A Phenomenological Critique of the Idea of Social Science

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Abstract
Social science is in crisis. The task of social science is to study “man in situation”: to understand the world as it is for “man”. This thesis charges that this crisis consists in a failure to properly address the philosophical anthropological question “What is man?”. The various social scientific methodologies who have as their object “man” suffer rampant disagreements because they presuppose, rather than consider, what is meant by “man”. It is our intention to show that the root of the crisis is that social science can provide no formal definition of “man”. In order to understand this we propose a phenomenological analysis into the essence of social science.

This phenomenological approach will give us reason to abandon the (sexist) word “man” and instead we will speak of \textit{wer: the beings which we are}. That we have not used the more usual “human being” (or some equivalent) is due to the \textit{human prejudice} which is one of the major constituents of this crisis we seek to analyse.

This thesis is divided into two Parts: normative and evaluative. In the normative Part we will seek a clarification of both “phenomenology” and “social science”. Due to the various ways in which “phenomenology” has been invented we must secure a simpliciter definition of phenomenology as an approach to philosophical anthropology (Chapter 2). Importantly, we will show how the key instigators of the branches of phenomenology, Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, and Sartre, were all engaged in this task. To clarify our phenomenology we will define the Phenomenological Movement according to various strictures by drawing on the work of Schutz and his notion of provinces of meaning (Chapter 3). This will then be carried forward to show how Schutz’s postulates of social science (with certain clarifications) constitute the eidetic structure of social science (Chapter 4).

The eidetic structures of social science identified will prompt several challenges that will be addressed in the evaluative Part. Here we engage in an imperial argument to sort proper science from pseudo-science. The first challenge is the mistaken assumption that universities and democratic states make science possible (Chapter 5). Contra this, we argue that science is predicated on “spare time” and that much institutional “science” is not in fact science. The second challenge is the “humanist challenge”: there is no such thing as nonpractical knowledge (Chapter 6). Dealing with this will require a reconsideration of the epistemic status that science has and lead to the claim of epistemic inferiority.

Having cut away pseudo-science we will be able to focus on the “social” of social science through a consideration of intersubjectivity (Chapter 7). Drawing on the above phenomenologists we will focus on how an Other is recognised as Other. Emphasising Sartre’s radical re-conception of “subject” and “object” we will argue that there can be no formal criteria for how this recognition occurs. By consequence we must begin to move away from the assumption of one life-world to various life-worlds, each constituted by different conceptions of \textit{wer}. 

1
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Contents

1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 4
   i. Seeing the crisis .......................................................................................................................... 6
   ii. Philosophy of social science ...................................................................................................... 15
   iii. Proper phenomenology ............................................................................................................ 19
   iv. The phenomenological analysis of social science .................................................................... 21

Part I ..................................................................................................................................................... 25

2. Phenomenology Simpliciter .............................................................................................................. 27
   i. Phenomenology and phenomenology-of-religion ...................................................................... 27
   ii. The Phenomenological Movement ............................................................................................. 33
   iii. The early branches of the Movement ......................................................................................... 41
   iv. The fourth branch of the Movement .......................................................................................... 60

3. Phenomenology Proper ................................................................................................................... 68
   i. Alfred Schutz as Husserl’s successor ........................................................................................... 68
   ii. Constituents of a province of meaning ......................................................................................... 75
   iii. Proper phenomenology ............................................................................................................. 83

4. The Essence of social science ......................................................................................................... 97
   i. Social Science as an ideal type .................................................................................................... 97
   ii. The postulates of social science ............................................................................................... 101
   iii. Proper phenomenology as social science .............................................................................. 116

Part II .................................................................................................................................................... 122

5. The Possibility of science ............................................................................................................... 124
   i. The practical possibility of science ............................................................................................. 124
   ii. Science and institutions ............................................................................................................. 132
   iii. The essential possibility of science .......................................................................................... 139

6. The Epistemic Status of science ..................................................................................................... 147
   i. The humanist challenge .............................................................................................................. 148
   ii. The epistemic superiority of naturalism ..................................................................................... 151
   iii. From “is” to “ought” ................................................................................................................ 158
   iv. Objectivity and neutrality .......................................................................................................... 166

7. The Crisis of social science ............................................................................................................. 174
   i. “Knowledge about” and “knowledge of” .................................................................................... 174
   ii. “Knowledge that” and “knowledge how” ................................................................................... 183
   iii. Wer without end ....................................................................................................................... 191
   iv. Fehdcdunr science ..................................................................................................................... 198

Glossary .............................................................................................................................................. 208
Bibliography ....................................................................................................................................... 208
1. Introduction

Social science is in crisis. As understood by Alfred Schutz (1899-1959) a crisis involves ‘an event or situation that cannot be met by applying the traditional and habitual pattern of behaviour and interpretation’ (Schutz, 1964i:231). To speak of a crisis of social science is to declare as Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) did in the opening of *The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Philosophy (Crisis)* (1936[1970c]) that ‘the crisis of science indicates nothing less than that its genuine scientific character, the whole manner in which it has set its task and developed a methodology for it, has become questionable’ (1970c:3). Despite many claiming to do social science, these claimants struggle to cohere with one another as to what is meant by “social science”. The task of social science as we understand it (co-opting Sartre) is the study of “man in situation”: to understand the world as it is for “man”. It is the charge of this thesis that this crisis stems from a failure to properly address the philosophical anthropological question “What is man?” As we understand it, “philosophical anthropology” is the determination of “man” over and against all that is “not-man”. It is our intention to show that the root of the crisis is that *social science as the study of “man in situation” can provide no formal definition of “man”* (see below).

To this end we will pursue a phenomenological analysis into the essence of social science as the most precise means of understanding this crisis. That is, phenomenology, among other things, is a reflection into the nature of science (Moran and Embree, 2004c:1). Following Schutz we understand that it is ‘the ideal of phenomenology to establish a complete realm of fully clarified ideas, that is, a complete system of all intuitively knowable essences’ (Schutz, 1970a:49). “Essences” are discerned when a thing is ‘brought by the process of clarification to perfect self-givenness, to perfect lucidity and vividness’ (1970a:50). We propose the essence of social science to be:

*The pursuit of nonpractical knowledge into “man” as a being who not only exists as a part of the organisation of the life-world but acts as one among many organisers of a life-world.*

Our task is to bring this essence to the fullest possible clarity necessary to address the crisis. We emphasise that this pursuit of essences is an ideal of phenomenology and no one study will fully discern the essence of social science. Rather, our intention is to affect the necessary shift in our understanding that will enable future constructive solutions to this crisis.

In the course of bringing this essence to the fullest possible clarity we will have cause to critique much that has gone by the name “social science”. Indeed, to achieve clarity we must recognise that much
of the “science” that occurs in universities is pseudo-science, though we do not mean to engage in an institutional defence of Social Science. To be clear, by “social science” we refer to a particular practice, an activity, and by “Social Science” we mean the institution or discipline. This does not necessarily exclude the “Humanities” as such. Rather, the institutional division within universities of Social Science and Humanities are taxonomic divisions done for practical reasons: ‘dividing the field of scholarship and science into various departments or faculties or schools is largely a matter of convenience in organisation rather than a reflection of intrinsic differences in subject matter’ (Gordon, 1991:1). As we see it, social science is to be found in both Social Science and Humanities.¹

As part of its process it must be noted that ‘clarification also has the function of giving old words a newly constituted sense’ (Husserl, 1980:88). Words and terms have been given phenomenological meanings, or new terms developed. But through translation or the historical gap between the writings of “then” and “now” unintended connotations or interpretations have accrued to these words that must again be clarified. One such word is “man” which in the wake of feminist critiques now carries with it a certain degree of sexism. In the treatment of ambiguous words we have adopted the strategy of translating them into their Old English equivalents² when we wish them to carry a specific phenomenological sense. We have chosen Old English for three reasons: first, it is closer to Modern German - which many key phenomenologists wrote in - than Modern English is; second, there is a level of specificity lacking in Modern English; third, as a dead language the terms used are unlikely to be read with meanings other than those defined. “Man”, as one such word, will now be rendered as “wer”.³ As we will use it in this thesis we define wer in the minimal sense of the beings which we are. Thus to say of someone that they are wer is to say “they are a being like me” and as such has no gender indication. The reader may well ask why we have not used “human being” or some equivalent in this particular case. The reason for this is what we call the human prejudice which constitutes one of our major steps in analysing the crisis of social science.

¹ For ease of exposition we have referred almost exclusively to the former.
² For translations we have relied primarily on Jember (1975), Englisc Onstigende Wordbōc (2014) and Old English Translator (2014). Where possible we have also kept to the Old English grammatical forms (see Glossary).
³ “Wer” is predominantly found in the concept of wergild: the price someone would have to pay for killing another person.
i. Seeing the crisis

In the lecture “Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man” (1935[1965b])\(^4\), which Lauer describes as an introduction to the *Crisis*\(^5\) (Lauer, 1965:7), Husserl claims that science began with the Greeks. Greece, Husserl suggests, is the spiritual birthplace of Europe not as a geographically defined area but the ‘unity of a spiritual life and a creative activity – with all its aims, interests, cares, and troubles, with its plans, its establishments, it institutions’ that includes Europe as a land mass and other English speaking domains such as the United States (Husserl, 1965b:155).

Here we strike upon our second term in need of clarification – “Geist”. Both Lauer and Carr translate “Geist” as “spirit” as it is the lesser evil in comparison to the alternative “mind” or “mentality” (in Husserl, 1965b:152; 1980:6). The issue is that both “spirit” and “Geist” can carry certain metaphysical connotations and be synonymous with “soul”. However, in the case of Husserl this would be erroneous as “soul” is always referred to as “Seelen”. According to Dermot Moran, “Geist” translated as “spirit” (over “mind”) indicates cultural activity (Moran, 2012:47). As such it is also erroneous to translate the associated *Geisteswissenschaft*, which Husserl uses to refer to what we now call “social science”, as “human science” as Lauer and Carr, and Rojcewicz and Schuwer in their translation of *Ideas II* (1952[1989]), all do. For the latter this leads to the odd construction: ‘if I am in the attitude of the human science, the sciences devoted to the spirit’ (Husserl, 1989:214).\(^6\) How “Geist” can be translated as both “human” and “spirit” in the same sentence is not explained by the translators. We agree with Seebohm that a proper translation would be “spiritual science” (Seebohm, 2013:126). Further complications, however, arise when we turn to a consideration of “Geist” as it is translated in Max Scheler’s (1874-1928) works. In the case of Scheler, “Geist” is more consistently translated as “mind” as well as “spirit”. As explained by Frings, a principle translator of Scheler, the use of both to translate “Geist” is to differentiate between a sociological use (“mind”) and a metaphysical use (“spirit”) (in Scheler, 1980b:vii). Not only does this cause difficulties for Frings’ translation; it also means that in English Scheler’s “mind” corresponds to Husserl’s “spirit”. To avoid confusion we will adopt the Old English

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\(^4\) An alternate translation also appears as appendix A in *Crisis*.

\(^5\) Only Parts I and II of *Crisis* were published in *Philosophia*. Husserl died in 1938 before finishing Part III which was then completed by his research assistant Eugen Fink. Moran has suggested the published text is a “Fink-Husserl cooperative effort” (Moran, 2012:13-14).

\(^6\) A similarly issue may occur in Weinsheimer and Marshall’s translation of Gadamer’s *Truth and Method* (Gadamer, 2013:3). More detailed study is required beyond the scope of this thesis to be sure of how Gadamer properly meant the phrase to be used.
word “ferhd” to mean the cultural activity indicated by Husserl. Should we need to refer to “Geist” or
“spirit” in a metaphysical sense we will use the cognate “gāst”. While “ferhd” shares the ambiguity of
“Geist” in that it can be translated as “mind” or “spirit”, unlike “gāst” it cannot be translated as “soul” or
“ghost”. We will further clarify this choice later in our discussion of Scheler’s phenomenology.

In Greece this ferhd took shape in the seventh and sixth century BCE as a new Einstellung
(attitude), or, ‘a habitually determined manner of vital willing, wherein the will’s directions or interests,
its aims and cultural accomplishments, are preindicated and thus the overall orientation determined’
(Husserl, 1965b:165). This arose into the “cultural form” which the Greeks called philosophy. According
to Husserl, “philosophy”, ‘in its original sense, bespeaks nothing but universal science, science of the
world as a whole, of the universal unity of all being’ (1965b:159). The interest in this totality began to
particularise itself into various specialisations out of which were produced the various sciences. Thus, in
the earlier Logical Investigations (1901, 1913, 1921[1970a, 1970b])\(^7\), Husserl characterises philosophy
(and logic) as the “theory of science”. Husserl goes on to call the attitude of philosophy (and the sciences)
the “theoretical attitude” by which is meant an attitude that pursues ‘knowledge for its own sake’
(1965b:164).

It is not our purpose to assess how historically accurate Husserl is in crediting the Greeks with
the beginning of science. Scott Gordon (1991), for example, suggests that science did not emerge until
the Renaissance (14th-17th Century). This is not to suggest that science did not occur before the works of
Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519), Andreas Vesalius (1514-1564), and Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) whom
Gordon singles out as exemplars in this period. Gordon also points to work of the Roman Period, Middle
Ages, and the 11th-13th Centuries as containing science. Rather, it is his suggestion that it is only with the
Renaissance that “modern science” can said to have begun as a continuous development (1991:23).

The Renaissance, and particularly Galileo, hold an important place in Husserl’s argument of the
Crisis also. Husserl credits Galileo with the mathematisation of nature: ‘nature itself is idealised under
the guidance of the new mathematics; nature itself becomes – to express it in a modern way – a
mathematical manifold’ (Husserl, 1970c:23). Koyré details the impact of the Galilean revolution, which
overturned Aristotelian physics, as the ‘discovery of the fact that mathematics is the grammar of science.
It is this discovery of the rational structure of Nature which gave the a priori foundations to the modern

\(^7\) The book would go through various editions and alterations.
experimental science and made its constitution possible’ (Koyré, 1943:347). In short everything in the
universe becomes amenable to quantification. As Husserl describes it:

The indirect mathematisation of the world, which proceeds as a
methodical objectification of the intuitively given world, gives rise to
general numerical formulae which, once they are formed, can serve by
way of application to accomplish the factual objectification of the
particular cases to be subsumed under them. The formulae obviously
express general causal interrelations, “laws of nature,” laws of real
dependencies in the form of the “functional” dependencies of numbers.
(1970c:41)

Galileo himself was unable to shake off all his Aristotelian heritage and in Husserl’s analysis Galileo is a
figure used to exemplify the emergence of modern science. Moran notes that the Crisis is more concerned
with uncovering ‘the concealed thought-formations and intentions that led to the “construction” of the
idea of nature as understood by modern science that has now become so thoroughly implanted in our
culture that we somehow think of this scientific nature as if it were the “natural” or common-sense view
of modern humanity’ (Moran, 2012:74).

Out of the mathematisation of nature comes a decisive split wherein the thing of experience is
treated as a sign of certain other properties. Beginning with Galileo there is a ‘surreptitious substitution of
idealised nature for prescientifically intuited nature’ (Husserl, 1970c:49-50). In this new science
emerging from Galileo as physics, ‘things “seen” are always more than what we “really and actually” see
of them’ (1970c:51). And it is through the “garb of ideas” this mathematisation creates that ‘we take for
ture being what is actually a method – a method which is designed for the purpose of progressively
improving, in infinitum, through “scientific” predictions, those rough predictions which are the only ones
originally possible within the sphere of what is actually experienced and experienceable’ (1970c:51-52).
However, in order to engage in this infinite progress of ever detailed predictions we must entertain an
abstraction whereby all “cultural properties” are removed from objects to create a self-enclosed world of
bodies. In effect, Galileo invented “nature” as we know it now: ‘a self-enclosed natural causality in which
every occurrence is determined unequivocally and in advance’ (1970c:60). And as “nature” was
discovered, so too was the idea of “gäst” as its opposite. As such this led to a new European ferhd. Or
rather, a revolution whereby what the European considered “natural” became replaced with a new
conception.

Most significant in this revolution is the ambiguous place ferhd held in this new nature/gäst
division. Culminating in Descartes’ mind-body dualism, ferhd effectively became equated with gäst.
However, also stemming from Galileo came what de Caro and MacArthur have recently called the “Great
Success of Modern Science Argument” - the technical achievements of natural science to encompass more and more data engendered scientism, the view that the only true picture of reality is provided by natural science (de Caro & MacArthur, 2004:4). Thus, Hobbes formulated the doctrine of subjectivity in which the intuited world of our lives is taken to be subjective and insofar as it relies on pre-scientific thinking is necessarily false. And even Descartes declared in the case of the sun that only the sun constructed by astronomers using geometry and mathematical physics was the true sun (Moran, 2012:77). As these various successes mounted they began to be taken for granted by scientists and in such a way that any attempt to get the scientist to reflect upon the ‘original meaning of all his meaning-structures and methods’ was rejected as “metaphysical” (Husserl, 1970c:56-57). In “Crisis of European Man” Husserl refers to the naïveté of scientism wherein bolstered by the success of the natural sciences those who claim to study ferhd “naturalised” it (Husserl, 1965b:181). As such ferhd became equated with nature and its method of study.

This naturalised study of ferhd is pegged on psychology for much of the Crisis as the exemplary case. Husserl brands this as naïveté because the idea of “nature” as a ferhdcund construction was never raised. By consequence the crisis of Husserl’s time was that European wer had become dominated by a “rationalism” based upon the natural sciences. In particular a dissonance emerged between the world as these “naturalistic” sciences proclaimed it to be and the world as it was experienced. Husserl saw this happening most clearly in the case of the “ferhdcund sciences”, or, what we now call the social sciences, which consistently fail to understand the “ferhdcund world” according to the principles of the “natural world”. This thesis may be considered an extension of Husserl’s project in the Crisis. Yet in writing of the “crisis of social science” are we suggesting that a new crisis has arisen?

There is a significant historical gap between this thesis and Husserl’s arguments of 1936-1938. Nor can we ignore that it came into being in a particular historical context with the rise of anti-rationalism both within philosophy and in politics. Husserl was not the first to attack the rationalism of the Enlightenment period but, as he saw it, the mistake of contemporary philosophers was to abandon rationality altogether. At the same time the “staleness” of naturalistic rationalism was finding a political reaction in the form of National Socialism which was also embracing anti-rationalism. Yet Husserl’s aim was not ‘a political polemic but a sober philosophical diagnosis of the roots of the problem’ (in Husserl, 1970c:xxvii). It was these problems of the day that gave the impetus for Husserl to reflect upon the crisis of European Science. And if we look at our current context then there can be no denying that the current
financial climate has not in some way provided the impetus to this current study. But it would be a
mistake to suggest that we are dealing with two separate crises of a similar nature. *It is the presupposition
of this thesis that social science has never not been in crisis.* It is only such events as the rise of Nazism
or the economic crash that make the crisis apparent.

Looking at the history of Social Science in the wake of Husserl’s *Crisis* we find scholars
tackling the same crisis that he identified: the question of the character of social science. Ernest Nagel,
writing in 1952, comments that:

> There is little general agreement as to what social theory ought to be, and as to what social theory ought to accomplish; and in any case, whatever sense is attached to the word “theory,” there is no theoretical treatise in these disciplines comparable in scope and authority with those current in physics, chemistry or biology. (Nagel, 1963:19)

Nine years later he expanded on this earlier comment making the situation of social science sound even
worse:

> In no area of social inquiry has a body of general laws been established, comparable with the outstanding theories in the natural sciences in scope of explanatory power or in capacity to yield precise and reliable predictions… It is also generally acknowledged that in the social sciences there is nothing quite like the almost complete unanimity commonly found among competent workers in the natural sciences as to what are matters of established fact, what are the reasonably satisfactory explanations (if any) for the assured facts, and what are some of the valid procedures in sound inquiry. (Nagel, 2003:39-40)

Fritz Machlup (1963) referred to this situation as Social Science’s “inferiority complex” – whether
justified or not – in which Natural Science is perceived to be better.

Stephen Toulmin later drew a distinction between Physics as a “compact discipline” and
Behavioural/Human Sciences (i.e. Social Science) as a “would-be discipline” (Toulmin, 1972:382-386).
In short, we seek the methodological unity of Natural Science, whether there is indeed such, and yet
somehow have failed to live up to this desire. In fact, Toulmin’s own views echo that of Husserl’s above:
‘in science and philosophy alike, an exclusive preoccupation with logical systematicity has been
destructive of both historical understanding and rational criticism’ (Toulmin, 1972:vii). More than this
though, the following diagnosis of a “would-be” discipline applies to social science:

> The different men attempting to co-operate in launching a new science (say) may not merely disagree about their particular observations and interpretations, concepts and hypotheses: they may even lack common standards for deciding what constitutes a genuine problem, a valid explanation, or a sound theory. (1972:380)
As of 2011 the situation has hardly improved according to Steel and Guala: ‘there is little consensus across the social sciences as to basic methods, aims, and fundamental assumptions about human beings’ (Steel and Guala, 2011:1).

The resolution, as Toulmin recognised, of such a problem is not to be found in empirical investigation but in methodological and philosophical discussion. As such while much of what we will discuss has practical benefits for many empirical studies the exploration of these goes beyond the scope of our main argument. Indeed, these “practical” problems can only be properly addressed once we have affected the fundamental shift this thesis aims to achieve. Where possible, we have included some indication of these in footnotes.

However, no such philosophical discussion can proceed without reference to these empirical investigations if it is not to be trapped in its own musings. To this end we shall use Religious Studies\(^8\) as a way of exemplifying the issues which we wish to discuss. We have chosen Religious Studies over other disciplines (e.g. Sport Studies) due to comments like that of Luther Martin and Donald Wiebe that ‘no undergraduate departments of Religious Studies have fully implemented a scientific program of study and research since such an approach was first advocated in the late nineteenth century’ (Martin and Wiebe, 2012a:9). There is a particular lack of identity that lends itself to our current considerations in part because Religious Studies straddles the institutional Social Science/Humanities divide. Samuel Preus (1987) and Eric Sharpe (1988) have detailed some of the chaos that has ensued as a result of this. But in 1996 Charlotte Allen suggested that it was a good thing ‘for religious studies to be a shapeless beast, half social science, half humanistic discipline, lumbering through the academy with no clear methodology or raison d’etre’ (Allen, 1996). In 2008 Paul-Francois Tremlett echoed Allen’s comments in slightly more negative tones: ‘The study is a field of enquiry that lacks any clear or singular definition of its object or a specific procedure, method or set of assumptions by which the study of religions might claim for itself the (dubious) status of a “discipline”’ (Tremlett, 2008:viii). But it must be emphasised that this crisis we are seeking to analyse is not just the concern of Religious Studies. Jonathan Turner, describing the situation of Sociology, states the following: ‘A discipline that speaks with so many voices is not vibrant; rather it is in chaos’ (Turner, 2005:38). We are simply using Religious Studies to illustrate this very point.

\(^8\) We will use “Religious Studies” and “religious studies” in the same fashion we have used “Social Science” and “social science”.
The comments of Martin and Wiebe, in particular, are useful for highlighting some of the charges we wish to make. As they see it, religious studies as it is done in universities now originated in the works of Max Müller (1823-1900) and Cornelius Tiele (1830-1902) who advocated a Religionswissenschaft – a “science of religion” (Martin and Wiebe, 2012a:11-12). The project of Religionswissenschaft, they explain, can be seen as a “specialisation” within the wider project of Wissenschaft (science) understood as “knowledge for the sake of knowledge”. Their account, however, is unacceptably naïve. Wissenschaft has its roots in the University of Berlin in 1810 as the first “modern research university” but was crucially oriented toward assisting Bildung – education as self-cultivation (Gregory, 2012:348-349). In this early stage the “modern university” was bound to a Romantic vision of education as self-realisation, a view in part stemming from the influence of Schleiermacher. Contra Martin and Wiebe’s abbreviated account, the Wissenschaft of 1810 did not yet resemble the Wissenschaft of a century later. According to Gregory, on practical terms, these “romantic universities” had only traded out one source of control, The Church, for another, The State, dependent as they were on funding (2012:350-351). It is not until the nineteenth century, and a certain transposition to America, that we see universities endorsing the sort of program advocated by Martin and Wiebe. Indeed, Gregory indicates that it is as late as Max Weber (1864-1920) – specifically “Science as a Vocation” (1919[1946]) – that Wissenschaft in Martin and Wiebe’s sense of “knowledge for the sake of knowledge” really established itself in universities (Gregory, 2012:358).

This Weberian Wissenschaft has since been taken up in phenomenology; according to Aron Gurwitsch there are two important aspects of Wissenschaft: even though much technology is based on the findings of science, technological development is not itself a part of science; and, the term not only indicates natural science, but also the human sciences and formal sciences (in Gurwitsch, 1974:ix). Though it originated separately, “Wissenschaft” has effectively become another way of expressing Husserl’s “theoretical attitude” as “knowledge for its own sake”. Or, as commented by Scheler responding to “Science as a Vocation”: ‘The very central point on which I fully agree with Max Weber is the assertion that science, by its nature, has no application to the development and formulation of a Weltanschauung (world-view)’ (Scheler, 1989a:87). A point echoed by Husserl’s conclusion to Cartesian Meditations (CM) (1931[1988]): ‘phenomenological explanation does nothing but explicate the sense of this world has for us, prior to any philosophising … a sense which philosophy can uncover but never

9 A similar argument is found in Gadamer (2013:3-16).
alter’ (1988:151). But the problem this presents for both Scheler and Husserl is the shared conviction that “science” has stemmed back as far as the Ancient Greeks; a view potentially just as idealised, if not more so, as Martin and Wiebe’s.

The distinction between the two is that Martin and Wiebe’s comments rely too much on science as it is done in ‘modern research universities’ (Martin and Wiebe, 2012a:12). That is, they take the practice of science, or lack thereof, in universities as the principle factor for discerning what they call a “failure of nerve” in Religious Studies to meet the scientific aims of pioneers like Müller and Tiele. More specifically, Wiebe (2012) comments elsewhere, these departments have failed to achieve the necessary “secularisation” demanded for a (Weberian) Wissenschaft and remove themselves from religious concerns. However, it must be recognised that not all Religious Studies departments descend from this original Religionswissenschaft and there are other origin stories too. Or, as they blithely ignore, that Religionswissenschaft fell into the hands of what we will call phenomenology – the “phenomenology” most familiar to Religious Studies – immediately after Tiele. Our charge against Wiebe’s account is that the crisis of social science is not brought about by a failure of universities to promote science. Husserl’s account of the “theoretical attitude” not only argues for its presence long before “modern” universities existed but makes hardly any reference to them. To argue for Wiebe’s position is to misunderstand the conditions under which science is possible. It will be one of our tasks to clarify the possibility of science to combat the mistaken assumption that universities are necessary for science.

Furthermore, both Martin and Wiebe have already proposed a solution to this crisis/failure on “scientific” grounds (2012a:13-17). They suggest that on the basis of cognitive and evolutionary sciences it is possible to explain why “religiousness” will continue to constrain religious studies. Drawing on Robert McCauley (2011) it is suggested from the evolutionary and cognitive perspective that religion is natural and science is not (2012a:15). Humans, they argue, are very adept at detecting agency pre-reflectively and on the basis of minimal stimulation. This ability to detect agency is an evolutionary trait that instilled a wariness that protected us from predators identified by Justin Barrett (2004) as Hyperactive Agency Detection Device (HADD). Martin and Wiebe conclude that: ‘Our evolutionary history has, in other words, endowed our species with a developmentally early proclivity for explaining our world in terms of agent causality’ (2012a:15). Scientific knowledge, they contend, replaces this agent causality with natural causality. But, as agent causality is part of our evolutionary make-up we have a
tendency to cognitively default to thinking in terms of agent causality. We have, as it were, a natural ‘anti-science proclivity’ (2012a:16). Framed in terms of the crisis of social science this would be to suggest that the crisis emerges from a human propensity to default into agent causality.

As a solution to the crisis, however, this does not reach far enough. Even if we were to accept their premises, their argument is aimed exclusively at religious studies. They openly admit that this problem is not suffered elsewhere: ‘In no other department of the modern university do researchers systematically avoid critical studies and theoretically based explanations of their subject of study’ (Martin and Wiebe, 2012a:17). But as von Stuckrad has recognised, it is question begging as to why, if we have a natural propensity to be un-scientific, this propensity only manifests in religious studies (von Stuckrad, 2012:59). As they present their argument, Martin and Wiebe are responding to a “crisis of religious studies” and their comments cannot be extended to include all of social science. It is also on the grounds that our analysis must be applicable to all social science that we will later reject phenomenology-of-religion.

Related to this point is that the division between agent causality and natural causality is heavily reliant upon the philosophy of naturalism. Their claim that agent causality can effectively be reduced to natural causality is one that naturalism has historically struggled to justify. Not only does this repeat the naïveté of which Husserl spoke above, but it has led more recently to a divide within naturalism between “scientific” and “liberal” naturalisms. But even liberal naturalism which would allow for some form of agent causality is nevertheless flawed because the way in which it determines which causes are “natural” or “agential” requires an orthodoxy of rationality which is fundamentally pseudo-scientific. Our charge against naturalism is that it has essentialised the epistemic status of science and it will be another of our tasks to clarify this.

The crisis, quite simply, is ongoing. Yet the obvious question is why? Husserl proposed the way out of the crisis was through transcendental phenomenology. Yet the less than universal acceptance of this program even among his own followers suggests that his solution to the crisis was inadequate in some regard. We do not intend to suggest that phenomenology is deficient in the task however. But as Husserl himself demanded: ‘It lies in the nature of phenomenology and of the unique functions which devolve upon it for the whole of our knowledge, that it be continually applied to itself reflectively, that

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10 Von Struckrad (2012) and Seiwert’s (2012) responses to Martin and Wiebe’s paper repeat some of Husserl’s more general contentions against naturalism.

11 The full meaning of this term word will be unpacked in Ch.4.i.
out of phenomenological sources it must bring to fullest clarity the method itself which it practices’ (Husserl, 1980:80). As such if we are to engage in a phenomenological analysis of the crisis of social science we must first clarify what it means to be phenomenological. Only then will we have adequate grounds upon which to proceed.

ii. Philosophy of social science

Based on the above comments we know there is a crisis of social science because there are a number of methodologies in contestation with one another. More accurately each methodology is an attempt to say what “social science” is. That this constitutes a crisis is precisely because there is disagreement and not agreement. As Delanty and Strydom define it, “methodology” roughly translates from the Greek as “theory of the way in which knowledge is acquired” and thus refers to the rationally and processes that guide scientific enquiry (Delanty and Strydom, 2003:4). In English “methodology” is often associated with “theory of science” or “philosophy of science” (2003:4). Broadly understood the philosophy of social science is a reflexive activity and is not the doing of social science per se. Delanty and Strydom note that this reflexive attitude can be conceived in one of three broad ways:

1. The philosophy of social science can be construed as a second order activity with the purpose of providing a normative vision for social science. The philosophy of social science is a sub-branch of the philosophy of science and plays a legislative role over how science should be done. As Gordon forcefully puts it: ‘some philosophers of science take the stance that the object of their discipline is to delineate a methodology of investigation that guarantees the discovery of truth, and to prescribe that methodology as canonical imperatives which practising scientists are obliged to follow’ (1991:iix).

2. As a reaction to this first kind of activity, a second emerged through a “hermeneutical tradition” started by social scientists rather than philosophers. In this understanding ‘leading social scientists advocated a specifically social science epistemology, seeing the philosophy of social science as something that goes on within social science and for which philosophers are not responsible’ (Delanty & Strydom, 2003:2). Like the previous understanding it is a second order activity as an epistemological consideration of the nature and status of scientific knowledge. In this respect we may think less of “philosophers” and more of “social theorists”.

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3. Another understanding, similar to the previous, regards the practice of social science and philosophical reflection to not be separate activities on different levels. This stance differs from the above in that “the philosophy of social science is a reflexive discourse on the practice of social science, but one that is neither prescriptive-legislative nor proclaims a specific philosophy of social science” (Delanty & Strydom, 2003:3). Another way of understanding this is to describe it as the social scientific study of social science.

As we understand it, there is little difference in Delanty and Strydom’s differentiation between philosophy of social science in the first and second senses. The only substantive difference that can be discerned is that the former are “philosophers” and the latter are “social scientists”. If we follow Husserl’s understanding of the relation of philosophy to science we can say that philosophers attempt to make normative claims about the whole of science (Husserl, 1970a:70-71). As Lauer suggests, philosophy ‘provides the norms whereby any science can be worthy of the name’ (in Husserl, 1965b:178). Scientific theorists differ in that their normative claims focus on the specific branch of science in which they operate. Both, however, are making normative claims that are operating at the same level. While scientific theorists may add certain claims there is, nevertheless, a core which applies to all science in their thinking or else they cannot speak of other disciplines outside their own as sciences. It is for this reason that we will speak of “normative philosophy of social science” to refer to both first and second senses and “evaluative philosophy of social science” to refer to the third sense.

Thus within Social Science these contesting methodologies are all normative philosophies of social science – i.e. they make normative claims about what social science should do and how it should be done. We do not, however, intend to argue that these methodologies are mutually exclusive per se. Rather, our focus is the source of this contestation which we have suggested can be found through a consideration of philosophical anthropology. However, to understand this contestation we must engage in a social scientific analysis of it. That is, this thesis can be regarded as evaluative philosophy of social science.

In saying this though, we enter into a hermeneutical circle. Evaluative philosophy of social science as a social scientific study of social science necessarily presupposes the validity of at least one of these methodologies in order to know what it is we are doing and how we are to do it. The presupposing of this methodology has a consequence for this argument: any attempt to study the crisis of social science from a social scientific perspective is also an attempt to resolve it. More exactly, it is the enforcement of
certain normative claims about social science to ascertain why they have not been kept by other parties. This can be seen in Husserl’s *Crisis*: not only did he recognise that his study involved ‘a sort of circle’, but the very phenomenology he used to perform the study became the very solution to the crisis (1970c:58). In presupposing a methodology we are drawing a line in the sand within which are encompassed social scientific methodologies, including the methodology used to draw the line itself. As Martin Heidegger, who made the circle famous, queried: ‘in working out the question do we not “presuppose” something that only the answer can provide?’ (Heidegger, 2010:7). This then implies those methodologies encompassed within this line are valid and should be defended as proper science against pseudo-science. As Heidegger goes on to say: ““Presupposing” being has the character of taking a preliminary look at being in such a way that on the basis of this look beings that are already given are tentatively articulated in their being’ (2010:7). Nor, though, should we be lulled into thinking this resolves the crisis. True, this may delimit proper social science, but this does not negate that there is still contestation among those methodologies contained therein. As such our concern is to first expel threats to science (pseudo-science) and from there delve deeper into this contestation, unconfused by outside influences, to get at the core of the crisis.

The presupposing of a methodology and the hermeneutic circle entailed is not a reason to discount this argument. Indeed, Kiesel has suggested that the hermeneutic circle is closer to thinking than presumed by (positivistic) science (Kiesel, 2004:50-51). If we tried to proceed without a methodology this analysis would be curtailed at the observation that there are many competing methodologies within Social Science and could say no more. Anything further said on the matter presupposes a methodology by which to proceed even if this methodology is only tacitly presupposed. The key is not so much breaking the circle but generating enough momentum with it that we are propelled forward: ‘the practical possibility of a new philosophy will prove itself: through its execution’ (Husserl, 1970c:18). The further we propel ourselves, the more successful we have been. From this, though, it may be legitimately claimed that the methodology presupposed has been presupposed either arbitrarily or ideologically. However, as a criticism this point is empty. As hinted at by von Stuckrad, any methodology presupposed will be subject to this point: ‘There is no way out of the dilemma that advocating science or a particular understanding of it cannot be grounded on scientific arguments but necessarily refers to normative positions and subjective

12 “Proper” and “pseudo” replace “good” and “bad” in Husserl’s discussion of a “normative science” (i.e. “theory of science”) (Husserl, 1970a:81-86).
preferences’ (von Stuckrad, 2012:36). Certainly we may be able to push the circle back a step. This is the naturalist move of making social science continuous with natural science. While this might appear to get us out of the circle for social science it only does this by the presupposing of a natural scientific methodology – i.e. the line in the sand of social science is drawn within the line in the sand of natural science which is also drawn by a presupposed methodology. The circle remains, only now it is in the frame of natural science.

Because of the arbitrary/ideological nature of this presupposing of phenomenology, we are making an imperial argument. The line we are drawing between proper science and pseudo-science will invariably displace certain people who claim to be doing “science” to the latter side. We will not shy away from this, any attempt to resolve the crisis of social science carries with it the claim “Get in line or get down”. But we would add in defence of this vulgar phrasing that we are not the first to say as such, Wiebe states similarly that: ‘What is required in that debate – not only in the field of the study of religion but there especially so – is an either-or choice, for it is not scientifically acceptable to mix our science with modes of thought that contradict its fundamental intentionality’ (Wiebe, 1999:135). Speaking more recently, he has suggested that this division and defence of science requires both an intellectual and political effort (Wiebe, 2012:184-186). What Wiebe has referred to as the political effort we have cast as the arbitrary/ideological. More important for now is that the intellectual effort requires a normative philosophy of social science not only to defend, but also to defend with. To reiterate, this does not make phenomenology the only normative philosophy of social science to be defended, only that the precision of phenomenology will bring the greatest possible clarity to the crisis.¹³

This thesis is, then, divided into two parts. Part I is a normative philosophy of social science: it will elucidate the phenomenological methodology presupposed and the essence of social science to be defended. Part II is an evaluative philosophy of social science; having established the essence of science it will be our task to scrutinise this further to sort proper from pseudo-science. Once achieved we will finally be in a position to understand the crisis of social science.

¹³ While we suspect there to be a number of similarities between Foucault and the position argued here (particularly in The Order of Things (1966[2002a]) and The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969[2002b])), his criticism of philosophical anthropology (see Schacht, 1990) turns him away from the very issue we wish to discuss.
iii. Proper phenomenology

The task of Part I of this thesis can be summarised as follows: we must bring to the fullest possible clarity our understanding of what is meant by “phenomenology” as the methodology which we shall presuppose in our analysis of this crisis. And so securing this meaning we must also demonstrate that phenomenology is social scientific and therefore in a position to analyse the crisis of social science.

However, in privileging phenomenology as the methodology for this thesis and taking Religious Studies as our main example we now need to make certain clarifications. Herbert Spiegelberg has bluntly pointed out that ‘the difficulty of stating point-black what phenomenology is are almost notorious’ (Spiegelberg, 1982:1). The word “phenomenology” has existed a long time and according to Spiegelberg it has been invented at least eighteen times independently. He points out this is hardly surprising that once “phenomena” became worth studying and “-ologies” became fashionable, the conjunction “phenomenology” was somewhat inevitable. We raise this point because within Religious Studies historically the most predominant methodology has been what we call “phenomenology-of-religion”. Although the phenomenology-of-religion has all but died in recent years under stringent criticism it has left behind a curious mark by which any form of “phenomenology” is treated with suspicion. It is the first task of this thesis, therefore, to separate the phenomenology-of-religion from the Phenomenological Movement. In order to achieve this we need to make various distinctions between “phenomenology simpliciter” and “pseudo-phenomenology”, “phenomenology simpliciter” and “phenomenology proper”, and “phenomenology proper” and “unrelated phenomenology”.

Beginning with phenomenology simpliciter it is necessary to determine how it is that so many disparate scholars working in relative isolation can claim the title of “phenomenology”. We propose in Chapter 2 that in the simpliciter sense what holds together otherwise disparate “phenomenologies” is that they are all engaged in the task of philosophical anthropology. That is, “phenomenology” is by definition an approach to the question “What is *wer?*”. We intend to demonstrate this by looking into the various branches of the Phenomenological Movement. 2.i will pursue why it is the approach to this definition has not proceeded along the lines of phenomenology-of-religion. There are two grounds for this: first, there is a large degree of ambiguity over when and where phenomenology-of-religion began and by consequence who should or should not be contained within the rubric; second, phenomenology-of-religion’s position on the relation of religious studies and social science indicate that its concerns do not extend to the latter. 2.ii will, however, show that though the Phenomenological Movement has more certain beginnings it
would be erroneous to equate the entire Movement solely with the thinking of Husserl. There are at least four “branches” of phenomenology for which Husserl can be accredited with the instigation of only two. 2.iii will resolve this problem by showing how the thinking of several key phenomenologists, Husserl, Scheler and Heidegger, all approached philosophical anthropology even if they did not always accept the title themselves. The lack of “philosophical anthropology” in both Husserl and Heidegger has more to do with a polemic attempt to outshine Scheler. 2.iv will argue that Sartre, despite comments to the contrary, carried forward the specifically phenomenological approach to philosophical anthropology. This will then lay the foundations for later arguments.

From this understanding of phenomenology simpliciter we need to move forward in Chapter 3 to an understanding of phenomenology proper as the specifics of how this approach to philosophical anthropology is carried out. That is, while both the Phenomenological Movement and phenomenology-of-religion are phenomenologies in the simpliciter sense, as phenomenologies proper they shared marked differences. To this end we will introduce the work of Schutz as the successor of Husserl. By this we mean that Schutz is the instigator of a fifth branch of phenomenology that applied itself specifically to the problems of social science. In 3.i we will introduce how Schutz synthesises and responds to the thinking of Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, and Sartre. 14 In particular we will focus on his notion of provinces of meaning, a key aspect of his sociology of knowledge, as being the framework from which we can delineate the phenomenology proper of the Phenomenological Movement. 3.ii will therefore detail the necessary components that must go into a province of meaning in order for it to function as such. Using these requirements we will then demonstrate how the Phenomenological Movement constitutes a province of meaning in 3.iii. We will thus identify the strictures of phenomenology and bring clarity to the definition of the phenomenology proper of the Phenomenological Movement as:

Proper phenomenology is the faithful study of things themselves to clarify their essences as they are given to wer.

Carried with this identification of phenomenology proper is the “ideological” claim that it is proper phenomenology. By this we mean that the phenomenology proper of the Phenomenological Movement is suitable for getting at the core of the crisis of social science whereas the phenomenology proper of phenomenology-of-religion is not.

14 That we have focused on these five phenomenologists to the exclusion of others (e.g. Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer, Ricoeur and Levinas) is based primarily on their explicit discussions of philosophical anthropology as well as their key positions in instigating the various branches of phenomenology.
Continuing with Schutz it will then be necessary in Chapter 4 to demonstrate the phenomenology of the Phenomenological Movement is also social scientific. In order to do this we must begin to formulate the essence of social science. For this 4.i will make the argument that “social science” is also a province of meaning, or more accurately, a means of characterising a type of province of meaning. In various essays Schutz delineated various postulates that can be used to determine whether a province of meaning is social scientific or not. However, as these postulates are spread across several essays which differ as to titles and content it is the task of 4.ii to bring to full clarity the proper list of postulates. In so doing we will argue that it is the purpose of science to pursue “knowledge for its own sake” and that social science is a qualification of this purpose to focus on knowledge about “wer in situation”. As part of this task we will also address the rationality of science. Having established the various postulates as the eidetic structures of the essence of social science we will finally show in 4.iii how these cohere with the strictures of phenomenology. By doing so we will confirm that the phenomenology of the Phenomenological Movement as proper phenomenology can engage in an analysis of the crisis of social science.

iv. The phenomenological analysis of social science

The essence of social science and its relation to phenomenology shall present us with a number of challenges which will be addressed in Part II. We will turn from a normative philosophy of social science to an evaluative social science in which the full extent of our imperial argument will take shape in the delineation of proper science from pseudo-science. It is only by making these demarcations around proper science that we will be able to get at the core of the crisis of social science.

The first challenge is already contained in our agreement with Toulmin above over social science as a “would-be discipline”. His diagnosis of what this means is quite apposite for summarising the current state of affairs of Social Science (and Religious Studies). But in admitting this we may question what we can add to Toulmin’s already detailed analysis? Our difference stems from the fact Toulmin recognised that the phrase “scientific discipline” is not tautological (Toulmin, 1972:359). While we agree with this, it does reveal that Toulmin focuses primarily on the problem of “disciplinarity” – a focus shared by numerous other scholars who take the issues of social science to be an institutional problem. But out of this has stemmed the erroneous assumption that science is dependent upon
institutions, specifically universities, in order to proceed. It is the purpose of Chapter 5 to address under what conditions is it possible for science to proceed? This requires differentiating between the practical and essential possibilities of science. Those who regard science as institutional have conflated these two kinds of possibilities. Such a view is exemplified by Robert Merton who made the further argument that democracy is essential to science. Contrary to this, in 5.i we will show that democratic States can hinder science according to Merton’s own understanding of it. In particular we will demonstrate that the recently implemented Research Excellence Framework violates Merton’s scientific norm of disinterestedness. In further investigating this challenge we will then explore the relation of science to institutions in order to show that science can be non-institutional. 5.ii will argue that institutions are “protected groups” and their ascription as such is subjective to the individual/group. Whether Science is an institution or not is a contingent matter which can easily be demonstrated by cases of illegal science. As we see it, the essential possibility for doing science lies not in its relation to democracies or institutions but in there being spare time. “Spare time” as we will define it in 5.iii is any time the individual/group has which does not need to be spent surviving or thriving – i.e. time available for the pursuit of nonpractical interests. Here we will draw on Sartre’s notions of fear and anguish to demonstrate how easy it is to lose spare time and by consequence that much that goes by the name “science” is in fact pseudo-science.

In arguing that the essential possibility of science lies in spare time we then encounter the “humanist challenge”: As we have eminently practical interests (surviving and thriving) that cannot be escaped, all “nonpractical interests” in fact contain implicit practical interests. Such a claim would reduce all proper science to pseudo-science. Chapter 6 will therefore deal with the argument that science understood as knowledge for its own sake has never, nor can ever, be achieved by considering the epistemic status of science. 6.i will give clarity to the divide between “scientist” and “humanist”, noting of the latter that it can in fact be divided into imperativist and cohortativist varieties. In order to clarify the epistemic status of science we need to demonstrate that science is “nihilist” and avoids “commitment”. To do this, we will demonstrate how the humanist challenge correctly applies to naturalism. In 6.ii we will explicate the constitutive claim of naturalism and the related positivism to reveal that they give science epistemic superiority by claiming to know the world “as it is”. Such a position, however, involves an orthodoxy of rationality which, in 6.iii, we will argue necessarily leads to ought claims. In order to avoid this and protect the claim that science involves “knowledge for the sake of

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15 This does not mean this view originates with Toulmin.
knowledge” we need to stand in complete opposition to the naturalists who would proclaim science to be
a ‘different, and epistemically superior, method for understanding and explaining the world’ (Martin and
Wiebe, 2012b:69). We thus suggest in 6.iv. that science is an epistemically inferior pursuit. In order to do
this we will clarify “objectivity” in the sense of objective knowledge in relation to neutrality. That is,
objective knowledge has to do with meeting the rational standard of a particular province of meaning.
More precisely in the case of science this has to do with determining whether a scientist is being
scientific. Naturalism, we charge, has essentialised the rational standard of science through its orthodoxy
of rationality so that it applies to all provinces.

All rational standards are intersubjectively constituted and this will lead us into a consideration
of intersubjectivity as the crux of social science. Here we will get at the core of the crisis of social science
in Chapter 7: why, if various methodologies are all social scientific, do they struggle to cohere with one
another? In 7.i we will begin to move away from an understanding of intersubjectivity as “mutual
understanding”. Our analysis will focus less on how objective knowledge is achieved and more on who is
involved in its constitution. In understanding intersubjectivity so we will return to the philosophical
anthropological question: “What is wer?” More specifically we are concerned with how the Other is
recognised as Other. To do this we will explore Scheler’s consideration of intersubjectivity as involving a
distinction between “knowledge about” Others in general and “knowledge of” the Other. We mean to
show that Schutz has misread Scheler on the basis of the human prejudice. In 7.ii we will show that the
human prejudice provides “knowledge that” is an Other in order to gain “knowledge of” the Other. We
argue, however, that in order to understand how the Other is recognised as Other we require instead
“knowledge how”. Sartre’s theory of intersubjectivity provides this through a radical reconception of
“subject” and “object”.

As a consequence of this appeal to “knowledge how” we will turn Derrida on his head in 7.iii
and argue that rather than an end of wer, wer is without end. Based on the processes of intersubjectivity
no formal definition can be given to the characteristics of wer – i.e. “knowledge that”. This is the crisis of
social science: as the study of wer in situation, social science can provide no formal definition of wer.
The human prejudice entails a limited concept of wer which presumes a world as it is and is thereby
unsocial scientific. We charge that much “social science” operates under the human prejudice and this
has led to distortions which mean we consistently fail to understand the world as it is for X. The full
ramifications of this argument will be explored in 7.iv. Here we argue that in order for a proper social
science to proceed we need to abandon the idea of the world and accept the notion of worlds. More importantly, as revealed by Schutz himself, the very name “social science” counterpoises itself to “natural science” and thereby contributes to perpetuating the very problems we have identified. We will therefore take steps towards clarifying our science as the science of ferhd.
Part I

It is the purpose of this thesis to provide a phenomenological analysis of the crisis of social science. But before we can begin our analysis we are beset with the question of what is meant by “phenomenological”? As suggested in the Introduction, the possibility of a “phenomenological analysis” presupposes that it is itself social scientific. Thus we must ask the question “what is phenomenology?” This is, however, not an easy question to answer; as recognised by Spiegelberg ‘the difficulties of stating point-blank what phenomenology is are almost notorious’ (Spiegelberg, 1982:1). Indeed, that we have chosen Religious Studies to highlight the crisis of social science makes an answer to this question all the more demanding. Within the history of Religious Studies the phenomenology-of-religion, through such figures as Gerardus van der Leeuw, Juoco Bleeker, Mircea Eliade, and Ninian Smart, has represented one of the dominant methodologies of the discipline. However, this is only one invention of “phenomenology” and whether it is appropriate to our study is debateable.

According to Spiegelberg there have been at least eighteen independent inventions (1982:7-19). In the Phenomenological Movement he designates the phenomenology of the Phenomenological Movement instigated by Husserl as “phenomenology proper” and the remaining seventeen inventions as “pseudo-phenomenologies” in the second edition (1971) and as “unrelated phenomenologies” in the third edition (1982). Spiegelberg explains in the preface to the third edition that the reason for the shift is to move away from the derogatory tone of the former designation (1982:xxxvii). It is the purpose of this Part to take up Spiegelberg’s terminology to understand what phenomenology is. However, we will use them in a slightly different fashion. Though he dropped the designation of “pseudo-phenomenology” it can in fact be retained by pursuing a simpliciter definition of phenomenology. Chapter 2 will show that phenomenology by its very definition is a philosophical anthropology – an approach to the question “What is wer?” Any “phenomenology” which does not meet this simpliciter definition will be designated as “pseudo-phenomenology”. However, this simpliciter definition applies to a number of phenomenologies which need differentiation. As such Chapter 3 will pursue a definition of phenomenology proper (designating a particular). That is, a definition of phenomenology as a methodology. The phenomenology proper which we shall seek to define is that of the Phenomenological Movement which we shall call “proper phenomenology” (of one’s own) in opposition to the phenomenology proper of the phenomenology-of-religion as an “unrelated phenomenology”. From here
Chapter 4 will argue that this proper phenomenology is social scientific by elucidating the essence of social science as it was discerned in the phenomenological analyses of Schutz.
2. Phenomenology Simpliciter

It is the purpose of this chapter to begin to clarify the precise sense of what we mean by “phenomenology”. As we have proposed to use Religious Studies as our example this consideration takes on double importance. Just as we have suggested there is a failure of claimants to cohere as to the meaning of social science, so too we find within Religious Studies a failure to cohere as to the meaning of “phenomenology”. This is in part due to the existence of a diffuse tradition of scholars which we will bring under the title phenomenology-of-religion. While the various disagreements as to who belongs to this tradition indicate its inadequacy to serve our purpose of analysing the crisis of social science, if we are to gain a precise understanding of the phenomenology we intend to use we must clarify how it is that “phenomenology” can be used by both the phenomenology-of-religion and the Phenomenological Movement to which we will subscribe ourselves. To this end we must first establish a simpliciter definition of phenomenology which we suggest can be achieved through a survey of the key instigators of the major branches of the Phenomenological Movement. By doing so we will define phenomenology simpliciter as an approach to philosophical anthropology.

i. Phenomenology and phenomenology-of-religion

According to Spiegelberg the “phenomenology” of Religious Studies is an invention which stands ‘halfway between the philosophy of religion and the history of religion, yet without coinciding with the psychology of religion’ (Spiegelberg, 1971a:10). In order to avoid confusion with the phenomenology of religion that occurs within the Phenomenological Movement we will refer to this invention as the “phenomenology-of-religion”. For the aims of this thesis the phenomenology-of-religion is unsuitable for the task of performing a phenomenological analysis of the crisis of social science. In order to see this we will compound Spiegelberg’s analysis of it.

In Spiegelberg’s brief account, the phenomenology-of-religion began with Chantepie de la Saussaye. However, while the first edition of de la Saussaye’s Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte (1887) contained a section on “phenomenology of religion”, this was subsequently removed for a dedicated work on the topic that never appeared. Thus Arie Molendijk has suggested phenomenology-of-religion really began with Gerardus van der Leeuw whom Spiegelberg also erroneously identifies as de la Saussaye’s
student (Molendijk, 2000:27; Spiegelberg, 1971a:605-606). But this is to then ignore the intermediary figures of Tiele and William Brede Kristensen (1867-1953), the latter of whom is suggested as the founder by James Cox (2006). Indeed, based on the work of Cox we have reason to suggest that phenomenology-of-religion is not a single Dutch invention and that there are two others occurring independently in Britain and America.

The British school begins with Edwin Smith (1876-1957), a contemporary of Kristensen. According to Cox, Smith’s phenomenology begins with *African Ideas of God* (1950) a full ten years before Kristensen’s principle work in English, *Meaning of Religion* (1960), was made available. As Kristensen was not widely known beyond his immediate locale and *Meaning of Religion* is a translation of lectures it is unlikely that Smith was aware of his work (Sharpe, 1975:227). Even Cox admits that Kristensen’s ‘substantial contribution to methodological issues did not occur until after 1950’ (Cox, 2006:108). There is nothing to indicate that Smith’s phenomenology-of-religion is drawn from the Dutch school. Similarly, Cox regards Geoffrey Parrinder’s (1910-2005) *West African Religion* (1949) and *African Traditional Religion* (1954) as being phenomenology-of-religion, but it is not until *Comparative Religion* (1962) that we see influences from the Dutch school’s C.J. Bleeker and Hendrik Kraemer (1888-1965) (2006:146-150). The same story occurs in the case of the American school along with the following comment: ‘Wach, Eliade, J.Z. Smith and W.C. Smith, aligned themselves with disciplinary approaches in the study of religion that can be distinguished from the phenomenology of religion’ (2006:171). In the case of Eliade, he referred to himself as a historian of religions and explicitly rejected the title of “phenomenologist of religion” (Eliade, 2006a:259).

Based on other comments it is likely that the British and American schools could be further divided into other inventions. But this multiplicity of phenomenology-of-religions creates a broader issue of general disagreement among commentators as to who does or does not belong under the rubric. If we compare those “phenomenologists” listed by Cox with those compiled by Eva Hirschmann (1940), Eric Sharpe (1975), Joseph Bettis (1969), and Jacques Waardenburg (1973) we gain conflicting results:

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<th>Hirschmann</th>
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<th>Bettis</th>
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<td>Chantepie de le Saussaye</td>
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<td>Brede Kristensen</td>
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Gerardus van der Leeuw
C.J. Bleeker
Joachim Wach
Joseph Kitagawa
Mircea Eliade
E.O. James
A.C. Bouquet
Cornelius Tiele
Friedrich Pfister
Max Scheler
Georg Wobbermin
Robert Winkler
Rudolf Otto
Heinrich Frick
Gustav Menshing
Friedrich Heiler
Joseph Bettis
Hendrik Kraemer
Edwin Smith
Geoffrey Parrinder
Andrew Walls
Ninian Smart
J.Z. Smith
W.C. Smith

This list is far from comprehensive and only takes into account those names mentioned in the respective works of the compilers. Certain names such as Ninian Smart, whose first publication was in 1958, cannot be expected to appear on the older lists. Furthermore, personal correspondence with Cox has revealed that he considers certain of those names above not mentioned in Guide to the Phenomenology of Religion as phenomenologists.¹ Nevertheless there are clear points of divergence between compilers over certain figures. Kraemer, counted by Waardenburg, is explicitly rejected by Sharpe for being a theologian (Sharpe, 1975:227-288). Ironically, Sharpe refers to Soderblom (1866-1931), who was Archbishop of Uppsala, as ‘a phenomenologist of religion before the label had even been invented’ (1990:167). Nor is Sharpe the only one inconsistent with his criteria; Cox includes Eliade who expressly claimed he was not a phenomenologist despite “self-identification” being one of his criteria for selection (2006:3). Indeed,

¹ However, this led to the contradictory exclusion of Edwin Smith and Walls as “theologian” and “church historian” respectively.
though we cannot deny the influence of Eliade and Otto on phenomenology-of-religion they are among
the most contentious and most often named “members” by critics.²

A distinct lack of agreement or understanding as to who should or should not be counted raises a
subsequent lack of understanding of what “phenomenology” means. Bettis, for example, proposes that
the “phenomenology of religion” can in fact mean one of three things. First, it can refer to the
philosophical school that began with Husserl and carried on through the works of Heidegger, Sartre,
Merleau-Ponty, and Ricoeur. In this understanding ‘phenomenology of religion would be that part of
phenomenological philosophy devoted to the study of religion’ (Bettis, 1969:1). Second, it can refer to a
group of scholars who employed ‘broad phenomenological methods’ within the history of religions
(1969:1). Such men, who included Eliade, van der Leeuw, and Kristensen, were primarily scholars of
religion rather than philosophers. As such they used phenomenological tools in the study of religion.
Third, it can mean ‘the application of general phenomenological methods to the whole spectrum of
religious ideas, activities, institutions, customs, and symbols’ (1969:1). Bettis’ volume, by his own
indication, works with this third understanding and has taken it from Merleau-Ponty. The advantage, he
claims, of this third conception is that it takes a disparate range of studies from different disciplines and
unites them on the assumption that ‘each has tried to describe the essence of religion’ (1969:2).

