COMPONENTS OF RETAIL CHANGE IN CENTRAL LONDON.

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ABSTRACT.

Central London contains one of the most important shopping centres in the world. The principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge are the core of this centre. The purpose of the study is to investigate patterns of retail change in these streets in the period from 1976 to 1985. A range of quantitative and qualitative data are gathered and analysed in order to describe and explain the patterns of locational change.

The three main components of retail change examined are political, economic and social influences. Each of these are discussed in terms of how their principal elements play a part in helping to shape trading patterns in the study area. Specific consideration is given to Oxford Street since this acts as the focus of retail activity in central London. Finally, an attempt is made to model some of the most important aspects of retail change that emerge from the study.

The study indicates a retail environment that is characterised by considerable and rapid change. These changes exhibit few elements of regularity or consistency through both space and time. This is a function of the complex range of factors that are responsible for producing this dynamic and unique retail system.

Thus, the research identifies changes that have taken place in trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the West
End and Knightsbridge in the period from 1976 to 1985, identifies the factors responsible for producing these changes, and develops an understanding of the ways in which these factors bring their influence to bear.
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1.1.1 Components of Retail Change in Central London: 

Introduction.

London is probably the most important centre of retail activity in the world. It is the focus of most aspects of political administration and economic and industrial wealth in the United Kingdom. London has a retail trade turnover equal to that of Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds, Birmingham, Newcastle, Glasgow and Edinburgh combined [1]. The aim of this research is to investigate patterns of retailing in central London and the processes responsible for producing these patterns in the period from 1976 to 1985.

The particular area of central London to be investigated is the West End and Knightsbridge [2]. This area is the core of London’s retail structure both spatially and in terms of concentration of retail activity; 60% of London’s retail floorspace is found in Westminster [3]. The particular streets of this area chosen for detailed examination are Oxford Street, Regent Street, Bond Street and Brompton Road [4]. These shopping streets are the focus of retail activity in the West End and Knightsbridge.

From the outset of the research, it is crucial to note that it does not draw exclusively on one methodological or theoretical approach in attempting to meet its range of broad and specific aims. In fact, it is the explicit desire of the researcher to draw upon as wide range of methodological and theoretical
approaches as necessary to attain these aims. The purpose of adopting this approach is to derive the advantages of a wide range of methodological and theoretical approaches whilst avoiding their disadvantages. It is also hoped that, by avoiding the exclusive adoption of a methodological or theoretical standpoint, it may be possible to undertake a more objective investigation of the components of retail change in central London than would otherwise be the case.

1.1.2. Research Aims (Broad and Specific) and General Structure.

In undertaking this investigation into the components of retail change in central London, two broad aims of the research can be identified; description and explanation of changing patterns of retailing. In general, the study can be divided into these two constituent parts; the first being concerned with describing patterns of retail change in the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge, and the second being devoted to an explanation of these changes by reference to the 'components' that are responsible for producing them. Within these broad aims of the study, a number of specific aims can be identified. These are represented by the subject matter of the subsequent chapters.

In order to place the study in context, Chapter 2 provides an outline of literature that is of relevance to the research. Three sections can be identified in this chapter; the first dealing with literature pertaining to locational change in
retailing; the second with processes of retail institutional change; and the third, with more detailed aspects of store location.

Chapters 3 and 4 respectively, are concerned with the collection and analysis of the data required in order to describe and explain patterns of retailing in the principal shopping streets of the study area. Chapter 3 deals with the data collection methods used in the course of the study. Data will be required in order to fulfil the two broad aims of the research; description and explanation of patterns of retail activity. The data collected with regard to the descriptive element of the study will take the form of the construction of a land-use data base of commercial land-uses in each of the principal shopping streets of the study area. The data collected with regard to the study’s explanatory element will take two forms. First, data will be required in order to examine the range of political, economic and social factors at work in helping to shape trading patterns in the four study streets. And secondly, data will be collected in order that the decision making processes of retailers trading in the study area can be investigated.

The decision to develop a land-use data base for the principal shopping streets of the study area is a relatively simple one, in that, by establishing the land-use composition of each of the study streets (Oxford Street, Regent Street, Bond Street and Brompton Road), at a number of points in time, it will be possible to identify the main characteristics and trends
of their commercial environments. In doing so, the descriptive aim of the research will be satisfied.

The collection of data with regard to political, economic and social influences on trading patterns, and with regard to locational decision making processes are required in order to satisfy the explanatory aim of the research. The identification of the data required for land-use mapping will simply involve identifying uses at a particular place at a particular point in time. The collection of data for explanatory purposes will be more complex since the sources from which these data can be derived are less readily identifiable.

In attempting to explain changing retail patterns in the study area it has been decided to incorporate two main elements. First, to identify the range of factors predominantly responsible for producing these patterns. And secondly, to try to establish the relative importance of these factors. Toward these ends the main methods of data collection to be employed are personal interviews and a questionnaire survey. The application of these techniques is discussed in Chapter 3.

Chapter 4 is concerned with analysing the data collected with regard to the descriptive and explanatory aims of the study. This chapter will focus on two main elements of analysis; the analysis of the land-use data base constructed; and the analysis of the data obtained from the questionnaire survey of traders in the study area. The analysis of the land-use data base provides
the basis of the fulfilment of the descriptive aim of the text. This analysis has three main purposes; to identify the dominant types of retail use in the principal shopping streets of the study area; to consider levels of non-retail uses and vacant properties; and to identify any statistically significant trends in the presence and distribution of these land-uses through time.

The analysis of the questionnaire survey data, coupled with the data obtained from the range of personal interviews carried out, with traders, representatives of 'political' bodies and property agents, provide the basis for the subsequent development of the explanatory aim of the research.

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 discuss the main political, economic and social factors which will be identified through personal interviews and the questionnaire survey as playing the most important roles with regard to the influencing of trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the study area. The discussion of various elements of these three broad categories is designed to provide an understanding of the particular ways in which each relates to changing patterns of land-use activity in the four study streets. This section represents the most important part of the text which is a reflection of the fact that the range of factors at work in this respect is a large and complex one.

In Chapter 8, a more detailed examination of trading patterns in one of the four principal shopping streets under consideration
(Oxford Street) is carried out. This more detailed examination of Oxford Street is justified on the basis that not only does it act as the focus of retailing for the other shopping streets under consideration, but that it also acts as a focus in this sense for the whole of the West End and Knightsbridge, and indeed, London in general. In fact, from an early point in the research it was apparent that Oxford Street is undoubtedly one of the World’s premiere shopping centres. This chapter, as well as considering its main trading characteristics and general trading patterns, will also give consideration to development proposals for Oxford Street and to what the street’s future may be.

The final explanatory element in the research is found in Chapter 9, which is devoted to an attempt to model certain aspects of retailing in the study area. In Chapter 9, three main elements of model building will be developed. First, an attempt will be made to model the main political, economic and social components of retail change. Secondly, a model will be developed with regard to the locational and operational decision making strategies of those trading in this area. And finally, an attempt will be made to relate theories of institutional change in retailing (as discussed in Chapter 2) with actual patterns of retail change in the principal shopping streets of the study area.

Thus, the above specific research aims, represented in the subject matter of Chapters 2 to 9, fall within the broad research aims of description and explanation of changing retail patterns.
These aims can be summarised as follows; to provide a review of relevant literature; to collect data suitable to describe and explain changing retail patterns in the principal shopping streets of the study area; to analyse these data toward these same ends; the investigation of the main political, economic and social components of retail change in the study area; to consider the focus of retail activity (Oxford Street) in greater detail; and, to model some of the prominent aspects of retail change in the four study streets. By pursuing these specific aims it will be shown that the broader aims of the research will be satisfied.

Finally, Chapter 10 is designed to draw together the whole study by reiterating the most important points to emerge from the research and by providing an appropriate set of concluding remarks.

CHAPTER 1: NOTES.
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3. See Appendix I for Location Map of study area.

4. See Appendix II Tables 1 to 4 for detailed location maps of study streets.
2.1.1. Literature Review: Introduction.

In this chapter, the literature relevant to the research will be reviewed. This review will have three sections. First, literature will be outlined with regard to the study of aspects of retail locational change in a general sense. This section will consider retail locational change from five different perspectives: economic theory, central place theory, land value theory, spatial interaction models and economic analogies. Secondly, there will be a review of the basic approaches towards processes of retail institutional change. Three basic approaches will be discussed in this respect; environmental theory, cyclical theory and conflict theory. And finally, there will be a discussion of more specific aspects of retail location, and in particular, those relating to store location decisions. It should be noted that these sections are not necessarily mutually exclusive, in that, certain aspects of the concepts under review relate to more than one section.

2.2.1. Retail Locational Change: Economic Theory.

Retailing economic theory can be considered from two different standpoints. The first, and that of less direct relevance to this study, is concerned with the spatial delimitation of the 'demand area' (or trade area) for a single good or number of goods. This delimitation is on the basis of the costs to the consumer, both in economic and in psychic terms.
The second aspect of economic theory (one that is of more direct relevance to the study) is one that can be drawn from the theory of the firm. It is assumed that profit maximisation is the fundamental basis of the location of 'private' economic activity. However, this assumption is undermined by the complexity of the environment within which retailers operate and by the inconsistencies in their reactions to this environment. Indeed, it is apparent that "we are very ignorant about the parameters of individual entrepreneurial decision making, but we do know that it is far from a precise or universally rational process, and often intuition, guesswork and subjective experience seem to be major factors" [1].

Prod [2] examined the behavioural and locational decisions of both entrepreneurs and consumers, focussing on actual rather than optimal spatial patterns. In examining the classical concept of 'economic man' he questioned the assumptions of motive and level of knowledge. Fred draws a picture of locational decision making by retailers as a process functioning under conditions of varying information and dependent upon the varying abilities of decision makers.

It can be argued that essentially entrepreneurs locate in response to spatial variations in demand [3]. However, others also point to the importance of the operational environment, for example, the way in which retailers respond to the locational decisions of others [4].
Traditional locational considerations of population distribution, purchasing power, distance and accessibility, may be replaced by other non-location specific factors such as, for example, the location of other outlets in a multiple group. Thus, the location of individual retail components (shops) may be of secondary importance to the optimisation of overall system performance [5].

One further economic consideration is that of agglomeration economies. These are apparent both at the macro-level and at the micro-level. At the latter level (that of most interest to this study) there is no doubt that there are forces which cause stores to cluster together; "because access to pedestrians is partially created by the presence of other nearby stores, the retailer is highly sensitive to the actions of neighbouring retailers, as well as competitors. Clusters of stores attract customers and create markets in an urban area" [6]. Two 'standard' approaches can be identified. First, that of Hotelling's 'ice cream vendor' situation [7], and second, Nelson's theory of cumulative attraction [8] which argues that similar stores types will operate more effectively if they operate close together than if they are spatially dispersed.

2.2.2. Retail Locational Change: Land Value Theory.

Land value theory, or as it is also termed, the 'bid-rent curve', is one of the most established methods available for the analysis and explanation of urban economic activities. This
approach, derived from Von Thunen's agricultural land use model, proposes that the location of different activities will depend on competitive bidding for specific sites on the basis of anticipated returns [9].

The aspect seen as being of most importance is that of accessibility. The 'core' of a city (in historical terms) has its highest accessibility due to it being the focus for transport networks. Consequently, land values are at their greatest here. The firms that can 'exploit' this accessibility to its fullest will be those willing to be pay the greatest costs in the form of rent and premium payments; "each type of store values accessibility differently, and is able to pay different amounts for a site" [10]. This idea is well illustrated by Scott [11] who suggests a systematic retail pattern determined by the maximum rents that retailers are willing to pay. This is shown in Figure 2.1. (below).

Garner incorporated these concepts into his spatial model of business centre structure [12]. This model (largely based and developing upon work by Getis [13] which demonstrated that total sales volume decreases with distance from the peak intersection) is underpinned by a simple set of relationships; high threshold functions (those requiring large populations to support it in profit) are associated with high rent paying ability and thus will tend to found at the centre of retail nucleations.
Figure 2.1. - The Bid Rent Curve.


This model, however, representing as it does, an over-simplification of a complex reality, has three main faults. First, establishments of a given type are not always associated with discrete 'economic' distances from the peak land value intersection. Secondly, a number of other factors, not taken into account by the model, are also of importance including, transport and accessibility irregularities, the significance of corner sites, population and income distribution [14]. And thirdly, as with most other land use theories, this model assumes a single
land market within which all uses compete for available sites. However, the imposition of planning regulations in the United Kingdom (of which a number have an effect upon trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the study area)\[15\] results in a number of separate land markets operating simultaneously (commercial, residential and industrial) which can be further divided (for example, zoning of commercial land into retail and non-retail uses).

The Garner model was extended by Davies in the 1970's [16]. This extension has three main elements. First, it notes that different types of business have varying accessibility requirements and rent paying abilities. Secondly, it links this to Berry's three kinds of retail complexes - centres, ribbons and specialised areas [17]. And thirdly, it incorporates the hierarchical tenets of central place theory. The main strengths of the accessibility/rent argument are, first, that it relates business type and structure to accessibility, and secondly, that it 'better fits' more general models of urban structure [18].

2.2.3. Retail Locational Change: Central Place Theory.

Christaller first developed central place theory in the 1930's as a means of analysing and describing the size, number and distribution of towns as service centres. It has subsequently been extended to help explain the location of service centres within urban areas. Basically, the theory seeks to explain an
apparent order among the pattern of settlements (or central places) dispensing goods and services to the surrounding area. Central place theory is based around a number of assumptions which can be summarised as follows [19][20];

(i) customers, with equal incomes, are spread evenly over a plain with no significant physical features, so that distance is the only restriction on customers travel;

(ii) there are a fixed number of store types each with a characteristic average cost curve that determines its threshold size of operation, and each with a distinctive spatial demand curve that determines range, given spatial pattern of demand;

(iii) there exists a threshold of demand below which a good cannot be economically offered for sale i.e. there is a minimum population required to support a good. This produces a spectrum of retail activity that can be ranked by threshold size of market;

(iv) the size of the population, and hence, trade area, depends upon the type or class of good;

(v) centres are classified into hierarchical groups according to the size of the trade area; or equivalently classified by the types of goods offered at the centre;

(vi) each high-ranked centre contains the goods offered by lower-ranked centres;

(vii) free entry of business produces trade a contraction of
trade areas to their minimum size;

(viii) the close packing of circular or hexagonal trade areas generates a set of inter-leaving (nested) hexagonal lattices.

The concept of hierarchy within central place theory is the one which is most commonly used by geographers in trying to explain retail patterns. A number of studies have indicated support for Christaller’s notion of a process of centralisation leading to a stepped hierarchy of centres [21]. However, other studies, and in particular the work of Losch [22] suggest that due to the number and complexity of influencing factors (economic, political and social) in reality, a hierarchy of centres would be impossible to identify [23]. The most crucial aspect of Losch’s approach is that the net of market areas for each function is derived independently, without reference to the supply of other functions [24]. Despite the arguments put forward by such studies, and particularly that which asserts that central place theory is not a suitable method for considering the internal arrangement of shops within centres, a number of studies have been put forward that have attempted to do just this including, for example, those of Berry and Garrison [25] and of Russwurm and Thakur [26], which focuses on the systematic variation in retail composition with city size.

In 1967, Berry produced the now widely accepted typology of centres, ribbons and specialised areas [27]. This built on earlier
work which drew an analogy between the settlement hierarchy of hamlets, villages, towns, cities and metropolitan areas on the one hand, and the intra-urban pattern of isolated clusters of shops, neighbourhood centres, community centres, regional centres and central business districts on the other hand. This typology [28] was subsequently qualified and refined, with important developments being provided by Szumeluk [29], Guy [30], and particularly Davies [31] who provides a structural model of retailing facilities within large central areas.

Thus, in the study of retailing patterns, central place theory has had a very important role to play. However, it should be noted that it is open to criticism on several fronts. First, it exhibits a high degree of abstraction resulting from its attempts to simplify a highly complex reality. Second, its deterministic economic nature results in it ignoring the role of historical and cultural factors in processes of urban growth, as well as the role of regulation and constraint in the form of planning restrictions and controls. A third criticism of this approach, also stemming from its inherently deterministic nature, is its view of rationality, both on the part of consumers and of retailers. The work of Huff [32] illustrated the importance of elements of sub-optimal behaviour and considerable attempts have been made to set central place theory within a more probabilistic framework [33].

Fourthly, important elements of central place theory appear to be rather tautological in nature, This 'circularity of
argument' is seen in the fact that "economic institutions, including retail outlets, adapt themselves to social behaviour, but equally the latter has evolved within certain economic constraints" [34]. Finally, central place theory would seem to struggle to cope with the dynamic nature of modern urban retailing processes since it is concerned with central place systems as they exist at equilibrium. Thus, no attempt is made to focus on processes of adjustment and change [35]. This criticism is well summarised by Berry who states that "the classical patterns of the central place hierarchy break down and are replaced by business patterns characteristically internal to cities" [36].

In order for central place theory to be more applicable to 'real world situations' it would seem necessary that a number of its basic and limiting assumptions (as outlined above) need to be relaxed. For example, the assumption of a uniform plain populated by consumers with similar demand preferences, is one that can be dispensed with. Beavon [37] considered the effects of spatial variations in the incomes of consumers and developed a model where areas of low incomes (and therefore reduced demand) would develop relatively large market areas and widely spread centres. However, in incorporating such changes into traditional central place models this often requires their drastic reformulation [38].

Thus, central place theory, although a valuable tool in the study of changing patterns of retail location, should always be
viewed within the context of these considerable limiting elements. Indeed, the advisability of any application of central place theory in the analysis of present day retailing patterns, (and in particular of those in the principal shopping streets of the study area), would seem to be inappropriate.

2.2.4. Retail Locational Change: Spatial Interaction Models.

Most of the models that fall under the heading of spatial interaction models are mathematical expressions of the basic notion that,

"an attracting force of interaction between two areas of human activity is created by the population masses of the two areas, and a friction against interaction is caused by the intervening space over which the interaction takes place" [39].

This concept, as developed by Reilly [40] and subsequently modified by Converse [41] is expressed in Figure 2.2. (below).

A very important development in the 'break point' models of Reilly and Converse was the adaption of the concept by Huff [42]. Huff expressed the probability of a given centre being chosen from a set of centres as shown in Figure 2.3. (below).

Further development of this approach by Lakshmanan and Hansen [43] provided a model which, as devised for a metropolitan region, stated that a shopping centre located in a given zone
will attract consumer expenditure, (i) in direct proportion to total consumer expenditure, (ii) in direct proportion to the size of the centre measured in terms of floorspace, (iii) in inverse proportion to the distance to the consumers expressed in terms of travel time and (iv) in inverse proportion to competing facilities [44].

Figure 2.2. - Mathematical Expression of the Gravity Concept.

\[
\frac{Ta}{Tb} = \frac{Pa}{Pb} \left[ \frac{db}{da} \right]^2
\]

Ta and Tb = trade drawn to cities a and b from an intermediate place
da and db = distances from a and b to that intermediate place
Pa and Pb = populations of a and b


However, despite the simplicity of the majority of models adopting this approach, they are subject to a number of operational problems. These problems take two main forms. First, those relating to the indexing of variables (and in particular that which measures attraction) and secondly, those relating to the calibration of the model, a process usually carried out by using known data from a previous date and/or by undertaking 'trial runs'.
Figure 2.3. - The Gravity Concept: Probabalistic Formulation.

\[ P_j = \frac{U_j}{\sum U_j} \]

Where \( U_j \) is the utility associated with the centre \( j \).

This notion was then expanded with the fuller formulation below.

\[
P_{ij} = \frac{\left( A_j^\alpha / d_{ij}^\beta \right) \prod_{j=1}^{n_1} \left( A_j^\alpha / d_{ij}^\beta \right)}{\sum_{j=1}^{n_1} \left( A_j^\alpha / d_{ij}^\beta \right)}
\]

- \( P_{ij} \) = probability that a consumer in zone \( i \) will visit centre \( j \)
- \( A_j \) = the attractive power of centre \( j \)
- \( d_{ij} \) = distance from zone \( i \) to centre \( j \)
- \( \alpha, \beta \) = exponents empirically derived


The criticisms of spatial interaction models have been usefully summarised by Jensen-Butler [45]. The main elements of the principal criticisms can be outlined as follows.

(i) Spatial interaction models have a relatively weak theoretical base.

(ii) The assumption that the slope of the distance decay function is a negative one is based on empirical rather than theoretical verification.
(iii) The models cannot predict the dynamics of change.

Thus, as with central place theory, spatial interaction models, although of some value in analysing processes of retail location change, must be considered in light of a number of important limiting criticisms.

2.2.5. Retail Locational Change: Ecological Analogies.

Ecology is the study of "organisms' relations to one another and to their surroundings" [46]. This analogy has frequently been used in the study of retail location. Its main elements are outlined below in Figure 2.4.

A number of aspects of ecological studies are particularly apparent within the study of retailing. One such aspect is that of the emergence of a dominant species. Marshall [47] argues that the dominant species in retailing will be a high order business type (but not necessarily the highest order) and cites the example of the controlling influence that supermarkets play in relation to the rest of the retail system. However, although the growth of supermarkets has stimulated considerable and important locational changes, it can be argued that certain multiple stores (by occupying or creating prime sites) fulfil this role of the dominant species [48].

A second aspect of ecological studies that is particularly applicable to retailing is that of adaptation and innovation - ecological responses which occur when the market is disturbed.
These concepts form the basis of work by Alchian who argues that the economic system is an adoptive mechanism where retailers embark upon processes of adaption, imitation and trial and error in the pursuit of profits [49].

Figure 2.4. - Summary of the Main Elements of Concept and Analogy in the Ecological Approach to the Study of Retail Location.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONCEPT</th>
<th>ANALOGY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Business Type</td>
<td>Species</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Form of Business Conformation</td>
<td>Different levels of organisation [50]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Overall Retail Structure of the city</td>
<td>Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Factors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.g. location of populations, workplaces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and transport [51]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Relations between retail units</td>
<td>(i) Competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(ii) Commensalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(ii) Adaption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(iv) Parasitism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Consumer Expenditure</td>
<td>Energy flowing through system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One important element in the application of ecological analogies to retailing is that they recognise that the relationship between the retailing subsystems, and the retail structure and its environment, is not static. Indeed, there would seem to be some evidence to support the contention that a city's retail structure is responsive to its environment [52]. Ecological analogies also encompass several aspects of affinity; the operation of retail outlets in a parasitic or symbiotic manner. For example, the clustering of outlets of a similar quality image.

Thus, it would seem that ecological analogies provide a useful framework within which to study retailing in general and, (because of its allowance for dynamic processes) retail locational change in particular.

2.3.1. Retail Institutional Change: Basic Approaches.

In considering theories of retail institutional change, three basic approaches can be identified [53]. First, environmental theory, which is based on the notion that changes in retailing are a function of the operational environment of a retail institution. Secondly, cyclical theory, which suggests that change takes place in a rhythmic fashion with the re-occurrences of earlier patterns. And thirdly, conflict theory which is concerned with inter-institutional conflicts arising out of the introduction of new forms of retailing. Each of these schools of thought will now be considered in more detail.
As noted above, the environmental standpoint with regard to retail institutional change, is essentially based upon the idea that retail institutions evolve and adapt in direct response to changing environmental circumstances [54]. There is considerable evidence in literature to support this view. For example, it has been argued that the department store, an important element in the retail character of the principal shopping streets of the study area, emerged as a function of a number of environmental changes in the nineteenth century, such as the growth of middle-class demand and increased efficiency in inter-urban transport systems [55].

A considerable number of other studies have also suggested that the emergence of a wide range of retailing forms, from variety stores to shopping centres, have been dependent upon environmental factors. Two distinct forms of study can be identified. First, those that are based on largely qualitative, anecdotal data [56]. And secondly, those that have tried to employ sophisticated statistical techniques in an attempt to quantify relationships between environmental factors and institutional change [57]. It is worth noting that examples of the first study type are far more numerous than those of the second.

Some studies, carried out from the less quantitative
standpoint, have concentrated on specific elements within the framework of environmental factors, such as technology [58], legal constraints [59], and economics (economic climate, stage of economic development, etc.)[60]. Such studies suggest that these specific elements are the most important within processes of institutional change and the level of infrastructural development.

The importance of studies linking economic development and the structure of retailing reached its peak in the 1970's, when it was felt that it may be have been possible to predict trends in any nation given knowledge of its stage of economic development. However, this approach was rapidly disproved due to the fact of the considerable complexity of environmental conditions (cultural, historical, economic, etc.) prevalent in any nation, making accurate prediction impossible. For example, many nations exhibited a range of environmental impediments to the introduction and development of supermarkets [61], reflecting the vital role that the 'environmental mix' of any nation plays with regard to its retail structure.

It is important at this point to bear in mind that environmental factors are not only responsible for the introduction of new retailing forms, but are also responsible for the evolution of these new forms. Inability on the part of a retail institution, to respond to changing environmental circumstances, can result in its decline or closure. Indeed, Gist [62] in his 'adjustment theory' suggests that those retail
institutions that are likely to survive in the long term are those that best adapt to changing environmental conditions. This is very similar to Aichian's concept of 'adaptation and adoption', a theory relating more specifically to industrial location, which states that firms must change their operational formats in order to conform with local environmental demands [63].

This 'survival of the fittest' scenario was extended and developed into ecological models of retail change. One recent example of such a modelling approach can be found in the work of Markin and Duncan [64] which highlighted the parasitic nature of many retailing relationships (the dependence for survival of one retail institution upon another).

It should be noted that although possessing many plausible elements (reflected in the importance that many retail institutions place upon environmental monitoring and forecasting) the environmental approach in general, and its ecological element in particular, require further development in order to be proven.

2.3.3. Retail Institutional Change: Cyclical Theory

- Introduction.

Within the cyclical school of thought with regard to retail institutional evolution, four main elements can be identified; the retail accordion, the wheel of retailing, the retail life cycle, and finally, the polarisation principle [65].
2.3.4. Retail Institutional Change: Cyclical Theory

- The Retail Accordion.

The retail accordion, or as it is also termed the 'general-specific-general cycle' is based on the notion of rythmic patterns of development relating to the number of lines handled by the predominant institutional form at any given point in time.

There seems to be considerable evidence to suggest that, through time, in both in the United States of America [66] and the United Kingdom [67], there have been rythmic movements from retail institutions supplying a wide range of goods, to those that are more specialised in nature, and then back again.

It is important to note, however, that these rythmic processes are unlikely to occur to all retail institutions at the same time. Rather, processes of diversification and specialisation are likely to be present at the same time in different retail institutions [68].

2.3.5. Retail Institutional Change: Cyclical Theory

- The Wheel of Retailing.

Figure 2.5. (below) gives an outline of the workings of the concept of the wheel of retailing [69]. This deterministic approach suggests that retail institutions emerge in their
Figure 2.5. - The Wheel of Retailing.

Mature retailer
- Top heaviness
- Conservatism
- Declining ROI

Innovative retailer
- Low status
- Low price
- Minimal service
- Poor facilities
- Limited product offerings

Traditional retailer
- Elaborate facilities
- Expected, essential, and exotic services
- Higher-rent locations
- Fashion orientations
- Higher prices
- Extended product offerings

Vulnerability phase

Entry phase

Becomes

Trading-up phase


formative stages as being simple, narrow margin operators. These will change as customer developments force up expense, margins and prices. In turn, these operators will become dependent upon quality of goods and services rather than price competitiveness. The 'wheel' is then completed, since with institutions taking on this last form, the way is open for the introduction of new,
innovative, simple, low margin retail institutions. Thus, the wheel is completed and moves on.

Evidence exists both in support of and against the viability of this concept. In general, the validity of this concept, if not its universal applicability, is accepted. For example, it would seem particularly applicable in many economically advanced nations, but far less so in developing nations [70].

The least satisfactory aspect of 'the wheel' is that of the concept of 'trading up', which would include, for example, such elements as the improvements in display, use of advertising, the introduction of credit facilities, and so on. No completely satisfactory explanation has been produced as to why retail institutions should embark upon such a process of change. Present day retail institutions cast doubt upon the dynamic nature of 'the wheel'. For example, the emergence of large retail empires ('conglomerate's) [71] has resulted in one institution having interests at more than one stage in 'the wheel'. These then are not allowed to 'evolve' into the next stage. Through this process new institutions find entry into individual market segments difficult, (due to their established, experienced incumbents), and thus, the wheel 'grinds to a halt'.

2.3.6. Retail Institutional Change: Cyclical Theory
- The Retail Life Cycle.
the product life cycle, as developed in the study of marketing.

Figure 2.6. - The Retail Life Cycle.

Source - Bell J. and Brown S. (1986).

Fig. 2.6. (above) shows how, in the retail life cycle approach, it is argued that retail institutions follow a route (again deterministic) from birth, through maturity, to decline [72]. This process can be briefly outlined as follows [73]. An institution, with competitive advantages over existing traders, enters the market, achieves public acceptability, and derives rapid rises in sales. This success results in imitation, the technique spreads and enters a stage of accelerated development. The volume of trade, profitability and market share all increase.
rapidly in this stage, but by its end, problems of escalating costs and 'over-rapid' expansion are encountered. Thus in the 'maturity' stage the vitality of the institution, so apparent in the early stages, disappears to be replaced by the final stage - that of decline - which is characterised by the loss of market share, profitability and eventual closure.

Some evidence does exist in support of this theoretical approach, however, as with the product life cycle, it is open to a number of criticisms [74]. For example, it is often difficult to locate the position of an institution in the cycle. In addition, it can be argued that the main weakness of this approach is found in its deterministic nature. However, despite its apparent limitations, there can be little doubt that the retail life cycle is of some use as a conceptual tool.

A number of interesting points are worth noting. First, that there are distinct elements of similarity between the retail life cycle and the wheel of retailing. Secondly, there is some evidence to suggest that the temporal component in the retail life cycle (the length of time for the cycle to be 'completed') has been reduced through time [75]. At the same time, as noted above, it would seem that 'the wheel' is slowing down. It can be argued that these trends are not necessarily incompatible, in the sense that, whereas the wheel of retailing assumes an element of evolution or change in the retail institution, the retail life cycle assumes that the technique remains unchanged.
2.3.7. Retail Institutional Change: Cyclical Theory

The Polarisation Principle.

The basis of this approach is that the now well established trend towards fewer but larger retail institutions is counterbalanced by a renaissance of the small shop sector [76]. This first trend is a function of a desire for the derivation of economies of scale of the shop. Many developed economies, including the United States of America and, more recently, the United Kingdom, have seen this 'desire' manifested in the form of hypermarket style operations serving the 'bulk orientated' needs of the shopper [77].

The renaissance of the small shop sector can be most readily identified in the emergence of the modern convenience store. Such stores serve two main purposes. First, an 'emergency/topping up' role for the 'bulk orientated shopper', and secondly, a service for shoppers either unable or unwilling to use hypermarket type operations. Thus, essentially these two institutional forms can be seen as being complementary rather than competitive in nature.

Again, a similarity can be observed between the polarisation principle and other facets of cyclical theory, namely, the wheel of retailing and the retail accordian. Like these other facets the polarisation principle deals only with a single element of retail dynamics; in this case, the relationship between large and small establishments.
One recent extension of the polarisation principle is the multi-polarisation model [78]. This argues that institutional developments can be identified in a number of formats; large, limited range outlets (for example, discount electrical warehouses; price cutting operations in large premises (such as hypermarkets); small, 'large number of lines' outlets (the 'modern convenience store'); and, small, service orientated outlets (for example, boutiques). As any of these retail formats evolve and change, there will emerge in response one or more counter-balancing forces. This model, although of some potential value, it should be noted that it remains largely untested.

2.3.8. Retail Institutional Change: Conflict Theory.

"Vigorous competition between old and new is capitalism's driving force" [79]. In retailing the 'competitive element' that is of greatest importance is that which results from the introduction of new retail institutions [80]. Failure on the part of any trader to respond to the challenge set by new institutions is likely to lead to decline or closure of business. Responses of traders tend to fall into two broad categories. First, the imitation of some or all of the characteristics of a new innovation [81]. And secondly, the avoidance of direct competition with a new institution by differentiating business format from that of the 'challenger'.

The emergence of discount stores in the United States prompted both types of responses from existing retailers such as
traditional department stores. Thus, for example, 'imitative responses' included the wholesale cutting of prices and services to match those of the newcomer, and 'avoidance responses' included traditional department stores moving 'up market' and disposing of the 'no frills' lines of the newcomer [82].

However, it is important to point out that appropriate responses to retail innovations rarely appear overnight. It is far more usual for a 'wait and see' attitude to be adopted by existing traders [83] In addition a range of responses may be considered, tested and applied or rejected by the threatened institution. A number of attempts have been made to model this process. For example, Swan [84] provided a model with three basic elements of response; recognition of the problem, proposing and testing of solutions, and adoption of new trading format. Stern and El-Ansary [85] applied a model which distinguishes four stages in the action-reaction sequence; shock, defensive retreat, acknowledgement, and adaption. The application of this model (originally developed by Fink, Boek and Taddeo) [86] to changes in American and British grocery retailing was clearly demonstrated by Dawson [87]. The main elements of the model are summarised below in Figure 2.7.

Arguably, the most important aspect of these 'crisis-response' models is that they infer that not only do threatened existing institutions change in response to a challenge, but that the newcomer is also altered by the hostile actions of these threatened institutions (for example, attempts to discredit the
Figure 2.7. - Action/Reaction Sequence of Threatened Institutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STAGE</th>
<th>REACTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Shock</td>
<td>- Refusal to recognise extent of threat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Newcomer seen as ephemeral and inferior.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Defensive Retreat</td>
<td>- Pressure on newcomers supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Attempts to discredit, control and impede newcomer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Acknowledgement</td>
<td>- Realisation that newcomer is likely to remain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Recognition of need for positive countermeasures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Creation of new power balance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


newcomer). Thus, a sequence of action, reaction and resolution can be identified; the 'action' of threatened institutions, the 'reaction' of the newcomer to the action of the threatened institutions, and, the combination of these two elements to provide the 'resolution' of the post-conflict institutional structure. This process has been formalised by Gist in his diætical theory (see Figure 2.8. below)[88].

35
This model argues that existing thesis is challenged by antithesis and that a synthesis emerges from the merging of the two. The synthesis then becomes thesis and thus the dialectical process moves on. Davies provides the example here of the thesis being the counter-service grocery store, and the antithesis being the self-service grocery store [89].
2.3.9. Retail Institutional Change: Combined Theories

- Introduction.

This review of the approaches to retail institutional change has thus far considered the three main approaches identified (environmental, cyclical and conflict based sets of theories) as separate entities. However, two important points emerge from the individual discussions of these three approaches. First, that far from being mutually exclusive, elements of one approach are commonly found in another. For example, the retail life cycle seems to be founded largely on an ecological basis. Second, none of the three approaches, by themselves, provide a completely adequate explanation of institutional evolution. For example, cyclical models suffer from their deterministic nature and environmental models tend to play down the importance of the role of the innovator. Thus, given these points it is not surprising that a considerable number of combined theories, drawing upon elements from two or more of these basic approaches, have been developed. The following provides an outline of the most important of these combined approaches.

2.3.10. Retail Institutional Change: Combined Theories

- Environmental-Cycle.

Processes of cyclical change operate within the context of changing environmental conditions. Thus, the cycle moves on since, given the alterations to the framework within which it
operates, it cannot return to its original starting point. Therefore, although a new retail institution may be similar to one that has gone before, it cannot be the same, since environmental circumstances have changed in the interim.

Broadly speaking, a theoretical continuum can be identified that ranges from conceptualisations that are environmentally based but recognise the presence of cyclical processes, to those that are cyclically based but recognise that environmental factors play a role in institutional change. An example of the former is the work of Kaynak [90] who proposed (in a study of supermarketing in Turkey) that environmental factors (cultural, socio-economic and legislative) are the determinants of whether or not (and indeed, to a large extent, how) the wheel of retailing revolves. An example of the latter is found in the work of Deiderick and Dodge [91] who provide a combined model for a revised wheel of retailing that divides the original wheel into three separate cycles and combines these with the organisational life cycle and the constantly changing environmental framework.

2.3.11. Retail Institutional Change: Combined Theories

- Cycle-Conflict.

A number of models have emerged that attempt to combine the cyclical processes of retail institutions with the conflict that these processes produce. Of the many models produced in this regard a number are worthy of particular note since they serve to illustrate the manner in which the cyclical and conflict
approaches can be combined and the value in doing so.

The first is the scenario proposed by Gist [92] which was an attempt to integrate the dialectical and wheel models discussed above. His argument is that the three elements of the dialectical component (thesis, antithesis and synthesis) are represented as follows; the thesis by the maturing retail institution; the antithesis by the innovation; and with the synthesis resulting from the mutual modification or assimilation process. A second cycle-conflict model worthy of note is that developed by Martenson [93] who produced a dynamic model by combining the life-cycle and crisis response conceptualisations.

2.3.12. Retail Institutional Change: Combined Theories

- Environmental-Conflict.

The functioning of the environment-conflict approach to institutional change is best understood if consideration is given to the theory of differential advantage as proposed by Alderson [94]. This theory is based on the premise that organisations are concerned with differentiating themselves from their rivals and thus creating for themselves a unique niche in the marketplace. Opportunities for differentiation are the result of technological, legal and economic developments. When an organisation takes up such opportunities, competitors are forced to respond. Two forms of response may result; first, an attempt to negate the differential advantage of the innovator, or secondly,
attempts at other forms of differentiation. Both forms of response force the original innovator to seek a further competitive edge through further differentiation. And so, the process moves on.

Several models are worthy of specific mention. First, Regan's multiplex model of retail institutional change [95] which argues that through time the product and service offerings of stores will become increasingly complicated as a result of the dual forces of competitive dynamics (inter-institutional strife) and environmental circumstances (for example, changing standards of living). The second model of note is Guiltinan's channel stage theory [96] which identifies a similar process of increasing complexity in retail institutions, again as a result of the same combined competitive and environmental approaches.

2.3.13. Retail Institutional Change: Combined Theories -
-----------------------------------------------
Environmental-Cycle-Conflict.
-----------------------------------------------

There have been a relatively limited number of attempts to bring together all three basic approaches - environmental, cyclical and conflict - in one composite model of retail institutional change. For example, McNair and May [97] argue that the 'next turn' of the wheel of retailing will be the result of environmental forces and would result in inter-institutional conflict.

The two most important models in this regard are, first, the theory of spiral movement [98] and secondly, the diversity theory
of market processes [99].

The first is based on the notion that as institutions trade up they leave a gap in the trading spectrum. Novel retailing techniques emerge to fill this gap but because standards of living have changed, the original format is recreated on a higher plane. For example, it could be argued that the modern convenience store is simply a more sophisticated version of the old corner shop.

The diversity theory of market processes proposes that historically, retailing has undergone processes of change in a series of short and long cycles. Long cycles are characterised by the appearance of new forms of retailing that are markedly different from previous trading formats (such as department stores and shopping centres) and are the result of changing environmental circumstances. However, as competitors identify and recognise the elements of differential advantage, these are imitated and thus eroded. Short cycles are characterised by the process of the unending search for differential advantage. Inter-institutional conflict is replaced by intra-institutional conflict, and an increasingly diverse retail institutional structure develops as competitors try to exploit a number of different aspects of the original 'markedly different' institution.
2.4.1. Store Location: Introduction.

The discussion thus far, has concentrated on patterns and processes in retailing and the models and approaches that have been identified in the literature to help explain these. The final element in this review of literature will concentrate on how retailers approach store location issues.

Two points consistently emerge from the literature regarding aspects of store location. First, that retailers have been finding it increasingly difficult to sustain their performance as the retailing sector becomes more competitive and new locations for expansion become harder to find. And secondly, retailers have been slow to make use of and develop new methods of making locational decisions.

In this section of the chapter, consideration will be given to more specific aspects of location in retailing. First, a brief outline will be given as to the recent locational trends that are apparent in the United Kingdom. Secondly, there will be a discussion of the types of problems that tend to be encountered in store location decisions. And thirdly, consideration will be given to techniques that are available to aid those involved in making such locational decisions.

2.4.2. Store Location: Current Trends.

In the United Kingdom, during the period of the study
(mid-1970's to mid-1980's), two general elements of spatial change in retailing can be identified. First, the emergence of retailing in 'new' locations (for example, the growth of out-of-town shopping facilities) and secondly, the introduction of new forms of retailing in more traditional locations (for example, the rapid growth of video and computer shops in the high street in the 1980's).

Two important elements of corporate change in retailing can also be identified in this period. The first is the emergence of corporate growth involving the creation of new outlets based on careful market segmentation. A good example is that of the clothing retailers 'Next' which has a product and image that is carefully designed to appeal to specific groups.

A second important element in corporate change is that of the use of merger and takeover as a means of growth. The result of the extended use of this method has been an increasing dominance of a few, major firms within different sectors of retailing and the intensification of competition between these firms. One consequence of this process is that "increasing financial resources are chasing a diminishing number of available sites" [100].

Retailing has also responded to changing patterns of consumer demand which have been linked to changing forms of competition, innovation and growth within retailing. These changing patterns of consumer demand have a wide range of contributory factors such as changes in levels of car ownership,
incomes and demographic structure and a major redistribution of population. The result of this last factor (the reduction of 'city' populations) has been a dramatic change in spatial patterns of demand. However, with the recent gentrification of many inner city areas (such as London's Docklands) these trends may be reversed.

Figure 2.9. - Population Changes for a Sample of British Cities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Core</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LONDON</td>
<td>-12.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bristol</td>
<td>- 8.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>- 7.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>-13.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leeds</td>
<td>- 1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardiff</td>
<td>- 6.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is interesting to note from Figure 2.9. (above) that London has tended to differ from the more general national trends of population redistribution in the sense that population has been lost from both its core and hinterland. It should be pointed out, however, that although change in the latter is only minimal, change in the former is far greater.
It can be argued that the above trends emphasise the need for careful site selection in retailing. Bowlby et al [101] suggest that four principal processes are at work in the search for 'good' locations.

First, they suggest that 'the easy sites go first'. Here, it is argued that when a new type of store is introduced there tends to be a large number of potential sites (as was the case, for example, when retail warehouses were introduced into this country), since whilst initially the potential market may be large, competition for sites is likely to be low. However, these sites will soon be taken up, as the market becomes more competitive, and therefore, more marginal, less favourable sites must be considered.

One problem that is identified is that of the potential restrictive effect of planning controls. It would seem, however, that in general, local authority and national planners are sympathetic to new froms of retailing. For example, the Department of the Environment, the ministry with most effect with regard to retailing related legislation, after initial suspicion of the effect of superstores and hypermarkets in out-of-town locations, issued guidelines to the effect that such developments should not be discouraged [102].
The second process at work is that 'experience is becoming a less reliable guide'. It can be argued that day to day practical experience is no longer a sufficient basis upon which to make a locational decision. This is a function of an increasingly competitive retail environment and results in the need for a far more rigorous assessment of locational requirements since increasingly economically marginal sites need to be considered.

This situation is exacerbated by rapid changes in local demographic conditions such as changes in population composition. Such changes can affect the market potential of a site in a relatively short time and thus, increase the risk in a locational decision.

The third process at work in relation to the search for 'good' retail locations is that the cost of locational mistakes is rising. The reason for this is that, as the number of 'easy sites' decreases, the cost of sites increases due to increasing competition for a decreasing number of 'easy sites'. As a result of this, 'risk' also increases. Strong evidence in support of this argument is found in the long-established process in the high street of increasing competition for prime sites forcing up rents for those in these sites [103].

As a result of this process, the cost of a locational mistake is likely to be high. However, it is important to note that not only must 'cost' be considered in relation to the resources ('economic') of the company, but may also have to be considered in terms of the 'cost' of 'losing' a potentially important site.
to a competitor and therefore, losing the opportunity of benefiting from a locationally derived competitive advantage.

The fourth process that can be identified is that of the pressure on companies to invest in new outlets is increasing. For most large retail firms geographical (territorial) expansion is an important element in their competitive strategies. Two main reasons lie behind this. First, such firms need tangible evidence of growth to satisfy shareholders. And secondly, the increasing pace of change puts pressure on companies to innovate and expand. However, if such a process is followed, it can lead to problems of over capacity and the over extension of financial resources, and as a result, may increase the need to close older stores. Thus, large retail firms must strive to find a balance between this extreme of action and the other (failure to respond to the locational strategies of rivals) since both extremes can lead to disaster.

If it accepted that these four processes are apparent in the search for 'good' retail sites, then it would seem to follow that they are producing an environment where retailers require to be increasingly aware of how locational decisions are taken and their potential effects. This seems to be borne out by the increasing number of retailers that are beginning to use more formal location decision methods [104] and especially those that make use of large, computer based data sources [105]. Thus, although, retailers have been slow to make use of new methods of making locational decisions, there would seem to be some evidence
to suggest that this is beginning to change.

2.4.4. Store Location: Techniques - Introduction.

A broad classification can be applied to the various techniques that are now available to retailers in helping them to make a locational decision. The three-way classification to be applied is based on the spatial level at which any of the given techniques may be applied. Thus, the three headings under which the techniques discussed will be categorised are those of search, viability and micro methods, as defined by Bowlby et al [106].

Search techniques are defined as those aimed at searching out areas of the country that might have potential for new stores. Viability techniques are those that forecast the likely turnover of a store in a particular site selected within the area of identified potential. And micro techniques are defined as those concerned with the effect of localised design, siting and perception issues on store performance. Each of these will be considered in turn with the principal techniques within each category being briefly outlined.

2.4.5. Store Location: Search Techniques.

A two-fold distinction can be drawn at this point between 'spatial marketing' techniques and techniques which provide 'measures of potential'. This is most applicable to search
techniques, but can also be applied to viability and micro
techniques.

Spatial marketing techniques relate information on product
sales to detailed information on the socio-economic
characteristics of the population of an area. Thus, this approach
is primarily concerned with spatial marketing rather than outlet
performance, in the sense that, its fundamental concern is to
relate product sales to socio-economic groupings and then to seek
geographical concentrations of such groupings. In contrast, the
set of techniques which provide measures of potential are
specifically concerned with assessments of facility locations by a
systematic procedure of locating a facility (outlet) or number of
facilities then allocating a population (customers) to each
facility.

Search techniques incorporating spatial marketing methods
are often based on the development and application of
socio-economic typologies at different spatial levels. Thus, for
example, a postal district will be allocated a typology
corresponding to the dominant characteristics of its population.
The best known standard typology in the United Kingdom is ACORN
developed by C.A.C.I.. Other advances on this system are also now
available, such as the MOSAIC system of classification developed
by C.C.N..

Such spatial marketing techniques are becoming increasingly
popular but they are prone to a number of problems. For example,
first, the typology chosen may not be relevant for a particular
retail sector. Secondly, important population elements can be overlooked given that each spatial unit is only allocated to one typology. And thirdly, the dynamic nature of the socio-economic characteristics of any area (especially of small spatial units) means that, in order to make 'good' locational decisions through time, a retailer must regularly draw upon the updated data of the company selling the system. Thus, the cost element, especially for smaller retailers, can be prohibitive.

Thus, in choosing the appropriate technique, the retailer must have the ability to recognise the typology that is likely to be of greatest benefit to his particular situation. Given the complexity of many of these typologies (and the increasingly 'hard sell' approach of the many of the companies who sell these systems) this is often a difficult decision. However, spatial marketing 'search' techniques are not limited to such complex types. For example, for some retailers simple comparison of existing levels of store provision across the country (for example, relating levels of sales and population) can be useful. Thus, retailers may be only interested in identifying areas where its own stores, and those of its competitors, are underrepresented in comparison to levels of population in particular, or of a specific population type corresponding to the target market.

Search techniques incorporating measures of potential tend to fall under the general heading of 'locational-allocation' methods. Such methods are concerned with assessments of facility locations
(retail outlets) by a systematic procedure of locating a facility or number of facilities and then allocating (usually by a shortest distance/time criteria) a population (customers) to each facility. In applying such a technique, a retailer will identify a number of criteria which he considers important in a locational decision, for example, taking into account population levels of a specific type at given distances/times from a potential site. An index of potential for different areas can then be produced with zones of equal potential being related together to produce a 'potential surface'. This can then be used to measure actual performance against hypothetical optimal performance.

2.4.6. Store Location: Viability Techniques - Introduction.

The search techniques discussed above are concerned with the ways in which retailers can find the best geographical areas in which to locate new outlets. Viability techniques are concerned with finding the best available site within the area chosen.

Most of the viability techniques that are available fall under the the general heading of 'store turnover forecasting' techniques. Most of these techniques are based on the concept of drawing an analogy between a proposed outlet and existing similar outlets. Two problems are immediately apparent. First, outlets in an analogue group should be carefully chosen so that they are as similar as possible to the proposed store in terms of outlet, site and location characteristics. Secondly, if a proposed outlet
is markedly different from anything that already exists, then it is impossible to construct an analogue group and thus, to apply this technique.

The techniques that incorporate the analogue method fall into four main categories: simple analysis, trade area analysis, regression analysis, and gravity models.

2.4.7. Store Location: Viability Techniques - Simple Analysis.

Data collected can be with regard to a number of variables that have a bearing on outlet performance. Thus, for example, information could be collected for each outlet with regard to turnover, population and population composition within specified distance/time ranges, competitors within specific distance/time ranges, sales per square foot, and so on. Having collected such information, it is then a relatively simple task to investigate the general relationships between these variables in the branch/outlet network. However, moving beyond this level of investigation and understanding can be difficult. For example, simple analysis will show that outlet turnover is influenced by a number of variables. However, such analysis is unlikely to determine the relative importance of the influences of these variables. Thus, simple analysis is often used as a preliminary stage to further investigation designed to examine the simple relationships identified in more detail.
2.4.8. Store Location: Viability Techniques

- Trade Area Analysis.

