherwise than instrumental way ([a] just education) and secondly it implies pedagogical practices that do not unfairly categorise participants and/or re-inscribe existent structures of advantage and disadvantage (a [more] just education). Chapter 2 revealed that historically education has sustained and has been sustained by a dualist conception of subjectivity and that as a result contemporary education is hyper-individualised, over-instrumentalised, and highly stratifying. Chapter 2 also revealed, perhaps more surprisingly, that the prevalent discourses in the field of somatics are equally dominated by instrumental tendencies and equally seek the protection of a universal ground. In this chapter I introduce three resources, or catalysts, for thinking otherwise than the prevalent dualist discourses and in the remaining chapters of the thesis I draw on these to consider the dynamic shifts needed to further the interests of (a) (more) just education. The first two "resources" that I introduce are thinkers whose work falls within the theoretical framework of poststructuralism and the third resource is the somatic practice Skinner Releasing Technique (SRT), which invites an experiential engagement with mutative subjectivity. Poststructuralism offers a theoretical framework that unsettles the privilege of cogito, although this assertion has to be understood with the reservations that the late twentieth century writers labelled with this terminology did not identify themselves as a group and that "poststructuralist" thinkers reject the closure and categorisation that the
inscription of such a label necessarily implies. Notwithstanding these caveats, poststructuralism can be described as arising in response to - or even in celebration of - the impossibility of asserting a foundation for knowledge. In terms of historical chronology poststructuralism comes after the attempt of structuralism to account for knowledge through the systematic structuring of signs and language, and after the phenomenological account of knowledge arising from lived experience. Poststructuralism exposes both approaches as leaving in tact the originary status of the human subject; from whose point of view both lived experience and linguistic structures were organised. From this perspective the "post" of poststructuralism does not merely denote its chronological appearance after structuralism but also indicates an approach to thinking beyond structure that comes in part from ‘a complication or unravelling’ of structuralist approaches (Standish, 2004, p. 488). More broadly speaking, poststructuralism is a movement of thought that undoes the privilege of the static and the certain (knowledge, truth, identity and in ontological terms: Being) by opening these alleged absolutes to a play of movement and therefore uncertainty (for example through notions of difference and becoming). The specific poststructuralist thinkers whose work I will introduce here and draw on in the chapters that follow are Derrida and Deleuze/Deleuze and Guattari.

Derrida and Deleuze, along with Levinas and Foucault, are known as philosophers of difference but this inscription is perhaps misleading for, as Lawlor (2000) suggests, a philosophy of difference implodes if it becomes a universalising force. Therefore whilst for both Deleuze and Derrida 'difference pulls us outside our allegedly secure and self identical subjectivity' (Protevi, 2003, p. 192) there are divergences, and even contradictions, between their approaches which allow for an even greater challenge to
certainty than either one read in isolation. Yet, given the resistance of both Derrida and Deleuze to the notion of representing primordial truths, it would clearly be at odds with both the trajectories of their thinking and the aims of this thesis to present quasi-concepts and concepts from their individual works as discrete "truths" applied where most obviously relevant to conclusively "solve" the problems that I have identified with contemporary education. Therefore, the question arises of how best to introduce their ideas here without suggesting such status and stasis. Thankfully the very complexity of their thought discourages such a reductive analysis, for the contribution of these theorists to this work is as much in their pertinacious invitation to think, and to think differently as it is in the individual quasi-concepts and concepts they introduce. Both Derrida and Deleuze/Deleuze and Guattari tirelessly unsettle the problems they explore through elucidating numerous notions that are distinct and yet are strongly resonant with concepts or quasi-concepts that each explores elsewhere. In this way, they recognise that the problematics that they are addressing endure but do not stay still. Moreover their writing unsettles the reader as it avoids offering a final word on what to think instead preferring to open thought to a process of ongoing movement. Foucault (1994) said of his own work that he did not intend it to tell anyone anything or to assert any "truth" but that he hoped his readers could encounter, and to some extent go through, the experience of transformation that he had in writing it. I have a similar intention here; that is to expose both the experience of reading and the experience of writing as movements of thought and to similarly expose the experience of attending to kinaesthetic sensation as a movement of thought. Nietzsche, whose influence on Deleuze in particular is significant, suggested that to determine the value of books we must ask 'can they dance?' (1974, p. 322). For me the texts of Derrida and of

32 Although both engage with a movement of difference, for Derrida movement mediates difference whereas for Deleuze it is an effect of difference, as will be explored below.
Deleuze/Deleuze and Guattari invoke a movement of thought reminiscent of Scottish country dancing, a dizzying *strip the willow* in which ideas link arm in arm and are spun around before being hurled towards new places and new relationships. Attempting to convey their ideas is no less disorientating, though the process feels more hesitant. Perhaps the dance of writing this text is more akin to a Contact Improvisation (CI) jam. Contact Improvisation is a duet dance form in which physical contact with another dancer provides the starting point for movement exploration therefore, as the dancer Daniel Lepkoff (2008) notes, the "form" of Contact Improvisation has no physical shape and can only be defined as a series of unfolding questions, questions that arise from the unfolding of the dance itself (such as where is my weight? How much momentum do I need? How much weight can I "give" my partner?). In a "jam" multiple improvised duets arise in a shared space with the dancers spontaneously exploring exchanges of weight with a partner, testing their boundaries and then perhaps unexpectedly finding themselves in contact with new partners. I always find that the trouble with contact jams is that they risk collapsing into a mush of indistinct movement, a pile up of bodies with nowhere to go; but the joy is when you find yourself able to fly and fall, risk and surprise. The trick is in allowing yourself to be a participant in a dance that has a life of its own. However I recognise that to attempt to allow the movement of thought that is a doctoral thesis a life of its own could be a risky strategy. A doctoral thesis necessitates at least some courtly dancing. In a court dance such as a minuet the dancers take small, precise steps, they come forward, offer the gesture of a bow, take the other's hand and then perhaps gently turn around themselves before returning to their original position, unruffled. A minuet is clearly not static but thought moves in a manner that allows the comportment of individual ideas to be

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33 see La Mothe (2012) for an opposite perspective. She asserts that Deleuze's work cannot meet Nietzsche's demand of dancing as on her reading Deleuze overlooks the materiality of the body and therefore his work does not engender a visceral experience.
introduced and appraised in relation to their place in an overall scheme. In what follows then, I attempt to retain some of the restraint of a court dance while nevertheless hinting at the giddiness of the reel and the surprise of the jam. My primary concern here is to introduce a movement and momentum of ideas. In later chapters the import of these concepts/quasi-concepts in relation to the specifics of (a) (more) just education is more thoroughly explored. Nevertheless, the dance of ideas that this chapter moves through already disturbs the ground of the Cartesian subject; a “character” in educational discourse whose position is currently comfortably secure.

Derrida

What differs? Who differs?

For Derrida, we cannot escape the Cartesian cogito that dominates the European philosophical and scientific tradition therefore we can only take responsibility by thinking otherwise from within its influence. Thus Derrida's strategy is to reveal that the self-present subject, who in the Cartesian account is assumed to be primordial and the arbiter of experience, is already contaminated by non-presence or absence. For Derrida, all "things" (living or otherwise) are already contaminated by their opposite because they can only be understood in relation to something/one other. Take for example, the notion of a "self". The very idea of "self" is already contaminated with the notion of "other" for without an idea of what is outside the self the idea of a self is unimaginable and meaningless. Our conception of "self" is thus infused with the trace (or presence of the absence/non-presence) of other. Derrida’s conception of trace is thus highly specific. Rather than the trace being that which leaves a mark on some other pre-existent entity, as might in everyday language be presupposed, Derrida’s trace
precedes and contaminates entities (words, meanings, selves, others) with an otherness that can never be assimilated. The structure of the trace brings with it the inevitability that our utterances can disseminate in ways beyond our control for words will always mean more than what they say and Derrida (1991a)\textsuperscript{34} therefore challenges the logocentric assumption that there is a prior truth or meaning that words represent. Logocentrism assumes that “things” are fully present. We are able to fully know and understand them within a rational order of things. They are what they are because they are grounded in a prior and stable reality. In the context of language words represent the prior reality of the intentions of a speaker. The relative closure of their meaning allows these intentions to be generally understood. This priority of origin and assumption of closure plays out through a privilege of speech over writing; for if my words can be directly attributed to me in a temporal present then the illusion of them representing my prior intentions is sustained. On this reckoning writing is a secondary representation of speaking which in turn represents the intentions of a rational subject.

For Derrida though, the privilege of speech over writing lies at the heart of the representational thinking that he wants to transgress. Derrida (1991a, 1991b)\textsuperscript{35} undoes the priority of speech over writing and meaning over (con)text by arguing that contamination, dissemination, and the structure of the trace undoes any priority of intention. Our intentions are vulnerable as language is \textit{a priori} unstable. What we mean our words to say is already contaminated by them saying what we do not mean. Moreover, written text materialises through the physical impulse and propulsive force of mark making; marks appear before their meaning, escaping the privilege of rationality, identity and the temporal present.

\textsuperscript{34} Originally published in French in 1967
\textsuperscript{35} Both originally published in French in 1967
Yet, as already hinted at in the opening sentence of this section, Derrida's deconstructive project challenges more than assumptions about the status of language. As Standish surmises: ‘Our thinking, our identity, are traced in other ways to us, profoundly compromising and complicating ideas of self-knowledge and self-mastery’ (2004, p. 493). Derrida destabilises the priority of presence, identity, essence and activity over absence, otherness, difference and passivity and in doing so disturbs Descartes’s concept of a self-contained subject from within the parameters of its own grounding:

The presence-absence of the trace, which one should not even call its ambiguity but rather its play (for the word ambiguity requires the logic of presence, even when it begins to disobey that logic), carries in itself the problems of the letter and the spirit, of body and soul, and of all the problems whose primary affinity I have recalled. All dualisms, all theories of the immortality of the soul or of the spirit, as well as all monisms, spiritualist or materialist, dialectical or vulgar, are the unique theme of a metaphysics whose entire history was compelled to strive toward the reduction of the trace. (Derrida 1991a, p. 43).

With the presence-absence of the trace all is haunted by what it is not and therefore the identity of words and meanings or subjectivities and intentions is endlessly deferred by the mediating intervention of difference. This dimension of deferral slips an "a" (which as Derrida notes is the first and signifying letter) into what Derrida calls the play of différance (1982a). Yet Derrida is clear that différance is neither a word nor a concept; for to be a word or a concept it would have to be some "thing" identifiable and since the movement of différance precedes and infinitely defers the very possibility of identity there can be no such self-enclosure (or disclosure). Différance is always already in play yet it cannot be known, it cannot even be recognised as it sounds indistinguishable from difference. In Derrida’s words: 'The a of différance, thus, cannot be heard, it remains silent, secret and discreet as a tomb' (1982a, p. 4). Différance therefore neither belongs to the realm of the sensible nor to the realm of the intelligible. It has neither existence
nor essence: 'For what is put into question is precisely the quest for a rightful beginning, an absolute point of departure, a principal responsibility' (Derrida, 1982a, p. 6).

The non-existence of *différance* not only troubles (or deconstructs) oppositions, that is differences, but also troubles (or contaminates) deferral. Deferral, for Derrida, cannot be a pure linear temporal delay. The *not yet* or *to come* that is such a feature of Derrida's thinking does not simply refer to the future (*l'avenir*) but to the incalculable (*à venir*). Whereas the future of *l'avenir* refers to a possibility that already exists but is simply not yet (in temporal terms) realised (i.e. it is contaminated by what has already been), Derrida is referring to a potential future that is not thinkable until it *arrives*. It is to come. Yet the play of *différance* means that the incalculable is haunted by its opposite. The *not yet* (the absence of a presence) is already here (the presence of an absence) thus: the ‘*arrivant* is also a *revenant*’ (Attridge, 2001 cited in Munday 2011, p. 416). The incalculable future is yet to come and yet its absence is always and already felt by us. It haunts us. There is always, therefore, a double contradiction, or aporia, to what escapes rationalisation. The incalculable can never be determined as an instance of something. It is yet to arrive. Yet on the other hand the haunting of the *revenant* brings with it a dimension of persistence. As Lingis (2003) highlights, this contradiction of the unforeseen permeates the very style of Derrida's writing, which places the reader in an aporia between "not yet" and urgency. On the one hand Derrida’s writings (which are often openings of the texts of others) endlessly defer the closure of a stance through his introduction of exergues, or claims he should have begun otherwise, or his introduction of trains of thought that he then says there is not time to go into. On the other hand he constantly *urges* himself and his readers through the use of imperatives such as "we must" and "we should":
Derrida badgers, harasses the text. We don't feel a twinge of pity for the text, though we may feel harassed ourselves, accused of being cavalier, peremptory, high-handed or heavy-handed. (Lingis, 2003, p. 170).36

Derrida therefore invites his reader to *experience* the aporia of urgency and deferral in their reading of his work, and to experience how quasi-concepts, only ever *quasi* since Derrida views concepts as closed (Smith 2003), *move* through his work, gathering intensity as they take on new forms. This is beautifully exemplified in his discussion of justice, which intensifies the import of his quasi-concept of deconstruction. In elucidating deconstruction Derrida says:

> The movements of deconstruction do not destroy structures from the outside. They are not possible or effective, nor can they take accurate aim, except by inhabiting those structures, inhabiting them *in a certain way*, because one always inhabits, and all the more when one does not suspect it (1991a, p. 41).

Derrida’s quasi-concept of deconstruction allows him to approach the question of justice in a radical way and his rethinking of justice plays a crucial role in how I will elucidate the possibility of (a) (more) just education in this thesis. Derrida (1992) argues that the authority of the law, like all structures, is contaminated by its lack of foundation. The law is deconstructible whereas: 'Justice in itself, if such a thing exists, outside or beyond law, is not deconstructible. No more than deconstruction itself, if such a thing exists. Deconstruction is justice.' (1992, p. 14-15). For Derrida neither deconstruction nor justice are ends to be achieved, rather they are both a particular quality of ongoing sensitivity, a sensitivity to how opposition privileges one side over another:

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36 Lingis (2003) assumes the reader agrees with him, which overlooks the often fierce opposition to Derrida's challenge to the closure of language; in particular the criticisms levied at Derrida by Searle, who possibly feels more than a twinge of pity for the text. For a detailed examination of the Searle /Derrida exchange see Bearn (1995).
[I]t is a sensitivity to a sort of essential disproportion that must inscribe excess and inadequation in itself and that strives to denounce not only theoretical limits, but also concrete injustices, with the most palpable effects, in the good conscience that dogmatically stops before any inherited determination of justice (1992, p. 20).

Derrida asserts that the closure and the certainty privileged by rationalism denies this sensitivity and therefore allows injustices to continue and to proliferate. The whole project of deconstruction, by haunting all certainties with their opposite, is a practice of sensitivity that Derrida calls justice. Although justice is not a "thing" or end that can be defined its absence (injustice) is viscerally felt by us. We are therefore forced to attend to (in)justice, in the double - no triple - sense of attending: a vigilance that involves attending to something other (for Derrida the possibility of justice must be preserved); an attending to something other that implies waiting (justice is not yet); and a waiting that implies vigilance (justice is an ongoing practice of sensitivity). Herein lies a contradictory double imperative. The call of justice is urgent, it haunts us and we feel its urgency in our sensitivity to injustice. Yet if we stay only with the urgency of overcoming injustice we overlook justice altogether. In our insistence at resolution our sensitivity is lost. A just resolution is therefore always a possibility that is not yet. The aporia between urgency and impossibility is an in-between, a parenthesis, that shifts the impossible to the (im)possible; from the never to be to the not yet possible. Suspended between activity and passivity is a here and now where we might experience the possibility of justice, which is to experience the possibility of what is (yet) impossible. Derrida calls this 'an experience we are not able to experience' (Derrida 1992, p. 16) and as such it is an experience of self-othering that I will later explore in relation to the self-othering of kinaesthetic sensation.
The uninvited guest

At this point a tap on the shoulder indicates a stranger 'cuts in' to the dance, for in discussing Derrida it becomes necessary to say something of his near-contemporary Emmanuel Levinas. The influence of Levinas on Derrida is significant, but it is the ways in which différance marks a departure from Levinas that is specifically relevant here. For Levinas, the Western tradition's valorisation of rationality, knowledge, and freedom has disastrous totalitarian consequences. He observes that the privilege of cogito overlooks that the facticity of embodiment binds us to the world and exposes us to an a priori responsibility to others:

Incarnation is not a transcendental operation of a subject that is situated in the midst of a world it represents to itself; the sensible experience of the body is already and from the start incarnate. The sensible - maternity, vulnerability, apprehension - binds the node of incarnation into a plot larger than the apperception of self. In this plot I am bound to others before being tied to my body (1981, p. 76).

Levinas (1979, 1981) strips Cogito of its privilege by introducing a prior responsibility to the Other. The capitalisation of the O indicates two inter-related themes. One is the irreducible alterity of the other, their absolute otherness which makes them beyond the grasp of my knowledge. I cannot master or assimilate this otherness, it infinitely remains exterior to me. The second dimension of the capitalisation is that it denotes a responsibility for the other that is not dependent on their status, relationship to me, characteristics, the specific circumstances or on any principle of reciprocity. It is a responsibility that exceeds the rational order of contractual obligation or economic exchange so in this sense too the responsibility is infinite. My responsibility for the Other therefore cannot be ignored, fully discharged, or delegated to someone else. The ethics of responsibility thus take precedence over the mastery of knowledge. Levinas

37 Originally published in French in 1961 and 1974 respectively.
therefore emphasises that encountering the Other brings with it uncertainty and vulnerability that we experience on a visceral level. We feel exposed and feel the call of our responsibility without any recourse to a process of conscious judgement:

Sensibility is exposedness to the other. Not the passivity of inertia, a persistence in a state of rest or of movement, the capacity to undergo the cause that would bring it out of that state. Exposure as a sensibility is more passive still; it is like an inversion of the connatus of esse; a not finding any protection in any consistency or identity of a state. It is a having been offered without any holding back and not the generosity of offering oneself, which would be an act, and already presupposes the unlimited undergoing of the sensibility (1981, p. 75).

Levinasian ethics places our responsibility to the Other beyond rationalisation. Derrida (1978) describes this as 'the positive movement which takes itself beyond the disdain or disregard for the other, that is beyond the appreciation and possession, understanding and knowledge of the other' (1978, p. 114). Yet at the same time he accuses Levinas as presupposing the assumptions he claims to counter, for Levinas gives the other an originary status:

By making the origin of language, meaning and difference the relation to the infinitely other, Levinas is resigned to betraying his own intentions in his philosophical discourse. The latter is understood, and instructs, only by permitting the same and Being to circulate within it (1978, p. 189).

For Derrida, the movement of *différance* means that no priority of one thing over another is possible. Therefore, although Derrida preserves the exteriority of the other found in Levinas he also contaminates it. The Other is always contaminated by the same/self and *vice versa*. There is, therefore, an *already thereness* to the alterity and

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38 I recognise that in the above brief synopsis I conflate Levinas's early and later work and that there are distinctions between them that I have not engaged with here (in particular a shift of emphasis away from the 'face to face' encounter). My interest here is not in the development of Levinas's thought but rather in how Derrida uses *différance* to contaminate originary status. Derrida's 1978 critique was directed at Levinas's early work but Levinas maintains that subjectivity is formed in and through our subjection to the other throughout his career. The distinction between the early and later work of Levinas is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
vulnerability we experience when we encounter otherness. The movement of *différance* means that these forces of uncertainty are already at work. Yet Derrida preserves the exteriority of and responsibility for the other that Levinas proposes and he explores the reach of this responsibility through the notion of hospitality; picking up the distinction Levinas makes between the laws of hospitality, which depend on the sovereignty of the host and are therefore finite, and the Law of infinite or absolute hospitality. The former is merely an exercise of power since the host can offer or withhold hospitality depending on the identity of the stranger. Absolute hospitality, on the other hand, extends to the 'absolute unknown, anonymous other' (Derrida, in Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 2000, p. 25) and is offered without thought and with no expectation of reciprocity. Levinasian absolute hospitality already implies not only that I give place to the absolute other, allowing them to take place, but also that I am displaced, by my encounter with them; I am essentially a stranger in my own home. However, for Derrida the movement of *différance* has no place; it is a movement of the homeless that precedes any dwelling and it therefore radicalises hospitality still further, as is indicated in Dufourmantelle's commentary on Derrida's discussion of hospitality:

> Now hospitality can only be offered here and now, someplace. Hospitality gives as unthought, in its “night”, this difficult, ambivalent relation to place. As though the place in question in hospitality were a place belonging to neither host nor guest, but to the gesture by which one of them welcomes the other – even and above all if he is without a dwelling from which this dwelling could be conceived (Dufourmantelle, in Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 2000, p. 62).39

Whereas for Levinas absolute hospitality is infinite and therefore beyond possibility, for Derrida it is a possibility that is *not yet*. Therefore, on Derrida's reckoning, although

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39 The format of the book *Of hospitality* (2000) engages with what Dufourmantelle alludes to here. She and Derrida inhabit the same space as each page of the book is divided vertically with the right hand side containing text by Derrida (which is positioned as a response) and the left hand side containing Dufourmantelle's commentary, or invitation. The layout of the book creates a poetic ambiguity about who gestures to whom.
absolute hospitality is something whose achievement is beyond our imagination its possibility always and already haunts us. Dufourmantelle hints at both the stakes and the bodily dimension of this subtle shift when she describes the workings of Derrida's deconstruction of hospitality as 'this drilling movement that gets to the uncanny at the heart of the most familiar' (in Derrida & Dufourmantelle, 2000, p. 136).

Although the movement of *différance* distinguishes Derrida's approach from Levinas's Derrida nevertheless unsettles the primordiality of the Cartesian cogito through recourse to the transcendence of the other. In the Cartesian tradition the assertion of the self as "consciousness" erects a self that is not open to doubt because it is transcendent to the flux of experience and is therefore the source of experiences and doubts. Levinas subjects the self to uncertainty through the face to face encounter with the other. For Derrida, the "self" is always and already contaminated by "the other" (therefore contamination de-capitalises the Other). On Smith's (2003) analysis, appealing to the transcendence of the other/Other (*pace* Derrida and Levinas) is one of two available strategies for calling into question the privileged position of *cogito*. He identifies the alternative strategy as appealing to the immanent flux of experience (*pace* Deleuze). It is to this latter approach that I now turn.

**Deleuze and Guattari**

**A life without limits**

In the Cartesian tradition immanence refers to the sphere of the subject, in other words immanence is bounded by consciousness. Yet Deleuze and Guattari know no boundaries and therefore they conceptualise immanence as a plane. Deleuze (both in his own work and in that with Guattari) problematises the idea that experience is given
to a pre-existent subject and questions both the primordiality of the "I" and the separation of "I" from the world that such a conception of subjectivity implies. By conceptualising immanence as a plane Deleuze and Guattari allow for experience to precede the subject: 'We might say there just 'is' experience, without subjects or objects, inside or outside' (Colebrook, 2002, p. 74). All apparent foundations or certainties (like the subject) are no longer considered primordial and are seen to be merely effects of experience. The pre-personal plane of immanence allows Deleuze and Guattari to think otherwise than the cogito without invoking an absence of existence (pace Derrida), therefore in ontological terms, Deleuze envisions non-existence as a question rather than a negative, a ?being which interrogates the limits of existence: 'In this sense, it turns out that the infinitive, the esse, designates less a proposition than the interrogation to which the proposition is supposed to respond' (Deleuze, 1994, p. 77). This absence of a negative is crucial as for Deleuze what puts the limits of existence into question is difference, and difference is always an affirmation.

In Difference and repetition (1994, orig.1968) Deleuze makes a departure from his previous work, which had focussed on the work of others, to speak in his own name. He asserts that his entire body of work following this, including that with Guattari, is a continued engagement with the same problems (Deleuze, 2006). All of his work sets out to (re)think immanence as A life, the whole of life and therefore the very possibility of life, including the possibilities of life not yet and perhaps never to be realised. In Difference and repetition he approaches this by articulating the force of life as the force of difference. Deleuze sees difference as "pure" invention, as I shall elaborate below, and his insight that invention is an elaboration of difference underlies his whole approach to philosophy. He claims the "doing" of philosophy is the invention of concepts (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994) yet such concepts never function as the closure,
fixing or representation of a thought for as inventions they articulate an affirmation of difference and thus open our current thinking up to new directions.

For Deleuze (1994), affirming difference affirms the possibilities of life, because life is the possibility of producing differences: 'In its essence, difference is the object of affirmation or affirmation itself, in its essence, affirmation is itself difference.' (1994, p. 62-63). The affirmation of difference is therefore "pure" and not a function of interpretation and Deleuze (1994) claims that this allows us to live differently and think differently for it allows us to think and live otherwise than through the hierarchical restraints of difference "in relation to" identity, representation, analogy or resemblance. In Deleuze's words: 'To affirm is not to bear, but on the contrary, to discharge and to lighten' (Deleuze 1994, p. 65). With affirmation life flows rather than coagulates for conceiving of difference otherwise than "in relation to" means that affirmation is distinct from confirmation and therefore distinct from solidifying the status or identity of something. On the contrary, affirmation is the courage ‘to think all those differences that we fail to notice, recognise or conceptualise’ (Colebrook, 2002, p. 21), differences at the level of the imperceptible, which Deleuze calls singularities. Deleuze (1990, 1993) takes the notion of singularities from his reading of Leibniz. Singularities belong to a virtual domain; that is to say to a domain that is property-less and pre-personal; one that precedes the attribution of tendencies to subjects. Smith, in his introduction to Deleuze's Essays critical and clinical, offers the following example:

"Being a sinner " is an analytic predicate of a constituted individual or subject, but the infinitive "to sin" is a virtual singularity-event in the neighbourhood of which the monad "Adam" will be actualised. Such singularities constitute the genetic elements not only of an individual life, but also of the world in which they are actualised (Smith in Deleuze 1997, p. xxv).
Singularities are thus potentialities. Adam actualises the potential of sinning (and is actualised as a sinner). Although the potential of sinning registers as a distinct intensity and is therefore real, Adam cannot be identified as 'being a sinner' prior to the event of actualisation (sinning). In the virtual realm the constitution of "a sinner" is murky and undetermined. The Adam/sinner actualisation thus produces something new. Deleuze makes a crucial distinction between actualisation and realisation and between a potentiality and a possibility. The realisation of the possible adds nothing new to life because the possible is already fully formed; it has an identity that precedes its existence. It is worth noting here that Deleuze's concept of potential is in stark contrast to the usage of the term in the dominant educational discourse. In the latter case potential is attributed to individuals and thus can only ever be realised. Potential in the Deleuzian sense belongs to no one. It cannot be attributed, measured or predicted and can never be realised; for it is always transformed in its process of actualisation.

Since singularities are intensities that generate the composition of both individual and world they precede and escape self/world, subject/object, inner/outer, self/other divides. Deleuze and Guattari describe this slipperiness as 'molecular' fluidity in contrast to the hierarchical binaries and 'the attraction of like by like' that sediment 'molar' formations such as the Cartesian rational subject (Deleuze & Guattari 1987, p. 51). Deleuze/Deleuze and Guattari, conceptualise subjectivity as a consequence of molecular experience; that is to say of the flow of pre-personal intensities within and between bodies.40 "Bodies" (of living or non living things) are thus gatherings of swarming intensities that are attributed to nobody in particular; gatherings that Deleuze

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40 However, the molar and the molecular are not opposed (as this would be to collapse back into binary molar structures). Molecular experience propels the composition and de/recomposition of molar structures such as thoughts and ideas, identities, and societal structures, as I shall explore through the dynamic of de/re territorialisation in the following section.
and Guattari (1987) call machinic assemblages. "Machinic" at first appears an incongruous choice of language in the context of living things, but in fact Deleuze and Guattari use the term in a way that hints at how life can continually proliferate. They point out that mechanisms (or identified subjects) are confined to movement within a defined structure whereas machinic assemblages can effect new connections or disconnections in their encounters thus producing movements of transformation or 'becomings' that allow for new possibilities of life. Yet assemblages are not wholly without continuity, for as Deleuze and Guattari observe:

One side of a machinic assemblage faces the strata, which doubtless makes it a kind of organism, or signifying totality, or determination attributable to a subject; it also has a side facing a body without organs, which is continually dismantling the organism, causing asignifying particles or pure intensities to pass or circulate, and attributing to itself subjects that it leaves with nothing more than a name as a trace of an intensity (1987, p. 4, original emphasis).

With one side facing the strata assemblages assume a territory. Territorialisation attributes the intensities extracted by and circulating through the assemblage with the status of "properties", thus creating an illusion of essence and meaning which Deleuze and Guattari refer to as a privileging of content over expression. However, an assemblage (being machinic rather than mechanistic) escapes the confines of a territory by a movement of deterritorialisation. Deterritorialising forces, or 'line[s] of flight' (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 9) free possibilities whereas (re)territorialisation (re)appropriates them. Deterritorialisation undoes habits, preconceptions, dominant discourses or ways of living but since assemblages always have one side facing the strata (the phenomena of organisation and sedimentation, the accumulation of habit) deterritorialisation always occurs within a context of territorialisation and reterritorialisation. The dynamic of de/re/territorialisation is articulated and re-
articulated through many of Deleuze and Guattari's concepts, as I shall further explore below.

**Deterritorialisations**

As indicated in the above quotation, one of the ways in which Deleuze and Guattari articulate the stakes of deterritorialisation is by reactivating Artaud's (1947) concept of a Body without Organs (BwO). The Body without Organs has nothing to do with organs as such, rather it is the disavowal of subjectivity being a function of a central organising force. Without the prioritisation of a unifying force the organs are distributed on a BwO as pre-personal intensities: an eye, a stomach etc.: 'Thus the BwO is never yours or mine' (Deleuze & Guattari 1987, p. 182). To face the BwO, then, is to attempt the elimination of identity and therefore to deny aspects of bodily experience, like habits, in order that other aspects of bodily experience can be intensified. As Deleuze and Guattari (1987) point out, this means that the concept of the BwO is not so much a concept as a practice, or rather a set of practices. You have to practise letting go of the habits and attitudes that determine your identity and have to practise being alive to potential dimensions of experience that these dominant habits habitually suppress, thus actualising these virtual potentials. These two practices are distinct from each other yet they do not stand in a linear relationship of means and end. For although Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between the practice of making oneself a BwO and the intensities that come to circulate on it they see these two phases as intimately bound up in each other, with the intensities produced on a BwO already part of that body's production. The BwO is therefore continually producing itself.

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41 I nevertheless recognise that in challenging the priority of identity the BwO also challenges phallogocentrism.
The BwO that continually produces itself is not an empty body. On the contrary the BwO is full and alive, swarming with pre-personal desires:

The BwO is the field of immanence of desire, the plane of consistency specific to desire (with desire defined as a process of production without reference to an exterior agency, whether it be a lack that hollows it or a pleasure that fills it (1987, p. 170 - 171, original emphasis).

The BwO, therefore, is perhaps most usefully understood as a medium of passage, which Deleuze and Guattari describe as a plateau, that is to say: 'a continuous, self vibrating region of intensities whose development avoids any orientation towards a culmination point or external end' (Deleuze & Guattari 1987, p. 24). As a medium of passage the BwO has no properties as such and passes no judgements. It registers only changes in intensity: speed and slowness, movement and rest. Yet one never becomes a BwO (and therefore one never reaches a culmination point) because new habits will always accumulate. While the accumulation of some habits is to some extent essential to the continuance of an individual life the problem is that as habits accumulate they stratify the plateau and inscribe the identity of a subject. Unhindered stratification creates an environment which blocks experimentation, passes judgement and limits us to the world we are already in. Whereas plateaus have a vista that is radically open the strata of organisms, subjects and interpretations all function to limit our perspective and to exclude dimensions of experience. Making oneself a BwO is thus an ongoing set of deterritorialising practices because it involves dismantling all of these three processes of stratification:

Significance clings to the soul just as the organism clings to the body, and it is not easy to get rid of either. And how can we unhook

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42 Deleuze and Guattari draw on the anthropologist and cybernetician Gregory Bateson in their conceptualisation of "plateau"
43 The way in which these strata exclude dimensions of experience is explored in chapter 5
ourselves from the points of subjectification that secure us, nail us down to a dominant reality? Tearing the conscious away from the subject to make it a means of exploration, tearing the unconscious away from signification and interpretation to make it a veritable production: this is assuredly no more or less difficult than tearing the body away from the organism. Caution is the art common to all three (Deleuze & Guattari 1987, p. 177).

Deleuze and Guattari continually advise caution in their discussion of the BwO. All limits inhibit life and the limit of deterritorialisation - the BwO - is not exempt from this. Becoming a body completely without organ(s)isation) and letting go of all perceptual and interpretative capacities would leave only madness or death; an empty body instead of one brimming with intensities. Life continues in a context of reterritorialisation that limits life, therefore the fullness of the whole of life (A life) can only ever be glimpsed fleetingly.

Deleuze and Guattari (1987) also explore the dynamics of passage by comparing a tree to a rhizome. They argue that with Cogito ergo sum Descartes roots all knowledge in the subjective apperception of objective certainty. Thus rooted, safely under the surface, the "tree" of knowledge has a ground that is not open to question. Knowledge thus grows as an arborescent structure, with trunk, leaves and branches merely accretions to its universalising base; everything with its place within a predetermined overall organisation. Deleuze and Guattari deterritorialise the organising force of a universal ground by introducing the alternative of the rhizome. In horticultural terms a rhizome is a subterranean stem rather than a root. Functioning as a milieu for life to flow through rather than as a determined structure the rhizome has neither beginning nor end and it is always spilling out from the middle. It grows, but it develops as a living process in relationship to its environment and has no predetermined form. When a rhizome meets an arborescent structure its process of becoming is blocked for a while,
however the tree's roots block its movement only temporarily; for if ruptured or blocked a rhizome off-shoots, nourishing and nourished by its own mutation. Whereas an arborescent process materialises predetermined structures, what matters through a rhizome is the power to continue (Deleuze & Guattari 1987).