Yet if we scrutinise these three forms of “phenomenology” it becomes clear the latter two are
derivatives of the first. The second form involves “broad phenomenological methods” and the third
“general phenomenological methods”. But where have these “broad” and “general” methods come from
if not the first? This is most clear in the distinction between the first and second groups. The first are
philosophers who founded a philosophical tradition called “phenomenology” while the second are
historians of religion who use those phenomenological methods. The imposition is that “phenomenology”
comes from a philosophical tradition that has been taken up by certain scholars who are not philosophers
and have found its application in other areas to be of use to them. This point is emphasised by the fact
that these are scholars who have ‘utilised phenomenological methods’ (1969:1). But then for all the
references to “phenomenology of religion”, “phenomenological philosophy”, “phenomenological
method”, and “phenomenological analysis” it is not really clear what phenomenology/phenomenological

² E.g. McCutcheon (1997); Tremlett (2008:100-102), Taves (2009:5), Stausberg and Engler (2011:27-
28), Spickard (2011:336) and Martin and Wiebe (2012b).
means in Bettis’ account. At best all we can say is that phenomenology-of-religion is a divergence from Husserl’s phenomenology but Bettis is less than clear in what this philosophical tradition entails.

However, this account can only be maintained because Bettis begins with van der Leeuw. According to Spiegelberg, van der Leeuw ‘shows an attempt to link up an impressive array of the main types of religious phenomena with philosophical phenomenology’ (i.e. the Phenomenological Movement) (1982:10). Spiegelberg’s comments imply a synthesis of two separate traditions rather than some form of divergence or appropriation. He goes on to warn that we cannot ignore the independent origins of phenomenology-of-religion and the Phenomenological Movement. And we can also question the extent of the merger, regardless of how successful van der Leeuw was; Bleeker as his effective successor quickly distanced phenomenology-of-religion from the Movement. 3 According to Cox: ‘With respect to its philosophical heritage, Bleeker argued that the *epoché* and the eidetic vision are employed figuratively in the phenomenology of religion and thus should be distinguished from a specialised philosophical analysis of knowledge as found particularly in the writings of Edmund Husserl’ (2006:136). Walter Capps makes a similar comment in his historical survey of Religious Studies where he notes there are two genealogies of “phenomenology” which correspond to the phenomenology-of-religion and the Phenomenological Movement. He points out that the application of the latter has been rather tangential in Religious Studies (Capps, 1995:109). Indeed, Capps suggests that “phenomenology of religion” is synonymous with “History of Religion” implying that, contra Bettis, these historians of religion didn’t just appropriate a range of “phenomenological tools” – they changed them into something else.

The multiple ways in which “phenomenology” has been applied within the phenomenology-of-religion renders it difficult to give a concise statement of what “phenomenology” is. 4 We are inclined to agree with Oxtoby’s critique of phenomenology-of-religion in which he charges that there are as many phenomenologies as phenomenologists (1968:598). This is mainly because the phenomenology-of-religion does not have a definitive origin. Rather, it is a history of converging inventions through the syncretistic work of, for example, Smart and Cox. From the latter, and therefore comparatively recently, we get the clearest statement on what phenomenology-of-religion is:

the phenomenology of religion defines the methodology that is *uniquely* associated with religious studies as a distinct discipline studying

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3 Bleeker succeeded van der Leeuw as the president of the International Association for the History of Religions after the latter’s death in 1950 (Sharpe, 1975:236).
4 We have largely focused on proponents and commentators; a full survey of the critiques of phenomenology-of-religion would likely compound the issue further.
“religion” itself, as opposed, for example, to studying sociology as it is applied to religion or psychology as it is applied to religion… Only phenomenology provides for the academic study of religions a distinct methodology, justifying its claim to a be field of study in its own right, sui generis. (Cox, 2006:3-4).

The inherent problem with such a position for our argument is made clear by the final sentence. If religion is a sui generis topic then by definition the methodology that studies that topic is specific and unique to it. By consequence this “phenomenology” cannot study non-religious phenomena. Any such attempt would mean we are either proceeding along mistaken lines whose results would be of no use to us or, if successful, we undermine the sui generis status of religion. A sui generis topic requires a sui generis method. Insofar as the phenomenology-of-religion sees itself as uniquely suited to the study of religion, it thereby becomes unsuitable for social scientific study in general. We simply cannot do a “phenomenological-(of-religion) analysis” of the crisis of social science. As Cox makes clear in Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion: ‘[phenomenology-of-religion is] a method for the study of religion that can be distinguished from other methods in the social and natural sciences and one that also remains distinct from theological interpretations’ (2010:22-23). And later he provides a definition of phenomenology-of-religion:

The phenomenology of religion is a method adapting the procedures of epoche and eidetic intuition to the study of identifiable communities which base their acts of believing and resulting communal experience of postulated non-falsifiable alternate realities on a tradition that they legitimate by appealing to its authoritative transmission from generation to generation. (emphasis added, 2010:48)

What is most telling here is that this says more as a definition of “religion” than it does as a definition of “phenomenology”, and the use of “adapting” indicates that this phenomenology-of-religion falls under Capps’ comment about the appropriation of “phenomenological tools”. Somehow in this adaptation these “tools” are rendered unique to the study of religion and lose validity outside this domain.

The problem with then taking up this methodology is similar to that faced by Martin and Wiebe in the Introduction. Any analysis would only be applicable on the level of religious studies and could not be expanded to social science more generally. In fact, because of its understanding of religious studies, the phenomenology-of-religion becomes part of the problem to be analysed by a “phenomenological analysis”. Cox’s comments regarding the relation of religious studies to social science reveal that the former is not a subset of the latter but sits at the same level.
ii. The Phenomenological Movement

Due to the lack of clarity within the phenomenology-of-religion as to what it is and who belongs, it seems unsuitable for the task defining “phenomenology” itself. To this end we turn instead to the Phenomenological Movement, for unlike the former there is a clear origin with Husserl. Capps, drawing on a comment made by Maurice Natanson, notes that within this philosophical genealogy we could treat phenomenology and Husserl as synonymous (Capps, 1995:109). If the Phenomenological Movement has this clear founder then it would stand to reason that its understanding of “phenomenology” derives from his.

a. Husserl I

Husserl studied under Franz Brentano whose philosophy had convinced Husserl to abandon his study in mathematics. In 1887 Husserl took a teaching position at Halle where he was disappointed by the role’s low prestige and income (Woodruff Smith, 2007:17). The former of these concerns seems to have predominated throughout his career in a consistent desire to develop a “following”. It was not until Logical Investigations (LI) that Husserl began to receive the recognition he desired and was offered a professorship at Gottingen. It was here that Husserl would begin to develop phenomenology as both philosophical method and as a movement. Though LI is considered phenomenological, only later editions make the connection apparent and it was not until 1907 that Husserl formerly began phenomenology in “The Idea of Phenomenology” (1907[1999]).

Husserl envisaged his philosophy in truly radical terms, according to Natanson he was looking for the same kind of certitude that he had found in mathematics (Natanson, 1973:5). In this respect he is rather Cartesian in thought but held that Descartes had fallen just short of his goal of absolute certainty. The English word “radical” may, however, cause some confusion and so we can also describe Husserl’s philosophical aim as that of a “rigorous science” (Husserl, 1981a:166). In “Philosophy as Rigorous Science” (1910[1981a]) Husserl sets his position against Dilthey and what he calls naturalism which is

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5 Essays taken from edited volumes such as Husserl: Shorter Works (1981) have been broken down into individual references to make clear which essay is being drawn from. Lettering has been done according to the chronological order in which they were originally published.
linked to positivism and psychologism. The naturalist trend had driven science to look only for “positive facts” and Husserl saw it that ‘science itself was crying out for a philosophy that would restore its contact with the deeper concerns of man,’ namely meaning and value (Spiegelberg, 1971a:80). In particular Husserl wanted to highlight the contradiction in naturalist thinking that reduced everything to functions of physical nature using principles of thought that could not be explained in naturalistic terms. The critique of naturalism has since become one of the universal themes of phenomenology and will be addressed later.⁶

Husserl expressed his radical attitude towards science as a desire to be free from presuppositions of any kind, prompting the famous slogan “zu den Sachen selbst”: “back to the things themselves” (Husserl, 1970a:252). In Ideas I (1913[1982/2012])⁷ this slogan was formalised as the principle of principles:

that every originary presentive intuition is a legitimising source of cognition, that everything originally (so to speak, in its “personal” actuality) offered to us in “intuition” is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits that in which it is presented there. We see indeed that each <theory> can only again draw its truth itself from originary data. Every statement which does no more than confer expression on such data by simple explication and by means of significations precisely conforming to them is … actually an absolute beginning called upon to serve as a foundation. (Husserl, 1982:44)

According to the principle, a propositional statement is valid or scientific only if it is drawn from relevant evidence. In Ideas III (1952[1980])⁸ Husserl then speaks of “description”: ‘the conceptual expression of the perceived itself, i.e., of that which is in the proper sense experienced’ (Husserl, 1980:58). Russell explains this “descriptive” and “demonstrative” task prevents science from becoming bound up in its own musings (Russell, 2006:109). This understanding of “description”, according to Russell, presents a

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⁶ See Ch.6.
⁷ There are two competing translations of Ideas I by Kersten (1982) and Gibson (1931[2012]). We have relied upon both because each has their own merits. Gibson’s translation was done under Husserl’s auspices and includes a preface from Husserl not found in Kersten’s translation. Kersten’s translation however claims to have included material that was prepared for Gibson’s translation but not included in the final publishing (in Husserl, 1982:xiv). Spiegelberg comments of Gibson’s that it is ‘fair, not always accurate’ (Spiegelberg, 1982:163). Perhaps one prime example of this is the slogan itself. Kersten’s translation follows that of Findley’s translation of LI and renders the phrase “back to the things themselves” (Husserl, 1982:35). Gibson, however, translates it as ‘guided by the facts themselves’ (Husserl, 2012:35). Based on Moran’s commentary we may suggest that Kersten’s translation is more accurate. Commenting on the slogan he notes that ‘Husserl does not mean that we must bring philosophy back to a concern with factual, empirical things, such as physical objects in space and time’ (Moran, 2000:107). By speaking of “facts” Gibson’s translation suggest exactly this. However, it is also worth noting that Moran does not bring this up in his preface to the 2012 reprint of Gibson’s translation.
⁸ The book was published posthumously but the completed draft existed as early as 1912 when Husserl was writing Ideas I.
definition of “evidence” in science as “originary” or “bodily” givenness. However, this requires clarification as “given” can be meant in the sense of “gifting” or “true without question”. “Givenness” as it is used by Husserl refers to the former sense as is made clear in his claims that phenomenology focuses on the ‘perceived as perceived’ (Husserl, 1982:214). For this understanding we will now use the Old English word “giefan” to avoid confusion. Thus, a thing is only a thing if it is giefan to someone. If a thing is not giefan to someone then it is not a thing. As noted by Lewis and Staehler, to understand things as gifts it is necessary to understand how such things are received (Lewis and Staehler, 2010:1). To speak of the things themselves is to say that the thing which is giefan to someone is also the giver. The thing giefen itself. If Varhern giefe his life for Leaphin the thing giefan is “Varhern’s life”. As “Varhern’s life” is the thing itself, how Leaphin receives it can differ from how Varhern expects her to receive it. It is thus necessary to emphasise that the giefannis of things therefore depends on the person receiving them.

In addition to this positive formulation there is also a negative formulation in LI as the principle of freedom from presuppositions (1970a:263). This is not to say we become tabula rasa, something which is impossible, rather that ‘no metaphysical, scientific and, above all, no psychological assertions can therefore occur among its premises’ (1970a:265). The principle is also found in the earlier “Philosophy as Rigorous Science” as the “radical lack of prejudice”: ‘What is needed is not the insistence that one sees with his own eyes; rather, it is that he not explain away under the pressure of prejudice what has been seen’ (Husserl, 1981a:196). No concept, no matter how seemingly obvious, was above scrutiny in Husserl’s mind. As such Natanson notes that Husserl pushed language to its philosophical and mundane limits by the introduction of completely new terms and using older terms in completely novel ways (Natanson, 1973:8). In this he was breaking new territory and in Ideas I Husserl referred to his philosophy as a wandering across a new continent (2012:xliv).

The most famous of the presuppositions that Husserl wished to get past was the natural attitude which takes for granted the possibility of knowledge: ‘Constantly engaged in the productive activity, advancing from discovery to discovery in the newly developed sciences, natural thinking finds no

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9 Kersten’s translation makes more sense in this context than Gibson’s which reads ‘the perceived as such’ (Husserl, 2012:185).
10 Lewis and Staehler go beyond this in their understanding: “Givenness” describes the way in which an entity appears insofar as it is certain beyond doubt that the appearance has not in any way been distorted by our experience of it (Lewis and Staehler, 2010:2). Such a position, however, moves back toward an understanding of “givenness” as “true without question” and stands at odds with their own recognition that gifts are always received.
11 A habit we have taken up by the introduction of Old English.
occasion to raise the question of the possibility of knowledge as such’ (Husserl, 1999:16). For Husserl
there are many attitudes within a particular culture – philosophy being one\textsuperscript{12} – all of which are derived
from this primitive natural attitude.\textsuperscript{13} According to Lewis and Staehler, this natural attitude has two basic
features: ‘First, it is directed in a straightforward manner towards its objects, and second, it is convinced
that these objects are not only there when we turn to them, but exist independently of our attention’
(Lewis and Staehler, 2010:12). What this amounts to is that the natural attitude incorporates all that is
given in the sense of “true without question”. But unlike a Kantian approach the given is understood as
subjective and hence open to revision. As Lewis and Staehler note, individual objects may be questioned
in their givenness but the natural attitude always composes what we take to be given (2010:13).

In order to break from this attitude Husserl looked at consciousness itself. But unlike standard
psychology, in his desire to break from all presuppositions Husserl conceived of consciousness
differently; he was not interested in physical processes but the structure of consciousness. Unlike
Descartes who was concerned with what could be doubted, Husserl was more interested in the process of
doubting itself. He argued that consciousness is always conscious-of and Natanson describes this as acts
of perception having ‘directional force’ (Natanson, 1973:13). Drawing on Brentano’s studies of
intentionality, Husserl states that consciousness is intentional (Husserl, 1970b:95-97). Intention in
Husserl’s sense gives meaning to consciousness and is not synonymous with volition. Both Moran and
Spiegelberg comment that Husserl’s development of intentionality breaks from Brentano significantly
and has more in common with William James’ Principles of Psychology. The difference from Brentano is
evidenced by the fact that Brentano never used “intention” in its noun form. Spiegelberg summarises an
intention to be,

that component of any act which is responsible not only for its pointing at
an object but also for (α) interpreting pre-given materials in such a way
that a full object is presented to our consciousness, (β) establishing the
identity between the referents of several intentional acts, (γ) connecting
the various stages of intuitive fulfilment, and (δ) “constituting” the object
meant. (Spiegelberg, 1971a:110)

While in the natural attitude, little of these aspects of intention are called to attention. Phenomenology as
such puts these into question. To do this Husserl “bracketed” (the epoché) the question of the object’s
existence in order to focus on the act of consciousness:

\textsuperscript{12} See Ch.1.i.
\textsuperscript{13} Phenomenology as a radical attitude is also subject to this point; it involves a habitual activity that is
only possible as a deviation from the natural attitude (see Ch.5.iii).
In the phenomenology of the consciousness of physical thing the question is not how physical things in general are, or what in truth belongs to them as such; but rather how the consciousness of physical things is qualified, what sorts of consciousness of physical thing are to be distinguished, in what manner and with what correlates a physical thing as such presents and manifests itself in the manner peculiar to consciousness. (sic) (Husserl, 1980:72)

Natanson describes this relation by stating that ‘phenomena are meant, not simply acknowledged in perception’ (Natanson, 1973:13). The intended object, the phenomenon, possesses meaning and according to (δ) and (β) consciousness constitutes this meaning and relates this meaning to the meanings of other intended objects. In effect we may define “phenomenon” as any object that has meaning for the subject. “Phenomenology” as the study of phenomena becomes the study of meaning.

These introductory comments do not cover the full extent of Husserl’s phenomenology. We have, for example, glossed over certain important notions like the epoché and the various reductions on the grounds that they constitute Husserl’s method. At present, however, it is the X to which this method is to be applied that concerns us.

Before we continue, however, several issues highlighted by Natanson must first be noted: first, Husserl was not a writer of books and while a number of volumes were completed in his lifetime, much of his thought was contained in a Nachlass of 45,000 pages of shorthand notes which would not just comprise books but whole sets of books (Natanson, 1973:5); second, Husserl was constantly writing “introductions” to phenomenology including: The Idea of Phenomenology (1907); “Philosophy as Rigorous Science” (1910); Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology (1913); Logical Investigations (1913); “Phenomenology” in the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1927); Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology (1931); and, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy (1936). According to Natanson: ‘Beginning, for Husserl, is the permanent state of the genuine philosopher’ (1973:10). The constant writing of “introductions” was Husserl’s way of assessing how well the philosopher had proceeded in that task. As Husserl himself claimed: ‘anyone who seriously intends to become a philosopher must “once in his life” withdraw into himself and attempt, within himself, to

14 Though Husserl did develop the notion of unconscious intentionality in later works (see Mohanty, 1971), engaging these discussions would be tangential to our primary arguments.
15 More detail will be given to these in Ch.3.iii.
16 Much of this has now been published under the Husserliana series. We have largely avoided arguments relying on those texts which do not yet have English translations.
17 Specifically the Prolegomena which was published as volume 1 in the German Edition.
overthrow and build anew all the sciences that, up to then, he has been accepting’ (Husserl, 1988:2). For Husserl the task of the philosopher was to seek out radical certitude which meant that there could be no reliance upon all that had gone before and phenomenology was meant to find that certitude.

b. The “turns” of the Movement

Paul Ricoeur has observed of this obsession with writing introductions to phenomenology that Husserl’s published works ‘do not constitute one homogenous body of work with a single direction of orientation’ (Ricoeur, 1967:4). Husserl was constantly developing his phenomenology and this invariably had a consequence for those around him. As Pierre Thevenaz describes it: ‘Even before Husserl himself knew exactly where he was going and what he was really searching for, his resolute step and the sterling quality of his method had already caught up and carried along a number of thinkers and philosophers’ (Thevenaz, 1962:39). This had its consequences upon his “followers” and “students”, as Spiegelberg comments:

Husserl’s own course within the movement may well be compared with a spiral converging upon an inner centre, in this case the phenomena of the subjective sphere. Yet at several turns of this spiral some of his followers were flung off at a tangent, as it were, following up lines suggested by Husserl himself during an earlier phase, while he himself had already changed his course. (Spiegelberg, 1971a:2)

However, such comments suggest that to each “turn” belongs a different conception of phenomenology. But this would mean that the Movement, rather than homogenous, is divided according to which “Husserl” is appealed to. In particular, the most famous “turn”, the “transcendental turn” which occurs between LI and Ideas I, led to political disputes within the Movement over which is the more genuine “Husserl”.

However, unlike phenomenology-of-religion, Spiegelberg comments that ‘it would go too far to say that there are as many phenomenologies as there are phenomenologists’ (1971a:xxvii). Yet Ricoeur, contra Spiegelberg’s image of tangents, suggests that phenomenology ‘is both the sum of Husserl’s work and the heresies issuing from it’ (Ricoeur, 1967:4). While there is some recognition of this point by Spiegelberg when he refers to the followers of Husserl in quotation marks, the problem arises that if Husserl’s so-called followers are heretics what is this “phenomenology” which holds them all together as the Phenomenological Movement? In the introduction to the Encyclopedia of Phenomenology (EP) (1997), Embree notes that, beginning with Husserl, phenomenology is often characterised negatively as
being opposed to naturalism. Yet the easy error to then make is to assume that everything that opposes
naturalism is phenomenology (Embree, 1997:1). As noted by Stikkers and Kerry and Armour,
“phenomenology” has become a byword for any sort of descriptive work, and often used as a means to
disguise subjective biases and prejudices (in Scheler, 1980b:3; Kerry and Armour, 2000:10). To clarify
“phenomenology” we need a positive understanding of what it does for which we will now turn to the
four branches of phenomenology discussed by Embree.

According to Embree there are four main branches within the Phenomenological Movement. For
Embree these branches represent the dominant phases in the shifting focus of what he calls the
phenomenological agenda (1997:2). Husserl as the instigator of phenomenology first laid out this agenda
in *LI* in which he placed maths, logic, and language as the first items as part of his attack on naturalism.
Further to these he also added the items of perception, re-presentation, and the eidetic method. By
“items” Embree means those topics which phenomenology is about, i.e. the “of” that often follows
“phenomenology”. As he suggests later, phenomenology is a distinctive approach that, focusing on a
particular domain, becomes the “‘phenomenology of X’” (1997:10). It is for this reason we have made a
distinction between phenomenology of religion not being phenomenology-of-religion. “Religion” is an
item (1997:10), an X, like any other to be placed on the phenomenological agenda. In this respect, unlike
the phenomenology-of-religion, the “phenomenology” contained within phenomenology of religion is
defined without reference to religion. In the same way that the “phenomenology” in the phenomenology
of geography and the phenomenology of nursing can be understood without reference to either geography
or nursing. Only phenomenology alone may be called a distinctive approach, but this has nothing to do
with some inherent connection to any one particular item of the agenda.

As Husserl’s phenomenology was taken up by others more items were added to the agenda. How the items of the agenda were subsequently arranged led to the development of various branches of
phenomenology, each with their own focuses. Realistic Phenomenology, as the first branch, placed
emphasis on the eidetic method in the search for universal essences (Embree, 2001:4). For example,
Scheler added the items of ethics, value theory, and religion, while others also added law, human sciences
(i.e. psychology), aesthetics, architecture, music, literature and film (Embree, 1997:2-3, 2001:4).
Constitutive Phenomenology was further instigated by Husserl as a result of *Ideas I* during which natural
sciences (for Husserl this mainly meant physics) and cultural sciences were placed on the agenda
(Embree, 2001:4-5). This also led to an increased focus on the *epoché* and reductions such that much
Constitutive Phenomenology belongs to the transcendental turn with its focus on the (solitary) Transcendental Ego. Yet in its way this prompted the development of the other two branches which are not accredited to Husserl by Embree.

Among those to react negatively to Husserl’s transcendental turn were Scheler and Martin Heidegger. Unlike Scheler who maintained Realistic Phenomenology, Heidegger wanted to alter the agenda by placing fundamental ontology at the top, over and above Husserl’s regional ontologies as they were first discussed at the end of Ideas I (Husserl, 2012:305-324). However, Being and Time (BT) (1927) was an incomplete work and through a ‘misunderstanding of intentions’ many focused instead on Heidegger’s analysis of ‘human life or existence’ which prompted Existential Phenomenology (Embree, 2001:5). Hannah Arendt might be called the first true existential phenomenologist but this branch is more widely associated with France under Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Simone de Beauvoir. This branch added the items of intersubjectivity, human freedom, action, desire, conflict, and reason to the agenda. Finally, not only did Existential Phenomenology stem from Heidegger but so too did Hermeneutical Phenomenology. Instigated as part of the proper intentions of BT, this branch builds on Heidegger’s methodology as interpretation. Not only did this add technology to the agenda, it changed how the items of the agenda were studied through hermeneutics.

Each of these branches had its heyday: Realistic and Constitutive Phenomenology were at their strongest just before and after World War I; Existential Phenomenology had its zenith between the 30’s and 60’s; and Hermeneutical Phenomenology monopolised America from the decline of Existential Phenomenology to around the 80’s (Moran and Embree, 2004a:5). We should not however think that phenomenology lives and dies with these branches. In EP Embree points to a potential fifth planetary period as phenomenology becomes better known in Eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia (Embree, 1997:5). Although there is nothing to presuppose that there could not be a sixth or seventh branch either, the question would be how do such branches even emerge? Quite simply this would be through the reordering of the agenda with the significance of certain items changing. On the individual level this means that the phenomenologist prioritises their items into a hierarchy, and the structures this takes can

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18 Originally planned in two parts comprising six divisions the published work only consists of the first two divisions. Supposedly the third division was drafted but Heidegger expressly denied that it be published even posthumously.

19 Moran has suggested that Husserl’s work in Crisis could also be described as a hermeneutical approach, particularly in its consideration of Galileo (2012:74-76). However, as this work came after BT it is still proper to suggest that Heidegger instigated Hermeneutical Phenomenology.
place that phenomenologist under one of the available branches. Or, if they strikes us as being singular in their agenda and accrues a subsequent following they may instigate a new branch. By 2001 Embree was more certain of the emergence of this fifth period, something he tentatively calls “Cultural Phenomenology”: ‘the general theme would then be collective as well as individual human life in the socio-historical world, a theme that is suitable for a reflective-descriptive philosophy of culture’ (Embree, 2001:8). As of 2004 the dominant themes of this new fifth branch appear to be religion, technology, ecology, ethnicity, gender, and interculturality; all topics of significance within social science (Moran and Embree, 2004d:1-2). We will suggest in the next chapter that this fifth branch of phenomenology was already instigated by Schutz in the 1930s.20

That Embree suggests these branches were instigated by Husserl and Heidegger would alter Spiegelberg’s metaphor to make two spirals for each thinker. However, this would present the image that Realistic Phenomenology ended and became either Constitutive, Existential, or Hermeneutical after the “transcendental turn”. To the contrary, Scheler, as one of the first to reject the “turn” stuck dogmatically to Realistic Phenomenology throughout his work, giving rise to three spirals. Further, as Existential Phenomenology came out of a “misreading”, it is more accurate to place its instigation with Sartre creating a fourth spiral.

### iii. The early branches of the Movement

It is our task now to show that despite the divergences implied by the metaphor of spirals/branches there is a common core that connects the Phenomenological Movement that will also provide our understanding of phenomenology simpliciter. We propose this unifying factor to be *philosophical anthropology* and how it emerges in the thinking of the four branches’ instigators: Husserl, Scheler, Scheler, and Heidegger.

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20 There is reason to suppose that a sixth branch already exists in the form of “Theological Phenomenology”. With roots in the work of Ricoeur and Levinas, the “turn” seems to have emerged in France during the 1980s-1990s and has become more visible since Dominique Janicaud’s essay “The Theological Turn of French Phenomenology” (1991[2000]). However, it is worth noting that Janicaud’s essay is aimed at accusing Jean-Luc Marion, Jean-Louis Chrétien and Michel Henry (prominent figures within Theological Phenomenology) of perverting phenomenology by introducing a (biblical) God which does not belong. Certainly Theological Phenomenology has understood itself to be closer to the Phenomenological Movement than phenomenology-of-religion (Kosky, 2000:110-112). However, the discussion of whether it meets the phenomenological strictures to be established in Chapter 3 goes beyond the scope of our main argument.
Heidegger, and Sartre. As the first three write concurrently, they shall be dealt with in this section and Sartre in the next.

Speaking of the connection between Husserl and Heidegger, Simon Glendinning claims that: ‘Husserl and Heidegger are both concerned (pace Husserl) to effect a fundamental shift of level in their reflections on worldly existence’ (Glendinning, 2007:75). There is, he suggests, a functional equivalence between Husserl’s Transcendental Ego and Heidegger’s Dasein. As Derrida intimates in “The Ends of Man” (1969) the Ego of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is none other than “man” understood as the rational animal (1969:43-44).21 And in the case of Heidegger, Dasein ‘if it is not man, is not, however, other than man’ (1969:48). As both Derrida and Glendinning see it, through the transcendental reduction of Husserl and the existential analytic of Heidegger, both were engaged in the task of philosophical anthropology. As Gurwitsch points out, the project of philosophical anthropology should not be confused as some kind of “ethnography” but rather indicates ‘the broader meaning of a general preoccupation with man and his existence’ (Gurwitsch, 1974:9). Its central question is “What is wer?”.

What we suggest here is that phenomenology in the simpliciter sense is an approach to philosophical anthropology.

Though we cannot speak for Derrida’s use we must reiterate that the use of “man” in this sense is supposed to carry no gender connotations. Following our comments in the Introduction, we will continue to translate “man” as “wer”: the beings which we are. Thus to say of someone that they are wer is to say that they have the same being as myself. Why we have not used “human being”, “humanity” or “human nature” will become clear in our consideration of phenomenology simpliciter as philosophical anthropology.

Derrida and Glendinning’s suggestion that Husserl and Heidegger were engaged in philosophical anthropology is, however, beset with the problem that they both repudiated the title. This can only be explained by considering the work of Scheler who is conspicuously, though not surprisingly, absent from their analyses. Scheler is a lesser known figure of the Phenomenological Movement but nevertheless one of great significance who both influenced Husserl and Heidegger and was in turn influenced by them. As Frings and Funk describe their main difference: ‘[Scheler’s] primary concern was never the phenomenological investigation of the Transcendental Ego or the ontological question of Being; it was rather the Being of Man, here and now, in his biological, social, ethical, metaphysical, and

21 Husserl admits as such in CM (1988:74).
religious dimensions’ (in Scheler, 1973b:xiv). Indeed, because of their close proximity to one another it is almost impossible to cover the full thought of one before the influence of another gets in the way.

c. Scheler I

By his own admission, Scheler, along with Heidegger, was Husserl’s greatest rival (Spiegelberg, 1971a:229-230). Scheler, a student of Rudolph Euckon and Max Weber, was initially brought to phenomenology through Husserl’s *II*. The first of Scheler’s major works, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Value (Formalism)* was published in two parts in the *Jahrbuch* in 1913 (alongside Husserl’s *Ideas I*) and 1916. In those early years Husserl rarely referred to Scheler’s work, while conversely Scheler was openly critical of the transcendental turn. However, between 1921-1928 Scheler’s immense popularity as a public speaker threatened to eclipse Husserl as the doyen of phenomenology (Moran, 2000:200). Threatened with the loss of his “following”, it is possible to see elements of Scheler’s thinking in Husserl’s later work without credit. Scheler’s influence was cut short by his untimely death in 1928 and his work became obscured under Nazi repression due to a Jewish heritage.

While both men subscribed to “phenomenology”, the two seemingly differed as to its purpose. Husserl was seeking a rigorous science to ground all others but to Scheler this was only a means to an end, and according to Frings ‘there is one subject in which ultimately all of Scheler’s thoughts focus: *Man*’ (Frings, 1996:2). Alongside Kant, Scheler shared the view that all philosophical questions ultimately reduce to the question “What is *wer?*” (1996:7). But as the title of “The Idea of Man” (1915[1972]) makes clear, Scheler had the same sort of radical approach that Husserl expected of philosophy in general: he took a prolific interest in biology, atomic physics, sociology, animal psychology, theology, medical science, history, and more. All these topics would have served as the basis for his *Philosophische Anthropologie* which was never completed before his death (1996:2). Scheler’s philosophical anthropology is, however, divided into two phases roughly delineated by his break with the

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22 Elements of which can be seen in the *Crisis*, according to David Carr the work represents Husserl’s growing awareness that his own presentation of phenomenology had not generated the desired following and the existence of such “revisionists” (i.e. Scheler and Heidegger) prompted a need to alter his approach (in Husserl, 1970c:xxv-xxvii). We suggest Husserl’s terminological adoption is far more extensive than Carr suggests.

23 Moran and Spiegelberg differ over how important he was to the work of Merleau-Ponty (Spiegelberg, 1982:537-538; Moran, 2000:292-393).
Catholic Church in 1922.\textsuperscript{24} For this first phase we will look primarily at Formalism, though a phenomenology of ethics, his discussions of the various concepts of value are underpinned by their relation to \textit{wer}. A significant part of this involves the critique of “anthropologism”: the view that human beings are of the highest value and that all other living beings are derivations thereon.

Herbert Spencer is one of Scheler’s main targets for an anthropologism based on biological and psychological findings. Due to a “one-sided” reading, Spencer endorsed “egoism”: the individual naturally places self-preservation over self-sacrifice (Scheler, 1973b:278). Not only does Scheler demonstrate the falsity of egoism in nature, he points out that even if it were correct this would contradict the anthropologism Spencer espouses. Egoism, Scheler notes, means that independence is a positive value: ‘The more dependent on others such forms are, the more they must be exposed to perils and injuries, and the earlier they will meet their destiny in earthly life in the sequences of death, which, in the end, is the destiny of earthly life itself’ (1973b:284). But civilisations as systems of interdependency, which only humans supposedly create, ‘represent a kind of faux pas which life has taken in its evolution on earth’ (1973b:285). Even the ability to create artificial tools represents the biological inferiority of humans because they lack the appropriate organ for the task. Indeed, even the highly complicated structure of humans stands against them compared to animals who can achieve the same level of survival (i.e. life-duration) with simpler systems. Scheler concludes of Spencer’s position that it is “anthropomorphism”: ‘from the beginning he relates all vital organisations to man and his milieu, and, without saying so, subordinations all organisations to man’s milieu’ (1973b:291). Due to the technical way in which “anthropomorphism” has been taken up by naturalists,\textsuperscript{25} we prefer instead to say that Spencer’s position is an anthropologism based upon what we call the \textit{human prejudice}: to speak of “wer” \textit{is to speak of the human (biological) species alone}. Spencer’s anthropologism privileges the human species and understands all other organisms as derivations thereof.

It is this definition of “\textit{wer}” in terms of a particular species that Scheler finds problematic. \textit{Wer}, Scheler argues, is not defined by biological characteristics:

\textsuperscript{24} Prior to this Scheler was known as a major Catholic apologist in Protestant dominated Germany which netted him a position at Cologne. However, \textit{On the Eternal in Man} (1921[2010]) showed signs of a divergence with Catholic fundamentals and a break with Thomism. Scheler supposedly lost his faith as a result of further research (Kelly, 1977:15), but another factor may have been his desire to divorce his second wife, Märit, which the Church had denied.

\textsuperscript{25} E.g. Guthrie defines “anthropomorphism” to mean “the attribution of human characteristics to nonhuman things or events” (Guthrie, 1993:3).
whenever we value “man,” we in fact presuppose values that are independent of vital values – the values of the holy and spiritual values. That is, man is the “highest being” insofar as he is the bearer of acts that are independent of his biological organisation, and insofar as he sees and realises the values corresponding to these acts. (1973b:288)

This reference to “holy” and “spiritual” values bears comment, however. In the Introduction we noted that Frings adopted the strategy of translating “Geist” in Scheler as either “mind”, for sociological uses, and “spirit”, for metaphysical uses. However, this does not work as Scheler speaks of both “spiritual values” (“geistigen werte”) which are clearly sociological and “holy values” which are metaphysical (“wertes des Heiligen”) (Scheler, 1966:124-126, 1973b:107-109). In this case “spiritual” has more in common with Husserl’s use than Fring’s comments would allow. We are therefore inclined to read “spiritual values” as “ferhdćund values” and “holy values” as “gāstcund values”.

With this emphasis on ferhdćund and gāstcund values, Scheler goes on to suggest that:

If I say that man is the bearer of a tendency which transcends all possible vital values and which is directed toward the “divine,” or if I say, in short, that he is a being that seeks God, I imply no predication having as its subject an already definable unity of man, be it of a biological or a psychological nature. It is precisely such a unity that I expressly deny. According to his essence man is, rather, only the living X of this seeking, an X that must be conceived as still completely variable with regard to all possible psychophysical organisations so that the organisation of factual earthly man represents only one actualised possibility among all the possibilities for which this X affords an infinite field of play. (1973b:291-292)

He thus stipulates that if a parrot were to manifest this tendency then it too would be wer. In this respect Scheler is trying to escape Spencer’s “naturalistic anthropologism” in which humans are placed at the top of a hierarchy. In saying wer as wer is independent of “psychophysical organisations”, Scheler evades the human prejudice and his further considerations of wer are not restricted to biological humans. Such a distinction then brings to light the difficulty of both defining and differentiating between “man”, “human”, and “human being”.26 It is perhaps because of the ambiguity of all these phrases that Scheler then speaks of “Person” in the final chapter of Formalism. However, even then it is not always clear where “Person” sits in relation to “wer”, either as a synonym for or separate from or specification of.

Scheler’s discussion of the Person27 is lengthy and complicated, taking up nearly a third of Formalism. One of his most significant claims comes earlier in the chapter:

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26 A problem made no easier by translation.
27 When speaking of the general concept we will use “Person” and when speaking of a particular we will use “person”. This also holds for our uses of “ego”, “transcendental ego” and “self” later.
The person must never be considered a thing or a substance with faculties and powers, among which the “faculty” or “power” of reason etc., is one. The person is, rather, the immediately coexperienced unity of experiencing; the person is not a merely thought thing behind and outside what is immediately experienced. (1973b:371)

With this Scheler accuses Kant of “rationalistic anthropologism” for conceiving the Person as nothing other than a rational will or rational activity; only what is capable of rationality can be considered a person. However, Scheler points out that such a notion renders the idea of “individual persons” a contradiction. Rational acts in Kant’s work correspond to a lawful state of affairs that is extra-individual, making them a system of rules and mechanisms which determines a person’s “personhood” by their conformity. Rather than recognising the autonomy of persons as Kant claimed, such an understanding emphasises the heteronomy of persons in which one could not be told apart from another (1973b:372).

On these grounds he goes on to deny the Ego also. In Kant the Ego is the correlate of the object – that through which the object is identified as “object”. But this requires that the Ego itself cannot be an object which Scheler shows to be clearly false as it can become the object of inner perception. Scheler notes that in the phrase “I go for a walk” the “I” (ego) does not speak, it is the person who speaks (1973b:390). The use of “I” in this case is a form of address, it differentiates one person from another. When I say that “I perceive my ego” this “ego” does not have the same sense as the “I”. As a consequence of the object-ness of the ego, this also entails a denial of any “supra-individual ego”, “consciousness in general” or “Transcendental Ego” as ‘special lawful types of procedural activities in all men’ (1973b:378). Though not mentioned by name, Scheler accuses Husserl’s Transcendental Ego of engaging the same sort of “rationalistic anthropologism”. For Husserl, the Transcendental Ego left behind by “bracketing” is the same for all individual egos. As Moran describes it: ‘the Transcendental Ego is a set of anonymous eidetic structures within which individual consciousnesses come to have their experience of meaning, but what is inhabited and lived is a single individual life’ (Moran, 2001:174). Rather than emphasising the autonomy of egos, Husserl emphases their heteronomy by providing a variation on the rational animal.

However, as noted by Eugene Kelly, the relation between Ego and Person is not all that clear (Kelly, 2011:194). Thus, for example, Dunlop suggests that there is a dualism in “human being” between Person and Ego, though Scheler himself claims that an ego is the opposite of the “outer world” and the Person is indifferent to both (Dunlop, 1991:22; Scheler, 1973b:390). Kelly himself suggests that the
dichotomy is between that of the Ego and the lived body to which the Person is a separate phenomenon.

However, as a phenomenon the Person is not an object:

It belongs to the essence of the person to exist and to live solely in the execution of intentional acts. The person is therefore essentially never an “object”. On the contrary, any objectifying attitude (be it perception, representation, thinking, remembering or expectation) makes the person immediately transcendent. (Scheler, 1973b:390)

Unlike Kant these acts are of many different kinds, not just rational activities. Acts contain ferhd in that they are intentional and fulfil meaning. Thus, according to Dunlop: ‘The person, then, is a “unity of being” of spiritual acts, and gives spiritual meaning and value to the vital function of an individual human animal’ (Dunlop, 1991:23). A ferhdcund act is by its nature intentional (in Scheler, 1962:xxxii).

However, there is a general issue with Scheler’s understanding of wer that impacts how accurately we can translate “Geist” as “ferhd”. In Formalism, Scheler’s understanding of wer indicates a being directed toward God which may force us to translate it to “gāst”. The problem with this phase of Scheler’s phenomenology, neatly summarised by Kelly, is that he was a political man with an axe to grind:

He might have been either an evangelist, basing his pronouncements upon the free speculation of his imagination – such as he believes to be of the essence of metaphysical creativity – or he might have been a phenomenological researcher into the essences given to the metaphysical, ethical, and social standpoints. The point is that he often tries to do both of these at the same time, and this attempt leads him to grief. (Kelly, 1977:22)

We cannot deny that a strong Christian apologetic seeps through into his considerations of the Person in Formalism. In 1926, after his break with the Church, he intended however to edit subsequent editions (Scheler, 1973b:xxvi), but this was never done before his death. In order to understand Scheler’s later position, and how it determines the translation of “Geist”, we must first account for Heidegger’s criticisms in BT.

**d. Heidegger**

It is important that Heidegger, like Scheler, was never a student of Husserl’s in the formal sense. By the time the two came to collaborate, Heidegger had already been a privadozent at Freiburg for a year when

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28 In this use of “human animal”, however, Dunlop deviates significantly from Scheler in that he threatens to reinstitute the human prejudice Scheler was avoiding. This will become clearer when we look at Scheler’s later work (Ch.3.iii.e).
they first met in 1916. Nor did Husserl hold much ambition for Heidegger to succeed him until after the First World War.\textsuperscript{29} Heidegger’s philosophical development was already underway by the time the two worked together and it would be wrong to think of him as the student who “broke away” from the master. As characterised by Spiegelberg, the two’s temporary coalition could only ever be temporary: ‘Heidegger’s fundamental wonder is objective Being, Husserl’s, subjective consciousness’ (Spiegelberg, 1971a:284).

In fact, there is much to suggest Scheler and his phenomenology was a far more significant influence on Heidegger’s work. This, in part, can be seen by the reaction of both Husserl and Scheler to \textit{BT}. Though Heidegger originally dedicated \textit{BT} to Husserl, the latter considered it a betrayal of phenomenology. Scheler on the other hand was the only scholar, Heidegger claimed, to recognise the importance of his work (Frings, 1996:3). Scheler even invited Heidegger to Cologne in 1927 to discuss the work and Heidegger later dedicated \textit{Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics} (1929) to Scheler after his death. He was even involved in a project that would unsuccessfully attempt to see \textit{Philosophische Anthropologie} finished. Schacht has suggested that Heidegger, out of deference or a desire for originality, eschewed the title of philosophical anthropology on the basis of this close connection to Scheler (Schacht, 1990:163). The problem with this interpretation is that it ignores Heidegger’s own claims that the existential analytic proposed in \textit{BT} is meant to precede a philosophical anthropology.

Indeed, Heidegger takes a negative stance towards “anthropology” in the opening chapter of \textit{BT}. Here he criticises both Husserl and Scheler of engaging in “traditional anthropology” by which he means “anthropologism” (Heidegger, 2010:47). Heidegger states that in the study of \textit{Dasein} (“being there”)\textsuperscript{30} ‘the manner of access and interpretation must instead be chosen in such a way that this being can show itself to itself on its own terms’ (2010:16). This statement rings very true of Husserl’s own maxim “to the things themselves”; and yet in the next sentence Heidegger also says that ‘this manner should show that being is as it is \textit{initially and for the most part} – in its average \textit{everydayness}’ (2010:16). Glendinning characterises the divergence between Husserl and Heidegger as follows: ’In Heidegger’s work there would be no going back to the solitude of an ego, transcendental or otherwise, but … a turn around for phenomenology that would re-launch it as an interpretative engagement with our existence as, essentially

\textsuperscript{29} Another factor was the death of Husserl’s intended successor, Adolf Reinach, during the war.

\textsuperscript{30} It has occasionally been translated as “existence” or “human being”. Following Stambaugh’s advice we have not used either translation due to various connotations, and have maintained the original German (in Heidegger, 2010:xxiv).
and irreducibly, *in the world* (Glendinning, 2007:58). It is part of the *existential* (the basic structure) of *Dasein* that it is *being-in-the-world*. This being-in-the-world, then, is Heidegger’s attempt to rewrite Husserl’s notion of intentionality (Moran, 2004b:159-161; Lewis and Staehele, 2010:74-76).

Heidegger was critical of Husserl’s concept of *epoché* on the grounds that it turns ‘the objects of consciousness exclusively into objects in consciousness’ (Frede, 1999:53). In spite of this apparent contrary view to Husserl, Heidegger did not abandon the concept of reduction altogether. Certainly, if we understand it in terms of moving away from prejudices and “theory”, Heidegger advocated what he called “destruction”, in his own words. Heidegger argues that if the question of being is to achieve any clarity there must be a loosening of the ‘sclerotic tradition and a dissolution of the concealments produced by it’ through the ‘destruction of the traditional content of ancient ontology’ (Hiedegger, 2010:21). As noted by Glendinning this “destruction” should not be construed negatively, but as “destructuring” that allows us to get at the primordial elements that make up tradition (Glendinning, 1998:77); and by “tradition” is meant those very prejudices that are meant to be bracketed in Husserl’s reductions.

Along with Husserl, Heidegger shared the conviction that phenomenology gets at the things as they present themselves without any form of presuppositions. However, it would be wrong to think that as Husserl and Heidegger share this trait that Heidegger also advocated “philosophy as rigorous science” as Hall does (Hall, 1999:125); on the contrary Heidegger was very critical of the idea. This critical attitude gives rise to the accusation of anthropologism. Here he shares Scheler’s critique that Husserl’s Transcendental Ego is no different from Kant’s rational animal (Scheler, 1973b:378). But he turns on Scheler too by adding a third form of anthropologism (different from both the rationalistic and naturalistic kinds) when he speaks of the “anthropology of Christianity”. This anthropologism arrives at its definition of *wer* through Genesis 1:26: And God said, “Let us make man in our own image, after our likeness”. This is one example, and modern variations have lost their theological character. The focus of this kind of anthropologism is on “transcendence”: ‘that man is something that reaches beyond himself’ (Heidegger, 1962:74). Scheler commits this anthropologism by suggesting that ‘vital values “ought” to be sacrificed for’ “ferhdcund values” which are in turn subordinated to “gästcund values” (Scheler, 1973b:107-109). As such his “transcendence anthropologism” is marked by the claim that beings strive toward “gästcundian” (in Scheler, 1980b:14). This creates a hierarchy in which some beings are more gästcunded than others.

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31 It is this focus on lived experience that led to Existential Phenomenology.
Heidegger’s core criticism of Husserl’s Transcendental Ego and Scheler’s Person is that they are entities (Heidegger, 1962:74). As such they try and determine the extra constituent(s) these entities possess in contradistinction to other entities without questioning the being of these entities. As Heidegger states clearly at the very beginning of BT:

> We are ourselves the entities to be analysed. The Being of any such entity is in each case mine. These entities, in their Being, comport themselves toward their Being. As entities with such Being, they are delivered over to their own Being. Being is that which is an issue for every such entity.

(1962:67)32

This emphasis is to avoid both anthropologism and the human prejudice. As Gorner observes: ‘There is, it must be confessed, something slightly artificial about Heidegger’s choice of the entity to be questioned. We must avoid any suggestion that the being of the human beings is to serve as the model for the being of all other entities’ (Gorner, 2007:22).33 A point that echoes Scheler’s own consideration of “factual man” above. Heidegger frames it thusly: ‘Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it’ (Heidegger, 1962:32). Lachterman draws a useful distinction to understand this: “Dasein” does not designate a particular kind of entity, rather it picks out a style of being that certain entities possess (Lachterman, 1973:xxv). Heidegger’s existential analysis undercuts Scheler’s philosophical anthropology because it recognises that the determination of wer as an entity (kind) is secondary to the

32 We have utilised Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation here because there is some difficulty with Stambaugh’s translation. In her version the passage reads as follows:

> The being whose analysis our task is, is always we ourselves. The being of this being is always mine. In the being of this being it is related to its being. As the being of this being, it is entrusted to its own being. It is being about which this being is concerned. (Heidegger, 2010:41)

In certain respects this translation is closer to the original German:


The main difference is in the translation of “Seiende” as “being” by Stambaugh and “entity” by Macquarrie and Robinson. Stambaugh’s confusing translation of two separate German words into one English word is brought about by the attempt to avoid a different confusion. Unlike Macquarrie and Robinson who always translated Sein as “Being”, Stambaugh avoids this capitalisation: ‘Capitalising “being,” although it has the dubious merit of treating “being” as something unique, risks implying that it is some kind of Super Thing or transcendent being. But Heidegger’s use of the word “being” in no sense refers to something like a being, especially not a transcendent Being’ (in Heidegger, 2010:xxiv). Without the original German to compare however, it then becomes unclear when Heidegger is speaking of being (Sein) or a being (Seiende).

33 It is worth noting that Gorner is aware of both translations by Macquarrie and Robinson, and Stambaugh. Initially he translates “ein Seiendes” as “an entity” and “a being” but then goes on to translate “Seiendes” as just “entities” (2007:15). No explanation for the preference is supplied, but all his translations of BT are consistent with Macquarrie and Robinson.
The full meaning of the claim that ‘The essence of Dasein lies in its existence’ is that ‘Dasein is concerned with its being in the sense that it must choose the way it is. Its being is such that it must choose the way it is, not that it is but how it is’ (Gorner, 2007:23).

Such a claim though does not necessarily mean Heidegger is divorced from the question of wer. As noted by Derrida even though Dasein is not wer, it is not other than wer. Similarly, Gorner observes ‘that Heidegger is talking about human beings when he uses the term “Dasein”’ (2007:23). But Heidegger qualifies this by suggesting that “human being” and “man” are not ontological terms whereas Dasein is (Glendinning, 1998:47). The novelty of Heidegger’s position lies less in the shift away from the philosophical anthropological question “What is wer?” to a different consideration of how to approach the question. Rather than defining wer by what a human is, which commits the human prejudice, Heidegger defines wer in terms of what weras do. But is this really that different from Scheler’s concept of the Person? Indeed, it has been suggested by Frings that much of Scheler’s Person anticipates Heidegger’s Dasein. For example, we noted above Scheler’s claim that Person cannot be objectified. Similarly in Heidegger we find the following claim: ‘Dasein is never to be understood ontologically as a case and instance of a genus of beings objectively present’ (Hiedegger, 2010:42).

e. Scheler II

The convergence between Scheler and Heidegger can also be seen in the post-BT publications of Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge (PSK) (1926[1980b]) and The Human Place in the Cosmos (HPC) (1928[2009]). The latter was to serve as Scheler’s introduction to Philosophische Anthropologie and is now the only indication of his later philosophical anthropology after his complete break with the

34 In Old English apostrophes are not used to indicate possession, rather this achieved by changing the word ending (-es).
35 A further ambiguity of phrasing and titles that pervades this discussion is the possibility that Heidegger saw his work as “existential anthropology”. According to Moran, Sartre considered BT to be existential anthropology – though it is not clear if this is Sartre’s phrase or Moran’s (2000:362). It is possibly the latter as the term “existential anthropology” seems to have been coined by Michael Jackson, a phenomenological anthropologist (e.g. 1996, 2005, 2012). Nevertheless there are two instances in which Heidegger does mention an “existential anthropology” in BT. However, in the first reference he claims we must ‘go beyond the special task of an existential, a priori anthropology’ and says similarly in the second (Heidegger, 2012:177, 288).
36 Even so, Glendinning persists in speaking of “human being” and “human existence” which undermines this point.
37 See Person und Dasein (1969). No English translation available. Comments are primarily taken from Lachterman’s discussion of the relation between Scheler and Heidegger (Lachterman, 1973:xxii-xxvi)
Church.\textsuperscript{38} Importantly, in \textit{HPC} Scheler seems to be attempting to get out of the “transcendence anthropologism” when he lists it among those kinds of “anthropology” he rejects (Scheler, 2009:3).

Before continuing with Scheler’s main argument, however, it is necessary to highlight certain issues with Frings’ translations. The first is an inconsistency in the translation of “Mensch”. In \textit{PSK} it is translated as “man” and we find the significant claim that Scheler proposes to study what he calls the “idea of man” as opposed to the “man-animal” (“factual man”); a distinction he proposed to justify in his \textit{Philosophische Anthropologie} (Scheler, 1980b:195). In this respect he is quite overtly avoiding the human prejudice. Yet this highly significant distinction is not maintained by Frings in \textit{HPC} where “Mensch” is translated as “human being”. Indeed, the title alone (\textit{Dies Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos}) is given different translations by Meyerhoff (\textit{Man’s Place in Nature (MPN)} (1962)) and Farber (\textit{”The Place of Man in the Cosmos”} (1954:393))\textsuperscript{39}. The book itself is based on a lecture Scheler gave in 1927 under the title “Die Sonderstellung des Menschen” which in a further oddity of Frings’ translation is rendered as both “The Special Place of Humankind” and “The Special place of the Human Being” (Scheler, 2009:xix, 3). While we regard Frings to be terminologically incorrect on the translation of “Mensch” we cannot unfortunately rely solely on \textit{MPN} – which does use “man” – as it is a translation of an abridged version of the argument which was published in \textit{Der Leuchter} (1927) and lacks certain salient details. As such in this one case we have altered quotatiions with our own term “\textit{wer}”.

Turning to “Geist”, we mentioned previously the difficulty Frings had in its translation as (sociological) “mind” and (metaphysical) “spirit”. In \textit{PSK} “mind” is his preferred translation but admits that there are certain situations in which he could not avoid translating it as “spirit” (in Scheler, 1980b:vii). These “situations” occur in the opening pages where “mind” and “spiritual” occur side-by-side almost immediately. Indeed, Frings’ own formal distinction breaks down when “\textit{objektiven Geist}” is translated as “objective spirit” and then “objective mind” in a corresponding footnote (Scheler, 1980a:24, 1980b:39, 194).

In order to clarify Scheler’s use of “Geist” it must be contextualised within his sociology of knowledge. As Becker and Dahlke explain, “sociology of knowledge” means “the analysis of the functional interrelations of social processes and structures on the one hand and patterns of intellectual life, including modes of knowing, on the other” (Becker and Dahlke, 1942:310). This Schelerian

\textsuperscript{38} Though it should be warned that this did not entirely remove Scheler’s “theological axe” (see Kelly, 1977:182-184).

\textsuperscript{39} This is also the title favoured by Schutz when he responds to Scheler’s work (Schutz, 1970e:151).
sociology of knowledge differs from the version forwarded by Karl Mannheim which is the more commonly accepted understanding within English speaking sociology (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:20-21). Broadening Marx’s understanding of “ideology”, Mannheim claimed that no human thought was immune from ideologising factors and these could only be mitigated by a sociology of knowledge. Mannheim’s position influenced, among others, the work of Talcott Parsons and Robert Merton. By contrast, Schelerian sociology of knowledge deals ‘with the processes by which any body of “knowledge” comes to be socially established as “reality”’ and is as such ‘concerned with the analysis of the social construction of reality’ (1966:15). This understanding then informs Scheler’s definition of “Geist”:

[Geist], in the subjective and objective sense as well as in the individual or collective sense, determines only and exclusively the particular quality of a certain cultural content that may come to exist. [Geist] as such has in itself no original trace of “power” or “efficacy” to bring this content into existence. [It] may be called a “determining factor” but not a “realising factor” of possible cultural developments. (Scheler, 1980b:36-37)

What is clear is that in PSK “Geist” carries the same meaning as Husserl’s (later) use in Crisis. Significantly any gæstund connotations seem to have been exorcised such that it can only really be translated with “ferhd”. This understanding, we argue, is then carried forward into HPC.

In HPC Scheler argues that what distinguishes wer from other beings is ferhd. Drawing on contemporary work in biology, zoography, and other related areas Scheler makes a four-fold division of life beginning with impulse or drives, and moving through instinct, habit, and practical intelligence. It is at the stage of practical intelligence that many try and make the division between weras and other beings. Scheler denounces this and points out that many, if not all, of the behaviours associated with such intelligence that are meant to make humans unique are also found within other animals too. Instead what distinguishes weras from other beings is the possession of ferhd which is ‘opposite anything we call life, including life in [wer]’ (Scheler, 2009:26). In a significant move this ferhd/life dualism should not be confused with a restatement of Descartes’ mind/body dualism: ‘the ultimate determination of a being with [ferhd] – no matter what its psycho-physical makeup – is its existential detachment from organic being, its freedom and detachability – and the detachment of its centre of existence from the bondage to, the pressure of, and the organic dependence on “life” and everything which belongs to life’ (2009:27). This argument is also part of the reason why we have chosen the word “ferhd”. Bearing in mind that Scheler wanted to get out of the mind/body dualism it is worth noting that in Old English “body” is
translated as “ferhdloca”: “location/house of spirit”. The virtue of this rendering, therefore, is that the two, ferhd and ferhdloca, though separable ideas are not presented as being diametric opposites.

Thus, what separates ferhd from life is precisely the ability of the possessor to separate itself from life. That is, ferhd is “world open” in that it can turn the sources of resistance and reaction in its environment into objects (2009:27). Resistance is a major concept in Scheler’s later phenomenology – grounding it in the Realistic branch – only briefly mentioned in Formalism as “with-standing” (Scheler, 1973b:135). It was further developed in “Theory of Three Facts” (1973c) which was written concurrently with Formalism but never published. In this essay he explains that: ‘In every experienced resistance, we are aware of the operation and the forcefulness of something which does not and cannot stem from ourselves… The phenomenon of resistance comes to light only as directed against an activity we perform and, indeed, only in the exercise of the activity itself’ (Scheler, 1973c:263). Scheler’s main published statements are then found in PSK (Scheler, 1980b:141-143). According to Stikkers, one of Scheler’s main criticisms of Heidegger’s notion of Dasein was the lack of a concept of resistance in relation to Dasein’s being-in-the-world (in Scheler, 1980b:10). Indeed, it is this ability – to turn sources of resistance into objects – that allows such a being to be aware of a world as “world”. Not only this, but the ferhd-bearing being becomes self-conscious in the sense that it ‘is able to objectify its very own physiological and psychological nature’ (Scheler, 2009:29). The animal in contrast to wer (as bearer of ferhd) is not aware of its instincts as instincts or a world as “world”. It does not reflect upon a particular action as the result of an instinctive behaviour; rather it is too caught up in the dynamic of draw and repel (the dynamics of resistance) giefan by things in its environment.