The traditional method of assessing an outlet has been to study its market area in detail [107]. The information required for this kind of assessment is a customer interview survey of existing outlets. The information collected is then analysed and the amount of expenditure coming from each chosen spatial unit (for example, distance bands or grid squares) is determined. Added to this, is information with regard to the population and consumer expenditure rates for each chosen spatial unit. From this a market penetration for each outlet can be derived (i.e. the proportion of total available expenditure going to each outlet). A similar process is then followed to derive an estimate of sales for a new outlet by estimating its trading area and calculating its likely sales by comparing similar spatial units in the trade areas of existing stores.

Such techniques are, however, prone to a number of problems. For example, first, they are more applicable to some types of retailing (for example, food retailing) than to others (such as outlets selling high order goods). Secondly, they are (perhaps more than the other techniques) largely dependent upon the ability and skill of the analyst in the company. And thirdly, the final results are dependent upon the subjective judgement of the user.
There are three different types of multiple regression model that can be used which provide a systematic method of forecasting retail sales in a new site. The first type of model considers each outlet in the analogue group as one observation. Data on several outlets are then used to develop a regression equation expressing the relationship between outlet turnover and a series of variables describing the site and its surrounding area (such as outlet and local population characteristics). To estimate retail sales for a new site, information on the variable chosen for the regression equation is substituted into the equation.

In the second type of model the catchment area of each outlet in an analogue group is divided into grid squares with each grid square representing an observation. Here, the regression equation provides information with regard to the amount of consumer expenditure attracted to the outlet from a grid square in terms of explanatory variables (such as population, competition, and so on). For a new site, information for each grid square is substituted into the equation to calculate expected sales from each grid square. The sum of these values will therefore provide a forecast of sales turnover.

The third type of model is similar to the second, but the grid squares are grouped in some way (usually by socio-economic characteristics). Thus, this model represents a further complication of the second model and as such requires the
collection of more data. Which model will be used will be
dependent upon the type of retailing, the type of outlet and the
availability of data.

2.4.10. Store Location: Viability Techniques – Gravity Models.

Gravity models express the main forms of shopping behaviour
in the form of a mathematical equation [108]. Two assumptions are
fundamental to such models. First, that people are attracted to
an outlet (or shopping centre) by the quality and quantity of its
shopping facilities. And secondly, that distance (or
time-distance) is a deterrent to travelling to any given outlet or
centre. These models allocate shoppers (or consumer expenditure)
from small zones to retail centres in a region. This information
can then be used predictively (for example, providing data on
likely retail sales, effect of other shopping centres in the
area, and so on.) Since these models provide their greatest value
when data are used in an aggregate form, (for example, all
shopping trips in a region) they are of limited use to retailers,
for example, investigating a single shop unit in a high street.
Thus, gravity models are not of great value for most outlet
location analyses. However, they may be an appropriate technique
for use at the aggregate level such as for local authorities that
always investigate shopping patterns within the same spatial
boundaries.
2.4.11. Store Location: Viability Techniques

- 'Enhancement' of Results.

It is important to note that the results gained from all of these viability techniques that incorporate elements of analogue study, (simple analysis, trade area analysis, regression analysis and gravity models) are based on average relationships within the analogue group. However, local site factors such as parking restrictions and narrow pavements (for a high street store) will have an effect on turnover. However, by using experience (for example, local knowledge) or through small scale surveys, an estimate can be made of how forecasts of turnover already calculated, will be affected. Thus, it is important that this process of result 'enhancement' must be carried out before the retailer should consider making a decision with regard to the viability of a site.

Finally, it should be noted that these 'analogue viability' techniques can be used in two different ways. The trader may compare the sales estimates derived, with costs involved and thus, (after subsequent analysis) determine the likely rate of return on his investment. Alternatively, he may calculate the level of sales required to make a site viable and then see if a site will derive such levels.
2.4.12. Store Location: Viability Techniques

- Viability Non-Analogue Techniques.

As mentioned previously, viability techniques incorporating analogue methods cannot be employed when information is not available with regard to an analogue group of similar outlets, as occurs for example, when a completely new type of outlet is being opened. The techniques that can be applied in such situations are relatively poorly developed, but still require (as far as possible) the collection of similar kinds of data as for the 'analogue viability' methods discussed above. However, 'non-analogue viability' techniques are more dependent upon the judgement of the retailer and therefore are more subjective in nature.

Despite this, these techniques (although subjective) still involve the systematic analysis of all the factors affecting site viability (where data are available). Thus, although in relative terms, these techniques are not as thorough as those discussed above, they can provide considerable information with regard to locational decisions.

2.4.13. Store Location: Micro Techniques.

Micro level features of a site (such as pedestrian flows, car parking, architectural quality, type and quality of neighbouring stores, level of non-retail use, and so on) will affect sales performance. For retailers to estimate the importance of these
factors they must, first, identify which of them are of most importance to their particular type of business, and secondly, try to estimate the effect of these 'most important' factors on turnover.

Bowlby et al [109] put forward a simple classification which relates type and size of business to the type of micro site factors that are of greatest importance. This is outlined in Figures 2.10. and 2.11 (below).

Figure 2.10. – A Classification of Retail Activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Large No. of Outlets</th>
<th>Convenience</th>
<th>Specialist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newsagents</td>
<td>Building Societies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supermarkets</td>
<td>Banks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundrettes</td>
<td>Fashion Multiples</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Small No. of Outlets</th>
<th>Superstores</th>
<th>Jewellers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hypermarkets</td>
<td>Quality Fashion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.I.Y. Stores</td>
<td>Auction Houses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.11. - Micro Site Factors Important to Each Group of Retail Activities in Figure 2.10.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Convenience</th>
<th>Specialist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large No. of Outlets</td>
<td>Public Transport Presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of other retailers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedestrian Flows Public Transport</td>
<td>Public Transport Pedestrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car Parking</td>
<td>Image’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small No. of Outlets</td>
<td>Car Parking Presence of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>other quality competitors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services (for example,</td>
<td>Presense of other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>restaurants)</td>
<td>complementary quality stores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exterior Design 'Image’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Small scale surveys at existing stores provide a means by which the actual importance of the factors identified can be tested. Larger surveys might attempt to investigate the reasons for people not using a particular store. However, customer surveys are of limited use for new stores. Therefore, it is necessary for experience or survey work to establish a list of the most important micro level factors in relative order, and provide a checklist of less important, but still significant micro level factors.
Having identified the micro site factors that are of importance, the next logical step is to try to relate these to turnover. It may be fairly simple, given information from a number of stores, to identify those characteristics that appear to enhance or decrease turnover. However, it is a problem attributing the actual levels of additional or loss of turnover that result from these characteristics. If the actual turnover is compared to the expected turnover (as derived from the application of one or more of the techniques described above) it could be argued that that residual (the difference between the actual and expected figures) can be attributed to micro level factors.

Thus, for example, stores that perform better than predicted may have a particular micro level characteristics in common. It is unlikely, however, that one single micro level factor will be identified; what is more likely is that such 'residual analysis' will identify a combination of micro level factors that tend either to enhance or decrease turnover. It should be noted that where this residual figure has been calculated the expected figure should not have been previously 'enhanced' (as described above) since this would result in some micro level factors being counted twice.

Where 'analogue viability' techniques cannot be applied, then it may still be possible to undertake a systematic analysis of micro level factors that could affect turnover which will yield useful information with regard to site viability.
It is important to note that the application of the above techniques should not be restricted to investigation of micro level factors relating to new stores. These techniques can also be usefully applied to the analysis of the effect of micro level factors on existing stores. However, 'internal' factors must also be taken into consideration (i.e. micro level factors in the form of in-store features, such as management, design, advertising and merchandising) and must be added to any analysis of residual turnover [110].

2.5.1. Literature Review: Summary and Conclusions.

Three aspects from the literature have been discussed; literature dealing with retail locational change in a general sense; literature dealing with retail institutional change; and, literature concerned with those aspects of retail location relating to store location decisions.

Retail locational change was considered from five different perspectives; economic theory, land value theory, central place theory, spatial interaction models, and ecological analogies.

The aspect of economic theory that is of greatest relevance to the study is that which can be drawn from the theory of the firm. However, Its underlying assumption that profit maximisation is the fundamental locational determinant is one that is undermined both by the complexity of the retailing environment and by the way in which retailers relate to this environment.
Land value theory emphasises the importance of competitive bidding for sites based on anticipated returns, with the most important aspect in this respect being accessibility. Since the 'core' of a city is its most accessible location, bids (in the form of rents) will be at their highest here. Thus, both rents and turnover decrease with distance from the core. Development of this approach produced an accessibility/rent theory approach which in relating business type and structure to accessibility, is compatible with more general models of urban structure.

Central place theory attempts to explain elements of order in settlement patterns by developing the idea of hierarchy. From its introduction by Christaller central place theory has now reached a stage where it represents a potentially useful structural model of retailing in large central areas. However, the weaknesses of the model (its degree of abstraction, its deterministic nature, its view of rationality and the circularity of argument) makes this type of application inadvisable.

Spatial interaction models describe the probability of a centre being chosen from a set of centres. There has been considerable development of this approach from its conception by Reilly which introduced considerations of consumer expenditure, retail floorspace, travel time to consumers, and, competing facilities. However, this approach is subject to a number of problems which relate to the indexing of its variables and its calibration. As a result, the usefulness of spatial interaction models in describing present day patterns of retailing is
limited.

Several ecological analogies can usefully be applied to retailing. These include, the idea of the dominant species, adaption, innovation, and parasitic and symbiotic affinity. Ecological analogies emerge as a useful means of considering retail change.

Three basic approaches to retail institutional change were discussed. Environmental theory, (the idea that environmental circumstances are responsible for the evolution and adaptation of retail institutions), emerged as being an approach that requires further development before its value could be assessed.

Cyclical Theory is based on the notion that cyclical or rhythmical patterns in retail institutions are repeated through time. Four cyclical approaches to retail institutional change were examined. The retail accordion, the wheel of retailing, the retail life cycle, and the polarisation principle, all tend to suffer from their deterministic nature. Despite this, they have some merits.

The idea that conflict is the basis of retail institutional change is one that can draw on considerable support. However, this approach is also subject to criticism, for example, its deterministic nature.

Given the drawbacks of these basic approaches, and the fact that none provides a completely satisfactory explanation of
processes of institutional change, the combined approaches discussed would seem to have some value. This is perhaps particularly true of the approach which combines elements from each of these three basic approaches.

The discussion of store location considered current trends and locational processes in retailing. It also discussed the approaches that are available to help traders in processes of store location to cope with these trends and processes. Four processes were identified for traders making locational decisions, which give rise to a range of problems. First, 'the easy sites go first'. Second, 'experience is becoming a less reliable guide'. Third, the cost of locational mistakes is rising. And fourth, the pressure for companies to invest in new outlets is increasing.

The store location techniques discussed were considered in terms of the areas in which they could be applied, the way in which they could be applied and their, advantages and drawbacks. What emerged, was that a wide range of techniques are available to suit different types of retailers in their locational decision making processes. If these techniques are applied properly there can be little doubt that traders will be able to take decisions that should help them to trade more successfully and profitably.

In conclusion, the three aspects of the literature covered, illustrate a number of points. First, the literature reflects the number of different aspects that need to be taken into account in
the study of retailing. Secondly, the review reflects the considerable amount of debate that is present in retailing. And thirdly, the literature shows how the dynamic nature of retail change makes it necessary for approaches to retailing to be constantly reviewed and updated.

CHAPTER 2: NOTES.
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10. ibid. p. 80.
15. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
28. Outlined in Appendix V.
33. For example, Wilson, A.G. (1977).
40. Reilly, W.J. (1931).
73. ibid.
81. ibid.
102. Discussed in Section 5.2.3.

In this section, consideration will be given to the data collection methods employed during the course of the study. Three main sections of the study require the collection of data. First, data are required on commercial land-uses in the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge. Secondly, data are required in order to examine the range of political, economic and social influences which are at work in helping to shape trading patterns in these streets. And thirdly, data are required with regard to the decision making processes of traders involved in locational decisions in this area.

Chisnall cites three main categories of survey technique [1]; observation, experimentation and questionning. Within these categories six main methods of enquiry are identified that could be incorporated in any research project [2]; postal inquiries, panel research, telephone inquiries, group interview techniques, personal interviews and special survey techniques. As will be seen, most of these methods were employed in gathering the data for each of the above sections of the study.

3.2.1. Land-Use Survey: Primary Data Base.

The initial remit of the study was to examine changing land-use patterns in the four principal shopping streets of the West End; Oxford Street, Regent Street, Bond Street and Tottenham Court Road. However, from an early stage it became apparent that
Tottenham Court Road (although a very important shopping street), was not of the same character and standing as the other streets, and thus, could not be considered as being one of the area’s ‘principal’ shopping streets.

At the same time, it became apparent that Brompton Road, in Knightsbridge, did possess the character and standing of the three above mentioned shopping streets, and therefore, any study of principal shopping streets had to take the commercial activities of this street into account. The decisions to omit Tottenham Court Road from examination, to include Brompton Road, and to include no other shopping streets (i.e. that the four streets chosen were the only streets in this area that could be described as truly principal shopping streets) was taken after an initial primary examination of the shopping streets of the area, and after consultation with personnel of the collaborative body in the study [3] who had an ‘in-depth’ knowledge of trading here. In taking these decisions, account was also taken of discussions with the three Borough Councils with administrative authority for the streets under consideration (Camden Borough Council - Tottenham Court Road; Westminster City Council - Oxford Street; Regent Street and Bond Street; and The Council of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea - Brompton Road).

Having satisfactorily selected the streets to be examined, data were then collected with regard to their land-uses. The data collected here took two forms; a primary land-use survey, and an examination of secondary land-use sources.
The primary land-use survey was undertaken between November 1984 and March 1985. Before collecting these data, it was important to define exactly the streets that were to be examined. It became apparent, from an initial examination of a number of secondary data sources, that the spatial delimitation of the study streets tended to vary between sources. It was decided, in order to standardise the primary and secondary sources utilised, to apply the spatial delimitation of these streets as defined by the appropriate Borough Council. Consultation with these bodies allowed exact definitions to be used, as shown in Appendix II [4].

Having defined the streets to be examined, the subsequent primary land-use survey posed few problems. This survey involved the recording of all land-uses at the ground floor level in each of the four principal shopping streets. The subsequent classificatory system used is discussed in Chapter 4 [5]. The main problem encountered, was that, initially, it had been hoped to map and examine uses at all levels in buildings in these streets. However, it soon became apparent that, although mapping uses at the ground floor level was a relatively simple matter, attempting to identify upper floor uses was far more difficult. In order to do this, it was necessary to find entrances to upper floors and, from nameplates, attempt to determine how many and what types of occupiers were present. Since many entrances were either concealed or 'off-street', and since many nameplates were misleading, accurate notation was virtually impossible. This latter problem was particularly evident. For example, one
misleading aspect of trying to identify upper floor uses in this manner was that, due to the status of these shopping streets, many businesses like to have a mailing address in one of them. This can result in one entrance showing nameplates for a number of businesses that is far in excess of the possible capacity for that building.

A further problem that arose subsequently with regard to the examination of upper floor uses was that of the difficulty found in obtaining an accurate and frequently updated source of such uses. The only sources found were those of the borough Councils which were not updated on a sufficiently frequent basis, and whose extraction, in a suitable form, would have been both technically complex and costly.

For these reasons, it was apparent that any attempted analysis of upper floor uses in the principal shopping streets of the study area, would have produced results that would have been of little value or consistency, and therefore would have lacked any degree of external validity. Indeed, given the fact that the vast majority of retail use in these streets is at the ground floor level, with only a relatively small proportion of above ground level floorspace being devoted to retail uses (as can be observed from any visual examination of the buildings), it can easily be argued that the omission of analysis of this component of retailing, is unlikely to adversely effect, to any significant degree, the overall study of retailing patterns in the study streets.
Thus, by the beginning of March 1985 a full set of data had been established with regard to all land-uses at ground floor level in the four principal shopping streets of the study area, with each ground floor property having three pieces of information relating to it; street number, name of occupier, and description of activity. Later, two classificatory elements (Standard Industrial Classification, and a broader use classification for the purpose of statistical analysis) were applied to each of these property entries [6].

3.2.2. Land-Use Survey: Secondary Data Base.
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In establishing a secondary data base of ground floor land-use activities in these shopping streets, three main sources were examined. The principal source employed was the data held by the collaborating body in the study. These data provided details of land-uses in the study streets for the years 1976, 1979 and 1982, and contained the relevant property details required for analysis. This source was cross-checked with two further secondary sources; Newman Book’s London Shop Surveys [7] and GOAD Maps [8]. This cross-checking established that the data held by the collaborating body were accurate. It should be noted that these data were collected in the above years by primary land-use surveys carried out by personnel of the collaborative body.

Thus, by mid-1985, a data set consisting of details of ground floor properties in the four principal shopping streets of the
West End and Knightsbridge had been established for the years 1976, 1979, 1982 and 1985. The subsequent analysis of this data is outlined in Chapter 4.

In addition to this data set, changes in the property market in these streets were also monitored in appropriate 'trade' publications including the 'Estates Gazette', 'Estates Times' and 'Planning' [9]. Details of retail developments, changes in property ownership, and so on (in these publications) provided useful indications of changes in the market after the period for which the main primary and secondary data had been collected (1976 to 1985).

3.3.1. Data Collection: Political, Economic and Social Influences - Introduction.

A variety of different data collection techniques and sources were used in establishing a data set that would help in identifying and explaining the main political, economic and social influences at work in the principal shopping streets of the study area.

3.3.2. Political Data.

The first main technique used in the collection of data relating to political influences on trading patterns here was that of the personal interview. As Chisnal states [10] "observation of
behaviour is rarely sufficient by itself; it yields information at a certain level, but does not reveal hidden motives". Therefore, personal interviews were carried out with personnel from the Greater London Council (in the period immediately before its abolition), the Borough Councils of Westminster, Kensington and Chelsea, and Camden, and the Trade Associations of Oxford Street, Bond Street and Regent Street. No interviews were carried out with central government personnel since it was felt that such interviews would serve little purpose since central government influences are readily identifiable through a range of published secondary sources. In addition, data were collected with regard to the effects of political factors on trading patterns as part of the personal interviews carried out with traders.

Cannell and Khan define an interview as "a two-person conversation initiated by the interviewer for the specific purpose of obtaining research relevant information, and focused by him on content specified by research objectives of systematic description, prediction or explanation" [11].

Interviews can be classified by their degree of structure. The more standardised the interview, the easier it is to aggregate and quantify results [12]. Mayntz et al [13] distinguish between the non-directive interview (where there is only minimal control and direction exercised by the interviewer) the focused interview (where data from the interview are used to substantiate or reject previously formulated hypotheses) and the standardised interview (where the content and sequence of questions are predetermined).
variant of this type of interview is the non-schedule standardised interview in which, the wording and sequence of the questions are adjusted to suit each respondent. One further type of interview can be added to this list; the non-standardised interview (one where no attempt is made to standardise the setting or format of the interview and each respondent is treated differently [14].

The non-standardised interview was used in almost all of the initial discussions with political bodies, since, at this stage, the aims of the interviews were threefold; to ascertain the most suitable persons in each body to interview; to establish a rapport and sense of trust with the respondents; and, having achieved this, to establish the extent of their knowledge and their likely willingness to divulge it. Thus, this form of non-standardised interview was used in only an exploratory sense (the use to which it is best suited). This reflects the view of one researcher who describes this type of interview as being "informal, friendly conversations" [15].

Subsequent interviews with these interviewees tended to take on a relatively more standardised form: the non-schedule standardised interview. In this type of interview certain types of information are desired from all respondents but the particular phrasing of questions and their order is redefined to fit the characteristics of each respondent. Thus, by incorporating this unstructured element the respondent is still allowed to express attitudes and opinions "in his or her own words" [16].

Few problems were encountered in the course of these
interviews. One that did emerge was that of gaining access to appropriate personnel. On several occasions, soon after an interview had been started, it became apparent that the interviewee did not have the type of knowledge required to answer the questions posed.

Both before and after these interviews, a number of secondary sources of information with regard to political influences on trading patterns in the study area were examined. The main secondary sources used here were, the Greater London Development Plan [17], the District Plans of Westminster City Council and the Council of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea [18][19], and central government advisory documentation, circulars and memoranda [20]. The structure of these sources made the extraction of relevant information a relatively simple matter.

No secondary data source with regard to the influence of trade associations in the study area was available. However, during interviews with these trade associations, other political bodies, agents and retailers, the role that they play in shaping trading patterns was investigated.

The final group of secondary sources consulted with regard to political influences on trading patterns were trade publications as listed in Appendix VI [21]. In addition to collecting data with regard to political influences through these primary and secondary sources, again it should be stressed that, during interviews with each of the political bodies the influence
of the others was discussed.

In summary, having used these sources, the data gathered with regard to political influences on trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge comprised of the following;

(i) strategy and policy outlines derived from the main secondary sources with regard to shopping in the streets of the study area;

(ii) expansion, explanation and justifications of these strategies and policies derived from personal interviews with political bodies;

(iii) perceptions of the role of each political body as derived from the other political bodies;

(iv) perceptions of the role of each political body as derived from agents and traders;

(v) trade publication articles containing information about the actions of these political bodies that had, and were having effects on trading patterns in the study area.

Taken together, these five elements of the political data base form the basis of the discussions in Chapter 5, and the subsequent political element of model building in Chapter 9.
3.3.3. Economic and Social Data.

The main techniques used in the collection of data relating to economic and social factors influencing trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the study area were a questionnaire survey and personal interviews. In addition to the collection of data with regard to these categories of influencing factors, these techniques also helped to supplement the range of data sources employed with respect to political data.

3.3.4. Questionnaire Survey: Problems.

In constructing a questionnaire to collect data with regard to political, economic and social factors influencing trading patterns in the study area it was important to bear in mind that "the main tools for guiding questionnaire design are knowledge of the survey population and the subject matter, common sense, past experience and pilot work" [22].

The decision to use the questionnaire technique as a means of collecting data with regard to political, economic and social factors influencing trading patterns in the study area recognised the three main problems inherent in its use [23].

The first main problem is that of response rate. Even with the most carefully designed questionnaires the percentage of completed and returned documents can be very low. Where this is the case it must raise considerable doubts as to the external
validity of any subsequent statistical analysis of the data obtained; the extent to which it can be said that the results obtained from analysis of a sample population are representative of the total population. However, even where a low response rate results in the questioning of external validity, such data can still hold important information. Indeed, it is important to bear in mind that "it is perfectly possible to produce a good report without extensive statistical knowledge as long as the questionnaire is carefully planned and well thought out" [24].

Thus, low response rate does not necessarily mean that the data obtained have no use. In stating this, however, it should also be noted that a significant degree of 'non-response' can bias results. For example, a questionnaire survey could be constructed in order to investigate differences in locational strategies between various sizes of organisation. Unless the element of non-response corresponded exactly with the proportions of organisations surveyed in each size category, then any subsequent results would be biased. In order for this not to be the case, non-response would have no correlation with size.

A second problem with questionnaires is that they often do not reach those within an organisation who have direct responsibility in taking decisions. This is probably most true in the questionnaire survey of large, corporate organisations as opposed to smaller, independent companies, and again, results in the data obtained being questionable in terms of validity and accuracy.
The third problem with questionnaires is that their scope is inherently limited. This is a direct result of the fact that, in order to enhance response rate, and to avoid problems of misunderstanding and misinterpretation on the part of respondents, questionnaires should be as short and simple as possible. Thus, by employing such a format the detail required in order fully to understand systems of change, may be lost. This again, introduces an element of invalidity in the data collected. The relative merits of interviewing versus questionnaire methods are summarised below in Figure 3.1. [25].

3.3.5. Questionnaire Survey: Piloting.

"The purpose of a pilot survey is to get the bugs out of the instrument so that subjects in the main study will experience no difficulties in completing it" [26]. The piloting of the questionnaire was carried in Princes Street in Edinburgh, Scotland. It was decided to use this street in this respect for three main reasons. First, it is a city centre shopping street which, like those of the study area, derives an important element of its turnover from shoppers who come from outside the population of the city (tourists and visitors from other parts of the United Kingdom and abroad). Secondly, it is a shopping street with which the researcher is familiar. And thirdly, the locality of the street allowed personal visits, should any be required in the process of refining the questionnaire.
Figure 3.1. - Summary of Relative Merits of Interviewing Versus Questionnaire.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSIDERATION</th>
<th>INTERVIEW</th>
<th>QUESTIONNAIRE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Personnel needed to collect data</td>
<td>Requires interviewers</td>
<td>Requires a clerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Major expense</td>
<td>Payment to interviewers</td>
<td>Postage and printing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Opportunities for response-keying</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(personalisation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Opportunities for asking</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Opportunities for probing</td>
<td>Possible</td>
<td>Difficult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Relative magnitude of data reduction</td>
<td>Great (because of coding)</td>
<td>Mainly limited to rostering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Typically, the number of</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>respondents who can be reached</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Rate of return</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Sources of error</td>
<td>Interviewer, instrument, coding, sample</td>
<td>Limited to instrument and sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Overall reliability</td>
<td>Quite limited</td>
<td>Fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Emphasis on writing skill</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The sample chosen was on the basis of traders who had been present in Princes Street for four years or less. This was achieved by matching a listing of occupiers in 1986 (the most 83
recent listing available at the time) and a similar listing for 1983 [27][28]. The sample size of thirty was thought to be one that was small enough to be manageable (in terms of the limited time available for the return of the pilot questionnaires) but large enough to provide useful information with regard to changes required to the format of the questionnaire.

The thirty questionnaires that were sent out yielded a response rate of 26%. After having analysed these replies the sections of the questionnaire which appeared to have caused most problems (those where responses were most frequently missing or had apparently been misinterpreted) were modified. In addition, a number of telephone interviews were carried out, both with traders who had responded to the questionnaire and those who had not. This initial phase of piloting brought out six main points.

First, that the piloted questionnaire was too long. Secondly, that certain sections had to be modified and others removed completely. Thirdly, some questionnaires had simply not reached the person or persons within an organisation who had sufficient knowledge to answer it. Either it had been "passed on to head office" or the person directly responsible for making a particular locational decision had left the organisation. Fourthly, that many traders were simply not interested in answering any questionnaires. Fifthly, many of the traders surveyed had moved out of the street, meaning that, despite the fact that the listing used was only one year old, it was, to a considerable extent, inaccurate. And finally, that, ideally,
further piloting should have been carried out. However, due to time and financial constraints this was not possible, with perhaps the most important factor to be noted here being that many replies to the piloted questionnaires took almost two months to arrive.

3.3.6. Full Questionnaire Survey.

Having taken into account the points arising out of the piloting of the questionnaire in Princes Street, Edinburgh, a revised format was drawn up for use in the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge [29].

In order to establish a mailing list, the most accurate listing of ground floor occupiers available at that time was used [30]. From this, 300 traders were selected to be surveyed. This selection was achieved by using random number generation, and this number represents approximately 37% of all ground floor occupiers in each of the four study streets.

The subsequent analysis of the data collected from this survey is outlined in Chapter 4.

3.3.7. Personal Interviews.

"For a questionnaire of any length or complexity, satisfactory completion is, generally speaking, most likely to be achieved by the administration of the questionnaire as a personal
interview" [31]. With this in mind, the second main technique used in the collection of data with regard to economic and social factors operating in the principal shopping streets of the study area was that of in-depth personal interviews. In addition, as noted above, these personal interviews also incorporated questions designed to investigate the effects of political factors.

By using these personal interviews, the three main problems of the questionnaire technique are overcome in the sense that, first, once an interview has been arranged, the problem of non-response is almost completely removed. Secondly, through careful pre-planning, it is possible to reach those persons in an organisation directly responsible for making decisions, and therefore, are aware of the impact of political, economic and social factors both on their decision making processes and in the streets in which they are located. And thirdly, interviews can be in far more detail than questionnaires and therefore the role of political, economic and social factors can be explored in far greater depth. The main drawback of personal interviews is that, due to cost and time constraints, the number that can be carried out is limited. In addition, this number is further restricted by the fact that it is very difficult to persuade personnel at high levels in large organisations to be interviewed by a researcher. In this regard, the assistance of personnel from the collaborative body was invaluable.
The main sources of data relating to political, economic and social factors were traders themselves, local trade associations, agents operating in the area, and other relevant bodies such as the Retail Consortium. Interviews with the last three of these sources had little formal structure since the data collected were not required for comparative purposes. In contrast, in interviews with traders the technique used was that of the non-schedule standardized interview [32]. Even although the questions asked were, on the whole, the same in every interview, it was felt that, in trying to create an atmosphere of trust, it was more appropriate to use this technique rather than the standardised interview method since this can lead to the interruption of the 'natural' flow of the conversation.

The range of questions asked in these interviews was the result of two processes. First, points that had arisen from data collected and analyses from the questionnaire survey. And secondly, discussions with personnel from the collaborative body and the University of Stirling, who gave advice as to the type and form of questions that would derive the best results. Thus, from these two processes a range of questions was developed [33] and six in-depth interviews carried out in the summer of 1987.

Therefore, by using these two main data collection techniques a data base was built up with regard to the range of economic and social factors that play a part in helping to shape trading patterns in the study area, and also, a valuable element was
added to the role of political factors in this regard.

3.3.8. Location Decision Making.
---------------------------------------------

One of the potentially most interesting aspects of the study is that of the location decision making strategies of traders as to whether to move into, remain in, or leave a shop unit in one of the principal shopping streets of the study area.

The data collected in this regard were derived as part of the questionnaire and personal interview surveys discussed above in relation to political, economic and social factors at work in the area. Thus, the questionnaire survey sent out to traders in the area, as well as examining political, economic and social factors also explored aspects of location decision making. Similarly, the personal interview survey of traders also sought to encompass these four elements. An analysis of the data collected here is provided in Chapter 4.

3.4.1. Data Collection: Summary and Conclusions.
---------------------------------------------

It can be seen that a variety of techniques were employed in order to collect data relating to the different aspects of the study. Primary data were obtained by using methods varying from land-use surveys, to questionnaires and personal interviews. Secondary data sources were also explored with considerable use being made of borough Council and Hillier Parker May and
Rowden's data bases, and a variety of published sources.

The data obtained from these sources reflect their varied nature, and range from those that are highly quantitative in nature (such as the land use data) and therefore suitable for statistical analysis, to data that are much more qualitative in nature, and thus require different forms of investigation, analysis and interpretation.

CHAPTER 3: NOTES.

3. Hillier Parker May and Rowden.
4. See Appendix II.
5. See Section 4.2.1.
6. See Appendix IX.
8. GOAD maps were consulted for the principal shopping streets of the study area for the years 1976, 1979 and 1982.
9. For full listing of the trade publications consulted see Appendix VI.
18. Westminster City Council (1982).
20. See Section 5.2.
21. See Appendix VI.
29. See Appendix VII Table 1 for sample questionnaire.
32. See Appendix VIII.

In this chapter, the data collected are analysed. As noted in Chapter 3, data were collected for three main sections of the text. First, with regard to land-use patterns in the four principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge. Secondly, for the examination of the main political, economic and social factors at work in helping to shape trading patterns in these streets. And thirdly, data were required with regard to the locational decisions of traders as to whether to move into, stay in, or leave a site in one of these streets.

This chapter will therefore concentrate on the results of the analysis carried with regard to the land-use survey in the study area and that carried out with respect to the questionnaire survey of traders in this area. The data gathered in the range of personal interviews carried out (with traders, political bodies and property agents) is far more qualitative in nature. The information obtained from these taped interviews is distributed throughout the text in order to help develop and support arguments and illustrate points. Thus, no formal presentation of this data, as such, is provided.

4.2.1. Land-Use Data: The Data Sets.

Data were obtained with regard to trading patterns in the four principal shopping streets of the study area in the period 1976 to 1985. These streets, Oxford Street, Regent Street, Bond
Street and Brompton Road [1], were examined at four points in time - 1976, 1979, 1982 and 1985. For each of these years a data set was established which took the following form (see Figure 4.1. below). Each property was identified by its street number and its name. To this was added a brief description of the type of activity that was carried out by the occupier. For the purposes of statistical analysis, it was apparent that some form of classification of commercial activity was required. The classificatory system chosen was that of the Standard Industrial Classification (S.I.C.)[2].

Figure 4.1. - Example of Format of Land-Use Data Sets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STREET NO.</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>S.I.C.</th>
<th>CAT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>002-004</td>
<td>Hornes</td>
<td>Menswear</td>
<td>6450</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>006</td>
<td>&quot;The Tottenham&quot;</td>
<td>Public House</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>008</td>
<td>Vacant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>010</td>
<td>MacDonalds</td>
<td>Fast Food Restaurant</td>
<td>6560</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>012</td>
<td>King Kebab</td>
<td>Fast Food Restaurant</td>
<td>6540</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>014-016</td>
<td>Superama</td>
<td>Mixed Retail Uses</td>
<td>6450</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>018</td>
<td>Herbert Wolf</td>
<td>Jewellers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>020</td>
<td>Casual Affair</td>
<td>Fashion Clothing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Data file created for Oxford Street, 1979.
The S.I.C. provides a framework for the collection and analysis of data about the performance of the economy. The revised version of 1980 shows economic activities as being divided into ten divisions, one of which covers retail activity [3]. The division relating to retailing has twelve classes of activity [4]. The relevant classification was added to the information already present in the data set for each retail ground floor property. For the purposes of statistical analysis these four figure retail classifications were simply numbered '1' to '12', and two further categories were added to cover non-retail activities and vacant properties, giving fourteen commercial activity categories [5].

Therefore, for each ground floor property in each of the four principal shopping streets of the study area, for each of the years of examination, five pieces of information were noted in the data set. Figure 4.1. (above) provides an example of the format of these data sets.

Having established the data in this form, it was then possible to apply a range of statistical methods in order to investigate whether or not there were any statistically significant trends in trading patterns.

4.2.2. Land-Use Data: Main Statistical Techniques.

This part of the text gives a brief outline of the main statistical techniques applied to the data sets. The results
gained from the application of these techniques will be discussed later in the chapter. The brief outlines below will help in putting these results into context.

In addition to basic statistics, such as mean and mode, a number of other techniques were employed including [6];

(i) The Chi-square Test - a method for comparing counted data, in which individual observations are assigned to categories (are differentiated on a nominal scale) and the number in each category counted. Chi-square is a measure of the aggregate differences between observed frequencies and those expected under the null hypothesis.

(ii) Correlation - the main method of correlation analysis used here was that of Spearman's Rank Correlation Co-efficient. It did not prove possible to use the Product Moment Correlation technique (the most powerful test of correlation), due to its rigorous data requirements, which the data sets established did not meet. Spearman's Rank correlation co-efficient, can be used when the rigid requirements of the product moment method cannot be met. This is a distribution free test which has around 90% of the 'power' effectiveness of the product moment method, and gives a co-efficient which closely approximates this. In this test the 'rank' order is used to determine the association between two sets of values and not the actual values themselves.

(iii) The Runs Test - this method is designed to test
whether or not a sequence may be considered to be random. By using this test it is possible to consider whether the distribution of certain shop types along the principal shopping streets of the study area is the result of chance.

(iv) The Linear Nearest Neighbour Index – this is a variant of two-dimensional nearest neighbour analysis which applies this concept to a linear situation. This technique was devised by Pinder and Witherick [7] and is used to test the degree of clustering or regularity of certain shop types in a retailing area. Thus, when used in conjunction with the runs test, these both provide a powerful 'combined' statistical test.

The original application of the linear nearest neighbour index was with regard to the distribution of clothing shops and chain stores in Germany [8]. One important point to bear mind when considering the results derived from the application of this test is that, although the term 'random locations' is used, it is most unlikely that the position of any shop will be solely the result of chance. Any number of influencing factors may be taken into account in determining location. Hammond and McCullagh argue that, at the aggregate level, these may be so numerous as to operate in a manner which produces a result similar to that of random distribution. This may comprise clusters and even distributions which, when averaged out over the whole transect, create a random effect [9].

A second important point to bear in mind here is that in the application of this technique the 'sides' of streets are examined
separately. This follows the precedent set down by Pinder and Witherick [10], which takes into account that the volume of traffic passing through a major shopping street tends to result in each of its sides operating independently. This can be applied to the principal shopping streets of the study area since no element of pedestrianisation is to be found in any of these streets (the only minor exception to this is a small pedestrianised area - 15 to 20 metres - in Bond Street which joins New Bond Street and Old Bond Street)[11].

4.2.3. Land-Use Data: Analysis - Oxford Street.

The initial stage of the analysis was to calculate the number of properties falling into the fourteen commercial activity categories, as derived from the Standard Industrial Classification [12], outlined above, and as shown in Appendix IX Table 3 [13]. The number of units in each of these categories is shown in Figure 4.2. (below). Initial examination of this table highlights a number of interesting points. First, the considerable variation through time on the number of traders in Oxford Street. The percentage increase (percentage variance) in trader numbers from 1976 to 1984 was 22.2%. This increase is primarily explained by the introduction to the street of a number of retail developments (such as the West One Shopping Centre) which resulted in this considerable increase in trader numbers.
Figure 4.2. - Commercial Activity Category Distribution, 1976 to 1985: Oxford Street.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY CODE</th>
<th>1976 No.</th>
<th>1979 %</th>
<th>1982 No.</th>
<th>1985 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

TOTAL 297 100.0 333 100.0 329 100.0 363 100.0

Note - Total Percentage figures for each year may not add exactly to 100 due to rounding of figures.

Source - Data Base Created for Oxford Street, 1976 to 1985.
It also may reflect a trend in the street toward the subdivision of large shop units into smaller shop units such as that which occurred in the property at 148-154 Oxford Street. In 1976 this property was trading as a Woolworth department store. However, by 1979 this property had been divided into 36 small units and which traded under the name of 'The Oxford Walk Shopping Village'.

The second point to note here is the marked dominance, through time, of Category 4 (S.I.C. Category 6450 - Retail Distribution of Clothing and Footwear). In the period 1976 to 1985 this category accounted for between 37% and 43% of all traders in the street. Considerable variation can be seen both in real numbers and in percentage terms, particularly in the period 1976 to 1979, when the number of traders in this category rose by 27 from 116 (an increase of 23.3%) and increased proportionately by 3.8% (from 39.1% to 42.9%).

Thirdly, the amount of non-retail use in Oxford Street (category 13) accounts for an considerable proportion of all land-uses. This category is the second most important through time, with the percentage of non-retail uses (in terms of numbers of property units) in the period 1976 to 1985 varying between 19.1% (in 1982) and 21.2% (in 1976). It is also worth noting here the increase in the number of non-retail units between 1982 and 1985 (63 to 73 - an increase of 15.9%) after a period of great stability in numbers.

Fourthly, a number of other categories emerge as being of some importance in numerical terms here. These can be identified
as follows; category 5 (Retail Distribution of Footwear and Leather Goods) which accounts for between 11.7% and 14% of occupiers in the street; category 11 (Other Specialised Retail Distribution - Non-Food) which accounts for between 8.1% and 9.4%; and category 12 (Mixed Retail Businesses) which account for between 5.2% and 7.4%. This is a particularly interesting category since most of the shops falling into it are department stores. One point of great interest here, is that although the number of mixed retail businesses has remained fairly steady through time (from 22 to 19), they have fallen somewhat as a percentage of all occupiers (7.4% to 5.2%).

The only other single category of trader that has a presence of any note in Oxford Street is category 7 (Retail Distribution of Household Goods, Hardware and Ironmongery). This category accounts for some 3.6% to 5.2% of traders. No other single category accounts for more than 5% of traders in the streets at any point in time within the survey period.

A further interesting point to emerge is the growth, both in absolute and relative terms, of vacant properties in Oxford Street since 1976. As Figure 4.3. (below) shows, there was a steady and marked increase in vacancy rates in the period 1976 to 1985, with only 6 properties being vacant in 1976 (2.0% of all units) but 20 being vacant by 1985 (5.5% of all properties). This trend, at first glance, may seem surprising, especially since, by 1985, the retail property market was operating in a 'boom' period, and therefore, it would be expected that demand for property would
be high, resulting in low vacancy rates. However, it should be remembered that this vacancy figure includes within it properties that are 'vacant and under reconstruction'. Therefore, many

Figure 4.3. - Oxford Street: Vacancy Rates, 1976 to 1985.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Vacancy Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Data Files created for Oxford Street, 1976 to 1985.

properties vacant in 1985, although not trading, may well have been undergoing a process of redevelopment or refurbishment, which had been stimulated by positive market conditions. This may also be a function of a shortening in the refurbishment cycle resulting in, at any point in time, more properties being refurbished.

After this initial phase, a number of statistical tests (as outlined earlier) were applied to the data in Figure 4.2. A chi-square test applied showed that in the time periods between the individual data sets (1976-1979, 1979-1982, 1982-1985) no statistically significant differences were present in S.I.C. category distribution. When the Spearman’s Rank correlation was
applied here, the above results were confirmed in the sense that the degree of association between the data sets (as noted above) were highly significant.

This does not mean, however, that no significant retail changes occurred during this period. And indeed, only 41% of ground floor property occupiers that were present in 1976 remained by 1985 [14]. This suggests that, although there have been considerable changes in property occupier through time, functional change has been less. This is perhaps best illustrated by reference to Figure 4.4. (below) which shows that, in each of the time periods involved, functional change has considerably

Figure 4.4. - Oxford Street: Rates of Occupier and Functional Change, 1976 to 1985.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Occupier Change</th>
<th>Functional Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976-1979</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-1982</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-1985</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Data Sets created for Oxford Street, 1976 to 1985.

less than occupier change. This may be explained by a number of factors. First, for example, it may be a function of the fact of the concentration of trader types in the street as noted above. This concentration must reflect the demand for retail properties.
from traders of these types, and therefore, it is logical to assume that (as property becomes available) there will be a much higher probability that a new trader will belong to one of these limited trader types. A second reason to help explain the disparity between occupier change and functional change is that some uses make conversion to alternative uses relatively expensive. For example, in the service sector, restaurants, because of their specialised requirements (kitchens, etc.), when they close down, tend to be reopened as restaurants. Thus, where this is the case it will add to occupier but not functional change.

**Figure 4.5. - Oxford Street: Average Annual Rates of Occupier Change, 1976 to 1985.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Average Annual Rate of Occupier Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976-1979</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-1982</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-1985</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source - Data Sets created for Oxford Street, 1976 to 1985.*

A further interesting aspect to note with regard to occupier change is the way in which this altered through time. **Figure 4.5.** (above) shows that, since 1976, the rate of occupier change has
increased greatly with the average annual figure rising by 8.5% between 1976 and 1985.

Two further aspects of changing trading patterns that were investigated were the rate of change at corner sites, and the rate of change close to 'anchor' stores (i.e. shops that are seen as being the most important in a shopping area, such as, for example, Harrods in Brompton Road)[15]. Figure 4.6. (below) indicates that

Figure 4.6. - Oxford Street: Rates of Occupier Change at Corner Sites Compared to Rates of Occupier Change in Whole Street, 1976 to 1985.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Occupier Change</th>
<th>Corner Site Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976-1979</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-1982</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-1985</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Data Sets created for Oxford Street, 1976 to 1985.

there is some justification for suggesting that the rate of change at corner sites is somewhat less than that for the whole of Oxford Street. This would seem to be a function of the fact that corner sites have a locational advantage that enhances their turnover (and therefore their potential profitability). This
results first, in traders who occupy these sites being unwilling to give them up (for example, they will accept increases in premiums and rents at times of review), and secondly, that the failure rate of traders in such sites (a direct function of their higher potential for turnover) tends to be lower, therefore, the chance of these properties coming onto the open market is reduced.

Figure 4.7. (below) also appears to show that rates of change close to anchor stores are somewhat less than those for

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Occupier Change</th>
<th>Proximity to Anchor Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976-1979</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-1982</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-1985</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Data Sets created for Oxford Street, 1976 to 1985.

104
Street. For the purposes of this test, the ten properties on each side of each anchor store were extracted from the main data set, and the rates of occupier change in each year for this set of properties compared to that for the full data set. The reasons for this are very similar to those cited above in relation to corner sites.

It is apparent that trading in Oxford Street is concentrated into a relatively small number of trader categories. As can be seen from Figure 4.2., just two categories (categories 4 and 13) consistently account for well over half of all ground floor traders in the street. Indeed, it can also be seen that the five main categories (the five most prominent categories in a street at each point in time) account for between 80% and 90% (an average figure of some 87.1%) of all such occupiers in the period 1976 to 1985 [17].

The next statistical method to be applied to these data was that of the runs test. This test was applied to any category of trader that had a presence of two or more ground floor occupiers at any point time on one side of one of the principal shopping streets. For Oxford Street, this involved some fifty applications of the runs test method.

By far the most apparent trend to emerge from the application of these tests, was that for the vast majority of traders in the principal shopping streets of the study area in the period from 1976 to 1985, their linear patterns of distribution within these streets were the result of chance and
therefore, as such, random in nature. However, out of the fifty
tests carried out, nine did not follow this predominant trend,
but instead, exhibited patterns of distribution the suggested that
they were not random in nature [18].

In each of these nine 'exceptional cases', the method of the
linear application of the nearest neighbour index was employed.
This had two main purposes. First, to give backing to the
statistical findings of the runs tests. And secondly, to
ascertain whether these elements of 'non-randomness' were in fact
indicative of elements of clustering or of regularity in the
linear distributions.

Thus, the dual application of these techniques provided the
following exceptions to the overall pattern of randomness in the
linear distribution of ground floor occupiers in Oxford Street;

(i) clothing retailers (category 4) on the north side of
the street in both 1979 and 1982 exhibited elements of clustering
in their distribution. In addition, it is worth noting here that,
when a runs test was applied to retailers in this category on the
north side of the street in 1984 the value found was only very
marginally above the rejection level set;

(ii) category 5 traders (mostly footwear retailers) on
the south side of the street in both 1976 and 1979, also exhibited
elements of clustering. When the runs test was applied here, a
value of marginal rejection was obtained for this category of
trader on the north side of the street in 1976;
(iii) category 11 traders (Other Specialised Retail Distribution – Non-Food) on the north side of the street were located in a manner in 1982 that suggested a significant element of clustering. This is perhaps a fairly surprising result given the wide scope of trader types that could potentially fall into this category. However, in Oxford Street, only two trader types dominate this category; jewellers and retailers of electrical goods. Thus, the result obtained here suggests that traders of these types either located in a clustered manner separately in 1982 (jewellers with other jewellers and electrical retailers with other electrical retailers) or that, what is far less likely, that the two types of trader tended to locate together; evidence of which is lacking;

(iv) clustering was also apparent in Category 12 traders (principally department stores), which were located in this manner on the south side of the street consistently in the period from 1976 to 1982;

(v) perhaps one rather surprising element to emerge here was that vacant properties (Category 14) exhibited significant elements of clustering on the south side of the street in 1982. It could be argued that this is a function of the lease periods for a block of properties owned by the same landlord, coming up for renewal or review at the same time (not an uncommon occurrence). In such a situation, and at a time of rapid upturn in the retail property market, there are likely to
be considerable changes in ownership which will result in the redevelopment of a number of shop units which is indicated in the data collected as concentrations of vacant properties [20];

(vi) and finally, it is worth noting that the south side of Oxford Street seems to show the greatest tendency towards 'non-randomness' in trader category distribution, with six 'exceptional' findings here compared with three on the north side. The most notable single year for such statistical occurrences was 1982 (with three in this year) with the least notable in these terms being 1984 (only one occurrence).

It can be seen therefore that a number of statistically interesting trends emerge in the data which suggest that, for some types of trader at some points in time, linear distributions are not random in nature. However, it should be noted that such trends are very much the exception rather than the rule, and thus, it would be wrong to conclude that trading patterns in Oxford Street, through time, take on any kind of organised or predictable form. In the main, trading patterns here are highly disorganised and defy prediction, with only a few exceptions which tend only to be at one or at most two points in time. Only the linear distribution of department stores would seem to be consistently predictable. This is probably a function of their longevity and that their initial clustered pattern of location has remained largely undisturbed.
4.2.4. Land-Use Data: Analysis - Regent Street.

As with the analysis of Oxford Street, the first stage with the analysis of Regent Street was to calculate the number of ground floor properties falling into the fourteen use categories derived [19]. This is shown below in Figure 4.8..

First, in comparison with Oxford Street, there would appear to be a far greater degree of stability in trader numbers in Regent Street. The lowest number of traders in the street was 166 (1979) and the highest 173 (1985)(a percentage variance of only 6.1%, compared to 22.2% in Oxford Street). It would therefore seem that, on the basis of this, Regent Street has a relatively stable retail environment. Indeed, during the period for which land-use data were available, very few significant retail developments, such as the shopping arcades of Oxford Street, were introduced.

Secondly, trading in Regent Street is also dominated by a limited number of categories of occupier. Two categories are particularly important through time, as can be seen from Figure 4.8. - categories 4 and 13. This is very similar to what was observed in Oxford Street. However, of particular note here is the role of non-retail uses in Regent Street.

It can be seen that non-retail (category 13) uses is the single most important category of land-use through time, accounting for around one third of all ground floor occupiers
Figure 4.8. - Commercial Activity Category Distribution, 1976 to 1985: Regent Street.

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<thead>
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<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
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<td>0.6</td>
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<td>1.8</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
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<td>1.8</td>
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<td>04</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
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<td>1.8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
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<td>10.2</td>
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<td>9.6</td>
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<td>10.7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9.8</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>32.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 167 100.0 | 166 100.0 | 168 100.0 | 173 100.0

Note - Total percentage figures for each year may not add exactly to 100 due to rounding of figures.

Source - Data Base created for Regent Street, 1976 to 1985.
(an average figure of 33.5%). This compares with only around 19.9% in Oxford Street, 14.5% in Bond Street, and 28.3% in Brompton Road. This is a particularly important feature of trading patterns here, since such a high level of non-retail use is very detrimental to the retail functioning and character of the street, and is a hinderence to its future retail development and enhancement. There are a number of reasons for this. For example, first, non-retail uses reduce the number and variety of retailers in a shopping centre, and secondly, many non-retail uses attract a non-shopping clientele. For example, people using travel agents or airline offices are doing so for a specific (non-shopping) purpose and therefore may not make use of the retail opportunities in a shopping centre.