The forces of de/reterritorialisation, passage and organisation are further explored through the concepts of smooth and striated space. Territorialisation, by attributing properties, striates space. Striated space is closed and hierarchical, it confines movement to predetermined paths between predetermined points that have attributed characteristics. Smooth space, however, is a space that unformed forces pass through; materials passing through smooth space do not organise into a settled form. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) contrast the constraints of striated space with the open-endedness of smooth space by contrasting the game of chess to the game of "Go". In chess the pieces are hierarchically organised and follow restricted patterns of movement that are assigned to them by their status. The counters in a game of "Go", however, hold no identity and move freely and in unexpected ways. As Deleuze and Guattari put it: 'movement is not from one point to another but becomes perpetual, without aim or destination, without departure or arrival' (1987, p. 389). For Deleuze and Guattari, therefore, smooth space is the space of the nomad.44

Deleuze and Guattari (1987) allude to this nomadic movement by describing smooth space as a haptic perception, choosing the word haptic over the word tactile in order to suggest the possibility that all sense organs might perceive haptically. Haptic perception explores rather than identifies, perceiving intensities at the level of the un/canny rather than recognising predetermined forms. Smooth space is thus populated

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44 The nomad is discussed in some detail in chapter 6
by affects rather than properties. As indicated in the last chapter, affects are prepersonal sensations, which are distinct from the proprietal status of affections. Deleuze and Guattari underline the distinction by noting: 'Affect is not the passage from one lived state to another but man's nonhuman becoming' (1994, p. 173). Whereas a change of state suggests a change in the properties of a self-enclosed identity, the pre-personal dimension of affect allows sensation to flow between one (machinic) body and another. As the citation above alludes to, Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 1994) describe this flow of sensation between bodies as sensory becoming. "Becoming" is always in the middle, pulling in both directions at once, and being thus destinationless and originated by no body it is non-hierarchical and entirely distinct from imitating, sympathising with or representing another "body". Deleuze and Guattari therefore describe becoming as 'a moment of grace' (1994, p. 96). Pulling in both directions at once means that becoming is neither here nor there, it is always in an indeterminate zone: 'It always eludes the present, causing future and past, more and less, too much and not enough, to coincide in the simultaneity of a rebellious matter' (Deleuze, 1990, p. 3). The paradox of two contemporaneous directions is underlined by the fact that the French noun sens indicates both direction and sense. The two directions combine in a 'rebellious matter' because their cohabitation confounds what Deleuze calls '[g]ood sense' (1990, p. 3); for it confounds the rationalist ordering of things into subject and object, self and other, cause and effect etc. As I shall explore in chapter 5, this is why Deleuze encourages us to stick with sensing rather than to go about making sense. While good sense has a determinable direction, the paradox of affirming both senses at the same time is nonsense. Nonsense is therefore distinct from being without sense for it is, rather, a doubling and therefore an excess of sense. Nonsense thus escapes from sense rather than opposing it.
The shifting mutations of becoming resist molar sedimentation and affirm the molecular fluidity of the force of life. Becoming thus tends towards the imperceptible, towards passage, towards the BwO. Becoming turns away from the 'majority' and tends towards the 'minority'. For Deleuze and Guattari (1987) the distinction between majority and minority refers to relative status in relation to the dominant standard rather than to greater or lesser numbers. The deterritorialisations of becoming-woman, becoming-child and becoming-animal are becoming(s) minoritarian that shift away from the norm against which all others are based: the white, non-disabled, rational man. Deleuze and Guattari (1986, 1987) further elaborate the major / minor distinction in relation to language with a major language always being the constancy against which the minor one is measured. To deterritorialise the dominance of a discourse, then, you must become a foreigner in your own tongue. Minoritarian forces make language itself stammer, thus creating an excess (nonsense) that escapes the established order and produces new possibilities for thinking: 'AND...AND...AND...' (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 109).

**Skinner Releasing Technique**

**Sensation, somatics and sense**

As discussed above, Deleuze/Deleuze and Guattari conceptualise subjectivity as a consequence of virtual intensities flowing within and between bodies. These virtual potentials are experienced as a swarm of micro-perceptions that do not pre-organise into a recognisable form. In other words, they are sensations that do not make sense. They are an excess that has escaped the editing and fabricating processes of our perceptions. Deleuze (1990, 1993, 1994) and Deleuze and Guattari's (1994) elaboration
of the virtual as a fold between non-sense and creativity allows for a fresh approach to the re-articulation (both discursive and through practice) of somatics as called for by Ginot (2010). As explored in the last chapter, both through its discourses and through its practice somatics has largely paid attention to kinaesthetic sensation as a means of increasing the repertoire of micro-perceptions that can be perceptually recognised and made available to consciousness. Thus the practice and discourses of somatics have been concerned with making sense. However, an alternative approach to attending to kinaesthetic sensation would be to follow Deleuze's advice to resist our sense making capacities and stick with sensing. This involves not only watching and waiting in our attitude of attentiveness but also includes the dimension of being beholden to something unfamiliar and other, in this case the "other" of sensation. Sensing the obscure can of course be confusing and frustrating but being enraptured by sensation perhaps also allows intensities that escape our habitual edit to affect us. Being taken by surprise, what we experience is the un/canny clarity of awe.

In the following sections I introduce how Skinner Releasing Technique (SRT), the specific practice that has framed my own history of kinaesthetic exploration, kinaesthetically re-searches the no-mans land between creativity and the non-sense of sensation. Skinner's commitment to sensation has allowed her to develop a technique that expresses a non-sense that is unmediated by third person methodologies like biomechanics, physiology or neuroscience and has thus largely escaped the dominant discourses of legitimation that Ginot (2010) identifies as circulating through the somatics field. Yet, as can be seen from the discussion below, SRT is not a completely deterritorialised practice. Skinner adopts some of the strategies and principles common

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45 For a discussion of Ginot's (2010) argument see the previous chapter.
to the field and through rigours of pedagogic structure and teacher certification she territorialises processes of legitimation that are internal to the practice of the technique.

**Becoming (almost) transparent**

Skinner Releasing Technique was developed by Joan Skinner, an American dancer whose early career included dancing in the Martha Graham, Merce Cunningham and American Dance Theatre companies in the 1950's. Throughout her performing career Skinner supplemented her daily regime of class and rehearsal by exploring on her own the constituents of the dance techniques she was studying. Skinner was perplexed by the way in which the demands of dance technique were commonly presented as a series of instructions to pull and to tighten and she began exploring how she might experience dancing otherwise than as a process of restriction and control. In the middle of this period of performing and researching Skinner sustained a back injury while on a brutally demanding tour and sought Alexander Technique lessons to support her recovery. Her back injury never returned and her performing career continued unabated but she was struck how the multi-directional alignment she experienced through the Alexander Technique (counterbalancing rather than organising the body through a strong centre) resonated with what she was exploring in her own research. She began to integrate some of the Alexander Technique principles into her explorations, asking herself how it might be possible to perform the preliminary exercises of ballet technique (the *barre*) while cultivating the freedom of breath and freedom from tension she had experienced when tapping into the experience of multi-directional alignment. Although it was injury that introduced Skinner to Alexander Technique her own research was not

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46 These three companies all fall within the mainstream of contemporary dance.
therapeutically oriented; her concern was to experience dancing otherwise than in relation to the norms that dominated dance technique at the time and as her experiments continued she found that she discarded more and more of the content of a traditional dance class in order to focus more specifically on the kinaesthetic sensation of the alignment tendencies she was experiencing. When she joined the dance faculty of the University of Illinois in 1963 her concern extended to how her students might in some way encounter the tendencies that she was experiencing and go through a similar transformation themselves (Davis, 1980). Over the following 50 years she experimented with how to use movement studies, poetic imagery and hands on partnerwork to hint at these tendencies, developing a pedagogy that is at one and the same time both highly structured and radically open ended.

Skinner's images do not describe anatomical facts, indeed she did not refer to anatomy, physiology or biomechanics textbooks in the development of her work, drawing only on observations of her own felt experience. Her images are poetic and fanciful in nature and Skinner likens them to haikus as they are brief and 'hopefully send out some sort of resonance or reverberation' (Skinner, cited in Skura, 1990, p. 11). Students who are undertaking an introductory level of study work with two kinds of imagery: specific and totality imagery. Specific imagery is concerned with individual movement principles whereas totality imagery 'cultivates an overall state in which an integration of multidimensional awarenesses is realized' (Skinner, Davis, Davidson, Wheeler, & Metcalf, 1979, p. 3). An example of a specific image is that of clusters of marionette

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47 There is therefore an interesting parallel between Skinner's attitude towards her students and that of Foucault towards his readers. Foucault's aspirations for his readers, to go through the same transformation in reading that he went through in writing, are discussed earlier in this chapter. 48 Even when training new teachers of her pedagogy Skinner does not dissect the images to offer an anatomical explanation of 'how they work'. A scientific reduction is irrelevant (and was never part of Skinner's route to discovery), what is important is that the teacher embodies the image, not that she can give a scientific explanation for it.
strings attaching to either side of the skull, just above the ears, lifting and suspending the skull as the whole self hangs from them. This hints at an experience of suspension and might be introduced after students have worked in pairs on a tactile study in which they gently suspend their partner’s skull. Even at this basic level the image alludes, in a subtle and playful way, to a disavowal of the central organisation of consciousness as much as to the disavowal of a static posture organised around a fixed and "held" centre; for the skull strings not only accompany the dancer wherever and however they move but might move them in unexpected ways and as the dance closes the dancers are reminded that the skull strings might re-appear sometime when they least expect them. An example of a totality image is the following image relating to the breath, given after students have already worked with the image of the tissues and bones softening and immediately preceded by them having their breath drawn to the forefront of their awareness:

The movement of the breath
has an ebb and flow
very much like the sea -
sea of breath.
And perhaps the whole self
can melt into that sea of breath
for a moment
and float in it

Dance practitioner, scholar and SRT teacher Rebecca Skelton describes Skinner Releasing Technique as: 'a movement practice that seamlessly fuses technique with the creative act, a two in a one, a process of doubleness, neither only technique nor only spontaneous enquiry/creative exploration' (2002); yet the creativity Skelton refers to has nothing to do with choreographic innovation. Crucially Skinner does not invite her students to interpret these images but to experience them and Deleuze's account of the
actualisation of the virtual is a useful way of approaching the creativity that Skelton alludes to. The imagery, though devised by Skinner, hints at pre-personal tendencies that she has tapped into; for example: suspension, suppleness, buoyancy, economy, multi-dimensional alignment and reverberation. Although her own incarnation of these tendencies actualises them in her personal lived experience, the resultant imagery is an *extraction* from that experience that *expresses* the virtual tendency.\(^49\) Each student has responsibility for the creative process of actualising the virtual tendency in their own lived experience. The student therefore experiences their own, personalised version of the imagery given but might also spontaneously experience other images that seemingly arise of their own accord. These spontaneously created images often bear an un/canny resemblance to images within the SRT pedagogy that have not yet been introduced to the student.\(^50\) This creative dimension of SRT allows kinaesthetic exploration to go (before and) beyond the question of embodiment, that is the question of where "I" end and something else begins; a question of individual boundary. In an SRT session the uncertainty encountered is of a different nature as what the dancer kinaesthetically explores is the elaboration of difference from a virtual world of potential(s); in other words, the limit they explore is the limit of A life without limits.

The doubleness Skelton (2002) refers to in the paragraph above alludes to more than the at once technical and creative process of SRT as experienced by the student; for there is a similar doubleness at work in the role of the SRT teacher who is always poised between rigorous structure and radical openness. The pedagogy is tightly structured in that Skinner has ordered when each image should be introduced in relation to each other image and the precise wording of the totality images, as written by Skinner, is

\(^49\) The dynamics of extraction and expression are discussed in chapter 5
\(^50\) This observation comes from my reading of students' writings about their experiences.
adhered to by all certified SRT teachers. Yet the teacher's job is a creative one. The teaching of the image is itself a process of actualisation, a new instance of lived experience expressed by the teacher in the act of teaching. The teacher does not need to add to the images (through an act of interpretation) in order to be creative as the potential of another life is already there. The process of teaching and learning, whilst creative, is thus one of subtraction rather than addition and it is subtractive in a double sense; for Skinner prepares her dancers for subtracting potentials from the virtual through a process of letting go.

As with many other somatic techniques, the early stages of an SRT session might involve some lying down and letting go. As Skinner puts it while teaching of class 1 of her pedagogy 'Lying on the floor can be very useful for focusing on movement. Curiously, we don't have to worry about keeping our balance, and we can focus on other things' (Skinner, 2003, unpublished teaching notes). Lying down we might notice if there is any tension in the back of the neck, at the base of the skull, that we can practise letting go of. Then our attention might lightly shift to the shoulders, any holding or tension there that we can practise letting go? Our attention might then shift to the ribs, perhaps noticing some holding or lifting away from the floor somewhere. How about the back - upper back, middle back, lower back? Or maybe we find some hidden tension that has crept in to the arms or the legs? The hands? The feet? If you, the reader, give yourself this checklist you might notice that letting go does not really involve any "doing", it is rather a process of attending. Just by noticing the tension it might seem to unravel a little on its own. As with all of Skinner's kinaesthetic imagery, the image is already the sensation. Practitioners soon discover that it is possible to attend to the sensation of letting go anytime, anywhere without the formality of a gravity reduced horizontal state. This practice of attentive non-doing, common across
somatic techniques, highlights the in-between of activity and passivity that characterises any somatic practitioner's comportment. However, in later classes Skinner moves away from inviting the dancers to pay attention to actual, perceivable tensions in her checklists. Instead the checklists introduce images of tissues melting, or bones loosening, or interior spaces opening. In this way the "releasing" of Skinner Releasing Technique no longer just refers to the letting go of unnecessary muscular tension and habitual patterns of movement, it also alludes to the releasing of preconceptions and of the central organisation of conscious control; releasing involves letting go of many stratas of territory. Skinner's tactile partnerwork and immersive fanciful imagery exposes the dancer to radical uncertainty by exposing them to the ravages of affect, as her description of the dancers she works with as having 'a sense of being danced rather than performing the dance' (Skinner et al., 1979, p. 12) serves to bring into focus. The releasing pedagogy is a pedagogy of becoming, with the dancers turning away from the security of the molar towards the uncertainty of molecular fluidity; as noted in chapter 1 the dancers are 'almost in a state of transparency' (Skinner & Dempster 1996, p. 26).

Becoming 'almost' transparent is always only an "almost" making the process and ourselves perpetually incomplete. That kinaesthetic experience can only ever offer up an almost, a glimpse or a flicker of a life without limits is critical as it is only by foregrounding incompleteness that the danger of one hegemony simply replacing another, or merely being a repetition of the same, is avoided. As I explored in the last chapter, the dominant discourses of somatics come perilously close to perpetuating a norm of holism, health and well-being. However, somatic exploration approached as an affective encounter that seeks no perfection and no justification beyond itself cannily subverts this hegemony by elaborating difference.
If I can’t dance I don’t want to be part of your revolution

Christie McDonald touches on the tyranny of hegemonic discourses by opening her conversation with Derrida with a citation from 19th century feminist Emma Goldman: 'If I can't dance I don't want to be part of your revolution' (cited in Derrida and McDonald 1991, p. 441). The revolution at stake here is (a) (more) just education; in the double sense of a process uncoupled from domination by its ends ([a] just education) and a process that does not unjustly stratify its participants (a [more] just education). The question for this thesis therefore is: how to invite an educational experience that keeps justice dancing and that is simultaneously (a) just experience that keeps education alive? In this chapter I have drawn on the practice of SRT and the work of Derrida and Deleuze/Deleuze and Guattari to introduce an alternative to the rationalist conception of subjectivity and the accompanying quest for certainty that dominate contemporary education. In the chapters that follow I explore how unsettling the privilege and self-enclosure of autonomous rationality and embracing the possibilities opened up by the uncertainties of life makes room for what I have called (a) (more) just education.

From Derrida (1992) I take the idea that boundaries are blind to justice. My contention is that contemporary educational discourses construct boundaries between self and other; self and world and self and work which constrain the possibility of (a) (more) just education. To keep justice dancing my task is to enliven an awareness of the forgotten dimensions of experience that these boundaries, and the concomitant emphasis on evidence of achievement, cause to be overlooked. In chapter 1 I identified three ways in which the practice of attending to kinaesthetic sensation unsettles the assumptions that underpin the prevailing state of affairs and I described these as three interrelated strands of provocation. Having now introduced the concepts/quasi concepts of Derrida
and Deleuze/Deleuze and Guattari I return to these provocations; as re-articulating them with reference to the quasi concepts and concepts just introduced brings into clearer view the way in which they provoke a sensitivity to justice. The first provocation challenges pedagogical practices of legitimation and categorisation. It arises from the way in which first person kinaesthetic experience escapes third person interpretations and generalisations. It is unique and non transferable. It cannot be appropriated by another or generalised from. The work of Derrida and Deleuze and the account of the actualisation of Skinner's imagery refine this provocation by underlining that there are (different) ways of conceptualising subjectivity which preserve the unknowability and uniqueness of another's lived experience without collapsing into a first person/third person dichotomy. In the next chapter, chapter 4, I look more closely at Derrida's discussion of self/other relationships and explore its import for the furtherance (a) (more) just education and in doing so elaborate on this refinement of the first provocation. The second provocation is generated by the practice of attentive non-doing, common to all somatic practices. The discussion of SRT in this chapter adds another dimension to this non-doing as her use of 'fanciful' imagery takes the principle beyond that of mere physical inactivity and into the realm of affect. Attentive non-doing is active and passive at the same time and involves waiting, watching and being beholden to someone/thing other (in the case of SRT the image/sensation) all of which permeate Derrida's conceptualisation of justice. In the next chapter I draw on Derrida's discussion of justice to re-conceptualise pedagogical expectations and dynamics. The third provocation gets its force from the transpersonal realm of becoming almost transparent, as practiced in the context of SRT. Deleuze/Deleuze and Guattari's

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51 This does not mean you cannot attend to kinaesthetic sensation while moving (albeit that lying down is a good place to practise) as dancers, for instance, focus on kinaesthetic sensation whilst in the midst of complex movements and in the performance of elaborate spatial patterns It only takes a barefoot walk on a beach to demonstrate the possibility of action and sensation at the same time. The point is not the presence or absence of movement but the dissociation of responsibility from initiation.
elaboration of what becoming puts at stake and their account of the dynamics of
de/reterritorialisation gives this provocation new clarity and force. This lived
experience of the indeterminacy of subjectivity eschews the ideal of autonomy and its
contemporary incarnation as hyper-individualism and eschews the ideal of progress;
and I explore this in some detail in chapters 5 and 6. I must emphasise that the
provocations of non-generalisation, hesitation and indeterminacy are not exclusive to
kinaesthetic experience. The chapters that follow demonstrate that they are already
active in certain texts with a philosophical inflection within educational theory; texts
that invite a thinking otherwise than the dominant discourse. However, in this thesis I
make a unique contribution for I explore whether a kinaesthetic elaboration of what is
at stake in each provocation can add - or perhaps subtract - anything new in the
furtherance (a) (more) just education.
Chapter 4 - Forgotten Others

Introduction

In chapter 2 I argued that educational theory and practice is dominated by dualist discourses and I explored how the certainty sought by these discourses served to perpetuate existent hierarchies. By recognising the tenacity of dualism I hope to loosen its grip a little so that what might otherwise be overlooked can be brought into awareness; and to explore whether this affords the possibility of (a) (more) just education. Such an education is more just in that it circumvents the diagnostic and instrumental tendencies that arise from dualist structures and at the same time by circumventing instrumentalism it is just education, affirmed for itself and not oriented to extrinsic purposes. I have proposed that kinaesthetic experience provokes this re-thinking through three inter-related strands: the irreducibility of kinaesthetic experience to third person interpretation; the practice of attentive non-doing; and the indeterminacy of subjectivity experienced in becoming (almost) transparent. Together they provoke a re-thinking of the dichotomies of self and other, self and world and self and work. In this chapter I explore the relationship between self and other.

I begin by exploring Gert Biesta's (2006, 2009a, 2010b) response to the hyper-individualised, hyper-instrumental learning society that I examined in chapter 2. Biesta's primary concern is the second dimension of just education I have identified: the question of what is specifically educational about education as distinct from how educational interventions can be oriented to serve extrinsic purposes. However, the conception of education that Biesta advances is one that positions the subjectivity of individual students as unique and impossible to foresee and thus Biesta is also concerned to envisage an education that is more just, in that it refuses the dynamic of
diagnosis and categorisation discussed in chapter 2. Biesta articulates a specifically educational purpose, which he calls subjectification, in terms that prioritise the relations between teachers and students. Biesta, therefore, is attempting to untether subjectification from instrumentality through a particular approach to the self/other relationship. His elaboration of this relationship positions the educator as in the service of, and vigilantly waiting for, the student's unique subjective response. Biesta conceives of the student's first person perspective as emergent, unique and beyond the teacher's current understanding; and therefore in these regards his conceptualisation shares much with the strands of kinaesthetic provocation I have identified. His emphasis on attending to the emergence of subjectivity invites thinking otherwise than the dominant discourses of diagnosis and categorisation and significantly shifts how the project of education and the responsibility of educators is conceptualised. However, as I will go on to argue with the help of Munday (2011), by closing down "who is responsible for what" Biesta narrows what counts as education and who can count as being educated, therefore frustrating the furtherance of a more just education. Munday's critique of Biesta draws on Derrida to observe how the boundaries of language deconstruct to include a forgotten other: namely the possibility of new meanings already in force. I further develop the points Munday raises by witnessing the forgotten forces that kinaesthetic awareness bring into awareness, forces that serve to deconstruct the boundaries of self/other relationships and to foreground a pedagogical responsibility towards (a) (more) just education.
Re-finding educational purpose

In chapter 2 I explored how Biesta (2006, 2009a, 2010b) problematises the 'learnerfication' (2009a, p. 38) of education on two counts. Firstly, Biesta identifies that the language of learning reduces the teacher/student relationship to one of exchange. Secondly he claims that the hyper-individualism of the discourse leaves no room for an overarching, publicly agreed purpose for education and that this makes education an institution that is undemocratic. Biesta therefore sets himself the task of restoring a discourse of education that is distinct from that of learning specifically because education demands a discourse oriented by purpose. He claims a fundamental difference between learning and education, namely: learning can be undertaken by a learner on their own whereas, in his view, education is always the function of a relationship between two people. Someone always educates someone else and: 'If there is an educator they have purpose and direction' (Biesta, 2009a, p. 39).

Biesta (2009a, 2010b) usefully highlights that educational practices can have different purposes and he conceptualises these by first identifying what the intervention of education functions to bring about. Biesta identifies three things that might happen as a result of education: qualification (the skill to do something); socialisation (induction into the norms of a society) and subjectification (the emergence of a unique perspective). While Biesta recognises that in practice these effects overlap in complex ways he argues that the distinction between these functions becomes crucial if we are to articulate the rationale behind any particular pedagogical interaction and if we are to articulate what is distinctively educational about education. Biesta claims that

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52 Biesta has pursued this task through an extensive body of publications. For ease of reading the texts cited to support my distillation of his thinking are therefore exemplary and not exhaustive.

53 Biesta specifically locates this particular discussion in the context of schooling though the purposes identified are not restricted to this context.
qualification and socialisation are instrumental purposes because they are geared to inserting students into an existing social order. 'Subjectification', on the other hand, is 'about ways of being that hint at independence from such orders; ways of being in which the individual is not simply a ‘specimen’ of a more encompassing order’ (2009a, p. 40).

Biesta is careful to distinguish subjectification from the realisation of autonomous, rational subjects that orients both the liberal and critical traditions. He accepts that postmodern critiques of Enlightenment ideals position rational autonomy as merely another form of socialisation and he attempts to retrieve a discrete function for subjectification by untethering it from the rationalist norm and repositioning it as connected to the formulation of unique responses. His conception of subjectification owes much to Arendt from whom he takes the idea of a 'newcomer' (Biesta, 2009a, p. 40) bringing something new into the world. Arendt claims that the uprooting of foundational authority left educators directionless and her solution is characterised by O'Byrne (2005) as giving educators a new authority, one no longer based on their command of knowledge but on their responsibility. For Arendt responsibility springs from the principle of natality; that is to say from the fact that: 'The new beginning inherent in our birth can make itself felt in the world only because the newcomer possesses the capacity for beginning something anew, that is of acting' (Arendt, 1977, p. 9). In *The crisis in education* (2006, orig. 1954) Arendt argues that children are born into a (human) world of existent norms and that both children and the world need to be conserved. By conserving the world the teacher makes no claim that existent norms, knowledge claims or expectations create the world as it must or should be; on the contrary she conserves the world as unfinished and open to change. The teacher thus passes on to the next generation the responsibility for what the world becomes; that is to
say how norms, knowledge claims or expectations are to be interpreted, evolved or abandoned. By conserving the newcomer the teacher protects the student from the normative constraints of both the family and the public realm therefore creating a quasi-public space that enables 'what we generally call the free development of characteristic qualities and talents' and she envisages these characteristics as 'the uniqueness that distinguishes every human being from every other' (Arendt 2006, p. 185). For Arendt conservation is not the purpose of education, rather it is the necessary framework for education to be able to realise its purpose: that of bringing forth subjectivities free to make the world anew. These new beginnings are revealed in unforeseen perspectives and points of view or perhaps by unimagined ways of living. Yet Arendt is careful not to cast new beginnings as a free for all. What constrains our new beginnings is that they are brought into a world of others who may or may not take them up. We cannot control how our words or actions are responded to for to do so deprives others of their opportunity to act. For Arendt, therefore, we are subject to how others take up our beginnings.

Biesta (2010b) follows Arendt in arguing that what makes education educational (rather than instrumental to some other purpose) is how new beginnings are initiated and taken up; however he distances himself from Arendt's casting of uniqueness as an inherent characteristic. Instead Biesta (2006, 2008a, 2008b, 2010b) takes from Levinas (1981) the notion that uniqueness is a function of being irreplaceable. Irreplaceability denotes the necessity that someone speaks or acts in their capacity as an individual and not as a representative of a group or as an instance of a category. By acting on our own initiative we take responsibility. Therefore, as Biesta (2008a) explains, responsibility is

54 see chapter 3 for a discussion of the self/other relationship in Levinas
not an *attribute* of a pre-existing subjectivity but is, rather, the condition out of which subjectivity is made possible. Subjectivity is thus *brought forth* by an intervention, or call, from outside the subject that urges the subject to respond. As Biesta puts it: 'Levinas tries to respond to the problems of humanism by not asking what the subject is, but by asking how subjectivity is possible, how subjectivity exists' (2008a, p. 204). In practical terms Biesta describes a dynamic of teaching in which students are expected to make their own minds up about what is offered to them; they are asked 'where do you stand' (2008a: 208) and are invited to 'take a position' (Osberg & Biesta, 2007, p. 48).

Biesta's account of subjectification distances itself from sovereign rationality by emphasising both action over essence and sensibility before reason. Moreover, his structuring of subjectivity through response supports his claim that education is always relational. The presencing of the student's unique subjectivity is reliant on the teacher calling it forth and hence Biesta describes the dynamics of subjectification as 'interruption' (2010b, p. 91; 2009c, p. 705; 2006, p. 150; 2003, p. 63). To some extent the Levinasian notion of interruption designates an external intervention that functions to rupture the self-containment of our inner world. Responsibility calls us forth as subject and Biesta repeatedly talks of subjectification as a 'coming into presence' (2010a, p. 47; 2009b, p. 391; 2006, p. 42; Osberg & Biesta 2007, p. 48). Yet for Biesta the dynamics of interruption also refer to a rupture in the way things are; in existing relations between people and states of affairs; an interruption to the rational order of things and in this sense Biesta is asserting a conception of education that seeks to be more 'just' in the sense of less oppressive.55 Since subjectivity is structured by response the teacher cannot predetermine what (or rather, who) will emerge from the student's

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55 The dimension of interrupting an existing state of affairs and social order is also emphasised in Biesta's work drawing on Rancière. See, for example, Biesta (2010a) Bingham and Biesta (2010).
taking up of her responsibility and Biesta (2001, 2009b, Osberg & Biesta 2007) draws on Derrida and on complexity theory (Osberg & Biesta 2007) to fortify the point that the emergent subjectivity cannot be pre-determined. This openness distinguishes subjectification from socialisation and emphasises that as well as interrupting the self-containment of the student the teacher interrupts their own "knowing" status and positions themselves as subject to the student's response. (Säfström 2003). Biesta describes the teacher's attitude of vigilant waiting as 'preparing for the incalculable' (2001, p. 32) and makes a distinction between the being prepared of education and the 'neglect' (2001, p. 51) of doing nothing at all. What makes the teacher prepared, and therefore what counts as education, is that the teacher has purpose. Her purpose is that the student responds.

Biesta is clear that the teacher in no way produces the subjectivity of the students (indeed that would be socialisation); yet there is, nevertheless, a never to be relinquished faith that the event of education, that is to say subjectification, is possible. This amounts to faith that the newcomer will bring something; that they will make their own meanings of what is offered and that this perspective will be disclosed through the formulation of a response. However, the infusion of faith with purpose shifts the comportment of the teacher from a posture of grace to a posture of expectation. This is a very subtle shift and I will elaborate it from a kinaesthetic perspective so that it becomes discernible. Perhaps you the reader, like I the writer, have been sitting for some considerable time. If you were to come to standing and have no other intention than just to be there for a moment you might notice that you have not arrived in a stationary position but are swaying slightly, almost imperceptibly, perhaps forward and
back, or from foot to foot or maybe in a circular motion.\textsuperscript{56} It may be that in this swaying motion your weight oscillates between the ball of the foot and the heel. As the weight shifts into the ball of the foot we are already poised for action, we are initiating something, but as we suspend our intention to move into what happens next the weight shifts back into the heel and we find ourselves in a posture of just being; of grace. If you slightly exaggerate the sway back and forth, or even just tune into it, you might notice that these shifts of weight affect your visual focus. I find that when the weight shifts forward what I see ahead of me tends to seem drawn towards me and be more clearly defined while the tiny shift back into the heels tends to distance what lies straight before me and bring my peripheral vision more strongly into play. Poised for action I am already oriented in a direction; forward; whereas grace is a multi-directional suspension of just being.

The response of Biesta's student is not pre-determined; it is incalculable; but for education to be said to have happened the student must respond. Not only must there be a response; there must be a recognisable display of response as subjectivity is shaped by how our responses are taken up by others. Only if there is a displayed response can the teacher validate that their purpose has been fulfilled. Moreover responses must be identifiable as belonging to someone, as for Biesta it is in acting as an individual and not as an instance of a category that we realise our freedom.\textsuperscript{57} However, the co-implication of individual responsibility, action and display leaves freedom grounded in active/passive, self/other private/public and even to a certain extent mind/body divides and leaves Biesta's theory of education reliant on a performance that is tinged with

\textsuperscript{56} This is a subtly different sensation from that of standing still as discussed in chapter 1. The chapter 1 discussion was concerned with the non-stillness of standing apparently still. Here I am interested in the specific micro movements that arise after coming to standing when we then do not move through space.

\textsuperscript{57} See also Biesta 2010a for a discussion of subjectification as an enactment of freedom in which Biesta draws on Rancière.
heroism. Teachers are those 'who have the courage to educate' (Biesta, 2001, p. 34) and who save the day by making possible the freedom of a unique subjectivity. In turn the free(d) subject stands heroically erect and without doubt as exemplified in Biesta's language of 'where do you stand' (2008a, p. 208) and 'take a position' (Osberg & Biesta, 2007, p. 48). There is also heroism in the scale of the ambitions that Biesta attaches to the project of education: freedom, democracy, purpose, responsibility and uniqueness. Finally, Biesta's relentless pursuit of these aims through an extraordinarily vast array of publications reinforces the hint of heroics. Yet Biesta's heroic educator is cloaked in humility; as for Biesta the teacher must pave the way for the emergent subject by putting aside their expertise and adopting a 'pedagogy with empty hands' (Biesta 2008a, p. 198).

Biesta's challenge to the 'age of measurement' (2010b, p. title page) draws on all three strands of provocation I have identified: the student’s experience and response is beyond the teacher's determination; the role of the teacher shifts from being the one "who knows" to being the one who attends in the triple sense of waiting, being vigilant and being in the service of another; and subjectivity is conceptualised as non sovereign and emergent. Yet his emphasis on purpose introduces a rigidity of roles and an exclusively forward (in the sense both of future and outward) orientation to the structuring of subjectivity that shifts the bearing of teacher and student from one of attentiveness to one of intention. This tiny shift narrows the focus and decreases sensitivity therefore risking the exclusion of some potential new perspectives, courses of action or ways of life from being included in the awareness of student and/or the teacher and therefore frustrating the possibility of a more just education.
No more heroes

Munday (2011) explicitly questions the rigidity of the roles that Biesta attributes to teachers and students and his questioning brings the demands of justice to the fore. Munday raises his questions in a discussion of Biesta's (2009b) reading of Derrida in which he picks up on how Biesta (2009b) positions subjectification as a function of communication failure. For Biesta (2009b), communication between the teacher and the student fails because the student uniquely interprets what is said to them and he therefore casts the student's act of interpretation as a simultaneous deconstruction of the teacher's intended meaning and construction of a new meaning. Biesta draws on Derrida in describing the student's interpretation as arriving outwith the bounds of the teacher's intention (arrivant). For Munday (2011), however, this personalisation of arrivant overlooks that the play of language is in language itself. As discussed in chapter 3, the movement of différance contaminates words with what they are not and therefore the different intentions of students and teachers cannot be claimed to be exclusively responsible for the creation of new meanings; the possibility of new meanings emerging is always and already in play. Munday points out that since 'words are not at one with themselves' (2011, p. 414) alternative interpretations can also emerge from solitary activities like writing and therefore failures of communication are merely secondary to the dynamics of arrivant: 'It is therefore not the act of interpretation that issues in the arrivant, but the iterability of language that splits the subject, just as it splits the constative.' (Munday 2011, p. 415). Munday goes on to argue that Biesta reinforces his (Biesta's) personalisation of what gives rise to the incalculable by translating Derrida's arrivant as "newcomer", thus firmly placing the responsibility for new beginnings on new beginners. For Munday this ignores that the 'arrivant is also a revenant' (Attridge 2001, cited in Munday 2011, p. 416) in that our
thoughts already carry traces whose origin we can never know. The personalising effect of Biesta's translation is deliberate and Biesta explicitly refers to it (2009b, p. 400) and it is arguably necessary and inevitable in the context of his overarching project of purpose; yet Munday's point remains significant. Munday (2011) describes the revenant as a ghostly presence, a dark side or shadow that is always and already at work in the mutability of meaning and he therefore counters the holism of bringing to light in Biesta's account of subjectification.

