Polish-Jewish Relations During the Rebirth of Poland,
November 1918-June 28, 1919

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A thesis submitted in conformity with
The requirements for the degree
Of Doctor of Philosophy
Of the University of Stirling

Department of History
November 2006
Amor mi fa cantar a la Francesca
Acknowledgements

In the long gestation of this thesis the author has been indebted to many individuals and institutions for their help, which has been deeply appreciated. I have accumulated many intellectual and personal debts which I can barely service, let alone repay. The first must be to Professor Robert B. McKean who, as my principal supervisor for the last three years of writing, bore the brunt of various heavily footnoted drafts with good humour, unending patience, constant support, and berated the author when necessary. His deep love and knowledge of East European history have remained an inspiration. Without him and the constant passion and enthusiasm shown by my second supervisor, Michael Rapport, the thesis would not have reached this stage, for which I am eternally grateful. I also owe a great debt to Professor George Peden for his unfailing support and encouragement. Antony Polonsky proved invaluable in offering help to the author. I am also indebted to the advice from Jerzy Tomaszewski, Jonathan Weber and the numerous scholars and non-academics I have met at the conferences held by the Institute of Polish-Jewish Studies. In a largely self-funded effort I would like to thank my parents and the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland for providing funds to help facilitate research in far-flung London, and to Graham MacMillan for putting me up (or up with me) in that city.

A very great debt is owed to my colleagues in the Department of History at the University of Stirling, both staff and the inhabitants of B19, who read and commented in a most illuminating way on various parts of the manuscript: Colin Nicholson, Stuart Salmon, and just before its completion, Francesca Young. Further thanks go to Jim Smyth, Susie Dyer, Amanda Beam, and to both Richard Oram and Alistair Mann for their insights into academic life shared in and around the squash courts of the University. Teaching has helped me keep my one eye on the broader topic of history and my students have constantly been a source of inspiration, while the Department’s secretarial staff have shielded me from much of the associated administration. Therefore, my thanks go to Annabelle Hopkins, Linda Bradley and Kitty Tollan. The IT support I received from Oron Joffe (who also helped me re-establish contact with the Hebrew language) and Andrew Monteith (who rescued my thesis from a crashed hard disk) deserve a special mention. The University Library at Stirling provided not
only a refuge but also employment during my years of research. Thanks are due to the patience of my long-suffering boss, Wendy Boyd, and the friendships of many others, including Ronnie McKenzie and the other porters, the members of Lending and Enquiry Services who were forced to work with me, and finally the invaluable work done by the Library’s Document Delivery Service.

Further thanks, too numerous to include in full, must be made to the myriad of characters at St. Modans Cricket Club and Bannockburn Rugby Club who managed to keep me both entertained and to root my feet firmly on the ground. Those who deserve special mention include Moses Jenkins, Ramchander Seshagiri, Greig Scott, and George Pollock. I would also like to acknowledge the role played by Scott Naismith, my History Master at George Heriot’s School, who helped inspire and shape my love of the subject.

Without the support of my family, especially my father, Matthew, who encouraged me to write a PhD from an admittedly abnormally early age, and my mother, Claire, who has constantly supported me and has remained a voice of reason, this thesis would not have been even attempted, let alone completed, and I give them my heartfelt thanks. To my brother, Simon, I would like to express my gratitude for a whole month in Australia to help facilitate my research into Polish history by insisting that I check the archival holdings held in Weipa, Northern Queensland.

Above all I must thank Francesca Young. I have received from her love and support in much greater measure than I deserved. Her place in the dedication is a small token of my love and gratitude.

D.B.K.

Stirling
November 2006
Abstract

This study examines Polish-Jewish relations during the pivotal eight months between the declaration of Polish Independence on November 11, 1918 and the formal re-establishment of the Polish state by its recognition by the Allied and Associated Powers at the Paris Peace Conference on June 28, 1919. The thesis explores the background to Polish-Jewish relations in the years immediately preceding the period under investigation in order to place the events in their political and socio-economic context. The key to the present study is a detailed examination of the controversial anti-Jewish outrages that occurred in the disputed Russo-Polish-Ukrainian borderlands, namely in Lwów in November 1918, and at Pińsk in April 1919. It is important not only to scrutinise these events in detail, but furthermore to place them in their full international perspective. The direct result was the imposition of a Minorities Treaty upon Poland, which was largely drafted during the final months of the Peace Conference. Polish anti-Jewish violence was not the only factor that influenced the Allies gathered at Versailles, yet the peacemakers felt compelled to treat Poland as a special case. The Treaty further strained the interdependent links between Poles and Jews, both in Poland and the west, as the dominant group saw it as an unfair limitation on its sovereignty. Polish resentment at the perceived influence of ‘international Jewry’ further heightened tensions between the two, yet the drafting of the Minorities Treaty was emphatically not as a result of the ‘Jewish lobby’ (which was in fact divided) that had gathered in the French capital in an attempt to further Jewish demands in both Eastern Europe and Palestine. The damage done to Polish-Jewish relationships during the crucial period of 1918-1919 not only strained interaction between those groups in the months covered by the thesis, but also exacerbated the Jewish ‘problem’ during the course of the Second Polish Republic and beyond.
Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis has been composed by myself, and that the work which it embodies has been done by myself and has not been included in another thesis.

David Kaufman
November 2006
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<tr>
<td><em>Agudat Israel</em></td>
<td><em>Aguda</em> (‘The Union of Israel’), the major Orthodox party in Jewish politics in the Second Polish Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AIU</strong></td>
<td><em>Alliance Israëlite Universelle</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>AJA</strong></td>
<td>The Anglo-Jewish Association</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>AJC</strong></td>
<td>The American Jewish Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ARA</strong></td>
<td>American Relief Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ARC</strong></td>
<td>American Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ausgleich</strong></td>
<td>Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Auswärtiges Amt</strong></td>
<td>German Foreign Office on <em>Wilhelmstrasse</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Błękitna Armia</strong></td>
<td>General Józef Haller’s Blue Army also known as <em>Hallerczycy</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BDBJ</strong></td>
<td>The Board of Deputies of British Jews</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Bet Am</strong></td>
<td>Meeting house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bund</strong></td>
<td><em>Algemeyner Yidisher Arbeter Bund in Lite, Poyln un Rusland</em> (United Jewish Workers’ League in Lithuania, Poland, and Russia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cisleithania</strong></td>
<td>The Austrian part of Austria-Hungary between 1867 and 1918</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Comité</strong></td>
<td><em>Comité des Delegations Juifs auprès la Conférence de la Paix</em> (Committee of Jewish Delegations at the Conference of Peace)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Duma</strong></td>
<td>Russian legislative assembly between 1906 and 1917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Endeks</strong></td>
<td><em>Narodowa Demokracja</em> (the Polish National Democrat Party) also called <em>Endecja</em></td>
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<td><strong>Eretz Yisrael</strong></td>
<td>Palestine</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Folkspartie</strong></td>
<td><em>Yidishe folkspartay</em> (People's Democratic Party or folkist party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Haskalah</strong></td>
<td>Jewish renaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hibbat Zion</strong></td>
<td>‘[those who are] fond of Zion’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JDC</strong></td>
<td>Joint Distribution Committee of the American Funds for Jewish War Sufferers or ‘the Joint’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JFC</strong></td>
<td>Joint Foreign Committee of the Anglo-Jewish Association and the Board of Deputies of British Jews</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Kaiserliche Armee</strong></td>
<td>Imperial German Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KNP</strong></td>
<td><em>Komitet Narodowy Polski</em> (Polish National Committee or <em>Comité National Polonais</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>-----------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Koło</td>
<td>Polish group in the Russian State Duma</td>
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<tr>
<td>Koło Żydowskie</td>
<td>Jewish Parliamentary Club</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konwent Seniorów</td>
<td>Convent of Seniors, or the Assembly of Chairmen of Parliamentary Clubs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPRP</td>
<td>Komunistyczna Partia Robotniczka Polski (Polish Communist Workers’ Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kresy Wschodnie</td>
<td>Eastern borderlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Królestwo</td>
<td>The Congress Kingdom (replaced by the Privilanski Krai or Vistula Territory between 1864 and 1917)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KuK Armee</td>
<td>the Austro-Hungarian army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulturkampf</td>
<td>Culture struggle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Litvaks</td>
<td>Jews from Lithuania – more generally accepted to be Jews from Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIR</td>
<td>Military Intelligence Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitteleuropakonzept</td>
<td>Middle European state under German control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mizrachi</td>
<td>Religious Zionism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naczelnik Państwa</td>
<td>Chief of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naród</td>
<td>Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narodnaia Volia</td>
<td>People’s Will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oberrabbiner</td>
<td>Chief Rabbi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oblava</td>
<td>street or house raid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obrona Lwowa</td>
<td>Defence of Lwów</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odżydzenie</td>
<td>De-Judaization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okhranka</td>
<td>Russian secret political police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ostimperium</td>
<td>New [German] order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ostjuden</td>
<td>German term for Jews living in Russia and Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAT</td>
<td>Polska Agencja Telegraficzna (Polish Telegraphic Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIC</td>
<td>Polish Information Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PID</td>
<td>Political Intelligence Division of the British Foreign Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKL</td>
<td>Polska Komisja Likwidacyjna (Polish Liquidation Committee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNC</td>
<td>Polish National Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Po’alei Zion</td>
<td>‘Workers of Zion’, a socialist-Zionist party in the Second Polish Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>Polska Organizacja Wojskowa (Polish Fighting Organisations)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Praca organiczna  Organic work
PPS  Polska Partia Socjalistyczna (the Polish Socialist Party)
PSL  Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish Peasant Party) – split into Lewica (Left), Wyzwolenia (Liberation) and Piast (Endek orientated) factions
Quai d’Orsay  French Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Rada  Central council
Rewolucja  Revolt – usually referring to the Polish revolt against Russian Rule between 1904 and 1907
SDKPiL  Socjaldemokracja Królestwa Polskiego i Litwy (the Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania)
SDKP  Socjaldemokracja Królestwa Polskiego (Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland)
Sejm  Polish parliament
Sejm Ustawodawczy  Constituent Sejm
Shtetlekh  Jewish settlement
Shtibl  Study house
Spacyfikowany  Pacified
Stańczyki  Cracow conservatives
Stawka  Russian military headquarters in the Polish theatre of operations
Szczepy  Tribes
Szlachta  Polish gentry
Szumowiny  mob
Taryba  Lithuanian National Council
TRS  Tymczasowa Rada Stanu (Provisional Council of State)
TŻRN  Tymczasowa Żydowska Rada Narodowa (Temporary Jewish National Council)
WZO  World Zionist Organisation
Yiddisher Soldatenrat  Council of Jewish Soldiers
Zemstvo  Russian local government
Zeirei Zion  Young Zion
Zionism  Jewish nationalism
<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>ZLN</td>
<td>Związek Ludowo Narodowy (The National Populist Association)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZOA</td>
<td>Zionist Organisation of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZPWMWZP</td>
<td>Zjednoczenie Polaków Wyznania Mojżeszowego Wszystkich Ziem Polskich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUNR</td>
<td>Zakhidno-Ukrainska Narodnia Respulika (Western Ukraine People’s Republic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ŻRN</td>
<td>Żydowska Rada Narodowa (Jewish National Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Żydokomuna</td>
<td>Judeo-Bolshevism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Second Polish Republic

![Map of Poland 1921-1939](image)
Introduction

“That nothing shall reveal the country, the religion, or the party … it is essential not only on the ground that impartiality is the character of legitimate history, but because the work is carried out … for no other object than the increase of accurate knowledge”\(^1\)

This thesis seeks to explore the importance of Polish-Jewish relations during the rebirth of the Polish state, from the last days of the First World War until its formal re-establishment on June 28, 1919, with its recognition by the Allied and Associated Powers at the Palace of Versailles. Interactions between Poles and Jews during the reconstruction of the new polity in the aftermath of World War One were to prove fractious with far-reaching implications both in Poland and on the international scene.

The principal theme of the thesis is to examine the effect of state building on an ethnic minority. The case of the Jewish population in the Polish lands between 1863 and the formal recognition of Polish independence in June 1919 is particularly pertinent. The atmosphere of ethnic-nationalism that was prevalent in Poland during this period further underlines the importance of a full and thorough study of this topic. Arguably, the key juncture in the history of Polish-Jewish relations could be said to have occurred during the eight months after the Armistice of November 11, 1918, and to have cast a shadow over the whole subsequent path of Polish-Jewish relationships through to the present day. Previous studies on this question have not benefited from either a full examination of as broad a range of publications in as many languages as possible or from an analysis of the question from a detached historical standpoint. It is vital in such a contentious topic as Polish-Jewish relations to examine the evidence as impartially as possible. The current investigation rests on the assumption that such an approach can indeed be taken to this question. Therefore, much as Lord Acton required that “our Waterloo must be one that satisfied French and English, Germans and Dutch alike”\(^2\), the ideal historical account of Polish-Jewish relations during the period covered by the thesis should be one that aspires to satisfy both Poles and Jews alike.

\(^1\) Appendix I, a letter sent by Lord Acton, the editor of the *Cambridge Modern History*, to the contributors, March 12, 1898; Lord Acton, *Lectures on Modern History* (London, 1960), p. 316.
\(^2\) Ibid., p. 316.
A broad trend can be seen in which historians tend to adopt either pro-Polish or pro-Jewish interpretations of the events of 1918-1919, and argue forthrightly from these respective positions. Scholars have been sharply divided in their assessments of the failure of Poles and Jews to reach an accommodation during the period of the reconstruction of the Polish state. There have emerged two contradictory points of view: an evaluation emphasising the fault of the representatives of both Jewish organisations in Poland and abroad, and their adverse reaction to the re-establishment of Polish sovereignty; and a contrary interpretation accepting the culpability of the majority Polish population, whose violent outpouring against the Jewish minority did much to precipitate any subsequent negative reaction by Jewish leaders toward Poland. The former argument is that the period of the Great War and immediately after, years that were of such critical importance to Poles for the regaining of their independence, were marked by Jewish attempts to undermine the cause of Polish nationhood. Norman Davies, for example, argues in ‘Great Britain and the Polish Jews, 1918-1920’ that “in a wartime situation it was impossible to disentangle acts of gratuitous antisemitism from the commonplace looting and brutality of the soldiery … the scale of Jewish casualties was minimal.”

Thus, the outpouring of cruelty against the Jews of the *Kresy* was a consequence of historical circumstance, namely the six years of war between 1914 and 1920. Andrzej Kapiszewski noted that the direct result of this was that Jewish demands in Paris were a “deliberate attempt to weaken the Polish position at the Conference … and to limit the country’s sovereignty and its credibility.”

Pro-Jewish historians reject this interpretation. Echoing the conclusions of contemporary Jewish political figures such as Simon Dubnow and Isaac Grünbaum, they regard the perilous position of the Jewish community in the Polish lands as the consequence of the unwarranted acts of hostility and violence perpetrated against Jews in the disputed Russo-Polish borderlands, which spread to the Polish heartland during the first months of Polish statehood. Celia Heller observed that “Polish independence was ushered in with a wave of fierce anti-Semitism, a gruesome fitting

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inauguration of the kind of treatment the Jews would receive in independent Poland … the declaration of Polish independence in November 1918 was followed by pogroms in many places.”

Furthermore, she argued that “with some fluctuations in its intensity, anti-Semitism continued throughout Polish independence.” The Jewish population, caught up in the ethnic and territorial conflicts unleashed by the Great War and President Woodrow Wilson’s advocacy of ‘national self-determination’ for the peoples of Europe, was left with little option but to declare its neutrality between the various warring factions, as the Jews were alone in being largely unable to form self-defence militias. In his *Juifs en Pologne* Paweł Korzec argues that this declaration of neutrality, far from calming tensions between the two groups, merely exacerbated differences that had been emerging from the mid-nineteenth century onwards.

Avowedly revisionist explanations have only recently begun to emerge, endeavouring to strike a balance between the two more extreme positions. Revisionist historians contend that a dual polarization occurred in Polish-Jewish dealings during this period. On the one hand, Polish hostility merely served to heighten Jewish feelings of helplessness; on the other, Jewish lack of sympathy toward the re-establishment of the new state, whether justified or not, warranted the reaction of some Poles to the Jews of the *Kresy*. The international dimension was furthermore of critical importance. In his *War, Jews and the New Europe* Mark Levene maintains that Lucien Wolf, an influential member of the ‘Jewish lobby’ at Paris, was forced to “moderate his minority rights stance and thereby bring himself into closer accord with the peacemakers”, rather than directly influencing their position. However, revisionist scholars such as Joanna Beata Michlic in her book *Poland’s Threatening Other* do not fully integrate the question of the ‘Polish pogroms’ into the discussion of international relations during the period of this study. Furthermore the drafting of the minorities treaties did not take place in isolation from the acts of anti-Jewish violence that

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6 Ibid., p. 77.
9 Joanna Beata Michlic, *Poland’s Threatening Other: The Image of the Jew from 1880 to the Present* (Lincon, Neb., 2006).
occurred throughout eastern Europe. Therefore, it is the primary aim of this work to make a balanced contribution toward filling the gap identified in the historical literature.

In order to understand Polish-Jewish relations during the period in question more fully it is further necessary to place them in their proper historical background. Associations between the two groups did not merely gestate in exclusively either a domestic or international context. Another major theme of the present study is to integrate these two strands of historical research completely in order to arrive at a more balanced analysis of Polish-Jewish relationships in 1918/1919. The tensions being played out within Poland, on the international stage and at the Paris Peace Conference, further heightened disagreements and suspicions between the two groups. Relations between Jews and Poles had been deteriorating in the years preceding the First World War and were brought increasingly to the surface by this conflict, as the Polish-Jewish question more and more assumed an international dimension outwith the purely Polish setting. The heightened feelings of Polish nationalism, combined with the increasing resentment felt towards the Jewish population for its lack of loyalty to the cause of Polish independence, perceived or otherwise, further damaged relations between the two races. New political doctrines of nationalism, both Polish and Jewish, further complicated interactions between them, as they found themselves in open competition over territorial and political claims in the vital years between 1914 and 1919. Furthermore, in the first months of 1919 the democratic institutions were put in place in the Polish state which, together with the establishment of the Polish army, constitute the basis for the study of the fate of an ethnic minority during a period of state building.

One of the most immediate and alarming consequences of the decline in relationships between Poles and Jews was the abrupt outbreak of anti-Jewish violence in the Polish lands at the war’s end. Incidents at Lwów in November 1918, Pińsk, Lida and Wilno in April 1919, have remained to this day a focal point of resentment between the two groups and have yet to be examined with a degree of detachment and in enough detail to enable historians to understand more fully the importance of the events that took place in the disputed borderlands of Poland. The significance of these events was magnified on the international stage, whereby the Paris Peace Conference had its
attention drawn to the problem of ethnic and religious minorities in the ethnically mixed Kresy due to the actions of some elements of the Polish soldiery against the exposed Jewish population. The issue of whether these incidents were in fact pogroms is directly bound up with the question of the extent to which these atrocities damaged Polish-Jewish relations for the course of the Second Republic. The Jewish population not only resented the violence directed towards itself, but the Polish majority bitterly took umbrage at the Polish Minorities Treaty which the Poles were forced to sign by the Allied and Associated Powers as the cost of the official recognition of the new state at Versailles on June 28, 1919. Another weighty theme of the present investigation is that the interpretation that the Minorities Treaty was forced upon Poland by a 'powerful' Jewish lobby is very much open to dispute.

In the historiography of the violent incidents in the Polish borderlands in late 1918 and early 1919, a most contentious issue is whether these events amounted to ‘pogroms’. In its definition of 'pogrom' this study rests upon a narrow understanding of the term. Through the course of the nineteenth century the term 'pogrom' was increasingly used to describe any acts of violence against Jews. The word has emotive overtones. When defined by its strict dictionary definition it means:

an organized massacre aimed at the elimination of a class or type of people.

19c. Applied esp. to massacres of Jews. [N]^{10}

Traditionally, the term pogrom would seem to describe an incident, either officially sanctioned or not, by the majority against a minority group. The term has been misused not only by pro-Polish historians, but also pro-Jewish ones, who far too readily label acts of violence against Jews as 'pogroms'. As such this work shall use two separate terms: 'pogroms' and 'excesses'. Whereas a pogrom shall be defined as an event whereby the majority population killed at least one member of the Jewish minority, the term 'excesses' shall be used to describe both individual acts of violence against the Jewish population and destruction of property, but without the loss of life. In this way it is hoped that the emotive connotations of the term may be avoided.

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In addition to published sources such as newspapers, contemporary publications and pamphlets this study is based chiefly on archival materials found in Great Britain, the United States, and Poland. The combination of these primary and other secondary sources constitutes a considerable basis for research, and has allowed for the most complete re-construction of the controversial events of the eventful period between November 1918 and June 1919. In Great Britain government papers contained within the collections of the National Archives based at Kew and private papers at the British Library proved invaluable. Further materials were consulted relating to the Jews of Poland held at the Wiener Library, the Board of Deputies of British Jews Archive at the London Metropolitan Archive, and the archives of the Jewish Historical Society of England located in the Mocatta Library, University College London Library. The Józef Piłsudski Institute and the Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum were found to be particularly useful. Lord Lothian’s papers in the National Archives of Scotland were also consulted. In the United States the copious collections of the National Archives II and the Library of Congress in Washington D.C. were supplemented by the Józef Piłsudski Institute of America (Instytut Józefa Piłsudskiego), the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research, the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) Archive in New York, and the Hoover Institution Archives at Stanford University in California. In Poland, as well as consulting the National Library (Biblioteka Narodowa) in Warsaw, particularly useful for its extensive collections of Polish newspapers, the author made use of the State Archives, principally the Archive of New Records (Archiwum Akt Nowych) in Warsaw and Central Military Archive (Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe) in Rembertów, which both contain considerable collections of contemporary newspapers and the correspondence of the Polish government and military. The Jewish Historical Institute (Żydowski Instytut Historyczny) was also helpful, making many useful suggestions for my research on my visit to Poland. Overall, with the exception of the collections held at the Central Zionist Archive in Jerusalem and the Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères in Paris, the widest range of sources has been consulted as far as possible in preparation of this study.
Chapter I

Polish-Jewish Relations Prior to the Polish Re-Birth of November 1918

“The Russian Revolution is supposed to have solved the Russo-Jewish Question. Unfortunately this is not the case. The old trouble is only transformed and it survives in all its old magnitude and gravity in the shape of the Polish-Jewish Question”.

According to the census of 1921, the population of Poland had reached just under 30 million people; the Jewish minority accounted for 2.85 million, or 10.5% of the total. Although seemingly an insignificant proportion of the population, the Jews formed a highly visible minority within Polish society. By 1918 they constituted one of the two largest concentrations of Jews in the world, along with the Jewish community in the United States. As a predominantly urban group within a still largely agricultural country they stood out by their absence in the countryside and by their large numbers within self-imposed districts in the larger towns and cities. Unlike the other

2 Ezra Mendelsohn, The Jews of East Central Europe Between the World Wars (Bloomington, Ind., 1983), p. 23. By way of contrast in Great Britain, the total Jewish population was only some 60,000 (0.17% of the total population) in 1880, the majority of whom were Sephardi (Jews from Spain and their descendants), growing as a result of the emigration of Ashkenazim (East European Jews) from the Russian Empire to 284,830 (0.55%) in 1914. The majority, 180,000, was concentrated in London. In France, as in Great Britain, the Jewish population lived mainly in the capital, Paris, where the Jewish population had grown from 40,000 (0.11%) in 1880 to 65-70,000 (0.17%) in 1914. The increase in population was less the result of emigration from Russia than the product of the internal migration of Jews from the Eastern provinces of France and of natural increase. See Eugene C. Black, The Social Politics of Anglo Jewry, 1880-1920 (Oxford, 1988); Lloyd P. Gartner, The Jewish Immigrant in England, 1870-1914 (London, 1973); Michael Robin, Les Juifs de Paris: démographie-économie-culture (Paris, 1952). Ethnically Polish immigrants in Great Britain numbered some 60,000 by 1914: according to Norman Davies, “The Poles in Great Britain, 1914-1919”, The Slavonic and East European Review, Volume 50 (1972), p. 64. An earlier estimate put the figure at a mere 3,500 in 1911: Jerzy Zabryzcki, Polish Immigrants in Britain: A Study of Adjustment (The Hague, 1956).
3 Pre-revolutionary Russia, with a Jewish population of 5,082,342 (4.04% of the total) according to the 1897 census (and estimated to have grown to some 6,869,828 (4.57%) by 1913), had the largest Jewish population in the world up to the dissolution of the Romanov Empire in 1917. In 1918 the total Jewish population of the United States was estimated to be 3,300,000 (3.2%), of whom 1,500,000 lived in New York (26.45%). The largest number of these, 542,061, lived in the Lower East Side of Manhattan in 1910, the majority of whom were immigrants from Eastern Europe. See Harry Schneiderman (ed.) [for The American Jewish Committee], The American Jewish Year Book, 5680. September 25, 1919 to September 12, 1920. Volume 21 (Philadelphia, N.J., 1919), pp. 601, 607; Hasia R. Diner, The Jews of the United States, 1654-2000 (Berkeley, Calif., 2004), pp. 71-81; The Statesman’s Yearbook, Volume 41 (1904), pp. 1032-1033.
4 According to the 1921 census, 64% of the Polish population was dependant on agriculture (which rose to 65% according to the 1931 Polish Census). 78.4% of the non-Jewish working population of
minorities in the newly formed Republic, Jews were scattered throughout the entire country, in contrast to the ‘national minorities,’ such as the Ukrainians, Germans, Lithuanians, Byelorussians and Czechs, who formed geographically compact groups. In the larger cities, the proportion of Jews was very high, especially when compared with the proportion of Jews to Gentiles in the other major cities of Europe. In the capital, Warsaw, by 1918 the Jews accounted for 45% of the total population. In the other major urban centres, Cracow, Łódź, Lwów and Wilno, the proportion of Jews to Gentiles was similar, except in the lands of the Prussian partition, such as in the city of Poznań.

Table 1.1: Jews as a proportion of Urban Population; Polish Census, 1921

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Warsaw</td>
<td>936,713</td>
<td>310,322</td>
<td>33.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Łódź</td>
<td>451,947</td>
<td>156,155</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lwów</td>
<td>219,388</td>
<td>76,854</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poznań</td>
<td>184,756</td>
<td>2,094</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cracow</td>
<td>183,706</td>
<td>45,229</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilno</td>
<td>128,954</td>
<td>46,559</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Urban Population</td>
<td>6,345,905</td>
<td>2,057,615</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Rural Population</td>
<td>19,030,270</td>
<td>700,138</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the smaller urban communities of Eastern Poland, the *Shtetlekh* (Yiddish: small towns, singular, *Shtetl*), the Jewish population could be as great as 80 or 90 percent of

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Poland was engaged in agriculture. Only 9.5% of the economically active Jewish population was engaged in the same sector (0.9% of the total): Georges Gliksman, *L’Aspect Économique de la Question Juive en Pologne* (Paris, 1929), p. 82; Zara Steiner, *The Lights That Failed: European International History, 1919-1933* (Oxford, 2005), p. 273.

5 In contrast, in Berlin the largely assimilated Jewish community made up only 4.29% (172,672) of the total population in 1925: *Encyclopedia Judaica* (Jerusalem, 1973), Volume 4, Col. 644.

6 Standard English spelling of the Polish Warszawa.


8 Cracow is the accepted English name for the Polish city of Kraków.

9 In keeping with the multi-ethnic nature of the city, it had numerous names, dependent on which power was in control of the city. Under the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (in German and in Yiddish) it was called Lemberg (up to November 1918); in Polish, Lwów; in Russian, L’vov; in French, Léopol; and in Ukrainian, L’viv. This study will generally use the Polish Lwów.

10 Wilno is the Polish name for the city now called Vilnius (the Lithuanian capital) in the West. Under Russian administration until 1915 the city was called Vilna. Between 1915 and 1918 the city was under German rule and was called Wilna. Most Jews during this period called the city Vilna (Vilne in Yiddish).


12 Also known as Posen in German and Poyzn in Yiddish.

the total, and routinely reached 70%. Not only was the proportion of Jews in urban areas high, but Polish peasants would only really come into contact with Jews in these towns, as Jews lived primarily as merchants or artisans, dealing with the Polish peasantry or providing services, such as cattle slaughter, or petty commerce, such as shopkeeping. The Jewish minority was also highly visible due to its different and distinct clothing, religious affiliation, and language. In their appearance, the Chasidic (Orthodox), who made up a majority of the Jews in Eastern Poland, dressed in kaften (long black silk coats) and the married men wore distinctive shtreimel kolpak (sable fur hats). They also grew beards and payot (side-curls), as well as observing the 613 Biblical Commandments. The language spoken by the majority of Jews, Yiddish, was essentially a branch of Middle High German, which took elements of Hebrew, Spanish, and Russian but predominantly German. This helped to reinforce the impression among most Poles that Jews were an alien group. It is true that there was a small proportion of the Jewish population that was assimilated into Polish society, spoke Polish, and considered themselves to be ‘Polish citizens of the Mosaic faith’, yet for a number of reasons they were not a large group, or always fully accepted by Polish society. From the census returns in the Second Republic, it would appear that the proportion of the Jewish population that could be described as assimilated in Polish society was only some 8-9% of the total. A more accurate, although older, figure based only on the lands of the Congress Kingdom can be seen from the 1897 Russian census, giving a total of only 2.86%.

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14 The majority of butchers were Jewish due to the kosher rules regarding Shechita (ritual slaughter).
15 By 1921 Jews accounted for 73.8% of people employed in Poland in ‘General Commerce’: James Parkes, The Emergence of the Jewish Problem, 1878-1939 (London, 1946), p. 239.
16 According to the census of 1931, the proportion of Jews who gave Yiddish as their principal language was 79.9%, and 7.8% gave Hebrew, although it is unlikely that Hebrew was used as the primary language of communication by Jews: Antony Polonsky, The Little Dictators: The History of Eastern Europe Since 1918 (London, 1975), p 182.
17 Polonsky suggests that a crude method of estimating the number of ‘assimilated’ Poles is to refer to how many Jews gave their language as Polish in the 1921 census return, of which 11.9% did: ibid., p. 182.
Table 1.2: Religion and Polish Adherence in the Congress Kingdom, Russian Census, 1897

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Affiliation</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
<th>Number of Polish adherents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholics</td>
<td>9,001,349</td>
<td>9,001,349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariavites</td>
<td>73,033</td>
<td>73,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>476,865</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>634,649</td>
<td>63,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>1,747,655</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1,787</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sociologists such as Celia Heller estimate that even these ‘assimilated’ Jews were not fully accepted as part of Polish society, purely on the basis that they, however much assimilated, were still Jewish.  

The background to the regaining of Polish Independence stretches back to when it was lost, over a century before, in the partitions of the Polish lands in 1772, 1793 and 1795. Through the course of the long nineteenth century the three partitioning powers, Russia, Austria and Prussia, co-operated to keep the Polish population under their control. Even as late as the 1863 Insurrection, Russian troops were used to suppress the revolt in the Austrian controlled province of Galicia. By 1914, the situation had far changed, with Russo-German relations declining steadily from Bismarck’s resignation in 1890 to the point that hostilities were declared in August 1914.

As seen in Map 1.1, by far the largest share of the partitioned lands was under Russian occupation, encompassing the Królestwo (Congress Kingdom) and the Kresy Wschodnie (Eastern Borderlands, or more usually just Kresy). These are usually accepted to be the Polish territory of the Second Republic east of the 1919 Curzon

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19 An indication of the number of assimilated Jews can be found in the small figure of Jews in the Congress Kingdom, 50,000, who acknowledged their loyalty (adherence) to a Polish state: George Slocombe, *A History of Poland* (London, 1939), p. 360.

20 Heller, op. cit., pp. 245-247. Richard Pipes, a Polish-born Jew who escaped from Nazi-occupied Poland in 1939 and became Professor of Russian and Soviet history at Harvard University, wrote in his memoirs that “the population at large was imbued with a hostility towards the Jews, instilled in it over centuries by the Catholic Church … it could be averted only by renouncing one’s own religion and one’s own people, and even then, in Polish eyes, one never quite got rid of one’s Jewishness”: Richard Pipes, *Vixi: Memoirs of a Non-Belonger* (New Haven, 2003), p. 20.

21 The best account of Poland under foreign rule is Piotr Wandycz, *The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795-1918* (Seattle, Wash., 1974).
These two regions had by far the largest proportions of Jews, far higher than the Prussian share and slightly more than were resident in Austrian Galicia.

Map 1.1: The Polish Lands on the Eve of World War I, showing the Administrative Divisions of the Partitional Powers


22 The Curzon line was named after the British Foreign Secretary, George Nathanial Curzon (Lord Curzon in 1919), who in December 1919, with a background of rising tension between the Polish Republic and Soviet Russia, proposed a demarcation line between the two states, based on ethnographic statistics, from Frondo in the North to the Carpathian Mountains in the South. The majority of the Orthodox Christian populations was left to Russia, and Roman Catholic to Poland. The plan was acceptable to neither, and the frontier was only settled after the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet War at the Treaty of Riga in March 1921, which awarded the majority of the territory to Poland. The line was used later in 1939 and 1945 for the basis of the Russo-German and later Russo-Polish frontier. See James R. Hooker, “Lord Curzon and the ‘Curzon Line’”, Journal of Modern History, Volume 30 (1958), Part 2, pp. 137-138; J. W. Brügel, “Neues zur entstehungsgeschichte der Curzon-Linie”, Osteuropa, Volume 10 (1960), Parts 2-3, pp. 181-184. Lewis Namier, who, Norman Davies has argued, was one of the most prominent advocates of the line, estimated there to be between 2,250,000 and 2,500,000 Poles out of a total population of 11,000,000 east of the Curzon Line: “Russia”, in Lewis B. Namier, Facing East (London, 1947), p. 113; Norman Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland. Volume II: 1795 to the Present (Oxford, 1981), p. 504.
Table 1.3: Jewish and Polish Populations in the Territories of the Three Partitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Polish Population</th>
<th>Jewish Population</th>
<th>Jews as % of Total</th>
<th>Size (Sq. Miles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congress Kingdom</td>
<td>11,933,551</td>
<td>9,137,382</td>
<td>1,747,655</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>101,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austrian Galicia</td>
<td>8,007,970</td>
<td>4,660,639</td>
<td>871,804</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>30,914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prussian Poland</td>
<td>5,797,910</td>
<td>3,319,785</td>
<td>25,226</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>17,889</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Economic and Social Life in the Russian Congress Kingdom to 1914

For almost forty years after its creation at the Congress of Vienna in 1814/1815 the Russian Tsar ruled an autonomous rump Polish State, named the Congress Kingdom. After the ‘November Insurrection’ of 1830/31 most autonomy was rescinded. The semi-independent Polish army, for example, was integrated fully into Russian military formations. After the suppression of the insurrections of 1863 the region merely became an administrative unit within the Russian Empire. The last vestiges of Polish autonomy were taken away in the years after 1864, and the territory was officially referred to merely as the *Privislanskii Krai* (Vistula Territory), although still commonly referred to by historians as the Congress Kingdom. Tension between the Polish and Jewish communities had long existed, yet relations were particularly difficult in the years following the failure of the 1863 uprising. 1863 was the high point in a period of co-operation between Jews and Poles. Synagogues were closed in solidarity with the Catholic churches, and Jews sang the Polish hymn, “It is not yet over with Poland”. Rabbis and priests appeared side by side at public services and funerals, whilst the Chief Rabbi Meisels was arrested and imprisoned for his role in the uprising. The idea of Jewish assimilation had advanced to such a point in cities such as Warsaw that Jews generally believed that the advancement of the Polish national cause would bring about benefits for the Jews. In the course of the revolt,

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23 Figures from the Congress Kingdom are based on the 1897 census, whilst Galicia and Prussian Poland are from 1910. The figure for the Jews in Prussian Poland is disputed. The total of 30,000 is given for the territories ceded to the Polish state in 1918: Gliksman, op. cit., pp. 21, 26; Adam Krzyzanowski and Kazimierz Kumaniecki (eds.), *Statystyka Polski: Handbuch der polnischen Statistik - Tableau statistique de la Pologne* (Cracow, 1915), pp. 37, 40-41; Slocombe, op. cit., pp. 360-365; Richard Blanke, *Orphans of Versailles: The Germans in Western Poland, 1918-1939* (Lexington, Ky., 1993), p. 34. The size of the different areas is based on the territories ceded to Poland by the time the frontiers were finalised in 1921: Office Central de Statistique de la République Polonaise, op. cit., pp. 12-17.

both Catholic and Jewish religious leaders had urged active support for the Polish national cause against the partitioning powers. After the failure of the revolt, the animosity between the two groups steadily increased through to the outbreak of the First World War. Disillusionment led both Poles and Jews naturally to look for reasons why the revolt had failed. Increasingly, each group came to the conclusion that the other was to blame. Assimilation, once advocated openly by the Jewish journal *Jutzenka (The Morning Star)*, was now held back due to a number of factors. There were various reasons for the increased tensions between the two communities. Primarily these were the fault of the tsarist Government, which provoked agitation among all of the non-Russian nationals in the Russian Empire to its advantage, so co-operation between minorities against Russian rule was less likely in the future. Measures resulting from the assassination of Tsar Alexander II, such as the adoption in 1882 of the May Laws and the reduction in size of the Pale of Jewish Settlement, the name of the restricted area in which Jews were allowed to reside in the Western reaches of the Russian Empire, caused further divisions, which were eased to an extent by the large-scale emigration of the Jewish population of European Russia in the years following 1880. Relations worsened again as a result of the renewed outbreak of pogroms following the 1905 Revolution.

As a result of tsarist policies, Jews who had no connection with Poland, and considered themselves to be primarily Russian, began to arrive from central Russia. These Jews, colloquially known to the Poles as *Litvaks*, (literally a translation of ‘Jews from Lithuania’, but the noun came to mean all Jews from Russia), were generally more Orthodox Jews, who rigidly adhered to traditional Jewish practices and customs, and usually spoke either only Yiddish or Russian. Like most other Russians they had little time for the Polish language or traditions, while displaying a lasting fondness for Russian culture, despite Russian hostility to Jews. Sects of these Russian Jews advocated that Russian was the only language for Jews. Osip Rabinowich, a Jewish journalist, wrote in the journal *Razvet (Dawn)*:

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26 For a recent overview of the question of Polish-Jewish relations in the years before the outbreak of the First World War, see: Theodore R. Weeks, *From Assimilation to Antisemitism: The Jewish Question in Poland, 1850-1914* (DeKalb, II, 2006).
27 In the Habsburg Empire similar resentment was directed towards ‘Ostjuden’ (East European Jews). This helped in the rise of anti-Semitism in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, due particularly to the large numbers who flooded into Vienna over the course of the nineteenth century.
instead of learning the glorious Russian language [we] persist in speaking our corrupted jargon [Yiddish or Polish] that grates on the ears or distorts. ... We Believe that the time has come for the Russian language to become the Jews’ guide on the road to enlightenment ... Our homeland is Russia - just as its air is ours so its language must become ours.28

Attitudes such as this, although not popular with large numbers of Jews, naturally caused tensions within the Pale of Settlement, and principally Poland, as resistance to Russification was intensifying, through the concept of praca organiczna (Organic Work) whereby Polish nationalism would be strengthened through the work of various associations, but without fomenting revolution. As the numbers of Russian Jews increased, so Polish Jews believed that there was a greater threat to their traditions and culture. Poles, too, saw their culture and language under challenge by the Tsars’ policy of Russification. More significantly for Polish-Jewish relations, among the Litvaks were large numbers of highly politically militant Jews, embittered by their treatment at the hands of the Russian government.

Polish-Jewish relations were strained not only on a social but also on an economic level. Periods of economic growth usually cause increased social tensions, and nineteenth-century Poland was no exception. Russian Poland found her industrial sector expanding rapidly, as a consequence of the economic expansion encouraged in European Russia under the guidance of the Russian Finance Minister between 1892 and 1903, Sergei Witte. Polish and Jewish interests appeared to be going down increasingly separate routes, as the capitalist enterprises of a small group of Jewish and German industrialists moved the economic powerbase further away from the Polish majority. As the proportion of Jews in Poland grew (due to the expulsion of the Jewish populations from St. Petersburg and the surrounding areas into the Pale of Settlement in the wake of the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881 and the resulting anti-Jewish violence), the feeling among Poles that the Jews as a whole did not desire Polish independence increased, particularly as the numbers of Russian-

28 “Russia is our Native Land: Just as We Breath its Air We Must Speak its Language”, Razvet, no. 16 (1861), pp. 200-205; as quoted in Paul Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz (eds.), The Jew in the Modern World: A Documentary History (New York, 1995), p. 400.
speaking Jews rose. It was argued by the increasingly anti-Semitic right wing of Polish politics, which would later develop into the National Democratic Party, that Jews would rather continue with the partitionist status quo. The future National Democrats argued that the Jewish population did not see any advantage to be gained for themselves through Poland becoming independent, in sharp contrast to the period immediately preceding the defeat of the 1863 Revolt. This was due to the associated material benefits of being part of the Russian Empire, as well as Jewish hostility towards the idea of Polish independence.

It was indeed the case that the fast-growing German- and Jewish-owned textile industry based around the city of Łódź in Western Poland was clothing a high proportion of not just the Russian army, but also other sections of the Russian population. Jewish-owned industries were growing rich through their favourable access to this vast market that would inevitably be lost if Poland became an independent country. Jews and Germans almost exclusively owned these large capitalist enterprises in Poland, which also caused bitterness between the German minority and the Poles. In 1913, 55.6% of the largest textile factories (employing over 1000 workers) in Łódź were owned by Germans and the remaining 44.4% by Jews. In non-textile industries of this size, Germans possessed them all. In small textile producing firms (employing 5-20 workers) Germans proprietors were 24.5% of the total, Jews 72.5%, and all others only 3.0%. In non-textile firms of a similar size the proportions were 50.0%, 27.55%, and 21.77% respectively.29 Poles were not seeing the benefits of this economic expansion. Jews and Germans were significantly better off materially in the major urban centres than the ethnically Polish population, and were in a better position to compete when, or if, Poland became independent.

The Jews owned a disproportionately high amount of capital, and controlled significantly more companies than the Polish majority. In such a relatively poor nation, such factors were readily noticed, and were the subject of a large amount of contemporary anti-Semitic literature. This point has been cited by many prominent

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Polish historians to explain the resentment the Poles felt towards the Jews. It is often overlooked that the majority of Jews, living outside the major cities, were also not benefiting from this period of economic expansion. Large numbers of Jews relied upon Poles for their living rather than their fellow Jews. The labour force in Poland was still relatively small compared to the population as a whole. It is certainly true that Jewish-owned businesses often employed predominantly Jewish workers, yet it was argued that Poles had jobs in other areas, such as agriculture, and in Austrian Galicia, administration, where very few Jews of Cisleithania worked before 1914. Such arguments were not well received, especially by middle-class Poles, who increasingly desired that they, and other Poles, should also be a part of the economic expansion that was happening in Poland rather than only the Germans and Jews who were benefiting almost exclusively at the time. The populations of the Eastern towns (Shtetlekh) were economically dependent on the rural Polish population, with their livelihood linked directly to the condition of the Polish agriculture. The Polish peasants relied upon Jewish traders and merchants to sell-on their products at the weekly markets. The urban Jewish population attracted criticism, for different reasons, from the politically active middle classes, the urban working classes and the unemployed. Historians such as Joseph Marcus have attempted to show that large numbers of Jewish urban dwellers also often lived in appalling squalor and were as destitute as many of the Polish urban dwellers. Both Jews and Poles lived side by side in Łódź, the second largest city in Poland, yet it had no system of sewers until the First World War. Yet the fact remains that Jews were in a better position to benefit

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31 Only 0.9% of the total by 1921: Polonsky, op cit., p. 185.
from Poland’s newly gained independence,\[32\] which would lead to further worsening relations between the two groups through the inter-war period.

**The Austrian and Prussian Partitions**

The Polish lands of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were acquired during the partitions of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century, and finally found their shape at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The principal centre in Austrian Galicia was Lwów (known as Lemberg during this period), and after 1846, Cracow, which had been the only part of Poland to remain independent after the Congress of Vienna, when a *Rzeczpospolita Krakowska* (the Free City, or Republic of Cracow)\[33\] was set up. Galicia was accorded a certain degree of autonomy in the Austrian Empire even before the 1860s, when the Habsburg monarchy reorganised itself along the lines of the Dual Monarchy of the *Ausgleich* (Austro-Hungarian Compromise) of 1867. With the failure of the January 1863 insurrection, the leaders in Polish Galicia, the *Stańczyki* (Cracow Conservatives), felt that they had little alternative but to work within the framework of Austrian rule, and continue a programme of *praca organiczna*, achieving a virtually autonomous state for Galicia, bringing real political benefits for the Poles, and also the Jewish minority within Galicia, who were not discriminated against.\[34\] The largely unassimilated Jewish population of Galicia more than doubled in size between 1857 and 1890, accounting for 11.5% of the population in that year. It reached 871,000 in 1910.\[35\] Jews dominated trade and small industry.\[36\] Increased tension between Christians and Jews over economic competition led to a rise in anti-Semitism similar to that in the Congress Kingdom, despite Galician Jewry more closely identifying with Polish culture than the Jews of

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32 Between the end of the eighteenth century and 1929, the per capita real income of Jews went up by 350%, while that of the non-Jewish urban population declined; Joseph Marcus, *Social and Political History of the Jews in Poland, 1918-1939* (Berlin, 1983), p. 13.
33 The official name was *Wolne, Niepodległe i Ścisłe Neutralne Miasto Kraków z Okręgiem* (The Free, Independent and Strictly Neutral City of Cracow with its Territory). It was incorporated into the Austrian Empire after the suppression of the Cracow Uprising of February 1846 led by Edward Dembowski.
34 One example of this was the Declaration sent by the Galician Diet to the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph in October 1860, which not only sought to remind him of the historical rights of the Polish peoples, but also requested polonization of the administration. Furthermore, it asked for complete equality for the Jews, which was accepted in all the Habsburg lands after 1867.
35 This figure was some three quarters of the total Jewish population in the Austro-Hungarian Empire: David Vital, *A People Apart. A Political History of the Jews in Europe, 1789-1939* (Oxford, 1999), p. 299.
36 In 1881 Jews controlled 75-80% of local trade: Wandycz, op.cit., p. 222.
the Congress Kingdom. This was a trend that was increasing. In 1890 74.6% of the Jewish population gave Polish as their “language of daily use”. By 1910 this had risen to 92.5%. The Jewish population, concentrated as they were in Eastern Galicia, were increasingly caught between Poles and Ukrainians in the struggle for national independence.

Polish-Jewish relations in the Prussian partition followed more closely the Russian pattern, with the incorporation of Pomerania and Poznania first into the Norddeutscher Bund (North German Confederation in 1867) and the German Reich in 1871, removing the special status given to the two provinces at the Congress of Vienna. Under Bismarck’s policy of Kulturkampf (Culture struggle), launched in the early 1870s to integrate and centralize the Reich against the threats of Catholicism and socialism, tensions rose between the Polish majority and the German government. With the ending of the Kulturkampf in the 1890s a policy of more general Germanization and colonization was initiated by the authorities, resisted by the Poles through praca organiczna. Tensions between the Polish and Jewish populations were always less acute in the Prussian partition, despite the widespread co-operation between the Jewish minority and the German government. One reason for this was the small size of the Jewish population. According to the census of 1890 the Jewish minority had shrunk to only 2.5%, mostly a result of the emigration of the Jewish population westward towards the larger urban centres of the German Empire, principally Berlin. Those who remained almost fully integrated themselves with the German population. The small numbers of Jews in Prussian Poland virtually erased the ‘Jewish problem,’ only for it to re-emerge after the outbreak of war in 1914, when Polish nationalists were put into direct conflict with the German population of the Prussian partition.

38 The Catholic Ukranian (Uniate) population of Galicia was also known as Ruthenian, so to distinguish themselves from the predominantly Orthodox Ukranians in the Russian Empire.
39 Some 20,000 in total, who were seen by the Poles as part of the German community: Wandycz, op. cit., p. 230.
Pogroms and Anti-Jewish Violence

Polish-Jewish relations reached a new low in the years after 1881 with the anti-Jewish riots sparked by the news of the assassination of Tsar Alexander II by the revolutionary organisation, *Narodnaia Volia* (People’s Will), one of whose members was Jewish, Gesia Gelfman. Despite *Narodnaia Volia* being an essentially Russian organisation, it was the Jews who were blamed for the assassination of the ‘Tsar Liberator’. The 1880s were the key decade in the development of Jewish politics, as Jews tried to come to terms with the acts of suspected, officially sanctioned anti-Jewish violence, and more restrictive legislation, most notably with the ‘May Laws’ of 1882. These resulted in a double persecution of the Russian Jews, from above from the tsarist authorities, and below, from the peasantry. No reliable figures exist as to the exact number of Jews who died in the wave of pogroms that lasted until 1884, but estimates range between fifty and a few hundred, whilst perhaps 20,000 had their homes destroyed, and an additional 100,000 suffered major damage to their property.

Although in Russia there was worse violence, and expulsions of Jews from Moscow and St. Petersburg, incidents in the Congress Kingdom had serious effects on Jewish attitudes, both within Poland and internationally. In Poland, the riots were a limited, yet spontaneous, act of violence against Jews. In Warsaw a ‘pogrom’ occurred on Christmas Day, 1881, during a service at the Church of the Holy Cross on Nowy

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40 The May Laws of 1882, introduced by the Minister of the Interior, N. P. Ignatiev, were measures originally designed to end pogroms. The laws themselves prohibited the establishment of new Jewish settlements out with existing towns and Shtetlekh; prohibited Jews from buying rural property; banned Jewish trading on Sunday mornings; deprived Jews of voting rights in zemstvo elections: see Mendes-Flohr and Reinharz (eds.), op. cit., p. 309.


42 *The Times* in London reported the Warsaw incident, commenting on the “disgraceful conduct displayed by the lower orders at Warsaw … among those suspicious parties there was not a single Jew, nor a convert from Judaism. Yet in the first moment there ran forth before the church a voice from the assembled crowd, but which did not express itself in the way that a crowd is used to utter its opinions, “Jews have in the church made our brother and our sisters a sacrifice. Let our Blood be revenged upon the Jews”. The voice decided upon what was to follow”: “The Riots at Warsaw on Christmas Day”, *The Times*, January 6, 1882, p. 6c.

43 Frank Golczewski, *Polnisch-Jüdische Beziehungen 1881-1922: Eine Studie zur Geschichte des Antisemitismus in Osteuropa* (Wiesbaden, 1981), pp. 41-51. It was also alleged that Polish soldiers of the Imperial Russian Army took part in the rioting: Isaac Grünbaum, “Die Pogrome in Polen”, in A. Linden [a pseudonym of Leo Motzkin, and distributed by the Zionist Organisation in London], *Die
Świat Street near the Old Town. A disturbance started among those gathered there after a cry of “it burns!” It was claimed that a Jewish thief had started the disturbance. In two resulting days of rioting and looting in the Jewish districts of the city, while no fatalities were reported, several thousand Jewish families were robbed. In addition it was estimated that the disturbances resulted in just under a million roubles’ worth of damage and the tsarist authorities arrested several thousand Poles. More significant was the harm done to Polish-Jewish relations. Warsaw considered itself to be a cosmopolitan and ‘western’ city, the most civilised in the Russian Empire. Previous pogroms had occurred in the Ukrainian or Belorussian provinces, not in the heart of Poland, although Jewish writers, such as Simon Dubnow and Isaac Grünbaum, blamed the Russian authorities for inciting the violence, and noted Polish condemnation of the events in Warsaw. Further damage was done through rumour, and the fear of any potential violence still to come.

Between 1904 and 1907 the Congress Kingdom was in virtual revolt (rewolucja) against Russian rule, and violence became endemic, not merely against the Jewish minority. During the course of the rewolucja there were many instances of large-scale violence in the Congress Kingdom, principally in the two major urban centres, Warsaw and Łódź, which was more notable for the joint action by Poles and Jews. In Warsaw on April 2, 1905, four Jews were killed and forty wounded when Russian police fired on a funeral march organised by the Jewish Bund. During the ‘June Days’ in Łódź, between June 5-11, 561 people died during the course of rioting between Polish and Jewish socialists and Cossacks; of the total killed, 341 were

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Judenpogrome in Russland: herausgegeben im Auftrag des Zionistischen Hilfsfonds in London von der zur Erforschung der Pogrome eingesetzten Kommission (Köln and Leipzig, 1910), Volume I, pp. 134-151. The accusation that the pogroms were organised by the tsarist authorities was largely the responsibility of the Jewish historian Simon M. Dubnow in his History of the Jews in Russia and Poland from the Earliest Times to the Present Day (New York, 1918). This claim that has been since revised by more recent scholarship. See the collection of essays in John D. Klier and Shlomo Lambroza (eds.), op. cit.

44 Golczewski, op. cit., p. 47; Grünbaum gives the figure of 3,153, but as with much of his account only relies on contemporary press reports: Grünbaum, op. cit., p. 146.


46 Further violence against the Jewish population did occur in the industrial town of Lodz, following strikes in the aftermath of May Day celebrations in 1892. It is unclear why the violence, which followed three days of strikes, turned towards anti-Jewish violence: Golczewski, op. cit., pp. 56-59.

Jews. In one day, ‘bloody Wednesday,’ August 15, 1906, seventy-six people alone were killed in Warsaw, 38 of them police or soldiers, the remainder PPS activists or innocent bystanders. Jewish victims were considerable, but the casualties were more the result of Jewish participation in the Polish rewolucja against Russian rule, and the actions of the ‘Black Hundreds,’ rather than any direct Polish role in the pogroms. The Polish nationalist leader, Roman Dmowski, would state in October 1918 that “there was never a pogrom in Poland”.

The Jewish Response

Many Jews drew the conclusion that their future did not lie any longer in the lands of the Russian Empire. Emigration was seen to be the answer and for many, particularly to the United States. As has already been shown, there was a sharp rise in the Jewish population in Western Europe in the years after 1881 largely caused by immigration.

In the wake of the pogroms in the 1880s, until the end of free immigration in 1925, 2,378,000 Jews arrived in the United States, the majority of whom came from the former Polish lands, and the Pale of Jewish Settlement. The 1881 pogroms proved the spur to emigration. Although there were no major acts of anti-Jewish violence between 1884 and 1903, emigration rates remained steady.

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48 Ibid., pp. 146-147.
50 Dmowski’s great rival for the leadership of the Polish National cause, the socialist Joseph Pilsudski, half agreed commenting that “there have been no pogroms in Poland!-nothing but unavoidable accidents”: Henry Morgenthau, All in a Lifetime (New York, 1922), p. 371. Dmowski made his comment in conversation with Louis Marshall, a prominent lawyer and President of the American Jewish Committee: Louis Marshall, “A Conversation between Roman Dmowski and Louis Marshall”, in Charles Reznikoff (ed.), Louis Marshall Champion of Liberty – Selected Papers and Addresses (Philadelphia, 1957), Volume II, p. 586. In general the word Rabunek (meaning: robbery or plunder) is used in Polish sources to describe the acts of violence usually referred to as pogroms in Jewish sources.
51 See n. 3. It is estimated that 350,000 Jews emigrated to Continental Europe; 200,000 to Great Britain. 115,000 went to Argentina; 100,000 to Canada; and 40,000 to South Africa up to 1914. Figures from Dan Cohn-Sherbok, Judaism: History, Belief and Practice (London, 2003), p. 284.
52 The Jewish population of the United States grew from 280,000 out of 50,155,000 (0.05%) in 1880 to 4,500,000 out of 115,000,000 (3.9%) in 1925: Encyclopedia Judaica, Volume 15, col. 1608.
With the onset of further pogroms in the aftermath of the Kishinev pogrom of 1903 in Bessarabia, where over two days between April 6-7, with the alleged complicity of tsarist officials, 47 Jews were killed, and 424 wounded, a new wave of violence began, further encouraged by news of the disastrous Russian campaign in the Far East against Japan. Between 1903 and 1907 the final toll of victims reached some 3,103 in 657 different pogroms. Emigration rates climbed yet further, to the extent that over the four-year period between 1904 and 1908, 642,000 East-European Jews arrived in the United States, a rate of 8.4 per 1000 Russo-Polish Jews. The result of the mass-emigration from the Jewish populations of Eastern Europe to the west was to be the internationalisation of the Jewish question. A number of Jews who emigrated to the United States returned to the lands they had previously left. Between 1908 and 1910 12,723 out of 170,952 Jews returned to Russia (7.4%), bringing back stories from the ‘new world’ and firmly establishing links between the two communities. The American Jewish leadership, for a long time the preserve of the American

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53 Figures for the years up to 1899 are incomplete as they only include immigration through the ports of New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore (which totalled 599,315 during these years). Between 1899 and 1919, 1,551,315 Jews entered the United States (10.44% of the total): American Jewish Year Book, op. cit., 1919, pp. 610-611.

54 Events in Kishinev were started as a result of a ‘Blood libel.’ Figures are quoted in Silomo Lambroza, “The Pogroms of 1903-1906”, in Klier and Lambroza (eds.), op. cit., p. 200. The largest loss of Jewish life was in Odessa in October, 1905. Exact figures have not been established. Leo Motzkin reported the total to be 302. He commented that “the Jewish [quarter of] Odessa was like a field of rubble, covered in bodies”: Linden, Die Judenpogrome, Volume I, p. 195. Other reports placed the figures higher. Russian police reports put the figure at 400, while others claimed that up to 800 Jews were killed and 5000 wounded: Lambroza, op. cit., p. 231.

55 Ibid., p. 228.

56 Encyclopedia Judaica, Volume 15, col. 1608.

57 Ibid., op. cit., p. 309.

58 By way of contrast, 12.4% of Jews from Austria-Hungary returned to Galicia; 23.9% of the Poles who left (in almost as great numbers for the United States) returned to the Russian Empire; and 38.8% to Galicia: Ibid., p. 308.
German-Jewish community, which had arrived largely in the 1840s, and was made up of assimilated Jews, was divided between the native-born Jews and the recent arrivals from Eastern-Europe, who spoke Yiddish. They had little in common. The German-Jewish leadership sought to assimilate the Ostjuden, and under the leadership of Solomon Schechter endeavoured to spread the influence of the ideas of Zacharias Frankel’s conservative Judaism, which combined limited assimilation with religious Orthodoxy. As it grew in size, the American Jewish community also increased in importance on the world stage. As a consequence, with the renewed outbreak of pogroms between 1903 and 1906, the Jewish communities in the Pale were able to appeal to the American Jewish community for aid, in a way that was impossible during the first wave of pogroms in the early 1880s. Mass protest meetings were held as the Jewish communities, largely made up of Jews from the Pale, protested to their governments over the violence being perpetrated against their co-religionists. These took place on December 4, 1905, in New York when 125,000 Jews marched in protest.  

On the same day, the Jewish population of Warsaw held a day of mourning. Western liberal opinion sympathised with the Jewish population of the Pale. In Great Britain there was a great outcry from many prominent members of the British establishment, including the Liberal Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. Arthur James Balfour, the former Conservative Prime Minister (and later, between 1916 and 1919 the British Foreign Secretary), commented:

> [t]he treatment of their Jewish citizens by European nations, from medieval times onwards, is certainly the darkest blot on the history of Christendom; and I earnestly trust that the outcome of this appalling Russian tragedy may be to make security, liberty, and equal rights the inalienable birthright of every Russian Jew.

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59 The march, organised by the Committee of the Jewish Defence Societies, was reported to be one of the largest protest meetings in American history: “Jews, in Huge Parade Mourn Dead in Russia”, New York Times, December 5, 1905, p. 1.

60 Joseph Chamberlain called the pogroms “an indelible disgrace upon our Christian civilization”, The Times, January 4, 1906, p. 6, while Campbell-Bannerman “expressed sympathy with the Jews in Russia, and horror at the cruelties that have been inflicted upon so many of them”, Campbell-Bannerman to Israel Zangwill, published in The Times, January 6, 1906, p. 9.

At the Queen’s Hall in London on January 8, 1906 Lord Rothschild presided over a meeting which condemned the Russian “Outrages”. The protests had an effect. In the case of Kishinev, perhaps not the largest but the most notorious pogrom, the tsarist officials were forced to bring those implicated to trial. While the few who were found guilty received only light sentences, international pressure had been brought to bear for the first time on the Russian government with regard to the Jewish population.

Many Jews in the Polish lands now became more extreme in their political outlook, no longer looking towards either Russia or Poland to advance their cause. The pogroms of 1881 saw the start of Zionism (Jewish nationalism) as a serious political force in both countries. Some thinkers, such as Leon Pinsker and Moshe Leib Lilienblum, who helped found the Hibbat Zion (literally translated from Hebrew into English as ’[those who are] fond of Zion’) movement in 1882, were deeply influenced by what they witnessed in 1881. They argued that Russia was not the only inherently anti-Semitic country, and that this problem would not be solved by emigration to friendlier countries, or legal emancipation, but only by the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine so that the Jews could be kehol hagoyim (just like the other nations). Zionism carried a number of other implications as well. Poles, Byelorussians, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians had their own historic geographical lands to defend, but the Jews had no such territory. Pinsker wrote that

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64 This can be reflected in the numbers of Jews arrested as political offenders. In the 1860s, they made up only 3% of the total arrested in Russia, but by 1907-8 Jews are estimated to have made up a quarter of all those arrested. See Piotr Wróbel, “Jewish Warsaw Before the First World War”, in Włodzimir T. Bartoszewski and Antony Polonsky (eds.), The Jews in Warsaw: A History (Oxford, 1991), p. 260. In other criminal activity, apart from prostitution, Polish Jewish criminality was declining in the years before the First World War: Robert Blobaum, “Criminalizing the “Other”. Crime, Ethnicity, and Antisemitism in Early Twentieth-Century Poland”, in idem. (ed.), Antisemitism and its Opponents in Modern Poland (Ithaca, N.Y., 2005), pp. 81-102.
66 Lilienblum, a moderate socialist, present in Odessa in 1881, and witness to the pogrom of April 4, argued that even in the event of a revolution, freedom for the Jews was not assured. See Motzkin, Die Judenpogrome in Russland. In his Autoemancipation, first published in 1882, Pinsker outlined the roots of anti-Semitism and called for the establishment of a Jewish National Home (Zion).
“we must not admit that we are doomed to play in the future the hopeless role of the ‘wandering Jew’ … it is our burdensome duty to devote all our remaining moral force to re-establish ourselves as a living nation, so that we may finally assume a more fitting and dignified role”. 67  As emigration to Palestine was almost impossible for many Jews, due to its position in the Ottoman Empire, only 50,000 had arrived by 1914 in the lands of Eretz Yisrael (Palestine). 68  There was little prospect of any increase in this number.  Pinsker noted that “Perhaps the Holy Land will again become ours.  If so all the better, but first of all we must determine what country is accessible to us, and at the same time adapted to offer the Jews”. 69  In recognition of the failure of Jewish assimilation in the lands of the Eastern Europe, large numbers of Jews began to adhere to the new political doctrine of Zionism, with its idea that the Jews would constitute a national rather than merely religious minority, which brought Jewish political thought into direct conflict with Polish nationalist ideas for the first time.  The Polish nationalist politician, Roman Dmowski, wrote in 1914 that “on the banks of the Vistula, there is no room for two nationalities”. 70

Zionist ideas were not merely popular in the oppressed Russian Empire, they struck a chord as well with Jews in Western Europe and the United States.  Pinsker’s ideas directly influenced Theodore Herzl, the founder of the World Zionist Congress, and author of Der Judenstaat (1896), one of the most important Zionist works.  Famously stating that the Jewish problem was not merely a religious question, he observed that “we are a nation, one nation”. 71  Herzl, further influenced by the increase in anti-Semitism in Karl Lueger’s Vienna and the trial of Captain Albert Dreyfus in France, helped spread Zionist ideas in Western Europe. 72  The First Zionist Congress held in

68 Figure quoted in I. Michael Aronson, Troubled Waters: The Origins of the 1881 Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Russia (Pittsburgh, Pa, 1990), p. 234.
69 Pinsker, Autoemancipation, p. 194.
72 Karl Lueger, a leading member of the Christlichsoziale Partei (Christian Social Party or CSP) and mayor of Vienna from 1897, had his appointment vetoed four times previously by Emperor Franz Joseph, who was called by the right-wing press the “Jüdenkaiser”.  But under pressure from Pope Leo XIII, the Emperor relented and Lueger was appointed.  See Weiss, op. cit., pp. 75-77.  Dreyfus, a Jewish officer in the French army, was accused of spying for the German Reich, based on faked evidence.  See Roger Magraw, France, 1815-1914: The Bourgeois Century (London, 1983), pp. 273-277.
Basle in 1897 showed the growing popularity of the movement. In the Congress Kingdom, one of the most prosperous and economically developed parts of the Russian Empire, assimilation and Orthodoxy were still the dominant political ideologies of the Jewish population, and Zionism was limited in support to the more recent arrivals, the Litvaks. Socialism and Zionism combined in the formation of the Po’alei Zion (also known as Vozrozhdeniye, Renaissance) which emerged between 1903 and 1905. It was recognised at the Third Conference of Russian Zionists, held at Helsingfors (Helsinki) in 1906, and as a further arm of religious Zionism (Mizrachi) appealed to the more religious Orthodox Jewish population of the Pale. The ‘Helsingfors Program’ called for both civic and national rights for Jews. Zionism was constantly undermined by splits over territorial and ideological matters. In the Congress Kingdom the General Zionists split into the progressive pro-Labour Al ha-Mishmar faction under Isaac Grünbaum, and the middle-class Et Livnot faction under Leon Levite. In Austrian Galicia there were divisions between the West Galician federation under the leadership of Adolf Strand and Osias Thon, who achieved prominence with his election to the Austrian Reichstrat in 1911, and the East Galician Federation led by Leon Reich, Fischel Rotenstreich and Emil Schmorak.

A Jewish workers’ movement began to develop, and in 1886 the first Jewish Revolutionary group was set up in Warsaw. In the universities similar organisations were organised, mostly among the Russian and Lithuanian Jews who had newly arrived in Poland. As a result, the Jewish ideal of assimilation within Polish society never fully recovered from these setbacks. Lilenblum and Pinsker spoke out against assimilation, warning that it would lead to the complete destruction of a separate Jewish identity, which many Orthodox Jews still craved. Furthermore, no matter how much Jews changed their ways and appearance, they were still “alien and vagrant … a man without a country; for all classes a hated rival”73 to the larger gentile community. While Jews turned to revolutionary and Zionist movements to solve their problems, assimilation became a more remote goal to a shrinking number of mostly middle-class Jews and dominated by those in the liberal professions. Among the greater mass of the Jewish population assimilation was not the answer. Under the influence of earlier ideas that developed out of the haskalah (Jewish renaissance), especially in the years

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73 Pinsker, op. cit., p. 188.
leading up to the First World War, a pride in traditional Jewish heritage became more popular among Jews. This gave birth to the ‘Hebrew revival,’ and later to a ‘Yiddish revival’, again undermining the assimilationist movement. A flourishing of the arts in particular resulted throughout both Poland and Russia.

It should be noted, however, that Zionism had, within the Jewish community in Poland, almost as many opponents as there were in Russian and Polish circles. Opposition came from both conservative and Orthodox Jews, such as the most popular Jewish political party from the Second Republic, Agudat Israel, which favoured the status quo. The Algemeyner Yidisher Arbeter Bund in Lite, Poyln un Rusland (United Jewish Workers’ League in Lithuania, Poland, and Russia, founded in Wilno in 1897, or socialist Bund) also opposed the idea of Zionism, claiming that it was merely a bourgeois nationalist fantasy. Moreover, ideas of socialism, and later Social Democracy (in both its Bolshevik and Menshevik versions), began to attract larger numbers of Jews. One example of this was the formation of the revolutionary Socialdemokracja Królestwa Polskiego (Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland or SDKP), which held its first congress on March 10-11, 1894. Many prominent Litwaks, such as Leon Trotsky, Grigory Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev, Maxim Litvinov, later Soviet Foreign Minister, and Rosa Luxemburg shared the Polish Bund’s background but gravitated towards the Internationalist stance of the Russian Social Democrats, and influenced the Bund to do likewise.

Both Poles and Polish-Jews resented the Litwaks for their disruption of earlier more harmonious Polish-Jewish relations. The popularity of left-wing ideologies among the Litwaks led to the popular, but certainly not exclusively Polish, idea of Żydokomuna (Jewish-Bolshevism), whereby Russian-Jewish intellectuals were not always unjustifiably associated with both Marxism and Communism, due to the

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75 After a number of arrests by the Okhranka the SDKP was forced to reform. Rosa Luxemburg and Felix Dzierżyński formed in September 1899 the Socjaldemokracja Królestwa Polskiego i Litwy (the Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania or SDKPiL).
76 Róża Luxemburg in Polish, who would play a prominent role in the attempted Spartacist revolution in Berlin, in 1919.
apparently high numbers of Litwaks involved in the radical left-wing political parties.77

The Rise of Polish Ethnic-Nationalism

These attitudes, and the spread of Zionist ideas among some sections of the Jewish population, could only increase resentment and hostility among Polish nationalists. These outsiders were bitterly resented by the Poles, who saw the Litvaks as over-zealous in collaborating with the bitterly-hated occupying Russians. Yet the Litwaks were also heavily represented in revolutionary parties. Polish politics were also changing in the closing decades of the nineteenth century. The spread of new political ideas, and the increased politicisation of certain sections of Polish society, mirrored the Jewish community of the same time in Poland. Jewish assimilation had been advocated by a number of prominent Polish writers. Bolesław Prus wrote in 1886 that “the Jews are not a nationality … once the Jews become educated and are accepted by society, they become good citizens”.78 The principal force in pre-war Polish politics was nationalism. The right-wing of Polish nationalism was most popularly represented by the Narodowa Demokracja (National Democratic Party, more commonly called Endek (ND) or Endecja), founded in 1897, which, through the ideas of Roman Dmowski,79 Zygmunt Balicki and Jan Ludwik Popławski, advocated

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77 It was estimated that during the Second Polish Republic the Komunistyczna Partia Robotnicza Polski (Polish Communist Workers’ Party, KPRP and after 1925, KPP) peaked at a membership of 20,000, of which one quarter were of Jewish background. While a higher proportion of Jews than that by population, the figure of 5,000 Jewish Communists in a Jewish population of some 3 million is still as an insignificant number. Jews were, however, a more visible element in the revolutionary parties: Jerry Z. Muller, “Communism, Anti-Semitism and the Jews”, Commentary, Volume 86, Part 2 (1988), p. 34; André Gerrits, “Antisemitism and Anti-Communism: The Myth of ’Judeo-Communism in Eastern Europe”, East European Jewish Affairs, Volume 25, Number 1 (1995), pp. 49-72; Jaff Schatz, “Jews and the Communist Movement in Interwar Poland”, Studies in Contemporary Jewry, Volume XX: Dark Times, Dire Decisions: Jews and Communism (2004), pp. 13-37. On the pre-First World War popular Polish view of the Litwaks, see Francois Guesnet, “’Litwacy’ i ’Ostuden’ (Żydzi ze Wschodu): Migracja i stereotypy”, in Elżbiety and Roberta Traba (eds.), Tematy żydowskie: historia, literatura, edukacja (Olsztyn, 1999), p. 70.
79 See Andrzej Micewski, Roman Dmowski (Warsaw, 1971); Roman Wapinski, Roman Dmowski (Lublin, 1979); Alvin M. Fountain, Roman Dmowski: Party, Tactics, Ideology, 1895-1907 (Boulder, Colo., 1980).
the concept of a Polish *naród* (nation), a right-wing and ethno-nationalist concept. Dmowski, who rose to prominence through editing the journal, *Przegląd Wszechpolski* (*All-Poland Review*), stated that he had, “never been an advocate of liberal humanitarian principles”. The ideas of *naród* were defined in works such as Dmowski’s *Mysli nowoczesnego Polaka* (*Thoughts of a Modern Pole*, 1904). Definitions of Poland were set down, both geographically and ethnically. Geographically, Great Poland was advocated, with roughly the borders of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea. But Dmowski’s ethnic conclusions gave rise to far more debate. The Poland Dmowski envisaged was to be an entirely ‘Catholic Poland,’ as after 1863 the Catholic Church was the only remaining national institution Poland could claim. Perhaps not entirely unconnected with this policy, a large number of Catholic priests were members of the National Democratic Party, and sometimes preached an overtly political message from the pulpit, bringing accusations from the Jewish community of Polish anti-Semitism. The National Democrats were advocating an entirely Polish nationalist idea, in direct competition with the purely Jewish idea of Zionism. There was also an ethnic undertone to Dmowski’s *naród* for Jews, since even ones who had converted from Judaism to Catholicism were to be excluded. Dmowski argued that they could not be assimilated, as they were alien, more German than Polish, no more than “second-rate Poles” who remained Jewish at heart. Father Jan Gnatowski, a priest in Cracow, for example, wrote in the Polish popular press on the question of Jewish nationality and language:  

[i]n pressing their demands for the recognition of their jargon as a separate language, the Jews attempt as much as possible to obscure the irrefutable fact

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80 In contrast to civic nationalism (or patriotism) advocated by federalists such as the PPS-orientated Józef Piłsudski, ethno-nationalism was an exclusionist response to the challenges to Polish nationalism from the three partitionist Powers. As in Ireland it also took the form of a defence of Catholicism against outside or ‘alien’ influences. See Walker Connor, “Nation Building or Destroying?”, *World Politics*, Volume 24, Part 3 (1972), pp. 319-355; Joanna Beata Michlic, *Poland’s Threatening Other: The Image of the Jew from 1880 to the Present* (Lincoln, Neb., 2006), pp. 3-8.  
82 For the background to the National Democrats see Fountain, op. cit.; Brian A. Porter, *When Nationalism Begins to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in Nineteenth-Century Poland* (Oxford, 2000).  
83 Quoted in Wróbel, op cit., p. 253.
that the so-called Jewish jargon is a German language and nothing else, a true folk dialect of that language ... the spirit of the [Jewish] language is German.\textsuperscript{84}

The implication was that Polish Jews, who were not part of the new influx of Litwaks, were more German than Polish, and therefore more hostile than supportive of the Polish national cause. In the face of Russification, Dmowski argued that the only way to keep Polish national culture was to keep Poland ethnically pure, by Polonising certain szczepy (tribes) such as the Ukrainians and Byelorussians. The Jews could not be Polonised. Dmowski wrote in \textit{Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka} that

[i]n the character of this race so many different values, strange to our moral constitution and harmful to our life, have accumulated, that assimilation with a large number of [Jews] would destroy us, (zgubiloby nas) replacing with decadent elements those young creative foundations upon which we are building the future.\textsuperscript{85}

Writings such as this, and the 1912 Endecja-led Jewish economic boycott, not only increased tensions between the Polish and Jewish communities in Poland but also led Jews living outside Poland to be less inclined to support Poland, precisely at a time when international Jewry was beginning to gain influence on the world stage. The result was that the two political factions, Polish nationalism and Zionism, were openly hostile towards each other, accusing each in turn of anti-Semitism and anti-Polonism. For Dmowski, a \textit{Kulturkampf} was developing between the Polish and Jewish populations.