This is of particular concern to Regent Street since an important element in helping to explain the high level of non-retail use here is the number of travel agents and airline offices present in the street. Figure 4.9. (below) shows the prominence of these non-retail uses in Regent Street in comparison with the other shopping streets under examination.

The other dominant category of trader, clothing retailers, accounts for between 26.8% and 30.7% of all traders through time. The number of traders in this category was also relatively stable through time, varying only by 5 (46 to 51) between 1976 and 1985.

Only three other categories of trader (Retail Distribution of Footwear and Leather Goods; Retail Distribution of Household Goods, Hardware and Ironmongery; and, Other Specialised Retail
Distribution, Non-Food) have any significant presence in the street, however, none of these has any more than around a 10% presence at any point in time.

Figure 4.9. - Study Area, Principal Shopping Streets: Travel Agents and Airline Offices, 1976 to 1985.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regent Street</td>
<td>28 19%</td>
<td>25 15%</td>
<td>25 15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford Street</td>
<td>4 1%</td>
<td>4 1%</td>
<td>3 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bond Street</td>
<td>13 8%</td>
<td>12 7%</td>
<td>10 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brompton Road</td>
<td>2 2%</td>
<td>3 3%</td>
<td>2 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>43 6%</td>
<td>44 6%</td>
<td>40 5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Data Sets created for Regent Street, 1976 to 1985.

Therefore, it would seem apparent that Regent Street, like Oxford Street has a high degree of concentration in its types of retailer. Indeed, it could be argued that the degree of trader concentration is more in Regent Street since the two most dominant categories in Regent Street account for an average of 62.0% of the total number of occupiers in the street (compared with a figure of 59.1% for Oxford Street), and the five most dominant categories account for an average of 87.3% (compared
to 87.1% for Oxford Street)[20].

In addition, it would seem apparent from Figure 4.8. that almost all of the categories of trader in the street exhibit a considerable degree of stability in their numbers through time. The only exceptions to this trend are category 10 (Retail Distribution of Books, Stationary and Office Supplies) which, due to the low number of traders in this category can be discounted as being of any real importance, and category 14 (Vacant properties). The changes in this last category are of far more importance since they show that vacancy rates in the street, although low in relative terms, did show a marked increase through time, rising from 1.8% in 1976 and 1979, to 5.9% in 1982 and 4.6% in 1985. Again, this surge in vacancy rates may, at least in part, be a function of refurbishment and redevelopment stimulated by the upswing in the market.

The stability in the number of traders in each category and which is apparent from the initial examination of the data, is also reflected in the fact that the chi-square test applied to the data showed that no significant differences were present in S.I.C. category distribution between the data sets, and the Spearmans Rank correlation method indicated that there was a high degree of association in this regard.

Again, this could infer that no significant retail changes have occurred in this period. However, this is far from being the case, which is reflected by the fact that only 53% of the traders present in 1976 remained in 1985 [21]. Although this is
considerably greater than the corresponding figure for Oxford Street (41%), it still shows that important changes had taken place. It can be argued again here, that occupier change in the period 1976 to 1985 was somewhat greater than functional change, as is shown in Figure 4.10. (below). The explanations for this trend are as outlined above with regard to Oxford Street.

Figure 4.10. - Regent Street: Rates of Occupier and Functional Change, 1976 to 1985.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupier Change</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional Change</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Data Sets created for Regent Street, 1976 to 1985.

Rates of occupier change have also been subject to a very marked increase through time, rising from 15.6% between 1976 and 1979 to 28.6% between 1982 and 1985. Indeed, this last figure is of great interest since it shows that in only a three year period over one quarter of the ground floor units in Regent Street changed occupier. This could well be explained by the fact that, in this period, many long term leases drawn up in the 1960's and early 1970's, with long review periods, came to an end, and the subsequent increases in rent forced many traders to leave. It is
interesting to note this high rate of ownership change in the context of the stability in trader category numbers through time. It would seem quite remarkable that, despite such a high rate of trader turnover, the 'replacement' traders arrived in almost exactly the same proportions as before.

Two further aspects of trading patterns examined again here were the rate of change at corner sites, and of stores in close proximity to anchor stores [22]. Figures 4.11. and 4.12. (below) would appear to show that these rates are somewhat less than for the whole of the street. The factors which might help to explain this, are as noted with regard to Oxford Street.

Figure 4.11. - Regent Street: Rates of Occupier Change at Corner Sites Compared to Rates of Occupier Change in Whole Street, 1976 to 1985.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Occupier Change</th>
<th>Corner Site Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976-1979</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-1982</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-1985</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Data Sets created for Regent Street, 1976 to 1985.
As was the case in the analysis of Oxford Street, the method applied at this stage was that of the runs test. The conditions for the application of this method were the same here as before - that the test would be applied to any category of trader that had a presence of two or more on a side of one of the study streets at any point in time. This resulted in the application of 47 tests in Regent Street.

Again, the most important aspect to emerge here was that for most categories of trader at the four points in time their linear distribution in the study streets was the result of chance, and thus, random in nature. And indeed, only one exception emerged to this dominant trend, namely that on the east side of Regent Street in 1984, non-retail land uses were distributed in a manner that suggested that it was other than
random [23]. When the linear nearest method was applied it indicated that there did appear to be a significant degree of clustering in the distribution of occupiers in this category at this point in time. This is a surprising result given the fact that this category is likely to encompass a wide range of different types of activity. Indeed, when these uses on the east side of Regent Street in 1984 are examined, no single type of use emerged as being sufficiently dominant, as to permit any degree of clustering. Thus, it would seem that this statistical anomaly is difficult to explain, and it could be argued that, at this point in time a combination of 'chance' locations on the part of the wide range of uses here, resulted in a category of 'pseudo' clustering.

Even when observations of marginal rejection are introduced, the consistent trend of randomness in linear patterns is not challenged in the sense that only three runs tests produced values that were only marginally above the rejection level set. The two most noteworthy of these are that on the east side of Regent Street in 1979 two such values were found for clothing retailers.

However, despite this, it is very apparent that trading patterns in Regent Street exhibit almost no element of spatial organisation or of predictability through time. Even the one apparent exception to this pattern lacks any logical explanation.
4.2.5. Land-Use Data: Analysis - Brompton Road.

As with the analysis of Oxford Street and Regent Street, the first stage in the analysis of Brompton Road involved the calculation of the number of ground floor occupiers falling into the fourteen categories derived [24]. Figure 4.13. shows the resulting frequency distribution. From this a number of interesting points emerge.

The total number of traders in Brompton Road, in the period from 1976 to 1985, fell from 98 to 92, a percentage decrease of 5.1%. This is very similar to the same figure for Regent Street (6.1%) but markedly different from that for Oxford Street (22.2%). Thus, in terms of total trader numbers, Brompton Road exhibits a relatively high degree of stability.

The most dominant categories of ground floor occupier through time are those of clothing retailers (category 4) and of non-retail use (category 13). Clothing retailers account for between 28.6% and 30.6% of all occupiers through time, and the numbers in this category are very stable, varying only once from 28 to 30 and only 2% in relative terms. Non-retail uses, although the second most important category through time, seem to exhibit a marked downward trend both in terms of numbers (falling from 32 in 1976 to 25 in 1985; a fall of 21.9% in absolute terms) and in proportional terms (32.7% to 26.9%). It could be argued that this reflects an element of success the policy objective of the local authority in trying to reduce the amount of non-retail use in
Figure 4.13. - Commercial Activity Category Distribution, 1976 to 1985: Brompton Road.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>1 1.0</td>
<td>1 1.1</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>03</td>
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<td>1 1.1</td>
<td>1 1.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>28 28.6</td>
<td>30 30.6</td>
<td>28 30.4</td>
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<td>13 13.3</td>
<td>12 13.0</td>
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<td>06</td>
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<td>2 2.0</td>
<td>1 1.1</td>
<td>0 0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>9 9.2</td>
<td>9 9.2</td>
<td>9 9.8</td>
<td>9 9.7</td>
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<td>0 0</td>
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<td>0 0</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2 2.0</td>
<td>3 3.3</td>
<td>1 1.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>4 4.1</td>
<td>6 6.1</td>
<td>5 5.4</td>
<td>5 5.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>2 2.0</td>
<td>1 1.0</td>
<td>1 1.1</td>
<td>1 1.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>32 32.7</td>
<td>28 28.6</td>
<td>22 23.9</td>
<td>25 26.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>3 3.1</td>
<td>3 3.1</td>
<td>7 7.6</td>
<td>7 7.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 98 100.0 98 100.0 92 100.0 93 100.0

Note - Total percentage figures for each year may not add exactly to 100 due to rounding of figures.

Source - Data Base created for Brompton Road, 1976 to 1985.
Brompton Road [25]. Alternatively, it could be argued that this is simply a product of market forces.

Only one other category of trader has a presence of more than 10% of all traders — category 5 (Retail Distribution of Footwear and Leather Goods). Both in terms of numbers (variation by 2) and in relative terms (variation of 1.5%), this category is also fairly stable.

Vacancy rates (see Figure 4.14., below) through time show two points worthy of note. These are that this figure shows marked variation through time, rising from three properties in 1976 (3.1%) to seven in 1985 (7.6%). This increase occurred between 1979 and 1982, and again may be a function of market forces. However, no matter the cause the figure of 7.6% (1982 and 1985) represents the highest percentage of vacant properties in any of the four study streets and at any of the points in time studied.

Figure 4.14. - Brompton Road: Vacancy Rates, 1976 to 1985.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Vacancy Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Data Files created for Brompton Road, 1976 to 1985.
At this point in the analysis the chi-square and Spearman's Rank correlation methods were applied. As was the case when these were applied with regard to the fourteen land-use categories for Oxford Street and Regent Street, when applied to Brompton Road, they indicated that no statistically significant differences were present in land-use category distribution in the time periods between each data set, and that these data sets exhibited a high degree of association.

However, again this finding tends to disguise the fact that a great deal of retail change had taken place in this time period, which is illustrated by the fact that only 47% of the traders present in the street in 1976 remained by 1985 [26]. As with the earlier examinations of the two other streets, rates of occupier change and functional change seem to be markedly different in Brompton Road through time. As Figure 4.15. (below) shows rates of occupier change are somewhat greater than those for functional change. The factors that may help to explain this disparity are as outlined above.

A further aspect of interest, is that rates of occupier change seemed to rise sharply in the period 1979 to 1982. From 1976 to 1979, the average annual rate of ownership change was 7.5%. However, in the period from 1979 to 1982 this rate increased to nearly 11%, a rate that stayed fairly constant in the period 1982 to 1985 (falling by only 0.4%). Again, the possible explanations for this trend are as discussed above.
Figure 4.15. - Brompton Road: Rates of Occupier and Functional Change, 1976 to 1985.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupier Change</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional Change</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Data Sets created for Brompton Road, 1976 to 1985.

Examination was also carried out with regard to the rate of change of ownership at corner sites and close to anchor stores [27]. Again, as shown in Figures 4.16. and 4.17., below) and for the same reasons suggested above, there would appear to be some justification in claiming that rates of change in these sites are somewhat lower than those on average.

From Figure 4.13. (above), it can be seen, as is consistent with a clearly emerging trend, that two categories of trader are dominant in Brompton Road; category 4 (clothing retailers) and category 13 (non-retail use). These categories consistently account for well in excess of half of all ground floor occupiers in the street in the period from 1976 to 1985. Indeed, at their highest levels (1976), these categories made up over 60% of all such occupiers, and although falling in relative importance in
Figure 4.16. - Brompton Road: Rates of Occupier Change at Corner Sites Compared to Rates of Occupier Change in Whole Street, 1976 to 1985.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Occupier Change</th>
<th>Corner Site Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976-1979</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-1982</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-1985</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Data Sets created for Brompton Road, 1976 to 1985.

Figure 4.17. - Brompton Road: Rates of Occupier Change in Close Proximity to Anchor Stores Compared to Rates of Occupier Change in Whole Street, 1976 to 1985.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Occupier Change</th>
<th>Proximity to Anchor Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976-1979</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-1982</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-1985</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Data Sets created for Brompton Road, 1976 to 1985.
1979 and 1982, by 1985 this figure was restored to 57%. The average figure over this period is 57.9%. This compares with a figure of 62% for Regent Street and 59.1% for Oxford Street. In addition, the five most dominant categories of trader account for between 84.7% and 87.9% of all ground floor occupiers through time. The average figure is 86.6% and compares with figures of 87.3% for Regent Street and 87.1% for Oxford Street [28]. Thus, it would appear that the concentration of types of category of trader in Brompton Road, although still high, is somewhat lower than that in the other two streets examined so far.

The next analytical method was that of an application of the runs test technique. Again it is interesting to note that of the 33 tests carried out, on the basis of the same qualifying criteria as employed previously, none produced values that suggested that any linear sequence at any point in time on any side of any of the four study streets were not the result of chance and thus random in nature [29]. Indeed, only one value was found that was marginally above the rejection level set; that for clothing retailers on the east side of the street in 1976.

Thus, it is apparent that, even more than in Regent Street and far more than Oxford Street, trading patterns in Brompton Road, through time, would seem to exhibit virtually no degree of spatial organisation or predictability.
4.2.6 Land-Use Data: Analysis - Bond Street.

Bond Street, as can be seen from the map in Appendix II Table 3 [30] is made up of two constituent parts - New Bond Street (its northern section) and Old Bond Street (its southern section) - with New Bond Street having around three times more traders than Old Bond Street. The two parts of the street have long been regarded as one, and thus, the analysis carried out with regard to trading patterns was on this basis.

Figure 4.18. shows the distribution of the traders in the land-use categories derived [31]. Again, initial examination reveals a number of interesting points. The first is that the number of ground floor shop units increased from 170 in 1976 to 180 in 1985, a change of 5.8%. This is very similar to the same figure as derived for Regent Street (6.1%) and Brompton Road (5.1%), and is substantially less than the 22.2% variance observed in Oxford Street. Given that there have been no major developments in Bond Street in this period, it would seem that this increase could have been the result of the subdivision of individual shop units through time.

Like the other three streets examined, Bond Street is characterised by the marked dominance of two categories of occupier. However, unlike these other streets, although clothing retailers make up one of these categories, the other is category 11 - 'Other Specialised Retail Distribution'. The presence in the street of one particular type of trader explain this dominance -
Figure 4.18. - Commercial Activity Category Distribution, 1976 to 1985: Bond Street.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>09</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 170 100.0 175 100.0 174 100.0 180 100.0

Note - Total percentage figures for each year may not add exactly to 100 due to rounding of figures.

Source - Data Base created for Bond Street, 1976 to 1985.
jewellers; a type of trader for which Bond Street is internationally renowned.

Category 11 traders account consistently for over one quarter of all ground floor occupiers through time. However, although the most dominant single category of trader in 1976, it was overtaken in importance by clothing retailers in the period from 1979 to 1985.

Clothing retailers account for between 24.7% of all occupiers (1976) and 32.0% (1979). In 1979, there was a quite remarkable increase in the number of traders in this category, rising by 14 from 42 to 56 (an absolute increase of 33.3% and relative increase of 7.3%). Such a dramatic change is very difficult to explain. However, perhaps some element of explanation may be found in that this increase was largely at the expense of non-retail uses in the street, which fell in the same time period from 33 to 25 (a fall of 24.2% in absolute terms and of 5.1% in relative terms). It could be speculated that this was, in part, a result of the policies of Westminster City Council toward non-retail uses in the street [32]. However, this argument is only partly backed up by reference to Oxford Street and Regent Street (also under the auspices of the same borough Council) where non-retail use fell, in relative terms, by 1.0% and 2.2% respectively between 1976 and 1979. And indeed, since the number of non-retail uses actually increased by one in this period in Oxford Street, this argument would seem to be rather tenuous.
Two other categories of trader make up a very important part of the functional character of Bond Street - category 5 (Retail Distribution of Footwear and Leather Goods) and category 13 (Non-Retail Use). The latter has already been discussed above, and in this regard, it is interesting to note that the fall in importance between 1796 and 1979 carried on until 1985, both in absolute and in relative terms, with falls of 20% and 3.2% respectively between 1979 and 1985. Thus, non-retail use changed from 33 units (19.4%) of all ground floor occupiers) in 1976 to only 20 units (11.1%) in 1985.

The number of footwear retailers (of which all of the traders in this category are) also saw a dramatic change through time. In 1976 such traders were 22 in number, 12.9% of all ground floor occupiers. By 1985, this number had risen to 31 (an absolute increase of 40.1%), 17.2% of all such occupiers.

Changes in one further category of trader are also worth noting, due to volatility in its numbers through time. This category is that of Retail Distribution of Furnishing Fabrics and Textiles (category 6). This category saw an increase in numbers from 4 in 1976 to 12 in 1979. However, after this time, its numbers fell steadily to just 6 in 1985. This trend is very simply explained by the fact that, in the late 1970's, Bond Street became a very popular location for 'Carpet Galleries'. However, the popularity of this street for this type of retailer rapidly changed, probably because the expected levels of turnover were not realised. As a result of this, most of the 'new' carpet retailers
left the street, and indeed, it was apparent from subsequent visits to the street after the initial phase of primary data collection, that their number has further fallen. This could reflect the hypothesis that locational decisions are made on the basis of expected turnover as derived from the image or status of the street, rather than on a more rational estimation of potential turnover.

The vacancy rate in Bond Street is relatively low and consistent through time, as shown in Figure 4.19. (below). The average vacancy rate in the street is 2.3%, with the highest level being 2.9% in 1976. This compares favourably with the average vacancy rates in the other three streets (the rate in Oxford Street being 3.9%, in Regent Street 3.6%, and in Brompton Road 5.3%).

Figure 4.19. - Bond Street: Vacancy Rates, 1976 to 1985.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Vacancy Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Data Sets created for Bond Street, 1976 to 1985.
At this point in the analysis, the chi-square and Spearmans Rank correlation techniques were applied. These tests indicated respectively that no significant differences existed between the S.I.C. distributions through time and that a high degree of association was present between each of these data sets through time. However, again it should be noted that this does not mean that no significant changes in the functional elements of Bond Street were occurring during this period. This is best illustrated by the fact that only 51% of the traders present in 1976 remained by 1985 [33].

Again, it can be seen that rates of occupier change in the period from 1976 to 1985 are significantly greater than those of functional change. This is shown in Figure 4.20. (below). Also, rates of occupier change seem to follow the emerging trend of

Figure 4.20. - Bond Street: Rates of Occupier and Functional Change, 1976 to 1985.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupier Change</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional Change</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Data Sets created for Bond Street, 1976 to 1985.
exhibiting significant increases through time which may well be explained by the factors outlined earlier (see Figure 4.21., below).

Figure 4.21. - Bond Street: Annual Average Rates of Occupier Change, 1976 to 1985.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Average Annual Rate of Occupier Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976-1979</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-1982</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-1985</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, in common with what is also a clearly emerging pattern, rates of change at corner sites and at sites in close proximity to anchor stores [34] would seem to be somewhat greater than those on average, as is illustrated in Figures 4.22. and 4.23. (below).

As is the case with the other streets examined, trading in Bond Street is concentrated into a fairly limited number of land-use categories. The two most dominant categories of trader in the street (categories 4 and 11) account for an average figure of some 55.0% of all ground floor occupiers in the period from 1976 to 1985. This figure is the lowest of any of the four streets.
**Figure 4.22.** - Bond Street: Rates of Occupier Change at Corner Sites Compared to Rates of Occupier Change in Whole Street, 1976 to 1985.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Occupier Change</th>
<th>Corner Site Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976-1979</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-1982</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-1985</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Data Sets created for Bond Street, 1976 to 1985.

**Figure 4.23.** - Bond Street: Rates of Occupier Change in Close Proximity to Anchor Stores Compared to Rates of Occupier Change in Whole Street, 1976 to 1985.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Occupier Change</th>
<th>Proximity to Anchor Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976-1979</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-1982</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-1985</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Data Sets created for Bond Street, 1976 to 1985.
The five most dominant categories through time account for an average figure of 89.2% of all ground floor occupiers. In contrast to the first figure, this is rather high in comparison with the other streets [35].

Again the method employed at this stage in the analysis of Bond Street was that of the runs test technique. When the qualifying criteria, (as outlined above), were applied, it resulted in some 41 runs tests being carried out. Again the dominant trend was toward randomness in distributional patterns of ground floor land uses in the street with only seven exceptions being found [36]. To each of these 'exceptions' the technique of the linear nearest neighbour index was applied in order to determine whether the patterns observed exhibited elements of spatial regularity or of clustering. The results can be summarised as follows;

(i) the most important trend to emerge within these statistically exceptional observations was that found with regard to category 11 (Other Specialised Retail Distribution - Non-Food). Here, it was found that on the west side of the street in both 1976 and 1979 traders in this category were distributed in a manner that suggested significant elements of clustering. In addition, the value for the same category of trader in 1982 was only marginally above the rejection level set. Significant values, also suggesting elements of linear regularity, were found in 1982 and 1984 on the east side of Bond Street. Thus, for the eight points investigated (i.e east and west sides in 1976, 1979, 1982
and 1985) four produced significant values and one other just failed to do so. This points to considerable and fairly consistent elements of regularity. This may seem surprising given that this category of trader could incorporate a wide range of different trader types. However, it should be remembered that, in Bond Street, this category is heavily dominated by one type of retailer - jewellers. Thus, when this is considered, then perhaps this element of statistical exception is not quite so surprising;

(ii) in 1979 on the east side of Bond Street non-retail uses were located in a manner that suggested a significant element of clustering. In addition, the value obtained from the runs test in 1976 was only marginally above the rejection level set. This, again, is a rather surprising result, given the potential scope of this category, and the fact that the category is not dominated at these points in time by one or a few user types. Thus, perhaps this could only be explained, as was a similar situation in Regent Street, by these individual user types locating in a manner that simulates regularity;

(iii) in 1984 on the east side of the street category 7 traders (Retail Distribution of Household Goods, Hardware and Ironmongery) traders were located in a manner that suggested a significant degree of clustering. Again, this is a result that is rather difficult to explain since the types of traders falling into this category vary from furniture shops to record and electrical retailers. Unfortunately, the explanation proposed above with regard to non-retail use would seem to be the most
(iv) the distribution of statistically significant patterns in Bond Street is relatively even through time. However the east side of the street does seem to somewhat more important in these terms than the west.

Thus, it would seem apparent that despite these exceptions, some of which are rather surprising in nature, Bond Street follows the pattern set by the analysis of the other principal shopping streets in the area, namely that its trading patterns exhibit few elements of spatial organisation or predictability through time.

4.2.7. Land-Use Data: Analysis - Aggregate Situation.

From the individual analyses of the four study streets it can be seen that each possesses its own range of characteristics and trends in its patterns of trading through time. In this section, consideration will be given to those characteristics and trends that, as well as emerging at the level of the individual street, also emerge as being of importance at the aggregate level. Before doing this, however, it is of value to take into account some of the main points arising out of an examination of the aggregated data relating to the trader category distribution of all four of the streets in the period from 1976 to 1985.

Figure 4.24. (below) shows the aggregate commercial activity category distributions for all four of the study streets in the
### Figure 4.24. Commercial Activity Category Distribution,

1976 to 1985: All Study Streets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
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<td>1.2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| TOTAL         | 732  | 100.0 | 772  | 100.0 | 763  | 100.0 | 809  | 100.0 |

Note - Total percentage figures for each year may not add exactly to 100 due to rounding of figures.

Source - Data Bases created for Oxford Street, Regent Street, Brompton Road and Bond Street, 1976 to 1985.
period from 1976 to 1985. A number of points are worth noting with regard to this distribution. First, the total number of traders in these streets rose from 732 in 1976 to 809 in 1985, a percentage change of 10.1%. By far the most dominant category of trader through time is category 4 (clothing retailers) accounting for an average of 33.4% of all ground floor occupiers. The most notable change in the number of traders occurred between 1976 and 1979, when their number increased by 40, a percentage increase of some 20.7% in absolute terms, and 4.6% in relative terms.

Non-retail land-uses are also very important through time. However, although their numbers showed little change between 1976 (186) and 1985 (175), the relative importance of such uses seems to fall significantly; from 25.4% of all ground floor occupiers in 1976 to only 21.6% in 1985.

The most notable other categories in all four of the streets through time are categories 5 (the category consisting mostly of footwear retailers) and category 11 (Other Specialised Retail Use - Non-Food). Both of these categories exhibit considerable stability in their relative importance through time, however, their numbers did show some very marked changes. For example, between 1979 and 1982 the number of footwear retailers in these streets increased by 17 to 101 (an absolute increase of some 20.2%, although only a relative increase of 2.3%). This increase in relative terms was largely redressed in the period to 1985. No other category of trader accounted for any more than 6.4% of all traders at any of the four points in time.
An interesting point to note was the result found from the application of the Spearman's Rank correlation method to the trader category distributions. Here this test was applied to establish the degree of association between the trader category distribution at each point in time in each street and the distribution for the same point in time in all of the other streets and the aggregate situation. For example, for the 1976, correlation measures were obtained between trader category distribution in Oxford Street and Bond Street, Regent Street, Brompton Road and the aggregate distribution. This process was repeated for each of the other streets in the same year. It is interesting to note that all of the values found indicated significant degrees of association between each of the data sets. Thus, there would seem to be a considerable degree of similarity between the distribution of traders in each of the streets at any point in time. Therefore, it can be concluded that functionally, all four streets are similar to one another and have not changed significantly.

The measure of the concentration of types of trader at an aggregate level in these streets is illustrated by the fact that the two most dominant categories of trader (categories 4 and 13) accounted for an average of 58.5% of all traders through time and the five most dominant, for an average of 87.5%. One interesting aspect to note is that there would appear to be a general trend toward a reduction in this category dominance through time, which is best illustrated by noting that from 1976 to 1985 the two most dominant categories of occupier fell from 60.4% to 56.9% of all
traders, and perhaps more significantly, the five most dominant fell from 88.6% to 85.5% [37].

The trends in aggregate vacancy rates through time are also interesting to note. It can be seen from Figure 4.25. (below) that vacancy rates increased from only 2.3% in 1976 to some 4.9% in 1985. The most notable increase was between 1979 and 1982, the period during which the current upswing in the market was initiated. It could be argued that this gives backing to the idea suggested earlier that during upswings in the market the amount of property falling under the heading of 'vacant, under construction' increases due to market conditions encouraging the redevelopment and improvement of commercial properties.

When the chi-square technique was applied to this data set it indicated that there were no significant differences in the aggregate trader category distributions through time. In addition,

Figure 4.25. - Aggregate Situation: Vacancy Rates, 1976 to 1985.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Vacancy Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Data Sets created for All Study Streets, 1976 to 1985.
the application of a correlation test indicated a high degree of association between these distributions.

Having considered the main points arising out of the analysis of the trader category distribution through time, attention can now be turned to the trends that are of importance at both the individual and aggregate street levels.

First, it would seem apparent that all four of the shopping streets under consideration constitute highly dynamic retail environments. This dynamism is at its most obvious in Oxford Street where an average of almost 17% of its traders changed on annual basis in the period from 1982 to 1985. Although the other streets do not exhibit these levels of 'trader turnover' the data undoubtedly show that they too are ever changing trading environments (see Figure 4.26., below).

Secondly, it consistently emerges through time, and in all of the streets, that occupier change is greater than functional change. The reasons for this were discussed earlier however, it is interesting to note that this trend does provide a stabling element in the system of change [38].

Thirdly, it also emerges that rates of change at corner sites [39] and in close proximity to anchor stores [40] are less than those on average. Again, the possible reasons for this were discussed earlier, however, it is interesting to note that, although a relatively consistent trend, there are exceptions to it. One possible reason for these exceptions could be the end of
Figure 4.26. - Aggregate Situation: Average Annual Rates of Occupier Change, 1976 to 1985.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Average Annual Rate of Occupier Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oxford St.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-1979</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-1982</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-1985</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Data Sets created for All Study Streets, 1976 to 1985.

long lease agreements, which may 'force' change in such sites.

Fourthly, the application of the runs test and linear nearest neighbour techniques, indicated that, although individual sides of streets, at individual points in time, and in individual trader types exhibited locational patterns that suggested that these were such as to be other than the result of chance, no consistent or marked trends emerge at the aggregate level. However, such statistically significant patterns are not consistent enough to be considered a definite trend in the locational patterns and, therefore, in the locational decision making processes of such traders. Thus, it could be argued that inconsistent patterns of distribution must mark a inconsistency in the locational decision making processes of those involved in producing these patterns.
Thus, it would seem that although each of these streets exhibited a wide range of trends and characteristics at an individual level, it is far more difficult to identify patterns that are present in all of the streets and at the same time. It could be argued that this is simply a function of the fact that trading patterns in these streets are the result of such a diverse and complex range of influencing factors, that it is to be expected that trading patterns will exhibit few elements of consistency or regularity through space. Thus, spatial regularities in trading patterns at a point time, or through time, in one street are unlikely to be repeated in another street at the same point or period in time.

4.3.1. Questionnaire Survey: Analysis - Introduction.

One element in the collection of data for the research was that of a questionnaire survey of traders present in one or more of the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge. The aims of this survey were threefold; to collect information regarding location decision making strategies of such traders; to examine the importance of political, economic and social factors as influences on trading patterns; and to form a basis upon which to develop the subsequent personal interview survey of traders.

The piloting of the questionnaire, in Princes Street in Edinburgh, Scotland, provided a response rate of some 27%, and on
this basis, it was felt that a fuller questionnaire survey of traders in the West End and Knightsbridge was justified. However, of the 300 traders to whom postal questionnaires were sent 54 replied and 84 had moved address since the listing from which the mailing list was derived had been published. Thus, the response rate, in terms of the total number of valid questionnaires was 34%.

With this element of non-response, it is apparent that the data obtained were not suitable for the application of rigorous statistical techniques. However, the data did serve a number of useful purposes in the sense that they did provide an adequate basis for the development of the subsequent personal interview survey, provide some information with regard to the importance of political, economic and social influences, and also gave an insight into locational decision making strategies of traders.

Therefore, although detailed statistical analysis of these data was inappropriate, a number of interesting trends do emerge that, although lacking in external validity, are nonetheless of interest and relevance in a qualitatively valid sense.

4.3.2. Questionnaire Survey: Analysis - General Trends.

The most interesting points to emerge from the questionnaire survey can be outlined as follows; [41]

(i) Over two thirds (68.4%) of those traders that replied to the questionnaire were part of an independent retail
group. Only one quarter (26.3%) of the replies came from multiples. This is also reflected in the fact that again, over two thirds (68.4%) of the respondents had ten or fewer retail outlets in their company, and well over half (57.9%) had less than ten employees working in their West End or Knightsbridge store surveyed.

(ii) Nearly half (47.3%) of the respondents had been in their present location for four years or less. Interestingly, nearly one third (31.6%) of the respondents had not had a shop of the same type anywhere else before locating in the study area, but one quarter (26.3%) had previously been located in the same street or elsewhere in the West End.

(iii) Just under half (47.3%) of the respondents stated that there were 4 or less direct competitors in the street in which they were located, and 42.1% stated that their were less than twenty other direct competitors in the rest of the West End. Over one third (36.8%) of respondents stated that their nearest competitor was less than fifty metres away, and for 89.4% their nearest direct competitor was less than two hundred metres away.

(iv) The most important factors to emerge in terms of the respondents decision to move to his/her present location were rents, rates and proximity of complementary traders. The search process and change in product sold emerged as being the factors of least importance. The former is reflected in the fact that 63.2% of the respondents considered five or fewer sites during
their search and 73.7%, ten or less. However, over half (52.6%) did use an external company in their search for a site. It can be assumed that this would be a property agent rather than a consultancy firm specialising in site research, since if the latter had been the case, then of the search process would have emerged as being of far greater importance. Only 36.8% of the respondents provided an approximate cost of the search, and for all of these, this was less than £1500.

(v) Over three quarters (78.9%) of the respondents stated that major refitting was required in their present store.

(vi) For over half (52.6%) of the respondents their locational decision was made by a single person (reflecting the high proportion of independents in the sample), and, not surprisingly, for all but two this decision was taken at director level, with the two exceptions being franchisees.

(vii) Of those responding to the questions regarding tenure preferred 86.7% stated that they were ideally looking for a leasehold, over half (58.8%) wanted this for over twenty years and only 5.9% for less than ten years. In reality, 93.3% of the respondents were trading on leaseholds, for 11.8% these were for less than ten years, and for 70.6% these were for twenty years or less.

(viii) The most important sources of information considered in the search for a site were property agents and personal sighting or recommendation, and the least important the
borough Councils, the Greater London Council, and trade associations.

(ix) Some 61.1% of respondents stated that they could not be better located within the street in which they were trading, with over two thirds (66.4%) stating that they could not be better located elsewhere in the West End. The most common locations stated by those already in Oxford Street were around Oxford Circus due to the high pedestrian flows. Those in the same category in Bond Street most commonly stated that 'better' locations were to be found in the northern end of the street, with the southern half being too 'cluttered' and having a large amount of construction work. Those in this category in Brompton Road cited locations on its south side due to higher pedestrian flows. No clear pattern of replies was noted in this regard in Regent Street.

Of the respondents who felt that they could be better located elsewhere in the West End the most common patterns of replies (i.e. better location and reasons) were as follows; for those located in Oxford Street, better locations were considered to be Marylebone High Street and Regent Street because a 'more appropriate' type of customer was to be found there; for those on Bond Street, Knightsbridge and Sloane Street due the existing and improving quality of the shopping environments of these streets; and for those in Regent Street, Oxford Street was the most commonly cited 'better' location, again, because of the high pedestrian flows. No clear pattern emerged for those in this category located in
Brompton Road.

(x) The most common advantages of present site stated were those of the presence of complementary traders, customer flows and the prestige or status of a location. The most common disadvantages stated in this regard were those of the high levels of rents and rates, parking problems and the size of premises.

4.3.3 Questionnaire Survey: Analysis - Conclusions.

The disappointing response rate to the questionnaire meant that it did not provide the quantity or quality of data that had been hoped. However, it is apparent that the data collected provided a number of interesting points which, although can not be said to be truly representative of all traders in the principal shopping streets of the study area, were of considerable interest for the subsequent personal interviews with traders and agents. Therefore, although not achieving as much as was hoped of it, the questionnaire survey still played a valuable contributory role in the overall context of the study.

CHAPTER 4: NOTES.

1. See Location Maps, Appendix I and Appendix II.
3. See Appendix IX Table 1.
4. See Appendix IX Table 2.
5. See Appendix IX Table 3.
8. ibid..
11. See Location Map, Appendix II Table 4.
13. See Appendix IX Table 3.
15. See Appendix XI Table 1 for listing of anchors in Oxford Street.
16. ibid..
17. See Appendix XII.
18. See Appendix X Table 1 for listing of 'exceptional' results.
19. See Appendix IX Table 3.
20. See Appendix XII.
22. See Appendix XI Table 2 for listing of anchors in Regent Street.
23. See Appendix X Table 2 for listing of 'exceptional' results.
24. See Appendix IX Table 3.
25. See Section 5.6.6.
26. Derived from data sets created for Brompton Road, 1976 to 1985.
27. See Appendix XI Table 3 for listing of anchors in Brompton Road.
28. See Appendix XII.
29. See Appendix X Table 3 for listing of 'exceptional' results.
30. See Appendix II Table 3.
31. See Appendix IX Table 3.
32. See Section 5.5.8.
33. Derived from data sets created for Bond Street, 1976 to 1985.
34. See Appendix XI Table 4 for listing of anchors in Bond Street.
35. See Appendix II.
36. See Appendix X Table 4 for listing of 'exceptional' results.
37. See Appendix XII.
38. See Figures 4.4., 4.10., 4.15. and 4.20.
41. See Appendix VII Table 2 for full listing of results.
In examining changes in the trading patterns of the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge, it is apparent from the outset that a wide range of factors are likely to play an influencing role. In categorising the influencing factors, a number of points need to be taken into account.

First, identification of every factor at work will be impossible, since it is very likely that some influences will be either so minimal or over such a short time period that it is not possible to identify accurately and document these during the type of time period being examined (1976 to 1985). For this reason, it will only be possible to identify accurately and examine the principal influencing factors at work; those that have been shown to have exerted an important influence either at a point in time or consistently through time.

The second point that needs to be taken into account is that, although identification of these 'principal factors' is possible, it is often very difficult to allocate them to any single category. As will be seen, several of these factors can fall into more than one of the categories selected.

Thirdly, the relationship between these principal influencing factors is a complex one. For example, it is often difficult to separate one factor from another, in the sense that, although two
factors may be identifiably distinct, the role that one plays within the other makes any distinction between their roles far more difficult.

For the purposes of this study, and bearing the above points in mind, it was decided to apply a broad, three-way categorisation of factors influencing trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the study area. Thus, it is argued that factors at work in this respect could be said to be political, economic and social in nature.

In the following chapters, the main influencing factors falling under these headings will be discussed. Although these factors will be discussed in this manner, it should be remembered, as noted above, that the factors in each category are not necessarily mutually exclusive. It is also important to note that little attempt has been made, at this stage, to discuss which of these factors play the most important influencing roles in the study area. This aspect will be discussed in Chapter 9 [1].

Thus, the following chapters are concerned with identifying and discussing the political, economic and social factors most prominent in shaping trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge in the period from 1976 to 1985.
5.2.1. Political Influences on Trading Patterns in the Principal Shopping Streets of the West End and Knightsbridge: 
Introduction.

In studying the spatial distribution of any form of economic activity in a modern society, it is apparent that political factors need to be taken into consideration since they are likely to play an important role. However, it should be noted that the term 'political' as employed will be used only in terms of political administration. The importance of political factors is particularly apparent in retailing in the United Kingdom, where a wide range of political elements combine to play a key part in shaping the patterns of shopping provision.

In this section, consideration will be given to the range of political factors that are at work in shaping trading patterns within the principal shopping streets of London’s West End and Knightsbridge (defined as being Oxford Street, Regent Street, Bond Street, and Brompton Road).

In examining the role that political factors play, four levels of influence will be identified; central government, metropolitan authority, local authority, and trade association. Each of these 'levels' represent different sizes of constituency, ranging from central government, whose concerns, in terms of retailing, are at the national scale, to trade associations, (for example, the Oxford Street Association) whose concerns are at the level of a single shopping street.
Thus, a hierarchy of political levels of influence will be identified (as shown in Figure 5.1., below) and in the

Figure 5.1. - Simple Hierarchy of Political Influences on Trading Patterns in the Principal Shopping Streets of the Study Area.

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY - Greater London Council

LOCAL AUTHORITY - Westminster City Council

- Council of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea

STREET TRADE ASSOCIATION - Oxford Street

- Regent Street

- Bond Street

Subsequent discussion each of these will be examined, both in terms of the individual contribution that they make in influencing trading patterns, and also in terms of how each relates to the others, and thus the contribution that each makes within the overall scope of political influence.
Each level will be addressed in turn. First, attention will be given to central government, where the means of influence available to it will be examined, as well as their effectiveness. Secondly, the role of the Greater London Council (G.L.C.), as the metropolitan authority which had responsibility for London, will be considered. It should be noted, that although the G.L.C. was abolished in 1985, the role that it had to play during the period of the study (data having been collected for the years 1976 to 1985 inclusive) was an important one, and therefore is worthy of examination.

Thirdly, local authority influences will be considered. The principal shopping streets under study come under the administrative authority of two borough Councils; Westminster City Council, and the Council of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. The role that these Councils play is undoubtedly an important one in the sense that their authority with regard to retailing, is the most direct of all the political bodies in the hierarchy. Thus, their strategy and policy frameworks with regard to shopping in these principal shopping streets will be required to be studied in some detail.

Finally, consideration will be given to the role of trade associations. Such bodies have only a limited ability to influence trading patterns directly. However, as will be discussed, they have a role to play in attempting to have an impact on these patterns through influencing decisions taken at higher levels in the political hierarchy.
In examining the strategy and policy frameworks at each of these levels, consideration will be given to the reasoning behind, and justifications for, decisions taken, and also to the kinds of factors that are taken into account by each body in its decision making process.

This section will show that the 'political input' to changing patterns of retail activity on the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge, is a highly complex one. However, this section will serve three main purposes:

(i) to identify the measures available to authorities at all levels in the political hierarchy to influence trading patterns;

(ii) to establish the effects, both potential and in real terms, of these measures;

(iii) to establish the overall effects of these measures when taken together.

5.2.2. Central Government: Introduction.

The role of central government in influencing retail patterns in general, and not just those of principal shopping streets, is undoubtedly an important one. Many areas of central government activity have effects upon retailing. However, in this section, it is important to bear in mind that the only aspect considered will be those governmental actions that relate
specifically to concepts of retail location.

It is interesting to note that there is no government ministry or department specifically concerned with retailing (as are found in relation to industry and housing, for example), and also that there is no major specific Council or advisory body (as with, for example sports and the arts). The Department of Trade and Industry is the sponsoring ministry, but only to the extent of the appointment of a junior minister with responsibility for this sector. It can be argued that this lack of a formal government body is principally the result of retailing being an efficient sector of the economy, with a record of good labour relations, that is 'directly' accountable to the public and therefore is likely to act responsibly [2]. However, at the same time, this 'laissez-faire' approach leaves retailing open to exploitation by individuals and groups (in the form of the derivation of excessive profit) and can result in marked spatial inequalities.

In recent years, there has been an increase in retailing related legislation. This legislation has had two main themes; extending the scope of consumer protection, and controlling the growth of retail monopolies. However, locational strategies, (those relating to the spatial organisation of new and existing forms of retail distribution) have, in common with most retailing legislation, lacked clear direction or effect, and as one article noted has "prompted cynics to ask 'retailing planning policy, what policy?'" [3].
The introduction of these legislative measures has been the responsibility of the Department of the Environment (and its Welsh and Scottish counterparts). Thus, although the Department of Trade and Industry is the sponsoring ministry with regard to retailing, the ministry with the most effect is the Department of the Environment.

The Secretary of State for the Environment has the obligation to 'supervise the orderly use and development of land according to the procedures laid down in the Town And Country Planning Acts of 1968 and 1971, and other earlier planning legislation' [4]. This involves three separate but integrated forms of responsibility.

First, at the local level, to provide guidance on spatial patterns. This is done through the issuing of advisory documentation, circulars, and memoranda, to local authorities, regarding changes in priorities on policies that should be applied to specific strategy areas [5]. Secondly, to ensure that local authorities, in their implementation of development controls and in their interpretation of statutory planning requirements, display consistency and continuity.

This is achieved by careful study of proposed Development Plan documents, such as those produced in 1982 by both Westminster City Council and the Council of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea [6][7]. A further method is by acting as arbiters in
appeals made against local authority planning decisions. Both of these measures can have important effects on trading patterns as will be discussed later.

The third element of responsibility is that of initiating new planning ideas and assessing suggestions made by others. A recent example is that of proposals for dealing with the potential impact on city centre shopping streets of out-of-town retail developments.

Government initiatives regarding such developments provide an excellent illustration of the powerful effect that they can have on trading patterns. The guidelines laid down in the 'Developments Plan Manual' of 1970 [8], were essentially opposed to radical or revolutionary change. Thus, the response to the growing demand for large out-of-town shops and shopping centres in the 1970's was largely a negative one. A number of Control Policy Notes [9] were issued on this subject that reflected this negative standpoint. The principal concerns of the Department of the Environment were of the potential effects of such developments on existing shopping patterns, intrusions into the green belt, and traffic related implications.

The effect of these Policy Notes was to promote a concentration of new retail facilities within existing town and city centres. However, it was never indicated whether this was an actual and specific goal of the government in issuing these Policy Notes. Indeed, relaxation in the 1980's of Department of the
Environment's attitudes towards proposals for superstores and hypermarkets in out-of-town locations, suggests that, either the above effect was not an actual 'goal', or that the negative impacts of such developments were not as great as originally feared. This relaxation came in the form of Department of the Environment Circular 14/85, which indicated that, unless these were against the public interest, planning permission for such developments should be granted [10] (termed 'presumption in favour of the market dictum') [11]. As a result of this, in 1986, more than half of new shopping floorspace was located in out-of-town sites [12] and a further 27 million square feet was planned [13].

It will be of interest to see the response of central government to the introduction of shopping developments such as the Metrocentre in Gateshead, described as the 'third wave' of out-of-town centres [14], which, due to their retail mix, pose a far more direct threat to the 'high street' than such developments have thus far.

5.2.4. Central Government: The Planning Appeals System.

The planning appeals system provides central government with a very direct and powerful means of influencing trading patterns [15]. When the planning permission of a local authority is sought with regard to a proposed development, whether of a large scale or at the level of an individual shop unit, the Council has the power to refuse or grant this permission. This decision will be
taken on the grounds of whether or not the Council feels that the development is compatible with its strategy for the given street or area. If planning permission is refused then the 'developer' has the right of appeal to the Secretary of State for the Environment.

In appeal, central government inspectors, acting on behalf of the Secretary of State, can invoke one of four decisions;

(i) reverse the decision taken by the local authority;
(ii) modify the decision according to certain conditions;
(iii) uphold the decision taken by the local authority;
(iv) make the decision dependent upon further constraints.

In deciding which of these options to choose, the central government inspectors apply a range of general principles that reflect the standpoint of the government at that particular time.

From discussions with planning personnel at both Westminster City Council and the Council of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, it was found that, in the mid-1980's, of the planning applications that they refused and that were subsequently taken to appeal, around a half are overturned. This compares with a 32% Appeal success rate nationally between 1981 and 1984 [16].

Within these 'overturned decisions' the pattern that emerges
is very similar, in part, to that noted in a study by Langton [17], in that two elements of particular interest emerge. First, with regard to non-retail uses that tend to be found in shopping streets, (such as banks, building societies, and employment agencies) local authorities, (as will be seen in the later discussion) tend to refuse planning permission for the development of such uses. In refusing permission local authorities claim that such uses are detrimental to the character and functioning of shopping streets. However, in general in recent times, this view has not been held by government inspectors in cases of appeal, and thus, in many if not most such cases, the decision taken by the local authority is overturned. It is interesting to note that local authorities tend to employ a relatively wide definition of non-retail use that includes non-retail uses, such as offices, and service retailing uses, such as banks and building societies.

A second element of interest are those proposals refused planning permission on 'moral grounds' such as, for example, amusement arcades and betting shops. Again, local authorities tend, on the whole, to argue that such uses are not suited to shopping streets. However, again on appeal, a majority of refusals made on these grounds, tend to be overturned. A typical example is found in a recent appeal where Westminster City Council had refused permission for the opening of a fast-food restaurant. The grounds of concern were the loss of a retail unit and the environmental effects of such a use (in particular,
litter). In appeal, the government inspectors overturned the Council's decision, believing that such a use would be beneficial to the overall trading environment of the street [18].

If the planning appeals system results in such a high proportion of local authority refusals being overturned as is apparent here, then this must reflect a conflict between the two levels of authority. The basis of this conflict is found largely in local authorities taking a 'borough-wide' stance (being concerned with how changes in principal shopping streets are likely to affect retailing throughout the borough) and central government taking a far wider social, economic and political standpoint. For example, in recent times, given the high levels of unemployment and the decay of many inner cities, central government seems to have taken the view that any development in a shopping street, regardless of type, should not be discouraged. Whether any given development will be to the long term benefit of a shopping street or area, is very much a secondary concern [19].

Thus, it is apparent that central government possesses a definite potential to influence trading patterns, not only in principal shopping streets, but in locational aspects of all retailing. Although, in stating this, it should be recognised that, judgements of commercial viability, play no part.

Indeed, this potential to influence is not restricted to these 'direct' retailing related measures. Other governmental policies and strategies that are not primarily directed towards
retailing can also have marked effects. An good example of this is that of changes in the level of personal taxation where as absolute levels of personal taxation change, (either changes in the basic rates of tax or in thresholds) there is likely to be a 'knock-on' effect on trading patterns.

It would seem that this adds to the already considerable scope for central government to influence trading patterns. However, are these effects quantifiable? The effects of 'indirect' government actions are unlikely to be quantifiable at the aggregate level, and indeed, even at the level of individual pattern changes it would prove difficult to attribute cause to any given government action. This is because of the 'time-lag' period involved (the time for any action to 'filter through' and take effect) and the complexity of other factors involved (other social, economic and political factors).

Similarly, 'direct' government policies are also of great difficulty to quantify in terms of their effects on trading patterns. However, because of this more 'direct' nature it may be easier to attribute cause here. This is probably most true at the individual level (for example, the planning appeals system), but may also be applicable, in certain cases, at the aggregate level (for example, effects of Policy Notes on out-of-town shopping developments).
5.2.5. Central Government: Summary and Conclusions.

In summary, it can be seen that central government influences come in the following forms;

(i) advisory documentation, circulars and memoranda to local authorities;

(ii) examination of proposed local authority development plan documents, in order to ensure 'consistency and continuity';

(iii) acting as arbiters in cases of appeal made against local authority planning decisions;

(iv) initiating new planning ideas and assessing suggestions made by others, with advise being laid down in in Control Policy Notes;

(v) influences derived from a range of 'indirect' government actions, such as changes to levels of personal taxation.


Before its abolition in 1985, the Greater London Council (G.L.C.) provided the means by which all activities in London could be co-ordinated. Within this, lay the G.L.C.'s role in attempting to provide a general framework within which shopping activities could operate. In providing such an overviewing role, it was hoped that changes in the provision of retailing in a specific part of the city could be viewed in a 'London-wide'
context, and that, the G.L.C. could "make sense of the chaos in London shopping policy" [20].