Biesta restricts the relational dynamic of education to self/other relations between teachers and students and as Munday points out this excludes the subjectifying effect of solitary activities counting as education. I contend that it also defines education in a way that excludes those who do not or cannot display their response, or whose responses go unrecognised. Like Munday I see the limitations of Biesta's theory as arising from ignoring the revenant but whereas Munday is specifically discussing the question of language and meaning I am interested in how the revenant brings into awareness the forgotten "others" who remain inevitably overlooked by the dynamics of subjectification. Subjectification casts the self and the other as hopelessly separate entities who must validate each other's offerings through displaying recognisable acts of response. Munday's emphasis on the revenant contaminates the enclosure of self and other and goes to the heart of what has come to be called deconstruction. It serves as a reminder that the (de)construction of words and meaning is not a method or a stratagem but is, in Derrida's words, 'a sensitivity' (1992, p. 20); a sensitivity towards what we might otherwise overlook; a sensitivity to the hierarchies that inevitably lurk in any binary opposition. This means not only sensitivity to possible alternatives to the existent rational order of things but also sensitivity to all the dimensions (past as well as

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58 see also the discussion of Derrida and deconstruction in chapter 3
future) which reverberate in the here and now of "our" context. Biesta orients teachers and students face to face and with their attention exclusively forward facing they lose touch with how unseen surfaces and shadowy interiors play their part in the shaping of experience. Munday draws on Derrida to assert that deconstruction is already at work within language, rather than being an action or method applied by individuals to language. The play of the world contaminates the closure of language and allows words to overflow their meaning. Derrida attends to how deconstruction is at work within texts and how they therefore already offer up mutable meanings. By doing so he exposes that what is given is not already closed. In the next section I examine how the enclosure of self/other boundaries are likewise contaminated and overflowing and in doing so witness the deconstruction of the first strand of kinaesthetic provocation: the irreducibility of kinaesthetic experience to third party interpretation. While this provocation usefully excludes our first-person experience of sensation from generalisation it appears to do so by prioritising an un-crossable boundary between self and others and therefore creates a context of seclusion and exclusion. However, Derrida's discussion of selftaste transgresses this inhospitable confinement to afford an alternative approach to the un-transferability of lived experience, one that invites an increased sensitivity to justice.

**Selftaste**

Derrida asks:

What is it to feel oneself [se sentir]? To feel oneself, to sense oneself in the sense in which one lets oneself be affected also by a feeling or sensation? One cannot imagine this affect without the figure of some contact with oneself, without an auto-affection of touching and more precisely, without the intimate tactile sensitivity that is enigmatically called taste (2005a, p. 690, original emphasis).
Selftaste just is. It cannot be commanded, externalised or generalised from. My selftaste is unique to me, can only be experienced by me and thus separates me from any other. No one else has access to it. Here we have the strand of provocation referred to in the introduction of this chapter as: the irreducibility of kinaesthetic experience to third party interpretation. However, the force of this provocation lies in how it undoes itself for although selftaste is irreducibly "mine" it is something I can neither intend nor capture. As discussed in chapter 3, this provocation stems from Thomas Hanna's definition of somatics, which underlines the distinction between first and third person perspectives, but what Hanna overlooks is that between the first and third person there lies the second person "we". In what follows I will explore Derrida's account of how the containment of first person experience is both contaminated and overflows, thus exposing a dimension of intersubjectivity (of second person perspective) that precedes and persists through the limits of languaged communication.

Derrida talks of taste being enigmatic and it is an enigma not just to the outsider; for our experience of our own sensation of tasting has its own mystery. Tasting is not a deliberate action although we are clearly participants in the tasting. It happens without our direction yet we probably taste and consequently enjoy a meal more when we attend to the sensation. To really taste is to shift from directing to noticing. There is a sense of tentative exploration to the notion of selftaste that brings to the fore that "my" feelings and sensations are obscure, enigmatic and happening to me. By foregrounding the passive dimension of taste Derrida emphasises that there is no "me" in command of my taste. Self and sensation are identifiable only in the context of the other. Derrida's practice of deconstruction exposes the impossibility of a self-contained "thing". That
which we name as a thing can only be understood in the context of what it is not, that is to say in the context of relationships. Such is the play of the world.

Glendinning (1998) usefully explores the movement between self and sensation and although he is discussing situations of trauma his discussion nevertheless illustrates how the Cartesian mind/body hierarchy deconstructs in a world of no things. Glendinning's starting point, following Wittgenstein, is that most of the time we do not go through a process of recognising our own sensations. His conception of sensation can be compared to a background of white noise with the volume so low that any particular sound is almost indiscernible (c.f. Skelton, 2003). To imagine circumstances in which sensation can be identified Glendinning turns to when our body takes us by surprise; for example through pain. On Glendinning's (1998) account, when I see someone else in pain I have to consciously assign both the identity of "pain" and the identity of the sufferer yet when I experience pain myself I feel the specificity of my pain without any need for conscious reasoning. From Derrida Glendinning takes the idea that iterability makes the ipseity of my pain paradoxical. To explain what Glendinning is getting at here I draw on Bearn's (1995) exploration of how, for Derrida, iterability functions as both 'broaching and breaching' (1995, p. 5) the possibility of identification.

Iterability "broaches" the possibility of identifying my pain because it is the repeatable nature of pain as a sensation that makes the sensation I am experiencing identifiable as pain. "Pain" has an iterable trait. However, this repeatability is itself "breached" by the
differentiation of my particular pain as distinct from other possible pains. It is this doubleness of broaching and breaching that allows Glendinning (1998) to argue that the iterable trait of pain constitutes a dimension of my pain that can be separated from me. Herein lies the paradox: on the one hand there can be no this pain separable from my expression of it but on the other hand my pain is only identifiable as pain because of the trace of other pains. The notion of trace that Glendinning takes from Derrida is specific and spectral as it denotes an absence that is not solely a function of my prior experience of pain. Glendinning (1998) argues, following Derrida, that since the trace opens up a dimension of sensation that is detachable from the one who is doing the sensing then the latter's claim of identity (my claim to this pain) is deferred. There is no "mine" before the "we" of my pain and I. Neither this pain nor "I" is a self-contained "thing."

In summary, Glendinning (1998) is making a similar point with regard to sensation as that which Munday (2011) makes with regard to language; namely that iteration 'splits the subject' (Munday, 2011, p. 415). Self and sensation are always in relation to each other.

Yet what of the background noise of sensation that just is, with no rupture of surprise from which to differentiate a self or a feeling? Since attending to kinaesthetic sensation tunes in to un-traumatised sensorial experience it effectively transforms the background white noise of sensation into fine-tuned reception (Skelton, 2003). When tuning in one finds that un-traumatised lived experience is already a differentiating feeling. In the text of his lecture Justices (2005a) Derrida similarly tunes in to how sensation is differentiation already at work without need of a trauma; although he tunes in through witnessing a linguistic, rather than a kinaesthetic, deconstruction of selftaste.
Derrida's account of selftaste draws on Miller's (1963) reading of the poetry of Gerald Manley Hopkins, the late 19th century Jesuit priest. Derrida's opening of Hopkins's text underlines that communication, or its failure, is a secondary issue to intersubjectivity and is not its ground. This is key to my argument that individual student responses do not ground the possibility of education. Derrida's discussion of Hopkins's relationship to God also exemplifies the duality of absence and presence that underwrites Derrida's relationship to justice. Justice is an other perpetually longed for, impossible to pin down but yet possible to taste.

Derrida takes from Hopkins the notion of an *inscape*, an inner landscape that is exclusive to each of us. He then uses, but at the same time usurps, Hopkins's philosophy of *via negativa* to contaminate the seclusion of this inner world. Hopkins is discussing the impossibility of describing God because God is not containable as a "thing", however the impossibility of containment that Derrida observes need not be confined to theology and is at work in all self/other relationships. In prioritising relationship over isolation Derrida opens the possibility of a radically open sensitivity to that which (or those whom) we might otherwise overlook. For Hopkins our inscape is an extraction from the scape of God. It is given by the grace of God and in being unique to each one of us it constitutes that which is unique about us. However, for Hopkins my inscape isolates me for since only I can experience it I cannot articulate it in terms that make it accessible to another. On this reckoning, since nobody can know my selftaste and I can know no other's, there arises a stalemate of ignorance born out of non-communication. In the same way the uniqueness of God imposes upon him [*sic*] an impenetrable solitude that makes it impossible to know God or adequately speak

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61 *Via negativa* is a theological approach that attempts to understand God only by saying what God is not. This negative strategy is necessary because it is impossible to say what God is. He cannot be contained in language as a describable entity because he permeates everything.
about him. God is *necessarily* isolated and not accessible to us. We can only understand him against what he is not (i.e. something we can perceive and identify, something that is present to us). Hopkins laments that God's isolation makes it impossible for God to respond to his (Hopkins's) prayers yet he has faith in (or rather, in spite of) the absence of God's response. However, the play of *différance* turns Hopkins's faith around from being faith in a presence that is absent (God exists but is not available to Hopkins) to being faith in an absence (the trace) that is always and already at work (we all already contain the trace of God). Following the same argument that Glendinning uses with regard to pain it follows that: If the trace is an absence, always and already at work without ever having been concretised, there can be no *prior* God from whose hand "it" is given. With no "He" before "we" the issue of the impossibility of (God's) communication or recognition or response is irrelevant. If God is not prior to the movement of the trace then the grace given scape is from nowhere and given to nobody in particular. This makes grace a giving without origin or destination and allows the absolute hospitality of the homeless to become thinkable; a gift that "just is" with a lightness of touch that escapes the economy of exchange; a relationship that is not shaped by a hierarchical divide. In Caputo's words: 'This lack of origin or destination is the an-economy or a-logic of the gift, a certain drift - as opposed to the heaving and sighing of creation for God' (1997, p. 58).

What Roberts aptly describes as '[t]he anarchy of grace' (1996, p. 506) means that the possibility or not of communication is a *secondary* issue to the question of subjectivity, just as Munday (2011) demonstrates in his discussion of words and meaning. It is therefore the inherent distinctness yet indeterminacy of sensation that structures

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62 see the discussion of Derrida and hospitality in chapter 3.
subjectivity rather than an isolation born out of ignorance of another's interiority or born out of inarticulacy about one's own. In Derrida's words:

[...]what comes to effect, identify, think, prove, this selfhood, in truth that by which selfhood affirms and produces itself, affects itself, "selves" itself, operates its own "selving" as Hopkins will say, is not thought, consciousness or reflection, but taste (Derrida, 2005a, p. 698).

Derrida explores how the movement of différance is already at work within the very corporeal boundaries that might otherwise be assumed to secure our seclusion. This brings to the fore a passive dimension of already thereness; the grace of a lack of lack. We experience this as a felt sense that we cannot necessarily articulate in words but can nevertheless touch or taste. By rendering selftaste a haptic sensibility Derrida transgresses the boundary of embodiment; he frees selftaste from self-containment because to touch is always simultaneously to be touched (Derrida, 2005b). In this way the priority of self over sensation becomes undone. My earlier discussion of Glendinning's (1998) analysis of Derrida underlines the point for it affirms that the movement of difference disturbs the ground of possessive individualism. Although "my" sensation has no existence outside of the here and now of my experience of it there is no priority of a self-contained "I" who has a claim. Sensation is attended to rather than intended. The open attentiveness of this sensitivity without a claim gives our comportment a particular dynamic that is neither active nor passive. It just is.

In the next section I turn to the second strand of kinaesthetic provocation, the practice of attending; this is in order to explore the dynamic of letting be that holds open this in-between of activity and passivity and in doing so holds open the possibility of a more just education.
Letting be

In this section I explore the practice of attending as a practice of letting be through exploring the dancer's practice of attending to her breath. The breath underscores the dancer's expression through movement but it also underscores any expression through voice. My claim is that the particular dynamics of letting be - as an in between of activity and passivity - is fundamentally potent and fundamentally educational, moreover the heightened sensitivity it demands is crucial to the possibility of an education that refuses oppressive structures and excludes nobody. The potency of this in-between is perhaps more easily expressed in French than in English for in French there is a useful distinction between pouvoir and puissance. Whereas pouvoir characterises a sovereign power of action puissance brings to the fore a doubleness of potency and reserve (Derrida, 2005b). Puissance, then, is a force of movement and relationship that precedes and persists through any act of expression; the already thereness of the breath that shapes the voice. The point about "voice" I want to make is slightly different to that which Derrida (1991a, 1991b) famously makes, although it supports and extends Derrida's argument. Derrida's (1991a, 1991b) distinction is between speech and writing. As discussed in chapter 3, Derrida sees the logocentric privilege of speech as shoring up a hierarchy of origin, a priority of the temporal present and an illusion of containable meaning. After all, if what I say can be attributed to me as I am saying it then the illusion that I am the master of its meaning is sustained. Writing, on the other hand, is not subject to the hierarchies of presence for as an act of mark-making that is exterior to corporeal boundaries it is a physical manifestation of how meaning arises through relationship (Derrida, 1991a).\footnote{For an in-depth discussion of the physicality of mark-making see Ingold 2007a. Ingold is considering the physicality of mark making in the context of exploring the history of lines. He is not drawing on Derrida and his notion of trace is specific and distinctive, however his discussion equally challenges the confines of representational thinking and brings to the fore the underscore of relationships that give rise to the written word.} My interest in breath is
also to explore an underscore of relationship that challenges boundaries of self-containment, after all each breath lives a dynamic of dependency and co-creation. However, at this juncture the point I want to make in relation to breath and voice is specific to the dynamic of subjectification discussed earlier in this chapter and to the question of how education might transgress the limits of interactions dependent on display and validation. The dynamics of subjectification is the dynamics of voice. A vocal expression is an easily discernible action attributable to an individual that others can respond to yet there is always the danger of overlooking what he who speaks loudest drowns out. The image of voice is commonly used to evoke an enactment of emancipation (see for example Rancière 1991; Bingham and Biesta 2010; Biesta 2010a) but it nevertheless overlooks those who do not speak or are not heard. Breath on the other hand just is. It is a no thing in common. The breath moves without our conscious intention although we are clearly participants in our breathing. We often unintentionally interfere with our breath, for instance we often catch our breath and interrupt its rhythm when we are nervous or in a hurry or concentrating too hard. However, if we watch our breath for a moment; not trying to change it but just attending to it; we might find that we can let go of the habitually invoked holding and can allow the breath to find to its own rhythm. If we attend to our breath while moving we might notice that our ability to move fluidly and responsively or for an extended period of time is dependent on allowing the breath to move without being unintentionally held or caught. Of course we can and sometimes do deliberately manipulate our breath, for example when playing the trumpet or performing a yoga sequence, however when one is an accomplished trumpet player or yoga practitioner this arguably becomes less a case of initiating and controlling each breath out and in and more akin to allowing breath and movement to become aligned. In other words, for
the skilled practitioner it is a case of attending, rather than pre-empting. The breath is a constant and gracious companion so there is no need for conscious awareness to assume the 'heaving and sighing' power of Caputo's God (1997, p. 58).

Breath invites a dynamic of attending and as already indicated, to attend is always a triple responsibility: to watch, to wait and to be in the service of. Yet the three dimensions of attention are not discrete. The watching encompasses sensitivity to the breath and resistance of the temptation to anticipate. To watch is already to wait and to wait is already to be in the service of, to hold back and allow an already thereness to come to the fore. My proposal is that this sensitivity towards what is already there has something to offer education as it keeps a concern for education and a concern for justice alive.

The already thereness that attending brings to the fore shows itself in the contamination of selftaste discussed above and in the next section I draw out how Derrida (2005a) further explores it in his homage to his friend the literary critic J. Hillis Miller. Through his discussion of Miller Derrida turns his attention to how selftaste overflows. In both cases (contamination and excess) the seclusion and sovereignty of subjective experience is called into question; thus bringing the third strand of my kinaesthetic provocation (the indeterminacy of subjectivity) into play. However, as is customary with Derrida (and evidentiary of the whole notion of how meaning deconstructs) his discussion of one thing opens up something other. In this case his sensitivity towards the other (Miller) allows Derrida to elaborate his conception of justice for, as discussed in chapter 3, Derrida conceives of justice as an ongoing sensitivity rather than a "thing" that can be distributed or "right answer" that can be arrived at. Justice is a degree of sensitivity resonant with that of kinaesthetic awareness; a sensitivity that holds us back
from the security of knowing and opens our awareness to those dimensions that lie
outside the range of our habitual gaze.

**Just being**

Derrida (2005a) is acutely aware that he can never know how it feels to be J. Hillis
Miller (how Miller feels to himself) however dear a friend he may be, yet he remains
curious about, and respectful of, what he senses of Miller's selftaste. Derrida
nicknames his friend "The Just" and although he does so partly to celebrate the personal
qualities he associates with Miller he is also observing that one's selftaste has a passive
dimension; it just is. In calling Miller "The Just" Derrida reflects:

> It is the name of a virtue, to be sure, and an exemplary sense of
> responsibilities before others and before the works, texts, signatures
> of others. But it is also the name of a gift that cannot be acquired, a
> simple way of being that one does not choose, a cheerful and natural
> "that's the way it is". (2005a, p. 691)

To be just, therefore, is a case of just being. It is having the 'grace' (2005a, p. 691) or
gift to let justice emanate. As discussed above, grace is from nowhere and directed at
nobody in particular and to demonstrate this Derrida (again drawing on Hopkins) turns
the noun justice into an intransitive verb:

> to justice, justicing, the act of doing justice, of justifying justice, of
> putting justice to work, operating a justice that, by rendering justice
> outside, in the world and for others, remains itself, remains the justice
> it is, carrying itself out in the world without going out of itself. To
> justice is intransitive even if justice, by justicing, does something,
> although it does nothing that is an object. Justice shines forth, it
> radiates and so does the just (2005a, p. 691).

Justice, therefore, is both 'immanent and emanant' (Derrida 2005a, p. 692) in relation to
Miller. Miller cannot ever hope to assert that "he" is the arbiter of what "is" just
because the justice that he tastes and that radiates from him is a verb and not a thing. He cannot claim to enact justice, yet he is undoubtedly a participant in putting justice to work. To taste justice is sensitivity without a claim, a quality of attention devoid of projection that opens our awareness to what (or who) we might habitually overlook. In the symposium paper *Force of Law* (1992) Derrida describes sensitivity to this forgotten other as 'a moment of suspense' (1992, p. 20) because it prevents us from proceeding towards the destinations of completion or knowledge or decision, thus underlining that justice is not a “thing” and can therefore never be fully determined. Derrida (1992) is sensitive to three kinds of forgotten others, each one haunting the possibility of justice ever being complete. The closure of the universal is haunted by the forgotten particular, the closure of decision is haunted by the undecideable and the closure of indefinite deferral is haunted by urgency. Although the strands of kinaesthetic provocation I am drawing on are not intended to mirror these specific hauntings both trilogies serve to unsettle certainty and closure by bringing sensitivity to the fore and there are discernible resonances between them. The irreducibility of kinaesthetic experience to third party interpretation haunts the possibility of universalization; the dynamic of attending resists projection; and subjectivity is indeterminate yet *lived* in the urgency of here and now.

For Derrida, the haunting of the universal by the particular, of decision by the undecideable and of deferral with urgency creates a dynamic of contradictory forces that he refers to as aporia and which prevent justice from ever being certain. Derrida therefore claims it is impossible to experience justice: 'As its name indicates, an experience is a traversal, something that *traverses* and travels toward a destination for which it finds the appropriate passage' (1992, p. 16). Justice can never be reached

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64 See also the discussion of aporia in chapter 3
because the contradictory forces of aporia disallow passage. However, as discussed in chapter 3, for Derrida the prevention of possibility is parenthesised and the impossible becomes (im)possible. The possibility of justice is not over; it is merely that justice is not yet. The not yet or to come of justice does not refer to the realisation of an existent possibility in the future (l'avenir) but to the fact that the contradictory forces of aporia render what justice might be incalculable (à venir). Therefore 'a moment of suspense' (1992, p. 20) need not mean that the desire for justice is brought to a halt, for Derrida is not talking about progress towards a known destination being temporally delayed. Since justice is à venir and not l'avenir a resistance to passage allows our sensitivity to be enlivened and not abandoned. When a force travelling through space meets counterbalancing forces it transmutates rather than disappears.

Kinaesthetic experience allows me to look more closely at what is at stake in an experience of suspension. When dancing there is a huge difference between suspending and arriving in a fixed position. To approach, for example, being off the vertical with one leg in the air as a static pose involves the considerable muscular effort of "holding on" to a strong, locatable and fixed centre; as does adjusting that position or transitioning into moving through space. To suspend off (and on) the vertical, however, is to engage in a dynamic counterbalance that involves no holding. Instead one is simultaneously drawn in multiple directions with equal force. The dancer's experience of the form that is created is enlivened, not lost, as with no privilege of one direction over another she can discern how tensile forces continuously interplay and adjust. The dancer, choreographer, scholar and teacher Rebecca Skelton (2002) draws on her kinaesthetic experience of counterbalancing to challenge the assumption that the

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65 See also the discussion in chapter 3 regarding the distinction between l'avenir of the future and the incalculable "not yet" of à venir
contradictory demands of her multiple roles necessarily create a conflict that needs to be resolved. She argues that by paying attention to the constant shifts in the various tensile forces of these opposing demands she can productively hang out in a dynamics of difference. Skelton (2002) emphasises that in SRT practice the dancer is not only drawn in multiple-directions in a counterbalance but is also simultaneously expanding in these directions. There are efferent as well as afferent forces at work and Skelton draws on Deleuze and Guattari to describe this as a '... way of travelling and moving; proceeding from the middle through the middle, coming and going rather than starting and finishing' (Deleuze & Guattari 1997 cited in Skelton 2002). Skelton's observations are apposite and hint at how the experience of counterbalance is multidimensional rather than merely directional, although this is not a distinction she explicitly acknowledges. My experience of SRT, and of the dynamic stillness of counterbalancing, is that in addition to the extremities being drawn and expanding into space I am acutely aware of a sense of axis that passes from space vertically through the centre of skull and torso and that counterbalances the peripheral emphasis of multidirectionality by opening a sense of three dimensional space inside the body. This axis (which Skinner calls an axial shadow and that Skelton hints at in her citation of Deleuze and Guattari) is closer to a sense of vibration than to determined line, a faraway hum that resonates in a profound emptiness.

In the next section I consider whether this attitude of suspension, held in the paradox between the present and endless reaching, might afford (a) (more) just education in the double sense I have been elucidating or whether the influence of dualism still constrains our reach into a space of no things.

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66 Efferent, or neuromotor, impulses are centrifugal and convey information away from the central nervous system to the muscles. Afferent nerve impulses are centripetal and convey sensory information from the sense organs to the central nervous system.
Suspended in a space of no things

What is at stake in just education is a pedagogy that it is sensitive towards forgotten others and is untethered both from instrumental demands and from heroic expectations of freedom. No longer directed from one to another, teacher to student the chance of the arrivant might hang in the space between, around, above, below, inside and outside of teachers and students. The shift to attending to what we might think of as the chance, the revenant, the forces already in play in the world includes in our awareness forgotten others too easily overlooked by the liberal and critical traditions, the individualism of the learning society and even by Biesta's conception of subjectification. All of these narrow their focus in prospect of freedom.

In the context of education sensitivity to the otherwise overlooked and to deconstructing structures reverberates on many levels. There are students who are forgotten because they are silent or do not act, or their words or actions are so far outside our expectations that we do not recognise them as being relevant. The expectations and dispositions that we as teachers hold on to are another layer of forgotten other, which if overlooked narrow the scope of our sensitivity. The forces already at play in the world are yet another layer of forgotten other, creating a context that both confines and exceeds confinement. These forgotten others draw our attention to the possibility of a (more) just education but yet at the same time are dependent on the very structure of self/other dualism that prevents this possibility. Bearn (2000) argues that this dependence generates an approach to the world still shaped by hierarchical divisions and that this therefore prevents the affirmation of otherness on its own terms.
Bearn (2000) argues that Derrida cannot affirm difference, or otherness, on its own terms. He cannot avoid categorising and determining the other because he approaches indeterminacy through a double negative. For example Derrida starts with impossibility, or absence, and this is the first lack. Yet impossibility is itself lacking, parenthesised and held back from completion. For Derrida even negativity arises in the context of its opposite. We cannot understand the impossible without the context of the possible; and it is possibility that makes the impossible (im)possible. In the face of nothing Derrida starts with something and then witnesses its failure to be complete. Bearn (2000) therefore reads Derrida as construing words, concepts and subjectivity as containers that lack the completion of being (but long to be) 'perfectly filled' (2000, p. 451). Yet as Bearn goes on to claim, these containers defy closure by being impossible to fill perfectly:

> If there is endless play it is because the vessels can never be perfectly filled. But the very fact that they can never be perfectly filled means that they can overflow. Indeed the very idea of excess presupposes that of a finite container (2000, p. 451).

The failure of words to contain meaning means that a failure of communication is inevitable and Bearn (2000) claims that this leaves Derrida in an attitude of perpetual longing. Bearn reads Derrida as longing to make experience communicable however my argument is that communication or its failure is irrelevant. While Bearn assumes Derrida is longing for the stability of a 'point' to address (2000, p. 452) I sense him longing for the dynamic stillness of multi-dimensional suspension.67

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67 The texts of Derrida's that Bearn (2000) refers to in are all significantly earlier than the essay *Justices* (2005a) that I have drawn from in this chapter. Indeed, Bearn is writing five years before the publication of *Justices*. However I do not read *Justices* as indicative of a shift in Derrida's thinking and find the same complexity of longing in *Force of law* (1992), from which I take the notion of suspense.
Bearn (2000) reads Derrida as longing for a certainty that can never be reached, in other words as longing for the presence of the other. The movement of *différance* makes Derrida's longing a longing for no particular other; but Bearn assumes that the longing is still a longing for some, as yet unforseeable, "thing" to have arrived. One way of encapsulating what Bearn is suggesting is to claim that Derrida is longing for an *arrivant* that brings no *revenant*, however I sense that Derrida includes the *revenant* in his longing. The *revenant* brings the otherness of interiority to the surface. Surfacing is not presencing, for in surfacing subjectivity emanates, rather than communicates, and therefore seeks sensitivity rather than understanding. On the surface self and other, interiority and exteriority meet in the intimacy of touch and taste. Being a ghost the *revenant* passes through boundaries and thus Derrida surfaces subjectivity through borders of self and other, exposing the leakiness of embodiment. This *surfacing through* is what is alluded to in the third strand of kinaesthetic provocation, a dimension of subjectivity I have called "becoming almost transparent", and it is glimpsed in the dynamic stillness of the releasing dancer and in the immanent justicing that emanates from Derrida's friend. It is this that I sense Derrida is longing for. I sense Derrida longing for experiences of indeterminacy that keep vigilance alive, moments of haptic sensibility where sensation tingles on the surface, discernible but beyond comprehension, escaping the rational ordering of "things". Yet despite departing from Bearn (2000) over what Derrida longs for I agree with the thrust of his argument; namely that for Derrida it is containment and exclusion that shapes experience. However, contaminated and overflowing bodily vessels might be Derrida’s notion of subjectivity nevertheless arises in the context of an interior/exterior dichotomy. Bearn argues that the dependence of contamination and excess on prior enclosure makes
Derrida's longing inevitable as the indeterminacy of the other can only be affirmed as *not lacking* when there is no prior context of interiority and exclusion.

Bearn (2000) makes his comments about Derrida's longing in the context of drawing a distinction between Derrida's thinking and that of Deleuze. Bearn (2000) explains that Deleuze starts with the materiality of the world, rather than starting with the metaphysics of "no thing". Deleuze, therefore, needs no recourse to structures of self/other, inner/outer or even self/world in order to approach the facticity of subjectivity because he tunes into the seething flux of intensities that flow through each moment of lived experience. Bearn (2000) affectionately refers to the difference between Derrida and Deleuze as arising from Deleuze's innocence. He aligns Deleuze's innocence with him (Deleuze) having no interest in the undoing of metaphysics or in the end of philosophy and he notes that Deleuze simply does philosophy differently. In making this claim Bearn cites Derrida's (1998) eulogy for Deleuze, in which Derrida observes that of their 'generation' Deleuze was the one who did philosophy 'most gaily.... most innocently' (Derrida, 1998, cited in Bearn, 2000, p.443). Where I depart from Bearn is that Bearn seems to cast Derrida as falling short and failing to find innocence; for Bearn Derrida is left longing because his way is blocked and his way is blocked for he has failed to think otherwise than in relation to hierarchical boundaries. However, what I want to emphasise is that Derrida's longing is not tragic, for it tends towards desire rather than nostalgia. By spatializing suspense, I read Derrida as holding open a space in which we can *sense* the possibility of a justice innocent of boundaries. I therefore read Derrida's sensitivity to others as *making room* for innocence rather than functioning as a failure to find it.

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68 see also the discussion of Deleuze in chapter 3
What now?

Educational theory and practice is permeated by dualist assumptions and their influence perpetuates an emphasis on performative demands that divide and exclude. Education can only function more justly if we remain vigilant of the force of dualism and at the same time this vigilance opens the possibility of (a) just education, affirmed for itself and untethered from extrinsic demands. What would education "for itself" do? Biesta's distinction between educational functions that have an instrumental purpose (qualification and socialisation) from the function he sees as uniquely educational: (subjectification) provided a useful vantage point from which to approach this question, particularly as subjectification brings with it a conception of subjectivity that is non-sovereign and emergent. However, by personalising the dynamics of subjectification Biesta leaves hierarchical oppositions between self/other, interior/exterior, included/excluded still in tact. By approaching the indeterminacy of subjectivity kinaesthetically, and with reference to Derrida's quasi-concepts of revenant and justice, I have witnessed how these dualisms decompose to allow a multi-dimensional extension of subjectivity that is not dependent on bursting the self/other boundary through communication, action or display. This allows for a (more) just education, in that it includes those otherwise overlooked, but (paradoxically) this particular decomposition of dualism is nevertheless dependent on there being a dualism to decompose. Since hierarchical structures remain in force the possibility of just education, free from instrumental concerns and oppressive dynamics, remains suspended. However, while suspense-as-temporal-delay leaves the possibility of just education beyond our reach, a spatialized experience of multi-dimensional suspension opens awareness to the chance of (a) just education, untainted by boundaries and therefore innocent of the hierarchies of dualism.
In the next chapter I turn to the dualism of self and world and draw on Deleuze to consider the possibility of an education innocent of this boundary and therefore untainted by the instrumentalism it contains and sustains. Deleuze follows Nietzsche in claiming '[i]nnocence is the game of existence' (Deleuze, 1983, p. 22) which, as I shall explore in the next chapter, is the game of 'affirming and being affirmed' (Deleuze, 1983, p. 21).
Chapter 5 - Worlding

Introduction

In chapter 2 I examined the relationship between Cartesian dualism and the hyper-individualising, hyper-instrumental trends in contemporary educational practice. In chapter 3 I identified three intertwining strands of kinaesthetic provocation with which to explore and extend ideas drawn from Derrida and Deleuze in order to challenge this dominant discourse. In the last chapter I put these provocations to work while drawing on Derrida to unsettle the dualism of self and other and suggested a pedagogical focus that extends before and beyond the performance of individual students. In this chapter I move on to approach the dualism of self and world. I approach this by first drawing on the poetry of William Blake to explore how the inherent self-enclosure of self/world dualism is intertwined with a primordially instrumental and exclusionary dynamic. While in chapter 4 I considered how to acknowledge yet transgress the boundaries of dualist thinking, in this chapter I additionally consider the possibility of thinking otherwise than through these boundaries and therefore shaping our experience of living in this world untainted by the instrumentality that dualism engenders. I begin this task by drawing on Colebrook (2011) and Protevi (2011) who both consider the theory of autopoiesis in enactive cognitive science, which asserts a challenge to the Cartesian mind/body and self/world dichotomies. Both Colebrook and Protevi take issue with how the theory of autopoiesis casts the subject as an entity, therefore prioritising enclosure, privileging autonomy and perpetuating instrumentalism. I extend their arguments with reference to the sensation of passage tapped into by the releasing dancer. I additionally draw on Deleuze (1994) and Baggs (2007) to further elaborate this otherwise than boundaries approach to the shaping of experience. Finally, I consider how different approaches to the self/world relationship might play out in how
the process of education is conceptualised. For this I return to Simons and Masschelein's (2008) critique of the hyper-individualism of the discourse of learning introduced in chapter 2 and to Masschelein's (2010a, 2010b) and Vlieghe, Simons and Masschelein's (2010) response to this malaise. I examine how their conception of education challenges the hierarchies of mind over body and subject over world that dominate educational discourses and how they introduce a pedagogical space of passage, or no man's land, where futures are radically undetermined. However, I contend that by clinging to a private/public divide they leave education tied in to a performative dynamic that overlooks forgotten others. By drawing on Ingold's (2011) concept of inhabitation, his (1986) discussion of bands and tribes and the no-man's land of Jean Luc Nancy (2003) I extend the reach of no-man's land in the interests of just education.

**Ah! weak and wide astray**

In the previous chapter, which explored the dualism of self and other, I found Derrida longing for the touch and taste of justice. His longing transgresses the seclusion and exclusion of embodiment and opens the possibility of a sensibility without a home that is indiscriminately hospitable towards others. I find a similar longing in the work of the artist-poet William Blake (1757-1827) except that the particular articulation of the interior/exterior dichotomy that Blake longs to escape is that between self and world. Blake longs to bring all of the senses out from the dark confines of the skull and on to the surface to imbue them with the openness and lightness of touch. In the first book of his epic poem *Milton* Blake laments how rationalist dualism casts embodiment as a state of seclusion that occasions an exclusionary and reductive dynamic. In the stanzas
cited below the skull-based senses are emblematic of the oppressive 'fix'd destinations' (1972, p. 125) that rationalism engenders for he describes them as perceiving only the instrumental value of what they encounter:

Ah weak & wide astray! Ah shut in narrow doleful form
Creeping in reptile flesh upon the bosom of the ground!
The Eye of Man a little narrow orb clos'd up & dark,
Scarcely beholding the great light, conversing with the Void.
The Ear, a little shell in small volutions shutting out
All melodies & comprehending only Discord and Harmony.
The Tongue a little moisture fills, a little food it cloys,
A little sound it utters & cries are faintly heard.
Then brings forth Moral Virtue the cruel Virgin Babylon.