Political fragmentation was highlighted by the elections for the Fourth Russian State \textit{Duma} in 1912.\textsuperscript{86} In the previous three \textit{Duma} elections the Jews, who formed a significant part of the limited electorate, had not previously voted \textit{en bloc} in an unsuccessful attempt to avoid antagonising Polish opinion. The majority of the


registered voters, 55% of the 45,000 votes in Warsaw, were Jews. The Jewish historian Simon Dubnow remarked that “out of consideration for the national susceptibilities of the Poles” no Jewish candidate was put forward in Warsaw in 1912, but on the condition that the Poles would not support an anti-Semitic candidate. Of the three candidates for Warsaw, two were affiliated with the National Democrats, namely Roman Dmowski, and the historian Jan Kucharzewski, who had split with Dmowski over the issue of co-operation with the Russian authorities. Dmowski stated that he stood because of the “provocation of the Jews”, and in order to fight a “struggle with the Jews”. The remaining candidate, an obscure socialist Eugeniusz Jagiello, who unlike Dmowski and Kucharzewski, actively appealed to the substantial Jewish vote, was duly elected. Dmowski did not receive enough votes to gain a position as an elector, and therefore lost both his seat in the Duma, and position as the leader of the Koło (Polish Circle), a considerable loss of prestige. The resultant boycott of Jewish shops, under the slogan of ‘swój do swego po swoje’ (stick to your own kind), was fanned by the Nationalist press, such as the Gazeta Poranna 2 grosze (Morning Gazette two grosze), which carried lists of Jewish-owned businesses. The boycott was accompanied by sporadic acts of violence, such as in Planów in the województwa (palatinate) of Kalisz, where in May 1913 a mob burnt down a Jewish shop, killing seven people. The National Democrats, and Dmowski in particular, politically regained ground in the Congress Kingdom. Indeed, he was even taken aback at the popularity of the boycott. The merging of political and economic anti-Semitism had greatly increased its appeal to the Polish population, and divisions in the Polish nationalist movement were forgotten.

After the defeat of the 1863 revolt, Polish culture came under attack through the programme of Russification as the tsarist regime sought to suppress any separatist feelings within the Empire. This was an attempt to prevent any further rebellions

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88 Dubnow, op. cit., Volume III: *From the Accession of Nicholas II until the Present*, p. 167.
92 Golczewski, op. cit., pp. 106-120.
against Russian rule and, as a result, the Polish language was gradually eliminated from schools in the Kingdom of Poland between 1866 and 1885. Against this, Poles sought to preserve their language and culture through *praca organiczna*, from the 1860s until almost the turn of the century. Poles sought to preserve their national identity through the Polish Catholic Church, which left no place for the country’s Jewish population. As a result of this struggle, Poles associated Polish culture with the Catholic Church. Therefore, the Jews were not seen to be taking any active part in the struggle to regain Polish nationhood, which was not actually the case, as the cooperation between Polish and Jewish left-wing groups showed. The Polish priests, with some notable exceptions, reinforced this impression with often anti-Semitic sermons, relaying the political message of Dmowski’s National Democratic Party.

While the National Democrats had wide support among the Polish *szlachta* (gentry) and middle classes, and a broad base of support among the peasantry, they were increasingly challenged from the mid-1890s by the formation of the *Związek Stronnictwa Chłopskiego* (Union of the Peasant Party) in 1893, followed by that of the *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe* (Polish Peasant Party or PSL). The latter was formed out of the *Ludowy Komitet Wyborczy* (Peasant Electoral Committee) which met at Rzeszów on July 28, 1895. The leadership of this new party was in peasant hands. While its programme did not include any plans for land reform, it became a significant factor in Polish politics,\(^\text{94}\) establishing itself as centrist-aligned but essentially conservative in its outlook. As the PSL’s principal interest was that of redressing the grievances of the Polish peasantry, the Jewish question was looked at purely from this angle initially. With mounting economic pressures in the years leading up to the First World War, however, relations between the peasantry and the Jewish minority declined. The shift towards the right in the Peasant movement came out into the open, when in 1913 the Peasant movement split between the radical PSL-*Lewica* (Left) under Jan Stapiński, and the more conservative PSL-*Piast* (named after the legendary Polish peasant who founded the first Polish dynasty) under Wincenty Witos, which moved towards the *Endecja*. The main peasant newspaper, *Piast*, started printing anti-Semitic articles, calling for the “expulsion of the Jews from the countryside, and [the Peasant movement] will aspire to this until it has been

\(^{94}\) Its most important figure, Wincenty Witos, who led the *Piast* faction from 1913, was one of the foremost politicians of the Second Republic.
accomplished”. 95 While Witos was the most influential Peasant leader, thrice holding the Premiership of Poland, including leading the Rada Obrony Państwa (Council for the Defence of the State) during the crisis of the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1920, his Piast party was never a significant factor in subsequent elections in the Second Republic. 96 Nevertheless, it was the anti-Semitic voice that was to be heard most strongly from the Polish Peasant movement. Witos embodied the ‘matter-of-fact’ anti-Semitism of the Polish peasantry, who still made up two thirds of the Polish population in the late nineteenth century. Jan Slomka, the mayor of the village of Dzikow in Austrian Galicia, commented in his memoirs that “in business the Jews were crooks and unreliable. The buyer had always to look sharp, else he would get short weight or measure, or get poor goods, or pay higher than he expected. He needed to watch his change”. 97 Slomka’s views on the Jewish population were fairly typical of the Polish peasantry as a whole.

Jews had more success in promoting better relations with the left-wing parties in Polish politics, especially the Polska Partia Socjalistyczna (the Polish Socialist Party, hereafter PPS) under the influence, but not direct control of Józef Piłsudski, born in 1867 in the town of Zulow in Lithuania to an aristocratic Polish family. The social basis of the party was almost entirely the emerging Polish urban working classes, who were beginning to make their numbers felt in the industrial centres of the Congress Kingdom, principally in Warsaw and Łódź. While not openly philo-Semitic, at least during the years following the First World War, it was often accused of being so by its opponents. In its early period the party had been more open in its support of the Jewish minority, stating in a manifesto published in 1903 that “we call upon you, comrades, to energetically step forward against the government-run anti-Jewish

propaganda … we call upon you to actively defend the Jews”.

The PPS formed an unofficial alliance with the *Bund* through the course of the Second Republic, and the Jewish parliamentary group usually sided with the PPS in the Polish *Sejm* (Parliament). Before the First World War, however, Piłsudski’s influence was minimal, due to the illegality of the Polish Socialist Party in the Congress Kingdom, and the fact that he spent many years in exile in Siberia and the west. The National Democrats were a viable political force, however, and up to the Russian Revolution of 1917 sought to further the Polish national cause through legal means, principally by securing representation in the *Duma* after its formation in 1906. The National Democrats were the pre-eminient legal party in Poland. Roman Dmowski was the best known figure in politics in Poland and internationally, based on his position as head of the *Kolo* in the first three *Dumas*, where he sought to further the Polish cause through Russian co-operation, seeing Germany as the main threat to the re-establishment of a Polish state. The strong influence of Dmowski on Polish nationalist thinking did little to promote ease among Jews both in Poland and abroad. The large and influential Jewish communities in France, Britain and the United States, including many immigrants from Poland, saw ominous signs of rising Polish anti-Semitism, due to the policies, actions and statements of Dmowski’s National Democrat Party. Piłsudski only came to prominence through his exploits of leading the Polish Legions in alliance with Austria-Hungary in the First World War, against Russia, which he saw as the principal enemy of Polish independence, at a time when Dmowski was attempting to further the Polish cause in Paris and the United States through diplomatic means with the powers that would eventually decide the fate of Poland at the end of the First World War.

**Poland and the First World War, the Chance for Independence**

Events moved quicker on the international stage with the onset of the Great War. For the first time in over a hundred years, the ‘Polish Question’ was forced back on to the top of the international agenda of the Great Powers. This was further reinforced in January 1918 following American President Woodrow Wilson’s demand (point 13 of his ‘Fourteen Points’) for a “united independent and autonomous Poland with free,
unrestricted access to the sea … guaranteed by international covenant”. 99 This was followed by a joint declaration by the British, French and Italian governments on June 3 1918. 100 The growing influence of ‘Jewish lobbies’ in the Allied countries moved the debate between Poles and Jews more fully on to the international stage.

The war itself further heightened feelings of Polish nationalism. It exacerbated the divisions within Polish politics between those who advocated the German and Austrian cause, or those who wished to advance the Polish cause through tsarist Russia. Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, commander of the Russian army at the outbreak of the war, proclaimed on August 14, 1914 that

[t]he time will come for the resurrection of the Polish Nation and its fraternal union with all Russia … May the frontiers which have divided the Polish people be united under the sceptre of the Russian People. 101

This was not an offer of independence for Poland, far from it, yet it was more than had been offered to Poland since the partitions in the late eighteenth century. This gesture was eagerly supported by Dmowski’s Endecja and a number of leading Jewish figures in Warsaw. Significant portions of Polish opinion wished to advance the Polish cause through the Austrian war effort, which was to have primacy in the East, as the Germans were to have in the West. Austria favoured the incorporation of the Congress Kingdom into the Habsburg Empire by joining it with Galicia, and making Poland a third component part of the reorganised Habsburg state, 102 to the annoyance of many Hungarians. This prospect of a larger Polish state, even one still under Habsburg rule, was enthusiastically welcomed by the Stańczyki in Galicia. Józef Piłsudski hoped to take advantage of the outbreak of hostilities to start an anti-Russian insurrection, marching into Russian territory from Cracow on August 6-7


100 It stated that “the creation of a united and independent Polish state with free access to the sea constitutes one of the conditions of a solid and just peace and the rule of right in Europe”: quoted in Charles H. Haskins and Robert H. Lord, *Some Problems of the Peace Conference* (Cambridge, Mass., 1920), p. 171.


1914. He set up his command in the town of Kielce with 400 men on August 12.\textsuperscript{103} Before joining the Austrian sponsored ‘Polish Legions,’ he formed the only entirely Polish formation, the underground Polska Organizacja Wojskowa (Polish Fighting Organisations, hereafter, POW) under the command of Tadeusz Zieliński. The military character of the re-born Polish state was set by the prominent role played by Piłsudski in both the formation of the Legions, and in independent Poland itself. 3,294,000 Poles fought in all of the armies of the partitioning powers. The majority, 2,179,000, fought for the Central Powers,\textsuperscript{104} and of these the most truly Polish in character were Piłsudski’s Legions (and the POWs), which numbered only some 12,000 at the beginning of 1916.\textsuperscript{105} The Legions, which grew in strength to three brigades during the course of the war, each had a different character. The first, commanded by Piłdudski himself, comprised his most loyal followers. The Second Brigade, Austro-Polish and National Democrat in orientation, and to some extent hostile to Piłsudski, was led by Józef Haller and Władisław Sikorski. Finally, the Third Brigade, raised from the former Congress Kingdom after its capture by the Central Powers, was led by Bolesław Roja and Mieczysław Norwid-Neugebauer and had more of a Piłsudskite character. Some of the most prominent men of the Second Republic came out of these formations, and Piłsudski remained essentially loyal to his men, especially of the First and Third brigades, throughout his career.

Much as with the Polish population, the Jewish minority did not have a vested interest in which side won the war. They were blamed for disloyalty by all sides during the conflict. In the early days of the war, Jews were generally supportive of the Russian side. In the Congress Kingdom, the Warsaw Rabbinate published an appeal for prayers for the victory of the Russian Army. Some Jews joined the Russian Army, and many in the Jewish community genuinely believed that this attitude would help their position in the tsarist Empire. This was not necessarily an act likely to bring conflict with Polish nationalists, as the National Democrats themselves had been attempting the same end, namely a better situation for the Poles through Russian support, particularly since the idea of full Polish independence was still seemingly

\textsuperscript{103} Michael Palij, \textit{The Ukrainian-Polish Defence Alliance, 1919-1921: an Aspect of the Ukrainian Revolution} (Edmonton, 1995), p. 31.
\textsuperscript{104} The majority, 1,400,000, fought in the KuK Armee (Austro-Hungarian Army): Bronisław Prugar-Ketling, \textit{Księga Chwali piechoty} (Warsaw, 1937), p. 192.
\textsuperscript{105} They were made up of 8,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, and 3,000 artillery, with 36 guns: Palij, op. cit., p. 31.
distant in 1914. Unlike the Poles, the Jewish population had no means of raising a military force of its own, and therefore could not defend itself against other military forces. They had no interest in armed conflict, and the Bund distributed leaflets against the ‘imperialistic’ war. The patriotic feelings, however, waned in the face of the general mobilisation, and stories filtered through to Jews awaiting mobilisation of being sent in trains full of anti-Semitic Russian soldiers, further discouraging Jews from joining the Russian army. Grand Duke Nikolai Nicolaievich, a notorious anti-Semite, was quick to blame Russian military reverses on the Jewish minority. He executed over a hundred ‘Jewish spies’; and expelled over 200,000 Jews from the front-line area.

In the years preceding the First World War Jews had often been attacked by Poles for their pro-Russian tendencies. After the German occupation of Warsaw in 1915, the allegations grew that Jews had cooperated too readily with the Germans, and had been too keen to play an active part in the puppet German regime. In the light of the attitude of the Russian High Command, the Russian defeats of 1915 were widely welcomed by the Jewish population, as indicated by the numbers of Jewish volunteers fighting with the Austrians and in Piłsudski’s Legions.

The perception that Jews as a whole were opposed to the idea of an independent Poland seemed to be confirmed after the German capture of Warsaw in August 1915. The German occupying forces initially relied on the support of important members of the Jewish community. The Jews were especially prominent in their economic cooperation with the Germans, and were seen by many Poles to be entering into war-

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106 This is related in Isaac B. Singer, In My Father’s Court (New York, 1966). p. 231.
profiteering at the expense of Poland. For Dmowski, who was attempting to further the Polish national cause through Russian support, the open Jewish support for the German administration merely confirmed his pre-war argument that the Jews were the natural enemies of Poland. Dmowski enraged western European opinion by equating Yiddish-speaking Jews with German agents. It is clear, however, that Jewish support for Germany or the German occupation was by no means universal, especially outside the major urban centres. In the small shtetl of Brańsk in the Congress Kingdom, the local Rabbi, Szkop, wrote that “Germans with murderous eyes and red, overfed faces” overran the town, and caused much damage to Jewish property. The treatment of Pole and Jew alike during the German occupation was harsh, with both men and women being selected for forced labour. Food shortages led to a large expansion in the black market, and popular accusations were made that rich Jews were hoarding food supplies. In Poland, these and other unpatriotic accusations caused much bitterness towards the whole Jewish population.

These rumours undoubtedly had further adverse effects on Polish-Jewish relations. The Endecja appeared to have been proved correct by the actions of a few Jewish capitalists. Further evidence was used by the Endecja to show that the Jews were opposed to the re-establishment of Poland, as indeed some were. As early as 1914, the Kommittee für den Osten (Committee for the East) was formed among both German and Austrian Zionists, with the intention of forcing Jewish national demands on the Central Powers. This body received recognition from the Germans, who set up a Department of Jewish Affairs in the Auswärtiges Amt (German Foreign Office). By 1915 the majority of the Jewish population of Europe was under the control of the Central Powers. With Palestine still under the control of Germany’s ally, Turkey, it was natural that Jews should attempt to further their national aspirations through the Kommittee. The latter suggested that concessions and privileges should be granted to Jews in a German-controlled state (Mitteleuropakonzept) to be set up in Eastern and


Central Europe. More significantly, the committee rejected the idea of an independent Poland, as it argued that Poles would oppress the new state’s minorities. It also thought that such a development might stimulate irredentist movements in Austrian Galicia and German Poznań. When reports filtered through to the Polish press regarding these sentiments, Poles reacted angrily against Jews both Polish and foreign, even though such views were not advocated in this instance by Polish Jews. The Germans, however, rejected these proposals, not accepting that the Jews had a viable and separate national identity. The Endecja made sure, especially through the use of the Catholic and nationalist press, that large numbers of Poles would hear how the Jews were attempting to undermine the Polish nationalist cause.

The allegation that Jewish tradesmen had profiteered from the conflict circulated widely. The conspicuous, if often overstated, Jewish presence in radical and Marxist ranks aggravated Polish fears that Jews were politically unreliable. Reports of mistreatment of Jews in ‘Poland’, rather than as part of the Russian Empire, which was what it still officially was, were commonly received in the west during the War years. In Great Britain in a pamphlet published in 1915 by the Russian Jews’ Relief Fund, its author, Leon Levison, stated that

> [w]hen the Germans invaded Poland, all the Jewish houses were looted and emptied of everything valuable … while in a large number of towns unspeakable atrocities, worse even than those perpetrated at Louvain in Belgium, took place. This time the instigators of these crimes were the Germans. Jewish women and girls were outraged … When the Russians came back and drove the Germans out, the Jewish haters in Poland had a great opportunity to keep the massacres going. They informed the Russian solders that their last retreat was due to Jewish treachery, and accused the Jews of being spies in German pay … At each advance of the Germans the Poles, to

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113 One example was The Jewish Weekly (New York) which over two weekly editions (February, 19 and 26, 1915) carried the banner headline ‘The Tragedy of Israel in Poland. An Account of the Indignities and Persecutions Heaped Upon the Jew in Poland by their Polish Countrymen.’ It stated that “the liberal Polish leaders of yesterday became the most rabid, heartless Jew baters”: US National Archives (Washington, DC), 861.4016/169, p. 1.
gain their favour, told them the same old story about their last retreat being due to the Jew, and so things go on.\textsuperscript{114}

In these circumstances of extreme hardship, it was entirely understandable that the Jews of Poland would call on their co-religionists in both Europe and the United States for support. The strains of the war certainly worsened relations between Poles and Jews. The problem of Jewish refugees, deported from the war zone by the Russian Army and living homeless in Warsaw, was regarded with indifference by the Polish population, which tried to make legal moves to get the 80,000 Jewish refugees removed to Russia.\textsuperscript{115} Civic committees and mutual aid societies were set up in Poland to help relieve the major cities of the effects of famine. Jews complained of being under-represented on these councils.\textsuperscript{116} The Jewish newspaper, \textit{Opinia Żydowska (Jewish Opinion)}, reported on March 1, 1915 that

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[t]he Poles are so obsessed by the idea of a boycott that they fail to realise their actions not only hurt the Jews but above all humiliate the Poles themselves, and make them unfit for self-government in the near future. In excluding the Jews systematically from the Civic Committees, which are the first stage to Polish independence, the Poles do not understand that they will not be allowed to rule on this basis in the future.\textsuperscript{117}
\end{quote}

When, in March 1915, the Russians granted limited self-government to the remainder of the Congress Kingdom in their hands, Jewish participation in the municipal elections was restricted to 10\% for the country as a whole and 20\% in the cities with a Jewish majority. Consequently Jews gained only six of sixty seats in the Warsaw city council. Nevertheless, for the first time the basis for political action was granted to Jews in Russian Poland. Jews were also under-represented in the Civic Guard,

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{115}{Piotr Wróbel, “The First World War: The Twilight of Jewish Warsaw”, in Bartoszewski and Polonsky (eds.), \textit{op cit.}, op cit., p. 280.}
\footnotetext{116}{Poles made up 86\% of the representatives, and Jews only 14\%: Jacob Frumkin, Gregor Aronson and Alexis Goldenweiser (eds.), \textit{Russian Jewry (1860-1917)} (New York, 1966), p. 59.}
\footnotetext{117}{YIVO Institute for Jewish Research [YIVO] (New York), from a newspaper scrapbook, (no file number).}
\end{footnotes}
formed to police Warsaw in the event of a Russian withdrawal. No Jews were stationed at the headquarters, and only a few Jews were commissioners at low levels. In a memorandum to Prince Zdzislaw Lubomirski, President of the Civil Committee, representatives of the Jewish press announced that Poles believed “that the Jews were outside the law and that it was time to be rid of them, now that the Poles were the bosses”. The situation did not last. The Germans broke through the Russian lines in May 1915, eventually capturing Warsaw on August 6. There were many instances of Jews welcoming Germans, often in German. The Germans were scarcely less welcoming; General Erich Ludendorff entitled a proclamation, “To my dear Jews”. The situation of Jews did improve with the advent of German rule. Jewish schools, libraries and newspapers appeared, and the Civil Board of the Warsaw General Government formed a Jewish Department, although its only responsibilities were cultural and religious. The Germans were aware that the Jews were well disposed towards them, yet they chose largely to do little about this as they saw the Poles as their principal allies, due to the fact that many Poles fought against Russia, whereas relatively few Jews enlisted for military service.

Under the German occupation Jewish newspapers, suppressed by the Russians, began to reappear. Other signs of a revival in Jewish interest in politics became apparent in 1917 when a number of Zionist groups were set up, including the Zionist Union and the Mizrachi. These groups were opposed by the German-sponsored Aguda, a party whose support was based around the large numbers of Orthodox Jews, who opposed the radical proposals of the Zionists, Bundists and folkists. There was also a mild rapprochement between the Poles and Jews, with the withdrawal of many of the Russophile National Democrat leaders from Warsaw, leaving elements of Polish society more willing to work with the Germans towards Polish independence. These were generally referred to as ‘Activists,’ who won a majority of the seats to the Warsaw City Council, whilst they co-operated with the moderate Jewish groups to avoid reviving the antagonism between them. Prince Lubomirski, the new mayor of Warsaw, declared his intention to aid the entire population “irrespective of class or religion”.

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118 Wróbel, op cit., p. 284.
119 Ibid., p. 282.
120 Quoted in Polonky and Riff, op cit., p. 69.
With the desperate situation of the minorities gaining more publicity in the west the struggle for the post-war settlements had already started. Indeed it was well underway by the time that the Emperors of Germany and Austria published the ‘Two-Emperors Manifesto’ on November 5, 1916. This promised the formation of an ‘independent Poland’ while stating that “the exact frontiers of the Kingdom … will be outlined later”. The new ‘state’ was described by Julian Marchlewski, a Polish socialist and later leader of the Soviet-controlled Polish Provisional Revolutionary Committee during the Polish-Soviet War, as being a “joke … An ‘independent’ state with unknown frontiers, with an unknown government”. The announcement was a result of a number of factors, from pressure on German manpower resulting from the huge losses sustained at the battles of the Somme and Verdun to the serious reverses suffered by the Austrians as a result of the Brusilov Offensive. As a consequence of these factors, it was decided to try to establish a satellite state in order to draw on the manpower and resources of Poland. While many saw through the joint declaration, it undoubtedly secured a core of support in the Polish lands. Furthermore, it internationalised the Polish question, principally the issue of which of the two warring coalitions (the Central Powers or the Allies) the Poles should support in order to regain their independence. Diametrically contradictory answers to this dilemma were provided by the two principal Polish leaders, Piłsudski and Dmowski. Piłsudski still supported the Central Powers, and was appointed as the administrator of the military commission of the twenty-five man Tymczasowa Rada Stanu (Provisional Council of State or TRS), created on January 14, 1917.

The German system of government began to deteriorate in Poland through 1916 and 1917. The German occupying forces exploited Poland’s territories unscrupulously, requisitioning food and raw materials for the German army. The Germans destroyed industry. They raised new taxes to prevent competition, whilst also hoping to produce a pool of labour for use in the German Reich. The main result of this, however, was unemployment and extreme poverty among both the Polish and Jewish populations. High prices and hunger were features of life in occupied Poland. In 1916 there was

121 Stephen Horak, op. cit., p. 221.
an outbreak of typhoid in Warsaw, and Jews were forced to eat non-kosher food, which caused much bitterness.

It is undoubtedly true that the Jewish population suffered greatly at the hands of the retreating Russian army, notorious for its anti-Semitism, which was officially sanctioned to carry out acts of anti-Semitic violence by its generals as a way of apportioning blame for the Russian defeats. The Stavka (Russian military headquarters in the Polish theatre of operations) did not limit its hostility to its own Jewish soldiers, but extended it to Jewish civilians at the rear. German and Austrian appeals to Russian Jewish subjects on a basis of equal rights to an extent proved the Stavka’s point of Jewish disloyalty, although there is no evidence of the Jewish population responding to the Central Powers’ overtures.\textsuperscript{123} It is unlikely that any Polish provocation of either German or Russian soldiers was necessary to incite any violence, although there was genuine anger at the perceived disloyalty of many Jews to the Polish cause, as Jews readily co-operated with the German occupation of Poland, as indeed did many Poles, with the German-sponsored Regency Council. W. O. Górski, Director of the Polish Information Bureau in Chicago, wrote in his pamphlet entitled, ‘Poland and the Jews’, that

\begin{quote}
[f]rom the most reliable sources of information it appears that some disorder did take place in Poland, but that this disorder was only the natural outcrop of the conditions which had prevailed in Poland during the war. Since 1915 all the available wheat and most of the foodstuffs had been placed by the German invaders in the hands of the Jews, who, taking advantage of this privileged situation, sold them to the Poles at seven times their value. There is nothing unusual in this, - for the Jews are universally known as excellent business men.\textsuperscript{124}
\end{quote}

There is no reason to believe that these sentiments were not accepted by the Polish population, as indeed there was a certain amount of truth in them. In March 1916, a new administration was elected for Warsaw city council. The German electoral

\textsuperscript{123}Egmont Zechlin, \textit{Die deutsche Politik und die Juden im Ersten Weltkrieg} (Göttingen, 1969), pp. 141-143.
\textsuperscript{124}US National Archives (Washington, DC), 860c.4016/165, pp. 5-6.
system had the result of over-representing Jewish merchants in the city council elections, causing a new wave of anti-Jewish agitation. As the German system of occupation deteriorated, Polish willingness to compromise faded noticeably, yet the Jews remained to a certain extent co-operative with the German regime. This was despite the fact that the German authorities did not go far enough for the majority of Jews, with the exception of the assimilationists. A decree of 15 November 1916 referred to ‘Personen jüdischen Glaubens’ (people of Jewish faith). This implied that a Jewish nation did not exist, thereby losing the support of Zionists and nationalists, who had hoped that the declaration would go further. They aspired to arrange social services and employment as well as unemployment benefit and organise schools. At the end of 1917 there were new elections to the community boards, but because none took place in Warsaw or Łódź, Jews were only represented by about thirty deputies among the 354 members of the Provisional State Council. The situation for Jews declined, as all previous decrees regarding education were cancelled. On October 1, 1917 control of the educational system was handed over to the Poles, who wanted only one educational system, and would have forced Jewish children to learn Polish. In the government of Poland under German occupation, it can be seen that the balance gradually shifted towards the Polish majority, and away from the initially supportive Jewish minority.

Not all Jews, however, were against the idea of an independent Polish state. The prospect of the re-birth of Poland was equated with the crossing of Jordan by some Jews, a few of whom readily volunteered to fight in Pilsudski’s Legions to further the cause of Polish independence.125 It is accepted that the numbers of Jewish volunteers were far fewer than the proportion of the Jews in the population of Poland, as had also been the case in the Russian and German armies, although not in the KuK Armeec (the Austro-Hungarian army).

The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in October 1917 completely changed the international situation on the Eastern Front. By the winter of 1918 detailed

125 A particularly high proportion of Jewish intellectuals served with distinction in the Legions. One Jewish former officer, awarded the Virtuti Militari Cross for bravery, commented that he had to “be doubly courageous” on account of his Jewish background. See Marian Fuks, “Żydzi w zaraniu niepodległości Polski”, Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego w Polsce, Volume 2 (1989), pp. 35-44; Aleksander Hertz, The Jews in Polish Culture (Evanston, Ill., 1988), p. 129.
information was reaching Poland about Bolshevik Russia. Jews in Soviet Russia had been recognised as a separate nation with equal rights, and this made a number of Polish Jews support the idea that Poland should become part of the Soviet Union. The reality for most Jews was that they neither understood nor realised the consequences of the Bolshevik Revolution. But that some Jews were openly advocating Poland becoming part of Soviet Russia caused much alarm among Polish nationalists. In the closing months of the First World War, independence appeared to be a possibility for the first time in 126 years, and that some Jews, however few, would advocate a return to foreign rule was bitterly resented by many Poles.

The collapse of the Russian war effort, and the eventual Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918 heightened the Polish question, with the Western powers now bidding among themselves to claim support for a free Poland.\(^{126}\) Lloyd George stated on January 5 1918, only five days before the declaration of Wilson’s famous Thirteenth Point, that “an independent Poland … is an urgent necessity for the stability of Western Europe”.\(^{127}\) The Allied statements were obviously a response to the events taking place as a result of the October revolution in Russia, the subsequent Bolshevik Decree on Peace passed on October 26 1917, and the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia of November 15. The Decree on Peace urged a general peace without annexations and indemnities. More relevantly to the Polish question it granted all the former nationalities of Russia the right to self-determination. However, the reality of Bolshevik policy showed itself at the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk in late 1917. It was clear that Trotsky, leading the Russian delegation, was not going to preside over the break-up of the former tsarist Empire. The Bolsheviks forcibly dissolved a Belorussian congress in Minsk in December of 1917. When the Rada (Central Council) in the Ukraine announced a republic in November 1917, followed by a declaration of full independence on January 22, 1918, the newly formed Red Army invaded the Ukraine. The Bolshevik position was weak, and the peace


\(^{127}\) Lloyd George, speaking at Caxton Hall, on January 5 1918: in Wandycz, op cit., p. 361. Wilson’s Thirteenth of his Fourteen Points stated that “An Independent Polish State … [should have] political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant”: Stephen Horak, op cit., p. 222.
eventually forced upon them decimated the Bolsheviks’ control over the western lands of the old Russian Empire.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had a further effect on Polish relations with the Central Powers. Concessions towards the new Ukrainian state were made, to some extent at the expense of Polish ambitions in Eastern Galicia (Map 1.2). Under the Treaty the Polish state of the Regency Council was arguably merely a rump, which was seen as solely existing to provide the Central Powers with men and resources. This was to some extent true. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and the reality of the Ostimperium (New Order) of the German victory in the East, lost any residual support that the Poles had for gaining any meaningful independence from the Central Powers. The Treaty had undermined the Two Emperors’ Manifesto. Co-operation with the Austrian government dating back to the October Diploma of 1860 now ended. The Polish Circle in Vienna joined the opposition for the first time. Furthermore, the Polish Auxiliary Corps under General Józef Haller, incensed at the Central Powers’ support for the Ukrainians at the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, marched through the Austrian lines into the Ukraine on the night of February 15-16, 1917. The Corps eventually arrived in France, but too late to see much fighting.

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128 The Regency Council was made up of the Archbishop of Warsaw, Karowski, and the conservatives, Prince Zdadislaw Lubomirski and Józef Ostrowski.
For the Jewish population of Eastern Europe, the reality of the German Ostimperium was overall positive, especially when compared to the bitter experience of Russian military rule. The German army pursued a rigorous ‘no-pogrom’ policy, and was the only army in the East to do so during the First World War, along with the Bolsheviks in the period immediately after. Jews, who suffered equally under Russian rule and the anarchic conditions of war, were one group who benefited from German rule in the East, not in strict political terms, as their aims were to some extent frustrated, but in terms of security. This was not the case for the Poles, whose bid for independence, always their primary aim, was being suffocated by German rule.

Poland and the Western Powers

For refusing to swear an oath of allegiance to the German Command, Piłsudski was arrested and imprisoned in Magdeburg Fortress with General Kazimierz Soskowki

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130 For German policy see Fischer, op. cit., pp. 456-460, 523-533; Zechlin, op. cit., pp. 224-237.
on July 22, 1917. The result was both to increase his prestige in Poland and in the West, but it also had the effect of leaving the political leadership of the Polish cause almost entirely in the hands of Roman Dmowski’s *Komitet Narodowy Polski* (Polish National Committee, hereafter KNP) formed in Lausanne on August 5, 1917. Significantly there was no Jewish representation on the committee. Polish efforts to regain independence shifted towards recognition through the Western Powers. Dmowski lost all hope of support from Russia as early as the great Russian defeats of 1915. As the former leader of the *Kolo* in the *Duma*, Dmowski was a substantial political figure, but was initially not welcomed in France due to its still close relations with Russia. Therefore, in the autumn of 1915 Dmowski arrived in London. With little prospect that the United States would intervene in the war, and French reluctance to support the cause of Polish independence, Britain became the centre of Polish aspirations for independence. Dmowski commented in his March 1917 “Memorandum on the Territories of the Polish State” to the British Foreign Office that “With the progress of the war, the chances of a Russian solution to the Polish question gradually disappeared. The chief reason was not the occupation of Poland by the German and Austrian armies. It lay in Russian policy itself”. Until the last months of 1917, the western allies had been reluctant to raise either the Polish or the Jewish question with their Russian partner, for fear of irritating the Russian government.

After 1917, Dmowski had gained recognition as the legitimate Polish spokesman in France and to a lesser extent in the United States, although his reputation had become somewhat tarnished in Great Britain. Dmowski craved western recognition for a

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131 In France the body was called *Comité National Polonais*.
132 Dmowski was not the only Pole who was unsuccessful in courting French favour. Piłsudski sent Stanisław Patek to explain the actions of the Polish legions to the Quai d’Orsay. The Quai d’Orsay (the French Ministry of External Affairs) commented that they had no interest in Russia’s “internal affairs”. Like Dmowski, Patek sought to further the Polish cause in London: Michał Sokolnicki, *Rok czternasty* (London, 1961), pp. 26-28; Stanisław Patek, *Wspomnienia ważkich okresów pracy* (Warsaw, 1938), pp. 8-12.
134 For an account of Dmowski’s relations with the British Government, see Paul Latawski, “Roman Dmowski, the Polish Question, and Western Opinion, 1915-1918: The Case of Britain”, in Paul Latawski (ed.), *The Reconstruction of Poland, 1914-23* (New York, 1992), pp. 1-12.
136 Woodrow Wilson, the American President between 1912 and 1920, casually commented of him that “I am told that M. Dmowski is violently anti-Semitic”: Arthur S. Link (ed.), *The Deliberations of the Council of Four* (March 24-June 28, 1919) Notes of the Official Interpreter Paul Mantoux. Volume II:
reconstructed Polish state. Poland was somewhat of a *terra incognita* in western eyes and the Allied powers were being constantly bombarded by memorandums and expositions regarding the future of the lands of the Central Powers. The major problem for the Western Powers was that they did not have any legations in Central Europe to report and inform their decision-makers in the Foreign Ministries. In these circumstances it was decided to fill the void with ‘experts,’ usually academics. In Britain, the Ministry of Information, essentially a propaganda department, formed an Intelligence Bureau, including experts such as the pre-eminent British specialists on Eastern Europe, R. W. Seton-Watson and Lewis Namier, who both worked in the Central Europe section. Namier, born Ludwick Bernsztajn vel Niemirowski, in 1888 in Wola Okrzejska in the Congress Kingdom to Polonised Jewish parents, would become a key figure in the reconstruction of the Polish state, as the leading British expert on Polish affairs. His family moved to an estate in Galicia. Namier was much influenced by the local Ukrainian peasantry, and conversely was horrified by his experiences when he enrolled as a law student at the Polish University of Lwów, where he was “confronted by a closely-knit anti-Semitic gang of fierce young Dmowski-ites”. Namier transferred to Lausanne University, then to the University of Oxford, where he gained a first class degree in Modern History at Balliol, eventually gaining British citizenship in 1913. At the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, he joined the Royal Fusiliers, where his active service was hampered by his shortsightedness. Positions in British political intelligence followed, and it was to Namier that Roman Dmowski’s memorandum of March 1917, the *Problems of Central and Eastern Europe*, was sent for comment by the British Foreign Secretary, Arthur J. Balfour’s, Private Secretary, Sir Eric Drummond. Dmowski claimed large portions

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137 One of the principal results of their work was the newspaper, the *New Europe*, which in its first issue called for “rights for minorities”, *New Europe*, Number 1, October 19, 1916. See Hugh Seton-Watson and Christopher Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe. R. W. Seton-Watson and the Last Years of Austria-Hungary* (London, 1981).


of the Eastern borderlands between Poland and Russia for the new Polish state. Dmowski commented that

as the German solution of the Polish problem is, from the Allies’ point of view, inadmissible … there remains only the establishment of an Independent Polish State … the following conditions are necessary:-

1. It must be sufficiently large and strong.
2. It must have conditions for its economic independence of Germany …
3. It must be a sovereign state with its own foreign policy, so as to be able to work for the organisation of the Central European nationalities and for their emancipation from German influence.140

Namier’s considered response to Dmowski, contained in his “Remarks on: The Problems of Central and Eastern Europe”, September 1917, was openly critical stating that Dmowski’s ambitions would lead to “conflict between the dominant and submerged nationalities”.141 He openly condemned his evidence for claims for territory; “for his reflections on Austria, he is mainly indebted to memory, for his facts about the Russian borderlands, to the toil of his imagination”.142 Namier also pointed out that when it suited him, Dmowski claimed Jews as Polish citizens, while previously stating in his memorandum that “Jews … do not form part of the Polish Nation”, and also encouraging emigration as a solution to the Jewish question.143 Dmowski complained to his friend Bernard Pares, the British historian, that “he was not being fairly treated by Mr. Namier of our Foreign Office”. In turn Namier suggested that Dmowski was “deserting the cause of the allies” on a visit to

140 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
143 Dmowski, Problems, p. 78; “[Dmowski] produces the Austrian official statistics which put the number of Poles in Austria at 4,967,984. He does not think it necessary to caution the British reader that some 900,000 Jews are included in that figure”: TNA (London), FO 371/3281/194676.
Switzerland. The disagreements led to open hostility between the two men, and their supporters.

Neither Namier nor Dmowski was regarded as a reliable source by Balfour, who commented that “what he [Namier] writes is coloured by this dislike [of Dmowski]”. As a result of this, it was Namier’s own memorandum that was sent to an independent expert, one of Namier’s former examiners at Oxford, Professor Charles W. Oman, for comment. Oman remarked of Namier that “he is quite sincere, but was very self-centred and disputatious”, adding that “in my opinion Mr. Namier’s criticism of the “The Problems of Central Europe” is written in a spirit of exaggerated hostility, making the worst of the Polish cause whenever it is possible to do so”.

On Oman’s criticisms Drummond noted, “Merely keep. No action required”. The eventual winner between the two men for influence was Namier, who was, if not promoted, then moved sideways to a similar job in the newly formed Political Intelligence Department (PID), commonly known as the “Ministry of All the Talents”, in the Foreign Office, when it was formed in April 1918. As such Namier now spoke with greater authority as a member of the British Foreign Office, rather than merely part of the British government’s Ministry of Information, with greater access to confidential information. Dmowski, however, found himself ostracised by the essentially liberal-minded Foreign Office, and Balfour still favoured a future

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144 Pares later broke off his previously “very close” relations with Dmowski as a direct result of conversations with Namier regarding the Pole’s claims for “the western provinces of Russia”: Bernard Pares, *My Russian Memoirs* (London, 1931), p. 481.
146 Balfour’s comment on the Namier report, TNA (London), FO 371/3016/194876.
147 Oman to Drummond, “Re. Namier’s Criticisms on Dmowski”, September 26, 1917: TNA (London), FO 371/3016/194876.
148 Drummond’s note on the folder containing the two reports, October 10, 1917: ibid.
150 The PID staff included under Sir William Tyrrell; Arnold Toynbee, Alfred Zimmerman, Rex and Arnold Leeper, Edwyn Bevan and George Saunders. Those who had written propaganda pieces for the *New Europe*, including Namier, continued to do so under pseudonyms. Earlier in the war Toynbee had written on Polish affairs: Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Destruction of Poland: A Study in German Efficiency* (London, n. d. [1916]). For the formation of the PID see Seton-Watson and Seton-Watson, op. cit., pp. 252-254.
151 Lord Robert Cecil, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, particularly disliked Dmowski. He commented that “it is much more important not to quarrel with the Jews than with the Dmowski Poles”: TNA (London), FO 371/3280/47304, quoted in Łatawski, “Roman Dmowski”, p. 5.
Polish state as “an autonomous part of the Russian Empire”. Dmowski was forced to seek further opportunities in the United States, leaving for New York in July 1917.

The National Democrat leader had further irritated the British establishment with his anti-Semitic comments. G. K. Chesterton, the British writer, reminisced that Dmowski had been brought to his house by Dr. Charles Sarolea. The latter taunted Dmowski about his anti-Semitism, stating that “After all, your religion came from the Jews”, to which Dmowski replied, “My religion came from Jesus Christ, who was murdered by the Jews”. The Pole also criticised the Jewish contribution to the Allied war effort, commenting that “after arriving in London I was shocked by the large number of Jewish Officers in uniform. On my later tours of the English front line, I never encountered but one. This does not mean they were not there, I even heard some received decorations”. The Anglo-Jewish establishment was still under the leadership of the assimilationist Anglo-Jewish Association despite the ground being made by the Zionist movement. A mediating influence was the official representative body of Jews in the British Empire, the Board of Deputies of British Jews (BDBJ). It mobilised itself against the KNP. Lord Swaythling (Edwin Samuel Montagu), a prominent member of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, and the British Secretary of State for India, commented after an interview with Count Władysław Sobański, the National Democrat affiliated leader of the KNP’s sister organisation in Britain, the Polish National Committee (PNC), that “the Polish

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153 The Belgian Consul, and later academic at the University of Edinburgh, author of Letters on Polish Affairs (Edinburgh, 1922).
155 Dmowski further commented that this was the case in “all armies”: Dmowski, Polityka Polski, Volume I, p. 233
156 The leading Zionist organisation in Britain was the English Zionist Federation, founded in 1896, and from 1917 under the presidency of Dr. Chaim Weizmann. As with the Zionist leadership in the United States, the majority of the leading British Zionists were recent immigrants from the former tsarist Empire, in contrast to the background of many prominent members of the British Jewish establishment who dominated the Anglo-Jewish Association (AJA), founded in 1871. From 1916 the president of the AJA was Claude Montefiore. Other leading members of the AJA included Lord Rothschild, Lord Swaythling and Edwin Montagu.
157 The BDBJ, founded in 1760, attempted to remain an apolitical organisation. Between 1903 and 1917 David Lindo Alexander (of the AJA) was president, replaced by the former Liberal MP, Sir Stuart Samuel after Alexander’s resignation in June 1917.
158 The PNC was recognised in October 1917 by the British Government, under the presidency of Sobański, and subsidised to the sum of £40,000 a year by the Foreign Office.
[National] Committee was anti-Semitic and not in favour of giving full equality to the Jews of Poland”, despite Sobański’s assertion that “having themselves been the victims of oppression they were most anxious not to be guilty of oppressing others”. The KNP declared in August 1918 that “in the future Poland all Polish citizens without distinction of origin and religion will be equal before the law”. The Board was not satisfied with the KNP’s declaration. Citing Polish anti-Semitism, “the long, sad story of proscriptions and pogroms, of boycotts, of oblavs and deportations”, a minute of a Board meeting observed that as all Polish citizens are already equal before the law, and it is not on that point that the Jews require to be reassured. What they want to know is what will be the legal qualification for citizenship in the New Poland, and, if these are technically satisfactory, what securities will be afforded by the law, even under a regime of Equal Rights, against anti-Semitic oppression of the Jewish minority.

Due to the rise of a “powerful Jewish national movement”, it went on to note that the traditional solution of assimilation, the one sought by the Anglo-Jewish community, was unworkable in the Polish lands. The attitude of the PNC towards the ‘Jewish question’ significantly affected the Anglo-Jewish attitude towards both the prospective new Polish state, and also the majority of Poles who represented their cause. It led the Board to conclude that only through the following four guarantees would the Jewish Question be solved:

1. That all native Jews of Poland and resident Russian Jews who do not desire to retain their Russian nationality shall be recognised as Polish citizens on a footing of perfect equality with their fellow citizens of other races and creeds.
2. That the linguistic restrictions of the Act of 1868 shall be repealed.

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159 Note of interview between Lord Swaythling and Count Sobański, July 25, 1918: contained in TNA (London), FO 371/3280.
160 Ibid.
161 Kojicki to Swaything, August 16, 1918: TNA (London), FO 371/3280.
162 Russian: street or house raid.
163 Lucien Wolf, “The Polish Jewish Question”: BDBJ (London), ACC/3121/C10/2/1/1; copy also in TNA (London), FO 371/3280.
164 Ibid.
3. That the Jews shall be secured in the autonomous management of their own religious, educational, charitable and other cultural Institutions.

4. That where they live in considerable masses Sunday labour and trading shall be permitted to those Jews who observe the Jewish Sabbath.\textsuperscript{165}

The Board of Deputies, through Lucien Wolf, complained about the attitude of Dmowski, and the KNP, which was largely upheld by the Foreign Office.

In order to sound out the Poles on the question of these demands, the Board of Deputies looked to a more moderate branch of the Polish independence movement. Roman Dmowski was not the first Polish political figure to attempt to improve Polish prospects for independence through the Western powers. August Zaleski, a supporter of Piłsudski, arrived in London from Warsaw via Petrograd in March 1915 at Piłsudski’s request to represent his interests in the West. Zaleski was a good choice for Piłsudski, on account of the former’s established contacts in Britain, which he had made during his time as a student at the London School of Economics. Like Namier, he was called upon to advise the Foreign Office on Polish affairs, and became the elected president of the Polish Information Committee (PIC),\textsuperscript{166} at that time, the most important Polish émigré organisation in Britain. His influence and reputation, however, were both undermined and slandered by Dmowski, who early in 1916 handed a list of ‘dangerous persons’ to the CID at Scotland Yard, with Zaleski heading the list. This information was not questioned as closely as it should have been, due to Piłsudski fighting for the Central Powers.\textsuperscript{167} The PIC was replaced by the Dmowski-supporting Opieka Polska (Polish Exiles’ Protection) as the vehicle for issuing nationality certificates for Poles in Britain. The intrigues between the numerous Polish émigré groups only further underlined the Foreign Office’s need for detailed, impartial, information.\textsuperscript{168} Zaleski held talks with the leading figures in the British Jewish community of the Joint Foreign Committee of the Board of Deputies of

\textsuperscript{165} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{166} The PIC was originally formed in September 1914 under the presidency of K. Proszyński, and reorganised under Zaleski’s Presidency in 1915.


\textsuperscript{168} Namier described how the PNC had issued forth a “poisonous flow of nonsense”: TNA (London), FO 3281/116413; also quoted in Davies, “The Poles in Great Britain”, p. 80.
British Jews, such as Lucien Wolf. He sounded out Zaleski as to what the Polish reaction would be to the Jewish demands on the new Polish state, as outlined in their memorandum, “The Polish Jewish Question”. Zaleski showed himself to be very much untypical of the majority of Polish groups in the west by stating that with regard to Jewish National Autonomy he “professed himself favourable, subject to the reservation … that the autonomy should be strictly cultural”, and further that “nor would there be any objection be [sic] raised to the acquisition of powers of self-taxation for the maintenance of communal institutions”. While it was still unclear as to which faction would dominate the reconstructed Polish state, the final outcome would to a large extent determine not just the relationship between the Jewish minority and the Polish Government, but the reaction of the international community as well. Zaleski was discredited by Dmowski’s attack on him, which ensured that it would be the latter’s KNP that represented Polish interests. The moderate branch of Polish nationalism was marginalised in the West, and concern grew among western Jewish leaders about the direction that the new Polish state was heading with regard to its Jewish minority.

A Zionist Victory

Jewish hopes had also been raised by seemingly unrelated events in the Middle East, with British forces advancing towards Palestine in the crumbling Ottoman Empire. The Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917 signalled a shift in the direction of official British policy towards Zionism, declaring its support for the “establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people”. British support was not entirely free of the taint of political expediency. Through the Declaration it was hoped that American Jewish support could be more fully mobilised and encouraged. In Poland, Dmowski had appeared to have been proved correct in his assumptions that

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170 “Note of Negotiations with M. August Zaleski”, in ibid.
171 Lloyd George supported his Foreign Secretary, as did the first British Jew to become a member of the Cabinet, the Home Secretary, Sir Herbert Samuel (who was later to become the first British High Commissioner to Palestine in 1920), and a British chemist, Dr Chaim Weizmann. For their accounts see Herbert L. Samuel, Memoirs (London, 1945), pp. 145-148, and Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error (London, 1950), pp. 192-196.
Jews had a dual loyalty, both to their state and their religion, and now prospectively another state altogether. While in the west Jewish leaders had a mixed reaction to the Balfour Declaration,\textsuperscript{173} in Eastern Europe, with the prospect of Jews being recognised as a national minority, the effect was enormous. Furthermore, there was a shift in the leadership in the Zionist movement, whereby the ‘Berlin period’ came to an end. After Weizmann and Nuhum Sokolow, a prominent Russian Zionist, moved the leadership of the Zionist Organisation to London, Zionist efforts shifted towards lobbying the Entente powers, principally the issuer of the Balfour Declaration, Great Britain.

Even before the Polish state came into existence, the World Zionist Conference met in Copenhagen. On October 25, 1918, it issued the ‘Copenhagen Manifesto,’ largely written by Leo Motzkin, the Ukrainian-born Zionist leader. In addition to a Jewish national home in “Eretz Israel” (the land of Israel), the manifesto demanded that in the “Galuth lands” (the lands of the Diaspora) the Jewish populations should be granted full equality in rights, including “national autonomy, cultural, social and political, for the Jewish population of countries largely settled by Jews, as well as of all other countries whose Jewish population demands it”, as well as “admission of the Jewish people to the League of Free Nations”.\textsuperscript{174} The Manifesto further demanded that the local National Councils and Zionist Organisations should lobby their respective governments to try and ensure that the demands were to be encompassed in the forthcoming Peace Treaty.

More specifically, the conference demanded that Jews be given national autonomy within the new Polish State. The ‘Copenhagen Manifesto’ was ratified by the Provisional Jewish National Council of Poland, yet support among British and French Jews, outside of the Zionist Organisations, was not forthcoming. They opposed this view, arguing that Jews in the East were merely a religious minority, just as they saw themselves in their more assimilated Western communities. Eastern European Jewry was seen by them to be loyal nationals of the countries in which they resided, just as

\textsuperscript{173} Officially the Board of British Jews remained neutral, yet one of their most important figures, Lucien Wolf, was reserved. See Mark Levene, \textit{War, Jews and the New Europe. The Diplomacy of Lucien Wolf, 1914-1919} (Oxford, 1992), pp. 152-158.

\textsuperscript{174} Full text of the Manifesto: \textit{Bulletins of the Copenhagen Office of the Zionist Organisation}, no. 78, October 25, 1918.
the largely assimilated populations of Britain and France were. For Polish nationalist leaders, these debates among Jewish delegates from Poland and the West appeared to exclude the interests of the majority, the Poles. The internationalist organisations appeared sinister to the Poles, who did not accept that Jews should be a national minority, but merely a religious one, and therefore did not understand why foreign Jews took such an interest in internal Polish questions. These foreign organisations that sought influence over the future of the Polish lands caused much mistrust in the eyes of many Poles, and not just among the political leadership, such as Dmowski, who used this issue as a political weapon. Jews, already seen as outsiders by Poles, were now more identified as an enemy within, working openly against the Polish national interest.

France recognised the KNP in September 1917, not as a government in waiting, but merely as an intermediary between the French Government and the Polish forces gathering on French soil that required political supervision. France was desperate to foster support from any and all national groups, of whom the Poles seemed the most keen. Perhaps Dmowski’s greatest achievement was on June 3, 1918, when the Polish National Committee was recognised as an ‘allied belligerent nation,’ vitally ensuring that Poland would be accepted around the table at the forthcoming peace conference on the side of the victors. In addition to political recognition, the Polish National Committee could claim to have formed by the last months of 1918 with the active support of the French, a Polish army in France, under General Haller, numbering 45,000 men in four divisions, with two more still in the process of formation.\footnote{These forces were widely distributed: 300 in Northern Russia; 700 in the Kuban area; 8,000 in Siberia; 17,000 in France and Italy; and 20,000 in the United States: Wiktor Sukienicki, \textit{East Central Europe During World War I: From Foreign Domination to National Independence} (Boulder, Colo., 1984), Volume II, p. 883.} More ominously the formations were closed to Jews.\footnote{Kay Lundgreen-Nielsen, \textit{The Polish Problem at the Paris Peace Conference. A Study of the Policies of the Great Powers and the Poles, 1918-1919} (Odense, 1979), p. 125.}
The Key – the United States

It became clear to the Polish nationalist leaders that the key to any future settlement of the Polish question would depend on the backing of the United States. The great Polish pianist Ignacy Jan Paderewski played concerts to help raise funds and awareness for the Polish cause throughout North America between 1916 and 1918, culminating in a piano recital for President Woodrow Wilson at the White House. Following his difficulties in France and Great Britain Roman Dmowski joined Paderewski to help promote the Polish cause in the United States. On September 18 1918, Paderewski and Dmowski were invited by the President to outline what they considered to be the extent of the territories of a reconstructed Polish state. According to Wilson Dmowski “presented me with a map in which they claimed a large part of the earth”. American support was not forthcoming. Both Paderewski and Dmowski were certain that it was the negative influence of prominent American Jews that was harming the Polish cause in the United States. Paderewski had a number of dealings with the prominent Jewish leaders of the American Jewish Committee (AJC), in which he attempted to promote better relations between the two groups, by arguing that relations would improve if Jews dropped their “hitherto extremely hostile attitude” towards Poland, and also their own territorial ambitions. There was pressure from American supporters of Dmowski such as Samuel N. Harper, a specialist on Russian affairs, who urged the Poles to compromise on the Jewish question:


181 For accounts of the meetings, see Witold Stankiewicz and Andrzej Piber (eds.), Archiwum Polityczne Ignacego Paderewskiego (Ossolineum, 1973), Volume I: (1890-1918), pp. 334-339.
knowing him well, I urged him on the need of meeting the situation which he would face in America, where Jewish organisations and their leaders were demanding that any American support for Polish aspirations for independence should be conditional on definite guarantees that the Jewish minority in any future Poland would be fully protected in all rights. Dmowski refused to compromise on a matter on which he had always taken such a definite stand.  

Efforts to foster better relations were made on both sides. The President of the AJC, Louis Marshall, requested a meeting with Dmowski on October 6. A further invitation was extended to both Dmowski and Paderewski to attend a dinner hosted by the committee on October 14. In his meeting with Marshall, Dmowski commented that the economic boycott, still in force some six years after its imposition, had prevented any acts of anti-Jewish violence in Poland. Marshall replied that

[...] pogrom is a thousand times less objectionable than the boycott which you have invented. A pogrom is an act of brutality, it is sporadic, it is an outburst of passion, which dies down almost as rapidly as it comes into being … such a boycott as you have created … is a manifestation of hatred which grows by what it feeds upon … the poison works night and day.

Dmowski refused to end the boycott unless there was an unconditional declaration of support for the Polish cause by the AJC, which was not forthcoming until the boycott itself was put to an end by the Polish leader. The differences proved insurmountable and no compromise was achieved. In an attempt to calm the increasingly concerned members of the AJC, Paderewski tried to persuade the KNP to issue a declaration in favour of Jewish equality and civil rights. In this he was outmanoeuvred by the KNP, under advice from Dmowski, who significantly re-drafted his document, altering it to

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such a degree that it could be taken instead as a criticism of Jewish demands for the post-war settlement.\textsuperscript{186} While the disagreements between Dmowski and Paderewski did not come out into the open, the former’s attitude towards the Jewish question had exasperated Paderewski to such an extent that by October 1918 he demanded that Dmowski leave America before he did any more damage to the Polish cause, but the harm had already been done.\textsuperscript{187} Jewish leaders in the United States, both assimilationist and Zionist, resolved on an anti-Polish policy wishing to end the “policy of extermination” being undertaken in Poland.\textsuperscript{188} In a letter sent to the State Department both Marshall and Judge Julian W. Mack, the President of the American Zionist Organization, commented that

Mr. Dmowski … admits his responsibility for the creation and continuance of this [economic] boycott. His committee has been recognised by our government. Would it not therefore be in order to take such steps as will require him and his organization to put an end to this intolerable condition which they themselves have created? … it is inconceivable that such a State should be organized under the auspices of those who have wilfully and deliberately sought to destroy four million Jews who would be inhabitants of the enlarged Poland.\textsuperscript{189}

Attempts at a compromise between the Polish nationalist and American Jewish leaders had come to nothing. As Polish independence approached, Jews in the West closely studied events in Poland as a guide to how their co-religionists would live in

\textsuperscript{186} See Stankiewicz and Piber (eds.), op. cit., pp. 478-488.
\textsuperscript{187} Paderewski commented that “unfortunately Dmowski does not understand the gravity of the situation … his attitude, although dignified and very patriotic, has done great harm to our cause … I cannot imagine why he wants to stay here provoking further animosity”: Paderewski to Smulski, n. d. [October 1918]; ibid., p. 492.
\textsuperscript{188} Marshall was describing the economic boycott. He observed that “the mere statement of the facts discloses an intolerable condition and bodes unspeakable evil unless immediate remedial action is taken by those who are seeking the recognition of an independent Polish State, to end this policy of extermination for which many of them are avowedly responsible”: Marshall to Wilson, November 7, 1918: Arthur S. Link (ed.), \textit{The Papers of Woodrow Wilson} [hereafter, PWW]. Volume 51: September 14-November 8, 1918 (Princeton, N.J., 1985), p. 625.
\textsuperscript{189} Marshall and Mack to William Phillips, November 11, 1918. The letter was forwarded to Paderewski by William Phillips, the United States Assistant Secretary of State, who asked for a “few words of enlightenment” from the Polish pianist: Phillips to Paderewski, November 16, 1918. Paderewski in reply commented that “it is my privilege to know personally both gentlemen who have brought the charges against Poland. They have impressed me as honourable and good men. Unfortunately, their informations are bad and their charges are wrong”: Paderewski to Phillips, November 20, 1918; ibid., pp. 541-542, 545-547.
the new state. They were not impressed with the reports calling for help from the various Jewish organisations in Europe.

**Poland Re-Born, September-November 1918**

Events in Poland moved quickly through the summer and autumn of 1918, with the disintegration of German and Austrian rule. In September the Regents in Warsaw dismissed the cabinet, which was seen to be too tainted with those who had too readily supported the German regime. On October 16 Emperor Charles, the Austrian Emperor, issued a manifesto which sought to save the Habsburg monarchy by transforming it into a federation, which failed to gain support with the many nationalities of the Empire who could now see the prospect of full independence. The collapse of the German military effort and the outbreak of the German Revolution effectively spurred the different Polish nationalist movements to take action. By late October 1918 various declarations of independence had been made in Warsaw, Poznań, and finally on November 7 1918 in Lublin where the Polish People’s Republic was proclaimed under Ignacy Daszyński. The Lublin “Manifesto of the Provisional People’s Government of the Polish Republic” contained “full equality of political and civil rights for all citizens irrespective of origin, faith and nationality”. The manifesto did not recognise the Jews as a nationality themselves, which led to criticism from some Polish Zionists, which merely confirmed the many divisions within the Jewish community of the new Polish lands in 1918.190

The Regency Council was abolished, with a republic declared in its place. The Polish right saw the Lublin Manifesto as a quasi-Communist statement. The danger of civil war was averted with the return of Piłsudski from Magdeburg. The Regents greeted him as someone who could not only unite the country, but also avert a social revolution. The POW and the Left hailed him as their hero, and even the National Democrats did not openly oppose him. His record in the war, as a figure who had fought all three of the partitioning powers in an attempt to gain Polish independence, seemed impeccable, and the Regents handed over to him control of the army on November 11. Three days later the Regency Council also transferred all civilian

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190 Kridl, Wittlin and Malinowski (eds.), op. cit., p. 142.
power to the general and dissolved itself. The other leaders in Warsaw, Cracow and Lublin recognised his authority, with the Lublin government dissolving itself in the process.

Poland was reborn out of the carnage of the Great War on November 11 1918, ending 123 years of foreign rule. Its emergence was sudden, leading to the expression among many Poles that ‘Yak Polska wiebuchala’ (My, how Poland has erupted). On November 20 1918, Jędrzej Moraczewski, a member of the Galician Polish Social Democratic Party, was selected as the first Polish Prime Minister. The choice represented a compromise between the socialist Daszyński and a candidate from the right wing of Polish politics. He issued a proclamation to the Polish nation that

[b]efore the Sejm passed projects for social reform, in accord with the spirit of the time ... we introduce immediately the complete equality of rights of all citizens without regard to race or creed.¹⁹¹

It appeared, therefore, that the situation of Poland’s Jews had immediately improved, with the collapse of the repressive and hostile tsarist Empire and the creation of a new democratic state that appeared willing to grant full and equal rights to all its citizens. Poland’s new leader, Józef Piłsudski, was an arch-opponent of both Dmowski and the Endeks. As a consequence the National Democrats were not as powerful as Jews feared. The Endeks never gained power in Poland. They may have had a strong influence up to 1926, but their opponents, either socialist or conservative, still could not all be described as anti-Semitic. It would be unfair to describe all Poles as anti-Semitic, as some Jews attempted to do. At this time there were many opponents of anti-Semitism in Poland, from the liberals to some members of the intelligentsia, and most of the left-wing political parties. The largest political grouping, the Peasant Party, was not itself anti-Semitic in its outlook, although Wincenty Witos and many of its deputies themselves were.

There were also acts of violence against the Jewish population, principally in Galicia, between the collapse of Austrian rule and the formal establishment of the Polish

state. In the town of Chryzanów, near Cracow, a pogrom occurred between November 5-6, perpetrated by “virtually every class in the Polish population”. The violence resulted in the death of two Jews and twenty-eight injured. Thus, the very moment of the re-birth of the Polish state was accompanied by unprovoked aggression against its Jewish population.

The idea that an independent Poland was ‘better for the Jews’ was not immediately apparent on a practical level for many Jews in the last months of 1918. The consequences of the war cast long shadows over the entire course of the Second Polish Republic in a variety of spheres, none more so than in Polish-Jewish relations. The Jewish contribution, or lack of it, to the formation of the new Polish State was often held up against the Jewish community in interwar Poland. Many Jews argued that as the re-establishment of Poland had little to do with the Poles, and more to do with the collapse of the three partitioning powers, the Jewish contribution or lack of it was irrelevant in any case. The new and insecure nation struggled to assert itself against two very powerful and aggrieved neighbours, Russia and Germany, which had both lost prestige and territory to the new Polish State. Poles, and not just extreme nationalists, desired to build as strong a state as was possible. Józef Piłsudski, the new Head of State, was the chief supporter of a Federalist policy, as he argued that Poland would probably have to stand alone against both threats. The actions of the Jews during and in the immediate aftermath of the First World War gave rise to suspicions about their loyalty to the Polish state. Jews were seen to be pro-German, pro-Bolshevik, or Zionist, indeed everything but pro-Polish.

192 The memorial volume for the Jewish community in Chrzanów commented that it “had the ‘honour’ of being the site of the first pogrom anywhere in liberated Poland”: Mordecai Bochner (ed.), Seyfer Khzshanow: lebn un umkum fun a Yidish shtetl (Regensburg, 1949), p. 10.

193 The town’s population was some 14,000, of which 45% (6,328) were Jewish in 1921: Encyclopedia Judaica, Volume 5, col. 534. A detachment of ten members of the Jewish self-defence organisation in Cracow were dispatched to Chrzanów to help reassure the Jewish population, but were disarmed by the local Polish authorities “on false charges”: Bochner (ed.), op. cit., p. 10.

194 Norman Davies commented that whereas later incidents (such as at Lwów and Pińsk) could not be described as a ‘pogrom,’ the events in Chrzanów undisputedly were. Davies defined a pogrom as “the deliberate lynching of Jewish civilians”: Norman Davies, “Great Britain and the Polish Jews, 1918-1920”, Journal of Contemporary History, Volume 8 (1973), Part 2, p. 140.


Chapter II

A Difficult Birth: The Situation in Poland, November-December 1918

“Terrible are the deeds that are being done to us in the new Poland”.¹

Between November 1918 and June 1919 Eastern Europe transformed from the remains of the three multi-national empires into essentially the modern collection of independent states that exist today. This was by no means a certainty at the collapse of the Hollenzollen and Habsburg Empires in November 1918. The fate of Russia was still to be determined, and with the collapse of the brief Brest-Litovsk Treaty of March 1918, the whole of Eastern Europe was thrown into chaos. The largest of these eventual states was Poland, the form of which was still to be finalised. Józef Piłsudski posed the question whether Poland was to be “equal to the powers of the world or a small state needing the protection of the mighty?”² The Jewish minority was an important factor in defining the new Polish state, with influence not only within the likely borders of the state, but internationally as well. As the first chapter has shown, relations between the Poles and the Jewish minority were not on a good footing in November of 1918, and were to be tested as never before in the months that followed.

Background to Violence, Poland November-December 1918

The re-born Polish state faced a number of acute problems. As the major scene of fighting on the Eastern front the country was devastated by four years of fighting, with the country suffering some 450,000 killed and 900,000 wounded while serving in the various partitioning armies.³ Poland was systematically stripped of her natural

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¹ Part of the Editorial in the Warsaw Yiddish paper *Haint* in regard to the incident at Pińsk, quoted in Information Bureau of the Committee for the Defence of Jews in Poland and other East European Countries, *Evidence of Pogroms*, p. 75.
² Quoted in Piotr S. Wandycz, “Polish Foreign Policy, an Overview”, in Timothy Wiles (ed.), *Poland Between the Wars, 1918-1939* (Bloomington, Ind., 1989), p. 65.
³ Poland was, after Serbia, the second most devastated country in Europe as a result of the Great War. The economy was also severely damaged, with an estimated 40% of bridges destroyed and only some 15% of the pre-War workforce employed in the lands of the former Congress Kingdom by 1918: cited in Wandycz, *The Lands of Partitioned Poland*, p. 369. Further estimates of wartime losses, such as the 4,180,000 Poles who had emigrated during the war years, are contained in Krzysztof Dunin-Wąsowicz,
resources by various occupying armies who requisitioned as much as they could to help their war effort. The mass relocation of populations, with the resulting over-population in the major urban centres, placed further strain on the economy. Polish industry and trade had been disrupted, and problems of high inflation, speculation and even crime were rampant. Regional political and economic differences between the three partitioned parts of Poland made the process of integration extremely difficult.

Table 2.1: Index of East European Manufacturing Output (1913 = 100)\textsuperscript{4}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1920/21</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>69.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>64.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe (18 Countries)</td>
<td>66.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>93.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Poland, affected by the Allied naval blockade, had shortages of almost all foodstuffs. One third of the population was undernourished, whilst Poland was ravaged by a series of epidemics.\textsuperscript{5} Local relief efforts could not cope with the hardships facing the population. Poland needed outside help and for that she required international recognition. She had massive enthusiasm among the population as a result of her ‘lucky break’ in gaining independence, but little else.

In November 1918 the political situation was not promising. While the mass of the 50,000 German troops who had been occupying the former Congress Kingdom had been speedily returned to Germany on November 10,\textsuperscript{6} German forces still controlled the provinces of Pomerania, Silesia, Poznań, and the disputed Baltic shore to Wilno in the north. With the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Eastern Galicia to the South was also in turmoil. The Poles only controlled the districts of Lwów and

\textsuperscript{4} Table based on League of Nations: Financial and Transit Department, \textit{Industrialisation and Foreign Trade} (Geneva, 1945), pp. 136-137; cited in Steiner, op. cit., p. 275.


\textsuperscript{6} Piłsudski had set himself this task, almost as soon as he returned to Warsaw. See Piotr Lossowski, \textit{Zerwane pęta. Usunięcie okupantów z ziem polskich w listopadzie 1918 roku} (Warsaw, 1986). Other sources cite 80,000 German troops: Richard M. Watt, \textit{Bitter Glory: Poland and its Fate, 1918-1939} (New York, 1979), p. 80. The withdrawal of the German forces from Poland was a significant achievement by Piłsudski as German troops remained in the Baltic States for over a year after the initial armistice.
Przemyśl, whilst the remainder of Eastern Galicia was controlled by the Western Ukrainian army. At the same time there was formed the Komunistyczna Partia Robotniczka Polski (Polish Communist Workers’ Party, KPRP) through the amalgamation of the Socialdemokracja Królestwa Polskiego i Litwy (Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, hereafter SDKPiL) with the PPS-Lewica (Left), on December 15, 1918. After the new party called for the establishment of communist rule in Poland, the Red Army had occupied Wilno and in the Kresy a Soviet Lithuanian-Belorussian Republic was proclaimed in January 1919.