In attempting to administer London, the G.L.C. saw the need for an overall plan to guide development and incorporate its competing demands and growing problems. This was achieved by the production of Greater London Development Plans, the most recent of which was considered and approved by the Secretary of State for the Environment in September 1976 [21]. This is a further example of the influencing ability of the government, as discussed above in the sense that this development plan like all others, had to be couched in terms that were seen as being acceptable to central government. In September 1984, the G.L.C. produced a document containing the Council's proposals to alter the Plan [22]. In considering the role of the G.L.C. in influencing trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge, it is this document that will be discussed. The justification for this is that the strategies and policies for shopping outlined in the in the 1984 document are a response to the changing patterns, demands and problems of retailing since the introduction of the 1976 Plan. Since the data collected with regard to the principal shopping streets of the study area was for the period 1976 to 1985 this document is therefore of most relevance since, the proposals in the 1984 Plan reflect the strategy and policy framework required to deal with all aspects of retailing that had emerged since 1976 and as such, are a combination of those shopping related policies of the 1976
Plan still relevant in 1984, and new and altered policies where required.

In considering the role of the G.L.C. in this context, three policy areas need to be taken into account: policies relating specifically to shopping, those relating to the Central Activities Zone [23], and, those relating to Town Centres [24].

5.3.2. The Greater London Council: Policies - Shopping.

The proposed alterations to the 1984 Plan provided a range of policies that reflected the wide scope of shopping activity within London. However, it is possible to identify a number of policies that are of particular relevance to the principal shopping streets of the central area.

First, the Council were concerned that the broad hierarchy and pattern of shopping facilities in central London should be maintained. An important element of this was the maintenance of the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge as centres of international reputation. The Council considered that the hierarchy of retail provision as it existed, served London, its workforce, and its visitors, well, and that the loss of the prime role of the West End and Knightsbridge could have a destabilising effect on the rest of the hierarchical framework.

Secondly, the G.L.C. developed a number of policies relating to large retail developments, and in particular, retail warehouses and superstores. A number of conditions were laid down in an
attempt to ensure that such developments did not adversely effect the hierarchical framework referred to above. These conditions included, for example, that such developments should meet a demonstrable consumer need, and that they should be demonstrated to have no unacceptable effects on other Town Centres [25].

Thus, in applying these policies the Council recognised the potential detrimental effects that such developments could have on the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge, and it was hoped that their application would minimise these adverse effects.

Thirdly, the Council adopted a policy of recommending that appropriate measures be framed in local plans to control the introduction of non-retail uses in prime shopping areas. Here the G.L.C. recognised the growing demand for premises in principal shopping streets by a number of non-retail functions. The Council considered that some, such as banks, building societies, and cafes, may be convenient to consumers, but felt that when the level of proliferation of non-retail uses was such as to destroy the character of a shopping street, then local authorities should adopt appropriate measures.

Thus, although having no formal powers to act in this regard, the G.L.C. hoped that their policy would be implemented through recommending to local authorities (i.e. the borough Councils) that they adopt one of the following measures [26];

(i) to limit non-retail uses to a certain proportion of the
premises in a frontage;

(ii) to limit the extent to which non-retail uses could locate adjacent to each other;

(iii) to differentiate between prime and secondary frontages.

The above policy reflects the fact that the G.L.C. was limited in terms of its ability to implement many of its policies. At the time of proposed alterations (1984) the Council only had direct responsibilities in respect of 'large shopping developments' (those over 20,000 square metres gross). In addition, the G.L.C. could turn to the Inner Urban Areas Act of 1978 [27] which relates to development in old industrial or commercial areas where economic activity might otherwise steadily decline. This, however, is of no relevance to the West End and Knightsbridge.

Thus, given the inadequacies in the ability of the G.L.C. to implement shopping policies, it is apparent that the Council was dependent, to a large extent, for the implementation of its shopping policies, upon the local authorities acting through their local plan policies and planning application decisions.

Finally, in addition to these policies, the Council adopted the strategy of monitoring changes in retail trends, and to attempt to measure the effectiveness of its policies. Of particular relevance was the monitoring; of the impact of major
shopping developments; of the provision and need for large stores; and, of planning decisions taken by local authorities and central government.

5.3.3. The Greater London Council: Policies -

The Central Activities Zone.

In formulating its general strategy for the whole of London, the G.L.C. saw the need for the central core of the city to be treated with particular care. The Council’s objectives for the central core were threefold [28]; to protect and enhance the role of central London as a regional, national, and international centre; to foster the range of activities appropriate to this role and to secure their appropriate location; and, to ensure that those who lived in and/or worked in central London were not overwhelmed by the needs of regional, national, and international activities.

An important element in striving for these objectives was the introduction of the concept of the Central Activities Zone (C.A.Z.)[29], which was seen as the focus of a number of activities which required specific policies, namely, shopping, tourism, education and culture, and transport. The majority of this zone lies within the boundaries of the City of Westminster, and thus Oxford Street, Regent Street, and Bond Street (but not Brompton Road, which lies in the Borough of Kensington and Chelsea and outwith the Zone) are subject to these ‘specific policies’.
Within the C.A.Z., the Council sought to encourage the introduction of what it termed 'Central London Activities', which were seen as being of vital importance to the economic well-being and efficient functioning of the core. These Central London Activities were defined as [30];

"activities of national, international and regional importance, mainly depending for their efficient and convenient conduct on face to face contacts at the highest level."

The range of activities falling within this definition was wide, but in terms of shopping, Central London Activities were defined as being [31];

"a wide range, from day-to-day needs of residents and the workforce, to facilities of regional, national and international importance such as specialist shops and showrooms."

In addition to these Central London Activities, the Council proposed that other 'supporting activities' should be encouraged, with these being defined as [32];

"those activities that provide essential support for the Central London Activities i.e. those that are vital to the functioning of the C.A.Z., although not necessarily located within it."

The principal examples cited of these supporting activities

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were transport (for example, British Rail's Central London Termini), local services (for example, police, local government), and industry (i.e. those which have important linkages with Central London Activities).

The spatial delimitation of the C.A.Z. was thus achieved by considering the distribution of Central London Activities already present in the area, as well as their likely future demands for space. Having defined the zone, the scope allowed by the Council for development of such activities within its definitional remit was considerable. Limitations on such development were very few, and only included, for example, the development of 'further uses' that would be likely to generate an amount of vehicular traffic that would conflict with the functioning of the road system or the environment.

Within this framework a number of specific policies were developed for shopping. The three most relevant areas of these policies can be summarized as follows;

(i) to protect and encourage areas of major shopping activity in the C.A.Z., due to their regional, national and international reputation and their contribution to the tourist industry and to employment generation;

(ii) to protect and encourage specialist shops;

(iii) to encourage proposals to improve or redevelop unattractive or inefficient shops in prime areas.
However, the ability of the Council to implement these policies was, again, largely dependent upon the co-operation of local authorities within the C.A.Z., and also upon liaisons with private sector bodies with a direct interest in the C.A.Z. Perhaps the most direct means available to the Council in attempting to effectively implement their policies was in the allocation of its own resources, in that, the Council, by reviewing its investment policy, would tend only to give resources to development that it considered to be compatible with their aims for the Zone.


From the discussion of the policies relating to shopping in the C.A.Z. it can be seen that Brompton Road, since it does not fall within the boundaries of this Zone, is excluded from the effect of these policies. However, a number of specific policies relating to shopping in Brompton Road can be found by examining those concerning Town Centres.

The Greater London Development Plan proposals of 1984 identified three Town Centres within the Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, one of which was 'Knightsbridge/Brompton Road'. The range of policies relating to such centres were wide, reflecting the diversity in character that they represented; the designation of each Town Centre meant that each was designed to satisfy the needs of the immediate area that it served. Thus, not all of the policies were of direct relevance to trading patterns in Brompton Road. Those that were of most relevance were as follows.
First, as a designated Town Centre, Brompton Road was subject to the Council policy of maintenance and improvement, both in terms of encouraging an adequate range of facilities and of securing environmental and other improvements. It should also be noted that outwith the three Town Centres designated within the Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, the development of any competing facilities, on a significant scale, would not be allowed.

Secondly, the Council followed a policy of requiring that proposals for development had to make a positive contribution to the centre and be appropriate to the site and location. In addition, they adopted a policy of requiring that developments were in sympathy with and would enhance, the character of the centre. And thirdly, where Town Centres had high numbers of tourist and business visitors (as Brompton Road has), the local plan should make provision for an appropriate range of facilities such as hotels, in the immediate area.

Thus, although couched in broad terms, it can be seen that the G.L.C. did have a number of policies of direct relevance to shopping patterns in Brompton Road. However, it is the case again that the Council was largely dependent upon the co-operation of the borough Councils for the effective implementation of their policies. And, as before, the judicious use of their own resources as well as those acquired from other sources (such as private developers), constituted the most direct means by which
they could have any significant influence on trading patterns.

5.3.5. The Greater London Council: Policies - Effectiveness.

From the previous discussion, it can be seen that the G.L.C., through the Greater London Development Plan (G.D.L.P.) ((1984)[33] formulated a range of policies of relevance to trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge. These can usefully be summarised as follows;

(i) Shopping - a) maintain the shopping hierarchy;
    b) large developments (principally retail warehouses and superstores) should not adversely affect existing patterns of shopping provision;
    c) control of non-retail uses;
    d) close monitoring of changing shopping patterns.

(ii) Central Activities Zone - a) protect areas of major shopping activity;
    b) protect and encourage specialist shops;
    c) Redevelopment and improvement of unattractive and inefficient shops.

(iii) Town Centres - a) maintain and improve designated Town Centres and to discourage competing
developments elsewhere in the borough;
b) developments only permitted that are appropriate to, and in character with, the Town Centre;
c) provide facilities for tourists where appropriate.

Three main points can be made with regard to these policies. First, although of relevance to the principal shopping streets being studied, they are fairly broad in nature, in the sense that although identifying policy objectives that needed to be addressed, they do not identify the actual means by which these would be achieved. Secondly, they were derived within the context of shopping within London as whole. Thus, they attempt to take account of how retailing in principal shopping streets relates to, and effects, retailing in the rest of London. This is in contrast to the concomitant policies of the borough Councils (discussed later) that are couched almost exclusively in 'borough-wide' terms.

The third point to note is one that has emerged already, namely that the Council, for almost all of its shopping related policies, was highly dependent upon the co-operation of the borough Councils. Thus, in terms of the effectiveness of their policies, it is apparent that this must, in turn, also be dependent upon these local authorities. This dependence takes two forms. First, if the G.L.C. and the borough Councils hold the same views, then the policies of the former are simply dependent
upon those of the latter being effective, as noted above. However, secondly, if the views of the two bodies differ significantly (if there is a conflict between 'London-wide' and 'borough-wide' interests) then the probability must be that G.L.C. policies would not be effective, since they are unlikely to be implemented through the local plans.


In 1964 the government announced its intention to bring legislation before Parliament abolishing the Greater London Council (G.L.C.), and providing for a new system of development plans which would not include a Structure Plan for Greater London as a whole.

In anticipation of this, the Local Government (Interim Provisions) Act 1964 [34] relieved the Secretary of State for the Environment of the duty of considering the proposals submitted to him for the alteration of the Greater London Development Plan (G.D.L.P.)(1976). As was noted above, the policies that were proposed in the Greater London Development (G.D.L.P.) (1984) took account of the changing patterns, demands and problems of retailing during the period for which data on changing patterns was collected (1976 to 1985).

Thus, although the subsequent abolition of the G.L.C. had no tangible effects in their policies regarding retailing in central London, (in the sense that, these still had to be produced in
case the proposed abolition did not take place), it is of some interest to consider the possible effects of the loss of this authority in terms of advantages and disadvantages arising from its demise.

One advantage of the abolition of the G.L.C. is that the administration of retailing, and indeed almost all commercial activities, became more simple because of the removal of this tier of authority. This is particularly true of the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge, where there existed a particularly complex system of responsibilities with regard to the provision of public services. The abolition of the G.L.C., although still leaving a fairly complex system, did greatly simplify this.

This is perhaps best illustrated by reference to Oxford Street. Before its abolition, the G.L.C. and Westminster City Council were the principal controlling authorities, although in a few exceptional cases (such as parking policy enforcement and liquor licencing) other bodies did have authority (for example, the Metropolitan Police and Licensing Justices)[35].

This essentially dual system led to the over-complication of what was already a complex framework of responsibilities in that the provision of public services in Oxford Street is divided into eight 'function areas'. Within each of these areas a number of functional elements were identified, and responsibility for each of these allocated to a specific authority.
For example, in the planning function area, four elements were identified; Planning Policy and Local Plan Policy, for both of which Westminster City Council had responsibility; Strategic Plan Policy, for which the G.L.C. had responsibility; and, 'the protection of architectural heritage', for which both of the above authorities had joint responsibility.

Thus, it is apparent that this system of responsibilities was a complex one. Indeed, it should be noted that the above example is not nearly as complex as other function areas, such as, for example, 'Highways and Transport' where seven functional elements can be identified, four with Westminster City Council responsibility, one with joint responsibility between this Council and the G.L.C., one administered on an agency basis for the G.L.C. by Westminster City Council, and one administered by the Metropolitan Police.

Therefore, since with the abolition of the G.L.C., most of its areas of functional responsibility (in the City of Westminster) were transferred to Westminster City Council. As a result this system became far less complex. With a similar transferal of traditional areas of G.L.C. functional responsibility to the other local authorities (including that of Kensington and Chelsea), it has been claimed, by these authorities and the Department of the Environment, that administration of not only principal shopping streets, but of all retailing in London, is now far more efficient.
Indeed, returning to the example of Oxford Street, it is apparent that, since the abolition of the G.L.C., Westminster City Council have been making stringent efforts to improve the functioning and character of this street [36]. It is claimed by the Council that few, if any, of the range of improvement schemes under consideration [37] could have been implemented under the previous system of public service responsibilities, since only now, does the Council have the ability to formulate, co-ordinate, and implement policies in a coherent and efficient manner.

A further element of advantage of the abolition of the G.L.C., relating to this question of increased functional efficiency, is that local authorities are likely to have a more intimate knowledge and understanding of the needs, problems, and patterns of retailing in their borough than a Metropolitan Authority. This argument is based on the contention that a Metropolitan body, such as the G.L.C., will be more distant from these aspects of retailing, and thus, will be less efficient in their response to the changes in policy required to administer shopping in any given borough, than would a local authority.

Thus, the abolition of the G.L.C. does appear to have had a number of positive aspects. However, there have also been a number of negative aspects resulting from this abolition. For example, it has resulted in the loss of the 'London-wide' perspective that the G.L.C. brought, not only to the administration and monitoring of retailing in Greater London, but to all commercial activity in the Capital.
Although, as was noted above, the G.L.C. was largely dependent upon the co-operation of Local Authorities for the implementation of its policies, there is no doubt that it did have the ability, principally through the allocation of its own resources (or more accurately through the non-allocation) to exert pressure on Borough Councils in this respect.

However, the G.L.C. did have responsibility for 'large retail developments' (those over 20,000 square metres gross). The transferal of this responsibility to individual local authorities could potentially have serious consequences for the prime shopping streets of both the City of Westminster and the Borough of Kensington and Chelsea.

For example, an important aspect of large retail developments (principally superstores and retail warehouses) in out-of-town locations, has been that they appear to have had little impact on prime shopping streets in the city centre. This is because the types of goods sold in such developments tend not to be in direct competition with those sold in these shopping streets (principally clothing and footwear, and other consumer durables). In addition, where such a direct competitive development has existed, the range and choice of good that it could provide rarely matched those available in centres such as Oxford Street, for example, and therefore such developments have not posed a serious threat.

These forms of out-of-town development have been termed 'the
first two waves’ of this kind of development (‘wave one’ being the emergence of out-of-town food stores, and ‘wave two’, the emergence of non-food developments, such as furniture warehouses and electrical retailers). The ‘third wave’ [38], such as those at Brent Cross in London, and the Metrocentre at Gateshead, pose a much more serious threat to the high street street, since they tend to include groups of major durable goods retailers, such as Marks & Spencer, Boots and Habitat, as well as a range of multiple ‘fashion’ retailers such as Burtons and Benetton. Thus, such a ‘third wave’ constitutes a far more direct and powerful competitive element to centres such as Oxford Street, Regent Street, Brompton Road and Bond Street.

Relating this to the abolition of the G.L.C., it is apparent that, due to the loss of responsibility, the ability of any body to take a London-wide view of this new generation of developments, has been removed; “strategic development control will cease with the loss of the G.L.C.... since there will be no substitute for the statutory London-wide planning role currently undertaken by the G.L.C.” [39]. Therefore, at the present time, individual borough Councils are free to compete for the siting of one or more of these developments. And indeed, there would seem to be little evidence that London boroughs have been willing to co-operate on planning issues since the demise of the G.L.C. [40].

If the G.L.C. were still in existence, then it could have foreseen the potentially detrimental effects of such developments.
could have on the West End and Knightsbridge, and thus, could have made use of its control measures (in developments of this size) to try to prevent their siting or their numbers, from resulting in these detrimental effects. However, since this is no longer the case, the principal shopping streets of the study area are now open to a very important and powerful competitive element, and as a result, their retail function and character as centres of national and international repute, could suffer.

It could be argued that central government would foresee these potentially detrimental effects and would prevent them occurring; that it would, in effect, adopt the 'London-wide' mantle. However, it is apparent that recent government advice, mentioned earlier, indicating that there would be a presumption in favour of granting planning permission unless this was against the public interest [41] (which is not 'the interests of any single centre'), suggests that this is unlikely to be the case.

In conclusion, it can be seen that the abolition of the Greater London Council is likely to have both negative and positive aspects. Which of these aspects will, in the long-term, be most prominent in influencing trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge, is a matter for debate. However, given the traditional strength of shopping in this area (drawing, as it does, on regional, national and international markets) it could be argued that the potential effects of out-of-town shopping developments will be resisted. Thus, because of this, perhaps the positive aspects discussed
such as simplification of administration) will now be more likely to come into play, and as a result, the principal shopping streets of the study area may well, in the end, benefit, overall, from the abolition of the G.L.C.

5.4.1 Local Authorities: Introduction.

In any examination of the influence of political factors in shaping patterns of retail activity, the role of local authorities must always be recognised as being of importance. The two local authorities with responsibility for the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge are Westminster City Council (with administrative authority over Oxford Street, Regent Street, and Bond Street), and the Council of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (administering Brompton Road). The part that these borough Councils play in influencing trading patterns in these streets will be considered in this section in some detail since, these authorities have the most direct means of controlling locational aspects of retailing of any of the authorities in the political hierarchy.

In considering the role of Westminster City Council, the principal sources of information were the range of interviews carried out with planning personnel, both within and outwith this Council, the City of Westminster District Plan (1982)[42], and the City of Westminster District Plan, Draft Alterations (1986)[43]. Greater emphasis has been given to the latter. The justification for this is similar to that outlined earlier with
regard to the Greater London Development Plan (G.D.L.P.) (1984) in that the strategy and policy framework of the 1984 Plan Alterations is a response to the changing patterns, demands and problems of retailing since the introduction of the 1982 Plan, which in turn also reflects elements during the period for which data have been collected on the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge (1976 to 1985 inclusive). Thus, the 1986 Plan Alterations and before these, the 1982 alterations, reflect the strategy and policy frameworks required to deal with all aspects of retailing that had emerged since 1976 (the earliest date for which data were collected), and as such, are a combination of those shopping policies of earlier strategy and policy frameworks still relevant in 1982 and 1986, and new and altered policies where required.

Similarly, the principal secondary source of information used regarding the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea was their District Plan of 1982 [44]. The reasons for choosing to examine this strategy/policy document are as above, with the previous District Plan being introduced in 1962.

The examination of the strategy and policy frameworks of both local authorities will take the form of a consideration of each borough Council in turn, under the headings of; an overview of shopping in each borough; trends in the nature of shopping provision; issues facing shopping; general shopping strategies; specific shopping strategies; and, finally, shopping policies. In addition, in relation to the City of Westminster,
policy changes and the Central Activities Zone will also be discussed. Attention will then be given to effectiveness of shopping strategies and policies.

5.5.1. The City of Westminster: Shopping In Westminster

- An Overview.

Westminster is undoubtedly the most important shopping borough in London. Some 60% of central London's shopping lies within Westminster and in 1971 total retail turnover in the Borough was £310 million - over half of that for London as a whole [45]. Although the total amount of shopping floorspace in the borough has fallen slightly, shopping remains the third largest user of floorspace in Westminster, with some 60,000 jobs being provided in Oxford Street alone at peak times [46].

Shopping centres in Westminster fulfil a wide range of overlapping functions. As has previously been mentioned, the West End and Knightsbridge attract visitors not only from other parts of London and the South East, but also from the rest of the United Kingdom, and indeed, from all over the world. Thus, its importance transcends the regional level, and reaches both the national and international levels.

The principal shopping streets of the West End (Oxford Street, Regent Street, and Bond Street) account for the bulk of Westminster's retail turnover and floorspace, and make up the most important element of the Borough's Central Activities.
Zone (C.A.Z.). However, Westminster also possesses a wide range of other centres both inside and outside the Central Activities Zone. These fall into two main groups. First, those, such as Queensway, Victoria Street and The Strand, which cater for the needs of tourists, workers, and residents. And secondly, local centres outside the C.A.Z., such as Harrow Road and St. Johns Wood High Street (which, together with other smaller shopping streets and individual shops, primarily serve local shopping needs).

5.5.2. Westminster City Council: Policy Changes.

In April of 1982, the City of Westminster District Plan was adopted [47]. This provided a detailed outline of the general strategy of the Council; its policies on a wide range of activities, commercial and non-commercial, including shopping; considerations of the implementation of the plan; and finally, the scheduling of these implementations.

In March 1986, Westminster City Council proposed a number of major changes in this District Plan [48], a number of which concerned its strategy with regard to retailing. The specific resulting differences between the shopping policies of 1982 and 1986 are described later in this chapter, however, at this point it is important to question, why, within only four years of the adoption of the District Plan were such 'major changes' felt to be necessary?
The principal feature of the 1982 Plan was that the Council followed a strategy of not permitting planning permission for any proposals that would result in the loss of existing or potential shopping, or would have a negative effect on the shopping character and function of a street. The Council argued that, in the period since this strategy and its associated policies had been first drawn up, there had been a rapid growth in service uses seeking premises in shopping streets, and that, because such uses could often afford to pay higher rents than local shops, they were often successful in doing so. Thus, although Westminster City Council considered that it was important to 'protect' shopping, it felt that policies, as they existed, had not been effective in doing this.

Two principal reasons can be suggested to help explain this. First, the inadequacy of the policies themselves, which were not specific enough in nature. And secondly, (the reason more favoured by the Council themselves) that many of the planning proposals refused by the Council, had subsequently been allowed 'on appeal' by the Department of Environment. The result of this 'policy ineffectiveness', the Council claimed, was that shops had been lost and services were distributed haphazardly. Thus, they argued that as a result of this and 'recent government advice' [49], which made it even harder for the Council to prevent shops being lost, they were compelled to propose the introduction of a number of changes.

Thus, although these changes were in part restricted by
strategy and policy inadequacies there can be no doubt that central government influences also played an important part in shaping Council policies. This 'influence' can therefore be seen as acting in two main ways. First, through the Planning Appeals system, and secondly, by compelling Councils to adopt policies more in line with 'government philosophies'.


The patterns of shopping provision in Westminster are highly dynamic in nature, responding to (and thus interacting with) changes in the general social, economic and political environment. This dynamic process has led to a number of notable changes in the nature of retail activity in recent years in the borough. These changes, influencing the pattern of shopping provision, have produced a number of important trends in Westminster, which have perhaps been most evident in the principal shopping streets of the area, due to their concentration of retail activity.

The foremost amongst these trends can be summarized as follows [50];

(i) an overall decline in the amount of retail floorspace;

(ii) an increase in the number of specialist and durable goods retailers;
(iii) changes within central London in 'long-established' forms of retailing. Of particular relevance are changes in department store provision;

(iv) a growth in the number of non-retail services, such as building societies and fast food restaurants, wishing to locate in shopping streets;

(v) the refurbishment of certain streets, such as that of South Molton Street, which have as a result, assumed a more distinctive and exclusive character;

These trends have affected different centres in Westminster in different ways. In relation to the principal shopping streets of the West End in particular there can be little doubt that their overall effect has been to erode the retailing element of these streets. For example, in the four study streets, in the period from 1976 to 1985, non-retail use increased from around 2% to almost 5% [51]. These changes have affected the character of these streets, if not their primary function.

5.5.4. Westminster City Council: The Central Activities Zone.

As discussed above, the Greater London Development Plan stresses the importance to Central London of what are termed 'Central London Activities' [52]. Such activities are seen as being of vital importance to its economic well-being and efficient functioning. An important element in Westminster City
Councils recognition of the importance of these Central London Activities, and their expansion, is the development of the concept of the Central Activities Zone.

The Council, defined this zone (or the part of it within its boundaries), as the area of central Westminster suitable for,

(i) the location and development of land-uses to accommodate Central London Activities and 'supporting activities', with the latter being defined as other activities which provide services for Central London Activities;

(ii) the application of other Greater London Development Zone policies which affect central London;

(iii) the application of those policies of the Plan which guide as to uses suitable to central Westminster and which are located elsewhere.

In recognising the Central Activities zone the Council claimed to have taken account of the important role that this area, as part of central London, plays in the economy of London as a whole, and the nation. In addition, however, there can be little doubt the Council was also recognising the importance of this area to its own 'well-being'.

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5.5.5. Westminster City Council: Issues Facing Shopping In Westminster.

Of the main issues facing shopping in Westminster as a whole, three are of direct relevance to the West End. First, there is the need to maintain and enhance the role of the West End as a shopping centre of international importance, whilst maintaining a balance with other activities that contribute to its character and functioning.

Secondly, there is the need to accommodate new forms of retailing where these are complementary and not harmful to existing provision. And thirdly, there is the need to tackle environmental problems in many shopping streets, including those resulting from heavy traffic flows which can make shopping unpleasant, such environmental problems are perhaps at their greatest in Oxford Street - a matter that is discussed later [53].

5.5.6. Westminster City Council: General Shopping Strategies.

It can be seen that in formulating a general strategy for retailing in Westminster, the Council has to take into account a number of factors, including, the general patterns of retailing in the borough; trends influencing these general patterns; influences of central government; and, the aims of the Greater London Development Plan. Added to these are the needs of customers (local, from other areas of London, and beyond) and
In taking these and other factors into account Westminster City Council produced its proposed strategy in 1986. The main trends of this general strategy that in particular relate to the principal shopping streets of the West End are as follows.

First, the Council recognised the intention in the Greater London Development Plan that turnover in London's central area should continue to grow [54]. To this end the Plan states;

"There is every prospect of retail turnover continuing to grow in most town centres, but the amount of floorspace does not need to grow in the same proportion since selling is becoming more efficient" [55].

Secondly, the policies inside the Central Activities Zones aim to enhance the attractiveness of the West End as a major shopping area, and to accommodate complementarily non-retail uses which whilst adding to this attractiveness, also maintain essential local shopping.

Thirdly, with regard to the development of new forms of major outlets (in particular superstores and retail warehouses) the Council's strategy was toward policies that would ensure that any such developments would not have an adverse effect on existing patterns of shopping provision in the West End. It should be noted, however, that from interviews carried out with planning personnel, it would seem that the Council 'feared less' for the
principal shopping streets of the West End in this regard, than it did for most other shopping centres.

And finally, Westminster City Council adopted a general strategy (primarily through its planning control powers) of attempting to influence the location, quantity and external design of new and redeveloped shopping. However, this ability to influence is restricted by external factors, in particular central government attitudes.

Having formulated this overall framework of general strategies, the Council went on to develop a range of specific strategies based on these.

5.5.7. Westminster City Council: Specific Shopping Strategies.

The framework of specific strategies developed by the Council with regard to shopping, had to recognise the wide range of factors influencing general strategy formulation mentioned earlier. Thus, in reflecting the general strategies of the Council, these specific policies had to attempt to strike a balance between the desires of the Council on the one hand, and the constraints and limitations on its powers of implementation on the other.

From the general strategies relating to West End shopping, a number of specific strategies were developed. The most important of these can be summarised as follows [56].

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First, the Council proposed to enhance the role of the West End’s principal shopping streets, with purpose of attaining an acceptable balance of retailing and other non-retail activities.

The reasons for striving for such an enhancement can be primarily found in the international reputation of these streets. The Council argued that much of this reputation was the result of 'the diversity, quality and character of West End shops' [57], and pointed to the resultant expenditure by tourists as being an important element in the retail turnover of the area. In addition, the Council pointed to the important role that employment in retailing plays in the West End. For example, Oxford Street alone provides employment for up to 60,000 at peak times [58].

Secondly, the Council, in its desire to maintain the attractiveness of Westminster’s principal shopping streets, pursued the specific strategy of 'creating a safe and pleasant shopping environment' [59]. Here the Council was concerned primarily with traffic related issues, and, to a lesser degree, with 'other' environmental improvements. Here, they pointed to the large amounts of vehicular traffic in principal shopping streets, (the result of shoppers, deliveries, workers and 'through' traffic). The problems resulting from this traffic had, in the past, been dealt with through the Plan’s transport policies which aimed to discourage unnecessary traffic, and to encourage shoppers and workers to use public transport [60]. However, the Council recognised that some journeys, for example
essential deliveries to shops, were inevitable, and therefore aimed at a strategy to further minimise resulting problems.

Thirdly, the Council addressed the three prime shopping streets of the West End in particular (Oxford Street, Regent Street and Bond Street) and recognised them as being the focus of their international reputations. As such, in providing a unique character in their concentrated provision of major department and 'chain' stores, the Council wished to maintain the level (in terms of both 'quantity and quality') of shopping provision in these streets.

Fourthly, still with regard to these three shopping streets, the Council recognised the important role that department stores play, not only in providing a wide range and variety of goods, but also in attracting other users to these streets. For these reasons, the Council felt it to be of great importance to retain the presence of this use.

Fifthly, the Council considered specific strategies with regard to shopping streets performing specialist functions, and made particular note of Bond Street in this regard with its 'haute coiture and gallaries' [61]. Again, they pointed to the role that such streets play in enhancing the international reputation of the West End, and accordingly, the Council attached particular importance to maintaining them, as well as individual 'specialist shops' in the area.

A sixth specific strategy recognised the importance of the
relationship between shopping and other activities in the West End, and that this mix was essential to the overall functional character of the area.

Thus, the Council, in acknowledging the complementary role that services play to shopping, was concerned that they should be provided in a way that enhanced the retail environment. However, it was felt that in some parts of the West End the level of provision of some of these supporting activities (such as restaurants, fast-food outlets, and financial outlets) was such that any further incursion would be detrimental to the character of the area.

And finally, with specific reference to Oxford Street, the Council felt that its retail environment would be enhanced by the introduction of additional and improved shopping developments. Future initiatives for Oxford Street are discussed later [62], however, it is interesting to note the role of the Council in setting up a working group of ‘interested parties’ (including, for example, traders, trade associations, local transport interests, property agents and the Metropolitan Police) to examine ways of improving the shopping environment of the street. Thus, here and in other similar centres within the West End, the Council adopted a specific strategy of pedestrianisation and other environmental improvements, as well as encouraging the creation of new shopping floorspace.

Having identified the ‘specific’ strategies for the principal shopping streets of the West End, their resultant
policies can now be examined.

5.5.8. Westminster City Council: Shopping Policies.

Between 1982 and 1986 Westminster City Council introduced a number of major changes in its strategy and policy frameworks relating to shopping in the borough. Thus far, consideration has been given to strategies, both general and specific as outlined in the proposal alterations of 1986.

In this section, however, as well as outlining the policies resulting from this strategy framework (for 1986), the differences between these and the policies set out in 1982 of particular relevance to principal shopping streets, will be highlighted.

The reason for this is to allow the effects of borough Council policies on trading patterns to be considered during the complete period of the study (1976 to 1985).

In taking into account the general and specific strategy frameworks outlined above, four main policy areas can be identified that are of particular relevance to the principal shopping streets of the West End; local plans and services; central London shopping; large new stores; and, improving shopping streets.

First, local plans and services. The 1986 Revisions introduced the distinction between; main frontages - where
planning permission would not normally be granted for a change from retail to non-retail use; and mixed frontage where a mixture of retail and non-retail uses would be permitted, so long as new non-retail uses did not adversely affect the retail functioning and amenity of any given mixed frontage [63].

In the 1982 Plan, this distinction was not made. The main points of policy were as follows; no planning permission for change from retail to non-retail use where this would affect local shopping provision or affect the character or functioning of a street; service uses where permissible above ground floor level; in the exceptional cases where non-retail use was allowed at the ground floor, its 'visual intrusion' should be minimised.

Secondly, with regard to central London shopping, the 1986 policy proposals state that [64]; in the Central Activities Zone (and here Oxford Street, Regent Street, Bond Street are specifically mentioned) change of use from retail to non-retail would not normally be permitted in prime shopping streets, as would be the case in a change involving the loss of retail floorspace at basement, ground or first floor levels in large stores; planning permission for new and refurbished shopping would normally be granted; loss of retail floorspace would only be granted above first floor level in large stores, and where this would be complementary to shopping, outside prime shopping streets at ground level only, if a number of stringent conditions were met. The 1982 plan held no specific policy for shopping in the central area.
Thirdly, on new large stores (particularly superstores and retail warehouses) a range of specific policies were proposed in 1986 with the aim of minimising any adverse effects that such developments could have on existing patterns of shopping provision [65]. Again, the 1982 plan has no specific policies in this regard.

And finally, with respect to improving shopping streets the 1986 proposals provided three specific policies [66];

(i) to undertake pedestrianisation schemes where appropriate;

(ii) to require rear servicing for new shops and to improve such arrangements where possible in existing shops;

(iii) to create a more pleasant environment for shoppers by carrying out environmental improvements in major shopping streets, for example, planting of trees and shrubs, pavement widening, and co-ordinated street furniture.

Only the third of these polices was not specifically included in the 1982 Plan.

It can be seen that the changes between the 1982 Plan and the 1986 Proposed Policy Revisions results in the latter being far more specific in nature than the former.
In common with Westminster City Council, the Council of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea recognises the important part that shopping plays in economic and social activity. This role is, in part, illustrated by about 20,000 retail jobs being provided in the borough of which over one quarter were filled by Borough residents [67].

The Council also recognises the necessity for retailing to cater for three broad categories of consumer; residents, visitors and workers. However, it should be noted that greater emphasis seems to be given by Kensington and Chelsea than by Westminster to the needs of residents. This is perhaps illustrated by the statement in the 1982 plan that, the Council’s aim is “to give priority to retaining, protecting and providing convenience shopping to serve the day-to-day shopping needs of the borough’s residents” [68].

In relation to shopping, the Council of Kensington and Chelsea, like that of Westminster, has a range of general and specific strategies and policies, within which a number are aimed at the principal shopping streets of Knightsbridge; of which Brompton Road is undoubtedly one of the most important.

The principal trends in the nature of shopping provision in the Borough of Kensington and Chelsea are largely the same as those identified in relation to Westminster [69]; a decline in the amount of shopping floorspace, an increase in the number of specialist/durable good retailers and a growth in non-retail activity.

In particular, the Council points to the effect that the rapid development of tourism has had on types and numbers of shops in centres such as Knightsbridge. In addition, the Council highlights the increasing competition for space from offices and small business uses.


The Borough of Kensington and Chelsea provides a wide range of shopping centres which are highly varied in nature, serve very different types and sizes of catchment populations, and provide different ranges of goods. Serving regional, national and international catchment areas are the major centres of Knightsbridge, Kensington High Street and Kings Road.

The issues facing shopping in the borough which are of
particular relevance to its principal shopping streets are as follows [70];

(i) pressure for change between different types of shop; in particular the loss of food and other convenience shops to other shop uses;

(ii) competition for space from non-retail uses such as banks, building societies and small offices;

(iii) environmental problems of traffic congestion, noise, and pedestrian versus vehicle conflicts;

5.6.4. The Council of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea:

General Shopping Strategies.

The Council were eager to stress that, since shops are essentially a private sector function, they had limited powers to influence the retail sector.

Its powers, as they existed in 1982, and as relating to the principal shopping streets in particular can be summarized as follows [71];

(i) to control the building of, or major alteration to a shop;

(ii) exercise control over the change of use of a building to, or from a shop, or over a limited number of changes in type of shop;

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(iii) when granting planning permission, to impose conditions on shops, such as restricting their size and use;

(iv) to introduce schemes to improve the environment of shopping areas, such as pedestrianisation;

(v) to enter into joint development schemes with private developers.

With these powers in mind the principal trends of the Council's general strategy can be considered. The first of these trends is to ensure that the three categories of consumer (residents, visitors and workers) are served by an adequate range of types of shops relating to their needs.

Secondly, to give priority, where necessary, to providing and maintaining convenience shopping for the day-to-day requirements of the borough's residents. And finally, the third trend of general strategy is to improve the environmental quality of shopping streets, and in particular to minimize the potential for conflict between shoppers and vehicular traffic.

5.6.5 The Council of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea: Specific Shopping Strategies.

Within this general strategy framework a range of specific strategy objectives were drawn up covering the full spectrum of concerns with regard to shopping in the borough. A number of these specific strategies are of particular relevance to the
First, the Council were specifically concerned with encouraging and enhancing retail areas. Here their main concerns were, the expansion of retailing in centres, and the maintenance of a wide range of shop types and sizes. Toward these ends, the Council committed themselves to ensuring that new and extended shopping units took both of these points into account.

The second specific strategy of the Council was with regard to the character of shopping streets. Here their first main concern was that of the control and regulation of shopfronts and advertisements. The Council felt that those streets of national and international standing (including Brompton Road) had their 'charm, harmony and character' jeopardised, by excessive and inconsiderate advertising, and that designs for shopfronts should be complementary to the rest of the building and surrounding shops. The second main concern in regard to this specific strategy for 'shopping street character' was that of townscape improvements in particular streets; one of these being Brompton Road. Here, the Council pointed to the requirement laid down in the G.L.D.P. of 'defining areas of special character' and of 'ensuring' the preservation, restoration and enhancement of their character.

The third tenet of specific strategy was that relating to pedestrianisation, traffic and servicing. This aspect coincides...
with the third of the general strategies of the Council; to minimise shopper/vehicular traffic conflict, whilst permitting the efficient servicing of shops, and allowing for the needs of other pedestrians, shoppers, cars, through traffic and other 'traffic related' activities.

Fourthly, the Council developed specific strategies with regard to the protection and provision of convenience shopping. Brompton Road, despite its international reputation, maintains through time a number of food and convenience shops [75]; far more in proportion than the other principal shopping streets studied. This reflects the Council's desire, as previously stated, that all residents should have sufficient shopping facilities to serve their day-to-day needs. Indeed, this is emphasised when it is considered that it is the policy of the Council to attempt to ensure that residential areas should have a 'reasonable level' of food and convenience shops within 'walking distance', defined as being 400 metres [76].

Here, the Council pointed to their extremely limited power to control changes between types of shop, since planning permission is not normally required to change from one shop type to another. In this regard, the Council adopted a strategy of continuing to pursue a change in Use Classes order and relevant legislation to make convenience shops a separate use class.

The final specific strategy area of the Council that is of particular relevance to the principal shopping street of the area is that of the control of non-retail uses. The Council identified
two main problems associated with the introduction of non-retail uses into prime shopping streets. First, that they weaken the retail character of such streets since they can afford to pay higher rents than, and thus displace, shops. And secondly, they frequently result in 'dead frontages' which are unappealing aesthetically and therefore are detrimental to the character of shopping streets.

The specific non-retail uses picked out by the Council as being particularly detrimental to shopping streets are banks, building societies, money exchanges, small offices, restaurants, cafes, wine bars, Public Houses, and take-away food shops.

It can be seen from the framework of general strategies of particular relevance to the principal shopping streets of the borough, the Council has formulated a wide range of specific strategies. The policies relating to each of these specific strategies areas can now be examined.

Thus, these specific strategies can be summarised as follows;

(i) encouraging and enhancing retail areas;

(ii) the character of shopping streets;

(iii) pedestrianisation, traffic and servicing;

(iv) protection and provision of convenience shopping;

(v) control of non-retail uses.
5.6.6. The Council of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea:

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Shopping Policies.
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The following policies relate to specific policy areas
discussed above;

(i) (a) Planning permission will normally be granted for the
extension of shopping units within or adjacent to exiting shopping
centres subject to a number of limiting conditions; (b) in
redevelopment the Council expected shopping space to be replaced
except where this would 'threaten' other centres, or where shops
are shown not to be viable; (iii) in granting planning permission
the Council tried to ensure that the plans provided a variety in
sizes and type of stores. This last point would normally be
achieved through the use of Section 52 agreements and by
imposing relevant conditions and permissions. It should be noted
that the most important element of Section 52 of the Town and
Country Planning Act [77], is that which amongst other things,
states that an agreement may be entered into by a local authority
and a developer in a redevelopment scheme specifying the type of
shops that may be let by the developer in this scheme. Indeed. it
should be noted that direct local authority involvement in
property development is common [78]; (d) the Council would
generally encourage the improvement and modernisation of
existing retail units, providing that they were in character with
the shopping centre (for example, retention of significant
architectural features).
(ii) The Council, by introducing for example, new paving, landscaping and sections, would attempt to improve the townscape of its shopping streets; in addition, the Council would press for legislation to control the display and sale of goods on shop forecourts (to retain street character).

(iii) The Council would consider pedestrianisation (partial or total) or traffic measures in centres where it felt that these would be appropriate. The Council continued to insist that new shopping units had off-street service provision, and in addition, encouraged efficient refuse disposal by traders.

(iv) In regard to the specific policy of protecting and providing convenience shopping, the Council adopted the following policies; no planning permission where a change of use resulted in loss of convenience shopping; where desirable on planning grounds the Council would make use of Section 52 (outlined above) to ensure that in any redevelopment scheme some element of food or convenience shopping was included. Other specific policies were introduced but their content is of little relevance to trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the study area.

(v) A number of policies were introduced relating to the control of non-retail uses; a. in principal shopping streets the Council would seek to keep a concentration of shops by resisting the encroachment of non-retail elements; b. planning permission would not normally be granted for non-retail development of ground floor units in a shopping centre. However, such development would
be encouraged above and below ground floor level and at the
margins of shopping developments; c. in exceptional circumstances
non-retail uses would be allowed at the ground floor level (such
as when a non-retail use would enhance the character of a shopping
centre or where vacancy rates were high and shops were unwilling
to move in. In such circumstances it was required that an
'attractive' shopfront be retained.

It can be seen that a range of policies derived from strategy
areas both general and specific, were formulated by the Council
of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, that are of
particular relevance to the principal shopping streets of the
study area, and thus to Brompton Road.

Having examined the general strategy areas and specific
strategy and policy areas for shopping in both Westminster and
Kensington and Chelsea, and in particular how these relate to the
principal shopping streets of these boroughs, consideration can
now be given to two how effective the implementation of these
policies has been.

5.7.1. The Councils of the City of Westminster and the Royal
Borough of Kensington and Chelsea: Effectiveness of
Implementation of Shopping Strategies and Policies.

Two main areas of constraint on policies (limitations on
implementation effectiveness) can be identified. First, the
ability of the Councils, to act represented by the scope of
powers available to them. It can be seen from the previous discussions that both borough Councils have developed a range of policies that attempt to influence patterns of shopping activity in their principal shopping streets. Thus, the scope of these policies is, to a large extent, determined by (and thus is a function of) the powers available to the Councils.

The outlines of the powers provided in relation to Westminster and to Kensington and Chelsea, serve to show that they do have powers and that they are fairly numerous. However, despite these 'powers' there still exist significant 'gaps' in the ability of both Councils to exercise control over patterns through time. Perhaps the most notable of these 'control gaps' is that of the almost complete inability of either Council to influence changes that do not involve the loss of retail floorspace; changes from one shop type to another. At first glance this 'inability' may not seem important in the sense that maintaining shopping in their principal shopping streets is of prime concern, and such changes do not result in the loss of shopping. However, such changes can have an important effect on the character and functional mix of shopping streets. In turn, this can affect the quality of retailing in the study area streets and thus, its international reputation.

A good example of how such 'inter-shop changes' can adversely affect the quality of retailing in a principal shopping street can be found in that of Oxford Street in the early 1980's. At this time, the combination of high rents and falling demand resulted in
rapid degenerative changes in the shopping environment of the street [79]. Shops of a generally poorer quality moved into the street (especially its eastern end)[80] to replace those that had been forced to cease trading. This process, termed the 'fast buck syndrome' is discussed in Chapter 6 [81].

Throughout these changes Westminster City Council could play no direct role. Where changes were from one retail type to another the Council could do nothing. In addition, these changes involved little new and refurbished shop units therefore there was little opportunity to invoke Section 52 agreements. Indirect measures were implemented in an attempt to redress this loss of quality (e.g. townscaping). However, in terms of preventing the actual 'loss' of quality, the Council was, in effect, powerless.

This example shows that the effectiveness of implementation of policies is strictly limited by the scope of powers (reflected in their policies) that the borough Councils have at their disposal and that these powers have significant and important gaps. However, it could be argued that if the Councils are unable to implement policies because of a 'lack of power' then they should not have formulated such policies in the first instance since they would seem to be outwith the remit of their authority.

The second limitation on the ability of the borough Council's ability to implement their policies is found in the Planning
Appeals system, and other central government influences. The effect of these systems is that they have an important limiting effect on the ability of local authorities to effectively implement their policies and therefore on their ability to influence trading patterns.

Thus, the effectiveness of implementation of strategy and policy frameworks is undoubtedly limited by these two direct ('imposed') factors. However, a further, more indirect factor must be taken into account. That is, that both of the borough Councils, whilst striving for an improvement in the provision of retailing in their constituences (and in particular in their principal shopping streets) must be aware of the political consequences of their actions. It is of paramount importance to the controlling political party of both Councils to be re-elected to office. Thus, strategies and policies must be 'seen' to be effective by the electorate.

One potential effect of this could be that long term strategies for shopping in the borough, which may take time to implement and therefore may not show immediate benefits, may be rejected in favour of short term proposals that will show some immediate, measurable benefits (and thus be popular with the electorate) but that may not be beneficial to (or compatible with) the long term provision of retailing in the borough. This may be particularly true of principal shopping streets, where, due to their international reputation and sheer volume of retail activity, are as such, a focus of attention (in retailing terms)
of the electorate.

In conclusion, it can be seen that the question of effectiveness of implementation is a highly complex one. On the one hand, it is affected by the powers available to the borough Councils and the Planning Appeals system and other government influences. On the other hand it is affected by the need for the Councils to provide tangible evidence that the strategies and policies that they are pursuing are the correct ones.

5.8.1. Street Trade Associations.

Trade associations form the final 'layer' in the hierarchy of political influence on the principal shopping streets of central London. Their interest is the most direct of all the political authorities in this hierarchy. However, their ability of influence is perhaps the least tangible.

Three of the principal shopping streets under study are represented by their own trade association; Oxford Street, Regent Street and Bond Street. These associations exist to serve the interests of traders within their particular shopping street. However, in addition to their 'trader members' (these include both retail and non-retail occupiers), their membership also consists of a range of 'non-trading' interests (not 'residents' of the street). These include, for example, chartered surveyors, estate agents, tourist bodies, and transport interests.

In 1986, the Oxford Street Association had 101 members, 9 of
whom were non-resident members [82]. In 1987, the Regent Street Association had 106 members, 6% of whom were non-resident members [83]. Finally, in the same year, the Bond Street Association had 200 members, 17 (8.5%) of whom were non-resident members [84]. This figure for Bond Street appears to be very high in comparison with the other associations. However, it should be noted that the Bond Street Association, unlike the other two bodies, draws a large proportion of its members from outwith the street itself. In 1987, this number was 89 (44.5% of total membership)[85]. One other important point that should be remembered when considering these membership figures is that they count duplicates (stores that are present more than once in a single shopping street) as having just one membership of an association.

Trade associations, attempt to provide a forum within which all aspects of retailing in a particular shopping street can be represented. However, membership of these associations is on a voluntary basis which is of particular importance in regard to trader members since if the proportion of traders in the street who are not members of their association is high, then that association cannot claim to truly represent the ‘trader views’ in the street, and as a result, the ability of the association to present itself as a cohesive and powerful body is diminished. Indeed, this problem of trader non-membership is recognised as being serious by the trade associations interviewed. This is reflected in the fact that in 1986 the percentage of ground floor occupiers in Oxford Street that were members of the trade association was 36%. In
1987, the same figure for Regent Street was 50%. However, in the same year the membership of the Bond Street Association by ground floor occupiers was 79% [86].

Membership of trade associations can have a number of benefits for both trader and non-trader members. For the latter such membership can play a number of important roles. First, it allows non-trader members direct access to traders in the street, and therefore allows them to hear their interests, plans, problems, and so on. This access is of particular use to, for example, estate agents and chartered surveyors who, through such contacts, can gauge the property requirements (both present and future) of these traders.

Secondly, it allows such 'external bodies' to express their own views and opinions with regard to retailing in a shopping street. For example, the possibility of the pedestrianisation of all or part of Oxford Street has been suggested a number of times in recent years. Here, the Oxford Street Association provided London Transport with an excellent means through which to make their views known in this regard. Their main concerns were that the removal of all vehicular traffic from the street (including public transport) would greatly cut access for customers. This would result in congestion in the adjacent streets through which this vehicular traffic was channelled, and would result in a reduction in the number of people using their services.

Thirdly, membership of a trade association by non-trading members enhances their image and profile in the eyes of both
consumers and other commercial bodies since, through their membership they are 'seen' to be concerned with shopping activity in the street. And finally, there can be little doubt that non-trader members see their membership in terms of economic gain. This may be particularly true of estate agents and chartered surveyors who can perceive economic benefit in two ways. First, 'direct economic gain' through, trader members making use of their services. And secondly, a more 'indirect economic gain' by their input of expertise, knowledge, and resources helping in both the short and long term economic well-being of the street, and thus ensuring that it remains as a potential source of work for them.