Can such an Eye judge of the stars? & looking thro' its tubes
Measure the sunny rays that point their spears on Udanadan?
Can such an Ear, fill'd with the vapours of the yawning pit,
Judge of the pure melodious harp struck by a hand divine?
Can such closed Nostrils feel a joy? or tell of autumn fruits
When grapes & figs burst their covering to the joyful air?
Can such a Tongue boast of the living waters? or take in
Ought but the Vegetable Ratio & loathe the faint delight?
Can such gross Lips perceive? alas! folded within themselves
They touch not ought, but pallid turn & tremble at every wind
(Blake 1804/1972, p. 125).

Blake longs for a world innocent of the instrumentality of rationalism. His lament resonates beautifully with the concerns that propel this thesis for I am exploring the possibility of (a) just education that is not oriented by the extrinsic demands of systems of categorisation. In *Songs of Innocence and Experience* (1794/1972) Blake differentiates between the sensitivity and openness of innocence and the oppression that arises from boundaries of ownership and opposition. To adopt an attitude of innocence is to be in touch with things before they are concretised and to remain open to the possibility that they could be concretised differently. Although Blake's songs align innocence with childhood I want to explore the possibility of an innocent attitude that is
not born out of a lack of experience in the world, rather it is cultivated through sensorial and visceral experience in the world for itself, in its glorious indeterminacy.

Blake laments that the habit of perception is to organise the world into a world that is "for me", excluding from awareness that which does not further our own interests and he sees this instrumentalism amplified in the structure of the society in which he lives. Colebrook (2011) detects a similar dynamic in contemporary society and seeks to redress this by considering an alternative self/world relationship. Although her impassioned writing is ultimately directed at the body politic what she brings to the forefront of awareness is that social organisation is a function of how we conceptualise our physical body's bearing in the world. Non-hierarchical social relationships are not possible if the body is rationalised as primarily structured to protect our own interests. Colebrook draws no distinction between the metaphysical boundaries of subjective identity and the material boundaries of the body-as-organism. Identity is material. Her intention, therefore, is to approach the body/organism otherwise than as a life form oriented by its own survival whose membrane protects and excludes. She begins by problematising challenges to Cartesian self/world dualism that valorise openness to the world merely for the furtherance of the subject-organism's own wellbeing. Colebrooks's problematisation resonates with Ginot's (2010) critique of the dominant discourses of somatics and with my critique of Hanna's (1987b) valorisation of efficient somatic well being as discussed in chapter 2; however, Colebrook's specific target is the instrumentalism she detects in enactive cognitive science, in particular in Maturana and Varela's (1980) theory of autopoiesis. Maturana and Varela (1980) conceptualise an autopoietic system as essentially closed and as organising the systems within it to maintain the health of the whole. A cell maintains itself within a membrane, for example, as does a human organism within the membrane of its skin. However, as
Maturana and Varela (1980) emphasise, autopoietic systems are embedded within an environment and are therefore primordially *relational* beings ever extending into their world and responding to changes in their milieu in ways that maintain and sustain them. For Maturana and Varela, this dynamic between a coherent whole and its environment is what makes cognition possible and thus their enactive cognitive science offers a powerful challenge to the mind/body dualism of the Cartesian *cogito*. However, for Colebrook (2011) the autopoietic account overlooks its own inherent contradiction. On the one hand autopoiesis emphasises the freedom and self-sufficiency of the organism while on the other hand it emphasises the organism's openness to the world. Colebrook's point is that the openness necessary for us-as-organisms to self-sustain renders us vulnerable to contingency and therefore undermines the possibility of autonomy.

Maturana and Varela (1980) get round this inherent contradiction by excluding the possibility of a brute encounter that is not on the organism's own terms, constructing autonomy as a function of an efficient somatic awareness that excludes experiences that are not useful to the organism. They therefore exclude unbounded life forms, such as viruses, from their definition of life and interpret any penetration of the organism by such life forms as an event of trauma. Colebrook (2011) asserts that such an attitude to life occludes the possibility of parasitic encounters that subject life-forms to variation and mutation, leaving autopoietic organisms able only to perceive what maintains and sustains them as autonomous relational beings. For Colebrook (2011), this privileging of autonomy leaves Maturana and Varela tied to an exclusionary norm of ideal

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69 In this respect they share much with Hanna (1997b). The work of Hanna, who identified the field of somatics, is discussed in chapter 3.
She likewise challenges the valorisation of child, animal and Buddhism (and we could add here somatic practitioner) whose mindful attunement to the world sediments the ideal of embodied life. She asks how we might engage in a 'viral politics' (2011, p. 26) to find ways of interacting that are not grounded on the mutual recognition of self-sustaining and exclusionary bodies. In order to seek an alternative approach to the body, including the body politic, Colebrook (2011) turns to Deleuze and Guattari's (1987) conception of the Body without Organs (BwO). In invoking the BwO Colebrook invites the reader to think of the body as forever forming. As discussed in chapter 3, the BwO is a set of practices that disavow the priority of identity and its concomitant dynamic of ownership. What is at stake in the BwO is letting go of the subservience of a body to a central organising force. Becoming a BwO thus involves letting go of habits that sediment and fix us-as-identity in order that other possibilities can come to the fore. The hollowed out body becomes a medium of passage, alive with pre-personal intensities passing through. As discussed in chapter 3, pre-personal intensities, or affects, are rigorously distinguishable from the feeling states of affections. Affections have a proprietorial status whereby they are attributed to individuals. Pre-personal affects, on the other hand, mark shifts in intensity that are un-owned and un-nameable: a particular degree of heat or the movement of a breeze or a time of day for example. Deleuze (1994) describes these pre-personal intensities as virtual potentials, by which he means that although these sensations are distinct ('differeniated' or singular) they are unformed and obscure ('undifferenciated') in that they have not been consciously perceived and concretised ('actualised') in the lived experience of an individual (1994, p. 261). For Colebrook re-thinking the body as a

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70 See chapter 2 for a discussion of the valorisation of well being in the field of somatics. The valorisation of wellbeing translates as norms of health, vitality, upright bodies and least resistance.  
71 See chapter 3 for a discussion of Deleuze and Guattari's (1994) conceptualisation of the virtual and the actual. Actualisation selects and extracts singular virtual potentials, bringing them out of obscurity and (trans)forming them into lived experience.
site of passage or BwO emphasises that these intensities have a *transpersonal* dimension, therefore there is a transpersonal dimension of subjectivity that is brought to the fore by the BwO. Rethinking the body as a series of transpersonal but differentiated qualities de-personalises attributes and achievement and in the educational context this shifts how we conceive of the consequences of pedagogical encounter and how we conceive of responsibility for those consequences. Later in this chapter I argue that this is a shift from consequences being 'shared out' to consequences being 'shared in' and that this shift creates affordances for a more just education.

Colebrook's critique of Maturana and Varela's self/world dualism is virulent and yet it is important to note that her reconfiguration of the body extends their challenge to mind/body dualism by leaving open what the body might do. Although Colebrook merely invites the reader to *think* the body without organs her non-dualist stance implies that this is inseparable from a bodily materialisation of the BwO. However, at this point Colebrook's discussion shifts exclusively to the body politic and ignores how we might live the body of the human organism differently. Yet living the body differently is what the releasing dancer does. For the dancer-in-suspense the transpersonal potentials that Colebrook refers to become actualised through a human body that both hollows out and extends through endless space. The dancer's sensory organs suspend their function of organising what is to be internalised and what is to be excluded and remain hyper-sensitive to the ever-differentiating flux of life. The dancer physicalises a dimension of the BwO that could easily be overlooked by Colebrook's viral politics; for they extend and hollow in a suspension that is *almost*, but not quite the BwO. As Deleuze and Guattari (1987) repeatedly re-iterate, you can never be a body completely without organs and as Skinner remarks of the dancers she works with they are only *almost* in a state of transparency' (Skinner & Dempster, 1996, p. 26, my
emphasis). Far from evaporating, the dancer maintains the sway between deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation that Deleuze and Guattari refer to. Yet the dancer's reterritorialisations do not tie her to standing her ground. She finds her bearings in the buoyancy of multi-dimensional space and the faraway hum of the axial shadow.\(^{72}\)

Becoming *almost* transparent affords the possibility of just education because it allows for a specifically educational dualism to be circumvented while still highlighting the possibility that education can happen. The specifically educational dualism I am referring to is the opposition between an embodied subject that is lacking (specific knowledge, skills or attributes) and one that is not lacking, whereby an un-just process of education aims to shift subjects (in varying degrees) from one side of this line to the other. This dualism assumes that subjectivity is the property of bodies that are delineated by boundaries and that are identifiable through time. Colebrook's (2011) critique of autopoiesis functions to problematise this priority of ownership and in doing so dissolves the self/world dualism, yet in doing so it raises questions about the possibility of education. For surely if a process called education is to affirm the potency of subjectivity there needs to be some kind of body-called-subject that continues? Only if there is an experience of continuity can there be a subject of education, yet how can there be continuity without first attributing subjectivity exclusively (even if emergently) to someone? The dancer offers a way out of this conundrum for as I indicated above, the dancer does not evaporate; in Deleuze and Guattari's words: 'Sensory becoming is the action by which something or someone is ceaselessly becoming other (while continuing to be what they are)' (1994, p. 177).

\(^{72}\) The axial shadow is discussed in chapter 4. The term refers to the dancer's sense of axis, experienced as a distant vibration.
Deleuze and Guattari (1994) distinguish this doubleness of continuity and change from transformation. With transformation something shifts from being one thing to being another but with becoming we are forever forming as intensities pass through, from one into the other, as in the dancer’s relationship with space.

What becoming *almost* transparent brings to the fore is that the tendency towards the BwO that Deleuze and Guattari (1987) call "becoming" is fundamentally creative. Emptiness is distinct from nothingness and as a hollowed out site of passage the BwO is alive with potentials, the actualisation of which brings something new to the world. This notion of passage affords the possibility of an education that is not founded on a presumption of lack and therefore is otherwise than therapeutic. Because the flux of life is there to be tapped into education need not be conceived as transporting subjects from one side of a divide (the before of education being a position of lack) to the other (the after of education being less lacking). The dancer, by becoming *almost* transparent, affirms both her indeterminacy and her continuance. By allowing for an *almost* free flow of sensation that Deleuze and Guattari describe as the 'zone of indetermination, indiscernability' (1994, p. 173) she confounds the divide of before and after, self and other, self and world and affirms the possibility of just education.

**Material imaginings**

In chapter 4 I explored how a conceptualisation of subjectivity as response offered an approach that avoided predetermining the student yet, by overlooking those whose response is not discernible, could not realise a just education. The attending and suspending dancer affords an alternative approach to the subject of education by affirming her indeterminacy whilst maintaining a sense of her own continuity. In doing
so she (re)sources subjectivity in sensation rather than response and confounds the before/after binary that traditionally structures education. Deleuze (1994) similarly affords an approach to the experience of continuity that undoes the dilemma of now and then and in doing so reinforces the subject as a site of passage. He does so through materialising the imagination. He defines the imagination as a contractile power 'like a sensitive plate' that contracts 'internal qualitative impressions' (1994, p. 90) from each passing moment. The imagination therefore senses what is different between one moment and the next but at the same time establishes a recurring habit of contraction that gives rise to the anticipation that future contractions of future moments will follow. Put simply, the habit of imagination constitutes an expectation that life will continue. This sensation of continuity is neither intentional nor reflective as it involves neither understanding nor conscious memory. Deleuze therefore defines this inclusion of past and future instants in our sense of the present one as a "passive" synthesis. Deleuze goes on to distinguish the immediacy of the retained sensation of the past from the reflexive relationship to the past offered by understanding and to distinguish the immediacy of the sensorial anticipation of a future from the reflexive prediction that there will be one; the latter of each pair being an “active” synthesis. Passive synthesis is simply our 'habit of living’ and experiences life 'for itself' whereas active synthesis organises life as 'for us' (1994, p. 94). Yet the terminology "passive" is nevertheless misleading because our 'habit of living' is not a simple combination of instants. Our sensitivity to passing moments is sensitivity to their difference. Each contraction of a moment draws something new from the repetition of moments, a drawing out that Deleuze calls contemplation. For Deleuze the habit of living is contemplating. Not only contemplating the differentiation in each moment of sensation drawn through the
sense organs (perceptual passive synthesis) but primordially at the metabolic level by contemplating matter (organic passive synthesis). As Deleuze explains:

We are made of contracted water, light, earth and air - not merely prior to the recognition or representation of these, but prior to their being sensed. Every organism in its receptive and perceptual elements, but also in its viscera, is a sum of contractions, of retentions and expectations (1994, p. 93).

Every organ, nerve and muscle in the body is constituted through contemplation and at a level beneath this contemplation also determines structure at the cellular level. Deleuze considers each movement of contemplation a micro-self that he calls a 'contemplative soul'. A crucial aspect of this account is that the life of each contemplation is finite and determined by its contractile stamina. The habit of living is therefore a function of multiple series of mutant contemplating micro-selves, each series with its own cyclical rhythm. That contemplative souls are life-potentials that mutate through self-exhaustion affords an affirmation of life without prioritising identity and self-sustenance. In Deleuze's words: 'We speak of our "self" only by virtue of the thousands of little witnesses which contemplate within us: it is always a third party who says "me"' (1994, p. 96).

Deleuze's (1994) account casts subjectivity as preceding the synchronic actions of an organism responding instrumentally to its environment in order to sustain itself. He points out that because contemplation is invisible and "does" nothing it is easy to fetishise action but that:

the entire theory of learning risks being misdirected as long as the prior question is not posed - namely whether it is through acting that we acquire habits...or whether on the contrary it is through contemplating (1994, p. 94, original emphasis).
Sensing sensibilities

Deleuze confounds the boundaries of experience; the boundaries of mind/body; metaphysical/material; self/world and now and then. He allows sentience to arise in the becomings of a selfworld rather than through the identity of a self that organises the world as "for me". Colebrook's (2011) critique of Maturana and Varela (1980), discussed above, is underscored by Deleuze's synthesis of habit. It highlights the contradiction between openness and autonomy that is inherent in the autopoietic account of sentience and the dualism and instrumentalism that arises from trying to accommodate this contradiction. The dancer materialises Colebrook's thinking otherwise by tapping into tendencies that are transpersonal and differentiating and her mutational becoming makes possible the thought of just education as it allows for a body that continues but does not stagnate. Deleuze's exploration of the sentience at work in the habit of living also brings to the fore another contradiction in the autopoietic account. Autopoiesis only accounts for the maintenance of the organism, not for its sense making, yet it assumes that the organism is making sense of the world because sensorimotor responses are oriented to homeostasis. Since the organism always acts to maintain its own internal balance and stability its sensibility must precede its actions. It is this contradiction that Protevi (2011) turns his attention to and his discussion underlines the extent of Deleuze's challenge to dualism. His discussion also brings into sharper focus what the kinaesthetic provocations work to agitate and therefore it warrants discussion here.

Like Colebrook (2011), Protevi (2011) recognises that Maturana and Varela's (1980) autopoietic account of emergent subjectivity differs from the emergent subjectivity of Deleuze because it is locked into preserving a boundary of identity. However, Protevi is quick to point out that Deleuze does not refute the conservatism of the organism per
Protevi’s concern is that Varela and Maturana ground thought in sensorimotor response to an environment yet the response itself is already predicated on the three dimensions of sentience that Protevi (after Deleuze) identifies as: sensibility, signification and direction. Protevi explores how these three dimensions of sense propel the integrated responses of bacteria in their milieu rather than being a functional effect of these responses as autopoiesis assumes. He therefore demonstrates that our sense of a self that continues is not predicated on a boundary that pits us against the world.73

Following Deleuze's (1994) organic passive synthesis Protevi (2011) disassociates "sense" from the integration of understanding and grounds it in basic biological activity. In making the case for metabolism Protevi starts out by overemphasising the distinction between organic and perceptual contemplations, separating imagination out of the former with a dualism not found in Deleuze. Protevi draws on the work of Di Paolo (2005) and its subsequent development by Thompson (2007) to explore how the subjectivity of a bacterium is qualitative and evaluative and not adequately accounted for by the all or nothing, friend or foe dynamic of inclusion/exclusion with which the autopoietic account grounds behaviour. He explains that what makes a bacterium swim towards sweeter waters is the rate of change in the sweetness rather than the quantity of sugar per se. A bacterium constantly measures and calculates, re-measures and re-calculates the density of sugar in relation to a norm employing a process of differentiation that is essentially a feat of calculus. Protevi (2011) concludes that this means that a bacterium's sense of its own continuity, that is to say its subjectivity, is a function of adaptive mechanisms that are serial and not synchronic. In Deleuzian terms, subjectivity emerges from the multiplicity of self-exhausting and renewable

73 See also the discussion of sense in Chapter 3
contemplations at work in the bacterium's metabolic mechanisms. For Protevi this challenges the notion that subjectivity is a function of an organism's self-maintaining coherence as it suggests that the integrated response of extending into a world that is "for me" is merely evidence of a first person perspective (sensibility, signification and direction) that arises in processes that are not synchronic (2011).

This distinction between evidence and function is crucial not only to an analysis of bacterial behaviour but also to the possibility of just education; for it is in confusing evidence and function that education serves to (re)enact socialising hierarchies, thus failing both dimensions of the just. In chapter 2 I highlighted this with reference to critiques of the prevalent accountability culture and in chapter 3 my departure from Biesta's concept of subjectification was underscored by the same distinction. What I take from Protevi is the idea that contemplation expresses the openness of a question (how sweet?) rather than being predicated on the presence or absence of a response. Not only is action secondary and evidentiary but it also serves to concretise just one possibility. Sensation, however, is curious and resources subjectivity in its openness. The extension of this shift of perspective to the educational context invites a rethinking of pedagogical dynamics.

Protevi (2011) uses the story of bacteria to illustrate that Deleuze's approach to subjectivity affords a first person perspective that precedes the integrated response of an organism. He also highlights the ingrained dualism that structures the thought and language of the scientists he draws from by revealing how they slip from using first person, evaluative language to using third person, mechanistic language to describe the bacteria's behaviour. For example, to describe the bacteria as swimming towards food obscures the fact that sugar only becomes food in relation to someone who eats sugar.
Sugar is identified as food through a series of metabolic contemplations that equally constitute the bacterium's structure as a sugar-eating organism. The scientists' slippage illustrates how easy it is to assume a priority of identity over action. Their slippage also illustrates how third party interpretations are reliant on externalised actions, hence the temptation to assign actions that evidence evaluative processes with the property of generating them (Protevi, 2011). This returns me to the first strand of kinaesthetic provocation: the irreducibility of first-person experience to third party interpretation.

In the last chapter I opened up this provocation to distinguish it from an assertion of uncrossable boundary and from a facet of communication failure. I thus articulated this provocation as a call to prioritise sensitivity over understanding and argued that this therefore furthered the interests of just education. What the story of bacteria underlines is that the un-transferability of lived experience that this provocation brings to the fore can be approached through the un-repeatability of each moment without re-asserting the ground of identity and without confusing evidence with function. Moments are unrepeatable because their ground substance mutates. Time and contemplations move on. However kinaesthetic experience is even more forceful than Protevi's analysis of bacteria in its refusal of dualism. Protevi's (2011) prioritising of metabolism assumes a distinction between the imagination, which de/composes sensation, and metabolism, which de/composes matter. However, the dancer works between this division because her imaginative synthesis of sensory data effects a material structural change in her corporeal structure as well as changing the dynamics of her relationship to her environment. As Skinner observes of the releasing dancer:

The muscles appear to be lengthened and wrapped around the bones rather than contracted or gripped. The joints give the appearance of having space in them and the limbs of being unbound though belonging to the torso. There is a suspended relationship to gravity which can be likened to the suspension of a dust particle in a shaft of sunlight (Skinner, in Skinner, Metcalf et al., 1974)
The muscles do not only *look* lengthened and joints *appear* more spacious but a change of functioning is experienced as well as observed. The dancer experiences less restriction in her musculature and joints and is therefore able to move through a greater range of movement. Over time this extended movement range effectuates changes in the dancer's muscle fibre thus redefining the limits of her physicality structurally as well as functionally. The dancer, therefore, not only imaginatively synthesises sensation into a sense of continuity she also reverses this process, confounding habit by materialising image as sensation which in turn materialises structural change. As such the dancer forgets to forget forgotten others: she forgets to forget the possibility of moving otherwise than within her habitual range; and forgets to forget a structure otherwise than she habitually inhabits; and forgets to forget a bearing otherwise than how she habitually holds herself against the world.

Standish (2000, 2012) emphasises the importance of *acknowledging* our forgetting; yet my invocation of forgetting to forget does not contradict Standish’s point. I agree with Standish’s argument that acknowledgement avoids the danger of denial in the face of being guilty of forgetting. However, the dancer’s forgetting to forget is concerned with preventing forgetting in the first place. My use of forgetting to forget is therefore guilt free and acknowledgement versus denial is not an issue.

**Forgetting to forget**

Deleuze (1994) explores the possibility of forgetting to forget in his discussion of the synthesis of memory. Memory accounts for the sense of coherence that we experience and both affords and constrains the possibility of just education; for memory gives us
something to draw from but at the same time if we are inevitably the product of our habits then education becomes reduced to mere socialisation. Deleuze explores the possibility of sensing coherence without re-asserting a priority of identity and in doing so opens the possibility of a life that can become other than a re-inscription of the limits of our past. To move on to this synthesis of memory it is useful to recap that the synthesis of habit draws impressions from each passing instant into the next one. The retention of these impressions - memory - is what allows the present to pass. Deleuze (1994) deduces that if we contract one instant into the next in this way then all past instants, contracted to differing degrees, must co-exist on different levels within our experience of the present instant; 'the present present being only the maximal contraction of all this past which coexists with it' (1994, p. 104, original emphasis).

Therefore, while habit draws continuity from successive instants memory draws coherence from the repetition of the whole of the past. Since thousands of micro-lives are lived in each moment and each one carries its past into the future the present therefore reverberates with the whole of all micro-lives lived and each new moment brings a repetition of this whole. This repetition of the totality of the past gives a sense of 'passage' (1994, p. 105 original emphasis) that grants coherence to our present experience even though there may be inconsistencies between successive moments. Deleuze calls the co-existence of all pasts 'destiny' (ibid.) and he distinguishes this conception of destiny from the inevitable unfolding of a pre-determined future:

Destination never consists in step-by-step deterministic relations between presents which succeed one another according to the order of a represented time. Rather, it implies between successive presents non-localisable connections, actions at a distance, systems of replay, resonance and echoes, objective signs, chances, signals and roles which transcend spatial locations and temporal successions (1994, p. 105).
Destiny leaves life radically undetermined because memory subsists on multiple levels rather than serving to organise experience in a linear fashion. The whole of life continues in each moment of lived experience, but at a different level to the preceding moment. Destiny therefore allows for the surfacing of the unforeseen and unimagined; the surfacing of a memory that exceeds what habit retained. Deleuze (1994) considers this the experience of a 'pure' (1994, p. 102) past as it is a past that retains the immediacy of sensation and is untainted by the active synthesis of interpretation and representation. Deleuze describes this surfacing of a pure past as reminiscence. The surfacing of reminiscence is involuntary and spontaneous and is evoked by sensation rather than conscious recollection. Reminiscence therefore denotes a remembrance within forgetting; it is essentially a forgetting to forget. Deleuze thus claims that reminiscence confounds time because it is experienced as a "past" without ever having been actively synthesised as a "present" in our consciousness. In other words, it is a pure past because it is a past that belongs to the world as it is and has not been already organised by consciousness into a past "for me". Moreover, the immediacy of reminiscence doubly confounds time because it breaks through the succession of moments and saturates the living present (1994).

An experience of reminiscence, by hinting at a conception of time as a durational whole, opens the possibility of a future not constrained by the habits of successive instants. Destiny is opened up by our forgetting to forget what we habitually exclude. Whereas habit draws the past and the future into the lived present, duration brings with it the possibility of hollowing out time by extending away from the present in both directions (towards the past and towards the future) at once. Deleuze, therefore, frees the future from the constraints of the past by opening the closed cycles of time into a line that interpenetrates each moment of lived experience. As Lawlor succinctly puts it:
'Literally the instant is nowhere or everywhere' (2003, p. 76). In *The logic of sense* Deleuze (1990) draws on Lewis Carroll's *Alice in Wonderland* to explain this empty time as a no place of pure becoming:  

When I say "Alice becomes larger", I mean she becomes larger than she was. By the same token, however, she becomes smaller than she is now. Certainly she is not bigger and smaller at the same time. She is larger now; she was smaller before. But it is at the same moment that one becomes larger than one was and smaller than one becomes. This is the simultaneity of a becoming whose characteristic is to elude the present (1990, p. 3).

In *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze draws on Shakespeare's Hamlet to observe that the paradox of two directions means that 'time is out of joint' (1994, p. 111). In the case of Hamlet this break with temporal succession arises from a momentous event that cuts open all the regulating structures of Hamlet's existing life. Hamlet's uncle has murdered his (Hamlet's) father, the king, and married his (Hamlet's) mother and in doing so created a chasm between the worlds of before and after this event. Caught between the opposing forces of an irretrievable past and an unimaginable future Hamlet's lived present is hollowed out; he thus becomes a self-less agent whose past can only play the part of a condition for action rather than acting as a source of habit that can organise his response.

Hamlet's story is a story of someone forced by circumstances to consciously refuse the divide that has been cut between past and future and therefore he generates a new beginning for a new chronology by sacrificing himself and killing his uncle. Alice, on the other hand, gives herself up to what happens next through bodily becomings

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74 In *The logic of sense* (1990) Deleuze draws on the Stoics to draw a distinction between the time of Chronos, which is the measured time of successive moments and the time of Aion, which is pure and empty time.

75 Derrida (1994, 1995b) also draws on Hamlet's experience of time out of joint. For Derrida a space for justice is opened in the no time of a time out of joint, a time that induces nausea rather than action. See also Lorraine (2003) for a detailed comparison the treatment of Hamlet by Deleuze and Derrida.
both cases, however, who they were conditions, but does not determine, who they might be becoming; for the paradox of a simultaneously extending past and future suspends constraint and expectation in a sense of passage (in Hamlet's case a sea voyage suspends him in passage prior to his killing of his uncle). As discussed above, sensitivity to passage affords the possibility of just education as it allows for becoming other without introducing a presumption of lack. Sensitivity to passage is what is at stake in the second kinaesthetic provocation of attending (waiting, sensing, and being subject to a play of forces). The bodily becoming of Alice, like that of the suspended dancer, particularly resonates with the concerns of just education for bodily becoming is not dependent on a momentous event and therefore it claims no heroic future. Retrieving a kingdom and revenging a murder may demand a decision akin to madness but for the dancer the paradox of passage shows itself in the everyday simplicity of sensation and shows itself as something we can practise being available to. The realm of education is the realm of paradox in the detail of the everyday and the potency of this double direction (its puissance) is both educational and a force for justice. As Lorraine (2003) observes in her discussion of empty time, justice comes to the fore through the ghosts that insist in the contexts we inherit and she notes: 'The ultimate context is the world as a whole, a world with no beginning or end that provides the context for all our experiences' (2003, p. 43). It is therefore the paradoxical passage of becoming with the world that allows us to refuse our place in an existing order.

**Becoming with the world**

Deleuze (1994) explores becoming with the world in the context of learning how to swim, specifically learning how to swim in the seemingly endless milieu of the sea. He
points out that we do not learn to swim by imitating either the swimming instructor's demonstrations or the wave, rather we meet the wave in a relationship of 'sensory-motivity' (1994, p. 26) through which, with each stroke, we align ourselves with the specificity of each wave that we encounter:

When a body combines some of its own distinctive points with those of a wave, it espouses the principle of a repetition which is no longer that of the Same, but involves the Other - involves difference, from one wave and one gesture to another, and carries that difference through the repetitive space thus constituted (1994, p. 26).

Learning to swim, therefore, is a question not just of becoming wave but also of becoming each wave anew. This means holding back from pre-empting the next wave and therefore holding back from assuming that we know what the world will throw at us and thus that we will know how to respond. The 'sensory motivity' (1994, p. 26) of becoming wave encounters each wave as a new becoming, a singular encounter within a context that has no beginning or end.

Deleuze's swimmer is ceaselessly becoming other while moving through a vast milieu but Amanda Baggs (2007) equally shares with us the openness of the world from the confines of her room. Baggs identifies herself as an autist and in her video In My Language she first expresses her relationship to what she encounters without words and through what she calls her 'native language' (Baggs, 2007, 3minutes 17), which I will elaborate below. In the second part of the film the footage is accompanied by a voiceover that relates something of her engagement with the world through the spoken word. Spoken language is a means of expression unavailable to Baggs and therefore the voiceover is created by computer software that expresses her typed words through an electronically generated "voice". The first, unexplained, footage reveals that Baggs interacts in a multi-sensory way with all aspects of the environment that she encounters.
In her ‘native language’ (Baggs, 2007, 3minutes 17) she smells, she touches, she tastes, she listens, she looks, she sways back and forth; all of this she does rhythmically and all the while she hums the rhythm with which she moves. The attentiveness of her engagement with the world heightens the attentiveness of the viewer. As a viewer I am invited to experience the precise quality of movement of the flag flapping in the wind in the distance through the window, its lightness, its rhythm, the way it furls and unfurls in the wind all flow through Baggs's movement. Baggs does not imitate or symbolise the flag; she is becoming flag. The texture of the wooden drawer handle, its grooves, its density are brought to my attention by the detail of Baggs's touch and the rhythmical sound that she creates with this touch and that she attends to. Baggs's engagement with the objects in her room reveals the multiplicity of intensities that intertwine to express the ipseity of each thing that she encounters. In the voiceover Baggs notes that, paradoxically, this immersion in the thick of the world is interpreted by the neuro-typical as her excluding herself from the world; whereas if she does exclude aspects of the environment from her awareness and relates to it through a more limited set of responses (as the neuro-typical tend to) then this is interpreted as her engaging more fully in the world.

Baggs notes that the neuro-typical only consider her to be communicating when she communicates through typing, yet earlier in the voiceover, when describing her relationship to the running water that her hand is at that moment dancing within, she did not talk of communicating with the water but described herself as being in conversation with it. Conversation suggests a back and forth of negotiation whereas communication suggests the closure of some "thing" to be communicated. Baggs does not discuss the

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76 Arguably they are not yet objects as they are not yet fully determined. A point Massumi makes when discussing the experience of autists (Manning and Massumi 2010). Massumi uses the term objectile to describe the not yet fully formed object encountered in the immediacy of experience.
difference between conversation and communication in her voiceover but her footage and her careful choice of words when describing her experiences invites this distinction. Baggs constantly redefines both herself and what she encounters by continuously becoming other: becoming water, becoming flag, becoming drawer-knob. Rather than confining herself within the confines of communication, which merely expresses what is already recognisable, Baggs expresses a co(i)mplicated trace of interlacing textures. The specificity of Baggs's movement and words is telling. To be sensitive to the thick of the world is not to reduce everything to a mush but is, rather, to develop an inclusive but highly differentiated sensitivity to the swarm of sensations released in any encounter. Baggs refuses to reduce things to their immediate use-value yet it is important to emphasise that her powers of discernment are strikingly specific. As Manning and Massumi (2010) explore in their discussion of neuro-diversity, the autist's excess of awareness is not a failure to differentiate but a function of their inclusiveness. Baggs refuses to discriminate against some textures of experience in favour of others. The "thick" environment that hosts what Manning and Massumi call the 'dance of attention' (Manning and Massumi, 2010, 12 minutes) is also a smooth space of non-discrimination.

Baggs is not romanticizing her life as an autist and she intends her film 'as a strong statement of the existence and value of many different kinds of thinking and interaction' (Baggs, 2007, 7 minutes 10 seconds). She is acutely aware of how easily the neuro-typical misread her hyper-inclusivity and notes: 'I would honestly like to know how

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77 Baggs's emphasis on communication is perhaps necessary in the context of her concern to assert her engagement with the world to a society dominated by the neuro-typical.
78 Manning and Massumi (2010) make a distinction between complex and complicated that I am drawing on here.
79 See chapter 3 for a discussion of smooth and striated space. Smooth space is a space that unformed forces pass through. It is non hierarchical and Deleuze and Guattari (1987) contrast it with the ordered hierarchy of striated space.
many people, if you met me on the street, would believe I wrote this' (2007, 6 minutes 22 seconds). The point she makes so eloquently is that, contrary to the assumptions of the neuro-typical, she is not the one who is excluding the world.

By becoming with the world both the swimmer and Baggs bring to the fore the subversion of dualism that the kinaesthetic provocations seek to agitate. The first provocation (that first person kinaesthetic experience is irreducible to third party interpretation) underscores how Baggs and Deleuze’s swimmer circumvent a world of communicable things in favour of a world of sensory becomings. What the stories of Baggs and the swimmer underline is that, rather than being a function of the inner/outer dichotomy of containment, the un-transferability of these sensory becomings is a function of the radical openness of their context. The openness of this context is preserved by the second provocation (attending). Baggs and the swimmer hold back from imposing an assumed knowledge of what drawer-knobs or waves might do and instead attend to the intensities released into passage by their encounter with them. By refusing the dualism of knowing and not knowing they wait, they watch (and touch and taste and smell and listen) and are subject to those intensities. The third provocation (becoming almost transparent) affords this passage of intensities from wave to swimmer, drawer-knob to Baggs and vice versa, and brings the indeterminacy of subjectivity to the surface, refusing the boundaries of self and world and now and then.