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40 We believe Scheler was approaching a similar point when he speaks of the “Hause” of “Geist” (Scheler, 1980a:21). Significantly in his translation of this passage (above), Frings removes any reference to “house”.

41 The full advantage of this manoeuvre cannot be worked out here. However, it nevertheless has implications for recent phenomenological investigations that have focused on the experience of the body in: video games by Murray (2000) and Crick’s (2010); sport by Meier (1988), Rail (1990, 1992), Allen-Collinson and Hockey (2007, 2011) and Samudra (2008); and martial arts by Masciotra et al. (2001), Morley (2001), McDonald (2007) and Spencer (2009).

42 There is potential to relate Scheler’s notion of resistance and this idea of “draw” and “repel” to Heidegger’s analysis of fundamental moods in BT. Staehler (2007b) has pointed out that Heidegger’s analysis of anxiety as a fundamental mood needs to be counter balanced with the fundamental mood of awe especially if we are to make sense of his distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity. We have not pursued the matter here because the understanding of authenticity/inauthenticity goes beyond the limits of our main argument. All we will stipulate is that we are not suggesting an equivalence between draw/repel and awe/ambivalence. In the main we have reservations about the notion of “awe” due to its application in the study of religion (e.g Otto, 1926; van der Leeuw, 1963:43-51; Tiele (quoted in Capps, 1995:119); Cox, 2010:38-41).
In fact Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein allows us to better understand Scheler’s earlier comments regarding the Person. Scheler points out that it is a quality of ferhd that it is the only being which cannot be objectified – [ferhd] is pure actuality; it exists only in freely carrying out its acts. Hence, [ferhdas] centre, the “person”, is not objectifiable, nor is the person a thinglike being. The person is a constantly self-executing order structure of acts (and essentially a specific structure). (emphasis added, 2009:34)

Just as Dasein is not a kind of entity but a style of being, so too is ferhd a style of being. That is, while humans may be delineated as one kind of entity among animals as a broader kind, insofar as they are the bearers of ferhd, i.e. are persons, they have a particular style of being. Thus in Heideggerian terms Person or ferhd is understood not in terms of categories but in terms of existentials. One of the most significant existentials of ferhd is its ability to separate essence from existence, the act of ideation, whereby the person ‘uses, consciously or unconsciously, a technique which can (tentatively) be called a suspension of the reality of things and the world’ (2009:37). Unlike other beings which always say “yes” to reality in that they always follow their drives, the person is able to say “no”. This act of sublimation allows the person to deny drives (2009:40). By such an act the person opposes themselves to life. Such a conception is no different from Dasein; in its ability to raise the question of being, Dasein performs this exact same sort of sublimation. Though Heidegger may have denied the title of philosophical anthropology, the equivalency of Dasein and Person indicate that he and Scheler were operating in the same manner.

f. Husserl II

In the wake of Heidegger’s publication of BT Husserl became more openly critical of his phenomenology. According to Spiegelberg he drew the following conclusions:

Apparently his main impression was that Heidegger, by substituting human existence (Dasein) for the pure ego, had transformed phenomenology into anthropology, the very same anthropology which Husserl had once fought in the first volume of his Logische Untersuchungen as a species of psychologism. (emphasis added, Spiegelberg, 1971a:282)\(^\text{43}\)

Husserl’s criticisms reached their most vocal in a lecture delivered in 1931 entitled “Phenomenology and Anthropology” (1981d). At the outset of the lecture Husserl declares: ‘It is a well-known fact that the

\(^\text{43}\) There is an ambiguity with Spiegelberg’s phrasing here. We have already noted above that Dasein is to be translated as “there-being” and not “human being”, and by extension “human existence”. It is not clear here whether it was Husserl who considered Dasein to be another name for human existence or if this is Spiegelberg’s interpolation.
younger German philosophers have during the last decade become increasingly interested in philosophical anthropology’ (1981d:315). Though these “younger German philosophers” are not named at all throughout the lecture, a letter to Ingarden reveals that his comments are directed toward Heidegger and Scheler (Scanlon, 1981:313). Husserl mentions that this new kind of “anthropology” stems from Dilthey and holds that philosophy is founded in *wer* and its concrete existence. Yet contrary to this both Heidegger and Scheler distance themselves from Dilthey: in *Formalism* Scheler had explicitly stated his agreement with Husserl’s analysis of Dilthey (Scheler, 1973b:302), and Heidegger criticises Dilthey’s philosophy of life alongside both Husserl and Scheler (Heidegger, 1962:72-73).44

What is significant about this new sort of philosophical anthropology is that, guided by phenomenology, it does not fall into the old pitfalls of psychologism and anthropologism. But once this point is recognised Husserl’s argument takes on an interesting tone. Take the two contrasting statements:

The fundamental, that is to say, definite decision of the question under discussion, how far philosophy and, specifically phenomenological philosophy can derive its method from “philosophical” anthropology will accrue to us automatically on the basis of the acquired insight. (Husserl, 1981d:316)

And then:

My task is now to make this true meaning of transcendental phenomenology evident to you. This will lead us to those fundamental insights which will help us decide whether philosophical anthropology is possible. (1981d:317)

The issue that Husserl appears to be tackling is which is given precedence: phenomenology based on philosophical anthropology or philosophical anthropology based on phenomenology?45

Yet Husserl, in his defence of transcendental phenomenology, makes a very similar claim to that of Scheler and Heidegger. While Husserl maintains the activity of the (Transcendental) Ego, which Scheler denied, he nonetheless speaks of the Ego in terms that parallel Scheler’s idea of the Person. In the first case the Ego becomes the correlate of the world. Following a process similar to Descartes’ meditations, Husserl points out that if we perform an *epoché* whereby we put into question the existence of the world:

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44 We may also note that this criticism, to a degree, plays into a misreading of Heidegger that Derrida points to in the “Ends of Man”, specifically one in which *BT* is read as a philosophy of “human reality” (Derrida, 1969:34).

45 This point seems to be recognised by Spiegelberg who discusses Husserl’s critique of Heidegger’s “Existenzphilosophie” but gives no explicit references to indicate that he is speaking specifically of “Phenomenology and Anthropology” (Spiegelberg, 1981:53-54).
I experience myself as the being who practices the *epoche*, an experience which I can justify immediately and actively. This is not experience of the world, because the validity of the experience of the world has been suspended – yet it is experience. As this apodictic ego, therefore, I am prior to the existence of the world because I exist as this ego whether or not the world’s existence can be accepted and accounted for. (Husserl, 1981d:318)

Later on, Husserl describes this Transcendental Ego as being above all worldly existence, directly paralleling Scheler’s concept of the Person. As Mohanty describes it: ‘the ego is constituted by *habitus*, through a sort of auto-genesis, though it never quite becomes an object but at best somewhat like an object’ (Mohanty, 1971:113). The mode of constitution of the Transcendental Ego differs from that of the constitution of objects. In *CM* Husserl states that this constitution is given through the habitualities of the Transcendental Ego (1988:66-67). In this respect the Transcendental Ego – like Person and *Dasein* – is unobjectifiable and these habitualities parallel Scheler’s acts and Heidegger’s *existentials*.

In a further fundamentally important insight, Husserl recognises that in the *epoché* of the world, ‘since this world of experience must now remain in question, my being as man among men and among other realities of the world has become questionable too and is also subject to the epoché’ (Husserl, 1981d:318). Without saying as such, Husserl’s Ego draws closer to Heidegger’s *Dasein* as the “being which I am”. As he goes on to add: ‘The epoché, however, makes it clear that the apperception, “human being”, receives its existential meaning within the universal apperception, “world”, only in the life of the ego’ (1981d:319). This transcendental reduction, then, echoes Heidegger’s own claims that his existential analytic precedes any “anthropology”. Heidegger too rejects discussion of “human beings” (Heidegger, 1962:72), suggesting an equivalence between *Dasein* and the Transcendental Ego. Echoing Heidegger’s comments at the opening of *BT*, Husserl goes on to add: ‘My own self, the essential structures of my entire sphere of consciousness together with the structures of actual and potential meanings, and the conferring of validity, must all be made the themes of an eidetic science’ (Husserl, 1981:321). To a certain extent it can be argued that Husserl was engaged in his usual practice of twisting words into new meanings in order to suit his own arguments. Thus the “Ego” Husserl actually presents is not necessarily the Ego Scheler and Heidegger have in mind when they level their criticisms.

As noted by Moran, by *Crisis* Husserl understood transcendental phenomenology to be ‘the science that grasps in a fundamental way the meaning of the accomplishment of spiritual life in all its

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46 Note there is an inconsistency within the article whereby “epoché” is referred to as either “epoche” or “epoché”. If there is meant to be a difference between the two uses no explanation is provided.
forms’ (Moran, 2004a:91). Here it would seem “spirit” has a certain equivalence to the Transcendental Ego when he claims of the former: ‘The spirit and in fact only the spirit is a being in itself and for itself; it is autonomous and is capable of being handled in a genuinely rational and thoroughly scientific way only in this autonomy’ (Husserl, 1965b:188). And as we have commented previously, “Geist” (Husserl, 1954:345) should be translated as ferhd. This ferhd, Husserl argues, can only be studied through transcendental phenomenology and the Transcendental Ego that reveals its activities (Moran, 2004a:92).

We suggest that there is a certain equivalence between Husserl’s Transcendental Ego, Scheler’s Person and Heidegger’s Dasein. The accusation of “anthropologism” made in “Phenomenology and Anthropology” is more of a polemic against his two greatest rivals of the time. The major difference between Husserl, Scheler and Heidegger stems from Husserl’s insistence on this study being a “rigorous science” or “eidetic science”. But this does not make their respective projects incompatible. In fact, Husserl’s entire project can be seen to argue that no social science can proceed without a proper foundation in phenomenology (as philosophical anthropology). And that this “rigorous science” of phenomenology is philosophical anthropology is made clear in closing statements to CM: ‘The path leading to a knowledge absolutely grounded in the highest sense, or (this being the same thing) a philosophical knowledge, is necessarily the path of universal self-knowledge’ (Husserl, 1988:156). However, less so than Scheler and Heidegger, it is perhaps not all that clear what the details of this philosophical anthropology are.

At the end of “Phenomenology and Anthropology” he claims that:

We must never lose sight of the fact that this transcendental phenomenology does nothing but interrogate just that world which is, at all times, the real world for us; the only one which is valid for us, which demonstrates its validity for us; the only one which has any meaning for us. (Husserl, 1981d:322)

What this amounts to is hinted at by Spiegelberg who speaks of a final (and most radical) turn in which Husserl produced (but rarely published) much work on two central issues of concern, intersubjectivity and the life-world (Lebenswelt) which emerged in CM and become central themes in Crisis (Spiegelberg, 1971a:156-157). According to Gurwitsch the life-world is: ‘the world as it is encountered in everyday life and given in direct and immediate experience – especially perceptual experience and its derivatives,

47 An early suggestion of this direction can be found in Ideas I under “world of experience” (Erfahrungswelt) (Moran, 2000:181). See also Moran (2013) for a more detailed account of the emergence of the phrase “Lebenswelt” in Husserl’s phenomenology. Spiegelberg indicates this final turn began prior to CM with Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929).
memory, expectation, and the like – independent of and prior to scientific interpretation’ (Gurwitsch, 1974:3). For Spiegelberg, Husserl found in this notion a revealing clue for the study of intentionality.

Indeed, its study is given fundamental importance:

the study of the life-world is already a type of phenomenology, though this may still be a “mundane phenomenology.” The importance of such a new phenomenology, destined to explore the fields of logic and formal ontology, ethics, psychology etc., is indicated, among other things, by the fact that the final arrangement of Husserl’s papers in 1935 put the manuscripts on mundane phenomenology first (under A) and those on reduction and the various types of constitutions only under subsequent letters (from B to E). (Spiegelberg, 1971a:160-161)

This “mundane phenomenology” seems to involve the study of the life-world as various cultural-worlds:

‘it is a world interpreted, apperceived, and apprehended in a specific way. In a word, it is a cultural world, more precisely, the cultural world of a certain sociohistorical group’ (Gurwitsch, 1974:20). As Gurwitsch goes on to point out, we never encounter the “perceptual world”, but rather our life-world, building on an earlier comment: ‘that man exists in the world means that he is involved in it’ (1974:7).

This would then seem to implicate Husserl in the very historical relativism that he accused Dilthey of in “Philosophy as Rigorous Science”. And while this might pertain on the level of “mundane phenomenology”, Gurwitsch points out that the step to transcendental phenomenology (i.e. through the transcendental reduction) entails the task of ‘setting forth and elucidating the universal structures of consciousness which make possible any cultural world as the life-world of a sociohistorical group’ (1974:25). Or, as Moran notes, ‘Husserl shifted the emphasis from phenomenology as an a priori exploration of pure consciousness to phenomenology as the a priori exploration of the life-world’ (Moran, 2013:124). We may alternatively refer to these universal structures of consciousness as existentials.

48 Based on this description it is possible to suggest (tentatively) that Husserl’s notion of the life-world is in part derived from Scheler’s discussion of “milieu” which he alternatively calls the “value-world” (Scheler, 1973b:142).

49 Spiegelberg over-emphasises the importance of mundane phenomenology in this regard. He adds later that it is only after the seemingly historical relative studies of the cultural worlds ‘have been carried out will Husserl’s phenomenological or transcendental reduction have a sound basis and a proper guide’ (Spiegelberg, 1971a:161). Mundane phenomenology as a potential synonym for “philosophical anthropology” would, as he characterises it, precede and serve as the basis of transcendent phenomenology. If true this would be a complete reversal of Husserl’s argument in “Phenomenology and Anthropology”.

50 “Cultural world” and “life-world” are often used interchangeably such that it is not always clear if there was a difference between the two. This point extends to Husserl’s own original presentation as noted by Carr (in Husserl, 1970c:xl-xl).
What is significant about Husserl, Scheler, and Heidegger is that despite certain polemical elements, all of them were using their respective phenomenologies to approach the question “What is *wer*?” What holds them together is a peculiar approach to the question: in the consideration of what makes *wer* “*wer*” the answer lies not in the consideration of *wer* as entity. Treating *wer* as entity leads to naturalistic, rationalistic or transcendence anthropologisms. Rather, the question of “*wer*” can only be answered if we treat *wer* as a style of being. The Transcendental Ego, Person and *Dasein* all signify the being which I *have* (not am) and to call other entities *wer* as marks them as having this same being. Being, though, (any being, be it *wer* or some other being) can only be *giefan* by the way in which the entity that possesses it interacts with its world. Thus the question of *wer* is a fundamentally social question. It is a question of meaning.

**iv. The fourth branch of the Movement**

In the “Ends of Man”, Derrida predominantly comes down in favour of Heidegger’s existential analytic and claims that its greatest misreadings have been brought about by Sartre. Contra Derrida, we argue that Sartre’s phenomenology is not some “existential misreading” but follows on from Husserl’s final “turn” when he abandoned the “Cartesian way” to phenomenology. This “Cartesian way” belongs to *Ideas I* and its almost Herculean leap into the realm of pure consciousness. According to Moran in the later works we see a shift to an “ontological way” through the life-world (2013:108-109). This “ontological” shift is significant for our consideration of philosophical anthropology. Eshleman has suggested that Husserl paved the way for a revolution in ontology by attempting to collapse the distinction between being (reality) and appearance (Eshleman, 2013:332). This he suggests indicates a more complex relation with Sartre and his own “ontology” in *Being and Nothingness (BN)* (1943[2003]) than has been recognised by secondary literature. Our concern here is to show that Sartre’s instigation of Existential Phenomenology continued this distinctively phenomenological approach to philosophical anthropology in a way that synthesises Husserl, Scheler and Heidegger.

**g. Sartre**
According to Spiegelberg, Sartre was heavily influenced by Scheler’s work and suggests that Sartre’s phenomenology ‘sounds like the program of a philosophical anthropology’ whereby ‘Sartre would presumably claim that his enterprise is even more basic than the philosophical anthropology of Max Scheler, its best known rival in this field’ (Spiegelberg, 1971b:482). However, Sartre’s position in The Phenomenological Movement is like that of a “black sheep” with a “phenomenological period” that can be dated roughly between 1934 with Transcendence of the Ego (TE) (1934[2004a]) to 1943 and the publication of BN. Commonly conceived, Sartre’s phenomenology involves a radical shift from the dogmatically Husserlian stance of TE which he began to take “liberties” with after the influence of Heidegger’s BT (in Sartre, 2004a:ix). Sartre comments that: ‘It is the war and Heidegger who have put me on the right path; Heidegger by showing me that there was nothing beyond the project which human reality realised itself” (quoted in Fretz, 1992:78). This “réalité humaine”, often equated with Heidegger’s Dasein, is the core of Sartre’s philosophical anthropology as “wer in situation”. In order to avoid “existentialist misreadings” we need now to clarify these ideas.

Two significant factors in this portrayal concern us here: first, a comparison is usually only made between TE and BN, largely ignoring the works in between of which Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions (STE) actually provides certain insights into the “shift” in Sartre’s phenomenology; second, discussions usually focus on how Sartre is related to Husserl and Heidegger, ignoring the influence of Scheler. These are important for our considerations because STE contains Sartre’s clearest statement regarding philosophical anthropology, but the lack of consideration of Scheler’s influence in particular stems partly from a tendency of Sartre only to really mention scholars when he disagrees with them. There is not the space to give a systematic treatment of how Sartre has been read and misread and so we will restrict ourselves to a few statements about the major points of Sartre’s phenomenology.

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52 Contained within this rough ten year period are also the works The Imagination (1936[1962]), the novel Nausea (1938[2000]), Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions (1939[2002]), and The Imaginary (1940[2004b]). Despite the importance given to Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960[1976]) by Fretz (1992) and Cannon (2013) we have followed Moran in not going beyond BN as Sartre strays into humanist philosophy (2000:255-256) (see Ch.6.i).

53 Like “Dasein” we have elected to leave the phrase untranslated.

54 Richmond has observed a similar point in regard to Henri Bergson (in Sartre, 2004:xxv).

55 A consideration of Sartre’s existential psychoanalysis at the end of BN has largely been ignored despite the numerous benefits it might have for social science. Such considerations are beyond the scope of our current considerations and also require us to deal with a strong methodological individualism emphasis in his work.
In order to make sense of Sartre’s phenomenology as philosophical anthropology we need to begin with STE. Here Sartre proposes an “experiment in phenomenological psychology” into the study of emotions. This stems from a criticism of psychology and its failure to understand wer. “Anthropology”, he claims, has as its task ‘to define the essence of man [l’homme] and the human [humaine] condition’ (Sartre, 2002:2). For Sartre psychology can never achieve this. Wer, as it is understood by psychology, is brought about by the observation that all over the world there are certain creatures that share common constituents, and from studies in sociology and physiology, certain “objective” relations obtain between them. The psychologist limits himself to the study of these creatures without asking if this limitation is arbitrary. Why, Sartre asks, are the “Australian primitive” and “American workman” included, but higher apes excluded (2002:2-3)? These remarks bear some similarity to Scheler’s (above) and indicate an awareness of a human prejudice involved in psychology.

More substantively, Sartre notes that the psychologist excludes as a possibility of his analysis that he consider the weras around him as weras like himself. The psychologist’s own “werisc character” is supplied after the fact, as it were. As such the notion of wer is no more than a unifying hypothesis aimed at bringing together otherwise disparate data and can only derive its probability from successful use. But this makes the psychologist a mere collector of facts and little more. In the case of emotions the psychologist thus knows that wer has emotions because they can see them and so catalogues them as historical accidents. Nowhere, though, do they study the conditions under which an emotion is possible – enquiring, that is, whether the very structure of the [“réalité-humaine”] renders the emotions possible and how it does so – to the psychologist this would seem needless and absurd. What is the use of enquiring whether emotion is possible, seeing that manifestly it exists? (2002:5)

The psychologist may counter that this “synthetic” approach is exactly the same sort as applied in the natural sciences. However, Sartre points out that the world as the synthetic totality of natural science is rarely appealed to. It is a presumption, then, that psychology thinks that it can synthetically reach wel.
Indeed, ““wer” and “the world” are beings of the same type, such that, ‘as Heidegger believes, the notions of the world and of [“réalité-humaine”] (Dasein) are inseparable’ (2002:5). This parallels an earlier comment in TE where Sartre claims that the Ego and the world are both synthetic totalities unifying psychical objects or things together (Sartre, 2004a:30); or, as Hazel Barnes usefully refers to them, “ideal unities” (in Sartre, 1956:xiii).

Turning to Husserl, Sartre argues that phenomenology accepted that not only can we have experiences of facts, but we also have experiences of essences and values. Accordingly, “emotions” cannot be picked out from the multitude of psychic facts unless implicit recourse is made to the essence of emotion as what holds these facts together as emotions (2002:7). In this respect “essence” is understood as that which holds the disparate emotions in a particular unity, and Husserl’s study into transcendental and constitutive consciousness through the “phenomenological reduction”, was a means by which these implicit essences are made explicit. Heidegger is appealed to in this sense because the phenomenological reduction is applied to me: ‘What must differentiate all research into man from other types of strict investigation is precisely this privileged circumstance, that the [réalité-humaine] is ourselves’ (2002:8). As such, I am a being who, to varying degrees of clarity, apprehends myself as wer.

It is on this basis, Sartre maintains, that any philosophical anthropology should proceed (2002:9).

Therefore:

In a general way, what interests psychology is man in situation. In itself it is, as we have seen, subordinate to phenomenology, since a truly positive study of man in situation would have first to have elucidated the notions man, of the world, of being-in-the-world, and of situation. (2002:12-13)

The remainder of STE is a piece of phenomenological psychology: the study of the essence of the emotions as one particular activity of réalité humaine – i.e. “wer in situation”. That is, the study of emotion, though only an aspect of réalité humaine, nonetheless indicates its totality. Though Sartre never speaks in terms of social science, it is not unreasonable to draw from this understanding the view that social science is the study of “wer in situation”, which elucidates the essence of wer through weres particular activities.57

57 Lewis and Staehler have commented that Sartre still recognised the importance of “empirical science” for showing how possible consciousness discerned by philosophy is actualised (Lewis and Staehler, 2010:124-125).
In *TE* Sartre is dogmatically Husserlian in his understanding of consciousness as intentional: consciousness is always conscious-of something other than itself. He even uses this core of Husserlian phenomenology to demonstrate that not only is the concept of the Transcendental Ego superfluous to our considerations of consciousness, but it actually hinders them (2004a:4-9). The supposed shift of *BN* is meant to revolve around a change in the understanding of consciousness, but as Barnes’ extensive footnotes in *TE* reveal, much of it is presupposed in the later text. She indicates that the only difference in *BN* is the recognition that the refutation of solipsism in *TE* failed (in Sartre, 1956:xi-xii). More significant, we suggest, is how Sartre’s phenomenology is given a focus in *BN* pre-determined in *STE* as the need to define “wer”, “the world”, “being-in-the-world”, and “situation” in order to study “wer in situation”.

In order to understand this we must see that *STE* reconciles an apparent contradiction between *TE* and *BN*. In *TE* Sartre claims that ‘for consciousness, to be and know oneself are one and the same thing,’ or, ‘consciousness is a being whose essence implies existence’ (2004a:36). In *BN* this is seemingly rejected: ‘Since consciousness is not possible before being, but since its being is the source and condition of all possibility, its existence implies its essence’ (emphasis added, Sartre, 2003:11). This, Sartre has garnered from both Heidegger’s study of *Dasein* in terms of its *essentia* and *existentia* and Husserl’s “necessity of fact”. By the phrase Sartre means that: ‘In order for there to be an essence of pleasure, there must be first the fact of a consciousness (of) this pleasure’ (2003:11). But understood in this way Sartre is hardly deviating from his claims in *STE* that phenomenology makes explicit otherwise implicit essences. If I am conscious-of a particular pleasure then contained within this is a consciousness of Pleasure in general. Each such essence then points back to *wer* in her totality. As he goes on to explain, as consciousness is always conscious-of something, consciousness emerges as a revelation revealed by a being which it is not and which gives itself as already existing when consciousness reveals that being (2003:18). As such: ‘Consciousness is a being whose existence posits its essence, and inversely it is consciousness of a being, whose essence implies its existence’ (2003:18). Unlike Fretz who has suggested that the crucial difference lies in two possible senses of “implies” (Fretz, 1992:82), we suggest the key is the use of “is” and “of”. Consciousness as a transcendent (going beyond) being reveals its

58 There is not the space to comment fully on the ease with which Sartre synthesises both Husserl and Heidegger in a number of places. Spiegelberg has suggest one reason is that Sartre was unlikely aware of the friction between the two (Spiegelberg, 1981:54).
59 Indeed, to speak of a “pleasure” at all requires recourse to some essence in this sense.
essence by its very existence; each object consciousness is conscious-of has the capacity to reveal consciousness to itself (existence implies essence). Conversely, the being which consciousness becomes conscious-of (i.e. itself) is a being which has as a part of its essence the necessity of existing (essence implies existence).

Further to this we must understand how Sartre uses “existence” in distinction to Heidegger. It must be noted that he dropped Heidegger’s Dasein in favour of consciousness. As such Spiegelberg has pointed out that Sartre’s concern with existence is not as a particular mode of being for Dasein but as ‘the concrete behaviour of human being in his conscious situation with an experienced world and responding to it’ (Spiegelberg, 1971b:482). This point allows us to give some sense to what Sartre means by réalité humaine. Existence is for Sartre consciousness in situation. Though the formal definition does not occur until much later, “situation” is understood by Sartre as the objective structure which surrounds me determining what possibilities I have available at the given moment (Sartre, 2003:283). The crucial question is how this structure of the situation is available to consciousness. The flaw of Heidegger’s definition of Dasein as ‘a being such that in its being, its being is in question’ is that it is not a full definition and Sartre proposes instead that: ‘consciousness is a being such that in its being, its being is in question in so far as this being implies a being other than itself’ (2003:18). Réalité humaine therefore indicates the dealings of consciousness with a being which is not itself. That is, “wer in situation”.

It is the investigation of this point that leads Sartre to his study of nothingness and negation. This negation is not a thing among things, but the means by which the totality of being is ordered into differentiated complexes of instruments. Through this negation we invest ourselves in the world and more importantly it is through this that the “world” arises as such. Sartre goes on to claim: ‘Thus we reach the first term of our study: man is the being through whom nothingness comes to the world (2003:48). This “first term” – the first item listed in STE – is wer and its definition: Wer brings nothingness into the world. By this Sartre means that insofar as wer is able to ask questions of being she must be able to put herself outside of being. To do this wer alters her relation with being: ‘For man to put a particular existent out of circuit is to put himself out of circuit in relation to that existent. In this case he is not subject to it; he is out of reach; it can not act on him, for he has retired beyond a nothingness’ (2003:48). Wer can never deny existence as such but only change her relation to it. Negation, then, is no more than Scheler’s concept of sublimation. These negations produce négatités – a term coined by Sartre – which indicate the subsequent relation of wer to the world. Sartre calls this ability freedom, the
requisite for negations to take place, and understood in parallel to Scheler it is no more than another way of speaking of ferhd.

However, unlike Scheler’s ferhd, freedom is not the essence of wer but the condition of weres essence: ‘Human freedom precedes essence in man and makes it possible; the essence of the human being is suspended in his freedom. What we call freedom is impossible to distinguish from the being of “[réalité humaine].” Man does not exist in order to be free subsequently; there is no difference between the being of man and his being-free’ (Sartre, 2003:49). We take Sartre to mean the following: the being of wer is wer existing – that is, consciousness in its full intentionality caught in situation. Thus the being of wer is found in being conscious-of something that is not itself. At the same time consciousness is also consciousness (of) consciousness. This reflected consciousness brought about by reflective consciousness is the essence of wer. As he goes on to explain later: ‘essence is what has been’ (2003:59). Existence precedes essence in the significant sense that the way in which wer indicates an essence by the phrase “that is” causes all that is designated to have-been.

The true advantage of Sartre’s synthesis will not be played out until our consideration of intersubjectivity. For now we want to contextualise his approach to the being of wer in relation to Husserl, Scheler and Heidegger in two respects:

First, for Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, and Sartre, phenomenology dealt with philosophical anthropology even if they did not all consistently use the title. Returning to our consideration of Spiegelberg’s divisions at the beginning of the chapter we can now say the following: phenomenology in the simpliciter sense means an approach to philosophical anthropology. Any “phenomenology” which does not engage in the question “What is wer?” is considered pseudo-phenomenology. In Spiegelberg’s list of excluded “phenomenologies”, we can point to Ernst Mach as one example of pseudo-phenomenology. In Mach’s use, phenomenology was not the study of wer but the means by which physics would be purged of all metaphysical elements (Spiegelberg, 1982:8). The obvious question, then, is whether or not phenomenology-of-religion meets this simpliciter definition also? The answer to which must be affirmative. To take two prominent members: van der Leeuw attempted to define “wer” as the seeker of power (van der Leeuw, 1963:680-681) and in Eliade “wer” is defined as homo religiosus (Eliade, 1959:15, 2006b:58-60). Though it is possible to question whether the latter belongs under the

60 See Ch.7.ii.
rubric “phenomenology-of-religion” it is nonetheless the case that this notion of *homo religiosus* is taken up by such members as Smart (1996:30) and Cox (2010:92).

Second, if we were to maintain Spiegelberg’s metaphor of a spiral, we should strictly speaking discuss the four separate spirals of Husserl (Constitutive Phenomenology), Scheler (Realistic Phenomenology), Heidegger (Hermeneutic Phenomenology) and Sartre (Existential Phenomenology). Such an image indicates wildly divergent traditions but as the case of Sartre shows, he was able to make his contributions by synthesising the thought of the previous three. The true advantage of the Phenomenological Movement (and that which holds these four together) is that in their approach to the question “What is *wer*?” *Wer* is understood not by a set of constituents but by a particular style of being. To define *wer* as “the beings which we are” is to say that *wer* carries a particular meaning. How Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, and Sartre differ in their accounts of this being – i.e. the structure or *existentials* of this being’s style – is brought about by their differing phenomenological agendas that led them to consider *wer* under different conditions. We propose to abandon Spiegelberg’s metaphor of a spiral in favour of the anology used by Moran and Embree to describe their edited series *Phenomenology* as a map by which the reader can get their bearing in the phenomenological tradition (Moran and Embree, 2004a:2). What we suggest is that the items of the agenda are “mountains” or waypoints which orientate our navigation through the “phenomenological continent”. Each phenomenologist relies upon different waypoints to draw their map of this continent; a map which approaches the question “What is *wer*?” The various branches instigated by Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, and Sartre represent various routes to exploring this continent. And it is this approach of the Phenomenological Movement that will allow us to get to the core of the crisis of social science.
3. Phenomenology Proper

By investigating the phenomenologies of Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, and Sartre we have now formulated a definition of phenomenology simpliciter as an approach to philosophical anthropology. However, this definition is not yet precise enough for our main argument. First, we have yet to demonstrate that phenomenology is a normative philosophy of social science. Second, without this understanding of phenomenology as normative philosophy of social science we lack the tools by which to engage in an analysis of the crisis of social science – i.e an evaluative philosophy of social science. In order to be in a position to achieve this we must develop a definition of a phenomenology proper. Such a definition will give us an understanding of phenomenology as a normative philosophy of social science.

i. Alfred Schutz as Husserl’s successor

The previous chapter argued that Husserl’s phenomenology was an approach to philosophical anthropology in all but name. However, Husserl was only ever to sketch the beginnings of this before his death and much of his thought is now known through posthumous publications of his Nachlass. And while Husserl may have held out hopes that Heidegger would be his successor, once viewed in the light of his final turn it is another figure that may be the true heir to Husserlian phenomenology. Spiegelberg, speaking of Husserl’s considerations of the life-world in Crisis as sketchy, suggests that they have received a full and concrete development in the work of Schutz (Spiegelberg, 1982:163). One significant aspect of Crisis, as recognised by Moran, is its continued focus on rigorous science. But what becomes clear about Husserl’s concept of science is that, unlike the positivist conception that was emerging at the same time, he was not advocating ‘a conception of the world to correct – or even replace – the naïve, natural, pre-scientific approach to the world’ but rather to ‘re-situate the scientific conception of the world within the life-world and show how the idealising scientific attitude requires and cannot replace the natural attitude’ (Moran, 2013:106). It is precisely this task that we suggest Schutz carried out beginning with The Phenomenology of the Social World (PSW) (1932[1967]) in which he provides an analysis of
Max Weber’s methodological position using Husserlian phenomenology.¹ Significantly, Husserl read
PSW, delivering it the praise that Schutz was ‘one of the few who have penetrated to the core of the
meaning of my life’s work’ (in Schutz, 1967:xviii). External constraints, however, prevented the two
from collaborating.

According to Embree, Schutz ‘fundamentally created the phenomenological theory of the social
sciences single handedly’ (Embree, n.d.). Delanty and Strydom list him under their second sense of
“philosophy of social science” (now subsumed under normative philosophy of social science).² As a
follower of Husserl, Schutz argued extensively for his importance for social science. Although he admits
in “Husserl’s Importance for the Social Sciences” (1959[1962j]) that Husserl himself was not concerned
with the problems of social science, social sciences will nonetheless ‘find their true foundation not in
transcendental phenomenology, but in the constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude’
(1962:149).³ The qualification contained here points to the fact that Schutz was by no means an
uncritical follower of Husserl. According to Seebohm, Schutz’s account of social science makes up for
certain shortcomings in Husserl’s own discussions in Ideas II and III (Seebohm, 2013:138). Based on our
discussion in the previous chapter it could even be suggested that Schutz focused on the work of
“mundane phenomenology” which Husserl saw capable within the study of life-world (Spiegelberg,
1982:256).

But most significant for our concerns is Natanson’s comments that Schutz saw that social
science required a basis in philosophical anthropology in order to proceed properly (Natanson, 1962:xlvi-
xlvii). As Schutz himself wrote in “Symbol, Reality, and Society” (1955[1962i]) regarding the study of
symbols:

The analysis of these transcendencies – from those going beyond the limits
of the world within his actual reach to those transgressing the paramount
of everyday life – is a major task of any philosophical anthropology. At

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¹ Though in reality Scheler had already provided a phenomenological critique of Weber’s work (see
Scheler, 1989b).
² Embree, however, has noted the difficulty of associating Schutz with the phrase “philosophy of social
science” since it had yet to be coined (Embree, 2011a:xi-xiii). Schutz himself speaks more often of
“theory of science”, a phrase seemingly equivalent to “methodology”. Embree adds that his primary aim
seems to have been to uncover and clarify certain foundational difficulties that may have been overlooked
(2011a:xiii). E.g. Schutz suggests that “choice” and “decision” are fundamental categories for any theory
of social science yet few social scientists have clarified these basic concepts (Schutz, 2011b:75).
Embree’s comments regarding “philosophy of social science” seem to fit in with a general difficulty of
capturing what is meant by the phrase. Nevertheless, his understanding of Schutz clearly indicates that he
was working on a methodology by which social science was to proceed. In this respect Schutz may still
be classified as a normative philosopher of social science as we have used the phrase.
³ See also 1962a, 1962c, and 1970b.
the same time, the clarification of the categories of common-sense thinking within everyday life is indispensable for the proper foundation of all the social sciences. (1962i:356)

Further to this he claimed in “Husserl’s Importance for the Social Sciences” that Husserl’s phenomenology was ‘designed to be developed into a philosophical anthropology’ (1962j:149).⁴ According to Gürwitsch, Schutz was in search of the same invariant structures as Husserl which could only have their roots in the “wêrisc condition”. Therefore, the search and clarification of such structures requires a philosophical anthropology (Gürwitsch, 1974:28). Schutz worked on developing phenomenology as a philosophical anthropology and on placing that within Social Science. But also significant in this regard is that as a critical follower of Husserl, Schutz also drew on the work of Scheler, Heidegger, and Sartre.⁵ Though we commented that Sartre synthesised much of the previous three, it is also the case that his comments were not related to social science. In Schutz we find a similar project with the added benefit of being explicitly concerned with social science. We can also suggest that Schutz is the instigator of the fifth branch of phenomenology that Embree calls Cultural Phenomenology.

Most significant in Schutz’s synthesis is his appropriation of Scheler’s sociology of knowledge, which he makes use of in numerous places without qualification. The major difference between the two is that where Scheler focused on “philosophical or theological systems” (Schutz, 1964i:249), Schutz focused on common-sense life (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:27-28).⁶ This “sociological” emphasis is the main reason Schutz himself is often characterised as a sociologist rather than a phenomenologist and why this fifth branch of phenomenology has moved beyond Philosophy departments into the Social Sciences.⁷ For our purposes our main focus will be on Schutz’s analysis into the essence of social science, but this can only be understood if placed into the wider framework of his work on provinces of meaning.⁸

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⁴ It is possible to see this in Husserl’s discussion of regional ontologies as formations of objectivities. These objectivities are: ‘all types of objects bearing a value, all practical objects, all concrete cultural organisations which as hard realities determine our actual life, the State, for instance, the Church, custom, the law; and so forth’ (Husserl, 2012:320).
⁶ Schutz’s relation to Mannheim is unclear; there is only one vague reference that might suggest an explicit disagreement with his form of sociology of knowledge (Schutz, 1967:11).
⁸ We avoided using The Structures of the Life-World (1973) on that grounds it was completed posthumously by Thomas Luckmann using the available collected notes and chapter plans Schutz was able to draw up before he died. As Luckmann admits in the preface: ‘This book cannot be the book as Schutz would have written it. It is not even the book I think he would have written’ (in Schutz and Luckmann, 1973:xxi). As such the work is a collaborative effort and there is not the space to extract Luckmann’s interpolations.
In PSW Schutz argues that Weber’s position fails to appreciate that there is a difference between meaning as it is intended by a person and meaning as it is received by another: ‘the subjective meaning of another person’s behaviour need not be identical with the meaning which his perceived external behaviour has for me as an observer’ (Schutz, 1967:20). Weber’s analysis of meaning takes it as a given that the meaning I observe of another is the meaning that they intend. Following Husserl, Schutz offers a different approach. At its simplest,

we will say that meaning is a certain way of directing one’s gaze at an item of one’s own experience. This item is thus “selected out” and rendered discrete by a reflexive Act. Meaning indicates, therefore, a peculiar attitude on the part of the Ego toward the flow of its own duration. This holds true of all stages and levels of meaning. (1967:42)

Each “attitude” is then ‘that frame of interpretation which sees them as behaviour’ (1967:57). In this respect Schutz extends Husserl’s discussion of “attitudes” to understand them as interpreting in a particular way.⁹

Drawing further on Husserl, Schutz focuses on the idea that polythetic experiences are synthesised into a monothetic unity. For example, when I observe an object I observe each constituent of that object individually while my consciousness synthesises all these observations into a single totality. The way in which these monothetic unities are brought together are called meaning-contexts by Schutz. He gives the following definition:

We say that our lived experiences E₁, E₂, … , Eₙ stand in a meaning-context if and only if, once they have been lived through in separate steps, they are then constituted into a synthesis of a higher order, becoming thereby unified objects of monothetic attention. (1967:75)

The meaning-contexts or “configurations of meaning”,¹⁰ as they are alternatively called, build up within the person a “stock of knowledge at hand”: ‘the story of already constituted objectives of experience in the actual Here and Now’ (1967:78). By this “Here and Now” Schutz means the situation I find myself in as “null-point” around which that situation, as situation, is oriented (1962a:133; 1962i:306-307).¹¹ Thus the stock of knowledge at hand contains all the configurations of meaning that a person has gathered up until this point. Many of these configurations also contain within them further configurations which may be regarded as subdivisions. A meaning-context is then a collection of these configurations based on

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⁹ See Ch.1.iii.e.
¹⁰ Though Schutz does not explicitly state as such within PSW there is a strong parallel between what he has called meaning-contexts and Husserl’s regional ontologies.
¹¹ This understanding of the “Here” can be found as early as Husserl’s LI (1970a:315-316).
similarities they hold. This is not to say that they hold these similarities in a formal sense; it is the person who decides if configurations of meaning are similar and so creates a meaning-context.

Both the notions of meaning-context and stock of knowledge are developed further in the later essay “On Multiple Realities” (1945[1962d]). Schutz draws upon James’ idea that within our lives our reality is divided up into “sub-universes” (1962d:207). Each of these “sub-universes” is determined by a particular set of relevancies or what Schutz later prefers to call ‘finite provinces of meaning’ (1962d:230). “Province of meaning” replaces “meaning-context”. Each province of meaning is finite in that ‘there is no possibility of referring one of these provinces to the other by introducing a formula of transformation’ (1962d:232). For example, taking Husserl’s notion of a European ferhd as a province of meaning we can contrast this with a (hypothetical) British province. As finite provinces this entails that I cannot be both European and British at the same time. They constitute exclusive monothetic unities.

While it is not stated as such by Schutz, we would qualify that this point holds true only for those provinces of meaning on the same level of meaning-context. That is, we re-interpret “meaning-context” to mean how provinces are hierarchically organised depending on the situation. Thus, if we regard Europe as a higher meaning-context level to Britain the latter becomes one of its polythetic constituents.

Each province involves its own cognitive style by which is meant that each province determines how an object should be engaged with – i.e. the attitude taken towards object. Britain, then, as a polythetic constituent of Europe entails that its cognitive style is in some way derivative of this higher level. According to Schutz, the natural attitude is the primary province of meaning in that it is the one we occupy most regularly and is indeed fundamental to most of our ability to interact with others. While he does not give a full exposition to the matter, he suggests that some, if not all, of these provinces of meaning form “enclaves” within the world of working (the natural attitude) by which he means each province becomes a variation upon this fundamental province (1962d:233). This seems to follow in the line of Husserl’s comments of “Crisis of European Man” in which different attitudes derive from the natural attitude.

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12 According to Sebald “province of meaning” is a more elaborate version of Weber’s “spheres of value” though we have found no textual reference from Schutz to confirm this (Sebald, 2011:342).
13 Again it must be emphasised that this is not a formal relation. Empirical observation would reveal examples of British people who would not regard Britain as a constituent of Europe. Britain would thus be a monothetic unity on the same level of meaning-context as Europe.
14 In “On Multiple Realities” only the provinces of work, phantasy, dreaming, and social science are mentioned.
15 See Ch.2.ii.a.
This emphasis on “work” as the equivalent of the natural attitude can lead to a confusion, however, as Schutz does not mean “jobs” in the sense of “going to work”. Rather, work is anything dominated by the pragmatic motive (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:36): anything concerned with the surviving and thriving of the person. Berger and Luckmann note that a similar confusion has occurred in interpretations of Marx’s thinking. Marx’s discussion of “substructure” and “labour” led many to equate this substructure with the economic structure alone. However, this is to miss that by “labour” Marx meant any “human activity” that produces “superstructure” understood as “human thought” (1966:18). This sub/superstructure scheme can then be found in Scheler’s sociology of knowledge as the difference between “real factors” and “ideal factors”: ‘the “real factors” regulate the conditions under which certain “ideal factors” can appear in history, but cannot affect the content of the latter’ (1966:20). In order to avoid confusion later when we discuss science in relation to jobs we will replace Schutz’s “work” with the Old English “swincan” to indicate his particular meaning. Further, it is important to recognise that swincan as concerned with surviving and thriving avoids the criticism of entailing egoism that Scheler levelled against Spencer. “Thriving”, understood here as prospering, requires not only one’s own survival but also the securing of future generations.

“Stock of knowledge” therefore comes to be defined as the totality of these provinces of meaning. Because these provinces are finite, access into each requires a specific form of epoché in which the person brackets out the cognitive style of the natural attitude in order to enter the cognitive style of the appropriate province (Schutz, 1962d:231). Again, to draw a connection with Scheler, this is similar to the idea of sublimation. To avoid conflation with the technical use of epoché by Husserl, Schutz states that moving from one province to another requires a “leap” or a “shock”.

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16 See also McMurty (1978) and Strenski (1998).
17 The sub/superstructure scheme can also be found played out in Scheler’s distinction between *Gruppenseele* and *Gruppengeist* (see Ch.7.iv).
18 See Ch.5.iii.
19 Translated as “strive”, “struggle”, “labour” or “toil”.
20 See Ch.2.iii.c.
21 See Ch.2.iii.e.
22 Schutz does not suggest if there is a difference between “leap” and “shock”, but we would infer there is. Specifically, “leaps” refer to those instances where the person enters a province by their own volition whereas “shocks” occur when they are forced into a province. This differs from Berger and Luckmann’s interpretation of provinces of meaning where they claim that: ‘While there are, of course, shifts in attention within everyday life, the shift to a finite province of meaning is of a much more radical kind’ (1966:39). In their conception “everyday life” is surrounded by provinces of meaning which implies these leaps are “unnatural” or disturbing. Sebald (2011) has suggested something similar in claiming that moving through provinces is never easy. We regard it as more accurate to say that everyday life is constituted by the totality of various provinces of meaning all arranged around the province of Swincan
To each province of meaning belongs a “practical attitude” and a “contemplative/theoretical attitude” (1962d:245). This distinction has potentially come from Scheler who speaks in Formalism of the “practical man” who ‘is surrounded, as it were, by thinglike units representing a realm of graduated and qualitatively differentiated efficacies independent of their being perceived. They are already differentiated and structured as points of departure of possible acting. The practical man “learns” to “handle” these units without needing to have any theoretical knowledge of the laws that govern such units’ (Scheler, 1973b:141). This is in contrast to the “theoretician” who seems concerned with this theoretical knowledge of these units. Where Schutz seems to differ is in not making this differentiation of persons. Thus, the practical attitude and the contemplative attitude constitute the two possible modes of the cognitive style a person adopts when operating within a particular province of meaning. We may usefully think of this in Heidegger’s terms, likely also drawn from Scheler, of ready-to-hand and present-at-hand (Heidegger, 2010:72-73). Each cognitive style determines the ready-to-handness (practical attitude) and the present-at-handness (contemplative attitude) of an object. The use of “ness” is meant to convey that how an object is ready-to-hand, say, is dependent upon the cognitive style in use. Take Heidegger’s hammer as an example. The ready-to-handness of the hammer differs if my intended project is to put nails in a wall or to kill someone.

In order to proceed in a phenomenological analysis of the crisis of social science we must develop an understanding of both phenomenology and social science as cognitive styles. In the case of the former this will lead to a phenomenology proper. “Proper” means here both “accurate” and “designating a particular”. More specifically, we understand the Phenomenological Movement to be a province of meaning with a particular cognitive style that we call “phenomenology”. In so doing we make the ideological claim to “proper phenomenology”. That is, returning to Spiegelberg’s discussion of various inventions of “phenomenology”, we are so far capable of dividing these inventions into simpliciter phenomenologies and pseudo-phenomenologies. But as these simpliciter phenomenologies all share in the philosophical anthropological concern they may be regarded as having the same contemplative attitude. What differentiates them, therefore, is the differences in their practical attitudes,

as the “lodestone”. Thus while the movement from province to province involves “leaps” and “shocks” these are by no means as disturbing as implied by Berger and Luckmann.

23 We will drop “theoretical” for the time being though it would be more in keeping with Husserl. The decision of whether we think of a province of meaning as having a contemplative or theoretical attitude depends, we suggest, on how we want to conceive that province. In this we take “contemplative” to be more fundamental.
i.e. how they go about approaching the question “what is wer?”. All these phenomenologies are cognitive styles and once we have grasped their practical attitudes we have their definition in the proper sense. It is for this reason we can carry forward Spiegelberg’s distinction of “unrelated phenomenologies” to designate those phenomenologies proper whose practical attitudes are not the same as that of the Phenomenological Movement. In this respect the “proper” of “proper phenomenology” can be understood in its Old French root propre meaning “one’s own”.  

The definition of the Phenomenological Movement as a phenomenology proper thus requires that phenomenology possess all the necessary constituents of a cognitive style.

ii. Constituents of a province of meaning

In order to define the phenomenology proper of the Phenomenological Movement we must be clearer on what we expect such a definition to contain. That is, we must be clear on what is entailed in both a province of meaning and its cognitive style. To achieve this we will further investigate some of Schutz’s thinking on provinces of meaning.

As was noted in the previous section, in “On Multiple Realities” Schutz develops the notion of provinces of meaning out of William James’ discussion of sub-universes of reality. Schutz focuses on the world of everyday life, i.e. Swincan, in this regard. He recognises that it is the province of meaning most fundamental for the person and as such occupies the highest level of meaning-context. Schutz discerns that there are six basic characteristics that constitute this cognitive style:

1. A specific tension of consciousness, namely wide-awakeness, originating in full attention to life;
2. A specific epoché, namely suspension of doubt;
3. A prevalent form of spontaneity, namely [swincende] (a meaningful spontaneity based upon a project and characterised by the intention of bringing about the projected state of affairs by bodily movements gearing into the outer world);
4. A specific form of experiencing one’s self (the [swincende] self as the total self);
5. A specific form of sociality (the common intersubjective world of communication and social action);
6. A specific time-perspective (the standard time originating in an intersection between durée and cosmic time as the universal temporal structure of the intersubjective world). (Schutz, 1962d:230)

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24 We have differed from Spiegelberg who used “phenomenology proper” in the sense that we have used “proper phenomenology” (Spiegelberg, 1971a:8).
Thus as he summarises on the following page: ‘To the cognitive style peculiar to each of these different provinces of meaning belongs, thus, a specific tension of consciousness and, consequently, also a specific *epoché*, a prevalent form of spontaneity, a specific form of self experience, a specific form of sociality, and a specific time perspective’ (1962d:232). What this latter quote provides us with that is not present in the list above is the primacy of the “tension of consciousness” – all the others are “consequent”.

What then is meant by a “specific tension of consciousness”? We can note that as Schutz is speaking of *swincan* as the natural attitude our interests are fundamentally practical. It is, then, this pragmatic motive of the person that sets up a tension within consciousness. In the philosophy of Bergson, whom Schutz also draws from, our conscious life has a number of planes graded from the plane of action to the plane of dreams at its two extremes. To each plane belongs a degree of tension in consciousness.

‘According to Bergson,’ Schutz informs us, ‘these different degrees of tension of our consciousness are functions of our varying interest in life’ (1962d:212). Schutz introduces the term wide-awareness to denote the plane of consciousness in which that tension is at its highest. He goes on to say that:

The state of full awareness of the [swincende] self traces out *that segment of the world which is pragmatically relevant*, and these relevances determine the form and content of our stream of thought: the form, because they regulate the tensions of our memory and therewith the scope of our past experiences recollected and our future experiences anticipated; the content, because all *these experiences undergo specific attitudinal modifications by the preconceived project* and its carrying into effect.

(emphasis added, 1962d:213-214)

We will modify Bergson’s, and Schutz’s, understanding of “tensions” here. To both, consciousness is always “tense” and the question of which plane we are on depends on how tense we are. What we suggest instead is that rather than there being one tension of varying degrees there are multiple tensions of different styles. Used in this way, “tension” indicates the attentional focus or *interest* of the person in that particular province of meaning.

**a. Purpose**

The notion of *interest* is found in Husserl but also taken up by Schutz (1970f:98-101).25 In “Choosing among Projects of Action” (1951[1962f]) and “Some Structures of the Life-world” (1970g)

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25 Husserl makes a distinction between two kinds of *interest*: ‘first, the object, which is passively pregiven to us, affects our receptivity and wakens in us the more or less intense tendency to follow the stimulus emanating from and imposed upon us by the object, and to advert to it’ and ‘the second and
Schutz explains that the prevailing interest determines what aspects of the world are picked out as relevant. This interest also determines which aspects of the stock of knowledge are relevant (1970g:123). To understand this he gives the case of “S is p” (1970g:102-104). If our interest is the p-being of S then what is not brought to mind is that S is also q, r, and other things as well as p and so really we should say “S is, among many other things such as q and r, also p”. He thus points out that if I assert “S is p” ‘I do so because for my purpose at hand at this particular moment I am interested only in the p-being of S and am disregarding as not relevant to such purpose the fact that S is also q and r’ (emphasis added, 1962f:76). Consciousness can thus be regarded as “tense” by the various ways in which it disregards certain aspects of the world in favour of others.26

That this interest also draws on the stock of knowledge entails that certain aspects of it are relevant to the current situation. From this we can determine that provinces of meaning, contained within the stock of knowledge, contain a “preconceived project”: an interest they can fulfil. Thus, the first requirement of a province of meaning is that it be relevant to fulfilling certain interests that I might have.27 This we shall call the purpose of a province of meaning following Scheler’s use of the term. A purpose according to Scheler is ‘a “content” of some sort (of possible thinking, representing, perceiving) which is given as to-be-realised, no matter by what, by whom, etc.’ (Scheler, 1973b:30-31). The purpose of the cognitive style is the interest which it can fulfil. In Schutz’s case the province of meaning that we call Swincan has the purpose of surviving and thriving. It is the purpose that is fundamental to a province of meaning because without this the province has nothing to be directed toward and could not exist as a province.28

(2) of Schutz’s list above also pertains to this point. By his use of this epoché the purpose of other provinces of meaning are bracketed so that they do not become obstructive. That is, at a given moment a person only operates with one province of meaning, if they tried to operate with more than one the purpose of each province would confound the purposes of the others. If Swincan is the fundamental province of meaning characterised by the purpose “surviving and thriving”, to say I suspend doubt is to

broader notion of interest does not originate in the simple adversion toward the object, but in making it thematic’ (Schutz, 1970f:98). In general how interest is used here relates to this thematic sense.

26 A parallel can be drawn here with Sartre’s notion of negation (see Ch.4.iv.g).

27 This choice is based on a footnote regarding interest where Schutz comments that: ‘Because what is commonly called interest is one of the basic features of human nature, the term will necessarily mean different things to different philosophers in accordance with their basic conception of human existence in the world’ (1962f:77).

28 In the converse direction the problem of phenomenology in the simpliciter sense is that it only indicates the purpose of a cognitive style and lacks the remaining constituents.
say I do not let myself be swayed by other provinces that I could think of as *swince* instead. For example, let us take two provinces of meaning “huscarl” and “gesith” which have as their purposes “being a warrior” and “being a learned advisor” respectively. Insofar as Reinakh has as his interest “becoming a warrior” he must suspend the interest “becoming a learned advisor”. The two provinces of “huscarl” and “gesith” are mutually exclusive as *finite* provinces of meaning. It is precisely because of this that all shifting from one province to another requires either a “leap” or a “shock”. So long as Reinakh’s interest is to become a warrior he must suspend those provinces whose purpose does not fulfil this.

As before, this exclusiveness applies only on the same level of meaning-context. Thus, the province of meaning “loyal subject” which contains the purpose “to aid his queen” sits at a higher level of meaning-context in that both the previous provinces may be subsumed under it. Reinakh may aid his queen by either being a huscarl or a gesith. In this respect “loyal subject” is a monothetic unity to which “huscarl” and “gesith” are polythetic constituents. Nevertheless, in speaking of the compatibility or incompatibility of provinces of meaning, we begin to move beyond the purpose of the cognitive style. In order to “bracket” out other provinces of meaning I must know what is constituted by the province I intend to utilise and that I could constitute it in another fashion. This means I know how to carry out the purpose of this province of meaning.

b. Outcome

Carrying out a purpose refers to the cognitive style of the province of meaning. That is, our concern is how the province of meaning is used in action.²⁹ We must now look at (3) and (4) of Schutz’s basic characteristics. The cognitive style may be more explicitly described as the “form of spontaneity” and the “form of experiencing”. As the cognitive style is the use of a province of meaning through “action”, we need a better understanding of this latter term and the corresponding “act”. Schutz defines these as follows:

The term “action” shall designate human conduct as an ongoing process which is devised by the actor in advance, that is, which is based upon a preconceived project. The term “act” shall designate the outcome of this ongoing process, that is, the accomplished action. (1962f:67)

²⁹ In this respect the contemplative attitude also involves acting.
The difference between the two actually provides us with two further components of a province of meaning. However, before continuing we would take a more Schelerian approach to “act” and “action” by reversing how Schutz has used them here. Take the following examples:

Hebiro acted bravely
Hebiro’s actions were brave
Hebiro’s action was brave
Hebiro acts bravely
Hebiro is acting bravely
Hebiro’s actions are brave
Hebiro’s action is brave
Hebiro will act bravely
Hebiro’s actions will be brave
Hebiro’s action will be brave

Whereas each use of “act” functions as a verb, the possessive in the uses of “action” indicates that actions are not processes but objects. This is made further apparent in the fact that whereas “action” can clearly be distinguished into plural and singular uses, the same cannot be done of “act”. Acting is a homogenous whole which requires demarcation into distinct units of action. This is more consistent with Scheler’s own argument that “acts” like “persons” cannot be objectified. Therefore, by “act” we designate the ongoing process and by “action” we designate the accomplished act.