Trader members can also derive several benefits from trade association membership since it allows them to communicate directly with other retailers on the street, as well as with non-trader members. Such communication has several benefits. For example;

(i) it allows traders to put forward their proposals for change in the street, and to react to future developments that are planned;

(ii) traders can air their views on problems that are present in the street;

(iii) it allows an exchange of ideas between the traders themselves and trader and non-trader members;
(iv) as with non-trader members, membership of a trade association for traders can improve their public profiles; virtually all members of the Oxford Street Association, for example, display the fact of their membership, in some form, in their premises.

Thus, the benefits of membership for traders are numerous. However, perhaps the greatest benefit for all members is that a trade association can provide a vehicle for their opinions. How then does this 'vehicle' attempt to make use of this 'power' to influence trading patterns?

Trade associations have no direct powers of influence. They possess no actual ability of policy implementation. However, this is not to say that they have no ability to influence trading patterns. It was apparent from a range of interviews carried out with trade associations themselves, local authorities, the Greater London Council, retailers, and other bodies, that they have some part to play in this respect.

Trade associations can influence trading patterns in both the very short term and in the much longer term. In the former, influence is at its most direct, and involves trade associations attempting to influence patterns through the application of their own resources. A good example of this is found in the funding of Christmas Lights by the Oxford, Bond and Regent Street Associations. These lights act as an important attraction to visitors for a period of 4-6 weeks before Christmas. The result of this is to add to both pedestrian and vehicular traffic flows.
in these streets (which are already much higher at this time of year), and thus, to have an effect on actual patterns of trading. The funding of such activities is provided by the members of the associations, who feel that such an outlay is justified in terms of the additional trade that it generates.

Thus, such influences may only be temporary (short term) in nature, however, it could be argued that some retailers would perhaps not survive, or maintain sufficient levels of profit (or indeed, be attracted to the street in the first instance) if it were not for this seasonal increase in trade, part of which is the result of the attraction of 'the Christmas lights'.

In the longer term, there are a number of ways in which trade associations can influence trading patterns. All of these involve the associations attempting to make an impact upon decision makers at levels above theirs in the political hierarchy; local authority, metropolitan authority and central government.

First, at the local and metropolitan authority levels, influence can be exerted in two ways. The first is through formal representation of trade associations in relevant planning bodies, and the second, is through informal contacts between association representatives and planning personnel. A good example of the former is the important role that the Oxford Street Association plays in the planning committee set up by Westminster City Council to consider all aspects of the future of Oxford Street. Examples of the latter, due to their informal nature, are
difficult to identify at an individual level, but nonetheless are certainly numerous and of importance.

Through these means of contact, trade associations can put forward their views, as intimated to them by their members, with regard to, for example, problems in, or proposals for, their shopping street. However, why should borough Councils and the G L.C. (when it existed) take any notice of the demands of trade associations, and indeed, do they take any notice of these demands?

From the range of interviews carried out with retailers, planners, and trade associations themselves, there can be little doubt that local and metropolitan authorities occasionally, take account of association views.

There are two principal reasons for this. First, these planning bodies recognise the considerable knowledge and expertise that trade associations can provide. For example, in deciding whether or not to permit planning permission for a retail development, a borough Council will often ask the advice of the relevant trade association with regard to its suitability, its 'retail mix', or design features. In the same regard, associations will often volunteer their 'advice' on a proposed development in their street.

The second principal reason for planning bodies occasionally taking notice of trade associations is that they can, at times, make it difficult for planning authorities to implement policies
if their views are ignored.

With these reasons in mind, there can be little doubt that planning authorities at the borough Council and metropolitan levels tend to take some account of trade association views, and thus, there can equally be little doubt that these views have some impact upon trading patterns. At an individual level (for example, advice given on a particular planning application) these influences may, at times, be identifiable. However, estimation of the aggregate influence of trade associations, through their range of formal and informal contacts, is virtually impossible. Indeed, even if this impact upon the decisions taken by planners was significant, then it should be remembered that it is in turn ultimately dependent upon the ability of these policies to influence trading patterns; borough Council and G.L.C. policies play a part in influencing trading patterns in principal shopping streets; trade associations only play a small part in the formulation of these policies.

Trade associations also attempt to influence central government with regard to its policies which have effects, both direct and indirect, upon the trading patterns in principal shopping streets. Again, there are two main methods through which associations attempt to exert influence. First, they lobby individual Members of Parliament, and secondly, they make formal submissions to the Secretary of State for the Environment. Through such contacts associations attempt to make an impact by making their views known on existing or proposed central
government policies that have a definite and identifiable effects on patterns of shopping.

As at the borough and metropolitan Council levels, central government may occasionally take account of trade association views in individual cases, albeit to a lesser extent, due to their expertise and knowledge.

Thus, in attempting to exert pressure on central government policies (which tend to be enforced for periods of several years) trade associations are concerned with influencing trading patterns in the mid to long terms. An example, is that of the concern of the Oxford, Bond and Regent Street Associations, in the 1970's, as to the potential effect of Value Added Tax on the sales of clothing and footwear, bearing in mind that shops selling such goods play a dominant part in these streets [87]. The fear was that the subsequent increase in the price of goods would have an adverse effect on the turnover of traders.

However, street trade associations do attempt to influence government policy in the more immediate or short term. An example of this, can be seen recently in the West End. The bombing of Libya by forces from the United States of America launched from United Kingdom bases, resulted in a drop in the number of tourists (especially Americans) visiting the United Kingdom, and especially London, in the summer of 1986. Since tourist spending makes such an important contribution to the turnover of retailers in the West End, this fall was of particular concern to the trade associations in this area. It is interesting to note
that the Oxford Street, Regent Street and Bond Street Associations, all made stringent efforts (through the means outlined earlier) to try to persuade the Government to introduce adequate measures to allay the fears of tourists, and to encourage them to visit London. Central government did take such measures (statements from the Prime Minister and other high ranking government spokesmen as to the safety of the United Kingdom). However, it would be very difficult to argue that the efforts of the trade associations in this regard had any effect whatsoever.

Thus, as was noted with regard to the borough Councils and the G.L.C., trade association inputs have some part to play in influencing the formulation of central government policies that have a direct and identifiable effect on shopping patterns. However, the overall impact of this influence must, in almost all cases, be fairly negligible. Hence, any influence that they do have on trading patterns in this regard is likely to be minimal.

To summarise, at the level of the borough Councils and the G.L.C. (when it existed), trade associations that represent principal shopping streets do appear to have some part to play in influencing policy decisions made in this regard, and therefore, in turn, must to some degree, be able to influence trading patterns in their shopping streets. At the level of central government, on the whole (except in occasional individual cases) their influence is far less, and thus the ability of trade associations to shape trading patterns through this means is
It has emerged in this section that the question of political influences on patterns of retail activity is a highly complex one, with contributions coming from all four levels in the political hierarchy, central government, metropolitan authority, local authority and street trade association.

The effects of central government advice, although rarely directed at individual shopping streets or centres, can nonetheless have important impacts in this respect. When taken together with Planning Appeals procedure, and the range of 'indirect' measures levied, it is apparent that the ability of central government to have an impact on principal shopping street patterns, is an important one.

The input from the metropolitan level, in the form of the now abolished Greater London Council, was one that potentially promised much, but that in reality, was greatly restricted. This was principally because of the fact that its own ability of direct policy implementation was very limited, and also that it was largely dependent upon the co-operation of local authorities in this respect.
Thus, the abolition of the G.L.C., from this point of view, does not seem to be of great significance to the future of retailing in the West End and Knightsbridge. However, as was shown, although there may be a number of positive aspects to this abolition, there could also be a number of negative impacts.

Westminster City Council, and the Council of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (as the local authorities with administrative and the most direct, control over the principal streets of the study area) also have an important role to play. The effectiveness of the measures available to them to influence trading patterns is limited by both 'external' factors (such as central government intervention), and 'internal' factors (such as the need for policies to be politically expedient).

Trade associations, although by far the 'weakest' of all the bodies in the political hierarchy, also have a role to play. Their ability to influence decisions taken at higher political levels (especially of local authorities) plays some part, albeit mostly a very limited one, in influencing trading patterns at the level of an individual street.

When taken together, the influencing ability of bodies in this political hierarchy is undoubtedly powerful. However, several factors must be taken into account. First, retailing is very much a part of the private sector, and therefore, as such, the ability of any political authority to control almost any aspect of it must be restricted by this factor.
Secondly, powers of influence of these political bodies, although cumulatively strong, may often be 'pulling in different directions', as was seen, for example, by the references to 'borough-wide', 'London-wide', and 'national' interests. Again, this must restrict the political power of influence.

Thirdly, the nature of retailing, especially at the present time, and in the principal shopping streets of the area under consideration, is highly dynamic and volatile. Thus, the ability of any political authority to produce constantly changing strategy and policy frameworks to 'keep pace' with this dynamism, must be questionable. In addition, are the political authorities fully aware of the processes at work and are the decisions that they take rationally based?

Finally, the overall impact of political inputs into the processes of retail change in the West End and Knightsbridge, can only be assessed when this political element is considered beside the range of economic and social elements at work. The next two chapters are concerned with examining these two elements.

CHAPTER 5: NOTES.

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1. See Section 9.2..


9. Advisory information provided by central government to local authorities with regard to elements of planning control policy.


15. For a detailed discussion of the Planning Appeals system, see Gilbert, F.P. et al (1986).


17. Langton, T. [Ed.] (undated)


19. Planning (1985b) p. 4


23. See Location Map, Appendix IV.

24. Town Centres are defined by the Council as the foci of retailing in each borough.


26. ibid. p. 57.

27. ibid. p. 57.


29. See Location Map, Appendix IV.


31. ibid. p. 158.
32. ibid. p. 158.

33. ibid.


35. A full listing of responsible agencies in Oxford Street can be found in Appendix XIII.

36. For example, setting up the Oxford Street Working Party to investigate the streets future.

37. Discussed in Sections 8.4.1 and 8.4.2.


41. Department of the Environment Circular 14/85.

42. Westminster City Council (1982).

43. Westminster City Council (1986a).


45. Westminster City Council (1986a) Section 9.1.

46. Westminster City Council (1986b) para. 1.1.

47. Westminster City Council (1982).

48. Westminster City Council (1986a).

49. For example, Department of the Environment Circular 14/85.

50. Westminster City Council (1986a) section 9.3.

51. See Section 4.2.7. figure 4.24.

52. As defined above in Section 5.3.3.

53. See Section 8.3.1.


55. ibid. para. 8.4. p. 155.

57. ibid. para. 9.16. p. 89.
58. Westminster City Council (1986b) para. 1.1.
59. Westminster City Council (1986a) para. 9.58.
61. Westminster City Council (1986a) para 9.18.
62. See Sections 8.4.1. and 8.4.2.
63. Westminster City Council (1986a) paras. 9.33. and 9.37.
64. ibid. paras. 9.15. to 9.29.
65. ibid. para 9.53.
66. ibid. para 9.63.
68. ibid. Section 14.2.5. p. 220.
69. See Section 5.5.3.
71. ibid. p. 220.
72. ibid. Chapter 14 pp. 219-236.
73. ibid. Section. 14.3. p 220.
75. See Section 4.2.5. Figure 4.13.
77. Department of the Environment (1971).
80. See Location Map, Appendix II Table 1.
81. See Section 6.5.6.
82. Data supplied by the Oxford Street Association.
83. Data supplied by the Regent Street Association.

84. Data supplied by the Bond Street Association.

85. ibid.

86. Derived from data supplied by the Oxford, Regent and Bond Street Associations and data from Newman Books (1987).

87. See Section 4.2.7. Figure 4.24.
6.1.1. Economic Influences on Trading Patterns in the Principal Shopping Streets of the West End and Knightsbridge: Introduction.

In the previous chapter, the main political factors at work in helping to shape trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge were discussed. In this chapter, the main economic factors in this respect will be outlined.

From the questionnaire and personal interview surveys of traders and personal interviews with agents, eight main economic factors were identified as being of importance. These are as follows; turnover (volume of retail sales), the market served by the principal shopping streets of the study area, tourism (a specific important element of the overall market), rents, rates and external finance. A final important economic factor that emerged was that of the role that Estate Agents and Chartered Surveyors play with respect to retail change.

Each of these factors will, first, be discussed with respect to their individual features, trends and characteristics and with regard to the ways in which they influence processes of retail change. And secondly, a general framework will be constructed to illustrate how these factors operate in relation to one another.

Turnover (sales volume) is an economic factor that, from the outset, would be expected to be of importance in terms of influencing trading patterns in the study area. More precisely, of concern, is the magnitude of turnover, its trends and characteristics through time and space, and the main elements contributing to these trends and characteristics. In this section, each of these will be considered in relation to the study area, in order that the impact of this economic factor, in helping to shape trading patterns in its principal shopping streets, can be assessed.

6.2.2. Turnover: Trends and Characteristics.

The first characteristic of turnover in the principal shopping streets of the study area is that it is high by national standards, and indeed, in comparison with other prime shopping streets elsewhere in London. For example, it has been estimated that in 1982 sales in Oxford Street were in excess of £2100 million [1]. In addition, to the west of Oxford Circus, the section of Oxford Street which is undoubtedly the best in terms of the quality of its retail environment, it was estimated that, in 1987, a jewellery or fashion clothing shop, with 1000 sq.ft. of shopping floorspace, would have had a turnover of around £1.5 million per annum (some £1500 per square foot). This is well in excess of the projected turnover of a similar shop unit in
another part of the United Kingdom, where, in general, this figure would be expected to be around half of the above value [2]. Although turnover levels in the rest of Oxford Street, and indeed, in the other prime shopping streets under examination, do not reach these levels of turnover, they still exhibit levels that are not equaled, or for that matter, are rarely approached, in other high streets in the United Kingdom.

The second characteristic of turnover is that of variance through time. This is perhaps best illustrated by reference to the example cited earlier of a shop unit in Oxford Street in 1987 with a turnover of around £1.5 million per annum. The turnover of the same shop one year earlier would have only been around £1 million per annum. Although this is only one example, and as such, is only anecdotal in nature, it helps to illustrate that very marked variance through time is undoubtedly a feature of turnover in this area [3].

The third characteristic of turnover is that it exhibits elements of spatial variation, which are present both between streets and within streets. The first characteristic that can be considered is that turnover variations between streets.

The highest levels of turnover in the principal shopping streets of the study area are to be found in Oxford Street, and the lowest levels, in Bond Street. The most accessible method of examining relative turnover levels in different shopping streets and within a shopping street, is to take rent levels into account. The relationship between turnover and rent levels is
discussed in more detail later, and as will be seen, there is an association between turnover and rents. As can be seen from Figure 6.7. [4] spatial variations in rent levels indicate that marked differences in turnover exist between the shopping streets under study; differences of an inter-street nature.

The second element of spatial variation in turnover is that of intra-street variance; differences in turnover within streets. Again, rent levels within shopping streets provide some evidence to support this contention, as can be from Figure 6.8. [5]. A further illustration of intra-street variance is found in Oxford Street where, two branches of the same multiple group, located less than 100 metres apart, and trading from similar shop units, had a difference in turnover, in the financial year 1986-1987 of some 20% [6].

It is also interesting to note that, the nature of these inter and intra-street turnover variances, is not consistent through time. Again, rent levels between and within the prime shopping streets under examination, illustrate this, in the sense that the relative relationship in turnover between shopping streets, and between parts of shopping streets, is subject to fluctuation through time [7].

6.2.3 Turnover: Influencing Factors.

The four characteristics of turnover in the four streets of the study area (described above) namely that it is high, by
Figure 6.1. - Average Gross Weekly Pay [8]: The United Kingdom, Regions of England, Wales and Scotland, 1976 to 1987.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Average Gross Weekly Pay (£'s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regions of England</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East</td>
<td>84.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Anglia</td>
<td>72.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South West</td>
<td>73.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Midlands</td>
<td>76.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Midlands</td>
<td>74.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorkshire &amp; Humberside</td>
<td>75.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>76.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>77.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>76.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>78.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>78.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


national standards, and that it varies both through time and space. The first of these characteristics of turnover (its high level) is explained by a number of factors.
The first, and arguably overriding, factor responsible for the high levels of turnover in the West End and Knightsbridge, is that its principal shopping streets serve the most densely populated and affluent market in the United Kingdom, namely, the South East of England. Figure 6.1. (above) shows that income levels in the South East of England are the highest in the country (on average, in the ten year period from 1976, almost 10% higher)[9].

In addition to being the most affluent market in the United Kingdom, the South East is also the most stable. Figure 6.2. (below) shows unemployment rates in the United Kingdom in the period from 1976 to 1985. As well as indicating that unemployment is less in the South East than elsewhere it also shows that changes in unemployment are also at their lowest here. Therefore, this provides an illustration of the stability of this market. In addition, it provides support for the contention (also supported by the data in Figure 6.1.) that this region is the last to be affected by periods of national economic recession, and the first to benefit from improvements in the economic climate.

Secondly, tourism exerts an important influence in this respect. As will be discussed later, tourism plays an important overall part in influencing the retail property market of the West End and Knightsbridge.

A third factor influencing turnover is that of conditions within the national economy. Of particular relevance is the level of disposable income. Increases in the standard of living of those
in employment result in the consequent increase in individual disposable incomes of this group. This, in turn, helps to boost domestic shops sales.

**Figure 6.2. - Average Annual Unemployment: Regions of England, Wales and Scotland, 1976 to 1985.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Average Annual Unemployment (%)</th>
<th>Total %</th>
<th>Change 1976-85</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regions of England</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East</td>
<td>4.2 3.4 8.7 8.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Anglia</td>
<td>4.8 4.2 9.9 8.8</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South West</td>
<td>6.4 5.4 10.8 10.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Midlands</td>
<td>5.8 5.2 14.9 13.7</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Midlands</td>
<td>4.7 4.4 11.0 10.7</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorkshire &amp; Humberside</td>
<td>5.5 5.4 13.4 13.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>6.9 6.5 14.7 14.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>7.5 8.3 16.5 16.6</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>7.3 7.3 15.6 14.9</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>7.0 7.4 14.2 14.2</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A further factor that has also helped to increase individual disposable incomes is that of the rapid expansion in the use of
credit facilities. Here, both the use of credit cards (such as Access, Visa, and American Express), as well as the range of credit facilities offered by most high street shops, have increased the turnover of many traders. Between 1983 and 1986 it is estimated that retail credit from these sources rose from £2.8 million to £4.5 million [10]. The number of credit cards in use rose from 11 million in 1979 to 30 million in 1986 [11]. The area of the United Kingdom with the greatest propensity of credit card ownership is Greater London, the South East and East Anglia, with in 1986, 43% of all cards in the United Kingdom being owned in this area [12]. Around one third of the credit spending with Access is taken up with purchases of clothing and footwear, household goods and furniture, and consumer durables [13].

Most of the factors that have been cited above as contributing to the high levels of turnover in the principal shopping streets of the study area, also have an important part to play in helping to explain the second characteristic of turnover identified earlier; temporal variations. First, although its predominant market, the South East of England, tends to be more stable during times of economic change than any other region in the United Kingdom, during such periods, the amount on money spent on shopping (especially consumer durables) can vary considerably.

Secondly, tourism also plays a part in contributing to temporal variability, reacting as it does, to a wide range of influencing factors [14].

A number of other factors also play a role in adding to this
variability. For example, trends in the distribution of retail activity can also affect turnover. Such effects can be seen at the local and at the metropolitan or regional levels. An example of a local change in retail activity which can have an effect on rent levels, is where a street undergoes a process of upgrading.

Such a process is evident at the present time in the traditionally less popular eastern end of Oxford Street [15]. In the eastern section of the street, average levels of turnover have always been considerably lower than those in the western section of the street. However, in the last few years a number of retail developments, in particular a Capital and Counties Development for the Crown Estates Commissioners in Oxford Street, have increased the quality of the retail environment of this part of the street. One consequence of this has been that levels of turnover have greatly increased, and indeed, at a rate that has resulted in a lessening of the 'turnover gap' between the two 'ends' of the street. This contention is supported by the fact that, in 1982, the difference between the average rent payed for a standard shop unit in the eastern end of Oxford Street and the western end was 24.4%. By 1986, this figure had fallen to 15.6% [16].

An example of changes at the regional or metropolitan levels having a potential effect on high street turnover levels, can be found in the introduction of out-of-town shopping developments. The 'new breed' of these developments, such as the Metrocentre at Gateshead, pose a far more direct competitive threat to trading patterns in the traditional high street. Thus, if subsequent
developments of this type, around Greater London, begin to 'drain' the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge of even part of its traditional concentration of high order retail uses, then it is likely that the turnover of these streets will fall.

Other factors that contribute to turnover variation through time include, for example, changes in government planning regulations; the effect of changing local environmental conditions (congestion, pollution, etc); and so on. These factors, however, are not of great overall importance, with their effects being limited to specific forms of trading or specific points in time.

The third characteristic of turnover (that of variability in space) is also the result of a number of contributory factors. First, 'tradition' is an important factor. It is apparent that, through time, certain shopping streets (such as Oxford Street), and even certain parts of shopping streets (such as the western end of Oxford Street) develop a reputation based on the quality of their retail environment. The actual basis for such a categorisation is difficult to define, principally due to the complexity of historical, economic, political, and social factors involved. The location of early department stores in Oxford Street, for example, has some part to play in explaining its current status. However, irrespective of how this element of tradition has been established, there is no doubt that it does play a part in explaining spatial variances in turnover.
A second factor that helps to explain, in particular, the intra-street variations in turnover levels, is that of the proximity of certain parts of principal shopping streets to other principal shopping streets. For example, in Oxford Street, the highest levels of turnover (as reflected in rent levels) are found in those sections of the street which intersect with Regent Street and Bond Street (sectors 3 and 4 - see Figure 6.8.) [17]. Similarly, the highest levels of turnover in Regent Street (again reflected in rent levels) are found immediately to the south of Oxford Circus (sector 2 - see Figure 6.8.)[18]. It is however, interesting to note that the apparent peaks in turnover values in Bond Street (derived through rent levels), are contrary to the above stated hypothesis. This is since, although in close proximity to Oxford Street, they do not occur in the section immediately adjacent to this street (see Figure 6.8.)[19].

A third factor that helps to explain how these inter and intra-street variations themselves vary through time is that streets, or parts of streets, can undergo periods of transformation that are quite different from the overall patterns of change occurring in other streets or in other parts of the same street. For example, such a situation occurs when a prestigious retail development is introduced into a shopping street. This would tend to boost the retail environment, and therefore, the level of turnover of the part of the street in the immediate vicinity of such a development, and to a lesser extent, that of the whole street. Thus, this would result, not only in a relative
intra-street change in turnover levels, but also in a relative inter-street change in turnover. Perhaps some support for this contention can be found by reference to Figure 6.3. (below). One of the most important developments in Oxford Street in the period 1976 to 1979 was the completion of the Marks and Spencer store at 458 to 466 Oxford Street in 1976. In this period, all sectors of the street saw considerable increases in their rents. However, it is interesting to note that the greatest increase occurred in the sector [20] containing this new store (sector VI) and that the next greatest increase in the adjacent sector (sector V). Thus, it could be argued that this was, at least in part, a result of the positive impact of this new 'prestige store' in this part of Oxford Street.

Figure 6.3. - Oxford Street: Increase in Average Rent Levels (Standard Shop Unit), 1976 to 1979 [21].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>87.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>83.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>135.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>175.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>219.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Derived from Hillier Parker May and Rowden (1987).
It can be seen that, the three main characteristics of turnover in the principal shopping streets of the study area, namely, high level, and temporal and spatial variation, are the result of the cumulative contributions of a number of factors. Arguably, foremost amongst these factors (those which play the greatest part in contributing to these characteristics) are, the fact that these shopping streets serve the wealthiest region in the United Kingdom, and the input from tourism. However, the importance of the other factors discussed within the overall framework of turnover characteristics, should not be overlooked. Thus, the characteristics of turnover, although readily identifiable, are far more complex in terms of explanation, since the range of factors involved in producing these features, is both varied and complex.

6.2.4. Turnover: Effects on Trading Patterns.

The characteristics of turnover in the principal shopping streets of the study area exert a number of influences over trading patterns in these streets.

The high level of turnover results in a high level of demand for floorspace, principally at ground floor level. Thus, competition for vacant shop units tends to be fierce (particularly during bouyant periods in the market). Due principally to planning restrictions and physical constraints, however, the supply of ground level floorspace is restricted. It is possible for use to be made of floorspace above ground floor.
level. However, the desirability of this type of floorspace is limited due to its lack of effective frontage, problems of access both for customers and deliveries, and so on. As a result, the demand of most traders for this type of floorspace, is also limited, although, some such as Next, do trade profitably from these type of properties.

Therefore, in the principal shopping streets of the study area, the situation exists whereby, the demand for ground floor shop units is high, but the availability of this type of floorspace is limited. The effect of this is to force rents upwards. This would seem to support the idea of the 'bid rent' curve [23], in which a situation exists where different activities are dependent upon competitive bidding for specific sites on the basis of anticipated returns. Firms that can 'exploit' the accessibility of the core to its fullest those that are willing to pay the greatest costs in terms of rent and premium payments [24]. Thus, the first main effect of turnover is to contribute towards high rent levels.

A second effect that turnover has had on these prime shopping streets, is to add to the volatility of their trading patterns. During periods of buoyancy in the market, expected turnovers by traders are, understandably, high. However, as has been discussed, turnover levels are subject to temporal fluctuation. Therefore, during downswings in the market, expectations of turnover are unlikely to be realised, profit margins will be affected, and thus, closure rates will tend to
increase. A more detailed discussion of this process will be undertaken when the role of rent levels is examined later.

6.2.5. Turnover: Summary and Conclusions.

Turnover is characterised by its high level (by national standards) and by its variance through both time and space. These characteristics and trends arise from the fact that turnover is dependent upon, and influenced by, a number of factors. These include, the nature of the market which the principal shopping streets of the study area serves (with its regional, national and international), conditions within the national economy, and so on.

These factors themselves are subject to considerable variation which turnover reflect. In the same way in which turnover is a function a number of factors, it in turn, plays an important part in influencing other economic features of trading in the study area. Foremost amongst these factors is the role that turnover plays in determining rent levels.

The most direct and tangible effects that turnover has on trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the study area are; to produce a high level of demand for retail floorspace, and thus, force rent levels upwards, and to the volatility of trading patterns.

It would seem reasonable to argue that turnover constitutes
the single most important economic factor at work in influencing trading patterns in the prime shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge. The subsequent discussion of a range of further economic factors should help to give support to this contention by showing the 'link' which turnover provides between these factors.

6.3.1. The Market Served by the Principal Shopping Streets of the West End and Knightsbridge.

The market served by the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge exists at the regional, national, and international levels. Thus, by locating a shop in one of these streets, a retailer, in theory, will have access to all three of these markets. However, a number of important considerations have to be taken into account. The first is that of threshold population.

This concept was introduced by Christaller as part of his Central Place Theory [25] (although this term was never actually used, the concept is clearly implied in his construct). The threshold population is the minimum population that is required to bring about the offering of a good for sale or to sustain any service [26]. In economic terms, in effect, this means the minimum demand required to make such an offering viable.

The second consideration (and one that is closely linked to threshold population) is that of the range of a good or service.
This is the maximum distance over which people will travel in order to purchase a good or derive a service offered at a central place [27]. Thus, at some range from the centre, the inconvenience of travel, measured in terms of time, cost and effort, will outweigh the value or need of the good, or an alternative (intervening) centre becomes available.

The third important consideration that needs to be taken into account, is that of economic rent. "In cities, economic rent is based on superiority of location only, the sole function of city land being to furnish an area on which to erect buildings" [28]. Thus, since, in retail terms (due to the unrivalled size of their potential market), the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge constitute the most 'superior locations' in the United Kingdom, rents are the highest at the national level, as is discussed later in the chapter.

When taken together, these three considerations provide a locational environment in the study area that inherently limits the type of trader that will tend to locate in its prime shopping streets. This is reflected in the fact that, as was seen in the earlier land-use analysis of the area, the vast majority of traders are selling high order goods (i.e. clothing and footwear and other consumer durables) and that very few are selling low order goods (for example, foodstuffs)[29]. Although the market for these streets provides the threshold population for almost all forms of retail activity, the range of low order traders tends to be small since shoppers will be unwilling to travel to
central London just to purchase such goods since more 'local' (intervening) centres are likely to possess the necessary low order traders. In addition, rents in these prime shopping streets also tend to be of such a level as to make it very difficult for low order traders to survive. Any low order traders that are found in the area tend to be in streets close to prime shopping streets, rather on these streets themselves, and are supported by relatively small local populations or workers in local shops and offices.

One interesting exception is that of newsagents, confectioners and tobacconists. As can be seen from Figure 4.24, a number of establishments under this heading, do exist in the principal shopping streets of the study area. It would appear that these goods are in demand, not only by shoppers, but also by local shop and office workers, and that turnover is of a level sufficient to offset rent, premium and rates levels.

6.4.1. Tourism: Introduction.

Tourism constitutes a very important element of the overall market that the principal shopping streets of the study area serves. The role that tourism [31] plays in this respect in the study area is probably more important than in most other shopping centres in the United Kingdom. There can be little doubt that tourism has a part to play, in this respect, in the shopping streets of many other towns and cities, and that, in some, such as Princes Street in Edinburgh, this is an important one.
However, in the West End and Knightsbridge, as will be shown, its importance is greater. In this section, three main aspects of tourism, in relation to trading patterns, will be discussed; the characteristics and trends of tourists visiting London; the factors influencing tourism; and, their effects on trading patterns.

6.4.2. Tourism: Characteristics and Trends.

In 1985, overseas visitors to London spent £3,620 million; £439 per visitor [32]. In the same year, visitors from other parts of the United Kingdom numbered 14 million, and spent £670 million (approximately £48 per visitor)[33]. The importance of this element of spending to retail turnover was illustrated in a survey in 1985 which revealed that 61% of central London's shoppers came from outside London or abroad [34]. The most important country of origin of overseas visitors to London, by far, is the United States of America. In 1985, nearly one third of overseas visitors came from this country [35]. The most important source region of domestic visitors to London is, not surprisingly, the South East of England (43%)[36], with 40% of all domestic visitors being in Social Classes A and B [37].

It is also interesting to note the seasonal pattern of expenditure by visitors to London. For overseas visitors, the quarter with the greatest expenditure is the third of the year (July, August, September) with 34% of such expenditure occurring
in this period [38]. For domestic visitor expenditure, the seasonal distribution is more even, but the most important quarters are the first and fourth of the year, (with 27% in each), which corresponds to the Christmas period and the 'January sales' [39].

Also of interest are the trends in visitor numbers in the longer term. Domestic visitors display a fairly constant trend a slow but generally steady rise from 11 million in 1976, to 14 million in 1985. In contrast, overseas visitor numbers have been subject to a far greater degree of fluctuation, as shown in Figure 6.4. (below)[40].

Figure 6.4. - Visitors (Domestic and Oversea) to London, 1976-1985 (millions).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Overseas</th>
<th>Domestic</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In relation to the principal shopping streets of the study area, a survey carried out in the summer of 1984 showed that some 82% of all overseas visitors had visited, or intended to visit.
Oxford Street, 70% Regent Street, 47% Bond Street, and 47% Knightsbridge [41]. In addition, it is estimated that 17% of Oxford Streets income is from visitor spending [42]. Indeed, there appears to be an increasing dependence of the West End and Knightsbridge as a whole, on tourist spending. It is estimated that tourist spending accounts for up to 30% of Central London’s retail sales [43].

6.4.3. Tourism: Influencing Factors.
--------------------------------------------

Factors influencing tourism in London can be categorised as being 'internal' and 'external' in nature. The overriding 'internal factor' (one that is a function of trading patterns on the area, and that plays a proactive role in relation to patterns of tourist activity) is that of the 'attraction' of this area to tourists. This 'attraction factor' is one that is of great difficulty to define. However, there are a number of identifiable elements of attraction in this area for both overseas and domestic visitors. These include, the reputation of the principal shopping streets in the area; the range and quality of shops; the low price and better quality of goods in relation to some 'tourist source countries' (for example, some European and Scandinavian countries, in terms of price, and the United States of America, in terms of quality). It has even been claimed that tourists are attracted by "the hustle and bustle" of these shopping streets [44].
The attraction of this area for tourists is a function of the attraction of the whole range of places of interest and other tourist related activities available in the rest of London, and indeed, the rest of the country. In addition, this 'attraction factor' is likely to vary through time as a result of a wide range of factors. For example, the attraction of these streets for tourists may be decreased, during downswings in the retail property market when the range and quality of shops may decline (downswings which may, at least in part, have been influenced by an earlier reduction in tourist numbers as a result of any number of factors) if local environmental conditions (such as overcrowding and pollution) worsen; if fluctuating exchange rates made goods 'relatively' more expensive; and so on. In contrast, attraction could be increased by, for example, new retail developments, such as the West One Shopping Centre in Oxford Street, and the proposed 145,000 sq.ft. Crown Estates Commissioners shopping scheme at 172-182 Regent Street [45].

'External factors' influencing tourism in London (those which are not a function of trading patterns, but also play a proactive role in relation to patterns of tourist activity) can be summarised as follows.

First, Figure 6.5. (below) shows that there is a relationship between the numbers of overseas visitors to London (reflected in their expenditure) and the level of Sterling in relation to 'a basket of currencies (the effective exchange rate)[46]. This seems to indicate that, when the level of
Sterling is high in relation to this basket of currencies (which, in effect, makes the United Kingdom 'more expensive' to visit) the number of tourists visiting London falls. The converse also appears to be true. Thus, since the value of Sterling tends to fluctuate considerably through time, this contributes to the fact that tourist numbers also tend to vary. Thus, a whole range of 'external factors' at work in the financial markets of the world
can have an indirect bearing upon tourism in London. And, through this, on trading patterns in the West End and Knightsbridge.

A second factor contributing to the volatility of tourism is that of the 'safety' of the environment. Two particular aspects are of relevance. First, the amount of crime that is 'tourist related' in London, such as robberies, muggings etc.. There is little doubt that, at the present time, central London is perceived by most tourists (especially those from North America) as being relatively 'safe' in this respect, unlike, for example, recent spates of criminal activity which have had an effect on the numbers of tourists visiting Spanish holiday resorts.

However, a second aspect of this 'safety factor' had an important negative effect on tourism in London, namely, the United States bombing of targets in Libya in 1986. This attack was launched from bases in the United Kingdom, and as a result there was a fear that reprisals against this attack would take place in this country. These fears were fueled by the bombing of the British Airways offices in Oxford Street later that year. The fear of similar attacks was a deterrent to many visitors, especially from North America, from coming to London in the early summer months.

A third element that adds to the volatility of tourism is that of the economic environment of the tourist source countries. For example, if the economic climate of a principal source country such as America, is poor, then the number of people who are likely to visit other nations on holiday, is likely to fall.
A number of other minor, less tangible and less directly accountable, factors are also at work. These factors include, for example, 'styles' and 'fashions' in tourism; London is a popular tourist destination at the moment, but in the future, it may lose its popularity. The weather can also have an effect, for, although tourists tend to expect rather poor weather when they visit the United Kingdom 'a run of poor summers' can have an effect on tourist numbers in the short term, especially with European visitors.

Thus, it is apparent that there are a number of 'external factors' that have an important bearing upon the patterns of inconsistency in tourist numbers visiting London though time. However, it is important to note that, despite variation through time, the numbers of tourists has tended to stay at a very high level. Despite this, it would appear that these temporal variations tend to have a disproportionate effect upon trading patterns in the sense that relatively small proportional changes in tourist numbers apparently have important effects on the retail property market, and thus, on retail trading patterns. This adds weight to the contention made above, that some retailers in this area are, to some degree, dependent upon tourist expenditure, in the sense that, even marginal proportional changes in tourist related income can have significant effects on the margins of profit required to continue to trade profitably in the West End or Knightsbridge.
6.4.4. Tourism: Effects on Trading Patterns.

The effects that tourism has had on trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the study area are threefold. First, it encourages retailers to move into the area, and maintains and enhances the turnover of those already present. Secondly, it helps to influence, in part, the types of goods that are sold, and thus through this, the type of trader in the area, in that an important element of the sales of traders are those goods that tourists demand. Arguably, the two most important elements of tourist spending are on items of clothing and footwear and other consumer durables. This importance may, in part, be reflected in, and help to explain the high proportion of retailers of these types of goods in the principal shopping streets of the study area. This is particularly true of the 'high quality' end of the market (for example, the exclusive clothes shops and jewellers of Bond Street) which is especially attuned to the needs of the tourist.

In addition, tourism has led to the introduction of a number of 'lower order' retail uses (in terms of quality of function and character) in the area (for example, a number of souvenir shops in Oxford Street), and the provision of elements of non-retail use, in particular, Bureaux de Change.

Thus, although in the main, the level of tourist spending in the West End and Knightsbridge has had very positive impacts in economic terms, there have been a few, less positive impacts. As
mentioned above, some of the uses that tourism attracts, do not positively contribute to the retail character and functioning of

shopping streets. In addition, tourism leads, to some extent with some retailers, to a dependence upon this element of turnover.

A recent study has illustrated the important role that
tourism plays in shaping trading patterns in the West End and Knightsbridge [47]. The study, undertaken by Hillier Parker May and Rowden, indicated that, as the number of tourists visiting London changes (in response to the level of Sterling and other factors), changes also occur in the retail rent levels (see Figure 6.6., above). Figure 6.6. appears to show a relationship between the number of visitors to London and the movement of shop rents (adjusted for inflation) in Oxford Street. There seems to be a 'time-lag' of approximately one year (indicated by the two 'turning points' in the graph) between a change in direction of the 'flow' of visitors and the trend in shop rents.

Subsequent research seems to contradict these findings in claiming that "London residents and visitors from other parts of the United Kingdom clock up 80% of expenditure in the West End's shopping areas and thus are the biggest influence on retail rents" [48]. However, the same study goes on to say that in any analysis of the retail rental performance of the West End "it is crucial to appreciate the role of overseas tourism" [49].

Despite its shortcomings, (principally, for example, its failure to fully investigate, quantify and explain the 'time lag' between changing tourist numbers and subsequent changes in 'the market') there can be little doubt that the earlier study does identify an important relationship in terms of influences on trading patterns in the study area, and perhaps suggests for some traders, there is an element of dependence upon tourist spending. This element of dependence is of particular concern due to the
volatile nature of tourist numbers. As was shown earlier, the number of tourists visiting London does not exhibit a consistent trend through time. This is a function of the fact that tourism is subject to the range of influencing factors discussed above.

6.4.5. Tourism: Summary and Conclusions.

In conclusion, it appears that tourism has an important role to play as an economic factor in helping to shape trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the study area. This is perhaps best illustrated by the apparent dependence of some retailers in this area upon tourist expenditure, and, by the correlation between this expenditure and the condition of the retail property market, as reflected through rent levels.

However, the volatility of the 'tourist factor' is of great concern to both retailers and planners in this area, since this variability is both in the short term (seasonally) and in the longer terms (from year to year, and over a number of years). The wide and complex range of internal factors (such as, the 'attraction' of the area) and external factors (for example, Sterling, safety, and so on) responsible for this, suggest that variability is likely to be a constant feature of tourism so long as it remains an important influence upon trading patterns in the study area.
6.5.1. Rents: Introduction.

Rents play a very important part in helping to shape trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the study area. In this section, the importance of this role will be illustrated, by reference to rent characteristics; to the factors that are at work in producing these characteristics; and, to the ways in which these characteristics exert their influence on trading patterns.

6.5.2. Rents: Characteristics and Trends.

The first characteristic of rent levels in the principal shopping streets of the study area is that they are high by national standards. In 1986, for example, shop rents in the prime locations in Oxford Street, were well in excess of £200 per sq.ft.. In Regent Street, Bond Street and Brompton Road, such levels were well in excess of £150 per sq.ft.. This compares with prime rent values in other towns and cities in the United Kingdom where, rental levels in prime high street retail locations rarely rise above £100 per sq.ft. [50].

The second characteristic is that, through time, rent patterns are far from consistent. Figure 6.7. (below) shows that, in the four study streets, there was a rise in rent levels between 1976 and 1979, a fall between 1979 and 1982, and a
Figure 6.7. - All Study Streets: Rent Levels (Standard Shop Unit) - Trends Through Time, 1976 to 1986.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Street</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1979</th>
<th>1982</th>
<th>1986</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Level</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Level</td>
<td>Rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford Street</td>
<td>£60,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>£134,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regent Street</td>
<td>£37,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>£84,000</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brompton Road</td>
<td>£30,000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>£80,000</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bond Street</td>
<td>£29,000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>£66,000</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Derived from Hillier Parker May and Rowden (1987).

Further rise between 1982 and 1986 that was to levels well in excess of those in 1979. Thus, rent levels, as well as being characterised by their absolute and relative magnitudes, are characterised by their considerable variation through time. In addition, a third characteristic is that rent levels exhibit spatial variations, both between streets (see Figure 6.7., above) and within streets (see Figure 6.8., below).

First, in considering rent variations between streets (inter-street variations), it can be seen from Figure 6.7. (above) that in the four principal shopping streets in the study area, the 'ranking' of each in relation to the others (in rent level terms) has tended to stay fairly constant through time with the highest rent levels being found in Oxford Street and the
Figure 6.8. - All Study Streets: Average Rent Levels (Standard Shop Unit) between 1976 and 1986 - Intra-street Comparison.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Street</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Average Rent Level, 1976-1986</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oxford Street</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>£70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II</td>
<td>£101,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III</td>
<td>£145,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>£155,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V</td>
<td>£86,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VI</td>
<td>£67,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regent Street</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>£44,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II</td>
<td>£97,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III</td>
<td>£79,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>£66,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V</td>
<td>£71,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brompton Road</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>£45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II</td>
<td>£72,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III</td>
<td>£122,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bond Street</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>£60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II</td>
<td>£79,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III</td>
<td>£67,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>£60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V</td>
<td>£44,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Derived from Hillier Parker May and Rowden (1987).
lowest in Bond Street (with the exception of 1988). The main exception to this pattern is seen in Regent Street which shows a steady decline in rank through time. This illustrates significant changes in 'rent ranking' can occur in a relatively short time period. A more extreme example of a rapid change in 'rent status' can be found in South Molton Street (adjacent to Oxford Street)[53], which was a shopping street of little consequence in the mid-1970's, yet, by the early 1980's, the transformation of it into 'a shopping street of worldwide repute' [54], saw its prime rent values climb to match those of Oxford Street itself [55].

The second element of spatial variation in rent levels is that of intra-street variance (differences in rent levels within shopping streets). Figure 6.8. (above), shows rent levels along the lengths of the four principal shopping streets under consideration. It can be seen that rent levels vary considerably within these shopping streets. Those streets exhibiting least variance are Regent Street and Bond Street, although, even here linear rent differences are apparent. The streets exhibiting the most marked linear variation in rent values are Oxford Street and Brompton Road. In Oxford Street, the pattern shows the traditionally less popular eastern end of the street as having the lowest rents, with rent levels rising to their peak around, and to the west of Oxford Circus, before again falling away towards the Western End of the street. The pattern in Brompton Road shows a steady rise from the south to the north of the
It can be seen that, rent levels in the principal shopping streets of the study area have three main characteristics; their high level, variance through time, and variance through space. A number of factors help to explain these characteristics. Indeed, it is interesting to note that the trends and characteristics outlined with regard to rent levels, mirror those discussed in relation to turnover. This tends to give backing to the contention made earlier, that there is a distinct relationship between turnover and rent levels. However, as will be seen later, although there is no doubt that turnover does play, by far, the most important part in determining rent levels, other factors also have to be taken into account in this respect.

6.5.3. Rents: Influencing Factors.

Given the relationship between turnover and rents discussed earlier (that, as turnover of a given shop unit increases so too does its rent level, and vice versa), it is apparent that the trends and characteristics of the two are likely to be similar. Thus, as factors such as the nature of the market which the West End and Knightsbridge serves, changes in the national economy (and in particular those which effect levels of disposable income) and so on, influence turnover, their influence, in turn, is passed onto rent levels.

However, one further mechanism of influence must be taken
into account, that allows the introduction of a number of other elements of influence on rent levels. This mechanism is the rent review.

6.5.4. Rents: The Rent Review.

Having identified the major factors responsible for producing the rent characteristics identified earlier, it is necessary to examine the mechanism which allows these factors to exert their influence. This mechanism is the rent review, which is the time (or times) during the period of a leasehold agreement, that the rent value of a property is reassessed by the landlord (acting through his property agent) and implemented. The idea of the rent review is to allow for the risk of inflation in the property market i.e to allow rents to keep pace with changes in the market [56].

At the time of a rent review, the rent value of a property will be adjusted according to a whole range of factors. In this procedure, laid down in the Landlord-Tenant Act, the landlord must prove that the rent that he is proposing to levy is fair. In setting a 'fair rent', as indicated above, a wide range of factors are taken into consideration. The main factor is the condition of the retail property market. For example, if the market is more buoyant at the time of the review than it was at the time of the previous rent assessment, then it is likely that the rent level will increase. However, as can be seen from the previous discussion, the range of factors that play a determining role in
this the retail property market, is varied and complex. Therefore, gauging the exact condition of the market is difficult.

Three of the main means employed in this respect are as follows. First, the landlord tends to take account of movements in the strength of the retail property market over the previous year. The rationale is that, in setting a rent level, it is important to know in which direction, and at what rate the market is moving. Solely assessing the market at the time of review would not achieve this, and thus, a rent level set on this basis, without knowledge of market changes, would most likely be inappropriate.

Secondly, at the time of review, the landlord will often take into account, rents set in recent reviews of nearby shop units. Even if the properties are not exactly similar, such a comparison provides the landlord with some measure as to the strength of the market.

Thirdly, the landlord, in setting a reviewed rent level, will often be influenced by the level of demand in the retail property market for a shop in that as competition increases (indicated by the number of parties showing an interest in a given property) the reviewed rent level that a landlord can justify, will also tend to increase.

This process, however, is subject to a number of problems. First, in relation to 'the condition of the property market' in
acting as a determining factor in a rent review, difficulties arise out of the fact that this process is retrospective in nature in that the condition of the property market over the previous year is taken into account when setting the rent value. Thus, the problem that arises is that, if, for example, in the year previous to a rent review, the market had been buoyant, and therefore on this basis, a reassessed rent level had been levied and agreed, and subsequently the market, experiences either a rapid upturn or downturn, then this rent level would quickly become inappropriate. Such a process occurred in the West End and Knightsbridge in 1980, when a rapid reversal in the market was experienced, and rent values had been based on the buoyant market of 1979.

A second, and similar, problem can arise where rent levels are, again at least in part, determined by 'evidence' of recent, local decisions. Here, if little or no such evidence of an appropriate nature exists, then this decision has to based on retrospective information, which, again, may not relate closely to 'current' market conditions.

If these problems occur, either singly or together, or indeed if the assessment of rent level at the time of review is simply perceived by the tenant to be unfair, then, the two parties (landlord and tenant) must take the case to a rent tribunal, at which both can put forward their cases, and a 'fair' rent be decided. Thus, it is important that, in the rent review, the landlord must set a level that is justifiable. This helps to
explain the necessity of the retrospective nature of two of the principal elements of this process (‘market condition’ and ‘rent evidence’) in that a landlord cannot justify a rent level based on market speculation.

It can be seen, that the rent review, as a mechanism which allows the major factors responsible for producing the rent characteristics identified earlier to exert their influence, is subject to a number of problems. These problems arise as a result of methods employed at the time of review to determine rent level, which in the main, tend to be retrospective in nature. However, a further economic factor must be taken into consideration at the time of the rent review, namely premiums.

6.5.5. Rents: Premiums.

At the time of a rent review, a premium may be levied by the landlord on the property under consideration, which must be paid by the tenant, as well as the reviewed rent, if he wishes to remain trading at this location. This premium is, in effect, the sum that the landlord considers that the property is ‘worth’ over and above the rent level set. The calculation of the level of the premium is far more volatile, and less rationally based than that of the of rent level. However, this is not to say that this calculation is not based on some rational, economic elements.

For example, in calculating a premium payable at the time of a rent review, likely movements in the retail property market
before the next review, are taken into consideration. For example, if it is felt that the market is likely to enter a more buoyant period, then the part of the Premium set on this basis, will be relatively high. It should be noted that this process is in contrast to the retrospective consideration of market movements in helping to determine rent levels. As was explained earlier, the latter is necessary in order that a 'fair and justifiable' rent can be levied. However, in setting a premium level, no such justification is required since premium is not subject to scrutiny by a rent tribunal. Therefore, as a result, even when 'economic' factors, such as market conditions, are taken into account, these tend to be considered in a relatively subjective sense. Indeed, although such factors play a part, premium levels tend to simply be set on the basis of what the landlord (acting through his agent) 'feels that the market will stand'.

In a strong market situation in the principal shopping streets of the study area, and where future prospects are favourable, premiums can be high in relation to rent levels, and indeed, in such markets the premium levied is commonly far greater than the reviewed rent level, and therefore, tends to be an important cost element for retailers wishing to trade in the area. For example, for a unit in Oxford Street taken on in 1984 by a large franchise operation at a rent of £40,500 per annum and review date in 1987, the premium paid was £107,000 [57]. Another example, is of a property in South Molton Street with an annual rent of £27,000 (set in 1985) and a premium paid of £100,000
In addition, it should be noted that, when both of the above market situations prevail, (strong market plus favourable prospects) rents levied also tend to be high. This is because demand (and therefore competition) will be high and thus landlords can justify a rent increase reflecting these conditions at a time of review. However, the fact that retailers are willing, in such market situations, to "pay sums more akin to ransom than any rational calculation of rent or premium value" [59] is indicative of the perceived potential profitability of a shop in a prime location in a principal shopping street in strong retail market and results in a "'who dares wins' competitiveness towards premiums" [60].