One of the most pressing problems for the new state was that of the Jewish question. The foundation of the republic seemed to offer the opportunity for a new and better chapter in Polish-Jewish relations. The minority of Jews, who accepted Poland as their nation, supported the new regime under the Naczelnik Państwa (Chief of State),

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7 It was only after 1925 that it would become the Komunistyczna Partia Polski (KPP).
Józef Piłsudski. Isaac Grünbaum, who represented the Central Committee of the Zionist Organisation, read out a declaration that expressed full support for the Polish state, reconstructed upon democratic principles, as well as his personal confidence in Piłsudski, who was seen to be philo-Semitic by Poles and Jews alike. Piłsudski’s socialist background, and the history of co-operation between his Polish Socialist Party and the Jewish Bund, were important factors that reassured Jews about the future of Poland under Piłsudski, rather than Dmowski. His federalist view of how the new Polish state should evolve made him hostile to Dmowski’s Endecja, which further increased Jewish support for him. On his return from internment at Magdeburg fortress, in Germany, on November 12 1918, Warsaw was in turmoil, and some form of united government was required. Among the “hundreds of delegations” that Piłsudski received was a delegation of the Jewish community of Warsaw, whose meeting lasted an hour and a half. Piłsudski, in his attempts to form a government, showed his willingness to involve different groups in the formation of his administration, and above all the Jewish minority. The delegation, a diverse collection of the many political groupings within Polish-Jewry, pledged Jewish cooperation in the reconstruction of Poland and voiced its concerns about widespread anti-Jewish violence and anti-Semitic propaganda in the country. The delegates requested that a department of Jewish affairs be created as one of the governmental branches, and that the internal life of the Jewish community be regulated by communal councils. Piłsudski listened to the deputations and promised to “take strong measures against anti-Semitism”, as well as to give thorough consideration to their requests. One of the results of Piłsudski’s sounding out of Jewish groups was the loss of support among the National Democrats in both Poland and Paris, neither of whom acknowledged his position as Head of State. The developing feud between the

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8 Isaac Grünbaum, Polityka żydowska w Polsce w ostatnich dziesięcioleciach (Warsaw, 1930), pp. 15-17.
9 On Piłsudski’s federalist policy, see Marian K. Dziewanowski, Joseph Piłsudski: A European Federalist, 1918-1922 (Stanford, Cal., 1969).
12 The divergent nature of Jewish politics in Poland can be seen by the large number of groups who made up the delegation; the Folkists, the Zionists, the ‘Agudas Haortodoksim,’ the Bund, the ‘Poale Zion,’ and the ‘Independent Jews in Poland.’
14 Ibid., p. 4.
15 Ibid., p. 18.
KNP in Paris and Piłsudski’s regime was one of the major issues in Poland during the first two months of independence, and helped add considerably to the confusion within the government.\(^{16}\) The western powers were suspicious of Piłsudski, due to his revolutionary background and the fact that he had actively fought for the Central Powers’ cause during the First World War, while Dmowski had always attempted to further the Polish cause through the Allies.

Piłsudski’s appointment as Head of State, by the now irrelevant Regency Council, and the subsequent appointment of moderate Socialist Moraczewski as Prime Minister later that month, should have paved the way for an easing, rather than a heightening, of Polish-Jewish tensions. Unfortunately most Jewish leaders in the west did not recognise this fact, as few really knew much about Piłsudski, whereas Dmowski, in the Allied capitals, had been the more visible, and unpalatable, face of Polish Nationalism whose high-handed and superior attitude to the Polish question caused much ill-feeling in Poland towards the Jewish population, which, although at least in part wishing a degree of self-government, generally supported the new Polish state under Piłsudski.\(^{17}\) He was seen as a strong man who would be able to restore order in Poland. In the anarchic vacuum that Poland was sliding into it was arguably the exposed Jewish minority who would suffer the most. The international attack on Poland, conducted through the press, based on reports from Zionist organisations in the west, was one of the major causes of tension between the Polish and the Jewish populations, and led to a potentially volatile situation within the country. A further cause of tension was the Jewish demand for the status of a national minority within Poland, voiced by various representatives of Jewish political groups who formed the Żydowska Rada Narodowa (Jewish National Council or ŻRN) in December 1918. The prospect of Jewish national autonomy was rejected by all the Polish political parties.\(^{18}\) Even the usually tolerant PPS opposed the ŻRN on the grounds that demands of national autonomy were nationalistic, and would therefore lead to further Jewish political isolation. If the Jews were granted national concessions, then it was argued that it might create a dangerous precedent, as principally the German minority would demand likewise.

\(^{16}\) Piłsudski sought to influence the KNP with a mission under Kazimierz Dłuski. In turn a KNP mission under Stanisław Grabski was dispatched to Warsaw.

\(^{17}\) Groth, “Dmowski, Piłsudski and the Ethnic Conflict in Pre-1939 Poland”, p. 81.

\(^{18}\) Paweł Korzec, “Antisemitism in Poland”, in Fishman (ed.), op. cit., p. 36.
On the international stage, the prospect that Poland would not be represented at all at the forthcoming Peace Conference was a very real possibility. The Allies threatened that if “order” and legitimate government were not established in Poland, then terms would be dictated to Poland as well as Germany.\textsuperscript{19} With the background of violence on Poland’s German, Czech and Russian borderlands, the first moves at the Peace Conference were being made. The attitudes of Great Britain, France and the United States were those of the victors, yet they had not actually fought for the liberation of Eastern Europe, despite rather vague pronouncements in the last months of the war.\textsuperscript{20} The way that both the defeated Germany and Bolshevik Russia were treated served as a warning to the emerging nation states that their future was by no means a certainty. The borderlands of Poland were seen as matters of international import. The main issues were the ‘Corridor’ for access to the sea, the status of the port-city of Danzig,\textsuperscript{21} the coal rich district of Silesia, and the fate of the oilfields located in Galicia. In Great Britain, the prospect of the Polish state gaining all that it desired was almost unthinkable. Polish leaders, both in Paris and in Warsaw, were aware that they would have to fight for the Poland they desired. Independence in itself was not enough. All political factions in Poland desired a strong and powerful state that included the ‘traditional’ borders of Poland, meaning those belonging to the eighteenth-century pre-Partition state of the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania. Such desires were not universal, or even realistically expected, but at the very least Poland sought Danzig, Teschen and the whole of Eastern Galicia. These demands would have to be decided on the international stage, and the Jewish minority in Poland, and the attitude of the Jewish communities in the Allied countries, were to play an important role in the formation of Poland’s international reputation.


\textsuperscript{20} While Wilson’s Thirteenth of Fourteen Points had stated that “an independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.” The Allies had never agreed that their war aims would be based on these principles. This occasioned much misunderstanding, which was shared by the German High Command in October 1918.

\textsuperscript{21} Danzig, Gda\n\n\n69
Piłsudski’s position was made difficult by his overriding need to establish law and order within the country, and to do this he required a centralised administrative apparatus with strong armed forces. Both of these branches were still very much in the making. More relevantly, anti-Jewish sentiments were shared by many Polish political groups, the military and large sections of the population. Any public statements of support for the Jewish minority would have risked a backlash from the National Democrats, whose support Piłsudski needed at this stage. An overriding theme of the policies, not only Piłsudski, but also of the whole Polish government, was that of the primacy of establishing a strong and united Polish state to the exclusion of almost all other factors.

With the breakdown in German and Austrian rule in Poland, there was a consequent deterioration in Polish-Jewish relations, the Jewish population having benefited from the order of German rule. Petty anti-Semitic acts in Warsaw led a German officer to comment in October 1918 “you see what will happen when we are no longer here?” German order crumbled as soon as news of the German military collapse in the West reached Warsaw. The Warsaw garrison responded by selling its rifles and ammunition to the local Jewish population and deserting in large numbers. In Warsaw, a committee under Abraham Truskier and Waclaw Wislicki, both prominent members of the Organisation of Jewish Merchants, was formed as early as November 9 in order to protest against attacks against Jews in the capital.

These debates and reports of anti-Jewish violence partially accounted for the readiness of international opinion to accept the accounts coming out of Poland in 1918 and 1919 that the conditions in which Jews found themselves were the result of deliberate pogroms, either encouraged by, or passively approved, by the new Polish state, rather than the truer explanation that, despite the armistice on the Western Front, the Eastern Front had remained fluid, and was still fundamentally at war. Poland, re-established in November 1918, had to fight a variety of forces, Bolshevik, Lithuanian

22 Zechlin, op. cit., pp. 480-484.
24 The weapons and ammunition were later bought by the Polish government to equip the fledgling Polish army: Kenneth Bourne & D. Cameron Watt, (eds.), British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print (London, 1984-1997), Part II, Series F, Europe, 1919-1939, Volume 51, Poland, 1919-1920 (Keith Sword, ed.), p. 5.
and Ukrainian, for control of the Kresy wschodnie of Poland, which had become a blurred war zone, with disorganised warring factions fighting to control the newly liberated territories between the old Congress Kingdom of Poland and the land controlled by the new Soviet Republic (see Map 2.2). Caught up in the middle of these territorial conflicts were the Jews of the Kresy. The local Jewish populations were all to a greater or lesser extent the recipient of overtures for support by the various competing national factions, and particularly the Lithuanian and Ukrainian administrations, who found themselves in a weaker position than did the Poles. Almost immediately conflict broke out in Eastern Galicia between the Poles and Ukrainians, and remained a focus of Polish attention until the Treaty of Riga was finally brought into effect, in 1921.

Map 2.2: Conflicting Territorial Claims of Nationalities in Eastern Europe


Blatant and brutal attacks against Jews emphatically did occur, but opinions differed then as now about the suitability of the term ‘pogrom’ to denote these incidents. Most
of the Jewish casualties attributed to pogroms in fact took place within the context of military encounters that afflicted Jewish and gentile civilians alike, and indeed killed more of the latter. Jews plainly suffered a disproportionate share of injuries for many reasons, such as the concentration of their numbers in the most fiercely fought over cities; their heightened vulnerability as shop owners to looting and food riots; bullying from soldiers; and their being the victims more generally of mobs and thuggery in anarchic conditions. It is the duty of the historian to endeavour to come to a balanced verdict on the most often highlighted, and also misrepresented, incidents of the early months of the Second Republic, namely the events in Lwów, Pińsk, and Wilno, events which still cause disagreement among historians.26 Some pro-Polish historians go so far as to speak of “reports that appeared in the international press about alleged pogroms, such as those reputed to have taken place in Lwów in November 1918 and Pińsk in April 1919”27 and even allege that they may have been “simply fabricated”.28 Bland sweeping statements such as these are not wholly typical of all pro-Polish historians, but go some way to show the trenchant position taken by some.29 On the other hand, Jewish sympathisers among historians still seem to refer to the Lwów and Pińsk ‘pogroms’ without fully examining the events that took place. For example, a sympathetic Ukrainian account discusses how “the Poles … managed to gain the control of Lviv; they celebrated the event by a slaughter of Jews … to the rejoicing of the anti-Semitic Poland”.30

27 It is interesting to note that this statement is not substantiated by supporting evidence in a documentary sourcebook: Peter D. Stachura, Poland, 1918-1945 An Interpretive and Documentary History of the Second Republic (Abingdon, 2004), p. 85.
28 Ibid. p. 85.
29 The view can be traced through time from the eminent Polish historian, Franciszek Bujak, who wrote in 1919 that “as a matter of fact there were no pogroms in Galicia … all that occurred there were comparatively insignificant riots”: Franciszek Bujak, The Jewish Question in Poland (Paris, 1919), p. 34; to Richard C. Lukas who spoke of “an alleged pogrom on Lwów in 1918 was a military massacre in which more Christians than Jews perished”: Richard C. Lukas, Forgotten Holocaust: The Poles Under German Occupation, 1939-1944 (New York, 1986), p. 125; Leszek Tomaszewski, “Lwów – Listopad 1918. Niewykle losy pewnego dokumentu”, Dzieje Najnowsze, Volume 25, Part 4 (1993), pp. 163-173; to Stachura, op. cit., p. 85.
30 Matthew Stachiw and Jaroslaw Sztendera, Western Ukraine at the Turning Point of Europe’s History, 1918-1923 (New York, 1969), Volume I, pp. 260-261. Even more recent work bandies around the word ‘pogrom’ without fully appreciating its meaning and without regard for the implications it carries. For example, on p. 44 of Leo Cooper, In the Shadow of the Polish Eagle: The Poles, the Holocaust and Beyond (New York, 2000), where the word “pogrom” is used 5 times, and also the phrase, “killing spree”. 

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Kielce, located between Warsaw and Cracow, had already been the scene of anti-Jewish riots in 1915 between the Russian withdrawal and the occupation by the Austro-Hungarian army (KuK Armee). It was also the first scene of violence between the Polish majority and the Jewish minority after Poland’s declaration of independence. In the early afternoon of November 11, Armistice Day, the local Jewish population held an authorised meeting in the town’s main theatre, The Polski, to discuss the newly established Poland, and to press their claims for national rights.

As the meeting was breaking up, the Polish Militia entered the hall under the pretext of searching for weapons, and in the chaos that followed attacked the 300 unarmed Jews who had remained in the hall. A crowd, largely composed of “Polish students”, gathered outside the Theatre, and beat the Jews as they were forced out of the building by the Polish Militia. The violence continued throughout the next day, which was usually the market day, in the Jewish quarter, the Polish authorities doing nothing to restrain the mob until after the violence had ended, placing armed guards around the Jewish district. The final toll was four killed and up to 250 wounded, lower than original reports of the incident in the Warsaw Jewish press. The Jewish district had been badly damaged, and most of the Jewish-owned shops in the town pillaged. As well as the obvious damage that Kielce was to do to Poland’s international reputation, the confidence of the local Jewish population was severely shaken. Further harm was done by numerous denials of the events in Kielce by prominent Poles. When the facts were confirmed, the damage to Poland’s, and the

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31 The town’s population was some 40,000, of which 37.5% (15,530) were Jewish in 1921: *Encyclopedia Judaica*, Volume 10, col. 989, The town was also the scene of a notorious pogrom on July 4, 1946, against Jewish survivors of the Shoah by Poles, who killed 47, and wounded more than fifty, see Yisrael Gutman, *Ha-Yehudim be-Folin aharei Milhemet ha-Olam ha-Shnia* (Jerusalem, 1985); Joanna Michlic-Coren, “Polish-Jews during and after the Kielce Pogrom: Reports from the Communist Archives”, *Polin: A Journal of Polish Jewish Studies*, Volume 13 (2000), pp. 253-267.

32 A report of the events is contained in US National Archives (Washington, DC), 861.4016/182, p. 3.


35 *Der Moment* in Warsaw initially reported on November 15 that there were ten deaths and six-hundred wounded: cited in Isaac Lewin, op. cit., p. 59.

36 Paderewski, while still in the United States, when asked by Robert Lansing, the American Secretary of State between 1915 and 1920, for an account of events by the State Department denied reports of the pogrom blaming Jews for “provocation”: US National Archives (Washington, DC) file no. 860c4016/102, no page. The Polish National Committee (KNP) in Paris also denied these reports,
Endek-dominated Polish National Committee’s (KNP) reputation in particular, were to have long-lasting effects on subsequent attitudes to Polish-Jewish incidents, with each side accusing the other of lying and exaggeration.

Polish accusations of exaggeration in the press reports, which undoubtedly did occur, were somewhat missing the point. The fact that Poles were attacking and killing the unarmed Jewish minority, no matter how large or small the figures, should have been acknowledged to be wrong, rather than simply denied. With Warsaw still in turmoil following the seizure of power from the Germans, no investigation was forthcoming. Jews in Poland saw that appeals to the Polish authorities, who could not always control the Polish population, were useless. It was evident that help would have to come internationally. More immediately, in Galicia the events in Kielce and numerous other small towns spread a very real fear among the Jewish population about the future.37 With the removal of protection that the Austro-Hungarian administration had provided to Jews in Galicia, the future seemed to be very uncertain indeed.

Lwów – November 1918

Arguably the most important event in Polish-Jewish relations for a number of decades occurred in Lwów,38 less than two weeks after the events in Kielce, between November 22 and 24, 1918. What actually happened is still a matter of historical debate. There are only a few historical accounts written on events in Lwów in English, apart from Harry M. Rabinowicz’s brief account in his 1965 book *The Legacy of Polish Jewry.*39 In Poland the ‘Obrona Lwowa’ (Defence of Lwów) forms

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37 Jan Slomka wrote that in the town of Dzikow after independence “the Jews were the next object of attention. They had got to be hated during the [First World] War”: Slomka, op. cit., p.255.
38 See Chapter 1, n. 9.
39 “During the month of November 1918, alone, there were pogroms of varying severity in 110 different towns and villages. The Lwów pogrom on November 21-23 was tragically reminiscent of Kishinev”. This may have been because some photographs reported to have been taken in Lwow in November 1918 were in fact merely old photographs of the Kishinev pogrom: Harry M. Rabinowicz, *The Legacy of Polish Jewry: A History of Polish Jews in the Inter-War Years, 1919-1939* (London, 1965), p. 38. There is, however, a full account in German in Golczewski, op. cit., pp. 185-205.
a vital part of the glorious history of the re-birth of Poland against all odds. The events occurring in Lwów in November 1918 unfolded against a background of heightened Polish and Ukrainian nationalism surrounding the largest and most important city in Eastern Galicia, with a population of some 200,000 inhabitants.

The city of Lwów was overwhelmingly Polish. According to the generally unreliable 1910 Austrian census, 86% of the population declared themselves to be “Polish speaking” and only 11% as “Ukrainian speaking”. The exact numbers of Jews is problematic, as most of them had been classified as, and encouraged to declare themselves, “Polish”. According to the 1921 census Jews accounted for around 30% of the population. The countryside surrounding the city was dominated by Ukrainian peasants (see Map 2.3).

Paderewski was essentially correct when he described Lwów as “a Polish island in a sea of Ukrainians”.

Table 2.2: Population of Lwów and District by Religion; Polish Census, 1921

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Roman Catholic</th>
<th>Greek Catholic</th>
<th>Orthodox Christian</th>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lwów (Town)</td>
<td>219,388</td>
<td>111,860</td>
<td>27,269</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>76,854</td>
<td>2,825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lwów (District)</td>
<td>2,718,014</td>
<td>1,264,162</td>
<td>1,126,207</td>
<td>1,456</td>
<td>313,206</td>
<td>12,983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Galicia</td>
<td>5,495,114</td>
<td>1,907,678</td>
<td>2,970,420</td>
<td>3,205</td>
<td>587,397</td>
<td>26,414</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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40 Certain traditional Polish accounts of the Lwow events in November 1918 make little or no mention of the Jewish population, or of “excesses”: for example, Stefan Mekarski, A Page of Polish History. Lwów (London, 1944), pp. 76-78.

41 According to the 1921 census, the population of Lwów had grown to 219,388: Annuaire Statistique de la République Polonaise, p. 11.


44 The Jewish population of Lwów had risen sharply in the years leading up to 1918. This was principally due to economic factors in the years preceding the First World War, and by the large number of refugees that flooded into the city, fleeing the Russian army. Between the last Austrian census in 1910, and the first Polish census in 1921, the Jewish population rose from 57,000 to 99,595: Encyclopedia Judaica, Volume 11, col. 613.

45 According to the Austrian Census of 1910, out of the 4.5 million population in Eastern Galicia 59% were Ruthenian (Ukrainian), 27% Polish, and 13% Jewish: Paton, op. cit., pp. 267-8.


47 The figure for East Galicia includes the provinces of Lwów, Stanisławów and Tarnopol. Others include “Évangéliques and inconnus”: Annuaire Statistique de la République Polonaise, pp., 16-17.
Table 2.3: Population of Lwów and District by Nationality; Polish Census, 1921

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Polish</th>
<th>Ruthenian</th>
<th>German</th>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lwów (Town)</td>
<td>219,388</td>
<td>136,519</td>
<td>19,866</td>
<td>1,650</td>
<td>60,431</td>
<td>924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lwów (District)</td>
<td>2,718,014</td>
<td>89,823</td>
<td>53,242</td>
<td>1,893</td>
<td>5,469</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Galicia</td>
<td>5,495,114</td>
<td>2,479,620</td>
<td>2,630,654</td>
<td>30,515</td>
<td>351,215</td>
<td>3,110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Map 2.3: Distribution of Nationalities (1921): Lwów and District


The First World War served as an impetus to Ukrainian national feeling and aspirations towards an independent Ukrainian state, which gained a further boost with the provisions for a German-aligned Ukrainian state being established by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918. In contrast to the attitude of the Poles, the Ukrainians, both in East Galicia, and in the former Russian Empire, appeared open to the concept of Jewish national rights. Indeed, from the time of the February Revolution the Ukrainians had co-operated with Jewish parties, principally the Jewish Bund, leading to the establishment of a vice-secretariat for Jewish Affairs in October, 1917. Suspicion still lingered about siding with the Ukrainians, as news of anti-Jewish excesses was widely reported in the Polish-Jewish press. Over the period of 1918-1919, in the land of the former tsarist Empire, an estimated 1,236 pogroms took

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48 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
place, of which some 493 were committed by the Ukrainian Nationalist Army.\textsuperscript{50} What is clear is that, while the Ukrainians appeared to be more disposed towards treating the Jewish minority as an equal, serious reservations remained among the Jews of Lwów.\textsuperscript{51}

Lwów was formerly part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire until its collapse in November 1918, apart from a short period under Russian control between August 1914 and June 9, 1915. During this short period, four weeks after the Russian occupation, there was a ‘pogrom’ against the Jewish population of Lwów on September 27, 1914, perpetrated by units of the Russian army. The pogrom started shortly after unconfirmed reports that stated that shots had been fired from Wałowa Street, in the heart of the Jewish district, at Russian soldiers. Later on that afternoon units of mounted Cossacks returned fire. The violence did not end there, but carried on into the evening and night, with Russian troops cordoning off the Jewish district, and proceeding to loot shops and apartments, beating and shooting indiscriminately.\textsuperscript{52} Jewish casualties totalled between seventeen and fifty and more than a hundred people were wounded.\textsuperscript{53} In light of this ‘pogrom’ and subsequent, sporadic, violence against the Jewish population,\textsuperscript{54} principally carried out during the Russian withdrawal from Lwów, the Jewish population of the city had grown fearful of the delicate position it found itself in, unable to defend itself, and with little prospect of finding a way to do so. Jews proved to be an easy target, not only as they could not easily protect themselves, but because they were readily identified by almost all other groups as if not an enemy, then at the very least as unsympathetic.

\textsuperscript{50} It is interesting to note that some 106 pogroms were perpetrated by the Red Army, a force not usually associated with such actions, principally in the provinces of Glukhoa and Novgorod-Seversk. Figures from N. Gergel, “Di pogromen in Ukraine in di yorn 1918-1921”, in Jacob Lestschinsky (ed.), \textit{Shriftn far ekonomik un statistik} (Berlin, 1928), p. 110.

\textsuperscript{51} David Horowitz, \textit{ha-Etmol sheli} (Jerusalem, 1970), pp. 62-64.

\textsuperscript{52} For an account of the events in Lwów in September 1914, including the accusation that the pogrom had been orchestrated by Russian officials, see Alexander V. Prusin, \textit{Nationalizing a Borderland. War, Ethnicity, and Anti-Jewish Violence in East Galicia, 1914-1920} (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 2005), pp. 29-32.

\textsuperscript{53} The lower figure is from Józef Białynia-Cholodecki, \textit{Lwów wczasie okupacji rosyjskiej, 3 września 1914 – 22 czerwca 1915: z lasnych pierzyc i spostrzeżeń} (Lwów, 1930), p. 91. The higher figure is from Jonas Kreppel, \textit{Juden und Judentum von heute übersichtlich dargestellt: ein Handbuch} (Zürich, 1925), pp. 77-78.

\textsuperscript{54} For example on October 4, 1914 a further two Jews were killed by Cossacks, and more violence was only stopped by the actions of a Russian officer: Prusin, op. cit., p. 32.
With the Russian withdrawal from Lwów in 1915, the position of the Jewish minority improved markedly, assistance to refugees was organised, and “Jewish life was resumed”. Under the Habsburgs, Polish-Jewish relations had been remarkably amicable, at least until the final few years leading up to the First World War. Jews, from the 1880s onwards, started to turn their backs on German as their official language, and began to use Polish, now the official language in Galicia, following the Ausgleich of 1867. With this, support for the Austrian cause on the part of the Jewish population (as indeed it was among the Polish population of the Empire) increased markedly. There can also be seen a distinct support for the values of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the writings of one Galician Jew, Joseph Roth, who wrote with its fall that he “no longer had a home”.

Polish leaders from all major political parties had aspirations towards Lwów as a key part of the post-war territorial settlement. Paderewski stated that “there is no Poland without Lemberg … There can be no Polish State, strong and capable of fulfilling its historical mission in the East, without eastern Galicia”. Historically Lwów itself had been a Polish city, surrounded by the Ukrainian dominated countryside of Eastern Galicia. Poles had dominated the regional administration and politics before the war. Austria-Hungary’s vague war-time offers to both Poles and Ukrainians for post-war concessions fuelled Polish-Ukrainian hostility and rivalry. Jews, who were the third

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57 See Mendelsohn, Zionism in Poland, pp. 37-43. Polish support for the Habsburg Empire was particularly strong in the years immediately before 1914, at least in part due to the Government’s suppression of the Ukrainian national movement. Many Poles, including Piłsudski, in the early years of the War supported the idea of a federal Polish state within the Habsburg Empire, including the territories of Galicia and the former Congress Kingdom.
58 Roth, born in 1894 in the East Galician town of Brody, wrote extensively of Jewish support and loyalty towards the Austro-Hungarian Empire and indeed, fought in the K.u.K armee during the First World War. Examples of this can be seen in his most famous work, Radetzkymarsch (1932), and its sequel, Die Kapuzinergruft (1939).
60 Prime Minister Paderewski, in a speech to the Sejm on November 12, 1919, spoke with the enthusiastic support of the deputies. He stated further that neither “I nor Mr Roman Dmowski would ever be capable of signing a treaty which compromises [the Polish acquisition of Eastern Galicia]”: TNA (London) FO 417/7/68780, p. 15.
largest group in Galicia, were courted by both sides for their support.  

With the decline of Austrian authority, the Ukrainians in Galicia took the initiative. On October 19 1918, a Ukrainian National Council was formed in Lwów to act as a constituent assembly, under the leadership of Dr Kost’ Levyts’kyi. The body, comprising the Ukrainian members of the Austrian Parliament and local politicians from Galicia and Bukovina, declared on 19 October the creation of a Ukrainian state including Eastern Galicia, east of the River San. In a measure aimed primarily at the Jewish minority, the declaration also guaranteed the equality of all nationalities. The Ukrainian National Council’s attempts to create a Ukrainian state coincided with Polish efforts in Galicia, concentrated in the major centre in Western Galicia, Cracow, where the Polska Komisja Likwidacjna (Polish Liquidation Committee or PKL) was formed on October 27, 1918, under Ignacy Daszyński, a leading Polish socialist, Wincety Witos, the leader of the Peasant (PSL-Piast) Party, and Aleksander Skarbek, a leading Endek politician. Polish efforts in Lwów centred around the merging of the Polish Military Organization (POW) and the Unia Wolności (Union of Freedom or UW), under the command of Captain Czesław Mączyński. The latter, who was sympathetic to Dmowski’s National Democrats, did little to ease the fears of the Jewish populations.

Events moved quickly by early November 1918, with the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian army. This resulted in mass desertion from the ranks of its multinational troops, who filed through the towns of Galicia forming armed bands, which posed a threat to the Jewish population. Due to their prominent role in commerce, they became a particular target of these gangs and “deserters from the Austrian Army” were blamed for breaking into Jewish stores. The Austro-Hungarian command was incapable of preventing excesses, and the gendarmerie was equally powerless.

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61 The question of Galicia was discussed at length by Louis Marshall and Roman Dmowski at their meeting on October 6, 1918. See Chapter I; Reznikoff, (ed.), Louis Marshall Champion of Liberty, Volume II, pp. 585-593; Dmowski, Polityka polska, Volume II, pp. 395-397.


resented by all during the war for the harsh order it kept. Many gendarmes were disarmed by local mobs, and “lost their authority completely”. The Jewish communities throughout Galicia were vulnerable to attack, and in an atmosphere where they had effectively no-one to turn to for help, they attempted to form self-defence militias.

When on November 1 Ukrainian forces in Lwów, under the command of Major Dmytro Vitovs’kyi, arrested Polish officers, disarmed soldiers, and held captive the Austrian Military Governor, Count Karl Huyn, the question of Lwów turned into an armed struggle. The residents of Lwów found their city under the blue and yellow of the Ukrainian flag, and the Zakhidno-Ukrainska Narodnia Respublika (Western Ukraine People’s Republic, or ZUNR) was declared, with Dr Eugene Petrushevych as its head. International recognition did not follow, despite the Allied Powers being notified of the state’s formation on November 8. In order to claim support the new government was tolerant of all minorities, and even allowed Polish newspapers to continue publication until November 6. They were suppressed only after they had published the Polish mobilization order. News of the Ukrainians’ coup sparked resistance among the Polish population, who occupied various strong points in Lwów, and a Polish Civil Committee was formed. The Polish reaction was initially rather confused, as Polish forces in Lwów were unclear from whom they should request help, the Liquidation Commission in Cracow or the emerging government in Warsaw. In the capital, Pilsudski felt that Poland had been “robbed” of Lwów, and ordered the Polish Galician Command to relieve the city. While a few Jews sided with the Poles, the majority, however, who lived in the north-west, Ukrainian-held parts of the city, decided to remain neutral and await the outcome, rather than, “courting catastrophe immediately [if] they sided with one or the other conflicting parties”.

The Jewish response to the outbreak of hostilities was immediate. On November 1,
various representatives of Jewish political parties formed a Committee for Public Safety, which announced that Jews would stay neutral, and would organise a militia in order to protect the Jewish quarter from attack from all sides, with the “sole-purpose of maintaining order and safety in the quarter inhabited by the Jewish population”. Both the Polish vice-president of the city, Marceli Chłamtacz, and the Ukrainian commander, Major Vitovs’kyi, were informed of this declaration, and told that the Jewish Militia would wear white armbands and be provided with identification cards in Yiddish. While Jewish protestations of neutrality, declared on November 2, were seen as welcome by some Poles, it was inferred more usually as an act of open hostility, betrayal, and even of surprise.

There was, however, little option for the Jewish minority but to remain neutral. To have openly sided with the Poles would have gone against the rising tide of hostility between the two groups during the last years of the First World War. Polish hostility towards the Jews was matched by the ill feeling felt by the Jewish minority towards the Poles, whom they had increasingly come to see as nothing but anti-Semitic. Equally the prospect of siding with the Ukrainians was unlikely. They appeared to be more sympathetic to the Jewish position, issuing a manifesto in Yiddish stating that they recognised the Jews as the “third ranking nation with all national rights … [and] there would be a special secretary for Jewish affairs in the cabinet”. The manifesto could not bridge the gap between the two communities. In the pre-War years the

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69 Ibid., pp. 10, 17-18; Leon Chasanowitsch, Les Pogromes Anti-Juifs en Galicie et en Pologne en novembre et décembre 1918: faits et documents réunis et rédigés par L. Chasanowitsch (Stockholm, 1919), pp. 51-52. Leon Chasanowitsch, a member of the American Jewish Congress, was a Zionist publicist based in Stockholm, who was paid by the German Foreign Ministry. Both Chasanowitsch and Tenenbaum (see n. 272) based their evidence on the collected depositions of the Żydowski Komitet dla Niesienia Pomocy Ofiarom Rozuchów i Rabunków w Listopadzie 1918 (later called Komitet Ratunkowy Żydowski) under the leadership of the Lwów Jewish assimilationist leader, Tobias Ashkenazy.


71 Rosa Bailly, A City Fights for Freedom: The Rising in Lwow in 1918-1919: An Episode in the History of Poland (London, 1956), pp. 235-236. Jozef Bendow (psuedonym of Joseph Tenenbaum, a Zionist and resident of Lwów), as author of, Żydowski problemy gospodarcze w Galicyi (Vienna, 1918) showed his academic credentials, as well as his comparative reliability as a source. Tenenbaum was later selected by the Temporary Jewish National Council as the representative of Polish-Jewry at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919: Der Lemberger Judenpogrom: November 1918-Jänner 1919 (Vienna, 1919), p. 15, copy of the declaration on p. 18.

72 “The Polish National Committee was relieved to see that the Jew were to remain neutral and, the Ukrainians in turn were equally happy not to have to defend the Jewish quarter”: Bailly, op. cit., p. 236.


75 Evidence of Pogroms, p. 23.
Jewish population had been siding more openly with the Poles than with the Ukrainians. The weak position of the Ukrainians in Lwów, as well as the mistrust by Orthodox Jews of any form of alliance, meant that neutrality was the only option open to the Committee for Public Safety.\textsuperscript{76} Assimilationists within the Jewish community saw the dangers of remaining neutral, and issued proclamations of loyalty to the Poles, fearing for the future of the Jewish population in a future Polish state. These protestations had little effect on the Poles, just as a declaration of the Polish government on November 7 that guaranteed “civil rights and liberties to all citizens”\textsuperscript{77} had with the Jewish population.

The neutrality of the Jewish population, and more specifically the Jewish Militia, was a matter of fierce debate in the months following November 1918. Zionists especially favoured the Ukrainian offer of national autonomy as against the Poles’ refusal to accept any demands for national rights.\textsuperscript{78} It should be understood that there existed a situation of lawlessness, aggravated by a number of factors: the collapse of Austrian authority; the large numbers of armed bands roving around both the city and the surrounding countryside; and the release from jail of a disputed number of criminals by the Austrian authorities, with estimates ranging between 800 and 2,000, according to whether Ukrainian or Polish sources are quoted.\textsuperscript{79} The Jewish militia engaged the looters, often in pitched battles in the Jewish district, located on the outskirts of the city. It was in these circumstances that the first direct confrontations occurred between Jewish Militia units and Poles.\textsuperscript{80} Since the city was divided between the Polish- and Ukrainian-controlled areas, Poles often had to cross areas of the city not controlled by fellow Poles. Some were stopped and confronted by the Jewish Militia, who were by no means sensitive to the sensibilities of the Poles they stopped.\textsuperscript{81} There was, by all accounts, a hostile atmosphere between the local Polish and Jewish communities, stretching back to before the First World War, and the newly armed

\textsuperscript{76} Bailly, op. cit., p. 102.
\textsuperscript{77} Hoover Institution Library and Archives [Hoover] (Stanford, Cal.), Poland Ambasada (Great Britain) Records, 1918-1945, “Ambasada RP w Londynie”, 1380, November 9, 1918, p. 18.
\textsuperscript{78} Marcus, op. cit., p. 300; Mendelsohn, op. cit., pp. 96-8.
\textsuperscript{80} Wasser, “Rola Żydów”, p. 839.
\textsuperscript{81} Bendow, \textit{Der Lemberger Judenpogrom}, p. 16.
Jewish Militia, whose arms were supplied by the Ukrainians,\(^\text{82}\) apparently released its anger and frustration on the Poles. It should also be noted that in strategic terms the Jewish Militia was by no means an insignificant force. At the beginning of November the respective Polish and Ukrainian forces only numbered some 1,500 men each, including a large proportion of untrained youths, and women fighters.\(^\text{83}\) In early November the Militia comprised some two hundred armed men, and by mid-November this number had swelled to 45 officers and 302 soldiers.\(^\text{84}\)

A formal agreement was signed between the Jewish Militia and the Polish command, signed by Stanislaw Lapinski, the Chief of Staff, on 10 November, fully ten days after the Militia was set up.\(^\text{85}\) By this point the activities of the Militia had fortified the opinion among Poles that the Jewish sympathies in reality lay with the Ukrainians, who recognised the neutrality of the Jews, and let the Militia control the Jewish district of Lwów. The lawlessness manifested itself in the Jewish district with various assaults on Jews by Ukrainian patrols and by paramilitary groups with no clear affiliation. By the very nature of the street-fighting, and the position of the Jewish district hedged in between the Polish- and Ukrainian-controlled areas of the city, fighting between Poles and Ukrainians inevitably overflowed into the Jewish district. The condition and irregular nature of uniforms of the belligerents, where in some cases insignia were the only way to distinguish between affiliations, made recognition almost impossible in the darkness of night.

While the Jewish Militia was a very small number in proportion to the total Jewish population, by far the largest proportion of the population wished to remain neutral. Yet this was not obvious by mid-November,\(^\text{86}\) with the official newspaper of the Polish forces, \textit{Pobudka (Reville)}, publishing every rumour about the Militia’s alleged

\(^{82}\) Bailly, op. cit., p. 102.
\(^{83}\) Tomaszewski, “Lwów, 22 listopada”, p. 281.
\(^{85}\) Bailly, op. cit., p. 102. The agreement outlined the role that the Jewish Militia would play, and further stated that “Polish troops will observe the neutrality of the Jewish Militia”; Cohen, op. cit., p. 25.
\(^{86}\) On November 12 \textit{Pobudka} published an article warning Jews not to “provoke anti-Semitism” by their actions: \textit{Pobudka}, November 12, 1918, p. 2.
violation of neutrality. According to some sources it “called openly for … a pogrom and the Polish soldiers talked about it quite frequently”. Indeed it was even noted by prominent members of the Jewish community, such as David Horowitz, the leader of the Shomer faction of Zionists in Lwów, that “in the Jewish militia there was strong pro-Ukranian feeling”. On November 12, a group of Jewish envoys approached the Polish stronghold located at the Sienkiewicz school, and only the intervention of Karol Baczyński, the Polish commanding officer, prevented the envoys from being fired upon, an indication of what was to happen without firm restraining force at the end of the month. Further incidents occurred due to the continued refusal of many Polish commanders to recognise the Jewish Militia as a legitimate fighting force, despite the recognition of Jewish neutrality by both the Polish command and the Polish Civil Committee.

The Polish Militia in Lwów

One of the greatest causes of tension between the Jewish and Polish communities of Lwów was the ill-disciplined Polish Militia. With the end of Habsburg rule in Galicia the prisons were opened, and many of the newly released criminals flocked to the Polish cause. These were readily armed, even if they could not be supplied with uniforms. In the anarchic condition that Lwów found itself in during November 1918 the criminal element of the Polish forces needs to be noted as a significant factor in the conflict. However large or small the element proved to be, its influence outweighed its actual numbers. The very presence of a criminal element within the Polish forces contributed to the Jewish mistrust of the Poles, and necessitated the organisation of the Jewish Militia in early November. The organisation of the Polish armed forces did not lend itself to tight military discipline, and as in other forms of Polish politics, the command was only loosely unified under Captain Mączyński. The criminal element proved itself to display good fighting qualities, but often engaged in looting and robbery. Their excesses compelled the Polish command to issue a

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87 Kozłowski, Zapomniana Wojna, p. 149.
88 Evidence of Pogroms in Poland, p. 27.
89 Horowitz, op. cit., p. 65.
90 Bailey, op. cit., pp. 102-103.
drumhead court-martial decree on November 9. The enforcement of the decree was another matter. From the period between November 5, 1918 and July 26, 1919, 13 people were executed by the Field Gendarmes in Lwów for the crime of “plunder and murder”. The Jewish Militia fired upon looters wearing Polish insignia, and even upon members of the Polish gendarmerie, who were reported to have looted in the Jewish district. By firing at looters, the Jewish militia found itself shooting at Polish forces. As most of the instances took place at night, the fact that the Jewish Militia were firing at Polish troops was made even less clear. A delegation from the Ministry of External (Foreign) Affairs, dispatched to Lwów in December 1918, concluded that trouble arose because of the composition of the Polish forces.

In the struggle to gain control of the city, Polish officers had distributed arms to all apparently willing to fight, including a number of criminals, recently released from the main prison in Lwów. As was reported in the Cracow Polish newspaper, Czas (The Age) “it was clearly difficult in such circumstances to demand from every applicant a certificate of moral character … Thus it is possible that many a bandit obtained a uniform and arms”. These elements fought to take Lwów but also simultaneously raided local businesses and shops, many of which were owned by Jews. These forces were described as “recruits from the underworld, from the riff-raff, the idlers, gangsters and all sorts of criminals”, while all reports agreed on their good fighting qualities. Interpretation of these acts varied between the Jewish one of a legitimate act of self-defence, and that of the Poles who saw their comrades attacked by those whom they regarded as an illegitimate force, allied to their Ukrainian enemy, interpreting it as an “act of hostility”. Rumours of arms stored in synagogues, Jewish non-military support for the Ukrainians, and even the pouring of boiling water onto Polish soldiers from Jewish houses further seemed to confirm Polish attitudes.

93 Four persons were executed on November 5, 1918, one on December 20, 1918, two on January 18, 1919, two on March 14, 1919, and four on July 26, 1919: US National Archives (Washington, DC), file no. 860c.4016/144. no page.
95 “Raport delegacji Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych R.P. w sprawie wystąpień antyżydowskich we Lwowie”, December 17, 1918, in ibid., pp. 281-283.
96 Czas, November 29, 1918, p. 2.
97 From “The Lemberg Horrors” by Joseph Bendow (pseudonym of Joseph Tenenbaum), a Jewish journalist and resident of Lwów: Evidence of the Pogroms in Poland, p. 23. Similar assessments are noted in the official reports on the events in Lwów: Tomaszewski, “Lwów, 22 listopada”, p. 282.
98 Neue Lemberger Zeitung, No. 602 (November 18), 1918, p. 1.
towards the Jewish population. Czas described them as “quaint inventions and legends which gained credence among the Polish soldiers and stories such as an excited popular imagination can invent”.

As November progressed, violence increased in intensity and volume. On November 14, among other incidents Ukrainian troops murdered captured Polish soldiers, which was responded in kind by Polish troops a day later. The situation between the Polish and Jewish sections of the city worsened on November 15, with the death of Maximilian Straub. As the commander of a unit of some thirty men of the Jewish Militia, he responded to reports of an armed gang, which was robbing the residents in a part of the Jewish quarter. Straub’s men attacked and dispersed the looters. In pursuing the looters they approached the Polish lines, under a white flag, but were still fired upon and lost between two and four men, including Straub. Fear of pogroms gripped the Jewish community, which, through the Committee for Public Safety, appealed to President Wilson on November 14 for support, much as the Jewish communities of Eastern Europe had done during the years of pogroms in the 1880s, 1900s and during the course of the First World War.

A Pogrom? – The Events of November 22-23, 1918

It was in this volatile atmosphere that Polish forces based around Przemyśl, comprising some 140 officers and 1,228 men, launched their offensive on Lwów on November 21, 1918 under the command of General Bolesław Roja, the military commander of the District of Galicia. Fighting continued through the night, and by November 22, the city was in Polish hands: “that day the sun shone down on streets gay with bunting. Polish flags fluttered from every window and the whole town was

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99 Report by Dr. Philip Washitz to the Polish commission to investigate the events in Lwów, Evidence of the Pogroms in Poland and Ukrainia, p. 38.
100 Czas, November 29, 1918, p. 2.
102 The Polish-Jewish daily newspaper in Cracow (Nowy Dziennik) reported the number to be four, Nowy Dziennik, No. 140 (November 28), 1918, p. 3. Other sources reported two: Evidence of Pogroms in Poland and Ukrainia, p. 39. Philipp Waschitz named the second man to be Adolf Korpus, TNA (London), FO 371/3903/30469.
103 It stated that “the Jews who are quite neutral are suffering the most … we beg for help”: Zygmund Lasocki, Wspomnienia szefa administracji P.K.L.i K.Rz. (Cracow, 1931) p. 40; Cohen, op. cit., p. 26.
104 Bailly, op. cit., p. 288.
red and white”.105 In these scenes of joy, what Polish sources referred to as a “szumowiny” (mob) entered the Jewish district, and attacked Jews, and their property.106 Continuing the pattern of the Polish take-over of other towns in Galicia, one of the first actions taken was the disarming of the local Jewish Militia.107 Jewish accounts report that almost “immediately”108 looting and violence broke out in the Jewish district, and without filling the vacuum with Polish troops, some form of violent outpouring seemed to become almost inevitable. Certainly there was a lack of order in Lwów during the day of November 22, with the streets full of drunken soldiers and residents.109 Prisons were also opened, adding to the disorder, with up to seventy prisoners evading recapture. According to the Foreign Ministry report, “truly hellish orgies began … [H]orrible things happened. It was a veritable barbarity, entirely medieval. Regretfully, we declare that a number of officers could be found who took part in the murders and robberies”.110

According to witnesses, the pogrom started on the morning of November 22.111 Noteworthy was the immediate nature of the looting. Ukrainian forces left the city at 6am that morning, and “contemporaneously with the entrance of the [Polish] troops into the city the plundering began”.112 Some of the earliest victims of the looting were Jewish-owned shops, and practically every shop on the Krakówska, between Rynek to the Krakówski Square, was looted in the early hours of the riots, including a number of wholesalers of alcohol, as a consequence of which large numbers of rioters quickly became inebriated.113 Not only was property damaged, but large amounts of stock were systematically looted by the rioters. Merchants were a proportionately high proportion of the total Jewish casualties.114 Events were not confined to looting

105 ibid., p. 311.
107 Similar events took place in various towns in both Eastern and Western Galicia between November 4 (Brzozów) and November 13 (in Cracow and Jarosław), inJarosław for example, “The Jewish militia was disarmed on November 13 by the town commandant, pillaging and assaults followed on November 15”: Chasanowitsch, op. cit., p. 29.
108 Evidence of Pogroms in Poland and Ukrainia, p. 27.
111 Ibid., pp. 281-283.
112 Zippers, the largest jewellers in Galicia, was one of the first targets of the robbers: US National Archives (Washington, DC) M820/225, LE1, pp. 3-4.
113 “Soldiers straightaway became intoxicated”, in ibid. p. 4.
114 Although there is some disagreement on the total numbers of Jews killed and injured (see n. 389), Jewish sources generally agree that they were either 72 or 73. Of the 73 dead recorded in one source,
of shops, and assaults on members of the Jewish community. When looting was completed, buildings were burned and according to the Foreign Ministry report, the Lwów fire brigade refused to put the fires out. Religious artefacts were also specifically targeted by the rioters; “there were also examples of sacrilege: Torahs in the old Synagogue were taken from their cases, piled in a heap and burned. The Torahs were also set fire to in the so-called new Temple”. Other anti-Jewish aspects of the pogrom included the cutting of beards and *peyote* by Polish soldiers; “armed with sticks and swords [they] began tormenting the hidden Jews and cutting off their beards”. Jews were requisitioned for forced labour or in other instances were compelled to dance to the “delight of the rabble”.

It was in this atmosphere that Mączyński made a tour of the newly liberated city, after which he reported that the whole of the city was in Polish hands but for Żółkiewska Street, in the centre of the Jewish district, and the old Castle, where Polish troops still faced “systematic resistance”. He reported that Jewish and Ukrainian defenders resisted stoutly until the evening, contrary to most other reports stating that the Ukrainian forces had withdrawn on the night of November 21-22, whilst the Jewish Militia had been disarmed on November 22. It was reported that elements of the Jewish Militia had resisted until the middle of the afternoon around the Skarbka Theatre, the Old Synagogue and around Krakow Street. Other Polish sources deny

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36 were merchants or traders, 11 artisans, 4 members of the intelligentsia, and 22 without occupation; of the 437 wounded, 121 were merchants or traders, 26 artisans, 5 workers, 14 commercial employees and 271 private persons: “Der polnisch-ukrainische Konflikt und die Juden”, n.d., Central Zionist Archive (CZA) (Jerusalem), L6/119; referred to in William W. Hagen, “The Moral Economy of Popular Violence. The Pogrom in Lwów, November 1918”, in Robert Blobaum (ed.), *Antisemitism and its Opponents in Modern Poland* (New York, 2005), p. 129.

115 Tomaszewski, “Lwów, 22 listopada”, pp. 283-284, and referred to in Bendow, op. cit., pp. 49, 139. This is disputed in the report of the Ministry of Justice, which argues that only twenty-five out of the usual sixty firemen were in Lwów between November 22 and 27, and were insufficient to deal with the demands placed upon them: US National Archives (Washington, DC) M820/225, LE1, pp. 7-8.

116 “The Extraordinary Governmental Investigating Commission in Lemberg”, US National Archives (Washington, DC) M820/225, LE1, p. 5. Jewish sources went further, stating that “legionnaires hacked at the torah rolls with swords”. Jewish sources often referred to irregular Polish units as Legionnaires (the name of Piłsudski’s units who fought on the Austrian side during the First World War), whereas the units in Lwów were not part of Piłsudski’s formations, Bendow, op. cit., p. 42.

117 US National Archives (Washington), M820/225.130.

118 Bendow, op. cit., pp. 116, 156.


120 Ibid., p. 21.

121 Bailey, op. cit., pp. 310-311.

122 Golczewski, op. cit., p. 189.

123 Witold Hupert, *Walki o Lwów (od 1 listopada 1918 do 1 maja 1919 roku)* (Warsaw, 1933), p. 94.
that there was any fighting in the city,\textsuperscript{124} whilst Major Roman Abraham, the Polish commander of the Polish position adjacent to the Jewish district, failed to mention any resistance in that region.\textsuperscript{125} It is therefore hard to see what fighting Mączyński was referring to, save for the local Jewish population trying to defend itself from the mob.

General Roja, however, had apparently foreseen the prospect of disturbances. On the afternoon of November 22 he requested reinforcements from Cracow to help keep order, despite the fact that there were some 3,000 Polish troops in Lwów at this time, easily enough to maintain order if they had kept their discipline.\textsuperscript{126} On Monday November 24, courts-martial were introduced into the city, enforced by armed patrols under the command of officers, sent out by Mączyński, which finally served to quell the pogrom. The patrols, which numbered some 150 men, would appear to be a remarkably small number of troops required to regain order, considering the large Polish force in the city.\textsuperscript{127} Calm was restored by the evening of November 24,\textsuperscript{128} although there were still reportedly bodies lying in the streets.\textsuperscript{129}

On the one hand, Jewish sources insisted that it was a pre-organised pogrom, “commanded from on high”.\textsuperscript{130} Antoni Jakubski, Captain Mączyński’s Chief of Staff, commented that a “punitive expedition” was being carried out.\textsuperscript{131} It was also reported that the pogrom had apparently come in waves, suggesting that the mob’s attack on the Jewish district was in some way systematic.\textsuperscript{132} Rumours circulated that the Polish liberators had been granted permission to plunder the Jewish district as a reward for the capture of Lwów, where Polish soldiers had “been allowed to rob for forty-eight

\textsuperscript{124} Baily, op. cit., pp. 310-312; Roja, op. cit., pp. 206-207.
\textsuperscript{125} Roman Abraham, “Pododcinek Góra Stracenia”, in Waniorek (ed.), op. cit., pp. 618-635, referred to in Prusin, op. cit., p. 82.
\textsuperscript{126} CAW (Warsaw), “Inwentarze kolekcji materiałów drukowanych i archiwaliów prywatnych” 444.1.1, no page.
\textsuperscript{127} Bendow, op. cit., p. 85.
\textsuperscript{128} US National Archives (Washington, DC), 860c.4016/144. no page.
\textsuperscript{129} Max Reiner, a Jewish journalist from Vienna, who was in Lwów at the time reported this in his account of the events: “Die Pogrome in Lemberg”, n.d., p. 22, held at CZA (Jerusalem), Z3/180, referred to in William W. Hagen, op. cit., p. 136.
\textsuperscript{130} Evidence of Pogroms in Poland and Ukrainia, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{131} Israel Cohen reported this from a conversation between Jakubski and leaders of the Jewish community: Cohen, op. cit., p. 29.
hours”. 133 Philipp Waschitz does not mention any such order, merely that “Polish combatants in Lemberg consisted mostly of volunteers amongst whom was a doubtful element who, from the length of the struggle … would have lost their fighting spirit had they not been stimulated by the thought that the Jewish quarter would be given as spoil to the liberators of Lemberg”. 134 The claim that the Poles organised the incident was further backed up by the assertion that “the entire Jewish section was surrounded with a cordon of soldiers, thus taking care that no one could leave or enter the Jewish streets”. 135 Three synagogues were burnt down, with a number of Jews dying while attempting to rescue religious artefacts from the burning buildings. Accusations that they were prevented from leaving the buildings, and that whole families were locked in burning buildings were also reported. 136

On the other hand, Polish evidence suggests that the pogrom was not in fact ordered by the Polish command. On November 22, a Jewish delegation of the elders of the community, including Emil Parnas and Ozjasz Wasser, approached the general commander of Polish forces, General Roja, for support. Yet the disarming of the Jewish Militia, their only means of defence against attack, on November 22 made some form of riot, let alone a pogrom, inevitable without firm action by the Polish command. 137 The delegation informed Roja that armed groups were breaking into Jewish stores, and asked for protection. 138 Roja agreed to help, recognising that their fears were “genuine”, 139 and sent them to Mączyński, who was responsible for carrying out appropriate measures, and he promised immediate action. 140 His command to maintain order and discipline was only published on November 23, and made public a day later. Mączyński attributed the delay to the fact that the printer failed to print the order immediately, and that General Roja had forbidden its

133 Bendow, Der Lemberger Judenpogrom, p. 57, but also referred to on pp. 69, 114; Cohen, op. cit., p. 27. Sir Stuart Samuel, who conducted an investigation in late 1919 into the incidents for the British Government, noted that “it has been proved to my satisfaction that these troops [Roja’s relief army] were promised three days’ free looting of the Jewish quarter”, Report of Sir Stuart Samuel on his Mission to Poland. Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, [Cmd. 674] (London, 1920), p. 9.
135 Bendow, Der Lemberger Judenpogrom, p. 142.
136 Evidence of Pogroms in Poland and Ukrainia, pp. 28, 33-34; Bendow, Der Lemberger Judenpogrom, pp. 141-159.
137 Evidence of Pogroms in Poland and Ukrainia, p. 39.
publication, despite the fact that he had a proclamation to the “Jewish population of Lwów” printed on November 22, stating that

[d]uring three weeks of fighting for Lemberg the majority of the Jewish population not only failed to maintain their neutrality vis-à-vis the Polish troops, but on several occasions offered them armed resistance and sought treacherously to prevent our troops’ victorious advance. Instances have been established of soldiers being shot from ambush, having boiling water poured on them and axes thrown at patrols. The Military High Command is having to restrain the natural reactions of the Polish people and its army … the bulk of the Jewish population should be obliged, in their own interest, to constrain those of their co-religionists who conduct themselves in a manner as if attempting to provoke an unforeseeable misfortune on the whole Jewish community.  

It was for this reason that the Vice-President of the Jewish council, Wasser, blamed Mączyński for the events of November 22-24.  

Evidence, if it existed at all, would appear to support the conclusions of the Foreign Ministry Report, namely that soldiers believed that “orders had been given out for reprisals … needless to say, no such order existed, the belief prevailed, however, that a formal command had been issued for a punitive military expedition”. No evidence of such an order has been found, meaning that either there was no such order, or that it was issued verbally. This leaves open the question of who would have issued such an order. Tokarzewski reported that it was Roja who had “given permission for 24 hours to do which they pleased” in the Jewish district, a

141 Mączyński, Boje Lwowskie, p. 22.
142 Gazeta Poranna, no. 4447, November 23, 1918, p. 2; referred to in Chasanowich, op. cit., pp. 56, 61-62. A copy of the declaration is printed in Roja, op. cit., p. 305.
144 Tomaszewski, “Lwów, 22 listopada”, p. 281, see also Bendow, op. cit., p. 69.
145 The Ministry of Justice report commented that “the claim that the military command did not desire to avoid them [anti-Jewish disturbances] is not worthy of discussion, but it appears likely that the executors of its orders did not always enthusiastically carry out commands issued in this connection”: US National Archives (Washington, DC) M820/225, LE1, p. 6.
146 Quoted in Golczewski, op. cit., p. 191.
statement denied by Roja.  Like the question of whether there was an order, the question of who ordered it can only remain a matter of speculation until further evidence is found.

One of the major and recurring accusations by the Poles was that the Jews had attacked Polish troops, either by firing from windows, or more commonly, by pouring boiling water onto Polish soldiers, and Jakubski claimed arms were found in one of the city’s synagogues. Despite the withdrawal of the Ukrainian troops, the Polish socialist, Adam Ciółkosz, reported that shots had been fired from the rooftops in the Jewish quarter, although he believed that they had come from Ukrainian soldiers, rather than Jews. This accusation was repeated in subsequent anti-Jewish riots in Lida and Wilno, and was cited as one of the major provocations for the outbreak of violence against the Jewish population. It should be noted that this was the same charge made against the Jewish population before the outbreak of the pogrom in Lwów undertaken by the Russian army on September 27, 1914. The official report, however, clearly stated that “so far this fact [of pouring boiling water on Polish soldiers] has not been expressly confirmed. In the principal Lemberg hospitals no cases of burning among soldiers were noted, although Miss Ignasziewicz, an employee of the Politechnique Hospital, states that one case of a burned soldier came to her observation, but this was on 22 November, the day of the robberies”. As was often the case, the fact that allegations had been made was more important than the truth, as it was the rumour that Jews had attacked Poles which became an accepted fact among the Polish population.

After the Pogrom

Although the violence may have ended by November 24, the situation in Lwów was still extremely volatile. Polish fears of a Jewish retaliation were serious enough for

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147 Roja, op. cit., p. 207.
148 “The Jewish Militia shot at Polish aeroplanes … soldiers claim that they were shot at from tenements occupied by Jews”: US National Archives (Washington, DC) M820/225, LE1, p. 4.
151 See n. 252.
the Polish garrison of Lwów to be put on high alert on November 27,\textsuperscript{153} incidentally the day before the funerals for the victims and the defiled Torah scrolls, at which some 40,000 mourners came to hear Rabbi Dr. Shmuel Guttman, the \textit{Oberrabbiner} of Lwów, who collapsed while giving the funeral service.\textsuperscript{154} \textit{Pobudka} reported on December 5 that Jews were “collecting weapons and preparing for armed struggle”.\textsuperscript{155} On December 11 five prominent Zionists, Leon Reich, Joseph Mordecai Anshel Tennenblatt, Alexander Hausner and Michael Ringel, were taken hostage, and interned in a castle at Baranow on the River Vistula.\textsuperscript{156} Pilsudski claimed that they were imprisoned “only as a military measure, designed to secure the tranquillity of the people of Lemberg, if I were to release the hostages, it would cause considerable discontent among the Poles”.\textsuperscript{157} The hostages were only released some two months later, under pressure from the Western Allies.\textsuperscript{158} Polish authorities also shut down the Zionist newspaper \textit{Togblat} on December 12. Under these circumstances it is easy to see how the Polish troops could treat the Jewish minority with hostility and suspicion.

Even some twenty years later Joseph Tenenbaum wrote of the “ever so cruel, ever so barbarous” events in “Lemberg”.\textsuperscript{159} The effect on the Jewish population of the events in Lwów was to have far-reaching implications for Jewish attitudes towards their Polish rulers. It was undoubtedly the case that the incidents in Lwów radicalised the Jewish attitude towards the Polish state. While the brutality suffered by both Poles and Jews alike during the First World War under Russian, and to a lesser extent German and Austrian, occupation,\textsuperscript{160} was to some extent expected, the new Polish state, claiming to be being built on democratic principles, had an ominous start in Kielce and Lwów. The events in the latter city were the culmination of many small acts of violence since Polish independence through the month of November, from

\textsuperscript{153} \textit{Pobudka}, No. 23 (November 28, 1918), p. 3.
\textsuperscript{154} Bendow, op.cit., p. 94 (Including a picture of the burials on p. 95). It is interesting to note that the figure of those attending the funeral was later revised by Tenenbaum to 20,000. See Joseph Tenenbaum, \textit{In Search of a Lost People. The Old and the New Poland} (New York, 1948), p. 13.
\textsuperscript{155} \textit{Pobudka}, No. 30 (December 5, 1918), p. 2.
\textsuperscript{156} It should be noted that a number of prominent Ukrainians were taken hostage as well.
\textsuperscript{157} Notes of a conversation between Israel Cohen and Józef Piłsudski, January 23, 1919: BDBJ (London), ACC/3121/B4/5H/6.
\textsuperscript{158} The Zionists were released, according to August Zaleski, on January 26 due to a “change in military situation”. Rumbold (Berne) to FO, January 27, 1919: TNA (London), FO 608/66/1276. It is also interesting to note that it was the British Foreign Office that informed Roman Dmowski in Paris of their release, not a Polish source, in ibid.
\textsuperscript{159} Tenenbaum, \textit{In Search of a Lost People}, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{160} For an account of Lwów under Russian occupation see Gatrell, \textit{A Whole Empire Walking}, pp. 18-20.
major incidents at Kielce to smaller acts of violence perpetrated by Poles. The Zionist newspaper *Ha-tsfira* declared that “Poland has been re-born with bloodstains on her forehead”.\(^{161}\) Poland could not have had a more inauspicious start to her relationship with her Jewish minority. Lwów inevitably coloured Jewish perceptions of the Poles, with the extensive coverage of even the smallest acts in the Jewish press. Poles were naturally treated with suspicion by the Jewish population. The brutal savagery of the anti-Jewish violence in Lwów was undoubtedly due in part to the bitter conflict between the Poles and Ukrainians in East Galicia. Polish accusations of Jewish breaches of neutrality had embittered the Polish side.\(^{162}\) Krysiak Franciszek Salezy, a member of the Polish forces who took the city, later wrote that “I don’t deny that, among the Polish inhabitants of the city, there was a great deal of resentment toward the Jews, particularly the Zionists, for purely political reasons … It [the pogrom] was totally justified”,\(^{163}\) due to Jewish support for the Ukrainians. The irony of the position is that Jewish support for the Ukrainian cause did increase, but as a result of the events in Lwów. The treatment of the Jewish population under Ukrainian rule in the weeks up to November 22, and even the earlier co-operation from the establishment of the ZUNR, helped lend support to the Ukrainians through the losing war that continued into the middle of 1919.

Some Poles were appalled by the events in Lwów. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lwów, Józef Bilczewski, appealed to the Polish population to restore order.\(^{164}\) Money was also provided by the Polish Liquidation Committee to help repair damage to the Jewish district.\(^{165}\) It has to be noted that the Polish reaction was far more typically hostile, and defensive. The apparent lack of vigour shown by the Lwów police in trying to apprehend those involved in the riots caused further ill feeling. By February 10, 1919, the Lwów Police Department announced that they had arrested seventy-six individuals implicated in the riots of November 22-24,\(^{166}\) whilst reports

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\(^{161}\) *Ha-tsfira*, December 5, 1918, quoted in Mendelsohn, op. cit., p. 90.
\(^{164}\) Bilczewski was later beatified by Pope John Paul II for his work against the Bolsheviks as a result of the anti-Catholic measures in his archdiocese, and was known to protect everyone in his see regardless of race or religion. *Nowy Dziennik*, No. 143 (December 1, 1918), p. 1.
\(^{165}\) *Nowy Dziennik*, No. 154 (December 12, 1918), p. 3.
\(^{166}\) Of these it is interesting to note that some forty-six were women. AAN (Warsaw), CAW “Dowództwo WP na Galicję Wschodnią”, I.304.1.63, no page. By the time that the Morgenthau
had stated that up to 7,000 individuals had taken part in the riots.\textsuperscript{167} Even if this figure is inflated, it would appear that the vast majority of those involved escaped justice.

To what extent could the events of November 22-24 have been avoided? The situation in Przemyśl,\textsuperscript{168} after the Polish take-over in early November, suggest that order could, and indeed, should have been maintained. In that city, with the collapse of Habsburg rule there emerged a short-lived joint rule between the Poles and Ukrainians, which lasted some three days, between November 1-4.\textsuperscript{169} Also on November 1, a \textit{Yiddisher Soldatenrat} (Council of Jewish Soldiers) was set up to defend the Jewish quarter as an “independent national sector”,\textsuperscript{170} separate from the Polish and Ukrainian districts. It purchased some 200 rifles and ammunition.\textsuperscript{171} The agreement was broken by the Ukrainians, under the command of General Puchalski, who took over the Polish headquarters, with the part of the town on the northern bank of the river San (Zasanie) remaining in Polish hands.

In response to the Ukrainian takeover, the local Jewish People’s Council issued a declaration of “absolute neutrality, and without reservations, in the Polish-Ukrainian dispute”\textsuperscript{172} on November 5 Tzvi Luft, a former officer of the \textit{KuK Armee} and a member of the Jewish Militia, described their situation as being “between the hammer and the anvil”.\textsuperscript{173} On the night of November 11, Przemyśl was cleared of Ukrainian
troops, and sporadic attacks on Jews and looting of Jewish shops in Franciszkanska Street did occur, leading to the death of one Jew, Jakob Rotter. The Jewish Militia was immediately disarmed, the officers imprisoned and a curfew was imposed. Lieutenant-Colonel Michał Tokarzewski accused the local Jewish population of supporting the Ukrainians, leading to the accusation that a pogrom had occurred.\footnote{Chasanowitsch, op. cit., pp. 22-25; Paweł Korzec, “Antisemitism in Poland as an Intellectual, Social, and Political Movement”, in Fishman (ed.), op. cit., p. 40.} Tokarzewski issued a declaration stating that, if a “contribution” of some 3,000,000 Kronen was not paid by November 21, he threatened “plundering of the Jews by his soldiers”.\footnote{Menczer, Sefer Przemysł, p. 187; Wade to Balfour, TNA (London), FO 371/3903.} On the following morning Major Julian Stachiewicz dispatched officer patrols to the Jewish district and “swiftly restored order”.\footnote{Report contained in CAW (Warsaw), “Inwentarz wycinkow prasowych” 410.9.2.} Furthermore, the Polish National Council confirmed that the Jewish population had kept their neutrality. On November 19 it also revoked Tokarzewski’s order. Interestingly it was an Endek member of the Austrian Reichsrat and of Przemyśl’s Polish Committee, Dr. Leonard Tarnawski, who informed Tokarzewski that “over my dead body will you collect the contribution”.\footnote{The Jews of Przemyśl remained loyal to Tarnawski, who was elected to represent Przemyśl in the Sejm in February 1919 with 10,423 votes, including 3,000 Jews who voted for his slate: Menczer, Sefer Przemysł, p. 188.} Comparing the reactions of Mączyński, in Lvów, and Stachiewicz and Tarnawski in Przemyśl, it can certainly be argued that a more vigorous and urgent reaction by Mączyński would have at least helped modify the seemingly inevitable anti-Jewish excesses by the victorious Polish soldiery.\footnote{A point that Leon Chasanowitsch forcibly makes: Chasanowitsch, op. cit., pp. 44-45.}

Almost immediately the question of who was responsible for the Lwów pogrom was debated in Polish circles. The former Viceroy of Galicia, Michał Bobrzyński, asserted that Jews had always been treated with respect by the Polish administration, but admitted that the “dregs of society and soldiers”\footnote{Michał Bobrzyński, Wkrzeszenie Państwa Polskiego: szkic historyczny (Cracow, 1920), Volume II, pp. 31-32.} had been involved, much to the damage of Poland’s international reputation. More typically Polish sources blamed criminals released from Lwów prisons, or the Ukrainians.\footnote{Bujak blamed both “criminals from the local prisons … with the hungry rabble of the town and suburb, and with numerous deserters”: Bujak, op. cit., p. 37.} Even Jews were implicated in a few reports, either as members of the Jewish Militia, petty criminals,
or as individuals dressed in Polish uniforms provoking the riots. Jakubski argued that the Jewish population had been distressed by the Ukrainian defeat, and having “completely lost all their sense” attacked the Polish forces. Roja and Mączyński simply blamed each other for not acting more swiftly or effectively for preventing the rioting. Mączyński absolved himself from blame by arguing that he had subordinated himself to the commander of the Polish reinforcements, Lieutenant-Colonel Michał Karaszewicz-Tokarzewski, who, Mączyński argued, was responsible for keeping order. Karaszewicz-Tokarzewski in turn argued that he was not in Lwów, and as such the responsibility for keeping orders should have remained Mączyński’s.

With Karaszewicz-Tokarzewski absent from Lwów over the period of November 22-23, the responsibility for keeping order, until relieved, should have been Mączyński’s, although Mączyński, Karaszewicz-Tokarzewski and Roja all bear some responsibility for what happened due to their “liberal” reaction to events.

It became obvious on the morning of November 25 that the damage to the Jewish district of Lwów was heavy, estimated to be in the region of some 103 million Kronen. Houses, synagogues, and shops were destroyed, and the loss in human terms was also heavy. In the most prolonged and extensive example of anti-Jewish violence since the last of the pogroms in 1906, reports stated that there were between 72 and 150 dead and up to 463 wounded and some 7,000 families affected. Generally the figure of 72 is accepted, but not quantified. When this is compared

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181 Evidence of Pogroms, p. 11.
186 Israel Cohen estimated this to be some 4 million British pounds. Cohen, op. cit., p. 16.
187 Three synagogues and around fifty two- and three-storey apartment buildings were destroyed by fire. Tomaszewski, “Lwów, 22 listopada”, p. 284.
188 Ibid., p. 284.
189 The lower figure from Joseph Bendow, Der Lemberger Judenpogrom, as merely the number of victims who can be named (listed on p. 97), and in Evidence of Pogroms in Poland and Ukrainia, p. 32. The Lwów Yiddish newspaper Tageblat reported 66 deaths, with a further 6 who had died from wounds (no date, taken from Newspapers scrapbook at YIVO (New York)). A similar figure, 73, is quoted in CAW (Warsaw), “Inwentarze kolekcji materiałów drukowanych i archiwalów prywatnych”, 410.9.2, no page. The higher figure is that of the government committee of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, sent to Lwów in December 1919, “Raport Delegacji Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych R.P. w sprawie Wystąpien Antyżydowskich we Lwowie”, quoted in Tomaszewski, “Lwów, 22 listopada”, p. 284. This figure is disputed by Leszek Tomaszewski in “Lwów – Listopad 1918”, pp. 163-173. The figure is significantly smaller than those used by other contemporary observers such as Samuel Gewürz, Lemberg: Eine kritische Betrachtung des Judenpogroms vom 21.
to the numbers of Polish casualties sustained in the fighting with the Ukrainians for the control of Lwów, estimated to be between 200 and 210, even the lower figure of 72 Jewish civilians killed is significant. Franciszek Bujak argued that of the 73 Jewish victims he recorded, these included “those Jews who during the fights died a natural death and could not be buried, owing to the inaccessibility of the Jewish cemetery”. Colonel H. H. Wade, the head of the first British Mission to Poland after independence, reported that the final figure of 72 “did not as stated include those killed in three weeks previous street fighting”. These arguments were strenuously denied in some sources, and backed up to a point in the official report into the events in Lwów, where it concluded that “about 50” Jews were killed in the “November Pogrom”, and of the remainder, sixteen died in unknown circumstances, twelve from disease or were killed during the period of Ukrainian occupation. A report in the Polish Warsaw newspaper, Gazeta Poranna (Morning Gazette), calculated that 41 Jews died up to “when the pogroms were quelled”. Polish military sources emphasised that Jewish civilian casualties occurred during the fighting, and that losses in the Christian civilian population were still higher.

Table 2.4: Jews Killed between November 1st and November 23rd 1918

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Merchants</th>
<th>Workmen</th>
<th>Private people</th>
<th>Free professions</th>
<th>Totally (of whom 52 killed between 22/XI and 23/XI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(18 women, 61 men)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


191 Bujak further states that “their number was relatively considerable, as influenza was just then raging in the city”: ibid., pp. 37-38.


194 This newspaper was vehemently pro-Polish, Gazeta Poranna, February 9, 1919.

195 It was reported that they numbered up to 268 killed and 952 wounded for both the Polish and Ukrainian civilians: Białyńca-Chołodecki, Lwów w listopadzie, pp. 43-44.