Acting, then, is the carrying out of a purpose but this can only make sense if we can divide the homogenous acting into actions which complete the act. Returning to the example of Reinaakh we can say that the acts that fulfil the interest of “becoming a warrior” include conditioning the body through exercise, practice with a sword, and learning military tactics. However, such acts can only make sense to Reinaakh if he has some measure of the end of these acts. That is, he must have some determinable notion of when his acts have been accomplished and thereby become actions. This we will call the outcome of the cognitive style and refers to (6) of Schutz’s characteristics. There is a logical sequence in which the person goes from a purpose which is revealed in the Here and Now to the outcome which is in the future. As Schutz notes: ‘I have to have some idea of the structure to be erected before I can draft the blueprints’ (1962f:68). Let us say in Reinaakh’s case that the outcome is to “defeat another warrior in real combat”. Only once this is established can we then focus on acting, the turning of the “to do” into the “done”.31

30 See Ch.2.iii.e.
31 It is for this reason that we have used “outcome” instead of Scheler’s “goal”. While goal does capture what we mean by outcome, how Scheler relates goal to purpose differs to how we have connected outcome to purpose. The following statement illustrates this difference:

Anything that is called a purpose of the will therefore presupposes the representation of a goal! Nothing can become a purpose that was not first a goal! The purpose is grounded in the goal! Goals can be given without
The person’s thinking moving from purpose to outcome is what Schutz means by “projecting” and “projection” (1962f:84-85).

c. Methodology

The acts referred to by which Reinakh can bring about the intended outcome are in fact generalisations. For example, the first act he takes is to condition his body, but no content was given to the actual process of “conditioning”. We may fill in this content by thinking of exercises such as push-ups, sit-ups, and running. A generalisation is another name for what Schutz described as typifications. According to Schutz in “Concept and Theory Formation in Social Science” (1962h) our stock of knowledge, and by extension the provinces of meaning contained within, is filled with typifications.

Drawing on the work of Husserl, he means that the world of the everyday is experienced in the mode of typicality. Any encountered object is experienced within a frame of familiarity constituted by other previously experienced objects. He gives the example of Rover to illustrate this:

Now I may look at Rover either as this unique individual, my irreplaceable friend and comrade, or just as a typical example of “Irish setter,” “dog,” “mammal,” “animal,” “organism,” or “object of the outer world.” (1962h:59)

Rover is a specific instance of all these typifications. In respect to Reinakh we can say that “push-ups” are the unique individual and at the same time a typical example of “conditioning”. In this respect they become polythetic actions within the monothetic act. But, “push-ups” is also an act to which “200 push-

For Scheler goals are logically prior to purposes which we have denied.

32 Hereafter “Concept and Theory Formation”.

33 In an early draft of this paper Schutz refers to “types” instead of “typifications” (Schutz, 2004:132). It would seem the term “typification” is taken up to indicate that these are utilised in everyday activity rather than just theoretical thinking. This connection is strengthened in his discussion of Husserl’s notion of horizon: ‘in spite of their undetermined generality these anticipations are, according to Husserl, nevertheless typically determined by their typical prefamiliarity, as typically belonging, that is to the total horizon of the same and identifiable objectivity, the actually apperceived properties of which show the same general type’ (Schutz, 1970f:94). More exactly we may say that the experience of the typicality of a thing is predicated on the knowledge of a type. However, there is a difference between typification and type which is echoed in the work of Douglas. Speaking of the way animals are divided in Leviticus 11 she points out that classifications ‘owe their divisions much more to their capacity to model the interactions of the members of society than to a disinterested curiosity about the works of nature’ (Douglas, 1987:59). A typification therefore not only classifies the thing but also determines how that thing is interacted with.
ups” is the action. To these we will now apply the terms methodology and method\textsuperscript{34} along similar lines to Christopher Lloyd in his survey of methodologies in social history. As he puts it: ‘Methodological questions … concern the actual explanatory practices and structures of a particular science or discipline. (These should not be confused with questions about research methods; they deal with the technical problems of conducting empirical research, the counterpart of experimental laboratory techniques in chemistry)’ (Lloyd, 1991:188) Methodology, as typification, is here defined as the correct procedure for pursuing purposes or negatively phrased as limitations placed upon possible procedures. Method, as specific example, is the individual practice that operates within the limitations set out by methodology. Thus, once Reinakh has his purpose and his projected outcome he then develops a methodology, the “doing”, to achieve just that.\textsuperscript{35} What Schutz calls the “project” is therefore the combination of purpose and outcome with a methodology.

d. Identifier

However, these three requirements are not enough to fully constitute a province of meaning because we have yet to account for (5) of Schutz’ basic characteristics. How are we to understand “forms of sociality” as a constituent of a province of meaning? Within the fundamental everyday this refers to intersubjective encounters.\textsuperscript{36} Earlier in “On Multiple Realities”, Schutz states the following: ‘Social actions involve communication, and any communication is necessarily founded upon acts of working’ (1962d:218).\textsuperscript{37} Communication is predicated on overt actions, according to Schutz, actions which it is presumed that the other person will understand. In a number of places Schutz (1964e, 1964f) develops this idea as the notion of “tuning-in” which for our purposes means that in communicating to the other person I communicate on the basis that he will understand what I mean, but in order for this to be the

\textsuperscript{34} We have not taken up Scheler’s term of “means” due to a slight in clarity in his usage. As he defines it: ‘whatever is related to the realisation – or, better, the reality – of the content of the purpose in terms of the logical relationship of a condition or a reason is, in the formal sense, a “means” for the “purpose”’ (1973b:31). For Scheler “means” applies to both “realisation” and “reality”, but these two refer to what we have termed methodology and outcome respectively. Further reason for this is because Scheler claims that ‘there is no temporal difference between means and purposes’ which conflicts with our agreement with Schutz on (6) (1973b:31).

\textsuperscript{35} There is not the space to engage in an extended discussion of methods; viewed here as logically entailed by methodology they constitute a subsidiary concern.

\textsuperscript{36} See Ch.7.

\textsuperscript{37} This earlier use of “action” and “act” is consistent with our amended use.
case I must assume that she is inhabiting the same province of meaning as I am. 38 “Common-sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action” describes this as the general thesis of reciprocal perspectives (Schutz, 1962g:11-13).

In the case of Reinakh, practice with the sword requires another person to engage with; Reinakh cannot simulate a real fight with just himself. However, in order for Reinakh to engage in a successful simulation it is necessary for him that his partner, Kerwalh, is also engaging in the simulation in the same way. As Schutz puts it: ‘He and I, we share, while the process lasts, a common vivid present, our vivid present, which enables him and me to say: “We experienced this occurrence together”’ (1962d:219-220).

Both Reinak and Kerwalh need to be engaging in the same province of meaning and further recognise that they are both engaging in that province as opposed to another. We identify ourselves as part of a particular group engaged in a shared purpose. This is a positive identifier which is categorised by such words as “we are” and “our”. The identifier can also be negatively conceived if we contrast the mutual exclusiveness of provinces of meaning on the same level of meaning-context. Insofar as Reinak does not pursue those actions pertinent to being a “gesith” he is declaring himself to not be one of “them”. Thus Reinak identifies himself as “huscarl” by what he does not do. Such an identifier is then categorised by “us-them” and “we are not” phrases.

In summary, a province of meaning has the following requirements: a purpose, the interests which it can fulfil; an outcome, how it knows the purpose has been achieved; a methodology, the manner in which it achieves the outcome; and an identifier, that which distinguishes it from other provinces of meaning. This is, however, only a preliminary sketch of these requirements and to each belong consequences that have only been hinted at here. Many of these consequences have been discussed in

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38 Another way of putting this would be to say that two persons share the same cognitive style. Phrased this way we can draw strong similarities with the work of Fleck (1935), Goodman (1978) and Douglas (1987). This does, however, entail a slight disagreement with Schutz. According to Schutz communication can only occur within the province of Swincan. By contrast we argue that communication can occur in any province so long as that province is accessible within each communicator’s stock of knowledge. While this also points to a strong affinity with discourse analysis we have not pursued this connection as such primarily because we hold that phenomenology offers a deeper level of analysis. Specifically, discourse analysis tends to focus on language in intersubjectivity whereas phenomenology, Zahavi has pointed out, has ‘often endeavoured to unearth the pre- or extra-linguistic forms of intersubjectivity’ (2004:197). Indeed, based on Glendinning’s argument (1998) an emphasis on language can be seen as anthropologism.

39 Hereafter “Common-sense and Scientific Interpretation”.

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For the considerations of this thesis we require only this basic understanding in order to define the provinces of meaning of Social Science and the Phenomenological Movement with its cognitive style that we have referred to as phenomenology proper.

iii. Proper phenomenology

In seeking a definition of phenomenology proper as the cognitive style of the Phenomenological Movement we must make use of people associated with the Phenomenological Movement. However, this entails a degree of circularity, for having used Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger and Sartre already it would seem they belong to the Phenomenological Movement before it is even defined. It would appear that we have already decided who are phenomenologists before we have even decided what phenomenology is. Nor will we attempt to deny this. These figures all belong to the Phenomenological Movement. It is not our intention to put into question whether these conventional phenomenologists are indeed phenomenologists – though by consequence it might – but to investigate the procedures and rationales by which they are given the title “Phenomenological Movement”: we are making explicit the cognitive style that these philosophers share in common by formalising the purpose, outcome, methodology and identifier of that province of meaning. In doing this we are doing no more than carrying out Husserl’s claim in Ideas III that ‘It lies in the nature of phenomenology and of the unique functions which devolve upon it for the whole of our knowledge, that it be continually applied to itself reflectively, that out of phenomenological sources it must bring to fullest clarity the method itself which it practices’ (Husserl, 1980:80).

We may compare this task to that of Merton in “The Normative Structure of Science” (1973b) in which he laid out the various norms that underpin science. As Kalleberg notes, Merton’s study was less a prescriptive claim but rather a reconstruction: ‘an identification and explication of presuppositions and norms taken for granted in well-functioning scholarly communities’ (Kalleberg, 2007:150). Merton

40 E.g. his discussions of the difference between consociates and contemporaries are highly relevant to further our understanding of identifier. His discussions on in-order-to and because motives is relevant for explaining actions and acts in terms of purpose and outcome respectively.

41 This essay was originally published under the title “Science and Technology in a Democratic order” in the Journal of Political Sociology (1942), then under the title “Science and the Democratic Social Structure” in Social Theory and Social Structure. It was printed under the above title in The Sociology of Science.
was acting as an “outsider” looking at the norms that shape the “world” of scientists. In a similar fashion to Merton we are here adopting an “outsider” position to reconstruct the *strictures of phenomenology*. That is, defining the Phenomenological Movement involves identifying the strictures phenomenologists work with when they do phenomenology. In order to do this we will draw on a number of other “outsider” reconstructions to understand phenomenology in terms of its purpose, outcome, methodology, and identifier.

It should be emphasised that the definitions that we shall draw on in this regard can be said to be trying to discern the essence of phenomenology. This follows both Schutz and Sartre in the sense that we are clarifying the otherwise implicit unity across different concepts of phenomenology. We have drawn on the following sources primarily:

a. The definition provided by Spiegelberg in *PM* (1971a, 1971b, 1982). Spiegelberg’s definition is unique in the fact, that unlike many other definitions having decided whose “phenomenology” does count within the Movement, he dedicates space to the description of a number of “phenomenologies” that do not qualify for admittance. It is in Spiegelberg’s sense that we have spoken of the Phenomenological Movement.

b. The definition Embree relies upon to organise *EP* and then supplemented by further essays (2001, 2003). Whereas Spiegelberg’s definition covered some of the most significant members of the Movement’s history, Embree’s covers the contemporary context of work containing a global range of contributors from numerous disciplines.

c. Glendinning’s five theses presented in “What is Phenomenology?” (2004) and *In the Name of Phenomenology* (2007). Glendinning offers the broadest definition in that he sees phenomenology extending beyond the names associated with the Phenomenological Movement.

d. Moran’s definitions in *Introduction to Phenomenology* (2000) (*IP*) and *The Phenomenology Reader* (2002) (*PR*). Moran differs from the above in that he does not present his definition by “bullet point” and as such explicates in detail some of the conceptions indicated by the others.

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42 Not to be confused with the 2008 article of the same name.

43 Interestingly included among these other “phenomenologists” is J.L. Austin who was Smart’s supervisor. Thus if we do grant that Austin is a phenomenologist we have another potential connection with the phenomenology-of-religion. Kelly also suggests that Smart’s *The Science of Religion and the Sociology of Knowledge* is influenced by Scheler’s work (Kelly, 1977:20). However, Spiegelberg warns against the association as Austin’s proposed “linguistic phenomenology” of 1957 was not taken up by his listeners and it seems Austin was unaware of the parallel this label had with the Phenomenological Movement (Spiegelberg, 1982:691-692).
a. Identifying proper phenomenology

By this choice, however, we are nevertheless faced with the problem that we must have some pre-understanding of what holds these names together into a single group. Clearly some sort of identifier is being presupposed to hold these names together. However, if we have learned anything from phenomenology-of-religion it is that use of the word “phenomenology” is not enough. Rather than one scholar say what “phenomenology” is, such an identifier could helpfully be established through a collaborative statement. Indeed, such a statement would potentially provide us with the purpose, methodology and outcome in the process of identification.

Based on our discussion of the agendas of phenomenology in the previous chapter it may be reasonable to look for some form of joint statement between Husserl and Heidegger. The rationale would be that as the four major branches of phenomenology (possibly five) can in one way or another be traced back to these two figures, a joint statement from the pair on what phenomenology is would help us in our task. Such a statement almost existed as an article on “phenomenology” for the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1927[1981c]). Unfortunately the collaboration was aborted. Already distant, Husserl seems to have used the article as a chance to re-ingratiate Heidegger into his phenomenology. As Spiegelberg describes the attempt:

He seems to have considered this occasion important enough to invite Heidegger to collaborate with him on a joint statement, based of course on his own draft: this would also give him a chance to make Heidegger a more active participant in the latest phase of his transcendental phenomenology. (Spiegelberg, 1971a:279)

But the attempt was to be a bitter disappointment for both scholars (Spiegelberg, 1981:18). None of Heidegger’s contributions were included in the final product and were only published separately much later. Based on what Heidegger would have included, Husserl went on to comment to Roman Ingarden a year later that ‘Heidegger has not grasped the whole meaning of the phenomenological reduction’ (quoted in Spiegelberg, 1971a:281). Instead of uniting the two phenomenologists the article further served to divide them.

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45 The trouble with the article did not end there; the original translation into English was a botch job and contributed to stifling interest in phenomenology in Britain (see Spiegelberg, 1981).
A better source is the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* which was instigated by Husserl in 1913. On the editorial board along with Husserl were Moritz Geiger, Alexander Pfänder, Reinach and Scheler, and later joined by Heidegger and Oskar Becker. Here we find the closest to a joint statement on phenomenology produced by the publisher at the head of the *Jahrbuch*:

> It is not a system the editors share. What unites them is the common conviction that it is only by a return to the primary sources of direct intuition to insights into essential structures derived from them (*die originären Quellen der Anschauung und die aus ihr zu schöpfenden Wesenseinsichten*) that we shall be able to put to use the great traditions of philosophy with their concept and problems; only thus shall we be in a position to clarify such concepts intuitively, to restate the problems on an intuitive basis, and thus, to solve them, at least in principle. (quoted in Spiegelberg, 1971a:5)

Though it begins with a problematic claim, Spiegelberg nevertheless uses this statement as the basis for his own definition of the Phenomenological Movement. We are, however, a little too wary of that opening sentence to proceed solely from this statement and by consequence Spiegelberg’s definition alone. The lack of qualification on what is not shared makes it difficult to assess who placed importance upon which areas of the above statement. Further reason to be wary is that Spiegelberg, through personal correspondence with Pfänder, thinks the statement was drafted by Husserl alone (1971a:5). In which case the obvious question is to what extent the other editors actually had any input.

Instead we will focus on the identifier Spiegelberg draws from this statement in his own definition:

> Conscious adherence, however qualified, to the Movement as such in full awareness of these methodical principles. Short of such an expression, a thinker may well be considered as “really” belonging to the Movement, but it would be unfair to read him into it as an actual member. (1971a:6)

What is almost unique about Spiegelberg’s definition is this criterion that in order to be a member of the Phenomenological Movement the scholar in question must recognise themselves as a phenomenologist. The only other definition that we have encountered that contains identifiers is in Embree who provides two: first in *EP*: ‘Phenomenologists tend to debate whether or not what Husserl called the transcendental phenomenological *epoche* and *reduction* is useful or even possible’ (1997:2); and second in the follow-up article: ‘phenomenology tends to oppose naturalism’ (Embree, 2001:7). The second identifier is negative and we have already noted Embree’s own comments on the difficulty of suggesting that phenomenology is anything that opposes naturalism. As for the first identifier there is an ambiguity in this point. The

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46 See Ch. 1.ii.
identifier is predicated upon Husserl but we must question the allowance of both positive and negative responses. Specifically, none of Embree’s other characteristics of phenomenology state that the scholar in question must call themselves a “phenomenologist”. As such there is nothing to stop us counting as phenomenological – if not phenomenologists – a number of scholars within Religious Studies, many of whom would balk at the association, simply because they responded negatively to Husserl.

Nevertheless Embree’s point about Husserl can help us formulate the qualification of Spiegelberg’s criteria of conscious adherence which is lacking by his own admission. To do this we wish to draw on Kerry and Armour’s review of phenomenology in Sport Sciences where they complain that ‘phenomenology, as a descriptor of research, is sometimes misused or simply used as another way to describe qualitative research’ (Kerry and Armour, 2000:10). For example, they criticise Whitson who argued for the benefit of phenomenology to sport sciences but fails, in their opinion, to engage with the roots of phenomenology as philosophically developed by Husserl, Heidegger, and more. As they see it, such lack of clarity over how a researcher is using “phenomenology” creates confusion and by extension marks it as improper phenomenology. Further, they note that Husserl and other proponents fail to be mentioned directly and the second-hand sources referenced may themselves not be proponents, resulting in “tiered” information. While the top tiers may be proper phenomenology, lower tiers cease to be so. According to Kerry and Armour, at best most researchers rely on “second generation” phenomenologists such as Giorgi, Schutz, and van Manen, who they deem more like ‘philosophically minded social scientists’ rather than proper phenomenologists (2000:11). But perhaps worst of this lower tier research is that it fails to take into account the philosophical underpinnings it relies upon.

We propose to qualify Spiegelberg’s criterion of conscious adherence with the following comments from Kerry and Armour who conclude that we need to make ‘explicit the philosophical background from which methodological approaches are drawn’ and that the ‘inclusion of such background detail in published phenomenological research’ is a necessity (2000:14). From this we can formalise the stricture of conscious adherence: explicit recognition of phenomenological approaches used with reference to other established phenomenologists as stemming from Husserl. Note, this does not contradict Embree’s positive identifier as such. It is not being suggested that phenomenologists follow tout court that which has gone before; they do put into question past methods/findings because in the

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48 We do not agree with Kerry and Armour for their inclusion of Schutz on this point (see Ch.3.i).
very doing so they are establishing themselves within that tradition so long as they also maintain the self-referential title of “phenomenologist”.  

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b. The purpose of proper phenomenology

As has been hinted in the above discussion, the purpose of any phenomenology proper has been covered in our definition of phenomenology simpliciter. Stated more formally we can say that the purpose of phenomenology is the stricture of philosophical anthropology: to study what wereas are through their encounters.

“Encounter” is taken from Embree’s fifth characteristic of phenomenology: ‘Phenomenologists tend to practice reflective observation on what can be called encourterings as encourterings of objects and also on objects as they are encountered, although few use this terminology’ (Embree, 2001:7). An “encountered object” parallels what Scheler calls “milieu-things” which are things (Sachen) effectively experienced: ‘something whose variation in any form corresponds to a variation of some form in my experience’ (Scheler, 1973b:139). Phenomenology as such does not concern itself with the “real” properties of objects: ‘The sun of the milieu of [wer] is not the sun of astronomy. Neither stolen meat nor brought meat is a sum of cells and tissues and their chemicophysical processes. The sun of the milieu is different at the North Pole, in moderate zones, and at the equator, and its beams are felt as different beams’ (1973b:139). Milieu-things, as encountered, are meaningful in that they demand a response of some sort by the experiencing wer. In Husserl’s own writings this has taken the form of intentionality, what Moran referred to as the “aboutness” of consciousness in his own definition of phenomenology (Moran, 2000:16). As Husserl describes this in Ideas III:

In the phenomenology of the consciousness of physical things the question is not how physical things in general are, or what in truth belongs to them as such; but rather how the consciousness of physical things is qualified, what sorts of consciousness of physical thing are to be distinguished, in what manner and with what correlates a physical thing as such presents and manifests itself in the manner peculiar to consciousness.  

(Husserl, 1980:72)

49 This therefore allows for Ricoeur’s comment on “heresies” (see Ch.2.b) and leaves room for a proclaimed phenomenologist to overhaul – allowing certain qualifications – the entirety of phenomenology.

50 Strictly speaking an object is a phenomenon, but a phenomenon treated in a specific manner (see Ch.6.iii).
We have refrained from using “intentionality” here because if we take up Schutz’s notion of “leaps” and “shocks”, consciousness as conscious-of a thing can involve either “leaping” at that thing or being “shocked” by that thing. Speaking in terms of “intentionality”, which implicitly gives directional force away from consciousness, can lead to odd grammatical constructs when we speak in terms of “shocks” when it is supposed to go the other way. Speaking in terms of “encounters” avoids this because we can say the encounter is either forced (“leap”) or enforced (“shock”).

As was suggested in the previous chapter, this philosophical anthropological task has as its setting the life-world:

The life-world, as Husserl characterises it, is the world of the pre-given, familiar, present, available, surrounding world, including both “nature” and “culture” (however they may be defined), that envelops us and is always there as taken for granted. The life-world also provides a set of horizons for all human activity. The life-world is, in Husserl’s terms, the “fundament” for all human meaning and purposive activity. (Moran, 2012:7)

Expressed in Spiegelberg’s terms, the purpose of phenomenology is described as the “phenomenological task”: ‘the descriptive investigation of the phenomena, both objective and subjective, in their fullest breadth and depth’ (1971a:2). Bearing in mind Husserl’s comments in Ideas III, to be “descriptive” in this sense entails that we focus on the perceived as perceived; a notion now in need of further clarification.

c. The outcome of proper phenomenology

As hinted at in the Introduction, essences are the outcome of phenomenology. Following Schutz we have provisionally defined “essence” as a thing ‘brought by the process of clarification to perfect self-givenness, to perfect lucidity and vividness’ (Schutz, 1970a:50). Husserl personally saw the goal of phenomenology as ‘the realm of pure consciousness and its phenomena’ (Husserl, 1981b:17). By this is meant the contents of consciousness. However, Husserl goes far beyond these individual contents to seek the ‘the ideal laws in the realm of pure consciousness’ (1981b:17), the very structures and essences required by consciousness in order to produce knowledge. Yet this use of “essence” requires further

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51 Framed in such terms it may also be possible to draw a parallel between leap/shock and the draw/repel of Scheler’s resistance (see Ch.2.iii.e).
52 This is not one of the criteria Spiegelberg uses for admission into the Phenomenological Movement but is brought up in the preceding discussion.
53 See Ch.2.ii.a.
clarification. “Essence” not only poses a problem in the English philosophical writing, but the German “Wesen” from which it is translated also presented a problem for Husserl (in Husserl, 1980:xii).

According to Moran: ‘Husserl never developed a full critical understanding of the notion of essence’ (Moran, 2000:134). Indeed, it is because of his discussion of essences that Husserl was sometimes seen as a Platonist – a connection he denied.

As can be seen in Ideas III, “essence” is used to mean a typical way of being experienced or of experiencing (in Husserl, 1980:xi; Schutz, 1970f). That is, it is a unity of meaning intended by different individuals performing the same act or by the same individual in different acts. An understanding carried forward by Sartre. In Ideas I Husserl introduced the terms noesis for the act of thinking and noema for what is thought to explain this. The noema is not the object which is intended but the object as it is intended, a point going all the way back to LI (1970b:113). The noema of the conscious act is the ‘perceived as perceived’ (Husserl, 1982:214). The phenomenological reduction drives a wedge into consciousness so that it separates out this noema from the noesis. However, we should not think that the noema is the essence (1980:73); rather the essence of a phenomenon is intuited across noemata as that which holds them together as a unity. Spiegelberg explains this process by suggesting that we intuit the essence when we see the noema as an example (Spiegelberg, 1982:697). In this regard Spiegelberg mentions redness as an example as an allusion to Husserl’s own discussion in IP:

I have a particular intuition of red, or several particular intuitions of red; I intend to pure immanence alone; I perform the phenomenological reduction. I separate off anything that red might signify that might lead one to apperceive it as transcendent, as, say, the red of a piece of blotting paper on my desk, and the like. And now I actualise in pure seeing the sense of the thought red, red in specie, the identical universal that is seen in this or that; now the particularity as such is no longer meant, but rather red in general. (Husserl, 1999:42)

There is a problem with this translation by Hardy in which “seeing” and “seen” are not placed in quotation marks, unlike in an earlier translation by Alston and Nakhnikian (see Moran, 2000:134). We should not think the person sees the colour red in the phenomenological reduction in the way they could picture a particular table. Only instances can be seen in the reduction. Rather, what is “seen” is the idea of “red” or “table”: what holds disparate phenomena under a single title and how future phenomena may also be brought under this title. We will refer to this as type.

An association can be made between essence as type and family resemblance style analyses. Spiegelberg himself refers to Wittgenstein but in reference to “phenomenological analysis” of investigating particular phenomena (Spiegelberg, 1982:691). Nonetheless, his discussion of investigating...
Type, however, is not the only way in which Husserl seems to use “essence”. After the phenomenological reduction which reveals *types*, Husserl speaks in various places of the *eidetic reduction* in which we perform the “imaginative free variation”, the possibility of which is predicated on the distinction between polythetical and monothetical acts. Consciousness, according to Husserl, is synthetical in the sense that when we look at the tree we see individual constituents. A “tree” is really made of many leaves and its bark among other things, each piece of which is regarded by consciousness as a single object. Thus, Husserl says: ‘No matter how many particular posittings and syntheses may be fitted into it, each synthetically unitary consciousness possesses the total object belonging to it as a synthetically unitary consciousness’ (Husserl, 1982:285). The total object is a monothetic act which regards the tree constituted by the synthesis of polythetic acts which regard the various components.

Relating to the above, the *noesis* involves these polythetic acts and it is in the *noema* that the monothetic act is produced. In imaginative free variation we focus on these polythetic acts, or constituents, and swap them in and out, thereby creating new monothetic acts turning a *noema* into *noemata*. By doing this Spiegelberg suggests we discover ‘essential relationships or connections (*Wesenszusammenhänge*) pertaining to such essences’ (Spiegelberg, 1982:699). The connections that he speaks of are those that are contained in the uses of such expressions as “it is the essence of…”, “is part of the essence of…” or “essentially…”.

These essential relationships are of two kinds: relationships within a single essence and relations across essences. In the first case we rely upon imaginative free variation (Husserl’s eidetic reduction) to vary the components of a phenomenon with one of three possible outcomes:

Either the essence in the sense described, i.e., the fundamental structure designed by the general name, will remain unaffected by such an omission or substitution, which proves the omitted or replaced component to be unessential; or such an omission or substitution, while conceivable, will change the character or gestalt of the entity fundamentally; or it will not only affect the total configuration but “explode” the whole essence, since its components are completely incompatible among themselves. (1982:700)

Based on these three outcomes we will discern that the component of the phenomenon is one of essential possibility, relative essential necessity, or absolute essential necessity respectively in order to belong to that essence. In case of relations across essences another form of imaginative free variation is performed.

*general essences* involves the suggestion that another route to identifying general essences other than the phenomenological reduction would be ‘in lining up particular phenomena in a continuous series based on the order of their similarities’ (1982:698).
By keeping one essence constant we associate it with various other essences through omissions and substitutions. Again we will produce three similar sorts of result, either the relation between two (or more) essences is of essential necessity, essential possibility or essential impossibility (1982:701). For example, “extension” is of essential necessity to “colour”. The discernment of these essential relations provides us with an a priori insight: ‘A priori insight in this sense is therefore a type of experience, but an experience which gives us structural understanding of the linkage between the phenomena to such a degree that we can read off one phenomenon from the other without waiting for an indefinite number of repetitions’ (1982:702). That is, from the experience of a single phenomenon it is possible to gain a priori insight regarding all phenomena of the same type without ever encountering such phenomena. A priori in this sense means what Husserl referred to as invariant: ‘that without which an object of a particular kind cannot be thought’ (Husserl, 1980:341). Husserl would then go on to replace this use of “a priori” with “eidos” (Moran, 2004a:98). Understood as eidos the essence is the sine qua non of a thing.

The outcome, we may say, is the clarified essence which incorporates both type and eidos. Specifically, type refers to the unity of meaning held across various instances and eidos refers to what is necessary for those instances to belong to that type. Insofar as the discernment of essences in this sense is the outcome of phenomenology, Embree’s own definition includes this point among its characteristics: ‘Phenomenologists tend to recognise the role of description in universal, a priori, or “eidetic” terms as prior to explanation by means of causes, purposes, or grounds’ (Embree, 1997:2). This a priori insight can also be seen in Glendinning’s fifth thesis, back to the things themselves: ‘[phenomenological investigations] are works of words whose capacity to work as philosophy is inseparable from their capacity to involve their reader’s capacity to acknowledge the matter of thinking “itself” for themselves’ (Glendinning, 2004:40). What is meant by this is that a phenomenological investigation has reached clarity if the person reading it is so convinced by the investigation it is as if they had done it themselves.

This understanding of essential relationships has a strong connection to Husserl’s notion of “evidence”. In another of Embree’s characteristics we also find this notion: ‘Phenomenologists tend to justify cognition (and some also evaluation and action) with reference to evidence, which is awareness of a matter itself as disclosed in the most clear, distinct, and adequate way possible for something of its kind’ (Embree, 1997:1). In this understanding the essence is that which is brought to full clarity such that

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55 However, it is important to note that the converse does not necessarily hold true.
56 See Ch.2.ii.a.
it is evident ‘when it displays or “gives” itself with all the requirements necessary for knowledge’ (Moran, 2000:95). I.e. giefannis. Focusing on what is giefan should also prevent us from determining this stricture purely in terms of eidos. To have full clarity regards a particular phenomenon, for example, requires more than just knowledge of its eidos. Indeed, knowledge of the phenomenon’s eidos must also necessarily entail that we have fully clarified knowledge of everything that belongs to that phenomenon which does not belong to its eidos. As such we can formulate the outcome of phenomenology as the stricture of insight into essences: the clarification of phenomena according to their type and eidos.

d. The methodology of proper phenomenology

In formalising the outcome of phenomenology we are now set with the question of how this is achieved. We have just now mentioned the imaginative free variation as employed by Spiegelberg and also made reference to Husserl’s reductions. However, we must bear in mind that Embree’s identifier characteristic points out that the value and use of the reductions is something that is in dispute. Heidegger, also, famously rejected Husserl’s notion of the reduction despite the importance placed upon it by the latter. Schutz in PSW vocally disavowed any attempt to perform the transcendental reduction and yet Husserl gave high praise to the work. There is a seeming incongruity here as to the role of the reductions within phenomenology. Does this then mean that it is not a part of the methodology of phenomenology? We may note in the case of other definitions that the reductions or the epoché, though mentioned with regard to certain criteria, do not constitute criteria themselves, with the exception above of Embree. For example, in the case of Moran the reductions are mentioned in reference to suspension of the natural attitude. According to Moran:

Husserl came to believe that the scrutiny of the structure and contents of our conscious experiences was inhibited and deeply distorted by the manner of our engagement with experience in ordinary life, where our practical concerns, folk assumptions, and smattering of scientific knowledge all got in the way of a pure consideration of experience as it is given to us. (Moran, 2000:11)

In this regard the reductions are “steps” that allow us to isolate the essential constituents of phenomena without being swayed in our analysis by our own scientific, philosophical, cultural, and everyday assumptions. Understood like this, we can say they are not Husserl’s methodology, but his methods. A point also recognised by Russell: ‘All three reductions – transcendental, eidetic, and philosophical – contribute to Husserl’s phenomenological method’ (Russell, 2006:57-58). This allows us to see that
Heidegger’s (and others) rejection of the reductions does not entail a rejection of phenomenology per se. To achieve a rejection of phenomenology we would have to reject the methodological principle that underpins the reductions as methods.

Our task therefore is to identify the methodological principles that underpin the reductions. In point of fact, we have already suggested the methodological principle behind the reductions, as methods, to be Husserl’s principle of principles. The principle of principles is encapsulated in the maxim “back to the things themselves” and represents Husserl’s concern that only those propositions which are drawn from the relevant evidence (what is giefan) may be regarded as scientific. As Spiegelberg describes this:

> What the phrase does mean is the refusal to make philosophical theories and the critique of such theories the primary and at times, the all-absorbing concern of philosophy, as does much linguistic analysis and criticism… what philosophy must begin with are the phenomena and the problems themselves; all study of theories, however significant, must take second place. (Spiegelberg, 1982:109)

This point is further emphasised in his definition of Sachen (things): ‘the phenomena themselves, as opposed to concepts or other derivatives from immediate experience’ (1982:753). This is a part of Husserl’s rigorous science in which phenomenology eschews any grand theories but instead like a form of archaeology digs ever deeper. Significantly, even though Heidegger rejected the reductions he also subscribed to the principle of principles. In *History of the Concept of Time* Heidegger declared the following:

> The phenomenological maxim “to the matters themselves” is addressed against construction and free-floating questioning in traditional concepts which have become more and more groundless. That this maxim is self-evident, that it nevertheless has become necessary to make it into an explicit battle cry against free-floating thought, characterises the very situation of philosophy. (Heidegger, 1985:76)

The principle is also found in Glendinning’s fifth thesis of phenomenology (2004:37-41) and Moran’s definition of the principle of presuppositionlessness (2000:9). The idea of “giefannis” in terms of the “perceived as perceived” is also important for relating back to phenomenology’s concern with philosophical anthropology in that ‘all experience is experience to someone, according to a particular manner of experiencing’ (Moran, 2000:11). Even though Embree does not explicitly reference the principle of principles it can be seen operating in his definition under the notion of encountering. Though he recognises that few phenomenologists use the word “encounter”,

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57 See Ch.2.ii.a.
58 This seems to be an alternate translation of the principle of freedom from presuppositions in *LI*. 
contained within it is the idea common to phenomenologists of the distinction between the ‘loving and
the beloved as loved, remembering and the remembered as remembered, willing and the willed as willed,
and so on’ (Embree, 2001:7). Thus, “encounters” are another way of speaking of “giefanis”. Drawing on
our discussion of Schutz, how things are then “encountered” depends upon the person’s stock of
knowledge and the various provinces of meaning contained within.59

Significantly, the focus on intuition also helps us understand Spiegelberg’s own definition of
phenomenology. In particular, in the first part of his first criterion for entry into the Phenomenological
Movement he speaks of: ‘direct intuition (in a sense still to be clarified) as the source and final test of all
knowledge, to be formulated as faithfully as possible in verbal descriptions’ (Spiegelberg, 1982:5). This
can be broken down into the two components of “direct intuition” and “faithful descriptions”. The former
may be clarified as referring to Husserl’s use of “originary presentive intuition” in his definition of the
principle in Ideas I (Husserl, 1982:44). It is therefore an expression of the principle of principles - so
what then of “faithful descriptions”? To this we return to Moran’s mention of the *principle of
presuppositionlessness* above which Russell suggests is the methodological principle upon which the
method of *epoché* is founded. As Husserl declares: ‘Phenomenology is never content, on principle, with
vague talk or obscure generalities, but systematically demands a definite clarification, analysis and
description shedding light on the essential connexions and penetrating to the remotest specifications
attainable: it demands thoroughgoing work’ (Husserl, 2012:316). As Spiegelberg describes this, it entails
freedom from ‘phenomenologically unclarified, unverified, and unverifiable presuppositions’ as a part of
Husserl’s *philosophical radicalism* (Spiegelberg, 1982:77). This point is usefully described in
Glendinning’s third thesis: ‘what phenomenologists will criticise most continuously in philosophy as they
find it are what they regard as inherited theoretical “prejudices”, descriptive “distortions” and
“inadequacies”, everything that prevents us from “seeing” what (by the phenomenologist’s lights) is there
to be “seen”’ (Glendinning, 2004:35). In short, the principle of presuppositionlessness entails that we do
not let ourselves deviate from what the phenomenon has *giefan* in our analysis of that phenomenon.
Embree encapsulates this point as the first of his characteristics of phenomenology: ‘Phenomenologists
tend to oppose accepting unobservable matters – e.g., the so-called outer world beyond the reach of
sensuous awareness and also the unconscious in some psychological conceptions, and it is thus

59 E.g. see Tuckett and Robertson’s (2014) discussion of how certain religious groups have reacted to the
content of video games.
convergent with empiricism but not positivism because conscious life (but not ideal objects) is considered observable in at least classical empiricism’ (Embree, 2001:7).

From this we may say that the methodology of phenomenology involves two strictures: the principle of principles: the only source of evidence for phenomenology is that which is giefan by the things themselves; and the principle of presuppositionlessness: no description of the phenomena can deviate from what is giefan.

Taken altogether we may say that the phenomenology proper of the Phenomenological Movement contains the following strictures: the purpose of philosophical anthropology; the outcome of insight into essences; the methodology of principle of principles and principle of presuppositionlessness; and the identifier of conscious adherence. All of these may be summarised in the following statement:

Proper phenomenology (conscious adherence) is the faithful (principle of presuppositionlessness) study of things themselves (principle of principles) to clarify their essences (insight into essences) as they are giefan to wer (philosophical anthropology).

As such the Phenomenological Movement constitutes a province of meaning with its own cognitive style. Now that we have defined phenomenology proper we must turn to our main task of analysing the crisis of social science. In order to do this we must return to the work of Schutz.
4. The Essence of social science

Having now established what proper phenomenology is, we now need to establish what we mean by “social science”. In particular, following the stricture of insight into essences, this entails that we need to identify those requirements (*eidos*) that are necessary for a particular cognitive style to be properly considered social scientific (type). We are now looking for the constituents of what Gordon called the “scientific way of thinking” (1991:x). Those who utilise this cognitive style may be regarded as “social scientific *wer*”. In order to do this we will discuss Schutz’s various postulates of social science found across several essays in *Collected Papers I-III*. Based on our understanding of proper phenomenology and Schutz as a member of the Phenomenological Movement, his analysis constitutes an attempt to describe the essence of social science. That is, the postulates discussed constitute that which is essential for the social scientist to do social science. In this regard we are concerned with the eidetic structures of social science. However, in keeping with our methodological strictures, particularly the principle of presuppositionlessness, our explication of Schutz’s analysis will require that we both clarify and amend certain aspects.

i. Social Science as an ideal type

Just as the Phenomenological Movement constitutes a province of meaning it must be recognised that so too does Social Science. This is made apparent by Schutz in his discussion of “leaps” and “shocks”:

> Religious experiences in all their varieties – for instance, Kierkegaard’s experiences of the “instant” as the leap into the religious sphere – are examples of such a shock, as well as the decision of the scientist to replace all passionate participation in the affairs of “this world” by a disinterested contemplative attitude. (Schutz, 1962d:231)

Two consequences can be drawn from this:

> Firstly, for the purposes of this thesis the term “religion” designates a particular sort of province of meaning. Thus, it is important to emphasise that when Schutz speaks of “religious experience” above

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1 An early version of this argument appears as “Alfred Schutz: Clarifications and Ammendments” (sic) (Tuckett, 2014).
2 The intended final chapter of *The Structures of the Life-World* seems to have been intended to draw these essays together in a single whole but no work was ever done toward its completion before Schutz’s death and Luckmann’s completed text abandoned the chapter altogether (in Schutz and Luckmann, 1973:xxi-xxiii).
he does not mean something akin to a special or sui generis experience as one might find discussed by the phenomenology-of-religion.³ For example, in “Interpretation and Mystical Experience” (1965[2009]) Ninian Smart’s understanding of religious experience is almost exclusively tied to prophetic or “mystical” experiences, i.e. an “event” of some significance. Rather, what Schutz means by “religious experience” is closer to Taves in that the focus is on ‘the processes whereby people sometimes ascribe the special characteristics to things that we (as scholars) associate with terms such as “religious,” “magical,” “mystical,” “spiritual,” et cetera’ (Taves, 2009:8). While this involvement of scholarly ideas might be beyond Schutz’s own understanding, it is nevertheless the case that both agree that to speak of “religious experience” means only to ‘focus on things deemed religious’ (2009:9).⁴ In this there is a strong affinity with Byrne’s cultural-symbolic approach to the study of religion. Taking issue with both naturalism and phenomenology-of-religion he argues that ‘the first task of any human science (be it history, sociology, anthropology, or whatever) is to describe, interpret, and explain human action by bringing out its relationship to the concepts that inform it’ (Byrne, 1999:253).⁵ As he then goes on to say, the study of religion is possible only to the extent to which there are distinctive religious concepts that make possible forms of religious action. This study does not aim to discover ‘esoteric mental contents but rather the tracing of connections between concepts embodied in symbolic structures’ (1999:253). What can be said of Byrne’s approach here is that these concepts can be seen to operate in configurations that we have called provinces of meaning.⁶ For present purposes we will not attempt to define “religion” as a province but use “religion” as shorthand for “insert religion here” – i.e. Christianity, Hinduism, etc. – unless otherwise stated.

However, this very use of “religion” lends itself to a problematisation of the phrase “religious experience”. In the Schutzian framework a religious experience is an experience interpreted religiously.

³ The above use of Kierkegaard has been pointed out by Wagner to be largely metaphorical (Wagner, 1984:113). Schutz borrowed the notion of “leap” in order to get a sense of how we move from province to province and did not mean by it some transcendental experience.
⁴ Though the two share this common concern they are diametric opposites methodologically in that Taves intends to pursue this goal through naturalism and Schutz through phenomenology.
⁵ On the basis of our comments regarding philosophical anthropology we would replace “human” with “social”.
⁶ We do not intend to suggest that Byrne’s cultural-symbolic approach is fully consistent with phenomenology however. In at least one regard we suspect his use of “symbol” is much broader than Schutz’s understanding (see Schutz, 1962i). Further, Byrne also makes use of “methodological agnosticism” which seems to have been drawn out of the work of Smart (1973) who belongs to the phenomenology-of-religion. Nevertheless, recent work by James Spickard (2011) and Jason Blum (2012) suggests an attempt to reconfigure phenomenology-of-religion along lines closer to our proper phenomenology.
But does this “religiously” indicate a particular style of interpretation or is it rather a synonym for Christian/Hindu/etc.? Framed in another way we can say that Advaita Vedanta is a province of meaning which in turn, as one of the six orthodox schools of philosophy, forms one of the polythetic constituents of the province of meaning Hinduism, i.e. Hinduism sits at a higher level of meaning-context to Advaita Vedanta. But is Hinduism then a polythetic constituent (alongside Christian, Islam, etc.) of a province of meaning called “Religion”? If we were to map the hierarchy of provinces of meaning of a particular person, the question arises whether we would get the chain Swincan→Religion→Hinduism→Advaita or Swincan→Hinduism→Advaita. If the latter is found then “Religion” is, as J.Z. Smith suggested, ‘not an empirical category. It is a second order abstraction’ (1988:233). We may therefore call it an ideal.type – not itself a province of meaning but a means of classifying certain provinces according to some common characteristics. There is thus no religious way of experiencing but ways of experiencing that share certain commonalities that scholars bring under a particular rubric. The issue we wish to emphasise is that, just as “religion” may be an ideal type, so too may “social science”. That is, there is no one province of meaning that we can call Social Science but rather provinces of meaning that share certain commonalities that we bring under this rubric.

Secondly, as ideal type, “social science” designates a particular type of cognitive style which can give greater clarity to our understanding of the crisis of social science: There is a crisis of social science in that there is a lack of agreement as to this cognitive style’s constitution. It is our contention here that just as a person can only properly function while utilising only one province of meaning at a given moment, so too can a province of meaning only function properly if it has a single cognitive style.

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7 We are aware that this is a gross oversimplification but one necessary for the speed of exposition. One particular point to bear in mind is that this relationship should not be regarded as one of essential necessity. There are cases of people who would treat the Advaita Vedanta province as equal if not higher to Hinduism in meaning-context.

8 This problem is faced by Byrne also, how does one identify a religious concept over a non-religious concept? While it might be quite easy to speak of Christian concepts can these same concepts also be called religious?

9 It is for this reason that we have not argued that phenomenology is the only social scientific methodology.

10 This point is partially recognised by Sturrock in his discussion of Structuralism. Within the “hard” sciences structuralism is seemingly obligatory, whereas in the “soft” sciences it is not and so has to fight as a competing methodology among others (Sturrock, 1986:viii). We will not make use of Sturrock’s distinction between “hard” and “soft” sciences which correspond to natural and social science respectively. Sturrock’s point, framed in our terms, is that Natural Science possesses a single cognitive style that we can call structuralism. In Social Science, however, there are numerous cognitive styles such that structuralism becomes Structuralism: ‘a fairly assertive intellectual movement [cognitive style] aiming to persuade those of other allegiances [cognitive styles] or none that its methods are the soundest and most inspiring on offer in the study of language, history, literature and so on’ (Sturrock, 1986:viii).
As it stands Social Science, and Religious Studies as our example, is overwhelmed with cognitive styles all vying to operate within the province of meaning. These cognitive styles are the content brought about by normative philosophies of social science. That is, the dictates of how one does “social science”.

In the context of what we have already discussed, we can say that within the province of meaning of Religious Studies, phenomenology of religion and phenomenology-of-religion represent two such cognitive styles.\textsuperscript{11} We can see this if we return to their emphasis on philosophical anthropology. Both the “phenomenology of religion” of the Movement and phenomenology-of-religion ask the question “what is religious wer?” For the Movement this question is a qualification upon “what is wer?”; either not all weras are religious or wer is not always religious. For the phenomenology-of-religion, however, the two questions are synonymous. Eliade, for example, in advocating the notion of \textit{homo religiosus}, argued that “wer” is always religious even when he denies it (Eliade, 2006b:58). This is set in opposition to the Heideggerian and Sartrean understanding of \textit{wer} due to their presentation of a ‘man who pretends that he makes himself in history’ (2006b:65). This idea of \textit{wer as homo religiosus} plays out on a methodological level in Cox’s discussion of the difference between Religious Studies and Social Science. Both are placed on the same level of meaning-context in his argument. From the perspective of the Movement, however, we make the ideological claim that Religious Studies of essential necessity is subordinated to Social Science. It is a polythetic constituent no different from Sport Science, Political Studies, Women Studies, etc. Phenomenology-of-religion, as such, engages in \textit{essentialism: the treatment of a province of meaning as if it belongs to a higher level of meaning-context than to which it actually belongs}.\textsuperscript{12}

We do not intend to argue that there is only \textit{one} correct cognitive style \textit{per se}; allowing that Social Science is an ideal type, several cognitive styles can be called social scientific. Scheler goes some way to recognising this when he claims “‘Science” as an abstract, unitary phenomenon does not exist. There are only sciences in the plural’ (Scheler, 1989a:88). The issue with regard to the crisis of social comparison to these other cognitive styles Structuralism is a scientific style. In this relation to social science, Seebohm, speaking of phenomenology as hermeneutics, has suggested that rather than a rival, structuralism is a refinement of the hermeneutic project (2004:164-166).

\textsuperscript{11} A subsidiary issue raised by this point pertains to the level of the provinces. That is, if it is not accepted that Religious Studies is a branch of Social Science, as seems to be the case with phenomenology-of-religion, then the former does not inhabit a lower level of meaning-context to the latter but is assumed to be equal.

\textsuperscript{12} It should be noted that this applies only insofar as Religious Studies is thought of as scientific, i.e. either subordinate to Social Science. This argument does not pertain to those who claim Religious Studies is \textit{not} scientific.
Science is why, if various cognitive styles are all social scientific, do they struggle to cohere with one another? It is the exploration of this lack of coherence which will bring us to the root of the crisis of social science. From the perspective of the Phenomenological Movement this task first requires an investigation into the essence of social science.

**ii. The postulates of social science**

In “On Multiple Realities” Schutz begins by stating the following: ‘Scientific theorising – and in the following the terms theory, theorizing, etc., shall be exclusively used in this restricted sense – does not serve any practical purpose. Its aim is not to master the world but to observe and possibly to understand it’ (1962d:245). Though the person may decide to “leap” into the scientific situation for eminently practical and interest driven reasons, once there these are forgotten. In order to do this the scientist must adopt a particular attention à la vie toward life. It must be recalled that, following Scheler, a province of meaning gives a “content” to be realised by anyone. A province of meaning is taken up by the person when the purpose of that province fulfils (or is presumed to fulfil) their current interest. Conversely, in order to enact the purpose of the province, certain interests must be adopted by that person. Thus to be a social scientist the person may have to subordinate an original interest in order to be social scientific. While there is quite obviously going to be a tension in this regard, we can only adequately address this once we have captured what it means to be social scientific – i.e. discern the essence of social science.

**a. The postulate of nonpractical knowledge**

In the case of science this purpose involves becoming a disinterested observer which ‘consists in the abandoning of the system of relevances which prevails within the practical sphere of the natural attitude’ (Schutz, 1962d:246). Schutz describes this further as freedom from hopes and fears; unlike the practical the interest lies not in whether their anticipations will prove useful to the solving of some

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13 The idea of the scientific situation is found in Felix Kaufmann’s *Methodology of the Social Sciences* (1944) whom Schutz has drawn from in part in his own understanding of science.

14 “Disinterestedness” has alternatively been expressed as: “detached observation” (Lowe, 1963:153); “non-evaluative precepts” (Barnes et al., 1996:viii); leaving behind everyday convictions (Seiwert, 2012); “unbiased explanation” (Kundt, 2012:41); “value-indifferent science” (Bubík, 2012:44). There is a strong connection here with the terms of “objectivity” and “neutrality” (see Ch.6.iv).
practical problem but in whether their anticipations will be verified. This later focus on the disinterested observer replaces the earlier postulate of relevancy found in “The Problem of Rationality in the Social World” and “The Social World and the Theory of Social Action” (Schutz, 1943[1964b]:81, 1960[1964k]:18). As Schutz defines the postulate: ‘The formation of ideal types must comply with the principle of relevance, which means that the problem chosen by the social scientist creates a scheme of reference and constitutes the limits of the scope within which relevant ideal types might be formed’ (1964k:18). These ideal types refer to the theorising of the scientist as Schutz discusses it in “On Multiple Realities”, i.e. the constructs he uses to build a “model” of the world. The postulate dictates that the purpose of the scientist is driven by a particular set of relevances that are constituted by being a disinterested observer. We suspect the shift from the postulate of relevancy to the disinterested observer is due to a slight vagary in the former. That is, technically all provinces of meaning have their relevances and so by speaking of disinterestedness Schutz intended to better reflect the particular relevancies of the scientist.

Based on the distinction between interest and purpose, however, we must further scrutinise this “disinterestedness”. If we take this to mean that the scientist has no interests when doing science then many critics rightly say this is impossible. There are a plethora of potential reasons why a scientist may have an interest in doing science, from financial gain, prestige, pressure from society to simple curiosity. To say the scientist is “disinterested” therefore seems a misnomer more likely to cause confusion than aid our understanding. Based on what Schutz says about the postulate, however, we can surmise that by “disinterestedness” he was appealing to something akin to what Husserl claims emerged in Greece as the “theoretical attitude” or the desire for “knowledge for its own sake” (Husserl, 1965b:164). That is, “disinterestedness” and “for its own sake” are synonymous. But we suggest that “for its own sake” is far better translated as “nonpractical” - i.e. “does not serve any practical purpose”. We will therefore adapt Schutz to speak instead of the postulate of nonpractical knowledge to better capture what is meant by disinterested observer. The loss of “interest” allows that the scientist does indeed pursue some sort of interest in doing science. The introduction of “nonpractical” indicates that the knowledge acquired is of no use to the person.

A similar point can be found in Scheler when he speaks of natural science: ‘there can be no doubt that the science of inanimate nature has the task of seeking and furnishing truth and nothing other than truth (Scheler, 1973c:198). “Truth” as it is used in this context is a synonym for “knowledge for its
own sake” as made evident in the following statement: ‘A researcher whose research is guided by something other than the investigation of truth, one who aims at useful or technically applicable results, lacks the primary ethos of the research and does not deserve that honourable name’ (1973c:198). Such a comment, however, points to a tension between the purpose of science, as it has been understood here, and the potential interests of the person claiming to do science. On one level it is clear that we must conclude that not everyone who claims to do science is in fact doing science. However, on another level this tension may well mean that no one does science.  

Yet it is significant at this juncture that the scientist has entered the province of meaning that is Science and not Social Science. This is made clear in “On Multiple Realities”, for just as with any other province of meaning,

the scientist enters a preconstituted world of scientific contemplation handed down to him by the historical tradition of his science. Henceforth, he will participate in a universe of discourse embracing results obtained by others, problems stated by others, solutions suggested by others, methods worked out by others. This theoretical universe of the special science is itself a finite province of meaning, having its peculiar cognitive style with peculiar implications of problems and horizons to be explicated. The regulative principle of constitution of such a province of meaning, called a special branch of science, can be formulated as follows: Any problem emerging within the scientific field has to partake of the universal style of this field and has to be compatible with the preconstituted problems and their solutions either by accepting or refuting them. (1962d:250)

What we take Schutz to mean here is the following: We begin with the monothetic province of meaning that we call Science, instigated by the postulate of nonpractical knowledge. Within this monothetic unity exist polythetic constituents which Schutz calls the “special sciences”. On the first level of meaning-context division we have Social Science and Natural Science. These too may be considered as monothetic unities with further polythetic divisions so that Natural Science is constituted by Chemistry, Physics and Biology. These all form special branches of Science. This entails that within all these special branches are certain shared science postulates alongside specialisation postulates.

b. The postulate of subjective interpretation

15 See Ch.6.
16 By placing Natural and Social Science on the same level of meaning-context this necessarily entails that they are incompatible with one another. I.e. neither can be reduced to the other. This however leads to a problem which we will return to in Chaper 7.
We now need a postulate which qualifies science as social science. The *postulate of subjective interpretation* which fulfils this requirement is first briefly stated in “The Problem of Rationality in the Social World”: ‘The scientist has to ask what type of individual mind can be constructed and what typical thoughts must be attributed to it to explain the fact in question as the result of its activity within an understandable relation’ (1964b:85). A more detailed explanation of the postulate is provided in “Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation” where Schutz explains that social scientists do not proceed in the same manner as natural scientists because they have different interests. The interest of social science is ‘human conduct and its common-sense interpretation in the social reality’ (1962g:34). By consequence it necessarily refers to subjective points of view – the interpretation of actions and their contexts by the actors themselves. Drawing on Max Weber’s phrase “subjective interpretation of meaning” Schutz defines the postulate here as: ‘we always can – and for certain purposes must – refer to the activities of the subjects within the social world and their interpretation by the actors in terms of systems of projects, available means, motives, relevances and so on’ (1962g:35).

In speaking of the postulate of subjective interpretation we are not referring to the interpreting of the social scientist but the object of his interpretations. To be clear, “interpreting” here refers to an act whereas “interpretation” refers to an action. Take the following from Weber: ‘In “action” is included all human behaviour when and insofar as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to it’ (Weber, 1947:80). As the individual acts they “attach subjective meaning”, that is, they interpret. The “subjective interpretation” therefore does not refer to the process of the scientist but the object of his inquiry. As Knudsen has ably described this, ‘the reality upon which the social sciences build their ideal types and models has already been experienced and interpreted by the “objects” themselves, i.e. the individuals of the scientific analysis’ (Knudsen, 2004:49).

However, clarity is required in this area, as Husserl demands: ‘we must grasp the contrast between objectivity and the subjectivity of the life-world as a contrast which determines the fundamental sense of objective-scientific discipline itself, and we must secure this contrast against the great temptations to misconstrue it’ (Husserl, 1970c:127). For example, Galdur may be observing Kerwalh and

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17 It cannot be ignored that despite our comments regarding the human prejudice (Ch.2.iii.c) that Schutz quite regularly speaks in terms of “humans” and “human being” – an issue to which we will return later (see Ch.7.iv).
18 The appearance of Weber in this context should not be taken to mean he should be considered a member of the Phenomenological Movement. Our consideration of Weber in these pages is only in relation to the ways in which he has influenced certain phenomenologists such as Scheler and Schutz.
Reinakh spar with each other. As an observer he is not involved in their action such that ‘he is “tuned in” upon them but not they upon him’ (Schutz, 1962g:26). In saying this, Schutz suggests that Galdur is thereby “disinterested” – i.e. fulfilling the postulate of nonpractical knowledge. However, in a later discussion on common-sense understandings of “equality” by groups in “Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World” (1957[1964i]) Schutz tacitly reveals a problem with this assumption. Although Galdur is not participating in the sparring, he nevertheless participates within the in-group of Kerwalh and Reinakh by sharing their relevances, by observing in order to offer advice to Reinakh. Subjective interpreting is therefore meaning constituted as meaning for “Me” or “Us” (1964i:251-254). By contrast, objective interpreting is really interpretations about an out-group and is therefore meaning constituted in terms of meaning for “Him/Her” and “Them” (1964i:254-257). The problem in relation to “disinterestedness” is that these objective interpretations are framed in reference to the observer’s own in-group. That is, the observer’s objective interpreting is nevertheless subjective. As such these would be, following Schutz’s terminology, subject _ive_ objective interpretations. 19 “They” only makes sense in relation to “Us” even if this “Us” is conceived negatively as “Not Them”. Such an observer is therefore not “disinterested” in the sense Schutz wishes to capture because by his own admission these objective interpretations can be imposed upon the out-group by the observer (1964i:255-256).

In order to avoid an unnecessary amount of confusion that can stem from such phrases as “subjective objective interpretations” and the possible combinations in which “subjective” and “objective” may then be placed, we will alter Schutz’s terminology. To do this we will co-opt certain terminology from Ninian Smart’s “Interpretation and Mystical Experience” even though his argument is largely untenable from our position. Specifically we need to extract the ideas of auto-interpretation and

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19 Elements of this can be found in another of Schutz’s essays, “The Stranger”: For the approaching stranger, however, the pattern of the approached group does not guarantee an objective chance for success but rather a pure subjective likelihood which has to be checked step by step, that is, he has to make sure that the solutions suggested by the new scheme will also produce the desired effect for him in his special position as outsider and new-comer who has not brought within his grasp the whole system of the cultural pattern but who is rather puzzled by its inconsistency, incoherence, and lack of clarity. (Schutz, 1944[1964c]:103)

Continuing the above example we may say of a second observer, Ardith, that she is not a member of Galdur, Kerwalh and Reinakh’s in-group. As an out-group member she must make sense of their province of meaning in its relation to her as their queen. Indeed, as the queen she not only lacks the monothetic unifying province “to aid the queen”, she cannot even possess it herself because she is the very object which that province is aimed at. As such in order to bring the province of “Huscarl” as a specific instantiation of “to aid the queen” to consistency, coherency and clarity Ardith must orientate this province which she herself cannot inhabit to her own province of meaning “Queen”.