Deleuze's (1994) swimmer ceaselessly learns how to swim. Every stroke in every sea is a process of learning. Baggs (2007) is similarly absorbed in the attentiveness that Deleuze calls learning and Protevi defines as 'a habit of creative transformations of habits' (2010, p. 39). Protevi's definition serves to highlight that becoming with the world is itself a habit, a practice of suspending the baggage of constraint and prediction
yet nevertheless trusting that life will continue. Yet arguably the habit of ceaselessly becoming treads dangerously close to the demand of the dominant discourse to endlessly learn more; therefore it is important to elucidate the difference between the two perspectives. The dominant discourses of learning construe learning as an accumulative process, largely happening inside people's heads and functioning as a means of individualised successive progression (from ignorance towards knowledge, from lack towards less lack). Deleuzian learning, on the other hand, affirms the power of letting go. The dominant discourses view learning as therapeutic but for Deleuze's swimmer learning is affirmative. The Deleuzian swimmer, like the releasing dancer, is suspended in a here and now that dissolves divisions of material and imagined, before and after, self and world. Yet the habit of creative transformation is a habit of curiosity that needs to be practised as it is easy to lose touch with its potency. When curiosity fades into the background we rush to action, assuming and asserting embedded constraints and expectations, perceiving only that which sustains us in a world within our own existing horizons.

**Experience**

In chapter 2 I found education to be dominated by an accumulative, personalised and performative dynamic that stands in stark contrast to what I am proposing here. Simons and Masschelein's (2008) analysis of the self-understanding of contemporary learners, as discussed in chapter 2, is worth returning to now as there is a remarkable resonance between the self understanding of the learner they portray and Colebrook's (2011) analysis of the self understanding suggested by autopoiesis. Simons and Masschelein portray the learner as an individualised entity who sees only their own horizons and
whose learning is a function of actions in an environment that is always for them. In this learning environment of hyper-autonomy what is at stake in any moment is a perceptive recognition of what is useful on the basis of what has been useful before.

Masschelein's (2006, 2010a, 2010b) response to the malaise of the contemporary learner is to turn away from the dominant discourse of learning and to re-think education as a particular quality of experience that transgresses corporeal boundaries. His plea for a quality of attentiveness that is devoid of intention shares much with the argument I have been progressing here. However, as I shall go on to explore, Masschelein interprets the transgression of corporeal boundaries as trauma and in doing so leaves the priority of the inner/outer dichotomy intact. Masschelein's account is therefore constrained in the same way as Maturana and Varela's (1980) account of organic learning and cannot overcome the normative constraints of ideal well-being; constraints that occlude the possibility of just education.

Masschelein (2006, 2010a, 2010b) distinguishes e-ducative practice from teaching (educare). The latter suggests the teacher holds a position of knowledge whereas e-ducation draws on the etymology e-ducere and is suggestive of a leading out or reaching out into the world. For Masschelein to be led out into the world is an experience that calls our sense of self into question and, drawing on Foucault, he refers to this experience as de-subjectivation (Masschelein 2006). De-subjectivation, he explains, is an experience of meeting a limit. It is not only an experience of not knowing but is also, to some degree, an experience of loss. In Masschelein's words: 'a limit-experience is precisely an experience that transforms us, which makes something in us to [sic] die’ (2006, p. 571). Masschelein's claim is that a limit experience (or experience of e-ducation) leads us out from the norms, habits and perspectives that
constrain us, making education a critical practice. How we practise this practice of critique is through paying attention to the world 'not only to make it known, but to make it 'real' or 'present'" (2010a, p. 276). Masschelein emphasises that attention is different from the dynamic of recognition or consciousness because attention leads us out into 'no man’s land' and no man’s land is for everybody, which therefore makes it for 'nobody in particular' (2010a, p. 288). Attention therefore suspends our intentions as a somebody in particular and brings with it a dynamic of play: attention can be drawn in any direction.

Masschelein (2010a, 2010b) develops a specific critical practice of educating the gaze that he realises through inviting his students to go walking. For Masschelein an invitation to go walking is an invitation to share a limit experience as it is an invitation to pay (or more accurately, to allow a play in) attention that displaces and disorients our gaze and in doing so makes the here and now alive for us. The activity of walking therefore releases the power of the present, an idea Masschelein takes from Walter Benjamin's distinction between walking and flying: 'The power of a country road is different when one is walking over it from when one is flying over it in an airplane' (Benjamin, 1979, cited in Masschelein 2010a, p. 278). For Masschelein, after Benjamin, the power of the road walked is that it physically commands us. Rather than viewing the lay of the land with an outside eye our gaze is propelled by the lines we follow and is thus liberated from the constraints of our intentions. Masschelein (2010a) repeatedly uses the imagery of cuts to evoke the dynamic with which the gaze is interrupted and taken along a new trajectory and to emphasise that this displacement of the gaze functions as a transgression of our boundaries by displacing the priority of our

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80 Masschelein (2010) elaborates this practice both as an educational practice and as a practice of educational research
intentions. He then goes on to draw on Foucault's observation that critique is a question of attitude in order to suggest that being 'present to the present' (2010a, p. 286) is an attitude that does not judge or evaluate, project or imagine and is an attitude that 'defers the expectation of a benefit' (2010a, p. 283). Experience, then, is an experience of 'the truth that comes out of the real' (2010a, p. 285) and is free from representation or interpretation. An educated gaze has a quality of tactility, it is to have an open regard for the world that disrupts the limits of 'I' although, as Masschelein confirms, 'it is certainly personal (and attached to the body), involving us, involving our "soul"' (2010a, p. 287).

In seeking to distinguish education from the limitations of self-sustaining learning Masschelein positions this experience of de-subjectivation as a performance of critique. Although he emphatically and convincingly re-positions critique as free from rationality, opinion or utopian ends he nevertheless sees it as offering an experience of individual freedom. In the previous chapter I explored how an orientation towards freedom infused Biesta's conception of the educator with a tinge of heroics and the privileging of freedom by Masschelein displays the same heroic tendencies. For example the gaze is 'liberated' (2010a, p. 281), and we find 'our soul' in a 'practical freedom' (2010a, p. 287). Education is also heroic in its respectful regard for the world for the world is preserved as an absolute exteriority, untouched by our interpretation or imagination. Moreover, although Masschelein emphasises that any pedagogy that exposes us to no man's land is an invitation to go walking the detail of his actualisation of this invitation in the literal sense (his particular invitation to his students to go walking) reinforces the heroism that undergrids the notion of being "led out". Postgraduate students undertaking a course called 'world forming education' travelled with Masschelein to post conflict cities and walked, sometimes in the dark, on routes
determined by the drawing of random lines on the map; to and from nowhere in particular (2010a). The locations were undoubtedly edgy and thus served to bring forth the (albeit productive) trauma of de-subjectivation. Yet, as with Biesta's heroism as discussed in the previous chapter, this heroic responsibility of the educator is cloaked in humility, for Masschelein contends that e-ducating the gaze calls for what he describes as a 'poor pedagogy' (2010a, p. 283). A poor pedagogy is one that lacks meaning, goes nowhere in particular and is devoid of explanations or justifications. It is a pedagogy that merely invites student and teacher to go walking and expose themselves. For Masschelein, "experience" is being in this (ex)position of vulnerability: 'As soon as one leaves this exposition the gaze changes and we get objects (and objectives) appearing to subjects, we get knowledge instead of experience' (2010a, p. 284).

Masschelein's desire to encounter the world as it is resonates strongly with the conception of education I am advancing here but yet the heroics of his "leading out" affords a very different affective tone. It is striking that to traverse along paved streets leaves no impression on the streets. The world remains an exteriority. This is consistent with Masschelein's attitude of regard, his privileging of vision (albeit a nomadic seeing) and his emphasis on our distance from the world. Ingold (2011) highlights the distinction between walking on pavements and walking on unpaved terrain by pointing out that in the former case we merely 'skim the surface of a world already mapped out' and are therefore walking 'on' the world' rather than 'in' it (2011, p. 44). Ingold points out that when walking on unpaved terrain we have a tactile experience of the world's indeterminacy through our feet (although, as Ingold emphasises, this is mediated by our footwear); the world impresses itself upon us but at the same time our feet leave a mark, pressing into the world a trace not only of their placement on the ground but also of the rhythm and gait of our walking. On a path,
therefore, we not only leave an imprint but walk in the imprint of others. Ingold (2011) also emphasises that walking is a rhythmical activity and highlights how the iterative quality of rhythm distinguishes it from mechanical repetition. In his discussion of sawing a plank of wood, which he explains is a processual activity like walking, Ingold (2011) exposes how skilled sawing is not a case of repeating the same movement exactly. On the contrary, the skill of sawing is a function of making micro-adjustments with each stroke in order to navigate the micro-changes emerging in the cut you are making. The same is true of walking in a landscape for the terrain underfoot is always changing. Thus for Ingold's walker difference in itself performs a calling into question that is not dependent on the heroism of the gaze (or the danger of the location) but is already at work in the processual negotiation that is walking. Masschelein's walker finds 'a practical freedom of the soul' (2010a, p. 287) in her faithful regard for the world. Ingold's walker inhabits the world and leaves a trace. At this juncture it is worth making a distinction between Ingold's use of the word trace and Derrida's. For both writers the trace arises from movement. For Derrida the trace is a movement of non-presence that allows for the contamination of language and identity. Ingold's trace, however, materialises as a lasting mark on a surface. For Ingold (2007) traces can either add a layer to an existing surface such as chalk on a board, or they can be reductive; removing material from the traversed surface for example by scratching or scoring. The path-walker leaves a reductive trace.

It is important educationally that we make a difference to the material world for without this possibility we remain positioned as primordially lacking. For education to be otherwise than therapeutic it must be an experience of negotiation with the world. Education can only be educational if it has a consequence. Thus, for education to matter it must matter.
Ingold uses the terrain of the path to effectively illustrate the difference between walking on the world and walking in it yet the viscosity of kinaesthetic experience is always there to inhabit. Even on a less porous surface we are in a negotiation with gravity. The fall of each step is a new fall, its suspension a new suspension. Masschelein's (2006, 2010a, 2010b) e-ducation, like Ingold's (2011) inhabitation, invites us to attend to the suchness of here and now but Masschelein overlooks that the here and now is not just the passing of this instant and not just what we are passing by. Whereas Masschelein (2010a) constructs imagination as transportation to another world and thus to be avoided, Ingold foregrounds how difference in itself is drawn out by the sensitivity of our imagination and he thus opens an imaginative dimension without leaving the world of materiality. Ingold's (2011) walker, like Deleuze's passive synthesis and like Skinner's pedagogy, frees imagination from fantasy and image from representation and places the imagined and the material on the same ontological plane. To imagine is to draw difference from the world. For Ingold, Skinner, Blake, Baggs and Deleuze, sensation functions as a constant thoroughfare between the real/imagined; material/mind; actual/virtual; inner/outer. Ingold contends that the imagination tends to be derided as mere 'figments' yet if we bother to pay attention to the phenomenal world we discover that it too is 'figmented' (2011, p. 198). With no hierarchy between the perceived and the imagined Ingold proposes that: 'these figments are but outward sensible forms that give shape to the inner generative force of life itself' (2011, p. 198). Although I depart from Ingold's attribution of life's force to a distinctly "inner" generative power his central argument regarding the status of the imagination is crucial. Elsewhere, Ingold (2000a) uses the passage between the material and the imagined to argue that knowledge stems from an education in attention; for if the forms things take 'whether in the imagination or on the ground' arise from our involvement in and with
the world then there is no need for them to cross an inner/outer private/public threshold 'from the interiority of my brain to the world outside' or *vice versa* (Ingold, 2000a, p. 145).

Ingold's foregrounding of the passage between sensation and perception, real/imagined; mind/material; virtual/actual beautifully articulates the *multi-dimensionality* that I am arguing is crucial to the experience of education. Where I depart from Masschelein is that he orients experience in one direction: *out*. In chapter 2 I criticised Hanna's attachment to an ideal of human biomechanical perfection: upright, forward facing, and with freedom to rotate around oneself on the sagittal plane. Masschelein's heroic education valorises an equivalent ideal subjectivity. The walker may rotate around himself to look at the world as it is but fundamentally he is oriented by freedom. Freedom is "out" ahead and it is "for me". The subject is upright and moving forward.

For Masschelein, and as discussed in the previous chapter for Biesta, freedom is grounded on private/public, inner/outer and even to a certain extent mind/body divides. Yet beneath the heroics of freedom what is at stake for both Masschelein and Biesta is the future. In each case the writers are responding to a learning environment that limits horizons to survival and both of them reinstate the idea of a future "ahead" without constraining that future to the horizon of rational autonomy. Yet they overlook that if we inhabit the world there is no need to cross an inner/outer divide for education to happen and that therefore an incalculable future does not lie exclusively in the trauma of interruption or the achievement of response. Bodily becomings need no heroic gesture because we are not "led out" to them; becomings are always multi-dimensional. The intrinsic value of education is not dependent on heroic actions and neither is the furtherance of justice. We are not "led out" to justice. If we are always orienting
forward we are literally looking the other way for we are overlooking the forgotten others that lurk elsewhere, including the habits that constrain us.

At the beginning of this chapter I referred to Blake's longing for a world innocent of dualist hierarchies and observed that while he used the image of childhood to explore this attitude I was interested in the possibility of cultivating this attitude through attention to the flux of the world. Masschelein grapples with something similar when he and Simons (2008) describe the attitude of attentiveness they wish to cultivate in their students as one through which we confront our own infancy. Yet (our own) infancy is something we have lost, which means we wander through the no man's land of experiencing the world as it is (de-subjectivation) as a function of a double loss. This marks us as diaspora, who even in no-man's land retain a trace of their tribal identity. In contrast the innocent attitude of becoming with the world opens the possibility of a different future without the rupture of ex-position. This is because our experience of the world as it is, here and now, can be drawn from a multitude of co-existing levels. Such a radically inclusive shaping of experience allows us to wander without a sense of loss. We wander not because we have lost the security of "home" or identity, or because we are seeking a lost infancy but because our sense of home or self extends to include the whole world. In the next section I will explore this difference in more detail through examining the distinction Ingold (1986) makes between nomadic bands and nomadic tribes. Ingold's discussion brings another dimension of inner/outer dualism to the fore, one at the heart of both Biesta and Masschelein's critique of contemporary discourses of learning: the divide between private and public good. His discussion of the bandsman reveals a worldview that dissolves the private/public dichotomy and in doing so removes the need to be "led out".
Bands and tribes

Ingold (1986) distinguishes between nomadic bands and nomadic tribes. He explains that, whereas tribes identify themselves by the boundaries of their community and thus exclude other groups, bandsmen belong to an unbounded collectivity. Discussing the individual bandsman Ingold notes that:

Far from standing opposed to others he incorporates them into the very substance of his being. The people around him, the places he knows, the things he makes and uses are all part of his subjective identity (1986, p. 239).

The bandsman thus relies on everyone but no-one in particular. Having no particular ties makes him radically autonomous even though his identity is indiscriminately inclusive. He avoids relationships of exchange as they would restrict his wandering yet there is no contradiction between his freedom and his commitment to (all) others (human or otherwise) 'since the world of others is enfolded within his own person these are one and the same' (Ingold, 1986, p. 240). As Ingold explains, there is therefore no private/public distinction for a band member.

Ingold (1986) goes on to explain two important consequences to this lack of private/public divide. Firstly, it means that all property (resources, food, shelter etc.) are held on behalf of the world and are therefore are goods that the community 'share in' rather than 'share out' (1986, p. 227). Secondly, even personal skills and attributes are not the property of individuals; for if "I" contain the world then "my" ability to run fast "belongs" to the world. Attributes, skills and talents are thus responsibilities held for the world rather than being endowments owned by, and for the benefit of, individuals. That individuals display specific attributes, skills and talents is not denied because band members are obliged to perform specific duties that exploit these; yet because skills and
attributes are held on behalf of the world rather than belonging to the individual their uneven distribution causes no hierarchical divisions within the society. From this Ingold (1986) draws an important conclusion about the difference between inequality and hierarchy. He notes that hierarchy is relational; it is a property of society and not of individuals in it. However, inequality, as it is conceived of in contemporary Western societies, is associated with differential endowments of intellect, ability, resources etc. In other words, inequality is a property of the individuals whose aggregate makes up the (hierarchical) society. In band societies differential endowment is not opposed to equality. The equality of 'sharing in' opposes hierarchy, and always must do, for 'sharing in' is always for the sake of the world.

The indiscriminate inclusivity of the band stands in stark contrast to the hyper-individualism of the contemporary learning discourse. Vlieghe, Simons and Masschelein (2010), in their opposition to the dominant trend, suggest that creating conditions of radical inclusivity has intrinsic educational value. To do this they extend the notion of e-ducation as ex-position that Masschelein (2010a, 2010b) explores in his invitation to go walking and which is discussed in the above sections of this chapter. Whereas Masschelein's (2010a, 2010b) discussion centres around a power of ex-position generated by the gaze the argument of Vlieghe et al. is that visceral experience has a similar capacity for undoing the subject and therefore of realising previously unimagined ways of being and states of affairs. Vlieghe et al. examine how outbursts of uncontrollable laughter in the classroom can actualise a communal experience that they call 'the democracy of the flesh' (2010, p. 279) and demonstrate that the radical passivity of uncontrollable laughter is educational irrespective of the content that gives rise to it or of any instrumental aims that an outburst of laughter might serve. They therefore make a distinction between a reflective acknowledgement of how laughter
might disrupt the hierarchies of a classroom and a corporeal experience that disrupts our ability to control our behaviour or make sense of our life. They claim that the latter, when commonly shared, gives rise to an experience of 'corporeal democracy' (2010, p. 719) that has intrinsic educational value. Crucially, they distinguish their notion of educational value from 'the traditional aims of education', which they surmise are 'the maximal development of individual capacities and the realization of a flourishing and more just society' (Vlieghe et al. 2010, p. 721). For them, laughter affords a more profound educational purpose. They explain that when laughter is contagious our body is taken over by muscular activity beyond our control: 'we are delivered to vegetative reactions' (Vlieghe et al., 2010, p. 726). In giving ourselves up to unintended bodily instinct we are ex-posed; by losing control of our actions and the sense of our lives we are shocked out of our fixed position. Thus, they argue, when the experience of uncontrollable laughter is shared it becomes an equalising experience that disrupts the established order of things and opens the possibility of an incalculable future (Vlieghe et al., 2010).

Their detailed account of shared laughter powerfully argues that autonomous corporeal function offers the possibility of a shared experience whereby we inhabit a non-hierarchical space; a smooth space that we all share in. Moreover their distinction of educational value from individual achievement or external political aims is precisely what I am arguing is called for. Nevertheless, I depart form them in one respect. In the account of Vlieghe et al. (2010) ex-position is dependent on public display. Indeed Vlieghe et al. emphasise that the public dimension of shared laughter is what makes it contagious and therefore makes it possible for laughter to seizes us without our will. For Vlieghe, Simons and Masschelein, ex-position and ed-ucation are about coming out from the private into the public domain. Elsewhere Vlieghe (2010) extends the
argument of the joint paper by drawing on Judith Butler's more recent work to argue that our bodies carry a public dimension that inescapably exposes us to one another. Yet even here the examples he cites of Butler's exposing or expropriating events are extremes and often involve extreme displays: the grief of mourning or the anger of exclusion and marginalisation for example. In this thesis I am arguing that the simplicity of attending to kinaesthetic sensation might afford a slightly different approach to what education might do because kinaesthetic experience always and already finds us in the world without demanding the rupture of a momentous event and dramatic enactment to make possible an unimagined future. Somatic experience involves more than the grand emotions and the subtlety of sensation reveals the here and now of the world to be already thick with incalculable potentiality.

My difficulty with grounding the possibility of a smoother space and a new future on our being led out and exposed to one another is that it still prioritises an inner/outer, private/public divide that has to be overcome (with education being what leads an individual from one side of the divide to the other). This linking of the intrinsic value of education to an appropriately public display places some boundaries around those for whom the possibility of education is available. It suggests that those who do not or cannot visibly or audibly act or whose actions go unrecognised could be overlooked in the communal space and that they therefore may not play a part in redefining the future. On the other hand, the grounding of the public realm on our being exposed to one another allows Vlieghe et al. to eschew the rationalist (and more powerfully exclusionary) grounding of community in a consensual homogenous, and transparent identity. Yet since they argue that radical inclusivity and unconditional equality is a function of 'the democracy of the flesh' (Vlieghe et al., 2010, p. 733) my question is whether awareness of our own and each other's corporeity need be limited to the display
of grand emotion. Although there are practical questions to open up regarding how to create the conditions for this awareness, Ingold's accounts of walking and sawing already suggest that an attitude of attentiveness and inhabitation is not activity specific. This point will be further explored in the next chapter. Here I restrict the discussion to the possibility of living as the bandsman does and therefore not shaping experience through the inner/outer dichotomies of self and world and private and public. Perhaps paradoxically, Vlieghe et al. open up this possibility, though they do not exploit it. They open it by citing Lingis's notion of 'a community of those who have nothing in common' (Lingis 1993, cited by Vlieghe et al., 2010, p. 278). Although Vlieghe et al. cite Lingis to support their call for ex-posture Jean Luc Nancy's (2003) elaboration of the "nothing" that Lingis refers to affords a community that disavows any public/private divide.

Nancy (2003) explores how, rather than implying the lack of a shared something, the "nothing" that is held in common is the border, which is always a no-man's land. No man's land is the space of no thing. I am not suggesting that Vlieghe, Simons or Masschelein overlook the no-thing of no-man's land. Indeed, as discussed above, Masschelein (2010a) specifically refers to it in his invitation to go walking. The distinction I want to draw is between the diaspora and the bandsman. There is a difference between encountering the elsewhere of no-man's land as a result of being forced out of position and encountering no-mans land with an attitude that all land belongs to no man in particular and thus belongs to everyman. Nancy's no-man's land is the latter, that is to say it is the no-mans land of the band, for he talks of the borderless border of a river that gives way to a bank that opens onto shores that open on to the sea. In casting the border as a passage of forces Nancy refuses its status as boundary and opens it into infinity. Moreover, if one considers how the pull of gravity
acts on the flow of a river then the significance of Nancy's notion of a dynamic flow is highlighted; for the pull of gravity moves river water in a spiralling, lemniscate pattern whereby it flows from one side to the other, gathering oxygen and nutrients that enrich the whole stream. The borderless border between banks and stream (and one bank and the other) is constituted and constantly re-constituted by this lemniscate flow allowing the beneficent attributes of each element to be shared by all. Nancy's notion of community is similarly constituted by an intra-change of forces that he calls an 'existential sharing' and that he notes 'carries with it the instance of a work and an exchange themselves a priori' (Nancy 2003, p.102). The work of tuning in to an intra-change of forces is precisely the work that tuning into kinaesthetic experience brings to the fore. Rather than foregrounding the finitude of here! now! self! others! private! public! through uncontrollable grief, laughter, lust, fear or anger we might tune into the traversal (both a work and a passage) of this moment in this world through the simplicity of a breath or a shift of weight, passing through, never to be repeated.

**The dynamics of education**

Privileging the private encloses us in the limits of our own horizons and de-sensitises us from the chance of other ways of living in this world. Yet the possibility of the as-yet-unforseen need not lie exclusively in the performance of a leading out. Alternatively we might tune in to the dynamic forces of the here and now, for in the passing of each moment reverberate an infinity of pasts and unimagined potential futures, we just lose touch with that from time to time. Tuning in gives shape to experience through a contemplative movement that is ephemeral; understated and perhaps not always easily translatable into gestures of communication; yet the "in" of tuning in is in the world, not
inside a boundary of isolation. The world invites us to approach living otherwise than through structures of finitude and this radically challenges the dominant notion of education, which assumes finitely apportioned subjectivities and attributes. Like Vlieghe, Simons and Masschelein I seek to resist the positioning of education as a private good and like them I turn to the body to think and do otherwise. I agree that the work of education can actualise an experience of "sharing in" but I am additionally interested in whether this inclusivity can extend beyond shared acts of public performance. My reason for this is twofold. Firstly, the emphasis on a separate public domain with its reliance on acts of shared display perpetuates a mind/body dualism. The body is cast as the site of grand emotions whose surfacing *overwhelms* rationality. My argument in this chapter has been that, on the contrary, sense is fundamentally *shaped* by the quietly invisible sensations of living in the world. The possibility of just education depends on remaining sensitive to the quiet and easily overlooked. Secondly, what has emerged from this chapter is the proposal that education hosts an experience of passage and my interest is in how the educator fosters this hospitality without casting themselves as the arbiters of experience. I consider this in the next chapter.

**Afterword/Afterwards**

In an endnote to his discussion of inviting his students to go walking Masschelein confides that:

> Every day, in long talks, I asked each of them very simple questions. What have you seen? What have you heard? What did you think about it? What do you make of it? (2010a, p. 288).

Here Masschelein stays true to a poor pedagogy, in that he as teacher is not offering any answers; yet his questioning does limit the hospitality of his invitation in that it asks his
students to make sense of their experience. What his questions demand is not only the
evidentiary power of language but the exclusionary power of recall and/or response:
ordering, defining and ultimately regaining one's integrity by maintaining a (dis)stance.
To borrow Ingold’s (2011, 2007) image of opening of the closed circle of the organism
into the line of a life lived: these questions loop the line cut through back into the circle
of an organism.

In any sensorial encounter there is an excess that cannot be reduced to sense but that
nevertheless reverberates in reminiscence. It cannot be recalled on demand but its
resonance might powerfully resurface when we least expect it. Perhaps it surfaces
sometime while we are in the midst of another, unrelated, sense making activity or
perhaps it glimmers in a drawing, a poem or the humming of a tune.
Chapter 6 - Traversing

Introduction

The legacy of Cartesian dualism is that subjective experience is conceptualised as excluding others and as protected from the world. In chapter 2 I examined how these exclusionary dichotomies have shaped the dominant discourses of education. I argued, with reference to the work of Allan (2008); Ball, (2008, 2006, 1994); Gillborn & Youdell (2000); Strathern (1997, 2000) and others, that the resulting emphasis on validating the performance of discrete subjectivities perpetuates hierarchical divisions: divisions between who is or who is not, between who is more and who is less, between who can or who cannot become educated. The intention of this thesis is to turn away from this instrumental, socialising dynamic in the interests of a more just education; that is to say an education that is more just in that it circumvents the injustices of possessive individualism that arise from dualist structures and at the same time is just education, affirmed for itself and not oriented to extrinsic ends.

Chapters 4 and 5 disturbed the boundaries of self and other and self and world respectively and in this chapter I trouble the duality of self and work. This is to some extent a dangerous strategy for some would argue that it is only by maintaining strict boundaries between "self" and "work" that we can avoid the performative discourse of relentless diagnosis, relentless intervention and ever more learning that dominates contemporary educational practice. However, there is a distinction between the troubling of boundaries I am proposing and the tyranny of performativity. Performativity makes for endless work but always with an end in mind. It is just that as each end is achieved another one appears ad infinitum. The continuous learning of the learning environment, therefore, is driven by the promise of what lies ahead: a "better "
qualification, a "better" job, more money, a "better" life, more status, being a "better" person etc. The dynamic of keeping busy is valorised, as there is always something more to be had. On such a reckoning education is a 'thing' outside ourselves that we appropriate for its use-value.

What I am proposing, however, is quite different. I am conceptualising education as a de-instrumentalised practice of attention whereby we stay in the midst of what is happening here and now. In the previous chapter I articulated this practice of attention as a commitment to passage and to further elaborate the distinction between passage and performativity it is useful to refer back to Deleuze and Guattari's (1987) discussion of the rhizome, which I introduced in chapter 3 of this thesis. Rhizomes are horizontally spreading stems that mutate in relation to their environment, off-shooting in new directions when blocked or split. A rhizome perpetually continues but where it goes is contingent on what happens. It is always in the middle and its passage is never a means to an end. The passage of a rhizome is for the sake of passage. Therefore, although the rhizome has no destination it seeks none and so lacks nothing. Performativity, on the other hand, is never ending because it serialises destination and leaves us always lacking.

In this chapter I trouble the dualism of self and work by considering the dynamics of passage for the sake of passage and examine the consequences of this meddling and middling for both education and justice. Firstly, I draw on Vansieglehem's (2009) critique of the performative drive dominating current practice and her invitation to approach teaching as a responsibility to care for the present. Vansieglehem proposes an ethical praxis that involves letting go of our perpetual future-oriented busyness in order to inhabit what is happening in the here and now and I further elaborate the dynamics of
such a *praxis* through Ingold's (2011) discussion of inhabitation and Deleuze's claim that ethics is the responsibility 'not to be unworthy of what happens to us' (1990, p. 129). I consider the difference between practising to be worthy and practising not to be unworthy by partly following and partly departing from Bryant's (2009) treatment of Deleuze's distinction between true problems and false ones. I open up my point of departure by using kinaesthetic experience and the work of choreographer Rosemary Butcher to foreground the virtual dimension that is overlooked when working towards serial ends but that insists through inhabitation and becoming. I then turn to how Colebrook (2008); Daignault (2008); Sellar (2012) and Bogue (2013) variously draw on the co-creativity of becoming in their conceptualisations of what it is to teach before exploring how kinaesthetic awareness both extends and radicalises the proposals they make. Drawing on Kuppers's reflections on the unknowability of dancing bodies and with reference to Wallin's (2010) deterritorialisation of the curriculum I argue that neither students nor teachers orient the dynamics of passage, for the passage of education quietly unfolds through the work that is between them.

**Who we are, here and now**

As indicated above, the dominant discourses of instrumentalism and performativity reify education and position it as an external object that we appropriate for its use-value. In chapter 2 I explored both Biesta's (2006, 2009a, 2010b) and Simons and Masschelein's (2008) critiques of these discourses and in chapters 4 and 5 respectively I examined their arguments for alternative approaches. Vansieleghem (2009) draws on both Biesta and Simons and Masschelein in her exploration of the dynamics of education-as-use-value and echoes their concern that the emphasis on learning over-
individualises the outcomes of education and moves it from a public to a private responsibility. She explicitly supports Biesta's call for an education 'beyond learning' (Biesta, 2006, cited by Vansiecleghem, 2009, p. 102) and, like Biesta, she draws on Arendt's essay The crisis in education (2006, orig. 1954) to approach this task. Arendt sees the essence of education lying in the next generation's capacity to renew the world and she therefore gives educators the responsibility of preserving the world as unfinished and open to these new beginnings. As discussed in chapter 4, Biesta (2006, 2009a, 2010b) picks up Arendt's notion of new beginnings and uses it to develop his conceptualisation of subjectification, whereby a teacher cannot determine the student's responses. However, rather than emphasise the beginners and their beginnings the dimension of Arendt's thinking that Vansiecleghem specifically highlights is the educator's responsibility of preservation. Vansiecleghem envisages this responsibility as a practice of attunement to the here and now and, as I shall discuss below, by doing so she allows for a dimension of educational experience that escapes instrumental demands.

Vansiecleghem's (2009) analysis of the hyper-individualism that dominates current practice is that it leaves education primarily directed towards self-optimisation and she describes this orientation as '[t]he will to construct one's own life' (2009, p. 104). As Vansiecleghem points out, such an approach demands that any hurdles blocking self-maximisation must be removed and to this end any difficulties encountered must be diagnosed as problematic and made subject to intervention. Vansiecleghem is troubled by the unbridled instrumentalism of the emphasis on managing problems and investing in opportunities and conceptualises the subject in this scenario as 'without destination' (2009, p. 104). She envisages the current scenario as producing desperate, not docile, bodies as it constructs subjectivities geared only to survival, their lack of destination
leaving them nothing to hold on to, in constant need of more feedback, more interventions and more education.

To contextualise why she wants to think differently Vansieleghem (2009) follows Arendt (1977) in highlighting the distinction between bios and zoe. Zoe, or bare life, denotes the labour of survival that is common to all organisms whereas bios indicates the "good" or ethical life. Arendt's thesis, which she in turn takes from Aristotle, is that what constitutes bios can only be agreed through freedom of speech and action in a shared public realm. On this account the exclusively human realm of bios excludes the instinctual and animal dimensions of our existence (zoe) that are reserved for the private realm of the family. The crux of the distinction between zoe and bios is that zoe is concerned with that we live (survival) whereas bios is concerned with how we live (values). Arendt's (1977) vision of a democratic society is one where private and public co-exist as separate realms with protected functions and in The crisis of education (2006, orig. 1954) she positions education as a quasi-public realm that is protected from the pressures of survival and yet holds open what the "good life" or “valuable life” might be (O'Byrne, 2005; Vansieleghem, 2011; Vansieleghem 2009). Vansieleghem's (2009) analysis of contemporary education is that the grasping bid for the satisfaction of personal needs and wants has resulted in the labour of survival invading the educational realm and therefore overwhelming the possibility of a shared public space of voice and action. Although Vansieleghem links education to the possibility of publicly agreed ends she stays clear of suggesting that achievement of this possibility should be the desired end of education.81 She argues against this strategy for two reasons. Firstly, these would merely become a new set of beliefs for those desperately seeking self-

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81 Masschelein (1998), whose approach to the private/public distinction is discussed in chapter 5, also draws on Arendt's discussion of bios and zoe, although he privileges the public realm in much less ambiguous terms than Vansieleghem.
maximisation to personalise and appropriate. Secondly, Vansieleghem's work consistently remains true to Arendt's (2006) disavowal of a developmental perspective. For Vansieleghem, education is not a means to an end; it is simply 'an invitation to take critical care of the present' (2009, p. 117). By offering no outcome or reward Vansieleghem sensitises the reader to the ephemeral quality of what is cared for and to the open curiosity that permeates this attitude of care. To care for the present is to question with no hope of an answer for the present is always passing:

To preserve newness is to teach in such a way that we experience and change the relation we maintain to ourselves. Education is not concerned with how the child is to be addressed, or with how it is possible to address someone without at the same time determining them, but rather with the experience of the question of ‘who we are here and now?’ (2009, p. 102).