196 “Wypadki w działańi żydowskiej we Lwowie w listopadzie 1918”: US National Archives (Washington, DC), file no. 860c.4016/144.
Table 2.5: Occupations of Jews Wounded on the 22nd and 23rd of November\textsuperscript{197}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Merchants</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a/</td>
<td>Merchants</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b/</td>
<td>Commercial assistants</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c/</td>
<td>Commercial agents</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d/</td>
<td>Workmen</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e/</td>
<td>Day – labourers</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f/</td>
<td>Public functionaries</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g/</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h/</td>
<td>Free professions</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i/</td>
<td>Peddlers</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>No profession</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Totally (of whom 152 are women)</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What is clear is that, even if the figure of Jews killed between November 22 and 24 was as low as some 50, this is still an unacceptable outpouring of violence against the Jewish community, which had tried to remain neutral between the Polish and Ukrainian factions in Lwów. Furthermore, what is not shown by a statistical analysis of the casualty figures are the other indignities inflicted upon the Jewish population, which are more difficult to quantify.

When the Polish historian Jerzy Tomaszewski attempted to form some conclusions on Lwów,\textsuperscript{198} he was roundly criticised for referring to Rabinowicz as a historical source.\textsuperscript{199} The final figures for casualties in Lwów in November 1918 are generally estimated to be 439 killed and 762 wounded.\textsuperscript{200} Historians sympathetic to the Poles such as Norman Davies have suggested that “an estimated 340 innocent persons were killed. Some two thirds of the victims were Ukrainians. The remaining seventy or so were Jews … one has to wonder whether a massacre in which the majority of victims were Christians can fairly be described as a ‘pogrom.’ Some clarification is necessary”.\textsuperscript{201} While it is true that Christian casualties, both Polish and Ukrainian, were higher than Jewish, the circumstances surrounding the Jewish casualties mark them out for special treatment. Even both Polish investigating Commissions sent to

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\textsuperscript{197} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{201} Ibid., p. 148.
Lwów and sections of the Polish press referred to the incidents as a “pogrom”, despite denials from prominent Poles, such as W. O. Gorski, the Director of the Polish Information Bureau. He wrote:

> [o]n the face of the evidence received, it would seem as though the reported Jewish massacres of Poland bore some resemblance with those terrific and self advertised South American revolutions, in connection with which it is usually reported that after a night of intense cannonading, only a dog was found lying dead in the street, and even then the learned faculty, after a careful post-mortem examination, was not able to decide unanimously whether “man’s best friend” had died of fright or been killed by a bullet.

Fundamentally the riots in Lwów could be classified as a pogrom, as there was looting and rioting in the Jewish district of Lwów, which had not been involved in the fighting to take control of the city.

Table 2.6: Attacks by District, Lwów, November 22nd and 23rd, 1918

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In streets</th>
<th>Numbers of the Streets</th>
<th>Numbers of the attacks</th>
<th>Numbers of the robbed families</th>
<th>Total damages (Kronen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Principally inhabited by Jews</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>5009</td>
<td>4043</td>
<td>89,525,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inhabited by a great number of Jews</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>14,809,309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little inhabited by Jews</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>8,637,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>6023</td>
<td>4814</td>
<td>113,071,436</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lieutenant Antoni Jakubski commented in his memoirs that “the Jews were rightly punished. The whole district had to be spacyfikowany (pacified) by military

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204 “Wypadki w działaie żydowskiej we Lwowie w listopadzie 1918”: US National Archives (Washington, DC), file no. 860c:4016/144.
action.”

As late as August 30, 1919, when Lwów was visited by the Morgenthau Mission, the counsel to the Mission, Arthur L. Goodhart, commented that Lwów was:

exceedingly pretty and modern-looking. Having read about the capture of the city by the Russians and its recapture by the Austrians during the Great War, and the fighting which had lately gone on between the Ukrainians and Poles, I expected to find most of the houses destroyed. The city, however, is virtually undamaged except for one or two buildings which are marked with machine-gun bullet holes. The Jewish quarter, however, which I passed, had been burnt down.

Whereas the Ukrainian casualties can be more readily attributed to the fighting for control of Lwów, occurring before November 22, the Jews were non-combatants and largely suffered casualties during the period of November 22-24. After the Poles had taken control of the city, the only casualties were Polish, killed while order was restored under the courts-martial. The fact that elements of the army took part in the violence also helps to clarify the events in Lwów as a pogrom, even though it was the army itself that finally restored order. Piłsudski, when in conversation with Henry Morgenthau snr., the American investigator into the anti-Jewish incidents in Poland, defined a pogrom as “a massacre ordered by the government, or not prevented by it when prevention is possible”. By this definition, it would appear that the events in Lwów could be classified as a pogrom. The 22 or so Jews who died as a result of the street-fighting (or possibly acts of anti-Semitism) in Lwów, cannot arguably be said to have died as a result of a pogrom, but the remaining 50 or so can justifiably be described as ‘pogrom victims.’ The accepted figure of 72 victims needs to revised down to 52, but they do, however, need to be recognised as the victims of a

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206 Goodhart, op. cit., p. 141. A local guide commented to Israel Cohen that the bullet holes were referred to as “Wilson’s Points … we are now engaged in self-determination, and God knows what and when the end will be”: Israel Cohen, Travels in Jewry (New York, 1953), p. 87.
207 Korzec noted that “the Jewish militia was interned and disarmed, and a pogrom occurred with the active help of the army”: Korzec, op. cit., p. 77.
208 Piłsudski quoted in Henry Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 371.
209 Even in works published in 2006 the figure of 72 is commonly used. Joanna Beata Michlic not only uses this figure, but incorrectly identifies the perpetrators to be members of General Haller’s ‘Blue Army’: Michlic, Poland’s Threatening Other, pp. 111, 118.
pogrom.\textsuperscript{210} With the number of Polish troops in and around Lwów, it should have been eminently possible to have kept order. Because it was not, whether or not there was an order issued giving the Polish ‘liberators’ free-rein to pillage the Jewish district the resulting disorder was what damaged the reputation of Poland internationally.\textsuperscript{211} As Israel Cohen, a British-Jewish journalist, noted: “as soon as the Poles felt the masters of their own house they began attacks on their Jewish neighbours”.\textsuperscript{212}

Table 2.7: Persons Acting in the Pogroms of the 22nd and 23rd of November

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number of Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a/ soldiers without officers</td>
<td>2302 cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b/ soldiers with officers</td>
<td>545 cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c/ only officers</td>
<td>8 cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d/ soldiers and civil public</td>
<td>448 cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e/ civil public</td>
<td>7 cases</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.8: Outrages by Street, Lwów, November 1918\textsuperscript{214}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In streets</th>
<th>Before the 22/XI</th>
<th>On the 22/XI</th>
<th>On the 23/XI</th>
<th>After the 23/XI</th>
<th>Totally</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Principally inhabited by Jews</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>2637</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>5009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inhabited by a great number of Jews</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little inhabited by Jews</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>3052</td>
<td>2222</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>6023</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{210} Sir Stuart Samuel gives the figure of 52 Jews killed between November 21-23, yet does not account for how he came to this figure, \textit{Report by Sir Stuart Samuel}, p. 9; Henry Morgenthau reported the total to be 64 killed between November 21-23; FRUS, 1919, Volume II, p. 777.


\textsuperscript{212} Cohen, op. cit., p. 9.

\textsuperscript{213} “Wypadki w dziejach żydowskich we Lwowie w listopadzie 1918”: US National Archives (Washington, DC), file no. 860c.4016/144.

\textsuperscript{214} Ibid.
The International Reaction to Events in Lwów

Reports of pogroms in the Second Republic Poland are almost as old as the reborn state itself. The first news of pogroms in “Polish Galicia”, sent to the British Government, directly to Balfour, was received on 12 November 1918. The Times reported on November 15, 1918 that “the Jewish Press states that pogroms have taken place in several towns in Western Galicia and Poland. At Siedlce Polish legionaries killed six Jews and at Chrzanow nine. Pogroms have also occurred at Dombrowa, Szakowa, Jawoza and other towns”. Little action was taken in regard to these reports by the Foreign Office, but the events in Lwów demanded their attention, with the first information of casualties numbering 3,000 received by the Foreign Office on November 26. Three days later Lloyd George received an appeal to “help prevent the complete annihilation of Polish Jewry”. Reports further stressed that events in Galicia were as with the “Armenian massacres [Lwów is an] international question”. The same day, Robert Lansing, the United States Secretary of State, cabled Colonel Edward House, President Wilson’s Special Representative in Europe, that “very important Department be informed true facts as soon as possible. Any American sent to Poland should carefully investigate and report on this matter”. There was an immediate response from the KNP in Paris, stating that the Jews were accidental victims of street fighting, whilst the Polish National Committee in America claimed that pogroms were Russian in origin, and “in Polish such an expression does not exist”. Konstanty Skirmunt, of the Polish Committee in Italy, reported that “riots have taken place, but they were small affairs due to Bolsheviks’

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215 Balfour was a particular recipient of such letters, on account of his perceived support of the Jewish question, and his Balfour Declaration, “as a man who has had the courage to take in hand the sublime idea of the right of the nations to determine the right of their own destiny”: contained in TNA (London), FO 371/3281.
216 The Times, November, 15, 1918, p. 7.
217 TNA (London), FO 371/4374/197821.
218 The same telegram reported the casualty figures to be some 600 killed: Zionist Bureau London to Lloyd George, November 29, 1918: NAS (Edinburgh), Lothian, GD40/17/1163.
219 The Zionist Bureau was referring to the massacres of the Armenian subjects of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War. The numbers of those killed is a matter of heated debate between scholars, but is generally accepted to be in the region of a million. The massacres were the subject of an American investigation headed by the American Minister to Constantinople, Henry Morgenthau (who later acted as head of an investigative mission into the pogroms in Poland in 1919). See Henry Morgenthau, All in a Life-Time (Garden City, NY, 1922), pp. 336-337, 423-437.
220 US National Archives (Washington, DC), 860c.4016/186b.
222 Lifschutz, op. cit., p. 79.
influence, and were between Poles and Ukrainians, Jews having sided with Ukrainians, who are controlled and directed by Austrian Generals”. Cables were also used by the Zionist bureaus in Vienna and Copenhagen to put pressure on the international press, increasing the pressure on the new Polish government. The *New York Times* carried the “German Version”, reporting “several thousand” casualties had occurred as a result of the fact that “immediately upon entering the city the Poles proceeded to sack and burn the Ghetto district”. The *Jewish Chronicle* claimed 1,100 victims “in fearful outrages on Jews” in Lemberg.

It would be erroneous, however, to assume that all press coverage regarding Poland and the pogroms was negative. On December 3, under the headline of “Visit to Lemberg: A Fortnight’s Street Fighting”, *The Times* carried a 2,000-word report on the situation in the city. It did not mention the Jewish population, let alone any reports of pogroms. The following day, on December 4, the newspaper reported under the title, “Lemberg Disorders: Pogrom Stories Much Exaggerated”, that:

> [o]n the night of Thursday to Friday there was a good deal of pillaging. The troops that had arrived to rescue the city were worn out, and after the final combat most of them stood and slept. There was no one to keep order, and a number of streets were burnt out in the Jewish quarter. This being admitted, it

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223 Page to Lansing, FRUS PPC Volume II, p. 414.
225 “Jews Massacred – Terrible Pogroms in Poland and Galicia – Many Hundreds Killed in Lemberg”, *Jewish Chronicle*, December 6, 1918. The article is the source of some confusion. Richard C. Lukas uses the example of the *Jewish Chronicle* quoting 3,200 Jewish victims as an example of Jewish horribleness towards the new Polish state. It would appear that Lukas merely read Norman Davies’s article “Great Britain and the Polish Jews” rather than looking at the issue of the *Jewish Chronicle* that he cites the figure from. Later in the *Jewish Chronicle* article it quotes “a Central News telegram form Amsterdam stating that during the recent pogroms at Lemberg in Galicia no fewer than 3,200 Jews perished. In twenty houses 1,200 fearfully mutilated corpses were found”. Obviously the figure was not the opinion of the *Jewish Chronicle*: Lukas, op. cit., p. 252 However, by March 1919 the newspaper reported that “instead of the 500 victims originally alleged only thirty-five cases have been actually proved, with thirty more still in doubt”: “Pogroms in Galicia – Allied Inquiry Report”, ibid., March 14, 1919, p. 10. The *Manchester Guardian*, in an anonymous article (written by Israel Cohen), reported “one of the worst pogroms in Polish history” at Lemberg, November 30, 1918, cited in Norman Davies, ‘Ethnic Diversity in Twentieth Century Poland’, p. 157. The Vienna newspaper, *Neue Freie Presse*, which reported under the headline “Der Judenpogrom in Lemberg” the number of Jewish victims to be between 2,500 and 3,000, cited in H. H. Fisher, *America and the New Poland*, (New York, 1928), p. 156. The *New York Times* also informed its readers on November 29 that “immediately upon entering the city the Poles proceed to sack and burn the Ghetto district, whose victims numbered several thousand”, *New York Times*, November 29, 1918, p. 20.
226 Davies, “Great Britain”, p. 126.
must be said that stories of the whole city being in the throes of an unprecedented pogrom are baseless.\textsuperscript{227}

The pressure on the Allies increased. George Geoffrey Dawson, editor of \textit{The Times}, commented that an “impartial inquiry will doubtless establish the truth and apportion the blame; but it cannot be too emphatically said that nothing would be more likely to prejudice the Polish cause in the eyes of the civilized world that any attempt at systematic violence against the Jews”.\textsuperscript{228}

The KNP also alleged that reports were the result of German anti-Polish propaganda.\textsuperscript{229} Contemporary Polish newspapers attributed some of the blame for anti-Polish propaganda to German hands.\textsuperscript{230} The Polish language newspaper \textit{Polak (The Pole)}, printed in Paris, alleged that “so-called anti-Semitic pogroms” were orchestrated with the “aim of German policy in Poland … to revive or to strengthen above all the European distrust of ‘Polish misgovernment’ and of ‘Polish intolerance’”.\textsuperscript{231} Moreover, the newspaper went on to state that “taking advantage of the fact that the uneducated Jewish masses in Poland have preserved the language (though very corrupt) of their former Jewish oppressors, Germany is endeavouring to turn these masses into its allies: into a battering-ram for shattering Polish unity and strength”.\textsuperscript{232} A dispatch sent by Sir Horace Rumbold, the British Minister in Berne, who was instructed to keep a “watching brief” on Poland until the arrival of British

\textsuperscript{227} \textit{The Times}, December 4, 1918, p. 7a. Two days previously the unnamed ‘Special Correspondent’ (the report was filed in Vienna on November 29) commented that “There was much talk of pogroms and massacring of Jews in the same city [Lemberg]. The only thing appeared to be to go and see what was happening”: “Poland in Transition – Galicia Without Government – Bandits Roaming the Country”, \textit{The Times}, December 2, 1918, p. 7a. \textit{The Times} editorial of the same day commented that “whatever exaggeration there may have been in the reports spread through German and Jewish agencies of massacres of Jews in various parts of Poland, it is established beyond doubt that atrocious outrages have been committed upon the Jewish population, in particular the Polish capture of Lemberg from the Ruthenes”: “Pogroms in Galicia”, \textit{The Times}, December 2, 1918, p. 9b.\textsuperscript{228} Dawson further remarked that “those who would retain the good will of the Allies and the United States must deserve it”: Ibid.\textsuperscript{229} A. de Pomian (the KNP delegate to Stockholm) to Count Sobanski, November 30, 1918: contained in TNA (London), FO 371/4373.\textsuperscript{230} Andrzej Kapiszewski, “Stosunki polsko-żydowskie w Stanach Zjednoczonych Ameryki”, T. Gromada, H. Kubiak and E Kusielewicz (eds.), \textit{Polonia amerykańska. Przeszłość i współczesność} (Cracow, 1988), pp. 609-671.\textsuperscript{231} \textit{Polak}, December 1, 1918, p. 1: BDBJ (London), ACC/3121/C11/4/2/3.\textsuperscript{232} Ibid. p 3.
Mission in Poland,\textsuperscript{233} reported on 31 December 1918 that the British Military Attaché’s Department had just procured a copy of a secret document addressed by Consul Taltenback of the Propaganda Department of the German Legation in Berne. The writer “advocates increased use in Switzerland … of anti-Jewish pogroms in Poland and Galicia to combat Polish claims, and asks for articles calling attention … to contrast between German and Polish method of administration”.\textsuperscript{234} In conclusion, Rumbold commented that “the document appears to confirm the theory already advanced by Poles that Germans are exploiting alleged pogroms in order to prove that Poles are unfit to govern”. How extensive and how effective this politically motivated propaganda was is still a matter of debate. In the British magazine \textit{Pall Mall}, Prince Eustachy K. Savieha, the new Polish minister in London, gave an interview, in which he stated that:

I do not think that the Germans would really dare to attack us, because the blame would fall on them, and they would be sure of the Allies interfering. Their policy is one of irritation and they are steadily trying to provoke the Polish people in whatever way they can, so that in the case of war the blame would be on Poland and the Allies would not interfere.\textsuperscript{235}

There was to a certain extent a duality of German policy towards the new Polish state, as indeed the Weimar Republic was the first state to recognise Piłsudski’s regime. In his meeting with Count Alfred Bernstorff at the German Foreign Ministry on \textit{Willhelmstrasse}, the first German minister to Warsaw, Count Harry Kessler, was “warned against establishing any links with Zionists or other Jewish political trends because this would rouse Piłsudski’s suspicions. I was to get on the best possible terms with Piłsudski”.\textsuperscript{236} Despite these instructions to Kessler, it is clear that the new German Republic used the reports of ‘Polish pogroms’ to their advantage, in an attempt to try and persuade the Allies of the unsuitability of the Poles to rule over non-Polish minorities, principally the German population of the former \textit{Reich} lands, that would become the ‘Polish Corridor’ as stated in President Wilson’s ‘14 Points,’ at

\textsuperscript{233} FO to Rumbold, November 14, 1918: TNA (London), FO 371/3282. Sir Horace Rumbold would later be made British Minister to Warsaw, replacing Sir Percy Wyndham in October 1919.
\textsuperscript{234} TNA (London), FO 371/3903/4914.
\textsuperscript{235} US National Archives (Washington, DC), 860c.00/28 p. 2.
the forthcoming Peace Conference. The German position was further complicated by the remaining German troops in the former Russian lands who had expected to be replaced by Allied troops, a solution flatly turned down by the Western Allies. In a cabinet meeting Lloyd George commented that “we cannot expect the British to go on sacrificing their lives for the Poles”. The Jews were to be used as a ‘bargaining counter’ in international diplomacy by the Auswärtiges Amt.

British concerns about the expansion of Poland beyond its “ethnographic limits” had been raised. Furthermore, the British threatened that if pogroms did not cease Poland’s case would be adversely affected at the forthcoming Peace Conference. The other Allied powers, principally France, were not so forthcoming about threats to the new Polish state, and did not support Britain, which wished to give “a strong intimation in responsible Polish quarters that unless all such action [pogroms] be stopped, the prospects of Poland at the Peace Conference will be very seriously affected”. France, which had recognised the KNP as a ‘legitimate government’ on November 13, some three months before it accorded recognition to Piłsudska’s regime in Warsaw, wished to build Poland up to be as strong a state as possible to act as a barrière de l’est against Germany, while also providing a cordon sanitaire against Bolshevism in the east. But protests in the left-wing French press could not be ignored. La Victoire criticised the French Government on account of the fact that

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237 The Republic’s second Foreign Minister, Count Ulrich Brockdorff-Rantzau, appointed on December 18, 1918, had close links to Zionists from his time as Imperial Minister to Copenhagen: Udo Wengst, Graf Brockdorff-Rantzau und die aussenpolitischen Anfänge der Weimarer Republik (Berne, 1973), pp. 9-11.
240 See Piotr Łossowski, Między wojną a pokojem: Niemieckie zamysły wojenne na wschodzie w obliczu traktatu wersalskiego (Warsaw, 1976). To help facilitate this the Auswärtiges Amt appointed Professor Moritz Sobernheim as its expert on Jewish affairs: Zechlin, op. cit., pp. 426, 432.
241 Mond to Balfour, November 25, 1918: FO 371/3282; FRUS PPC, Volume IV, p. 441. Lloyd George’s hostility to Polish action in East Galicia is noted in ibid., Volume II, p. 408, Volume III, p. 624.
242 FO proposal to Cabinet regarding Eastern Policy, December 5, 1918: TNA (London) Cabinet Records [CAB] XCVII.
243 Derby to Pichon, November 28, 1918, quoted in Lundgreen-Nielsen, The Polish Problem at the Paris Peace Conference, p. 112.
it “does not hasten to shout about the anti-Jewish pogroms.” The Quai d’Orsay merely reprimanded her prospective ally, requiring the such “excesses” be moderated. There were disagreements between the Allies as to who should represent Poland at the Peace Conference. The lack of British recognition of the KNP was to a large degree due to Namier’s influence in the Foreign Office, while the French refused to recognise Piłsudski.

The Jewish Response

Zionists, who had been the main instigators of the largely inaccurate reports about Lwów, mobilised themselves. In Poland the lack of support from Piłsudski and Moraczewski was indicative of the hostility that was being focused on Jews by both left and right. Polish Zionists were in no doubt that help would only come from outside. As Ernst Theodor Breiteri, a Jewish member of Lwów Municipal Council, wrote in an appeal to Balfour: “thousands and thousands of inhabitants of Lemberg and of Western-Galicia call out the cry of distress: We need the most urgent and immediate help!”

It was clear that Zionists would use the events in Lwów to their advantage. They exerted pressure on the western powers both for Jewish nationality rights within the new states of eastern Europe, and for the establishment of the Jewish homeland, as set out in the Balfour Declaration, now over a year old, and not much advanced. In a meeting with Sir George Clerk, Balfour’s Private Secretary, at the Foreign Office, Dr Chaim Weizmann stated that “it was impossible for him, and others like him, to remain silent under the stream of appeals for help”, implying that he would embark on a “public crusade in the press”. Weizmann put further pressure on the Foreign Office by writing directly to Lloyd George, linking the Polish question to Palestine, a

246 “La Situation des Juifs en Pologne”, by Georges Sienaime, La Victoire, November 26, 1918.
247 ‘Pologne et des Juifs,’ L’Humanité, December 6, 1918.
249 TNA (London), FO 371/3282/200422.
250 Minute of meeting between Sir George Clerk and Chaim Weizmann: TNA (London). FO 371/3282/199154.
subject he knew the British Prime Minister supported. Weizmann posed the question:

[What then was the remedy? If the remedy for which Zionists asked was provided – if a large field for Jewish immigration were opened in the Near East by the creation of a Jewish National Home in Palestine on an adequate scale – then in course of time the situation in Poland might be eased at some future date. The sixteen per cent [i.e. Jews in the Polish population, incorrectly estimated by Weizmann] might be reduced and that would make things easier both for the Poles and the Jews … the existence of a strong Jewish Palestine would raise the status of the Jew all over the World and that alone would be an effective check on persecution.]

The British were in no position to find a ‘Palestinian solution’ to the Polish-Jewish question. As a result Balfour acceded to Weizmann’s demand to send a Jewish investigator to report on the situation in Galicia, on the understanding that “I do not feel I can confirm any official authority on Mr. Cohen’s Mission, nor regard him as having any official recognition”, but merely as a ‘Special Correspondent’ for *The Times*. It was made clear to Cohen that while he had “been given all facilities” for his journey “his mission can have no official character and that he cannot be regarded as having any official connections with a British mission in Poland or with the Foreign Office”. It was still a remarkable success for the Jewish representative

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251 Weizmann to Lloyd George, November 28, 1918: NAS (Edinburgh), Lothian, GD40/17/1160. The two men had dealings before with regard to the Balfour Declaration, and Lloyd George held the Zionist leader in high regard: David Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties* (London, 1938), Volume II, pp. 1117-1119.

252 Weizmann to Lloyd George, November 28, 1918: NAS (Edinburgh), Lothian, GD40/17/1160.


254 Balfour to Weizmann, November 29, 1918: TNA (London), FO 371/3282. Weizmann also sent a memorandum to Lloyd George informing him of his version of the meeting with Sir George Clerk: Weizmann to Lloyd George, November 28, 1919: NAS (Edinburgh), GD40/17/1160. Weizmann told the Polish Information Committee in London that Cohen “had the backing and authority of the British Government”, Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum [PISM] (London), A.12.851/E/1A.


256 FO to Rumbold (Berne), 6 December 1918: TNA (London), FO 371/3282/201720.
bodies in Britain,\textsuperscript{257} as at this point, only three weeks after the end of the First World War, no other British citizen was allowed to travel across Europe. Indeed, Israel Cohen, the chosen representative, was the first British citizen to arrive in Poland since 1915. Not satisfied with Cohen’s approval for his investigation in Poland, Zionist organisations continued the pressure in the West. In the United States, shortly after the Senatorial election, a mass protest meeting took place in New York’s Madison Square Garden on December 12, 1918. The principal speakers included the leading American banker and anti-Zionist Jacob Schiff, who denounced Dmowski’s anti-Semitism, and invited the gathered 8,000 to “weep in sympathy for the persecuted Jews in Galicia and Poland, and to demand protection” for the Jewish minority through the forthcoming Peace Conference.\textsuperscript{258} The second largest Jewish community in the world, located in North America, was a significant political force, which could not be ignored.

Arguably, the most important political figure in the world at the end of 1918 was the American President, Woodrow Wilson, whose opinion on the events was actively sought. Much to Marshall’s disappointment, Wilson refused to condemn the Poles openly. Furthermore, he would make no comment on minority rights for the Jewish community, despite an American Council of Inquiry that had recommended the need for minority protection in Poland.\textsuperscript{259} Wilson, who boarded the USS \textit{George Washington} for his voyage to Europe on December 4, sensibly refused to comment until further facts had been obtained, and looked to the proposed League of Nations to take over the responsibility for the problems facing Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{260} American action was limited to the US Ambassador in Paris, William G. Sharp, who issued a strong warning to Dmowski, who continued to maintain that reports from Lwów were “exaggerated”.\textsuperscript{261}

\textsuperscript{257} On behalf of the Joint Foreign Committee of the Jewish Board of Deputies and Anglo-Jewish Association, Lucien Wolf separately requested an investigation into events in Lwów, BDBJ (London), ACC/3121/C11/5/1/1.

\textsuperscript{258} The podium was shared by two Socialists, Justice Jacob Panken and Congressman Meyer Landon. \textit{New York Times}, December 12, 1918, p. 5.


\textsuperscript{261} Sharp to Lansing, December 6, 1918: US National Archives, 860c.4016. Robert Lansing had earlier written to Sharp commenting that the “Department of State has received information through various
It was clear that independent investigation of events in Poland was required by the Allied Powers. Balfour’s reason for not recognising Israel Cohen’s mission as official was that he felt Cohen’s report would be “biased”.\textsuperscript{262} Therefore, the arrangements for a separate “semi-official” British Mission to Poland included the instructions “on behalf of H. M. G. to get in touch with the Polish authorities, and to report on the situation in that country generally”.\textsuperscript{263} While the mission was not specifically dispatched to Poland to report on the anti-Jewish excesses in Galicia, it was planned that the commissioner, Colonel H. H. Wade, the British Military Attaché to Copenhagen,\textsuperscript{264} would arrive via the Baltic and travel to Poland. The two other members of the mission, R. E. Kimens, the assistant commissioner, who had been the pre-war British Consul-General in Warsaw, and Rowland Kenney, the secretary, were instructed that “they must find their way to Vienna, Lemberg, Cracow and Warsaw … the advantage of this plan would be that the Mission would see all the important places in the shortest possible time, and Mr Kimens and Mr Kenney could give us early information about the pogroms”.\textsuperscript{265} But they were warned that they “should keep clear of any Jewish commissions”.\textsuperscript{266} Thus, events in Lwów can be seen as the direct impetus for the dispatch of the various Allied missions.

A French mission, under General Joseph Berthelémy of the Eastern Army, followed, under specific instructions to investigate the situation in Galicia, specifically with regard to the pogroms.\textsuperscript{267} The United States sent a political mission under Lieutenant R. C. Foster, who was to be more concerned with social conditions in Poland.\textsuperscript{268} These loosely-linked Allied operations would start a two-year-long procession of missions to Poland that had the effect of releasing the Allies from further military sources of pogroms conducted against Jews in Poland. If these reports are true the sympathy of the American people for Polish aspirations will undoubtedly be affected”: Lansing to Sharp, December 2, 1918: FRUS, 1919, Volume II, p. 746.

\begin{itemize}
  \item TNA (London), FO 371/3282/199154.
  \item TNA (London), FO 371/3282/199154.
  \item Lord Hardinge to Wade, TNA (London), FO 371/3281/201348.
  \item Wade was not sent as a military representative, but with the authority of the Foreign Office.
  \item Lord Hardinge to Wade, TNA (London), FO 371/3281/201348.
  \item FO to Rumbold (Berne), 13 December 1918: TNA (London), FO 371/3282/206205.
\end{itemize}
entanglement in Polish affairs. At this time the British Government was concerned with the 1918 ‘coupon election,’ the primary issue in the hustings being the terms of the armistice with Germany rather than Anglo-Polish relations or the fate of the Jewish minority in Poland. The primary aim of Colonel Wade’s Mission was to establish contact with the new Polish government.

As a result of the questions raised internationally the Polish Government itself sent two investigative missions to report on the “anti-Jewish wrongdoings” that had occurred in Lwów. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent the first commission to find out the facts about the incidents in the city, due to the intense international interest and speculation surrounding the events there. The Commission consisted of Leon Chrzanowski, a member of the Legal Department of the Foreign Ministry, and a Jewish journalist and former editor of Izraelita, Józef Wasercug, known for his assimilationist views. It filed its report on December 17 1918. To a large extent this verified the Jewish version of what had happened, and severely criticised Polish officials for not taking steps to quell the pogrom earlier than they did. The “Raport Delegacji Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych R.P. w sprawie Wystąpień Antyżydowskich we Lwowie” was never published, or even used by the Polish Government, presumably due both to the unfavourable light it cast on the Polish side, and to the fact that it described the events in Lwów as a “pogrom”, in direct contrast to the reports of the KNP.

The second Report, “The Extraordinary Governmental Investigating Commission in Lemberg” from the Ministry of Justice was prepared by a judge, Zygmunt Rymowicz. It worked for some seven weeks from mid-January 1919, presenting its findings to the Minister of Justice, Leon Supiński on February 13. Unlike the report prepared for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this document was translated from Polish and handed to Henry Morgenthau snr.’s investigating commission in August, 1919. While the report

269 “wystąpienia antyżydowskie” from the title of the report: ibid., p. 281.
271 While the Ministry of Justice report was known of and used by the British (TNA (London), FO 608/66/1251), no such acknowledgement of the Foreign Ministry report is to be found in the Foreign Office records.
was more critical of the Jewish minority for its obvious “sympathy” for the Ukrainian cause, it still concluded that regular Polish troops had been the principal perpetrators of the robberies, and subsequent murders, between November 22 and 24, 1918. Yet like the Foreign Ministry report, it also remained unpublished. With the apparent rejection of the second report by the Polish Government, it would seem necessary to furnish the government with evidence that placed less blame on the Polish army. To that end, various municipal leaders in Lwów encouraged witnesses to blame “bandits” or “professional criminals” for the disturbances.273

Enormous damage was done to Polish-Jewish relations by the events in Kielce and Lwów. The prominent socialist and journalist, Mieczysław Lodzia, referred in Robotnik to “the deplorable Lemberg incident, which has done us so much harm in the eyes of Europe”.274 At the Paris Peace Conference the Polish cause had been further harmed by the fact that no violent excesses were carried out by Ukrainians against the Jewish population of Lwów during their three-week control over the city.275 The damage was compounded by the fact that the interim regime of Piłsudski refused to condemn the events,276 even though the Head of State claimed credit for “restoring a degree … of order”277 in Lemberg, and for “taking all means necessary to prevent further breach of order”.278 These claims were not substantiated. It is possible that Zaleski was merely attempting to paint Piłsudski and his new regime in a positive light to his friend, Lucien Wolf, and therefore the British Foreign Office. A delegation from the ŻRN, led by Dr. Osias Thon, with Isaac Grünbaum and Dr. Max Leser, delivered to Piłsudski a memorandum of demands on November 29. These were:

1. Piłsudski, as Chief of State, should order military and political authorities to withhold in their statements any remark or threat which people might use as

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275 Korzec, op. cit., p. 77.
277 August Zaleski, the Polish representative in Berne, referred to Piłsudski’s reaction in an undated letter to Lucien Wolf, who forwarded it to the British Foreign Office: TNA (London), FO 371/3281.
278 Zaleski described Pilsudski as a “dictator”: Wolf to FO, November 26, 1918: TNA (London), FO 371/3282/196853.
justification for the criminal excesses and which would serve as encouragement for carrying out a ‘lynch justice’ upon Jews;

2. Piłsudski should order a search for the criminals and the stolen goods to the owners;

3. It should be ascertained that all groups had taken the necessary steps to prevent the disorder and not to act, as was customary until then, ‘post factum,’ when the crime had already been perpetrated;

4. The Polish state should declare that it will pay compensation to the victims of the pogroms, to take care of the widows and orphans, and help the homeless victims.279

Piłsudski answered by stating that he was no “autocrat”, and that orders had already been sent to the Polish army to protect the Jewish population from pogroms, and that in war, “terrible” things can happen.280 It is almost certain that Piłsudski was against the oppression of minorities, not merely because it would adversely affect Poland’s reputation internationally, but also as he was also genuinely opposed to it.281 The weak position of his regime, however, did not allow a full and open condemnation of the events in Kielce and Lwów, perhaps fearful of the Endek backlash that any perceived pro-Jewish declaration might have provoked. When asked by Israel Cohen on January 22, 1919, why no official condemnation of the pogroms was forthcoming Piłsudski stated that:

how can you expect that the Government should say that it disapproves of pogroms? That would suggest that the Government consists of pogromists. It is understood that the Government doesn’t approve of the pogroms or of violence of any kind against anybody.282

279 Isaac Grünbaum, op. cit., p. 22-23.
280 Ibid., p. 24.
281 There is an indication to this effect contained in AAN (Warsaw), KNP 2066, claiming that the Polish Foreign Ministry’s investigation was at his suggestion. If it was indeed Piłsudski who instigated the inquiry, it raised further the question as to why the report was not more publicly used. The Polish Head of State was undoubtedly in an invidious position, caught between pressure from the Western Allies and the Endeks (and associated domestic considerations). Piłsudski faced criticism no matter what decision he made, and evidently reasoned that his position in Poland was more important than the immediate damage to Poland’s reputation.
Piłsudski’s policy on the Jewish question was not without ambiguity. In an interview with journalists Piłsudski condemned anti-Semitism, but he also stated that it was caused by the activities of “Jewish profiteers”, and in Lwów, “it is said that they [the Jewish population] were not neutral in the fight between Poles and the Ukrainians, but whether they were or not is difficult to say”.\(^{283}\) Despite these difficulties, Piłsudski still remained a figure whom the Jewish community in Poland wished to support, seeing the alternative as far worse. He was also a person whom Jewish leaders in the West were beginning to see in a more positive light than they had done in the first weeks of his regime. Wolf commented to Louis Marshall that despite the lack of any formal action on the “pogroms”, his government was “doing their best to help us”.\(^{284}\)

Paderewski, while still without an official position within the new Polish state, and not officially part of the KNP in Paris, was nevertheless an important and influential figure. His reaction to events in Lwów had been more immediate and indignant than Piłsudski’s. In a telegram to William Phillips, the United States Assistant Secretary of State, he suggested that an independent commission should be sent to investigate the “alleged pogroms”,\(^{285}\) gaining support among some western Jewish opinion, such as Lucien Wolf.\(^{286}\) His opinions were more clearly outlined in a telegram sent to John F. Smulski, President of the Polish National Department (a Polish-American organization), received on December 8, 1918. Paderewski wrote that

\[\text{[t]here is at the present time, a violent anti-Polish agitation rampant which makes the task of political reconstruction more difficult than ever. The disturbances in Lemberg and elsewhere in eastern Galicia were not in the nature of pogroms at all and had nothing to do with so-called anti-Semitic feeling in Poland. These disorders were really due to the wholesale release of criminals from the jails and as a result, 60 of the malefactors were immediately shot by the Polish troops and 1,500 were arrested. Out of that}\]

\(^{283}\) Halpern, op. cit., p. 11.

\(^{284}\) David Mowschowitch, a Russian Jew, was Lucien Wolf’s private secretary. In his archive he kept a full collection of Lucien Wolf’s correspondence and numerous other materials submitted to Wolf during this period. Wolf to Marshall, December 19, 1918: David Mowschowitch Collection [Mowschowitch], YIVO, (New York), 198192.

\(^{285}\) Paderewski to Phillips, November 20, 1918: US National Archives (Washington, DC) 860c.4016/166.

\(^{286}\) Lucien Wolf to Arthur Balfour, December 7, 1918: TNA (London) FO 371/3281/101651 and 201604.
number it was later found by computation that 60% of these persons were Ruthenians, 30% Poles and only 10% Jews, so that it is evident from this tabulation that religious persecution could not have been the basis for these disturbances.\textsuperscript{287}

Not only was the guilt apportioned to the Ukrainians, but also rather somewhat strangely Paderewski seemed to be blaming a small number of Jews for taking part in the “disturbances”. It is clear that Paderewski’s prejudices can be seen from this telegram, and can go some way to explain his reluctance to speak out against not only the events in Lwów, but also the subsequent incidents of anti-Jewish violence, most relevantly when he was Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{288} The prospect of a National Democrat leaning Prime Minister, even one as distinguished as the famous pianist and composer, who was seen in some circles as an apolitical appointment, duly created a further strain in Polish-Jewish relations with his trenchant position on the attitude of the Jewish minority shown in his ten months in office. A public declaration by Piłsudski, Ignacy Paderewski or the Sejm deploring the killings in Lwów would have deflected much of the criticism heaped upon the Poles as a result of the ‘Lemberg pogrom.’

The events in Lwów occurred as a result of a Jewish declaration of neutrality in the Polish-Ukrainian war, and should be seen in the wider context of anti-Jewish violence, that had been increasing in intensity from the beginning of November throughout Eastern Galicia, where in Lwów alone 262 Jews are thought to have lost their lives, including those during the ‘Lemberg horrors,’\textsuperscript{289} although it is possible that this figure was inflated in order to imply that a number of Jews had died under the Ukrainian administration of Lwów. The idea that the Jewish community was fully behind the Ukrainian cause was nothing short of absurd; the majority of Jews remained passive, or even disinterested. Orthodox Jews, the majority of Lwów’s Jewish community, even refused to join the Committee for Public Safety. The Jewish

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{287} Paderewski to Smulsiki December 8, 1918: “Wewnętrznej sytuacji w Polsce z uwzględnieniem problemu żydowskiego”, AAN (Warsaw) Paderewski Archive [Paderewski], Folder 745, p. 11.
\item \textsuperscript{288} Paderewski, who was still in the United States at the time he wrote the letter to Phillips, clearly refuted the (admittedly exaggerated) Jewish evidence.
\item \textsuperscript{289} Golczewski, op. cit., p. 198. The figure also appears in Bujak, op. cit., p. 37. The \textit{Gazeta Poranna} quotes 131 as the total number of Jews who died in Lwów in the month of November: \textit{Gazeta Poranna}, February 9, 1919.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Militia, another source of tension, by being disarmed on November 22, should have ceased to have been a provocation to the Poles, yet this event appears to have been the catalyst that started the riots. Even the charge that the Jewish Militia had supported the Ukrainian cause, as undoubtedly some Jews did, receives less weight, as neither the Polish command nor the Polish Civil Committee charged the Committee for Public Safety with violations of Jewish neutrality in the fighting. Some reports even go so far as to state that up to two thousand Jews fought for the Polish cause. The unsubstantiated accusation that the Polish command had given the order for the looting of the Jewish district, and the anti-Jewish sentiments of those taking part, combined with the unwillingness of the local Polish commanders to restore order, led directly to the events in Lwów. Polish and Jewish attitudes towards the events in Lwów set the tone for Polish-Jewish relations that still reverberate today. For Jews the ‘pogrom’ signalled the start of their life in an anti-Semitic country, and their survival, in their view, depended on appealing for support outwith Poland. In turn this factor gave rise to the Polish charge that Jews were against Polish independence, the primary aim of almost all Polish politicians, whatever their political outlook.

Internationally, Poland’s reputation was severely damaged; Poland had supplanted Rumania and Russia as the principal areas of Jewish suffering in the world. Western Jewish leaders, principally the non-Zionists, such as Louis Marshall and Lucien Wolf, made it their primary aim at the forthcoming Peace Conference to safeguard the rights of their brethren in Eastern Europe. This brought the Jewish question squarely onto the international stage, and Lwów had handed the advantage to the Western Jewish groups on the eve of the opening of the Conference in Paris.


291 In an interesting article David Engel looks at the position of Lwów in Polish historiography with regard to the Holocaust, commenting that Polish representatives held up the events in Lwów as an example of the Jewish population being against Polish independence, and this “sin of 1918” was a reason why Poles would not help rescue the Jewish population. David Engel, “Lwów, 1918, The Transmutation of a Symbol and Its Legacy in the Holocaust”, in Joshua D. Zimmerman (ed.), Contested Memories Poles and Jews During the Holocaust and Its Aftermath (New Brunswick, NJ, 2003), pp. 32-44.
Events outside of Galicia

The new Polish state not only faced problems on her south-western borders from the West Ukrainian Republic, but also had the prospect both of war looming with Soviet Russia, and resistance from the newly acquired lands of the ‘Prussian Partition.’ Nationalist Poles in Wielkopolska on December 17, and in Poznań on December 26, staged an armed uprising, throwing the districts into two months of chaos, possibly at the instigation of Piłsudski. The situation intensified with the arrival of Paderewski in Poznań late on December 25. Following a Polish parade in honour of the pianist two days later, further fighting broke out between Poles and the local German population, after accusations that some Germans had fired at Paderewski’s hotel. The New York Times reported the events under the headline of “Germans put Posen under Martial Law – Berlin Asserts Pogroms by Poles Occurred there and Thirty Jews Killed”. This was a further example of exaggeration by the German press, taken up by their western counterparts.

Piłsudski charged his Prime Minister, Moraczewski, with holding elections for a Sejm Ustawodawczy (Constituent Sejm) as soon as possible. Piłsudski’s answer to the squabbling political factions within Poland was always that it was for the people to decide the fate of the nation at the forthcoming election. There were a number of problems facing the Moraczewski Government in holding the vote, including the small amount of territory under the control of the Polish state by the end of 1918, namely, the former Congress Kingdom, Teschin, Silesia, and parts of Galicia recently conquered from the Ukrainians, around Przemyśl and Lwów. This excluded large numbers of Jews who were to become Polish citizens after the borders were formally recognised in 1921. The vote was extended to all citizens over the age of 21, with the Sejm to be elected by proportional representation. The meant that 14,275

294 Piłsudski commented that “my greatest ambition is that Poland should have her first parliament, and that it should meet peaceably”, quoted in Aleksandra Piłsudska, Memoirs of Madame Piłsudski (London, 1940), p. 280.
295 Cieszyn in Polish, Těšín in Czech.
votes were needed in Warsaw, for example, to secure a seat in the new parliament. This was to count against the Jewish minority, but was a problem created by the splintered Jewish political scene in Poland. In Warsaw alone, nine different Jewish lists campaigned, excluding the Bund, which stood with the PPS.\textsuperscript{296} There had been attempts to organise Polish-Jewry. Between December 26-30, the Jewish Preliminary Conference took place in Warsaw, attended by 498 delegates from 144 different towns and cities.\textsuperscript{297} Isaac Grünbaum, who played a prominent role on the Organisational Committee, opened proceedings by stating that the conference “will lay the foundation for the future Jewish National structure and will express the wishes of the Jewish people in Poland”.\textsuperscript{298} The majority of those attending supported Zionist ideals, issuing resolutions regarding “the establishment of a permanent home for the Jews in Palestine”, and furthermore, declared a wish to have Jewish nationality recognised in the new Polish State.\textsuperscript{299} A 40-strong Tymczasowa Żydowska Rada Narodowa (Temporary Jewish National Council, or TŻRN) was appointed by the conference, although it was not recognised by the non-Zionist left and large numbers of Orthodox Jews who bitterly opposed the Zionist leanings that the Council took. Therefore it was seen as merely a Zionist organisation, when its intention was to unite Polish-Jewry for the forthcoming elections.

\section*{Conclusion}

The re-birth of the Polish state was accompanied by an immediate outpouring of anti-Jewish violence, the cause of which was only partially explained by the anarchic conditions that were not exclusively limited to Poland, but were being experienced throughout Eastern Europe. In Poland outrages that resulted in Jewish fatalities were mostly limited to the province of Galicia, but in the lands where Polish rule was re-established numerous other ‘excesses’ occurred. This first phase of violence died down after the pogrom in Lwów was quelled on November 24, yet during that month alone pogroms occurred in 15 different towns (with at least one Jewish fatality in each

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{296} The nine lists were made up of: the Jewish Democratic Party, the ‘Poale Zion,’ ‘Agudas Shlome emune Israel,’ the Provisional Jewish National Council (Zionists), Jewish Merchants Association, Jewish People’s Party (Folkists), Jewish Socialist Workers’ Party, the Assimilationist group, and the Independent Jews (Assimilationists).
\textsuperscript{297} Korzec, “Antisemitism in Poland”, p. 34.
\textsuperscript{298} Halpern, op. cit., p. 32.
\textsuperscript{299} Ibid., pp. 33-34.
\end{footnotes}
pogrom), whilst a further 91 Polish urban centres witnessed assaults against the persons or property of their Jewish communities.\textsuperscript{300}

Table 2.9: Acts of Anti-Jewish Violence in Poland, 1918-1919\textsuperscript{301}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Estimated Casualties (Killed/Wounded)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grochow</td>
<td>November 3, 1918</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilzno</td>
<td>November 4, 1918</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chryzanów</td>
<td>November 5-6, 1918</td>
<td>2/28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seirsza</td>
<td>November 7, 1918</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siedlce</td>
<td>November 10, 1918</td>
<td>1/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Przemyśl</td>
<td>November 11, 1918</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kielce</td>
<td>November 11-12, 1918</td>
<td>4/250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Działoszec</td>
<td>November 12, 1918</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lasi</td>
<td>November 12, 1918</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brezesko</td>
<td>November 12-14, 1918</td>
<td>8/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubomil</td>
<td>November 13, 1918</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuczempij</td>
<td>November 15-16, 1918</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zolynia</td>
<td>November 17-18</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wodzislaw</td>
<td>November 18-20</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lwów</td>
<td>November 22-25, 1918</td>
<td>52/463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamość</td>
<td>December 29-30</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rozane</td>
<td>January 29, 1919</td>
<td>6/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalish</td>
<td>March 12-13, 1919</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byala</td>
<td>March 25, 1919 (rpt.)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pńsk</td>
<td>April 5, 1919</td>
<td>35/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lida</td>
<td>April 17, 1919</td>
<td>39/150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilno</td>
<td>April 19-21, 1919</td>
<td>54/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strzyżów</td>
<td>April 21, 1919</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niebylec</td>
<td>April 28, 1919</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szczeshow</td>
<td>May 3, 1919</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baranów</td>
<td>May 5-6, 1919</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolbuszowa (Rzeszów district)</td>
<td>May 6-7, 1919</td>
<td>8/20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novy-Dvar</td>
<td>May 14, 1919</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lublin</td>
<td>May 18, 1919</td>
<td>3/60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poryck</td>
<td>May 22, 1919 (rpt.)</td>
<td>16/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Częstochowa</td>
<td>May 27, 1919</td>
<td>5/45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cracow</td>
<td>June 6, 1919</td>
<td>0/24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warsaw</td>
<td>June 26, 1919</td>
<td>1/15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minsk</td>
<td>August 8, 1919</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Poland re-emerged as an independent state at the beginning of November, 1918 and Polish-Jewish relations were undoubtedly in a far more perilous state than they had

\textsuperscript{300} Anti-Jewish violence was reported in 106 different towns in Poland.

\textsuperscript{301} This table is made up from numerous sources including my own estimates, based on archival sources, principally from reports in TNA (London), FO 317/3903 and FO 371/3904; US National Archives (Washington DC), 860c 4016 and the AAN & CAW in Warsaw. Among the primary and secondary sources consulted were: Witold Stankiewicz, Konflikty społeczne na wsi polskiej 1918-1920 (Warsaw, 1963); Cohen, Pogroms in Poland; Morgenthau op. cit.; Samuel op. cit.; Frank Golczewski, Polnisch-Jüdische Beziehungen, 1881-1922: Eine Studie zur Geschichte des Antisemitismus in Osteuropa (Weisbaden, 1981), pp. 181-283; Jolanta Żydul, Zajścia antyżydowskie w Polsce w latach, 1935-1937 (Warsaw, 1994), p. 9; Alfred Nossig, Polen und Juden die polnisch-jüdische Verständigung zur Regelung der Judenfrage in Polen (Wien, 1921), pp. 45-57.
been in the past. It is important to note, however, that despite the violence of November the potential for violence in the Polish lands was not fully realised. In December there was only one incident in Poland that resulted in Jewish fatalities.\footnote{Despite (incorrect) reports of Jewish fatalities in Poznań, there were two Jews killed in the town of Zamość in the Województwo Lubelskie of central Poland on the night of December 29-30, 1918. The Jewish population of Zamość according to the Polish Census of 1921 was 9,383 (59% of the total): Shmuel Spector (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Jewish Life Before and During the Holocaust. Volume III: Seredina-Buda-Z (Jerusalem, 2001), p. 1488.}

Yet this did not detract from the shock felt in the west at reports of anti-Jewish violence in Poland. Such incidents in Bessarabia, the Ukraine and Russia were to some extent expected. Poland held herself to be western-looking, Roman Catholic and civilized, and her representatives in the West were inclined to deny flatly all reports of pogroms. The immediate response of the representatives of the threatened Jewish communities was to bombard Jewish, and especially Zionist, offices in Vienna, Copenhagen, Amsterdam, Stockholm and Berlin which immediately forwarded telegrams to the representatives of the Allied governments, as the traditional protector of Jewish interests, the Germans, were a defeated nation and neither inclined nor in a position to help the Ostjuden.\footnote{The Bolsheviks, the perceived replacement of the Germans as protector of the Jewish population by subsequent historians, were neither in a position to help, nor was their attitude to Jews obvious by the closing months of 1918: Zechlin, Die deutsche Politik und die Juden, pp. 230-237; Zvi Y. Gitelman, Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics: The Jewish Sections of the CSPU, 1917-1920 (Princeton, NJ, 1972), pp. 105-114.}

In the anarchic conditions prevailing in the Kresy the Jews appealed to the only people they felt could help, namely Balfour and President Wilson. The Jewish question in Poland was a prominent and pressing international issue, but the response in the west was mixed. Sympathy was felt most strongly in Great Britain, where Balfour especially showed sympathy towards the fate of the Jewish citizens of Eastern Europe.\footnote{“The Pogroms in Poland and Galicia”, Jewish Chronicle, November 22, 1918, p. 16; “The Outrages in Poland and Galicia”, ibid., December 27, 1918, p. 9.}

The issue of the Polish pogroms was closely linked with the forthcoming Peace Conference. Sir George Clerk at the British Foreign Office told Chaim Weizmann that “they [the Poles] would jeopardise their case at the Peace Conference by ill treating the Jews”.\footnote{Sir George Clerk in conversation with Chaim Weizmann: November 28, 1918: TNA (London), FO 371/3282/199154.} While sympathy was felt, and some statements made, little else was done. There were
a number of reasons for this, including the lack of reliable information\textsuperscript{306} and the faith that any such problems were to be addressed at Paris. Furthermore, there was the hope that Wilson’s “Association of Nations” would establish a new era in international diplomacy, whereby the principle of minority protection would be enshrined in its imminent Covenant\textsuperscript{307}.

The last months of 1918 had been disastrous for Polish-Jewish relations, and 1919 would turn out to be a crucial year for Poland’s Jewish community as it was for the Polish State itself. No decisions had been made on the key issues regarding Poland by the Allied Powers with regard to the future of the new state, despite the considerable reports of anti-Jewish violence in Galicia. The first free elections were about to be held and if the Polish state could continue the trend started in December 1918 of limiting the acts of violence against its Jewish minority, it was entirely possible that Polish claims would be looked on more sympathetically at Paris.

\textsuperscript{306} Reports of anti-Jewish violence, and inflated casualty figures, were treated with caution by the Foreign Ministries in the West, a problem compounded by the lack of any Western representatives in Eastern Europe: Clerk Minute, November 29, TNA (London), FO 371/3280.

\textsuperscript{307} In his speech to Congress on January 8, 1918 Wilson in his Fourteenth Point called for “a general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike”: PWW, Volume 45: November 11, 1917-January 15, 1918, p. 536. Although hopes that minority protection would be placed under the responsibility of the League were to be dashed by mid-February 1919, early British and American drafts of the Covenant (such as the Phillimore Plan) contained clauses relating to this subject: see Malcolm D. Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 83-92.
Chapter III

Poland under Pilsudski and Paderewski, January-June 28 1919

“If a Jew is injured it is called a pogrom. If a Christian is mobbed it is called a food riot”.

The focus of the world’s attention at the beginning of 1919 was on the Peace Conference soon to commence in Paris where decisions on the future of Eastern Europe were to be made. In Poland, as in the other countries in the lands of the former partitioning Empires, events did not stand still waiting for the Peace Conference to dictate the terms of the new European order. In Poland especially the leadership of the new state, both in Warsaw and Paris, had visions of how they wanted it to develop and expand. Yet what was taking place in the far distant Eastern Kresy had ramifications on the international stage. In both international and domestic politics tensions between Jews and Poles were rising. These developments were partially a result of the anarchic conditions out of which the re-born state emerged. By the middle of 1919, however, a Parliament had been elected, a popular government under Paderewski was in power and the moderate Pilsudski firmly in control. Although the borders of the new state were still to be finalised, Poland had emerged back onto the map of Europe. Yet serious acts of anti-Jewish violence did still occur throughout the first months of 1919, principally in the wake of Polish military actions in the Eastern Kresy, which harmed the prestige of Poland on the international stage at perhaps the most crucial moment of the Paris negotiations. The principal acts of violence that occurred against the Jewish population in the first six months of 1919, at Pińsk, Lida, Wilno and Częstochowa, were different from the ‘excesses’ of the previous November. Anarchic conditions could no longer be used as an excuse for Jewish casualties. Charges of Bolshevik sympathy (Żydokomuna) were levied on the Jewish populations of the Kresy by the Polish authorities. These accusations require closer examination.

1 Gibson to Polk, June 2, 1919: FRUS, 1919, Volume II, p. 758.
The fall of Moraczewski; Paderewski becomes Prime Minister, January 1919

As the year opened, the divisions in Polish politics were as obvious as ever between the Government in Warsaw and the KNP in Paris. As early as 19 November 1918 National Democrats staged demonstrations in Warsaw, protesting against the moderate Socialist government of Moraczewski, under the slogan “Piłsudski has betrayed us!” The Right further attacked Piłsudski’s relationship with his mistress, and later second wife, a Lithuanian Socialist activist, Aleksandra Szczepanińska, in particular her alleged negative influence over Piłsudski and her Jewish background.2

On the left, attempted Bolshevik uprisings in Lublin, Zamość and Warsaw between December 28-29 were defeated.3 Pressure increased on Piłsudski after the arrival in Warsaw of Paderewski on January 3, 1919. The two met at the Belvedere Palace, Piłsudski’s residence in Warsaw, the following day, when Paderewski told Piłsudski that if he wanted Allied support at the Peace Conference, he needed a more representative government. Piłsudski refused to co-operate. More seriously an abortive coup d’état by a mixture of conservatives and nationalists led by Prince Eustachy Sapieha4 and Colonel Marian Januszatis followed that night, which managed to arrest Moraczewski and a number of other government figures.5 It was only suppressed when faced by troops still loyal to Piłsudski.6 As a result of the coup, Piłsudski was forced to make changes in his government. Paderewski, who had prior knowledge of the coup,7 (and did nothing either to warn Piłsudski, or stop the coup) had left for Cracow. He was sent for by Piłsudski. The coup did not lead directly to

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2 Piłsudski became estranged from his first wife, Maria, who died in poverty in Cracow in 1921. Piłsudski did not attend her funeral, sending his brother Jan in his place. See Janusz Cisek, “O Dacie śmierci Marii Piłsudskiej”, Niepodległość, Volume 22 (1989), pp. 166-169; Władimir K. Korostowetz, The Re-Birth of Poland (London, 1928), p. 93. Count d’Etchegoyen, a member of the French Military Mission to Poland, commented: “one hardly dares to say it, but at any rate it is permissible to think-the favoured Jewess, who has been clever enough to mount with the dictator the steps of the Polish throne, and there to replace the legitimate wife, has no doubt succeeded in obtaining from her august lover certain mitigations in the lot of her co-religionists”: Olivier d’Etchegoyen, Pologne, Pologne… (Paris, 1925), p. 68.

3 The threat from the left was marginalised by the presence of Moraczewski and six socialists in his cabinet. Furthermore the Communists rejected an independent Polish state, which very much limited their appeal in Poland.

4 Later the first Polish Minister to London, appointed in May 1919.


the downfall of the Moraczewski Government, but gave Piłsudski the excuse to
dismiss his cabinet. The government was a conspicuous failure, and treated both in
Poland and internationally as something of a “joke”.\footnote{The British Legation’s first annual report on Poland, 1919, commented that the cabinet was made up
“of violent partisans without any intellectual culture”: Bourne and Watt, op. cit., Part II, Series F, Volume 51; (Keith Sword (ed.)), p. 4.}
Pressure was also placed upon
the Polish government from the United States, as Herbert Hoover’s American Food
Mission had just arrived in Poland.\footnote{See Pease, Poland, the United States, and the Stabilization of Europe, pp. 3-21.}
One member of the mission, Vernon Kellog, stated that unless Paderewski became Prime Minister “American cooperation and aid
were futile”.\footnote{Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, Volume I: Years of Adventure, 1874-1920 (New
York, 1951), p. 357. On February 25, 1919 the American Congress voted to send relief to Poland
worth $178,729,932.16: Fisher, America and the New Poland., p. 366.}
While this may not have been the only factor in Paderewski’s
appointment, his stature in the West was undoubtedly the most important.

Paderewski became Prime Minister and Foreign Minister on January 14, 1919. In a
further compromise with the KNP in Paris, he and Roman Dmowski were nominated
as the two Delegates chosen to represent Poland at the Paris Peace Conference.\footnote{Until Paderewski’s arrival in Paris, Dłuski and Dmowski were to represent Poland at Paris.
See Casimir Smogorzewski, L’Union sacrée polonaise: le gouvernement de Varsovie et le
Paderewski was made Prime Minister as a result of a ‘compromise’ between the
Piłsudski faction in Warsaw and Dmowski’s KNP in Paris, when the two camps saw
the need for a unified Polish government to be represented at the Paris Peace
Conference.\footnote{Pilsudskia, op. cit., p. 281. When he first met Paderewski, Clemenceau asked if he were related to the
great pianist. When he replied that “I am he, Mr. Prime Minister”, Clemenceau exclaimed, “And you,
the famous artist are now President of the Council? My God! What a come down”. Lloyd George was
not so positive: “What can we think of a country which sends us a pianist as its representative?”
Quoted in Howard, op. cit., Volume II, pp. 322, 330.} With the appointment of the KNP-affiliated Paderewski it appeared
that Piłsudski had been defeated, yet he had little choice but to dismiss Moraczewski,
who refused to co-operate with rightist elements either in Poland or abroad. Piłsudski
explained his reasons for the nomination of the politically inexperienced Paderewski. He claimed that above all Paderewski had “a supreme reputation both in Europe and
across the Atlantic. From the point of view of propaganda abroad, of which Poland
stood badly in need, no man could be more suitable”.\footnote{See Casimir Smogorzewski, L’Union sacrée polonaise: le gouvernement de Varsovie et le
great support within the country after its appointment. With Paderewski heading a
non-political government of ‘experts,’ whilst Piłsudski remained Chief of State, the
right were outmanoeuvred rather than placated,\(^{14}\) with Dmowski denied the Foreign Ministry he desired.\(^ {15}\) Despite the change in government the working relationship between the two men was never easy. Indeed, a British diplomat spoke of the “great antagonism” between the two leaders as early as February 17, 1919.\(^ {16}\)

The Paderewski ministry was cautiously welcomed by both the French and British Governments, the French as they thought Paderewski a supporter of the KNP, and the British as they saw it as a victory over Dmowski.\(^ {17}\) Paderewski was seen as a felicitous compromise between Dmowski’s extreme right-wing views and Piłsudski’s left-wing populism, although the Allied governments waited until his cabinet had been approved by a vote in the Sejm before officially recognising it.\(^ {18}\)

Paderewski’s appointment proved to be more controversial among the Jewish minority in Poland, as he had been a long-time financial backer of the National Democrats.\(^ {19}\) While it would appear that Paderewski was in a powerful position, he was constantly undermined by the National Democrats who even accused him of being an agent of Anglo-Saxon and Jewish interests by blocking Dmowski from power.\(^ {20}\) Paderewski appeared to be a figurehead leader, due in part to being a novice politician without his own power-base, apart from his fame as a composer and pianist. However, Paderewski had played the role of diplomat, working for the Polish

\(^{14}\) The right-wing press in Poland had been demanding a change in Government, arguing that the country lacked confidence in the qualifications of its leaders. Reported in the Endek newspaper Czas, January 12, 1919, p. 2.

\(^{15}\) Roman Dmowski, Polityka polska, Volume II, pp. 114-115. Dmowski became Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs under Wincenty Witos, between October 30 and December 18, 1923, the only official position he held in Poland.


\(^{17}\) Headlam-Morley to Namier, January 24, 1919, neither of whom were sympathetic to Dmowski’s position: Agnes Headlam-Morley, Russell Brant and Anna Cienciala (eds.), Sir James Headlam-Morley: A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919 (London, 1972) [hereafter: Headlam-Morley, Memoir], p. 13. Sir Esmé Howard was a supporter of Dmowski, and he acknowledged that the latter had been outmanoeuvred: untitled minute, January 22, 1919: TNA (London) FO 608/61.

\(^{18}\) France recognised the Paderewski government first on February 23, 1919, followed ten days later by Britain, the United States and Italy.

\(^{19}\) See Dmowski to Paderewski, September 12, 1912: Stankiewicz and Piber (eds.), Archiwum Polityczne Ignacego Paderewskiego, Volume I, p. 39.

\(^{20}\) An account of Paderewski’s problems with the National Democrats is contained in Marian M. Drozdowski, Ignacy Jan Paderewski: A Political Biography (Warsaw, 1979), pp. 161-170.
National Committee. His writings in his archive are full of allusions to his anti-Semitic views, which were not apparent in his earlier political work in the United States, but which he did little to dispel by being elected to represent Warsaw for the National Democrats in the Sejm elections in January 1919. Paderewski, while not a Endek, harked back to more of a symbol of traditional Polish aristocratic patriotism, and proved to be a person of right-wing views, but was unwilling to be their public champion. Paderewski became far more radical in his opinions on the Jewish question, moving away from a position of moderation, where he had attempted to curb the radical views of Dmowski. By the end of the Peace Conference he had certainly changed his opinions, arguably as a result of the irritation aroused in him by constant Jewish demands, complaints and delegations.

Domestic Politics – Elections to the Constituent Assembly

National elections to the Constituent Assembly (Sejm Ustawodawczy) were held ten days after Paderewski came to power on Sunday, January 26. They were not only the first free and secret elections in Poland, but also the first to be held in the newly liberated independent Eastern Europe. It should also be noted that the elections took place on a Sunday and therefore did not fall on the Jewish Shabbat (Sabbath), as elections in Eastern Europe had previously done. The elections for the unicameral Sejm were limited to the old provinces of the Congress Kingdom and Western Galicia, with no party achieving a majority of the 296 seats.

21 For example, a note contained in his archive alleged that a great part of the British Peace Delegation was under “Jewish-Masonic” influence, “Is Lloyd George a Free Agent or a Cat’s Paw?” See Davies, “Great Britain”, p. 128, n. 14.

22 Paderewski was seen as a figure of anti-Semitic tendencies by some Jews in both the west and in Poland, and had been the target for demonstrations, as early as January 1914, following revelations that funds from Paderewski had been used by Dmowski to finance an newspaper that supported the anti-Jewish economic boycott. Adam Zamoyski, Paderewski (London, 1982), pp. 143-145; Marian M. Drozdowski, Ignacy Jan Paderewski-pianista, kompozytor, mając stanu (Warsaw, 2001), pp. 63-64.

Table 3.1: Results of the Elections to the *Sejm Ustawodawczy*, January 26, 1919

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affiliation/Party</th>
<th>Vote</th>
<th>Affiliation Percentage</th>
<th>Percent by Party</th>
<th>Percent of Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Right</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Związek Ludowo Narodowy</td>
<td>1,770,000</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Centre</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stronnictwo Katolicko-Ludowe</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narodowy Związek Robotniczy</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polskie Zjednoczenie Ludowe</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL-Plast</td>
<td>410,000</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Left</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grupy inteligenco-radykalne</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL-Wyszwolenie</td>
<td>810,000</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL-Lewica</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPS, PPSD and Bund</td>
<td>650,000</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Minorities</strong></td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Socialist Jewish Parties</td>
<td>430,000</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German and Evangelical Parties</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Without Party Affiliation</strong></td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The election results were to an extent misleading. The *Związek Ludowo Narodowy* (The National Populist Association or ZLN), the name under which the National Democrats, and their allies, fought the 1919 elections, received both the largest percentage of the vote and the most seats. Certain groups, such as the Peasant-dominated centre, were over-represented in the numbers of seats gained, as were the various parties of the left, excluding the KPRP, which boycotted the election. The minority (Jewish and German) parties gained 10.5%, yet with only eleven deputies elected it was clear that various factors had worked against a fair representation for the minorities in the *Sejm*. The domination of the parties of the right was even clearer in the districts, as of the 50 where elections were held, 23 elected a majority of ZLN deputies. With the addition of deputies from provinces later judged able to participate, by mid-1919 a more lucid picture could be seen. The *Sejm* had the following make-up:

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24 The 2.1% under the designation Without Party Affiliation was made up of candidates from smaller parties (who aligned at a later time) and candidates without affiliation: see ibid.; Adam Próchnik, *Pierwsze piętastolecie Polski niepodległej: zarys dziejów politycznych* (Warsaw, 1983), pp. 46, 48.
Table 3.2: Composition of the Sejm Ustawodawczy, June 15, 1919

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affiliation/Party</th>
<th>Number of Seats</th>
<th>Percentage of Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Związek Ludowo Narodowy</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polskie Zjednoczenie Ludowe</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klub Pracy Konstytucyjnej</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narodowo-Robotnicze Koło Sejmowe</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL-Piast</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL-Wyszwolenie</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL-Lewica</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZPPS</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Minorities</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without Affiliation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were sharp divisions between the Congress Kingdom and Western Galicia in the results of the election, with the ZLN far more popular in the former Congress Kingdom, securing 45.58% of the vote, than in Western Galicia with only 10.54%. The latter was dominated by the Peasant Parties (PSL-Piast, PSL-Lewica and Catholic Peasants) who polled 62.19% of the vote. The less extreme nature of politics in Western Galicia where the only two nationalities were Poles and Jews was possibly one reason why the more radical ZLN failed to make an impact there. The restriction of the elections to the more ethnically pure Polish lands of the Congress Kingdom and Western Galicia, with the incorporation of more German deputies only after elections in the former-Prussian territories between 1920 and 1921, as well as Polish control over the eastern Kresy only confirmed after the Treaty of Riga, in 1921, limited the numbers of Jews in the Sejm. It also resulted in the complete exclusion of the Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Lithuanian minorities. As a result their participation in the organisation of the new state was impossible since the only national minorities

27 The figures are made up of those sitting in the Sejm by June 1919. Of the total, 348 deputies were directly elected or appointed on January 26. An additional 84 seats were added to the Sejm by March 24 1922, with 20 Deputies elected from the District of Wilno. By this date there were 16 Jewish deputies in the Sejm out of 432 seats (3.7%). In areas where elections were impracticable, candidates were appointed to the Sejm from lists of Polish representatives from the legislatures of the former partitioning powers. Elections were held in territories as they came under Polish control: on April 25, 1919 in Greater Poland; June 15, 1919 in the district of Białystok and Podlasie; May 2, 1920 in Pomerania; and March 24 in Central Lithuania. As elections were held deputies appointed to the Sejm stood down, unless selected in the respective elections. The remaining two National Minority seats were made up by German deputies: ibid., pp. 45, 49; Andrzej Albers, Najnowsza historia polska. Volume I, 1918-1939 (Warsaw, 1983), p. 61; Jacek Jedruch, Constitutions, Elections, Legislatures of Poland, 1493-1977: A Guide to their History (Washington, DC, 1982), pp. 340-341, 367.

represented in the *Sejm Ustawodawczy* were Jewish and German deputies. During the first *Sejm* the Jewish deputies stood up for minority rights, and were the loudest dissenting voice (especially as the KPRP had boycotted the election). This strengthened the impression that there was not so much a minorities question in Poland as a Jewish one.

Paderewski’s call for a quick election left little time for the many different strands of Jewish politics to unite and fight the election on a single list, as desired by the Jewish National Council. Jews had many options open to them among the Jewish-affiliated parties, from the numerous Zionist parties (including the Folkists, Mizrachi, Hechalutz and the ‘Poale-Zion’) to the left-wing Bund and the party of Orthodox Jewry, Agudat Israel. In addition there were the more ambiguous assimilationist groups, who in May 1919 formed the *Zjednoczenie Polaków Wyznania Mojżeszowego Wszystkich Ziem Polskich* (the ‘Association of Poles of Mosaic Faith of all the Polish Lands’ or ZPWMWZP), which, despite referring to ‘Mosaic religion,’ was an entirely secular party. In a pre-election rally held at the Kaminski Theatre in Warsaw on January 18, Isaac Grünbaum, in front of the 3,000 gathered there, commented that “if they [assimilators of the ZPWMWZP] felt like Polacks, let them go to the Polacks!”

The ZPWMWZP was almost entirely rejected by the Jewish electorate, outwith the professional and middle classes.

Among the Jewish candidates in the *Sejm Ustawodawczy*, nine were elected on January 26: three from Warsaw, the Folkists Noah Prylucki and Samuel Hirszhorn, and Isaac Grünbaum, a Zionist; two from Łódź, Dr. Jerzy Rosenblatt, a Zionist, and Rabbi Moshe Elias Halpern, an Agudist; one from Bedzin, Dr Salomon Weinzieher, under a united slate; one in Lublin, Rabbi Abraham Perlmutter, an Agudist; one in Chelm, Dr. Max Rosenfeld, of the ‘Poale Zion;’ and one from Cracow, the Zionist

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29 As well as the 11 Jewish deputies, two German deputies were elected in 1919, growing to seven after elections in Poznań and Pomerania in 1920.
34 Rosenfeld died on February 9, 1919, aged only 35, in Vienna on his journey to Warsaw from a socialist conference in Berne, and never took his seat in the *Sejm*. He was replaced by Dr. Ignacy
Dr. Osias Thon. Among the thirty former members of the Austrian Reichsrat, elected in 1911, who were appointed to sit in the Sejm by the Polish authorities due to the inability to hold elections in East Galicia, were five assimilated Jews, all of whom refused to sit with the Koło Żydowskie (Jewish Parliamentary Club). Of the nine deputies who made up this group, six also represented the Jewish National Council.

Table 3.3: Affiliation of Jewish Deputies in the Sejm Ustawodawczy, June 1919

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grouping</th>
<th>Number of Deputies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Council (Zionists)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox (Aguda)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Folkists</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poalei Zion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were 454,841 votes for parties on the Jewish lists, out of a prospective Jewish electorate of between some 1-1.2 million votes, a turnout of 37.9%. The Bund received the disappointing figure of 16,366 votes, due in part to the fact that the party was split as to whether to boycott the elections or not. The votes were divided as follows:

Schipper, as the second candidate on the ‘Poale Zion’ slate, who refused to sit with the Jewish deputies, instead aligning with the PPS.