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hetero-interpretation from his general argument. According to Smart, when it comes to describing “religious experiences”\(^\text{20}\),

> There is the description given by the man himself, in terms of his own tradition. There is the description which others of his own tradition may give. Also, men of another tradition may describe his experience in terms of their tradition or standpoint …. We crucially, then, should distinguish between a mystic’s interpretation of his own experience and the interpretation which may be placed upon it from a different point of view. (Smart, 2009:80)

To the mystic’s interpretation of his experience is applied “auto-interpretation” and to the interpretation of the experience by another is applied “hetero-interpretation”. Smart’s discussion is framed in terms of comparing two interpreters with one another; we do not need to go that far to make use of these two phrases. When, for example, Gharys speaks of “Me” and “Us” he is engaging in auto-interpreting, and when he uses such language as “Him/Her” or “Them” he is engaging in hetero-interpreting. Both auto-interpreting and hetero-interpreting are forms of subjective interpretation because they are framed in terms of the “Here and Now” which Gharys occupies.\(^\text{21}\) In the case of group level distinctions such as “Us” and “Them”, his “Here and Now” is expanded to include certain other persons.

However, it must be recognised that, in hetero-interpreting “Them”, Gharys is fulfilling certain practical interests that are dominating: ‘This world as experienced through my natural attitude is the scene and also the object of my actions. I have to dominate it and change it in order to carry out my purposes’ (Schutz, 1962i:306). The “Us/Them” distinction has an inherent bias to suggest “We” are better. But if such is the case then the scientist is failing at the postulate of nonpractical knowledge because he is automatically placing himself in a dominating position through hetero-interpreting “Them”.\(^\text{22}\) Such a line of argument has exactly been that of Edward Said (1978) who argued that the scholar will always hold power over his subjects, an argument also found in feminist and postmodernist thinking.\(^\text{23}\)

We must be clear that objective interpreting and hetero-interpreting are not the same. All subjective interpreting involves holding a position, a “Here”, which entails practical concerns. But in taking up the postulate of nonpractical knowledge the social scientist abandons their “Here”. As Schutz says in “Common-sense and Scientific Interpretation”:

\(^{20}\) Here meant ‘in a special sense, meaning something like a vision or an intuition’ (Smart, 2009:42).

\(^{21}\) See Ch.3.1.

\(^{22}\) We have sketched some preliminary comments on the application of auto- and hetero- interpreting in relation to the topic of “myth” (Tuckett, 2013).

The social scientist has no “Here” within the social world or, more precisely, he considers his position within it and the system of relevances attached therefore as irrelevant for his scientific undertaking. His stock of knowledge at hand is the corpus of his science, and he has to take it for granted – which means, in this context as scientifically ascertained – unless he makes explicit why he cannot do so. (1962g:39)  

By having no “Here” the social scientist engages in objective interpreting, there is no in-group whose interests are being served. Based on our comments about nonpractical knowledge, however, one may argue that it is impossible not to occupy a “Here” as this is tantamount to having no interest whatsoever. All interpreting, in order to be interpreting, involves taking a position. In subjective interpreting this involves taking a position against an object. Accepting this point, by objective interpreting what is properly meant is that the interpretation involves taking up the position of the object. In the case of social science the objects under study are subjective interpretations. What the postulate of subjective interpretation properly entails is that the social scientist occupies the “Here” of the out-group. But because of the postulate of nonpractical knowledge this occupation is only ever virtual: the social scientist does not then take up the practical interests of that individual/group.

The postulate of subjective interpretation therefore qualifies the postulate of nonpractical knowledge – all that is relevant to the scientist is the group’s subjective interpretations – refining the purpose from science to social science: nonpractical knowledge of the world as it is for wer. This qualification serves to distinguish social science from natural science. According to Schutz natural science develops constructs of the first degree and social science develops constructs of the second degree (1962h:59). By this Schutz means that the constructs of social science are the constructs of constructs whereas natural science just has constructs. The objects of natural science are “dead” in the sense that they are neither experiencing or interpreting – i.e. they are not taking a position against another

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24 This last qualification distances Schutz from a monolithic conception of science as a cumulative process. So long as the scientist can make explicit why, science is open to revision.  
25 Technically we should regard the scientific community as an in-group. Indeed, we must for the purpose of certain other postulates below. Rather, the point here is that in terms of approaching his topic of study the scientist has no in-group in the sense that neither the people under study or some other group benefit from his research in terms of their ability to further practical interests.  
26 Scheler is getting at exactly this when we he claims in his discussion of the variations in practical morality:

Practical morality pertains to the value of the factual comportment of men, that is, comportment on the basis of norms which belong to the relations of value-ranks recognised by these men, and which correspond to their own structures of preferring. The value of such practical comportment is completely relative to its “ethos” and can never be measured by an ethos of another epoch or that of another people. Only after we take possession of an ethos of a certain age can we judge the actions and types of comportment of the people of that age. (Scheler, 1973b:300)
In the case of both sciences, by objective interpreting we take up the position of the object in question. In the case of social science, however, this object is itself a position taken against another object.

**c. The postulate of adequacy**

In order to ensure that the scientist is objectively interpreting subjective interpretations further postulates are required. To this end we have the most consistent postulate which appears in all Schutz’s essays, the *postulate of adequacy*: ‘each term used in a scientific system referring to human action must be so constructed that a human act performed within the life-world by an individual actor in the way indicated by the typical construction would be reasonable and understandable for the actor himself as well as for his fellow-man’ (1962g:44; 1962h:64; 1964k:19; 1964b:85). The only variation occurs in “On Multiple Realities” where this definition is subsumed under the *postulate of consistency and compatibility*, and where “compatibility” takes the place of “adequacy” (1962d:251).

“Problem of the Rationality of the Social World” reveals this postulate is derived from Weber, who states that:

> A motive is a complex of subjective meaning which seems to the actor himself or to the observer an adequate ground for the conduct in question. We apply the term “adequacy on the level of meaning” to the subjective interpretation of a coherent course of conduct when and in so far as, according to our habitual modes of thought and feeling, its component parts taken in their mutual recognition are recognised to constitute a “typical” complex of meaning. (Weber, 1947:89-90)

As it is used by Weber here, “adequacy” refers to the way in which the acting person construes their action as fitting into a “typical” way of acting in the situation that they find themselves. That is, they have a yardstick of “what people do” against which to judge their own action. For example, if Akelot rebels, he “views” his rebellion as “adequate” insofar as he thinks the conditions which caused him to rebel are

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27 While this certainly holds true in such branches of Natural Science as Physics, such branches as Zoography and Ethology whose attention is the behaviour and habits of animals might be considered to be dealing with experience and interpretation. For example, how can we describe the mating dances of birds as “mating dances” if the opposite sex does not interpret the associated behaviours as such? Husserl himself mentions briefly “animal spirituality” (*ferhdcdndh*ad) (Husserl, 1965b:152). Gordon has mentioned that if social science is construed as the study of societies then there are various animals that also form these (Gordon, 1991:2-15). Though there is no space to pursue such inquiries here, these points raise necessary challenges and issues that we suspect are so far under-considered particularly if we attend to philosophical anthropology.
“typical” conditions for rebelling. It is in this sense that Schutz uses the term typification28: ‘We typify, in daily life, human activities which interest us only as appropriate means for bringing about intended effects, but not as emanations of the personality of our fellow-men’ (Schutz, 1964b:81). Typifications therefore provide the relevant conditions for bringing about a particular end.

Following the postulate of subjective interpretation, social science’s object of study is the world as it is for wer; the social scientist thus constructs ideal types as interpretations of weres interpreting. That is, ideal types are second degree constructs of the typifications – first degree constructs – which guide the person’s acting. Continuing with the example of Akelot, the social scientist constructs an ideal type which posits the relevant conditions necessary for Akelot to rebel – i.e. how the situation must be giefan to Akelot for him to respond in a particular fashion. This ideal type can then be “correct” on two grounds. First, it is correct if the proposed relevant conditions are observed and Akelot does rebel. If the relevant conditions are observed but Akelot does not rebel then it is incorrect. Second, as our concern is the world as it is for Akelot, this ideal type as a second degree construct must make sense to Akelot if it were “rewritten” as a first degree construct. That is, the ideal type must not contain a relevant condition to which Akelot could not attest to as a possible relevant condition. Thus, as another example, if Odagen witnesses the god Lugus, the relevant conditions within our ideal type used to objectively interpret this encounter cannot contain Barrett’s Hyperactive Agency Detection Device29 if Odagen does not himself recognise it as belonging to his various typifications. The postulate of adequacy thus stipulates that second degree constructs of the social scientist correspond to the first degree constructs used by wer in order to be correct. Gordon expresses this point quite usefully: ‘no discipline that studies phenomena can be satisfactory unless contact is made between the theory and the real world’ (Gordon, 1991:40). We must not lose sight that our interpretations are of an interpretation.

d. The postulates of rationality

It is important to recognise here that there is a subtle distinction in the way “adequate” is used by Weber and Schutz in terms of who is “correct”. For Weber it is Akelot who is “correct” or not. For Schutz it is the social scientist who is “correct” or not. However, we must be clear on what is meant by “correct” in both cases. As recognised by Schutz, Akelot’s appeal to typifications has to do with what

28 See Ch.3.ii.c.
29 See Ch.1.i.
Weber called “rationalisation” in terms of “disenchantment of the world”. Schutz interprets this to mean ‘the transformation of an uncontrollable and unintelligible world into an organisation which we can understand and therefore master, and in the framework of which prediction becomes possible’ (Schutz, 1964b:71). Thus to be “correct” is to be rational. But in saying this, we must now determine what it means to be rational. In following Weber’s formulation Schutz understands rationality to refer to “problem” solving. That is, to “master” something is to solve the problem which it presents to the person. However, this requires careful clarification because there is an assumption that what we are going to designate as the postulates of rationality belongs to science alone. A careful consideration of Schutz’s comments on this point reveals that actually these postulates are common to all provinces of meaning. That is, every province is within itself rational.

In “Problem of Rationality of the Social World” Schutz speaks of the postulate of rationality. This states that: ‘The ideal type of social action must be constructed in such a way that the actor in the living world would perform the typified action if he had a clear and distinct scientific knowledge of all the elements relevant to his choice and the constant tendency to choose the most appropriate means for the realisation of the most appropriate end’ (Schutz, 1964b:86). This point is worth emphasising for it is Schutz’s contention that science is rational and can only deal with rational constructs. Schutz’s understanding of rationality primarily responds to Parsons’ understanding of rational action:

Action is rational in so far as it pursues ends possible within the conditions of the situation, and by the means which, among those available to the actor, are intrinsically best adapted to the end for those reasons understandable and verifiable by positive empirical science. (Parsons, 1937:58)

But what ends are these? Schutz states that these ends are the problem of the social scientist. That is, all the ideal types are constructed around a problem which is his central interest. Each special branch of science then becomes concerned with one (or a type of) problem (1962d:249-250). He gives the example of economics: ‘Build all your ideal types as if all actors had oriented their life-plan and, therefore, all their activities to the chief end of realising the greatest utility with the minimum of costs; human activity which is oriented in such a way (and only this kind of activity) is the subject matter of your science’ (Schutz, 1964b:87). The economist then constructs ideal types of people who would work according to this problem as it has been laid out by the economist.³⁰ Rational deliberation involves three requirements

³⁰ While framed in this way, “problem” is an acceptable way to describe the scientist’s work. Certainly it is consistent with what Thomas Kuhn call “normal science” (Kuhn, 2012:25-34). However, in certain
(1964b:86) which are explicated in greater detail in “Common-sense and Scientific Interpretation” as clear and distinct knowledge of:

a) the particular state of affairs within which his projected action has to start. This involves a sufficiently precise definition of his biographical situation in the physical and socio-cultural environment;

b) the state of affairs to be brought about by his projected action, that is, its end. Yet since there is no such thing as an isolated project or end… I have, therefore, to have clear and distinct knowledge of the place of my project within the hierarchical order of my plans (or the interrelationship of the end to be achieved with other ends), the compatibility of one with the other, and the possible repercussions of one upon another;

c) the various means necessary for attaining the established end, of the possibility of bringing them within my reach, of the degree of expediency of their application, of the possible employment of these same means for the attainment of other potential ends, and of the compatibility of the selected means with other means needed for the materialisation of other projects. (1962g:30-31)

We suggest that these requirements are expressed in other essays as separate postulates which collectively constitute the postulates of rationality:

(a) finds expression as the postulate of logical consistency: ‘The system of ideal types must remain in full compatibility with the principles of formal logic’ (1964k:19). According to this postulate the constructs of a given case must form a consistent whole and be non-contradictory. By “formal logic” is designated those rules by which constructs may be consistently connected.31 No problem exists in isolation and can only be made sense of in relation to other problems.

(b) occurs in “Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation” as part of the postulate of logical consistency. In “On Multiple Realities”, however, Schutz speaks of ‘the postulate of highest possible clarity and distinctness of all terms and notions used, especially requiring the transformation of confused prescientific thought into distinctness by explicating its hidden implications’ (1962d:251). Dennis describes this usefully as the postulate of clarity: ‘Scientists, then, must maximise, and be seen to maximise, the clarity and consistency of their terms of reference as an end in itself’ (Dennis, 2004).

situations the use of “problem” may incline us to think of some practical interest that needs resolving. Take the following comment from Kalleberg: ‘When we define something as a “problem”, we not only assume a given state of affairs, but also that the situation is not as it ought to be’ (Kalleberg, 2010:189). In this respect it may be less confusing to speak of “question” instead.

31 McLain has pointed out that while the postulate of subjective interpretation is what divides natural and social science, the postulate of logical consistency is what holds them together (McLain, 1981:106). Contained within this is the assumption that the rules of “formal logic” are the same for both natural and social sciences. A similar point can be found in Elster (1983). Elster argues that different sciences rely on different types of explanation. Physics, Biology and Social Science all share causal explanations in common but differ in also utilising mechanistic, functional, and intentional explanations respectively.
(c) appears alternatively as the *postulate of compatibility* (1964k:19) and the *postulate of tested observation* (1962d). The latter provides the fullest descriptions: ‘all scientific thought has to be derived, directly or indirectly, from tested observation, that is, from originary immediate experiences of facts within the world’ (1962d:251). Though the postulate is not named, a similar comment is then made in “Concept and Theory Formation”: ‘each step involved in the construction and use of the scientific model can be verified by empirical observation, provided that we do not restrict this term to sensory perceptions of objects and events in the outer world but include the experiential forms, by which common-sense thinking in everyday life understands human actions and their outcome in terms of their underlying motives and goals’ (1962h:65). As this latter comment may seem problematic it must be contextualised as a response to Nagel’s (1952[1963]) and Carl Hempel’s (1941 [2011], 1952[1963]) views on social science. In particular Schutz criticises their *postulate of sensory observation* which involves a restriction such that observation only “counts” in face-to-face relationships, yet he observes that much of what goes on in the common life-world exists outside this kind of relation. In this respect the postulate of sensory observation is too strong and actually removes from the interests of the social scientist much of the social world (1962h:54-55). To avoid possible confusion with Nagel and Hempel’s postulate we will speak of the *postulate of verifiability*: the social scientist’s constructs are verified if another social scientist performing the same study would produce similar constructs. In order to be verifiable it is therefore necessary to exist within a community of scientists who can perform this verification.

The problem of this presentation is highlighted by Dennis (2004) who argues that Lynch (1993) – following Schutz – sees scientific rationality as superior to common-sense rationality. Though Lynch (2004) repudiates the claim, had he made this argument he would not entirely be incorrect. Take the following comment from Schutz: ‘Only on the level of models of interaction patterns constructed by the social scientist in accordance with certain requirements defined by the methods of his science does the concept of rationality obtain its full significance’ (Schutz, 1962g:33). This can be seen particularly with the postulate of clarity. Dennis has argued that clarity is for science an end in itself and so it will always obtain to a higher degree than that found in common-sense thinking. Yet this relies upon a misconstrual

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32 E.g. Gordon speaks of the principle of *empirical testability*. As he sees it, something is scientific if it can be tested by observation or experiment (Gordon, 1991:26).
by Dennis based, we suspect, upon the under-emphasis given to the question of relevancy by Schutz.\textsuperscript{33} More accurately, Dennis’ claim that clarity is an end in itself is nothing more than a re-statement of the postulate of nonpractical knowledge that as such has nothing to do with rationality but rather gives rationality its relevance. Unlike Parsons who held that only science is rational, Schutz held a much broader view.

In “Problem of Rationality in the Social World” Schutz makes a distinction between rationality of knowledge and the rationality of choice itself (Schutz, 1964b:79). What he stipulates, though, is that although we may lack clear and distinct knowledge in the everyday situation this does not mean that we are not acting rationally: ‘it would be sufficient to interpret the terms clearness and distinctness in a modified and restricted meaning, namely, as clearness and distinctness adequate to the requirements of the actor’s practical interest’ (1964b:79).\textsuperscript{34} All rational deliberation is based upon a “problem at hand” but this very problem is determined by our biographical situation. As each person has a different biographical situation this then assumes that in-groups share,

\begin{quote}

a system of relevances sufficiently homogenous in structure and content for the practical purposes involved. If this is not the case, then a course of action which is perfectly rational from the point of view of the actor may appear as non-rational to the partner or observer and vice versa. Both attempts, to induce rain by performing the rain-dance or by seeding clouds with silver iodine, are subjectively seen, rational actions from the point of view of the Hopi Indian or the modern meteorologist respectively. (1962g:29)
\end{quote}

Rationality, it is heavily implied, is determined by a system of relevances that are in turn determined by the stock of knowledge of the person’s biographical situation. But this is to say no more than the postulate of relevancy. Indeed, this is the very reason we have abandoned it. A person’s interests are determined by a problem which determines what the relevant conditions are regardless of whether that problem be religious, artistic, or scientific.

Let us say that my “problem at hand” is to catch a train. This requires a degree of clarity because I need the relevant knowledge of where I am and where the train is. But the level of clarity needed for me to solve the problem does not require knowledge of the exact GPS co-ordinates of my home, only that my home is seven streets away from the train station. Let us say further that the train leaves in fifteen minutes. I must then determine a route that will get me to the station within that time which requires

\begin{quote}

\textsuperscript{33} Much of Schutz’s work on the question of relevancy was never completed in his life time and most has appeared as posthumous publications (e.g. 1970[2011a]; 2004[2011d]).
\textsuperscript{34} As the use of “adequate” may cause confusion with postulate of adequacy we may instead use of Garfinkel’s phrase “sufficient for present purposes” (Garfinkel, 1967:268).
\end{quote}
knowledge of which routes I have taken in the past, or others have taken, which cover the distance in the requisite time – i.e. a verified route. In this I may come to the conclusion that there are two routes available that take eight and ten minutes respectively. If I choose to take the ten minute route I am acting no less rationally than if I took the faster route because both meet the relevant conditions of catching the train within fifteen minutes. Indeed, I may have factored into my choice of route the fact that the slower route is more aesthetically pleasing. This then brings us to the logical consistency of the act of catching the train, for as Schutz noted it must sit within a system of actions. Catching the train at that time is necessary for getting to work which is necessary for earning money which is necessary for others things and so on. That I have chosen the slower route factors into this logical consistency because walking a pleasing route improves my mood which improves my frame of mind for working, thereby having a knock-on effect.

It must be emphasised that the clear and distinct knowledge required is dependent upon the “problem at hand”. In the case of each of these postulates it is possible for me to have “clearer and more distinct” knowledge of them but this extra knowledge is irrelevant to solving the problem. In “common-sense” rationalities, clear and distinct knowledge solves the problem. Where scientific rationality differs is that clear and distinct knowledge is the problem to be solved. Schutz himself concludes ‘that “rational action” on the common-sense level is always within an unquestioned and undetermined frame of constructs of typicalities of the setting, motives, the means and ends, the courses of action and personalities involved and taken for granted’ (1962g:33). By virtue of this typicality, however,

the more standardised the prevailing action pattern is, the more anonymous it is, the greater is the subjective chance of conformity and, therewith, of the success of intersubjective behaviour. Yet – and this is the paradox of rationality on the common-sense level – the more standardised the pattern is, the less the underlying elements become analysable for common-sense thought in terms of rational insight. (1962g:33)

That is, the more rationalised this action becomes, the more it is repeated, the less the person needs to have clear and distinct knowledge into the typifications that guide it.35 A person may correctly solve a problem without knowing how they did it per se. By contrast, as the objects of social science are these “underlying elements” – these typifications – the social scientist cannot correctly solve a problem without knowing how they did it.

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35 Though it goes beyond the scope of our main argument, it is possible to introduce notions of “unconscious” or “sub-conscious” here.
The point to be emphasised is this: rationality is always determined by the province of meaning the person is currently operating within. As Husserl argued in Crisis, it was the error of positivistic sciences to distort rationality and construe it in a one-sided manner (Husserl, 1970c:7-10). In the case of scientific rationality, the system of relevances of the province is provided by the postulate of nonpractical knowledge and in the case of social scientific rationality by the addition of the postulates of subjective interpretation and adequacy. Rationality in all its guises is determined by the postulates of clarity, logical consistency and verifiability, but without the addition of further postulates it is empty. This point is not made clear by Schutz’s own discussion because the postulates of rationality in “Problem of Rationality in the Social World” have already been giefan relevance by the postulates of science. That is, they are framed in terms of scientific rationality rather than rationality in general. It is therefore more accurate to speak of multiple rationalities that are giefan their distinctive identities as Christian, Azande, Scientific, or Sporting rationality which differ according to what they deem the relevant conditions for solving “problems at hand”. To reiterate this does not entail that the scientist’s rationality is “higher” as the possibility for his rationality is dependent upon a different set of relevances.

Thus we have the following postulates as constituting the essence of social science: postulate of nonpractical knowledge which is the necessary criterion of all science; the postulate of subjective interpretation is necessary to make that science social; the postulate of adequacy ensures that science is objective; the postulate of logical consistency, postulate of verifiability, and postulate of clarity ensure science is rational. Further based on our discussion of rationality above we can also stipulate that these postulates are eidetic, they are of essential necessity for social science to be social science.

36 It is worth noting that the postulates that are necessary to “fill” rationality are always those postulates which would determine the purpose of a province of meaning.
37 Scheler also comes to a similar conclusion about science: ‘All of its theses, inferences, deductions, and inductions must be correct and therefore subject to a normative legislation based on pure logic. Leaving aside the basic articles of its constitution, which have no validity in philosophy, science naturally shares these standards of cognition with every form of cognition [rationality], including cognition exercised in our daily affairs from the perspective of the natural attitude’ (Scheler, 1973c:198).
38 This understanding of rationality is echoed by Toulmin: ‘The idea of rationality, I shall be arguing, is concerned far more directly with matters of function and adaptations – with the substantive needs and demands of the problem-situations that men’s collective conceptions and methods of thought are designed to handle – than it is with formal considerations’ (Toulmin, 1972:vii).
iii. Proper phenomenology as social science

What we have called the postulates of social science parallel what Merton referred to as the norms or ethos of science developed in “Science and the Social Order” (1938[1973a]) and “The Normative Structure of Science”. Merton observes, however, that ‘the ethos of science has not been codified, it can be inferred from the moral consensus of scientists as expressed in use and wont, in countless writings on the scientific spirit and in moral indignation directed toward contraventions of that ethos’ (Merton, 1973b:269). That is, the norms he identified were not written down in a “lore book of science” but rather discerned from what scientists did when they went about doing something called “science”. As Kalleberg notes, the norms are ‘taken for granted in well-functioning scholarly communities’ (Kalleberg, 2007:150). With regard to our postulates of social science, then, we have been following Sartre in rendering explicit an implicit essence. Yet at the same time, the main way in which these norms are made apparent for Merton is the way in which scientists have reacted to their violation. Thus it is important to bear in mind that the scientist will not always satisfy the postulates in their day-to-day activities. Agreeing with Garfinkel, our postulates of social science are ‘a way of stating the ways in which a person would act were he conceived to be acting as an ideal scientist’ (Garfinkel, 1967:280). These postulates, insofar as they capture the essence of social science, are ideal in the sense that we do not expect that social scientists will consistently meet them. What we regard as important is the attempt by scientists to meet with this ideal, no matter how difficult, and the fact that they recognise when it has not been achieved. We do not shy from this entailing overt normative claims about what scientists ought to do.

What should also be drawn from Merton’s comments if applied to the postulates of social science is that if they lack formalisation they are not constituents of a cognitive style as such. Rather, these postulates are criteria by which we determine if a particular cognitive style can be called social scientific. This point also feeds into our recognition that there is a crisis in social science. Simply put, why, if these cognitive styles are all social scientific, do they struggle to cohere with one another? Before we can answer this question however, we need to make the further point that phenomenology has a warrant to comment upon this situation because it is itself a social scientific cognitive style. This is not only based on Husserl’s own claim that phenomenology is a rigorous science or Embree’s discussion of the emergence of Cultural Phenomenology, but that the strictures of phenomenology accord with the postulates of social science:
In the first instance, the stricture of philosophical anthropology can be seen to be an expression of the postulate of nonpractical knowledge and postulate of subjective interpretation. In the case of the former this is made apparent by the fact that any philosophical anthropology has as its concern the question “What is *w*er?” Phenomenology is a descriptive task as made clear by Spiegelberg’s statement of the “phenomenological task”: ‘the descriptive investigation of the phenomena, both objective and subjective, in their fullest breadth and depth’ (Spiegelberg, 1971a:2). Precisely because we are only describing, in Husserl’s sense of giving conceptual expression to the perceived, we are engaged in a nonpractical interest. To see this we can contrast “descriptive investigation” with “evaluative investigation” which implies a practical interest. In the process of evaluation I have set the object in question against some standard which I find it to either satisfy or fail to satisfy. This very establishment of a standard of evaluation requires a practical interest to which alters the relevant conditions. Let us return to the example of rebellion in the previous section: For Akelot to rebel, relevant conditions must pertain to cause him to rebel. A descriptive investigation – which is guided by the postulate of subjective interpretation – determines what these relevant conditions are *for* Akelot. If we observe that Akelot is not rebelling, we may predict what relevant conditions need pertain to cause him to rebel, but these predictions are no more than descriptive investigations in need of verification. If the proposed conditions pertain and Akelot does not rebel, then clearly the observer is wrong in their prediction. By contrast, the evaluative investigation determines what these relevant conditions *should* be. Rather than Akelot determining the relevant conditions, it is the observer. Thus, if the proposed conditions do pertain and Akelot does not rebel then it is not the observer who is wrong, but Akelot. An evaluative investigation therefore generates “ought” claims about how the observed should behave.

It should be noted that this use of “evaluation” does not contradict our understanding of an evaluative philosophy of social science. It is precisely the task of an evaluative philosophy of social science to stand in judgement over the findings of social science – i.e. to sort proper science from pseudo-science. In the current context of our argument this is to say that we are making a “third degree” evaluative investigation into the second degree constructs of social scientists, accepting those that are descriptive investigations and rejecting those that are evaluative investigations. We do not deny that there

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39 This recognition of the phenomenological use of “description” has perhaps been somewhat understated particularly in its relation to “explanation”.
is a practical interest involved in this. However, clarification will need to be given as to the extent and limits of such an interest.  

While this places a certain onus on the postulate of nonpractical knowledge, so far it is only by virtue of the example of Akelot that the postulate of subjective interpretation has been introduced at all. However, phenomenology’s descriptive investigation focuses on phenomena which we saw in our definition of phenomenology simpliciter are necessarily giefan in social relations. As Embree so lucidly described it, phenomenology focuses on “encountering”, where encountering is a social engagement. In a further aspect we can draw the contrast with Natural Science, which lacks this postulate, by pointing to Glendinning’s fourth thesis of no view from the sideways perspective: ‘the phenomena of interest to phenomenology are simply objects and properties “for us” or even “for me”’ (Glendinning, 2004:36). The objects of natural science, by contrast, are not “for us” or “for me” in that it can have a view from “nowhere”.

Though we will have reason to disagree with Glendinning on this thesis it will not be for the obvious reason that the “for us” or “for me” implies a subjective aspect. The concern this may cause can first be mitigated by the context of his argument. Glendinning’s main contention is that, contra naturalism, phenomenology involves the ‘attempt to rid us of the idea that “a view of phenomena from sideways on” makes sense’ (2004:37). That is, a phenomenon by definition is always “for me”, “for us”, “for him”, “for her”, etc. A phenomenon never just is. We must recall that in the principle of principles we lock ourselves to studying that which is giefan, and as pointed out earlier this entails that it is giefan to someone. And on these grounds the principle of principles is the phenomenological formulation of the postulate of adequacy.

Nevertheless, it would seem that if the phenomenon in question is “for me” this would make it almost too easy to meet the postulate. Certainly if I am Akelot I can decide what the relevant conditions are for me to rebel. To an extent this cannot be denied but at the same time it is also a fairly bland investigation. It must be remembered that phenomenology has as its purpose the stricture of philosophical anthropology. As such, the consideration of Akelot’s desire to rebel as a case of “wer in situation” is only of interest insofar as it tells us something of wer in general. In this we should return to Sartre and STE:

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40 See Ch.6.iii.  
41 See Ch.6.iv.
our study is always aimed at “we ourselves”. For Sartre the phenomenological analysis of my joy should inform our understanding of joy in general in turn conceived as a particular activity of *wer* in general. Here too, our consideration of Akelot’s desire to rebel is of interest insofar as it tells us something of rebellion in general. This in turn is of interest if we recognise that rebellion is one among many activities that inform us about *wer* in general. So even if I am Akelot this presents no impediment if this “for me” tells us something about “for us”.

That the study of Akelot’s desire to rebel should tell us something of rebellion in general brings us to a consideration of the rationality of phenomenology. To begin with, the postulate of logical consistency is expressed by the principle of presuppositionlessness. As Husserl states in *LI*: ‘meanings inspired only by remote, confused, or inauthentic intuitions – if by any intuitions at all – are not enough’ (1970a:252). In the phenomenological sense logical consistency cannot be achieved by simply accepting “tradition” if what “tradition” tells us is remote or accepted on *bad faith*, then what “tradition” provides is unclarified and unverified. It is, in Heidegger’s words, only the destruction of “tradition” in the sense that, tied to the postulate of adequacy, the concepts we draw on are consistent with what is *giefan* by the phenomena. As such this relates back to the principle of principles; as Carr recognised, ‘being true to Husserl is less important than being true to the “Sachen selbst”’ (Carr, 2004:360). In the case of Akelot this would mean that our analysis of his rebellion should not be coloured by our pre-knowledge of rebellion. Again we can see Sartre’s claim that “existence precedes essence” as a social scientific stricture in the sense that each new study has the potential to overthrow all that has gone before. In regard to the use of “unclarified” and “unverified”, this also relates the principle to the postulate of clarity and the postulate of verifiability. We may also say that the postulate of clarity is expressed by the stricture of insight into essences. It is only by achieving the greatest possible clarity and distinctness that we can say that we have discerned the full essence of a thing in terms of its type and *eidos*.

Looking more specifically at the postulate of verifiability, we can see how this protects the postulate of adequacy from vapid subjective claims. While the principle of principles demands that all verification is done against the things themselves, we must also be clear upon who is doing the verification. Drawing on our comments on the postulate and its communal aspect, we may thus relate this

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42 See Ch.2.iv.g.
43 According to Sartre acting in *bad faith* entails one who ‘constitutes itself in its own flesh as the nihilation of a possibility which another [réalité humaine] projects as its possibility’ (Sartre, 2003:70). It is important to bear in mind that this notion of *bad faith*, much like Heidegger’s *authenticity* and *inauthenticity*, does not indicate a moral valuation.
to the stricture of conscious adherence. That is, verifiability is achieved only if another phenomenologist would come to the same conclusions if studying the same phenomenon. In the case of Akelot this would mean that not only would another phenomenologist affirm what we have concluded about Akelot’s rebellion but also what can be said of rebellion in general based on this. This then requires knowledge of who can, or is suitable, to do such verification. Perhaps an interesting example of this is the Crisis.

According to Moran, Husserl thought of himself as a scientist engaged in “co-philosophising” with his various assistants including Edith Stein, Heidegger, Ludwig Landgrebe, and Eugen Fink. Crisis was written with Fink’s assistance and it seems he had some input into its composition such that: ‘The final text of the Crisis, then, in part is a Fink-Husserl cooperative effort and their individual contributions may never be properly identified and disentangled’ (Moran, 2012:13-14). In short, in any collaborative work the work itself cannot be said to properly belong to one or the other as they must share the conclusion reached.

Taking the above altogether, the table below shows the relation of phenomenological strictures, postulates of social science, and requirements of a province of meaning:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phenomenological Strictures</th>
<th>Postulates of social science</th>
<th>Requirements of a Province of Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philosophical Anthropology</td>
<td>Nonpractical Knowledge</td>
<td>Purpose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principle of Principles</td>
<td>Adequacy</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principle of Presuppositionlessness</td>
<td>Logical Consistency</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Verifiability</td>
<td>Identifier</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conscious Adherence</td>
<td>Clarity</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
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| Insight into Essences                      |                              |                                      |

One may well object at this juncture that our analysis so far has been too convenient. Particularly in our heavy use of Schutz, it may be charged that the requirements of a province of meaning, the strictures of phenomenology, and the postulates of social science cohere all too neatly. And there is a certain element of truth in this. To use our terminology of above we are engaged in an auto-interpretative activity in which we declare who “We” are and at the same time a hetero-interpretative task that determines whether “They” belong with “Us”. We will make no attempt to deny that this argument is in its way ideological when it comes to social science. Wiebe called such discussions “political”; we view it as our imperial argument. Nor do we see a problem in this *per se* because it is a problem faced by everyone engaged in a

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44 Lauer’s translation (1971) does however indicate a number of sections that are clearly Fink’s additions.
normative philosophy of social science. Yet in proclaiming this we do not view Schutz’s postulates to be completely clarified. In the course of our exposition certain problematic features have arisen; grounds upon which we will need to criticise Schutz. Having now concluded our normative philosophy of social science, it is the task of Part II to turn to an evaluative philosophy of social science in which these challenges will be met. Only by doing this will we be able to fully clarify the essence of social science and address the crisis which it suffers.
Part II

In Part I we have established what is meant by proper phenomenology, and in so doing we have come to an understanding of the essence of the social science. As we have suggested, Alfred Schutz’s postulates of social science present the eidetic structures of this essence. In the course of doing so we have already clarified certain aspects of this essence. This has been our normative philosophy of social science and in this Part we turn now to an evaluative philosophy of social science. Principally this takes the shape of an *imperial argument: sorting proper science from pseudo-science*. Only once this delineation has been achieved will we be in a position to get at the core of the crisis of social science. As such we must deal first with the challenges to proper science, some of which we have already begun to identify in the previous chapter.

The first challenge to be recognised is the abstracted nature of the essence of social science that we have presented. By this we mean no mention has been made of the concrete situation of doing science. Having delineated the eidetic structure of social science, the necessary question is what circumstances must pertain in order for the postulates to be met: *under what conditions is it possible for science to proceed?* Based on the comments of Martin and Wiebe regarding the emergence of *Wissenschaft* in Germany, one might be inclined to suggest that the conditions on which science proceeds are established in universities. They would not be alone in the argument that universities are the guardians of science and this fits in with a broader framework in which democracy is also necessary for science. However, such arguments rely too heavily upon the unwritten assumption that Science as an institution covers all of science. To the contrary we find it necessary to argue that there is nothing in the nature, or structure, of universities and democracy that would protect science. Quite the opposite in fact. Simply put, democracies - or indeed any State - and universities have a proclivity toward pseudo-science.

A second more fundamental challenge lies in what we call the “humanist challenge”: *as we have eminently practical interests (surviving and thriving) that cannot be escaped, all “nonpractical interests” in fact contain implicit practical interests*. While this challenge has been formulated in numerous ways, including by postmodern and feminist critiques that we have mentioned already, the root argument is that science, despite its claim to seek “knowledge for its own sake”, cannot avoid being value-laden\(^1\) – i.e.

there is no proper science, only pseudo-science as we have understood it. In order to maintain that proper science does not reduce itself to pseudo-science, we must further investigate the epistemic status of science through a consideration of objectivity. Particularly under the auspices of naturalism, a reification of science’s objectivity through an orthodoxy of rationality has led to epistemic arrogance which engenders pseudo-science.

Investigating these problems of the possibility and epistemic status of science will place us in a position to address the crisis of social science. Having cut away pseudo-science we will nevertheless be left with the problem raised by our own recognition that multiple cognitive styles may be proper science. That is, numerous cognitive styles may meet the postulates of social science as we have established them. The problem to be tackled, then, is why, if these cognitive styles are all social scientific, do they struggle to cohere with one another? A consideration of this problem can only be achieved if we focus on the “social” of social science. By this we mean it is necessary to engage into an investigation into intersubjectivity and how it is Others are recognised as Other. In so doing we shall return to the human prejudice as a major source of pseudo-science in social science.
5. The Possibility of science

The first challenge to be addressed is *under what conditions is it possible for science to proceed?* As has been noted in the Introduction and the previous Part, a significant number of scholars maintain science is dependent in some fashion on universities. Such arguments have their emphasis in the institutional setting of science. It is the purpose of this chapter to demonstrate that, based on our understanding of science, these arguments have taken issues regarding the practical possibility of science as matters of the essential possibility of science. By “practical possibility”\(^1\) we mean the amount of time that can be *giefan* over to the doing of science, and by “essential possibility” the condition upon which this *gieneende* can take place. Such an argument is predicated on the following point by Husserl:

> The sense of our whole meditation implies that sciences, as these facts of Objective culture, and sciences “in the true and genuine sense” need not be identical and that the former, over and above being cultural facts, involve a claim, which ought to be established as one they already satisfy. Science as an idea – as the idea, genuine sciences – “lies”, still undisclosed, precisely in this claim. (Husserl, 1999:9)

Quite simply, just because a university department calls itself “Social Science” or claims to be doing social science does not mean that it actually is. In particular we need to recognise that while such departments provide more opportunity in which to do science, science is itself not dependent upon these departments in order to be done.

i. The practical possibility of science

In the past a number of scholars have maintained that the possibility of science is founded upon a democratic society: Hook (1944) argued for the relevance of naturalism to democracy; McLung Lee (1973) helped inspire Students for a Democratic Society (Morton et al. 2012:11); Lloyd advocates a methodology that he calls historical structurism which is ‘radically egalitarian and democratic’ (Lloyd, 1989:488); Merton (1973a) argues that under totalitarian rule science is undermined; Kalleberg (2010) argues that Merton’s norm of *universalism* is fundamental to both democracy and science; and Burawoy (2011a) equates public sociology with deliberative democracy. Indeed, there is a whole host of literature (mostly American) that implies that higher education has always been in the service of promoting

\(^1\) This phrase is derived from Husserl (1970c:18).
democracy, John Dewey’s *Democracy and Education* (1916) and Ernest Boyer’s “The Scholarship of Engagement” (1996) being two notable examples. Expanding upon Scheler’s scepticism on the matter (Scheler, 1980b:93-94), we argue that the relation between democracy and science is one of practical possibility and not essential possibility.

In order to show this we will return to the work of Merton as one of the strongest advocates of the relation of science to democracy. Take the following passage from his essay “Science and the Social Order”:

> [In totalitarian structures] incompatible sentiments must be insulated from one another or integrated with each other if there is to be social stability. But such insulation becomes virtually impossible when there exists centralised control under the aegis of any one sector of social life which imposes, and attempts to reinforce, the obligation of adherence to its values and sentiments as a condition of continued existence. In liberal structures the absence of such centralisation permits the necessary degree of insulation by guaranteeing to each sphere restricted rights of autonomy and thus enables the gradual integration of temporarily inconsistent elements. (1973a:266)

The relation between democracy and science is also strengthened in “The Normative Structure of Science”, in which Merton lays out the norms of science, where he claims scientists now ‘recognise their dependence on particular types of social structure’ (1973b:267). We mean to deny this claim by looking at two of Merton’s norms in relation to democracy.

*Universalism* demands that all truth-claims be consistent with observation and previously confirmed knowledge. As Merton goes on to explain: ‘The circumstance that scientifically verified formulations refer in that specific sense to objective sequences and correlations militates against all efforts to impose particularistic criteria of validity’ (1973b:270). By this Merton means that science does not distinguish its results on the grounds of gender, race, religion, nationality, etc. Acceptance or rejection of scientific data is dependent upon its verification either by already established knowledge or further observation. This then also agrees with our postulate of verifiability.

*Disinterestedness* – so dependent is science upon verification by fellow scientists that they in effect police one another, promoting a disinterested attitude in one’s work (1973b:276). Merton sees priority in scientific discovery as one of the criteria of achievement but because this requires validation by a community of peers who themselves seek priority there is less room for cheating. In order to express this Merton speaks of “compeers” instead of peers which Gieryn suggests is to deliberately capture the notion that the people assessing one’s work are the very people one is competing with (Gieryn, 2007:124). Thus in the interests of getting ahead the scientist needs to play by the rules of the game.
Merton suggests this is more of an institutional point rather than a personal one; the scientist is made disinterested by the institution he works in as this is the only means to advance within that institution. While this disinterestedness equates with the postulate of nonpractical knowledge, we may note, that because of his focus on compeers, this is not the purpose of science for Merton, *per se*. And more than Schutz, Merton also recognised the frailty of the norm: ‘To the extent the scientist-layman relation does become paramount, there develop incentives for evading the mores of science. The abuse of expert authority and the creation of pseudo-sciences are called into play when the structure of control exercised by the qualified compeers is rendered ineffectual’ (Merton, 1973b:277). On this we both concur that the Scientific province of meaning pivots around the maintenance of disinterestedness and when this is abandoned Science collapses.\(^2\)

As recognised by Epstein (2007), the norm of universalism is particularly important because Merton argues that it is also to be found in democracy: ‘impersonal criteria of accomplishment and not fixation of status characterise the open democratic society’ (1973b:273). As noted by Kalleberg, this is the closest Merton comes to ever defining the norms of democracy which he notes is typical of contemporary sociology in failing to provide definitions of the concept (Kalleberg, 2010:195). But at the least it can, according to Kalleberg, be said that there is an “internal relationship” between the universalism of democracy and the universalism of science (2007:155). However, it is impossible to ignore the context in which Merton writes with the rise of Nazism. As Kalleberg admits earlier, Merton is politically ‘left of the centre, being antifascist and prodemocracy’ (2010:183). Throughout, the paper is an attack upon the state of science under Nazi totalitarianism, concluding that science cannot function under any form of totalitarian rule. However, as Kalleberg comments indicate, aside from the norm of universalism Merton gives no clear definition of “democracy” and even less consideration to “totalitarianism”. The definition of the latter has come under particular scrutiny and many would question if Nazism comes under this definition.\(^3\) We do not mean to put into question Merton’s analysis that Nazism undermined science, but rather draw attention to the leap that is made from this analysis to the argument that *all* totalitarian States undermine science whereas democracy protects it.

We charge that Merton is dealing with a reified understanding of democracy whereby he assumes universalism is a necessary feature. Universalism entails a non-racist and egalitarian State. But if

\(^2\) A similar sort of argument is presented by Wiebe (2012).
\(^3\) According to Kershaw “Nazism” has come under the rubric of “fascism”, “totalitarianism” and “sui generis phenomenon” at various points in time (Kershaw, 1985:18-19).
we look at the earliest known democratic State, Athens, we see this clearly isn’t the case. Around the 4th century BCE when Athenian democracy was at its height the population of Athens was around 300,000 and the number of citizens entitled to vote was somewhere between 30,000-60,000 and a significant portion of those not allowed to vote were women and slaves. In Merton’s context sexism and slavery are considered to be antithetical to democracy, yet the Athenians had no such problem reconciling them. As such democracy means something very different to two collections of people of different milieux. In order to understand Merton’s use of “democracy” in this context it is worth drawing on Kershaw’s observation about the term “totalitarianism” as ‘an ideological instrument of negative political categorisation’ (Kershaw, 1985:30). In Merton’s case we see the converse, the use of “democracy” as “an ideological instrument of positive political categorisation”.  

We will not seek to define either “democracy” or “totalitarianism” in this case. What we need to focus on is Merton’s use of “liberal” in “Science and Social Order” as synonymous with “democracy” in “The Normative Structure of Science”. Following Scheler we accept that “liberal democracy” may be beneficial to science but not that all democracy is “liberal” (Scheler, 1980b:94). By contrast, Merton has erroneously conflated “liberal” and “democratic”. By “liberal” Merton means the insulation of a particular group by the State such that it can operate autonomously. Following Scheler we define “State” in the following manner: ‘The state, as seen by itself, is simply the highest centre of the [ferhdcdunl] collective will, i.e., the will of control over a natural life-community (people) or a plurality of such communities’ (1973b:545). A State, therefore, is any group which auto-interprets itself (“as seen by itself”) as a monothetic unity that cannot be made the polythetic constituent to a higher level of group (“highest centre”). This “controlling will” is then directed to, among other things, ‘the preservation and furtherance of the well-being of the whole of the community, both within and without (administration, “defense” of the community against attacks)’ (emphasis added, 1973b:546). To avoid confusion with “liberalism”, we understand Merton’s use of “liberal” to mean “abstentive control” in contradistinction to

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4 This “positive” formulation of democracy has also occurred in phenomenology. E.g. Klaus Held has spoken of the Greek invention of democracy as ‘the novel and unique world-historical form of community which does justice to this authentic phenomenology of the political’ (Held, 1993:299). This use of “authentic”, meant to be derived from Heidegger, however contains a positive valuation that Heidegger did not originally ascribe to it (Heidegger, 2010:42-43). Held goes on to suggest that it is because of Heidegger’s one-sided focus on the notion of anguish to the exclusion of awe that he was not able to see the benefit of democracy against national socialism. He claims that: ‘Heidegger could not see the uniqueness still distinguishing liberal democracy of “rights of man” rooted in the Greek beginning’ (Held, 1993:300). A claim (much like Merton’s) that neatly obscures that the current “rights of man” condemns slavery, which the Greeks found perfectly acceptable.
“active control” by the State. That is, the State necessarily controls the various groups that constitute it by either determining what those groups should do (active control) or letting those group determine for themselves what they should do (abstentive control). Therefore when Merton claims that ‘Democratisation is tantamount to the progressive elimination of restraints upon the exercise and development of socially valued capacities’ we can see the assumption that democracy enforces abstentive control (1973b:273). This abstentive control by democracy therefore insulates science. But turning to our very own democracy (Britain) we can see that in this empirical case the government does not observe abstentive control in relation to science. Instead it takes active control through the recently enforced Research Excellence Framework (REF) that determines the apportionment of funding to universities in Britain. We will explore this case in detail to show that democracy is not only unnecessary for science (essential possibility), but it can in fact hinder it.

Under REF, universities present research accomplishments to acquire funding which are assessed according to an overall quality profile which determines the submitted work’s “originality”, “significance” and “rigour”. However, no definition as such is given to these terms, but for each profile there are three sub-profiles: “Outputs”, “Impact” and “Environment”. Within the sub-profile “Outputs”, definitions to the above three assessment terms are provided. Of interest to us is “significance”. In the Social Science division “significance” means: ‘the development of the intellectual agenda of the field and may be theoretical, methodological and/or substantive’ (REF, 2012:67). But this definition is ambiguous as to the locus of this significance: Is it meant to be significant to academia or is it meant to be significant to society at large?

In order to answer this question we must look instead in more detail at the “Impact” sub-profile. The generic description of “Impact” states the following: ‘The sub-panels will assess the “reach and significance” of impacts on the economy, society and/or culture that were underpinned by excellent research conducted in the submitted unit’ (REF, 2012:6). This is then further interpreted by the various divisions according to their intentions. In the case of Social Science, REF ‘wishes to encourage the submission of a wide range of types of impact outside academia’ within the spheres of ‘creativity, culture and society; the economy, commerce or organisations; the environment; health and welfare; practitioners and professional services; public policy, law and services’ such that the ‘beneficiaries of impact may include (but are not restricted to) community/ies, the environment, individuals and organisations’ (emphasis added, REF, 2012:68). According to REF, then, the purpose of Social Science is the postulate
of public benefit: scientific research should be beneficial to society as a whole. It is not concerned with work that is significant to academia alone: ‘HEIs [Higher Education Institutes] are reminded that impacts on research or the advancement of academic knowledge within the higher education sector (whether in the UK or internationally) are excluded’ (REF, 2012:68). This concern with society beyond academia is again emphasised later: ‘The main panel particularly acknowledges that there may be impacts arising from research within Main Panel C disciplines which take forms such as holding public or private bodies to account or subjecting proposed changes in society, public policy, business practices, and so on to public scrutiny’ (REF, 2012:86). This is finally summarised in the definitions for “reach” and “significance” of impact:

a. Reach will be understood in terms of the extent and diversity of communities, environments, individuals, organisations or any other beneficiaries that have benefitted or been affected.
b. Significance will be understood in terms of the degree to which the impact has enriched, influenced, informed or changed policies, opportunities, perspectives or practices of communities, individuals or organisations. (REF, 2012:74)

We may regard “reach” and “significance” as expressions of the outcome that REF would impose on Social Science. While “Impact” may only account for 20% of the overall assessment our charge here is that the REF – as a medium of governmental control – enforces a postulate of public benefit which fundamentally affects the purpose of Social Science and overrides the postulate of nonpractical knowledge.

John Ziman (2002) and Philip Moriarty (2011) both raise concerns about this focus and changes to Research Councils UK (RCUK) and the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) which is in charge of REF. Significantly, both appeal to Merton’s norms of science and both recognise these government structures as undermining them. Ziman sees disinterested science as academic research which is opposed to instrumental research, which is effectively what is entailed by “impact”. He criticises that: ‘Being normally funded by contracts rather than by patronage, instrumental science is so captive to material interests and commercial agendas that it is partisan rather than objective in its judgements’ (Ziman, 2002:399). Indeed, this ethical practice (as Ziman refers to it) is incompatible with the ethical practice that underpins academic research founded on the mutual trust that everyone pursuing this kind of research is being “disinterested”. In this regard the notion of “disinterested” is further unpacked by Ziman’s list of basic ethical principles of academic research: personal integrity, transparency, intellectual
sincerity, honesty, authenticity, collegiality, benevolence, and autonomy (2002:399). Normally, the corruption of these principles is attributable to instances of were's frailty, but Ziman warns, if we accept instrumental knowledge then the corruption of these principles will become habitual. In short, the community of scientists falls apart.

Moriarty sees just this in the case of RCUK and REF which focus on short-term economic gains that are actively causing the demise of the scientist as disinterested. Disinterestedness is defined by Moriarty as the drive by curiosity: ‘[scientists] carry out their work not to “engage with users” nor to “generate impact” but to address a question, or series of questions, about how nature behaves’ (Moriarty, 2011:60). To serve a client is to bear the potential applicability of one’s findings very much so in mind. It is to be constrained by the practical interests of that client. He further sees this as the loss of Mertonian norms in science and the death of academia in the face of an emergent post-academia (Ziman’s phrase). He goes on to discuss the Warry Report, Increasing the Economic Impact of the Research Councils (2006), which advocates that universities steer research in ways that will produce economic growth (Moriarty, 2011:66). This includes the contamination of the peer review process in which the main criterion becomes economic relevance. Further, he warns of the subtle shift in language that occurs in the report from “peer” review to “user” review. He also goes on to detail how the baffled responses by a number of universities over just how economic impact was to be measured/defined was summarily ignored by the research councils (2011:67-68). Worse still, in the case of “Impact” in REF, a petition was signed by 17,500 academics in 2009 to have the category removed from the assessment criteria, but was ignored by HEFCE. The full demise of academic research for Moriarty is made clear by RCUK’s tips for completing “impact statements”, which place an emphasis on putting outcomes, users and beneficiaries of research first and designing the project around them (2011:68).

The postulate of public benefit entails cohortativism: the purpose of “science” becomes to “fulfil the client’s interest”. In particular this has a significant impact on scientific rationality and the postulate of verifiability. As observed by Tittle: ‘the extent to which [the clients] want sociologists’ help, they want us to find evidence that supports their interests. But can this form the basis of scientific validation? I doubt it, unless scientific validity is no more than the ability to appease one’s clients’ (Tittle, 2004:1643). As Tittle further observes, this kind of validation ‘leaves the door open to two competing analyses

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5 In various ways these correspond to Schutz’s postulates of social science.
6 Moriarty is a professor of physics at Nottingham University, hence the use of “nature”. In this case the word can be substituted for the object of study of whichever branch of science we are speaking of.
coming to contradictory results being equally valid to one another. Publics rarely want to find the “truth” in the sense that looking at the full array of positive and negative evidence’ (2004:1643). Different clients will have different interests which then require different standards of verification.7

REF instils this mercenary approach in Science. Moreover Desmond King indicates that to a certain degree REF not only engenders cohortativism but also operates as the “client” too. Studying previous iterations of “applied research” (fulfilling practical interests), King observes that as far back as 1965 such research ‘might be politically unpalatable for the prevailing government’ (King, 2011:75). This brought about the creation of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), a branch of RCUK, to oversee funding applications that in 1981-82 came under fire from the Rothschild Inquiry which questioned the “scientific” nature of the SSRC. King notes that Rothschild validated the quality of research of the SSRC and its research questions, as well as confirming its scientific status (2011:83). But at the same time Rothschild accepted a very broad notion of “client” for applied research. King goes on further to argue that since then “applied” has taken on narrower meanings and it is out of this restrictive understanding of “clients” that REF’s “Impact” was inspired (2011:85-86). As such REF approved research must also be “politically palatable”.

As Ziman, Moriarty and King’s arguments make clear, REF undermines the very scientific norms that Merton espoused. Contrary to his assumption democracies do not necessarily provide the abstentive control that would insulate science. REF itself is an instrument of active control that engenders cohortativism which through a postulate of public benefit replaces the postulate of nonpractical knowledge. Regardless of whether we are considering a “totalitarian” or “democratic” State, the insulation of science is dependent upon instruments of abstentive control. However, we must not then fall into a confusion that the essential possibility of science is dependent upon abstentive control by States. The “insulation” of which Merton has spoken of refers to “institutional” science, e.g. science done by university departments. As Wiebe has put it more recently: science ‘could not exist without strong institutional support for the sustained critical reflective thought it requires’ (Wiebe, 2012:183). What is not considered by either Merton or Wiebe is non-institutional science.

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7 See Ch.6.iv.
ii. Science and institutions

In pursuing an understanding of “non-institutional science” we mean to show that universities only provide practical possibility towards the pursuit of science. To do this we must first secure what is meant by “institution” in order to know what is “non-institutional”. For this task we need to consider groups as groups for which Schutz may not be ideal. Some have regarded Schutz’s phenomenology as being methodological individualism, a view perhaps stemming from the influence of Weber. For example, this can be seen in the way that the postulate of subjective interpretation is formulated in terms of understanding the “individual mind” (Schutz, 1962g:43, 1964k:18). In this respect Merton’s norms could be regarded as more holistic; his norm of disinterestedness arises out of the collective need for “fair play”. In another respect Schutz gave significant prominence to the role of consociate relations, face-to-face encounters, throughout his work, leading to a focus on individuals interacting with individuals rather than individuals with groups, or groups with groups.

Embree has also pointed to this seeming deficit in Schutz’s thinking. However, based on Schutz’s conclusions in “Some Equivocations in the Notion of Responsibility” (1958[1964j]), he suggests that there is an implicit but fundamental perspective in which groups can be regarded as individuals (Embree, 2011b:2). He raises three points in this regard. First, there are comments like the following in PSW:

we frequently use sentences in which ideal types like “the state,” “the press,” “the economy,” “the nation,” “the people,” or perhaps “the working class”… appear as grammatical subjects. In doing this, we naturally tend to personify these abstractions, treating them as if they were real persons known in indirect social experience. But we are indulging in an anthropomorphism. Actually the ideal types are absolutely anonymous. (1967:198-199)

Second, we can suggest that holding a province of meaning involves being a member of a group. In his discussion of the stock of knowledge Schutz recognises that much of this is not directly gained by the individual but rather *giefan* by his fellows. As Embree suggests, this entails that ‘we always already are members of groups’ (Embree, 2011b:5). Third, though not always recognised, Schutz held that ‘the individual is the *abstractum* abstracted from intersubjectivity or collective life and, it would follow, the structure of the social world as a structure of individuals rests on an abstraction and is thus abstract, while intersubjectivity is concrete’ (2011b:5). Take, as one example, this statement from “Common-sense and
Scientific Interpretation”: ‘we preceded as if the world were my private world and as if we were entitled to disregard the fact that it is from the outset an intersubjective world’ (Schutz, 1962g:10).8

While Embree’s argument does suggest that Schutz did not commit himself to methodological individualism, he admits that his own subsequent suggestion that groups can be treated as individuals themselves goes beyond the letter of Schutz’s own writing. We can, however, develop an alternate argument to Embree’s by relating Schutz’s work to that of Scheler on groups. We have noted previously that Schutz accepted Scheler’s sociology of knowledge largely without qualification.9

Scheler’s discussion of groups is intimately bound up with his analysis of the Person:

not only does everyone discover himself against a background of, and at the same time as a “member” of, a totality of interconnections of experience which have somehow become concentrated, and which are called in their temporal extension history, in their simultaneous extension social unity; but as a moral subject in this whole, everyone is also given as a “person acting with others,” as a “man with others,” and as “co-responsible” for everything morally relevant in this totality. (Scheler, 1973b:520)

This totality of “living with one another” has its centre which Scheler calls the collective person which can be contrasted with the individual person. Scheler describes the mode of experience of the individual person as experiencing-for-one-self and the collective person as experiencing-with-one-another. As Schutz himself suggests: ‘The subjective meaning the group has for its members consists in their knowledge of a common situation, and with it a common system of typifications and relevances… The system of typifications and relevances shared with other members of the group defines the social roles, positions and statuses of each’ (emphasis added, Schutz, 1964i:251). We may therefore qualify our idea of auto-interpretation10 into “meaning for me” which belongs to the individual person and “meaning for us” which belongs to the collective person. In this respect the collective person is constituted by the co-experiencing of individual persons and therefore possesses its own “consciousness-of” (Scheler, 1973b:522-523). As the totality of persons experiencing with one another ‘the collective person with its world is not fully experienced in any of its member-persons; it is given as something going beyond the member-persons in terms of duration, content, and range of effectiveness’ (1973b:523).11 Thus, to call groups collective persons is to say that they constitute a “Here” that is not identical with the “Here” of

9 See Ch.3.i.
10 See Ch.3.ii.b.
11 In his consideration of intersubjectivity in CM, Husserl largely repeats Scheler’s thought when he speaks of ’personalities of a higher order’ (Husserl, 1988:131-136).
any single member (individual persons) but rather is an external “Here” which they must occupy in order to be members.