Vansieleghem (2009) starts out by asserting what it is (or is not) to teach. However, by approaching the question of "who we are" from the perspective of felt sense she radically changes the pedagogical dynamic and offers up a shared space of becoming. She eschews any mind over body, man over matter hierarchy and disassociates "action" from necessarily denoting the achievement of realising a conscious intention, repositioning it as that which we attend to in the stillness and quiet of our felt sense. Her refusal of dualism affirms that what is taught is not an ex-carnate "thing" that can be appropriated and that "Who we are here and now" is not a question of either psychology or moral judgement. What matters through education is that we feel the processual nature of existence. Vansieleghem therefore troubles the distinction between zoé and bios (although she does not refuse it) by hinting that ethical action is something we inhabit rather than achieve.82 As I shall explore below, with reference to Ingold (2011), to inhabit is to be in a relationship of co-creation that is other to the dynamic of

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82 She additionally draws on Agamben (2005) to support the argument that that 'the will to construct one's own life' is not a biological given but itself the product of a given bio(s)-political machine.
acting on the world. Therefore, by loosening the grip of 'the will to construct one's own life' (2009, p. 104) Vansieleghem disturbs not only the hegemony of hyper-individualism but also the dualist hierarchy of mind over matter that underpins this particular notion of construction.

There is no before and after in the pedagogical dynamic of attending to the present and therefore Vansieleghem does not cast the educator as a heroic figure, albeit that she shares with Biesta the language of coming into presence and with Masschelein the language of ex-posure that I subjected to critique in chapters 4 and 5 respectively. Her conception of what education could be for does not privilege reason over passion and thus affords the possibility that attention to that we live (our corporeality or zoe) is inseparable from the how of our living (bios). The question of who "we" are, therefore, is a question of attention to what is happening. By re-envisioning education as a 'praxis' that attends to 'what is' (Arendt, 1977, cited in Vansieleghem, 2009, p. 115) Vansieleghem conceives of an education that is destination-less without being desperate. As she puts it:

> Becoming responsive means the acceptance that there is no reason why the world is here and that there is no reason why we are in the world. And this requires our attention, beyond all intention, projects or ends (Vansieleghem, 2009, p. 115).

Vansieleghem's foregrounding of attention suggests that rather than attempt to construct our own lives we might instead do well to inhabit them. Her invitation to think otherwise about what education is for is offered in a poetic tone that avoids concretising a different world to live in, however her radical openness is counterbalanced by a hint of perfectionism. In the above quotation, for example, there is a religiosity to her attentiveness that wrecks us away from the hurly burly of life. There is perhaps, after
all, a subtle difference between preserving the present through the *praxis* of care and sticking with the messiness and volatility of where we find ourselves. The latter is to practise affirmation. An attitude of care involves a dimension of interpretation whereas affirmation says yes to the world as it is occurring. To say yes to the happenings we find ourselves in is nevertheless an ethical practice. As Deleuze explains: 'Either ethics makes no sense at all, or this is what it means and has nothing else to say: not to be unworthy of what happens to us' (1990: 169). His invitation 'not to be unworthy' does not ask us to be worthy. What is more there are differences between practising not being worthy, practising not being unworthy, and practising not to be unworthy. The first turns away from worthiness but perhaps suggests worthiness is lacking; the second suggests I lack worthiness but should aspire not to be so lacking; and the third is purely affirmative and de-stratifies un/worthiness from being a personal attribute or achievement of mine. How I practise 'not to be unworthy' must be lived anew every time.

**Gatherings**

To approach the question of how "not to be unworthy" it is perhaps useful to consider it in relationship to some of Deleuze's other concepts. Bryant (2011) undertakes this task and begins with the reminder that for Deleuze both individuals and societies are assemblages; that is to say they are gatherings within a milieu that is replete with all sorts of other gatherings. Bryant calls the process by which gatherings compose, decompose and recompose differently one of 'ethical ecology' (2011, p. 29), using the etymology of both ethics (from *ethea* meaning accustomed place) and ecology (from

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83 See chapter 3 for discussion of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of assemblage.
oikos, meaning dwelling) to assert that the relationship between a gathering and a milieu is one of inhabitation. Bryant (2011) explains that to inhabit an environment is to live within it in a dynamics of co-creation (cf. Ingold, 2011). We gather from the environment in which we are gathered through a process of mutual becoming. Bryant (after Deleuze 1994) therefore observes that although "we" (gathered as an individual or as a society) are gathered in a milieu of ethics this milieu does not pre-exist our unfolding relationships with it; hence the processual nature of the responsibility "not to be unworthy". Bryant then claims that we learn how to inhabit our milieu (and therefore learn how not to be unworthy) though a 'pedagogy of problems' (Bryant, 2011, p. 41). Bryant chooses this terminology because Deleuze's approach to problems is very specific. As Bryant goes on to explain, for Deleuze there are true and false problems and ethics involves learning to sort out the true problems from the false ones. False problems are bounded entities or "things" to be overcome. We stand outside them with a third person perspective for they ask for an answer beyond refute. We cannot overcome true problems, however, for they are not a determinate question that promises a "right" answer ahead. The dynamic of our meeting with a true problem is one of becoming because they are gatherings that we inhabit and that inhabit or haunt us. True problems reverberate in our bodily tissue and by doing so change their consistency; in other words, we both lose our composure. However, how Bryant then goes on to use this dynamic of de/re composition is somewhat at odds with the pedagogy of problems he has set out. He asserts that by composing problems in new ways we can generate new solutions; yet surely the generative power of true problems lies in their persistence as problems.

Bryant (2011) appears to assume that the creativity that problems engender is necessarily innovative and productive of something novel, with the novelty produced in
this instance being new solutions. Yet as Ingold (2011) explores, inhabitation affords an alternative approach to creativity than that of innovation. For Ingold (2011) inhabitation engenders creativity through the practice of improvisation. Ingold cites Deleuze and Guattari to describe improvisation as: 'to join with the world or meld with it' (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, cited in Ingold, 2011, p. 84) and he further explains that the task is to discern what is happening, here and now, and to align our attention with the intricate dynamic flows of what is unfolding. Whereas the emphasis of innovation is to add something to the world through our own interpretative action, Ingold sees improvisation as restorative in tone; for as a practice of attention improvisation renews our relationship to 'the generative fluxes of the world' (Ingold, 2011, p. 29).

Bryant (2011) conceives of the community as a generative field to which new constituents are added and his discussion of novel solutions arises in the specificity of this context. Although within these confines there is possibly an attractive pragmatics to his proposal the notion of novelty nevertheless serves to unnecessarily overdetermine the gatherings of both problem and of community. From an inhabitation perspective new inhabitants do not arrive fully formed but instead 'occur' (Ingold 2011, p. 154 original emphasis) because community is itself a gathering that inhabits the milieu of a wider society within the milieu of a wider world within the milieu of a wider universe whose forces we are also subject to. Moreover communities are gatherings of individuals but these individuals are themselves gatherings of sedimented habits and attitudes that are subject to a current influx of sensation. These various gatherings habit and are inhabited by each other therefore their reconstitution is a function of renegotiation rather than novel additions. These gatherings within gatherings are all entangled in the that and how of our living and in our responsibility not to be unworthy of what occurs.
Ingold's observations on improvisation afford another perspective on the distinction I am drawing between Vansieleghem's reading of Arendt, as discussed in the previous section, and Biesta's, as discussed in chapter 4. Biesta's focus can be described as being on the innovative power of beginners bringing new beginnings into the world whereas Vansieleghem's conception of the power of renewal can be aligned with the improvisation of inhabitation. As I have pointed out, Vansieleghem does not fully commit to staying "in the middle of things" for there are differences between a praxis of care and practising affirmation: differences that reverberate in the difference between emotion and sensation and between preserving the world and being restored to its flux. Nevertheless, there are points of resonance between Vansieleghem's conception of educational responsibility and Deleuze's 'pedagogy of problems' (Bryant, 2011, p. 41) and these resonances afford the argument that both teaching and learning are processes of being alive to what occurs. Deleuze's discussion of learning how to swim affirms this, as the invitation from swimming teacher to student is to 'do with me' (1994, p. 26) whereby teacher and student are improvising together in a shared milieu. Each one discovers different points of sensitivity when aligning themselves with the moving wave particles for they bring different intensities to the smooth space of the sea: different levels of excitement and different levels of skill, different rhythms of stroke and heartbeat and breath; yet all of these intensities contribute to teacher, student and sea becoming other. Protevi (2010) considers that this dynamic of mutual alignment and becoming allows teachers to introduce their students to something (for example a new text or concept) in a way that invites them to 'learn from it rather than gain knowledge from it' (2010, p. 36). Gathering up and being gathered in the subject matter of a lesson allows us to search out its sensitive points and 'nudge it a little' so that 'it and we will be transformed' (Protevi, 2010, p. 36).
Nudging

Kinaesthetic experience invites a closer look the nudging dance that Protevi (2010) proposes. Nudging need not always take the form of a physical touch; Protevi's nudging dance, for example, was between himself, his students and the text of Deleuze's (1994) *Difference and Repetition*. However, by decomposing the concept of nudging through tuning in to the constituent qualities of movement, touch, sensation and rhythm that make a nudge specifically *a nudge*, rather than some other point of contact, I hope to get closer to the essence of what education brings to the surface. The word essence is a tricky one and in using it I do not mean to suggest a fixed and ultimate grounding. I am referring to essence in the way in which Deleuze refers to the truth of a true problem: as that which persists in perplexing us by escaping our definitions; that which enlivens our experience by being always here and gone; that which, like justice, we can never pin down completely but yet whose absence we might feel as a longing in our gut.

The dynamics of nudging are very specific. There is a sense of hesitancy to nudging that is very different from the dynamics of pushing or of manipulating the movement of another person and yet nudging is a powerful force for change. In the Skinner Releasing Technique pedagogy nudging is used as a precursor for introducing the image-action of inner and outer spaces moving in relation to each other, an image-action that draws the dancer's attention to her envelopment in a milieu. Skinner's nudging dance is scrupulously simple and precise and yet in my experience it seems to unfold in an atmosphere of wonder. Nudging always with the unfamiliarity of the back of the hand. Nudging very specifically, perhaps behind the knee or in the front of the shoulder for example. Each nudge is listened to, with the specific site nudged softening

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84 Image-actions are what Skinner calls poetic imagery that may spontaneously evoke movement. Rather than interpreting the images the dancers are invited to merge with the image and to experience it as an unfolding feeling state.
or melting a little as it meets the back of the hand, which is itself softening and melting in the meeting. Skinner uses the expression 'phantom hands' (Skinner, 2003, unpublished teaching notes) to express the way in which the nudging hand feels as if it could pass right through the softening body tissue of the place being nudged. This softening actualises a displacement in space as the reverberation of the softening leads the one being nudged into a shift of weight; just one step away and return. Returning to give a nudge. Alternating roles. Entering into a rhythm. Much the same could be said about the dynamics of touch when dancing a tango. Both the tango and the nudging dance are true problems as they invite re-searching rather than knowledge. To approach learning the tango as gaining knowledge of a repertoire of ready-choreographed steps rather misses the point of the tango. A tango, like the nudging dance, is an improvisation within a specific movement vocabulary and therefore underlines the distinction between improvisation and novelty. We dance with our partner in the consistency of the here and now of the dance that is unfolding. In a tango we search out moments for a hand to nudge a back, a foot to nudge an ankle, a knee to nudge a knee. We dance with a hesitancy that holds us back from anticipating what happens next. As Manning (2007) puts it, the experience of touch in a tango ‘cannot be classified, organised, defined as anything but the moment in passing when I listen(ed) to you’ (2007, p. 29, original parenthesis). The "roles" of male and female tango dancer, or of the one who nudges and the one who is nudged, are not so clear-cut as it seems. To nudge is to be nudged, to touch is to be touched. A touch is always doubled.

Throughout this thesis I have proposed that kinaesthetic experience provokes thinking otherwise about the nudging dance that we call education. I have drawn out three dimensions of kinaesthetic experience as three strands of provocation: the irreducibility of kinaesthetic experience to third person interpretation; the practice of attending; and
the indeterminacy of subjectivity. Nudging dances draw these strands of kinaesthetic
provocation together. We attend to the tango and the nudging dance in the triple sense
of waiting, watching and being in the service of what occurs. The kinaesthetic
experience of these improvisations is non transferable, impossible to generalise from
and even impossible to concretise and communicate fully in language to a third party.
As such there is a kinaesthetic dimension of these duets that remains elusively a "solo"
experience (c.f. Lepkoff, 2008). Nevertheless, my personalised sensations arise in a
dance that unfolds between my self and my partner and which spills into the world. I
am becoming almost transparent and the heat of the phantom hand at my back seems to
pass right through.

Nudging is an invitation to come this way and "do with me". It is an invitation to
meet in the middle, which is very different from an invitation to do as I do. The latter
only works if you want to solve a false problem, the former invites us to luxuriate in the
passage of true ones. My contention is that the in-between of education and learning is
a realm of true problems and I shall draw on Deleuze's distinction between the actual
and the virtual to help me to elaborate on this contention. As discussed in chapter 3,
Deleuze's distinction between the actual and the virtual has nothing to do with what is
real and what is not. The distinction is between "actual" crystallised "things" (the word
nudging, the book Difference and repetition, the known and named steps of a tango)
and the virtual intensities (rhythms, speeds, sensations) that flow through and are
expressed by them. The virtual is therefore already real and might even be thought of
as more real than the actual in as much as it is primordial and precedes our

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85 Nudging, of course, goes on outside the dance studio or the tango salon. Nudging might even occur in a
negative context, children nudging each other to warn of the teacher's reappearance in the playground
perhaps, yet the dynamics of the nudge itself is always invitational: "come this way" or "do with me".
interpretation. The virtual is intensely felt. Munday, for example, uses the example of the 'much loved goldfinch' (2014, p. 195) contrasting the (actual) properties that enable us to distinguish a goldfinch as a "thing" that is distinct from an eagle or a magpie from the virtual realm of a goldfinch merging with wind currents or leaving a trail of red in the sky behind it. The virtual is not lost through the actual, it is rather that we tend to overlook its power, forgetting the complex relationships and differentiations that give rise to the singularity of a moment of experience, seduced as we are by the usefulness, repeatability and communicability of identifiable forms. The virtual is a realm of shifting relationships and of in-bettwens; a realm of passage rather than destination. All dances of attention step into the virtual realm for they seek out what is occurring without destination or goal. The music might stop, the dancers might sit, but surely that is not the goal of the dancing. As Nietzsche puts it: 'Not every end is the goal. The end of a melody is not its goal, and yet if a melody has not reached its end, it has not reached its goal. A parable' (1967, p. 183). Nietzsche therefore de-instrumentalises the 'goal' by untethering it from linear achievement. He foregrounds a dimension of experience that escapes the means end distinction by exceeding the confinement of the actual. The melody might be over but it still haunts us. The dance reverberates in all our tissues. So it is with true problems; they reverberate as predicaments; their "truth" lies in their escape from an actualised solution and in our obligation to let this uncertainty endure. This is the task that Deleuze calls learning and that Vansieleghem describes as what it is to teach.
Predicaments

The notion of a predicament keeps alive both a dimension of feeling perplexed and a dimension of feeling enlivened and attentive to what is happening. The in-between potency of a predicament intensifies the distinction between the dynamics of improvisation/inhabitation and those of innovation and novelty that I have taken from Ingold. Predicaments bring the tension and exhilaration of true problems, persisting as problems, to the fore and this has consequences for education and consequences for justice for it brings into view what we habitually overlook. Before discussing these consequences, however, I turn to the work of choreographer Rosemary Butcher in order to look more closely at what is opened up by allowing a predicament to endure.

My first experience as a professional dancer was with choreographer Rosemary Butcher. At that time, nearly 30 years ago at the time of writing, Butcher's work was controversial because it raised questions about ownership. In those days choreographers, not dancers, were understood as the creators; they created steps for dancers to repeat. Butcher does not do this. Neither does she ask her dancers to respond to choreographic tasks by generating innovative material that she then can select from, edit and organise. Rather than asking them to generate a series of forms she is interested in the sensations that we usually overlook because we are over-concerned with finding a form. Life is always more than we can handle and it is always on the move. There is therefore always an excess of sensation that we do not habitually perceive. Butcher's working process additionally highlights that the move from sensation to perception not only edits but that it is also fashions or fabricates our lived experience. Our perceptions "make sense" of sensual encounter - a compositional dimension that adds the framework of our existing habitual patterns. To deestratify this

86 Flying Lines first performed at Riverside Studios, London 1985
layer of interpretation by her dancers Butcher works back towards what propels an idea rather than going towards its actualisation, a process through which the "idea" provoking the work is expressed as a series of inter-relating qualities of activity. After working with Butcher for five weeks dancer Bettina Neuhaus describes this approach in terms that suggest that Butcher's working process invites dancers to keep the virtual dimension of movement alive. Neuhaus describes Butcher's working process by drawing an analogy with how a song decomposes into various activities of singing:

the idea or concept of "a song" contains the seed of activity of "singing". By entering the activity of singing I activate the needed key that opens the 'room' of the original idea. And the idea changes its static state into a dynamic one (2012, unpublished student journal, unpaginated document).

Although her notion of "seed" arguably introduces a notion of fixed source and predictable outcome Neuhaus's analogy nevertheless offers some useful affordances, for it reminds us that to discover singing we have to undo our relationship to song. Only then can we sense the complex gathering of a whole range of activities that give the activity of singing its particular quality. Neuhaus's list includes 'moving, vibrating, breathing, directing, listening, adjusting, shaping, projecting....' (2012, unpublished student journal, unpaginated document). The singer's heightened awareness of the sensations of moving, vibrating etc. allow her to modulate the relative intensity of each of the activities so that the particular gathering of "song" can be actualised. Butcher invites her dancers to give up the security of actualised forms and to dwell in the predicament of our perpetual incompletion. The dancers dance a dance of becoming almost transparent whereby they undo the identity of their corporeal form and undo the pattern of their habitual dance-making; attuning themselves to the virtual, real but yet un-nameable, sensations that are released in this undoing. Yet Butcher's methodology

87 Cited with permission.
of predicament involves opening up the multiple dimensions of ideas as well as performing a stripping away. For example, Butcher might start by asking the dancers to notice the meeting of the body's surface with the other of floor or air. She might then invite dancers to modulate the pressure with which different parts of themselves meet the floor or meet the air surrounding them. Later she might suggest becoming aware of a fixed point in space that emanates a particular pull or density and perhaps later she might add an awareness of spatial relationships with other dancers, or maybe allude to the specific densities of space created by these relationships. The possibility of pausing to notice specific degrees of pressure (between points in space, between body parts and air, between body parts and floor) is introduced, and eventually one might notice that moments of activity and stillness seem to resonate through each other. Rather than supplanting the first image that was given the additional dimensions of awareness that Butcher introduces draw attention to sensations that are persisting through these multiple dimensions. What this means is that Butcher is extracting each new image that she articulates from the shifting relationships and resonances that she discerns while watching the dance that is unfolding and she is therefore restoring the dancers' awareness of these sensations. She is not innovatively adding new images for the dancers to work with.

My own experience with Butcher was as a professional dancer in her company but when I observed her teaching a group of MA students in 2012, of whom Neuhaus was one, I was struck by how her teaching and her own creative practice follow the same methodology. Butcher is not teaching her students a thing. Which is to say that she is not teaching them a "thing" called choreography. Rather she is teaching them to attune themselves to what flows through "things" like choreographic ideas or "things" like a body.
Predicaments are at once unsettling and exhilarating because they restore us to the flux of life. There is nothing *therapeutic* about a predicament for there is no deficit to repair, rather this restorative power arises from the enlivening of our attentiveness as life touches us. For Colebrook (2008) the flux of life continually engenders new relationships and education is the work of teasing out the powers of distinction and discrimination that de/re compose the relationships that life engenders. Colebrook observes: 'it is the task of thinking *as learning* to intuit the powers that compose relations' (2008, p. 39 original emphasis) and for Colebrook, to accept established relations as we find them is not to think, for relations need to be undone so that they can be recomposed. The point I take from Colebrook (2008) is that thinking involves loosening the grip of our habits of opinion and perception so that we can attend more faithfully to the forces that make up whatever it is we are faced with. To learn from something is to dwell in the predicament it poses and to see what insists through this letting go. As Colebrook concludes:

> For Deleuze, there is no thinking or learning without truth, without the desire to encounter the sense or genesis of a problem, but this truth - though it exists in itself and must be thought of as existing in itself - is the power to disclose itself differently with each new encounter (2008, p. 41).

Colebrook (2008) reinforces the distinctiveness of what Deleuze's approach to problems might offer to education by citing Muriel Spark's fictional character Miss Jean Brodie, an Edinburgh schoolteacher in a girl's school in the 1930s. Brodie, draws on the etymology of *e-ducere* (to lead out) and describes her vocation as a teacher as devoted to the leading out of souls. In Brodie's case her students were led towards Brodie's own image in what Colebrook casts as a pedagogy of seduction. In chapter 5 I examined how Masschelein emphasises the etymology of *e-ducere* in his e-ducation of the gaze, which he also describes as 'involving our "soul"' (Masschelein, 2010a, p. 287). For
Masschelein, e-ducation exposes us by leading us out of our fixed position and although he rigorously argues against leading one's students out to a pre-determined destination or to one's own image his attachment to the dynamics of before and after leaves him unable to completely disentangle the teacher from the role of hero. Colebrook avoids heroics by using Deleuze to rethink what the leading out of souls puts at stake and she cites Deleuze's observation that: 'If life has a soul it is because it perceives, distinguishes or discriminates' (Deleuze, 1993, cited by Colebrook, 2008, p. 36). The casting of souls as activities rather than as constitutive properties of persons allows for a conception of 'leading out' that disperses the responsibility for leadership. The focus shifts from teachers leading out the "I" of the individual student to teachers and students collectively leading out, or teasing out, the virtual realm of movement and in-between that might otherwise be overlooked in the rush to grasp "what is". For Colebrook (2008), instead of asking students to "make" sense of something being presented or asking teachers to "make" sense of students what is at stake is sensing the power of the in between to undo the stasis of our existing stance or position and to open up new possible relationships between ourselves, others and the "things" that we encounter. Daignault (2008) conceptualises this task of de/re territorialisation as that of opening up our perceptual threshold enough to perceive the virtual that usually dissipates as a vapour just beyond our conscious awareness. Colebrook's (2008) reconfiguration of relationships depends on meeting this vapour at its limit.

Discerning the opportunity to re-pattern relations in this way is described by Sellar (2012) as an experience of doubt or hesitation that suspends who we are. For Sellar, the jolt out of this momentary inability to act can either confirm old patterns or allow for the emergence of new ones. He frames the question of pedagogy as the question of how you create the conditions for the latter. Sellar notes that our usual reaction to someone
losing the capacity to act is to reassure them and he argues that this merely allows the
teacher to re-assert their mastery and thus confirms existing patterns. In contrast to
reassurance what interests Sellar are conditions that hold the space of hesitation open
long enough for new relationships to emerge (2012). Although I align myself with his
desire to hold open the predicament of re-patterning I approach suspension somewhat
differently to Sellar. Rather than perceiving the suspension of identity as a temporal
interruption that disables us from action I look to luxuriate in a spatial suspension that
needs no ground or centre. As discussed in chapter 4, the dancer does not lose herself
in a moment of suspension. On the contrary, her capacity to act is intensified by the
dispersal of potency that occurs in the meeting of substance and space. Deleuze touches
on this release of power when considering the mid-air suspension of a leap and his
description fortifies the significance of not overlooking the virtual realm. For Deleuze a
“thing” leaps over its limits when it is no longer separated from what it can do:

Here limit no longer refers to what maintains the thing under a law, nor what delimits it or separates it from other things. On the contrary it refers to that on the basis of which it is deployed and deploys all its power; hubris ceases to be simply condemnable and the smallest becomes equivalent to the largest once it is not separated from what it can do (1994, p. 46, original emphasis).

The trajectory of a leap is arc-like, rising into the air and descending while effecting a
horizontal displacement across space. To leap we take off from one foot and land on
the other. The leg that pushes off is extending in one direction (in opposition to the
direction of travel) while the leg to be landed on extends in the opposite direction (the
same direction as the direction of travel). There is also a sense of diagonal opposition
through the body, as there is in walking, for example if the left leg is forward then so
too is the right arm. It is these oppositional tensions that amplify the dynamics of
leaping (and they need not rely on the body part combinations I have described); there
is no question of this being a hop, a skip or a jump. Our imagination only leaps. In the
midst of a leap is a moment of hover; a moment of suspension at the height of the arc
that neither rises, descends or travels. We are neither where we have been nor where
we are going but in a no man's land described by Deleuze as 'a single maximum at
which the developed diversity of all degrees touches the equality which envelops them'
(1994, p. 46). In this mid-air suspension the actual and virtual meet. As Munday
(2014, p. 196) cogently argues, opening ourselves to 'a singular experience in (rather
than of) a moment in the world' does not deny that things are what they are. Yet this
"whatness" is dispersed through experience whereby we get a "flavour" of how things
might be prior to representation and categorisation' (2014, p. 195).

**Knowing hesitations**

The dominant discourses of education forcefully privilege the actual realm making it
hard to taste the flavour of education prior to representation and categorisation. Since
kinaesthetic experience dwells in the predicament of the virtual it offers up dimensions
of this flavour that might otherwise be overlooked. As I allude to above, the difference
between suspension and interruption is one such dimension. The distinction was first
introduced in chapter 4 with reference to how Biesta drew on Arendt, Levinas and
Derrida to propose a pedagogy of interruption and there I drew on Derrida's discussion
of justice and on Skinner Releasing Technique's practice of multi-dimensional
suspension to distinguish a temporal break from the enlivenment of extending into
space. Here I will draw on this distinction in response to how Sellar (2012), Colebrook
(2008) and Diagnault (2008), as discussed above, draw on Deleuze to propose their own
versions of interruptive pedagogies.
For Sellar (2012), Colebrook (2008) and Diagnault (2008), relationships between students, teachers and the curriculum are given a pedagogical dimension by being decomposed and recomposed and each of these writers draw on Deleuze and Guattari's (1987) concept of assemblage to envisage the possibility of these shifting compositions. All three of them suggest decomposing the existing states of affairs by interrupting the teacher's expert relationship to the curriculum through a "time-out". Daignault (2008) for example, describes going off the class plan and creating a parenthesis that allows him to elaborate beyond the syllabus and exemplify through anecdote. He calls these moments of aside a 'gratuity' (2008, p. 54) as they are given freely and overflow the parameters of the teacher/student relationship. His students seem to sense the qualitative shift that these gratuities bring, as he reports that it is these moments that seem to influence them most. Colebrook (2008) similarly suggests that students are enthralled by the moments when teachers distance themselves from what they seem to be or thought they knew, and that it is this distance that makes space for the thought that allows for new forms of organisation. These moments of respite that Colebrook and Daignault refer to are undoubtedly to be applauded and the ease with which such moments can be experimented with and slipped into existing structures and constraints is attractively pragmatic. However, if uncertainty is only released in brief moments of stepping outside the curriculum then the curriculum itself, and the teacher's knowledge of it, remain largely territorialised and immobile. This somewhat curtails the challenge to education-as-we-know-it that Deleuze's thinking offers, for Deleuze's teacher invites the learner to get in the water and learn from the sea making the territorialised "knowledge" of the teacher apparently irrelevant. Deleuze's invitation to 'do with me' (Deleuze 1994, p. 26), therefore, deterritorialises both teacher and

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86 See chapter 3 for a discussion of the concept of assemblage.
knowledge to such an extent that the whole project of teaching and learning is approached from the vaporous side of experience. Crucially, however, the invitation to the student is to share in an activity, which is not the same thing as inviting them to share an experience. When it comes to experience they must live through their own. Yet, perhaps paradoxically, the teacher's experience is part of the milieu the student learns from. Practice has given the teacher a developed sensitivity towards the sea /the text /the curriculum content and this intimacy is dispersed (suspended in the milieu), intensified and internalised each time she swims. Yet at the same time, in the singular consistency of this here and now with these others, the teacher is obliged to attend to the moving droplets of this wave, remaining alive to what the milieu still has to teach her.

To look more closely at how a teacher's body of experience can have something to offer the student I turn to how Bogue (2013) elaborates Deleuze's conception of teaching and learning. Bogue first analyses Deleuze's discussion of learning how to swim but then extends this analysis by looking at Deleuze's own practice as a teacher. As I have already indicated, the discussion in *Difference and Repetition* (Deleuze, 1994) suggests that the swimmer learns to swim from the sea. As Bogue (2013) explains, the movements of the waves sign up the fluxing relations between moving particles that constitute the body of water that we call the sea. The signs that the waves emit draw the virtual side of the sea to our attention. The swimmer (themselves a flux of heterogeneous particles) learns to swim by tuning into this virtual flux and aligning the movement of their bodily particles with the movement of the particles of the sea: 'it is the encounter between wave signs and the responding body movements that does the teaching' (Bogue, 2013, p. 22). Bogue is therefore implying that what we call teaching involves drawing our students' attention to the virtual side of things (the sea teaches by emitting signs) and that what we call learning (reading the signs) involves tapping into
this virtual dimension. Bogue reads Deleuze as strategically positioning both teachers and students as apprentice readers of signs in order to counter the orthodox position of the teacher as "master". Bogue then goes on to make the claim that Deleuze's own practice as a teacher points towards the possibility of a 'master apprentice' (2013, p. 22). A master apprentice has such an established practice of tuning in to the virtual dimensions of the milieu (the idea / text / sea / song) that his invitation to 'do with me' is also productive of signs that teach. What Bogue (2013) is suggesting is that the teacher teaches in the same way as the milieu: by drawing our attention to the virtual side of curricula or water or texts etc. and asking how this articulation of the actual relates to the felt sense that precedes and exceeds it. Bogue (2013) makes this claim by examining accounts of Deleuze's teaching spanning nearly four decades: from his classes at the Lycée d'Orléans early in his career to the packed seminars at the University of Paris VIII. Bogue notes that all of these accounts refer to a certain hesitancy in Deleuze's style, almost as if Deleuze were unsure of the content of the lecture he was presenting:

Roger recalls that Deleuze 'frequently gave the impression of having prepared nothing, expressing himself in a hesitant uncertain fashion, as if unsure of himself.' He might begin ' " Ah, there, you see ... the transcendental ... what is the transcendental? ... Well, obviously, Kant tells us that it's the conditions for the possibility of knowledge ...Yes ...Yes ... but why call this transcendental, why? ... I don't know... I don't know ... " ‘And then, following this stuttering introduction, Deleuze would gradually put everything in place, such that 'at the end of an hour of what had seemed useless and blank gropings, Deleuze's thought would rise, luminous......’ (Roger, 2010, cited in Bogue, 2013, p. 24)

Yet in fact Deleuze's lectures were always meticulously prepared and Bogue emphasises that they were rehearsed and re-rehearsed until Deleuze knew by heart what he was going to say. In spite of Bogue's questionable use of the word 'strategy' (2013,
p. 24) to describe Deleuze's hesitant meanderings he is rightly adamant that Deleuze is not feigning unpreparedness. Deleuze is neither unprepared nor stepping outside his subject matter, on the contrary, his hesitations are indicative that he is diving in. His rigorous preparations allow him to inhabit the milieu of the ideas under discussion and therefore his relationship to his lecture is attentive and improvisatory; even if he utters what he has prepared word for word. His fumbling and uncertainty comes from his here and now searching and re-searching for what escapes formulation. His is a bodily engagement with what he explores, discerning and expressing the affects and percepts that this exploration emits. Deleuze hesitates because what he is teaching is unknowable, not because what he is teaching is unknown. The distinction is akin to that between true and false problems: The unknown can be made known but the unknowable cannot for it is continually resistant to being mastered (Manning 2007).

From the recollections Bogue (2013) gathers he discerns that Deleuze recurrently utters the word "Yes... "; both in response to student discussion and in the course of elaborating his (Deleuze's) own thinking. Bogue cites Phillipe Mengue who recalls how Deleuze's utterances of yes would hang in the air: 'And in that moment of suspension you suddenly saw all the possibilities of thought surge forth, light and free like birds, liberated from ponderous habits and mediocre objections' (Mengue, cited in Bogue, 2013, p. 25). Drawing on Mengue's recollections of the warmth of Deleuze's voice Bogue beautifully describes Deleuze's teaching as 'a sonic materialisation of concepts, percepts and affects no longer belonging to Deleuze the individual, but to thought itself' (2013, p. 27). Bogue therefore makes the claim that teaching is akin to being a performing dancer or musician; for the task is for teacher, student and curriculum (like musician or dancer, audience and performance) to become constituents of an a-personal event. Bogue's discussion is of a solo performer, for Deleuze's format was the formal
lecture, but I am not proposing this format as a universal model. What I take from Bogue is his notion of the teacher as a 'master apprentice' (2013, p. 22), which he likens to a Japanese martial arts master or sensai. The sensai is a skilled practitioner in the way of the bow, or hand or sword depending on the particular practice. Their status as apprentice subsists for it is the a-personal dimension of bow, hand or sword that teaches. Their status as master arises not only from their technical skill but also, and more significantly, from their sensitivity to, and ability to draw our attention to, reverberations between the unknowable dimensions of the way of the bow and this iteration of practice (Bogue, 2013).

No 'master apprentice' (Bogue, 2013, p. 22) can provide their students with answers. Instead their practised re-searching draws forth a virtual dimension (a "sign") that affirms problems as problems (the problem of the sea for Deleuze's swimmer, the problem of Difference and repetition for Protevi, the problem of the conditions that make knowledge possible for Deleuze when he teaches Kant's Critique of pure reason). To keep the unknowable dimensions of these problems alive is a practice born of both 'grace and necessity' (Citron, 2007, cited in Bogue, 2013, p. 25). It is the practice of allowing a predicament to endure. This has nothing whatever to do with mastering a subject for the whole notion of a "thing" that can be mastered has no place in such a pedagogy.