35 On March 12, the Zionist Maksymilian Apolinary Hartglas was selected for Biała Podlaska, and on June 15, Heshel Farbstein of the Mizrahi, Zionist-religious party.

36 They were: Dr. Henryk Koliszer, Dr Nathan Loewenstein, Edmund Rauch, Dr. Ignacy Steinhaus and Bernard Stern. Loewenstein commented that problems could only be resolved through co-operation between Polish and Jewish deputies, and that Jews were not a national minority, merely a “confessional group”: Dr. Nathan Loewenstein’s address to the Sejm: in R. P., Sejm Ustawodawczy, Sprawozdanie stenograficzne Sejmu Ustawodawczego [SSSU] (Warsaw, 1919), 5th Session, February 24, 1919, p. 203.

37 Bacon, op. cit., p. 378.

38 This figure is based on the population statistics of the 1921 Polish census, excluding the areas not voting in the 1919 election, and furthermore, excluding the approximate 35% of the population under the age of 21. The figure of 37.9% is calculated assuming the prospective Jewish population to be 1.2 million.

39 In the 1922 elections the Bund (in all the Polish lands) received 81,473 votes on a very similar voter turn-out (68%): Shlomo Netzer, Ma’avak Yehude Polin ‘al zekhuyotem ha-’ezrahiyot ve-ha-le’umiyyot, 1918-1922 (Tel Aviv, 1980), p. 309.
Table 3.4: The Jewish Vote to the Sejm Ustawodawczy, 1919

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Zionists (Temporary National Jewish Council)</th>
<th>Orthodox ('Agudas Shlome Emune Israel')</th>
<th>Folkists</th>
<th>Local Lists</th>
<th>Social Democrats</th>
<th>Bund</th>
<th>‘Poale Zion’</th>
<th>Verinigte &amp; Ind. Socialists</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congress Kingdom</td>
<td>180,234</td>
<td>97,293</td>
<td>59,229</td>
<td>7,739</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>16,366</td>
<td>27,063</td>
<td>8,883</td>
<td>396,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Galicia</td>
<td>56,661</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>2,431</td>
<td>1,991</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>58,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>232,895</td>
<td>97,293</td>
<td>59,229</td>
<td>10,170</td>
<td>1,991</td>
<td>16,366</td>
<td>28,014</td>
<td>8,883</td>
<td>454,841</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, a Jewish electorate, making up some 8-10% of the total number of voters, had secured less than 3% of the seats, undoubtedly a product of the divergent nature of the Jewish political groupings, but more importantly, of their lack of unity going into the election. It has been calculated that it took an average of 45,000 votes to elect a Jewish deputy, as opposed to 12-20,000 for a Polish one. With the exclusion of the larger Jewish populations of the Kresy, that would later make up a significant number of the Jewish population of the reconstructed state after 1921, the nature of Jewish representation in the Sejm Ustawodawczy can be at least partially explained. There was the lack of political consciousness among large numbers of the Orthodox Jewish population. The alleged cases of harassment of Jews by ZLN-sympathetic groups, designed to discourage Jewish voters, may also have had the effect of lowering the Jewish vote. In some overwhelmingly Jewish districts in Warsaw, for example, it was estimated that the Jewish turnout was as low as 55% of eligible Jewish males, and 48% of females, compared to 73% of non-Jewish males and 71% of non-Jewish females. Overall the turn-out for the 1919 election was 64%. Jewish support for parties of the left, and the small assimilationist part of the Jewish minority who voted for Polish political parties (principally the PPS), would also

41 Leopold Halpern, Polityka żydowska w Sejmie i Senacie Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 1919-1933 (Warsaw, 1933), p. 35.
43 Jedruch, op. cit., p. 456.
partially explain the disappointing return for the parties on the Jewish lists. There were Jewish accusations of gerrymandering, whereby, under the electoral law, constituencies of the Sejm were divided in such a manner that urban districts tended to be amalgamated with rural districts that had higher proportions of Poles.

The elections to the Sejm Ustawodawczy were undoubtedly a success for the Zionists and Mizrachi, who, despite Agudat Israel’s claim to speak for the mass of the Jewish population, had the majority of Jewish deputies, and the largest vote, 51.2% of the total. Yet they did not see it as a victory for themselves, principally due to the lack of representation in the new Sejm. Grünbaum, who had led the Zionist election campaign, was now undoubtedly the most prominent Jewish politician in Poland, despite his secular views. It was therefore the voice of Jewish nationalism that was to be heard loudest on both the domestic and international stage, when the Jewish delegations were chosen to present their case at Paris. It was the Zionists, under Nahum Sokolow, Leon Reich, Osias Thon and Joseph Tenenbaum, who dominated the East European delegates in the Comité des délégations Juives which represented the interests of Jewry at the Paris Peace Conference.

The ‘Temporary Jewish National Council’s’ post-election statement blamed the Polish Government for the results, stating that “the Jewish masses, which for the first time in Polish history would have been attracted to the work of building the State, were simply horrified by the results of the elections and have begun to understand that the so-called popular government has in fact deprived them of their civic rights”. This was apparently reinforced by the exclusion of Jewish representation on the Konwent Seniorów (Convent of Seniors, or the Assembly of Chairmen of Parliamentary Clubs), as it was ruled that only parliamentary clubs consisting of at

44 See Netzer, Ma'avak Yehude Polin, pp. 82-103.
46 This was emphasized by his leadership of the Minorities Bloc which comprised 89 out of 444 deputies, in the Second Sejm elected in November 1922: Paweł Korzec, “Der Block der Nationalen Minderheiten im Parlamentarismus Polens des Jahres 1922”, Zeitschrift für Ostforschung, Volume 24 (1975), pp. 198-201.
47 The Polish representatives sent to Paris were: Nahum Sokolow, Leon Levite, Osias Thon, and Mordechai Braude. In addition to delegates from Poland, East Galicia sent three representatives: Leon Reich, Joseph Tenenbaum and Mihkhal Ringel. See Tenenbaum’s memoirs for an account of the Zionist domination of the East European delegation to Paris: Joseph Tenenbaum, Tsvishn milhome un sholem: Yidn oyf der sholem-konferents nokh der ershter velt-milhome [Entre la Guerra y la Paz (Memorias)] (Buenos Aires, 1956), pp. 45-59.
48 Quoted in Lewin op. cit., p. 94.
least twelve representatives could join. The Convent of Seniors played an important role in the new legislative system, as only members of this body had the right to direct interpellations and motions, and to sit on parliamentary commissions. The lack of Jewish participation was cited by the TŻRN as another case of Polish anti-Semitism.

The results of the election showed a clear majority for the Zionists (including the Folkists) among the politically active part of the Jewish community of Poland. This inevitably led to demands by the newly elected Zionist deputies for recognition of Jews as a distinct National Minority, as opposed to their consideration as only a religious minority. It was a clear rejection of assimilationist ideals by the Jewish voters, and promised to make the political life of the new Republic a hostile one for the Jewish deputies in the Sejm.

The Sejm met for the first time on February 10, 1919. It was opened by Piłsudski who spoke of the importance of the “Entente Powers … there has long been the closest sympathy between Poland and the democratic people of Europe and America … their sympathy has increased since the victorious armies of the Allied Powers in breaking the last vestige of the Power of our oppressors, have freed Poland from her servitude”. The session concluded by restricting Piłsudski’s power of decree, the method by which he had ruled Poland from November, 1918. One of the first tasks facing the Sejm was to elect its Marshal (speaker). Three candidates were proposed, none of whom were from Socialist or Minority affiliations. Two candidates were put forward by the ZNL, Wojciech Trampczyński and Józef Ostachowski, whilst Wincenty Witos stood with the support of Piast and the PPS. On February 14, the first vote eliminated Ostachowski, but the close result between Trampczyński, who

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51 SSSU, 1st Session, February 10, 1919, p. 44.
52 There was the prospect that the first Marshal of the Sejm could have been Rabbi Abraham Zevi Perlmutter, born in 1844, who was the oldest elected deputy. As such there was talk that he should chair the Sejm sessions until the Marshal was elected. The prospect of an elderly Rabbi chairing the Sejm was not welcomed in either Polish or Jewish circles and was made redundant by the arrival of Prince Janusz Radziwill, born in 1843: Bacon, op. cit, p. 384.
53 Witos as a ‘moderate’ candidate held no appeal for the Jewish deputies. The PSL-Piast leader was variously described as “the Galician National Democrat” who had “played a sad part in the Lemberg pogrom”: “Polish and Jewish Parliamentary Compromise”, *Jewish Chronicle*, May 2, 1919, p. 10.
gained 128 votes, and Witos, who gained 144, gave the Jewish deputies a casting vote in the second ballot, as the 27 deputies who voted for Ostachowski mostly moved their vote to Trampczyński. In order to gain the support of the Jewish deputies a deal was struck by Dr. Thon, by which two prominent ZLN deputies, Marian Seyda and Stanislaw Grabski, proposed that a Jewish representative should be elected to the committee charged with the preparation of the new constitution (despite his opposition to this compromise with the ZLN deputies, Isaac Grünbaum served on the committee), a significant achievement. As the leftist deputies made no offer to the Jewish deputies, five of the Jewish deputies voted in favour of Trampczyński, who won by 155 votes to Witos’s 149.54 The Jewish deputies, who had not been keen to support Witos, due to his attitude towards the Jewish deputies and the anti-Semitic leanings of the Piast press, ensured the hostility of the Peasant movement under Witos to Jews through the course of the Second Republic. Witos used his first speech in the Sejm to denounce the Jews who “made use of all their rights while not fulfilling their duties”, by avoiding military service or by declaring neutrality in the Polish-Ukrainian conflict in Galicia.55 While ostensibly a centrist candidate, Witos shifted towards the right, and according to some historians, principally due to this setback.56 The Jewish vote for Trampczyński meant that one of the first acts by the Jewish deputies in the newly elected Sejm was to elect a prominent member of the Endecja to an influential position in the state. It was debated in the press whether this would have any effect on Roman Dmowski’s attitude towards the Jewish minority in Poland, implying that the votes were given in an attempt to placate the Endecja.57 These events were followed six days later by Piłsudski transferring his authority to the Sejm, making it the central institution of rule. Piłsudski was subsequently unanimously reappointed Head of State, but now with a democratic mandate. The elections also brought about a change in government, with the socialist members who had served under Moraczewski leaving the Paderewski cabinet. These were replaced with more right-
wing deputies from the Sejm. Paderewski argued that the government no longer needed to justify itself as a government of national unity, and now had a popular mandate.

Paderewski spoke to the Sejm for the first time on February 20, omitting entirely to mention the Jewish question in Poland. In the debate over his speech, the Jewish deputies showed how divided they were. The Folkist deputy Noah Prylucki\(^{58}\) was unreservedly hostile, and spoke of “official anti-Semitism” whereby Jews were being “boycotted … in refusing them positions in the new Government institutions”.\(^ {59}\) The Agudath Shlome Emune Israel (Orthodox) spokesman, Rabbi Abraham Perlmutter, declared that “Orthodox Jews are loyal citizens of the Polish state, belonging to the Jewish national group”,\(^ {60}\) finishing his address with the cry: “Long live Poland!”\(^ {61}\) While Grünbaum stated that the “rebirth of the Polish state is an act of historic justice”, he continued in a less conciliatory vein:

> [t]he sacred moments of Poland’s rejuvenation were to us the worst moments we had in recent times. We have lived through massacres (protests from the Polish deputies) which we ourselves never believed possible … We state categorically that the Government has not used its power to crush at the outset all outrages against the life and property of the Jewish citizens.\(^ {62}\)

Furthermore, Grünbaum accused the Polish government of doing nothing to punish the culprits, specifically giving the example of the Kielce pogrom, where Moraczewski’s promised investigation had failed to materialise.\(^ {63}\) The reaction of the Polish deputies in the Sejm was routinely hostile, not only to issuing an official declaration condemning the anti-Jewish violence, but to the speakers themselves.

\(^{58}\) Prylucki, a journalist, had come to prominence during the First World War, writing for the German subsidised Folkist newspaper, the Warszawer Togblat. See Keith I. Weiser, ‘The Politics of Yiddish: Noyekh Prilutski and the Folksparlet in Poland, 1900-1926’ (PhD Diss., Columbia University, N. Y., 2001).

\(^{59}\) Jewish deputies were not allowed to make comments on Paderewski’s speech until February 24: SSSU, 5\(^{th}\) Session, February, 24, 1919, p. 185.

\(^{60}\) Polish deputies were angered by this statement and hecklers commented that what Perlmutter wanted equated to a “state within a state” and further advised that he learn Polish: Ibid., pp. 180, 183-184.

\(^{61}\) Ibid., p. 184.

\(^{62}\) Grünbaum’s address to the Sejm: ibid., p. 190.

\(^{63}\) Ibid., pp. 190-193.
Jewish deputies were interrupted with calls of “get out to Palestine!” The greatest protest came when Grünbaum called for the Jews to be recognised as a national minority. Wojciech Korfanty, a prominent ZLN politician, commented that Jews did not deserve such rights, as they were divided among themselves as to their own demands, as was shown by the split between the Folkists and Zionists. Trampczyński had to appeal to the Polish deputies for greater tolerance for the Jewish deputies.

The principal aim of the Sejm Ustawodawczy was to draft a constitution for the new Polish state, since neither the Constitution of 1791 nor the Napoleonic Constitution of 1807 could be adapted to modern conditions. Jewish representation in the Sejm gave a prominent voice to the elected Jewish deputies, who took the opportunity to write an open letter to Paderewski on May 8, 1919. As well as detailing the anti-Jewish excesses in Poland up to that date, it carried a demand for “equal rights for Jews”. Jewish deputies called for Poland to be recognised as a ‘państwo narodowościowe’ (multi-nation state) rather than the ‘państwo narodowe’ (one nation-state) favoured by the majority of Polish deputies. Jewish deputies demanded a degree of autonomy, under the kehilla organisations (Jewish local community organisations, known as gmina in Polish), and a Ministry for Jewish Affairs to deal with religious, educational and charitable affairs, in line with the example of the Ukrainian model. These demands were flatly turned down as early as February 1919, with the restriction of kehilla organisations to merely a religious role. As a result Jewish claims for autonomy and minority rights were forced to shift away from efforts in Poland to Paris.

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64 SSSU, 7th Session, February 26, 1919, pp. 281-285.
65 Grünbaum had already acknowledged that Jews had equal rights in the Kingdom of Poland for more than fifty years: SSSU, 5th Session, February 24, 1919, p. 191.
67 Evidence of Pogroms, p. 134.
68 Tenenbaum, Tsvishn milhome un sholem, p. 78.
69 Tenenbaum, In Search of a Lost People, pp. 171-173; the Jewish programme was outlined in: Apolinary Hartglas, Zasady naszego programu politycznego w Polsce (Warsaw, 1918).
70 The restrictions on kehilla organisations were enacted into law on February 9, 1919: Kurt Klikar, Janusz Pierzchalski, Adam Słoninski and Stefan Szymorowski, Dziennik Praw Państwa Polskiego, 1 lutego 1918-14 sierpnia 1919 (Warsaw, 1919), no. 16.
71 See Chapter IV; Tenenbaum, Tsvishn milhome un sholem, p. 93.
A committee was formed to help draft a constitution for Poland, with a sole Jewish representative, Isaac Grünbaum. The aim was to have the constitution in place before the Minorities Treaty being proposed at the Paris Peace Conference was imposed on Poland. The latter Treaty was intended as a test case and as an example to the other ‘successor states’. It would also be the price for recognising Polish independence, a condition only made necessary due to the acts of anti-Jewish violence in November 1918. The nine-man committee to organise the new state’s constitution was chaired by the ZLN deputy, Professor Edward Dubanowicz, a constitutional lawyer at the Polish University of Lwów, and its principal expert was Kazimierz Lutosławski. The main result of the deliberations of the right-wing-dominated committee was the Constitution passed by the Sejm on March 21, 1921, closely resembling that of the French Third Republic. The power of the president was severely limited, as he could not propose legislation. This was largely due to the National Democrats’ assumption that Piłsudski would assume the role, due to his popularity among the mass of the population. In a measure designed specifically at Piłsudski, Article 46 stated that the President was head of the Armed Forces, but expressly prohibited his exercising command in wartime. By placing control over the executive in the hands of the Sejm, it produced unstable governments in Poland, as it did in France. When the Sejm was deadlocked over executing policy issues, there was no prospect of dissolution.

The events in Lwów were still casting a long shadow over politics in Poland, and questions were raised in the Sejm by Jewish deputies over the question of official odżydzenie (anti-Jewish discrimination), namely the dismissal of 400 Jewish postal and telegraph workers in Lwów, in the month of May alone. In the increasingly hostile atmosphere within the chamber, the exact course of events in Lwów was still a matter of debate, not helped by the lack of publication of either official investigation. It would seem to have been sensible to have published the results of one or other of the investigations, which was within the power of the Sejm to do, yet neither the

72 The Sejm passed a vote objecting to foreign intervention into the internal affairs of Poland, SSSU, 41st Session, May 23, 1919, pp. 31-40.
74 By 1921 Jews only accounted for 1.7% of post and telegraph workers and 0.8% of railway workers; by 1931 in Galicia there were only 21 Jewish out of 16,840 post and telegraph workers: Raphael Mahler, “Jews in Public Service and the Liberal Professions, 1918-1939”, Jewish Social Studies, Volume 4, No. 4, (1944), pp. 301-302, 305. Overall Jews accounted for 5,618 out of 135,630 (4.2%) “State Officials” in 1921: Gliksman, L’Aspect Économique de la Question Juive en Pologne, p. 83.
investigation by the Polish Foreign Ministry nor the report of the Extraordinary Investigating Commission from the Justice of the Supreme Court into the events in Lwów in November of 1918 was published. Presumably the reason for the lack of circulation of these reports was the fact that they both placed a large measure of culpability on the Poles, and more prominently the soldiers, an issue of burning importance to the new state, fighting to establish its borders.

The Polish Army, the Jews and State-Building

The Polish High Command’s attempt to shape and rebuild the national consciousness of the soldiery, and thus to solve the problems associated with creating a modern nation in arms, compelled it to step headlong into one of the most intractable difficulties encountered by the state during the whole interwar period, namely what role, if any, should Poland’s substantial number of ethnic minorities, and principally its Jewish minority, play in the key role of defending the state. In the position Poland found herself in by November 1918 she had to mobilise her total population merely to maintain her borders, let alone expand them to the extent that Polish statesmen of all persuasions wanted to see. The position of Poland between the recently defeated Germany, stung by the loss of territory to the Polish state, and Soviet Russia, still in the throes of the Civil War, but never losing sight of the prospect of exporting the Bolshevik revolution, was unenviable and dangerous. The threat posed by these two ‘revisionist’ powers was obvious to Polish leaders who did not want to see Poland partitioned as she had been at the end of the eighteenth century. Accordingly, they planned to give Poland as good a chance as possible of challenging these Powers through a number of means, certainly diplomatic, but more immediately military. A breathing-space was urgently required.

The High Command openly wished to strengthen the ‘Polishness’ of the rank and file, a particularly difficult proposition not only with the Jews, who were developing a national consciousness, as well as harbouring feelings that were not necessarily supportive of the Polish state, but also with other national minorities who already had developed a national identity to a greater (Germans) or lesser (Ukrainians and

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Byelorussians) extent. The military situation in Poland was as acute as in the other ‘successor states.’ As the following table shows, in 1919 the principle of Wilsonian self-determination had left numerous ‘orphans.’

Table 3.5: Minorities within the ‘Successor States’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country (Dominant Nationality)</th>
<th>Dominant Nationality</th>
<th>Minority Nationalities (inc. Jews)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia (Serbs)</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia (Czechs)</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland (Poles)</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania (Rumanians)</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary (Magyars)</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria (Austrians)</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, army planners had to find ways to fashion non-Polish soldiers into good citizens, and foster their allegiance to the state. In some cases the High Command sought to assimilate the ethnic minorities, presuming that ethnic groups with less-developed national consciousness could be polonized; in others, they appealed to the soldiers’ sense of civic duty.

In the earliest period of independence, the Polish officer corps gained a reputation for anti-Semitic views. Developments during the struggle for Lwów in November 1918 and the perception that Jews had an unsympathetic attitude toward the new Polish state further strained Polish-Jewish relations, merely reinforcing the mutual suspicions and recrimination that had been building since the last decades of the previous century, and grown through the First World War. Lwów set the tone for the army’s developing relations with the Jewish minority. Rumours, correct or not, that the Jewish population of Lwów had stood with the Ukrainians gave weight to the impression that Jews were opposed to Poland, seeming to support all other national demands at the expense of Poles.

Jews were generally seen by Polish soldiers as an unreliable element to be treated with a degree of caution, if not hostility. In this atmosphere it was necessary to decide what role they would play in the army. A parliamentary military commission in April 1919 had the temerity to complain that Jews had in fact turned out for the recent draft,

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“since a reliable element is needed at the front”, 77 even though 30% of the total eligible conscripts had otherwise avoided it. Conscription was far from universal in the new state. In some districts, such as around Bialystok, 78 only people who had claimed Polish citizenship were called up. In Eastern Galicia in February 1919, the High Command in Warsaw called for conscription of all eligible males, but local military officials re-worded the order so that only ethnic Poles were called up. As Jews of draft ages assumed that the directive did not apply to them, they did not report for duty, only to be arrested by the authorities. 79 Local officials argued that the Jews who had voted in the previous parliamentary election were Polish citizens, and those who refused to take the army oath were arrested. A total of 102 Jews were detained and sent to a disciplinary work unit where, according to the official report, the prisoners were abused. 80 The investigation stated that abuses did not occur “from the influence of innate racial hatred or the deliberate, systematic persecution of Jews, but rather as a spontaneous appearance as an expression of resentment or antipathy against these particular Jews who, born and raised in Poland, and not long ago being the greatest proponents of the Austrian army, now appear as the greatest enemies of the Polish army, or at the very least try to maintain an attitude of complete neutrality”. 81

Władysław Sikorski and Piłsudski, officers sympathetic to non-Polish nationals serving in the Polish armed forces, equated the present situation with that which Poland faced under the partitions, whereby Poles served as loyal soldiers in the armies of the three different partitioning powers. 82 Some assimilated Jews argued that they should fulfil military service, while still expressing their separate Jewish identity. Jewish recruits who emphasised their Jewish ethnicity were considered a hostile element, whereas one citing his religion as Jewish, but his nationality as Polish, was

77 AAN (Warsaw), Papiery Laudańskiego, 76/II/39, folder 115r.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
perfectly acceptable. Colonel Henryk Minkiewscz, the commander of the Przemyśl Military District, commented that Jews were willing to be “‘neutral’ citizens of the Polish state, who have rights, but don’t bear obligations”. His opinion outweighed Piłsudski’s view among the Polish officer corps.

The opinion that ethnicity and loyalty were connected was at least partly responsible for the High Command’s effort to ensure the distinctly ‘Polish’ character of the officer corps. As early as February of 1919 officers of the Military Training Department of the Ministry of Military Affairs debated the value of restricting military academies to Christians and ethnic Poles. They argued that ethnic unity was more important than the larger size afforded by a multi-ethnic officer corps, as officers should be prepared to defend the state with their lives; Jews, they argued, were not prepared to do this. Debates in the Sejm were heated on the matter of Jews serving in the military. Dr. Oasis Thon stated that Jews would stand by Poles to defend “Polish territories”. The only reliable figures for number of Jews in the Polish army relate to those of Jewish officers and those serving in the armed forces as a whole. According to the 1921 census there were 694 Jewish officers out of 27,843 in the Polish army, a mere 2.5% of the total. In total, Jews constituted 15,393 out of the 349,840 serving in the armed forces, or 4.4% of the total. The majority of these were in the Medical and Supply Corps, a further cause of attack by both the right-wing and Piast press.

In a later debate members of the Military Commission submitted legislation to the Sejm on officer registration that limited the officer corps to ethnic Poles, or those citizens who, regardless of their religion, chose to be recognised as Polish nationals.

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83 Minkiewicz to Iwaszkiewicz, March 21, 1919: CAW (Warsaw), Szefostwo Sadownictwa Polowego NDWP, 1/301/23/69.
84 Ibid. It was noted in Przemyśl that after the Jews had participated in the Sejm elections “if you enjoy the rights, you must also bear the obligations. Until now you were not required to be drafted to the army, now you must do so”, Menczer, Sefer Przemysl, p. 188.
85 Łucjan Zarzecki to Jacyna, February 13, 1919: CAW (Warsaw), MSW, Oddzial III Naukowo-Szkolny, 1/300/8/2.
86 SSSU, 11th Session, March 7, 1919, p. 526.
88 The figure for the armed forces include the army, navy and air force. Gliksman, op. cit., p. 102. By way of comparison, in 1882 in the Imperial Russian Army there were in Warsaw 145 Jews out of 6,331 (0.2%), growing to 801 of 30,411 (2.6%) in 1897, Corrin, Warsaw Before the First World War, pp. 151, 154-155.
89 For example, “Żydzi w wojsku”, in the Warsaw Endek newspaper Gazeta Warszawska, February 23, 1919.
Stanislaw Lesniewski, of the Sejm’s Military Commission, wrote to the army’s Personnel Department, stating that the Commission had decided that the officer corps should be “a purely national [Polish] character, freeing it of foreign elements.” While not specifically directed against the Jewish minority, the report undoubtedly sent a negative signal to the prospective Jewish recruits. When the debate took place on the bill, on June 17, 1919 Jewish deputies objected to its wording, arguing that every citizen, no matter what that person’s nationality, was obligated to defend the state. In response Bronisław Malewski, speaking for the Military Commission, claimed that the measure was directed against German colonists and Ukrainians, rather than the Jewish minority. Malewski maintained that the army should have some control over the origin of its officers for the sake of military security. In practice the law did little to alter the character of the officer corps, although it did increase the number of Jewish officers who were not accepted into the Polish armed forces, even though they had served in the Austro-Hungarian army during the First World War.

Political considerations also came into play. It has been suggested that a sizable proportion of the officer corps, principally those who served in the tsarist army, supported the National Democrats. The Endeks favoured the conscription of Ukrainian and Byelorussian minorities, feeling that they could be moulded into model Polish soldiers; Jews were another issue. ZLN deputies were constantly attempting to enforce the Polish character of the army, yet they also criticised the Jewish minority for avoiding military service. While the more political active army officers generally supported the National Democrats, they were not as successful as they had hoped to be in controlling the armed forces. The influence of, and support among army officers for, Piłsudski, who had no real rival in the military leadership, as he refused to appoint a Minister of War, was still very strong, and it needed to be, as he had purposely refused to align with any political grouping, using the army as his support base.

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90 Sprawa przymowanie do WP osób narodowości nie polskiej. CAW (Warsaw), MSW, Gabinet Ministra, I/300/1/44.
91 SSSU, 52nd Session, June 17, 1919, pp. 109-110.
94 „Żydzi w wojsku”, Gazeta Warszawska, February 23, 1919.
It can be stated generally that with the possible exception of Austrian Galicia, Jews were distrustful and apprehensive of military service. They feared that in joining the army they would have to have their beards shaved, eat food that was not kosher, and break other religious regulations.\footnote{Wróbel, op. cit., p. 291.} A vicious cycle with Jewish draftees occurred throughout this period. Jews who joined up were often mistrusted by their commanding officers, which was reported back to Jews through the Jewish press. In turn this increased the numbers of Jews who evaded their draft. Ironically Poles themselves were not always willing to volunteer, with peasants especially being reluctant to serve.

Pińsk – April 1919

In spring 1919 deliberations in Paris were rocked by the news of events in a small town in the Pripyat marshes of the Polish/Byelorussian borderlands. Even more so than the ‘Lemberg horrors’ in 1918, the incident at Pińsk has to be seen as the defining influence in Polish-Jewish relations in 1919, more so as it arguably led directly to the imposition of the Minorities Treaty. 35 Jews were shot on the orders of Major Alexander Narbut-Łuczyński, the commander of the local Polish military garrison.\footnote{The exact number of victims is still a matter of debate (although the figure is not usually quoted as being more than 40). Jerzy Tomaszewski’s figure of 34 is generally accepted. See his article: “Pińsk, Saturday 5 April 1919”, Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry, Volume 1 (1986), p. 227. Israeli Historian Azriel Shohat quotes the total figure to be 35, as one person had already been shot earlier: Azriel Shohat, “Parashat Hapogrom Bepinsk Ba-hamishah Be’April 1919”, Gal-Ed: On the History of the Jews in Poland, Volume 1 (1973), p. 146.} There were important differences between the situation in Lwów in November 1918 and Pińsk in April 1919. Events in Lwów had taken place during the fighting between the Poles and Ukrainians to secure the city in a virtual civil war. Pińsk was in Polish hands, and no fighting had been reported between the Polish forces and the Red Army. Furthermore, no provocations, such as the alleged firing from the Jewish quarter on Polish soldiers in Lwów, accusations that had played such importance in events there, occurred such as to justify the executions.\footnote{Poles had alleged that shots were fired at their troops after they entered the town after its recapture from the Ruthenians: Golczewski, op. cit., p. 218.} More fundamentally, there were many non-Jewish casualties in Lwów, whereas there were no gentile casualties at all in Pińsk. This further blurs the interpretation, as the events
in Lwów could be argued to constitute a pogrom, violence against Jewish civilians and property, while the officials stood by until the disorder had arguably run its course. In contrast, Jewish casualties in Pińsk were the result of executions, ordered by the Polish commanding officer, while Pińsk was in a state of emergency. To Polish historians the events in Pińsk have long been explained as the execution of mere “Bolshevik infiltrators”. A closer examination of the evidence available, however, leads to a different conclusion.

The situation in Pińsk was different from that in Lwów during the time of the ‘Lemberg horrors’, in that the town was overwhelmingly Jewish, with a Jewish population of 17,513 according to the 1921 census, 74.6% of the total. Pińsk was a classic example of an eastern European Shtetl.

Table 3.6: Population of Pińsk and District by Religion, Polish Census, 1921

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Roman Catholic</th>
<th>Greek Catholic</th>
<th>Orthodox Christian</th>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pińsk (Town)</td>
<td>23,276</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>17,513</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pińsk (District)</td>
<td>147,621</td>
<td>7,928</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>117,447</td>
<td>21,991</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polesie</td>
<td>880,898</td>
<td>68,698</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>697,373</td>
<td>110,639</td>
<td>2,608</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.7: Population of Pińsk and District by Nationality, Polish Census, 1921

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Polish</th>
<th>Ruthenian</th>
<th>Byelorussian</th>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pińsk (Town)</td>
<td>23,276</td>
<td>1,605</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pińsk (District)</td>
<td>147,621</td>
<td>27,727</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>97,062</td>
<td>19,956</td>
<td>2,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polesie</td>
<td>880,898</td>
<td>214,052</td>
<td>156,142</td>
<td>375,220</td>
<td>91,251</td>
<td>44,233</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

98 Azriel Shohat flatly states that what occurred at Pińsk was a pogrom: Shohat, “Parashat Hapogrom Bepinsk”.
99 Poland’s Minister of the Interior, Stanislaw Wojciechowski, announced a state of emergency on April 1, including measures restricting public meetings, where any gathering required the permission of the local military commander.
100 The full quote is: “another reported pogrom in Pińsk in 1919 was in reality the execution of thirty-five Bolshevik infiltrators, a judgement an American investigator considered justified in the circumstances”: Lukas, Forgotten Holocaust, p. 125.
103 The category ‘Other’ includes a large number of persons who, when asked for their nationality, replied “pinchuki”, (local) the majority of whom were generally classified as Byelorussian: ibid., p. 14; Walter Kolarz, Myths and Realities in Eastern Europe (London, 1946), p 17.
Between the German occupation of Pińsk on the eve of Yom Kippur 1915 and the cessation of the Polish-Soviet War in 1920, the town changed hands no less than six times. German control of the town continued after the November Armistice until authority was passed to Ukrainian forces on December 5, 1918, although the German forces were allowed to remain in the town. On January 22 1919, the Red Army attacked Pińsk, taking it three days later, much to the celebration of elements of the Jewish community. The Red Army forces were greeted by “red flags … waved on high”. During the Bolshevik occupation looting occurred, but there were no acts of violence. A local Revolutionary Committee (Rev Com) was set up, with both Polish and Jewish members. At the time of the shootings, Pińsk had only recently been taken by the Poles from the Red Army, as the conflict between Soviet Russia and Poland for control of the Kresy escalated from February 1919.

In the Eastern Kresy the Polish army set about expanding the new state’s borders. Under the leadership of General Dowbór-Muśnicki, Polish forces of the Lithuanian-White Russian division fought both Byelorussian and Ukrainian nationalists, as well as local Bolshevik forces. Stanislaw Michał Kossakowski, an adjutant of the Polish General Commission for the Civil Administration of the eastern Territories, in his diary recounted the Polish occupation of Pińsk, noting the harsh treatment meted out to the local Jewish population at the hands of the occupying Polish army. Pińsk was recaptured by the Poles on March 5, 1919, in an operation that even the Polish forces admitted to having been relatively easy, due to the withdrawal of the limited Bolshevik forces. Conditions in Pińsk in the month following the Polish takeover were extremely harsh, not helped by the large numbers of refugees who had flocked to the town from the surrounding countryside looking for aid.

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104 Wolf Zeev Rabinowitsch and Nachman Tamir (eds.), Pinsk Sefer Edut ve-Zikaron le-Kehilat Pinsk-Karlin (Tel Aviv, 1966), Volume 1, p. 77.
107 Referred to in Paweł Korzec, Problem żydowski w życiu politycznym Polski, 1900-1939 (unpublished), pp. 154-155.
108 The British journalist Henry N. Brailsford witnessed the harsh conditions where “at Pinsk men and women frequently faint on the streets”, noting especially the hardships of the Jewish population. He reported them to the Supreme Economic Council in late March. William R. Grove, War’s Aftermath (Polish Relief in 1919) (New York, 1940) p. 74.
With the introduction of martial law a number of declarations were issued on March 20. Second Lieutenant Landsberg, the Commandant of Pińsk, ordered the replacement of all signs in “German, Russian and Yiddish … by Polish inscriptions, written correctly”, and furthermore, stated that “all mass-meetings, meetings and organisations of a political character are absolutely forbidden”. Such measures were being undertaken due to heightened Bolshevik activity in the Pińsk district, and Jews as well as Polish peasants were suspected of helping the Bolsheviks. Listowski commented that “it was known that a considerable number of local bolshevists had remained in the town and were hiding considerable quantities of firearms”. Accounts agree about the nervous nature of the Polish troops in the Pińsk district. Henry N. Brailsford, a British journalist, visited the town at the end of March 1919 and described how

[t]he town lived in daily fear under the Polish military occupation. It must be explained that the Polish officers are firmly convinced that every Jew is a Bolshevik, and that every Jewish house (as the General [Listowski] puts it) harbours a Jewish spy or a Red Guard in hiding. It is true that some of the Jewish Socialist youth of this district have joined the Bolsheviks.

As there were only three companies of troops to defend the whole district, the closest support would have to come from Brest-Litovsk, some 100 miles away, a journey of eight hours by train. Reports reached Pińsk of the killing of “several” Polish soldiers in a nearby town on the morning of April 5. Major Narbut-Lucyński commented on the “arrogant attitude of young Jews” in Pińsk after the news arrived, yet he also noted that “the [Beylorussian] villages are hostile”. Furthermore, he reported that a Polish soldier had been shot at, and injured, an accusation that remains unsubstantiated.

109 Copy of declaration in AAN (Warsaw), files of the Polish National Committee [KNP] 149.
110 Polish peasants were found bringing ammunition into the town at the end of March. Evidence of Major Aleksander Narbut-Lucyński to the Polish Court of Inquiry, AAN (Warsaw), Paderewski 774.
111 PAT Report [no date, probably April 7], AAN (Warsaw), KNP, 149.
112 The article was written on March 28, 1919: Brailsford, op. cit., p. 70.
113 PAT Report: AAN (Warsaw), KNP, 149.
114 AAN (Warsaw), Paderewski 774.
It was in these circumstances that at 8:30 in the evening of April 5, 1919, Polish soldiers came upon a gathering of the Zeirei Zion (Young Zion) organization at the Bet Am (Meeting House) in Kupiecka Street, the headquarters of the local Zionist Organisation. Interpreting the meeting as subversive, despite the fact that it had been authorized by the local commandant, Konstanty Trofimowicz, the (allegedly drunk) Major Narbut-Lucyński ordered the surrounding of the Bet Am, detaining the some 150 members of the Zionist Organisation who were attending the meeting. He became suspicious after those who had gathered stayed after it had finished, not an unusual occurrence since the hall was by all accounts an important community centre, the shtibl (study house) containing a library and reading room. Under the command of Corporal Stanisław Cichosz a troop of fifteen Polish soldiers entered the Bet Am, in contravention of Landsberg’s express orders, at which point a number of Jews escaped, raising the suspicions of the Polish troops. Two Jewish soldiers, who were informers, Daniel Kozak and Motel Kolkier, had warned of an impending uprising. One of the two soldiers, unidentified in the military report, stated that some Jews had tried to induce him to join the Bolshevists, and had been taken to 72 Kupeieka [the Bet Am], as the house where the recruiting of Bolshevists was done, but the enlister was not there [his evidence] was not corroborated, except by a Corporal of the Gendarmes, who visited the house in disguise, and found a number of Jews there “whispering together”.

While no arms were found in the building, the Polish troops could not tell if Bolshevik propaganda was there, as none could read either Hebrew or Yiddish. The remaining 80-100 occupants were marched to the local military headquarters, their ranks swollen by the addition of a number of Jews along the route. On arrival, Major Alexander Luczyński ordered a selection of those who remained; after women

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116 Article X of Landsburg’s order for martial law stated that “Searches can only take place, in the presence of the Gendarmerie. The Gendarme present at each search must each time present an order signed by the commandant [and?] his substitute”: AAN (Warsaw), KNP 149.
118 The Military Commission Report, contained in AAN (Warsaw), KNP 149, also published in Tomaszewski, “Pińsk”, p. 244.
119 Ibid., p. 244.
120 Rabinowitsch and Tamir (eds.), op. cit., p. 80.
and children were taken out, 34 were left. Major Luczyński testified that “after a short consultation with some officers, which had the character of a court martial, I gave the order to separate the women, children and old men from the group and to shoot the remaining”.  The thirty-four remaining Jews were taken to the main square in Pińsk and shot against the wall of the town’s Russian Orthodox church, by a Polish officer, Lieutenant Drobik. One thing that all the reports concur on is the fact that not all the Jews died immediately. Indeed they allege that up to 12 had to be killed the next day by pistol shots to the head as they were still breathing. The bodies were buried in a mass grave in the Jewish cemetery (and according to Henry Morgenthau, the head of the American Mission to investigate the alleged pogroms in Poland, the local Jewish population was not allowed to visit the graves until Morgenthau himself went to examine the scene). The fact that, according to Jewish sources, the ‘Bolshevik Meeting’ was nothing more than a gathering discussing the distribution of matzo flour from the American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee for Passover, leant the Polish army accusation that the meeting had been one of Bolsheviks an unconvincing and cruel character. Luczyński was undoubtedly suspicious of the Jews still remaining in the Bet Am after the end of their meeting, yet he had no evidence to prove their guilt, while he argued that he did not have sufficient men to “guard the suspected men until they could be further investigated”. In these circumstances he decided to shoot those whom he admitted he did not have any evidence against, undoubtedly an act of anti-Semitism. The action of Luczyński, who consulted his fellow officers before carrying out the sentence, was undoubtedly harsh in the extreme and hasty. Nevertheless, his decision was accepted and even supported by some western observers, as Pińsk was under martial law at the time. However, to the outside world, it appeared to be yet another example of Polish anti-Jewish violence. The executions did not end the mistreatment of the Jewish population. Twenty-six were imprisoned, while the rest were released. A “fine” of 100,000 marks

121 Quoted in Isaac Lewin, op. cit., p. 147.
122 According to eyewitness reports contained in “Zajście w Pińsku w oświetleniu urzędowem”, Robotnik, (9 April, 1919), pp. 1-2.
123 Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 369.
124 Official communiqué, General Litowski to Polish Government: April 7, 1919: AAN (Warsaw) KNP 149.
125 See below; Paris to Kimens, 13 April 1919: TNA (London), FO 608/66/7502, and Report by Captain B. Crewdson, the Chief of British Military Mission in Warsaw, June 11, 1919: TNA (London), FO 608/67/14268.
was levied on the Jewish population for causing a “disturbance”, which was only paid back on May 24, 1921 after the Parliamentary Investigative Committee finally reported to the Sejm on the events in Pińsk.

In contrast to other, earlier, incidents, there were numerous witnesses to the events in Pińsk. The harsh economic conditions of the territories newly recaptured from the Bolsheviks meant people were in danger of suffering from mass starvation. As a result, the eastern Kresy was opened to foreign aid agencies. Although apolitical organisations, their staffs inevitably became embroiled in domestic Polish politics.

The two principal ‘impartial’ witnesses were American aid workers, with diametrically opposing opinions on Polish-Jewish relations. Baruch (Barnet) Zuckerman, an American member of the Food Distributing Commission of the JDC, and a Zionist, had spent five days in Pińsk, between April 1-5, organising the distribution of flour through a flour-distribution committee he had helped to set up. On the night of the shootings Zuckermann was in Brest, just over 100 miles from Pińsk, and learned of the executions from Jewish residents of Pińsk, who had fled from the town. As a result his report both lacked detail and contained certain factual inaccuracies. Zuckerman’s immediate reaction was not to return to Pińsk, but to go to Warsaw, arriving on 6 April, to inform the western representatives of the shootings. He also related the news to the Central Zionist Organisation in Warsaw and Isaac Grünbaum, who two days later submitted a question in the Sejm, as well as the report by Baruch Zuckerman, which was published in the Warsaw Jewish newspaper *Haynt (Today)* on 9 April.

Most of the Warsaw papers, however, followed the *Polska Agencja Telegraficzna* (Polish Telegraphic Agency or PAT) report on the incident, entitled, “Bolshevik Plot

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126 Ibid.
127 The most important of these was the American Relief Administration (ARA), part of Herbert Hoover’s United States Food Administration, under Colonel William R. Grove, who administrated both the Joint Distribution Committee of the American Funds for Jewish War Sufferers (JDC, or more informally, ‘the Joint’) under Dr. Boris D. Bogen, and the American Red Cross (ARC) under Lieutenant Colonel John Bailey, see Boris D. Bogen, *Born a Jew* (New York, 1930).
128 Zuckerman’s report, enclosed in TNA (London), FO 608/66/7150.
129 At the meeting, Zuckerman reported the total number of casualties to be between 40-100, detailed in Kimens to Balfour, Warsaw April 8, 1919: TNA (London), FO 608/66.
130 *Haynt*, April 9, 1919, p. 1; the account was later published in the Jewish Polish-language Cracow newspaper *Nowy Dziennik* on April 11, 1919: SSSU, 29th Session, April 10, 1919, pp. 110-115.
at Pińsk”, which backed up the army’s position that justified the killing of the Jewish citizens. It stated that “Polish units are surrounded by treason”, and that according to statements made by Jews serving in the Polish army, there is undeniable evidence that notwithstanding the law prohibiting meetings, secret meetings were being held continuously, with a view to taking over the town by bolshevik elements. During the putting down of the plot at Pińsk, large deposits of ammunition and rifles were found. The arrested bolsheviks attempted to destroy their documents and papers. Fortunately while this was happening, the American relief mission was at Pińsk, some members of which were Jews … the plot was in the first time [revealed] by the help given by Jews in the Polish army. 131

The report concluded by stating that “the verdict by which 30 bolsheviks were sentenced to death was at once put into practice, and at once put an end to the uprising, by which a terrible bloodshed was avoided”. 132 Arguably the PAT report was also aimed in part at placating both Jews in Poland, and for use internationally.

Józef Piłsudski demanded an immediate explanation. In a letter to General Antioi Listowski, the commander of the Pińsk sector, he asked for a quick accounting of events as the Americans had already started to investigate the affair, presumably referring to the investigation being carried out by the Allied officers, Major A. L. Paris and Lieutenant R. C. Foster. 133 He showed his anger, as the events were damaging to Poland’s international reputation at a crucial time in the Paris negotiations. 134 As early as 8 April General Antoni Listowski, who had had a hand in drafting the PAT report, ordered an investigation into the events in Pińsk. The report, written by Colonel Stefan Strzemieński, was undoubtedly flawed, perhaps understandably due to the circumstances in which it was compiled, in war-time conditions and only a few days after the event, when the local population, especially Jewish civilians, might not have been keen to accuse Polish army officers to another

131 AAN (Warsaw), KNP 149.
132 Ibid.
133 Kimens to Balfour, April 14, 1919: TNA (London), FO 608/66/7502.
Polish officer. It also contained inaccurate information from various Polish soldiers, who both claimed that arms, two pistols and some ammunition, had been found in the Bet Am, and also that the evidence had been lost when Jews had returned and ransacked the building while the executions were taking place. This is unlikely, as there was an armed guard around the building throughout the night of April 5, and Polish troops themselves were searching the building.\textsuperscript{135} Major Paris in his report commented on the “contradictions” and “erroneous” evidence of the Polish soldiers.\textsuperscript{136}

On April 10, Zuckerman’s report was presented to the Sejm by Noah Prilutski and Isaac Grünbaum who claimed that 50-100 persons were believed executed, with a further 30-40 still under arrest who had possibly “been shot by now”.\textsuperscript{137} Although this number proved to be inaccurate, it was more reasonable than other initial Zionist estimates of such incidents.\textsuperscript{138} They were encouraged to speak, thanks to the immunity granted them as Sejm deputies, an important safeguard that Jewish deputies used throughout the interwar Sejm.\textsuperscript{139} It is relevant to quote extensively the reply to the questions from the Jewish deputies from the Minister of Military Affairs, General Józef Kyzyżtof Leśniewski, who stated that

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[d]espite the order issued by military authorities to turn over all fire-arms, soldiers were shot at from town windows. The aim of these organized actions was to prepare an armed rebellion in Pińsk, which was confirmed by the Jewish inhabitants of the city in the presence of a representative of the American Red Cross Commission, Mr. F. Fronczak … on the Sunday morning, 5 April 1919, a secret meeting of the Bolshevik organization took place … That afternoon, about a hundred Communists gathered at 72 Kupiecka Street. The commander of Pińsk, Major Łuczyński, warned by a Jew, a soldier in the Polish army, that the meeting was to discuss the details of a planned action aimed at disarming and murdering the [Polish] military detachment in Pińsk and it was to take place on the night of the 5\textsuperscript{th} to 6\textsuperscript{th} of
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\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{135} AAN (Warsaw), KNP 149; Report of Major A. L. Paris, TNA (London), FO 608/66/7502.
\item \textsuperscript{136} Report of Major A. L. Paris, TNA (London), FO 608/66/7502.
\item \textsuperscript{137} TNA (London), FO 608/66/7150.
\item \textsuperscript{138} SSSU, 29\textsuperscript{th} Session, April 10, 1919, p. 110.
\item \textsuperscript{139} Netzer, \textit{Ma’Avek Yehudei Polin}, p. 119.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
April, sent a few soldiers to see what was going on. The participants at the meeting welcomed the soldiers with pistol shots. Two soldiers were injured and one of them died a few hours later. About 80 persons were arrested and escorted to the Command Headquarters … Out of those 80 participants at the Bolshevik meeting, 33 persons were executed. I base my explanation on the report sent by General Listowski and on the deposition made under oath by Mr. Fronczak, an American delegate.

The reply given by General Leśniewski is interesting in light of the conclusions of even the Polish investigating commissions. Its basis was the sworn deposition by Dr. Francis Fronczak, who referred to himself as a Lieutenant Colonel, yet was later accused by the Deputy ARC Commissioner, Colonel Taylor, of wearing bogus officer’s insignia; nor does his name appear on the ARC’s personnel file. What is known about Fronczak is that he was an American of Polish background, and one of the leaders of the National Polish Department of America, a relief organisation. From February 1919, he had been a member of Dmowski’s KNP in Paris, directing the Department of Public Welfare, where he had been noted by Lieutenant R. C. Foster, the head of the American Political Mission to Poland, for his anti-Jewish opinions. Under pressure from the KNP, Herbert Hoover moved Fronczak to Poland under the ARC in March 1919. According to the sworn deposition of Fronczak, there was “according to the information given me by the military authorities a plan to massacre the Polish Officers and Soldiers remaining in the town of the night of Saturday, April 5, 1919 … A Jewish soldier, serving in the Polish Army who was prevailed upon to join this communistic organization, warned the district Commander of the impending massacre and the night on which it was to be held”. It is interesting to note that in his deposition Fronczak does not refer to the gathering as Jews at all, but always as either “Bolshevik” or “Communists”. He quotes Major Narbut-Luczyński as saying that “I think that most of those who were at that meeting were Jews. Probably, they were all Jews, because they are the only sympathisers in the city with the

141 Located at the US National Archives (Washington, DC) ARC file 943.3.
142 US National Archives (Washington, DC) 860c/4016.
143 Lieutenant Colonel Frances F. Fronczak’s sworn deposition (in English) contained in AAN (Warsaw), Paderewski Papers, Folder 773, p. 83. There is also a copy located in the files of the British Peace Conference Delegation, TNA (London), FO 608/66.
144 Ibid., pp. 83-85.
Bolsheviki and the Bolsheviki are recruited in great number from the Jewish population. In view of the public orders issued by General Listowski and the military authorities and myself there was no doubt that the only way to quell all attempt to give up the city to the enemy was to arrest the Communist or the Bolsheviki and order their immediate execution”. He later quoted a Jewish resident of Pińsk that “our Jewish folk were crazy to try to make an insurrection at this time and kill the Polish soldiers. It serves them right”. 

The two contradictory reports were deemed “inadequate” at the meeting of the Inter-Allied Mission, and it was decided that a “correct account of events” was required. The Allied Military Commission to Pińsk reported to their legations as early as April 13, having arrived in the town on the April 10. The Commission members, Major A. L. Paris, of the British Military Mission and Lieutenant R. C. Foster, were given full access to the Polish Military Inquiry, and told by General Listowski that they were to have “carte blanche” for their investigation. It was not only Fronczak’s background that was unreliable, but his statements as well. Major Paris reported that “the description of events as reported by Lt Col Fronczak … contained most incorrect statements”, commenting that “no Polish soldier was shot, although they say that they were shot at. Our investigation, in company with the corporal who said he was shot at from inside the house 72 Kupiecka, showed only one bullet mark and that of a shot obviously fired from outside”. The report concluded that “our opinion is that the execution was justified as an act of war, in view of the [grave] military situation, and that this is the only, but a sufficient justification”, continuing with the comment that “there can be no definite proof of the guilt of the men, but there was grounds for great suspicion”. 

The efforts undertaken by the military authorities to justify the decision of Major Lucynski were a natural consequence of the prevalent belief that military interests were predominant and superior to civilian considerations. Higher-ranking officers

145 Ibid., pp. 85-86. 
146 Ibid., p. 88. 
147 Kimens to Balfour, April 8, 1919: TNA (London), FO 608/66/7150. 
148 TNA (London), FO 608/66/7502. 
149 Copy of Major Paris’s report; Paris to Kimens, 13 April 1919: TNA (London), FO 608/66/7502. 
regarded the investigation as a nuisance that prevented them from performing their normal duties. There was also the question of defending the honour of army officers, and this helped influence the interpretation of the various documents. Only when the military authorities were compelled to act, because of international interest in the matter and the appearance of a parliamentary commission, did they in fact initiate an inquiry, but they continued to interpret the facts in favour of the accused. The investigation carried out by the military command did not affect to any great extent the positions of Major Luczyński and General Listowski, who did not have their military careers affected by their association with events in Pińsk. General Władysław Sikorski, taking over Listowski’s command of the Ninth Infantry Division and the Polesie group, discovered wide-ranging abuses and the soldiery running amok and mistreating the local populace, not only the Jewish population.\footnote{“In General Listowski’s time the most despicable scum in our resurgent army ran wild”. Sikorski to Piłsudski, August 19, 1919: in Świtalski, “Listy Józefa Piłsudskiego”, p. 57.} Accusations followed Listowski to his new post as head of the Volhynian front, and he was repeatedly attacked by leftist deputies and the Socialist press throughout 1919. Despite all this, Listowski continued in his command position. It is certainly true that Piłsudski was hesitant to change commanders in periods of tension. He was even less inclined to do so during military operations. Listowski’s own combat record was the thing that made him indispensable. He had headed a battalion in the Russo-Japanese War, and during the First World War had commanded three regiments in the Russian army and by late 1917, the Thirty-Seventh Army Corps. The retention of Listowski, and other officers like him, cannot be taken as the Army High Command’s acceptance of the mistreatment of Jews by the army. Tolerance was not a qualification for service, but neither did anti-Semitic feeling disqualify a soldier. The lack of qualified, and especially, experienced officers, was a higher priority to the Polish army, where the ability to command a unit larger than a regiment, especially during hostilities, was the sole consideration when posts were handed out. Major Luczyński served with distinction during the Polish-Soviet war, and in 1922 rose to the rank of General.

The reasons why the events in Pińsk occurred are of more relevance than the result of the Polish military authorities’ reaction. There were accusations (apparently based on the words of a Jewish soldier, Daniel Kozak, and a trusted informer Mordcha Kolkier) that a Bolshevik organisation was hiding in the local forests, attempting to sabotage
the local Polish garrison with the support of the Jewish population. The impression that a Bolshevik organisation was planning a rebellion caused panic within the Polish garrison. The first paragraph of the Pińsk Military Commission’s Report stated flatly that “as a result of inquiries, a predominant proportion of Jews in Pińsk sympathize with the Bolshevik movement and are unfavourably disposed to the Polish Army and the idea of Polish statehood in general”. The tone of the report remained unrepentant, although it did concede that “the Jews generally deny the state of affairs as presented above … They particularly deny the accusation that they supported the Bolshevik movement”. The fact that such reports were believed can at least in part be due to the make-up of the Polish garrison. In Pińsk, there were relatively few Poles, even peasants. The majority of Poles in the region were land-owners, who were resented by the local largely Byelorussian peasantry, who along with sections of the Jewish community had supported the Red Army when it entered Pińsk, believing the Bolsheviks were soon to redistribute the land.

The commission’s report raised a number of questions, few of which were answered. One was how were a few Polish soldiers supposed to have arrested and moved over a hundred, possibly armed, conspirators. The use of an American’s testimony involved the Allied countries in an issue that the Poles would, no doubt, have preferred to have kept out of the western press. Whatever the circumstances of the shootings at Pińsk, the events, and the fact that they were reported quickly and more accurately than other such incidents was to cause considerable problems for the new Polish state, principally through the usual process of denials and counter-accusations, at a vital time with the negotiation of the Paris peace treaties underway.

When set against other acts of violence that occurred against the Jewish populations of Eastern Europe from the outbreak of the First World War to the end of the Russian Civil War and Polish-Soviet War (or indeed the events of the Shoah), in purely numeric terms, Pińsk was a relatively small affair, so then why did it cause, indeed still causes, so much controversy? Arguably the events that occurred on April 5

152 Contained in AAN (Warsaw), files of the Polish Embassy in Washington 2604, April 29, 1919, p. 20.
154 Grove to Hoover, Warsaw April 10, 1919: US National Archives (Washington, DC) 860c.4016.
155 On the afterlife of Pińsk see Lewandowski, “History and Myth”, pp. 50-72.
1919 were not a ‘pogrom’ in the sense set out earlier – an organised or officially tolerated massacre of a minority, such as the events in Lwów in November 1918 – but the military execution of a small group of civilians, all of whom happened to be Jewish. The Warsaw Yiddish newspaper Haint commented on April 9 that “no matter how atrocious was the pogrom at Lemberg, it yet contained no such episode as we had just experienced at Pińsk. That which took place at Pińsk was no pogrom; it was something which we don’t know how to call, how to classify”.156 This conclusion was supported in the Socialist newspaper, Robotnik (The Worker), which put on its front page the account published in Haynt, quoting the representative of the Zionist Organisation, Szymon Rykwert, who noted that “[what] took place at Pińsk was no pogrom”.157 The timing of the events was unfortunate, while the negotiations were ongoing in Paris to reshape the map of post-war Europe. Once more the very issue of minority rights was forced into the fore of international politics. Pińsk was very much used to that end by Jews both in Poland and abroad. The very location of Pińsk, a Byelorussian town in the disputed Kresy, influenced many western leaders, some of whom did not need much convincing, that Poland’s eastern borders should be limited to strict ethnographic bounds. The only reason they were not was due to the Polish military successes in the Polish-Soviet war, some of whose first shots were being fired at Pińsk in April 1919.

International Reaction to Pińsk

The situation was just beginning to calm down from the height of the outcry following Israel Cohen’s reports published in The Times,158 when news reached the west of the events that had happened in Pińsk on April 5, 1919.159 As Herbert Hoover, who was in 1919 the director of the American Relief Administration for Eastern Europe, related in his memoirs: “On April 10 a news dispatch appeared that fifty Jews had been lined up against a wall and executed by command of a Major in the Polish Army … Paderewski was in Paris and I suggested that he should have an investigation made at once … On June 2nd I wrote President Wilson suggesting that with Paderewski’s

156 Quoted in Evidence of Pogroms in Poland, p. 75.
157 Haint, April 9, 1919.
158 See Chapter IV.
159 The original reported casualty figures were twenty-three: “Outrage at Pinsk – Jews Shot”, Jewish Chronicle, April 18, 1919, p. 8.
approval, an official American Mission be sent to look into the matter”\textsuperscript{160} The situation was, however, not that simple.

It was only a matter of time before the western press picked up on the story, seeming to confirm the reports that had been coming out of Poland ever since she had gained her independence. The confused reaction in the western media can be summarised by the \textit{New York Times}’s reporting of events in Pińsk. Its first report of the incident, carried on the front page on April 9, was also the most accurate in terms of reporting the number of victims, 33, but commented that they were “Red Plotters”.\textsuperscript{161} As late as May 2 the newspaper carried reports quoting the Central Zionist Office that “fifty-six Jews have been killed in a pogrom at Pińsk”.\textsuperscript{162}

As a result of these news stories there were large demonstrations in both London and New York. In a speech to 15,000 protesters at Madison Square Garden on May 21, 1919 Charles Evans Hughes, the Republican Presidential candidate in 1916, demanded that “America owes it to herself that at this time her people with one accord and because they are Americans should unite in this effective protest … You cannot let loose unrestrained violence in Poland without running the risk of unrestrained violence in New York”\textsuperscript{163} Also speaking at the meeting was Jacob H. Schiff, one of the leading bankers in America and founder of the American Jewish Committee, who commented that “Never has a thing like this occurred since the middle ages”.\textsuperscript{164} On June 26, 1919, at the Queen’s Hall in London the Chief Rabbi, Dr. J. H. Hertz, claimed that “the promise of brotherhood and liberty to the Jews of Poland on its birth and freedom had so far proved a bitter mockery”, and finished his address by posing the question: “the Peace Treaty secured liberty of persons and

\textsuperscript{160} Hoover, op. cit., pp. 357-58.
\textsuperscript{163} The meeting was reported on the front page under the headline, “Call on Nations to Protect Jews”, \textit{New York Times}, May 22, 1919, p. 5. One of Paderewski’s associates in New York, Rutger B. Jewett, commented that “It is not so easy to understand how a man of Mr. Hughes’s intelligence is willing to take a position in this matter before he has verified the facts … many of these rumours are the natural expression of German propaganda, others probably the result of Jewish fanaticism, written by indiscreet and emotional reporters who have no interest in stating exact facts”: Jewett to Paderewski, June 12, 1919: AAN (Warsaw), Paderewski 737.
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid.
conscience to African savages. Were Polish Jews outside the pale of humanity?“

At Hyde Park 100,000 gathered in protest. In a separate meeting in London’s East End, at the Pavilion Theatre, Israel Zangwill, the Zionist activist and novelist, gave an account of events in Poland and read a letter from Lord Robert Cecil, who stated that “the Western Democracies … must put an end once and for all to this crying scandal”. The meeting unanimously passed a resolution calling for “guarantees inserted in the Peace Treaty for all national minorities, and complete respect for their civil and political rights”.

The Allied governments felt that they could not ignore this wave of protest and it was in Paris that the incidents in Pińsk would have their greatest impact. Paderewski was now clearly the most important Polish figure in international politics, with both Piłsudski pre-occupied with his forthcoming offensive into Byelorussia and Lithuania, and Dmowski marginalised by Paderewski’s presence in Paris. Speaking to the press in early April Paderewski commented:

[that case [Pińsk] was a matter of pure Bolshevism. A few days before more than sixty of our Polish officers and soldiers had been killed at Pińsk by Bolsheviki. We executed the people responsible for that crime, and they happened to be Jews. They were not executed because they were Jews or in a spirit of revenge, but for the sake of discipline and self-defense. It was learned afterward that of thirty-seven shot, four were innocent. We regretted that bitterly, but we are in a state of war, and things of that sort are bound to happen."

Konstantin Buszczński, the Polish Consul General to the United States, was quoted in the New York Tribune, stating that “I left Poland on April 28. There had been no pogroms up to then … I heard that at Pinsk thirty-three Bolshevist had been executed.

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166 The idea to hold a “monster indignation meeting” was made by the Chief Rabbi of Scotland, Dr. Salis Daiches, who was also a member of the Joint Foreign Committee of the Board of Deputies of British Jews and Anglo-Jewish Association: BDBJ (London), ACC/3121/C10/3/1/1, Daiches to Samuel, May 1, 1919.
167 As reported in The Times, June 27, 1919, p. 19.
Certainly there was good reason for executing them. True, there may have been Jews among them, but they were not executed because they were Jews”. The Polish denials were in direct contrast to the reports from various Jewish sources that were arriving in Paris on an almost daily basis, and only served to reinforce Allied convictions that minority rights were required in the new ‘successor states,’ and above all Poland.

As the four months between the events in Lwów and Pińsk had been relatively quiet between Poles and Jews, the international outcry over Pińsk was far louder and more persistent than had been the case with the ‘Lemberg horrors.’ The charge that the Jews had been Bolshevik was akin to the charge that they supported the Ukrainians in Lwów, but had far more long lasting and serious consequences for the Jewish minority. Yet it also went directly against the allegation often made by Dmowski that Jews were damaging to the Polish people on account of their dominance of capitalist enterprises and predominance in the liberal professions. The charge of Jewish support for Bolshevism (Żydokomuna) was far more dangerous for the Jewish community than the petty recriminations between different nationalities. Soviet power was a far greater threat to the independence of the ‘successor states’ than any supposed threat from ‘Jewish interests.’ The prominence of Jews within the Bolshevik movements in Russia, Germany and in Poland itself has long been held up as evidence of Jewish support for Bolshevism, a view still existent today in Polish historical writing. As early as November 1918 Paderewski commented to William Phillips that

[t]he Polish people love order and are determined to fight by all means, the Bolshevist movement which is menacing their country. The Jews, as everybody knows are playing a very prominent part in that movement in

169 Ibid., p. 12.
171 The accusation is principally wheeled out over the question of Polish-Jewish relations under the Nazi and Soviet occupation between 1939 and 1944. The Polish historian Marek Jan Chodakiewicz comments that “Christian Poles” were hostile to the “manifestation of żydokomuna, an unholy collusion of the entire Jewish community with Communism. Incapable of disentangling this complicated web, they [Poles] regarded the Jews (as well as other “non-Poles”) as enemies”: Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, After the Holocaust: Polish-Jewish Conflict in the Wake of World War II (New York, 2003), pp. 132-133. See also: Artur Eisenbach, “Report Jana Karskiego o sytuacji Żydów na okupowanych ziemiach polskich na początku 1940 r.”, Dzieje Najnowsze, Volume 2 (1989), pp. 193-195; Stachura, Poland 1918-1945, p. 34.
Russia. It is therefore quite possible that the authorities in order to stop the pernicious propaganda, have been forced to adopt some energetic measures. No government could blame them for it.  

In a letter to Herbert Hoover Paderewski further commented that “the misery of the Jews in the old Russian Empire has created in them especially that fertile field from which Bolshevism has sprung”.  

Chaim Weizmann rather oddly commented that “perhaps a small faction of the Russian Jews were Bolshevists and no doubt provided the brains of Bolshevism”. While Jews were prominent in the Bolshevik hierarchy, none more so than Leon Trotsky, they viewed themselves as internationalists rather than Jewish. Trotsky was assimilationist, and fiercely anti-Zionist in his views. This was also the case with Rosa Luxemberg, who had renounced her Jewish heritage. Russian Jewry generally saw such prominent figures as traitors. The majority of the Orthodox Jewish population remained essentially conservative, or even apolitical in their outlook. The Jewish bourgeoisie often itself fell victim to the Bolshevik commissars, and the prominent role of Jews in commerce led them to be victims rather than the beneficiaries of Bolshevik rule. Jews of the Kresy were classified as ‘sobstvenniki’ (private owners) and unable to be assimilated into the classless society. As Israel Zangwill noted, “all Israel should set up a statue to Lenin for not being a Jew”. Such arguments and sentiments had little effect on the Polish popular consciousness, and very quickly Jews were associated with Bolshevism, much to the harm of Polish-Jewish relations. Jewish actions in the Kresy certainly encouraged this perception, but this was not necessarily due to an inherent Jewish support for Bolshevism, merely that the Jews were better treated under Bolshevik rule. The Red Army attempted to behave in a correct way towards them, being the first fighting force since the Kaiserliche Armee (Imperial German Army) to follow a

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173 Paderewski to Hoover, no date [May 1919], AAN (Warsaw), Paderewski, 547.
174 Weizmann to Lloyd George, November 28, 1918: NAS (Edinburgh), GD40/17/1160.
‘no-pogrom’ policy. The Council of People’s Commissars decreed in July 1918 that “pogromists and person inciting to pogroms be outlawed”, and any such acts were severely dealt with. Lenin made a radio broadcast in March 1919 in which he stated:

[i]t is not the Jews who are the enemies of the working people. The enemies of the workers are the capitalists of all countries. Among the Jews there are working people, and they form the majority. They are our brothers, who, like us, are oppressed by capital; they are our comrades in the struggle for socialism. Among the Jews there are kulaks, exploiters and capitalists, just as there are among the Russians, and among people of all nations … Shame on those who foment hatred towards the Jews, who foment hatred towards other nations.

Therefore, it is in some ways understandable why some Polish Jews turned towards Bolshevism, just as it was comprehensible why the majority of the politically active members of the Jewish community was moving increasingly towards the various strands of Zionism, which was becoming far more representative of Jewish politics than Bolshevism would ever be.

Pińsk also radicalised the Jewish response to violence. The traditional strategies were seen to be failing, as after months of negotiations and threats the Polish government still had not granted equal rights and protection to the Jews. Neither was lobbying from within Poland working. Consequently, Jewish hopes were now pinned to the Paris Peace Conference to deliver equal rights and protection to the Jewish minority. Others hoped that this would be achieved primarily by the representatives of the western Jewish delegations at Paris.

178 Gitelman, op. cit., pp. 163-165.
181 Brailsford, who commented that he was giving evidence “as a non-Jew … since the word of Jews seems to be suspect”, wrote that “an honest man who believes that these long-bearded Orthodox Jews feel anything but horror at the thought of a social revolution must have parted with his wits”: Brailsford in a letter to The Times dated May 21: The Times, May 23, 1919, p. 8b; Brailsford, op. cit., p. 70.
Piłsudski’s Easter Campaign, April 1919

The impression of Polish intrinsic violence against the Jewish minority was apparently confirmed shortly after the shootings in Pińsk, when Piłsudski launched a new offensive against Lithuania during the Easter week, much to the annoyance of the Western Allies gathered in Paris.\textsuperscript{182}

The city of Wilno\textsuperscript{183} was not in a dissimilar position to that which Lwów found itself in during November 1918. It was a mixed Polish and Jewish city in a countryside shared between Poles, Lithuanians and Byelorussians, and with both Poles and Lithuanians claiming the city as their own. Using the statistics from the last census under the tsarist regime in 1897, as well as the figures used by the Allied experts at the Paris Peace Conference,\textsuperscript{184} a more accurate picture of Wilno can be seen. The figures from the 1921 Polish census, which are often cited, are somewhat misleading, as there appears to be an artificially small number of Lithuanians represented, a pattern started with the German \textit{Verwaltungsgebiet Oberost} of March 1916.\textsuperscript{185}

Table 3.8: Population of Wilno and District, Russian Census, 1897\textsuperscript{186}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Belo-Russians &amp; other Slavs</th>
<th>Lithuanians</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Poles</th>
<th>Germans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City of Vilna</td>
<td>363,313</td>
<td>132,353</td>
<td>76,030</td>
<td>77,224</td>
<td>73,088</td>
<td>2,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District of Vilna</td>
<td>154,532</td>
<td>39,992</td>
<td>3,131</td>
<td>61,847</td>
<td>47,795</td>
<td>2,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District of Lyda</td>
<td>205,767</td>
<td>178,303</td>
<td>17,825</td>
<td>24,775</td>
<td>9,623</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Vilna</td>
<td>1,591,207</td>
<td>971,439</td>
<td>279,720</td>
<td>202,374</td>
<td>103,054</td>
<td>3,873</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{182} Wilson in particular viewed the episode with much anger, seeing it as a further example of Polish imperialism: \textit{Mantoux}, Volume 1, p. 118.

\textsuperscript{183} According to the Polish census of 1921, the Jewish population in Wilno was 46,559 (36.1\% of the population): \textit{Encyclopedia Judaica}, Volume 16, col. 147.

\textsuperscript{184} Tallents to Curzon, June 4, 1920, Bourne and Watt (eds.), op. cit., Part II, Series F, Volume 51, pp. 187-188.


\textsuperscript{186} Stephen Horak, \textit{Poland and her National Minorities, 1919-39} (New York, 1961), p. 93. According to the Polish census in 1921, the Lithuanian population in Wilno was only 0.8\% of the total, Office Central de Statistique de la République Polonaise, \textit{Annuaire statistique de la République Polonaise}, p. 34. According to the Commissions considering the projects of Zemstvo organisation in the North-West Provinces (1911), in Vilna, Poles accounted for 15.3\% of the population, Russians, 57.2\% and Jews 13.9\%, Bourne and Watt, op. cit., Part II, Series F, Volume 51, p. 188.
Table 3.9: Population of Wilno and District by Nationality, Polish Census, 1921

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Belo-Russians</th>
<th>Lithuanians</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Poles</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City of Wilno</td>
<td>128,924</td>
<td>4,781</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>46,559</td>
<td>72,416</td>
<td>8,198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province of Wilno</td>
<td>973,104</td>
<td>249,857</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>79,508</td>
<td>563,556</td>
<td>80,427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District of Lida</td>
<td>195,129</td>
<td>49,393</td>
<td>…</td>
<td>9,804</td>
<td>44,304</td>
<td>11,485</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Wilno, known as the ‘Jerusalem of the North,’ was one of the world’s most important centres of Rabbinical learning in the years before the Shoah. Jewish politics were especially active in Wilno, and were far more radicalised and pro-Zionist than in other parts of the new Polish state, while the Jewish population was one of the least assimilated in Europe. The Jewish minority was stuck between the two national groups (See Map 3.1). As in Lwów the previous November, it was the group in the worse position, in this case the Lithuanians, that was most willing to compromise and co-operate with the Jewish community. An alliance of Jews and Lithuanians would provide a non-Polish majority within the town, to the benefit of the Lithuanians, while in turn the latter promised autonomy for the Jewish community. The German occupation forces set up a Taryba (Lithuanian National Council) in Wilno in September, 1918, and ordered that national minorities be admitted to the administration. Furthermore, the Taryba included Jewish elements, principally Zionists, and appealed to international Jewish opinion for support. In December 1918 the Zionist Committee in Wilno decided to appoint three members to represent the Jewish community in the Provisional Government of Lithuania after the disbanding of the Taryba, including Dr. Samson Rosenbaum, who later became the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. N. Rachmilevitch, the Vice-Minister for Trade and Industry and Dr. Jacob Wigodski who became the Government’s Minister for Jewish Affairs.