Another aspect of the payment of premiums is that of their use in sub-letting agreements between reviews. Here, for example, if a trader wishes to give up the lease on a property before the time of review, he can offer it (usually through an agent) for sub-lease. At such a time, if the market is buoyant, then a premium can be levied. Such arrangements are very common in the principal shopping streets of the study area (and indeed, in most high streets), and as above, the setting of their level is fairly arbitrary.

It can be seen that premiums add a further dimension to the operation of the rent review, and although there is little rationality in the derivation of exact levels, there is a distinct relationship between premium levels and the condition of the
market, both past and future. It should also be noted that the action of premiums tends to emphasise the main rent characteristics outlined earlier in that the level of rents and their temporal and spatial variance, tend to be heightened by the introduction of premiums at the time of rent reviews.

It is also interesting briefly to note the pattern of rent reviews through time. The trend in recent times has been towards increasingly shorter review periods. In the 1960's, it was not uncommon to find lease agreements of up to twenty years with infrequent review periods (up to ten years). At the present time the situation is markedly different, with lease lengths commonly falling to as little as three to five years with one or two reviews in such a short period. This tends to reflect two things. First, it reflects the growing volatility of the retail property market in this area in recent times. Changes in the market have not only occurred more frequently in recent times but have also been more marked. Secondly, the reduction in review periods reflects that in the late 1970's, and at the present time, the rate of improvement in the market is such as has never before been experienced. Therefore, both of the above points result in the need for rents to be far more responsive to the needs of the market; a need that is reflected in the reduction of review periods.
6.5.6. Rents: Effects on Trading Patterns.

The three principal characteristics of rent, outlined above, namely their high level, and their variance through both time and space, derived through the mechanism of the rent review, and emphasised by the introduction of premiums, exert a number of important influences over trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the study area.

First, the high levels of rents and premiums restrict the type of retailer that can trade profitably in these streets since, in order to survive, a trader must be able to guarantee a high level of profit simply in order to 'cover' rents, premiums and rates; "within the city, the potential for profit is eroded by locational costs" [61]. Thus, this plays an important part in helping to explain the dominance of retailers of clothing and footwear and other durable goods [62]. These retail types trade at higher margins of profit than do other retail types, such as convenience shopping, and therefore, can survive in such an environment of rents and premiums.

A second and more subtle aspect, is that the proportion of retailers in these streets belonging to multiple chains is lower than in most other high streets. Figure 6.9. (below) shows the percentage of multiples in the study area in the period from 1976 to 1985. The highest levels are found in Oxford Street (up to 35%)[63]. However, this figure compares to most suburban and provincial centres where multiple representation is well over 50%
Rent levels undoubtedly play an important part in this trend, in that multiples tend to operate within a fairly rigid framework of standardised prices. Therefore, since rent levels in

Figure 6.9. - Multiple Percentage Share of Shop Units, 1976 to 1985.

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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oxford Street</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regent Street</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bond Street</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brompton Road</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Hillier Parker May and Rowden (1987), Data Base Created for All Study Streets, 1985.

the principal shopping streets of the study area are much higher than those in other high streets, the margin derived from the sale of a good in a branch of a multiple in the West End and Knightsbridge will be lower than in a branch elsewhere. Thus, branches of multiples in the principal shopping streets of the study area must depend on the greater volume sold (due the comparative market sizes) to maintain profitability. However, this is not to say that multiples cannot derive substantial profits from their West End and Knightsbridge stores. For example, one of the Marks and Spencer stores in Oxford Street is this company's most profitable store [65].
A third consequence for trading patterns of the high rent levels in the principal shopping streets of the study area, is that these greatly contribute to the high rates of change of traders in these streets. By this it is meant that profit margins, not only for multiples (as outlined above), but for all traders, are restricted by rent levels. For many traders, this level of restriction may prove to be so severe as to result in closure. It could be argued that this effect would be compounded during periods of upturn in the retail property market, when rent and premium levels tend to increase substantially. As a result it might be expected that the rate of change for traders in the principal shopping streets of the study area would increase.

Figure 6.10. (below) appears to provide some support for this argument in that the data show that as rent levels have increased in each of the study streets during the period from 1976 to 1982 so too have rates of occupier change.

However, it should be remembered that as well as being characterised by increasing rent and premium levels, upturns in the retail property market are also characterised by increasing retail turnover. Even when the latter is sufficient to offset the effects of the former there can be little doubt that the high level of rents and premiums contribute to the volatile nature of trading patterns in the study area.

A further aspect is found during downswings in the market. At such times when rents or the combination of any range of
social, economic and political factors force a retailer to cease trading at a given location in a prime shopping street, it often proves difficult for an existing trader to find another trader willing to sublet the property. In contrast, it should be noted, that when the market is buoyant, vacant properties rarely reach the 'open market' due to the associated level of demand at such times since immediately upon a property becoming vacant, the landlord (acting through his agent), will find any number of willing traders to compete for the tenancy. However, during downswings in the retail property market, when demand tends to fall substantially, vacant properties reach the open market, and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average Rent Level</td>
<td>Occupier Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford Street</td>
<td>£97,000</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regent Street</td>
<td>£60,500</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brompton Road</td>
<td>£55,000</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bond Street</td>
<td>£47,500</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources - Data Sets Created for All Study Streets, 1979 to 1982 and Derived from Hillier Parker May and Rowden (1987).
indeed, can remain there for some time. In such cases, rent levels are often dropped to levels, well below realistic market valuation, in order to attract a trader to take up the leasehold. Often this takes the form of a 'desperate' occupier dropping the rent level in order to attract a sub-letting trader and thus, 'cut his losses'.

This process, however, can lead to what has been termed 'the fast buck syndrome'. Here, the trader may take advantage of these artificially low rent levels and move into a property in a prime shopping street, with the purpose of selling goods that will provide 'quick sales'. For example, as was noted in 1983 "(in Oxford Street) ailing stores are shutting to be replaced by small-scale, rapid-turnover, low investment outfits who aim to sell as much stock - jeans, hi-fi or teeshirts - before their leases expire and they move on" [67]. Thus, when the time of the next rent review arrives, or the lease ends, and the rent level is returned to a more realistic market level, the retailer will leave the premises. If, at this time the market is still in a depressed state, and the property again lies vacant on the open market, the landlord may be forced to reduce the rent level, and therefore, provide the opportunity for this process to begin again. Thus, this 'syndrome' is detrimental to the character and functioning of a prime shopping street in a number of ways.

First, it increases the volatility of the retail environment. A certain amount of change is not necessarily a bad thing, but the rates of change in the study area are undoubtedly
at times damaging to their functioning and character. For example, in a three year period from 1979 to 1982, which included the 'slump' of the early 1980's, nearly one third of the units in Oxford Street underwent a change of occupier [68]. Secondly, the 'quality' of the shopping mix is reduced with the introduction of the "jeans, hi-fi and teeshirts" traders, as noted above. And thirdly, an element of aesthetic deterioration is introduced in that these 'fast buck traders' "have no incentive to do anything about the maintenance of their slovenly shopfronts" [69]. It could be argued that these types of traders are still likely to attract large numbers of customers. The types of customer that are likely to be attracted, however, (in terms of general socio-economic characteristics, and 'spending power' in particular) are unlikely to be of the quality traditionally found in this area (with 40% of all domestic visitors to London being in social classes A and B)[70].

There is little doubt that this 'fast buck syndrome' played an important part in shaping the retail character and functioning of Oxford Street in the early 1980's, when the retail property market saw a distinct movement away from the 'boom years' of the late 1970's. The consequences for the trading environment of the street at this time were exactly as described above with a significant decline in all aspects of its retail character and functioning. Indeed, it is interesting to note in this respect, that from discussions with property agents who have an intimate knowledge of trading in this area, it was apparent that a number of retailers 'specialise' in trying to take advantage of such
situations in the sense that they have part of their overall locational strategy based upon searching for properties which are vacant and proving difficult to let during downturns in the retail property market.

Thus, the contribution that this 'syndrome' makes (especially in an already depressed market) is not only to add to the volatility of the trading environment, but also to provide a climate of change which, rather than being planned or positive in nature, is haphazard and inconsistent.

6.5.7. Rents: Summary and Conclusions.

Turnover is the most important determinant with regard to rents in the principal shopping streets of the study area. These characteristics exert their influence though the mechanism of the rent review. It can be seen that the setting of 'fair and justifiable rent' at the time of review, is a complex process, with the principal factors taken into account being movements in the strength of the retail property market, rent levels recently set in nearby properties, and the level of demand for a given property. A number of problems were outlined which arise out of the largely retrospective nature of this process, which can result in inappropriate rent levels being levied.

A further complicating factor, adding to this already complex process, is that of premiums. These appear to be far more responsive to likely future market conditions.
The most notable trends seen with regard to rents were as follows. First, that in the past few years, rent levels have reached unprecedented levels. And secondly, that, again in recent times, review periods have tended to decrease significantly, reflecting the growing volatility of the market, and the exceptional rate of improvement in market recently.

Thus, this mechanism allows these trends and characteristics to be expressed in the trading patterns of the principal shopping streets of the study area in a number of ways, including, the restriction on the type of trader that can operate profitably, an effect on retail composition, and an important contributory element in trading volatility.

One interesting aspect discussed in this respect, was what was termed 'the fast buck syndrome', a process that had significant detrimental effects on the retail character and functioning, particularly of Oxford Street in the early 1980's.

It would seem apparent that rents play a very important part in shaping trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge.

6.6.1. Rates.
-------------

A further economic factor that needs to be taken into account, is that of rates. It should be noted that this discussion will focus on rates paid vis a vis rateable value. Two
factors need to be taken into account when considering rates; rateable value and rate poundage. The rateable value of a property varies in relation to a number of factors including the size of the property, its condition and its location. Rateable value can vary through time. Changes in rateable value occur at times of reassessment when the above factors will be reconsidered. The actual rates paid for a property are decided by the local authority which decides the rate poundage i.e. the amount of each pound of rateable value which must be paid. Thus, although the rateable values of adjacent properties can be different, the proportion of the rateable values that are paid will be the same.

In determining the rate poundage the local authority has to consider two main factors. First, the authority needs to decide the amount of monies that are required to be raised from the levying of rates on commercial and residential property. By comparing the total rateable values of all properties with this amount, the rate poundage can be set.

The second factor that needs to be considered, is the effect that rates can have on the commercial land-use patterns. This consideration can be particularly important for retailing. For example, in Princes Street in Edinburgh, Scotland, rates paid by traders are high. This is a result of the combination of high rateable values and a high rate poundage. It has produced a situation where annual rates paid can be a considerable proportion of annual rents [71]. Traders in Princes Street claim that such rates are detrimental to its retail environment in that, for
example, they reduce profit margins (thus, increasing the possibility of failure), and therefore, increasing its volatility. Since no land-use data has been collected for Princes Street, it is difficult to comment upon this.

In the principal shopping streets of the study area, given the number of prestigious properties (in terms of size, fittings and location) rateable values tend to be high. As a result, rates paid by traders tend to be high. In the City of Westminster in 1986 the rate poundage paid by retailers was 164.1p in the pound which, argue traders in the study area, is "an understandable deterrent to improvements in the shopping environment" [72]. Examples of rates paid include, those of Selfridges in Oxford Street which were £1.6 million in 1983, and those of the Bourne and Hollingsworth department store (also in Oxford Street) which was paying £450,000 per annum in rates before its closure in 1979 [73].

A general association can be identified between rates and rents. This is, that properties with high rateable values tend to have high rents. This is a result of the rateable value of a property and its rent level both being greatly influenced by the location of the property i.e. the 'better' a location in terms of its 'potential turnover' the higher the rents and rates paid for a property at that location.

Thus, given this general association between rents and rates, the effect of the rates in the principal shopping streets of the
study area is to re-enforce the effects of rents on trading patterns, as discussed earlier, of restricting the type of retailer that can trade profitably in these streets; in limiting the proportion of traders in these streets that belong to multiple groups; and, in contributing to the high rate of change of traders by reducing profit margins.


As has already been seen, income from outwith the United Kingdom, in the form of sales to overseas tourists, constitutes an important economic element of influence on trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the study area. However, another 'external' element of finance is also of importance in this respect, namely, the input of overseas capital into retailing in the West End and Knightsbridge.

6.7.2. External Finance: Funding of Retail Developments.

Funding of retail developments from overseas sources of capital has had an undoubted impact upon trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the study area. Perhaps most notable, in this respect, is the impact on Regent Street and Oxford Street.

Regent Street, in the early 1970's, entered into a period of decline in terms of the quality of its retail environment. At this time, although responding in part to the overall movements in the
market in the area, turnover and rent values in the street began to steadily fall. It is difficult to explain exactly why this street, which is after all, one of the most famous shopping streets in the Western World, should 'opt out' of the trends in the market of the area as a whole. One theory is that it was due to the increasing proportion of non-retail uses in the street. By 1976 over one third of available units in Regent Street were given over to non-retail uses. This compares with less than one fifth in Bond Street and one quarter in Oxford Street at the same point in time [74].

The early 1970's saw Regent Street become popular with a number of non-retail uses, in particular, Travel Agents and Airline Offices. In 1976, 19% of occupiers in Regent Street were Travel Agents or Airline Offices compared to 2%, 4%, and 13% in Brompton Road, Oxford Street and Regent Street respectively [75].

Such an influx of this type of land-use activity was detrimental to the character and functioning of the retail environment of Regent Street for two main reasons. First, it narrowed the range and quality of the shops available, in a street where the proportion of non-retail uses was traditionally high. And secondly, such non-retail uses are not attractive to tourists (unlike others such as, for example, Bureaux de Change) therefore, tourists numbers visiting the street fell, and thus, so too did an important element of turnover.

Thus, as the proportion of non-retail uses in the street increased, this tended to discourage retail uses from entering the
street, which left increasing amounts of property available for non-retail use. Hence, in this sense, the process of decline in the retail character and functioning of Regent Street was self perpetuating. Even if this theory is not accepted completely there can still be little doubt that it is, at least, of some validity.

It was felt by the Crown Commissioners, the landlord for all of Regent Street, that this trend could only be reversed through the introduction of a number of important retail developments into the street. However, the developers found it difficult to obtain financial backing from within the United Kingdom, principally because of the loss of reputation that the street had experienced. As a result, the major part of the capital required for these developments was obtained from overseas sources, and in particular, from the Middle East.

The effect of these developments on Regent Street was of great importance. The proportion of non-retail uses, although remaining high in comparison to the other prime shopping streets of the area, began to fall, from around 35% in 1976 to 33% by 1985 [76]. A number of 'high quality' traders such as Laura Ashley and Jaeger, were attracted to the street. Both turnover and rent levels recovered, once again, entering into the 'mainstream' of property market movements. This claim is supported by noting the fact that between 1965 and 1979, top shop rents (rents payed for the best sites in a street) in Bond Street, in comparison with Oxford Street, remained relatively constant,
whereas those in Regent Street, again in comparison with Oxford Street, rose dramatically (see Figure 6.11., below).

**Figure 6.11. - Top Shop Rents in Regent Street, Bond Street and Brompton Road Compared With Oxford Street, 1965 and 1979.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1979</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oxford Street</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regent Street</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bond Street</td>
<td>43.0%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brompton Road</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source - Hillier Parker May and Rowden (1983).*

This recovery of Regent Street, as a shopping centre of international reputation, cannot be entirely attributed to the introduction of these developments. However, it must be recognised that the role that they played in initiating this recovery, was a vital one. Thus, it would seem that, since overseas finance played a very predominant part in these developments, the role that this economic factor played in influencing trading patterns in Regent Street, at this time, was a very important one.

A further, and more recent example of the effects of the
funding of retail developments, is that of the former Bourne and Hollingsworth department store in Oxford Street.

In March 1985, the Glengate Group, backed by Kumagai Gumi, one of Japan's biggest construction companies [77](each with a 50% stake), obtained the freehold for the 350,000 sq.ft. building, which had been closed in 1983, for between £13.5 and £15 million. The Bourne and Hollingsworth department store had, since its opening in 1928, been one of the foremost attractions of Oxford Street. Its closure in 1979 served to reflect, and add to, the decline of the eastern end of "one of the world's most famous but latterly ailing shopping centres" [78].

The development of this building in this Glengate-Kumagai venture, will provide a complex with 164,500 sq.ft. of retail floorspace on four floors, with 134,710 sq.ft. of office space above [79], and with a final value of some £55 million [80]. It is widely anticipated that this development will have a significant effect in helping to "boost the fortunes" of this part of Oxford Street [81], and thus again provides an illustration of the effect that an injection of external capital can have upon trading patterns in a prime shopping street.

In addition to these examples of large scale development funding from external capital sources, there are also numerous examples of smaller developments being funded, either partly or completely by overseas capital, and of similar examples of such capital playing some part in other large developments. However, it
should be noted that the identification of sources of capital investment can often be difficult, since overseas funding can often pass through a number of intermediary agencies before reaching the developer. Thus, the role that overseas funding plays can often be difficult to quantify.

Thus, it would seem that the direct funding of retail developments (wholly or in part) from external sources of finance, has a part to play in helping to shape trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the study area. However, although it may be possible to quantify these effects 'at a point in time' or even in the very short term (at the time of, and immediately after, the opening of an externally funded development) it is very difficult to quantify effects in the longer term, as can be seen with respect to Regent Street in the 1970's. In the longer term, since a whole range of economic, political and social factors have had the opportunity to come into play, it is impossible to attribute directly any change in trading patterns to a given element of overseas funding. At best, any such element of funding may be identifiable as playing a fundamental role in helping to initiate, accelerate, or reverse a set of changes in trading patterns.

6.7.3. External Finance: Summary and Conclusions.

It can be seen that there are two main elements of external finance that have effects upon trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the study area. The first, spending by
overseas tourists, is dealt with in an earlier section of the text, and its importance, in this respect, noted. With regard to the second element, external funding of retail developments, it can be seen that this adds considerably to the ability of external financial sources to influence trading patterns.

This ability to influence varies through space and time, is both positive and negative in nature, and is often of great difficulty to identify and quantify (with the exception of examples at the level of the individual shop unit or development, and at a point in time or in the very short term). Despite this, however, the effects of external funding are undeniable, and serve to add to the complexity of economic factors that play a part in shaping trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge.

6.8.1 The Role of Property Agents.

The role that Estate Agents and Chartered Surveyors ('agents') play in helping to influence trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge is one that, as will be seen, cannot be ignored. In this section, two main aspects of the role that agents play in the above respect will be discussed. First, the extent to which this role is reactive and the extent to which it is proactive in nature. And secondly, whether this role varies in relation to changes in the prevailing conditions of the property market and between
different types of retailers.

First, do agents play a reactive or a proactive role here? In other words, one that is influenced by (reacts to) the locational requirements and decisions of traders or one that influences these locational requirements and decisions? From the range of interviews carried out with agents and retailers, it would appear that the main agents acting in property deals of shop units in the principal shopping streets of the study area exhibit elements of both of the above behavioural roles.

When adopting a reactive role agents can act in a number of ways. First, a trader can approach an agent with a request for a particular type of shop in a particular area. The degree of specification of requirements by the trader can vary enormously. At one extreme are those who provide a detailed outline of desired rent and premium levels, lease and review periods, and shop unit requirements. And, at the other are those who simply specify that they require 'a shop somewhere in the West End'.

The agent, armed with this knowledge of the locational requirements of the trader, will then examine the range of suitable properties (if any) that are either currently available (vacant) or are likely to become available in the near future (for example, those nearing the end of a lease period). Having determined a suitable property the agent will then approach the landlord (or landlord’s agent) of the property to establish whether he would be willing to lease the property to that particular retailer, and if so, at what price (rent and premium).
and for what period. Having thus established these details the
agent can then return to the trader to establish whether these
terms are suitable and whether the property adequately meets his
other particular locational requirements. If not, then a series
of negotiations are carried out between the trader and the
landlord (acting through their respective agents), to try to
provide a compromise situation with regard to rent, premium,
length of lease and review period. It is very interesting to note
the speed of this process especially where the property concerned
is in high demand. Indeed, one prominent agent in the West End
illustrated how this process an be completed within a matter of a
few hours [82].

The second form that this reactive role can take is where a
trader becomes aware of a property that is available or is about
to become available, and that suits his locational requirements.
In such a situation, a trader will contact the agent acting for
this property to determine rent, premium, length of lease and
review period. Again, the agent will act as an intermediary
between the two parties (trader and landlord or landlord's agent)
in order to establish a situation with which both are satisfied.

There would appear to be some evidence, from the interviews
carried out, to suggest that certain aspects of this reactive
process may tend to alter in response to changes in the
prevailing conditions in the property market. For example,
during downswings in the market the locational requirements of
traders are likely to become more stringent since potential
profitability at such times tends to decrease. Conversely, during upturns in the market the locational requirements of traders are likely to become less stringent since more locations are likely to be potentially profitable due to the increase in trade.

Thus, in adopting a reactive stance, agents are simply attempting to accommodate the locational requirements of the trader, on the one hand with the economic demands of the property owner on the other, both of which are a function of the prevailing conditions in the property market. Therefore, the scope for agents to bring their influence to bear upon trading patterns is inherently restricted. One of the only ways in which they can achieve this (albeit to a limited extent) is in the situation outlined above where the demand for a property is high. Here, by 'playing one trader against another', agents can, at times, greatly increase the rent and premium levels that traders are willing to pay. It should be noted that such processes are very informal in nature, and therefore, as such, difficult to provide documented evidence for their existence.

If, in adopting a reactive stance, the ability of agents to exercise some element of influence over trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the study area is limited, then, in contrast, in adopting a proactive stance, the potential ability of agents in this respect, would appear to be far greater.

The proactive behaviour of agents tends to take one main form. When a property is available or about to become available,
an agent can take the step of recommending to a particular trader that the particular property provides a highly suitable shop unit. If, subsequently, the trader makes the decision to locate in this shop unit, either on, for example, strictly economic grounds or on the basis of 'keeping the competition out', the role that the agent played in initiating this decision would be a fundamental one. Thus, as well as having a proactive effect on trading patterns, the agent is also playing a proactive part in the locational decision making process of the trader.

At this point, two aspects have to be introduced. First, as was noted with regard to reactive behaviour of agents, there would seem to be changes in the proactive behaviour of agents in response to changes in the state of the property market, in the sense that, there would appear to be some evidence (again from the interviews carried out) that agents tend to become more proactive during downswings in the retail property market, when demand for shop units will tend to be low.

At such times, it is in the interest of agents to 'promote' vacant properties. In one sense, this is made relatively simple by the fact that the stock of available properties in market downturns tends to be relatively great (in comparison with upturns, when properties in the principal shopping streets of the study area rarely reach the open market) due, first, to the high business failure rate at such times, and secondly, due to traders being unwilling to take on new leases.

Thus, with a relatively high number of available properties in,
or adjacent to, prime locations, agents have the opportunity of trying to persuade traders that, for example, in the long-term (in anticipation of the 'next upturn'), it will be of benefit for them to take up a lease on a vacant shop unit.

It would seem apparent that both the reactive and proactive roles of agents (and most especially the latter) appear to vary in relation to changes in prevailing market conditions. However, is their any evidence to suggest that these roles may also vary between different types of retailers? Again, from interviews carried out with both retailers and agents, it would seem that, in some situations, this is the case.

A good illustration of this is would seem to be that agents are apparently far more proactive in relation to new traders (those with little experience of this particular aspect of the retail sector) and overseas based traders. This is a function of the fact that such traders are, on the whole, unfamiliar with the market conditions in the principal shopping streets of the study area, and therefore, are often willing to rely on the direction and advice of agents. In contrast, in dealing with established companies with rigorous locational decision making structures, agents are very often forced to adopt a highly reactive stance.

It should be noted that it is very difficult to draw up a general rule since the degree to which agents are reactive or proactive in relation to different types of retailer, and indeed, in all their activities, tends to vary greatly from one agent to
another. Reasons for this variation are found in, for example, the 'style' of agents, and the fact that certain agents develop, through time, a 'reputation' for dealing successfully with new or overseas clients.

6.8.2. The Role of Property Agents: Summary and Conclusions.

Property agents have an important part to play in the process of retail change in the principal shopping streets of the study area. The role that they play can be both reactive or proactive in nature, can vary in relation to changing prevailing market conditions, and can vary between different types of retailer.

At their most proactive it would seem that agents have an important part to play in influencing trading patterns through influencing the locational decision making processes of traders. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the role of agents in this respect constitutes another important economic influence on trading patterns in the study area.

6.9.1. Economic Influences on Trading Patterns in the Principal Shopping Streets of the West End and Knightsbridge: Cumulative Effects.

The discussion of economic factors of influence up to this point has been restricted to the ways in which they individually exert their influence upon trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the study area. However, it is
apparent that these factors cannot operate in isolation and that, in fact, there is a system of interrelationships between them.

Figure 6.12. (below) provides an outline of the form that this system of inter-relationships take.

**Figure 6.12. - Economic Influences on Trading Patterns: Operational Framework.**

Trends in the national economy in general
Economic Trends in retailing in particular

→ The 'Market'; Regional National International (Tourism)

→ Turnover Rents Rates External Finance

→ Changing Patterns of Retail Activity

At the outset it is important to recognise the importance of the input from two economic elements that are external to the system. Trends in the national economy in general and in retailing in particular both have an effect on the populations that make up the market (regional, national and international) that is served by the principal shopping streets of the study area; either increasing or decreasing the potential retail spend of the
elements of the market. Thus, as the market served by the principal shopping streets of the study area changes (and in particular, as its potential retail spend changes) there is a consequent change in retail turnover in the study area i.e. turnover is reactive with respect to (is a function of) changes in the market.

As turnover changes, it in turn, affects a number of other economic factors of influence; rents and rates will change (given the relationship between turnover and these factors as discussed earlier); and finally, the amount of external finance is also be affected in that overseas investors are more likely to be attracted to a bouyant retail environment (at which times, levels of turnover will be increasing) than to a depressed retail environment. Thus, it can be said that, rents, rates and external finance are reactive with respect to changes in turnover.

The cumulative effect of these economic factors is to help to alter trading patterns. These changes, in turn, act in a proactive manner with respect to the market in the sense that, as the retail environment of a shopping centre changes then the way in which the market relates to the centre also changes. For example, if there is an improvement in retailing in the study area then more shoppers (regional, national and international) are attracted to its principal shopping streets.

The final element in this process is the role of agents who, in effect, provide the linkages through which other economic
factors can exert their influence on trading patterns, and in doing so, exert an influence themselves.

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2. Estimated values provided by Hillier Parker May and Rowden.
3. ibid.
4. See Section 6.5.2.
5. ibid.
6. Data provided by Hillier Parker May and Rowden.
7. See Section 6.5.2. Figures 6.7. and 6.8.
8. All full-time males (21 and over) at adult rates.
9. Derived from data in Figure 6.1.
13. ibid. p. 42.
15. i.e. to the east of Oxford Circus; see Location Map, Appendix II Table 1.
16. Derived from data in Figure 6.8.
17. See Section 6.5.2.
18. ibid.
19. ibid.
20. For Location Map of Rent Sectors in Oxford Street, see Appendix II Table 1.
21. The Standard Shop Unit is the most commonly demanded size for a retail outlet. Currently, this is for a 25 ft. to 30 ft. frontage and 100 ft. depth (Estates Gazette (1986).
22. For Location Map of Rent Sectors in Oxford Street, see Appendix II Table 1.

23. Discussed in Section 2.2.2.

24. ibid.

25. Discussed in Section 2.2.3.

26. ibid.

27. ibid.


29. See Section 4.2.7. Figure 4.24.

30. ibid.


33. ibid. p. 5.


36. ibid. p. 12.

37. ibid. p. 10.

38. ibid. p. 8.

39. ibid. p. 5.

40. ibid. p. 10.


42. Westminster City Council (1984) p. 32.


44. Quote from Oxford Street Seminar, September 1984 from representative of London Transport.


46. Study carried out (and data provided) by Hillier Parker May and Rowden.
47. ibid..


49. ibid. p. 12.


51. For Location Map of Rent Sectors, see Appendix III.

52. The term 'average rent' refers to the mean rent levels in each street in the years 1976, 1979, 1982 and 1985.

53. See Location Map Appendix II Table 1.


55. Data provided by Hillier Parker May and Rowden.


62. See Section 4.2.7. Figure 4.24.


64. ibid. p. 4.

65. Located at 455-466 Oxford Street.

66. See note 52 above.


68. See Section 4.2.3. Figure 4.4.


71. Annual rates in Princes Street can often be as much as half of annual rents. (Personal Interview; Hillier Parker May and Rowden).


74. See Figures 4.2., 4.8., 4.13. and 4.18. (Sections 4.2.3., 4.2.4., 4.2.5. and 4.2.6.).

75. See Section 4.2.4. Figure 4.9.

76. See Section 4.2.4. Figure 4.8.


82. Personal Interview; Hillier Parker May and Rowden).
Social factors that play a part in helping to shape trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge can be divided into two main categories. First, there are those that are derived from changes in the social character of the populations that these streets serve, and secondly, those that are derived from the social requirements and demands of the traders in these streets.

Accordingly, in this section, the role that both of these social elements play in the study area will be discussed in terms of their trends and characteristics, their source, and their effects on trading patterns.

Changes in the social characteristics of a population have an effect on virtually all spheres of economic activity in a society. The tenets of social requirement which have had the greatest impact upon patterns of retail activity are those relating to changes in shopping habits that are socially derived.

For example, in recent years there has been the emergence of shopping as social/recreational activity. Increasingly, since the
late 1960's and up until the present time, shopping has no longer been regarded as simply a necessary function of living, but has come to be regarded as pastime that is both planned and enjoyable; a function that constitutes an important element of leisure time. Chubb et al [1] provide support for this contention in noting the variety of reasons why shopping is now so popular as a form of leisure activity. They list; shopping can be a pleasurable experience because of the change of environment or because it involves interaction with other people; shopping constitutes a challenge for some in, for example, finding 'bargains' or in the search for 'superior quality goods'; shopping includes the possibility of making use of elements of non-retail provision in shopping centres (such as restaurants, wine bars and cafes)[2]. In order to cope with these changing social shopping demands, shopping environments have had to react in a number of ways.

First, there has been a marked improvement in the quality of shopping environments. Perhaps this has been most noticeable in range of 'purpose built' shopping complexes that have been established both within town centres (for example, the West One shopping complex in Oxford Street) and outwith it (for example, Brent Cross)[3]; "what shoppers want is warm brightly lit covered malls" [4]. Thus, such centres provide a clean, safe, and warm environment for customers and are frequently combine shopping with other land-use activities including recreational activities [5] which has helped to make shopping a far more pleasurable experience [6]. Modern, enclosed shopping malls (and the modern
department store) provide shoppers with "a greater variety of merchandise and the reduced feeling of obligation to buy.... many feel free to visit such shopping facilities just for a respite from inclement weather, loneliness or boredom" [7].

In addition, traditional high streets have also tended to improve their shopping environments. One of the most obvious methods that has been employed in this respect has been the removal of all or some of the vehicular traffic from many busy shopping streets in pedestrianisation schemes. This has improved high street shopping environments in two main respects. First, for the consumer, the environment is safer and less polluted. And second, for retailers, the improved environment in turn helps to improve pedestrian flows and increases the efficiency of goods delivery by removing the on-street parking of private vehicles [8]. Other notable related elements which have also helped to add to the amenity of town centre shopping streets have been the introduction of co-ordinated street furniture, trees, and shrubs, and the licencing of street entertainers in many pedestrianised areas.

Secondly, most shopping centres have seen the introduction of a number of non-retail uses that can both benefit and complement the retail environment. Such uses, such as restaurants, travel agents, hairdressers, banks, and building societies, can all add to the overall functioning of a shopping centre since they widen its scope beyond simply that of retailing by providing a range of services that shoppers require. However,
as has already been discussed, the incursion of too many non-retail uses, or of inappropriate (non-enhancing, non-complementary) non-retail uses, can be detrimental to the retail functioning and character of a shopping street, and thus, is not compatible with the concept of shopping as a social activity.

Some of the most recent trends in shopping provision also reflect changing social shopping demands. For example, at the present time the in United Kingdom there is a rapid expansion of out-of-town shopping centres on a regional scale (such as that at Gateshead) which, due to their retail mix, pose a far greater threat to the traditional high street than have previous forms of out-of-town retail developments. This new generation of centres move the concept of shopping as a social activity to a higher level since, not only do they provide a range of high order retail uses in a controlled and pleasant environment, but this range tends to be extensive and the complementary provision of non-retail uses also tends to be of similar order and range. In addition, environmental problems associated with town centre shopping developments, such as pollution and traffic congestion, are avoided (town centre shopping developments may have a controllable 'internal' environment, but the 'external' environment of the town centre is not controllable in the same sense).

However, the previous discussion implies that shopping environments are a direct response to changing social shopping
requirements. Is this really the case, or rather, is the converse more true? Could it be argued that, as shopping environments change, and thus, new possibilities to pursue shopping as a social activity are introduced, the demand for this type of 'shopping requirement' is stimulated, and therefore, social shopping characteristics are modified? Indeed, as Dawson notes many major developments in the organisation and control of retailing since 1960 have initiated changes in the spatial pattern and organisation of shopping facilities which do not necessarily reflect consumer pressure [9].

This is an area of debate that is both complex and contentious scenario. However, it can argued that changes in the character of shopping provision can be initiated by changing social shopping demands. Subsequent changes in shopping provision will react to these changing demands, and in doing so, will themselves shape future social shopping demands and characteristics.

Such an argument is dependent upon the social demands of the shopping public being transmitted to planners and developers in the first instance, in order that change can be initiated. However, the range of data available in this respect in a modern society (derived through, for example, shopper surveys, and so on) means that such a transfer of information is relatively straightforward.

This argument is open to criticism. However, at least it does provide an alternative scenario to the 'extremes' of either
changing social shopping characteristics being exclusively 
responsible for changing patterns of retail provision, or vice 
versa, and serves to illustrate that, in reality, these dynamic 
elements are likely to play an integrated and interrelated role 
in this respect.

Having discussed the role of those social factors, derived 
from changing social characteristics, in influencing shopping 
patterns at the general level, how then are they more specifically 
at work in helping to shape trading patterns in the principal 
shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge?

It is apparent that the role that 'socially derived' social 
factors play in influencing trading patterns in the study area 
will be similar to that in most other high streets in the United 
Kingdom. However, as was discussed earlier [10], these streets 
draw upon not only a regional market (the market scale which most 
high streets serve) but also upon national and international 
markets. Thus, as a result of this, trading patterns in the 
principal shopping streets of the study area are, in theory, 
subject to the social influences of these three population 
scales. Therefore, the range of social characteristics at work 
is extensive. Each of these 'markets' will be discussed in turn.

The most important market for the principal shopping streets 
of the study area is that of the South East of England which is 
the most affluent region of the United Kingdom, with incomes 
almost 10% higher than anywhere else [11]. As a result, the 
dominant social characteristics, and therefore, the social
shopping demands of the population of this area are likely to
differ, at least in part, from those of the population of the
rest of the nation. A number of aspects are worth noting.

The first, and most important, is that due to the higher
levels of income of this area, levels of disposable income tend
to be high by national standards, and thus, demand for retail
goods is relatively high. Retailing has responded to this, not
only in the amount of shopping provision available to those who
live in the South East of England, but also in its type and
quality. Thus, it is apparent that this social characteristic has
had a particular role to play in the principal shopping streets
of the study area which have been described as the fashion
centre of the South East in the sense that levels of individual
disposable income play an important part in supporting the
concentration of retail activity in these prime shopping
streets.

A second element is that such a centre of population
concentration is likely to be both more innovative and receptive
to change. This concept comes from the idea that, due to the ease
of communication in large, concentrated population centres, the
exchange of ideas is highly efficient, and therefore, innovation
is more likely. It follows that in an area where innovation is
prevalent changes in environmental conditions will be more
readily accepted. This argument can be applied relatively easily
to the South East of England, in the sense that, as the greatest
concentration of population in the United Kingdom, changes in
shopping provision are more likely to occur and be accepted.

Although it is difficult to provide 'hard' evidence to support this argument, perhaps some backing is found in the fashion industry. London as long been recognised as the 'hub' of the fashion industry in the United Kingdom. New styles, from both home and abroad, tend to be first seen in the streets of London. It can be argued that this is a function of the affluence of the 'local' population and the process of initiation and acceptance of change and outlined above.

Thus, it is apparent that the South East of England possesses a range of social characteristics which have a number of identifiable effects upon trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the study area, in the sense that they help to support the concentration and quality of shopping provision in these streets, and encourage a retail environment where change is both initiated and readily accepted. However, although it is possible to identify the principal effects of these characteristic social trends of this region, other, more subtle aspects are more difficult to identify.

The second market which the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge serve, that at the national level, is of less importance to trading patterns than that of the South East of England. Although there is no doubt that the social characteristics, and thus, the social shopping requirements of this wider market also have some part to play. It is, however,
far more important to examine the element of 'social demand' that the principal shopping streets of the study area satisfies.

Here, of great importance are the concepts of the threshold and range of a good or service [12]. The types of goods that 'national' shoppers are willing to travel to London to purchase will be high order retail goods and will tend to fall into two categories. The first are those goods that are not available in most other prime shopping streets in the United Kingdom. A good example would be that of the exclusive jewellers, art dealers, and clothing and footwear retailers of Bond Street. The second category are those goods that available in other centres in the United Kingdom but that are offered in a far greater range and variety in the West End and Knightsbridge.

Thus, although levels of disposable income are lower in other parts of the United Kingdom than in the South East of England, the principal shopping streets of the study area do provide an attractive centre in which the element of social shopping requirement, derived from this income, can be satisfied. Indeed, despite the fact that such shopping trips can only be on an occasional basis (perhaps only two or three trips per year), this element of turnover is important to traders in this area, due to the relatively high cost of high order retail goods.

However, although these concepts of range and threshold are economically based, they do incorporate non-economic elements since image and perception have a part to play. Thus, for 'national shoppers' the principal shopping streets of the West
End and Knightsbridge provide a means through which to satisfy their desire for shopping as a social/recreational activity. Therefore, as well as being attracted by the type, range and quality of goods available, these shoppers are also attracted by less rational considerations. Examples include the 'prestige' of simply shopping in Harrods, or of a shopping trip to Bond Street.

So, at the national level, trading patterns in the prime shopping streets of the study area are influenced both by social shopping requirements derived through availability of disposable income, and those relating to concepts of leisure and image (both of the shopper and of the area).

Finally, at the international level, the social factors influencing trading patterns in the study area are much more specific in nature. Overseas visitors tend predominantly to have social shopping requirements for high order goods, and therefore, the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge can serve this demand better than anywhere in the United Kingdom. In addition, the question of status and image of shopping in this area also plays an important role. However, although in relation to the numbers of shoppers from the South East of England and the rest of the United Kingdom, those of overseas visitors are relatively small, the amount of money that they spend has an important part to play in helping to shape trading patterns in the study area [13].
It can be seen that this element of social influence (that derived from the social characteristics, and thus, social requirements of the populations served by the principal shopping streets of the study area), is one that is highly complex and abstract in nature. Indeed, it is apparent that these social influences are far more abstract, and as a result, far less tangible, than any of the elements of political and economic influence previously discussed. However, despite this, there is little doubt that the social shopping requirements and demands of the populations that these streets serve play some part in helping to shape their trading patterns.

7.1.3. Social Requirements: Traders.

The second category of social factors that influence trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge, are as was noted above, those that are derived from the social requirements and demands of the traders themselves. Of particular relevance is the locational decision of a trader to move into, remain in, or move out of one of these streets.

In making such a decision, a wide range of political, economic, and social factors could, potentially, be taken into account. However, retailers will not take all possible factors pertaining to a locational decision into consideration. Indeed, it would be virtually impossible for any retailer to make a completely rational locational decision in this sense. However,
due to the highly varied types, structures, and sizes of retailers trading in the principal shopping streets of the study area, it is apparent that some will take more rational locational factors into account than others. Thus, there is likely to be a significant amount of variation in the rationality of locational decisions taken by retailers. Later, a more detailed discussion will be undertaken with regard to this concept of the rationality of the locational decision [14]. However, at this point it is interesting to consider some of the elements of 'non-rationality' that can be introduced in this respect (i.e. those social factors that have a part to play in reducing economic optimality in decision making).

One of the most important social factors that emerges with regard to locational decisions in the prime shopping streets of the study area is that of status or image. From the range of interviews and the questionnaire survey carried out with traders in the West End and Knightsbridge, as well as the interviews with agents, it is apparent that rational considerations of turnover, rents, planning restrictions, and so on, do not always play a prominent role in a locational decision. The introduction of social requirements on the part of traders in this respect can play an important part. This is largely a function of the international reputation of the prime shopping streets in this area.

Thus, for example, several jewellers belonging to multiple chains which have outlets in Bond Street are willing to accept
lower levels of profitability (and in some cases, even losses) than would be derived in a 'normal' high street outlet in order to gain the prestige of having an outlet in this street, believing that association with such an internationally renowned shopping street helps to boost the overall image of the company.

Thus, a locational decision of this kind, based largely on considerations of image and status, can be perceived as being sub-optimum. However, it can be argued that this may only be the case at the the level of the individual shop and in the short term since, at the level of the organisation as a whole and in the long term, the economic gain from the image enhancement of this loss making shop unit may be of importance. This could certainly be true in relation to multiple groups which, with their large capital bases, can easily offset any loss made by a unit in both the short and long terms. However, with respect to independent operators with only a few outlets, any locational decision justified principally on these grounds must be brought into question.

Despite this, it is apparent that, in some cases, a locational decision made largely on the basis of image or status, although sub-optimum, can incorporate considerable elements of economic rationality.

However, in other cases, it is equally apparent that locational decisions made on these bases have almost no element of rationality. For example, some franchise operations take on
shop units in these prime locations on relatively rational grounds (for example, investigating likely levels of turnover, rents, rates, and so on). However, others make such decisions incorporating almost no element of rationality. However, these types of low rationality locational decisions are not only found in franchise operations. One very prominent example of such a decision, although particularly extreme in nature, does illustrate the kinds of factors that can be taken into account in these situations.

The example, quoted by a West End agent, is that of an overseas client from who took on a lease of a jewellers in New Bond Street on order to satisfy the needs of his mistress during the eleven months of the year in which he was not in London. In this example, it is apparent that profitability was of no concern, and in actual fact, the shop made considerable losses during its period of trading. The extremity of this example should not mask the fact that many other traders do move into prime locations with the aim of satisfying their social requirement of status or image, and with, at best, the perception that 'a shop in the West End is bound to make money'.

It is therefore apparent that the social requirements of traders, particularly in the form of status and image, play a part in helping to influence locational decisions relating to trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the study area, and thus, these patterns themselves. Indeed, it can also be argued that this element of social influence is likely to be
far greater here than elsewhere in the United Kingdom, in the sense that, no other shopping street in this country provides as great an opportunity for this social desire to be satisfied. Perhaps one of the few other shopping streets that may provide this to some degree being that of Princes Street in Edinburgh; again a 'high profile' shopping street.

7.1.4. Social Factors Influences on Trading Patterns in the Principal Shopping Streets of the West End and Knightsbridge: Summary and Conclusions.

In conclusion, social factors that have a part to play in influencing trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge emerged as being both abstract and complex in nature. The simple division between those social factors derived from the social character and requirements of the populations that these streets serve, and those derived from the social requirements and demands of the traders themselves, masks an influencing element that is difficult to define.

The social demands of shoppers change through time, and these changes have a part to play in relation to trading patterns. Attention must be focused on the effects of these social factors rather than their causes. In this regard, it would seem that the social demands of shoppers have a part to play.

The social demands and requirements of traders seem, at least
in terms of identification, to be simpler in nature. Image and status emerged as being important elements, and although decisions incorporating these elements can be of very low rationality (in economic terms) it is also apparent that, in some instances, decisions made on such bases, can be economically rational in the longer terms and at a wider scale. The question of trader rationality is discussed in more detail in Chapter 9 [15].

Social factors, when added to the political and economic factors discussed in earlier chapters, help to provide an overall framework of influences on trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the study area that is both diverse and complex in nature.

7.2.1. Political, Economic and Social Influences on Trading Patterns in the Principal Shopping Streets of the West End and Knightsbridge: Conclusions.

In the previous chapters the main political, economic and social factors that have a part to play in influencing trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge were discussed. From this discussion several important points emerged.

First, it is apparent, that as was suggested in the introduction to these chapters, a considerable number of factors play important parts in influencing trading patterns. Secondly,
it is equally apparent that, both individually and even more so, collectively, these factors are highly complex in nature.

These chapters provide the basis for attempting to develop an overall framework to examine, in relative terms, the importance of these influencing inputs. Later, in Chapter 9, such a framework will be developed in order to allow the analysis of these political, economic and social factors to move beyond simply identification and discussion in singular terms, to examination in cumulative and relative terms.

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10. See Section 6.3.1..
11. Derived from data in Section 6.2.3. Figure 6.1..
12. As discussed in Section 2.2.3..
13. See tourist spending figures in Section 2.2.3..
14. See Section 9.3.
15. ibid.

The West End and Knightsbridge is one of the most important shopping areas in the World. Oxford Street, as the focus of retailing in this area, has a concentration of shopping activity that is rivaled only by that of Tokyo’s Ginza and New York’s Manhattan and is therefore one of the World’s premier shopping streets and "Europes premier retail thoroughfare" [1]. In this chapter, several aspects of trading in Oxford Street will be discussed.

First, a summary of the main trading characteristics that emerged from the earlier statistical analysis of retailing trends in the street, will be outlined [2]. Secondly, the general framework within which these specific trading characteristics operate will be discussed. Thirdly, consideration will be given to the problems that Oxford Street faces which are those relating to retailing, environmental and traffic issues. Fourthly, an outline will be discussed of the main development schemes that have been investigated by Westminster City Council in an attempt to improve the quality of the trading environment of the street. And finally, consideration will be given to what the future may hold for Oxford Street. Three main scenarios will be examined; decline, prosperity and development, and staganation.


In Chapter 4 [3] a detailed analysis of trading patterns in
Oxford Street between 1976 and 1985 was carried out. From this analysis, seven main characteristics of trading patterns emerged. These can be summarised as follows:

(i) the scale of retail activity in Oxford Street. In 1985, the number of traders in the street was 343. However, the scale of trading in the Street is perhaps best better put into perspective by noting the fact that the retail floorspace of Oxford Street is substantially greater than in any of London's main shopping centres, and in addition, exceeds that of many major provincial cities such as Bristol and Edinburgh [4]. In 1982, Oxford Street contained nearly half a million square metres of shopping land-use (sales and non-sales floorspace)[5];

(ii) the high proportion of total floorspace in retail use. In 1985, 74% of properties in the street operated as retail outlets selling products. This proportion is of particular significance, especially when it is considered that the definition of 'retail use' employed [6], does not include service retail activities such as building societies, travel agents, airline ticket agents, hairdressers, and other services, that tend to play an important role in the trading patterns of the traditional high street;

(iii) the dominance of retailers of clothing and footwear, and durable goods. In 1985, these categories of trader accounted for some 46% and 21%, respectively, of all occupiers at ground floor level in the street. Together, these two categories of
retail activity make up approximately two thirds of all activity in the street;

(iv) the low proportion of stores in Oxford Street belonging to multiple groups, compared to other high streets in the United Kingdom. In 1985, multiples made up only 35% of all traders in the street compared to over 50% in most suburban and provincial centres [7]. A number of factors which help to explain this have been discussed earlier, including, for example, the high rent levels in Oxford Street cut the net profits of multiples due to their largely rigid pricing policies. And secondly, since multiples tend, by definition, to have outlets in many provincial centres, one consequence of this is that goods available in a 'multiple store' in Oxford Street are likely to be available in many other 'more local' branches;

(v) the high percentage of duplicates in the street i.e. retail outlets of a company that are represented more than once in a shopping street. In 1985, this figure was 51%;

(vi) the high number of department stores in Oxford Street. In 1985, this number was 14;

(vii) the high rate of change of occupiers in the street. (i.e. changes in outlet occupier in relation to the total number of outlets). Between 1982 and 1985, the average annual rate of change was 17%;

Taken together, these seven elements constitute the most prominent trading characteristics of Oxford Street in the period
The specific trading characteristics discussed above, operate within a complex and constantly changing retail environment. However, a number of general patterns can be identified in Oxford Street.

Oxford Street is very much a street of two halves; its western and eastern sections [8]. The Western end of the street has traditionally been the most popular sector, possessing the best quality of retailing. Change, both functional and occupier, is significantly less in this sector despite rents being at their highest level. Indeed, it would appear that, at times, traders are "prepared to pay money that is more akin to ransom than to any sensible calculation of either rent or premium" [9].

The eastern end of Oxford Street has traditionally been the less popular. In the main, it possesses a poorer quality of retail environment and is prone to rapid degenerative change during downswings in the market.

In the presently prospering trading climate both ends of Oxford Street are flourishing and indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the difference in quality of trading environment between the western and eastern sectors is narrowing [10]. This can be seen in a number of new 'high quality' developments at
the eastern end of the street, including a large scale development of the former Bourne and Hollingsworth department store. It is hoped that this and other similar developments will help to 'draw' better quality retailing along the street, and thus further reduce the discrepancies in quality along its length [11].

When discussing the trading patterns in Oxford Street it is important to bear in mind two important points. First, the West End of London, and Oxford Street in particular, serves as the core of the 'fashion centre' for the South East which is the most prosperous region of the United Kingdom, last to be hit by recession and the first to benefit from upturns in the economy [12]. In 1985, spending by shoppers in Oxford Street was £3000 million, of which £2500 million was from domestic sales [13]. This factor provides traders in Oxford Street with a solid and wealthy foundation upon which to operate. The second important point to bear in mind is that added to this 'solid base' is tourism; the 'icing on the cake'. The number of overseas visitors to London reached 8.4 million in 1985, and it estimated that almost 80% of them visited Oxford Street during their stay, spending an estimated £500 million [14]. Indeed, 17% of Oxford street's income is from visitor spending [15]. These two factors together, provide Oxford Street with an enormous retail potential.