Scheler points to a community of collective persons. We may usefully put this in Schutz’s terms of meaning-context. That is, a collective person as constituted by a particular province of meaning can find itself as a polythetic constituent to a province of meaning of a higher level. In such a case collective persons become individual persons in relation to a collective person of a higher level. As Scheler himself explains: ‘the collective person (apart from the concepts of it, such as state, nation, church) is as much a [social] individual as the individual person’ (1973b:525). An example of such stratification can be found in the structure of Taekwondo:

- Practitioner
- Tuesday class
- Edinburgh University Taekwondo Club
- Central Taekwondo Academy
- United Taekwondo Association
- British Taekwondo Control Board
- European Taekwondo Union
- World Taekwondo Federation
- Taekwondo

Each level of organisation is the controlling force over an ever increasing number of practitioners creating levels of collective person in which the “we” becomes ever expanded. But running this in reverse this does not mean that someone operating at the meaning-context of Central Taekwondo Academy speaks of practitioners alone. Referring to a lower level of meaning-context they, as Schutz above points out, treat the Edinburgh University Taekwondo Club as a “grammatical subject”. In this respect they do not refer to a single practitioner or practitioners in the plural, but treat the whole club as an individual person.12

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12 The above example of Taekwondo also highlights other useful points that do not, however, further the current argument:

First, it is worth noting the abstractions involved. The list is taken from my own personal affiliation to Taekwondo and it is worth pointing out that not only am I practitioner at the Tuesday Class but also the Wednesday Class within the Edinburgh University Taekwondo Club. However, this may pose a problem if we remember that provinces of meaning on the same level of meaning-context are contradictory. While this is technically true it is only so in the sense that a person cannot occupy them at the same time. As both classes happen at different times I am able to attend both. But, if another club has a Tuesday Class I would not be able to attend both. On this point too, so long as class times do not conflict a single practitioner may therefore also be a member of various clubs, academies, associations, etc. without problem.

Second, though not contradictory provinces on the same level of meaning-context are nevertheless conflictory. By this we mean that the physical strains induced, or injuries incurred, during the Tuesday Class render it harder to attend the Wednesday Class. Thus a practitioner may forgo the Tuesday Class in order to be able to attend the Wednesday Class. On a different level this conflict of
Among those groups considered by Scheler as collective persons, he regards the State to be one particular type (1973b:545). And to understand the State as “controlling will” is significant if related to Schutz’s own comments regarding the individual person. According to Schutz our world is one of domination in that ‘we have an eminently practical interest in it, caused by the necessity of complying with the basic requirements of life’ (Schutz, 1962d:227). That is, all swincan is geared towards surviving and thriving. Both State and individual as persons share the same concern of surviving and thriving.

States, just like other collective persons, contain within them subgroups that are themselves individual persons, many of which are referred to as “institutions” in social science. But as Patricia Martin (2004) has pointed out, the prolific application of “institution” to a wide range of cases does not exactly make the notion clear. In the case of Schutz there are numerous references to “institutions” but rarely if ever do these comments give a suggestion as to what is meant. This would seem to be a missed opportunity as Martin lays the majority of confusion over “institution” at the feet of Parsons (2004:1253), whom Schutz butted heads with frequently. One may be inclined to therefore accept Martin’s twelve point definition of “institution” (2004:1256-1259). However, as detailed as this definition is, there is an inherent flaw to the entire scheme. If we were to replace every mention of “institution” with “group” we would find that no part of the definition would become problematic. That is, if institutions are a kind of group, it is not clear what feature on this list cannot be found in non-institutional groups or, considering its extensiveness, what feature could be added to go beyond an institution. This is made clearest with the third criterion, which happens to be the strongest: ‘Institutions entail distinct social practices that recur, recycle, or are repeated by group members’ (2004:1256). Based on this we can ask why Great Britain isn’t an institution? The State as an institution seems to run counter to the generally accepted assumption provinces can be more “ideological”. For example, alongside the World Taekwondo Federation (WTF) there is at the same level of meaning-context the International Taekwondo Federation (ITF). Both Federations have differing rules and styles of Taekwondo, ones each regards as proper while treating the other’s as improper. Thus senior members will occasionally exhort members not to associate with the other Federation.

Third, following on from this point we can observe in Taekwondo a far more complex relation of provinces of meaning than the above list indicates. In particular we can note that the Edinburgh University Taekwondo Club offers both WTF and ITF classes. Thus the club is the polythetic constituent to two monothetic unities simultaneously.

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13 See Schutz 1979[2011c].
that States contain institutions. One may counter that Great Britain can’t be an institution because the social practices of now are not those of the Tudor period. But Martin’s own definition denies this rebuttal with the ninth and tenth criteria: ‘Institutions are inconsistent, contradictory, and rife with conflict’ and ‘Institutions continuously change’ (2004:1257). That an institution differs from how it was some years ago does not stand against it. And again it is unclear how this differs from non-institutional groups.

Working with our comments regarding States above, we could draw on Albrecht’s definition of institutions: ‘the principle structures through which human activities are organised and established to serve basic human needs’ (Albrecht, 1968:383). And at one point Schutz would seem to endorse this: ‘There are, on the one hand, institutions of various kinds, tools, machines, etc.; on the other hand, habits, traditions, rules, and experiences, both actual and vicarious’ (Schutz, 1964b:70). But this functional differentiation is then countermanded later:

Following the customary terminology, we use the term “cultural pattern of group life” for designating all the peculiar valuations, institutions, and systems of orientation and guidance (such as the folkways, mores, laws, habits, customs, etiquette, fashions) which, in the common opinion of sociologists of our time characterise – if not constitute – any social group at a given moment in its history. (1964c:92)

In this case institutions appear to include those very things they were differentiated from in the previous quote. Even if we set this aside, the notion that institutions are necessarily functional is fairly suspect. Albrecht argues that Art is an institution and tries to justify this on the basis of “basic human needs”. But while Art may be very important to an individual person’s needs can we then broaden this to the whole group as a person? If we consider the collective person’s need to survive and thrive there are three areas that need to be attended to: production, new members must be created to replace lost members; regulation, some level of discipline must be maintained among members; protection, members must be defended from external threats. An institution would presumably fulfil one of these needs. How Art does this is less than clear.

Take another example, Sport, which is also widely regarded as an institution(s). Sport cannot, in this functional sense, be an institution as it neither produces new members for the State or protects

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16 This point is made by Berger and Luckmann who argue that States are made up of the interconnection of various institutions (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:55).
17 The two sources are only a year apart.
18 This list is derived from the introductory comments of “Equality and the Social Meaning Structure” (Schutz, 1964i:229-230).
them from external threats. One may counter that it is a source of regulation, keeping people happy and so forth, but this is to ignore the rampant tribalism that occurs between fans of different teams such as in Football.  

Another counter would be that the amount of money Football earns contributes to production. However, not all Sports are so financially successful and such an argument does not consider the possibility that Football’s financial success is the result of it being an institution rather than vice versa. That this is likely the case can be seen if we draw a comparison with another major institution – marriage. On a purely functional level what is gained by marriage? It is not required for production as offspring can be produced in other ways. We may suggest that it serves a regulatory function through rearing these offspring. However, not only are there societies without marriage, but in other cases marriage is undergoing de-institutionalisation. Further, in societies that already have marriage as an institution we witness cases of single parent families raising successful members in that these offspring do not present a threat to the State’s surviving and thriving.

All this indicates that institutions cannot be defined functionally. Nonetheless, though Schutz never gives an explicit definition, an understanding of “institution” can be drawn out of certain other comments. One idea we need to draw on is Schutz’s sociology of knowledge as it occurs in “The Well-Informed Citizen” (1946[1964e]). In many other places Schutz talks of “socially derived knowledge” but in this essay he also introduces “socially approved knowledge”: what I know is given additional “weight” if others I trust also affirm this knowledge. Further, if I giefe authority, be it to my mother or government, then the knowledge they possess also carries more “weight”. This leads to the following statement:

The power of socially approved knowledge is so extended that what the whole in-group approves – ways of thinking and acting, such as mores, folkways, habits – is simply taken for granted; it becomes an element of a relatively natural concept of the world, although the source of such knowledge remains entirely hidden in its anonymity. (1964e:133)

What we wish to emphasise from this statement is the idea of a “natural concept of the world”, a concept that is drawn directly from Scheler’s “natural view of the world” (Scheler, 1980b). As Scheler argued, there is ‘no universal and constant view of the world such as the “state of nature,” “idealism,” or “materialism.” There are only relatively “natural” views of the world integrally united with particular
social groupings’ (Becker and Dahlke, 1942:315). Thus, “natural” means what is “given” or “accepted without question” by a group (Scheler, 1980b:74). We can apply this to our discussion by suggesting that an institution is any group deemed natural by the State. That is, the group is “accepted without question” and even defended when put into question: institutions are protected groups. Even groups that do not fulfil the needs of the State (producing, regulating, or protecting) are institutions if the State actively tries to protect them. We will utilise the Old English “rihtgesetnes” to signify this phenomenological use of “institution”.

By consequence the ascription of “rihtgesetnes” to any particular group is entirely subjective on the part of the State. Conversely, the case of Don Quixote indicates the ascription of “rihtgesetnes” is not merely the prerogative of States. In his study of Don Quixote, Schutz points out that for the hero of the story ‘the institution of knights errant… is universally acknowledge and authenticated’ (Schutz, 1964h:137). The rihtgesetnes of knights errant has its own historical basis, is a way of life with a particular goal, possesses its own legal and economic system and even its own cosmogony. But as is made clear from the story, though the other characters humour Don Quixote they treat it as nothing more than phantasy; that in their “common-sense world” there is no such rihtgesetnes of knights errant and all that is associated with it.

The problem this presents for our consideration is that no formal criteria can be laid out by which we can determine if a particular group is a rihtgesetnes or not. Nevertheless, groups can be marked out as rihtgesetnessa or not based on the way the State treats them through such mediums as law. That is, rihtgesetnessa are protected by laws laid down by the State and un-rihtgesetnessa are either not covered by particular laws or are subject to laws that repress them. In short, if we wish to identify un-rihtgesetnisc science an easy way of doing this is to identify illegal science.

24 “Given” is not therefore being used in our sense of “giefan”.
25 It is important to recognise the difference between protection and insulation in this regard. All insulated groups are institutions, but not all institutions are insulated.
26 Literally translated as “right office” or “right institution”. Derived from the conjunction of “riht” (“right” or “proper”) and “gesetnes” (“position”, “foundation”, “tradition” or “institution”). While “gesetnes” would be a more direct translation, the conjunctive “riht” better captures our intended meaning.
27 This point concurs with Klaus Meier’s (1981) work on the definition of Sport in sociology. He provides an extended argument as to why “institutionalisation” is inadequate as an essential feature of Sport. Based on our comments the understanding of rihtgesetnes can be applied to what he classifies as Sports but this is not a necessary connection.
28 Byrne has criticised those who would claim that all religions are a priori “masking institutions” and instead states ‘the notion that religions are masking institutions is to be proved, if at all possible, on a case-by-case basis’ (Bryne, 1999:257). We would make the much stronger claim that whether religions are rihtgesetnes at all needs to be demonstrated on a case-by-case basis.
For such an example of illegal science we need only turn to the Scientific Revolution and the debate over heliocentrism. Although Galileo was not initially censored for discussing the hypothesis that the earth moved and the sun was stationary, his *Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems* (1632) had him brought before the Vatican Inquisition which found him “vehemently suspect of heresy”. According to Finocchiaro this phrase does not have the same connotation it does in current parlance but rather is the official categorisation of a crime: ‘there were three types of religious crime, in descending order of seriousness: formal heresy, vehement suspicion of heresy, and slight suspicion of heresy’ (Finocchiaro, 1989:15). Galileo was therefore convicted of having committed the second most serious crime the Inquisition could accuse someone of. As a consequence he was placed under house arrest for the rest of his life (a lenient sentence) and the *Dialogue* was placed on the list of illegal books. During his lifelong arrest Galileo wrote *Two New Sciences* (1638), and Finocchiaro notes ironically that ‘though the forbidden topic of the earth’s motion was not so much as mentioned, the conceptual framework and laws of motion he elaborated therein could be used later to provide a more effective proof of the phenomenon than any he had been able to formulate before’ (1989:39). Quite simply, Galileo’s science was illegal and yet he did it anyway. Just because the State or ruling body suppresses science does not mean that science does not get done “behind closed doors”.

The point to be made of this is that science is not always *richtgesetnisc*.

*Richtgesetnessa* of Science (i.e. university departments) only increase the practical possibility in which science can be done. Contra Wiebe, science *could* ‘exist without strong institutional support for the sustained critical reflective thought it requires’ (Wiebe, 2012:183). As such, in relation to the crisis of social science it is important to emphasise that this crisis is *not* a *richtgesetnisc* matter. Our concern is not the protection of Social Science as a *richtgesetnesses*. The question then, is, insofar as science is *richtgesetnisc* what condition is being met (essential possibility) so that time can be *giefan* to doing science.

**iii. The essential possibility of science**

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29 Of course the problem is that because such science is done secretly, awareness of it is limited. Much of Galileo’s work was held in the Vatican Secret Archives and virtually unknown until access was granted in the 1870s (Finocchiaro, 1989:42).
In order to discern the essential possibility of science let us focus further on Galileo. As Finocchiaro points out, being under house arrest provided Galileo with the very time he needed in order to write *Two Sciences* that would justify heliocentrism (1989:39). If we attend to what it means to be under house arrest we can note that it involves a lot of spare time. “Spare time” is defined here as any time in the life of the person that does not need to be spent surviving and thriving. As Schutz notes, we have eminently practical interests (swincan) in the life-world founded upon the necessities of life. Conjoined, this is to say that *all practical interests are aimed at the surviving and thriving of the person*. If the person fails in their practical interest then they risk their surviving and thriving. Hence the possibility of a person having nonpractical interests is dependent upon all practical interests being currently satisfied. If satisfied this leaves time in the person’s life for the pursuit of interests extra to their surviving and thriving.

This division between what we are now calling “swincan time” and “spare time” was partially recognised by Sartre in *BN* as the division between the “serious attitude” and “play”: ‘The serious attitude involves starting from the world and attributing more reality to the world than to oneself; at the very least the serious man confers reality on himself to the degree to which he belongs to the world’; and ‘The first principle of play is man himself; through it he escapes his natural nature; he himself sets the value and rules for his acts and consents to play only according to the rules which he himself has established and defined’ (Sartre, 2003:601). To play, then, is to ignore the eminently practical interests of surviving and thriving and establish a new approach to the world. Science, we argue, as the pursuit of nonpractical knowledge (a nonpractical interest) is a form of play predicated upon spare time. As Husserl himself recognised:

> The theoretical interest that comes on the scene as that *thaumazein* [science], is clearly a modification of curiosity that has its original place in natural life as an interruption in the course of “earnest living,” as a working out of originally effected vital interests, or as a playful looking about when the specific needs of actual life have been satisfied or working hours are past. (Husserl, 1965a:172-173)

This theoretical attitude requires a turning away from practical “earnest living”. This point is made no less clear than by phenomenology when Husserl recognised in *IJ* that the intuitions of phenomenological analysis run in an ‘unnatural direction’ from the natural attitude (1970a:254). This is precisely because

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30 It is the very point of Heidegger’s *anxiety* that the individual will always act in the interest of continuing their interests but must face that inevitably they will not be able to do this (Heidegger, 2010:178-184).
we put into question those things taken for granted, things which allow us to pursue our practical interest, and un-invest ourselves in the world.

In practice too, Schutz pays dividends to the idea that science is predicated on spare time. After participating in World War I Schutz was granted the right to university level education as a veteran and went on to study law and economics. Afterwards he then went to work in banks as a legal advisor which he continued to do after moving to America in 1939 until the last two years of his life. As Wagner has pointed out: ‘When we discuss aspects of his scholarly work, we hardly think about the fact that almost everything he wrote was done in his spare time’ (Wagner, 1984:111). This includes the only major work published in his life time – PSW.\textsuperscript{31} By consequence of this it is necessary to recognise that science, and by extension phenomenology, is play understood as the fulfilment of a nonpractical interest. \textit{Nonpractical knowledge is a derivative form of nonpractical interest and as such we view science as no different from sport.}\textsuperscript{32} Meier’s (1981) definition of Sport, for example, is predicated on a definition of Games. Building on the work of Suits (1972), Meier suggests that a game differs from “technical” activities (synonymous with “practical interest”) by instantiated rules that favour inefficient means to achieve the set goal (1981:93-94). This pursuit of inefficient means is, as Sartre suggested, to set the rules for ourselves.

However, three objections can be raised to the notion that the essential possibility of science is spare time. First, it is not clear how spare time is not a matter of practical possibility like State insulation and \textit{rihtgesetnessa} above? Second, the claim that science is play seems to contradict the fact that people are employed to do science. Third, engaging in play is tantamount to satisfying “idle curiosity”, but it could be argued playing does in fact contain practical interests. We regard this third objection as the more fundamental criticism for it gets at not just the possibility of science but the very possibility of having any sort of nonpractical interest.

The first objection can be restated as follows: practical possibility can be understood as that which determines how much time is made available for a particular activity to be pursued. In suggesting that science is predicated on spare time are we not just speaking about another variable like the existence of \textit{rihtgesetnessa}? It must be conceded that quite obviously the more spare time is available the more time can be spent doing science. But the difference between this and the above cases can be seen if we consider the postulate of nonpractical knowledge. As we see it, States and \textit{rihtgesetnessa} – insofar as they

\textsuperscript{31} That only the one book got published and the vast majority of his work was done as articles also testifies to the fact that much of his work was restricted to his spare time.

\textsuperscript{32} Husserl was working toward a similar point with science and art (see Moran, 2004b:180).
enforce insulation – are potential sources for the creation of the spare time necessary for science to occur. As we saw in the case of Galileo though, these are not the only sources which have the capacity to create spare time. Thus if States or rihtgestenssa do not create spare time this does not undermine the postulate of nonpractical knowledge. However, science is logically dependent upon spare time because of this very postulate. Any “time” which is not spare time is quite obviously “swincan time” – i.e. time spent pursuing practical interests. But if science is attempted during this swincan time this would involve either a contradiction of the postulate of nonpractical knowledge or the redefinition of the purpose of science.33

This point leads to the second objection. The imposition is that Science rihtgesetnenssa, e.g. university departments, have as their function the creation of spare time. Not only does the case of REF above clearly indicate otherwise but even without this, scientists who work at universities are earning money and therefore pursuing practical interests. This is in fact completely true, but we must be clear as to how it is true. Returning to the constituents of a province of meaning we need to understand Science’s relation to Swincan. As a province of meaning Swincan has as its purpose “the surviving and thriving of the person”. This then requires a methodology in order to carry out this purpose. What then is the methodology of Swincan? Considering the basic requirements for continued surviving such as food and shelter (Schutz, 1964i:230), the primary means in which these are achieved in many societies is by the accruing of money with which to buy them. Money, we can say following Heidegger, has the being-useful-for surviving and is a methodology of Swincan.34 How then is money accrued? Again looking at the societies about us, the most common method is having a job. Jobs have the being-useful-for earning money. Science has the being-useful-for earning money which has the being-useful-for surviving insofar as it is treated as a job.

However, we must distinguish between the reasons for gaining such knowledge (interest) and the sort of knowledge produced (purpose). That is, science produces a particular kind of product, nonpractical knowledge, but any kind of production requires a producer with the incentive to produce. But to speak of “product” in this sense is to necessarily speak of “demand” which is to draw us from the individual level to that of the group. In the context of science being a job this depends on “paymasters” being willing to pay for the production of nonpractical knowledge. But the group as a collective person

33 It should be recognised that as the sources of creation of spare time are dependent upon the situation, the “swincan time”/“spare time” distinction we have drawn is a formal division not always clear to the person in everyday living.

34 Just as Social Science does not necessarily have social science as its methodology so should we not be mistaken into thinking that earning money is the only methodology of Swincan.
also has eminently practical interests which will not necessarily be served by such a product. The only way in which paymasters would ask for such a product is if the surviving and thriving of the group is so secured as to allow time to be *giefan* over to such production – i.e. there must be spare time on a group level.

However, this is a tenuous transition, for as Seiwart notes: ‘it is unnatural to cultivate a discipline that demands leaving behind one’s everyday convictions’ (Seiwart, 2012:36). To pursue nonpractical interests is to go against ourselves, and though Seiwart’s comment is meant at the level of the individual person, it pertains to the collective person also. Thus if, subjectively, the collective person perceives itself to be “threatened” in any way then this tenuous situation in which an “unnatural” activity was possible will be lost and it will re-organise its constituents to respond to this threat.\(^{35}\) This is achieved by controlling the activity of its members so they contribute to the surviving and thriving of the collective person. The most effective means for doing so is through the control of the individual person’s own means of surviving and thriving. In States such as ours in which the surviving and thriving of individual persons is achieved through jobs and the earning of money, this is achieved by the control of funding.

That is, through the instrument of paymasters (of which REF is one) the collective person puts funding into those jobs or areas of work that are most likely to contribute to its own surviving and thriving.

In order to further elucidate this point, we can turn to Sartre’s analysis of *anguish* and re-apply this on the level of the collective person. Anguish, according to Sartre, ‘is the mode of being of freedom as consciousness of being; it is in anguish that freedom is, in its being, in question for itself’ (Sartre, 2003:53). The notion is drawn from both Kierkegaard and Heidegger (2010:179-180).\(^{36}\) Kierkegaard, Sartre observes, is correct in differentiating anguish from *fear* which comes from without whilst anguish comes from within. In many normal situations the two can oscillate between each other, but Sartre also maintains that there are ‘situations where anguish appears pure; that is, without ever being preceded or followed by fear’ (2003:54). According to Sartre fear entails ‘the apprehension of myself as a destructible transcendent in the midst of transcendants, as an object which does not contain in itself the origin of its future disappearance’ (2003:54). When I am afraid I apprehend the possibility of my own disappearance as the object I currently am as coming from an outside source. Wars, for example, recreate this on the

\(^{35}\) We call this a subjective perception because it is a situation pertaining to “Us” – “We are in trouble”. That an out-group may say of the situation that “They are not in trouble” is irrelevant.

\(^{36}\) It should be noted that Sartre’s notion of anguish has a much more practical concern than Heidegger’s concept of anxiety (Spiegelberg, 1982:507).
level of collective persons: one collective person is pursuing the disappearance of another collective person either by destruction or assimilation. Therefore each collective person involved in the conflict faces fear, including the aggressor who runs the risk of losing.

Thus in the state of war which causes fear, the collective person reorganises itself in order to ensure its surviving and thriving against this external threat. Fearful of its own disappearance, the collective person loses spare time. Historically we can see a number of examples in which threats to the collective person have denied the possibility of science. Merton goes some way to recognising this argument when discussing the universalism of science, he notes the following situation:

> Particularly in times of international conflict, when the dominant definition of the situation is such as to emphasise national loyalties, the man of science is subjected to the conflicting imperatives of scientific universalism and of ethnocentric particularism. The structure of the situation in which he finds himself determines the social role that is called into play. The man of science may be converted into a man of war – and act accordingly. (Merton, 1973b:271)

The “structure of the situation”, the state of war, threatens the collective person and so takes away the possibility of spare time directing all constituents towards the surviving of the group. Merton cites the 1914 manifesto of ninety three German scientists as such a moment when the *wer* of science becomes a *wer* of war, turning their science into a form of cohortativism. More famously we can think of both Weber and Durkheim who wrote strong polemics for their respective sides of the war, both claiming “objectivity” (Derman, 2012:26-30; Tiryakian, 1995:123). In this situation science is thereby *for-rihtgesetnesian* (de-institutionalised). Even Wiebe recognises that ‘in periods of cultural crisis, it is not impossible that the sciences could be seriously curtailed or lost altogether’ (Wiebe, 2012:184). That is, university departments re-organise themselves to contribute to the war effort and cease to do science in the sense we have defined it.

Anguish differs from fear in that it originates not from an external source but internally. Anguish is the realisation that ‘any conduct on my part is only possible, and this means that while constituting a totality of motives for pushing away that situation, I at the same moment apprehend these motives as not sufficiently effective’ (Sartre, 2003:55). I realise in the moment of anguish that all that might cause me to take one course cannot in fact cause me to take that course. There is always the possibility that I may do something else. Specifically this takes two forms as either “anguish in the face of the future” or “anguish in the face of the past” (2003:56). Whereas anguish in the face of the future entails that I am faced with possibilities to which I have no determinant that forces me to take one or the other, in the case of anguish
in the face of the past I realise ‘the total inefficacy of the past resolution’ (2003:57). We may frame this in Schutz’s terms of provinces of meaning to say that in anguish there is a discord of the purpose of a province of meaning and my prevailing interest. In anguish in the face of the future I am faced with multiple provinces of meaning and realise that no one province is more being-useful-for than any other and in anguish in the face of the past I realise that some previously inhabited province of meaning no longer has the being-useful-for fulfilling my interest. With regard to collective persons, we may say that Democracy, Monarchy, etc. are provinces of meaning which can be inhabited by those collective persons that we have brought under the type State. In the cases of these States (e.g. Britain) we can see moments of anguish exhibited in historical instances of governmental upheaval. 37 This takes the form of anguish in the face of the past in which the currently inhabited province of meaning to which the collective person ascribes no longer fulfils the prevailing interest. Any civil war may therefore be described as a moment of anguish of the collective person. 38 With regards to the surviving and thriving of the collective person the opportunity for spare time is dissolved due to the inherent confusion caused by anguish. That is, without a province of meaning standing out as being-useful-for fulfilling the collective person’s prevailing interest over and above other provinces of meaning, time cannot be suitably organised.

Based on this distinction we may be inclined to suggest that the current economic crisis is a moment of anguish for the State. Certainly, it has no relation to fear as it is not a threat from without per se. 39 However, this would not be entirely accurate. As we saw above, earning money is the methodology of Swincan which has the purpose of surviving and thriving. If the economic crisis were to do with the anguish of the collective person this would entail one of two outcomes: Either, through anguish in the face of the past the purpose of Swincan no longer corresponds to the prevailing interest of the collective person; or, through anguish in the face of the future a number of provinces all have as their purpose

37 One can relate this point about anguish to a consideration of rihtgesetnessa also. That is, for-rihtgesetnesian can either be the cause or the result of anguish. For-rihtgesetnesian as a result of anguish is in certain respects similar to the situation brought about by war. For example the Pilgrimage of Grace in 1536 was provoked as a response to the dissolution of Catholic monasteries in Yorkshire. In this situation the for-rihtgesetnesian of the Catholic Church in England brought about the moment of anguish.

38 In point of fact, Democracy as a province of meaning, particularly British Democracy, involves the rihtgesetnesian of the moment of anguish. Each election calls for the purpose of government to be called into question by making the populace vote for different political factions each with their own interests in mind. Such a point requires further elucidation beyond the space available here. It should however be recognised that no value judgement is implied by this. Anguish, as Sartre saw it, is a part of the essential structure of consciousness of freedom (2003:57-58). As Spiegelberg recognised: ‘Sartre’s anguish has nothing to do with cowardly timidity in the face of real or imaginary dangers’ (Spiegelberg, 1982:507).

39 The qualification is necessary because it can become a moment of fear insofar as “bankers” are made responsible for the crisis and removed from the in-group.
“surviving and thriving” and none commends itself as more being-useful-for. However, as the purpose of *Swincan* is surviving and thriving this corresponds directly to the eminently practical interest of the collective person; it is in fact the only province where there is a direct correlation between interest and purpose. In other cases the purposes of provinces may not correspond directly with the prevailing interest, thereby opening up more provinces as suitably being-useful-for. Quite simply, the being-useful-for of *Swincan* can never be put into question.

However, while we may not be able to put the purpose of *Swincan* into question, we can put its *methodology* into question. If earning money is the prevailing methodology of *Swincan* for our collective person then the economic crisis is predicated on this: As the value of money devalues it loses its being-useful-for surviving. Similarly to anguish in the face of the past, we may say that the methodology of the province of meaning no longer fulfils the purpose of that province and thereby no longer fulfils the prevailing interest. However, as this pertains to methodology and not purpose we cannot say this is a moment of anguish. Instead we shall define this as *malaise: there is a disjunction of the being-useful-for of a methodology and my prevailing interest.*

The economic crisis, therefore, is a moment of malaise for the collective person in which the methodology, earning money, has been put into question, thereby frustrating the possibility of fulfilling the prevailing interest. As in this case, the prevailing interest is the eminent interest of surviving and thriving and this entails that time is lost as time is redirected to alleviating this malaise either by fixing the methodology or discerning a new one. *REF,* as the paymaster in this situation, does precisely this by reorganising academia toward economic gain.

As such we may conclude the following: science as a job does not constitute a contradiction of the postulate of nonpractical knowledge. However, science as a job is a matter of *practical possibility* dependent upon the group’s surviving and thriving being so secured as to generate the requisite spare time in which such a job can exist. This does not mean, though, that departments of Science are thus closed down the moment the collective person’s spare time is lost. The title “Science” which a department may hold stands for nothing in our consideration. In this respect they are full of pseudo-science but this need not just take the form of cohortativism.

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*40 Properly speaking what has been discussed here is “malaise in the face of the past” and we may posit the corresponding “malaise in the face of the future” in which many methodologies presents themselves as equally being-useful-for the prevailing interest.*
6. The Epistemic Status of science

The previous chapter suggested that the essential possibility of science is predicated on spare time. However, we have yet to address the third objection – which is also our second challenge – that science, and play more generally, nevertheless involve practical interests. Previously we have pointed to a tension between the interests of the person and the purposes of provinces of meaning.¹ A province only ever finds itself utilised if it can fulfil the prevailing interest of the person. Conversely, to utilise a province one must adopt certain interests. In the case of science this presents an especial problem because of the postulate of nonpractical knowledge. Schutz, having given primacy to the province of Swincan, suggests that we are driven by practical interests. But science, in claiming to be nonpractical, clearly goes against this. This leaves room for a doubt that finds expression in Husserl’s CM:

Naturally we get the general idea of science from the sciences that are factually given. If they have become for us, in our radical critical attitude, merely alleged sciences, then, according to what has already been said, their general final idea has become in a like sense, a mere supposition. Thus we do not yet know whether that idea is at all capable of becoming actualised. (1988:8)

Placed in our current context, Husserl’s doubt amounts to what we call the “humanist challenge”: As we have eminently practical interests that cannot be escaped, all “nonpractical interests” in fact contain implicit practical interests. As such science understood as knowledge for its own sake has never been, nor can ever be, achieved even in situations where abstentive control is exercised and Science does not promote practical interests. Ruggerone, for example, has criticised the fact that Schutz’s ‘notion of science remains an idealised vision which ultimately ignores its debt to worldly rationality, and hence its dependence on the life-world’ (Ruggerone, 2013:191). As such this essence of social science has no empirical validity. In order to counter this challenge and justify the possibility of nonpractical knowledge, we turn to a clarification of objectivity. Previously we understood objectivity to involve taking up the position of the object. Properly speaking, this is objective interpreting and it is necessary now to delineate a second sense of “objectivity” in the form of objective knowledge which pertains to our understanding of rationality. It is only by a reification of the latter in “science” that the humanist challenge holds sway.

¹ See Ch.4.ii.a.
i. The humanist challenge

Returning to our comments in the Introduction on Martin and Wiebe’s solution to the failure of Religious Studies, one objection that we can raise is that they fail to give due credit to the tension between Wissenschaft and Bildung. The latter – as self cultivation – is closely related to the notion of “humanism” particularly as it emerged out of Sartre’s post-phenomenological phase. In the 1945 lecture “Existentialism and Humanism” (1973) Sartre claims that there are two senses in which “humanism” can be used. First: ‘One may understand by humanism a theory which upholds man as the end-in-itself and as the supreme value’ (1973:54). This view is associated with Auguste Comte, and a similar criticism is found in Scheler who argues Comte has a concept of *wer* in which ‘it is never anything more than himself that he is adoring’ (Scheler, 1954:156). This form of humanism is thus closely associated with both the human prejudice and anthropologism. Sartre advocates, however, a second form: ‘Man is all the time outside of himself: it is in projecting and losing himself beyond himself that he makes man to exist; and, on the other hand, it is by pursuing transcendent aims that he himself is able to exist’ (Sartre, 1973:55). Such an understanding is related to Bildung in that through humanism ‘man can realise himself as truly human’ (1973:56).

In other terms this has been expressed by Lowe (1959[1963])\(^2\) as the opposition between scientists and humanists. According to Lowe, each approaches theory formation and the question of reality in a different fashion. For the “scientist”:

> the only subject of study is everyday experience – not that mysterious substratum of such experience which ancient and mediaeval philosophers proclaimed as “true” or “essential” reality. And for the scientists there is only one method appropriate to the study of man, as to that of nature: *detached observation, in order that the “facts” can speak for themselves* – and all the more clearly the better the observer succeeds in cutting himself loose from the observed object. (emphasis added, 1963:153)

Whereas the “humanist” responds:

> everyday social reality is subject to the flux of history, amenable at best to description but not to theory, that is, to meaningful generalisation. To arrive at such generalisations we must ascend from the kaleidoscope of experience to the realm of norms. *It is with the “good society” that social theory is concerned.* Hence it must not sever its ties with that domain where criteria are established, namely philosophy. And since the student, in studying society, studies the likes of himself, it is through his participation rather than his aloofness that laws of the social process are discovered. (emphasis added, 1963:153)

\(^2\) Lowe’s comments are a response to Jonas’ “The Practical Uses of Theory” (1959[1963]).
While much can be drawn from these brief comments our primary concern is how Lowe portrays the scientist as concerned with the way society is and the humanist as concerned with the way society ought to be. Framed in philosophical anthropological terms each side poses a different question: the social scientist asks “What is the world for we?”; and the humanist asks “how can I make we better?”. Based on the way we have defined social science and phenomenology, humanism as “the betterment of we” is antithetical to their nonpractical interests.

The cohortativism we mentioned in the previous chapter is one kind of humanism and concerns how the better we is achieved. This corresponds to what Hearn has called the ‘blue-ribbon policy experts’, juxtaposed against the ‘red-ribboned vanguard party members’ (Hearn, 1982:407). This latter constitutes another form of humanism which we call imperativism that seeks to define what the better we is. In contrast to cohortativist who works out how to achieve a particular goal, the role of the imperativist is to decide upon the goal to be achieved. The “existentialism” proposed by Sartre in “Existentialism and Humanism” may be regarded as imperativistic through its use of ‘existence comes before essence’ (Sartre, 1973:27-30). That is, by suggesting we defines their own essence, this is to suggest we decides upon the goal they wish to achieve. Of course, as Schutz suggests, with any type, the division between imperativist and cohortativist is a construct based on the current considerations and in reality we may find that they are one and the same person (Schutz, 1964c:123).

The divisions we are now drawing between “science”, “cohortativism”, and “imperativism” have recently been rendered in Sociology by Michael Burawoy’s presidential address to the American Sociological Association “For Public Sociology” (2004[2005a]). During the paper he made a fourfold division of labour of Sociology into professional, critical, public and policy sociologies. Professional sociology supplies ‘true and tested methods, accumulated bodies of knowledge, orienting questions, and

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3 It is for the reason that Sartre’s existentialism post-BN is humanistic that we have avoided drawing upon this later period. While certain of aspects of his thought are phenomenologically acceptable it is beyond our scope to justify this here.

4 The address turned out to be so important it was published in several journals: American Sociological Review (2005a), Sociale Welt (2005b) and The British Journal of Sociology (2005c). Social Problems, Social Forces, Critical Sociology, The American Sociologist and The British Journal of Sociology then dedicated special issues to it. Since then Burawoy claims that there are well over a hundred essays from a large range of countries contributing to what he calls the “public sociology wars” (2009:450).

5 We have not provided a parallel here for critical sociology. This is in part because of some ambiguity and criticism over the divisions particularly from British Sociology (Scott, 2005:405). Despite this a number have favoured the ethos of Public Sociology and produced work along that line. E.g. Beck (2005), Braithwaite (2005, 2008), Callhoun (2005, 2008), Ericson (2005), Etzioni (2005), Hall (2005), Kalleberg (2005, 2010, 2012), Sassen (2005), and Vaughan (2005, 2011). Most of Burawoy’s ardent critics have come from America in the form of the Strong Professional Program in Sociology. E.g. Boyns and Fletcher (2005), Brint (2005), Turner (2005), Smith-Lovin (2007) and Stinchcombe (2007).
conceptual frameworks' and is in fact the sine qua non of the other three (2005a:10). In Burawoy’s opinion, as the dominant branch of Sociology it is characterised with being the “disinterested observer” and is thus equivalent to our “scientist”. Public sociology is the successor to the utopian aspirations of “first-wave speculative sociology” prevalent between 1850-1920 from which positivism and naturalism also stem (Burawoy, 2005e:158-159). As Burawoy explains elsewhere, public sociology involves ‘conveying sociology to a wide lay audience through sociological interventions that set a new agenda for the discussion of public issues’ (Burawoy, 2005d:71). That is, it is an imperativist discourse about which values should be promoted.⁶ By contrast, policy sociology ‘is sociology in the service of a goal defined by a client. Policy sociology’s raison d’être is to provide solutions to problems that are presented to us, or legitimate solutions that have already been reached’ (2005a:9). Such an understanding corresponds to the cohortativism discussed in the previous chapter.

Also, like Schutz, Burawoy recognises a dialectic between public sociology (imperativism) and policy sociology (cohortativism). He gives the example of Diane Vaughan’s analysis of the Challenger disaster of 1986 which was an imperativist argument accusing ‘the organisational culture of NASA as “normalising deviance”’ which allowed the disaster to happen (2005d:73). These conclusions then become cohortative when she became part of the government body investigating the cause of the Columbia disaster of 2003. Burawoy therefore notes: ‘The distinction between public and policy sociology is analytical – the one a conversation about values and goals and the second concerned with the means to solve well-defined problems – in practice the two are often closely connected’ (2005d:73).

The cohortativist, as so ably described through the medium of policy sociology, is hired ‘to solve a problem or justify an already given solution’ (2005d:73). Similarly to what we saw in the previous chapter, Burawoy warns: ‘policy sociology is all too easily captured by clients who impose strict contractual obligations on their funding, distortions that can reverberate back into professional sociology’ (2005a:17). Insofar as “science” is a job, it is at risk of becoming cohortativist in order that the “scientist” can insure that they get paid. But this means professional sociology (science) is undermined by the trappings of policy sociology (cohortativism). Another example is provided by Turner, an ardent critic of Burawoy, in the form of “social engineering”:

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⁶ Among the reasons we have not considered Sartre’s work beyond BN is that his work possessed a “utopian” (re. imperativistic) goal ‘to bring about a classless society’ which is necessarily unphenomenological (McBride, 2013:176).
I would not be so arrogant as to tell a client or the public what they should do to be morally or ethically pure (I certainly have opinions but this is different than giving advice or demanding that my opinions be the centre of public debate). My proposal is more modest: use sociological knowledge to solve problems that clients bring to us. (2005:40)

This “modesty”, though, hardly defends science as Turner thinks it does. If the client has a problem to be solved there is no guarantee that this problem is one of nonpractical interest. Indeed, it seems highly unlikely that a client would pay out money for the resolution of something other than a practical problem. But this then means that the “social engineer” does not accord with the postulate of nonpractical knowledge. Indeed, there can arise a situation whereby the methods that satisfy one client would produce results totally unsatisfactory to the next.7

However, the humanist challenge runs deeper than the risk that clients may undermine science. As this challenge is understood by Natanson, there is a conflict over the question of “value” in science between those who advocate “commitment” (the humanist) and “nihilism” (the scientist) (Natanson, 1963:19-26). Natanson asks whether social scientists can reach “objectively true conclusions” about matters of value and “the good” and if so whether this should be a part of scientific research (1963:352). As we have defined science, the response to this question is similar to the position of Weber: ‘it can never be the task of an empirical science to provide binding norms and ideals from which directives for immediate practical activity can be derived’ (1963:358). However, Natanson’s question assumes that the social scientist can pull back from reaching these conclusions. The humanist challenge, however, forces us to rephrase the question: can the social scientist reach conclusions about things themselves without making judgements about what is good? It is our charge that this is possible but this requires a consideration of the epistemic status of scientific knowledge. To demonstrate this we will continue our imperial argument by charging that the epistemic status naturalism confers on scientific knowledge necessarily makes it humanistic and therefore pseudo-science.

ii. The epistemic superiority of naturalism

7 An extension of this is that appeasing certain clients will render the mercenary scientist unpalatable to others. A point partially recognised by Wiebe who comments that getting funding from one source in Religious Studies can close down other potential sources (2012:189).
In charging that naturalism is inherently humanistic we are, however, faced with the challenge, as pointed out by de Caro and MacArthur, that due to naturalism’s “pre-eminent status” “little energy is spent in explicitly defining or explaining what is meant by scientific naturalism” (de Caro and MacArthur, 2004:2). A case in point is McCutcheon’s Critics Not Caretakers (CnC) (2001), in which the section headed “Naturalism” says nothing on what he takes naturalism to be. Indeed, as suggested by numerous scholars, “naturalism” is a term that can be used in several ways.⁸ According to de Caro and MacArthur’s the first naturalist movement began with the positivism of Auguste Comte, John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer and Ernst Mach in the nineteenth century (de Caro & MacArthur, 2004:8). But “positivism” is equally difficult to define. Whether an explicit definition can be given to either “naturalism” or “positivism” is dubious, but just as with “phenomenology” it is in our interests to be as precise as possible and highlight the shared constitutive claims of “naturalisms/positivisms” such as they are.

From Husserl’s perspective, naturalism has its roots in Galileo and the mathematisation of nature which prompted what de Caro and MacArthur call the “Great Success of Modern Science Argument” (2004:4).⁹ This position that only science gives us the true picture of reality finds its earliest expression among the positivists. Saint-Simon held the view that the study of human phenomena had to proceed along the lines of natural science, and suggested in Travail sur la gravitation universelle (1813) that all phenomena operate under a single principle which he identified with Newton’s law of gravitation. According to Gordon, descriptions of society in terms of “social physics” and “social physiology” in early positivist writings are influenced by Saint-Simon’s ideas (Gordon, 1991:280). Comte, as a seven year assistant of Saint-Simon, further developed his ideas and in Course in Positive Philosophy (1830-1842) he coined the term “positivism” to mean ‘the laws of intellectual evolution which govern the development of the human mind’ (1991:272). Contained within this “positive philosophy” was the means to banish disorder from human civilisation, but as Gordon notes this was not conceived as either an ethical or political philosophy but as “scientific” philosophy. Rather, this new “science” – sociology – would determine the laws that underpin social phenomena.¹⁰

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⁹ See Ch.1.i.
¹⁰ Saint-Simon and Comte hold a difficult place in modern sociology even though it is from the latter that we get the word “sociology”. Instead many sociologists trace the founding of their discipline to the figures of Spencer, Durkheim and Weber. However, this raises more questions because of the above comments and there is a debate on the degree to which Durkheim, in particular, was influenced by Comte (see Gouldner (in Durkheim, 1959) and Giddens (1978) for two every different opinions). Gordon
However, there is a friction between this Comtean understanding of science and ours, especially when, as Gordon notes, ‘from the beginning of his work, [Comte] intended that the new science he would build should be a practical one, having the same relation to politics as physiology to medicine’ (1991:292). This friction was felt particularly in Britain where positivism was to have its biggest audience. Among the many that started to draw on positivism was the utilitarian philosopher John Stuart Mill. This did not mean that there was a total merger of utilitarianism and positivism. Within the British audience, a divide was made between Comte’s positivism as a philosophy of science and a social philosophy. A critique emerged which led to the rise of neo-positivism, which was antagonistic towards this older version. In their definition of positivism, Delanty and Strydom provide six positivist tenets which any “positivism” may or may not adhere to. The divide between the two positivisms stems from one tenet in particular – instrumentalism: “an orientation towards the manipulation of the world rather than understanding it and, closely related, an instrumental view of theory as consisting of nothing but observations and nothing more than a tool of prediction” (Delanty & Strydom 2003:14). Mill’s critique of Comte is rooted in his instrumentalist bent toward the construction of a positivist society. This instrumentalism is what we are now calling humanism. As such, in Britain Comte’s positivism failed to establish itself as a social philosophy.

Neo-positivism came to prominence through the Vienna Circle, including Moritz Schlick (1882-1936), Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970), and Otto Neurath (1882-1945), during the 1920s onward. It has been alternatively called logical positivism or logical empiricism which is associated with such names as Hempel (1905-1997), Nagel (1901-1985), Anthony Flew (1923-2010) and A.J. Ayer (1910-1989). The positive or the empirical was no longer viewed as total, and the logical was introduced, marking a shift from inductive reasoning to deductive logic. Wittgenstein played an important role in this shift from the older positivism. He moved away from the older thing-event-fact model, to a thing-event-fact-language model (2003:15-16). This meant that logical positivism concerned itself less with things, events and facts, but with the language in which these are expressed. The focus became the logic of language, particularly the language of science which was supposed to be an ideal language that would map onto reality directly. As summarised by Carnap: ‘All statements belonging to Metaphysics, regulative Ethics, and

suggests that Durkheim wanted to show his colleagues that Comte had been correct in two respects: ‘society could be studied scientifically; and such a study, properly conducted could provide knowledge of great practical value’ (Gordon, 1991:441). As such he continued Comte’s positivism and is included within the “older positivism” by Delanty and Strydom (2003:18).
(metaphysical) Epistemology have this defect, are in fact unverifiable and, therefore, unscientific. In the Viennese Circle, we are accustomed to describe such statements as nonsense’ (Carnap, 1934:26).11

How, then, does naturalism fit into this? Another of Delanty and Strydom’s tenets is physicalism: there is only physical stuff and all mental and psychic properties can be reduced, in effect, to brain processes and chemicals. Significantly they also suggest that physicalism can also be called naturalism (Delanty and Strydom, 2003:14).12 In this case naturalism is an aspect of a broader positivism.

Naturalism, as a movement in philosophy, however, seems to extend far beyond this single tenet. According to Delanty and Strydom, positivism was the orthodox methodology of the social sciences in the first half of the twentieth century with its strongest footholds in Britain and America (2003:13). Naturalism seems to have arisen with the demise of neo-positivism, beginning with certain key defections by Ayer (1940) and Wittgenstein (1953[1968]) leading to a virtual collapse in the 1950s. According to Kincaid, naturalism as a movement arose out of this demise (Kincaid, 1996:19).

Steel and Guala suggest there are two dominant “naturalisms” which stress the centrality of science to philosophy and the thesis that social science should endorse the methods and standards of natural science (Steel and Guala, 2011:3). De Caro and MacArthur, however, regard both to be a part of what they call “scientific naturalism” and call them the ontological and methodological doctrines respectively:

*Ontological doctrine:* the world consists of nothing but the entities to which successful [natural] scientific explanations commit us.

*Methodological doctrine:* [natural] scientific inquiry is, in principle, our only genuine source of knowledge or understanding. All other alleged forms of knowledge (e.g. a priori knowledge) or understanding are either illegitimate or are reducible in principle to [natural] scientific knowledge or understanding. (de Caro, and MacArthur, 2010:4)13

The positivist tenet of physicalism is seemingly expressed through the ontological doctrine in that it is natural science which studies and uncovers this “physical stuff”. Writing separately, however, MacArthur

11 There is an interesting parallel in Carnap’s claim in *The Logical Syntax of Language* (1937) that philosophy is the “logic of science” and Husserl’s claim in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* that philosophy is the “science of science”.

12 However, by their own account this may not be entirely accurate; later they then seem to suggest that naturalism has arisen out of the demise of physicalism (2003:368).

13 In an earlier version they call these “themes” rather than “doctrines” and also make the claim that both entail that ‘philosophical inquiry is conceived continuous with science’ (de Caro and MacArthur, 2004:3). Quine has expressed this view: ‘it is within science itself, and not in some prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described’ (Quine, 1981:21). And more recently, Moser and Trouts: ‘philosophy is continuous with the natural sciences’ (Moser and Trouts, 1995:9). On the broadest scale, then, not only should social science be dependent upon natural science but so too should all philosophy.
has suggested that physicalism is a component of *extreme scientific naturalism* (MacArthur, 2010:130). This “family” of scientific naturalism argues that not only should all sciences be reduced to natural science but that natural science ultimately reduces itself to physics. By contrast, *narrow scientific naturalism* accepts that not all natural sciences can be reduced to one particular science and *broad scientific naturalism* accepts the same of certain human sciences also (2010:126). Based on their conceptions of science the older positivism can be characterised as *extreme scientific naturalism* and neopositivism as moving toward *narrow scientific naturalism*. Certainly the latter seems to be the more orthodox position in philosophy and social science. A quick survey of naturalism as it occurs within Religious Studies, for example, and its emphasis on evolutionary explanation would suggest that narrow scientific naturalism predominates.\(^4\)

Broad scientific naturalism, however, points to an emerging critique among philosophers of scientific naturalism which has led to its counterpart - liberal naturalism. While there is no clear definition as yet, it would seem that liberal naturalism involves the rejection of the ontological doctrine and/or the methodological doctrine of scientific naturalism (de Caro & MacArthur, 2010:9). Within Religious Studies, for example, McCutcheon advocates methodological reduction in the study of religion while denying metaphysical reduction which corresponds to the ontological doctrine (McCutcheon, 2001:x). And Martin and Wiebe, under criticism by Seiwert (2012), have also renounced “ontological naturalism” in favour of “methodological naturalism” (Martin and Wiebe, 2012b:67-68). However, as liberal naturalism can reject either doctrine the question arises as to what holds it and scientific naturalism together as “naturalism”. According to de Caro and MacArthur:

> What makes Scientific Naturalism and Liberal Naturalism both versions of *naturalism* is that neither countenances the supernatural, whether in the form of entities (such as God, spirits, entelechies, or Cartesian minds), events (such as miracles or magic), or epistemic faculties (such as mystical insight or spiritual intuition). (2010:3)

Or, as Kincaid put it: ‘Naturalism is thus the belief that social phenomena are part of the natural world and accordingly amenable to the methods of the natural sciences’ (Kincaid, 1996:xv).

There is not the space here to give an exact history of the many divergences that occur between naturalism and positivism. Indeed, as made clear by one of Embree’s identifiers,\(^{15}\) the Phenomenological


\(^{15}\) See Ch.3.iii.a.
Movement has understood itself as a response to naturalism and positivism, with the seeming assumption there is little difference between the two. As we see it this constitutive claim of naturalism is synonymous with positivism’s tenet of unified science:

Based on a series of assumptions – i.e. that the universe is a causally ordered, homogenous, one-layer world, that there is a basic unity to human experience and that we are therefore able to gain knowledge of reality and indeed construct a knowledge system about it. It is claimed that it is possible to produce a unified scientific language for all scientific disciplines, which effectively means that all the different scientific disciplines, including the social sciences, can be reduced to physics – a claim that in its extreme form takes on the character of an ideology, named scientism. (Delanty and Strydom, 2003:13-14)

As we saw above in the older positivism of Saint-Simon and Comte, this notion was prevalent in their conviction that society could be explained according to the same laws as those found in physics. Neurath, speaking for neo-positivism, states that:

The aim of scientific effort is to the reach the goal, unified science, by applying logical analysis to the empirical material. Since the meaning of every statement of science must be statable by reduction to a statement about the given, likewise the meaning of any concept, whatever branch of science it may belong to, must be statable by step-wise reduction to other concepts, down to the concepts of the lowest level which refer directly to the given. (Neurath, 1929[2003]:33)

Similar statements can be found from other members of the Vienna Circle such as Carnap (1936[2003]), and prominent logical positivists Hempel (1942[2011]) and Nagel (1961[2003]). Thelma Lavine, who was critical of Nagel and may be seen as a proto-liberal naturalist, likewise claimed:

The naturalistic principle may be stated as the resolution to pursue inquiry into any set of phenomena by means of methods which administer checks of intelligent experimental verification in accordance with the contemporary criteria of objectivity. The significance of this principle does not lie in the advocacy of empirical method, but in the conception of the regions where that method is to be employed. That scientific analysis must not be restricted in any quarter, that its extension to any field, to any special set of phenomena, must not be curtailed – this is the nerve of the naturalistic principle. (Lavine, 1944:184-185)

And more recently Daniel Dennett has argued that ‘the central biological concept of function and the central philosophical concept of meaning can be explained and united’ (Dennett, 1995:185). Entailing that ‘all the achievements of human culture – language, art, religion, ethics, science itself – are themselves artifacts… of the same fundamental process’ (1995:144).

The full consequences of unified science can be seen if we turn to Wiebe and his comments about science in The Politics of Religious Studies (PRS) (1999). Wiebe’s argument is framed around a

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16 See Lavine, 1953a[1963a], 1953b[193b].
political conflict within the academic study of religion in the form of ideological commitments that will fundamentally alter the way in which Religious Studies departments proceed. He proposes a “scientific” study of religion by which he means ‘the attempt only to understand and explain that activity rather than to be involved in it’ (1999:ix). This is in contrast to the encroaching threat of “theology” by which is not meant ‘a particular intellectual activity or discipline, but more generally it denotes any kind of confessional or religious orientation’ (1999:x). What Wiebe calls a “theologian” is a more specific understanding of a “humanist”. As Wiebe explains: ‘The discourse that establishes a science is not a scientific discourse, but that does not imply that it must be political in the narrow sense of the word; it is a discourse about methods for the attainment of a particular kind of conversation rather than a substantive discourse on behalf of a particular set of values’ (1999:xi). In many respects this argument is similar to our own but it is worth noting that for Wiebe this is a rihtgesetnisc problem – i.e. whether rihtgesetniss of Religious Studies are populated by scientists or humanists. This is made clear when he summarises the argument of his book:

If the academic study of religion wishes to be taken seriously as a contributor to knowledge about our world, it will have to concede the boundaries set by the ideal of scientific knowledge that characterises universities. It will have to recognise the limitations of explanation and theory and be content to explain the subject-matter – and nothing more – rather than show itself a form of political or religious behaviour (or an injunction to such action). (1999:xii)

We have mentioned already that this theme has been continued with Luther Martin, as a “failure of nerve” of university departments to be truly scientific (Martin and Wiebe, 2012a, 2012b). Again, it is debatable as to how far universities actually promote the “ideal of scientific knowledge”. Rather, our focus here is on the idea of the “ideal of scientific knowledge” as Wiebe’s expression of the tenet of unified science.17

In Wiebe’s understanding: science ‘attempts to obtain reliable beliefs about the world; it attempts to understand the world as it is and to represent it as accurately as possible’ (emphasis added, 1999:133). He thus associates himself with Weber who had the following to say on the position of the academic:

One can only demand of the teacher that he have the intellectual integrity to see that it is one thing to state facts, to determine mathematical or logical relations or the internal structure of cultural values, while it is another thing to answer questions of the value of culture and its individual

17 More recently this has been cast in terms of “scientific purity” (Wiebe, 2012:181).
Wiebe sees himself as making a similar contention regarding the position of the scientist in society. He proclaims that: ‘Those who see science as but another ideological structure have not understood its nature; they fail to see that what is special about science is that it concerns restrictions’ (Wiebe, 1999:133). In this respect everything Wiebe has thus far suggested accords with the postulate of nonpractical knowledge.