As indicated above, Bogue's (2013) concern is how the teacher, as solo performer, leaps into the 'threshold of indiscernability' (Deleuze & Guattari 1994, p. 46) that envelops performer, audience and performance; however not all performances are the work of solo performers. For example, a musical performance might not merely enfold a musician, an audience and a performance, but might enfold an entire orchestra, a
conductor, a score, an audience and a performance. In such a scenario the body of "performer" has a *transpersonal* dimension as it is made up of multiple players playing differentiated roles within that specific role. The conductor conducts this transpersonal force in the same way that water conducts electricity and the same can be said of a teacher conducting a lesson. This notion of conduction is not the same thing as claiming that the teacher transmits knowledge, for it is not knowledge (as a fixed object) that is being transmitted but, rather, forces of (de/re) composition. Standish beautifully encapsulates this dimension of teaching when he describes the teacher as a ‘conductor of intensity’ (2004, p. 497). The conduction of intensity is exquisitely exemplified in the 1965 film-footage of Stravinsky conducting the New Philharmonia Orchestra as they play his composition *The Firebird Suite* (1910). My analysis of this performance is not intended as a scientific claim. It is an exploration of what good conducting (in both concert or classroom contexts) can be. Stravinsky is 82 at the time of the performance and he appears frail as he walks to the podium aided by a stick. Yet this frailty fades into the background during the 30 minutes of the performance as the force of every note of the music resounds through his body. At times he transmits the music's unfolding through energetic gestures involving the arms and torso but he also expresses the music through, for example, minute lifts of an eyebrow or an almost imperceptible release of the jaw. It is hard to imagine how a musician at the back of the vast stage of the Royal Festival Hall could possibly see these almost imperceptible modulations. Yet to assume that the musicians need to see this detail in order to *follow* him is to misinterpret the status of Stravinsky as conductor. Stravinsky is undoubtedly a powerful presence on the podium but how he "holds" the orchestra together is not by

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89 Stravinsky originally composed the music in 1910 for Fokine's Ballet *The Firebird*. Stravinsky arranged several shortened versions for concert performances and the version played at the Royal Festival Hall by The New Philharmonia Orchestra in 1965 was his 1945 arrangement, which is around 30 minutes in duration.
transmitting instructions for them to follow. Instruction is impossible because *The Firebird Suite* cannot be mastered, even by Stravinsky who knows the form of the notes so well, for it is awash with unknowable dimensions of rhythm and intensity that can only be lived in the here and now. Stravinsky lives the music through a *bodily* "holding" of the orchestra in all its diversity for the entire performance. By this I mean that every cell in his body is tuning into the forces of the music as realised in this iteration and therefore his body acts *as a conductor* by allowing the passage of those forces across him. Every member of the orchestra, even during sections of the music in which they might not play for extended periods of time, is tuning in and contributing to this transpersonal transmission and are riding its wave. The audience also tune in to this wavelength and live through it. No-body, not even Stravinsky, can claim exclusive responsibility for the life of *this* wave but all enliven and are enlivened by it.

The *becoming Firebird* of audience, orchestra and Stravinsky adds another dimension to the concept of becoming *almost* transparent that I have been elaborating throughout this thesis. Thus far I have discussed becoming *almost* transparent from the perspective of passage between a body and a particular other; be that other an image, gravity, a dance, an environment or the touch of another human body. The transpersonal dimension of *becoming Firebird* co-implicates matters, as it disperses the unknowable dimensions of the other (in that case the music of *The Firebird Suite*) through multiple others. Up until now becoming *almost* transparent has highlighted the effects of deterritorialisation on teachers and/or students but the dispersion of responsibility in the performance of *The Firebird Suite* underlines how the deterritorialisation of a *work* or *curriculum* can also happen across many bodies.
Coursing

If a curriculum is deterritorialised then it is no longer a "thing" to be learned but instead becomes an unfolding occurrence, swarming with deterritorialised affects and percepts. Wallin (2010, 2013) considers the contrast between the workings of a deterritorialised curriculum and how the curriculum functions within the prevalent discourses of schooling. His argument is that the curriculum in contemporary schooling functions as a 'track to be followed' (2010, p. 3) and that this "track" is a pervasive territorialising force. For Wallin, the constant tracking of student progress and achievement makes schooling analogous to a horse race and he argues that, as with all horse races, the demands of the track functions to produce winners and losers. Wallin (2010) therefore sets out to think how we might deterritorialise the curriculum and he approaches this task by exploring the deterritorialising art practices of improvisational Jazz music, the independent film making of Jim Jarmusch and the traversal of urban space through the dance form parkour (also known as free-running); practices that he sees as unfettered by the instrumentalist, territorialising constraints of contemporary educational practice and therefore offering new lines of flight. For Wallin (2010, 2013), re-thinking pedagogy alongside improvisation affords a radical rethinking of the whole function of the curriculum; shifting it from 'curriculum-as-plan' to 'curriculum-as-lived' (2013, p. 201). Wallin makes this shift by observing how, for improvisers, there is no pre-existent composition and therefore processes of decomposition and recomposition are not approached as successive movements but are instead experienced as contemporaneous forces that interact and modulate each other. Wallin argues that these contemporaneous 'flows of relation' (Wallin, 2010, p.160 original emphasis) are virtual dimensions that precede and escape the achievements of individual actors and that they thereby constitute the coursings of an a-personal dimension of subjectivity. Put simply, the
improvisations have a life of their own. The lived curriculum, therefore, unfolds as a process of running rather than functioning as the course to be run (Wallin, 2010). On this reckoning the bodies of persons and bodies of knowledge do not operate as fixed and separate entities but unfold as a dynamic web of 'relationscapes' (Manning, 2009, p. 5). Wallin's argument hints at how this deterritorialisation of the "track" might afford (a) (more) just education as he claims that a lived curriculum untethers education from its socialising role of assigning winners and losers (therefore affording what I have called [a] just education) and de-stratifies the hierarchies that current educational structures re-inscribe (what I have called a [more] just education). Attending to the running shifts the focus of education away from the properties, actions, whys and wherefores of individual teachers and students. However, it is not entirely clear what Wallin envisages teachers will teach and the scope of his argument is limited by his assumption that contemporaneous flows of de/reterritorialisation can only arise in the absence of set content. What Wallin overlooks is that the 'subjectless subjectivity' (Bains 2002, p. 101) of an improvisation can also unfold in relation to a score. I, therefore, am not suggesting that content is abandoned and that teachers no longer need to prepare their classes. Deleuze's lectures and Stravinsky's conducting both derive their intensity from a deeply invested prior relationship to their score. Yet because the Deleuze/lecture on Critique of pure reason and Stravinsky/The Firebird Suite relationscapes, are not frozen these scores can be lived each time anew with their "truth" reverberating differently in each iteration.

Wallin would undoubtedly take issue with my reading of the performance of The Firebird Suite and with my use of it to extend his argument to different territory. He views the classical orchestra as 'emphasising practices of tracing and representation' and

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90 The etymology of curriculum is from the Latin currere: to run
the conductor as exerting 'powers of life and death over the "voices" of the symphony' (2013, p. 203, original quotation marks). However, I think the absoluteness of his stance risks confusing the creativity of improvisation with that of innovation and in so doing overlooks the full force of the challenge that improvisation makes to the dominant discourses of education. As the discussion of walking in the previous chapter highlighted and the discussion of construction at the beginning of this chapter affirms, improvisation is a practice of passage rather than one of producing a novelty. Innovation sits comfortably within the language of performativity and managerialism whereas the nimble-footedness of improvised wayfaring escapes these discourses.

Wallin (2010) deterritorialises the curriculum in an attempt to render teachers and students mobile yet it is not just his conflation of improvisation with novelty that constrains his ambitions. By de/recomposing the role of the curriculum he seeks to de/recompose relations between students and between students and teachers however my argument is that his insight about contemporaneous 'flows of relation' (Wallin, 2010, p.160 original emphasis) need not stop at the level of skin. As I shall explore in the section below, kinaesthetic awareness powerfully unsettles our status as fixed entities and thus affords a new dimension of deterritorialisation.

**Unknowable bodies**

Attending to kinaesthetic experience is a practice of deterritorialisation. The specificity, power and impact of this particular practice of deterritorialisation is elucidated by Kuppers (2003, 2011a, 2011b) in her exploration of how disabled dancers use kinaesthetic awareness to challenge the status ascribed to them. Kuppers is writing as a dance artist, scholar and disability culture activist and offers both a third person analysis
of the positioning of disabled dancers and a first person reflection on her own experience as a disabled practitioner of the Japanese dance form of Butoh. In chapter 1 I drew on the experiences of Butoh dancers, as recorded by Ravn (2010), to elucidate the intersubjective dimension of subjectivity that I inscribed 'becoming almost transparent'. Ravn paraphrases the subjective experience of these dancers as: 'how they work to make themselves "transparent" to what might appear from the environment' (2010, p. 27 original quotation marks) and the stark contrast between this attunement to the flux of life and transparency-interpreted-as-explicitness is highlighted throughout Kuppers's discussion. Although Kuppers (2003, 2011a, 2011b) is not concerned with education her discussion of transparency and her practice of affirming the unknowable as unknowable is pertinent to the educational context.

Kuppers (2003) considers how disabled dance artists might confound the assumptions that mark them as disabled. She introduces how the mark of disability functions by recounting dance critic Arlene Croce's notorious refusal to review *Still/Here* (1994) choreographed by Bill T. Jones. The work *Still/Here* includes video footage of people living with terminal illness describing their experiences and Croce's refusal to review it in the New York Times stemmed from her conception of the work as "victim art". Croce categorizes dance work that includes physically disabled dancers in the same way and Kuppers interprets Croce's rationale as claiming the bodies of the dying and the disabled as readable and transparent. For Croce the disabled dancer has no choice but to communicate difference and suffering. Kuppers (2003) notes that, in contrast to the readability of the marked disabled performer, the body of the unmarked privileged normate is invisible, leaving such an individual free to embody whatever movement or
whatever 'identity' he or she chooses. Transposing the idea of performing a prescribed identity from the stage to the classroom it is already clear how the narrative Kuppers is unfolding is equally embedded within the context of education. The Enlightenment legacy of preparing the autonomous individual to choose his own version of the good life perpetuates a rationalist approach that sits comfortably within the invisible body of the dominant norm and allows for a re-inscription of their privilege. So too does rationalism's off-spring: the hyper-autonomy of 'the will to construct one's own life' (Vansieleghem, 2009, p. 104).

Kuppers (2003) sets out to disturb the assumption that the disabled body is readable and fully transparent by pointing out that we can never know another's kinaesthetic experience and she notes: 'We do not know what it means to move in that body' (2003, p. 58). Although Kuppers makes this point specifically in relation to the disabled dancer we equally do not know what it means to move in anybody's body. Moreover, not only are our kinaesthetic sensations unknowable to a third party but a dimension of unknowability also reverberates within our awareness of our own kinaesthetic experience. Yet, although kinaesthetic experience escapes categorisation it does not eliminate difference. Kuppers (2003) emphasises that differences are real. They are lived. Yet they are also mythologized. By being mythologized difference becomes over-formed, sedimenting binary divisions that are value-laden and thus creating hierarchical divisions between differently lived lives. Kuppers (2003) argues that it is this over-formed mythology of difference, not the difference of bodies, which perpetuates injustice. While Kuppers, as an activist, recognises the need to make the

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91 In most contexts the invisible norm would be considered the white able-bodied male. In the context of dance performance the prevalence of female performers makes the gender identity of the normate less clear cut, though arguably the disproportionate rise of male dancers to the higher status position of choreographer demonstrates that males still occupy a privileged position in the dance world.
binary of "with" and "without choice" visible at the same time she acknowledges that revaluing the body's invisible, unknowable dimensions is an essential facet of mythbusting and she asserts: 'We need to revalue the body as a source of experience and difference, before we are able to move forward with identity politics' (2003, p. 58). She sustains this argument by examining specific dance works where the performers erase the mark of disability by bringing the movement of breath to the forefront of their and our awareness. As discussed in chapter 3, breath comes and goes and belongs to no-one in particular therefore, as Kuppers (2003) argues, in these works neither those identified as able-bodied nor those marked as disabled perform the containment of an asserted identity. Instead they perform the mobility of life. The act of living is common to all but performed differently through every body. How life flows through any body is always beyond full disclosure and therefore attending to the movement of life foregrounds the unknowability of all bodies. Foregrounding the unknowable undoes the mythology of the readable disabled body and undermines the binary of bodies with and without "choice":

These performances occur on the scene of unknowability: the acting is more important than the being. The performing body is present, and it makes its presence felt, but the body denies insights into its truth (Kuppers, 2003, p. 68).

Attending to the movement of life affirms an a-personal dimension of experience that Gil describes as 'profound continuity' (Gil, 2002, p.122) and in a later text Kuppers (2011a) explores the persistence of this continuity through becomings encountered in her own practice and performance of Butoh. Like Skinner Releasing Technique, Butoh grows out of felt imagery and dancers have to develop the skill to let go of the conscious effort of visualizing the imagery in order to be able to internalise (and express) it. Kuppers (2011a) emphasises that the work is not concerned with
communicating the precise image being worked with as what the audience witness is a poetic process of becoming provoked by the image. How she describes this process intertwines the kinaesthetic provocations that thread through this thesis; for Kuppers attends to the unknowable with an in-between of activity and passivity that releases the 'profound continuity' (Gil, 2002, p.122) of almost transparency:

This is a dance that invites a walk in the impossible. I invite the emptiness of an ‘I,’ and use tension and vibration to open up to the possibility of no-control in that highly careful control of the fibrous pull of my muscle tissue. (2011a, p. 86).

Through Butoh, Kuppers negotiates a realm before and beyond the subjectivity of a subject and she cites Butoh dancer Masaki Iwana's description of Butoh as a 'tendency' towards 'pure life' (Iwana, 2002, cited in Kuppers, 2011a). Kuppers maintains that even the Butoh dancer can never grasp or know pure life (just as Skinner's dancers are always almost transparent) as we are always situated by the traces left by our histories. However, she points out that the dancer can nevertheless invite pure life and when saturated by sensation can fleetingly glimpse this purity:

We live in the narratives, images and practices, the disciplined docile body minds we are in time and space. And yet, when I move with great precision, with full attention, fully present to the movement and its demands, I can feel the limit in myself (2011a, p. 88).

Kuppers (2011a) identifies herself as a disabled dancer and her reflections on her own practice also chart the pain, discomfort and downright difficulty that dancing can involve for her. As such her personal reflections extend her 2003 analysis by revealing from a first person perspective how the limit touched, like that of Deleuze's leap, is a double affirmation. Touching the limit affirms that we are suspended in the unknowable milieu of the flux of life (what Deleuze calls the 'equality that envelops us', 1994, p. 46) and at the same time affirms that difference is real and that it is lived. For
Kuppers dancing comes at a cost, which reminds us that affirming the unknowable is a risky business.

The Butoh dancer spends her time affirming the unknowable. Her attention hovers, suspended in the endless milieus of an unfolding present of bodies within worlds (whether real or imagined). Yet any body can be drawn into the infinity of here and now. Often it creeps up on us unexpectedly, perhaps when we let go of looking for the known. The poet Mary Oliver describes the meeting of worlds in such a moment:

You can
die for it -
an idea,
or the world. People

have done so,
brilliantly,
letting
their small bodies be bound
to the stake,
creating
an unforgettable
fury of flight. But

this morning,
climbing the familiar hills
in the familiar
fabric of dawn, I thought

of China
and India
and Europe, and I thought,
how the sun

blazes
for everyone just
so joyfully
as it rises

under the lashes
of my own eyes, and I thought
I am so many!
What is my name?
What is the name
of the deep breath I would take
over and over
for all of us? Call it

whatever you want, it is
happiness, it is another one
of the ways to enter

Oliver describes an experience of the multi-dimensionality of here and now but in her writing she arguably slips into the dynamics of over personalising and over concretising both sensation and world and her verse loses force by not quite leaping into the indeterminacy of the virtual realm. Nevertheless, she hints at the wonder of encountering worlds within worlds; an experience of awe through which we step back from looking for answers and just says "yes" to where we find ourselves.

**Just say yes**

To say yes unconditionally is a deterritorialisation. It is to hover where we are. This unconditional affirmation touches and is touched by a primordial pre/a/trans-personal dimension of experience. Pre-personal because it is a dimension of experience that precedes our personalised interpretation and rationalisation. A-personal because it is a dimension of experience that persists in escaping these representational modes of thought. Transpersonal because it is a dimension of experience that belongs to no-one in particular as it arises in a flow of relations between bodies rather than being a constitutive characteristic of an individual. To hover where we are deterritorialises the "here" in Vansielegehem's question of 'who we are, here and now?' (2009, p. 102). If "here" never settles it makes the question of subjectivity one of "where" rather than one
of "who". "We" are a world unfolding within and enfolding a world. Can we say yes to the uncertainty of this "here"?

Unconditional affirmation is a no ifs, no buts, *just* yes and this "yes" is "just" in the double sense of being de-instrumentalised (just as it is, not a means to an end) and in the sense of prioritising no-one (more just). A just education, therefore, is also doubly affirmative. It affirms education for itself rather than as a means to an end ([a] just education) and by affirming the unknowable dimensions of its subjects it privileges no-one (a [more] just education). Since just education affirms unknowability its pursuance involves practising "not to be unjust" in the same way that Deleuze's ethics demand practising "not to be unworthy". In other words, I am suggesting that we hold back from trying to be just in the same way that Deleuze invites us to hold back from trying to be worthy. I see this dimension of hesitancy as a holding back from "landing" and therefore as a suspension that deterritorialises the bodies we call teachers and students, the bodies of practice we call teaching and learning, the bodies of knowledge we call curricula and the ideal body we call justice. In this way, for both teachers and learners, just education is a practice of attending to the *pre/a/transpersonal* dimensions of passage that affirm the unknowable as unknowable. Saying yes to the unknowable is what the kinaesthetic provocations provoke.

In the next chapter I gather together the argument so far and consider how to practise saying yes to just education.
Chapter 7 - Just Education?

Introduction

In the previous chapter I argued that, (a) (more) just education is a practice of affirming the unknowable as unknowable. Such an education is a process affirmed for itself rather than as a means to an end ([a] just education) and by affirming the unknowable dimensions of its subjects it privileges no-one ([a] more) just education). In the course of this argument I deterritorialised the bodies we call teachers and students, the bodies of practice we call teaching and learning, the bodies of knowledge we call curricula and the ideal body we call justice. By shifting attention to the dynamic flows between teaching, learning and the curriculum I opened the pedagogical focus out from a concern for emergent changes in identity. Since education is a moving force then what matters (both in terms of being material or having significance and in terms of materialising or being brought about) is where we have got to, together, as a result of aligning ourselves with these flows. "Where we are, here and now?" is a question that acknowledges some sort of passage but says nothing about where we might be going. In the current context "here" is the final chapter of a thesis and this begs the question "Where have I got to?" Particular paths have been trodden and others have not been cut but perhaps “here” offers a new vista of the territory crossed. In this chapter I therefore begin with an overview of the arguments put forward; arguments that invite not only a rethinking of how education is theorised but also a re-sensing of how education is practised. I then consider a specific example of how a sensitised pedagogical practice makes space for education to happen, even when this is unexpected. My examination of this example opens up an additional perspective on the passage of this thesis. While the overview presents a distillation and analysis of the discussion so far, this second perspective explores how the content of these arguments have functioned to decompose
and recompose the very methodology that gave rise to them. In the course of this methodological de/re-composition I touch upon the contradictions inherent in concretising my conclusions given that my task is to think otherwise than through a dynamic of means and ends. I therefore offer glimpses of experience that make palpable how teaching can be deterritorialised from the origins of intention, the ends of achievement and the space-time of a particular class or module. Finally I tease out what is put at stake by the dynamics of what I have called (a)(more) just education.

The overview

At the beginning of this thesis I traced the intimate entanglement of Cartesian mind/body dualism and the rationale of education. It is an entanglement that has persisted through various twists and turns in how the purpose of education is conceptualised and in how the practice of education is organised. Although the onset of postmodern performativity unsettles the ideal status ascribed to the autonomous rational subject it also serves to intensify rationalism's grip and the contemporary context is one in which both "autonomy" and "rationality" have become ultra-tensile. On the one hand autonomy is stretched to its limit by a movement of extreme contraction. Without the horizon of a meta-narrative to orient it autonomy reduces to hyper-individualism, individualising each new goal to be reached in an endless succession of achievement while at the same time producing a survival strategy of each "man" for himself. Rationalism, on the other hand, is stretched to the limit by extending its reach. Paradoxically it is an apparent corporeal turn that allows for this. Merleau Ponty's (2002 [orig. 1954]) phenomenology, Maturana and Varela's (1980) theory of autopoiesis and the field of somatics, for example, are part of a discourse that situates
the body as the source and carrier of intention and meaning. While en-minding and en-worlding the body challenges the rationalist perspective by overcoming the dualist divides it is nevertheless a discourse that valorises the body because it establishes our autonomy and rationality and therefore stops short of any radical shift (Vlieghe, 2014). The somaticisation of rationality reinforces the privilege of intention and meaning over dimensions of experience that escape an interpretative frame and thus essentially instrumentalises the body for autonomous, rational ends. My argument contends that this particular corporeal turn does not turn far enough for it sustains and is sustained by the hyper-individual, hyper-instrumental, and hyper-diagnostic dynamic of contemporary performativity. In what Turner describes as the ‘somatic society' (1992, p. 12) the performative frame extends to include ever more aspects of bodily function. From the fad of the body beautiful to the functional ease of somatic practices our bodies have got to do better; and they must also feel better. From ‘emotional intelligence' (Goleman 1996) to measuring happiness (Layard, 2011) this is a discourse that subjects ever more domains of experience to "rational" control.

The somaticisation of rationality is concerned with the integration of an individual's subjectivity, therefore although it is an account that recognises that subjectivity is relational to our environment rather than removed from it this is nevertheless an account that shapes subjectivity in relation to a norm of autonomous well-ordered coherence. Yet in the course of this thesis I have also problematised the particular way in which disrupting this coherence has been articulated as a strategy to circumvent the hyper-individualism and instrumentalism that rationalist discourses bring. In the educational context strategies of disruption play out as pedagogies of interruption, which seek to interrupt on a number of levels. They seek to interrupt the narrative of autonomy, they seek to interrupt an existent subjective perspective and they seek to interrupt existing
power relations. As with the somaticisation of rationality, however, my argument is that these interruptions do not escape the performative frame they profess to resist and they thus fall short of furthering (a) (more) just education. For example, some interruptive pedagogies ostensibly interrupt power-relations by the teacher disavowing the position of "expert". Yet on these accounts power-relations are at the same time sustained by this move, for the teacher's holding back is countered by an expectation that the student will step forward with his or her own point of view (for example Biesta, 2008a, 2008b, 2009c; Masschelein, 2010a, 2010b). Although on this account there is no predetermined right answer there is still an assumption that students can or will respond in a way that the teacher can or will recognise and that the response will happen within a space-time that allows for this witnessing and validation by the teacher. Moreover, the requirement of recognisable response risks confusing processes of learning with evidence of achievement.92

I contend that my argument also turns further away from the dominant discourses than narratives that depend on the body's involuntary functions as a strategy of interruption. These narratives sometimes focus on displays of emotional response (Zembylas 2007a, 2007b, 2008) or sometimes go further in their rejection of an interpretative stance by focussing on aspects of bodily functioning that are essentially "pointless," such as uncontrollable and contagious laughter where one no longer knows what it is about (Vlieghe et al., 2010). The dimensions of corporeality that are beyond the parameters of conscious control are usually invisible (Leder, 1990), and Vlieghe et al. (2010) argue that their visibility in instances like uncontrollable laughter interrupts the narratives of

92 As discussed in chapter 6, other interruptive pedagogies (Colebrook 2008, Daignault, 2008, Sellar 2012) similarly invite the teacher to hold back from being an expert, but in those cases they sustain existing relations by positioning the interruption as a "time-out" from the business of the curriculum.
autonomy and rationality. Vlieghe et al. (2010) go on to argue that as this overwhelming of rationality is a shared experience it momentarily enacts what they describe as 'corporeal democracy' (2010, p. 719), thus interrupting the way in which educational environments are stratified. My argument is that their notion of corporeal democracy is too reliant on display. Corporeal democracy centres around the making public of "pointless" dimensions of experience, just as the previous narrative centres around making public that subjectification or de-subjectivation (respectively Biesta and Masschelein's interruptions of subjectivity) has happened. The performative dynamic of public display over-crystallises what counts as shared experience and to some extent frustrates the argument about autonomous bodily function; for we sometimes can refrain from breaking into laughter when we feel a spontaneous urge, perhaps because circumstances would deem it inappropriate. What offers a more powerful challenge to rationalist instrumentality is our awareness of the uninvited, spontaneous, invisible sensation of a compulsion to laugh.93

I have developed the argument of this thesis by focussing on noticing sensations rather than on displaying them and this allows me to go further than discourses that somaticise rationality but maintain the coherence of a rational order and further than those that contend to interrupt the rational order within and between bodies. These discourses dwell on categorical distinctions between dimensions of bodily sensation that are within conscious awareness and those that are beyond it; and on distinctions between dimensions of bodily sensation that source intention and those that thwart it. In this thesis I think otherwise than through these distinctions, which are still caught up in a discourse of mastery, because I experience no ontological hierarchy between the material and the imagined. My relationship to affect is one in which, as the dancer Lisa

93 See chapter 5 for a more detailed critique of Vlieghe et al.’s (2010) notion of corporeal democracy
Nelson puts it: 'The sensation is the image' (1996, p. 2). My argument in chapter 5 was that sensation functions as a constant thoroughfare between the real/imagined; material/mind; actual/virtual; inner/outer. This thesis, therefore, offers an alternative to the rationalist narrative and claims that this alternative opens the possibility of (a) (more) just education; that is to say, an education that both functions more justly (a [more] just education) and at the same time is untethered from external ends ([a] just education). In fact at this point in my argument I can be more precise: I claim that my alternative approach affords a more just education because it untethers education from external ends; and yet at the same time it is a concern for justice that propels the desire to de-instrumentalise education. My kinaesthetic approach thus affords thought of (a) (more) just education because it moves between these two dimensions of "just". It brings forgotten dimensions of living into awareness but at the same time it does not harness them to performativity; it lets them be and says yes to them as they are.

Rather than acting, the dynamic of affirmation is to "let be"; that is to say, to be with things as they are occurring; to leap into the flux of life and allow affect its full force without discrimination or manipulation. Sentience is always and already buffeted here and there and always and already oscillating between moments of crystallisation (involving dimensions of interpretation, identification and understanding) and moments of dispersion and indiscernibility (knowable only as a feeling) and I foreground the co-dependence of these different dimensions of sentience by not privileging the former over the latter. Such a conception of subjectivity offers certain challenges to how we currently theorise and practise education, challenges that can be thought of as opportunities for thinking and practising differently. The title of this thesis suggests that this involves thinking otherwise about educational purpose, yet re-thinking how educational purpose is theorised is not enough; the task is to re-sense how education is
practised. One of the contributions of this thesis is that it makes palpable the inextricable intertwining of re-sensing and re-thinking. My argument is that we can only re-think education by coming to our senses.

In Deleuze’s words: ‘Thinking is always experiencing, experimenting, not interpreting but experimenting, and what we experience, experiment with, is always actuality, what’s coming into being, what’s new, what’s taking shape’ (1995, p. 106). In the following section I examine the educational consequences of suspending interpretation in favour of sensorial experience through considering the specific example of Duncan Mercieca’s sensorial engagement with children with profound and multiple learning difficulties (PMLD). Mercieca’s (2013) tale of ‘becoming-teacher through becoming-PMLD’ (2013, p. 179) leads me to reflect more broadly on minoritarian becomings and on their contribution to the content, methodology and emergent conclusions of this thesis. I then add to Mercieca’s conclusions by picking up on the dimension of experiment, or creativity, that circulates through experience in the above citation from Deleuze.

**Minor gatherings**

To explore how a re-sensing of practice might afford the possibility of (a) (more) just education I turn to how Mercieca’s (2013) practice of haptic attentiveness to the almost imperceptible allowed him to think otherwise than through the dominant discourses surrounding children with PMLD. Mercieca begins by analysing in some detail how these discourses function and he argues that they are ‘linear, systematic, defining, defective, and closed to contingency’ (2013, p. 1) and that they therefore position children with PMLD as primarily lacking in capacity. What is exciting about the re-
sensing of his teaching is that, in stark contrast to these discourses, his sensitivity affirms his students’ habitually overlooked power. Mercieca (2013) rejects the fixed identity of his students' diagnosis and draws on Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) concept of assemblages to posit that neither subjectivities nor relationships between subjects are fixed, closed or pre-determined. As I discussed in chapters 3 and 6, assemblages do not congeal as a fixed identity or state of affairs, rather they are gatherings of flows, forces and intensities that remain fluid and open to contingency. Mercieca engages with the dynamic interplay of these forces, flows and intensities through attending to the minutiae of the school day of five different students; three of whom attend a special school for children with PMLD and two who attend a mainstream primary school. In each instance his attentiveness to what is happening sensitises him to the power of the student to affect and be affected, power that he articulates as 'agency'. The force of their agency is hinted at in Mercieca’s admission that: 'it had not occurred to me that my students with PMLD could enter my space and engage me with possibilities that I could take up' (2013, p. 146).

Crucially, Mercieca (2013) does not organise or categorise the behaviour of his students. He does not attempt to suggest solutions and strategies to enhance the experience of students with PMLD and he avoids insisting that we recognise the complexity of their agency in a particular way. Instead, he takes what I would describe as a choreographic approach to arranging his observations by using space, body, sound and time as modes of composition. His choreographic approach allows him to emphasise the sensorial nature of his relationship to his students’ power and to make visible that he discerns their agency through a series of moments that are impossible to explain or to generalise from. For example, Mercieca tells the story of a particular student who habitually ignores those around her but who one day suddenly expresses
unexpected and unsolicited affection. Another moment that Mercieca describes involves a boy who was subject to constant intervention by medical and educational staff. The rigidity and immobility of the boy’s body sometimes interfered with his breathing and therefore staff had to make sure he was repositioned at set intervals, massaged regularly and monitored constantly; yet despite these attentions his body refused to be a 'not-so-much-profoundly impaired body' (2013, p.143, original emphasis). One day staff were particularly busy and he was left lying on the sofa while they attended to other things. There happened to be some music playing in the classroom and a member of staff suddenly realised that the boy was spontaneously moving as he lay there. His spontaneous “dance” (as Mercieca describes it), like the unsolicited affection of the unsociable girl, had neither intentional cause nor generalisable result. It happened in a rare moment when he was not subject to intervention. Mercieca underlines the importance of finding a way to relate to these moments without attempting to rationalise or “make sense” of them. By drawing on Deleuze he notes that what we call good sense, or the sensible, involves a constant process of comparing what we encounter to past experiences and existing conceptualisations; a process of recognition that precludes what I have called (a) (more) just education; that is to say an education that can let go of categorising means and instrumental ends. Mercieca reflects:

I have learnt to listen to vacuoles of non communication. Maybe this could be what needs to be taught in teacher-training courses. This is different to what usually happens in our classrooms. Teachers listen to communications from students within an environment. They empathise with their students; however on their listening they mark, identify and label students accordingly (Mercieca, 2013, p. 150).

Mercieca’s affirmation of his students’ agency is more just in the double sense of the word. He avoids reinforcing the injustices conferred the dominant discourses by
affirming his students’ power just as it is, that is to say without attempting to interpret their behaviour or classify their capacities. The fact that the power of his students is expressed, rather than communicated, means that his affirmation is neither asked for nor acknowledged by his students. It just is. What makes it possible for Mercieca to affirm their power is that he abandons the rational order of things in favour of the ravages of affect and thus finds himself caught up in the minoritarian becoming of becoming PMLD. As discussed in chapter 3, Deleuze’s notion of minority has nothing to do with numbers:

The difference between minorities and majorities isn’t their size. A minority might be bigger than a majority. What defines the majority is a model you have to conform to: the average European adult male city-dweller for example…. A minority, on the other hand, has no model, it’s a becoming, a process. One might say the majority is nobody. Everybody’s caught, one way or another, in a minority becoming that would lead them into unknown paths if they opted to follow it through (1995, p. 173).

The majority are always what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) describe as a molar formation; sedimenting existing states of affairs and re-inscribing hierarchical boundaries. Minorities, on the other hand, turn away from the dominant norm towards the molecular fluidity of pre/a/trans personal intensities and therefore always affirm the proliferation of life and of ways of living. However, as I mentioned in chapter 3, it is important to remember that the molar and the molecular are not opposed; the molecular force of minority becoming propels the composition and de/recomposition of molar structures such as ideas, identities, and societal structures. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) therefore talk of continually decomposing the dominant norm through a whole host of possible becomings, for example: becoming woman, becoming child, becoming animal, becoming imperceptible.
It strikes me now, looking back over the terrain of this thesis, that both my approach to and articulation of (a) (more) just education has throughout been dependent on a series of minor discourses and minoritarian becomings; and that composing, or gathering together these tendencies towards the minor offers a particular way of articulating what (a) (more) just education might demand. What then, have been the various manifestations of this tendency to turn away from the molar norm? In the first place, at the level of discourse, to discuss educational justice while under the influence of dancing already exposes a tendency towards the minor. Dance is a minor discourse (even more so within the context of education) and somatics is undoubtedly the minor discourse of dance. Even within the field of somatics, my own practice of Skinner Releasing Technique (SRT) turns away from the dominant discourse as it sits outside the mediating and justifying frames of physiology, evolutionary biology and neuroscience that are favoured by most somatic practices. However, it is not only the way in which SRT turns away from more dominant discourses that casts my decision to employ it as a tendency towards the minor. Much more significant is the practice itself. For attending to kinaesthetic experience is a non-linguistic practice of sensory becoming that undoes the molar fixity of our habitual comportment to the world and invites us towards the molecular fluidity of the almost imperceptible. The releasing dancer glimpses the almost imperceptible when she practises dancing 'almost in a state of transparency' (Skinner & Dempster 1996, p. 26). To attend to kinaesthetic experience, then, is to find molecular possibilities of de/recomposition that leave you a stranger in the “home” of your own skin and a foreigner in the tongue of your habitual movement language. Deleuze elaborates the experience of being a foreigner in your own tongue as an experience of hesitation. What does it mean to hesitate? As I

*For a discussion of the molar and the molecular see chapter 3.*
discussed in chapter 4, for the dancer, holding back from stepping forward need not be conceived of as a temporal break or interruption; it can alternatively be understood as a multi-dimensional suspension. The dominance of the concept of interruption in educational philosophy with a post-structural inflection (as discussed in the overview section above and in chapters 4, 5, and 6) merely serves to re-affirm the minoritarian force of my argument. Interruption subjectifies or de-subjectivates. It changes the status of “subjects” and in so doing perhaps re-organises the structures of a particular world. However, as Deleuze and Guattari point out, when it comes to minoritarian forces: 'It is a case not of organisation but of composition; not of development and differentiation but of movement and rest, speed and slowness' (1987, p. 282). The dancer has a sense of this when she approaches suspension as a moment of enlivening rather than a space of dead time. As discussed in chapter 4, suspension disperses and intensifies our sensitivity to unfolding with a world; it affects and is affected by shifts in dynamics and tone rather than changes in position and structure. As such suspension is an experience of continuance rather than of rupture although it is not any the less powerful for that; on the contrary. I therefore approach Deleuze’s concept of hesitation as a simultaneous internalisation and dissipation that can more accurately be described as usurping and redirecting, rather than interrupting, the dominant discourses. Deleuze talks of a ‘[c]reative stuttering’ (1997, p. 111) that renders language rhizomatic and subjects our discourses to perpetual disequilibrium and the kinaesthetically informed minor language of this thesis usurps and redirects not only the discourses that shape contemporary education but also those that claim to resist it. However, it is not only these discourses that have been subjected to disequilibrium. In

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95 See chapter 3 for a discussion of the growth patterns of the rhizome.
the next section I consider how the structure of this thesis has also been unsettled by minoritarian forces.