"Everybody knows that Oxford Street is horrible – a festering slum, a permanent closing-down sale which a few thousand Christmas fairy lights do nothing to conceal" [16].

Oxford Street, as a trading environment, suffers from a wide range of problems which have resulted in "growing criticism that the street is becoming shabby and congested and that shopping there is no longer a pleasure" [17]. These problems fall into three main categories. First, retail problems. These are most apparent at the eastern end of the street and, to lesser extent, the extreme western end, and were most marked in the early 1980's. The character and quality of the shopping environments of these parts of the street were badly affected by the types of trader operating particularly at this time, who tended to trade on short leases, and offered, in the main, small scale, rapid turnover, cut price items.

Secondly, environmental problems. Oxford Street, as a physical environment, is characterised by crowds and congestion, with pollution from noise and traffic fumes. In addition, much of the 'street furniture' is visually intrusive, and only adds to the 'cluttering' of the street. And finally, many poorly designed and maintained shopfronts clash with the design of buildings.

The third category of problem are those resulting from the volume of traffic passing through Oxford Street. The street is used intensively by both pedestrians and vehicular traffic. For
example, it has been calculated that, at peak times, the maximum frequency of buses passing along the street, is 340 per hour [18]. This intensive level of use results not only in congestion and various forms of pollution, but also in a high number of accidents; a particular cause of concern.


In September 1984 Westminster City Council held a Seminar with the purpose of providing a forum in which those directly involved in the future of Oxford Street could participate and put forward their views [19]. One of the main contributors to this seminar was Professor Peter Wills of the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne. His paper emphasised the fundamentally important relationship between environment and transport in Oxford Street, and stressed that the deterioration of the environment of the street in the 1970's was related to its continued use as a main traffic thoroughfare [20].

The paper outlined a range of the most viable traffic schemes that could be introduced to Oxford Street in an attempt to solve the problems to which it is subject. Nine alternative scenarios were proposed and evaluated. These can be summarised as follows [21].

(i) Maintaining the existing system of bus, taxi and delivery vehicle access with restricted car access (i.e. the 'do nothing' option). This 'existing situation' was brought about by
the implementation of traffic management schemes in the street in 1972 and 1976. In these schemes buses, taxis and service vehicles were given priority, as was an increase in the space for pedestrian movement.

(ii) A system of elevated walkways at first floor level whilst maintaining modes of transport at ground floor level. The main problems with this proposal were that its inevitably lengthy period of construction would cause considerable disruption to traders, vehicular traffic, and pedestrians, and that a large number of stairs and escalators would be required in order to allow pedestrians to change levels.

(iii) A system incorporating an elevated monorail or 'Personalised Rapid Transit System' (for example, such as a travelator similar to those commonly seen in airports), with existing modes of transport at ground level. The problems are similar to those of Option (ii), and in addition capital, technical, and maintenance considerations have to be taken into account.

(iv) Using special 'shuttle' minibuses. The main advantage of this system is its ease of integration with existing modes of transport. However, conflict with London Regional Transport is likely since their services could be duplicated (thus increasing competition and congestion), or removed.

(v) Remove all taxis and buses from the street and replace them with some form of Personalised Rapid Transit System in the
the central reservation. Again capital, technical and maintenance problems arise as do the problems of pedestrian movements across the street and the need for the rerouting of buses and taxis.

(vi) Constructing an elevated roadway for bus and taxi use and leaving the street surface for pedestrian and service use only. Problems of this scheme include capital and maintenance costs, highly detrimental visual effects, and amenity problems in terms of noise and 'daylighting'.

(vii) Complete pedestrianisation. This would have great benefits for the shopping environment of the street, however, it would be subject to problems of traffic displacement (and in particular the resultant congestion of adjacent streets through which traffic would be channeled), the distance that shoppers would have to walk from bus 'drop off' points to shops, and increased demand on an already congested underground service.

(viii) Restoring private car access and providing more 'off street' parking facilities. Here, problems of congestion, accidents, pollution, and noise, as well as the cost of providing appropriate parking facilities (in for example, multi-story car parks, access roads) are prohibitive.

(ix) Maintaining the existing access arrangements but introducing further time-restrictions for service traffic access, and introduce further widening of existing footways. This option would be likely to result in problems of traffic displacement, at
least in the short term.

In considering these nine traffic options, the impacts (both positive and negative) of their implementation on three main groups was evaluated. First, 'the traveller', in terms of safety, comfort, speed, frequency of service, and ease of access. Secondly, 'transport operators', in terms of system capacity, operating costs, interchange and compatibility with existing transport modes. And finally, 'the community at large', in terms of environmental impact, investment, and maintenance of goods delivery costs.

Using this framework, it was found that for travellers, all of the schemes, with the exception of Option (viii), (restoring private car access), offered advantages. In terms of benefits to transport operators, the results of the application of this framework were less clear since, although almost all of the schemes resulted in increased capacity, the unit costs of this extra capacity would rise more rapidly than required to meet existing provision levels. Finally, those schemes offering the best returns to the community at large were Options (vii) and (ix) since they combine further degrees of traffic restraint on Oxford Street with lower levels of capital construction and maintenance costs.

From this evaluation of all of the relevant positive and negative aspects of the above options, it was apparent that five options emerged as offering the the greatest potential for
improving Oxford Street. These options were as follows;

1. Total Pedestriansation.
2. Further time restrictions on service access and footway widening.
4. Shuttle minibuses.
5. Upper level walkways.

Subsequently, number 5 (upper level walkways) was removed since, although it would have several benefits for the street, it would cause difficulties for many retailers and would seriously detract from its architectural quality.


Two other sets of proposals with regard to possible improvements in the shopping environment of Oxford Street can be identified; The Conran Laurie Proposals [22] and the Brian Avery Proposals [23].

The Conran Laurie proposals do not try to put forward a 'final solution' to the problems of Oxford Street, but is an approach based on a number of design concepts. The proposals identify nine problems within Oxford Street. These were as follows: competition from suburban centres, accessibility, availability of car parking, traffic use, overcrowding, under-utilisation of upper floors, fumes and weather protection, quality of shopping mix, and distance.
The report points to the good existing public transport provision in the street, but notes that it is not used by all shoppers because of the convenience of car travel. It felt that the combination of such factors as rising public transport costs linked with the increasing provision of suburban shopping opportunities (a process aided by the construction of roads such as the M25) reduce the competitiveness of Oxford Street. The report suggests that perhaps better use of existing parking facilities in the area could be encouraged (such as those at Hyde Park) and that these could be linked to Oxford Street via a system of bus ('shuttle') links.

The main 'ideological' element of the proposals was that the Oxford Street shopping area could be divided into seven identifiable 'villages'; three areas of family shopping, one of fashion, one of clothes and jewellery, one of food and restaurants, and one of Hi-Fi and furniture. It was the view of the report that this diversity of shopping types must be maintained in order to protect the commercial viability of the street. In order to achieve this, the report suggests a multiple solution to the issue of improving transport and pedestrian facilities.

The main elements of the Conran Laurie proposals can be summarised as follows.

(i) Closing Oxford Street to traffic.
(ii) Introduction of a system of guided electric minibuses running along the street.

(iii) The provision of covered walkways both at ground and first floor levels, with some being in the form of 'travelators'.

(iv) The provision of frequent bridges across the street (above the any minibus routeway).

The Conran Laurie proposals represent a different approach to the problems of Oxford Street than that of the proposals of Professor Hills discussed earlier. However, they both conclude that, in order to provide effective solutions to the problems of Oxford Street, and thus improve the street for all its users, significant changes are required to the relationship between traffic movement and other users of the street.

The Brian Avery proposals suggested a scheme that included a new high level traffic roundabout at Oxford Circus with pedestrianised provision and enlargement of the London Regional Transport station underneath. It was felt by Westminster City Council that this element alone of the proposals made the overall scheme inappropriate for further consideration due to its expense and environmental impacts.

It can be seen that Westminster City Council, in attempting to find a solution to the problems of Oxford Street has investigated a wide range of different options from a number of different sources. However, it should be noted that, at the time
of the research, the traffic related proposals of Professor Hills were those that were being most closely considered.

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So far, consideration has been given to trading in Oxford Street in the relatively recent past (1976-1985), in terms of the main trading characteristics and general trading patterns in the street. In addition, it can be seen from the outline of the types of problems faced by the street, that its retailing environment could be greatly improved, and that, toward this end, Westminster City Council has investigated a range of options for improvement schemes. This 'investigation' reflects the fact that, at the present time, there is considerable debate with regard to what the future may hold for Oxford Street, and to ways in which its international standing can be maintained, and indeed, enhanced. This section examines the alternative future scenarios that the street is likely to face.

Like any other shopping street there are simply three paths that Oxford Street could follow; it could decline, it could prosper and develop, or it could stagnate.

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There are many who argue that Oxford Street will experience,
through time, a process of long term degeneration. Exponents of this argument point to two main pieces of evidence. The first, is found in the United States of America, where there has indeed been a significant decline in the retail environment of the central areas of many cities. This decline has largely been the result of outward population movements away from the inner city and towards the urban periphery, and beyond, in recent decades. The response of retailing to this outward movement has been a substantial relocation of retail activity into suburban locations, manifested in the rapid growth of out-of-town shopping complexes.

With this in mind the proponents of this argument then turn their attention to the United Kingdom where, in the late 1960’s and 1970’s in particular, there were similar outward movements of population [24]. The response of retailing to this has been the emergence of an increasing number of trading estates, superstores, and hypermarkets in suburban locations; a trend that appears to have accelerated considerably in recent times. For example, between March and December 1986, the amount of planned out-of-town shopping floorspace increased from 25.3 million square feet to 61 million square feet [25].

From these points it is argued that the high street in general will, through time, gradually, be drained of its retail activities and thus will experience an inevitable decline. Oxford Street, in this respect, is seen as being no different from any other high street, and thus will follow the same path towards the degeneration of its retail environment. Indeed, the likely
Emergence of large scale retail developments associated the recently completed M25 road system around London, would seem to add considerable support to this contention, especially if any of these developments are similar to that of the Metrocentre in Gateshead which, as was discussed earlier, is a type that poses a far more direct competitive threat to the traditional high street.

Is Oxford Street likely to follow this 'inevitable path' towards decline? There are number of reasons to suggest that this is unlikely to occur. The first is found in the types and variety shops that Oxford Street provides. As was seen earlier the dominant retail types in the street are those selling clothing and footwear, and durable goods [26]. In addition, the number of department stores in the street is unique. Thus, Oxford Street provides a range of shops of these, and other types, that would be virtually impossible to replicate in any out of town shopping complex. Indeed, with regard to the threat posed by out-of-town shopping developments, it has even been argued that such developments will improve the high street and make it more viable. This argument is based on the idea that the location of large, convenience stores in out-of-town sites will free high streets for more specialised shopping and leisure pursuits [27].

Secondly, Oxford Street is very well served by public transport, and therefore is highly accessible to the massive surrounding population. It is a major bus route with more than 300 buses per hour passing along it at peak times [28]; it is
well served by London Underground with the central line running along its entire length with four stations; it is well serviced by taxis; and, main line railway stations are easily accessible. Indeed, shoppers make great use of this provision of public transport with seven out of ten arriving in the street by this means [29].

This can be further developed in that the American public are far more 'car orientated' than their British counterparts, despite 61% of United Kingdom households now having the use of at least one car [30]. Suburban shopping trips can still involve significant distance/time-distance element, and suburban shopping centres, by definition, tend not to be as well served by public transport as city centre shopping streets. Thus, the 'public transport orientation' of the British shopper, coupled with the high level of public transport provision in Oxford Street provide a strong element for arguing that Oxford Street is unlikely to decline.

A final element in this argument is found in the scale of tourist activity in the street. As was pointed out above [31] in 1985 tourists spent some £500 million in Oxford Street, and thus provide an important element in the retail activity of the street. This input is subject to fluctuation through time largely in response to changes in the level of Sterling, and other 'unforeseen' short-term fluctuations, such as occurred recently as a reaction to terrorist activity. However, despite these short-term fluctuations there can be little doubt that
tourism will continue, in the long-term, to have a significant positive impact on the retail environment of Oxford Street.

When considered together it would seem that the reasons outlined above provide a strong case for arguing that Oxford Street, as a principal shopping centre, is unlikely to decline.

8.5.3. Oxford Street: The Future - Prosperity and Development.

For Oxford Street to prosper and develop, it is generally agreed that change of a fairly radical nature would be required. Indeed, there can be little doubt that considerable scope exists for the improvement of the shopping environment of the street, through tackling some of the problems outlined earlier of pollution, congestion, and so on.

As was discussed, a number of radical schemes have been proposed toward the end of exploiting this potential for the development of Oxford Street, including for example, a system of elevated walkways, an elevated roadway for through traffic with pedestrian and service access at ground level, and total pedestrianisation of the street.

These and other such radical schemes would undoubtedly have a important bearing on improving the quality of the retail environment of the street. However, the implementation of any of these schemes is likely to pose several major problems. For example, first, the capital investment required for such radical development proposals would be immense. When this cost is set
beside the benefit accrued through development then it may well be found that the marginal increment in the latter is insufficient to justify such investment.

Secondly, the question of who would pay the cost of development is raised. The most likely payee would be the local (Oxford Street) ratepayers. However, this would require a special Act of Parliament to levy an additional rate to pay for construction. Although this is unlikely to be opposed, it could still prove to be a complex and lengthy process.

Thirdly, any radical change will undoubtedly cause massive disruption during the period of construction; a period that is likely to be lengthy. Trade diverted during this period could, at least in part, be lost permanently, especially if, for example, this period of disruption coincided with major competitive retail developments around the M25.

And lastly, it will be difficult to choose a scheme that strikes a balance between all interested parties. For example, if the scheme chosen is in favour of through traffic then there is likely to be opposition from retailers. Conversely, if the balance is in favour of the retailers then there will be opposition from local transport interests.

In general, any radical scheme for the development of the retail environment of Oxford Street is likely to face considerable and even perhaps insurmountable problems. Does this imply that the street is unlikely to prosper and develop in the
future? If so, and if the earlier contention that Oxford Street is unlikely to decline is accepted, then it would seem that it is very possible that the street could stagnate.


What would this option of the stagnation of Oxford Street incorporate? It implies that no radical changes will occur; that the street will continue, as it has done in recent times, to move from one problem to the next by implementing only short term solutions. The cost and complexity of any radical development certainly appears to make this a viable proposition.

Indeed, it could be argued that many of the retailers in the street could be content with the trading environment as presently exists. Many continue to trade profitably even during downswings in the market, and so could adopt the attitude that it is not necessary to pay an additional levy on their rates to pay for a scheme that may only have a marginal effect on their turnover.

However, it would seem from the questionnaire and personal interview surveys carried out (as well as the interviews with agents) that many of the retailers in Oxford Street are well aware of its problems and are, along with shoppers and local planners, anxious that some changes should be introduced.

Taking into account all of the factors thus far outlined, it
would seem that a compromise policy could well be the most viable proposition.

8.5.5. Oxford Street: The Future - An Example of Compromise.

Arguably, a compromise which would be greatly suited to the development of Oxford Street is that of partial pedestrianisation; the removal of all traffic from sections of the street. This scheme would have a number of significant advantages.

First, the cost of such a project would be relatively low in comparison with most of the other more radical solutions.

Secondly, introduction of this scheme could easily be 'phased in' through time, thus minimising disruption during the period of construction.

Thirdly, it would allow a through flow of traffic by the channelling of vehicles through adjacent side streets. In addition, it would allow access for customers, private and public transport, and for the servicing of retailers.

And finally, partial pedestrianisation would provide a less congested and safer shopping environment in the developed sections of the street. Indeed, overall there can be little doubt that such a scheme would greatly improve the retail environment of Oxford Street, encouraging more trade both locally and from tourists, as similar schemes have done in other parts of London (for example,
Partial pedestrianisation could however pose a number of problems. First, it would only improve the environment of sections of the street, and thus, the possibility arises that the traditional 'east/west' pattern of differential quality and development could be replaced with a 'pedestrianised/non-pedestrianised' pattern. The remainder would still be subject to problems of congestion, pollution, and so on. This leads to a second possible problem, in that if payment for such a scheme were to be through local traders having to pay an additional levy on their rates, then those in sections of the street not scheduled for pedestrianisation may be unwilling to pay this levy.

Lastly, it is likely to be opposed by retailers and their occupiers in those adjacent streets through which traffic from the pedestrianised sections would be channelled.

Despite these problems, partial pedestrianisation provides an example of a compromise solution through which Oxford Street could potentially develop. At worst the implementation of such a compromise would help to steer the street away from what would appear to be, logically, its most likely course - towards stagnation.


In conclusion, a number of important points are worth emphasising. First, in viewing changing patterns of retail
activity in Oxford Street it should always be remembered that it acts as the focus of retail activity of one of the most important shopping areas in the World. Thus, the forces at work in influencing trading patterns are likely to be both powerful and unique.

Secondly, trading patterns through time are characterised by their highly dynamic nature and are the product of the operation of a wide and complex range of influencing factors.

Thirdly, Oxford Street is prone to a number of retailing, environmental and traffic related problems which pose a constant and serious threat to the quality of its trading environment. As such, these problems need to be examined carefully and suitable solutions implemented.

The fourth concluding point that should be emphasised is that a number of schemes exist that could be implemented in Oxford Street and that would enhance its shopping environment. However, it is apparent that only a few of those outlined above provide a measure of benefit that is sufficient to justify and offset cost, technical, and other problems.

Fifthly, three alternative scenarios were examined in relation to what the future may hold for Oxford Street as one of the World’s most important shopping centres. As was argued, it would seem unlikely that the street, as a principal shopping centre, will decline in the long term, and that any radical schemes designed to improve the quality of the retail environment
of the street, are likely to face considerable, or even insurmountable, problems. In addition, since stagnation would seem to be unacceptable, it would seem that some form of compromise situation would be most suitable. However, as was seen from the discussion of such a compromise (partial pedestrianisation), even these are prone to a number of serious problems.

No matter what scheme is chosen for Oxford Street, careful management will be required; "the importance of positive management in creating successful shopping centres is increasingly being recognised in this country" [33].

CHAPTER 8: NOTES.
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2. See Section 4.2.3.
3. ibid.
5. Westminster City Council (1986) Appendix V.
6. See Appendix VII Table 3.
8. This division of Oxford Street is to the east and west of Oxford Circus. See Location Map, Appendix II Table 1.
10. As discussed in Section 6.2.3.
12. As discussed in Section 6.2.3.
14. Westminster City Council (1986a) Appendix VII.
18. Westminster City Council (1986a) Appendix VII.
21. ibid.
22. Westminster City Council (1986a) Appendix VII.
23. ibid.
24. See Section 2.4.2. Figure 2.9.
26. See Section 4.2.7. Figure 4.24.
28. Westminster City Council (1986a) Appendix VII.
31. Westminster City Council (1986a) Appendix VII.
32. See Location Map, Appendix II Table 1.

In this chapter, consideration will be given to the development of models with regard to certain elements in patterns of retail change in the principal shopping streets of the study area. By doing this the two broad aims of the study, description and explanation of these trading patterns, will be complete.

The text thus far has concentrated on the identification and analysis of the major changes that have taken place with respect to trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the study area during the period from 1976 to 1985. It also concentrates on the identification and discussion of the main political, economic and social factors which have played the most important roles in helping to shape these trading patterns in this period.

In attempting to explain these complex processes of locational change, models may be developed. Three aspects in particular will be considered. First, an attempt will be made to model the role of political, economic and social factors that help to shape trading patterns, as noted above and as discussed in some detail in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. Secondly, a model will be constructed with regard to aspects of the locational decision making strategies of traders in the area. And finally, consideration will be given as to how changes in retail patterns in the study area relate to the theories of retail institutional change, as outlined in Chapter 2.
9.2.1. The Role of Political, Economic and Social Influences:  
Introduction.

In Chapters 5, 6 and 7 an outline was provided with regard to the major political, economic and social influences at work in helping to shape trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge. As was noted in the conclusion to that section of the text, in this chapter, an attempt will be made to develop a framework that will move away from simply the identification and discussion of the above categories of influence, in largely singular terms, towards their examination in cumulative and relative terms. The purpose of this modelling is to pursue a better understanding of the role that these principal influencing factors play within the complex and constantly changing retailing systems of the West End and Knightsbridge.

9.2.2. The Role of Political, Economic and Social Influences:  
Initial Development of the Modelling Framework.

It is apparent from the earlier consideration of the range of political, economic and social factors at work in the principal shopping streets of the study area that it would be impossible to develop a model that could quantify the actual importance of any single influencing factor. Indeed, due to the diversity and complexity of the factors involved even any attempt to model the relative importance of these factors has to be treated in a very
general sense. The first stage in modelling the role of influencing patterns to identify briefly those discussed earlier.

Political influences can be identified at four different levels, central government, metropolitan authority, local authority and trade association.

The range of economic influences identified with regard to trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the study area were turnover, the market that they serve, tourism, rents, rates, external finance and property agents.

The social factors that have an effect on trading patterns through time were discussed in terms of the social characteristics and demands of the shopper and those of the trader. It is possible to show these three groups of factors in diagramatic form. This is shown below in Figure 9.1.

Figure 9.1. - Framework of Influences on Trading Patterns in the Principal Shopping Streets of the West End and Knightsbridge.
Figure 9.1. serves to illustrate that a wide and complex range of factors have a part to play in the trading patterns of the four main study streets, and therefore, it is not surprising that the patterns of trading examined earlier in these streets, as a function of this range of factors also tend to be varied and complex in nature. However, a further aspect must be added to this framework of influences in that, the importance of the role that these factors play varies both through time and between the factors themselves.

9.2.3. The Role of Political, Economic and Social Influences: Further Development of the Modelling Framework.

Any consideration as to the relative importance of these influencing factors can only be in the most general sense since it would be impossible to fully rank each of these factors in terms of its 'impact' on trading patterns. This is for three main reasons. First, the diversity in the nature of these factors makes direct comparison unsuitable. Secondly, the impact of any individual factor is likely to vary through both space and time. And thirdly, it would be impossible to attribute any specific change in trading patterns to any single factor.

However, despite this, it is possible to identify which of these factors do tend to play the most important role in helping to shape trading patterns. In terms of political influences it can be seen from the earlier discussion that the most important set of influences come from central government. However, some
trends in the data collected and analysed with regard to changing land-use patterns in the four study streets suggest that some borough Council policies also have some effect. The most prominent example is of the apparent trend toward a reduction in the proportion of non-retail land-uses in these streets; a policy vigorously pursued by both borough Councils, if not by central government, who do not seem to hold it in such high regard in acting as arbitrators in appeals. Both the Greater London Council (before abolition) and the three trade associations in the area would seem to play the least important political role in influencing trading patterns; both being restricted by their lack of formal powers and their dependence on others for the enforcement of their demands.

Therefore, it would seem that within the political element of influence, it may be possible to construct a very general hierarchy of importance in terms of influence on trading patterns, with central government influences at the top, borough Council influences in the middle, and metropolitan and trade association influences at the bottom. This 'hierarchy' has, of course, at the present time, been further simplified by the removal of the Greater London Council (see Figure 9.2., below).

Any attempt to derive the same kind of hierarchical arrangement for the economic factors discussed earlier proves not practicable. This is due to the nature and diversity of the factors involved which makes accurate and meaningful direct comparison impossible. However, from the questionnaire and
interview surveys carried out it is possible to identify three economic factors that consistently play the most important roles through time in all of the streets [1]. First, rent and rates levels were consistently identified as being very important in

relation to trading patterns. There are several reasons for this including the fact that rent and rates levels restrict the type of trader that can operate profitably in the principal shopping streets of the study area and that they greatly contribute to the rate of change of retailers since margins are reduced and thus the possibility of business failure is increased.

Secondly, tourism would also seem to be an economic factor of considerable importance. Tourism probably plays a more important role in helping to shape the trading environment of the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge than in most other shopping centres in the United Kingdom; a role that is
illustrated by the retail property market seemingly being linked to tourist spending [2].

Thirdly, the presence of complementary traders also emerges, from all of the sources examined, as being of particular importance to traders making a locational decision in the area, and thus, through this, upon trading patterns in the area.

The other economic factors discussed earlier also play a part in helping to shape trading patterns. However, their importance tends to be limited to either particular types of trader, one or two of the study streets, or one or two points in time, and thus, do not exhibit consistency of importance.

Finally, any form of differentiation of importance of the main social factors involved here is unwise. To a far greater degree than was the case with either the political or economic factors, the nature of these social factors makes comparison in this sense virtually impossible. Thus, it can be assumed that, in effect (for the purposes of the modelling framework) the influences of the social demands and requirements of both shoppers and traders upon trading patterns can be considered to be of equal importance.

Having considered the importance of these factors, the framework of the model can be modified. This is shown below in Figure 9.3.

One possible further modification that, it could be argued, would be to the benefit of this model would be to consider the
importance of these influencing factors, in relative terms between the different categories of factor. The earlier attempt to
distinguish between the importance of these factors was carried out within the bounds of each category with each category being considered in isolation. Therefore, it would seem to be of some value to consider these category differences across category boundaries. However, such a modification, although desirable, would not be advisable since any resultant hierarchical structure
(derived on the basis of differential inter-category importance) would be highly questionable. This would be because direct comparison between different categories of influence is very difficult to justify.

9.2.4. The Role of Political, Economic and Social Influences: Summary and Conclusions.

In this section of the text, a general model was developed to help illustrate the ways in which political, economic and social factors combine to help shape trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge.

Its development draws upon the range of data collected throughout the course of the study including those derived from the questionnaire and personal interview surveys of traders in the area, the range of personal interviews with planning personnel, both in local and metropolitan authorities, local trade associations, agents, and other bodies, and in-depth discussions with personnel of the collaborative body, Hillier Parker May and Rowden.

The model is not predictive. In addition, the model should not be assumed to be externally valid, in that it can only be applied to the principal shopping streets of the study area. It is constructed with regard to a trading environment that is unique, and therefore, is unlikely to be directly applicable to other retailing systems. The purposes of the model are twofold.
First, to identify the main factors at work in shaping trading patterns in the study area. And secondly, to illustrate the way in which these factors inter-relate in their influencing role. One further point that should be noted is that, although the model does incorporate a temporal element, this is only valid in the period of the study, and therefore, other factors may come into play at other points in time.

This model is an attempt to simplify a highly complex system, and indeed, it could be argued that this complexity makes modelling of the systems of change inappropriate.


From the data gathered with respect to the locational decisions of traders as to whether to move into, remain in, or leave a shop unit in one of the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge, it is apparent that there is a great diversity between the types of factors taken into account in this respect.

One basis upon which it may be possible to build a model that illustrates and incorporates this diversity is that of the degree of rationality of the locational decision. In this section of the text an investigation will be carried out with respect to the construction of such a model.
9.3.2. Decision Making: Theoretical Background.

Rationality has been defined as being "concerned with the selection of preferred behaviour alternatives in terms of some system of values whereby the consequences of behaviour can be evaluated" [3]. It can be argued that rational decision making takes the following form [4];

(i) the decision maker sets out all the feasible alternatives which are open to him, rejecting any that are not feasible;

(ii) he takes into account whatever information is readily available, or worth collecting, to assess the consequences of choosing each of the alternatives;

(iii) in the light of their consequences, he ranks the alternatives in order of preference;

(iv) he chooses the alternative that is highest in this order i.e. he chooses the alternative with the consequences he prefers over all others available to him.

To be absolutely economically rational is to be economic man. Economic man, in making a locational decision, would exhibit four major behavioral qualities, as pointed out by Chapman [5]. First, and most importantly, a desire to seek maximum profit. Secondly, total objective rationality. Thirdly, the ability to take decisions based on perfect information. And finally, infallible judgement in relation to the evaluation of alternative strategies.
With these behavioural qualities in mind, it is apparent that "economic man is an exceptional character who has little resemblance to decision makers in the real world" [6] since it is not possible for any individual to act in the conditions of perfect knowledge and perfect judgement [7]. In attempting to act in an objectively rational manner "the behaving subject cannot know directly the consequences that will follow upon his behaviour. What he does is to form an expectation of future consequences. If the predictions are accurate, the correct decisions can be made" [8]. Thus, "human decision making falls short of meeting the demands of rationality" [9].

Pred examined the behavioural decisions of entrepreneurs and the classical concept of economic man. He questioned the assumptions of motive and level of knowledge [10]. Pred's scenario is one of locational decision making as a process functioning under conditions of varying information and dependent upon the varying abilities of decision makers.

Krumme recognised that, for entrepreneurs, there is a 'range of tolerance' which is represented by the "scope of alternative actions within which the entrepreneur is free to apply principles other than those of profit maximisation" [11]. For example, empirical studies of firm relocation studies by Loasby [12] suggest that, when firms are faced by problems which prompt them to look for a new location, initial investigations tend to be in their existing locality. Only if these initial investigations
fail to find a satisfactory site will they search further afield. Thus, rather than seeking the 'best' site available, firms tend to seek only for a 'satisfactory' site. The result of the operation of this 'range of tolerance' is the emergence of profit margins (ranging from break-even to profit maximisation) within which firms may tolerate deviations away from the optimum.

At this point it is important to introduce a distinction between the use of the terms 'optimum' and 'optimal' (in locational terms) as employed in the following discussion in order that there use will not be confused. term 'optimum' will be used (as defined by Losch [13]) to refer to a site which would command the largest market area and thus would result in the highest sales revenues. The term 'optimal' will refer to a site which commands a large enough market area (and thus will derive sufficient sales revenue) to provide profit. Thus, for the purposes of modelling, optimum is being equated to profit maximisation and optimal to any profit except maximum profit.

It is apparent that all locational decisions taken must (in practical terms) be sub-optimum in nature. There are two senses in which this must be the case. First, those decision makers seeking profit maximisation must do so within the constraints of their knowledge and judgement. Since neither of these can be 'perfect' any decision cannot be absolutely rational and thus, cannot be optimum. Secondly, decision makers may not be seeking an optimum location. This notion involves replacing ideas of maximising with those of satisficing; "the idea that decision
makers merely seek solutions that 'will do'; that are satisfactory in terms of the targets set by the decision makers themselves" [14]. However, although all locational decisions must be sub-optimum, the degree to which they are sub-optimum is likely to vary considerably between decision makers. It is on this basis of variability that an elementary model may be constructed.

9.3.3. Decision Making: The Hypothesis to be Modelled.

The hypothesis that can be forwarded is that, in the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge, in the period since 1976, it is possible to categorise traders on the basis of the degree of rationality of their locational decision to move into, remain in, or move out of a shop unit in one of these streets.

The basis for the testing of this hypothesis are the data gathered from the questionnaire survey of traders, the interview survey of traders, and interviews with agents and others with a knowledge of trading in the study area [15].

9.3.4. Decision Making: Initial Development of the Model.

The perfect scenario would be one where the classification of trader would be in terms of actual degree of economic rationality. However, this would only occur where it was possible to determine trader rationality precisely. It is apparent, that
this ideal (of an infinite number of categories of rationality) is unrealistic. Despite this, it may be possible to develop a classificatory system based upon a smaller number of categories of rationality. The logical starting point would be to identify those types of trader in the four principal shopping streets of the study area who would exhibit (in relative terms) the highest and lowest levels of rationality in their locational decision making strategies.

9.3.5. Decision Making: The High Rationality Trader Category.

It is possible in the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge to identify traders who are highly rational (in relative terms) in their locational decision making strategies. For these traders, in this respect, it is felt to be of great importance to trade from a location that will maximise profitability. Thus, in this search for locational optimality a considerable amount of market research is carried out. For such traders a number of factors emerge as being of great importance in relation to site profitability. For example, one of the traders interviewed indicated that it was not sufficient to simply have a knowledge of pedestrian flows at a given shop unit (from which it may be possible to derive some rough projection of turnover levels) but it was also necessary to know the composition (in terms of their socio-economic characteristics and so on) of this 'passing trade'. In addition, trends in turnover, both past and future may be investigated. Thus for these 'highly rational'
traders considerations of turnover, rents, rates, and so on, as well as being considered at a point in time may also be considered through time. Therefore, in this respect, rationality is being defined as the number of factors taken into account in making a locational decision, and the depth to which these factors are investigated. This is similar to a technique employed by Townroe (in relation to the rationality of industrial location decisions) which incorporated the development of the concept of the 'scenario of righteous behaviour' in locational decision making [16].

If it is accepted that such a category of highly rational trader does exist in the principal shopping streets of the study area, what types of trader are they likely to be?

Three main types of trader emerge as falling into this category. First, traders who have 'in house' research facilities, usually in the form of effective estates departments. In this situation, locational decisions tend to be taken at two levels; board level (company directors) and departmental level. This process often operates as follows. At board level, the general decision, for example, to increase the company's presence in the West End may be taken. This decision will then be passed onto the estates department who will then investigate a number of possible sites and make its recommendation to the board of directors who will then take the final locational decision. The initiation of such a process will come from one of three sources; the board themselves, the estates department, or property agents.
acting a proactive manner.

Thus, for this group of highly rational traders it is important that rationality is exhibited at both of these organisational levels in that, the board, in initiating or considering a general locational strategy should act on a basis of a wide range of influencing criteria, and that the estates department should employ rigorous site selection methods.

The traders who fall into this first category of highly rational traders tend, in the main, to be larger multiples who have a capital base that allows the development and maintenance of an effective estates department.

The second type of trader that tends to fall into this highly rational category are those who employ outside agencies to investigate potential sites. Here again, the general locational strategy will be determined at board level, but specific site investigation will be external to the company. Thus, by employing a professional agency to undertake this aspect of the locational strategy, rationality of site selection (matching the demands of the trader with the characteristics of the site) is virtually guaranteed. However, again it is necessary that the board level locational processes are themselves rationally based.

The types of trader who tend to fall into this category tend to be smaller organisations for whom rationality is seen to be important in locational decision making, but for whom 'in house' research facilities could not be maintained due to
limitations of company size.

The third type of trader falling under this highly rational heading are certain of the franchise operations. Some aspects of franchising incorporate significant elements of locational rationality. For example, some franchisors, in attempting to establish a market profile, are very careful in their early site selections in order to satisfy considerations of profitability and image. In addition, for some franchise operations, as was seen from the interview survey, strict locational rationality is fundamental in their overall and long term strategies. For example, one of the traders interviewed outlined a locational strategy where the parent company took responsibility for the selection of all sites using their in-house estates facilities. Only when a suitable site was selected was a 'suitable' franchisee sought. For this particular company, such a high degree of rationality in locational choice, (coupled with a similar degree of rationality in relation to franchisee selection and marketing) has been very successful. This is perhaps best illustrated by noting that, since its establishment in 1984 in its present form, only one of its outlets (now in excess of one hundred on a nationwide scale), has failed. However, this 'highly rational, franchise' category, like the first, is also dependent upon rationality being exhibited both at board and departmental levels within the company structure.

It would seem apparent that the types of traders that fall into this highly rational category cannot be defined in terms
of size, type or structure. For example, as will be seen, some large, multiple traders exhibit relatively low levels of rationality in their locational decision making processes and some small, independent retailers, principally by employing specialised external agencies, exhibit relatively high levels of rationality in this respect.


In contrast with those traders in the principal shopping streets of the study area that exhibit relatively high levels of locational rationality, a category of trader also exists that places a low priority upon rationality in this sense. A broad two-way distinction can be drawn with regard to these low rationality traders into those 'who don't try to be rational' and those 'who don't need to be rational'.

First, consideration can be given to those traders who 'don't try' to be rational in their locational strategy. Such traders tend to fall into two main groups. The first are those for whom the status or image of trading from a shop unit in a prime shopping street in the West End or Knightsbridge is of great importance. The role of status or image as social factors influencing locational decisions, as discussed earlier, tends to result in traders paying insufficient attention to the likely profitability of a shop unit. Thus, by removing from this group, those traders making decisions on the basis of status or image
which may have long term or larger scale benefits and therefore, can be perceived as possessing some element of rationality, it is apparent that locational decisions made solely (or even predominantly) on this basis, exhibit a low level of economic rationality. It can be seen that this first group of 'low rationality traders who don’t try to be rational' operate in almost direct contrast to those traders who exhibit relatively high levels of locational rationality, in the sense that the former group incorporate few 'economic' factor into their locational strategies.

The second group of traders who fall into this 'low rationality and don’t try to be rational' category is found in some franchise operations. As noted above, some franchise operations incorporate relatively high levels of locational rationality in their overall operational strategies. However, as was also noted, the opposite can also be the case. This can be seen in two main forms; on the part of the parent company (the franchisor) and on the part of the franchisee.

A parent company in a franchise operation need not follow a highly rational locational strategy in order to be profitable. This is particularly true where the franchise operation is well established and has a high market profile. One large franchise operation in the United Kingdom, with an international reputation and a significant presence in the West End and Knightsbridge, typifies this low rationality approach. This franchise operation, by satisfying the criteria of being well established and having a

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high market profile, finds little difficulty in finding franchisees willing to take on new or existing shop units. Responsibility for rents, rates and service charges is left in the hands of the franchisee who must pay the parent company a percentage of his turnover. Thus, even when a franchised shop unit fails, the franchisor is guaranteed to derive some capital gain, albeit that it could be in the relatively short term. In addition, since as was noted above, demand for franchises is high, few problems arise in finding a new franchisee.

Trading in such an environment, it is apparent that the parent company need not be rational either in location choice or in franchisee choice, since profit is guaranteed. Indeed, the particular franchisor in question, trades highly profitably at the present time by employing such a strategy. However, the length of time that this inherently unstable strategy can be followed must be brought into question due to the likely long term damage to the market profile of the franchisor.

The second form in which the 'don't try to be rational' approach appears in franchise systems is on the part of the franchisees themselves. Some franchisees are relatively rational in their locational strategies, and indeed, some would even fall into the the 'highly rational trader category' discussed above. However, some exhibit very low levels of rationality in this respect. Here, two attitudes are prevalent. First, the attitude that, by being part of an established or rapidly expanding, high profile franchise operation, profitability must be guaranteed.
And secondly, the attitude that incorporates status or image as being a prominent factor in a decision making process.

It can be seen that the ‘low rationality/don’t try to be rational traders’ fall into two main sub-categories; first, those for whom location status is important in making a locational decision, including some franchisees, and secondly, parent companies of certain franchise operations.

The second group of ‘low rationality traders who don’t need to be rational’ are, on the whole, found in the form of traders who are already trading in one of the prime shopping streets of the study area, and are trading there on long leases taken up in the 1960's or early 1970's. In this period, it was possible to enter into lease agreements of upwards of twenty years with infrequent reviews. Thus, with the massive improvement in the retail property market of the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge, since this time (and with the last rental review being perhaps ten years before) such traders are operating with rent levels that are very low in comparison with true (current) market values.

Therefore, for traders in this position, the question of locational rationality does not arise since, at such artificially low rent levels, the magnitude of passing trade means that a turnover that will derive profit is virtually gauranteed. For these traders, operating as they do as profit satisficers, there is no question of following processes of locational optimisation (changing operational format to reflect and exploit site
characteristics) and thus of pursuing maximum profit.

A number of traders in the principal shopping streets of the study area fall into this category, and of particular note in this respect, is one large multiple footwear retailing chain.

It is interesting to note that many of these long leases are beginning to come to an end, and therefore, the upward revisions of rent levels toward more realistic market values, has taken place. The response of many of these traders to this rent change, has been to leave their prime sites in favour of shop units in less prestigious, and therefore, less expensive (in rent terms) locations. This suggests that these business types, run in this way, are not suited to these prime shopping streets, are not capable of changing their operational formats to survive, or do not wish to change their operational format to pursue profit. Thus, these 'don’t need to be rational traders' are being 'forced' into taking an economically rational locational decision.


Thus far, the discussion has been limited to traders in the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge who exhibit relatively high or low levels of rationality in their locational decision making strategies. These groups, however, do not account for all of the traders in these streets, and therefore, the remaining group must represent a wide range of
locational rationalities. However, it was not found to be possible to identify more than one meaningful category. Thus, this 'middle group' of traders could be described as being meso rational in locational terms, in the sense that they exhibit some degree of rationality in their locational decision making processes, but not to the extremes required to fall into one of the other categories.

Three main groups of traders can be found in this meso rational category. The first are those that take a limited number of 'economic factors' into consideration in their locational choice. Thus, although not investigating a wide range of economic factors at a point in time and through time, a number of the most important (for example, pedestrian flows, rents, etc.) may be taken into account in order that some estimation of turnover and profitability may be derived. The rationality of a trader, reflected in the number and depth of investigation of factors taken into account, will tend to vary between traders falling into this meso rational category. However, sub-division into smaller 'rationality categories' would be impracticable and, arguably, of little value.

The second group of trader falling into this meso rational category are those who take locational decisions based on the presence in a shopping street of one or more direct competitors. From the interviews carried out, it was apparent that a number of traders (especially smaller, independent traders) decide to take on a shop unit in a prime shopping street on the basis that, if a
direct competitor (one that sells a product very similar to that of the small, independent trader) is trading there profitably (and especially one with an established, high market profile), then it should be possible for that trader to also operate profitably in that street. Thus, the assumption, on the part of the decision maker, is that the 'established, high profile trader' has taken a highly rational decision to locate there, and therefore, in a sense, the 'small, independent trader' is transferring that rationality to his own locational decision. It could be argued that such a locational decision is, to at least some extent, rational. However, a locational decision taken on such a basis could well face a number of problems in the longer term.

The third group of traders falling into the meso rationality category also exhibit elements of 'rationality transfer' in the sense that this group are largely dependent upon the input of agents in their locational decisions.

It is apparent that agents play a part in helping to shape trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge. This role is perhaps most apparent in this group of traders who fall into the meso rational category. For example, from the interviews surveys carried out it was apparent that many traders, after taking a general locational decision (to, for example, increase their presence in the West End) simply ask an agent to find a property that suits their needs. Thus, for such trader, the role that agents play is a fundamental one, and
as one trader interviewed indicated, it is a relationship that is based on complete trust, and therefore, may have very little 'follow up' investigation; "When I need a new shop unit, I know that (the agent) will find me the best available on the market at that time. He knows all about these things" [17].

It would seem, that this whole approach is dependent upon the agents themselves acting in a rational manner in relation to the property needs of their clients, and indeed, from the interviews carried out, it would seem that, in the main, they do act in as rational manner as possible in this respect. However, it is apparent that it is very difficult for an agent to know the exact property requirements of clients, since these are not always transmitted accurately to the former from the latter. In addition, it must also be recognised that agents can find themselves in a situation where a conflict of loyalties arises. For example, if a property comes onto the market that is ideally suited to more than one 'property seeking' client, in this situation, the agent will always act, either in his own best interests or in those of his company. Therefore, it would seem apparent that for these two reasons (agents not knowing exact requirements of traders, and finding themselves in a situation of conflicting interests) a locational strategy that relies heavily on the input of agents, although rational to some extent, is not a highly rational one.

What type of trader tends to fall into the meso rational category? By its broad definition, it is apparent that this
category is likely to encompass a wide range of trader types, sizes and structures. Indeed, it would now seem apparent that locational rationality bears little consistent relationship to any of these factors. Thus, in this category it is simply not possible, with the few exceptions outlined above, to identify any one type of trader that is more apparent than others.


It is apparent that the initial phase of this model building, based on a range of qualitative data sources, provides a complex picture of processes of locational rationality in the principal shopping streets of the study area. Therefore, at this stage, it is useful to summarise the three broad categories so far developed.

From Figure 9.4. (below) it can be seen that, in the highly rational category, three main types of trader are found; large multiples with in-house research facilities; smaller traders employing external professional agencies; and, 'long term' rational franchisors.

The types of traders falling into the low rationality category fall under two broad sub-headings. First, those 'who don't try to be rational', and secondly, those 'who don't need to be rational'. These two sub-categories can be further divided. In the first, this is into traders for whom considerations of
locational status and image are important, and traders in some franchise operations, both on the part of the franchisor (those for whom locational rationality is no longer a requirement for profitability), and on the part of the franchisee (for example, those for whom, as above, status and image play a predominant role).

Figure 9.4. - Trader Rationality Categories: Interim Summary.

HIGH RATIONALITY - 1. 'in-house' research facilities - mainly large multiples;
2. employ outside agencies - desire 'in-house facilities, but cannot justify due to limitations of company size;
3. some franchises.

MESO RATIONALITY - 1. limited number of 'economic factors' in locational choice;
2. decision based on presence of successful similar traders;
3. decision dependent on property agent input.

LOW RATIONALITY -
1. 'Don't try to be Rational' (i) status/image important;
   (ii) Franchises - a. franchisor - high profile, guaranteed profit; b. franchisees -'part of profitable franchise group therefore must make profit' attitude OR status/image important.
2. 'Don't Need to be Rational' - long lease holders.
Finally, traders falling into the meso rational category, can be divided into three sub-categories; those who take into account a limited number of economic factors into consideration in locational decision making; those locating on the basis of the presence of successful, high profile and directly competitive traders; and, those who are largely dependent upon agents in their locational strategies.

It would seem from this that the hypothesis forwarded earlier, namely, that in the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge, in the period since 1976, it is possible to categorise traders on the basis of the degree of rationality of their locational decision to remain in, move out of, or move into one of these streets, has to some extent been proven. This can be argued in the sense that three broad categories have been identified on the basis of locational rationality, into which all traders in these streets fall.

It may, however, be possible to take this general model further, and introduce elements of refinement that should help to clarify its functioning in relation to processes of locational change in the study area.


It would appear from the discussion thus far, that a number of economic satisficers trade in the principal shopping streets of the study area. This is perhaps seen in its most extreme form.
in the case of traders for whom profit assumes little importance compared with considerations of status and image. However, excluding this extreme group, who make up a small proportion of traders in these streets, it would seem apparent that profit plays an important role in locational decisions.

Profit is intrinsically linked to location, in the sense that, the 'better' the location the higher the potential profits. Therefore, in seeking profitability in a new shop unit, it is apparent that the fundamental factor is that of locational optimality.

Given that the optimality of locations in the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge is subject to spatial changes relate to movements in the market through time, what does this mean for the model under construction?

The model, as it stands, only takes into account the rationality of a locational decision at a point in time. Only the most rational of traders make any attempt to consider likely future trends in their economic locational determinants, and indeed, it is apparent that market predictions are extremely difficult due to the number and complexity of influencing factors. Therefore, for those traders seeking an optimal location (those in the high and meso rational categories) a location may be optimal at the point in time that it is taken. However, changing market conditions through time may affect the optimality of that site in that the site could either become more optimal (during upswings) or less optimal (during downswings). In
addition, it is important to note that it may on occasions be economically rational to locate in a sub-optimal (loss making) site if an upswing in the market is predicted and thus, an increase in the optimality of a site is expected.

It would seem that for those sites that are marginally optimal, downswings in the market can have particularly serious, in the sense that, these sites can become sub-optimal (loss making). Indeed, it is apparent that virtually all sites at such times will lose some element of their optimality. Traders could respond in one of three ways to such a situation. First, they may continue to trade at a reduced level of profit, in anticipation of an upswing in the market. Secondly, they may choose to cease trading at that location in order to minimise profit loss. Or thirdly, they may choose to change their trading approach to one that better suits the prevailing market conditions for that location.

This final idea is closely linked to Alchian’s concept of adaption and adoption, which was developed by Tiebout [18] on the basis of the findings of and Katona and Morgan [19]. This concept was developed within the behaviouralist school of thought with regard to industrial location.

It could be argued that, in making a locational decision, traders are searching for a ‘window of success’; to sell a product in such a way as to maximise the optimality and thus, the profitability of a location. However, this ‘window’ is likely to
alter through time, and therefore, unless short-term reductions in profit are accepted, changes in product or marketing strategy must be introduced in order to 'restore' optimality.

Thus, it is apparent that the model, as it stands, must be adapted to incorporate these elements. It could be argued that these adjustments would take the following forms. First, those traders falling into the high rationality category (and as such acting, in effect, as profit maximisers) and those falling into the meso rationality category (and as such, acting as profit satisficers) seek to adapt their overall trading strategies, where appropriate, to maintain profit levels, may be prepared to endure reductions in profit levels in the short term (so long as some element of profitability is maintained), or they may cease trading.

Secondly, those falling into the 'low rationality, don't need to be rational category' will either continue to trade without change, unless profit levels become unacceptable, in which case they will cease trading. And thirdly, it could be argued that those in the 'low rationality, don't try to be rational category', will continue to trade without change, since profit is of little or no concern. This argument is summarised in Figure 9.5., below.

It is apparent that a weakness emerges in that the model assumes that low locational rationality in a trader must mean that overall trading strategies are also low. However, this is not necessarily the case, and is well illustrated by the
contention that it may be possible for traders to make poor locational decisions but, by adapting to prevalent market conditions and adopting new trading methods (Alchian's concept of adaption and adoption), may be able to survive and be profitable. Thus, with specific reference to the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge, 'Alchian's concept' may be applied in this sense, or alternatively, it may be applied in the sense of traders changing their operational formats in order to maintain or improve the optimality of a particular site as determined by prevailing 'market' conditions.

These developments of the model, by introducing a temporal element, increase its value in helping to explain locational strategies through time. In addition, this helps to explain some more general aspects of trader behaviour.

9.3.10. Decision Making: Summary of Model.

Figure 9.5. (below) provides an outline of the model developed to help explain decision making strategies of traders in the principal shopping streets of study area through time. It would seem apparent that this general outline is an extreme simplification of what is a very complex process, and indeed, on this and other grounds, it is open to considerable criticism. However, it does have several main strengths.