However, as we see it, this appeal to unified science necessarily leads to humanism, particularly if we recognise a subtle distinction between the position of Weber and Wiebe. According to Weber it is the role of the academic to ‘determine… the internal structure of cultural values’ (Weber, 1946:146). We suggest in the case of Weber the attempt to discern the internal structure of cultural values is to understand the world as it is for wer. Indeed, it is from Weber’s original formulation that we have formalised the postulate of subjective interpretation. Weber’s concern is not necessarily whether these cultural values are “true”. He explicitly denies this when he says the academic is not to ‘answer questions of the value of culture and its individual contents’ (1946:146). Rather, he is more interested in the internal logic that holds a collection of cultural values together as those values for that group. Wiebe’s formulation of “understanding the world as it is” differs in lacking the crucial clause “for wer”, thereby proclaiming the world to be in certain a way and only in that way; a statement not made or endorsed by Weber. Because of this focus on the world as it is brought about by this ideal of scientific knowledge, science is a ‘different, and epistemically superior, method for understanding and explaining the world’ (Martin and Wiebe 2012b, 69). Or as Sellars puts it: ‘science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not’ (Sellars, 1956:173). And de Caro and MacArthur claim that ‘according to the most common form of naturalism, the image of the world provided by the natural sciences is all the world there is’ (de Caro and MacArthur, 2010:2). It is these claims to “epistemic superiority” that give warrant to Husserl’s criticism of earlier naturalism that it leads to a one-sided conception of rationality (Husserl, 1970c:7-10); they reveal that naturalism/positivism has ceased to be scientific.

iii. From “is” to “ought”

18 See Ch.4.ii.b.
Schutz calls the general view that expresses unified science the “monopolistic imperialism” of natural sciences (Schutz, 1973:49). Some recognition of this is found in MacArthur who points out that:

‘Scientific Naturalism is itself a normative doctrine. Consequently, it is really a claim about how philosophy should be conducted, or what it should admit, from the rational point of view given the great success of modern science and its implications’ (MacArthur, 2010:136). But we cannot criticise naturalism for being a monopolistic imperialism in this regard; our arguments regarding phenomenology are no less imperialistic.19 Our issue is that naturalism goes beyond imperial arguments to colonial ones – i.e. extending beyond the province of Science. We propose that the epistemic status granted by unified science entails an orthodoxy of rationality: there is only one correct form of rationality and all other forms of rationality must either be made derivative of this form or rendered false. This orthodoxy, though, is not limited to the sciences but pertains to the entire life-world. Scheler had begun to identify this when he spoke of ‘the peculiar positivist idea of judging the development of all [werisc] knowledge on the basis of a small curve segment that shows only the development of the modern West’ (Scheler, 1980b:148). That is, an orthodoxy of rationality determines what sorts of knowledge are valid for all provinces of meaning. This colonialism is thus imperativistic in that by knowing the world as it is one is by consequence determining how well people have appropriated this “as it is”. We charge that any “social science” founded upon an orthodoxy of rationality therefore engages in evaluative investigations rather than descriptive investigations20 and is therefore pseudo-science. Nevertheless, Wiebe would deny this humanistic element in naturalism and has supported nonpractical knowledge. Recently, he has decried McCutcheon’s call that the scholar of religion should be a “public intellectual” (Wiebe 2012, 187-188).21 However, contra Wiebe, our charge is that humanism is the unavoidable consequence of naturalism’s orthodoxy of rationality.

To see this we need look no further than the source of Wiebe’s phrase “a failure of nerve”. Gilbert Murray coined the phrase in *Four Stages of Greek Religion* (1912) to indicate ‘a rise of asceticism, of mysticism, in a sense, of pessimism; a loss of self-confidence, of hope in this life and of faith in normal human efforts; a despair of patient inquiry, a cry for infallible revelation; an indifference

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19 Though our phenomenological position may be more tenable on the grounds that it is not “monopolistic”; as we understand the term, this indicates that there can only be one social scientific methodology.
20 See Ch.4.iii.
21 Together with Martin, they also accuse the naturalistic work of Mark Johnston (2009, 2010), Wesley Wildman (2009) and Owen Flanagan (2011) of introducing extra-scientific agendas more appropriate to what they elsewhere referred to as Bildung (Martin and Wiebe, 2012c:619).
to the welfare of the state, a conversion of the soul to God’ in Greece brought about by the emergence of Christianity (Murray, 1912:103). The phrase was then taken up by Sidney Hook in “Naturalism and Democracy”: ‘A survey of the cultural tendencies of our time shows many signs pointing to a failure of nerve in Western civilisation’ (Hook, 1944:40). This failure ‘exhibits itself as a loss of confidence in scientific method and in varied quests for a “knowledge” and “truth” which are uniquely different from those won by the processes of scientific inquiry’ (1944:40). Hook decries that this failure of nerve has led to ‘intellectual and moral irresponsibility’ (1944:41). Speaking of the deplorable state of the world due to the Second World War he continues that ‘a scientific analysis of modern history – and I am assuming that history is an empirical discipline – reveals that the chief causes of our maladjustments and suicidal conflicts are to be found precisely in those areas of social life in which the rationale of scientific method has not been persistently employed’ (1944:44). Naturalism, therefore, is ‘the only way of reaching truths about the world of nature, society, and man’ (Hook, 1944:45). McCutcheon, taking up the phrase from Wiebe, then echoes Hook in CnC when he claims that: ‘One of the implications of this failure of critical nerve is that scholars of religion find themselves all but speechless when it comes to debating the so-called religious contributions to be made to making decisions of relevance to the public concern’ (McCutcheon 2001:130). What we mean to show here is that McCutcheon’s argument supports Scheler’s own argument that rather than being epistemically superior to theology, naturalism shares a ‘unity of style’ (Scheler, 1980b:88).

The key difference between the “naturalism” of Wiebe and McCutcheon is that where the former is strongly embedded in scientific naturalism the latter has more in common with liberal naturalism. As mentioned earlier, McCutcheon vocally rejects any metaphysical reduction and favours instead only methodological reduction; a rejection that later allows him to claim that rather than being antagonistic, naturalism and postmodernism form a dialectic (McCutcheon, 2001:61). McCutcheon thus disassociates himself from scientific naturalism as something modernist and we could call his version of liberal naturalism “postmodern naturalism”. However, liberal naturalism’s rejection of scientific naturalism seems to be centred on a denial of unified science. What these criticisms fail to appreciate is that unified science is the logical consequence of what de Caro and Voltolini call the “constitutive claim of naturalism”: ‘no entity or explanation should be accepted whose existence or truth would contradict

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the laws of nature, insofar as we know them’ (de Caro and Voltolini, 2010:75) – i.e. de Caro and MacArthur’s ontological doctrine. Because of this, Ram Neta (2007) has pointed out there is a dilemma in liberal naturalism in which it either reduces itself to scientific naturalism or ceases to be naturalism.

The inherent problem of de Caro and Voltolini’s statement above is how do we know the laws of nature? Quite simply, these laws are those that have been furnished through natural science. Natural science, and by consequence scientific naturalism, set the limits within which these seeming non-natural entities operate: only entities which do not ‘imply any violation of the causal closure of the natural world’ are permissible (de Caro and Voltolini, 2010:78). By consequence we charge that the ontological doctrine (or “metaphysical reduction”) necessarily leads to humanism and, conversely, McCutcheon’s “public intellectual” could not make sense without it.

In CnC, as elsewhere, McCutcheon argues that the sui generis treatment of religion as a topic has resulted in a compartmentalisation that has isolated it from the rest of academia. By consequence it now struggles to define its position in those rihlgesetnessa. This lack of identity has resulted in a situation where it is impossible to know whether the scholar down the hall is a colleague or an object of data (2001:xiv). We have no strict disagreement with this contention. His point here is effectively the same as the one made earlier in regard to essentialism: it is a mistake of scholars to treat Religious Studies and Social Science as being on the same level of meaning-context. When this step is made, religion is separated off from the world and its mundanity is denied. This forms what Paul Griffiths calls McCutcheon’s imperialistic argument: ‘he thinks that when scholars think and write about religion and religions, they ought reduce what they study to “minds, economies, societies, classes, genders” (452) – these terms are, it seems, central to McCutcheon’s final vocabulary, a final that vocabulary he thinks all scholars of religion ought share’ (Griffiths, 1998:893). That is, there is a way scholars of religion should be doing things and McCutcheon is proclaiming what that way is. Again, we cannot criticise McCutcheon’s imperial argument, this is exactly what we are doing.

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23 De Caro and Voltolini erroneously label the second horn of the dilemma as leading to supernaturalism (2010:70). Neta’s criticism is quite simply why call it “naturalism” at all (2007:661)? If there is no formal connection with scientific naturalism which she notes various other authors equate with naturalism in general why is the title retained? We suggest it is retained so as to grant legitimacy, the need for which in part stems from the fear that once one leaves the bosom of “naturalism” one falls into the clutches of “phenomenology” (here only meant in that vague sense of everything that isn’t naturalism).

24 See Ch.4.i.
However, in taking up this “failure of nerve”, McCutcheon goes beyond this imperial argument in advocating that scholars should be “public intellectuals”. In particular he laments that the current trend of scholarship in Religious Studies (here he refers to America) is mostly just “translation” or “colour commenting”. As such: ‘When it comes to deciding whether and to what extent religious positions that claim ahistorical authority, wisdom, and direction are useful in charting the course of a public school curriculum, a welfare agency, or even a policy for war, translators have no voice and little, if anything to add’ (McCutcheon, 2001:131). The role of the public intellectual, for McCutcheon, is to assess how appropriate it is for religion to engage in debates on developing the “good society” - i.e. he advocates a postulate of public benefit. But in forwarding this postulate he has ceased to be imperial and started to be colonial. As partly recognised by Griffiths: ‘Along with McCutcheon’s views about what scholars of religion ought and ought not do goes a set of views, sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit, about the way things are’ (Griffiths, 1998:894).

McCutcheon goes on to say that: ‘Where they could be involved in studying the mechanisms that make cultures possible, thereby uncloaking the ahistoric rhetoric that makes its appearance in all debates, scholars of religion qua translators have instead opted for the highly conservative practice of entrenching ideologies and rhetorics’ (McCutcheon, 2001:133). He argues that instead of being translators we should be critical rhetors. However, it is at this juncture that he becomes somewhat guarded, shying away from the explicitly normative position expressed in the work of Chomsky (1987) and Said (1994) and referred to as “moralist intellectuals” by Karabel (1996). As McCutcheon describes the role, a critical rhetor ‘exposes the mechanism, whereby these very truths and norms are constructed in the first place, demonstrating the contingency of seemingly necessary conditions and the historical character of ahistorical claims’ (2001:134), a role that would incline us to think as full-force humanism. However, McCutcheon denies this:

the scholar of religion as critical rhetor comes not to inform the world of how it ought to work, but explains how and why it happens to work as it does, making such critical scholarship a convenient resource to avoid when making pronouncements on the future of human meaning, the nation, or the world – claims that are either politically conservative or liberal, in support of dominant or oppositional regimes. (2001:135)

25 Gary Lease asks a somewhat similar question: ‘is “religion” in any traditional sense still viable? Can it represent an adequate response on the part of humanity to the world in which it now finds itself” (Lease, 1994:471)?
26 See Ch.5.i.
As McCutcheon sees it, this critical rhetoric is no good for humanism because they do not provide anything constructive. But surely in exposing these contingent mechanisms and historical “ahistorical claims” McCutcheon is engaged in a task no different from Chomsky’s demand that scholars should ‘speak the truth and to expose lies’ to those under study (Chomsky, 1987:60)? That McCutcheon is not deviating from Chomsky’s humanism is made clear in the following: ‘When compared to the moralist intellectual, however, the scholar of religion as public intellectual – and as publicly accountable intellectual – is more timid about making pronouncements on what these conditions really should be’ (2001:135). Even though McCutcheon may be “timid” in making his pronouncements there is still, nonetheless, the expectation that the public intellectual should be making such pronouncements. But this makes his position no less imperativistic than that of Chomsky or Said.  

It is once this imperativistic emphasis is engaged that McCutcheon begins to depend on the ontological doctrine he denied earlier. He rules out of hand certain entities as valid causes of events. As Griffiths also notes: ‘This presumably means, inter alia, that God does not exist; that what is claimed by the Nicene Creed is (by and large) false; and that what the Buddha represented as having said in the Lotus Sūtra is a tissue of mistakes’ (Griffiths, 1998:894). Or, in Hook’s words: ‘The existence of God, immortality, disembodied spirits, cosmic purpose and design, as these have been customarily interpreted by the great institutional religions, are denied by naturalists for the same generic reasons that they deny the existence of fairies, elves, and leprechauns’ (Hook, 1944:45). In endorsing this sort of statement McCutcheon thus makes judgements about how the world ought to work. This is clearest in his criticism of William Dean’s The Religious Critic in American Culture (1994) where he takes issue with Dean for studying Zbigniew Brezieszki’s comments on the fall of America as a world leader.

We should caution that McCutcheon gives no explanation as to who Dean is or why he has been singled out. This is significant because McCutcheon chooses not to mention that Dean at the time of publishing was emeritus professor of constructive theology at Iliff School of Theology. In this he commits the same “sleight of hand” that Ivan Strenski has noted of David Chidester’s work on Africa:

27 Said characterises the intellectual as an “outsider”: ‘It is the spirit in opposition, rather than in accommodation, that grips me because the romance, the interest, the challenge of the intellectual life is to be found in dissent against the status quo’ and ‘there is no dodging the inescapable reality that such representations by intellectuals will neither make them friends in high places nor win them official honours’ (Said, 1994:xv). By his own admission this view of the intellectual may in fact be due to his inability to ever secure himself a position ‘inside that charmed circle’ (1994:80).
religious or political ambitions – theologians, missionaries, or colonial administrators. But in reading Chidester more closely we discover the curious fact that he applies the description “study of religion” and “comparative study of religion” to just those sorts of persons pursuing deliberate religious or political agendas! Kolb and Mentzel were, as a matter of fact, then serving in the colonial administration, not in some early research institute or university. (Strenski, 1998:363)

McCutcheon, like Chidester, provides no information on the proper identity of Dean and instead goes straight into highlighting how Dean suggests that a cause for America’s impending fall is (in our terms) “gāstcund illness”. McCutcheon opines that gāstcund illness is hardly a ‘useful explanatory category,’ a causal agent in this decline (McCutcheon, 2001:137). Why? Because such an explanation obscures the real political and economic causes. He quite literally corrects the cause. Rather than asking the question of why Dean, who is quite overtly a theologian and therefore someone McCutcheon should consider as a datum of study were he still being imperial, has made this argument, McCutcheon engages Dean at his own level. Even if Dean has appropriated from “academic theory” McCutcheon fails, like Chidester, to recognise that ‘with “metropolitan theory” having been “colonised” by missionaries and thus put to use by them for purposes of domination, we are back to theology and churches, and no longer in the realm of academic Religious Studies or comparative “study” of religion in the recognisable sense’ (Strenski, 1998:364).

Our point here is that McCutcheon engages in a colonial argument of his own by criticising Dean’s conclusions at the same epistemic level. Having denied “metaphysical reduction” which leads to claims that ‘religion is nothing but … ’ (McCutcheon, 2001:x), McCutcheon’s criticism of Dean does exactly this by saying ‘religion is nothing but [politics and economics]’. This then begs the question of how McCutcheon is no less theological than Dean? We can find no grounds on which to determine which is epistemically superior to the other. There is a dreadful irony in the fact that McCutcheon proclaims that ‘to uncover – and thereby challenge – the often occluded and disguised mechanisms that carry out these universalisations is nothing other than the consistent analysis of ideologies: the means by which slippage from is to ought routinely take place’ (2001:140). But the presupposition to know the “is” is itself an ideological commitment to ontological naturalism. As Griffiths rightly sees it: ‘the program of historicization and transgression that McCutcheon recommends (indeed, requires) of scholars of religion is not (and in principle cannot be) free from deep axiological and metaphysical commitments that give it sense, purchase, and power’ (Griffiths, 1998:894). McCutcheon’s response to Griffiths’ admittedly

28 Scare quotes are not required.
scathing comments proves the point: ‘despite all of us having all sorts of pretheoretical commitments, aims, and motives, the truth of which can neither be verified or falsified, they do not all have something to do with intentional, invisible agents (whether personal or not) controlling the course of cosmic history’ (McCutcheon, 2001:146). Despite claiming that he does not wish to “lower” himself to the level of metaphysical discussion this is exactly what he does by calling these agents “invisible”.\textsuperscript{29} How does he know they are invisible?

McCutcheon’s position reveals that methodological naturalism cannot proceed without presupposing ontological naturalism, as Neta saw. But this ontological naturalism which makes claims as to what is necessarily makes ought claims. “Is”, as McCutcheon rightly notes, leads to “ought”. Wiebe, therefore, in also proclaiming to know the world as it is cannot escape this charge either despite his advocation of nonpractical knowledge. As we see it, this is a consequence of the presumed epistemic superiority of naturalism brought about by its orthodoxy of rationality. A point reiterated by Slingerland, who agreeing with Martin and Wiebe (2012a), decries the ‘cultural parochialism’ (colonialism) of the older Comparative Religion only to commit it when he claims that ‘the science of religion is certainly making inroads in more civilised parts of the world’ (Slingerland, 2012:615). This assumption of “more civilised” parts of the world falls into Scheler’s criticism of the peculiar positivist trend of judging all knowledge according to the “modern West”. All naturalistic “science” is little more than an evaluative investigation into how well (the “ought”) groups have addressed reality (the “is”) it assumes there to be based on its orthodoxy of rationality.

The problem that must now be addressed is whether this slip from is to ought is a problem peculiar to naturalism or something that pervades all science. That is, does all science slip into humanism? In order to address this we must return to the root distinction between Weber and Wiebe. As we pointed out, the difference between the two is that Weber proposed to understand the world as it is for we risk whereas Wiebe sought the world as it is. Recognising this distinction between the two entails a difference in understanding objectivity. So far we have spoken of “objectivity” as objective interpreting:

\textsuperscript{29} McCutcheon commits the same failure with Griffiths as he does with Dean. He does not account for the fact that Griffiths, as professor of Catholic Theology at Duke Divinity School, is a theologian in the proper sense of the term. (This does not, however, detract from his accurate assessment of McCutcheon’s position). Thus, when he criticises Griffith’s Religious Reading: The Place of Reading in the Practice of Religion (1999), he is not attacking a scholar of religion qua “theologian” or even a theologian attempting to be a scholar of religion as he would have the reader believe. Indeed, that he does not give the full title of Griffith’s book where the word “practice” would instantly indicate an explicit theological project is somewhat telling that he may have been setting up a straw man.
understanding reality from the perspective of the object. But, and this must be emphasised, this understanding of objectivity is not unique to social science. What we suggest is that all sciences, properly understood, entail understanding the world as it is for X. What this X is depends on the particular branch of science being dealt with. In the case of social science this X is determined by the postulate of subjective interpretation. The fault of naturalism/positivism is to fail to recognise that any use of “as it is”, even in natural science, is really an abbreviation of “as it is for X”. Physics, for example, does not give us the world as it is but the world as it is for atoms or as it is for planets. Naturalism engages in an essentialism whereby the province of meaning of Science is raised to the highest level of meaning-context – i.e. subordinating all other provinces of meaning. Contra this we need to recognise that science, predicated on the postulate of nonpractical knowledge, necessarily holds a low, if not the lowest, level of meaning-context thereby becoming epistemically inferior. As such no non-scientific provinces of meaning are derivative upon it.

iv. Objectivity and neutrality

In order to escape the epistemic arrogance brought about by an orthodoxy of rationality we must now clarify a second sense in which “objectivity” is used. According to Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann in this second sense “objectivity” is taken to mean “possessing a reality of its own” (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:76). Or, “true independent of the subject” (sic.). We designate this understanding objective knowledge. Naturalism appeals exactly to this sense as the possibility to “view the world from nowhere”. To understand the world as it is one must lose one’s position in it but at the same time not take up another position either. Contra to this, Glendinning has noted how phenomenology rejects a “view from the sideways perspective” (Glendinning, 2004:36). However, he applies this only with regard to social phenomena and admits that natural science can achieve this. We regard his argument as not going far enough and deny that even natural science can achieve the “view from the sideways perspective”. Developing their phenomenological positions we must qualify “true independent of the subject” and in doing so we can recognise the epistemically low status of science to escape the humanist challenge.

30 See Ch.4.ii.b.
31 Both were students of Schutz.
As we see it, “nowhere” and “true independent of the subject” are alternative ways of saying “true for everyone”. By “everyone” we mean anyone signified by any “us/them” distinctions we make.\textsuperscript{32} “Everyone” therefore includes any hypothetical “thou” regardless of whether we respond to them protagonistically or antagonistically. We say hypothetical because the “thou” does not have to come into existence to nevertheless be a part of “everyone”. As Schutz identified, all successor relations are geared towards hypothetical “thou’s” that we assume will come into being though, by historical accident, they may not (Schutz, 1962i:318). As such because this “thou” is hypothetical it is anonymous – possessing only the bare minimum required to be a “thou”.

This understanding of objectivity is heavily bound up with an understanding of “neutrality”.\textsuperscript{33} In order to be objective in this sense, one must also be neutral with regard to what one is talking about or else it will not be accepted by “everyone”. In a simpliciter sense Peter Donovan has defined neutrality as follows: ‘To be neutral is to stand in relation to two or more parties which are themselves in tension, in such a way that the respective interests of those parties are not thereby materially affected’ (Donovan, 1999:235). This definition of neutrality, however, reveals it to be a relational concept, the “would-be neutral” is always what Sartre called the “Third” (Sartre, 2003:437). Donovan identifies three modes of neutrality based on this relational criterion (Donovan, 1999:235-239). However, “neutrality” as it is used above and in one of his own modes does not depend on this relational criterion and we see that there are four different forms of neutrality in Donovan’s scheme. Of these, only two concern us here:

Neutrality as “designated role”. Of this role-neutrality Donovan suggests that ‘would-be neutrals have a defined contribution to make, a role to play’ (1999:238). Examples of this kind are referees in sport contests. The referee is a part of the situation who enforces the pre-agreed conditions of the opposing parties that ensure “fair play”. The key aspect of this is that the conditions of “fair play” have been agreed upon by opponents.

Neutrality as “disinterestedness”. This form of neutrality is our addition to Donovan’s classifications based on two criticisms he provides of observer-neutrality\textsuperscript{34}: observer-bias, the observer is limited by both their location and frame of mind; and observer-incomprehension, the observer may miss

\textsuperscript{34} We would prefer to call this form of neutrality abstentive-neutrality and we have already partially covered this in our discussion of States and “abstentive control” (see Ch.5.ii).
the most significant aspect of the event. But bias and incomprehension are not just problems of observers and any activity can be affected by them. Rather, they have everything to do with the interpretive framework used by the person. In the case of observations, the observed may never be privy to these interpretations. Thus, we call this addition *reflexive-neutrality: a reflexive activity that attempts to mitigate interpretative bias and incomprehension in any form of acting.*

Objectivity as objective knowledge is underpinned by reflexive-neutrality. That is, “true for everyone” (objectivity) is assumed to also mean “acceptable by everyone” (neutrality). Despite Donovan’s claims, it is non-relational in the sense that because it applies to “everyone” it is therefore context invariant. If a particular claim is shown to suffer from bias and/or incomprehension this entails that it is not “true for everyone” as the claim would not be accepted by those who do not share the bias/incomprehension. In this understanding objectivity and neutrality are synonymous. This differs from the understanding of objectivity as objective interpreting which requires reflexive-neutrality but is not synonymous with it. One can be reflexive-neutral without understanding the world as it is for X.

We can demonstrate this point by noting that role-neutrality requires reflexive-neutrality. If I am the referee in a Taekwondo match I am expected to enforce certain rules to ensure a “fair” match. This is clearly role-neutrality because I act as a Third in the contestation of two other parties. But being a referee requires a level of reflexive-neutrality in a number of ways:

1. Article 14.5.1 of the rule book states that ‘Lifting the knee to avoid attack or impede the progress of an attack’ will result in a kyongo penalty (half point deduction) (WTF, 2012:26). I may regard lifting the knee a valid defence – this is their bias – but if I wish to continue as a referee they must enforce this rule or it may be perceived that I am not fulfilling this role. Added to this, the player may have lifted their knee for any number of reasons – their knee may have locked mid-kick – but these are irrelevant to the application of the rule.

2. Similarly, according to article 3.4 a coach is not allowed to leave their designated seat. Leaving their seat is covered by articles 14.5.1 that ‘Uttering undesirable remarks or any misconduct on the part of a contestant or coach’ will result in a kyongo and 14.5.2 ‘A coach or a contestant interrupting the progress of the match’ will result in a gam-jeom (full point deduction) (WTF, 2012:26). Depending on the manner in which they leave their seat it is at my discretion to apply a kyongo or a gam-jeom. This, as was pointed out during training, is irrelevant to the intentions of the coach. The coach may be trying to get my attention because they have missed a foul
against their player. This is a legitimate reason to call for attention but this is not reason to leave their seat. But here I must avoid incomprehension by either failing to enforce a penalty where a penalty is due (they allow themselves to be swayed by the coach’s legitimate concern) or I am too harsh applying a gam-jeom when only a kyongo was appropriate (they left their seat but did not step into the ring).

In both cases my being “objective/neutral” does not require me to understand the situation as it is for player/coach. In fact, in this case of being a referee, trying to understand the situation as it is for the player/coach would not only slow proceedings down but would undermine my ability to referee.

Following Berger and Luckmann, this understanding of “objectivity” is produced and constructed by werisc activity. They call this objectivation: ‘the process by which the externalised products of human activity attain the character of objectivity’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:78). They are, however, quick to point out that this objectivity ‘does not thereby acquire an ontological status apart from the human activity that produces it’ (1966:78). This is the naturalist claim. Rather, this understanding of objectivity can be summarised by the phrase “this is how things are done”. Based on their phrasing it would be more accurate to say that objective knowledge is the product of meeting a rational standard determined by the postulate of verifiability in terms of what a particular in-group deems as rational, that is, the appropriate means for fulfilling a given end. In other words, objective knowledge is brought about by complying with the rules of verification within a particular mode of rationality that group members are expected to meet. Indeed, this equivocation is found in an early draft of Schutz’s “Concept and Theory Formation”: ‘the social sciences too have to be objective in this sense, if by objectivity it is understood that all scientific propositions are subject to verification or recitification by fellow scientists’ (Schutz, 2004:124).

Based on our previous discussion about objective and subjective interpretations, it is important to highlight how the word “objective” can be maintained in this regard. Previously, we noted that the postulate of verifiability in reference to scientific rationality is what points to the communal aspect of science. The postulate can only be met if it is assumed that there is some Other – belonging to the ingroup of scientists – to do the verification. We must emphasise that “I” do not decide that my work is verified but “they” do. For example, it is common practice that any submission to a journal undergoes

35 See Ch.4.ii.b.
blind peer review by at least two reviewers. The fact that these reviews are “blind” is useful for highlighting the point we wish to make. The reviewers belong to an in-group, broadly speaking the scientific community, to which the author of the work, because of their anonymity, becomes an outsider. The reviewers in question have no way of knowing whether the author is a completely new scholar or someone who has previously been accepted into the in-group already. In this respect the author through their submitted work is a candidate, a particular kind of out-group which seeks to join the in-group. On this point it is worth emphasising that the reviewer is not a case of role-neutrality, in this situation there are only two parties involved. Thus, the task of the reviewer is as follows: ‘By the operation of his system of typifications and relevances he subsumes individuals showing certain particular characteristics and traits under a social category that is homogenous merely from his, the [insider’s], point of view’ (Schutz, 1964i:255). The reviewer must decide whether the candidate meets the rational standard which determines membership to his in-group. This requires reflexive-neutrality on the part of the reviewer in both a forced and enforced sense. It is forced because the reviewer must know how to apply the rational standard avoiding incomprehension, and it is enforced because they are unaware of the identity of the candidate avoiding bias. Whenever this standard is appealed to, therefore, a process occurs whereby the verifiee’s membership in the in-group is temporarily put into question during the verification process.

We call this rational standard “objective” because the verifiee must occupy the group’s position. Thus, as noted earlier, the group as a collective person is a single grammatical subject and has its own “Here” to be occupied by members. Whenever a person wishes to be a part of a group they must apply themselves to that group’s rational standard. This requires reflexive-neutrality because bias and incomprehension threaten group membership. But as the above example of the taekwondo referee indicates, neither the rational standard nor reflexive-neutrality are the exclusive rights of science.

In this sense “objective” and “neutral” become bywords for complying with group norms – i.e. professionalism. To say a scientist has produced objective knowledge is to say no more than that they have met the agreed upon rational standard that makes the scientist a scientist. That is, being objective involves complying with a set of rules laid down by the rest of the group. The referee, insofar as their role-neutrality requires reflexive-neutrality, is a case in point. They do not create the rules which they

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36 We are dealing here with an abstracted “ideal” case.
37 Of course in certain situations it is impossible to have “blind” reviews, e.g. when Taekwondo referees assess another referee.
38 See Ch.5.ii.
enforce during a match. Instead, how well they enforce the rules determines how professional they are.

Recognising this point allows us to return to the humanist challenge. In the case of naturalism, because of the orthodoxy of rationality the rational standard that applies to science is essentialised so that it becomes the rational standard for all provinces of meaning. Though we said objective knowledge entailed the claim “true for everyone” where “everyone” includes any hypothetical “thou”, this is only the case if we accept the objective knowledge produced by objective interpreting is presumed to be the only form of objective knowledge. What must be recognised is that objectivity in the sense of objective interpreting pertains to the postulate of nonpractical knowledge and as such is part of what makes science “science”.

By contrast, objectivity understood as meeting a rational standard pertains to the postulate of verifiability and therefore is part of the rationality of any province of meaning not just Science. The epistemic arrogance of naturalism consists in treating the objective knowledge produced by science as objective knowledge for all provinces of meaning. By doing this it cannot avoid making “ought” claims (humanism) as the categories, or ideal types, of science are imposed upon other provinces of meaning.

Phenomenology in recognising science to be a form of play, however, recognises that as a nonpractical interest science is easily abandoned when practical interests arise. Provinces of meaning are arranged by the groups that utilise them in order of superiority and inferiority (Schutz, 1964i:241). This hierarchy of meaning-context is determined by what the group constitute surviving and thriving to be. A consequence of this, not fully explicated by Schutz, is that the valuations of a superior province can override the valuations of an inferior province. This is so because the knowledge of superior provinces is more “taken for granted” due to their importance for the group’s surviving and thriving. As a form of play, science is epistemically inferior in that other superior provinces must be safeguarded before it can be pursued. Further, as the postulate of nonpractical interest can make other forms of play an object of study, science will always remove itself to a lower level of meaning-context. It thus avoids “ought” claims because there are no provinces below Science to which its objective knowledge can then be applied. Only by this recognition can the humanist challenge be avoided. However, three concessions must be made.

First, the humanist challenge is not, in fact, totally defeated and nor can it be. By this we mean that any discussion of how science is to go about its business is a normative discussion that is filled with “ought” claims. Both von Stuckrad and Wiebe have pointed out that the discussion that establishes science is not necessarily scientific (von Stuckrad, 2012:36; Wiebe, 2012:184-186). This is imperialism
in that these “ought” claims only have validity within the sphere of science. Here it is useful to draw on Schutz’s discussion of the notion of equality: ‘Equality and inequality in this sense refer to various degrees of excellence in performance, achievement, and status – but only of homogenous elements, that is, only elements belonging to the same domain of relevances are comparable in this respect’ (Schutz, 1964i:239-240). The equality of objects, according to Schutz, can only be properly determined if those objects are within the same domain of relevance (province of meaning). Thus the scientist can only justifiably evaluate those objects that belong to the province of Science. This is exactly what we are doing with our phenomenological analysis. Thus, as Schutz goes on to say, ‘that which is comparable in terms of the system of one domain is not comparable in terms of other systems’ (1964i:240). While the normative claims of our phenomenological position apply within the province of Social Science, these “ought” claims should not translate into other provinces.

Second, the use of “should” above highlights another need for clarification. Contra Hook, it is not the purpose of science to remedy “intellectual and moral irresponsibility”. Indeed, due to its inferior epistemic status it cannot speak of the “irresponsibility” of other provinces. However, we must, as recognised by Strenski, admit a risk of colonialism. By this we mean that purely scientific categories (ideal types) can be taken up and forced upon the object of study such that the object adopts them for its own. Schutz recognises something similar when he discusses the difference between in-group and out-group interpretations. He notes that based on the way a particular out-group views it (hetero-interpreting), the in-group may begin to adopt those views as their own (auto-interpreting) (1964i:247). In the case of science this colonialism can occur simply by making the findings/results of analysis publicly accessible and without any volitional act on the part of the scientist themselves. As Strenski noted in the case of Chidester, the findings and theories of science can be co-opted by other groups. Such is the risk of science: the products of science, nonpractical knowledge, are useable in that they can have the being-useful-for fulfilling practical interests.

Simply, once scientific knowledge is produced it becomes part of our (both the individual person and the collective person so far as this knowledge is shared) overall stock of knowledge and therefore available for use by other provinces of meaning. In this respect, the findings of science are naturalised in that they become taken for granted not only by scientists themselves but non-scientists also. Again, we can turn to Galileo and heliocentrism as a case in point. That the earth revolves around the sun is now taken for granted by “Europeans”.

172
Third, while the knowledge produced by science is *useable*, any scientist who construes their knowledge as *useful* is actively engaging in colonialism and ceases to be scientific. They become a humanist. A survey of “scientific” literature to sift out *useful* from *useable* knowledge would likely reveal that much of this literature is not scientific in the sense we have defined it. As such, the sphere of scientific research is greatly reduced and much that goes by the name is not proper science. One may note that insofar as *rihtgesetnessa* promote the production of *useful* knowledge, not only are they not scientific but science becomes an *un-rihtgesetnisc* activity. In such cases the continued use of the word “science” is a means of legitimating and conferring authority. Think, for example, of the numerous adverts that present “scientifically proven” products. In fact, much science that finds itself in “common” discourse is colonial.

To a certain extent one may conclude that the crisis of social science stems from the necessarily ideological struggle of separating proper science from pseudo-science. While this may have some merit, we regard this as the problem of the possibility of science and risk of science. That is, establishing the time to do science and protecting it from pseudo-science involves dealing with external threats to science. In lamenting the current state of Religious Studies, for example, both Wiebe and McCutcheon are combatting sources of *fear* – the “theologians” – which would determine how religious studies should be done. Our consideration is not focused on defending science from its various foes, however. By “crisis” we have indicated something internal to social science. Nevertheless, this consideration of external threats has led to an understanding of objectivity as meeting a rational standard that can now be related to our earlier comments on sociology of knowledge. It is important to recognise that the production of objective knowledge insofar as it is based on the postulate of verifiability relies upon approval by the ingroup. That is, *objective knowledge is nothing more than socially approved knowledge.* And if objectivity in this sense is a matter of social approval, this entails that all knowledge is intersubjectively constituted. By thus considering the matter of objectivity, in both senses, we are now in a position to understand the crisis of social science. That is, if we want to get to the core of the crisis we must now turn to a consideration of *intersubjectivity* for which we will gain the precise advantage of our proper phenomenology.

39 See Ch.5.ii.
7. The Crisis of social science

In previous chapters our imperial argument has focused on delineating proper science from pseudo-science. In this concluding chapter we must establish a delineation between proper social science and pseudo-social science. As we have argued, science properly understood is the attempt to understand the world as it is for X. What sort of science we are engaged in therefore depends on what this X is. Co-opting Sartre, we have suggested social science is the study of “wer in situation”; this is to say that the X of social science is wer and we are concerned with the world as it is for wer. The issue to be addressed now is that multiple cognitive styles do this – meeting the postulates of social science – which begs the question why, if these cognitive styles are all social scientific, do they struggle to cohere with one another? This lack of coherence, we propose, stems from a failure to consider the philosophical anthropological question “What is wer?” Each methodology operates as if the question has been answered and it is in this presumption that we will find the core of the crisis through a consideration of intersubjectivity; a consideration for which phenomenology is precisely suited.

i. “Knowledge about” and “knowledge of”

As we see it, the rational standard explicated in the previous chapter is predicated upon intersubjectivity. By this we mean that in order to engage in the process of constructing “socially approved knowledge” it must first be assumed that the person involved in doing this has the “right” to do so. In the previous chapters our postulates of social science have referred to the achievement of the rational standard of social science. But to question this “right” is not to determine how objective knowledge (whether scientific or otherwise) is constructed, rather it is to ask who is involved in its construction.¹ This is in an

¹ Contained within this point is a further criticism of Merton’s norms of science, particularly the norm of universalism that science does not adjudicate on the basis of gender, race, etc. (see Ch.5.1). As discussed by Barnes, Bloor and Henry, in its earliest days the Royal Society was more inclined to trust the word of a “gentleman” than a “commoner”. Thus, for example, although Robert Hooke’s (1635-1703) discoveries have withstood the test of time in comparison to Robert Boyle (1627-1691), among their contemporaries it is the latter who is credited with being a better scientist as he was a gentleman and Hooke his paid servant (Barnes et al., 1996:146). Since then the authority of the gentlemen has transferred from virtuoso, to philosopher, to scientist (1996:149). These transitions represent within science alterations in the rational standard by which work is verified and who is involved in such verification. Such a point is not problematic to our phenomenological understanding of social science because it only refers to who is involved. The later example of Robert Chambers shows how specialisation became a mark of authority
important clarification. Since its introduction to English speaking social/behavioural sciences in the 1960s, “intersubjectivity” has come to mean “shared” or “mutual understanding”. For example, Bruner defines intersubjectivity as ‘how people come to know what others have in mind and how they adjust accordingly’ (Bruner, 1996:161), and Cox – representative of phenomenology-of-religion – portrays intersubjectivity as a means of obtaining objective knowledge (2010:1).\(^2\) As Alessandro Duranti explains it, the term was introduced through English translations of certain works that were drawing from Husserl, of which two notable books are Merleau-Ponty’s *Phenomenology of Perception* (1945[1962]) and Schutz’ *PSW* (1932[1967]) (2010:4). However, within a couple of generations this connection to Husserl was forgotten, and crucially what Husserl meant by “intersubjectivity” differs from this more modern rendering as “mutual understanding”.\(^3\)

According to Duranti the main issue is how we read various German compound words (usually featuring the component “*Wechsel*”)\(^4\) Husserl used when discussing the topic. As early as Royce Gibson’s translation of *Ideas I* (1931), there is a tendency to translate these words as “mutual understanding”.\(^5\) Similarly in Schutz’s essay “The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl” (1957[1970d]) when discussing *Ideas I* he asks: ‘How in the frame of the natural attitude, is mutual understanding (*Einverständnis*) in principle possible?’ (Schutz, 1970d:51). Duranti notes that the inclusion of the original German suggests the translators’ (Kersten with the aid of Gurwitsch and Luckmann) awareness that the phrase is not entirely accurate (2010:5-6). In turning to *Ideas II*, however, Duranti suggests that these “*Wechsel*” compounds mean something akin to “trading places”. For example we get the following passage:

> The things posited by others are also mine: in empathy I participate in the other’s positing. E.g., I identify the thing I have over and against me in the mode of appearance \(\alpha\) with the thing posited by the other in the mode of appearance \(\beta\). To this belongs the possibility of substitution by means of trading places [Platzwechsel]. (Husserl, 1989:177)

Intersubjectivity is not to be understood as the *achievement* of “mutual understanding”. Rather, as “trading places” intersubjectivity is the existential condition upon which “mutual understanding” becomes *possible* (Duranti, 2010:6-7).

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3 A similar point can be found in Kerry and Armour’s evaluation of Sport Studies (see Ch.2.ii.b).
4 E.g. Wechselverständnis, Einverständnis, Wechselverständigung.
5 “Mutual understanding” is also found in Findlay’s translation of *LI* (Husserl, 1970a:278).
However, we would argue that this shift has more to do with Schutz’s treatment of Husserl than a translation issue. In responding to *Ideas II*, Schutz actually refers to “trading places” as “transferring”, as part of Husserl’s considerations of “transcendental intersubjectivity” (Schutz, 1970d:69-73). But Schutz concludes of the whole project:

> We must conclude that Husserl’s attempt to account for the constitution of transcendental intersubjectivity in terms of operations of the consciousness of the transcendental ego has not succeeded. It is to be surmised that intersubjectivity is not a problem of constitution which can be solved within the transcendental sphere, but is rather a datum (*Gegebenheit*) of the life-world. It is the fundamental ontological category of human existence in the world and therefore all philosophical anthropology. (1970d:82)

Duranti’s own quotation crucially misses this rejection of transcendental intersubjectivity in which this question of possibility is meant to occur (Duranti, 2010:9). Further, Duranti does not assume that *PSW* is prone to the above translation issue because the phrase “mutual understanding” does not occur (2010:5). However, this is to brazenly ignore that Schutz’s consideration of intersubjectivity is titled “Foundations of a Theory of Intersubjective Understanding” and that he is concerned with how “genuine understanding” (i.e. mutual understanding) is achieved (Schutz, 1967:111). As we see it, the shift away from considerations of intersubjectivity as possibility has more to do with Schutz’s outright rejection of the issues of transcendental phenomenology (1967:97). That is, he refuses to ask how the Other is constituted for the subject but instead claims that: ‘The object we shall be studying, therefore, is the human being who is looking at the world from within the natural attitude’ (1967:98). The problem this creates is that rather than rejecting this “transcendental problem” Schutz actually presupposes a solution to it and that solution takes the form of the human prejudice. To understand this we must clarify the problems of intersubjectivity.

Scheler, much like Schutz, recognises the connection of intersubjectivity to philosophical anthropology. In *The Nature of Sympathy (NS)* (1913, 1923[1954]) he suggests that the fundamental consideration from which empirical social sciences and other branches of philosophy can proceed is

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6 One may object that the following treatment of *PSW* as well as our assessment of “The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl” is dogged by translation issues similar to those faced by Husserl, Scheler and Heidegger. However, the significant difference in the case of Schutz is that his later writings were in English. As George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert note of their translation of *PSW* they have followed the terminology established by these later English writings (in Schutz, 1967:ix).

7 *NS* was initially published concurrently with *Formalism as Zur Phänomenologie der Sympathiegefühle und von Liebe und Hass* (1913). The second edition was then published as *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie* (1923). The translation used here is of the fifth edition (1948[1973a]) which contains corrections by Maria Scheler of mistakes by the printer found in the second through fourth editions.
intersubjectivity (1954:213-215). Scheler begins his discussion by arguing that the problem of intersubjectivity is not in fact a single problem but rather six problems which need to be properly distinguished. For our purposes only the first four concern us, of which we may note there is an order of precedence:

the common basis for the epistemological as well as for the metaphysical enquiry must consist, [1], in an ideal scrutiny, without reference to actual existence, of the essential relationships between self and community in general; and [2], in an exact determination of the situation within the field of natural experience. This is succeeded at once by [3] the epistemological question as the origin of our knowledge of other minds, and this in turn by [4] a critical justification of this knowledge in respect of empirical evidence. (1954:227)

Scheler then reduces this order to two separate questions:

Knowledge of the nature of the community, and of the existence of others in general; and knowledge of the contingent existence of a member of a community or of some particular historical community. (1954:234)

In “Scheler’s Theory of Intersubjectivity and the General Thesis of the Alter Ego” (1942[1962b]), Schutz usefully re-renders this distinction as ‘[general] empty knowledge about the existence of some alter ego and some community as such and the [contingent] knowledge of one or more concrete fellow-men and social groups’ (1962b:158).

Empty “knowledge about Others’ existence” refers to (1) and (2) and Scheler deals with this by his consideration of an “absolute Robinson Crusoe” (originally found in Formalism) to whom the question is posed that if he has never perceived entities of his own kind would he nevertheless know of the existence of conscious subjects like himself? In Formalism, Scheler answers that Crusoe would know that there was such a community of subjects but he would not know where they are (Scheler, 1973b:521). This is on the basis that Crusoe would have a ‘specific and well-defined consciousness of emptiness or absence (as compared with the presence of some genuine entity already there), in respect of emotional acts as represented, for instance, by the authentic types of love for other people’ (1954:235). Crusoe, in effect, would experience the existence of other subjects in general by being lonely.8 He would have an

8 We differ slightly from Scheler on this point who claimed that Crusoe would never think “I am alone in the world” (1954:234). Loneliness as it is used here means the feeling of need for the presence of another. In the state of loneliness I believe there is someone “out there” but cannot find them. The feeling of loneliness we are suggesting of Crusoe is quite a broad one, one in which he thinks of a community rather than a particular Other. More often, the experience of loneliness is felt as the need for the presence of another who is not among those who are present. Much more space needs to be given over to the study of loneliness than can be given here. What we will emphasise is that though we have disagreed with Scheler on the feeling of loneliness we nevertheless affirm the conclusion he draws about knowledge about other subjects in general.
abundance of acts to perform but no appropriate target; this “firing blanks” leads to the idea of a “Thou” with whom he is currently unacquainted. What is significant about this “general Thou” is that it ‘must necessarily be given as a whole beforehand, as a “background” to the positing of the reality of any possible object within it; hence it does not simply comprise the sum of all contingent facts with it’ (1954:236). What can be drawn from this is that although Crusoe has a general idea that out there are “Thou’s” whose lack of presence he experiences, this does not necessarily mean that he knows what they will “look” like.

For Scheler the case of the absolute Crusoe shows that “knowledge about Others’ existence” is never problematic and therefore focuses on “knowledge of an Other”: (3) and (4). Following the order of precedence we begin with the presence of the Other (3) when ‘in the order of dependence among cognitive intentions (or the corresponding spiritual acts of the person), at which social and other-consciousness commences, i.e. what kind of cognitive acts must already have been accomplished before awareness of others can appear’ (1954:217). We may qualify this as “knowledge of an Other’s presence”. This is an issue of “transcendental psychology” and concerns when we recognise a subject as subject. Once recognised, this is followed by (4) ‘the emergence and development of knowledge on the part of actual men concerning the minds of those about them’ (1954:221). That is, “knowledge of an Other’s thoughts”.

Scheler observes that there are two approaches to this question of contingent Others:

The theory of analogical inference, whereby, on perceiving expressive movements similar to those which we experience in ourselves in consequence of our own individual self-activity, we infer as a similar self-activity in others; and the theory of empathy especially associated with Theodor Lipps, whereby this assumption involves a belief in the existence of mind in others, based upon a process of empathic projection of the self into the physical manifestations evinced by the other. (1954:238)

A modern example of this sort of reasoning is found in phenomenology-of-religion through Cox’s notion of “interpolation”: ‘To interpolate means to insert what is apprehended from another religion or culture, which to the outsider often appears strange or unusual, into one’s own experience by translating it into terms one can understand’ (Cox, 2010:52). This modern version is still just as prone to Scheler’s criticism of the original:

we are indeed conscious of our expressive movements, but apart from mirrors and suchlike, such consciousness takes the form, merely of intentions to move, and of the consequences which follow from sensations

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9 Developed from van der Leeuw (1963:674-675).
of movement or state; while in the case of others, the primary data are presented by the visual images of such movements, which have no sort of immediate resemblance or similarity to the data encountered in our own case. (Scheler, 1954:240)

How I experience my ferhloca performing a gesture is not the same as how I experience the other person performing the same gesture. Not only this, we can analogise other minds in animals whose gestures are quite unlike our own. Most damning is that while potentially helpful in explaining the degree to which we understand other subjects, the analogical argument already presupposes them to be subjects. Further, even when we do make such inference all we have done is place my self into another location rather than recognise another self. Empathy, which is presented in the same way as Husserl in Ideas II (1989:170-180), fares little better. It can only provide a hypothesis as to how the assumption that there is an Other before me arises, but ‘it would be blind chance that the process of empathy should coincide with the actual presence of mind in the bodies so perceived’ (Scheler, 1954:241). It could not, he goes on to say, distinguish between empathetic feelings toward a genuine Other or a painting or the character Hamlet. Further, like the analogical argument, to see expressive movements as “expressive” is to have already presupposed subjectivity.

As theories of presence, Scheler argues analogy and empathy are unable to pick out the Other as Other. We can see this in the case of Husserl’s notion of “trading places”. In order to “trade places” with someone, that “someone” is already presupposed to be a subject worth “trading places” with. Conversely, that I can “trade places” with an object does not guarantee that object to be a subject. “Trading places” is therefore no different to “mutual understanding”. That is, analogy and empathy pertain to thoughts but as they are utilised by Lipps, Riehl, and Husserl, among others, they also try to explain how we know the Other is present (1954:240). But this is to violate the order of precedence. That I can know what the Other is thinking through “trading places” cannot be the proof that the Other is an Other because the Other has already been presupposed in the premise.

Both the analogy and empathy rest on what are, for Scheler, two unphenomenological presuppositions: ‘(1) that it is always our own self, merely, that is primarily [giefan] to us; (2) that which is primarily [giefan] in the case of others is merely the appearance of the body’ (1954:244). Scheler’s main argument as to why these are presuppositions is that it is not always clear who an experience “belongs” to. Indeed, we have a tendency, he suggests, to ‘live more in others’ than ourselves (1954:247). In this respect he charges analogy and empathy with underestimating the difficulty of self-knowledge and over-estimating the difficulty of Other-knowledge. Much of what we think belongs to our
Self – based on the findings of child psychology – is in fact “socially derived”.\textsuperscript{10} That most of my knowledge is socially derived clearly indicates that who “I am” depends in large measure on “who” is around me. Embree has also pointed out that Schutz too thought the “individual” to be an abstraction.\textsuperscript{11} Schutz nonetheless criticises this argument on the basis that ‘there is no such thing as an experience “given” to me that would not indicate which individual stream of consciousness it belongs to’ (Schutz, 1962b:170). This is pursued further to argue that even though an experience may refer to the thoughts of another person this does not destroy their character of belonging to me; there are only ever “other people’s thoughts thought by me” (1962b:171). On one level Schutz’s criticism is valid: the hatred of ducks has to belong to someone in the sense that the hatred must occur in a particular *ferhdloca*. “Me” and “you” are designations of different locations of *ferhd* in which this hatred occurs. The hatred is “mine” insofar as it occurs in this *ferhdloca*.\textsuperscript{12} But Scheler does not deny this: when the thought “hate-ducks” occurs, we can say which *ferhdloca* had this particular thought. Rather, he is putting into question the *origin* of this hatred. I hate ducks, but whether I hate ducks because you hated ducks first or because I hated ducks first is the matter of obscurity.

Drawing on this point Scheler moves to his perceptual theory of the alter ego. The obscurity of whom the hatred of ducks originated with allows Scheler to suggest that internal perception is not only perception of oneself (Scheler, 1954:248). By this he means that just as I can have an external perception of myself – when I touch my arm for example – and also an external perception of the Other so too then my internal perception of my self indicates the possibility of an internal perception of the Other. In all cases the internal and external are intrinsically connected to one another. Such internal perception is conditioned by external perception in that the Other’s body must influence my body in order to give rise to this internal perception. But the only restriction this enforces is that the external perception affects the specific content of the Other’s thought. Indeed, the only thing which cannot be understood in this way is the Other’s experience of their own *bodily states* (1954:255). And it is exactly because of this that I am separated from the Other, and it is from this level of the experience of one’s own body that analogy and

\textsuperscript{10} Zahavi’s (2004) study of intersubjectivity indicates that Husserl may have also been making the same sort of argument in the posthumous *nachlass* volumes of *Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität* (1973a, 1973b, 1973c).

\textsuperscript{11} A significant point to be drawn from this is that Scheler’s argument to a large extent entails that subjectivity is intersubjectively constituted. Subjectivity, that is, in the sense of being an “individual self” different from others. Schutz, despite his disparagement of Scheler in “Scheler’s Theory of Intersubjectivity”, nonetheless agrees with this position (see Ch.5.ii).

\textsuperscript{12} See Ch.2.iii.c.
empathy may come into play. Scheler claims the Other is giefan as an “integral whole” and that internal perceptions give aspects of their self and external perceptions aspects of the body (1954:261-264). That is, the form of perception determines what limited content I draw from this whole.

Schutz agrees with Scheler’s criticism of analogy and empathy in trying to present solutions to “empirical problems” (4) as solutions to “transcendental problems” (3) (Schutz, 1962b:159, 164). He also agrees that Husserl is just as subject to Scheler’s criticisms. But Schutz’s analysis of Husserl comes to a very different conclusion:

- it is in no way established whether the existence of Others is a problem of the transcendental sphere at all, i.e., whether the problem of intersubjectivity does exist between transcendental egos (Husserl) or Persons (Scheler); or whether intersubjectivity and therefore sociality does not rather belong exclusively to the mundane sphere of our life-world. (1962b:167)

Not only does he ignore the transcendental problem as he does in PSW, but now denies that it is a problem altogether. Like Scheler he concurs that our “knowledge about Others” is never problematic (1962b:168), but now makes the significantly bolder claim that our knowledge regarding presence isn’t problematic either. As such he goes on to claim that “we will set aside transcendental problems and turn to the mundane sphere of our life-world” (1962b:167). Part of the basis for this rejection of transcendental problems is Scheler’s claim in his perceptual theory that the Person is unobjectifiable (1962b:171). But it would seem that the Self recognised in internal perception is the objectified Person. On this point Schutz seems to be comparing Scheler’s comments on the Self in NS with those found in Formalism and HPC which seem largely inconsistent. This inconsistency, however, mainly stems from Scheler’s refutation of analogy and empathy. Here it is difficult not to notice the rapid speed with which he changes from “subject” to “mind” to “self” giving all the terms a certain degree of equivalency. This equivalency, however, stems from his amalgamating the thinking of Lipps, Riehl, Wolfgang Köhler, Lévy-Brühl and others – who all use these terms in their discussions of analogy and empathy – under a single umbrella. Rather, it would seem in his own thinking the Self is only a given portion of the integral whole that is the Person. But this begs the question of how I know a person when I meet one? Though Schutz does not put it in such terms, Scheler falls back into analogy: as a person I can bring to consciousness my self, the qualities of this self can be observed in other entities, and so they too must be persons. But the very unobjectifiability of the Person, like empathy, also means that it is blind chance that this perceived self belongs to a genuine person.
Schutz proposes to get out of this problem via his general thesis of the alter ego. He effectively argues that the Self is the objectified Person on the basis of introducing a time structure lacking in Scheler’s consideration of external and internal perception. Accordingly we must recognise two attitudes: ‘one of living in our acts, being directed towards the objects of our acts; and the other, the reflective attitude, by which we turn to our acts, grasping them by other acts’ (Schutz, 1962b:172). According to Schutz we never grasp our Selves in the acting attitude 13, only the reflective attitude. The Self as it is acting in the vivid present is inaccessible to the reflective attitude because it is precisely the Self of the vivid present performing the reflection. Thus, when I do reflect, ‘what we grasp by the reflective act is never the present of our stream of thought and also not its specious present; it is always its past’ (1962b:172-173). However, while I cannot grasp my self in the vivid present I can grasp the self of the Other in their vivid present. He draws the following point:

In listening to a lecturer, for instance, we seem to participate immediately in the development of his stream of thought. But – and this point is obviously a decisive one – our attitude in doing so is quite different from that we adopt in turning to our own stream of thought by reflection. We catch the Other’s thought in its vivid presence and not modo praeterito; that is, we catch it as a “Now” and not as a “Just Now”. (1962b:173)

Schutz calls this vivid simultaneity. He thus defines the alter ego as ‘that subjective stream of thought which can be experienced in its vivid present’ (1962b:174). And in further explicating this general thesis he admits this to be an analogical argument:

It implies that this stream of thought which is not mine shows the same fundamental structure as my own consciousness. This means that the Other is like me, capable of acting and thinking; that his stream of thought shows the same through and through connectedness as mine; that analogous to my own life of consciousness his shows the same time-structure (emphasis added, 1962b:174)

However, we may note that this does not involve overestimating self-knowledge, as Scheler feared above, because I crucially perceive the Other (in their vivid present) in a way that I cannot perceive my self.

Insofar as Schutz is treating a problem of thoughts, of achieving genuine understanding, then this general thesis is adequate for social science:

The general thesis of the alter ego, as outlined above, is a sufficient frame of reference for the foundation of empirical psychology and the social sciences. For all our knowledge of the social world, even of its more anonymous and remote phenomena and of the most diverse types of social communities is based upon the possibility of experiencing an alter ego in vivid presence. (1962b:175)

13 Our interpolation – Schutz uses no particular term or phrase.
However, he goes on to conclude that ‘we have in a similar way as Scheler to distinguish between our experience of the existence of Others, that is, the general thesis of the alter ego, and our knowledge of or about the Other’s specific thoughts’ (1962b:176). But this means Schutz is using the general thesis as a solution to the problem of presence - now rendered “existence”. But as the example of the lecturer makes clear, the general thesis clearly is concerned with thoughts. Insofar as Schutz thinks the general thesis also solves the problem of presence, he has failed to ask a crucial question: why should he listen to this object that is making noise in the first place? If we contrast the lecturer with a monkey solving a puzzle it is not difficult, via this general thesis, to build up the thought processes of the monkey as it tries to solve the puzzle in its vivid present.

Based on comments by Barber, Schutz would necessarily exclude the monkey, however, because he criticised Husserl for being too lax in recognising consciousness in the non-human (Barber, 2013:321-322). But this presupposition that the lecturer is a subject and the monkey not has nothing to do with the general thesis. Rather, it has to do with comments such as the following: ‘As long as human beings are not concocted like homunculi in retorts but are born and brought up by mothers, the sphere of the “We” will be naively presupposed’; ‘I just live along amidst other human beings which I group under the relations of we and you’; and ‘any production and any tool ... is the frozen result of human activities’ (emphasis added, 1962b:168, 177). And as he puts it in “Phenomenology and the Social Sciences” (1940[1962a]): ‘Of special importance for our topic is the constitution of the specifically human, and that means cultural, worlds in their peculiar manner of objectivity’ (1962a:126). Where Husserl spoke of Transcendental Egos and Scheler of Persons, Schutz speaks of Human Beings. Elsewhere Schutz openly admits that his approach to social science is anthropomorphic (Schutz, 2004:131). This entails, though, that the question of presence is actually answered by the human prejudice: to find the “human” is to find the Other.

ii. “Knowledge that” and “knowledge how”

While we accept this distinction between “knowledge about Others” and “knowledge of an Other”, the problem as we see it with Husserl, Scheler and Schutz’s accounts is in subsuming the problems of presence and thoughts under a single question, as this entails the assumption that both require the same solution. Instead, we suggest the consideration of “knowledge of an Other” concerns itself solely with
thoughts; it is a matter of intersubjectivity understood as achievement – i.e. “mutual understanding”. The problem of presence requires a different sort of “knowledge”, the sort that produces the human prejudice. Dan Zahavi has gone some way to indicate this when he discusses different kinds of empathy; taking anger as an example, it is possible to distinguish between “that someone is angry” and “why someone is angry” (2012:81). The question of “why” pertains to “knowledge of an Other’s thoughts” which presupposes the subject. And this must be distinguished from “knowledge that an Other is present” which informs this presupposition.