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187 Without a separate category for Lithuanians, all those who registered themselves as such were classified as others under the Polish census of 1921. The figure for others also includes small numbers of Germans: Office Central de Statistique de la République Polonaise, *Annuaire statistique de la République Polonaise*, p. 34.
All this was in contrast with Polish designs on the region. At a meeting with Sir Esmé Howard, the British diplomatic representative of the Inter-Allied Mission to Poland, before the offensive started, Piłsudski had indicated his attempt to gain support among the Jewish population of Lithuania. He claimed that if a “federal union of that country [Lithuania] with Poland could be brought about, he [Piłsudski] would be ready to recognise the Jews as a distinct nationality in Lithuania”. Furthermore, he stated that “it would be impossible to accord them special privileges in the Kingdom of Poland itself”,188 a comment Lewis Namier, working for the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, described as “a little strange”.189 The statements by Piłsudski were indicative of a change in attitude by the Polish Chief of State, whereby his initially conciliatory attitude towards the Jewish population had, if not taken a hostile stance, certainly cooled.

188 Sir Esmé Howard to Balfour, 2 April 1919: TNA (London), FO 606/66/6683.
189 Namier to Clark, 17 April, 1919: TNA (London), FO 371/3903/57316.
Wilno was seen to be of particular importance to Piłsudski, as it was the district of his birth, while the incorporation of a Lithuanian state was also central to his federalist view of Poland.\textsuperscript{190} One further complicating factor was the Bolshevik occupation of the city. This occurred after the German Oberkommando Ost, which had been left in control of the city under Article 12 of the Armistice agreement with the Allies in order to halt Bolshevik expansion westward, but also to stop the fighting between Poles and Lithuanians, had withdrawn between January 1-4, 1919. The city was left open to the Red Army, which took the town from the Poles on January 4, who themselves had attempted to capture the city on January 1.\textsuperscript{191} The Soviet Lithuanian-Belorussian (or Litbel) Republic, under Vincas Mickievičius-Kapsukas, was declared in Wilno on the same day. During the Soviet occupation of the city, the Jewish population openly co-operated with the Bolsheviks, occupying many prominent positions in the administration.

After Piłsudski gave the order to advance, Polish troops made quick progress, capturing Lida\textsuperscript{192} after two days of fighting on April 17, and reaching the Lithuanian capital, Wilno, by April 19, finally capturing the city after three days of street fighting. During the taking of Lida, a small town some 60 miles south of Wilno, according to some, generally Jewish, sources up to 39 victims were killed and 150 were wounded, with “the pogrom perpetrated by soldiers in the [Polish] army”.\textsuperscript{193} In contrast to earlier excesses, the final casualty figures were increased. The Warsaw Jewish newspaper Haynt reported on April 30, 1919 that 35 Jews had been killed.\textsuperscript{194}

Not all of the units of the Red Army withdrew when ordered to do so, and proceeded to fire on the Polish troops which entered the town. Polish troops marched into the Jewish quarter of the town and proceeded to ransack houses and shops. Questions were again raised by Jewish deputies in the Sejm. General Leśniewski, the Minister of War, replied that “[Polish] prisoners were murdered in the most barbarous manner under conditions that suggest that local Jews were involved”, and further that “taking

\textsuperscript{190} Tadeusz Piskor, Wyprawa wileńska (Warsaw, 1919), pp. 18-20.
\textsuperscript{191} Temperley, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 341.
\textsuperscript{192} Lida (Lyda in Lithuanian) had a Jewish population of some 5,419 in 1921, (40.4% of the population): Encyclopedia Judaica, Volume 11, col. 212.
\textsuperscript{194} Haynt, No. 99, April 30, 1919, p. 1.
the above facts into account I have to affirm that the troops had every reason to conduct military repression of the Jewish population of Lida because of the disloyal attitude of the Jews. However, that repression was not allowed". Colonel Stanisław Haller, the cousin of Józef Haller, and a former member of the Austrian High Command, commented in the official investigation on events in Lida that “there weren’t any anti-Semitic tendencies in the army”. Leśniewski and Haller’s conclusions were also disputed by the local investigating commission set up by the Jewish population.

In the wake of the Polish occupation of Wilno, effected between April 19-22, Polish forces occupied the Jewish district and numerous acts of anti-Jewish violence ensued amid charges that members of the Jewish population had fired upon the approaching Polish soldiery. This accusation was strenuously denied by the Jewish Committee of Wilno, which stated that

of the Red Army there are many more Poles than Jews … the representatives of the [Jewish] community protest solemnly against the false accusation that the entire Jewish population belongs to the Bolsheviki and that they offered resistance against the Polish armies.

It did not take long for exaggerated reports of pogroms to reach the west. For example, David Mowschowitch, Lucien Wolf’s Russian secretary, received the following telegram on May 1: “Warsaw Jewish papers twentyfifth report terrible Jewish pogrom on capture Lida, Government Wilna, by Polish troops stop Entire

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198 The exact nature of the anti-Jewish violence seen in Wilno between April 19-22 is still one of historical debate. The extent to which the Polish forces encountered resistance from either sections of the Jewish population or remnants of the Red Army is yet to be established. What is clear is that some form of punitive military expedition by Polish troops entered the Jewish quarter, similar to events that occurred in Lwów between November 22-24, 1918.
Jewish quarters destroyed Hundreds killed. The originally reported casualty figures were as high as 2,200. The final toll has not been finalised. Estimates range between 54 and 65. The lower figure was also from a Zionist Organisation, this time in Berlin; the Morgenthau Commission reported the higher figure. Among the dead were a number of prominent Jewish writers, including Isaac-Mayer Devenishsky who was taken out into the street and shot by Polish soldiers. Hostages were taken, including the Grand Rabbi, Rudinstein, and were mistreated, according to unconfirmed Jewish sources.

A more worrying aspect was that Piłsudski who had been in direct command of his soldiers had attempted to “curb” (hamulec) the anti-Semitic activities of his troops, but had evidently failed, a more damning lapse with respect to Wilno as he had prior warning of what was possible from the events in Lida only two days before. Reports stress that it was Piłsudski himself who restored order in Wilno, with the help of his brother, Jan, who was made commandant of the city. Polish reports, it should be noted, were full of accusations about the Jewish population having sided with the Bolsheviks. Piłsudski himself reported to Paderewski in Paris that the people wept for joy. In spite of the terrible state of famine in the city, they brought out what food they had and forced it upon the soldiers. Already there are the most cordial relations between them and the army. The only exceptions have been the Jews who under Bolshevik rule were the governing classes. I have had the greatest difficulty in preventing a massacre provoked by Jewish civilians [who] had shot at Polish soldiers from windows and roofs of their houses and thrown grenades from them.

200 Mowschowitch, YIVO, (New York), 16408.
201 These figures were reported from the Zionist Organisation in Stockholm, Marling to FO, May 14, 1919: TNA (London) FO 371/3903.
202 The lower figure cited by the Zionist Organisation in Berlin is quoted by Colonel Wade in “The Vilna Pogrom” in TNA (London), FO 371/3903; and a report prepared by Kimens, April 27, 1919: TNA (London), FO 608/71. The Samuel Report quotes the final figure to be 55: Samuel, op. cit., p. 12. A slightly higher figure, 59, is quoted in: US National Archives (Washington, DC) 860c.4016/178. 60 are quoted in “Report of the Occurrences in Wilna, Presented to the Polish Government by Jewish Community of Wilna”, FO 608/67/12141. Other, usually Jewish sources, quote total higher figures, as for example, 80 in Encyclopedia Judaica, Volume 16, col. 147.
203 Devenishsky wrote under the pseudonym A. Vayter: Finkelshtayn, Haynt, pp. 70-71.
205 AAN (Warsaw), Paderewski Archive, folder 777.
Jews had again been accused of pouring boiling water on Polish soldiers, which was denied by Jewish sources.\textsuperscript{207} Polish reports mentioned street fighting, where houses were searched for snipers, and arms, which if found “is the equivalent to condemnation to death”.\textsuperscript{208} The total number of Polish troops lost in this action was reported to be thirty-five, indicating that there was still some degree of resistance after the withdrawal of the Red Army,\textsuperscript{209} which continued to fight for a further three days.\textsuperscript{210} The accusation that some elements of the Jewish population had actively been working with the Bolsheviks was a far more serious, and one that was based partly in fact. It led to some 400 Jews being deported from Wilno,\textsuperscript{211} including some of the more prominent members of the Jewish community, seemingly in retaliation for the deportation of some Poles under the Bolshevik occupation. Events in Wilno were used by the Lithuanian government to try and discredit the Polish government internationally, much as the German government had done after the events in Lwów.

In a cable sent to the Anglo-Jewish Association Rosenbaum acting on behalf of the Lithuanian Government stated that “the difference in the name of the streets where the firing occurred and of those where the Jews were killed indicated that the latter were the victims of an organized pogrom and not of the street fighting”.\textsuperscript{212} Events were far more blurred than in Lwów the previous November. Jewish support for the Bolshevik administration, in some quarters, was undoubtedly very strong, yet the large numbers of Jewish civilian casualties would count against the Polish accusation that the vast majority had resisted. Jewish reports of the event strenuously denied this, describing in detail the circumstances around which over forty of the victims perished.\textsuperscript{213}

In Paris, despite the reports sent to him from Piłsudski, on May 28 Paderewski flatly denied there had been any excesses in Wilno, stating that “they [reports of a pogrom in Wilno] are absolutely false. Nothing of the sort happened there. That is a sample of the exaggeration German agents are giving to the situation to poison public opinion

\textsuperscript{208} Colonel Dawley’s Report, TNA (London), FO 608/67/12243.
\textsuperscript{209} US National Archives (Washington, DC) 860c/2067-95.
\textsuperscript{210} Colonel Dawley’s Report, TNA (London), FO 608/67/12243.
\textsuperscript{211} US National Archives (Washington, DC) 860c:4016/178.
\textsuperscript{212} The report (n. d. [May, 1919]) had earlier stated that the number of victims was 200, and that “about 5,000 vigorous Jews” had been deported. BDBJ (London), ACC/3121/C11/12/066.
against Poland”. \footnote{Evidence of Pogroms, p. 11.} In a letter to Hoover, Paderewski commented that “our army captured the whole of the General Staff of the Bolshevist Army operating in that [Wilno] territory. Almost all of them were Jews. Some of these were tried and convicted of unspeakable barbarity and have been published, have not the leaders and the propagandists of Bolshevism published the incident as a pogrom?\footnote{Paderewski to Hoover, no date [May 1919]: AAN (Warsaw), Paderewski, 547.} The comments were also contrary to Namier’s record of a conversation between himself and the Polish Premier, who met him a number of times in Paris during May. Paderewski stated that Jewish population of Wilno “offered resistance” to the Polish army, and that “Jewish opposition [had] embittered the Polish soldiers”. \footnote{Namier minute, May 22, 1919: TNA (London), FO 371/3903/80643.}

Due to the constant denials, as was the case with Pińsk, the western Allies were becoming increasingly uncertain about Poland. Namier, while still working in an unofficial capacity at the Peace Conference, commented that

I venture once more to raise the question whether it is compatible with the principles of the Allies to support the advance of such hordes and to take upon themselves the moral responsibility for their doings? Were it even true that some Jews in Lithuania are helping the Bolsheviks, this would hardly be surprising as even the Bolsheviks could not behave worse than the Poles, and as a matter of fact, according to all evidence in our possession, they have hitherto behaved in Lithuania with unusual moderation. Undoubtedly the population of these countries, White Russian, Lithuanian or Jewish, will greet anyone as a liberator, if he merely comes to put an end to the Polish robberies and extortions. \footnote{Namier to Headlam-Morley, March 22, 1919: TNA (London), FO 608/66/5097.}

In describing the Polish army as a “horde” Namier revealed his growing hostility to the new Polish state. A similar attitude can be detected when Lloyd George commented that “we won freedom for nations that had not the slightest hope of it. Czechoslovakia, Poland, and others. We have the greatest trouble in the world to keep them from annexing other nations and imposing upon other nations the very
tyranny which they have themselves endured for centuries”. The constant reports of major incidents had taken its toll. British pressure for guarantees for national minorities in the ‘successor states’ was applied to the Poles who had a right to raise questions only after the treaty had been drafted. Events in Poland had now become a matter of international interest, and the fate of the new Polish state was, at least in part, to be decided on the international stage.

While in Lwów the charge of violation of Jewish neutrality remains one that is at best unproven, the situation in Polish-Lithuania was quite different. Backed up by events in Lublin, where three Jews were killed after its capture by Polish troops in May 1919, a pattern can be discerned. While Polish claims that Jewish losses in Lublin occurred as a result of street-fighting, it is clear from the majority of reports that most Jewish casualties occurred when the fighting had finished, and on the afternoon of June 26, two days before the Versailles Treaty was due to be signed, eight soldiers of General Haller’s army, reportedly mostly American volunteers, wounded fifteen Jews riding on streetcars in Soloc Street, one of them when an elderly Jew, while attempting to hide in a local abattoir, died of heart failure.

**Haller’s ‘Blue Army’**

The front in Galicia had remained in a state of constant war after the Polish seizure of Lwów in November 1918, the city being placed under siege by the West Ukrainian army until the arrival of General Józef Haller’s ‘Błękitna Armia’ (Blue Army, also known as the Hallerczy) from France, some 50,000 strong, on April 30. True to his word, stating that he would “determine the borders of Poland in the east as rapidly as a bird flies”, by mid-July 1919 the whole of East Galicia to the Zbrucz River had fallen to the Poles. The arrival of the ‘Blue Army’ caused further tensions between Poles and the Jewish minority, as Haller’s troops, conspicuous in their blue French

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218 FRUS PPC, Volume VI, p. 197.
219 In 1921 Lublin had a Jewish population of 37,337 out of 94,412 (39.54%) of the total, Office Central de Statistique de la République Polonaise, op. cit., p. 16.
221 See Lundgreen-Neilsen, Polish Problem, pp. 125-160.
222 Quoted in Horak, Poland and her National Minorities, p. 55.
uniforms, proceeded to treat the local Jewish population with disdain.\textsuperscript{223} In a report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, listing the “cases tried in the General Court Martial in Warsaw, in which the accusation concerned wrongs to Jews”, twelve out of the seventeen cases that were “at liberty” involved “unknown person in the uniform of Gen. Haller’s Army”, principally for the complaint of “beating and cutting of beards”.\textsuperscript{224} When commenting on his troops, Haller observed that “the Jews are greatly hated by the Polish volunteers”.\textsuperscript{225} Haller’s ‘Blue Army’ is often made special mention of by Jewish sources, a fact in part explained by their conspicuous uniforms. Complaints were also often made about Polish units from German Pomerania and Poznań, parts of Poland that had the smallest number of Jews by proportion in the population from the reconstructed Polish state.\textsuperscript{226} Furthermore, the Jewish population was generally assimilated into German culture,\textsuperscript{227} supporting the German claim in the struggle over Upper Silesia. Haller’s army was to a large extent made up of American and French volunteers, as well as former Austrian and German prisoners of war, captured by the Allied armies, organised at the insistence of the KNP in Paris, who wished to show the positive effort Poland was willing to make to the Allied war effort. When troops from these formations arrived in the Kresy, they were unused to the distinctive nature of Orthodox Jewish life and the more densely populated Jewish populations of the Kresy who came into contact with them. Polish-American and Canadian volunteers of General Haller’s Army reacted in an anti-Semitic way, whereas the Polish troops who were used to their appearance did not act so readily.\textsuperscript{228} Lucien Wolf received a report:

[O]ne should think that after the arrival of Polish troops from Posen and from France (the Haller army) the conduct of the Polish army should become improved since it had to be expected that these troops would keep better

\textsuperscript{223} Both the British and American archives are full of reports of attacks on Jews by “Hallerchiks”. For example, see US National Archives (Washington, DC), 860c.4016/178, and TNA (London), FO 371/3903 and FO 371/3904. Lucien Wolf received the following telegram: “Pogroms Westgalicia continue large excesses in Barow Czyzyn Słomnik stop In Jedrzejow Bieszow Polish recruits and soldiers Hallerarmy [sic] organising Pogroms”. May 13, 1919: Mowschowitz, YIVO, (New York), 16410.
\textsuperscript{224} US National Archives (Washington, DC), 860c.4016/140. p. 2.
\textsuperscript{225} US National Archives (Washington, DC), 860c.2067/109.
\textsuperscript{226} The population declined at a great rate, to the extent that there were only 2,000 Jews living in Poznań in 1931 and 1,500 in 1939: Encyclopedia Judaica, Volume 13, col. 948.
\textsuperscript{227} See William W. Hagen, Germans, Poles and Jews: The Nationality Conflict in the Prussian East, 1772-1914 (Chicago, Ill., 1980).
\textsuperscript{228} Goodhart, op. cit., pp. 117-118.
discipline. The facts have, however, proved to be rather disappointing. They [The Posen and Haller armies] fill the Jewish population with horror. 229

A number of serious incidents occurred away from the battlefields of the Kresy. These changed to an extent the nature of anti-Jewish violence in Poland, which had witnessed the last of the major anti-Jewish outrages. From the arrival of the Hallerczycy the larger-scale pogroms ended, but were to some extent replaced by a far greater number of smaller incidents, where casualties were less. Nevertheless, these still damaged Poland’s reputation during the course of the Paris Peace Conference.

Częstochowa and Cracow

Częstochowa, one of the most important pilgrimage sites in Poland, home of the ‘Black Madonna,’ located in southern Poland between Cracow and Lwów, had a Jewish population of some 22,663 in 1921, a third of the total. 230 Częstochowa had not been the scene of any significant fighting since the German occupation in 1918. The arrival of the Hallerczycy in the district heightened tensions. 231 On May 27, in the early afternoon a soldier was severely wounded by an unidentified attacker. The house the shot was thought to have come from was entered. A Jew found there was hurt by a crowd that had followed the Gendarmerie, one of whom was wounded defending the Jew. A Jewish doctor sent to help those wounded was killed by the mob. The incident led to a riot, where some several thousand people, 232 including numerous soldiers of General Haller’s army, tore through the Jewish quarter of the town, leaving some five dead 233 and forty-five wounded. 234 It was only the presence of French troops, part of the French 600-man Military Mission sent to Poland, that limited the extent of the violence, as French patrols were sent onto the streets to

229 Mowschowitch, YIVO (New York), 16361.
230 Encyclopaedia Judaica, Volume 5, col. 1212.
231 “The local papers Gonietz Czenstochovski and Kurier Czenstochovski had for a long time and with impunity incited the population against the Jews. Beginning with May, there had begun the attack upon Jews by the soldiers, the looting of stores, the cutting of beards and beatings”. Evidence of Pogroms, p. 69; The Sefer of Czenstochova has an account of the beating of the local Rabbi by “Haller Troops”: Jack Kugelmass and Jonathan Boyarin (eds.), From a Ruined Garden: The Memorial Books of Polish Jewry (Bloomington, Ind., 1998), p. 107.
232 According to Sir Percy Wyndham’s secretary, Bevan, they numbered some 3-4,000: TNA (London), FO 608/67/14286.
233 One died at the scene, and the remaining four died in hospital after the event.
234 The first Zionist reports stated that nine Jews had been killed in Czestochowa, Mowschowitch, YIVO (New York), 16841.
As was becoming the norm for such cases, “agents” acting against Polish interests were blamed. In this case a “sailor (? formerly) German navy” was blamed for inciting the crowd to violence, charging the Jews with both hoarding food, and deliberately increasing the price of flour to the Polish population. Casualty figures were again debated, the Poles claiming that they were inflated, while not stating a figure, and that “disturbances appear not to have been caused by religious animosity [but] by high prices of food, attributed to Jewish profiteering”. The events in Częstochowa occurred at a particularly sensitive time, as the reports that reached the west coincided with Paderewski’s return to Paris.

An interesting insight into Polish political struggles can be seen from a report of a meeting between Piłsudski and Hugh Gibson, the American Minister in Warsaw, in which Piłsudski was at pains to stress his role in re-establishing order in Częstochowa, and his determination to “put down any anti-Jewish activity”. Furthermore, he went on to state that “Haller had made disposition to make a life miserable for Jews and this was causing such renewal of such acts by civilian population”. The very fact that Haller had been both armed and sent to Poland by the Allies was causing some embarrassment to the British, who felt more responsible for the actions of the Hallerczycy. Shortly after Częstochowa these troops were arguably the cause of a further incident in Cracow.

While it is important to investigate the most notorious incidents that took place in Poland during this crucial period, they are also illustrative of the complicated nature of Polish-Jewish relations. The three principal events that have been looked at so far in this study, Lwów, Pińsk and Wilno, to a greater or lesser extent occurred in the Kresy Wschodnie (in the ethnographic rather than political sense), while incidents occurring away from the war-zones were limited to beatings on railways, and a certain number in Warsaw. Cracow, the capital of Western Galicia, had a large Jewish population, some 45,229 in 1921. It had also long been associated as a bastion of Polish culture, as had been Lwów, the capital of Austrian Galicia.
administrative contact with Vienna, especially after the granting of greater autonomy after the *Ausgleich* of 1867. The city had become the home of the Polish artistic movement, *Młoda Polska*, and the Jewish community tended towards acculturation with the Polish majority. It had prominently supported the Polish cause in the dying months of the First World War, welcoming the Polish Liquidation Commission’s governmental authority. A difference between Cracow and Lwów was the ethnic make-up of the city, and Western Galicia as a whole, where the Poles were the dominant group (See Map 3.2). Therefore, there was no major ethnic conflict between Poles and another national group which had claims over the territory, such as with the Ukrainians in Lwów or the Lithuanians and Bolsheviks in Wilno.

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Map 3.2: Nationalities in Poland, according to the Census of 1921

Table 3.10: Population of Cracow and District by Religion; Polish Census, 1921

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Roman Catholic</th>
<th>Greek Catholic</th>
<th>Orthodox Christian</th>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City of Cracow</td>
<td>183,706</td>
<td>136,241</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>45,229</td>
<td>840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District of Cracow</td>
<td>105,966</td>
<td>104,021</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>1,680</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Galicia</td>
<td>1,992,810</td>
<td>1,779,389</td>
<td>52,864</td>
<td>1,397</td>
<td>152,926</td>
<td>6,252</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.11: Population of Cracow and District by Nationality; Polish Census, 1921

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Polish</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Germans</th>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City of Cracow</td>
<td>183,706</td>
<td>154,873</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>27,056</td>
<td>922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District of Cracow</td>
<td>105,966</td>
<td>105,595</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Galicia</td>
<td>1,992,810</td>
<td>1,853,654</td>
<td>49,896</td>
<td>9,295</td>
<td>76,861</td>
<td>3,104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cracow had already been the scene of Polish anti-Jewish violence, even before Poland had regained her independence. A ‘pogrom’ had occurred between April 16-21, 1918, leading to the death of one Jew. The incident had occurred in an atmosphere of increased tension between the Polish and Jewish communities, when flour prices had risen significantly in the preceding months, at the same time as the establishment of the Central Ukrainian Council in February 1918. The Red Army had also occupied the territories around Chelmanszczyzna, with the local Polish population associating Bolshevik territorial gains with Jewish influence. The April ‘pogrom’ helped to radicalise the Jewish population, as demonstrated in the increased support for Jewish nationalism and rising fear at the prospect of Polish rule. Cracow was one of the earliest and most eager communities to establish a Jewish militia. Nowy Dziennik carried numerous “reports of pogroms” through early November that had occurred in up to 19 different towns in Western Galicia. The Polish Liquidation Commission initially gave its permission for the Jewish National Council to form its own militia on November 1, headed by Jewish former-officers of the KuK Armee,

242 Office Central de Statistique de la République Polonaise, op. cit., p. 16.
243 Ibid., p. 16.
244 An account of the events is given in Andrzej Żbikowski, Żydzi krakowscy i ich gmina w latach 1869-1919 (Warsaw, 1994), pp. 304-306.
246 Żbikowski, op. cit., p. 305.
247 Nowy Dziennik, November 9, 10, 12, 1918.
“subordinate to the Polish Military Command in Cracow”, and indeed, provided arms for them through its own military department. General Bolesław Roja, a man who would play a prominent role in events in Lwów in November, ordered that they surrender their arms on November 6. Despite the disarming of the Jewish militia, there were no major incidents of anti-Jewish violence reported in Cracow, perhaps explained by the relative good order in the city in the subsequent months, as it was to a great extent away from the scene of fighting between 1918 and the arrival of the Hallerczycy in early 1919. Indeed it was their arrival that heightened tensions and led to the ensuing riot.

Reports reached the west of violence against the Jewish population of Cracow in June 1919. At about five o’clock in the afternoon of June 6, following a row over the cost of a shawl, an argument arose between a Jewish shopkeeper, Mrs Schönbauer, in the Sukiennice Bazaar (the Cloth Hall, and main feature of the Market Square in Cracow), and two Polish-American soldiers, Joseph Watt and Francis Witkowski, both serving in General Haller’s army. Mrs Schönbauer accused them of being “future bandits”, after which they proceeded to beat the proprietor and sack the store. Simultaneously a fight broke out between “two bandits”, one of whom was wounded with a knife. Rumours stated that Polish soldiers had been wounded by members of the Jewish militia. A large mob, reported in the Jewish newspaper Nowy Dziennik, although not corroborated, to be some two thousand strong, moved into the Kazimierz District (the Jewish quarter), only to be confronted by a detachment of the Jewish Militia, which in attempting to warn the mob fired shots into the air. “Instantly the mob threw itself on the detachment”, disarmed it and proceeded to use the arms it had seized to both “plunder” Jewish shops, and to oppose the attempts of

249 Details of the Cracow Militia in Chasanowitch, op. cit., pp. 20-22.
250 “cables from Copenhagen … reports since three days large jew excesses … numerous jews beards cut jewish shops dwelling plundered … railway station travellers beaten”: June 22, 1919: US National Archives (Washington, DC), 860c.4016/128
251 “Report in the Cracow-based Polish newspaper Czas, 7 June, 1919.
252 “Report of the Ministry of the Interior relative to the incidents in Cracow”: contained in US National Archives (Washington, DC) file no. 860c.4016/129. A supplementary report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported their names to be Ferdinand Lasko and Marjan Jagusinski, both of whom had been recently released from prison. “Raport Delegacji Ministerstwa Spraw Zaganiczych R.P. we Krakowie”: AAN (Warsaw), Paderewski Archive, folder 547, p. 1.
the local authorities to quell the mob. A major riot ensued, with fifty-eight shops pillaged, almost exclusively owned by Jews. An indication of how large the mob was can be seen by the number of persons arrested, namely 222. According to the Ministry of Interior report, one woman (of Christian faith) was killed and 44 persons were seriously injured (half of whom were Jews). In addition, two police agents, two functionaries, nine gendarmes and four soldiers were wounded in keeping order, as were a French officer and a French soldier. As in the case of Lwów, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wished to obtain a full explanation of the events. Accordingly an investigation was sent by the Ministry of the Interior. General Haller commented on the enormous exaggeration by which every disturbance, by which in Poland anything happens to a Jew, is turned into a pogrom ... [regarding the incidents in Cracow] in every city in the world, [the incidents would] simply have been called a riot, a communist or spartacist riot, but was immediately dubbed a Pogrom. Of course in Cracow, where there are so many Jews, once there is any rioting going on the chance that a Jew will be hit is very great, and when there is plundering going on, naturally it is the Jewish stores, that are going to suffer, there being no other: of course accidentally it is always the most hated Jew, whose shop gets plundered, the goldsmith; but if he had happened to be a Christian, then ten chances to one, that his shop would have been spared!

It is hard to agree that the events in Cracow were a pogrom, as argued by some historians, such as Isaac Lewin, as the spontaneous nature of the incidents would count against them being classified as such. Nevertheless, the socialist journal *Naprzód (Forward)* unreservedly stated that the events were indeed a pogrom. It is also hard to agree fully with Haller’s assessment of events in Cracow. It would

253 Ibid., p. 3.
254 Ibid., p. 2.
255 Dziennik Powszechny [no date], contained in TNA (London), FO 608/67/14286.
257 “In Krakow, a pogrom began on June 6th and continued without interruption until the night of June 7th. About one hundred Jews were wounded and one died. The material damage was extensive”: Lewin, op. cit., p. 184.
258 Jan M. Malecki re-evaluates the events in Cracow, and argues that the events were not indeed a pogrom: in Jan M. Malecki, op. cit., p. 121.
259 Referred to in Zbikowski, op. cit., p. 308.
appear that even far from the front-line Jews were the targets of violence, although where law was more easily kept, the authorities attempted, at a quite significant loss to themselves, to keep order. The reason why Jews were targeted, as specifically pointed out in the supplementary report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was that the “high cost of living and the bad state of approvisation that Galicia has had to suffer of late, caused by the lack of foodstuffs and insufficiency of materials of transport, have directed the general discontent against profitiers and usurers who are exploiting the population”. 260 It is clear that the statement implied that the Jewish population was “exploiting” the Poles. Jews were not exclusively blamed for the troubles, as a number of Ukrainians, “known to be implacable enemy of Poland”, and a man called Adolph Goldberg, with both German and Czech passports, were blamed for “provoking” the Polish troops. 261 Even if events were instigated by various non-Polish elements, about which both the official investigations were ambiguous, the outpouring of violence was exclusively aimed at the Jewish community.

The Response of the Polish Government

As a response to the violence taking place in the Kresy the Polish government took various measures that had detrimental effects on the Jewish minority, and outwardly broadcast its hostile attitude to Jews. Police surveillance was increased over Jewish organisations, 262 and the policy of odżydzenie was intensified. Jews were systematically removed from positions the government considered sensitive, such as railway workers. A report compiled for the Polish Chief of Police overwhelmingly supported the view that Jews were hostile to the new state:

[i]t is not surprising that the Jews as a foreign and hostile people within this nation do not perceive the sense of duty of citizens of Poland. As a consequence of this is their refusal to serve in the army, to pay duties and as a whole series of crimes as seen in the statistics from the period beginning January 1st, 1919.

260 “Raport Delegacji Ministerstwa Spraw Zaganiczych R.P. we Krakowie”: AAN (Warsaw), Paderewski Archive, folder 547, p. 2.
261 Ibid., p. 3.
1) discovered 61 secret distilleries, Jewish 55.
2) commercial laws violations 101, by Jews 94.
3) smuggling cases 29, by Jews 27.
4) receivers of stolen goods 248, Jews 230.
5) Communist agents registered 341, Jews 159.
6) Spies arrested 20, Jews 5.
7) Spies in the army registered 12, Jews 5.
8) conspiracy clubs discovered 6, Jewish 6.
9) conspiracy meetings noted 9, Jewish 9.
10) propaganda addresses noted 16, Jewish 16.
11) antipolish orators noted 12, Jews 12.
12) discovered stores of arms 21, Jewish 16.\footnote{US National Archives (Washington, DC), file no. 861/2657-DD-6.}

The report even went so far as to claim “provocation of the riots by the Jews themselves in order to create feelings of pity in other nations which causes the foreign interference and hinders the development of the State”.\footnote{Ibid.}

The situation was not wholly without hope. The Polish government did not produce anti-Semitic propaganda, although the National Democrats did.\footnote{Howard to Balfour, March 26, 1919: quoted in Howard, op. cit., p. 652.} Violence was not universal. Intervention by gendarmerie and some army units prevented the spread of violence. A statement from Stanisław Wojciechowski, the Minister of the Interior, to all Governmental Police Officials reminded them that “all Poles, including Jews, are equal before the law”, and that the “full force of the law” should be used against those committing anti-Semitic acts.\footnote{“Ogólnik Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych Wojciechowskiego – 1 lutego 1919 – do wszystkich komisary rządowych” AAN (Warsaw) Komitet Narodowy [KN] folder 117.} Various political groups, principally the PPS, and prominent intellectuals such as Dr. Leon Biliński and Andrzej Strug spoke out against the pogroms. At the Sixteenth Congress of the PPS a resolution was passed regarding the “maltreatment of the Jewish population or in real pogroms which the inspired mob and even the solders are making”, the blame being firmly apportioned to the “Polish
bourgeoisie”. The PPS also “deprecates the Jewish nationalism”,\textsuperscript{267} which it equally blamed for the rise in anti-Semitism.

\textit{Robotnik} published an article condemning the behaviour of the Polish army in the Eastern borderlands.\textsuperscript{268} Yet even this piece in a newspaper usually tolerant towards the Jewish minority commented that “the Polish soldiers are usually embittered against the Jewish population because these in many cases play the role of Bolshevik spies”.\textsuperscript{269} It further highlighted the problems that the Jewish population of the \textit{Kresy} was facing; “in all … towns the Jewish population approaches our soldiers with great fear and distrust”.\textsuperscript{270} Some elements of the new Polish officer corps, the background of which was also an important factor in determining its outlook towards the Jewish minority, urged that the officers “should maintain a dignity and moderation worthy of a Polish soldier”. The majority had received professional training in the armies of the partitioning powers, and it is reasonable to assume that they had been influenced by the dominant ethnic biases of the Russian, German and Austro-Hungarian officer corps.\textsuperscript{271} Between November and December 1918, 990 Polish officers of the Russian Imperial Army took service with the Polish army, while by far the largest number, 6,426, came from the relatively tolerant Austro-Hungarian officer corps.\textsuperscript{272} \textit{Robotnik} claimed that the majority of anti-Semitic incidents were the result of Polish Lithuanian-White Russian divisions, under the command of General Dowbór-Muśnicki.\textsuperscript{273} The alleged link between Jews and Bolshevism can therefore be seen to be the reason for the anti-Semitic bias of the Polish officer corps, rather than necessarily any attitude inherited from the partitioning armies.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Dziennik Nowy}, No. 56, (May 9, 1919), p. 1.
\item “W sprawie zachowanie się żołnierzy na kresach”, \textit{Robotnik} No. 144 (March 12, 1919), p. 1.
\item Ibid., p. 1.
\item Ibid., p. 1.
\item \textit{Robotnik} No. 144 (March 12, 1919), p. 1.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Conclusion

During the First World War and its immediate aftermath anti-Semitism in Poland underwent a number of profound changes. Popular pre-war stereotypes of the Jew as peddler and economically exploitative gave way to new images of the Jews as the allies of Poland’s main enemies – Ukrainians, Germans and Bolsheviks. These convictions, in combination with the serious military and political situation, led to an increase in anti-Semitism. Even if not officially sanctioned, the representatives of the state acted in an anti-Semitic way. Outside of the major incidents in Lwów, Pińsk and Wilno various other anti-Jewish riots took place between April and June in Lublin, Częstochowa, Warsaw, Cracow, Przemyśl. These incidents differed as the mobs involved contained a large number of regular soldiers. In June twenty-three Jews were murdered in Stanisławów province by troops from Poznań. Opinions were becoming more polarised. One of the most prominent members of the PPS, Ignacy Daszyński, stated that “if somebody falls victim to street battles, in struggles as bitter as those for the possession of Lwów, Lida or Wilno, they cannot be called the victims of pogroms” Yet this is exactly what the Jewish community felt it was the victim of. Violence against Jews, far from receding on the eve of the Polish-Soviet War, was rising. The pattern of anti-Jewish violence in the areas under armed conflict cast an ominous shadow, just as the prospect of an expanded war with the Bolsheviks became more of a reality through the middle of 1919.

The violence had a number of effects on Polish-Jewish relations. There was a growing international context to the reports of violence coming out of Poland. While the new state continued to establish itself under the stewardship of Piłsudski, the Eastern border remained fluid, and was not wholly within the control of the regime to set. The shadow of the Paris Peace Conference hung over Poland in the first months of 1919. With both Jews and Poles seeking to influence the shape and character of

274 Chwila, n. 179, (July 13, 1919), p. 4; Bourne and Watt, , op. cit., Part II, Series A, The Soviet Union, 1917-1939, Volume 3, Soviet Russia and her Neighbours, p. 212. There were also some allegations that it was the local commanders who ordered the soldiers to attack Jews: CAW (Warsaw), “Dowództwo Frontu Galicyjskiego”, I.310.1.26, pp.76-77.
275 An account of this is contained in Leon Grosfeld, Polskie reakcje formacje wojskowe w Rosji, 1917-1919 (Warsaw, 1956), pp. 171-175.
the new state, the international context assumed an importance as never before. The charge had been made by Jewish representatives in the west, and also some elements of the international community, that the Poles were not fit to rule themselves. The pogrom in Lwów had appeared to have signalled an end to Poland’s already insecure international reputation. Despite the attempt to form an apolitical government under Paderewski’s leadership, his National Democrat leanings and political naïveté further undermined Poland’s position. Lwów had alerted the world to the problems of Polish-Jewish relations, and Pińsk had appeared to confirm its worst fears. The reaction of the western powers was to have far-reaching ramifications for Polish-Jewish relations. The failure of the Zionist programme for national autonomy forced the Jewish representatives of the TŻRN to seek international guarantees at the Paris Peace Conference to solve the growing Jewish problem in Poland.

The Jewish population was not the only group of people to suffer in this period at the hands of either the Polish army or her many opponents. In the exceptionally brutal fighting in Poland’s Kresy, armed forces, whether Polish, Ukrainian, White Russian or Bolshevik, had their share of perpetrators of atrocities. Whilst each group had its own set of victims, the local Jewish populations, as shopkeepers or artisans, were a particular target. The peasantry irrespective of nationality was also prey to forced requisitioning of grain. Its suffering, when compared to the incidents against Jews, went under-reported. In a letter to Piłsudski, Sikorski reported that the peasantry in the Polesie region regarded the Polish army as an enemy, and supported the White Russian forces under Denikin. The Ukrainian army’s treatment of the Polish peasantry in Galicia was undoubtedly harsh, a point used forcibly at the Peace Conference by Paderewski, especially when trying to force Polish territorial demands in the region. It was also the subject of a parliamentary inquiry.

Further conclusions can be drawn from the study of anti-Jewish violence during the first months of the Second Polish Republic. Acts of extreme violence, where fatalities occurred, were comparatively rare, especially when compared with events that had been occurring in the Ukraine and South Russia as the Civil War raged over the

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277 Tomaszewski, “Pinsk”, p. 113.
279 “Dzialalnosc konisji sejmowej dla badadia okrucienstw ukraienskich”, AAN (Warsaw), Biuro Sejmu RP, 5/1/58.
Steppes through the course of 1918 to 1920. Yet they gained significant international attention, arguably more widely than the ‘Russian’ and ‘Ukrainian’ pogroms where many thousands died.\footnote{Modern estimates calculate the number of Jewish casualties to be between 15,000 and 200,000 in the Ukraine alone between the years 1918 and 1921. The smaller figure is from Gitleman, although this is for only those directly killed. He estimates the total who died as a result of the pogroms to be in the region of 150,000; Gitleman, op. cit., p. 162. Orlando Figes reports a figure of 150,000 dead and 300,000 casualties from a 1920 report of an investigation by the Jewish organisation in Soviet Russia: Orlando Figes, \textit{A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891-1924} (London, 1996), p. 679. The higher figure is that of Gusev-Orenburgskii, a Ukrainian historian, who estimated that some 10% of Ukrainian Jewry died during the period, 1918-1921, Sergi Ivanovich Gusev-Orenburgskii, \textit{Bagrovaia kniga: pogromy 1919-1920} (New York, 1983), p. 15, cited in Peter Kenez, “Pogroms and White Ideology in the Russian Civil War”, in Klier and Sholmo (eds.), op. cit., p. 302.} The British investigating Commission under Sir Stuart Samuel concluded that the “total cannot be less than 348” Jews who had been killed in Poland during this period, of which some 330 had died in the war zones of the \textit{Kresy}.\footnote{Samuel, op. cit., p. 14. The Morgenthau Commission, which had similar terms of reference, estimated the total to be slightly lower, 280: FRUS, 1919, Volume II, p. 781. More recent Polish scholarship has placed the figure of Polish Jews killed by Poles during the period, 1918-1919 as 230: Jolanta Żydul, \textit{Zajścia Antyżydowskie w Polsce w latach 1935-1937} (Warsaw, 1994), p. 10; Tomaszewski, “Polskie formacje zbrojne wobec Żydów 1918-1920”, pp. 97-111. The American historian Ronald Modras quotes an article by Thaddeus C. Radzialewski, which calculates the total number of Jews killed by Poles between 1918 and 1920 to be “between one and two thousand”. The same article also quoted the total Jews killed by Ukrainian Nationalists to be 75,000. Despite contact with Dr. Modras and Ted Radzialewski, I have been unable to track down the article to ascertain the sources Radzialewski used: “Jews in Poland”, \textit{Perspectives} (1979), p. 482; referred to in Ronald E. Modras, \textit{The Catholic Church and Antisemitism: Poland, 1933-1939} (Chur, 1994), pp. 25-26.} Repeated incidents of attacks on Jews by soldiers in 1919 only served to thwart the possibility of mutual accommodation. These abuses were frequently associated with negative stereotypes of Jews, as collaborators, cowards, speculators, and most often as Bolsheviks. The anti-Semitic character of Poland was displayed in the many thousands of acts of petty anti-Semitism that Poles displayed towards the Jewish minority. There was an almost constant Polish accusation against Jews who lived in the multi-national regions of the Polish state that they identified with forces hostile to Poland. In Poznań, Galicia, Lithuania and in the \textit{Kresy}, Jews were routinely identified with Germans, Ukrainians, Lithuanians or Bolsheviks. The more Poles mistrusted the Jewish minority, the more relations between the two groups spiralled downwards, and became a self-fulfilling prophecy. In the highly charged atmosphere of the first months of 1919 the declining relations would be played out on the international stage at the Paris Peace Conference.
Chapter IV

This Troublesome Question - The Polish Problem at the Paris Peace Conference, and its effect on Polish-Jewish Relations, January-June 1919

“The proposal of the Polish Commission that we should place 2,100,000 Germans under the control of a people which is of a different religion and which has never proved its capacity for stable self-government throughout its history must, in my judgement, lead sooner or later to a new war in the East of Europe”¹

On January 18 1919, the anniversary of the proclamation of the German Empire at the Salle de Glace at the Palace of Versailles in 1871, the Paris Peace Conference officially opened. It was to be the largest gathering of its kind in history. Representatives of every nation and ethnographic grouping arrived in Paris hoping to further their goals based on the stated aims of President Wilson’s Fourteen Points. It was felt that diplomacy had entered a new age with “open covenants openly arrived at”.² Yet the peace was not all-inclusive. Both defeated Germany and Soviet Russia were excluded from deliberations in Paris.³ Even as the guns fell silent from the Great War, new, smaller, but no less devastating, wars were breaking out to determine the borders of the new Europe by force rather than diplomacy.⁴

In his monograph, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking, Arno J. Mayer proposed the thesis that the primary aim of the Western Powers at Versailles was the containment of Bolshevism.⁵ The ‘Mayer Thesis’ has since been substantially revised and challenged by subsequent historians, not least over the example of Poland.⁶ If the

³ The exclusion of Germany was the reason why the Allied and Associated Powers met for a Peace Conference rather than a Congress, as convened at Vienna between 1814 and 1815 when France was invited to attend the deliberations on an almost equal footing.
⁴ In addition to the Russian Civil War and the Polish-Ukrainian War in Galicia there were six further conflicts in Eastern Europe: see C. A. Macartney and A. W. Palmer, Independent Eastern Europe: A History (London, 1962), pp. 103-105.
‘Mayer Thesis’ were to be followed with regard to Poland, then the strongest possible Polish state should have been re-established as a barrier against Bolshevik expansion. This was not the case at Paris in 1919, which raises the obvious question: what were the specific factors that determined the frontiers of the new state?

The concept of national self-determination had been accepted by the Allies in principle. Yet this was particularly difficult to implement in relation to the lands of Eastern Europe. In territories long ruled over by multi-ethnic empires there were no longer any clear ethnographic boundaries. Robert H. Lord, the American expert on Polish affairs at the Paris Peace Conference, commented that “geographically, Poland is one of the hardest countries in the world to define.” As a consequence of the problems relating to the implementation of national self-determination, the Allies were forced to adopt the secondary principle of national minority rights, which the ‘successor states,’ but not defeated Germany, were forced to accept as a condition of their independence.

The question of Poland itself was thrust back onto the international stage by the collapse of the partitioning empires which threw up many questions that needed to be answered in the short amount of time available to the Paris Peace Conference. At the Congress of Vienna, in 1814-1815, the problem was whether Poland should be resurrected; in 1919 it was not so much whether Poland should be resurrected, but what territories should Poland possess? Should it have solely the territory inhabited by Poles, or was it entitled to go back to the earlier pre-partition borders of the late eighteenth century and claim vast territories which had large non-Polish populations? The Polish question was to be one of the most acute facing the Allied peacemakers.

Joseph Tenenbaum, one of the representatives of Polish-Jewry present in Paris, commented that the rebirth of Poland was “one of the crowning achievements of the Peace Conference”. Yet the Poles were not the only group which sought to influence

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7 Lord’s official title was: Specialist on Russia and Poland, Division of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence, [American] Commission to Negotiate Peace. Lord, a Yale academic, had recently published his 1910 PhD thesis: *The Second Partition of Poland: A Study in Diplomatic History* (Cambridge, Mass., 1915).
the outcome of the Peace Conference. Whilst the Polish question had long been absent from the agenda of the Great Powers, the Jewish question had been addressed at every major international conference of the nineteenth century. Napoleon’s enlightened emancipation of German Jewry was debated at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, while the flawed Congress of Berlin in 1878 raised the issue of minority rights for the first time (for the Jewish minority of Romania). Diplomats and Jewish leaders immediately looked back to the failed Treaty of Berlin, with the Jewish leaders especially determined to guarantee the rights of their co-religionists in Eastern Europe. The focus of Jewish interest in the immediate post-War months had inevitably shifted to Poland. Combined with the still in-force Endek-led economic boycott of Jewish businesses in Poland, the spontaneous anti-Jewish violence and subsequent negative publicity abroad had focused the world’s attention on the Jewish minority in Poland.

**Constraints on Allied Policy Making at Paris**

While the victorious Allied countries were far more stable than the defeated Central Powers, the leaders of the ‘Big Three’ were far from able to act with a ‘free hand’. Much revolved around the question of the United States and its President, Woodrow Wilson. He had long advocated a new international order, based around the proposed League of Nations, which he saw as the centrepiece of the whole peace settlement, in which disagreements between states could be resolved by arbitration rather than resorting to war. Initial discussions between the American President and the French and British Prime Ministers had confirmed that Wilson thought this to be of the overriding importance. In financial and security terms the United States was also vital. The French and British had almost bankrupted themselves in the four and a half years of total war, and as a result had been loaned large sums of capital from both the

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10 See Max J. Kohler, *Jewish Rights at the Congresses of Vienna (1814-1815) and Aix-la-Chapelle (1818)* (New York, 1918). For Romania see Parkes, *The Emergence of the Jewish Problem*, pp. 91-103. Despite reservations over both the Romanian government’s attitude towards its Jewish minority and its dubious record in the War (for example, by declaring war on Germany for a second time on November 9, 1918 in order to guarantee participation at the forthcoming Peace Conference) she was accepted as a full partner in arms by the Supreme Council: see Sherman D. Spector, *Rumania at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study of the Diplomacy of Ioan I. C. Bratianu* (New York, 1962), pp. 74-79.


12 Ibid., pp. 20-22.
United States Government and various American banks. It was clear that the French wished to make Germany pay the full cost of the reconstruction of northern France and Belgium, war pensions and an indemnity, much as Germany had treated France after the Treaty of Frankfurt in 1871, a fact that was reinforced by the financial crisis in France in February 1919, whereby the franc was only saved by loans from Britain and the United States.\textsuperscript{13} Furthermore, now that Britain and France had involved the United States in ‘old world politics’, they wished to keep her committed to Europe after the fighting had finished. The French were especially concerned for their future security. They suspected, not incorrectly, that Britain might withdraw again from European affairs in order to concentrate on her imperial concerns, leaving them alone to face a resurgent Germany bent on revenge, and having little confidence that the League of Nations would replace the security of a system of permanent alliances.

The policies of the ‘Big Three’ at the Paris Peace Conference were also affected by the fact that they had to fight elections in either 1918 or 1919. This was no better illustrated than by the example of Lloyd George in Great Britain.\textsuperscript{14} While he had been resoundingly returned by the British electorate at the recent ‘coupon election’ in December 1918, he was very much acting as a Prime Minister without a party. The establishment of the Lloyd George coalition in December 1916 had split the Liberal Party (the majority of whom had followed H. H. Asquith into opposition), ensuring that Lloyd George had to rely upon the great mass of Conservative MPs for support. Encouraged by the popular press Lloyd George made a number of electoral promises to both his rump of Liberal supporters, and the country as a whole. As a consequence he could not act as freely as he desired at the Peace Conference. Calls from Lord Northcliffe’s \textit{Daily Mail} to ‘hang the Kaiser’, and to expel aliens were allied to demands to make the Germans pay the full cost of the war through punitive reparation payments to the victors. This was graphically illustrated by Sir Eric Geddes, the First Lord of the Admiralty, who argued that Germany should be “squeezed, as a lemon is


squeezed - until the pips squeak”. Lloyd George eventually threw off his earlier caution when he declared to an election meeting in Bristol that “we propose to demand [from Germany] the full cost of the war”. His political future counted on his taking a hard line against the Germans at the Peace Conference, even if he did not think it in the best interests of the future peace in Europe.

Clemenceau and Wilson were in similarly invidious positions. The French Premier was forced into a punitive position against Germany, not only as a result of the hard-line Chambre des Députés (later nicknamed the ‘one legged chamber’ because of the number of maimed ex-servicemen it contained or the ‘chambre horizon bleu’), but also because the presence of Marshal Ferdinand Foch, the Allied Commander in Chief, at the negotiations in Paris ensured that the French did not moderate their position at the Conference, despite disagreements in the French delegation about the economic importance of Franco-German co-operation. Wilson was also in a difficult position. Having fought the 1916 Presidential election as the man who would keep the United States out of the ‘European’ War, he had led the Americans to intervene in April 1917 in ‘old world’ politics, directly in opposition to the traditional key to American Foreign Policy, the Monroe Doctrine. Wilson had become the first serving American President to leave the United States while in office, in order to head the American Delegation at Paris, and personally negotiate for the new world order he had outlined in his ‘Fourteen Points’ of January 1918. The midterm elections of November 5, 1918 for both the House of Representatives and Senate had proved more controversial than had been expected. The Republicans were particularly incensed at Wilson’s call for the return of a Democratic Congress as essential for the interests of the nation’s security. The result was nothing short of a disaster for Wilson, as the

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16 “Prime Minister on Conscription”: The Times, December 12, 1918, p. 6. Lloyd George and Andrew Bonar Law, the Conservative Leader, had initially devised the less clear phrase: “Germany should pay to the utmost limit of their capacity”. See Donald E. Moggridge, Maynard Keynes: An Economist’s Biography (London, 1992), pp. 289-306.
17 MacMillan, Peacemakers, pp. 45-56.
19 In 1823 United States President James Monroe declared that the United States would remain neutral in European affairs, in return for which the United States expected no European powers to intervene in the Americas. The Monroe Doctrine had been a cornerstone of American foreign policy thereafter until Wilson’s declaration of war in April 1917.
Republicans secured a majority in both Houses of Congress.\textsuperscript{20} The resulting Peace Treaty would have to be scrutinised by the now hostile Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate (under the Republican Henry Cabot Lodge, who hated Wilson),\textsuperscript{21} and furthermore, would require a two-thirds majority in the now Republican-controlled Senate. It was obvious that any Peace Treaty based on the principles outlined in the ‘Fourteen Points’ would face severe opposition. Ultimately the result of this situation was that Wilson effectively did not speak in Paris for the American people, as Lloyd George and Clemenceau were aware.

\textbf{The Attitude of the Allies towards Poland}

The Allies had spent the last months of the war preparing for the forthcoming Peace Conference. Large numbers of experts had produced reports on Poland for the consumption of their respective Governments.\textsuperscript{22} The United States ‘Inquiry’, which reported its findings to President Wilson on December 22, 1917 stated, that “it is necessary to insist from the outset upon a democratic basis for the Polish state. Unless this is loyally observed, the internal friction of Poles, Ruthenians, and Jews is likely to render Poland impotent in the presence of Germany”.\textsuperscript{23} Over a year later the threat to the stability of the new state posed by large numbers of non-Polish minorities was still a cause for concern to the three principal victor nations. While the appointment of Paderewski as Prime Minister received a unanimous welcome in the Allied capitals, the three powers still had significantly differing opinions on how the re-born Polish state should evolve.

\textsuperscript{20} In the Senate the Republicans controlled 49 seats to the Democrats’ 47. In the House of Representatives the Republicans gained 240 seats to the Democrats’ 192: Selig, Ader, "The Congressional Election of 1918", \textit{South Atlantic Quarterly}, Volume 37, Part 3 (1937), pp. 447-465.

\textsuperscript{21} Lodge argued that Poland and the Ukraine should not only be created, but also be made as strong as possible as a counter-balance to Germany: MacMillan, \textit{Peacemakers}, pp. 79, 162-163.

\textsuperscript{22} See Chapter I.

Poland fell into the informally agreed French ‘sphere of influence.’

France, having borne the brunt of the German war effort over the previous four and a half years, naturally saw Poland principally in terms of an ally against any future aggression on the part of their common Teutonic neighbour. This role had become far more important after the withdrawal of Russia from the international scene and the obvious hostility of the new Bolshevik government to the capitalist powers. France had invested heavily in Poland. Equipping the Haller Army itself had cost some 350 million francs, and she naturally wished to see a return on her severely stretched resources. No clear French policy had developed towards Poland, despite the formation of a Comité d’Études to define French plans for the post-War settlement.

The KNP in France had successfully courted important figures in the French Government. Clemenceau had a great sympathy for the Polish cause, describing the partitions of Poland as the “greatest crime in history”. He also spoke warmly of the Polish patriots he encountered in France as a result of their exile after the defeated January Insurrection. The French Prime Minister had stated that he desired Poland to be “a buffer between Germany and Russia”, a role the British Government did not think it could necessarily fulfil.

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24 Mr Selby of the Russian Department of the Foreign Office noted that “Poland falls to France, owing to a theory which has arisen, that since France undertook the arrangements for equipping General Haller’s army, she is now responsible for meeting all other Polish requirements” and furthermore that “they [the French] are more popular than we are”: Memorandum by Mr. Selby, June 6, 1919: contained in Curzon to Balfour, June 11, 1919: in Woodward and Butler (eds.), DBFP, Volume III, pp. 365, 367.

25 Clemenceau wrote that as a result of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk “suddenly, when the War was raging at its fiercest, the whole scheme of military aims was completely changed. We had started as allies of the Russian oppressors of Poland, with the Polish soldiers of Silesia and Galicia fighting against us. By the collapse of military Russia Poland found herself … transformed”: Georges Clemenceau, *Grandeur and Misery of Victory* (London, 1930), p. 180. See Michael Jabara Carley, *Revolution and Intervention: The French Government and the Russian Civil War, 1917-1919* (Kingston, Ont., 1983), pp. 165-166; Wandycz, *France and Her Eastern Allies*.

26 It is estimated that to the end of 1920 France had paid 826 million francs to Poland, including a credit of 375 million francs between April and October 1919: Carley, op. cit., pp. 184, 242.

27 The body, set up in 1916 under the direction of Professor Ernest Lavisse, formed the basis of French proposals for the preliminary peace with Germany. It came to three principal conclusions: the military neutralisation of the left bank of the Rhine and the return of the French territories taken in 1815 and 1871 (the Saar and Alsace-Lorraine); second, the creation of a strong anti-German and anti-Bolshevik Poland; third, that the German political system should be left to the Germans to decide (but to encourage a federalist solution): de Fleuriau to FO, December 7, 1918: FRUS PPC, Volume I, p. 372; the full findings of the Comité d’Études were published in: *Travaux du Comité d’Études* (Paris, 1918, 1919), the most relevant to Poland were published in *Questions européennes*, Volume IV: *La Pologne et Russie*.

28 Clemenceau, op. cit., p. 182.


30 Balfour commented that “even if such a Poland were capable of playing the part of an efficient buffer State (which I doubt), I am not sure that a buffer State between Germany and Russia would be any
Affairs, had fully converted to the KNP position. Yet France, usually characterised as unswervingly pro-Polish, was always acting in her own self-interest rather than any desire merely to restore the Poland that Dmowski and the KNP urged upon them.

Despite Poland being in the French ‘sphere of influence’ it was Britain that was the most important voice at the Peace Conference in Polish affairs, with almost all of the major issues resting on the attitude of the British Delegation. Support for Poland was not as forthcoming in Great Britain as in France. H. J. Paton, the British expert on Polish affairs at the Peace Conference, commented that “Great Britain was the only Power which found itself in the unhappy position of opposing or seeking to limit the Polish claims in all the main questions where there were substantial differences of opinion”. Public pronouncements to the contrary, the Lloyd George government fully expected Germany to emerge from the Peace Conference territorially much as she had entered it, at least in the East, regarding her as a far more viable barrier to Bolshevism than a reconstructed Polish state, whatever form it should take. With regard to Central Europe, let alone Poland, E. H. Carr, a member of the British Peace Delegation, noted that “the Armistice of 1918 found Britain without a policy … other than a somewhat vague commitment to self-determination”.

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32 While France supported Polish claims to the majority of the former Prussian partition and the incorporation of Eastern Galicia into Poland, she did not support Polish claims over either Danzig or Wilno.
34 Paton continued, stating “it is necessary to insist that this attitude arose from no unfriendliness towards Poland”: H. J. Paton, “Poland at the Peace Conference” in Temperley (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, Volume VI, p. 239.
leadership of the new Polish state did not help its cause in British eyes. Polish designs on the provinces of the former Prussian partition were seen as an inconvenience in London. Poland was a potential liability; the question remained: who was to defend it? The British were adamant that they should not be burdened with the troublesome new state. Furthermore, the position of the Jewish minority in Poland was viewed with far more importance by the leading members of the Cabinet. Accordingly, it was agreed that a small Polish state, defined by the lands with a purely Polish ethnic majority, under the direction of the League of Nations would be preferable.

Lloyd George was especially hostile as the “Poles … [had been] attempting to conquer [Posen] by force, and thereby to prejudge what the Congress was assembled to do … although the Rumanians were doing the same thing they were not asking the Allies to assist them”.

Two days later, on January 24, the Conference formally warned the Polish Government that they should be warned against adopting a policy of an aggressive character. Any appearance of attempting to prejudge the decisions of the Conference will have the worst possible effect.

The various Polish émigrés who fought for recognition in Britain during the course of the First World War had to a great extent been discredited by their infighting, and therefore, it was left to the ‘British’ experts to advise the British Peace Delegation. Among British officials at the Foreign Office there were relatively few who supported

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37 Piłsudski was treated with suspicion by the Allied leaders in the west, as was Dmowski’s KNP. Balfour argued that it would be “premature” to acknowledge the KNP as a “government of a recognised independent state”: meeting between Pichon and Balfour, September 1918: Stanislaw Filasiewicz, *La question polonaise pendant la guerre mondiale: recueil des actes diplomatiques, traités et documents concernant la Pologne* (Paris, 1920), pp. 484-485.

38 Lloyd George speaking to the Meeting of the Supreme War Council, January 22, 1919: ibid., p. 674. At the same meeting Balfour had earlier stated that “among the many difficulties the greatest would be to get the Poles to accept a restricted programme … this would have to be imposed upon them”, and while Polish claims to Posen were “entitled … [in] Eastern Galicia, according to all the information at [my] disposal, did not desire to be Polish”: ibid., p. 672. John F. Smulski, of the Polish American Committee, wrote to President Wilson stating that “the new Republic of Poland is in great need at this time, of financial and material aid, far beyond the resources of its own citizens”: Smulski to Wilson, March 3, 1919, AAN (Warsaw), Paderewski 995. Polish demands for Allied support detailed by Dmowski on January 29, 1919: FRUS PPC, Volume III, pp. 772-782; “Poland as Ally – Paderewski’s Appeal to Britain, Help Needed Against Anarchy”, *The Times*, January 22, 1919, p. 8e; Paderewski to House, January 12, 1919: House to Wilson, January 21, 1919: Charles Seymour (ed.), *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House. Volume IV: The Ending of the War, June 1918-November 1919* (Cambridge, Mass., 1928), pp. 272-275.

Poland to the same extent that the Quai d’Orsay did. In the absence of an accredited Minister in Warsaw, the most important advisory body, the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, was almost unreservedly hostile to Polish aspirations. Its expert on Eastern Europe, Lewis Namier, kept up a constant correspondence with the leading members of the delegation. It was his influence, arguably, that helped form the largely anti-Polish attitude of the majority of the members of the British delegation. In particular it was Namier’s correspondence with Philip Kerr, Lloyd George’s influential Private Secretary, which helped influence British policy at Paris. John Maynard Keynes, the chief Treasury advisor to the

41 Among those who supported the Polish cause the most important was Sir Eric Drummond, Balfour’s Private Secretary (and later the first Secretary-General to the League of Nations): Drummond to Kerr, January 18, 1919, NAS (Edinburgh) GD40/17/208. In addition both of the principal figures of the first two British post-war missions to Poland (Colonel H. H. Wade and Sir Esmé Howard) developed significant attachment to the new Polish state, for which they were attacked by Lewis Namier for their biased reporting based chiefly on “principles”: Namier to Spicer, April 17, 1919: TNA (London), FO 3903/57316. James Headlam-Morley, who was to sit on the important New States Committee, was initially enthusiastic towards the new Polish state, as was his secretary, E. H. Carr.

42 Headlam-Morley obviously did not have any confidence in either Wade or Howard when he commented that “what disturbs me most is that we have no responsible person at Warsaw at present who can keep in touch with Piłsudski”: Headlam-Morley to Kerr, April 16, 1919, NAS (Edinburgh), Lothian GD40/17/216. Headlam-Morley acknowledged Namier as correct when he stated that “your prognostications have come quite true and I understand that the members of the Mission to Warsaw have all become pure Poles”: Headlam-Morley to Namier, March 20, 1919: Headlam-Morley, Memoir, pp. 52-53. Namier, for the P.I.D., commented on and severely criticised Howard and Wade’s reports. Namier’s reports were attached to those coming from Poland. For example Namier commented that Wade’s “sympathies are very strongly on the side of the Poles, he was at pains to do justice to both sides, but handicapped as he was by his lack of acquaintance with conditions, he has really not done justice to either side”: Namier to Tilley, March 14, 1919: TNA (London), FO 608/66. Sir Percy Wyndham was sent to Poland at the beginning of May as the first British Minister. Unfortunately he was not a successful appointment: Lloyd George to Piłsudski, May 2, 1919, NAS (Edinburgh), Lothian GD40/17/896.

43 Headlam-Morley, Memoir, p. xxix.

44 Among those hostile to Poland were: Arthur J. Balfour, General Jan Smuts, Maurice Hankey, Hamish J. Paton (the Admiralty Intelligence Department’s Polish expert), Lord Robert Cecil, Sir William Tyrrell and Sir George Clerk. See Headlam-Morley to Kerr, January 25, 1919, NAS (Edinburgh), Lothian GD40/17/210; Taran Hanczak, “Sir Lewis Namier and the Struggle for Eastern Galicia, 1918-1920”, Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Volume 1 (1977), pp. 198-210; Mark Baker, “Lewis Namier and the Problem of Eastern Galicia”, Journal of Ukrainian Studies, Volume 23, Part 2 (1998), pp. 59-104. Smuts commented at the 33rd meeting of the British Empire Delegation that the ‘Successor States’ were too “immature” for full statehood, and should be treated as League of Nations Mandates. He later commented that “Poland was a historic failure, and would always be a failure, and in the Treaty we were trying to rewrite the verdict of history”: TNA (London), FO 608/156/511/1/3/11558; also quoted in Frederick S. Northedge, The Troubled Giant: Britain Among the Great Powers, 1916-1939 (London, 1966), p. 111.

45 Namier and Kerr corresponded with each other mostly on Polish affairs from 1917 onwards, when Namier was still working for the Department of Information Intelligence Bureau at Wellington House: Namier to Kerr, April 11, 1917: NAS (Edinburgh), GD 40/17/873. The two men later corresponded with each other during the Peace Conference: Namier to Kerr: NAS (Edinburgh), Lothian, GD40/17/892, 895, 897, 900, 902, 904 and 905. Lloyd George was not keen to read the considerable amount of memoranda that passed over his desk and he preferred to speak to a small number of advisors whom he trusted. As such, his Private Secretary, Philip Kerr, was highly influential, organising the Prime Minister’s meetings and reading the mass of literature that the Prime Minister
British Delegation, commented that “unless her great neighbours are prosperous and orderly, Poland is an economic impossibility with no industry but Jew-baiting”.

Namier was not, however, unchallenged in his opinions. Sir Eric Drummond commented that “the memorandum written by the P.I.D. entitled “The Position in Poland” seems to be a completely misleading document. It is obviously written by Namier who, although quite honest is, I understand, a Ruthenian and I feel in his heart bitterly opposed to a strong and independent Poland”. Yet on matters of high policy it was Lloyd George that dominated the British delegation. The British Prime Minister had publicly spoken up for a policy of reducing the numbers of minorities as the best way to create a strong Poland.

The American attitude towards the Poles at the Peace Conference lay somewhat between the British and French positions. Some American delegates, such as Robert H. Lord and Colonel Edward M. House, the special representative of the United States in Europe (who essentially acted as Wilson’s deputy, and stood in for Wilson during

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47 Drummond to Kerr, January 16, 1919, NAS (Edinburgh), Lothian GD40/17/55, also located at TNA (London), FO 800/215. Namier’s friend and colleague, James Headlam-Morley, also criticised him for his obvious anti-Polish prejudice in his correspondence which made it “impossible to put forward some of your work”: Headlam-Morley to Namier, February 3, 1919: Headlam-Morley, Memoir, p. 21.

48 Lloyd George trusted few members of the Foreign Office, and essentially he and his personal staff ran British foreign policy in the immediate post-War years. Lloyd George commented that “diplomats were invented simply to waste time”: George de Manteyer (ed.), Austria’s Peace Offer, 1916-1917 (London, 1921), p. 168; Dockrill and Steiner, op. cit., pp. 64-65. The influence of the Foreign Office was not helped by the indisposition due to health grounds of Balfour for much of the preliminary stage of the Peace Conference. See Antony Lentin, “Several Types of Ambiguity: Lloyd George at the Paris Peace Conference”, Diplomacy & Statecraft, Volume 6, Part 1 (1996), pp. 223-251.

49 Lloyd George commented that he “fully recognises, however, the great difficulty of Poland’s position in Europe, and its people’s inevitable want of practical experience in running a great state … fully alive to the difficulties which confront them owing to the fact that they have got large numbers of Germans, Jews, Russians, and non-Polish peoples already in their country. From the start, therefore, … the best friend of Poland was the man who set his face against the inclusion in Poland of non-Polish majorities”: Kerr to Rumbold, December 15, 1919: NAS (Edinburgh), Lothian GD 40/17/911/2.
his long absences in the United States, occasioned by the President’s ill health) were both described by Lloyd George as “fanatical pro-Poles”. Yet to a greater degree than Lloyd George and Clemenceau in Britain and France, it was the attitude of the President that determined American policy. Wilson’s ‘Inquiry’ had come to the same conclusion about Poland that the British had, further emphasising that guarantees would be required for minority rights. In practice Wilson remained flexible concerning the Polish question. His critics made much of his willingness to agree with whoever had last spoken to him, and of the influential nature of the Polish vote in the United States, support that Wilson was in full need of. The contrast between the President and the Prime Ministers of Britain and France was commented upon by Harold Nicholson, a member of the British Peace Delegation, who remarked on “the slowness of the President’s own mental processes which placed him at such a disadvantage in his conversations with such men as Clemenceau and Lloyd George”. Undoubtedly it was the lack of representatives from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, whose hostility to the President was confirmed by Wilson’s refusal to admit the now hostile Senators to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, which undermined the American effort at Paris.

50 He continued, stating that their judgement was “vitiated by an invincible partisanship”: David Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, Volume II, p. 991. Two members of the Russian Section of the American Inquiry, Henryk Arctowski and S. J. Zowski, were openly sympathetic to the KNP position and were strongly influenced by Dmowski: Gelfand, op. cit., pp. 205-208.

51 Biskupski, “Re-Creating Central Europe”. Despite Wilson’s attempt to limit the influence of the State Department, Robert Lansing, the Secretary of State, largely agreed with the ‘Inquiry’s’ finding. It argued that Russia, not Poland, would prove a more formidable opponent to German expansionism. As such, Lansing argued that Eastern Galicia should not revert to Poland as it “ignored the principle” of national self-determination: Robert Lansing, *The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative* (Boston, Mass., 1921), p. 195.

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The last of the ‘Big Four’ present at Paris was Italy, under the direction of Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, the Prime Minister, and his half-Welsh, half-Jewish Foreign Minister Baron Sidney Sonnino. While a victor nation, and included at the ‘top table’ of the Peace Conference, the remit of the Italian delegation was far more limited than that of the other Allied powers. While Italy was generally pro-Polish, she was fundamentally only interested in achieving her territorial ambitions in the Adriatic and in North Africa, outlined in the secret Treaty of London in 1915. The instability of the Italian Government, and the withdrawal of the Italian delegation for a short, but vital, time in the negotiations (over the question of the port of Fiume), restricted its influence over Polish affairs, whereby the Committee on New States, which was to deal with the minorities question within Poland, had no Italian representative for the pivotal first few weeks of its existence.

**Polish Preparations for the Conference**

The selection of the two official Polish delegates to represent Poland at the Peace Conference was not made without some difficulty. On January 5, Dmowski and Paderewski (in his absence) were unanimously selected only after all the thirty Polish delegates were locked up in a Paris hotel room for three hours until they had come to a unanimous decision.

While information was being received from the foreign missions and legations in Poland, official contact was made with Dmowski in Paris. Stephen Bonsal, an

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58 As the KNP had official recognition, there was no question that the delegates would not be members of this group, therefore, effectively excluding both socialist and minority representatives from the Polish delegation. There were no Jewish representatives among the sixty-five Polish delegates: FRUS PPC, Volume III, pp. 42-45; Joseph Blociszewski, *La Restauration de la Pologne et la diplomatie européenne* (Paris, 1927).
59 The meeting was at the request of Colonel House, who commented that “there must be no more of the *liberum veto* which, as all historians agree, killed independent Poland in other days. If an agreement cannot be reached, then Poland cannot be represented in the Council of Nations, which would be too bad”: Bonsal, *Suitors and Suppliants*, p. 120; Pichon to KNP, January 15, 1919: Marjan Seyda (ed.), *Polska na przelomie dziejów: fakty i dokumenty; od zbrojnego wystąpienia Stanów Zjednoczonych do konca wojny; w tem szkic dzialalnosci Komitetu Narodowego Polskiego w Paryzu* (Poznań, 1931), Volume II, pp. 636-637.
American State Department official, was detailed with this task by Colonel House, with instructions to “feel out” Dmowski about his and Polish “intentions with regard to the Jewish question”. Dmowski commented that “we have in Poland more than one quarter of all the Jews of the world. They form 10 percent of the population, and in my judgment this is at least 8 per cent too much … Jews … are grasping storekeepers or avaricious money lenders,” and further that “we have too many Jews, and those who will be allowed to remain with us must change their habits … the Jew must produce and not remain devoted exclusively to what we regard as parasitical pursuits”. Dmowski’s statements merely confirmed Colonel House’s opinion that “it will be a long time before these religious and racial animosities subside. I agree with the President that before the Poles receive the charter of their independence they must make an iron-clad pledge to give fair and equal treatment to religious as well as racial minorities”.

Further confusion over the validity of reports of pogroms from Poland hurt the Polish cause, and western diplomats began to doubt the reliability of the new State’s representatives.