First, it proposes the concept that economic rationality in locational decision making is a viable means by which to
categorise traders in the principal shopping streets of the study area. Secondly, it identifies that there exists a wide range of locational strategies of traders in these streets. Thirdly, it

Figure 9.5. - Trader Rationality; Summary Model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRADER CATEGORY</th>
<th>TRADER AIM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Rationality</td>
<td>Maximum Profit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meso Rationality</td>
<td>Profit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Rationality -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Don't need to be'</td>
<td>Profit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Don't try to be'</td>
<td>Status/Image</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OPTIONS TO MEET CHANGING MARKET CONDITIONS.

1. Trade at short term loss;
2. Cease trading - relocate or close;
3. Change operational format;
4. No action.

OPTIONS TAKEN.

High Rationality and Meso Rationality - Options 1, 2 or 3.

Low Rationality 'Don't need to be' - Options 2 or 4.

Low Rationality 'Don't try to be' - Option 4.
shows how it is possible for traders to adapt to changing market conditions in order to maintain locational optimality and thus profitability. And finally, if nothing else, it provides a starting point for examining processes of locational change and decision making strategies in one of the most dynamic and complex retailing environments in the world.

9.4.1. Retail Institutional Change: Introduction.

In Chapter 2 consideration was given to theories of retail institutional change. In this section, these theories will be examined with regard to how they relate to actual changes in retailing in the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge in the period 1976 to 1985.

The three basic approaches discussed earlier were, environmental theory (based on the notion that changes in retailing are a function of the operational environment of a retail institution), cyclical theory (which suggests that changes take place in a rhythmic fashion with reoccurrences of earlier patterns), and conflict theory (which considers the introduction of new forms of retailing and how these result in processes of inter-institutional conflict). Also discussed in Chapter 2 were a number of 'combined theories' which draw elements from combinations of these basic approaches.

In this section, each of these elements will be considered in turn with respect to the 'evidence' that exists (in changing
patterns of retailing in the principal shopping streets of the study area in the period from 1976 to 1985) in support of each. In doing so, it will emerge as to whether any single approach (or combination of approaches) is the most applicable to dynamic elements of retailing in these streets, and thus as such, can be considered to be the most useful model of retail institutional change in this respect.

9.4.2. Retail Institutional Change: Environmental Theory.

The idea that retail institutions evolve and change in direct response to changing environmental circumstances [20] is one that would seem to have some credence with respect to the principal shopping streets of the study area. The first element of support is found in the fact that, as was argued earlier, a range of political, economic and social factors have a fundamental part to play in shaping the trading characteristics of the four study streets.

However, perhaps the aspect of environmental theory of greatest applicability is that of the notion that environmental factors are not only responsible for the introduction of new retailing forms but are also responsible for their evolution [21]. One element in the development of the model of trader rationality was, that this model argued that those institutions most likely to derive the greatest profits (and indeed, survive) in the long term were those that tried to adapt to changing environmental conditions. Thus, for example, as the potential
profitability for a particular retail format changes (as a result of the action of changing environmental conditions such as turnover, rents, market characteristics and so on) then, in order to maintain or enhance profitability, the retail format must be altered in order to accommodate (or exploit) the 'new set' of environmental conditions.

9.4.3. Retail Institutional Change: Cyclical Theory.

In considering the applicability of any of the four main elements of cyclical theory (the retail accordion, the wheel of retailing, the retail life cycle, and the polarisation principle) to the study, there are two distinct problems. First, the period of the study (1976 to 1985) is arguably too short to consider whether any of these cyclical concepts were definitely in operation. And secondly, the limited spatial scale of the study (just four shopping streets; albeit that these streets accounted for some 809 ground floor property units in 1985)[22], makes it difficult to examine these concepts properly.

As a result of these factors there exists little 'hard evidence' in support of any of these theories. However, it should be stressed that this does not mean that these approaches are wrong, simply that the nature of the study is such that the data that it yields are insufficient to identify a full cycle (or even a complete phase of a cycle) of any of these processes. Thus, in the principal shopping streets of the study area, there would
seem to be little evidence of, simultaneous processes of diversification and specialisation in a range of different institutions (the retail accordion)[23]; there would seem to little time for any stage of the wheel of retailing to evolve [24]; a similar argument can be made with regard to the retail life cycle's approach of birth through maturity to decline of retail institutions [25]; and finally, again in such limited temporal and spatial scales it is difficult to argue that there is consistent evidence to support the notion of a trend towards fewer but larger retail institutions being counterbalanced by a renaissance of the small shop sector (the polarisation principle)[26].

Thus, it would seem, in the context of the research, that the applicability of cyclical theories to retail change in the principal shopping streets of the study area is strictly limited. As this is a function of the time period and spatial scale of the study, it would be unfair to conclude that any of its main elements are valid or invalid in the longer term or at a wider spatial scale. However, in terms of appropriate models with regard to retail institutional change in the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge in the period from 1976 to 1985, cyclical theories must be discounted.

9.4.4. Retail Institutional Change: Conflict Theory.
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In contrast to the problems encountered in applying cyclical theories of retail institutional change to changing retail
patterns in the study area, there seems to be considerably more evidence to support the application of conflict theory in this regard.

There would seem to be evidence to suggest that retailers react to the introduction of new forms of retailing and to changes in the operational formats of competitors [27]. For example, the introduction of Jeans Shops to Oxford Street in the 1970's (by 1976, 20 were present)[28], resulted in many of the department stores in the street starting to sell similar products (i.e. an imitative response)[29]. Also, it could be argued that the emergence of retailers such as Bennetton and Next which tend to appeal to a rather 'up-market' clientele is evidence of an avoidance response to Jeans Shops, which on the whole tend to have a 'lower' market appeal.

9.4.5. Retail Institutional Change: Combined Theories.

It would seem that the two basic approaches to retail institutional change which are the most applicable to patterns of retailing in the principal shopping streets of the study area are the environmental and conflict based approaches. Thus, since cyclical approaches were largely discounted, it would seem appropriate to only consider those theories which involve these environmental and cyclical elements.

The environmental-conflict approach argues that changing environmental circumstances provide the opportunity for retailers
to differentiate themselves in the market place. An inevitable conflict arises out of this initial differentiation either in the form of attempts to negate the differential advantage of the innovator or of seeking other forms of differential advantage.

It can be argued this approach is the most important with regard to patterns of retail change in the principal shopping streets of the study area. There is little doubt that, trading patterns are a reaction to a whole range of changing environmental factors (rents, planning regulations, national economic trends, and so on). Equally, there can be little doubt that trading patterns also react to changes in the composition and operational formats of competing traders.

Thus, given that both environmental and conflict elements are present in changing trading patterns of the study streets, it can be argued that for the purposes of the study, in a general sense, the combined environmental-conflict approach is the most applicable model in helping to explain changing patterns of retail activity in the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge in the period from 1976 to 1985.

CHAPTER 9: NOTES.
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1. See Appendix VII Table 2 for full listing of Questionnaire Survey results.
2. As discussed in Section 6.4.4. and shown in Figure 6.6.
6. ibid p. 22.
15. As outlined in Section 3.3.
17. From personal interview.
18. Tiebout, C.M. (1957)
20. As discussed in Section 2.3.2.
21. ibid.
22. See Section 4.2.7. Figure 4.24.
23. As discussed in Section 2.3.4.
24. As discussed in Section 2.3.5.
25. As discussed in Section 2.3.6.
26. As discussed in Section 2.3.7.
27. As discussed in Section 2.3.8.
29. As discussed in Section 2.3.8.
10.1.1. Components of Retail Change in Central London:

Conclusions.

In this final chapter a number of concluding remarks will be made with regard to the study. First, a number of conclusions will be drawn from each section of the text. And secondly, a number of final comments will be made. Thus, this section should help to consolidate the research in context by emphasising and clarifying important conclusions and arguments, and by noting its limitations and drawbacks.

10.2.1. Conclusions: Literature.

The review of literature served to illustrate that the study of retail change incorporates a considerable number of different aspects. On the one hand, highly theoretical considerations need to be taken into account. Here examples include those theoretical aspects relating to retail locational change in general, and approaches to retail institutional change in particular. On the other hand, 'practical' concerns emerged in the literature. In particular, reference can be made to the techniques designed to help in locational decision making processes.

A considerable number of approaches can be applied to different aspects of retailing. As well as reflecting the complex and dynamic nature of present day retailing, this perhaps reflects that more than one approach may be valid in terms of explaining processes of change. The literature seems to assume
that change can be explained by a single approach or combination of approaches. However, several approaches or combinations of approaches may be equally valid.

10.3.1. Conclusions: Data Collection and Analysis.

The wide variety of data collected for the study reflected the considerable number of different aspects of retailing in the principal shopping streets of the study area that needed to be taken into account in making any attempt to describe and explain processes of retail change. It could be argued that, in gathering data with respect to such a wide variety of aspects of retailing, specific aspects would not have been covered in sufficient depth. As a result the goals of description and explanation will themselves lack depth.

However, two main points should be noted here. First, since one of the explicit aims of the study was to investigate overall patterns of retail change in the study area (rather than simply focusing on one specific aspect) it was necessary to make use of such a wide variety of data sources. Thus, the only strict limitations laid down from the outset were spatial and temporal; limiting the study to a defined area at specific points in time.

Secondly, it should be noted that, although a wide variety of data were gathered, this did not result in them lacking depth. In the main, the data gathered were sufficient to describe and explain patterns of retail change in the study area. Some data
inadequacies were encountered (for example, the low response rate derived from the questionnaire study of traders in the West End and Knightsbridge). However, where such inadequacies did arise, the data were used in a way that recognised and compensated for these. In addition, in such cases, further data were sought in order to validate findings (as was the case, for example, in the personal interviews of traders that followed the questionnaire survey).

The techniques of analysis employed, reflected the wide variety of data collected. Again, it could be argued that the use of a wide variety of techniques would have resulted in specific techniques not being utilised to their full potential. However, from the analysis of the data carried out, it is apparent that the techniques used (and the manner in which they were used) were sufficient to fulfil the research aims of description and explanation. As was noted in the introductory chapter, in the study it was decided to employ this 'selective' analytical approach in order to derive the advantages of techniques whilst avoiding their disadvantages; a problem often encountered with the exclusive application of a technique.

The results of the analysis indicated a retail system which conformed more closely to concepts of entropy rather than to those of regularity, consistency and conformity. The land-use analysis provided little evidence of elements of spatial or temporal regularity in processes of retail change. Similarly, the analysis of the questionnaire and personal interview survey of
traders indicated little consistency in approaches to retailing in the study area.

It could be argued that, given the time and effort expounded on collecting and analysing these data, it was disappointing that they did not yield more 'positive' results. Indeed, the conclusion that, on the whole, patterns of retail change in the study area are haphazard in nature, is one that was intuitively apparent from the outset of the study. However, for the purposes of valid and meaningful research, intuitive beliefs are not sufficient; what is required is evidence derived through rigorous investigation.

Thus, if it were the case that all the collection and analysis of data did was to prove that which was already intuitively apparent, even this in itself is a valuable result. However, the data collected and analysed did far more than this, in that they provided the basis from which to move away from merely the description of processes of change, towards their explanation.

10.4.1. Conclusions: Factors Influencing Trading Patterns.

In explaining patterns of retail change in the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge it is not sufficient merely to note that the lack of elements of regularity, consistency and conformity is a function of the wide and complex range of factors that are responsible for influencing and
producing these patterns. The main factors at work in this respect needed to be investigated. These factors, identified from the data collected from questionnaire survey and various personal interviews carried out, were considered under the headings of political, economic and social influences.

Political influences on trading patterns in the study area were identified as coming from four sources which were formed into a simple hierarchy of central government, metropolitan authority, local authority and trade association inputs into the system of retail change. The investigation showed that there was a complex system of interrelationships between each of these levels in the hierarchy. These took the form of the ways in which (and extent to which) the ability of any level in the hierarchy to influence patterns of retail activity was itself influenced by and dependent upon other levels.

10.4.2. Conclusions: Factors Influencing Trading Patterns -

Influences from central government with regard to retailing in general and with regard to retailing in the principal shopping streets of the study area in particular emerged as being of considerable importance. Through implementing a range of 'direct' measures (for example, specific retailing policies and the planning appeals procedure) and 'indirect' measures (such as changes in general government policies) central government can
both initiate changes in retail patterns, and to an important extent, determine the form that these changes will take.

It is apparent however, that the role that central government plays in this respect is likely to change through time. For example, this role is dependent upon the underlying aims and philosophies of the government in power. For example, as noted, the present government has largely adopted a laissez-faire approach to retailing; leaving this sector open to the will of the free market. Other parties in government (for example, the Labour party) could impose more direct means of central government influence in retailing through, for example, the introduction of more direct retailing policies. In addition, existing means of influence could be used differently by different 'ruling' parties. For example, the response of a Labour government to planning appeals is likely to be different from that of a Conservative government, given the greater emphasis on 'social' concerns by the former and the importance of 'economic' concerns by the latter.

Thus, for example, where a Labour government (acting through the instructions and advice passed onto its inspectors) may view a planning appeal in terms of its 'social' effects on the community, (such as the provision of adequate elements of basic shopping requirements), this would be a less important consideration for a Conservative government.

It would seem logical to conclude that the opportunity for 'conflict' would be at its greatest where a local authority and
central government are controlled by different parties. However, this was not apparent during the period of the research in the study area where despite both local authorities holding Conservative majorities, the proportion of planning applications refused and subsequently overturned in appeal was far greater than the national average. This reflects the fundamental importance of the conflict between the 'borough-wide' concerns of these local authorities and the 'national' concerns of central government.

This incompatibility between central and local government makes retail planning difficult for local authorities and restricts the extent to which they can influence trading patterns. Indeed, when this limitation on their influencing ability is coupled with the need for local authorities to be politically expedient in the short term (to ensure re-election) it is apparent that the potential for these authorities to influence trading patterns, which promises much in theory is greatly restricted in practice.

The inputs to patterns of retail change at the metropolitan level (the Greater London Council) and trade association level (the three street associations in the study area) are ones that emerged as being restricted to a far greater extent than that of local authorities. The reason for this, is that both of these levels of influence are even more dependent upon others to implement their aims and policies. In the boroughs of Westminster and Kensington and Chelsea the restriction in the scope of the
Greater London Council to act in this regard is particularly acute given that the local authorities are Conservative controlled and the metropolitan authority (during the time of the study) was Labour controlled.

Perhaps the most concerning aspect to emerge from the examination of the political factors of influence with regard to patterns of retail change in the principal shopping streets of the study area, was that the body which has the greatest ability to influence these patterns (central government) is the one which has the least 'direct interest' in local trading patterns. In addition, it is the body with the least direct and intimate knowledge in this regard. Thus, it is relatively poorly placed in terms of the type of changes which would be most beneficial to the shopping environments of these streets.

10.4.3. Conclusions: Factors Influencing Trading Patterns -
-------------------------------------------------------------
Economic.
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Economic factors that are at work in influencing trading patterns in the study area emerged as operating within a complex framework of interrelationships. Thus, the market which the principal shopping streets of the study area serves is the main determinant of turnover which in turn, is the main determinant of other economic factors such as rents and rates. Thus, although all of the economic factors discussed play a part in shaping trading patterns, they all stem from the market.
Since the market that the principal shopping streets of the study area serves is a diverse one, it is apparent that it is open to a wide range of 'external' influences which are likely to make this a dynamic economic factor of influence. Given the dynamic nature of trading patterns during the period of the study it can be argued that these are likely, at least in part, to be a function of the dynamic nature of the market.

The role that agents play in this system is an important one. They provide the means through which the influence of economic factors can be exerted on trading patterns. In doing so, they inevitably bring their own influence to bear. It can be argued that, agents, first and foremost, must take the interests of their company into account, and then those of their client. In doing so, they may not always act in the best interests of shopping in the West End and Knightsbridge. However, it is very much in the interest of agents that this shopping centre maintains its high status. Thus, in acting in the interests of company and client, agents will tend to act in the interest of shopping in the study area.

The framework drawn up shows one element of 'positive feedback' into this system, namely that changing patterns of retail activity themselves will exert some influence on the market. However, it would be impossible to gauge the effect that this input may have in comparison with the 'external' influence on the market.
Although this framework makes a complex process seem simple, the complexity of its individual elements and their system of linkages should not be overlooked. In addition, it shows a situation where these economic factors are developed and operate in isolation. However, it must be remembered that, in this regard, other political and social factors will play a part.

10.4.4. Conclusions: Factors Influencing Trading Patterns - Social.

The examination of social factors completed the framework of factors that play a part in helping to influence trading patterns in the principal shopping streets of the West End and Knightsbridge. Dividing social factors into those derived from the social characteristics and requirements of the populations that these streets serve ('the market'), and those derived from the social requirements of traders in these streets, provided a useful means of examining this element of influence.

Despite the fact that the social factors are far less tangible than many of the political and economic factors discussed, their importance should not be overlooked. However, one interesting point here, is that it can be argued that any effective retailing system should always seek to satisfy the social requirements of the populations that it serves rather than those of its traders. If the social shopping requirements of the customer are satisfied then a retail system may be efficient; if the social requirements of the traders in a retail system are
predominantly satisfied, then it is unlikely to be efficient, since their social requirements are often incompatible with those of the customer. However, traders in efficiently satisfying the social requirements of their customers will be more likely to derive increased turnover and profitability. Therefore, the economic needs of traders (e.g. profit) are not necessarily incompatible with the social needs of customers.

Given the evidence from the study that the social requirements and demands of traders tend to play an important part in locational decision making processes in the study area, (and thus in influencing trading patterns) this would seem to be a basis for arguing that the retailing system that operates in these shopping streets is an inefficient one.

When taken together, these political, economic and social factors provide a powerful set of influences on patterns of retailing. However, only later in the text was a discussion of their relative roles and importance (rather than their individual roles and importance) undertaken. This chapter (concerned with modelling these aspects) is discussed later.

10.5.1. Conclusions: Shopping in Oxford Street.

Devoting a whole chapter to a discussion of retail change in just one of the study streets required little justification. As undoubtedly one of the World’s premier shopping centres, and as the focus for retail activity in the West End and Knightsbridge,
Oxford Street required more specific consideration than the other shopping streets of the study area.

It is apparent that the highly concentrated and dynamic patterns of trading in Oxford Street constitute a shopping environment that is unique. However, given its range of retailing, environmental and traffic related problems, it is not surprising that steps are being taken to ensure that the standing of Oxford Street is not lost.

It was argued that Oxford Street will not decline as a shopping centre of international repute in the long term. However, this will only be the case if a suitable set of solutions to these problems is found and if the political and financial will exists to implement these solutions. In this regard, Westminster City Council is making considerable efforts. However, these efforts are likely to be hampered by the constraints placed on local authorities by central government and the need for immediate political expedience.


In attempting to model aspects of retail change in the principal shopping streets of the study area, two points of view had to be taken into account. First, given the complexity of the factors responsible for producing trading patterns, any modelling process was likely to be difficult and perhaps even inadvisable. The second and contrasting point of view, was that,
given this complexity, and adding to this the importance of this shopping centre in global terms, it was important that at least an attempt was made to simplify and rationalise processes of retail change.

The three aspects modelled, were chosen with these two considerations in mind, in that, in choosing to model these aspects, an attempt was made to strike a balance between what was of interest and value, and what it was possible to model. The three aspects modelled were; political, economic and social factors of influence on trading patterns in the study area; decision making processes; and, processes of retail institutional change.

The validity and applicability of any of the three models developed could be questioned. However, in saying this, it should be noted that they are based on a large and varied data base. In addition, it should be noted that they do not seek to represent the only solution or model that is applicable to aspects of retail change; rather, they seek to show one possible way of approaching the understanding of these aspects.

The three models developed are open to criticism. However, this is not, in itself, a negative reflection on them. All modelling includes a subjective input; the data collected could possibly have been interpreted in a number of other ways. Indeed, given the complexity of the retailing system concerned, the scope for varying interpretations of its components of change
is likely to be considerable. In addition, the models developed are open to improvement, development and augmentation.

10.7.1. Conclusions: Final Comments.

This study of retailing in one of the most important shopping centres in the World has posed many questions. On the one hand, it is of importance to study the West End and Knightsbridge; to identify patterns and processes of trading. On the other hand, it must be asked whether (given the obvious scale and complexity of its retailing system), it is advisable to attempt to study this shopping centre as whole. However, in order to examine individual elements of such a complex shopping environment it is necessary to have a framework which describes and explains overall processes of change.

It is hoped that this study provides such a framework. It is a framework that requires further testing and development. Indeed, it is recognised that although it may be of value in describing and explaining components of retail change in the study area in the period from 1976 to 1985, it may require to be updated as these components alter through time. However, by developing a framework that is general in nature, it is hoped that the study may not be applicable to only its restricted time period.
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APPENDIX II: Table 1 - Location Map; Oxford Street.

NORTH SIDE

OXFORD STREET

SOUTH SIDE

Oxford Circus

OXFORD STREET

Regent Street

Charing Cross Rd.

Tottenham Court Rd.

Park Lane

1. Park St.  
2. North Audley St.  
3. Balderton St.  
4. Duke St.  
5. Binney St.  
6. Gilbert St.  
7. Davies St.  
8. South Molton St.  
9. Sedley Pl.  
10. Woodstock St.  
11. New Bond St.  
12.  
13.  
14.  
15.  
16. Ramillies St.  
17. Poland St.  
18. Berwick St.  
19. Wardour St.  
20. Gt. Chapel St.  
21. Dean St.  
22. Soho St.  
23. Hanway St.  
24. Rathbone Pl.  
25. Perry's Pl.  
27.  
28.  
29.  
30.  
32. John Princes St.  
33. Holles St.  
34. Old Cavendish St.  
35. Chapel Pl.  
36. Vere St.  
37. Marylebone Ln.  
38. Stratford Pl.  
39. James St.  
40. Bird St.  
41. Duke St.
KEY (Cont.).

12. Dering St. 27. Berners St. 42. Orchard St.
13. Harewood Pl. 28. Wells St. 43. Portman St.
14. Argyll St. 29. Winsley St. 44. Old Quebec St.

Source - Primary Land-Use Survey.
APPENDIX II: Table 2 - Location Map; Regent Street.

KEY:

1. Air St.  
2. Man in Moon Passage  
3. Swallow St.  
4. Vigo St.  
5. Heddon St.  
6. New Burlington Mews  
7. New Burlington St.  
8. New Burlington Pl.  
9. Air St.  
10. Man in Moon Passage  
11. Swallow St.  
12. Vigo St.  
14. Margaret St.  
15. Little Portland St.  
16. Margaret St.  
17. Gt. Castle St.  
18. Little Argyll St.  
19. Gt. Marlborough St.  
20. Tenison Court  
21. Air St.  
22. Man in Moon Passage  
23. Swallow St.  
24. Vigo St.  
25. Gt. Castle St.  
26. Margaret St.  
27. Little Portland St.  
28. Margaret St.  
29. Gt. Castle St.  
30. Little Argyll St.  
32. Tenison Court  
33. Air St.  
34. Man in Moon Passage  
35. Swallow St.  
36. Vigo St.  
37. Gt. Castle St.  
38. Margaret St.  
39. Little Portland St.  
40. Margaret St.  
41. Gt. Castle St.  
42. Little Argyll St.  
43. Gt. Marlborough St.  
44. Tenison Court  
45. Air St.
KEY (Cont.).

10. Maddox St. 22. Regent Pl.
11. Hanover St. 23. Glasshouse St.

Source - Primary Land-Use Survey.
APPENDIX II: Table 3 - Location Map; Bond Street.

**KEY.**

1. Stafford St.  
2. Royal Arcade  
3. Grafton St.  
4. Bruton St.  
5. Grosvenor St.  
6. Brook St.  
7. Blenheim St.  
8. Clifford St.  
9. Conduit St.  
10. Maddox St.  
11. Brook St.  
12. Dering St.

Source - Primary Land-Use Survey.
APPENDIX II: Table 4 - Location Map; Brompton Road.

KEY.

1. Lancelot Pl. 6. Ovington Gardens
2. Montpelier St. 7. Beaufort Gardens
5. Yoemans Row 10. Hans Crescent

Source - Primary Land-Use Survey.

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APPENDIX III: Table 1 - Location Map (Rent Sectors);

Oxford Street.

ZONE I | ZONE II | ZONE III | ZONE IV | ZONE V | ZONE VI

NORTH SIDE

OXFORD STREET

Oxford Circus

OXFORD STREET

SOUTH SIDE

Regent Street

Charing

KEY.

2. North Audley St. 17. Poland St. 32. John Princes St.
4. Duke St. 19. Wardour St. 34. Old Cavendish St.
5. Binney St. 20. Gt. Chapel St. 35. Chapel Pl.
6. Gilbert St. 21. Dean St. 36. Vere St.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. Davies St.</th>
<th>22. Soho St.</th>
<th>37. Marylebone Ln.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10. Woodstock St.</td>
<td>25. Perry's Pl.</td>
<td>40. Bird St.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Dering St.</td>
<td>27. Berners St.</td>
<td>42. Orchard St.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Harewood Pl.</td>
<td>28. Wells St.</td>
<td>43. Portman St.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Argyll St.</td>
<td>29. Winsley St.</td>
<td>44. Old Quebec St.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Primary Land-Use Survey.
APPENDIX III: Table 2 - Location Map (Rent Sectors);
Regent Street.

ZONE I
REGENT STREET
ZONE II
ZONE III
ZONE IV
ZONE V

KEY:
3. Swallow St. 15. Little Portland St.
4. Vigo St. 16. Margaret St.
5. Heddon St. 17. Gt. Castle St.
KEY (Cont.).

8. New Burlington Pl.  20. Tenison Court
10. Maddox St.         22. Regent Pl.
11. Hanover St.        23. Glasshouse St.

Source - Primary Land-Use Survey.
APPENDIX III: Table 3 - Location Map (Rent Sectors); Bond Street.

KEY.

1. Stafford St. 7. Blenheim St.
3. Grafton St. 9. Conduit St.
4. Bruton St. 10. Maddox St.
5. Grosvenor St. 11. Brook St.

Source - Primary Land-Use Survey.

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APPENDIX III: Table 4 - Location Map (Rent Sectors);

Brompton Road.

ZONE I

EAST SIDE

10 9 8 7

ZONE III

Beauchamp Place

6 5 4

BROMPTON ROAD

WEST SIDE

1 2

ZONE I

ZONE II

ZONE III

1. Lancelot Pl.
2. Montpelier St.
3. Brompton Sq.
4. Egerton Terrace
5. Yoemans Row
6. Ovington Gardens
7. Beaufort Gardens
8. Brompton Pl.
9. Hans Rd.
10. Hans Cresent

Source - Primary Land-Use Survey.

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APPENDIX IV: Location Map; Central Activities Zone.

KEY — — — Boundary: Central Activities Zone

Source — Westmister City Council (1984).
APPENDIX V: Berry’s Typology of Business Areas Within a Metropolis.

APPENDIX VI: Listing of Trade Publications

Consulted During Study.

Estates Gazette

Estates Times

Planning

Planning Exchange Bulletin

Retail Distribution Management

The Grocer
APPENDIX VII: Table 1 - Questionnaire Survey of Traders in the Study Area; Sample Questionnaire.

The questionnaire overleaf was that sent to retailers in Regent Street. Questionnaires sent to retailers were the same with the exception of the insertion of the appropriate street name.
Dear Sir,

Changing Patterns of Retail Activity in
the West End of London.

The Institute for Retail Studies, in the University of Stirling, is carrying out research into changing patterns of retail activity in principal shopping streets in the West End of London. An important part this research involves an analysis of Regent Street.

The enclosed questionnaire is designed to investigate locational influences on retailers presently trading in Regent Street. The information that we hope to obtain from this questionnaire survey is of vital importance to the success of the overall research project.

The information that you give will, of course, be treated in strictest confidence, and the aggregated results of the survey will be made available to you when analysis is complete.

I would be most grateful if you could complete the questionnaire and return it as soon as possible. If you would like any more information on the questionnaire or on the project, please contact me here at the Institute.

Thank you for your co-operation in this matter.

Yours Sincerely,

David M. Brooks.
1. What is the name of your company? __________

2. Is your shop part of an independent retail group or part of a multiple retail group?
   - INDEPENDENT
   - MULTIPLE
   - NEITHER
   - DON'T KNOW

3. How many retail outlets are there in total in your company? __________

4. How many branches do you have in Regent Street? __________

5. How many branches do you have in the rest of the West End? __________

6. How many people are employed in your store?
   - (i) Full Time __________
   - (ii) Part Time __________
   - (iii) Training __________

7. How long have you been at your present location? ___ years

8. Where were you previously located? -
   - REGENT STREET
   - ELSEWHERE IN THE WEST END
   - ELSEWHERE IN LONDON
   - OUTSIDE LONDON

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9. How many direct competitors are there:

(i) in Regent Street? ________

(ii) in the rest of the West End? ________

10. How far away is your nearest direct competitor? ________

11. How important were the following factors in your decision to move to your present location?

Please circle appropriate number from 1 to 5 where –

1 = NO IMPORTANCE
5 = VERY IMPORTANT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change in product sold</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of tenure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of lease</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Rental</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Rates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search Process</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximity to complementary traders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopfitting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. How many sites were considered during your search? ________

13. Was an external company employed in your search for a new site?

YES
NO
DON'T KNOW

14. What was the approximate cost of the search? ________
15. Was major refitting required? YES

NO

16 Who made the decision to locate here? ______

17 Was it a single person decision or multi-person decision?

(Please circle appropriate answer) SINGLE PERSON

MULTI-PERSON

18. What type of site tenure were you ideally looking for? ______

19. If lease, what would the ideal length have been? ______

20. What type of site tenure was actually chosen? ______

21. If lease, what time period was this for? ______

22. Which of the following sources of information were considered in the search? ;

Please circle appropriate response -

Estate Agents YES / NO
Trade Journals YES / NO
Personal sitting/recommendation YES / NO
Greater London Council YES / NO
Borough Council Sources YES / NO
Local Trade Associations YES / NO
Other Sources YES / NO
23. If 'other sources' of information were considered in the search, please specify.

24. If Borough Council Sources were used, please specify.

25. Do you feel that you could be better located within Regent Street?

YES
NO
DON'T KNOW

26. If 'YES'; Where in Regent Street?

And, for what reasons?

27. Do you feel that you could be better located elsewhere than the West End?

YES
NO
DON'T KNOW
28. If 'YES': Where in the West End?  
And, for what reasons?

29. What are the main advantages and disadvantages of your present location?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADVANTAGES</th>
<th>DISADVANTAGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30. What is the approximate annual turnover of your store?  

31. What is the annual rental for your store?  

32. What are the annual rates for your store?  

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APPENDIX VII: Table 2 - Questionnaire Survey of Traders in the Study Area; Results.

QUESTION 2 - Is your company part of an independent retail group or part of a multiple retail group?

Independent 68.4%
Multiple 26.3%
Neither 5.3%
Don’t Know 0.0%
No Reply 0.0%

QUESTION 3 - How many retail outlets are there in total in your company?

0 - 10 outlets 68.4%
11 - 20 outlets 5.3%
21 - 30 outlets 10.5%
31 + outlets 15.8%

QUESTION 4 - How many branches do you have in _____ Street/Road?

1 branch 68.4%
2 branches 26.3%
3 branches 0.0%
4 branches 5.3%
**QUESTION 5** - How many branches do you have in the rest of the West End?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branches</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 branches</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 branch</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 branches</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 branches</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 branches</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**QUESTION 6** - How many people are employed in your store - full time? (N.B. low response to other parts of question).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - 10</td>
<td>57.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - 20</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 30</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 - 40</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 +</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
QUESTION 7 - How long have you been at your present location?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 years</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 years</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 years</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 years</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10+ years</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Reply</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

QUESTION 8 - Where were you previously located?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Same Street</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Elsewhere in the West End</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Elsewhere in London</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Outside London</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Options 2 + 3</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. All four above options</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Nowhere</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
QUESTION 9 (i) - How many direct competitors are there in the same street?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 5</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - 10</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - 15</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 - 20</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 +</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Reply</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

QUESTION 9 (ii) - How many direct competitors are there in the rest of the West End?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 5</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - 10</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - 15</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 - 20</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 +</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Reply</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Question 10 - How far away is your nearest direct competitor?

0 - 50m 36.8%
60 - 100m 26.3%
110 - 150m 10.5%
160 - 200m 15.8%
Don't Know 10.5%
No Reply 0.0%

Question 11 - How important were the following factors in your decision to move to your present location?

Where; 1 = no importance, and 2 = very important.

(i) Product

1. 42.1%
2. 5.3%
3. 10.5%
4. 0.0%
5. 10.5%
No Reply 31.6%

(ii) Tenure

1. 21.1%
2. 10.5%
3. 21.1%
4. 21.1%
5. 21.1%
No Reply 5.3%
(iii) Lease

1. 10.5%
2. 21.1%
3. 21.1%
4. 21.1%
5. 21.1%

No Reply. 5.3%

(iv) Rent

1. 15.6%
2. 5.3%
3. 31.6%
4. 21.1%
5. 21.1%

No Reply. 5.3%

(v) Rates

1. 10.5%
2. 10.5%
3. 36.8%
4. 15.8%
5. 21.1%

No Reply. 5.3%

(vi) Search

1. 26.3%
2. 15.8%
3. 10.5%
4. 15.8%
5. 10.5%

No Reply. 21.1%
(vii) Complementarity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No Reply. 0.0%

(ix) Shopfitting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No Reply. 0.0%

Ranking of Factors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proximity to Complementary Traders</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Rental</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Rates</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of Lease</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopfitting</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Tenure</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search Process</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Product Sold</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**QUESTION 12** - How many sites were considered during your search?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Sites</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 5</td>
<td>63.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - 10</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO Reply</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**QUESTION 13** - Was an external company used in your search for a new site?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Reply</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**QUESTION 14** - What was the approximate cost of the search?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost Range</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>£0 - 500</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£500 - 1000</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£1000 - 1500</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£1500 +</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Reply</td>
<td>57.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**QUESTION 15** - Was major refitting required?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>78.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
QUESTION 16 - Who made the decision to locate here?

Chairman 10.5%
Managing Director 31.6%
Director(s) 31.6%
Board 15.8%
Franchiser 5.3%
No Reply 5.3%

QUESTION 17 - Was it a single person or multi-person decision?

SINGLE PERSON 52.6%
MULTI-PERSON 47.4%

QUESTION 18 - What type of tenure were you ideally looking for?

Freehold 10.5%
Leasehold 68.4%
Inappropriate Reply 15.8%
No Reply 5.3%
QUESTION 19 - If lease, what would the ideal length have been?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 10 years</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - 20 years</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 30 years</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inappropriate Reply</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Reply</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

QUESTION 20 - What type of site tenure was actually chosen?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freehold</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leasehold</td>
<td>73.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inappropriate Reply</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Reply</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

QUESTION 21 - If lease, what time period was this for?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 10 years</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - 20 years</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 30 years</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Reply</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
QUESTION 22 - Which of the following sources of information were considered in the search?

Ranking of Sources (By Greatest Number of 'YES' responses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estate Agents</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Siting/Recommendation</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Journals</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Sources</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borough Council Sources</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater London Council</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Trade Associations</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

QUESTION 23 - If 'other sources' of information were considered in the search, please specify.

Most important 'other sources' cited - 'Direct Negotiation'

'Personal Contacts'

QUESTION 24 - If Borough Council Sources were used, please specify.

Most important Borough Council sources cited - 'Westminster City Council'

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QUESTION 25 - Do you feel that you could be better located within ______ Street/Road?

YES 31.6%
NO 57.9%
Don’t Know 10.5%
No Reply 0.0%

QUESTION 26 - If ‘YES’; Where in ______ Street/Road?

And, for what reasons?

Most Frequently Cited Locations/Reasons
of Traders in Each Street -

Oxford Street - ‘West of Oxford Circus’
‘Nearer prime pitch to maximise trading potential’
‘Oxford Circus – better customer response here’

Regent Street - No clear pattern in responses

Brompton Road - ‘South Side – larger human traffic flow’

Bond Street - ‘Northern End – in present location (Old Bond Street) there is a lot of building work (both at present time and proposed) there for present location difficult to trade from’
‘Just want larger premises anywhere in the street’
QUESTION 27 - Do you feel that you could be better located elsewhere in the West End?


YES 26.3%
NO 68.4%
Don’t Know 5.3%

QUESTION 28 - If 'YES', Where in the West End?

And, for what reasons?

Most Frequently Cited Locations/Reasons
of Traders in Each Street -

Oxford Street - 'Marylebone High Street, Regent Street, Tottenham Court Road - to satisfy demand'

Regent Street - 'Oxford Street - different and larger market'

Brompton Road - No clear pattern in responses

Bond Street - 'Knightsbridge, Sloane Street - better trading streets'

'Sloane Street - lot of traffic/very fashionable'

'Knightsbridge - improving shopping environment/success of major department stores in close proximity'
QUESTION 29 - What are the major advantages and disadvantages of your present location?

Most Frequently Cited Advantages - 'Customer flow' 'Prestige/status of location'

Most Frequently Cited Disadvantages - 'Rent too high' 'Rates too high'

QUESTION 30 - What is the approximate annual turnover of your store?

Up to £1 million 26.3%
Between £1 million and £2 million 21.1%
Between £2 million and £3 million 15.8%
Between £3 million and £4 million 0.0%
Between £4 million and £5 million 5.3%
No Reply 31.6%
**QUESTION 31** - What is the annual rental for your store?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>£0 - £10,000</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£11,000 - £20,000</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£21,000 - £30,000</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£31,000 - £40,000</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£41,000 - £50,000</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£51,000 - £60,000</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£61,000 - £70,000</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£71,000 - £80,000</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£81,000 - £90,000</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£91,000 - £100,000</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freehold</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Reply</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**QUESTION 32** - What are the annual rates for your store?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>£0 - £5,000</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£5,001 - £10,000</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£10,001 - £20,000</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£20,001 - £30,000</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£30,001 +</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Reply</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX VIII: Listing of Questions Asked During Non-Schedule Standardised Interviews with Traders in the Study Area.

1. Is your locational decision making process carried out on an 'in-house' or 'external' (e.g. employing agencies) basis?

2. What tend to be the most important factors in taking a locational decision relating to the West End and Knightsbridge? Are these different from those relating to locational decisions taken elsewhere?

3. How important is the presence of complementary traders?

4. How important is the presence of competing traders?

5. Is the role of status and image important in your locational decision making process?

6. How do you view the role of property agents in your locational decision making process? In general, do they act in a proactive or a reactive manner?

7. Is your overall locational decision making strategy different in the West End and Knightsbridge than elsewhere? If, yes, why?

8. Have there been any major changes in your locational decision making strategy in the last 10 years? If yes, what and why?

9. How does your locational decision making strategy compare to those of your main competitors? Is it more or less rational?
10. Are your present set of West End and Knightsbridge locations the best that they could be? What are their major advantages? What are their major disadvantages?

11. What locations in the West End and Knightsbridge would be better. Why?

12. How have the best sites in the West End and Knightsbridge changed in the last 10 years? Why? How are they likely to change in the future? Why?


14. What implications do you think the abolition of the G.L.C. will have for trading patterns in the West End and Knightsbridge?

15. What in your view are the major problems facing retailing in the West End and Knightsbridge at the present time? What do you see as the possible solutions to these problems?

16. What are the major threats to retailing in the West End?

17. What are the major threats to the high street in general?

18. If these are different, why?

19. What does the future hold for you in the West End and Knightsbridge and elsewhere?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division Code</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Agriculture, forestry and fishing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Energy and water supply industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Extraction of minerals and ores other than fuels; manufacture of metals, mineral products and chemicals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Metal goods, engineering and vehicle industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Other manufacturing industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Distribution, hotels and catering; repairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Transport and Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Banking, finance, insurance, business services and leasing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Other services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Her Majesty's Stationary Office (1980)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY CODE</th>
<th>ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6410</td>
<td>Food Retailing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6420</td>
<td>Confectioners, Tobacconists, Newsagents, Off-Licences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6430</td>
<td>Dispensing and other Chemists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6450</td>
<td>Retail Distribution of Clothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6460</td>
<td>Retail Distribution of Footwear and Leather Goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6470</td>
<td>Retail Distribution of Furnishing Fabrics and Household Textiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6480</td>
<td>Retail Distribution of Household Goods, Hardwear and Ironmongery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6510</td>
<td>Retail Distribution of Motor Vehicles and Parts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6520</td>
<td>Filling Stations (Motor Fuels and Lubricants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6530</td>
<td>Retail Distribution of Books, Stationary and Office Supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6540</td>
<td>Other Specialised Retail Distribution (Non-Food)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Her Majesty's Stationary Office (1980).
### APPENDIX IX: Table 3 - Commercial Activity Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>CATEGORY DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Food Retailing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Confectioners, Tobacconists, Newsagents, Off-Licences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>Dispensing and other Chemists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>Retail Distribution of Clothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>Retail Distribution of Footwear and Leather Goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>Retail Distribution of Furnishing Fabrics and Household Textiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>Retail Distribution of Household Goods, Hardwear and Ironmongery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>Retail Distribution of Motor Vehicles and Parts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>Filling Stations (Motor Fuels and Lubricants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Retail Distribution of Books, Stationary and Office Supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Other Specialised Retail Distribution (Non-Food)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Mixed Retail Businesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Non-Retail Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Vacant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Derived from Her Majesty’s Stationary Office (1980)
APPENDIX X: Listing of Significant Values from Application of
---------------------------
Runs Test and Linear Nearest Neighbour Techniques.
---------------------------

Application conditions -
---------------------------

Runs Test Technique - any trader type with a presence of two or
---------------------------
more on either side of any study street
at any point in time.

Linear Nearest Neighbour Technique - any category code shown to be
---------------------------
significant from application
of the runs test technique.

Rejection Level Set (in both tests) = 0.05
---------------------------
### APPENDIX X: Table 1 - Oxford Street.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY CODE</th>
<th>SIGNIFICANT VALUES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>1979 North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>1982 North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>1976 South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>1979 South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1982 North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1976 South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1979 South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1982 South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>1984 South</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Number of Significant Values = 9**

**Total Number of Original Runs Test Applications = 50**

**Source - Data Base Created for Oxford Street, 1976-1985.**
APPENDIX X: Table 2 - Regent Street.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>SIGNIFICANT VALUES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CODE</td>
<td>YEAR/SIDE OF STREET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>1984 West</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Number of Significant Values = 1
Total Number of Original Runs Test Applications = 47

Source - Data Base Created for Regent Street, 1976-1985.

APPENDIX X: Table 3 - Brompton Road.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>SIGNIFICANT VALUES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CODE</td>
<td>YEAR/SIDE OF STREET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NONE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Number of Significant Values = 0
Total Number of Original Runs Test Applications = 33

Source - Data Base Created for Brompton Road, 1976-1985.
APPENDIX X: Table 4 - Bond Street.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY CODE</th>
<th>SIGNIFICANT VALUES</th>
<th>YEAR/SIDE OF STREET</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>1976 West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>1979 West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>1982 East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>1984 East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td></td>
<td>1984 East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>1979 East</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Number of Significant Values = 6
Total Number of Original Runs Test Applications = 41

Source - Data Base Created for Bond Street, 1976-1984.
APPENDIX XI: Table 1 - Listing of Anchors: Oxford Street [1].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Street No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>167-173</td>
<td>Marks and Spencer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200-210</td>
<td>C &amp; A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>252-258</td>
<td>British Home Stores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>274-298</td>
<td>John Lewis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300-322</td>
<td>D.H. Evans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>334-348</td>
<td>Debenhams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>374-384</td>
<td>C &amp; A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>398-456</td>
<td>Selfridges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>458-466</td>
<td>Marks and Spencer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>506-520</td>
<td>Littlewoods</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Personal Interview: Hillier Parker May and Rowden.

APPENDIX XI: Table 2 - Listing of Anchors: Regent Street.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Street No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>058-060</td>
<td>Dunn &amp; Co.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>092-096</td>
<td>Aquascutum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103-113</td>
<td>Austin Reed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200-206</td>
<td>Jaeger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>208-210</td>
<td>Hamleys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>214-222</td>
<td>Liberty and Co.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>224-252</td>
<td>Dickens and Jones</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Personal Interview: Hillier Parker May and Rowden.
APPENDIX XI: Table 3 - Listing of Anchors: Brompton Road.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Street No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>035</td>
<td>St. Laurent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>045</td>
<td>Russell &amp; Bromley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>065-067</td>
<td>Mappin &amp; Webb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>087-135</td>
<td>Harrods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>096-098</td>
<td>Jaeger</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Personal Interview: Hillier Parker May and Rowden.

APPENDIX XI: Table 4 - Listing of Anchors: Bond Street [2].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Street No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>016</td>
<td>Watches of Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>057-063</td>
<td>Fenwicks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>St. Laurent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165-169</td>
<td>Asprey</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Personal Interview: Hillier Parker May and Rowden.

Notes.

1. The term anchor is used to describe shops that considered to be the most important in any shopping street. The anchors in each street were defined on the advice of personnel of Hillier Parker May and Rowden. In addition all of the shops chosen were present in the street throughout the period from 1976 to 1985.

2. All shops are in New Bond Street.
APPENDIX XII: Table 1 - Commercial Activity Category Distribution, 1976 to 1985: Concentration (Top Two Categories).

**TOP TWO CATEGORIES [1].**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE IN TOP TWO CATEGORIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oxford St.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>60.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>62.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>57.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-1985</td>
<td>59.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note - [1] The two commercial activity categories with the greatest frequencies of property units.

Source - Data Bases Created for All Study Streets, 1976 to 1985.
APPENDIX XII: Table 2 - Commercial Activity Category Distribution, 1976 to 1985: Concentration (Top Five Categories).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Category 04</th>
<th>Category 05</th>
<th>Category 06</th>
<th>Category 07</th>
<th>Category 08</th>
<th>Category 09</th>
<th>Category 10</th>
<th>Category 11</th>
<th>Category 12</th>
<th>Category 13</th>
<th>Category 14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oxford Street - 1976 to 1985</td>
<td>Category 04</td>
<td>Category 05</td>
<td>Category 06</td>
<td>Category 07</td>
<td>Category 08</td>
<td>Category 09</td>
<td>Category 10</td>
<td>Category 11</td>
<td>Category 12</td>
<td>Category 13</td>
<td>Category 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regent Street - 1976 to 1985</td>
<td>Category 04</td>
<td>Category 05</td>
<td>Category 06</td>
<td>Category 07</td>
<td>Category 08</td>
<td>Category 09</td>
<td>Category 10</td>
<td>Category 11</td>
<td>Category 12</td>
<td>Category 13</td>
<td>Category 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bond Street - 1976/1985</td>
<td>Category 04</td>
<td>Category 05</td>
<td>Category 06</td>
<td>Category 07</td>
<td>Category 08</td>
<td>Category 09</td>
<td>Category 10</td>
<td>Category 11</td>
<td>Category 12</td>
<td>Category 13</td>
<td>Category 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brompton Road - 1976/1979</td>
<td>Category 04</td>
<td>Category 05</td>
<td>Category 06</td>
<td>Category 07</td>
<td>Category 08</td>
<td>Category 09</td>
<td>Category 10</td>
<td>Category 11</td>
<td>Category 12</td>
<td>Category 13</td>
<td>Category 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YEAR</td>
<td>PERCENTAGE IN TOP FIVE CATEGORIES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oxford St.</td>
<td>Regent St.</td>
<td>Bond St.</td>
<td>Brompton Rd.</td>
<td>Aggregate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>89.1</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>89.8</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>87.4</td>
<td>90.1</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>88.3</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-1985</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>87.3</td>
<td>89.2</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note - [1] The five commercial activity categories with the highest frequencies of property units.

Source - Data Bases Created for All Study Streets, 1976 to 1985.
APPENDIX XIII - Listing of Agencies Responsible in Oxford Street

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FUNCTION</th>
<th>AUTHORITY</th>
<th>DEPARTMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PLANNING - applications</td>
<td>W.C.C.</td>
<td>Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- protecting architectural heritage</td>
<td>W.C.C.</td>
<td>Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G.L.C.</td>
<td>Transportation &amp; Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- strategic planning policy</td>
<td>G.L.C. [1]</td>
<td>Transportation &amp; Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- local plan policy</td>
<td>W.C.C.</td>
<td>Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUILDING CONTROL - alteration and new building works</td>
<td>G.L.C. [1]</td>
<td>District and Building Regulation Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>: serving of notices</td>
<td>W.C.C.</td>
<td>Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- neglected structures</td>
<td>W.C.C.</td>
<td>Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- demolition</td>
<td>G.L.C.</td>
<td>District Surveyor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- licensing of advert supporting structures</td>
<td>W.C.C.</td>
<td>Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- drainage</td>
<td>W.C.C.</td>
<td>Director of Environmental Health &amp; Consumer Protection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A variety of different agencies provide public services in Oxford Street in the period before the abolition of the Greater London Council. The following is a listing of the major services, the responsible authorities and, where appropriate, relevant departments.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FUNCTION</th>
<th>AUTHORITY</th>
<th>DEPARTMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HIGHWAYS AND TRANSPORT</td>
<td>W.C.C. [2] City Engineer</td>
<td>W.C.C. City Engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>W.C.C. City Engineer</td>
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### FUNCTION

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<td>LICENSING - cinemas</td>
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<td>- music and dancing</td>
<td>G.L.C. [1] Director General</td>
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**Notes:**

1. As envisaged by the yellow paper 'Abolition of the G.L.C. and the Metropolitan Councils' issued by the Department of the Environment in July 1984, most of the functions listed as being carried out by the G.L.C. were transferred to Westminster City Council.

2. Undertaken on an agency basis for the G.L.C.

3. There are no on street parking facilities on Oxford Street itself. Off street parking is either privately owned or controlled by Westminster City Council.

4. Metropolitan Roads in the Oxford Street area are; Oxford Street, Edgware Road, Park Lane, Gloucester Place, Baker Street, Cavendish Square, Regent Street, Great Portland Street and Tottenham Court Road.

Source - Westminster City Council (1986).