At this juncture it may be asked in what respect the human prejudice, as a form of “knowledge that”, constitutes an actual problem for social science. The issue stems from the vast swathes of anthropological and religious studies literature that indicate groups for which this human prejudice is not accepted. To give two examples in both directions: in his study of the Ojibwa people, Irving Hallowell observed: ‘While in all cultures “persons” comprise one of the major classes of objects to which the self must become oriented, this category of being is by no means limited to human beings’ (Hallowell, 1960:20). One does not need to be a human being in order to be a “person” (i.e. subject).14 Conversely, Claude Levi-Strauss noted that: ‘a very great number of primitive tribes simple refer to themselves by the term for “men” in their language, showing that in their eyes an essential characteristic of man disappears outside the limits of the group’ (Levi-Strauss, 1969:46). In this case not all human beings are “men” (i.e. subjects). We have called the human prejudice a “prejudice” precisely because it has less than universal acceptance in the mundane sphere. That is, to turn Schutz against himself: ‘the results of an analysis of the mundane sphere, if true, cannot be impugned by any basic assumption (metaphysical or ontological) which might be made in order to explain our belief in the existence of Others’ (Schutz, 1962b:175). In other words, our understanding of wer cannot violate the postulate of adequacy.15 The assumption of the human prejudice (whether metaphysical or ontological) simply cannot be accepted as there are groups for which subjectivity is recognised in the non-human or not in all humans.16

14 If there is a connection to Scheler’s concept of Person in this use we have not yet identified it.
15 See Ch.4.ii.c.
16 A critic may at this point wish to leap upon Schutz’s use of “true”. As we take him to mean “true” in this context, it refers to whether the likes of Hallowell and Levi-Strauss have accurately represented the people they are talking about thus meeting the postulate of adequacy. The alternative reading of “true” is to suggest that in recognising subjectivity in the non-human these groups are being untrue somehow. But to make this claim violates the principle of principles. That is, groups that recognise subjectivity in the non-human or not all humans would be accused of being deviant. Such analysis ceases to be social scientific because it carries with it statements regarding how these groups “ought” to understand the world – i.e. it becomes colonial (see Ch.6.iv).
More importantly, to accept the human prejudice is to enforce a European orthodoxy of rationality.17 – one we charge is prevalent within Social Science. According to Hallowell it is common practice within Social Science to assume that “subject” and “human” are synonymous.18 Within Religious Studies, Ioannides and Robertson have recently commented that ‘it is noteworthy that the study of religion, fundamentally concerned with the consideration of one of the most enduring products of “the human”, only sporadically and reluctantly embraces a deconstructive (re)thinking of this seemingly commonsensical, yet discursively and materially volatile category’ (2013:230).19 This taking for granted of “the human” is played out in naturalist literature, for example, when entities regarded as subjects by various groups are labelled as: “superhuman beings” (Spiro, 1966; Lawson and McCauley, 1990); “humanlike but nonhuman beings” (Guthrie, 1980, 1993); “non-natural entities” (Barrett and Keil, 1996); and “counter intuitive agents” (Boyer, 2001; Pyysiäinen, 2003). Each indicates an anthropomorphic cognitive default whereby the person identifies the human in the non-human. This is particularly clear in the case of Pyysiäinen20 who, eager to deny a value judgement is not involved, nonetheless states that “counter-intuitive” ‘only means something that contradicts panhuman intuitive expectations of how entities behave’ (2003:157). Similarly, in the antagonistic phenomenology-of-religion, we find van der Leeuw claiming that humans are everywhere, everytime the same (1963:675). Cox too has spoken of ‘postulated non-falsifiable alternate realities’ (2010:48).21

Pyysiäinen’s “counter-intuitive” and Cox’s “non-falsifiable” serve the same function in implying that there is a particular way the world “is” that is then violated by what we have dubbed “religions”. We charge that both these concepts fail at the postulate of adequacy. That is, the Buddhists of Pyysiäinen’s study do not think of the Buddha as “counter-intuitive” and the indigenous tribes of Cox’s studies (2007) do not think of their ancestors as belonging to a reality which is non-falsifiable. Indeed, that these groups do not view such entities in these terms was made clear back in the 1970s by Evans-

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17 See Ch.6.iii.
18 Within this thesis a number of scholars utilised have perpetrated the human prejudice (e.g. Albrecht (1968), Byrne (1999), Delanty and Strydom (2003), and Steel and Guala (2011)). This even extends to those who have responded to or interpreted the very phenomenologists we have suggested were trying to avoid it (e.g. Spiegelberg (1971a) Dunlop (1991), Glendinning (1998), Gorner (2007) and Kelly (2011)).
19 Part of the problem with their account, however, is the continued use of the word “human”.
20 We have favoured Pyysiäinen’s account over Boyer’s because he rejects the latter’s “cognitive optimum” whereby the human mind can only handle so many counter-intuitive breaks by a single entity. Pyysiäinen clearly demonstrates that insofar as we grant these ideas as counter-intuitive it is possible to have radically counter-intuitive ideas through the introduction of writing which allows them to be remembered (2003:161-162).
21 See Ch.2.1.
Pritchard’s study of the Azande and witchcraft. He recognised that for the Azande witchcraft was falsifiable because they were perfectly capable of determining whether or not it had taken place. As Evans-Pritchard observed, the occurrence of witchcraft is not miraculous (1976:19). The best known example of this is the case of collapsing granaries – the Azande are quite clear whether witchcraft has caused the collapse or not (Evans-Pritchard, 1976:22-23). In our terms, the presence or non-presence of witchcraft is covered by the postulate of verifiability within the Azande conception of rationality. To call these realities “counter intuitive” or “non-falsifiable” is at best to proclaim that the postulate of verifiability employed by the Azande differs from our own. But the “our own postulate of verifiability” referred to here is not that of the social scientist. This we noted in Chapter 4, as a postulate determining rationality is dependent on other postulates to give it context.22 In the social scientific case this context is provided by the postulates of nonpractical knowledge, subjective interpretation, and adequacy, all of which would refer us back to the Azande. But the use of “counter intuitive” or “non-falsifiable” actually indicates the implicit adoption of some other rationality that has obstinated the study. Pyysiäinen’s case makes this very clear:

Our knowledge, for example, partly consists of panhuman preferences and inclinations encoded in our minds in evolution. It is, however, cognitively easier for us to consider our moral intuitions as someone’s viewpoint; this someone is a god. Ascribing moral ideas to a divine mind both explains these ideas (their existence and their binding nature) and makes it easier for us to process moral knowledge in the mind. (2003:162)

The findings of evolution set the rational standard for all rationality against which the rationality of the Buddhists, etc., are being judged. The issue with the approach of both Pyysiäinen and Cox is that the use of “counter-intuitive” and “non-falsifiable” comes with a tacit “to us” hidden in the usage. But the “us” represented here is not the “us” of social scientists. This “us” more accurately belongs to a European stock of knowledge.23 Schutz in accepting the human prejudice falls to the same rebuttal.

Schutz’s acceptance of the human prejudice actually deviates from earlier phenomenology in two important respects: first, he re-institutes the “man-animal” which earlier phenomenology was trying to remove from the consideration; second, insofar as phenomenology rejected this, the question of recognising a subject as subject is not a matter of “knowledge that”. As we saw in the case of Heidegger,

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22 See Ch.4.ii.d.
23 “European” is used in Husserl’s sense (see Ch.1.i). One may object that it is out of this European ferhd that the idea of social science emerged. And while this might be true, such an objection hides a cultural parochialism - à la Slingerland (See Ch.6.iii) – in which it is assumed only Europe can be properly scientific.
phenomenology recognised that this is the wrong question: the study of Dasein is not a study of entities ("that") but a study of being ("how"). The question “What is wer?” is not answered by determining a kind of entity but a style of being. As such a phenomenological approach analyses “knowledge how an Other is present”. As argued in Chapter 2, Husserl’s Transcendental Ego, Scheler’s Person and Heidegger’s Dasein all signify the being which I have (not am) and to call other entities wera marks them as having this same being. The question, then, is if they are all aiming at “knowledge how”, why did they consistently fail to achieve their goal? The answer to this can be found in Sartre’s approach to intersubjectivity, which affects a fundamental shift in our understanding of “subject” and “object”. As Sartre himself proclaims at the end of Saint Genet, his aim is to ‘reconcile, with one final effort, the object and the subject’ (1952[1963]:599). Schutz has criticised this approach in “Sartre’s Theory of the Alter Ego” (1948[1962e]) but this criticism is flawed because it is trapped by the approach of “knowledge that”. Once we have recognised this shift we will finally be in a position to understand the crisis of social science.

Sartre’s primary consideration of intersubjectivity is found in BN where he rejects both realist and idealist solutions to the problem (Sartre, 2003:247-254). The realist can only be certain of bodies, and so posits the mind of the Other as a certainty, thus endorsing an idealistic thesis without warrant. For the idealist the Other is just my representation but if it is my representation how can it refer to a system of representations that are not mine? In this he effectively repeats Scheler’s criticisms of the analogical argument and theory of empathy. Both fall into the trap that the Other is just a replication of my self, but Sartre points out the fundamental presupposition that we operate under is that ‘the Other is the one who is not me and the one who I am not’ (2003:254). The Other is constituted by an absence of my representations. But the crucial question, what we have called “knowledge how”, is how this absence is recognised as such. Realist and idealist accounts must either give into solipsism or posit a “Third”, a being who is simultaneously “Here and There” to confirm that my representation (“Here”) of the Other (“There”) is accurate. The challenge, then, is to provide a positive theory of the Other’s presence that

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24 See Ch.2.iii.d.
25 See Ch.6.iv.
does not fall into solipsism or require God (2003:256). As Sartre sees it, Husserl, Hegel\(^{26}\) and Heidegger have attempted exactly this.

Husserl’s solution, according to Sartre, comes from CM and FTL in which he argues that reference to the Other is indispensable for the constitution of the world. On a level not pursued by Sartre, we can say that such an argument really concerns “knowledge of”. According to Lewis and Staehler, in CM Husserl did not intend to prove the Other’s existence but to ‘to show that it is possible to make sense, phenomenologically speaking, of the Other in his or her otherness’ (Lewis and Staehler, 2010:50). Husserl recognises that: ‘The character of the existent “other” has its basis in this kind of verifiable accessibility of what is not originally accessible’ (Husserl, 1988:114) – a point that Sartre will take up himself. But as Staehler’s analysis of CM reveals, Husserl is still faced with the challenge ‘that the Other is accessible in the mode of inaccessibility appears to be a rather paradoxical response to the question of the Other’s givenness’ (Staehler, 2008a:113-114). Problematically Husserl does not question this giefannis. Indeed, Staehler’s discussion of my accessibility and the Other’s inaccessibility indicates that Husserl is still operating via an analogy similar to Schutz’s general thesis above (2008:114-116). Sartre himself sees the argument as little different from Kant’s own idealistic position. The “Other” becomes little more than a regulatory concept:

> If someone replies from the start that the transcendental subject refers to other subjects for the constitution of the noematic whole, it is easy to reply that it refers to them as to meanings. The Other here would be a kind of supplementary category which would allow a world to be constituted, not a real being existing beyond this world. (Sartre, 2003:258)

Heidegger, building upon the work of previous thought, recognised two necessities: ‘(1) the relation between “human-realities” must be a relation of being, (2) this relation must cause “human-realities” to depend on one another in their essential being’ (2003:268). Thus Heidegger argued that Dasein is being-with (Mit-sein) and more specifically “being-with-Others”. Sartre’s criticism focuses on this “with”: “‘with” does not intend the reciprocal relation of recognition and of conflict which would result from the appearance of a [réalité-humaine] other than mine in the midst of the world. It expresses rather a sort of ontological solidarity for the exploitation of this world’ (2003:269); Heidegger fails to account for the phenomenon of resistance identified by Scheler.\(^{27}\) This can be seen in his analysis of tools

\(^{26}\) Hegel’s position is not examined even though his inclusion here by Sartre prompted French phenomenologists to regard him as part of the Phenomenological Movement. A claim largely contended by other members (Spiegelberg, 1982:440-442).

\(^{27}\) See Ch.2.iii.e.
as a way of revealing the Other. First, the Other may not be present at the time of use so that this gives us “knowledge about” rather than “knowledge how” (Heidegger, 2010:11-122). Second, Zahavi has pointed out that Husserl claims that to recognise a tool as a tool (if not created by ourselves) stems from Others’ teaching us (Zahavi, 2004:183-185). But this entails that to recognise an Other in a tool is to presuppose another Other who taught us this recognition – i.e. “knowledge that”. The problem with Heidegger’s approach is that it makes our original relation to the Other one of interdependence and solidarity rather than confrontation (2004:186). This focus on similarity, however, risks descending into monism because the Other is no more than an identical Self projected onto another body. Thus Heidegger’s focus on “being-with” falls into the pits of analogy and empathy.

From this analysis Sartre draws four necessary and sufficient conditions for any theory of the Other’s presence to be valid: (α) Such a theory should not provide a new proof for the existence of Others. Solipsism on this level is impossible. In effect the ability to doubt the existence of the Other is predicated on the already accepted affirmation of his existence. (β) It is only by a Cartesian cogito that we can proceed ‘by disclosing to me the concrete, indubitable presence of a particular, concrete Other, just as it has already revealed to me my own incomparable, contingent but necessary, and concrete existence’ (Sartre, 2003:275). That is, only by delving into my own “inmost depths” will I determine the how of the Other’s being-not-me. (γ) As such this cogito cannot reveal the Other as “object”. That is, insofar as the Other is “for me” they are not a constitutive part of the world but one who “interests” our being (2003:276). By this Sartre means that ‘my relation to the Other is first and fundamentally a relation of being to being, not of knowledge to knowledge’ (2003:268). We raise this point to highlight that “knowledge” as it used here is both Schutzian terminology and construed in the broadest sense possible. (δ) Grasping the Other as being-not-me cannot be an external spatial negation but an internal one.

This requires some unpacking both in relation to Schutz’s criticisms and Scheler’s order of precedence. In particular we have the main criticism from Schutz:

Sartre’s criticism of the solipsistic argument can be applied to his own theory. For even if we were prepared to admit with him that our belief in the Other’s existence needs no proof since it is rooted in a pre-ontological understanding, we should have to show how we can arrive at an understanding of the concrete Other’s concrete behaviour without falling back upon the solipsistic argument. (Schutz, 1962e:199)

28 Staehler offers a different view that ‘an alien tool is still recognised by us as a kind of tool that supposedly fulfils a certain function’ (Staehler, 2008b:18). The major issue is how we conceive “alien”.

189
Sartre is, in this context, a victim of his own style for not indicating the influence of Scheler on this particular list. We may note that in his own presentation Schutz renders (α) as ‘Such a theory need not prove the Other’s existence, the affirmation of which is rooted in a “pre-ontological” understanding’ (1962e:187-188). However, what Sartre actually writes is: ‘Such a theory can not offer a new proof of the existence of others, or an argument better than any other against solipsism’ (emphasis added, Sartre, 2003:274). The key difference here is that Sartre opens by speaking in the plural and is ruling out, like Scheler, “knowledge about” as problematic – I can never doubt that there are Others somewhere. Moving onto (β), this entails that Sartre concerns himself with the cogito which discloses ‘to me the concrete, indubitable presence of a particular, concrete Other’ (emphasis added, 2003:275). This statement parallels Scheler’s consideration of Crusoe when he mentioned ‘the presence of some genuine entity’ who is absent (emphasis added, Scheler, 1954:235). The issue with Schutz’s criticism is that “presence” has been rendered as “existence” but how he and Sartre use the latter term differs. As such, we must be clear that Sartre’s “existence/presence” distinction does not correspond to Schutz’s “existence/thoughts” distinction. And while existence may not require proof, presence does.

This does not, however, mean that (γ) and (δ) then refer to thoughts or the metaphysical and value considerations found in Scheler’s order of precedence. To the contrary, nowhere in his consideration of “The Existence of Others” does Sartre show himself to be considering “concrete behaviour” in the sense of “knowledge of”. In fact, (γ) and (δ) rule out any consideration of thoughts. This is made clear by the following claim found in (γ):

> If [the Other] is for us, this can be neither as a constitutive factor of our knowledge of the world nor as a constitutive factor of our knowledge of the self, but as one who “interests” our being, and that not as he contributes a priori to constitute our being but as he interests it concretely and “ontically” in the empirical circumstances of our facticity. (Sartre, 2003:276)

Quite simply, the error of Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger and Schutz was to consider our relation to the Other as “knowledge to knowledge” (2003:268). This is quite overt in Scheler when the problems of presence and thoughts are subsumed under a single question: ‘the epistemological question as to the origin of our knowledge of other minds, and this in turn by a critical justification of this knowledge in respect of empirical evidence’ (Scheler, 1954:227). All recognise that the Other is constituted by the absence of my representations; it is this that underpins their claims that the Transcendental Ego, Dasein,
and Person are unobjectifiable. But treating this unobjectifiability as an epistemological issue leads to insurmountable problems.

If we are to understand how the Other is present this must be in terms of “being to being” – i.e. an ontological consideration. In making this a matter of being, (δ) renders the recognition that the Other’s not-being-me must engender an internal negation in the sense that they must have some effect on me for the recognition to occur. Returning to our comments on the stricture of philosophical anthropology, Scheler understood phenomena in terms of milieu-things by which was meant that phenomena are things whose variation effects were experiencing. However, in Formalism Scheler does not go into much detail on what forms these effective experiences might take, thus placing the effective experience of a storm and the love of parents alongside each other (Scheler, 1973b:140). This is in part because milieu-things are treated epistemologically (1973b:148-149). Sartre’s comments, however, suggest that it is in how they are experienced effectively that we are able to recognise the presence of the Other. But this is occluded if we treat the matter epistemologically instead of ontologically. Sartre, therefore, effectively makes Scheler’s order of precedence stricter by suggesting that not only must each problem be separated out, but no solution to any problem can then be used as a solution to another.

iii. Wer without end

Sartre proposes to meet all these requirements via the regard. The primary problem of the above attempts to establish the Other’s presence is that they first approached the Other in their object-ness (epistemologically). Sartre instead begins with the concrete fact that in everyday life I can have an original relation with an Other, and it is this “ordinary appearance” which must be questioned. By this he means that my experience of shame, for example, is always shame before somebody (2003:245).

Sartre begins by discussing seeing a man in the park. Insofar as this man is treated as an object he is no more than one among many objects in this park which are arranged around me from ‘my point of

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29 See Ch.2.iii.f.
30 See Ch.3.iii.b.
31 In the translation of BN by Hazel Barnes “regard” is translated as “look”. We have maintained the original French for clarity.
view into instrumental complexes’ (2003:278). That is, objects are primarily giefan as instrumentalities.32 Here we may helpfully introduce Schutz’s own discussion of the null-point.33 So far as this man is treated as an object he may be subtracted from the totality of objects without the remainder being perceptibly changed. The bench he is sitting on does not disappear too. But: ‘Perceiving him as a man, on the other hand, is not to apprehend an additive relation between the chair and him; it is to register an organisation without distance of the things in my universe about that privileged object’ (2003:278).34 Rather than the objects of view being oriented around me as the null-point they “flee” this orientation. I see these objects of the park as they are oriented around this man.

But even accounting for this decentralisation we may still be caught in the analogical argument – I am imagining the world as it would be if I made that “There” this particular object (the man) is occupying my “Here”. This decentralisation is “virtual” because that man is still a “full object” for me to grasp (2003:280). Yet in the recognition of this object as null-point a revelation can occur:

If the Other-as-object is defined in connection with the world as the object which sees what I see, then my fundamental connection with the Other-as-subject must be able to be referred back to my permanent possibility of being seen by the Other. It is in and through the revelation of my being-as-object for the Other that I must be able to apprehend the presence of his being-as-subject. For just as the Other is a probable object for me-as-subject, so I can discover myself in the process of become a probable object for only a certain subject. (2003:280)

Sartre calls this “being-seen-by-another” in which “I the subject” finds myself “I the object”. The decentralisation of my world ceases to be virtual and becomes actual. This regard which objectifies me, however, should not be confused with the faculty of sight alone: ‘the [regard] will be given just as well on occasion when there is a rustling of branches, or the sound of a footstep followed by silence, or the slight opening of a shutter, or a light movement of a curtain’ (2003:281). The regard is not, therefore, the particular faculty which regards me. This faculty, we are told, is bracketed out in the experience of “being regarded”.35

32 More formally we may, following Heidegger, say that a particular entity is either giefan as instrument when it is ready-to-hand or as object when it is present-to-hand (see Ch.2.iii.d).
33 See Ch.3.1.
34 It is important that Sartre has italicised “man” is this regard to emphasis the shift to “mankind” rather than an individual male.
35 Thus Spiegelberg’s interpretation of the regard as “gaze” is in fact too restrictive particularly as he associates it with the “human gaze” (1982:523-524).
It is this self-reference of the *regard* that is key. In Sartre’s definition of the *situation* I am surrounded by a world which determines both my facticity and my freedom. The world as a collection of “instrumental complexes” gives me certain possibilities for acting. We suggest Sartre’s understanding of the “world” is no different from the concept of the *life-world* introduced by Husserl:

> the life-world, for us who wakingly live in it, is always already there, existing in advance for us, the “ground” of all praxis whether theoretical or extratheoretical. The world is pre-given to us, the waking, always somehow practically interested subjects, not occasionally but always and necessarily as the universal field of all actual and possible praxis, as horizon … Things, objects (always understood purely in the sense of the life-world), are “given” as being valid for us in each case (in some mode or other of ontic certainty) but in principle only in such a way that we are conscious of them as things or objects within the world-horizon … The world, on the other hand, does not exist as an entity, as an object, but exists with such uniqueness that the plural makes no sense when applied to it. (Husserl, 1970c:142-143)

The life-world, like *wer*, is not entity but being. The possibilities I have available thus depend on the particular complex of the situation. My freedom is then the possibilities which I can enact in this situation. Then I am *regarded*. I become aware of my self, but this awareness is not that of the reflective attitude but an unreflective consciousness of the self (Sartre, 2003:284). Such awareness of the self presents it not with possibilities but with probabilities. The self perceived is the self that the Other regards. It is, Sartre continues, a self which I cannot escape and it is exactly this self that is *giefan* in moments of pride and shame. In this my possibilities become instrumentalities for the Other. That is, I am no more than an object for this Other to manipulate. Indeed, the experience of shame is this manipulation. As instrumentality my possibility is therefore probability (2003:288).

It is this distinction between possibility and probability that gets to the core of Sartre’s understanding of subject and object. Schutz’s criticism of Sartre fails to account for this distinction. He agrees with Sartre’s criticism of Husserl’s resolution of the intersubjective problem (Schutz, 1970a:36-39), but then takes issue when Sartre admits there is an oscillation between subject and object such that two persons are never subjects to one another at the same time. Sartre speaks first of being enslaved by the Other (2003:291), and then later of regaining our subjectivity by making an object of the Other (2003:304). Schutz’s contends that if we accept this oscillation of subject/object how can we determine the Other has open possibilities? Just as my possibilities die under the *regard* so too ‘the objectified Other has no freedom of action within open possibilities, or better: his possibilities are dead possibilities,

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36 See Ch.2.iv.g.
referring to other objective aspects (I have) of the Other’ (Schutz, 1962e:200). Reintegrating Sartre’s terminology, this is to say that I can only ever know the Other’s probabilities, not her possibilities. And while this is true it is the problem of “knowledge of”. But the presence of the Other is not determined by knowing what her possibilities actually are; it is in realising myself as among her possibilities.

Schutz, we argue, misconstrues the dynamics of objectification and subjectification. To render this clear we are better off using “subject” and “object” as verbs (being) as opposed to nouns (entities). Only if we do this will we be considering being. Thus: as subject I subject the life-world to my acts and objects (as instrumentalities) object to this subjection. To avoid confusion we will refer to these verb uses by gehīersumian (subjaction) and forstandan (objection) This allows us to re-integrate Scheler’s understanding of resistance (one translation of forstandan) (Scheler, 1980b:141-143). Entities forstandeen my gehīersumende and they are successful in this insofar as I lack appropriate “knowledge of” them. However, certain entities not only forstandee, they defy my gehīersumende. In this Sartre improves on Scheler to recognise the moment in which I find myself gehīersumed by some entity to which I can only forstandee. As such, to experience myself as gehīersumed is to recognise the Other’s presence.

As part of the dialectic accepted by Sartre this forstandeende may become gehīersumende. The problem for Schutz, still reading “subject” and “object” as designating entities, is that the subjecthood of the Other is lost the moment I reassert my gehīersumende over them. But this he denies because:

Peter addresses Paul because he anticipates that Paul will understand him, and this implies that Paul will be able and willing to co-perform by his listening and interpreting activity the single steps in which Peter builds up, while speaking, the meaning of his message. (Schutz, 1962e:202)

But what is not clear is how this differs from Peter addressing his computer. When Peter operates a particular program he inputs certain commands that he anticipates that his computer will understand and so interpreting them will gain the meaning of the message and carry out the operation desired. On this point we maintain that “knowledge of” the Other is no more difficult than “knowledge of” any object. But this is not to say that how Paul and the computer feature within Peter’s possibilities is not different. Because of the subjective experience of being gehīersumed by Paul, Peter’s “knowledge how” this entity

37 Literally translated as “reduce”, “conquer”, “subject” and/or “make obedient”.
38 Literally translated as “hinder”, “oppose”, “resist” and/or “withstand”.
39 Strictly speaking we should say that objects which successfully do this geforstandan. The introduction of “ge-” changes this from a weak verb to a strong verb in Old English.
40 Sartre never explicitly refers to Scheler in this regard but there are uses of “resistance” that clearly echo Scheler’s and a near identical criticism of Husserl and Heidegger (Sartre, 2003:347-355).
stands out from other entities determines its subsequent treatment within his possibilities.41 As Sartre explains, the experience of being regarded (gehiersumed) ‘pushes me into a new dimension of existence’ (Sartre, 2003:292). As suggested by Overgaard, this ‘attempt to “fight back” by objectifying the other is of no use, as it only allows me to conquer an object’ (Overgaard, 2013:116). Paul is unobjectifiable in the sense that Peter cannot orient himself toward Paul in the same way he can toward his computer because having been gehiersumed by Paul he “knows” Paul can do it again. In effect after the initial gehiersumende experience all subsequent interaction must factor Paul’s subjecthood. This is not epistemological knowledge in the sense that I can point to some feature of Paul as his subjecthood, but rather “knowledge how” is conditioning in that it sets limits for my interaction with Paul.42 As Sartre goes on to explain, even though the life-world may forstandee me it is only the Other that can limit me. By not-being-me the Other presents a limit to my own subjecthood, a limit that could not otherwise be known:

It would perhaps not be impossible to conceive of a For-itself [subject] which would be wholly free from all For-others [other subjects] and which would exist without even suspecting the possibility of being an object. But this For-itself simply would not be “man”. (2003:306)

Intersubjectivity as possibility, therefore, is brought about by the interplay of entities that gehiersume one another.43

We have called this experience of being gehiersumed “subjective” on the grounds that no rational standard can be provided to determine the occurrence of being gehiersumed (2003:291-292). There are two reasons for this. First, Sartre recognised being regarded is not dependent upon the entity possessing a particular set of constituents. Eyes may be the most common source of the regard but they are not the only one. Second, the experience is self-referential. It is I who feels shame or pride in the face

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41 Used in this context we can draw a parallel between beings differentiated by “knowledge how” and Sartre’s notion of the négatités.

42 It must be remembered that the regard is not about the actual constituents of Paul. If the regard is brought about by his looking at me this is bracketed in the actual experience of being regarded. It may be countered that in reflection I can bring to mind the fact that Paul looked at me and recognise this as the source of his regard. And we do not deny this, but his subjectivity, once established, is not then bound to his eyes. To say so would be to argue that to strike out his eyes would be to destroy his subjectivity.

43 Many criticisms of Sartre’s theory of intersubjectivity stem from the result that this constant interplay of gehiersumian means that subjects are never equal. As Fretz summarises it, there is ‘no room for social intercourse in which equal subjects respect the ambiguity of human existence (facticity and freedom), with regard to themselves as well as to one another’ (Fretz, 1992:88). However, we regard this criticism on the basis of equality as somewhat vapid. Such arguments presume the equality of subjects but rarely consider what is meant by “equality”. Natanson, for instance, suggests that most of these criticisms charge that BN is not true to experience (Natanson, 1981:332-333). Ironically, Schutz is among those who appeal to this sort of argument and yet also argued at the same time that equality is a relative notion (see Ch.6.iii).
of the Other. These feelings are mine and do not entail that the Other is ashamed or proud of me. Combined, this entails that given two entities of the same kind we cannot exclude the possibility that I will only experience one as gehīersumende me. Or, given two entities of different kinds we cannot exclude the possibility that I will experience both as gehīersumende me. Contra Glendinning, there is not an ‘a priori assumption that non-human animals, along with stones and plants, are, in some way, absolutely deprived of the kind of “sight [gehīersumende]”, and hence also of the kind of “world”, that belongs to Dasein [wer]’ (1998:64). Rather, the recognition of Other as Other is no different from the recognition of certain groups as rihtgesetnessa. It is this point drawn from Sartre’s analysis of intersubjectivity that brings us to the very core of the crisis of social science. Contrary to Derrida (1969), we cannot speak of an “end of wer” but must rather accept “wer without end”. By this we mean that no essential possibility for which sorts of entities may be wer can ever be determined.

By consequence, if an entity does gehīersume me this only raises the practical possibility that entities of a similar kind can also gehīersume me. Were it a matter of essential possibility this would dictate that all entities of the same kind after this initial experience are wer. Further, this determination of practical possibility is not just a matter of which entities gehīersumen me, but the form that gehīersumende takes. By this we mean something akin to Scheler’s case of the ducks above. Let us say I have been gehīersumed by Maerin, during which she has imparted upon me that “Farholt is wer”. By consequence I may now treat Farholt as wer even though I have never had an originary experience of being gehīersumed by him. This indicates the need for a sociology of knowledge conspicuously absent in Sartre’s considerations of intersubjectivity. According to Berger and Luckmann, for Scheler, the sociology of knowledge is ‘concerned with the analysis of the social construction of reality’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:15). More exactly, it is to understand wer in terms of her “world openness” brought about by “socially approved” and “socially derived” knowledge such that each group develops its own “knowledge that” which presents limitations in terms of the practical possibility of which entities may or may not gehīersume a member.

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44 See Ch.5.ii.
45 See Ch.5.
46 Here we differ from Sartre slightly who took it that I cannot know – conceptual knowledge in the form of propositions – that a particular entity is an Other without this subjective experience (Sartre, 2003:292).
47 This lack was later recognised in his post-phenomenological period.
48 See Ch.2.iii.e.
As such “knowledge that” involves the establishment of a rational standard regarding who can or cannot be wer. Thus if I know Morholt as wer, and Maerin is an entity of the same kind, this raises the likelihood that she too can be wer. Morholt, however, may deny that Maerin can be wer. To him she is an orc\(^49\): an entity who is perceived to be incapable of possessing the being that entities of the same kind have been perceived to possess. We are here extending Fitzgerald’s argument in *Discourse on Civility and Barbarity* in which the civil/barbarian dichotomy ‘is about who is and who is not properly human’ (Fitzgerald, 2007:111). A notion that can be traced back (at least) as far as the Greeks of Homer to Aristotle who made a distinction between *oikumene* (Greek-born) and *barbaroi* (non-Greeks). Husserl, too, spoke of the difference between “men” and “brutes” among humans (1988:126). However, we need to escape the use of “human” in this regard, as the Greeks were aware that there was only one species of human and as such the difference between *oikumene* (wer) and *barbaroi* (orc)\(^50\) is a social, rather than biological, valuation (Padgen, 1982:16-17).\(^51\) The difference between wer and orc is one of social valuation, entailing that Farholt can take up Morholt’s denial as his own. That is, Farholt may never experience being *gehīersumed* by Maerin precisely because Morholt has informed him that she cannot.

Yet this rational standard can never undermine the essential possibility that any entity can *gehīersume* me. Thus, even though the human prejudice may be a part of my European rational standard this does not preclude me from being *gehīersumed* by my dog. Indeed, when Manque poos she looks at me, a look which I interpret as some sort of embarrassment on her part and which inclines me to turn my back to her. By turning my back I am becoming an object in the life-world as it is orientated around Manque - submitting to her *gehīersumende*.\(^52\)

*Wer* as a socially constructed concept will thus vary from group to group and from member to member within a particular group.\(^53\) To keep with Sartre’s terminology this is to say that *wer* is itself a

\(^{49}\) From the Old English meaning “foreigner” or “demon”.

\(^{50}\) Both can in fact be translated as “foreigner”. They are also potentially linguistically related if not cognate. Padgen mentions the work of Ker (1958) in which the Normans were referred to as “barbarians” (1982:202). However, it is not clear who called them this and we have been unable to find an edition of *The Dark Ages* (1904, 1955) that matches this pagination and thus failed to find the reference Padgen has alluded to.

\(^{51}\) Scheler also produces a similar case to this (see 1973b:312).

\(^{52}\) A similar example can be found in Glendinning (1998:141-143).

\(^{53}\) Contrary to Glendinning it is possible to maintain Heidegger’s “sharp” distinction between *Dasein* (wer) and animals (*not-wer*) because as social this divide is subjective not ontological (Glendinning, 1998:65-70). However, we are called to a more detailed analysis of being *not-wer* of which *orc* is only one type.
negation and that the various ways this negation is affected produce négatités wer. The crisis of social science lies in the very interest of studying wer when no unifying concept of wer can be given. This is the full significance of what we mean by “wer without end”. The proliferation of methodologies (normative philosophies of social science) stem from this crisis as each presumes a négatités wer in order to proceed. Phenomenology-of-religion, for example, proceeds with the négatités wer of homo religious. The lack of agreement that is encountered results from each négatités wer covering a restricted region of the province of wer (which is without end) and only partially overlapping with the négatités wera presumed by other methodologies. As such we charge that all such methodologies are inherently limited on the grounds that each works with a négatités wer that does not allow them, as philosophies of social science, to study the full extent of “wer without end”. It is on this basis that they are unable to cohere with one another.

In contrast to this, a phenomenological position must conclude – following Sartre – that an entity has the being of wer insofar as it is experienced by us as gehīersumende. We refuse on principle – namely the principle of principles – to determine whether the entities which do this are real or not; our interest is that these entities are giefan to us as being wer. Only by doing this can we understand how the presence of Others is recognised in such a way as to accommodate the empirical findings of scholars such as Hallowell and Levi-Strauss and keep to the postulate of adequacy that our social science demands.

iv. Ferhdcund science

While there are likely numerous négatités wer, in these closing comments we must deal with the human prejudice of the European négatités wer which is presupposed by many philosophies of social science. As we see it, the human prejudice is one among many ‘implicit premises which permeate the explicit

54 A similar line of thought can be found in Foucault’s The Order of Things. More accurately Foucault argues that “man” did not exist until the end of the eighteenth century (2002a:336). As we understand it, Foucault’s discussion rather than covering wer without end really highlights the emergence of a particular négatités wer. Further study is required to explore the similarities and differences in Foucault’s projects and our own. An initial question would be the relation of this négatités wer to Husserl’s discussion of the European ferhd.

55 See Ch.2.iv.

56 See Ch.3.iii.d.

57 We should also not think that wer is the only being these entities can possess.
propositions of [social] science in a hidden way, as a tacit dimension in the way [the scientist] as a scientist speaks and acts and practices his science’ (Kiesel, 2004:45). But in presupposing the human prejudice, social science becomes obstinate. By obstinate we mean that in presupposing the human prejudice we cannot escape this European orthodoxy of rationality. We cannot avoid pseudo-scientific colonialism of some sort because we will always assume that the people under study should accept the human prejudice also.  

But in saying this must we conclude that Schutz, whom we have heavily accused of human prejudice, also engaged in colonialism, and if so does this not then undermine the entire idea of social science that we have promoted through our normative philosophy of social science? Take the claim that: ‘Of special importance for our topic [social science] is the constitution of specifically human, and that means cultural, worlds in their peculiar manner of objectivity’ (Schutz, 1962a:126). This has then impacted on those drawing from his phenomenology. Berger and Luckmann echo this claim: ‘As soon as one observes phenomena that are specifically human, one enters the realm of the social. Man’s specific humanity and his sociality are inextricably intertwined. Homo sapiens is always, and in the same measure, homo socius’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:69). Natanson claimed that ‘the reality of everyday existence presupposes the possibility of mutual interaction for all human beings of whatever epoch or culture’ (Natanson, 1981:333). And as we saw above, Duranti restricted intersubjectivity to humans alone, denying the possibility of non-human intersubjectivity (Duranti, 2010:12). Even in Sartre we cannot ignore that réalité humaine is translated as “human reality” and that he regularly referred to “human beings”. However, unlike those above we can reconfigure Sartre’s use of “human” with little damage to his thinking primarily because this use refers to a style of being rather than a kind of entity.

58 This becomes doubly obstinate in the way that humans then become privileged in terms of “knowledge of”. E.g. there are claims like that van der Leeuw’s above – prototypical of phenomenology-of-religion – that wer is everywhere and everytime the same. Luther Martin has contented similiarly on the basis that evolutionary psychologists have found that the morphology of the human brain has remained relatively consistent for the past 100,000 years (Martin, 2012:63). The danger here is the slip into the “horse fallacy” identified by Evans-Pritchard whereby we assume that the humans of some past epoch think exactly like we do but really only construct a “world” that we (with all our prejudices) would conceive (Evans-Pritchard, 1977:108) We regard knowledge of humans from a past epoch as no more or less difficult than our knowledge of ducks. That we may happen to be human also offers no special privilege, or advantage we should say, in garnering this “knowledge of”.  

59 They perpetrate the human prejudice in a number of places from an over-emphasis on language, to citing humans’ geographical spread and reproductive tendencies (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:65-70).  

In order to combat this we must remove ourselves to a lower epistemic level. To do this we will see how presupposing the human prejudice has a consequence for Schutz’s application of social science. Echoing Husserl, Schutz makes the point that the life-world in which I live in is one shared with fellow wera:

My experience of the world justifies and corrects itself by the experience of the others with whom I am interrelated by common knowledge, common work, and common suffering. The world interpreted as the possible field of action for us all: that is the first and most primitive principle of organisation of my knowledge of the exterior world in general. (Schutz, 1964k:9)

The life-world, we must remember, is the totality of all that is organised about me as its null-point (Schutz), as various instrumental complexes (Sartre). However, Schutz, presupposing the human prejudice, then makes a distinction between “natural” and “social”: ‘I discriminate between natural things, which may be defined as things essentially given to me and you and everyone, such as they are, independent of any human interference, and on the other hand, social things, which are understandable only as products of human activity, my own and others’’ (1964k:9). But in so presuming this he falls into exactly the same sorts of problems as we have identified above. Namely, the “natural world” is taken to be some sort of invariant core in the same way that “panhuman” indicates such. Indeed, this “natural world” gives us the “man-animal” from which spread various “social worlds” as derivations and deviations from this “core”, and can only be discussed as such. Berger and Luckmann, following Schutz, put it thus: ‘these biological facts serve as a necessary presupposition for the production of social order’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:70). This point can also be seen in Spiegelberg’s description of the life-world: ‘Now this world in the sense of an all-inclusive horizon was clearly not the world in the sense of objective science or cosmology. It was the world as experienced by a living subject in his particular perspective, however distorted, hence clearly a subjective and relative affair’ (Spiegelberg, 1982:146). More recently, Staehler, speaking on Klaus Held’s treatment of Husserl, has spoken of ‘the relation between the “one world” of humanity and the many cultural worlds’ (Staehler, 2007a:325). One can only understand the life-world as various “social worlds” presenting different perspectives on the one “natural

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61 See Ch.6.iv.
62 See Ch.2.iii.f.
63 We are sceptical of how much of Berger and Luckmann’s work is still consistent with Schutz’s phenomenology beyond this point. They make hefty use of Marx, Helmuth Plessner, Arnold Gehlen, Durkheim, and George Herbert Mead (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:29). It is not overtly clear, however, how reconcilable these thinkers are with Schutz’s phenomenology.
world”. But the failure of Schutz, Spiegelberg and Held in this regard is to not recognise that the very discrimination between a “natural world” and “social world” is itself social.

By saying this discrimination is itself social we mean that it is brought about by a group of concurring weras. Based on our understanding, “life-world” is the correlate of the questioner. Regardless of whether I do so scientifically or not, the life-world into which I enquire is inescapably my world. As Wciórka puts it: ‘Each person possesses its own world proper only for it … World is always world in reference to the person only’ (Wciórka, 1989:620). Through the processes of intersubjectivity my world is always recognised as a perspective on our world (1989:621). I recognise that my “Here” gives me a different perspective to the one you have at your “There”. Following Husserl in Ideas II:

‘Each person has, ideally speaking, within his communicative surrounding world his egoistic one insofar as he can “abstract” from all relations of mutual understanding and from the apperception founded therein, or rather, insofar as he can think them as separated’ (Husserl, 1989:203). But this difference of perspectives is founded on the similarity we share as both being weras. That is, in order to participate in this “our” you too must be wer. We suggest in this regard that each négatités wer is the progenitive rihtgesetnes from which a life-world as “our world” can exist at all. But the wer who does not concur with us about this rihtgesetnes does not share our life-world; they have their life-world.

Husserl was beginning to make a similar distinction in the form of home-world and alien-world (Lewis and Staehler, 2010:57-58). However, we need to stipulate that Husserl’s notion of home-world and alien-worlds is a negation within a single life-world (Waldenfels, 2004:282). As Staehler notes of Husserl’s distinction: ‘alienworlds make us aware of our home context in a significantly different way from how we experience it in everyday life, and at the same time, this homeworld is put into question by

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64 While it is possible to call any group of concurring weras a collective person (see Ch.5.ii), it would potentially be more accurate to say that concurring weras actually involve a community of collective persons.

65 A key passage for the development of the idea of “alien-worlds” comes from “Crisis of European Man”. Speaking of European and Indian civilisations Husserl writes: ‘Dies tritt sofort hervor, sowie wir uns z.B. in die indische Geschichtlichkeit mit ihren vielen Völkern und Kulturgebilden einfühlen. In diesem Kreis besteht wieder Einheit einer familienhaften Verwandtschaft, aber einer uns fremden’ (Husserl, 1954:320). The key word “fremden” is translated by Lauer as “strange” (Husserl, 1965b:157) and by Carr as “alien” (Husserl, 1970c:275). Although Carr’s seems to be the predominant translation, Lauer’s could be used to create a connection with Schutz’s work, particularly his essay “The Stranger” (1964c). A third possible translation of “fremden” is “foreign”. While we have reservations about Carr’s translation we have maintained it for ease of exposition.
the existence of alien homeworlds’ (Staehler, 2008b:19). Home-world and alien-world represent possible “views” within our life-world which makes this “questioning” a matter of anguish.66

However, to speak of “views” does not mean that we are now endorsing world view analysis.

Stemming from Robert Redfield’s work, a

“world view” refers to the way the world looks to that people looking out. Of all that is connoted by “culture,” “world view” attends especially to the way a man, in a particular society, sees himself in relation to all else. It is the properties of existence as distinguished from and related to the self. It is, in short, a man’s idea of the universe. (1952:30)

This understanding has in turn influenced the work of Hallowell, Saler (1977) and the phenomenology-of-religion of Smart (1996). And while much of Redfield’s understanding is similar to what we have termed “life-world”, the phrase “world view” nonetheless indicates one and the same world shared by all for which there can be various perspectives. In the case of Redfield this is brought about by the human prejudice and presumes that humans share the world (our life-world). He admits that ‘to use the concept is to assume certain human universals’, one of which is that ‘every man separates other human beings from one another … and looks upon other human beings as significantly different from all else that is not human’ (1952:30).67 To speak of their life-world, however, is to speak of an orc-world: a life-world in which the négatités wer is constituted differently. Insofar as these orc-worlds engender “questions” for the home-world, as they are without our rihtgesetnes of wer they are sources of fear.

Any disagreement on wer indicates the multiplicity of life-worlds each constituted by its own négatités wer. It is therefore inappropriate to speak of the life-world for this implies the singular.68 Or rather, the problem lies in the full phrase “the world as it is for X” which we maintained in previous chapters, as this falls into the same problem as “world view” above by implying only a particular perspective on one and the same life-world which we must now deny. That is, the world as it is for atoms and as it is for planets is the study of two perspectives on the European life-world. Both “atoms” and “planets” belong to our life-world in that they are ways of organising the totality that surrounds us. Husserl also identifies this:

The differences in “World pictures,” i.e., in empirically intuited worlds of things, which come to the fore within intersubjective consensus and which, despite their discrepancies as to content, nevertheless manifest themselves in intersubjective understanding as experiences of the world,

66 See Ch.5.iii.
67 Redfield makes some rather hefty, and difficult to substantiate, claims about what these “human universals” are.
of the one and the same world, together with the impossibility, which results, of arriving on the basis of actual experience at unconditionally valid judgements about this world, necessitate theoretical research in the form of natural science. (Husserl, 1989:218)

Atoms and planets are négatités, and Schutz’s distinction between a “social world” and a “natural world” another. They form part of what Scheler called the “relative natural view of the world” as that which is taken without question.69 Indeed, the very idea of an “absolute natural view of the world” is an idol of cognitional theory. To speak of “the world” is to mask an “our” and in such a fashion as to be normative. Hobbes’ “bellum omnium contra omnes”, for example, is no more than a ‘political foil and background for the future interests that all these typical “ideologies” seek to justify’ (Scheler, 1980b:74). To speak of “the world” to someone carries with it the tacit attempt to convince them to share this “natural view of the world”. Again this is recognised by Husserl: ‘Natural science brings to cognition “Objective” nature, which henceforth belongs for its part to the surrounding world of the communal spirit’ (Husserl, 1989:219).70 Or, as Scheler put it in a potentially problematic statement: ‘[natural views of the world] belong at the bottom of the automatically functioning “group-soul” – and certainly not to the “group-mind”’ (Scheler, 1980b:75).

Strictly speaking we should translate “Gruppenseele” and “Gruppengeist” as “group-gāst” and “group-ferhd” (Scheler, 1980a:54). However, Scheler intends no gāstund claims by the former: ‘These are not for us metaphysical entities that would substantially precede all living and experience with one another; rather, they are only the subject of psychic and mental contents which always produce themselves ever anew in experiences with others’ (1980b:69). Rather, he goes on to explain that to “group-soul” belong folk traditions, customs and mores and to “group-mind” belong philosophy, art, and science. He contrasts the two as bottom-up and top-down approaches. Thus, claiming that the natural view of the world is rooted in the “group-soul” is to say that it is not itself an “artificial” concept such as those produced by the “group-mind” but rather the conditioning which determines what sort of concepts can be thought of – it determines the sort of negations that can take place. The “group-mind” in effect formalises as négatités those negations already found in the “group-soul”. We do not need to maintain this distinction, however, to carry our point. Indeed, we should not. Not only do the terms confuse with

69 See Ch.5.ii.
70 It is also possible to find in Ideas II discussion of “nätrlicher Weltbegriff” which translates as “natural world-concept”. According to Carr the phrase seems to have come from Richard Avenarius (Carr, 2004:372). The phrase can also be found in Heidegger’s BT. We suggest that both likely developed the notion from Scheler.
our accepted terminology, but there is, we suspect, a lack of dialectic between the two in Scheler’s analysis.\textsuperscript{71} More important is how the relative natural view of the world conditions negations.

The scientific study of \textit{wer} is not the study of the \textit{organisation} brought about by such negations;\textsuperscript{72} it is the study of the \textit{organiser(s)} – the one(s) doing the negation. To recognise \textit{wer} as present is to recognise an entity capable of organising the life-world. As Scheler put it in NS: ‘\textit{our conviction of the existence of other [selves]}\textsuperscript{73} is earlier and deeper than our belief in the existence of \textit{Nature}’ (1954:259). Any disagreement as to who are and are not \textit{wer} amounts not to a difference in “Here” and “There” but a disagreement over who does the organising and thereby the organisation that subsequently arises. For every group of concurring \textit{weras} – a \textit{négatités wer} – there arises a life-world.\textsuperscript{74} No proper social science can proceed without the recognition that there is not one life-world but life-worlds.\textsuperscript{75} Only by recognising this fundamental point which stems from “\textit{wer} without end” will we avoid the consistent error of understanding their life-world by the conditionings of our life-world.

On this final point we must scrutinise our own use of “social”. Above we have said of Schutz that the division into a “social world” and “natural world” is a social one. Yet “social” is being used in two different fashions in this context. The problem is that when we speak of the “social” there is a tendency to set it in contradistinction to the “natural”. But to then say this contradistinction, this negation, is itself social seems to lead either to contradictions at worst or confusions at best. Carr, for example, in analysing Husserl’s presentation of “life-world” in \textit{Crisis} erroneously places what he calls the “scientific world” and “cultural world” (sometimes used as a synonym for life-world by Husserl)\textsuperscript{76} on the same level

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\textsuperscript{71} As Husserl’s analysis of Galileo’s mathematisation of nature shows, the European life-world came into being by creating new conditions as to what sort of negations can take place. But in this respect what was at the time of Galileo part of the “group-mind” has since become part of the “group-soul” of Europe. We may usefully apply Thomas Kuhn’s (2012) notion of “paradigm shift” in this case with certain qualifications.

\textsuperscript{72} It is therefore the task of natural science to study these organisations, though whether the word “natural” of the title can still be maintained on the basis of this discussion is a point we will not explore.

\textsuperscript{73} Up until this sentence the phrase “\textit{fremden Ich}” (Scheler, 1973a:253) is consistently translated as “other selves” and no explanation is provided for the sudden switch to “mind” which we have replaced.

\textsuperscript{74} Husserl may have been rendering a similar point when he spoke of the “harmony” of monads (1988:108).

\textsuperscript{75} This does not exclude “world view” completely. As suggested above worldviews apply to variations within the home-world brought about by different locations and epochs. Within the European life-world, for example, there have been “changes from the early Western organismic world-view, which extended to the thirteenth century, to the mechanistic world-view” (Scheler, 1980b:43).

\textsuperscript{76} See Ch.2.iii.f.
Based on what we have said about “knowledge about” it must be recognised that aper always acts on the basis that there are other weras even when alone. If we return to Scheler’s absolute Robinson Crusoe, in our sense all of Crusoe’s actions are social even though the Others “known about” are not present. Indeed, his actions are oriented around their very not-being-here. How Crusoe acts upon or thinks about a rock is irrevocably social in that the Others’ not-being-here factors into his acting/thinking. In this we differ markedly from Weber who argued that social actions only occurred with animate objects and not inanimate objects: ‘Not every kind of action, even overt action, is “social” in the sense of the present discussion. Overt action is non-social if it is orientated solely to be the behaviour of inanimate objects’ (Weber, 1947:102). A similar division is found in Berger and Luckmann, following Schutz, between social and non-social activity (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:71). The issue with this conception of “social” is that it is really a synonym for “public”. Or more exactly, only actions directed at “animate objects” can be classed as social. Not only is it unclear how the division between animate and inanimate is to be made but it is also far from obvious that actions directed to inanimate objects are non-social. What is not considered then is the notion that even an action committed in complete privacy is still social. Even Crusoe’s simple act of classification, of sifting one sort of rock from another is social in our regard because he always carries with him the possibility that an Other, were they present, might organise the rocks differently. But the inevitable conclusion our understanding leads to is that all Crusoe’s world is social in the sense that Others “haunt” him at every turn. And once recognised we are forced to ask what difference is there between “social world” and “world”? What does “social” add in such a consideration?

The answer can only be supplied if we in turn add, whether explicitly or not, the “natural world” to counterpoise it. But this “social world” we now speak of is not the “social” of our social science. Properly understood social science has as its object life-worlds as products of concurring weras. The negation of life-worlds into “social” and “natural” are not presuppositions of this science, which is how Schutz proceeds, but a part of this object to be studied. To act on the basis that atoms, planets, etc., are not themselves social ideas or constructs is to operate with a Europeanised understanding of our science:

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77 Carr also speaks of a third “perceived world”. However, the notion is deeply problematic because alongside the “cultural world” it is “pre-given”. But if both are “pre-given” it is question begging as to how the to two can be distinguished from one another.
78 A similar argument can be found in Glendinning (1998:123-125).
it presupposes the European life-world as the “absolute natural view of the world”. The human prejudice which we have tried to combat here is the highest expression of this Europeanisation. To co-opt a comment from Ioannides and Robertson, the human prejudice ‘seek[s] to re-inscribe [wer] within a biopolitical paradigm that brings about the centrality of the human, and particularly of certain humans’ (Ioannes and Robertson, 2013:230). So long as social science is treated as the contradistinction of natural science then we will continue to perpetuate this Europeanisation - this crisis of social science. We do not hesitate, therefore, to claim that any who accept this contradistinction are engaging in pseudo-social science. This is not to say they are not doing a science of a sort (meeting the postulate of nonpractical knowledge), but they are not doing a social science which is aware of its proper object.

We must, therefore, remove ourselves to an inferior epistemic level by abandoning “social science”. There are two social sciences, that which accepts the contradistinction with natural science and that – at a lower epistemic level – for which the former is a negation to be studied. It is a science for which all sciences (including itself) can be an object of study. To avoid confusion between the two we return to Husserl’s original title – “Geisteswissenschaft”. To reiterate our comments in the Introduction, we agree with Seebohm that “Geisteswissenschaft” should be translated as “spiritual science” or, in our terms, “ferhdcond science”. Indeed, we must now admit that the science whose essence we have been trying to clarify is the science of ferhd. Ferhd, as we have understood it, is the ability to address a life-world in its “whatness”.79 In Sartre’s terms it is the capacity to create negations within a life-world. In a more significant sense, to be gehiersumed is to be the object of ferhdcond activity. Indeed, what Schutz called “socially approved knowledge” and “socially derived knowledge” properly entails the taking up of previous ferhdcond acts, i.e. negations, as one’s own.

To relate this to our emphasis on philosophical anthropology, we can say that the organisation of a life-world involves ferhdcond activity. Thus the negating of a life-world into “social” and “natural” is itself a ferhdcond act. And those participating in this process of organisation are recognised as wer. Indeed, the recognition of wer as wer as brought about by gehiersumian also entails our being brought within that very organisation being constructed. Gehiersumian places us within our life-world. Thus, insofar as our science is “social” this is to recognise only that no study of wer, as the source of ferhdcond activity as established in Chapter 2, can proceed without recognising that wer is only wer among weras. Scheler’s consideration of Crusoe and “knowledge about” is no more than the establishment of the

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79 See Ch.2.iii.e.
presupposition of our science at this level of meaning-context: there are weras like me as the source of ferhdcund activity and this can never be doubted. The crisis of ferhdcund science, then, predominantly brought about by the human prejudice, is the assumption that there is one life-world to which there are numerous derivative world views. We thus conclude that:

Ferhdcund science is the pursuit of nonpractical knowledge into wer as a being who not only exists as part of the organisation of the life-world but acts as one among many organisers of a life-world.

Furthermore we may add that on the basis of our conclusions in Chapter 5 that ferhdcund science as a nonpractical pursuit is a form of play and as such is not bound to universities. While rihtgestnesian may aid its practical possibility, it is not of essential possibility. Further, following our conclusions in Chapter 6, as a form of play, ferhdcund science holds an inferior epistemic status and is easily abandoned when more practical concerns demand.

This essence of ferhdcund science is not, however, the end. While enough clarity has been achieved to explicate the problem at hand – the crisis of social science – it must be remembered that essences are the ideal of phenomenology. It is for this reason that the stricture of conscious adherence and the principle of presuppositionlessness exist as expressions of the postulate of verifiability. The errors and prejudices of one phenomenologist can be recognised and accounted for by his fellows. As such our argument does not invalidate the postulates of social science in Chapter 4 that Schutz discerned, even if after discerning them he continued to presuppose the human prejudice of the European life-world. Rather, through an imperial argument this clarification of the essence of social science, via the strictures of proper phenomenology established in Chapter 3, has pushed through to a lower level of meaning-context so that we have in fact been clarifying the essence of ferhdcund science. To carry the metaphor of that chapter, we have not provided a map of the terrain of the phenomenological continent. Rather, we have affected the necessary shift to enter the continent in such a way that understands the crisis of social science and from which constructive headway can now be made. Following the stricture of insight into essences, we are in no doubt that now that this shift has been affected that there are other problems in need of clarification.

80 See Ch.4.iii.
Glossary

_Ferhd_ – “spirit” understood in a “sociological” sense to mean the capacity to “halt” the world and address it in its “whatness”. _Ferhdconud_ – “spiritual”.

_Ferhdloc_ – “body”. The sources from which an entity with _ferhd_ is able to act upon its world.

_Forstande_ – “objection”. An object is an object insofar as it objects to being subjected by a subject. Therefore an object is a particular localisation of resistance against the subject in their world. When this resistance is successful, i.e. the domination fails, this objection becomes _geforstandan_.

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_Gäst_ – “soul”; “spirit” when understood in a metaphysical sense.

_Gehīersumian_ – “subjection”. The mark of a subject is its ability to dominate the world about it. I.e. the subject subjects (or subjugates) its world according to its needs.

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_Giefan_ – “given”. Verb sense of “to give”. Not to be read as “accepted without question”.

_Rihtgesetnes_riepl/ _Rihtgesetnessa_pl – “institution” defined as a protected group. The presence of the group is accepted without question by the individual/group. If threatened it is actively defended. _Rihtgesetnisc_ – “institutional”. _Rihtgesetnesian_ – “institutionalisation”.

_Swincan_ – “Work” meant in the sense of any activity aimed towards the surviving and thriving of the person. Not meant in the sense of having a job.

_Wer_riepl/ _Weras_pl – “man”; the beings which we are. A valuation of another entity that it has the same sort of being as myself.

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208


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214


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