Whilst Dmowski and Piłsudski’s visions of the new Polish state were not significantly at odds regarding its territorial boundaries, it was in the implementation of their plans that the differences lay. The federalist plan of Piłsudski had little chance of being adopted unless he could militarily impose such a settlement upon the peacemakers. But it was Dmowski who was at Paris. As he was the chief Polish delegate at the Conference, it was inevitable that it was his views that were heard loudest in the West. He commented that “only those things will be said on our side at the Conference which I shall agree”. This duality of Polish policy at Paris inevitably

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60 Bonsal, Suitors and Suppliants, p. 124.
61 Ibid., p. 124.
62 Ibid., p. 125.
hurt her cause, which was not helped by the late arrival of Paderewski at the Conference.  

Jewish Diplomacy – Division and Discord

Numerous Jewish delegations descended on Paris through the first months of 1919 and it became apparent that they needed to organise themselves in order to get their demands considered by the Council of Four. The most powerful ‘Jewish lobby’ existed in the United States but was split into two main groups: The American Jewish Committee (AJC) and the Zionist Organisation of America (ZOA). The AJC was the traditional voice of American Jewry, led by the older more established immigrant families, who had mostly arrived in the United States from Germany in the 1840s, and held anti-Zionist, assimilationist views. The leadership included the prominent lawyers, Louis Marshall, Cyrus Adler, the banker, Jacob H. Schiff, Simon Wolf and Julius Rosenwald. The Zionist Organisation of America’s membership was made up from the mass of Jewish immigrants who had arrived in America in the wake of the anti-Jewish pogroms in 1881-4 and 1905-7. Their leadership had access to both Wilson and Colonel House. It included the Supreme Court Judge, Louis D. Brandeis, Justice Julius W. Mack, the Harvard law Professor Felix Frankfurter, and Rabbi Stephen S. Wise. Their aim of recognition for a separate Jewish nationality led them into direct opposition to the AJC. Through the formation of the American Jewish Congress in 1916, they sought to dominate American Jewish groups and have Zionist ideals adopted.

American Jewish organisations were more successful than those in both Eastern and Western Europe at compromising on their principles, and forming a united front for the Peace Conference. At the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the American Jewish Committee, held in New York on November 10, 1918, it was clear that the principal area of concern was the position of the Jews of Eastern Europe.  

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66 One of the main themes of the Danish academic, Kay Lundgreen-Neilsen, in his *The Polish Problem at the Paris Peace Conference* (1979) is that the Polish cause was damaged by the splits within the Polish national movement between its two strains, in Paris and Warsaw, p. 308 and passim.


68 Louis Marshall noted that “the greatest, the most important, the most difficult of our complications, are those which revolve around the new state of Poland”; Louis Marshall, “Jewish Rights in Eastern
were opened by Judge Mack, the Chairman of the ZOA, who read a telegram received by his organisation from a Zionist group in Galicia that warned of a general anarchy of which the Jews will be the first victims … in this minute of panic, agony, the Jewish population, seeking protection from cruel excesses, regards as only hope immediate effective international intervention. It must be made clear claims of only such nations will prove worthy of political, national independence. Only immediate acting can save millions of Jews from terrible danger. In name of these missions we urge for help. Fulfil your duty, help save our brethren.  

The Banker Jacob H. Schiff urged the AJC to co-operate with the Zionist Organisation of America. Louis E. Levy, President of the Jewish Community of Philadelphia, proposed that “in view of the deplorable condition and unjust discrimination under which the Jews of eastern Europe have long been forced to live, the Jews of America feel the urgent necessity at this time for the declaration and protection of the rights of these Jews in their respective lands, there to enjoy civil and political equality with the other inhabitants”. The resulting American Jewish Congress, which met in Philadelphia between December 15-18, 1918, was attended by the majority of the American Jewish leadership. Louis Marshall in his opening address reminded the delegates that we are not seated at the peace table. It is not within the power, or within our desire, to determine these political issues. Various new or expanded nations are about to be organized. The Jews constitute but a fraction of each of them … if these nations, however few or numerous they may be, and however weak or powerful, are formed, then the Jews must be assured by those nations of

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69 “Twelfth Annual Meeting, November 10, 1918”, in [American Jewish Committee], The American Jewish Year Book 5680, p. 623.
70 Ibid.
71 The only senior members of the American Jewish Committee that remained aloof from the Congress’s proceedings were Cyrus Adler and Felix M. Warburg. In total some 400 delegates attended the meeting held at the Metropolitan Opera House in Philadelphia: “Jews Plan Unity at First Congress”, December 16, 1918, New York Times, p. 24.
every right in every way equal to those of any other inhabitant of the State in which they may dwell.\textsuperscript{72}

The Congress unanimously agreed on a Jewish ‘Bill of Rights’ for their co-religionists in Eastern Europe, calling for minority rights within all the ‘successor states.’\textsuperscript{73}

The influence of the American delegations was, however, greatly reduced by the lengthy delay in their arrival in Paris due to Wilson’s insistence that he meet the American Jewish leaders in Washington, on his first return from Paris. Louis Marshall and Cyrus Adler arrived in the French capital on March 27. At Weizmann’s request the American Zionist leaders, Frankfurter and Rabbi Wise, had already sailed to Europe, but their influence on the European settlement was indirect, as their principal area of concern was always the question of the ‘Jewish home’ in Palestine.\textsuperscript{74}

European Zionists, more directly affected by the upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe, were more interested in the question of Minority Rights, and were represented by Nahum Sokolow, Leo Motzkin and M. I. Rosoff. The European Zionists not only lacked the contacts and influence of the American Zionists, but were treated with open suspicion by many in the British and French delegations in Paris.\textsuperscript{75}

Sokolow, the official Zionist representative of Polish Jewry, complained bitterly that

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\textsuperscript{73} The ‘Bill of Rights’ contained seven articles to be signed by the new states, containing provisions for: citizenship; religious and linguistic equality; minority autonomy and protection for the Sabbath. It also demanded an inquiry into events in Poland: Oscar I. Janowsky, \textit{The Jews and Minority Rights (1898-1919)} (New York, 1933), pp. 266-267; “Jews Going to Paris with Bill of Rights”, December 19, 1918, \textit{New York Times}, p. 8. Adler, speaking for the more conservative Jews in America, commented that “few of the men are fit for the purpose [Louis Marshall was plainly the exception for Adler], several are unworthy of public confidence; the combination is grotesque … No matter what the result, the Jews of America will have cause to hang their heads in shame at this motley representation to the most august assemblage the world has ever seen”: Adler to the \textit{Jewish Exponent}, December 27, 1918; Robinson (ed.), op. cit., pp. 355-356.


\textsuperscript{75} Weizmann was the only European Zionist with any significant links to the British Government: Weizmann to Lloyd George, November 28, 1918: NAS (Edinburgh), Lothian, GD40/17/1160.
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the Zionist Organisation was not concerned with “European problems”, as it “existed for Palestine only and the Zionist question was geographically limited to Palestine”.76

The gap left by the absence of American and East European Jews, who were still organising their delegations, was eagerly filled by British and French Jewish organisations.77 The British delegation had joined with the French, following an invitation from the president of the Alliance Israëlite Universelle (AIU), Eugène Sée.78 Under the influence of Jacques Bigart, the secretary of the AIU, and Lucien Wolf the assimilated Jews of Western Europe sought to influence their respective delegations, which was no easy task. The pro-Polish attitude of the Quai d’Orsay was, however, in line with the AIU opposition to any demand for Jewish minority rights, which it saw as dangerous as it would be “erecting walls” between the two communities.79 Lucien Wolf, the secretary of the Joint Foreign Committee of the Board of Deputies of British Jews and Anglo-Jewish Association and frequently referred to as the Jewish “Foreign Minister”,80 had assiduously prepared for the conference, producing his own ‘Green Book’ to distribute to all, either interested or not, on the various Allied delegations.81 He more importantly counted a large number of members of the British Foreign Office as, if not friends, then contacts.82 In France

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76 Crowe Minute, January 20, 1919: TNA (London), FO 608/98.
78 The AIU outlined its position in a pamphlet: Alliance Israëlite Universelle, La question juive devant la conference de la paix (Paris, 1919).
81 Wolf, Notes on the Diplomatic History of the Jewish Question.
and Britain, as in the United States, there was a Zionist threat to the authority of the traditional spokesmen of world Jewry. Chaim Weizmann, who wished to use both the Palestinian and Polish questions to further his bid for the leadership of the world Zionist movement, had little time for Wolf in particular, a view that was reciprocated by Wolf, at least in view of the Zionist leaders’ politics. This was reinforced by the representatives of Anglo-French Jewry, who were the most determined and vigorous opponents of national minority rights for East European Jews, as they saw themselves as French patriots first, and therefore, fell in line with the official French position on the new Polish state.

In his inauguration speech to the Sejm, Paderewski’s stated aim had been to grant the Jewish population of Poland equal rights. In response to the Zionist programme, that demanded Jews be recognised as a distinct national group and allowed autonomy with all its implications, the Polish Prime Minister had been distinctly cool. Paderewski’s statement on the Polish-Jewish question to the Sejm on March 13 was widely reported in the Western press. Outlining the problem, the Polish Premier stated that there were “two Jewish factions in Poland”. The Orthodox, he claimed, were in a majority and he “regarded among the best and most useful citizens in the

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83 Weizmann argued that the assimilated western Jews who had represented Romanian Jewry at the Congress of Berlin had failed, and at the forthcoming conference they were likely to do so again. The Zionist leader described Wolf as a “gifted but embittered man”: Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 200.

84 A good indication of Wolf’s opinion of Zionism can be ascertained from his review article published in the Edinburgh Review in April 1917. Wolf commented that “the Zionist wing of this movement [the Jewish national movement] is never tired of claiming that it expresses an unbroken national yearning of over two thousand years, but it is doubtful whether this claim can be substantiated. From the time of Bar Cochba, who raised the flag of Jewish revolt for the last time in the year 132, to our own days, there is scarcely a trace of Jewish national feeling … The Jews were always primarily, and above everything else, a religious community”: Lucien Wolf, “The Jewish National Movement”, Edinburgh Review, 224:460 (April 1917), p. 304.

85 In order to co-ordinate their efforts Wolf and Bigart set up a joint bureau, which Wolf envisaged would eventually include East European and American Jewish representatives: Wolf Diary, January 14, 1919, pp. 2-3.


87 Paderewski commented that “this statement he has granted permission to print, because he feels that years of German propaganda have so clouded the issues and perverted the facts that it may be difficult for Allied countries clearly to comprehend the position his Government has definitely taken up”: “The Polish-Jewish Question – Statement by M. Paderewski”, Jewish Chronicle, March 21, 1919, p. 8; “Paderewski Pleads for Strong Poland”, New York Times, March 22, 1919, p. 8.
new State”.88 The second group, however, were “the Poland Separatist Party [Zionists] … [who] wished to maintain themselves as a class apart, a nation within a nation … we cannot have Jewish Poles and Polish Poles. All must be simply completely Poles, bound by single allegiance and a common patriotism”.89 The position of the Polish Premier, and the attitude of the vast majority of the deputies in the Sejm to the small and divided Jewish parliamentary grouping, made it clear that no concessions towards Jewish minority rights would be easily obtained in Poland. The hostile reality of Sejm politics for the Jewish deputies had meant that their leadership in Poland increasingly looked to the Peace Conference to solve the problems facing the Jewish minority through the imposition on the new state of international guarantees and undertakings.

Deliberations Begin – Conference by Sub-Committee

It was with this background that the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers gathered in Paris to discuss the future of Europe. The first issue that dominated the discussion was that of the Polish-German border. The Polish question was formally introduced by the French on January 22, who backed the Polish claim to the historic borders of the 1772 Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.90 It became clear that despite the pre-War preparations for the Peace Conference, the Supreme Council was in no position to make any decisions regarding Eastern Europe. The Allies, also worried by the press reports of pogroms in Poland, saw the need for further investigation into more than the territorial question in Poland. The Allied

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88 Paderewski further acknowledged the “support of the great mass of Poles of Hebrew extraction had given him”: Jewish Chronicle, March 21, 1919, p. 8.
89 Paderewski listed the Zionist demands to be “separate schools for Jews, the use of the Jewish language whenever members of their race come into court, the printing of all official announcements in both Polish and Hebrew, and much else to emphasise and perpetrate the distinction between Poles born of Jewish parents and Poles not of Jewish blood … may I ask what nation on earth would even discuss acceding to such a request?” ibid.
governments bombarded their newly arrived legations for requests for information regarding the reported excesses.\footnote{Lt. Colonel H. H. Wade arrived in Gdansk on HMS *Concord*, with the returning Paderewski, on Christmas Day, 1918, but it was clear at an early stage that Wade’s Mission was not a success. A full account of Colonel Wade’s Mission is contained in Peter Lesniewski, “Lt. H. H. Wade’s Mission to Poland, December 1918-March 1919”, in Peter D. Stachura (ed.), *Perspectives on Polish History* (Stirling, 2001), pp. 46-63.}

The inconclusive meetings between the Polish government and Colonel Wade forced the Supreme Allied Command to organise a more high-profile Inter-Allied Commission for Poland whose remit was “for collating Polish information, reporting thereon, and making joint suggestions to respective governments”.\footnote{Quoted in Lundgreen-Neilsen, *Polish Problem*, p. 279; FRUS PPC, Volume III, pp. 684-686. The mission arrived in Poland on February 12, and left with Paderewski on March 30. It comprised two representatives from each of the four principal Allied Powers: France by Joseph Noulens and General Henri Albert Niessel; Great Britain by Sir Esmé Howard and Lt. General Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart; the United States by Dr. Robert H. Lord and General Francis J. Kernan; and the Italians by Giulio-Casare Montagna and General Romei Longhena. Both British representatives of the Mission published their accounts: Howard, op. cit., Volume II, pp. 312-358, 649-654; Carton de Wiart, *Happy Odyssey* (London, 1950), see also B. J. C. McKercher, *Esmé Howard: A Diplomatic Biography* (Cambridge, 1989), pp 197-233. For the French mission’s final report, as well as other material from the French Archives, see Tadeusz Jędruszczak, “Francuskie dokumenty archiwalne o sytuacji w Polsce w pierwszej połowie 1919 R.”, *Najnowsze Dzieje Polski*, Volume 16, *Materiały i Studia z Okresu, 1914-1939* (1969), pp. 195-219.} Marshal Ferdinand Foch, the Allied Commander in Chief, commented that without Allied intervention Poland “might be suffocated before its birth”.\footnote{FRUS PPC, Volume III, p. 674.} The mission, under the direction of Joseph Noulens, the former French Ambassador in Petrograd,\footnote{The choice of Noulens was significant, as he was well known for his advocacy of intervention in Russian affairs: Komarnicki, *The Rebirth of the Polish Republic*, p. 257.} and General Henri Albert Niessel arrived on February 12, 1919. Despite Foch’s prediction no military or material aid accompanied the diplomatic mission. France, which had only recently made Poland her principal ally in the East in the wake of the success of the Bolshevik revolution in October 1917, was keen to see her anti-German alliance resumed with the Russian government, of whatever colour, as soon as possible.\footnote{Wandycz, *France and Her Eastern Allies*, pp. 130-139.} Polish-German hostility had been guaranteed by the awarding of former-Prussian territory to the new state, which many within Germany did not accept as a victor-nation.

The purpose of these missions was not specifically to investigate the position of the Jewish minority in Poland. Nevertheless, the Inter-Allied Commission in Poland was
repeatedly called upon to report on Polish-Jewish relations. Fully half of the final report of the French Mission, sent on 21 May, on the “Situation in Poland between 9.II-6.IV,” was taken up by the Jewish Question, an indication of the importance placed upon domestic Polish affairs, even by the foreign military missions. In regard to the pogroms, the report stated that

[t]he Jews have called “pogroms” the pillaging of shops committed by bands of Austrian soldiers or escaped prisoners. But never has it has been organised massacres of Jews. The Jewish press has a similar definition of pogroms as movements of resistance by the Polish population against Bolshevik intrigues. It has to be noted that the Bolshevik rabble-rousers are the most likely to become the leaders of an insurrection in Poland of whom almost all are Jews, as is the case in Russia. Of this interpretation, it arises that Jewish opinion in Poland is far from agreement on the definitive solution to determine the understanding between the two societies, Christian and Jewish. The only acceptable formula appears to be that of assimilation: the Jews preserving their freedom of culture, and becoming an integrative part of the countries’ population. This solution is likely to cause a development in Poland, from a political, social and economic point of view.⁹⁶

The report played down anti-Jewish excesses, with the writers arguing that knowledge of such events would possibly “hamper” French plans for intervention against the Bolsheviks. In contrast to his diplomatic superiors, Count Olivier d’Etchegoyen, a Major in the French Army and a member of the 600 strong French Military Mission, commented on the considerable anti-Semitism of the Polish soldiery.⁹⁷

Dmowski as Chief Polish Delegate

Dmowski outlined Polish demands to the Supreme Council on January 29, 1919, arguing that Poland was not a narodek (little nation). He stressed that “between the

great states of Germany and Russia there is no place for a small and weak state.”

At this early stage in the Conference he concentrated mainly on Polish claims to the former Prussian lands, even going so far as to demand that the rump state of East Prussia should be made independent, and that “in settling the boundaries of Poland, the principle of including within those boundaries only those territories where the Poles were in a large majority must not be accepted”. Dmowski’s territorial programme would inevitably have led to large numbers of non-Polish nationals and Jews being incorporated into the new Polish state. It was obvious that despite Dmowski’s public statements supporting the principle of self-determination, there was to be no application of this principle in the Kresy. In his *Problems of East Central Europe* Dmowski estimated that those “Polish in language, culture, ideas and feeling would represent no more than 70 per cent” of the total population of the new state. In his presentation Dmowski showed how politically naïve he could be on occasion when he commented that the Ukrainians lacked “a substantial educated class which might assume the responsibility of government”. With the Allies able to agree over little more than a Europe defined on the principle of ‘national self-determination,’ Dmowski’s imperialistic policy of absorption and assimilation of the non-Polish nationals in the Kresy provinces, together with his known anti-Semitic position, caused inevitable harm to the Polish cause at Paris. Lloyd George in particular disliked Dmowski for his anti-Semitic views, and remarked that the KNP leader “did not represent the democratic opinion of Poland”.

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101 See Chapter I; Dmowski, *Problems of East Central Europe*, p. 77. Recent Polish scholarship has estimated that the non-Polish population of the enlarged Polish State, envisaged by Dmowski, would be as high as “at least 40%”: Wandycz, *Polish Diplomacy 1914-1945*, p. 13.
103 Lloyd George commented that Polish claims “by every canon of self-determination were extravagant and inadmissible”: Lloyd George, op. cit., Volume II, p. 972.
104 FRUS PPC, Volume IV, p. 680. Lloyd George did later concede that Dmowski was “an exceedingly able and cultured Pole”: ibid., Volume I, p. 313.
As a result of Dmowski’s presentation, the Supreme Council decided that it was not in any position to make decisions on Poland. On Balfour’s initiative, it was resolved to appoint a Commission on Polish Affairs, with a view to reporting back to the Council of Ten by March 8 its conclusions regarding the territorial settlement of the Polish-German border. While the pro-Polish Esmé Howard and Robert H. Lord were absent as members of the Inter-Allied Mission in Poland (and did not return until April 6), they were replaced by diplomats who were by no means as sympathetic to the Polish cause. Before the commission met and the Polish Delegates had presented their case, an attempt was made to reach an agreement. The question of Danzig was debated. Although it was undoubtedly a German city, the commission members thought that its economic importance to the new Polish state outweighed any ethnographic considerations. When Wilson was informed provisionally of these findings, he remained non-committed.

A Sub-Committee of three was organised, which met for the first time on March 3 to prepare a report for the Commission. The British member, Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Kisch, the head of Military Intelligence Russia (MIR) and part of the Military Section of the British Delegation at Paris, who was acting as Sir William Tyrrell’s assistant, was a particularly interesting choice for the Sub-Committee. A decorated soldier and a member of the Royal Engineers, Kisch came from a Jewish background.

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105 The question of minorities was not directly within the remit of the Commission: FRUS PPC, Volume IV, p. 139-141. The Commission was established on January 29, but did not meet until February 20: see FRUS PPC, Volume III, pp. 779, 1007. Jules J. Jusserand, the French Ambassador in Washington, in the original “Plan of Procedure” for the Peace Conference had proposed, along with a commission on Polish Affairs, a committee on Jewish Affairs, which was not established. A further “Committee on public free determination of the peoples combined with the rights of ethnical and religious minorities” was only established as a result of reports of anti-Jewish violence in the Kresy in May 1919: Jusserand to Lansing, November 29, 1918: Ray S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement: Written from his Unpublished and Personal Material (London, 1923), Volume III, p. 62.

106 The members were: Jules-Martin Cambon (France, the former French ambassador in Berlin, who became the Chairman of the Polish, Czechoslovak and Romanian Commissions); Sir William G. Tyrrell (Great Britain); Isaiah Bowman (United States); Marquis Pietro della Torreta (Italy); and K. M. Otchiai (Japan). Robert H. Lord, on his return from Poland, replaced Bowman on April 9. The Inter-Allied Mission was to submit a summary of its findings to the Commission which would prepare a report for the Supreme Council. See de Wiart, op. cit., p. 97; FRUS PPC, Volume III, pp. 1007, 1014.


109 Kisch owed his appointment to his expertise in Russian affairs (and as a result of the exclusion of the Bolsheviks after the abortive Prinkipo proposal, which had attempted to include all Russian parties in the Peace Conference, his help was available). The two other members of the sub-committee were Bowman and General Le Rond (France).
family and was an avowed Zionist and close friend of Chaim Weizmann. Nevertheless, his and the Sub-Committee’s findings were distinctly pro-Polish, awarding almost all of the disputed territories of the Polish-German borderlands to the Poles. Restrictions were imposed upon the committees whereby only official spokesmen were allowed to present evidence to the committees, thereby excluding testimony from delegations from prospective minorities. Such a procedure had invariably made not only the Polish Commission, but other territorial committees, sympathetic towards the position of the Poles, or dominant nationality. Dmowski submitted the Polish territorial demands to the Commission on February 28.

The ‘Big Three’ were absent for most of the month of February. Wilson, forced to return to the United States by the Senate, was absent between February 15 and March 17. Colonel House deputised for the President, although the latter was not particularly impressed by his performance. Lloyd George returned to London between February 8 and March 6 to deal with domestic political concerns. Clemenceau, after a failed assassination attempt by a French anarchist, Emile Cottin, convalesced between February 19 and March 1. This had ensured both that the Conference drifted and also that the Allied delegations, who relied heavily on their political leadership for direction, produced reports that were often at variance to their masters’ political opinions.

Despite dissenting voices the Committee reported its findings to the Supreme Council on March 12. The presentation, made by Jules Cambon, awarded not only the entire

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110 Headlam-Morley commented in a letter to Namier on March 20 that “Polish affairs are now practically in the hands of Kisch … he has certainly great intelligence and ability and I should think pretty good judgement”: Headlam-Morley to Namier, March 20, 1919: Headlam-Morley, Memoir, p. 53. Harold Nicholson described Kisch as a man of “marked ability”: Nicholson, op. cit., p. 109. Kisch was later head of the Jewish Agency in Palestine from 1923, but, according to Weizmann, he had little to do with Zionism or Jewish politics until 1922. One of the reasons why he was of use to the Zionist leader was precisely because of his being “completely British in upbringing”: Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 367; see also Norman de Mattos Bentwich and Michael Kisch, Brigadier Frederick Kisch: Soldier and Zionist (London, 1966), pp. 47-53.

111 This was particularly the case with the German-Polish border: Harold I. Nelson, Land and Power: British and Allied Policy on German’s Frontiers, 1916-19 (London, 1963), pp. 151-154; Patricia A. Gajda, Postscript to Victory: British Policy and the German Polish Borderlands, 1919-1925 (Washington, DC, 1982); Ralph Schattkowski, Deutschland und Polen von 1918-19 bis 1925: Deutsch-polnische Beziehungen zwischen Versailles und Locarno (Frankfurt am Main, 1994).

112 FRUS PPC, Volume III, p. 854. Dmowski gave evidence to the Commission twice, while no non-Polish nationals were permitted to make their case.


‘Corridor’ to Poland but the largely German port of Danzig. A total of 2,132,600 Germans would be incorporated into the new Polish state. On March 20, with the return of the principal Allied leaders, the Council of Ten turned down the Peace Commission’s pro-Polish recommendations, the only occasion at the whole Conference that a unanimously proposed report was not accepted by the Council. Lloyd George in particular criticised the report for being “immoderate” and against the spirit of the Fourteen Points. After consideration, on March 20 the Committee “stuck to their guns”. When the Polish question was discussed again by the Council of Ten on March 22, Lloyd George warned that “the Conference must avoid presenting such a Treaty that no Government would dare sign”. The British Prime Minister temporarily backed off and merely thanked the Commission for its impartiality. The Council of Ten provisionally accepted the report’s findings. Lloyd George, increasingly worried by the shape the peace was taking, delivered his rebuttal in his ‘Fontainebleau Memorandum’, of March 25. While not merely concerned with the prospect of Polish acquisition of former Prussian territory, the Memorandum’s main thrust was that the Peace terms should not destroy Germany, who, he cautioned, might throw in its lot with Bolshevism if the Treaty terms were too harsh. He warned that the proposals regarding Poland might lead to a “future war … in the East of Europe” over the poisoned legacy by placing millions of Germans and Hungarians, or

115 The report was submitted to the Council of Ten on March 12: Report Number 1 of the Commission on Polish Affairs; “Frontier Between German and Poland”: Miller, My Diary, Volume IV: Documents, pp. 350-366.

116 FRUS PPC, Volume IV, pp. 413-419.

117 Nicholson, Peacemaking, p. 129. Lloyd George commented that “the Report was unanimous product of the Commission … I was, however, seriously opposed to some of its recommendation and delimitation, on the ground that they proposed to transfer definitely German areas to Polish rule. When the Report came before the Conference, I therefore challenged some of its conclusions. This gave rise to one of the most significant and fundamental discussions of the whole Conference”: Lloyd George, op. cit., Volume II, p. 981. Dmowski unreservedly supported the Report: Dmowski, Poityka polska, Volume II, pp. 130-132.

118 Lloyd George attacked the proposals as he argued it was unfair to the Germans in the ‘Corridor’. It was liable to lead to instability in Central Europe. The Poles “had not a high reputation as administrators”: FRUS PPC, Volume IV, pp. 415-416. Wilson’s reaction to the disagreement between Lloyd George and Cambon was confused. He admitted that he “had not reached a definite conclusion in his own mind”: ibid., p. 417. According to some sources Lloyd George had previously supported the Commission’s conclusions: Henry Wickham Steed, Through Thirty Years, 1892-1922: A Personal Narrative (London, 1924), Volume II, p. 297.

119 Headlam-Morley to Namier, March 20, 1919: Headlam-Morley, Memoir, p. 53; an account of the meeting is contained in FRUS PPC, Volume IV, pp. 452-454; Miller, My Diary, Volume IX: Documents, pp. 14-24; Le Rond’s version of the meeting: Recueil des Actes de la Conférence, pp. 78-80.

120 FRUS PPC, Volume IV, pp. 449-450.

121 Ibid., p. 449.
other minorities, under the alien rule of “small States”. More damningly he judged that Poles were not only “of a different religion [to the Germans]” but that Poland had “never proved its capacity for stable self-government throughout its history”. Over the question of Poland, the British Prime Minister decided to make a stand, arguing that “as a guiding principle of the peace that as far as is humanly possible the different races should be allocated to their motherlands, and that this human criterion should have precedence over consideration of strategy or economics of communications, which can usually be adjusted by other means.” The Fontainebleau Memorandum, however, achieved little aside from drawing out the hostility between the French and British more into the open.

By March 27 the Council of Ten had gone, to be replaced by the more efficient Council of Four. Lloyd George argued that to give Danzig to Poland “will perhaps be the straw that breaks the camel’s back.” Wilson merely remained silent. On April 1 the Council of Four decided that Danzig was to be a ‘Free City’ under the supervision of the League of Nations.

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122 Ibid., p. 449; Some Consideration for the Peace Conference before they finally draft their Terms, Command Paper 1614 (London, 1922), p. 3.
123 See Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, Volume I, p. 406. Regarding the eastern boundaries of Germany Lloyd George proposed that “Poland [is to] be given a corridor to Danzig, but that this be drawn irrespective of strategic or transportation considerations so as to embrace the smallest possible number of Germans”: ibid., p. 413.
125 MacMillan, Peacemakers, p. 198; See Tardieu’s “General Observation on Mr. Lloyd George’s Note of March 26th” in which the French reinforced their desire to “give Poland and Bohemia normal frontiers”: ibid., pp. 416-420.
126 The Supreme Council was pared down from Ten to Four to help speed up decisions in the face of mounting public criticism. The first meeting of the reduced Supreme Council was on March 24. While the Council of Four (Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Wilson and Orlando) would deal with “the most important and difficult questions”, a Council of Foreign Ministers was to discuss more detailed matters referred to them by the Council of Four: Mantoux, Volume I, p. 3.
127 Ibid., p. 37.
128 David H. Miller suggested that Wilson agreed to make Danzig a free city “because he did not want to give Fiume to the Italians, and if Danzig went to the Poles he would have to consent to Fiume being Italian”: Miller, My Diary, Volume IX: Documents, p. 208. Winston Churchill commented that “cynics pointed to the fact that Italian emigrants to America usually returned to Italy without acquiring voting rights, while the Polish vote was a formidable factor in the domestic politics of the United States”: Winston S. Churchill, The Aftermath: Being the Sequel to The World Crisis (London, 1929), p. 219.
129 Wilson introduced the proposal that Danzig should be a “free city somewhat like the Hanseatic cities of the Middle Ages”. Clemenceau objected, arguing that the Poles needed to be present at such a decision. Wilson retorted that “we can agree among ourselves beforehand … they must accept the solution that we deem reasonable”: Mantoux, p. 106-109.
borders had been essentially finalised by the beginning of April.\textsuperscript{130} Jewish interest and influence was negligible, yet this did not prevent the accusation that it was the Jewish lobby that had prevented the full Polish claims being realised.\textsuperscript{131}

**The ‘Myth’ of the Jewish Lobby’s influence over Poland at Paris**

It has become a common accusation among Polish historians that a “powerful, well organised” Jewish lobby actively worked against, and materially affected, Polish claims at the Paris Peace Conference.\textsuperscript{132} The Conference did not merely examine questions of territory but also addressed financial issues, the most pressing of which to Poland was the prospect of an international ‘stabilisation’ loan required to reconstruct the Polish economy, which many in the Polish Delegation saw as being threatened by the power of ‘international Jewry’.\textsuperscript{133} Count Aleksander Skrzyński, the Polish Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, wrote of the “considerable part” played by the Jews in imposing the Minorities Treaty.\textsuperscript{134} Isaac Grünaub concurred. Speaking in 1922, he commented that “the power of the Jewish people in Poland was insufficient … our one support was the power of world Jewry. Only thanks to this support were we able to accomplish anything at all.”\textsuperscript{135} Dr E. J. Dillon, a British journalist present at Paris, observed that “Dmowski has incurred the resentment of the most powerful international body of modern times. He had the misfortune to have the

\textsuperscript{130} Paderewski was informed of the decision over the Polish-German border on April 9, 1919: Ibid., pp. 199-203. On the same day Kisch was replaced by Headlam-Morley on the Commission on Polish Affairs.


\textsuperscript{134} Count Aleksander Skrzyński, *Polska a Pokój* (Warsaw, 1924), p. 76. Not only Poles concurred with this interpretation, President Wilson’s Press Secretary, Raymond Stannard Baker, observed that the minorities treaties were imposed upon the new states as a result of “propaganda of the Jews”: Raymond Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement: Written from his Unpublished and Personal Materials* (London, 1923), Volume 1, p. 227.

\textsuperscript{135} Grünaub, *Milhamot yehudei Polin*, p. 158.
Jews of the world as his adversaries”.136 The Polish politician himself in his collected writings on the war years and after, Polityka polska i odbudowanie panstwa (Polish Politics and the Rebuilding of the State, 1924), in an essay entitled: “Żydzi wobec wojny,” (Jewry during the War) blamed the Polish failure at the Peace Conference (indeed, his failure as the chief Polish Delegate) on Jewish influence, whereby the Jews were attempting to control the world from Palestine through the influence of Zionism.137 He would later write in his last published book, Przewrót (The Coup d’état, 1934), that

Lloyd George prevented at the peace conference the incorporation into Poland of territories already agreed to be incorporated … Upper Silesia, Malbork, Sztum and Kwidzyn, Danzig. In this matter, Lloyd George acted as the agent of the Jews and he would not have achieved his goal had [President] Wilson been able to act independently of the Jews. The Jews, for their part, acted in alliance with German freemasonry, and according to which, in return for help on the border questions at the peace conference, they were offered a number of leading positions in the German republic.138

Nor did the Polish delegation keep its opinions quiet about the alleged motivations of Lloyd George. In the Polish press, which Namier in particular maintained a close eye on during the course of the Conference, increasingly libellous allegations about the British Prime Minister were made. Henryk Korab-Kucharski, Dmowski’s press agent in Paris, wrote a report, published in the Warsaw daily Kurier Warszawski (Warsaw Courier) on April 1, 1919, that “Lloyd George has taken up an unfriendly attitude towards us and in spite of the unanimous decision of the Polish Committee, did not want to give us Danzig … [he] wished to do so on the sly, probably in order to please some person near him (???)”.139 The article further accused “Filipa Karra” [Philip Kerr] of his negative influence as he was a known supporter of Zionism.140 The

139 “Z Kongresu”, Kurier Warszawski, No. 91, April 1, 1919, p. 8; enclosed in Namier to Kerr, April 19, 1919, NAS (Edinburgh), Lothian GD40/17/892/1.
140 Ibid.; Weizmann commented on Kerr’s support of Zionism, that he was one of his “friends in England”: Weizmann, Trial and Error, pp. 98, 503.
allegations were expanded upon and published in Paris in the Polish language newspaper *Gazeta Polska (Polish Gazette)*, of April 6, which commented that

Dmowski accused the Prime Minister of keeping up relations … with a Polish Jewess! A Jewess is the mistress of Lloyd George. That is sufficient (perhaps in Warsaw) to disclose to the world the motives … of the statesman to whom England has entrusted the leadership of the nation.\(^{141}\)

The allegations were treated with a mixture of amusement and annoyance by the British delegation, and certainly did not help the credibility of the Polish politicians implicated in spreading the rumours about the British Prime Minister. Dmowski’s view that French support was essential, to the exclusion of pandering towards the two Anglo-Saxon powers, further harmed the Polish cause with the joint British and American victory over French plans for the future of Eastern Europe. Dmowski argued that it was the hostility of the British position that was decisive, and the influence of Lloyd George the most important.\(^{142}\) His opposition was blamed on Jewish Masonic influence, when the truth quite clearly lay in the fact that British policy was based firmly on its own self-interest. The major opponents of Polish interests were the “Prussians on the Thames” rather than the mysterious Jewish lobby.\(^{143}\)

Jewish delegations concentrated their attention on the Eastern borderlands of the fledgling Polish state, as this was where the majority of the Jewish populations lived. Among the disputed Eastern lands of the *Kresy* the Jewish population was far higher than in the western provinces of Poland. As early as December 2, 1918 Balfour received a long memorandum from the Joint Foreign Committee regarding the official Jewish position in Britain regarding the Peace Conference, in which no mention was made of the Polish-German border.\(^{144}\) The accompanying tables show the size of the

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\(^{141}\) “Dmowski contra Lloyd George”, *Gazeta Polska*, no. 156, April 6, 1919, p. 1.
\(^{143}\) Namier to Kerr, April 19, 1919, NAS (Edinburgh), Lothian GD40/17/892/1.
Jewish population of the *Kresy*. The first furnishes the statistics for the Polish provinces according to the Polish Census of 1921, which seemed to downplay the number of Jews in the Polish borderlands, even if the criterion of Jews by Religion was used. By way of contrast the statistics for the Western provinces of the Russian Empire according to the 1897 Census are also provided, showing a far higher number of Jews by proportion in the population. While neither census could be described as absolutely definitive, the Poles might have had political reasons to underestimate the number of Jews in their Eastern provinces, and exaggerate the number of Poles in the disputed *Kresy*. There was no reason why the Russian census takers would have exaggerated the Jewish population within the Pale of Settlement.\(^{145}\) A further advantage of the Russian data is that this was the material used by the experts at the Paris Peace Conference. It also related to the whole disputed region (see Map 4.1) rather than those particular territories that made up the Polish state after the Treaty of Riga in March 1921.\(^{146}\)

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\(^{146}\) For example, Dmowski claimed the city of Minsk which had a significant Jewish population, 53,700 in 1926 (40.8% of the population): *Encyclopedia Judaica*, Volume 12, col. 53.
Map 4.1: Poland, showing Provincial Divisions, 1921-1939

Table 4.1: Proportion of Jews in the *Kresy* Provinces of Poland, 1921

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Jews by Religion (Total)</th>
<th>Jews by Religion (Percent)</th>
<th>Jews by Nationality (Total)</th>
<th>Jews by Nationality (Percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wilno</td>
<td>973,104</td>
<td>91,784</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>79,508</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nowogródek</td>
<td>824,045</td>
<td>74,467</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>56,307</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polesie</td>
<td>880,898</td>
<td>110,639</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>91,251</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolyn</td>
<td>1,437,907</td>
<td>164,740</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>151,744</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarnopol</td>
<td>1,428,520</td>
<td>128,965</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>68,967</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanisławów</td>
<td>1,348,580</td>
<td>145,226</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>91,880</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,893,054</td>
<td>715,821</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>539,667</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2: Polish and Jewish Populations in the Western Provinces of the Russian Empire (excluding the Congress Kingdom (except Suvalki Province)), Russian Census, 1897

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Poles</th>
<th>Poles (Percent)</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Jews (Percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vilna</td>
<td>2,083,200</td>
<td>170,800</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>264,500</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suvalki</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grodno</td>
<td>2,094,300</td>
<td>211,500</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>364,400</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minsk</td>
<td>3,095,400</td>
<td>92,800</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>495,200</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volynia</td>
<td>4,253,400</td>
<td>262,600</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>561,500</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12,244,300</td>
<td>902,800</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>1,758,100</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3: Polish and Jewish Populations in the Western Provinces of the Russian Empire (excluding the Congress Kingdom) *Zemstvo* Organisations, 1911

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Poles</th>
<th>Poles (Percent)</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Jews (Percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vilna</td>
<td>1,815,215</td>
<td>277,728</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>252,315</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suvalki</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grodno</td>
<td>1,728,623</td>
<td>81,245</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>307,695</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minsk</td>
<td>2,360,707</td>
<td>101,510</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>328,138</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volynia</td>
<td>3,367,300</td>
<td>228,976</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>468,055</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9,272,945</td>
<td>689,459</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>1,356,203</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.4: Population by Religion in East Galicia, Austrian Census, 1910

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Greek Catholic (Ruthenian)</th>
<th>Roman Catholic (Polish)</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>(Percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Galicia</td>
<td>5,336,000</td>
<td>3,291,000</td>
<td>1,351,000</td>
<td>660,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percent)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The incorporation of Jews from the *Kresy* would obviously have far more of an effect for the Jewish population of the Congress Kingdom than the incorporation of the disputed former German territories, of which Jews formed a far smaller proportion.

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147 Office Central de Statistique de la République Polonaise, op. cit., pp. 12-17.
149 Contained in Tallents to Curzon, June 4, 1920; Bourne and Watts (ed.), *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, Part II, Series I, Volume 9, p. 188.
Table 4.5: Proportion of Jews in the former Prussian Provinces, c. 1921

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Jews by Religion (Total)</th>
<th>Jews by Religion (Percent)</th>
<th>Jews by Nationality (Total)</th>
<th>Jews by Nationality (Percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pomorze</td>
<td>935,679</td>
<td>2,927</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poznań</td>
<td>1,967,649</td>
<td>10,351</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1,480</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śląsk (Upper Silesia)</td>
<td>980,296</td>
<td>9,313</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cieszyn</td>
<td>73,141</td>
<td>2,164</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1,229</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free City of Danzig</td>
<td>335,221</td>
<td>7,282</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,291,986</td>
<td>32,037</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>7551</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The former Prussian territories had such an insignificant Jewish population that they were not considered to be of any great importance to Western Jewish leaders. It was the large, and far more exposed Jewish population in the Kresy that concerned them. Dmowski himself commented that Polish independence “hinged on its position in the Baltic”. Jewish interests were dominated by the large Jewish populations further east. Louis Marshall observed that “I do not express any opinion as to what the boundaries [of the new Polish state] should be … it is the future of these our brethren that we should take to heart”. The more highly charged controversies over Teschin, Upper Silesia, Danzig and the Polish Corridor were of little interest to the Jewish lobby. Namier, Dmowski’s principal bête noire, actually supported Polish claims over the Polish-German borderlands and spoke highly of

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151 Office Central de Statistique de la République Polonaise, op. cit., pp. 12-17. The figures for Upper Silesia are from 1919 and for the Free City of Danzig from the official League of Nations census of November 1923. Two thirds of the Jewish population of the Free City had arrived since 1918 and did not have Danzig nationality (in 1910 the Jewish population of Danzig was only 2,717 (1.4% of the total)): Ibid., pp. 12-17; Wirtschaftspolitische Stellung und weltwirtschaftliche Bedeutung der Freien Stadt Danzig (Danzig, 1923), pp. 16-18; Samuel Echt, Die Geschichte der Juden in Danzig (Leer, 1972), p. 60.

152 Lucien Wolf commented to Louis Marshall that “I have wholly and solely in mind the interests of our co-religionists”. Polish territorial demands were not of interest to Wolf: Wolf to Marshall, June 1, 1919: Wolf Diary, p. 322.


155 Namier commented that Polish claims “in the west were based on the democratic principle, in the east on the historic heritage of the upper classes—thus for instance, every argument … supported Poland’s claims to Upper Silesia, destroyed, even more thoroughly, her converse claim to East Galicia. A proverb says that you can sit on one stool only—‘but we sit on a whole collection of furniture,’ confessed to me a distinguished Pole some twenty years ago”: Lewis Namier, “Poland” in idem., Facing East, p. 89.
the Polish character.\(^{156}\) It was over the Eastern borderlands that Namier wrote the majority of his correspondence, advocating not only Jewish national rights, but also pushing for Ukrainian claims in Eastern Galicia.\(^{157}\) The only other British Jew in a position to affect Poland territorially, Frederick Kisch, was very much pro-Polish, yet Dmowski still described him as a “non-entity of a young man, who did not [even] look like an Englishman”.\(^{158}\) It is undeniable that the Polish cause at Paris was most harmed by Dmowski’s presence as the chief delegate. American Jewish leaders, such as Louis Marshall, who had comprehensively failed in their attempts to negotiate with the Polish leader during his time in the United States, argued that they should lobby the Allied leaders directly for this very reason. Talks with the Poles had failed.\(^{159}\)

The Zionists, granted an audience with the Supreme Council on February 27, made no mention of either the alleged pogroms in Poland, or of the question of minority rights, underlining their determination to seek a Palestinian solution to the ‘Jewish question’ first and foremost.\(^{160}\) The only interest the delegation had with regard to the Jewish population of Poland was to be able to “send to Palestine 70 to 80,000 Jews annually.”\(^{161}\) The *Tymczasowa Żydowska Rada Narodowa* (Temporary Jewish National Council) resolved with regard to the “fixing of the new boundary lines of the Polish State, the Zionist policy must count with the ethnographical composure and the real will of the population of the territories in question.”\(^{162}\) The greatest influence that the Zionists held over proceedings at the conference were through the reports of anti-

\(^{156}\) Namier commented that “the Poles are a glorious nation and no one can deny it”: Namier to Kerr, June 26, 1919, NAS (Edinburgh), Lothian GD 40/17/904.

\(^{157}\) Although Namier was excluded from the British Delegation, he exerted an influence over H. J. Paton, Howard’s replacement as the Polish expert in Paris, and Kisch, the British representative on the Polish Commission. Namier constantly reinforced the importance of the eastern borders of Poland and almost ignored the Polish-German border: Namier to Kisch, May 5, 1919: NAS (Edinburgh), Lothian, GD 40/17/897.

\(^{158}\) Dmowski, *Polityka polska*, Volume II, p. 137; Dmowski earlier bracketed Kisch with the other Jewish members of the British Peace Delegation and Foreign Office staff such as Namier and Alfred E. Zimmern in their opposition to the Polish cause at Paris, ibid., pp. 61-62.

\(^{159}\) Louis Marshall commented that he had “received sweet words of promise” from Paderewski, Dmowski and Smulski, yet in the face of continuing anti-Jewish violence Marshall argued that such negotiations had failed: Marshall, “Jewish Rights in Eastern Europe”, p. 530.

\(^{160}\) None of the Allied leaders attended the meeting, leaving it to the five Foreign Ministers, or as various British diplomats labelled them — the “second eleven”. The delegation consisted of Weizmann, Sokolow, Levi, Spire, and Ussishkin. The meeting is detailed in FRUS PPC, Volume IV, pp. 159-172. The Zionist representatives expressed that they were “very well satisfied” by their meeting with the Supreme Council: “Action of Conference Satisfies Zionists – Dr. Weissmann Says Palestine Will be First Fruits of League of Nations”, *New York Times*, March 3, 1919, p. 3. MacMillan, *Peacemakers*, p. 282.

\(^{161}\) Ibid., p. 169.

\(^{162}\) TNA (London), FO 371/3904/178578.
Jewish violence sent via the Zionist bureaus in central Europe and Scandinavia, which led to anti-Polish rallies in the larger cities of the Entente. E. H. Carr commented that not only was he “doubtful about the wisdom of the protest meetings” but also felt that “the Zionist telegraph agencies had spoilt their own good case by their exaggerations”. Not even the Jewish representatives in Paris believed the “grossly exaggerated” reports of the Copenhagen Zionist Bureau.

The ‘Pogroms in Poland’ – The Press and the New Poland

E. H. Carr would later state that at the Peace Conference “the influence of the press, had been responsible … for raising popular indignation”. There was no better illustration than the controversy over the ‘pogroms in Poland’. The Inter-Allied Commission was not the only source of information regarding Polish-Jewish relations available to the Allies in early 1919. Two British subjects, Israel Cohen and Henry N. Brailsford, toured the new Polish state and commented on its anti-Jewish character. Their anti-Polish stance had a significant influence on British policy throughout the vital year of 1919.

The first and most influential was Israel Cohen. Born in Manchester in 1879 to Polish-Jewish parents from the town of Łomża, located between Warsaw and

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164 Wolf commented that “we must be very discriminating in our use of news which comes through the Copenhagen Zionist Bureau. This is the same office that gave so exaggerated reports of the Lemberg pogroms”: Wolf Diary, May 23, 1919, p. 272; Adler to Racie Adler, May 13, 1919: Moshe Davis, “The Human Record: Cyrus Adler at the Peace Conference, 1919”, in Jacob Rader Marcus (ed.), Essays in American Jewish History: To Commemorate the Tenth Anniversary of the Founding of the American Jewish Archives (Cincinnati, Ohio, 1958), p. 480. Piłsudski in his more blunt way called the reports “obviously ridiculous”: “Notes of an interview between Henry Morgenthau and General Piłsudski, August 2, 1919, at Vilna”: Library of Congress (Washington, DC), Henry Morgenthau (Sr.) Papers [Morgenthau], Subject File Poland (1919-22), Container No. 21.
166 Cohen wrote extensively on his month-long ‘mission’ in Poland. Aside from his article for The Times (entitled: “The Pogroms in Poland”, published on February 8, 1919), Cohen prepared a pamphlet for wide distribution by the Zionist Organisation in London: A Report on the Pogroms in Poland, copies of which he sent to the Allied foreign ministries. In addition he published his diary twice: “My Mission to Poland (1918-1919)”, Jewish Social Studies, Volume 8 (1951), pp. 149-172; and in his Travels in Jewry (New York, 1953), pp. 48-92 (including a slightly longer account of his two day visit to Lwów). Finally there is a brief account in his autobiography: A Jewish Pilgrimage: The Autobiography of Israel Cohen (London, 1956), pp. 134-148.
Białystok, he had taken a keen interest in Polish affairs since visiting Galicia and Warsaw in the summer of 1906. While he had been denied official recognition by Balfour, he spoke with the authority of the “Special Correspondent” of *The Times*. Cohen received his Polish visa and a letter of introduction from the Polish Minister in Berne, August Zaleski, on December 14, 1918, but due to visa problems with the Austrian authorities his arrival in Poland was delayed until January 1, 1919. The following day Count Zygmunt Lasocki of the Polish Liquidation Commission in Cracow furnished Cohen with a letter, stating that for the duration of his visit to Poland the local authorities were “not to make any difficulties for him in this matter and to provide him with the information necessary to the fulfilment of his task”.

He travelled to Warsaw, arriving on January 8 at the invitation of Colonel Wade. The two men met, but due to Balfour’s instructions Cohen was not allowed to travel with Wade to Lwów to ensure the impartiality of Wade’s mission (and to avoid giving the impression that Cohen was an official British representative). While waiting the return of Wade, Cohen made contact with the other members of the British mission, Kimens and Kenny, and pressed upon them the importance of the Jewish question in Poland.

He also had meetings with most of the prominent Polish political and military figures then present in Warsaw, including Paderewski twice, Władysław Grabski, the leader of the ZLN in Poland and Józef Piłsudski. In his numerous encounters Cohen’s confrontational and insistent manner caused much annoyance to the Poles. He “regretted to note that Paderewski had become less conciliatory” between their two meetings, on January 8 and 22. After spending over two weeks in Warsaw he had arrived in Lwów on January 26, fully 6 days after he written his report on the pogrom to *The Times*. The report, “The Pogroms in Poland – Origin and Extent”, published in *The Times* on February 8, stated that “the most serious pogrom was that at

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167 As noted in Chapter I, Zaleski’s movements in France and Great Britain were restricted as a result of Dmowski’s denunciation of him. As a result of this, since November 1918 Zaleski had been acting as the Polish Minister in Berne.

168 The letter is located at CZA (Jerusalem), A213/11/1, quoted in David Engel, “Lwów 1918”, p. 43, n. 24.

169 This is indeed obvious even in Cohen’s own accounts of the conversations.

170 On each occasion the interview was terminated by Paderewski’s wife nagging her husband and pulling at his sleeve: Cohen, *Travels in Jewry*, pp. 62-62, 71-72.

171 According to Cohen’s diary he had started work on his article on January 14 and completed it on January 20. It was composed entirely while he was in Warsaw, although this was in part due to Wade’s presence in Lwów: Cohen, *Travels in Jewry*, pp. 66, 70.
Lemberg, which by reason of its magnitude and ferocity, and also of its political significance, required separate consideration”. George Geoffrey Dawson’s editorial in *The Times* that day commented that Cohen “if not completely above the suspicion of partiality, had every inducement not to spoil his case by exaggeration”. Dawson went on to recommend that

[to reproach the Poles for these excesses might relieve feelings but would not be helpful. The great fact to keep in mind is that these excesses are a reproach to ourselves, and particularly to the nascent League of Nations, which much be regarded as responsible for the conduct of its wards. Until more regular machinery of government is set up, it is the duty of the Powers now assembled in Paris to discipline the Poles and to prevent them from soiling the new banner of liberty which we gave to them clean.]

On his return from Poland Cohen again visited Zaleski in Berne, meeting him on February 8. He noted that Zaleski was “deeply disappointed … Zaleski spoke to me about it [Cohen’s article of February 8 in *The Times*] in a tone of serious perturbation. He said that it would do Poland a great deal of harm, whereupon I replied that the article showed that the Poles had done the Jews a great deal of harm and surely could not expect that I should suppress the truth”. In his *Report on the Pogroms in Poland* (1919), Cohen noted as the cause of the alleged pogroms that “in [towns and especially] Warsaw, the emotions of the Poles on securing their long awaited independence found expression in an extensive outbreak of anti-Jewish excess”. He then likened these ‘excesses’ to those committed by the Black Hundreds after the 1905 Revolution in Russia. He stated that “anti-Jewish prejudice was diligently fostered by political agitators, and in some cases, Catholic priests, with the result that

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172 The report by Cohen was one of the most important and widely circulated pieces of reportage on the new Poland. It stated that “during the month of November alone there were pogroms of varying dimension and gravity in 110 different towns and townlets”. This figure has often been repeated in secondary literature on the subject: Israel Cohen, “The Pogroms in Poland – Origin and Extent”, *The Times*, February 8, 1919, p. 7a. Despite this being the only comment that Cohen makes about Lemberg, Norman Davies still finds time to criticise him for his inflammatory remarks about it: Norman Davies, “Ethnic Diversity in Twentieth Century Poland”, *Polin: A Journal of Polish Jewish Studies*, Volume 4 (1990), p. 156.

173 He later stated in the editorial that “We believe our correspondent’s account”: “Excesses of Friends and Foes”, *The Times*, February 8, 1919, p. 9.

174 Ibid., p. 9.


as soon as the Poles felt the masters of their own house, they began attacks on their Jewish neighbours". The implication was clear, namely that Poles were inherently anti-Semitic and could not be trusted to treat Jews fairly. Pogroms did not happen during the partition of Poland only because the Poles “had been kept in check as long as both nations were equally subject to another power”. This was interpreted as a clear challenge to the Poles for their independence. Cohen did not limit himself to reports in the press. He spoke on his return to London to a packed Queen’s Hall in February 1919:

[the Polish legionaries took an active part in the looting of the shops, synagogues and houses … (cries of ‘Shame’) … one of those small nations who had gained its independence through the war after being oppressed for 100 years, had suddenly become an oppressor of a small nation itself.]

The Morning Post on April 11 attacked Cohen as it felt that the “alleged pogroms” did not “bear the test of even a cursory examination,” and further that the “true object of the meeting [at the Queen’s Hall] was to discredit Poland and to help Germany”. Cohen replied stating that “I should … like to refer to my report in The Times of February 8, to which also no Poles have yet ventured to reply. Could any silence be more self condemning?”

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177 Ibid. p. 9.
178 Ibid., p 8.
179 Polish diplomats in London monitored closely Cohen’s actions after his return from Poland, AAN “Ambasada RP w Londynie”, 1420, n.d. [February 1919]. Transcript of Israel Cohen’s speech, held in the PISM (London), A.12.851E/1A. On April 9, after reports of the anti-Jewish incidents in Pińsk and Wilno, further protest meetings were organised, at which Cohen also spoke: “The Pogroms – Protest Meeting at Queen’s Hall – Speech by Lord Parmoor”, Jewish Chronicle, April 11, 1919, pp. 11-12.
180 It was further alleged that the Jews who had been attacked were “profiteers”. As a result of these allegations the “power of Jews the world over” was being “mobilised against Poland”: “Apocryphal Pogroms”, Morning Post, April 11, 1919, p. 4.
Cohen’s influence, not only in Britain, but internationally was quite profound, a fact acknowledged by the Poles themselves. On a train back from Paris to London, while reading Israel Cohen’s article of February 8, Lloyd George commented to Lord Riddell that “the Bolsheviks have done nothing worse than that!” Lloyd George’s opinions on Poland are well known and one cannot help but feel that reading reports such as those submitted by Israel Cohen helped to strengthen these negative views. Cohen, having completed his ‘mission’, met Brailsford, who was travelling to Poland via the International Socialist Conference at Berne, providing him with a letter of introduction in Hebrew to Grünbaum. Brailsford wrote extensively as a “non-Jew” on the Jewish question in Poland for a number of publications, including the Manchester Guardian, Daily Herald, the Nation and the New Republic. He commented on the “intense intolerance of Polish Nationalism”. Furthermore, he stated that

[w]e were officially blind during the existence of the pre-War Entente, to all the misdeeds of Tsarist Russia. If we, or even more obviously the French, require Poland as a “barrier” against Russia and Germany, we cannot afford to take Polish oppression of the Jews all too tragically. What one asks of an ally is bayonets, not virtue.

In Brailsford’s article, “The Polish Jews” published in the Nation, written at the end of March 1919, he commented that “a Pole will always begin any conversation about

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185 Cohen also met Leon Chasanowitsch (author of Pogromes anti-Juifs), and agreed to collaborate with him; Cohen, Travels in Jewry, p. 81.
186 The Times, May 23, 1919, p. 8b. Brailsford collected a number of his articles together and published them as: Across the Blockade: A Record of Travels in Enemy Europe (London, 1919). These were reprinted in the editorial of the Jewish Chronicle, for example: Jewish Chronicle, April 18, 1919, p. 5.
188 Ibid., p. 89.
the Jew by recalling the traditional tolerance of the Polish State. That is, I fear, a myth. Brailsford finished his report stating:

[O]ne might press this case [for a territorial settlement in the Kresy] as strongly from the Lithuanian, the White Russian or the Ukrainian standpoint, for the Polish population here is a negligible minority. All these races will be wronged, but more especially the Jews, if the Polish frontier is drawn beyond the true Polish racial limits. I know a town in the Pale which had lived under Tsarist Russian, German, Ukrainian, Bolshevist, and Polish rule. I asked the local Jews which, from their standpoint, was the best and the worst. They had nothing, as Jews, against Germans or Bolsheviki. Neither persecuted. They all agreed that Polish rule was decidedly worse than that of Tsardom. The Ukrainians, I imagine, would have said the same thing if I could have questioned them, but they were all in prison.

While not all agreed with Cohen and Brailsford, their reports carried weight in the west, not least because the two journalists had actually visited Poland, a fact that gave them special credibility, and proved to be especially harmful to Poland’s image on the international stage. The claim that Poland was, since the Middle Ages, a place of flight and toleration for the Jews from Western Europe was not seen as convincing to the Allies. Poland was now regarded as the land of Dmowski’s National Democrats and of the cruel economic boycott, still in force in parts of the former Congress Kingdom since 1912. This was due in no small part to the largely negative press coverage the new state received.

The Arrival of Paderewski in Paris

On the morning of April 6, Paderewski made his long-delayed arrival in Paris. Misgivings over Dmowski’s leadership of the Polish delegation had to be balanced

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190 Ibid., pp. 89-90.
191 On the month long visit of Paderewski to Paris see Lundgreen-Neilsen, *Polish Problem*, pp. 267-313; a more positive, although less persuasive, account is contained in Zamoyski, *Paderewski*, pp. 186-193.
against delays over the finalisation of Paderewski’s ministry. Charles Mayer, an associate of Paderewski from his time in the United States, wrote to the Polish Premier that “[since I arrived in] Paris I regret to inform you that I am but little satisfied with the workings of many of your representatives. Intrigue, lack of intelligence, self-aggrandisement seemed to play too important a part in what, from my standpoint, is necessary to give Poland that which she needs now”. By the time of his arrival at the Peace Conference Paderewski, who had disagreed with Dmowski over Polish policy, principally with regard to the Jewish question while the two men were in the United States, had moved more in line with the Endek leader. Zaleski, recently arrived in Paris from Berne, described by Lucien Wolf as “the most liberal-minded Pole I know”, had disagreed openly with Paderewski.

Soon after his arrival in Paris Paderewski quickly managed to take over the Polish delegation. The first problem faced by the Polish leader was not over territorial questions, foreign loans or the status of Danzig but the massacre of Jews in Pińsk. The Polish Premier, immediately after having attended a session of the Council of Four, lunched with Lloyd George on April 9 and was forced to defend his position with regard to the Jewish population. Paderewski commented that the Jews were “by turns for the Germans, for the Russians, for the Austrians and very little for Poland itself”. It was clear that the Polish delegation had to address the Jewish question, or it faced the prospect of losing all sympathy that it might have had from the Allies.

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193 Mayer to Paderewski, February 14, 1919: AAN (Warsaw), Paderewski 987.
194 Wolf Diary, April 23, 1919, p. 211. Israel Cohen used similar sentiments in describing Zaleski on his arrival in Britain in 1939, calling him “one of the few liberally minded statesmen of pre-War Poland”: Cohen, *A Jewish Pilgrimage*, p. 363.
195 This became more apparent with the arrival of Zaleski in Paris from Berne to help moderate the Polish position. Disagreements between the two men, and therefore, Piłsudski were obvious. Paderewski complained that Zaleski had “exceeded his brief” and was firmly put in his place by the Polish Prime Minister. Headlam-Morley commented extensively about the disagreements between the two men in his report of their meeting on April 17, 1919: NAS (Edinburgh), Lothian GD40/17/889.
196 Lundgreen-Neilsen, *Polish Problem*, p. 307. Headlam-Morley commented that “Dmowski’s influence has much declined” since the arrival of Paderewski: Wolf Diary, April 14, 1919, p. 188.
197 Piłsudski to Paderewski, April 10, 1919: AAN (Warsaw), KNP 149.
198 At the interview between Paderewski and the Council of Four on April 9 the question of the Jewish minority was not discussed, the conversation concentrating on the Polish-German border and the status of Danzig. The Polish Premier warned the Allied leaders that “we know the Germans too well to rely on any guarantees they may accept. We have seen them be always the same, ever since the tenth century … I might remind you of the story of the grand master of the Teutonic Order, who having signed a treaty with several Pomeranian and Polish princes of the coastal region, invited them to a banquet during which he had them assassinated. That is the kind of treaties we have made with Germany in the past”. Despite Paderewski’s hysterical performance (Clemenceau noted that “you
Paderewski decided on a different tactic from his politically more experienced co-delegate. He invited the most vehement critic of Polish Galician policy, Lewis Namier, to Paris for talks in order to try and win him over to the Polish position. Namier arrived in the French capital during a freak snowstorm on April 28.\textsuperscript{199} Dmowski had successfully singled out his old adversary for exclusion from the British Peace Conference Delegation,\textsuperscript{200} and had attacked him in the émigré Polish press.\textsuperscript{201} The chief Polish delegate later wrote of his anger that “such a żyd galicyjski [little Galician Jew] could play such an important role in the Polish Question”,\textsuperscript{202} The persistence of Namier could be seen in his copious writings on behalf of the Jewish population of the Kresy throughout 1919, in which he railed against ‘Polish Imperialism’. Before meeting Paderewski he was far from complimentary, describing

\textsuperscript{199} On Paderewski’s initiative Zaleski met with Headlam-Morley and requested that Namier should meet the Polish Premier in Paris. Headlam-Morley only acceded when Zaleski mentioned that the suggestion came from Paderewski and not himself, “I gather that Mr. Namier’s name has been so often mentioned in Polish circles, both on other matters, and particularly about the Jewish question, that M. Paderewski feels that an interview with him might be helpful”. Headlam-Morley Memorandum, April 22, 1919 and “I hope Namier will be able to come to Paris before long”: Zaleski to Headlam-Morley, April 23, 1919: TNA (London), FO 608/61/8354. Namier spent sixteen days in Paris (between April 28 and May 13), but at his request, Namier’s second wife, Julia, on completion of her biography of her husband, destroyed his private papers, leaving only her, somewhat inadequate, account of the meetings: Julia Namier, op. cit., p. 142. Namier had to ask for permission from the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to accept Paderewski’s invitation, who stated “as to Paderewski’s request to see Mr. Namier I agree to his coming but his visit should be short, i.e. about a couple of days”: Hardinge to Headlam-Morley, n. d. [probably April 25, see Headlam-Morley, \textit{Memoir}, p. 86], TNA (London), FO 608/68/476. The sensitive nature of Polish affairs and Namier’s role in them ensured that Balfour informed his representative in London, Lord Curzon, that “Mr. Namier should come out as soon as possible for three nights. Please inform me when he will arrive”: Balfour to Curzon, April 30, 1919: Paderewski to Namier, n. d., TNA (London), FO 371/4379/364.

\textsuperscript{200} Esmé Howard was the expert on Polish affairs in the Foreign Office and was chosen as such for the British Peace Conference Delegation, but when he was selected for the Inter-Allied Commission to Poland, it was H. J. Paton from the Admiralty Intelligence Department who was chosen to replace Howard, not Namier. He noted that “the fact that Paton has been summoned and I have been passed over will be exploited by my enemies”: Headlam-Morley, \textit{Memoir}, p. 29; Julia Namier, op. cit., p. 142. The French were also hostile to the appointment of Namier. While Dmowski disliked Namier, it is most unlikely that they were planning his assassination, as he himself apparently thought they were: Isaiah Berlin, “Lewis Namier: A Personal Impression”, in Martin Gilbert (ed.) \textit{A Century of Conflict, 1850-1950: Essays for A. J. P. Taylor} (London, 1966), p. 224.

\textsuperscript{201} Namier was defended by Sir Charles Hardinge, who threatened to withdraw subsidies from Polish groups in Great Britain after articles attacking Namier appeared in the London published \textit{Tygodnik Polski} (the Polish Week): Alan Sharp, “Some Relevant Historians – the Political Intelligence Department in the Foreign Office, 1918-1920”, \textit{Australian Journal of Politics and History}, Volume 23, Part 3 (1989), pp. 359-368.

him as “a fantastic liar, if anything worse than Dmowski”. Namier would, however, later recall of one of the meetings that

the Jewish problem naturally figured largely in it. “The Jews in England speak English,” started off Paderewski, “French in France, German in Germany. Why do they not speak Polish in Poland?” “But do you want them to speak Polish?” I asked in reply. “Of course I do”. “Please consider,” I said. “In Germany the Jews form about one per cent in a highly educated population; and yet this has sufficed for them powerfully to influence German literature, science, the Press, and the theatre. If you want the Polish Jews, who form 10 per cent of the population, to give up Yiddish and learn Polish, you will have to educate them. And then you will have to adopt a different language if you want to think your own thoughts”. After a moment’s reflection Paderewski said: “You may be right. But let them at least speak Hebrew and not Yiddish, which jars on us”. “As a Zionist I certainly should wish the Jews to adopt Hebrew,” I replied. “But you must allow me to say that once you give up your demand that the Jews in Poland adopt Polish, what language they speak is an internal affair of ours.”

It was clear that Namier and Paderewski, despite a certain warmth between the men, could not come to an agreement. The Polish Premier’s initiative failed, much as with the efforts of the Jewish lobbyists’ attempts to compromise with Dmowski. As the meetings were informal, there were no official records of their conversations, save the already cited reference to the events in Wilno. On April 23 Paderewski also met with Lucien Wolf, who commented in his diary that “my interview with Paderewski … was very pleasing. His reception of me was all that could be desired”. Wolf argued that the Jews must support the regime of Paderewski, who by Polish standards was a moderate. Wolf feared for the prospects of the Jewish population in Poland

203 Quoted in Headlam-Morley, Memoir, p. 70, n. 1.
205 See Chapter III; Namier minute, May 22, 1919, TNA (London), FO 371/3903/80643.
206 Wolf Diary, April 23, 1919, pp. 209-212.
207 Wolf commented that “he is certainly a man of moderate views, and is a great contrast to Dmovski, with whom, at the present moment, he is not on good terms. If by persecuting extreme claims on the Jewish Question we should render his tenure of office impossible, the result would only be that we
were Dmowski to take power. While Paderewski may have charmed both Wolf and Namier he made no concessions, stating that he was disposed to make great sacrifices in order to transform the Jews into good Polish citizens, but he could not in the present state of Polish public opinion ask the Diet to make large concessions to the Jews outside Equal Rights, which in any case would be assured to them.

Yet it was over the issue of Pińsk that Paderewski showed that he was still close to Dmowski’s position. Wolf, through August Zaleski, requested that Paderewski draft a “satisfactory letter”, by which he meant a mild rebuke for the Polish army for its conduct in the Polish Kresy. As Paderewski’s reply still implied that those executed were Bolsheviks, Wolf refused to publish it, even going so far, on the suggestion of Stanisław Patek, to demand the exclusion of the offending paragraph. Paderewski refused and Wolf’s gentle diplomacy with the Poles had come to nothing, much as Marshall’s had done with Dmowski.
The Consolidation of the ‘Jewish Lobby’ at Paris

During the month of March Jewish delegates began to arrive in Paris from both the United States and Eastern Europe to join their British and French counterparts. The arrival of the Zionist-dominated delegations from Eastern Europe caused serious disagreement over the issue of Jewish nationalism. The East European delegates may not have had the contacts, and in many cases the diplomatic skills, of their co-religionist Western representatives, but they did possess a democratic mandate of sorts. Both the Sejm and municipal elections within the former Congress Kingdom had achieved majorities of Zionist deputies among the Jewish voters. This was plainly not the case with the unelected and anti-nationalist representative bodies the AIU, JFC and American Jewish Committee. While often protesting that they would defer to the wishes of the East European Delegations decisions, the representatives of Western Jewry were not willing to relinquish their privileged role in the Conference. Jewish representatives from both America and Eastern Europe were far from pleased that the JFC and AIU had already submitted their memoranda to the Peace Conference on February 21. These proposals contained an outline for a system of minority protection, with the AIU scheme even going so far as to propose safeguards through the right of appeal to the League of Nations. Yet both the AIU

Kazimierz Dłuski and Zaleski also met with various Jewish representatives. A number of Endek figures such as Władysław Grabski, Stanisław Kozicki and Bohdun Wasiutyński, but emphatically not Dmowski, also met with Jewish figures.


The demands by the Jewish National Council to the Peace Conference were similar to those presented to Paderewski in the Sejm in February. The Orthodox majority of the Jewish population of Poland was primarily concerned with more mundane issues such as Sunday Rest and Shehitah (ritual slaughter).

17 out of the 27 Jewish members of the Warsaw Municipal Council were affiliated to the Zionist (or Jewish Nationalist) parties; while in the municipal election in Lodz the Orthodox (Aguda) parties polled 6,916 votes against 25,261 for Zionist parties: Namier to Tilley, 14 March, 1919: TNA (London), FO 3903/4875. It should, however, be noted that the Jewish delegates elected from the Tymczasowa Żydowska Rada Narodowa were not universally accepted as representative among all Polish Jews.

Wolf commented in a letter to Marshall that “the question of Nationality, is of vital importance to the whole of Jewry”. Other matters were, however, for the “exclusive competence of the East European Committee … I feel I have no right to oppose them, much as I should doubt the wisdom of their decision”; Wolf to Marshall, May 29, 1919: Wolf Diary, pp. 300-301.

Sokolow had tried to prevent the JFC and AIU reports from being presented to the Peace Conference, arguing that the Western representatives should be made to wait for the arrival of the East European delegations. Wolf had initially acceded to Sokolow’s request, only to be overruled by the President of the BDBJ, Sir Stuart Samuel: Wolf Diary, February 20, 1919, p. 72.