**Agitations**

In chapter 2 I established that it takes cunning to subvert the hierarchical dichotomies that dominate Western thought. Cunning requires a certain litheness and only a minor language can move with the requisite fluidity. Upon reflection this need for suppleness became increasingly apparent over the course of the thesis. I started out with the strategy of three interrelated but nevertheless distinct observations from kinaesthetic experience that I claimed provoked a thinking otherwise about (a) (more) just education.

The first provocation arose from the way in which first person kinaesthetic experience is unrepeatable and unknowable by another. I claimed that, being therefore irreducible to third person interpretations and generalisations, kinaesthetic experience eschewed pedagogical practices of legitimation and categorisation. The second provocation was generated by the practice of attentive *non-doing*, common to all somatic practices. I claimed this in-between of activity and passivity exposed dimensions of learning that are not necessarily displayed and are therefore commonly overlooked. The third provocation got its force from the releasing dancers’ experience of becoming *almost* transparent, a lived experience of ‘subjectless subjectivity’ (Bains, 2002, p. 101) which I claimed escaped the ideal of autonomy and its contemporary incarnation as hyper-individualism. In chapter 4 I sketched how these provocations of unknowability, attentiveness and indeterminacy resonated with Derrida’s view of justice being incalculable and perpetually beyond our reach. The overview section of this current chapter charts how my challenges to the dominant discourses played out but what I
want to consider here is the way in which these relatively molar provocations almost immediately started to de/recompose. Looking back I can see that over the course of the thesis the methodology has shifted from employing a structure of provocations (albeit nudges rather than shoves) to composing a choreography of minoritarian becomings. I now see that the whole thesis is populated with minors who live otherwise than in relation to the dominant norm: not just the releasing dancer (who I designate as “she”) but also the non-heroic teacher, the silent student, the spectre, the artist-poet (overlooked in his lifetime), the bacterium, the autist, the bandsman, the physically disabled dancer (a minority within a minority), the student with PMLD. The leaky subjectivity of these minoritarians (re)sources the subject as a site of passage. For example, as I discussed in chapter 4, the dancer not only extends into space, she internalises space, becoming spacious; and as I discussed in chapter 5, the bandsman not only traverses across territories, he internalises all whom or that he encounters on his way, his sense of subjectivity not defined by corporeal or territorial boundaries. My original provocations could not withstand the molecular force of these becomings so they too engaged in becoming imperceptible. As provocations they perhaps called too forcefully for response and action, which as I shall discuss below is subtly distinct from the agitations of a minor. My provocations may have been displaced but I believe their force has been intensified by being dispersed throughout the discussion and internalised within it.

To employ a cast of minors was not pre planned but it was nevertheless essential for only they can provide the molecular agitation needed to ‘minorize’ (Deleuze, 1997, p. 109) how we might think and practise education. There is an important distinction

96 Although, as I have indicated, we are all potentially caught up in minoritarian becomings the point is that we follow these through to a greater or lesser extent and my cast of minors exemplify the leaky subjectivity of following through.
between the minoritarian language of an agitator and the discourses of an activist that is relevant here. It is a distinction that has informed both the content and style of this thesis and must equally inform the tone of its conclusions, for only the former can afford an education that is both de-instrumentalised and no longer instrumentalising. As I mentioned above, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) call it the difference between organisation and de/recomposition. The activist discourse is a discourse that seeks to communicate ideas and build new structures. A minor language does not communicate. It niggles and disturbs. It affects. We internalise a minor discourse rather than master it. The sensitivity of Mercieca’s (2013) conclusions serve to underline the distinction. Non communication is not just what he attended to, it is also what he offered through his refusal to suggest strategies or solutions. Mercieca’s attentiveness to ‘vacuoles of non communication’ (2013, p. 184) comes from his reading of Deleuze but in fact Deleuze invites us to do more than listen; he invites us to create:

Maybe speech and communication have been corrupted. They’re thoroughly permeated by money and not by accident - by their very nature. We’ve got to highjack speech. Creating has always been something different from communicating. The key thing might be to create vacuoles of non communication, circuit breakers, so we can elude control (Deleuze, 1990, p. 175, my emphasis).

The contribution of this thesis partly lies in how pre-linguistic strivings hijack communication and instead create; so the distinction between listening and creating is a significant one. However before turning to the specifics of creating it is perhaps worth clarifying that creating ‘vacuoles of non communication’ (Deleuze, 1990, p. 175, Mercieca, 2013, p. 184) does not mean that nobody can ever say anything. Although Deleuze (1990, p. 175) suggests that there is power lurking in moments of solitude, stillness and silence he goes on to point out that it is only out of these moments of
apparent nothingness that we might ever have something to say. In the context of writing this thesis Deleuze’s words on the latent power of silence resonate strongly as the pre-linguistic world of kinaesthetic experience vitalises my conceptualisation of education and my approach to hijacking its dominant discourses. I am therefore not opposed to ever saying something. In this thesis I have had plenty to say. What is more, through the discipline and demand of making thought visible on the page, by bringing it to language, my kinaesthetic musings have mutated in directions I did not predict. Before writing began I thought I would be arguing about fairness and equality but discovered justice was much more complex than that. My immersion in deep quiet pools of inner awareness has given me plenty to say yet I do not construe ‘vacuoles of non communication’ (Deleuze, 1990, p. 175) as a “time-out” that functions as the means to a communicative end. This has consequences both for the writing of this thesis and for how I might practise (a) (more) just education. In the context of this thesis the distinction between agitation and communication prevents me from asserting generalizable claims, proffering models of good practice or writing manifestos for change. In the context of my teaching, not only do I need to let go of needing any display of understanding, I must also suspend my desire for my students to “get it” and accept that when or how what is offered might meet their desires is always incalculable. In chapter 5 I drew on Deleuze’s (1994) utilisation of Bergson’s notion of duration to argue that unforeseen and unsearched for connections and reverberations might surface at any time and the possibility of this was underlined for me recently by an ex-student. The student, whom I had taught over 10 years ago, came up to me in a café saying he wanted to apologise. He felt he had not been a “good student” in the days when I had taught him as at the time somatic practices had “not been his thing”. He now regretted

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97 Significantly, the expressions of agency by Mercieca’s students were never in response to specific staff interventions, they occurred in moments when staff were not trying to elicit a response.
what he saw as his former lack of respect for the work because it had recently become so key to his dancing and teaching on a daily basis. Of course he had no need to apologise. As a teacher it is not in my want to claim or capture what I teach.

**Gorgeous nothings**

In the above section I argued that the contribution of this thesis partly lies in how extra-linguistic strivings hijack communication and I proposed that the distinction between listening and creating might be a significant one. In this section I explore this distinction by examining the specific dynamics of creativity. As discussed in chapters 5 and 6, when attending to kinaesthetic experience the creative task is one of navigation rather than construction and this is crucial to the task of creating ‘vacuoles of non-communication’. Like Mercieca’s *listening*, creating involves the grace of non-action yet perhaps creating ‘gorgeous nothings’ (Dickinson, cited in Werner & Bervin, 2013, p. 8) invites an additional dimension of abandon because it involves an experiential relinquishment of one’s own priority. The releasing dancer helps make what I am suggesting about creativity more palpable as her creativity is actualised by the *almost* transparency of a selfhood that Skinner describes as: ‘a dynamic network of energies’ within the wider dynamic network of the universe (Skinner et al., 1976). In other words, the *art* of dancing lies in being danced. The fluidity, range and precision of the dancer are merely secondary, displayable functions of her creativity, albeit ones that yield professional advantage. More fundamental than these displays are the *fleetingly*

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98 Cf. Glaser (2015). Glaser’s taught a somatic pedagogy to BA1 dance students for 10 years and in her article she notes that some graduates informally told her that they only appreciated the work much later.  
99 “Gorgeous nothings” is a phrase form one of Emily Dickinson’s letters. In referring to Dickinson’s phrase Werner and Bervin cite Dickinson as saying ‘Nothing is the force that renovates the World’ (Dickinson in Werner & Bervin, 2013, p. 8).
felt moments of being caught up in something; flickerings of continuance and abandonment that denote a *withness* that is other than an effort.

Deleuze rather fittingly describes this kind of *withness* in his discussion of changing conceptions of motion in sport:

> The kinds of movements you find in sports and habits is changing. We got by for a long time with an energetic conception of motion, where there’s a point of contact, or we are the source of movement. Running, putting the shot, and so on: effort, resistance, with a starting point, a lever. But nowadays we see movement defined less and less in relation to a point of leverage. All the new sports – surfing, windsurfing, hang-gliding – take the form of entering into an existing wave. There is no longer an origin as starting point, but a sort of putting into orbit. The key thing now is to get taken up in the motion of a big wave, a column of rising air, to “get into something” instead of being the origin of an effort (1995, p. 121).

Education as we know it is built on the mechanical efforts of both students and teachers but the potency of moments of *withness* invites a thinking otherwise about the “subject” of education; in both senses of the word. Throughout this thesis I have problematized the expectation that students demonstrate the origins of an action. However, a recent tutorial with an MA student reminded me of how attachment to ‘the origin of an effort’ with regards to the role of the teacher can equally close teaching down. My student was a professional dancer and teacher with over 20 years of experience in the field and this assignment involved her reflecting on her experiences of teaching undergraduates a particular work from the repertory of a company that she had danced with for many years. In her draft writing the student located herself as an ex company dancer and as someone experienced in somatic practices. She then went on to describe a series of specific teaching strategies, that she presented as uniquely and single-handedly devised by her as a result of her “embodied knowledge”. Pen at the ready, I was about to
annotate her script with “in what ways did this choreographer’s working method or your experience of somatic practices influence your approach?” when I realised that these comments would merely suggest that what she was calling her "embodied knowledge" was something appropriated (through contact with this particular choreographer and with various somatic practices) and then manipulated and applied as a set of effective teaching strategies. This would still leave what and how she taught fully dependent upon and reducible to processes of conscious rationalisation. It struck me that this missed the more radical opportunity, for her own education and for that of her students, that her expertise as a dancer afforded; for kinaesthetic expertise enfolds a continuing series of almost imperceptible becomings with others, rhythm, breath and gravity and as such is replete with sensations that escape the limits of autonomous rationality. Arguably expertise in any field enfolds a series of encounters with people, experiences and ideas that affect us in ways that escape the rational order of things. The very vitality of any teaching is lost if expertise is reduced to a set of use-values that can be identified, manipulated and then claimed as one’s own. Of course this train of thought was too complex to write in a margin so in the margin I merely wrote “let’s discuss”. The ensuing discussion with this student held another lesson for me. The student listened attentively and yet her own perspective maintained her claim as origin and master of all she taught. For my student, knowledge was a possession. With the benefit of hindsight I can see that I was too keen for my student to “get it”. By determinedly holding on to what I wanted her to “get” I was in fact no longer teaching.

My student considered herself origin and master of all she taught. I consider myself lucky because when teaching Skinner Releasing Technique (SRT) I am forced to give up any claim to be the origin of what I teach because I am teaching work that bears another’s name. However, although Skinner is undoubtedly responsible for a particular
approach to teaching dance technique and for rigorously refining the detail of her pedagogy even she is not the origin of what is taught when I am teaching. How her work developed is significant in the context of giving up the claim of effort. As I discussed in chapter 3, Skinner, a dancer with a recurring back injury, undertook Alexander Technique lessons with a view to protecting her back by reducing unnecessary tension in her movement. She noticed that the Alexander work, which invites participants to inhibit their habitual patterns of movement in order for new ones to emerge, allowed her to experience a tension-free multi-directional sense of alignment that she wished to explore further. She began working on her own, exploring how to dance the exercises of a ballet barre with this sensation of openness and connectivity and writing down what this felt like by portraying her experiences through poetic images (Skura, 1990). However, even Skinner is not the origin of what is taught in her name. This is not only because of the influence of Alexander, but more importantly because although the images are hers the sense of suspension, suppleness, or economy of movement which the images portray are tendencies that she has accessed; not principles that she has generated *ex nihilo*. This does not diminish the importance of her discoveries or the rigorous specificity of her poetic portrayals, nor does it obscure that her methodology evidences an extraordinary faith in kinaesthetic experience as a way of knowing that needs no other justification. Her images were not generated in response to a third person analysis of anatomy or biomechanics for example, and although they tend to catalyse greater biomechanical efficiency they are never reduced to or mediated by such an analysis by Skinner. Moreover, no SRT teacher would ever “explain” the images in scientific terms. To teach, the SRT teacher must *be with* the tendencies the images allude to in the here and now of her teaching; for it is through the reverberating aliveness of this *withness* that the students, too, can be with them. The
kinaesthetic withness of teaching SRT is admittedly a particular circumstance yet, as I examined in chapter 6, all expertise involves a lived and living relationship to the unknowable dimensions of one’s subject.

Shifting emphasis away from the origin of an effort to give way to the withness of passage offers up a shift in dynamics that minorizes the very concept of education as it implies thinking education otherwise than as the means to achieving an ever-expanding series of ends. A minorized education can only be actualised by what Deleuze calls ‘inadequate means’ (1997, p. 113 original emphasis); that is to say by ‘fragments, allusions, strivings, investigations’ (1997, p. 113) that are without origin or achievement but that might nevertheless have some sort of resonance. Only through the radical openness of these ‘inadequate means’ can we afford (a) (more) just education; in other words, a traversal on its own terms and for its own sake. The experience of a friend of mine hints at the dynamics of ‘inadequate means’. In preparation for training as an early-years teacher my friend observed the Year 1 class of her local London primary school. The lesson topic was telling the time and the children had been given a worksheet with rows of circles on it. Underneath each circle was written a time, for example: a quarter to 3, 10 minutes past 6, 12 O’clock and the task was to draw the hands on each “clock” to represent the time assigned to it. One child left his worksheet completely blank and the teacher marked him as failing to understand how to tell the time. My friend was asked to give him some extra help. At first it seemed hopeless; the boy had no idea where to draw the hands so eventually my friend, perhaps free to do so because she was merely helping out, completely gave up asking him to fill in the circles. What then gradually emerged was that the boy could tell the time perfectly, he simply could not see the relationship between the circles on the page and the clock on
the wall. It was only when they both gave up trying to make that connection that my friend entered the world of his time telling.

Another example comes to mind from during my daughter’s primary school years. She and her classmates were learning to add double – digits. The teacher gave the children the following sum:

\[32 + 21 = ?\]

Instead of trying to work out the answer my daughter asked the teacher why he did not reverse the numbers to make the sum easier. Luckily the teacher did not interpret her intervention as avoidance or insolence and instead of insisting that the class persevered with the original sum he picked up on her point.

\[32 + 21 = 53\]
\[23 + 12 = 35\]

Since 35 is the reverse of 53 her strategy of reversal was not as ridiculous as it seems. As long as the second digit is smaller than the first in both of the numbers being added and their total is a double-digit then this is a formula that works. However, it is not a formula that is part of the curriculum for small children adding double-digits and a less attentive teacher might easily have insisted on sticking to the original sum.

My trainee teacher friend and my daughter’s teacher were both willing to give up what they were trying to achieve but crucially neither of them had given up caring about what it was they were teaching. As discussed in chapter 6, the relationship between the teacher and the content of their teaching is one of deep investment and this investment
is crucial if the dynamic of education is to be otherwise than a dynamic of means and ends. In chapter 2 I examined the way in which the performative demands of contemporary education stem from a quest for certainty but as Blake et al. (2000) argue, caring is a risky business compared to the risk free efficiency of teaching reduced to skills and competencies. Blake et al. claim that the risk of investment is ‘disappointment’ (2000: 19) when our students remain sceptical despite our best efforts, but I see the risk more as the risk of surprise that comes with any improvisation; for I need to give up my desire to own what happens in order to be absorbed in the withness I have described. The absorbency demanded by withness has a certain intensity to it that matters to and through the teacher. What is taught and who is taught gets under her skin and this agitation deterritorialises teaching from the origins of intention, the ends of achievement and the space-time of a particular class or module. Yet my argument is that letting go of the dynamic of means and ends not only has an effect on the roles and expectations of educational players; it also affords a re-appraisal of societal expectations regarding education. As an institution, education as we know it is a reified structure with heroic ambitions to change lives and equalise opportunities yet it instead merely reinforces and exacerbates unjust divisions. The outcome of “better life chances” that education that has hitherto been tasked to deliver may be politically seductive and a more equal society may be morally imperative; yet no amount of effort on the part of educators can achieve these ideals. To expect this of education is a fundamental misunderstanding of the dynamics of education and of the dynamics of justice. My argument is that the function of education is not the action of a “leg up” for my conceptualisation of education is otherwise than something attributed to the origin of an effort. For me, education names a co-creative process of getting into something,

See chapter 2 for a discussion of how contemporary education functions to re-inscribe unjust divisions.
perhaps even getting lost in something; whether we be teachers, students, researchers or autodidacts. Whatever our role, we can only launch into something; or more precisely some non-thing; by entering into a withness that gives up our habitual tendency to stake a claim. This means that, both conceptually and in practice, the process of education has to be disentangled from displays of achievement in order to function as a mutative force rather than a defining structure. In making these assertions I am far from shirking our political and social responsibilities for fair chances. On the contrary my argument is that we face up to them. The question of what part educational institutions can play in furthering a fairer society will always be messy, complex and filled with tensions but it is shirking this challenge to hide behind a rhetoric that confuses the question of a just society with the question of (a) (more) just education on its own terms. Only by knowing which is which can we have the courage needed to pursue either or to negotiate their sometimes conflicting demands.

To completely unhook education from instrumentality risks not serving society well because in an advanced capitalist society there can be good reasons why educational institutions might be tasked with meeting wider social objectives (as well as powerful reasons of convenience). What educators and educational institutions can do will therefore always be contained and shaped to some extent by prevailing ideals of use-value. My argument is simply that pretending that these are educational reasons not only allows injustices to proliferate; it also stultifies the dynamics of education.

In this section I have argued that a kinaesthetic minoritarian language agitates educational discourses by disturbing assumptions about origin and effort, means and ends, and learning and achievement. However, I must reiterate that neither major and minor, nor molar and molecular are diametrically opposed for there are always flows
and interminglings between them. In the context of education such interminglings offer both opportunities and cause for caution. On the one hand flows between the molar and the molecular invite teachers and students to minorize majoritarian discourses through the molecular practice of ‘inadequate means’ (Deleuze 1997, p. 113); for example by deterritorialising the emphasis on measurement and categorisation through creating an atmosphere of non demonstrative attentiveness and rhizomatic strivings. On the other hand, emphasising that teachers might practise ‘just education’ despite the constraining ends-oriented structures they work within is a dangerous strategy; for it allows majoritarian discourses to hyper-individualise the responsibility to bring into effect an education that functions more justly and to sediment this responsibility through judgements of success or failure. This latter tendency, to blame the teacher and/or fail the student, is already prevalent in contemporary educational discourse. It therefore appears that the affordance of (a) (more) just education places on educators the practice of a double vigilance. Firstly, the practice of ‘inadequate means’ (ibid.) in studios and classrooms is made possible by vigilant attending, as the experiences of my friend and my daughter serves to illustrate. Secondly, as I have just suggested, the affordance of (a) (more) just education necessitates vigilance against the striating forces of the majoritarian discourse.

The difficulty is that vigilance leaves educators still trapped within discourses that define the limits of what (a) (more) just education might be and so the radical openness of ‘inadequate means’ (Deleuze, 1997, p. 113 original emphasis) only serve as a “time out” and do not fundamentally shift how education is structured and its ends are conceptualised. Yet, the distinction I have made between Mercieca’s listening to, and Deleuze’s creation of ‘vacuoles of non communication’ (Mercieca, 2013, p. 184, Deleuze 1990, p. 175) offers a way out of this apparent dead end. In the next section I
explore how the creative dimension shifts the dynamic of a (more) (just) education from that of vigilant care to that of jurisprudence and argue that this crucial shift undoes the priority of the discourses that constrain how education is conceptualised and how it is practised, thus avoiding the hopelessness of collapsing back into their grip.

Towards jurisprudence

In legal theory jurisprudence operates in situations where there is an absence of pre-existing legal principle and therefore it contributes to the law through inductive rather than deductive reasoning. Jurisprudence involves differentiating the situation at hand from situations already covered by existing law and at the same time jurisprudence regenerates the law by creating a precedent. However, the creative responsibility for justice that I am suggesting educators take up has to be distinguished from the conventional understanding of jurisprudence in legal theory as I am drawing specifically on the way in which Deleuze conceives of jurisprudence (Deleuze, 1995; Deleuze, Parnet, & Boutang, 2012). Deleuze takes from legal theory the idea that justice has to be invented in response to the unique situation at hand but for him the creativity of jurisprudence does not lie in extending codes of practice by constructing precedents. For Deleuze, situations are always contingent and provisional therefore there is always only jurisprudence with no priority of existing law and no legacy of a precedent. Whereas traditional jurisprudence contributes to the law by filling in a gap, Deleuzian jurisprudence traverses an open range. To appreciate what Deleuze means by jurisprudence one has to remember the specific way in which he conceives of creativity.

101 While deductive reasoning starts with a general rule and based on it infers specifics, inductive reasoning works the other way round; starting with specific observations, establishing a pattern and working outwards towards a general rule.
Deleuzian creativity happens through improvising in a world that is constantly unfolding rather than by single-handedly adding to a pre-existent state. 102

My argument, then, is that the affordance of (a) (more) just education demands a slightly different tonus from that of being vigilant. Vigilance makes room for creativity as it brings us to our senses yet vigilance suggests a dynamic of preservation that puts the one who waits, watches or listens apart from the world. In chapter 5 I made a distinction between Masschelein’s (2010a, 2010b) walking practice and that of Ingold (2011) that illustrates the distinction. Masschelein’s emphasis on the gaze left the world untouched whereas Ingold’s wayfarer co-created the path of his traversal. Just education requires ‘inadequate means’ (Deleuze, 1997, p. 113 original emphasis) that are without origin or destination and are generated in, and generative of, the messiness of the world. The generative dimension of withness is co-constitutive of a radical lack of originating effort and determinable destination. Thus while vigilance preserves justice as a “not yet imagined” to strive towards, Deleuzian jurisprudence lets go of the orientation of future justice all together, even a justice not yet imagined. 103 This allows me, in both my conceptualisation and my practice of (a) (more) just education, to let go of any hope of perfection and any mourning of its lack. Letting go of perfection therefore shifts my responsibility from preservation to creation, as I must discern what is just without even the burden of injustice to ground me. My creative responsibility is ethical because I have to relinquish the priority of my own preconceptions about

102 As discussed in chapter 5, Ingold’s (2011) distinction between novelty and improvisation usefully elaborates this conception of creativity.

103 As I discussed in chapter 4, I do not read Derrida’s perpetual vigilance as longing for closure (be that of meaning, of autonomous subjectivity, of justice or of truth). For Derrida, justice is not yet because our sensitivity precludes it, not because we are waiting for it to arrive.
existing states of affairs and dive into an unfolding predicament that is not mine to
master.\textsuperscript{104}

The distinction I am making here between jurisprudence and vigilance reminds me of
the difference between attending to kinaesthetic experience for therapeutic purposes and
doing so within a creative practice. There is a subtly different tone of attention. In both
contexts judgement and expectation are suspended and one is immersed in an unfolding
present of sensations. However, in the therapeutic context the practitioner’s
responsibility is one of preservation, or non-interference, and this duty of care for the
present is conditioned by the perfectionism of balance and well-being, albeit that this
perfection is always ‘not yet’.\textsuperscript{105} If, however, one attends to kinaesthetic experience as
part of a creative endeavour, that is to say in the context of dancing, then one is tasked
with intensifying and expressing the sensations that one encounters. As my discussion
of Petra Kuppers’ work in chapter 6 demonstrates, the dancer’s aesthetic task is that of
becoming (the) present. I must bring myself to what is unfolding and give myself up to
it but I do not disappear. This present is uniquely lived through my body and is
uniquely conditioned by the virtual past experiences vibrating there. The conditions of
this self/world becoming are singular, unrepeatable and seething in the here and now.
Like dancing, the creative force of jurisprudence can only be resourced in the chaosmos
of here and now, a here and now that as the dance artist Deborah Hay puts it, is always

\textsuperscript{104} In chapter 6 I distinguished the ethical complexity of ‘not to be unworthy of what happens to us’
(Deleuze 1990: 169) from the religiosity of Vansieglehem’s duty of care. Vansieglehem’s re-envisioning
of education as a ‘praxis’ that attends to ‘what is’ (Arendt 1977 cited in Vansieglehem 2009: 115)
resonates strongly with my argument in many ways yet she maintains a tone of perfectionism and
proscription in her writing that holds us back from the full force of life and leaves a dimension of
interpretation in tact. The ethical complexity of ‘not to be unworthy’) comes from our being forced to
stay in the hurly burly of the world as it is occurring with no orientation to guide us.

\textsuperscript{105} As discussed in chapter 1 many somatic practices were developed for therapeutic purposes. An
example of engaging in a somatic practice for a therapeutic purpose would be to visit a Feldenkrais
practitioner for a one on one Functional Integration session to address a lack of mobility following an
injury.
‘here and gone, here and gone’ (Hay, in Edmunds 2014). This kind of creative practice does not promise a blueprint for the future; yet the reverberations of this here and now, having been generated with the world, nevertheless vibrate indefinitely.

I am arguing that (a) (more) just education can only be actualised in the situation we are in and yet I acknowledge that to a certain extent teachers, students and curricula are bodies who are separated from what they can do by the discourses, policies and expectations that contain, constrain and structure educational practice. I have claimed that vigilance can make room for practising just education but that it still leaves educators powerless to influence the dominant discourses that stultify (a) (more) just education and that usurp any attempts to resist their power. The creative dimension of jurisprudence offers a way out of this conundrum for creativity exposes a mistaken assumption of dynamics; namely the mistaken assumption that resistance is a matter of effort. On the contrary, for the creative, improvising, minoritarian resistance is a case of puissance rather than pouvoir. As I explained in chapter 4, whereas pouvoir characterises a sovereign power of action puissance is a force of movement and relationship that precedes and persists through any action or expression. The potency of puissance is doubled by an attitude of reserve (Derrida 2005b). Deleuze’s distinction between concepts of movement in sport touches on this dynamic shift but perhaps the Japanese martial art of aikido offers a particularly helpful sporting image in the context of resisting an opponent as powerful as the dominant discourses. In aikido puissance overcomes pouvoir by redirecting its potency rather than by resisting it. My opponent is attacking me. Yet instead of meeting his effort with an opposing or blocking effort I confound his effort by usurping its force. By attending to the direction and force of his effort and aligning myself with its undercurrent I find I can redouble his power but remove his destination. Over my shoulder he goes.
Letting go

As I examined in chapter 2 and have reiterated throughout this thesis, the language of education is one of dualistic discourses that have remained powerfully active in the field of education in spite of numerous attempts to think otherwise. What I have argued in this chapter is that the best efforts of educators and educational theorists to interrupt these discourses may not be the best strategy of resistance. What is needed to outfox their pouvoir is to displace their destination. In the context of education there are several layers of destination to be displaced. I have talked a lot about the ‘ends’ of individual achievement and how room for just education is created when these are let go. My friend only entered the world of the child’s time-telling by letting go of hoping he would achieve the assigned time-telling task. My daughter’s teacher revealed a novel mathematical formula by letting go of his lesson plan. My MA student never did let go of seeing knowledge as a possession, perhaps because I held on too tightly to my desire that she should. At a more macro level the privilege of individual achievement perpetuates the performative drive. Yet intertwined with displacing the privilege of individual achievement is the need to let go of the ideals ascribed to education. Throughout this thesis I have shown that freedom has remained the professed end, or purpose, of education through both liberal and critical iterations of educational theory and that a debased, hyper-individualised conception of freedom propels contemporary performativity, which in turn propels a never ending series of achievement ‘ends’. At the beginning of this project I rather naively thought that replacing the aspiration of freedom with that of justice was the track I was taking; for I began by detailing how educational discourses and practices perpetuated existent injustices and hierarchical
divisions: mind/body, self/other, self/world, capable/incapable or less capable, achieved/not achieved, included/not included. However, instead of interrupting the educational purpose of freedom and replacing it with the purpose of justice I have displaced the “who” that freedom was destined for. I have dispersed the educational subject between and within bodies for I have argued that, like dancing, teaching and learning are processes of co-creation involving the unfolding force of an idea/tendency/dance that we inhabit rather than master; and I have also argued that sentience is at work on a cellular level. This double-direction dispersion of subjectivity calls the whole emphasis on individual achievement into question and allows for a thinking otherwise about pedagogical dynamics.

Untethering the dynamic of education from the ends of a series of achievements was my starting point for affording (a) (more) just education in the double sense of the claim. However, the attentiveness, creativity and sensual becoming that I engaged with to untether education from its ends also allowed me to perform another untethering. Crucially, these attitudes to living allowed me to untether the question of (a) (more) just education from pre-existent injustices because they offered up a practice of jurisprudence through which justice is ever-presenting. Untethering just education from injustice is perhaps the hardest dimension of letting go as it means letting go of the ambition to be a hero, to have the answer, to stop the advance of these discourses and/or to undo their harm. It is hard to give up being a superhero, not just for oneself but because the image sticks. The actor Michael Keaton became so identified with Batman that his only line of flight was becoming Birdman (Iñárritu 2014), thus usurping his previous casting by doubling it back (in Birdman Keaton was cast as a character called Riggan who could not escape the identity of the superhero, Birdman, that he, Riggan,
had previously played). Untethering the affordance of (a) (more) just education from existent injustices offers educators a line of flight from expectations of heroic achievement and therefore undoes their powerlessness against the priority that the dominant discourses hold. On this reckoning there is no need for the regret that Nietzsche (1967) and Deleuze (1983) call ressentiment for the process of education is before and beyond the origin of an action. Educators may always be working in a context where dominant discourses continue to perpetuate injustices yet what I am advocating is that this need not stop teachers from practising jurisprudence as they teach. Their jurisprudence cannot redress the injustices re-inscribed by the dominant discourses but by relinquishing the ends ascribed to education, including the ‘end’ of education enacting social justice, they can create an alternative reality that is lived in the here and now of a classroom or studio. It could be argued that this is futile because the present always passes but on the account I am elucidating it does not do so passively. Each present absorbs from the past and extends into the future. Therefore, when teachers displace the potency of dominant discourses in the here and now of their teaching they are also redirecting the future trajectories of those discourses. Yet they will have to accept that these shifts escape their claim on them; they may not become discernible in an immediate time frame and they may materialise in unexpected and/or almost imperceptible ways. As my encounter with my ex-student serves to demonstrate, the same is true of the impact that their teaching might have on their students.

\footnote{Coincidently, the subtitle of the film is The unexpected virtue of ignorance, though from my discussion in chapter 5 I would argue ‘The unexpected virtue of innocence’ would be a better one.}
I am claiming the affordance of (a) (more) just education is an aesthetic phenomenon rather than a procedural one.\textsuperscript{107} This means practising jurisprudence through the conduction of microscopic, perhaps even atmospheric, shifts as they unfold within the immediate environment and trusting that doing this this spills out to have wider consequences beyond our ken. Yet I think educationalists can also engage in jurisprudence beyond the limits of their personal pedagogic assemblages. By sharpening their aesthetic sensibilities they can perhaps also turn their attention to discerning shifts in institutional or policy tone that can be engaged with, opened up or re-directed.

As educators teachers are neither blameworthy nor responsible for the injustices that our systems re-inscribe but this does not stop the furtherance of (a) (more) just education. On the contrary, I have argued that it is this innocence that makes just education possible. I claim that (a) (more) just education does make a difference, both to the dynamics and effects of the pedagogic assemblages that teachers, students and curricula create and to the dynamics and effects of the wider educational environment that these assemblages inhabit. These two claims have absorbed the past pages of this thesis and now extend towards a possible alternative future. Yet these claims are perhaps best not thought of as conclusions as the whole point is that they do not offer an end. (A) (more) just education is something educators, and their students, have to practise rather than achieve. Given this, then perhaps the only way to conclude is with a plea rather than a claim. My plea is that educators equally practise jurisprudence in their role as citizens. Practising (a) (more) just education depends on distinguishing the

\textsuperscript{107} It seems that nowadays even judges agree that jurisprudence is an aesthetic practice, for in 2014 I was asked to teach a somatic movement workshop to a group of judges and legal theorists. The workshop was part of series of arts-practice workshops funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council’s Beyond Text project and took place within the Edinburgh University School of Law spring festival 2014.
passage of education from the array of socialising functions ascribed to educational institutions. Nevertheless, the competing priorities of these functions and the desirability or not of their various effects is something that must demand the constant attention and creative engagement of citizens if a more just society is to be realised.
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