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and JFC memoranda were flatly against any form of either national autonomy or national rights, a central pillar of the Zionist demands.217

Wolf commented that “the Eastern Jewries have been sadly in need of a good representative”.218 They found one in Judge Julian W. Mack, the distinguished American arbitrator, who was almost immediately recognised as the leader of the East European Delegations.219 After much bitter negotiation on March 25, 1919 the American Jewish Congress and the major East European Jewish delegations merged to form the Comité des Delegations Juifs auprès la Conférence de la Paix (Committee of Jewish Delegations at the Conference of Peace, or the Comité), under the leadership of Mack.220 The assimilated British and French Delegations refused to compromise and remained independent of the Comité.221

Further attempts were made on the arrival of Louis Marshall in Paris. At a meeting of both the Eastern and Western Jewish delegations in the hall of the Salle du Consistoire (the offices of the AIU), on the night of April 5, the very same evening of the shootings in Pińsk, the Jewish representatives still could not find an agreed solution. The more moderate western Jews argued that national rights could be compromised upon, to which Sokolow answered, in Yiddish, “Nein! Nein! Nein!” to vociferous cheers from support of the other Zionist delegates.222 Sokolow, Thon and Ussishkin, representing the East European delegations and encouraged by the

217 The British proposal: Report of the Delegation of the Jews of the British Empire, pp. 77-78; French proposal; Alliance Israélite Universelle, op. cit., pp. 11-12. Neither requested consideration of national rights or minority representation. The details of The Joint Foreign Committee’s memorandum were passed to The Times by Wolf, and were published almost in full: “The Jew and Civil Liberty”, The Times, February 27, 1919, p. 14f.
218 Wolf Diary, May 14, 1919, p. 246.
219 Tenenbaum, Tsvishn milhome un sholem, pp. 63-66; Harry Barnard, The Forging of an American Jew: The Life and Times of Judge Julian W. Mack (New York, 1974), pp. 244-254. Mack commented to E. H. Carr that “he thought the Eastern Jews were the best judges of their own requirements but he was not personally very keen” on their programme demanding national autonomy: Wolf Diary, April 25, 1919, p. 216.
220 The Jewish Chronicle optimistically hailed a “new era of justice and freedom” with the formation of the Comité: “The Jewish Delegation in Paris”, Jewish Chronicle, May 2, 1919, p. 9. Louis Marshall, on his arrival in Paris on March 27, was appointed Mack’s deputy, and subsidised the Comité to the tune of $5,000 of his own funds. The Polish Zionist leader Nahum Sokolow took over the Comité when Mack left Paris on May 18: Feinberg, op. cit., pp. 32-44.
221 The JDC and AIU were invited to join the Comité by Judge Mack, but despite Sir Stuart Samuel, describing the organisation as a “good omen for the Jewish cause” no compromise was reached: Mack to Wolf, n. d.; YIVO (New York), Mowshowitch, 83; “An International Jewish Council”, Jewish Chronicle, May 2, 1919, p. 6. For the stormy meeting between Wolf and Mack see Wolf Diary, March 30, 1919, pp. 146-151.
222 Wolf Diary, April 7, 1919, p. 171.
establishment of a Ministry of Jewish Affairs in the Ukraine, demanded similar representation in each of the ‘successor states.’ In order to attempt to reach a working arrangement between the two Jewish groups “in the interests of Jewry”, a Committee of Seven was formed under the leadership of Marshall, comprising Adler, Sokolow, Thon, Ussishkin, Bigart and Wolf. Wolf commented to Headlam-Morley that “the difficulty was that the Polish extremists were as mad as the Jewish extremists, that there was nothing to choose between Dmowski and Ussishkin”. Despite the formation of the Comité, there were still considerable differences of opinion between the nationalist members. Even with the news of the events in Pińsk the various Jewish representatives showed no sign of compromise, let alone cooperation. On April 14 Wolf thought that they were on the point of “rupture”. As a result he and the representatives of the AIU concentrated on meeting personally with members of the Polish delegation in order to reach an agreement with them, as they could find no common ground with the Jewish nationalists. By the end of April Wolf would only learn of the Comité’s proposals from Headlam-Morley and Carr.

On April 17 Lucien Wolf was invited to lunch to discuss the Polish-Jewish question with three prominent members of the KNP, Count Aleksander Skrziński, Prince Casimir Lubomirski and Count Leon Ostrorog. A fairly clear indication of the attitudes of the two groups can be seen from the meeting. Wolf noted in his diary that Skrziński, like Ostrorog, is disposed to deny the existence of anti-Semites in Poland, and to make the grant of special concessions to the Jews dependent on the Jews doing something exceptional for Poland. This is Dmowski’s view in less aggressive form … I asked him to state explicitly what he wanted the Jews to do. He said that the Danzig and Teschin Questions were of great

223 Barnard, op. cit., p. 250.
225 Avraham Menachem Mendel Ussishkin, 1863-1941, a Zionist leader, born in Russia: Wolf Diary, April 14, 1919 p. 188.
226 Even among the East Galician Jewish delegation there were bitter personal disagreements between Michael Ringel and Dr. Leon Reich that undermined the Comité’s cause in Paris: Tenenbaum, Tsvishn mithome un sholem, pp. 74-75.
227 Wolf Diary, April 14, 1919, p. 188. A number of days after Wolf had opened negotiations with Polish representatives, Sokolow, Thon and Levite met with the more moderate Poles, such as Wladislaw Grabski and August Zaleski.
228 Wolf Diary, April 25, 1919, p. 216. Cyrus Adler also refused to align himself with his friend Louis Marshall and to sign the Comité Memorandum on behalf of the American Jewish Committee.
importance for Poland, and that if the Jews of Western Europe would help Poland to get these localities, or would publicly manifest their strong sympathy with Poland in regard to them, it would make a very favourable impression on Polish public opinion.

Wolf replied that while “Danzig and Teschin were questions of international politics, which Jews of different countries differed according to the policies of their representative countries, [the] Jews of England and France could not treat such questions from an exclusively Jewish point of view”. In reply Skrziński “scarcely seemed convinced, and talked about the Jews of all countries being banded together, controlling the press”. Wolf concluded by stating that he “felt certain that if the Polish Jews were treated with kindness and generosity, they would become ardent Polish citizens”. Wolf’s negotiations eventually came to nothing, as he realised that the Polish representatives were merely interested in their own territorial programmes rather than in the Jewish minority in Poland and had little concrete to offer in return for promises of Jewish support for Poland’s claims over the German borderlands and the Kresy. He had failed in his negotiations with the Eastern Jews, and also now with the Polish delegates. He was left with only his few contacts in the British Foreign Office. At the same time as Wolf’s efforts, Marshall was using his substantial contacts with various members of the American delegation to exert his influence. It would be these links that would prove vital in the remaining two months of the Peace Conference.

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229 Ibid., April 17, 1919,
230 Ibid.
231 Wolf was not the only Jewish representative to hold an exchange of views with the KNP in Paris. The Polish-Jewish leadership of Osias Thon and Nahum Sokolow held a number of meetings during March and April, handing Paderewski a list of demands including “national rights” in the reconstructed Polish State: Tadeusz Kozminski, Sprawa Mniejszości (Warsaw, 1922), p. 156.
232 Wolf kept in touch with Sokolow and Marshall, but none of the more extreme Jewish nationalists.
233 Marshall had relations with all the most important members of the American Commission in Paris. Marshall also met with a British representative on Good Friday, April 21. Headlam-Morley noted that “in the old days I believe the right method of spending Good Friday was to massacre the Jews; this custom still prevails in Eastern Europe; The Church of England prays for their conversion; we have advanced, inasmuch as we were trying to devise means to prevent them being converted; so the world progresses!” Headlam-Morley to Koppel, April 21, 1919: Headlam-Morley, Memoir, p. 85.
Galicia

The problems relating to the minority populations of the new state were not the only factors working against the Poles at the Peace Conference. Their expansionist policy in Eastern Galicia was often cited as harming the Polish cause at Paris.\(^{234}\) Polish disappointments over Danzig were not directly blamed on Paderewski, as Dmowski himself commented that “Paderewski arrived during a difficult period in the Peace Conference. The German-Polish frontiers were already settled”.\(^{235}\) The question of Eastern Galicia was, however, still open. The British especially were not willing to accept Polish military \emph{faits accomplis} in the \emph{Kresy}. By taking East Galicia Lloyd George argued that the Poles were going against self-determination.\(^{236}\) The British became increasingly annoyed at the Polish refusal to accept a cease-fire in the region.\(^{237}\) Furthermore, the use of General Haller’s army against Ukrainian forces was not only decisive in settling the issue of the Polish-Ukrainian War, but was in direct contravention of the agreement made with the Allies to facilitate their passage to Poland, which had stated that they would only be used against Bolshevik troops.\(^{238}\) The fact that in their wake a large number of anti-Semitic incidents followed further strained relations between the Poles and the Allied powers, who felt responsibility for bringing them to Poland. Piłsudski, who had been placed under pressure from almost all factions to utilise the Haller army in Galicia, received a note from Clemenceau stating that “the Polish authorities were in effect, if not in purpose, denying and rejecting the authority of the Conference”.\(^{239}\) Esmé Howard warned Paderewski that “I am of the opinion that it will be in the best interest of the Polish Government to order at once that any attack in Eastern Galicia should be at once suspended. The

\(^{234}\) For the Commission on Polish Affairs’ deliberations regarding Eastern Galicia see DBFP, Volume III, pp. 828-909.
\(^{235}\) FRUS PPC, Volume IV, p. 417.
\(^{236}\) Ibid., pp. P. 410.
\(^{237}\) Lundgreen-Neilsen, \emph{Polish Problem}, p. 282.
\(^{238}\) It was communicated that “General Haller’s divisions … will not be sent to Lemberg”: Bliss to Paderewski, April 24, 1919, AAN (Warsaw), Paderewski 953. The latter’s reply makes no acknowledgement that the Poles would comply with these terms. It merely noted that it was the Ukrainians who had broken the previous cease-fire agreement in March: Paderewski to Bliss, ibid.
\(^{239}\) It continued, stating that if the Poles “are not willing to accept the guidance and decisions of the Conference of Peace in such matters [the Allied powers] will not be justified in furnishing Poland any longer with supplies or assistance”. Miller, \emph{My Diary}, Volume XVIII: \emph{Bulletins}, p. 428; also in FRUS PPC, Volume VI, p. 62; AAN (Warsaw), Paderewski 967. Dillon commented that “for the “Big Four” this turn of events was a humiliation”, Dillon, op. cit., p. 251. Copy of the Supreme Council’s demand for a cease-fire: Clemenceau, Wilson, Lloyd George and Orlando to Noulens [Head of the Inter-Allied Commission], March 23, 1919, April 2, 1919: AAN (Warsaw), Paderewski 953.
sacrifice of the good and friendly relations with His Majesty’s Government are not worth the advantages that may possibly result from such action”. The situation was so serious that Paderewski was forced to return to Warsaw on May 11 to persuade the Poles of the need for an armistice. Pilsudski, however, overruled his ministers and Lwów and the Galician oilfields were captured in a brief offensive that had reached all its objectives by May 30. At the same time Foch was placed in command of the Polish army. The anti-Jewish prejudices of the Haller army, combined with the fact that their presence in Poland was due solely to a result of a decision made by the Allies, caused understandable alarm in Paris.

Lloyd George railed at Polish “imperialism” in the East against its smaller neighbours. This did not stop the Council of Four from shifting its responsibility for decisions concerning Eastern Galicia to the Council of Foreign Ministers, which in its turn merely placed the matter in the hands of the pro-Polish Territorial Commission. Galicia was finally ceded to Poland on November 10, 1919, when the British agreed to a Polish twenty-five year mandate over East Galicia, similar to the League of Nations administration of the port of Danzig, which was later quietly dropped under pressure from the Poles, when Galicia was annexed into the Polish-State in the wake of the Polish-Soviet War.

240 Howard to Paderewski and Pilsudski, May 12, 1919, AAN (Warsaw), Paderewski 953.
241 Paderewski addressed the Council of Ministers, warning not only of the damage being done by the reports of anti-Jewish violence, but also of the anger of the Allied leaders over the use of the Haller army in Galicia: AAN (Warsaw), PRM: May 12, 1919.
242 Wilson commented on the difficult position that the Allies had placed themselves: “if Paderewski falls and we cut off food supplies to Poland, won’t Poland herself become Bolshevik? Paderewski’s government is like a dike against disorder, and perhaps the only one possible”: Meeting of the Council of Four, May 21, 1919: Mantoux, Volume II, p. 150. Text of Allied rebuke to Pilsudski contained in FURS PPC, Volume V, pp. 859-860.
243 Lloyd George was angered by Paderewski’s demand for territory, shouting at the Polish Premier that “all we want - and that is why we propose some changes in the [Polish] boundary - is not to place populations in Poland which would not be Polish … Your liberty was paid for with the blood of other people, and truly, if Poland, in these circumstances, should revolt against our decisions, she would be something quite other than we had hoped.” He continued “I myself belong to a small nation. I have the warmest and most profound sympathy for small nations which are fighting for their independence, and I am seized with despair when I see them more imperialistic than the great nations themselves.” The British Prime Minister defined imperialism as “the annexation of populations against their will”: Meeting of the Council of Four, June 5, 1919: Mantoux, Volume II, pp. 311-312.
**Further International Pressure**

Despite the contemporary debate over the validity of Cohen’s press reports, his version of events was apparently confirmed by what happened in Pińsk, Lida, Wilno and Częstochowa. Outside of Paris pressure was mounting for both discovering the truth behind the allegations of pogroms and for some system of international protection of the Jewish minority in Poland. In the House of Commons, Lieutenant Commander Joseph M. Kenworthy, the Liberal Member for Central Hull, used his maiden speech of April 16, 1919 to comment that

> their [the Poles] first act on receiving their freedom was to oppress the Jewish people living in Poland … It seems obvious that Poland is not yet ready for complete self-Government without some form of guidance and assistance from [the] Allied powers.\(^{244}\)

Five further MPs posed questions in the House, all demanding action by the British Government to restrain the new Polish State.\(^{245}\) On May 29 Colonel Josiah C. Wedgwood put the question: “is the Polish Government at present directed by a famous anti-Semite [Paderewski]?\(^{246}\) On June 5 Cecil Harmsworth, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in reply to Lord Henry Cavendish-Bentinck (who quoted directly from the Zionist reports of events in Częstochowa) corrected his account. He commented that “I fear that anti-Jewish disturbances have recently occurred in Poland and in the territories under Polish occupation, and that Polish troops have taken part in them”.\(^{247}\) In the United States, Senator William F. Calder of New York declared to the United States Congress that “it is reported that innocent men, women, and children, particularly of the Jewish faith, are being outraged and massacred in Poland … the American people generally deeply deplore acts of violence and cruelty committed against men, women, and children because of race or


\(^{245}\) James, D. Kiley (National Liberal), Colonel Josiah C. Wedgwood (Labour), Lord Henry Cavendish-Bentinck (Conservative), and Captain William G. A. Ormsby-Gore (Conservative) all raised the issue of “anti-Jewish Pogroms in Poland”: HC, Fifth Series, Volume 115, May 19-June 6, 1919, col. 78, 165-166, 370, 722-724, 1060, 1384-1385, 1467-1468, 1800, 2181-2182

\(^{246}\) Cecil Harmsworth declined to reply: Ibid., col. 1386.

\(^{247}\) Ibid., col. 2181-2182.
religion.” At this stage no official rebuke was, however, forthcoming from either the British or American Governments.

The reaction of the British authorities was to request information from their official representatives and, if necessary, reprimand the Polish Government. In the face of the large number of reports of anti-Jewish violence in Poland, further allied action was required. By the end of April, 1919 guarantees for minority rights were seen as the answer by the Allies. The Jewish Chronicle railed that “although the controversy in regard to the Lemberg pogrom died away, reports come to hand of further disastrous outbursts … While the Peace Conference is spending itself in the doubtless necessary considerations of territorial adjustments, helpless men are being butchered in platoons”.

**Conclusion**

The exclusion of Russia from the Peace Conference had the effect of further strengthening the focus on to the western borderlands of the former tsarist empire. While the Jewish question in Poland may have intermittently flashed into the attention of the public mind, the Peace Conference consistently failed to address the issue in the first months of its sitting, despite the presence of the ‘powerful Jewish lobby’ in Paris. Legitimate questions remained about the actual extent of anti-Jewish violence, and the condition of the Jewish minority in Poland. In the Conference’s early deliberations the issue of the status of minorities focused on the extensive German minorities being created as a result of the decisions taken at the numerous territorial commissions. Yet a combination of factors ensured that the Jewish populations of Eastern Europe were not forgotten: pressure from western Jewish groups; the reports of excesses from both Jewish and non-Jewish sources; Polish military action in the Kresy and the impression made on the Allied representatives by Roman Dmowski. Yet none of these issues had

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248 United States Congress. House of Representatives, *Congressional Record: The Proceedings and Debates of the Congress of the United States* (Washington, 1919), 66th Congress, 1st Session, Volume 58, Part 1, p. 256. Under pressure from Colonel Edward M. House, Frank Polk cabled Hugh Gibson, the first American Minister in Poland, on May 28 and declared that the investigation on the alleged pogroms should take “precedence over other matters in order to furnish the Department complete report without delay”: FRUS, 1919 Vol. II, p. 750.

249 “And Now Pinsk”, *Jewish Chronicle*, May 9, p. 6.
actually placed the Jewish question in Eastern Europe on the agenda of the Supreme Council.

Assimilation, the preferred answer to the Jewish question of many of the Allied representatives who reported back to their respective governments, was impossible in the highly charged climate in the months following the end of the Great War. There had been too many instances of anti-Jewish violence that had worked against such a solution. This was recognised by the unelected leaders of the western liberal Jewish factions of the JFC and AIU, who, although they did not speak for the mass of Jewry who lived in Eastern Europe, professed to be working in their interests. The goal of Jewish emancipation was pursued erratically by these representatives, not helped by the confused and separate question of Palestine that so dominated the Zionist lobby in Paris. The Jewish delegations were paralysed by disagreements between themselves for the vital month between mid-March and mid-April. Yet the continuing divisions among Jewish factions was less damaging to the Jewish cause than the various splits in the Polish delegation. The two Jewish delegations complemented each other as Wolf in particular confined himself to lobbying those whom he saw as the decision makers at the Conference. In fact, the Jewish representatives had achieved nothing in the first months of the Conference. Divided and with little prospect of speaking with one voice, the Jewish lobby, so often lauded as ‘powerful’, was in fact in danger of being ignored at the Peace Conference.

Polish territorial claims in the Eastern Kresy sapped the sympathy of the Allies who were unwilling to allow Poland to force their hand over Poland’s eastern borders. Thus, Article 87 of the Treaty of Versailles with Germany boldly stated that “the boundaries of Poland not laid down in the present Treaty will be subsequently determined by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers”. The failure to gain the full Polish territorial demands at Paris was not the fault of the ‘Jewish lobby’. Polish ‘losses’ in the Czech and German borderlands, most prominently felt over an independent Danzig and the imposition of a plebiscite for Upper Silesia, were more a consequence of Piłsudski’s gains in his Galician and Lithuanian campaigns of April and May. Jewish lobbyists inadvertently made themselves a convenient, if inaccurate,

scapegoat for those who had failed to achieve the maximum Polish territorial programme. The divided Jewish lobby however, did agree on the question of minority rights. It was on this issue that they achieved their lasting, and controversial, legacy at the Paris Peace Conference, that of the Minorities Treaties.
Chapter V

‘Medina betoch medina’? (A State within a State) - The Question of Minority Rights at Paris

“I have the deepest interest … in assisting Poland in every way and, amongst other things, in this troublesome question of the treatment of the Jewish people”.

Looking back on the Peace Conference almost twenty years after its conclusion, Lloyd George wrote that “assurances for the protection of … minorities must be given as one of the essential conditions of a Peace settlement. Apart from the inherent justice of such a provision, we foresaw trouble in the future if any of these minorities were ill-treated.” Yet Lloyd George had earlier commented at the Peace Conference itself that the Jewish claim for national minority rights was both “dangerous” and tantamount to a “kind of state within a state.” With the settlement of the Polish-German border, the question of the significant ethnic and religious minorities of the Kresy that were to be included within the new Polish state came to the fore. The protection of minorities had been submerged as an issue during the First World War and the first months of the Peace Conference, overshadowed as it was by the various claims for national self-determination.

Despite the reduction in the numbers of minorities, from a half of the total population of Eastern Europe in 1914 to a quarter after the 1919 settlement, this was still a very considerable number of peoples who had not been accorded the right of national self-determination, estimated to be as high as some 30 million. With the unsuccessful attempt to re-establish relations with Russia and gain her participation in the Paris Peace Conference, the difficult decisions required on the borders of Eastern Europe

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3 Meeting of the Council of Three (Italy was absent until May 7, having been frustrated over territorial demands, principally over the port of Fiume), May 1, 1919: Mantoux, pp. 439-440. The charge was not a new one, see Jacob Katz, A State Within a State: The History of an anti-Semitic Slogan (Jerusalem, 1969).
needed to be finalised. A considerable sympathy was felt by the Allied leaders, principally Woodrow Wilson, for the Jewish populations of Eastern Europe. Yet even by the end of April 1919, the leaders of the three principal Allied states were moving further apart. The strains were beginning to take their toll. Wilson fell ill at the beginning of April and threatened to leave the Conference. With Clemenceau still recovering from an assassination attempt this left only Lloyd George, who was at the height of his powers as the most dominant figure at the Conference, although he was to some extent a prisoner of his promises made at the ‘coupon’ election the previous December. A solution was sought that would satisfy the Jews’ demands and the interests of the Great Powers. The result was the Minorities Treaties that were to be signed by each of the ‘Successor States.’ But by April it was feared by the Jewish lobbyists that the opportunity for imposing such treaties had passed them by.

The problem of minorities was seen as one of the most important issues faced by the Conference, yet it had been conspicuous by its absence from the agenda of the Supreme Council. Distractions over the drafting of the League of Nations Covenant, a question Wilson thought more important than any other, as well as the related problem of whether minority protection should be within the remit of the League, blurred the issue, which was almost lost sight of altogether. Many explanations have been advanced as to why the Allies decided to impose the Minorities Treaties, yet one

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5 The Allies had made two diplomatic initiatives to tempt the different warring factions in Russia to the Peace Conference, both of which had been fatally undermined by the Allies’ half-hearted military intervention in Russia. Lenin’s establishment of the Comintern under Grigory Zinoviev, of Jewish background, to promote revolution abroad was seen as a hostile move on the part of the Bolshevik leader. See John M. Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism and the Versailles Peace (Princeton, N.J., 1966); Michael Kettle, Russia and the Allies, 1917-1920. Volume III: Churchill and the Archangel Fiasco, November 1918-July 1919 (London, 1992); Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew, The Comintern: A History of International Communism from Lenin to Stalin (Basingstoke, 1996).

6 American policy at the end of the War stated that “rigid protection must be afforded the minorities of Germans and Jews living there [in Posen and Silesia] as well as other parts of the Polish state”: Official American Commentary on the Fourteen Points”, October 1918. Seymour (ed.), The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Volume IV, pp. 150-155, 209.

7 The Great War was believed to have erupted out of the legion of minorities problems of southern and central Europe. J. Holland Rose described the issue as “the most complex which has distracted the world since the break up of the Roman Empire”: See J. Holland Rose, The Origins of the War: Lectures Delivered in the Michaelmas Term, 1914 (Cambridge, 1915), pp. 115-133; Charles R. Buxton, “Nationality”, in idem. (ed.), Towards a Lasting Settlement (London, n.d. [1915]), pp. 37-59.

8 Neither Lloyd George nor Clemenceau shared Wilson’s enthusiasm for the League of Nations. The British Prime Minister left the drafting of the covenant to two of his deputies, Lord Robert Cecil and the South African General Jan Smuts, while Clemenceau appointed the former Prime Minister Léon Bourgeois and Professor Fernand Larnaude, Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Paris, and the legal advisor to the French Delegation: MacMillan, Peacemakers, pp. 92-106.
factor in particular has received scant attention from historians, namely the anti-Jewish violence of the Polish army in April 1919.9

Jewish Demands for Minority Rights

Light can be thrown on the question of minority rights at Paris by a comparative examination of the same issue in the new Kingdom of Romania in the nineteenth century.10 The Jewish populations of the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia were thrust onto the international stage, as they were denied citizenship and increasingly repressive measures were carried out against them.11 Article 44 of the Treaty of Berlin, 1878, forbade discrimination against the “Jewish citizens of Rumania”, a stipulation that was evaded by Romania by merely making the process of Jews

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10 In 1912 the Jewish population of Romania numbered some 240,000 (3.3%); by 1930 (the only year that a full census was held in Romania during the inter-war years) in the enlarged state that emerged from the First World War the Jewish population had grown to some 750,000 (4.2%). For the position of the Jewish minority in Rumania before 1914 see James Headlam-Morley, Studies in Diplomatic History (London, 1930), pp. 143-144; C. A. Macartney, National States and National Minorities (Oxford, 1934); William N. Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After: A Diplomatic History of the Near East Settlement, 1878-1880 (London, 1938), pp. 31, 91, 358; Adler and Margalith, With Firmness in the Right, pp. 99-139; Parkes, op. cit., pp. 91-103; Carol Iancy, Les Juifs en Roumanie (1866-1919): de l'exclusion à l'émancipation (Aix-en-Provence, 1978); Keith Hitchins, Rumania, 1866-1947 (Oxford, 1994), pp. 165-166.

obtaining Romanian citizenship as well. night impossible, provisions described by Louis Marshall as a “Dead Sea apple”. 

A more recent precedent was the incorporation of provisions for the protection of minorities included in the Treaty of Bucharest, signed between the Central Powers and German-occupied Romania, on May 7, 1918, which contained provisions for the protection of “linguistic and religious minorities” and furthermore granted full citizenship to Romania’s Jewish population. It is unlikely that these ‘minority’ clauses were included as a result of a genuine liberal tendency in the German government, but were more likely to be lip-service being paid to Wilsonian principles, as well as a reaction to the Balfour Declaration in an effort to promote support from the Jews for the Central Powers in the last months of the war. Attempts had also been made by German Zionists to have similar provisions included in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Soviet Russia and Germany.

12 After the Congress of Berlin Article 7 of the Romanian Constitution was amended, granting non-Christians the right to become Romanian citizens. 888 Jews were naturalized for having fought in, or supported, the War of Independence. Naturalization was granted on a case-by-case basis (reported to have taken up to ten years to process) and also subject to the approval of the Romanian Parliament. By 1913 as few as 2,000 Jews, including the 888 veterans, had been naturalized. Louis Marshall, “Jewish Rights in Eastern Europe”: Reznikoff (ed.), Louis Marshall, Volume II, p. 530. When the Minorities Treaties were first discussed by the Council of Four, Headlam-Morley commented that “What took place in Rumania must be avoided. The Rumanians evaded their international obligations, which imposed the equality of all the citizens of their state upon them, by declaring that the Jews were not “citizens”.”: Meeting of the Council of Three, May 3, 1919: Mantoux, Volume I, p. 473. See Anonymous [James Headlam-Morley], “The Protection of Minorities”, in H. W. V. Temperley (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris. Volume V: Economic Reconstruction and Protection of Minorities (London, 1921), p. 115. The Treaty of Bucharest, signed in 1913 to end the Second Balkan War, contained no provisions for the protection of the considerable numbers of minorities in southern Europe: Carole Fink, “The Minorities Question at the Paris Peace Conference: The Polish Minorities Treaty, June 28, 1919”, in Boemeke, Feldman and Glaser (eds.), The Treaty of Versailles, p. 251.

13 Chapter VII of the Treaty, entitled “Equality of Religions in Romania”, contained two articles: “Article 27: Equal freedom is granted in Romania to the Roman Catholics, to the United Greek, to the Bulgarian Orthodox, to the Protestant, to the Musulman, and to the Jewish Faiths, and each shall receive the same judicial and official protection as that accorded the Romanian Orthodox faith. Especially they shall have the right to establish parishes or communities of faith as well as schools which are to be regarded as private schools and may not be interfered with, except in the case of a violation of the national security or of public order. In all private and public schools, the pupils may not be compelled to attend religious instruction, unless it is given by an authorised teacher of their faith. Article 28: The difference in religious faith must not exercise in Romania any influence over the status of the inhabitants from the viewpoint of their rights, especially as regards their political and civil rights”: M. Searle Bates, Religious Liberty: An Inquiry (New York, 1945), p. 493; N. M. Gelber, “The Problem of the Rumanian Jews at the Bucharest Peace Conference, 1918”, Jewish Social Studies, Volume 12 (1950), pp. 223-246.


The position of the Jewish minorities of Eastern Europe was unique. In contrast to the other national minorities they had no nation to whom they could appeal. As a result, they required representation at Paris of their trans-national bodies, such as the Board of Deputies in Great Britain and the American Jewish Congress in the United States, which all too readily knew of the defects in the Treaty of Berlin system. But it was Poland rather than Romania that had become the focus of Jewish interest in the post-war settlement, as the locus of immediate post-War anti-Jewish violence lay in Poland and the Ukraine. And while the future of the Russian State was not specifically under the remit of the Peace Conference, Poland most especially was, although there were disagreements over what was the best course by which the rights of the Jewish minority could be guaranteed.

Yet Jewish organisations were not the only groups calling for minority protection. Two liberal, and largely ineffective, international societies, the *Office des Nationalités* (Office of Nationalities) at Lausanne and the *Organisation Central pour une Paix Durable* (Central Organization for a Durable Peace) at The Hague, both attempted to influence the Allied Powers. The Paris Peace Conference was seen as a unique opportunity for Western Jews to promote effectively Jewish emancipation and a form of equal rights for their co-religionists in Eastern Europe. The Treaties became of special importance to Poland, as it was to be the first of the ‘successor states’ to have a Minorities Treaty imposed upon it, as the recognition of Poland was tied up territorially with the German Peace Treaty. Rather than revealing the influence of the ‘Jewish lobby’ alone, the Polish Minorities Treaty was as much about the various national minorities of the new Polish state as about its Jews. The most pressing of these minorities was the German population of the ‘corridor’ whose citizenship would

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19 Lloyd George commented that “the immediate case was Poland, a newly created State which incorporated … large numbers of Jews … it was a delicate and complicated problem and not one to be settled in a hurry … [but] as the Polish Treaty was to be signed at the same time as the German”: Lloyd George, op. cit., Volume II, p. 1364. It was originally intended that the Czechoslovak Minorities Treaty would be signed along with the German Treaty, but it was not yet ready, and was incorporated in the Treaty of Peace with Austria, signed at St. Germain, on September 10, 1919.
be transferred to Poland. A solution to this problem would also have important implications for the establishment of Polish rule in the Eastern Kresy as well, and as such it is hard to escape the argument that the Germans were the primary concern for the Allies.20

As in Poland, Jewish politics in the west were fragmented between Zionist and assimilationist groups. All Jewish representatives had made strenuous efforts to lobby Allied Powers during the course of the First World War.21 In October 1918 Lucien Wolf informed the Foreign Office that

the Russian Revolution is supposed to have solved the Russo-Jewish Question. Unfortunately this is not the case. The old trouble is only transformed and it survives in all its old magnitude and gravity in the shape of the Polish-Jewish Question.22

On November 7 1918 Louis Marshall, on behalf of the AJC, wrote to President Wilson, requesting that the “civil, political and religious rights of these [Polish] Jews must be safeguarded”.23 On November 16 he requested a “public announcement by you, which will unquestionably be heeded by all the world, in which you would give

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22 This was because almost the entirety of the old ‘Pale of Jewish Settlement’ was to be located in territories of Dmowski’s suggested re-born Polish state, with the exception of six provinces in the East and South-East; Chernigov, Poltava, Ekaterinoslav, Taurida, Kherson and Bessarabia, but this would be offset by the acquisition of former Austrian and German territory with Jewish populations, especially in Galicia; Wolf also expressed his concerns that “the Allied Powers, in close and necessary alliance with the New Poland will probably feel as much reluctance to interfere in the internal affairs of that State as they felt in the case of Tsarist Russia”: Lucien Wolf, “The Polish Jewish Question”, BDBJ (London), ACC/3121/C10/2/1/1; copy also contained in TNA (London), FO 371/3280.

23 Marshall to Wilson, November 7, 1918: PWW, Volume 51: September 14-November 8, 1918, p. 625. Wilson himself did not reply, leaving it to his secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, to convey that “will you not assure these gentlemen that this is a matter that I have very much at heart and am not likely to forget or neglect if I have any opportunity to act”: Wilson to Tumulty, November 13, 1918, ibid., Volume 53: November 9, 1918-January 11, 1919, p. 67.
expression to your abhorrence of these outbreaks of religious and racial prejudice.”

Wilson cautiously replied to President of the AJC:

[my] own judgement is that such a public pronouncement as you suggest … would be unwise. I think you can hardly realize all the reaction of my attempting leadership in too many ways. I have no doubt that there will be many opportunities to impress upon the Peace Council the serious aspects of the very great and appealing problem upon which you dwell, and I shall deem it a privilege to exercise such influence as I can.

At the Annual Meeting of the AJC it was reported that “it is manifest that the antagonism of the Poles against the Jews is so deep-seated, that some extraordinary provision with proper guarantees must be arranged to safeguard their political, educational and religious rights.” Worried by the continuing Endek-led economic boycott and the leadership by Roman Dmowski of the Polish nationalist movement, the conservative Jews of America argued that “something more definite than a vague statement is required.”

Alarmed by the weaknesses of the Treaty of Berlin the Jewish leaders in the West, fearful that the Allied leaders might repeat the “false promises” made in 1878, lobbied their respective governments for safeguards and guarantees. This pressure on Wilson eventually bore some fruit. Shortly before sailing for Europe Wilson addressed representatives of the New York B’nai B’rith at the White House on November 28, 1918.

The President stated that “one of the most difficult problems [at the Peace Conference] will be to secure the proper guarantees for the just treatment of the Jewish people in the countries where they have not been

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24 Marshall to Wilson, November 16, 1918, ibid., p. 104.
26 “Twelfth Annual Meeting, November 10, 1918”, in [American Jewish Committee], The American Jewish Year Book 5680, p. 653.
27 Ibid., p. 655.
28 Marshall, “Jewish Rights in Eastern Europe”, p. 527. He later commented that “I can say that I would personally rather die ten thousand deaths than to have been guilty of the crime of being silent in the face of the wrongs which my brethren have suffered in Poland and other east European States”: Marshall to Elkus, August 19, 1919: Reznikoff (ed.), op. cit., Volume II, p. 607.
29 The B’nai B’rith Organisation, founded in 1843, was a Jewish charitable organisation, which set up the Anti-Defamation League in 1913, whose charter stated: “the immediate object of the League is to stop, by appeals to reason and conscience and, if necessary, by appeals to law, the defamation of the Jewish people. Its ultimate purpose is to secure justice and fair treatment to all citizens alike and to put an end forever to unjust and unfair discrimination against ridicule of any sect or body of citizens.”
justly dealt with, and unhappily there are several countries where that may be said.” 30

The question remained: how were minority rights to be enforced in the new Polish State?

At the same time the Joint Foreign Committee and other organisations in Great Britain were addressing this question and had been putting pressure on the British Government for their preferred solution. 31 Their principal areas of concern were that the Jewish observance of the Sabbath was guaranteed, and therefore preventing any provisions providing for enforced ‘Sunday Rest’; protection for the Yiddish language, principally to allow for that language to be used in schools, including those funded by the Polish state. Despite the reservations of their assimilated co-religionists in the West, they professed that they would accede to the demands of the representatives of Eastern European Jewry. 32 These desiderata, which would ensure the hostility of the entire strata of Polish political life, were backed by the representatives of the assimilated Jewish community in Great Britain, as outlined in their long memorandum to Balfour on December 2, 1918. 33 It commented that

there are ominous symptoms that similar tactics [to those used in Romania in the years after 1878] maybe pursued in Poland and Finland, where under a

30 Wilson continued by stating that “the embarrassment in that connection is this. It is one thing to give a people its right to self-determination, but it is another to enter into its internal affairs and get satisfactory guarantees of the use it will make of its independence and its power, because that, in a way, involves a kind of supervision which is hateful to the people concerned and difficult to those who undertake it”: “The Great Tasks that Lie Ahead of Us”: Ray S. Baker and William E. Dodd (eds.), The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson. Volume V: War and Peace, Presidential Messages, Addresses, and Public Papers (1917-1924) by Woodrow Wilson (New York, 1970), Part I, pp. 306-307; also printed in Feinberg, op. cit., p. 42.

31 In addition to the BDBJ, for example, the Glasgow Jewish Representative Council wrote to Balfour asking that “we trust, that at the Peace conference about to take place, due regard will be given to the rights of the Jewish populations in those districts and countries, where the principle of self-determination is to be applied”: Isaacs to Balfour, December 19, 1918: TNA (London), FO 371/3282.

32 The Board of Deputies concluded that “however much we may despise the “jargon” … To deprive them of it would be a great cruelty and, since in that case they would be suffering as Jews, they would certainly seem to be entitled to the support of their Jewish brethren in other lands even though Yiddish has no attraction for them”: “The Polish Jewish Question”, BDBJ (London), ACC/3121/C10/2/1/1. See also Wolf Diary, March 5, 1919, pp. 105-112.

33 The left in Poland was particularly keen to provide protection for workers, provisions that would be guaranteed by providing enforced Sunday Rest, a popular measure in the predominantly Catholic state. See Szymon Rudnicki, “Anti-Jewish Legislation in Interwar Poland”, in Blobaum (ed.), Antisemitism and its Opponents in Modern Poland, pp. 148-170. Joint Foreign Committee [signed by Stuart Samuel, Claude Montefiore, Lord Rothschild and Lord Swaythling] to Balfour, December 2, 1918: Report of the Delegation of the Jews of the British Empire, pp. 72-76. Balfour responded to the memorandum by stating that “it is the earnest desire of His Majesty’s Government to see equal rights extended to Jews in all countries”: Graham to Joint Foreign Committee [Wolf], December 19, 1918: ibid., p. 76.
narrow and intolerant conception of national homogeneity the teachings of German anti-Semitism have lately made great strides, and have even resulted in deplorable outrages. Against this danger it is important to provide … our Committee thinks that an amended version of the Civil and Religious Liberty clauses of the Treaty of Berlin will be necessary in the new Treaty of Peace.\footnote{The Committee proposed the following to be considered by Her Majesty’s Government: “All … citizens of the Polish State … shall enjoy equal political and civil rights without distinction of race, language or religion. The freedom and outward exercise of all forms of worship shall be assured to all persons belonging to the Polish State, as well as to foreigners, and no hindrance shall be offered either to the hierarchical organisation of the different communities”. The assimilationist leanings of the JFJC were confirmed with the demands regarding the “religious and cultural minorities in Poland shall be secured in the autonomous management of their religious, educational, charitable, and other cultural institutions, provided always that the Polish language shall be made an obligatory subject of instruction in their schools. Differences of race or religious creed shall not be alleged against any person as a ground for exclusion or incapacity in matters relating to admission to public employments, functions, and honours, or to public schools, universities, educational endowments, and the exercise of the various professions and industries in any locality whatever. The subjects and citizens of all the Powers, traders or other, shall be treated in Poland, without distinction of creed, on a footing of perfect equality”: ibid., p. 73.}

Further mention was made of the “hateful form of persecution … the organised economic boycott of the Jews which … has been in baleful operation throughout Poland during the last six years.”\footnote{Ibid., p. 74.} In direct contrast to the Zionists, little mention was made of Palestine. It was clear that the principal area of concern for the Joint Committee was the fate of the Jewish populations of Eastern Europe.\footnote{Wolf proposed the same provisions protecting the minorities within the new states as had been proposed to Balfour on December 2, 1918, with the addition of the following clause: “any persons or communities who may suffer from the non-observance of any provision of this Article shall have the right to submit their complaints to the Executive Committee of the League of Nations, and to seek the protection of that body”: Joint Delegation of the Jews of the British Empire [signed by Wolf] to the Peace Conference, February 21, 1919: ibid., pp. 77-78. The AIU submitted a memorandum with similar terms on the same day, but dated February 21: Alliance Israëlite Universelle, La question juive devant la conference de la paix, pp. 11-12. In his acknowledgement of the memoranda, Balfour promised to “give the closest consideration”: Malcolm to Wolf, February 24, 1919, ibid., p. 80.}

Jewish lobbying did play a very important role in the origin of the Minorities Treaties, which would be imposed on the numerous successor states of Central and Eastern Europe. The treaties were seen to be required principally due to the anti-Jewish incidents in Poland that had occurred since she had regained independence, which had convinced Jews in the West of the need to guarantee both their and all national minority rights in international law. The Polish Minorities Treaty was held to be the basis for all the resulting Minority Treaties, yet it was only to be in the Polish Minorities Treaty that special ‘Jewish clauses’ were seen to be necessary to protect
the Jewish population of Poland. All other clauses contained generic provisions for the protection of minorities in general, yet the special circumstances of the Jewish population in Poland forced the Allies to act.

One of the principal drafters of the Polish Minorities Treaty, James Headlam-Morley, referred to the body that drafted the Treaty as “a Committee to consider what guarantees have to be found for the protection of Jews and other minorities in the New States, especially Poland.”

Lewis Namier had advocated a system of Jewish autonomy based on “distinction between nationality in the civic and racial sense”, arguing that “a man may be a Welshman, a Boer or a French Canadian and claim Welsh, Dutch or French schools under autonomous administration and yet he is a good Britisher, though he is certainly not an Englishman. In the same way a Polish Jew may be a decent Polish citizen and yet may wish to be brought up in the Jewish language and the Jewish traditions, and this cannot be described as a claim to “privileges and special rights.” … [Jewish claims are both] moderate and reasonable.”

There were specific clauses included within the Minorities Treaty itself that were drafted with the Jewish minority in mind. The hostility between the two groups precluded them from reaching a ‘western’ solution to the ‘Jewish question’.

Outbreaks of anti-Jewish violence in April 1919, while the treaties were being drawn up, were widely reported in the press. Events in Pińsk, Lida and Wilno were used prominently by the Jewish delegations to highlight the threat to their co-religionists not only in Poland, but Eastern Europe as a whole.

Wolf, in an unofficial meeting with Count Ostorog, Erasmus Pilz and Dr. Stanisław Kojicki, the Secretary-General of the Polish Delegation, commented that “British and French Jews conceived their political life very differently from their Polish co-religionists, but as co-religionists of the Polish Jews who frequently appealed to them for assistance they were naturally deeply concerned in their future … the whole Polish-Jewish problem was different

38 Namier to Tilley, March 14, 1919: TNA (London), FO 3903/38028.
39 Israel Cohen noted that “so long as the Polish Government connives at or tolerates such atrocities [as at Pińsk] the lives of the Jews in Poland will be exposed to constant danger.” Cohen outlined his programme for national minority rights and safeguards to The Times on May 22: Israel Cohen, “The Pogrom at Pinsk”, Jewish Chronicle, May 9, 1919, p. 9; “Polish Jewry. Claim to Racial Representation, the Scheme Explained”, The Times, May 22, 1919, p. 11a.
from that of the Western communities and had to be treated differently.” Pilz and Kojicki, who were initially hostile, were placated by Wolf’s assurances that he would try and convince the East European delegations to modify their hostile attitude. Nahum Sokolow persuaded Wolf to delay any declarations on minority rights until the “democratically elected,” but Zionist-dominated, East European delegations arrived in Paris, to which Wolf acceded. The result of this was that the Western Jewish representatives were effectively inactive for a vital month, while the Conference considered territorial issues and the proposed League of Nations.

A Missed Opportunity – The Covenant of the League of Nations

Woodrow Wilson introduced the concept of the protection for “racial and religious minorities” in his ‘first Paris draft’ of the Covenant of the League of Nations on January 10, 1919. It was seen as necessary due to the complications resulting from national self-determination in Eastern Europe. While Wilson intended that all the signatories of the Covenant were to accept clauses respecting and protecting the religious and racial minorities within their borders, Britain and France objected, fearing the effect of such provisions on their colonial Empires. Alfred E. Zimmern, a member of the Political Intelligence Department of the British Foreign Office, was commissioned to outline what the British position regarding the League should be. He unequivocally stated that the League should not be saddled with the responsibility of the protection of minorities, and to “leave as much discretion as possible in the

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40 Wolf Diary, March 5, 1919, pp. 105-106.
41 Wolf Diary, February, 10, 11, 20, 1919: Wolf to Samuel, January 27, 1919, Mowschowitch, YIVO (New York), 51. The JCD memorandum was not submitted until February 21.
42 Wilson’s draft did not speak specifically of minority rights, merely that “The League of Nations shall require all new States to bind themselves as a condition precedent to their recognition as independent or autonomous States, to accord to all racial or national minorities within their several jurisdictions exactly the same treatment and security, both in law and in fact, that is accorded the racial or national majority of their people”: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, Sprawy polskie na Konferencji Pokojowej w Paryżu w 1919 r: dokumenty i materially (Warsaw, 1968), Volume III, p. 241. See David H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (New York, 1928), Volume II, pp. 65-93.
43 Wilson “explained the motive of this article was the desire to prevent religious persecution or wars in the future”: Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, Volume I, p. 191; Volume II, pp. 273-274, 276.
44 Headlam-Morley pointed out that such a scheme would “have involved the right to protect the Chinese in Liverpool, the Roman Catholics in France, the French in Canada, quite apart from the more serious problems, such as the Irish”: Headlam-Morley, Diary, n. d.: Headlam-Morley, Memoir, p.113; Lord Robert Cecil, the Special Advisor on League of Nations Affairs to the British Delegation, commented that while his preference would be to “extend minority control to all States … I was never allowed by my Government to advocate” such a policy: Viscount Cecil [Lord Robert Cecil], A Great Experiment: An Autobiography by Viscount Cecil (London, 1941), pp. 120-121.
hands of each of the Associated Powers … it would clearly be inadvisable to go even
the smallest distance in the direction of admitting [an] appeal to an Inter-State
Conference over the head of their own Government.45 Of the principal figures in the
drafting of the League Covenant, Wilson, Lord Robert Cecil and General Jan Smuts,
it was the British Lord and the former Boer soldier who took the more active role.46
At the Sixth Meeting of the League of Nations Commission on February 8, Wilson
again urged that minority rights be guaranteed in the Covenant.47 Even before Wilson
returned to the United States in March, all such provisions for minority protection had
been cut from the Covenant, as a result of both Japanese and British pressure.48
Dmowski, the Polish representative on the League of Nations Commission, had also
let known his opposition to any references to racial equality.49

The Jewish delegations organised themselves too late to pressure effectively for
minority protection to be included within the Covenant of the League. At the Tenth,
and last, meeting of the League of Nations Commission, in the absence of Wilson,

45 A. E. Zimmern, “The League of Nations”, December 20, 1918: TNA (London), CAB P.28; also
contained in Alfred E. Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918-1935 (London,
1936), pp. 197-209.
46 The draft of the Covenant was written by the South African General Jan Smuts. Lord Robert Cecil
personally was in favour of the inclusion of provisions for the protection of minorities within the
Covenant, but was not able to have them included in the final draft. Wilson was more concerned with
the broad concept of the League of Nations: David Hunter Miller, “The Making of the League of
Nations”, in House and Seymour (eds.), op. cit., pp. 403-405; Seth P. Tillman, Anglo-American
Wilson, Jan Smuts, and the Versailles Settlement”, American Historical Review, Volume 66 (1971),
p. 968-986; George W. Egerton, “The Lloyd George Government and the Creation of the League of
Anglo-American Preliminary Negotiations for a League of Nations”, Journal of Contemporary History,
47 Wilson proposed Article 19 stated: “the High Contracting Parties agree that they will make no law
prohibiting or interfering with the free exercise of religion, and that they will in no way discriminate,
either in law or in fact, against those who practice any particular creed, religion, or belief whose
practices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals”: Miller, Drafting of the Covenant,
Volume II, p. 237. Cecil wanted to go further, arguing that the League should be able to intervene
against acts of “religious persecution and intolerance”: ibid., Volume II, p. 236.
48 Viefhaus, op. cit., pp. 100-119; Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, Volume II, pp. 323-326;
first time on February 3, comprised representatives from nineteen nations, making it one of the largest
commissions at Paris, and was chaired by Wilson himself. As well as British and Japanese opposition,
the Belgian, Greek, Portuguese, Polish, French and Italian delegates spoke against minority provisions
being included in the Covenant: Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, Volume I, p. 191.
49 On March 25, 1919 Dmowski commented that “it [the racial equality clause] had better be left out”: Bonsal also commented that “the Anglo-Saxon corner grew plutôt glaciale [towards Dmowski]”: Stephen Bonsal, Unfinished Business (New York, 1944), pp. 154, 167.
who was preparing to return to face the United States Senate, it was formally proposed to delete the proposed and revised Article relating to the protection of minorities. This was accepted at the Plenary Session of the Conference on February 14. As a result, no specific mention was made in the Covenant of the protection of minorities. The ‘successor states’ had already been granted membership of the League. Article XIX of the Covenant stated that the granting of civil and religious liberty was made a condition of admission to the League. Jewish lobbyists, fearful of their weak position, worried that the new states might argue that such matters were of a racial nature, and therefore not under the jurisdiction of the League. Wolf commented that “it is very regrettable that we did not act.”

Wilson eventually held an interview with the four representatives of American Jewry in Washington on March 2, 1919, where he expressed regret that the Covenant had

50 With Wilson out of Paris Lord Robert Cecil chaired the meeting. House, representing the United States in his President’s absence, argued in favour of the inclusion of the provision, but was opposed by Professor Larnaud. Heits rejected inclusion “in spite of the great advantage that there would be in proclaiming freedom of conscience and worship, the drafting of these reflections was so difficult that it was better to suppress it.” It was, however, the intervention of the Japanese delegate, Baron Nobuaki Makino, that proved decisive in the deletion of Article 21, as he wished to insert a clause based on “race” rather than religion, a distinction unacceptable to the United States and Australia. Miller commented that the Japanese proposal “served a good purpose at the meeting, for it helped to make impossible any article on religious liberty in any form; any such article in the Covenant would have been most dangerous and perhaps fatal to the League; the subject was never again considered”: Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, Volume I, pp. 183, 267-269, 323-324; FRUS PPC, Volume III, p. 5; “League of Nations in Being – Revised Covenant Adopted – The Japanese Attitude”, The Times, April 29, 1919, p. 13c. See Paul G. Lauren, “Human Rights in History: Diplomacy and Racial Equality at the Paris Peace Conference”, Diplomatic History, Volume 2, Part 3 (1978), pp. 257-278; Frederick R. Dickinson, War and National Reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914-1919 (Cambridge, Mass., 1999), pp. 205-206.

51 The revised minorities article (XXI) stated: “the High Contracting Parties agree that they will not prohibit or interfere with the free exercise of any creed, religion or belief whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals, and that no person within their respective jurisdictions shall be molested in life, liberty, or the pursuit of happiness by reason of his adherence to any such creed or belief”: Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, Volume II, p. 315.

52 The task of drawing up the Covenant of the League was organised at the League of Nations Commission, which agreed its final draft at the 10th Meeting on February 13: see Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, Volume II, pp. 321-326. The minutes of the Plenary Session of February 14 are contained in FRUS PPC Volume III, pp. 209-217; Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, Volume II, pp. 560-567.


54 Wolf Diary, February 29, 1919, p. 85; Wolf later stated that “a mere formula of equal rights will not solve the Polish-Jewish question”, ibid., March 5, 1919, p. 111.

55 Wilson met with Judge Julian W. Mack, Louis Marshall, Rabbi Stephen S. Wise and Bernard G. Richards, the secretary of the American Jewish Congress. The Jewish representatives presented Wilson with two memoranda, one dealing with Jewish demands for minority rights in Eastern Europe and the second regarding Palestine. On Eastern Europe it requested “in addition to providing for equality of civil, political and religious rights, it is also asked that national rights shall be guaranteed. This calls for an explanation. By “national rights” are meant those which may be accorded in the
adopted with his promises made the previous November.\textsuperscript{56} Marshall reminded the
President that “within the past four months there have occurred in Russian Poland and
in parts of Galicia, a series of pogroms which have cost the lives of hundreds of
Jews”.\textsuperscript{57} Despite Wilson’s admission that he had been thus far unsuccessful the
Jewish leaders remained optimistic, confident of the support of their President.\textsuperscript{58}
Opposition had been too strong among both the major powers and the smaller nations
to any restrictions placed upon the citizens of their respective countries by the as yet
inchoate League of Nations. Despite Wilson’s long-time support of the Zionist cause
his grand concept for minority protection under the aegis of the League had come to
nothing.\textsuperscript{59} As before, any minority guarantees would have to be included along with
the territorial agreements, as had been the pattern at the Congresses of Vienna and
Berlin. Yet there was little demand from within the Allied Delegations to have
Minority Protection included within the settlements. Herbert Hoover was in favour of
political equality and religious liberty, but thought minority rights to be a “profound
error”.\textsuperscript{60} A further opponent was the American expert on Polish Affairs, Professor

\textsuperscript{56} Rabbi Stephen S. Wise noted that “I may say that the President and Colonel House, and I dare say,
their associates as well, will fight for everything we want … the real problem is over minority or group
rights; but even here, the President told us things that led us to believe that he will make a most
vigorou$s$ and determined fight for everything we hope for.” Wilson reconfirmed his desire to grant
Jews “equality of status” and warned that “racial minorities must be taken care of everywhere, not only
Poland. There will be hell to pay if they are not”: Wise to Nathan and Lena Straus, March 6, 1919:
pp. 86–87.

\textsuperscript{57} American Jewish Congress, \textit{Memorials Submitted to President Wilson}, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{58} The delegates commented that the President was “as always sympathetic with the incontestable
principle of the rights of the Jewish people everywhere to equality of status”: “President Gives Hope to

\textsuperscript{59} Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, \textit{Sprawy polskie na Konferencji Pokojowej w Paryżu},

\textsuperscript{60} [Kohler], “The Origin of the Minority Provisions of the Peace Treaty of 1919”, p. 784. Hoover, a
close friend of both Marshall and Adler through their work for the JDC (which co-operated closely
with Hoover’s ARC), was extremely hostile to Minority rights in Eastern Europe: Adler to Racie Adler,
However, the pressure brought to bear by the growing number of Jewish groups in Paris ensured that minority rights remained on the agenda in Paris.

Events moved quickly from the beginning of April. David Hunter Miller, the chief legal advisor to the American Commission in Paris, had told Judge Mack that it was unlikely that clauses on religious equality would be included in the Covenant on April 1. By April 5, as a result of having read a memorandum from Professor Archibald C. Coolidge, the head of the Allied Mission in Vienna who argued that “the rights of nationalities include those of minorities as well as majorities”, Miller advised Mack to lobby the Commission on Polish Affairs directly. The former commented in a letter to Colonel House that even the Treaty of Berlin contained “stronger provisions for the protection of minorities [than those included within the League Covenant] … and the massacres and cruelties of the generation following 1878 in Macedonia and

Miller met Lord on May 5. He commented that he “found him very pro-Polish. His general idea seems to be to do nothing in the way of protecting minorities”: Miller, *My Diary*, Volume I, pp. 289. Miller asked Lord for “any observations”, Lord failed to reply: Miller to Lord, May 10, 1919: ibid., Volume IX, p. 305. Sir Esme Howard, the British expert on Poland, wrote that “I have many objection to autonomy for the Jews in Poland, Palestine or anywhere”: Howard Minute, [n. d.]: TNA (London), FO 608/66.


Miller, *My Diary*, Volume I: Diary. Memoranda. Personnel, p. 217. Oscar S. Straus, the first Jewish member of the American Presidential Cabinet, and former Ambassador in Constantinople between 1910 and 1912, requested an amendment to the Covenant of the League of Nations on March 24 regarding minority rights, but was told by Wilson that “I am indeed interested in a religious liberty article in the Covenant, but am trying to reach the matter in other way”: Oscar S. Strauss, *Under Four Administrations, From Cleveland to Taft: Recollections of Oscar S. Straus* (Boston, Mass., 1922), p. 419.

A separate treaty on minority rights was first proposed on March 31 by Coolidge, who commented that “it is urgent that some understanding should be reached and proclaimed by the Conference as to what constitutes at least the minimum of these rights, political, linguistic, religious. No authoritative statement on the subject has been issued.” He also argued that as a result of the territorial changes in Central and Eastern Europe “many millions of people who are about to be handed over to or left under the rule of others with whom they are at present in deep enmity and from whom they can see no reason to expect generous treatment in the future.” Coolidge concluded that “a statement of the broad principles of human rights which should and must prevail in assuring the new national minorities the life, liberty and pursuit of happiness to which they are entitled and which now seems so gravely menaced”: “Rights of National Minorities”: Coolidge to Miller, March 31, 1919: Miller, *My Diary*, Volume VII: Documents, pp. 365-367; Harold J. Coolidge and Robert H. Lord, *Archibald Cary Coolidge: Life and Letters* (Boston, Mass., 1932), pp. 231-232; Robert F. Byrnes, *Awakening American Education to the World: The Role of Archibald Cary Coolidge, 1866-1928* (Notre Dame, Ind., 1982), pp. 165-177. Joseph C. Grew, the Secretary General of the [American] Commission to Negotiate Peace, wrote to Miller so that he “could prepare, for possible insertion in the Treaty of Peace, a clause embodying the ideas emphasized by Professor Coolidge, which might be submitted to the President and the Commissioners in case they approve of Professor Coolidge’s statement”: Grew to Miller, April 4, 1919: Miller, *My Diary*, Volume VII, p. 368.

other parts of the Turkish Empire are a witness to their efficacy.” 

John Eppstein, a British journalist, noted that “promises of national self-determination had been made with more enthusiasm than discretion.”

It was clear both that provisions for the legal protection of the minorities of Eastern Europe would be required and that the League Covenant would not provide an adequate solution.

The overriding reason why such provisions were seen as necessary was the reports of further anti-Jewish violence in Poland. After a lull following on events in Lwów, news reached the west of further excesses in the Kresy. This forced the Supreme Council to act on the matter of minority rights.

Even the usually calm Wolf commented that “we are in the presence of what certainly looks like a deliberate attempt to thin out the Jewish population by massacre.”

While the violence may not have been as extensive as the Jewish and Allied representatives feared, it was undoubtedly the case that the anti-Jewish outrages associated with Piłsudski’s Lithuanian and Haller’s Galician campaigns came at an especially ill-advised time during deliberations at the Peace Conference.

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68 Yet Miller turned down Oscar S. Straus’s proposed amendment to the Covenant for “the complete national equality of the States members” on the grounds that “India, Australia, Canada, etc.” were not states: Miller, *My Diary*, Volume I, p. 279; Wolf Diary, April 18, 1919, p. 201.
69 Carr minute, April 25, 1919: TNA (London), FO 608/61/196.
70 Wolf Diary, March 20, 1919, p. 136.
Figure 5.1: Acts of Violence in Polish-Controlled Territory, with one or more Jewish Fatality, November 1918-December 1919

The Committee on New States - “Interesting and rather attractive work”

While one opportunity to provide provisions for ensuring religious liberty in the Covenant of the League of Nations had been missed, a second soon presented itself. The situation had changed since the Charter of the League had been drafted. In the

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71 Among the primary and secondary sources consulted were: Witold Stankiewicz, Konflikty społeczne na wsi polskiej 1918-1920 (Warsaw, 1963); Cohen, Pogroms in Poland; “Report of the Head of the Mission [Morgenthau] to Poland to the Commission to Negotiate Peace”, October 3, 1919: FRUS, 1919, Volume II; Samuel, Report on the Pogroms in Poland; Golczewski, Polnisch-Jüdische Beziehungen, pp. 181-283; Jolanta Żyndul, Zajścia antyżydowskie w Polsce w latach, 1935-1937 (Warsaw, 1994), p. 9; Alfred Nossig, Polen und Juden. Die polnisch-jüdische Verständigung zur Regelung der Judenfrage in Polen (Wien, 1921), pp. 45-57. In addition archival material from Poland, the United Kingdom and the United States was used.


73 Temperley’s History of the Peace Conference of Paris, written under the direction of James Headlam-Morley at the newly established Institute of International Affairs, became essentially the official British history of the Conference. Headlam-Morley commented that “it might have been expected that from the beginning the Conference would have considered the matter. Unfortunately months elapsed before anything was done. This seems to have been due to the general want of foresight and supervision which characterized the arrangement of business, especially with regard to everything which did not immediately concern the future of Germany. It was nobody’s business to sketch out the problems that would have to be dealt with”; [Headlam-Morley], “The Protection of Minorities”, p. 123; see also Alan Sharp, “Making International History: The Writing of “A History of the Peace Conference of Paris”,” in Andrea Bosco and Cornelia Navari (eds.), Chatham House and British Foreign Policy, 1919-1945: The Royal Institute of International Affairs During the Inter-War Period (London, 1994), pp. 101-119.
wake of reports from Pińsk, Lida and Wilno, which had apparently confirmed Israel Cohen’s account of events in the Kresy, it was decided among the Council of Four that the minorities of Eastern Europe required protection, the most prominent being the Jewish population in Poland. Lloyd George, who had always kept a close eye on British public opinion, could not ignore the mass meetings being held to protest the ‘Polish pogroms’. At the Queen’s Hall on April 9 Lord Parmoor argued that the League of Nations should “exercise its powers in preventing outrages of this character from taking place.” The gathering, having heard a report by Cohen, passed a resolution that “called upon the British Government to insist upon the creation of constitutional safeguards for the free and peaceful development of the Jewish people in the Polish Republic.” The Socialist International, in session at Amsterdam, adopted a resolution, proposed by delegates from the Bund, calling for national rights for the Jews of Eastern Europe. Allied officials had warned both of Polish “imperialist” designs in the East and of the potential for racial violence.

74 Louis Marshall directly linked the outbreak of anti-Jewish violence in April 1919 with the need for minority protection: Marshall to Hudson, January 21, 1921; Reznikoff (ed.), op. cit., Volume II, pp. 554-555. It would seem that Marshall, while he knew that such Treaties were in preparation at least since May 4, faked ignorance in order to attempt to gain an interview with Wilson: Marshall to Wilson, May 19, 1919, PWV, Volume 59: May 10-31, 1919, pp. 445-446; Cyrus Adler to Racie Adler, April 13, 1919: Robinson (ed.), op. cit., p. 366. Wolf conceded that traditional methods of attempting to secure the rights of the Jewish minority in Poland (such as through diplomacy and the use of publicity) had failed: Wolf Diary, April 3, 1919, p. 160. Manly O. Hudson noted that “people engaged in a struggle to be free do not easily conceive of themselves as possible oppressors. Where excesses and pogroms had occurred, they had been, perhaps in all instances, the result of irresponsible zeal rather than of deliberate government policy. It was, therefore, something of a shock to the Polish leaders to be called upon to sign a separate treaty with the Principal Powers concerning what they deemed to be a domestic matter”: Hudson, “The Protection of Minorities and Natives”, p. 213.

75 Text of Lord Parmoor’s speech contained in “The Pogroms – Protest Meeting at Queen’s Hall – Speech by Lord Parmoor”, Jewish Chronicle, April 11, 1919, p. 11.

76 The resolution was passed to the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and to the Secretary of the Peace Conference: Hyamson to Balfour, April 25, 1919: TNA (London), FO 608/66.

77 “Projet de résolution concernant les droits des juifs”; see also “Socialist Criticism Of League Covenant. Demands For Disarmament”, The Times, April 30, 1919, p. 10e.

78 As early as January 9, 1919 Colonel William R. Grove remarked on “daily combats of a very local character between the soldiers searching the Jewish quarter [in Warsaw] for hoarded supplies of food, etc., and the Jewish merchants.” He also commented that “shots [were] being fired by the soldiers” at the Jewish population: Grove to Marlborough Churchill, January 9, 1919: FRUS PPC, Volume II, p. 428. E. H. Carr warned of the Poles using the “menace of bolshevism” as a pretext for the annexation of large territories in the East: Memorandum by E. H. Carr, March 11, 1919: TNA (London), FO 608/206. Lewis Namier had sent many memoranda to the British Peace Delegation about the conduct of the Polish army who were ‘behaving like bandits (and this not towards the Jews alone, tho’ they get it worst) and are spreading anarchy … it will be surprising if the position does not get worse”: Memorandum by L. B. Namier, April 7, 1919 [before reports of Pińsk had reached London, but after reports of anti-Jewish incidents in Kalish and Byala during the month of March]: TNA (London), FO 3903/50097. H. J. Paton noted that there “is a certain amount of evidence that these pogroms are fairly wide spread and in certain cases no attempt has been made by the authorities to prevent them”: Paton Minute, April 25, 1919: TNA (London), FO 608/66.
The leading members of the Jewish delegations were becoming increasingly worried by their lack of headway at the Peace Conference. On April 15, Mack and Marshall, representing the Comité, succeeded in meeting with Colonel House, who had only agreed to meet the Jewish delegation in the wake of the news reports from Pinsk.\(^{79}\)

The major outcome of the encounter was that House placed at the disposal of Mack and Marshall two of the most able members of the American Commission, David H. Miller and Manly O. Hudson.\(^{80}\) House asked for a “definite draft” of some minority rights clauses, which would be inserted into a treaty with Poland and for them to “submit it” as a proposed ‘Polish Clause’ on April 18.\(^{81}\) The following day James Headlam-Morley and E. H. Carr discussed the “present State of the Polish Question” with Lucien Wolf, who at this stage only hoped for “assurance[s] from the Polish Government”.\(^{82}\) Miller, still fully occupied with the final English and French drafts of the League Covenant, had little time to prepare his own minority provisions. He therefore asked the two Jewish representatives to prepare an outline for him, which

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\(^{79}\) Janowsky, op. cit., pp. 334-335. It is unclear when the first reports of Pinsk arrived in Paris. The *New York Times* carried the PAT version of events on April 9, while the Zionist reports were only printed on May 2. Jewish representatives received telegrams from Stockholm on April 12 containing Zuckerman’s account of events. Cyrus Adler was told of the events on April 13 by Oscar Straus and commented on the “bad news from Poland for which we must await conformation but it sounds true”: Adler to Racie Adler, April 13, 1919: Robinson (ed.), op. cit., p. 366. “Poles Execute 33 Red Plotters at Pinsk”, *New York Times*, April 9, 1919, p. 1; “Reports Pogrom at Pinsk”, ibid., May 2, 1919, p. 12; “Outrage at Pinsk – Jews Shot”, *Jewish Chronicle*, April 18, 1919, p. 10.

\(^{80}\) Hudson, who had applied for an appointment at Harvard Law School with the support of Felix Frankfurter and Julian Mack, was a supporter of minority rights. Marshall wrote that Hudson “was a tower of strength. I shall be eternally grateful to him. We worked together constantly”: Marshall to Mack, June 30, 1919: Luzzatti (ed.), op. cit., p. 745; Gelfand, *The Inquiry*, pp. 308-310.

\(^{81}\) Miller “had a tentative engagement to dine with the Judge Mack and Mr. Louis Marshall but of course I did not keep it.” He sent his assistant, Manly O. Hudson, to meet the Jewish leaders on April 18: ibid., p. 259. Miller had himself earlier lunched with Mack, Frankfurter and Howard Gans, to ask the American lawyers’ advice on whom to lobby in regard to minority protection: ibid., p. 225. A detailed account of the negotiations between Miller and various Jewish delegates: Janowsky, op. cit., pp. 335-340.

\(^{82}\) According to Wolf’s Diary, the meeting was at the request of Headlam-Morley, who had written to Philip Kerr on April 15, asking at what “stage at which there should be introduced a guarantee for minority rights in such cases as the transference of population (outside Danzig) to Poland”: NAS (Edinburgh), GD 40/17/59. Wolf reported that the East European Delegation would probably present their Memorial to the Peace Conference, including a claim for a “separate nationality for the Jews” which all present parties agreed to be unacceptable. He outlined his proposals as a “basis of arrangement”, namely: “an assurance from the Polish Government that the Electoral Law would not create jerrymandered [sic.] constituencies to the prejudice of the Jews, and that a liberal scheme of municipal self-government should be enacted for the whole of Poland. If this were done, the claim for a separate Jewish Electoral Curia, which was the chief practical excuse for demanding National Rights, would lose its justification. I also suggested that the League of Nations should be made the special custodian of Civil and Religious Liberty in Eastern Europe.” The last suggestion was “impossible” according to Headlam-Morley: Wolf Diary, April 19, 1919, pp. 202-203. Wolf returned to London between April 27 and May 3, limiting his influence over the British proposals for the proposed new Committee.
they were more than eager to do.\textsuperscript{83} Mack and Marshall’s resulting proposal was a strange mixture between the American Jewish Congress’s ‘Bill of Rights’ of December 1918, the \textit{Comité’s} demand for ‘national rights’ and JFC and AIU’s suggestion for minority protection by the League of Nations.\textsuperscript{84} The proposals and their accompanying Memorandum were delivered to Miller on April 21. They proposed that “each national minority … shall constitute an autonomous organization on a footing of equality with the right of establishing and managing its national, religious, educational, charitable and social institutions … the Jewish population shall be regarded as a national minority.”\textsuperscript{85} The American and Jewish representatives met that night and the following day to attempt to put forward a proposal acceptable to both parties.

Miller, Mack and Marshall jointly redrafted the proposed ‘Polish Minority Clauses’ which were submitted to Colonel House on April 22, stating that “the protection of life and individual liberty to all inhabitants of Poland is assumed by Poland as an obligation which it recognizes to be of an international concern.”\textsuperscript{86} During the course of the following week the clauses were expanded upon and resubmitted to House a week later on April 29. The claims for protection of the Sabbath and the right of appeal to the League of Nations had been deleted, but Article 4 boldly stated that

\begin{quote}
Poland recognizes the several national minorities in its population as constituting distinct public corporations, and as such having equally the right to establish, manage and control their schools and their religious, educational,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{83} Miller, \textit{My Diary}, Volume I, pp. 259, 263; Miller’s first draft is contained in ibid., Volume VIII, p. 455.

\textsuperscript{84} Mack and Miller’s draft contained in Miller, \textit{My Diary}, Volume I, p. 262; the “Jewish Memorandum”: ibid., Volume IX, pp. 186-190. A copy was also forwarded to the British Delegation: Mack to Hurst, n. d.: TNA (London), FO 608/61.

\textsuperscript{85} The proposals also had provisions for protecting “those who observe any other day than Sunday as their Sabbath”, as the only provision specifically designed for the Jewish population: “Proposals for the Protection of Minorities”: Miller, \textit{My Diary}, Volume I, p. 262, Volume XIII, pp. 422-424. These articles bore a distinct similarity to the proposals put forward by the \textit{Comité} on June 10, 1919: see ibid., Volume IX: \textit{Documents}, p. 191; Feinberg, op. cit., pp. 76-94; Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, \textit{Sprawy polskie na Konferencji Pokojowej w Paryżu}, Volume III, p. 247-251.

\textsuperscript{86} The draft was obviously influenced by the American constitution, stating that “the forgoing provisions shall not only be a matter of individual obligation on the part of Poland but shall also be embodied in the fundamental law of Poland as an irrevocable bill of rights, with which no law or regulation shall conflict or interfere and as against which no law or regulation shall have validity or effect, and which shall not be amendable except with the consent of the League of Nations”: Miller, \textit{My Diary}, Volume VIII: \textit{Documents}, p. 456.
charitable or social institutions … Within the meaning of these articles the Jewish population of Poland shall constitute a national minority.  

Miller’s draft was entirely in agreement with Mack and Marshall’s proposal in all but one point, that of national autonomy for the Jewish population. Colonel House suggested that “it would be inadvisable for them to make their claims public”. As a result, the Jewish proposals were kept from the Poles. The draft of April 29 was to be used as the basis of discussion by the Council of Three. While the Jewish leaders may have had a significant hand in the drafting of the American proposals for minority protection, the Jewish leaders themselves felt powerless. Mack commented on his “sleepless night”, thinking that his proposals had not reached Wilson.

The Jewish leaders need not have worried. On May 1, with many of the terms of the German Peace Treaty completed, the issue of the protection of national and religious minorities was discussed by the Supreme Council for the first time. Wilson was clear that the provisions were mainly being put in place for the protection of the Jewish minority in Poland. He introduced the subject thus:

[on]e of the things that troubles the peace of the world is the persecution of the Jews. They have been or are held in very poor esteem in many countries. You know they are especially badly treated in Poland … In the Treaty with

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87 The Sabbath clause had been replaced by a more general article calling for “freedom of religion and the outward exercise thereof”: Miller to House, April 29, 1919: Miller, My Diary, Volume IX, pp. 182-185; FRUS PPC, Volume V, pp. 397-398.
88 Mack and Marshall’s proposed Article 6 read: “Poland agrees that each national minority shall have the right to elect a proportion of the entire number of representatives in all state, departmental, municipal and other public elective bodies based upon the ratio of its numbers in the respective electoral areas to the entire population therein.” Miller suggested that it should read that “Poland agrees to adopt and enforce the principle of proportional minority representation by means of cumulative voting in all state, departmental, municipal or other public elective bodies, conducted on a basis of justice and equality, the several electoral areas being sub-divided into electoral districts which shall consist of compact contiguous territory, and the population of the several electoral districts being equal as nearly as practicable”: Miller, My Diary, Volume IX, pp. 184-185.
89 However, he did suggest that they might wish to co-operate with Dr. Mott and Dr. Watson of the Y.M.C.A.: Miller, My Diary, Volume I, p. 270.
90 Miller’s draft, with both his and the Jewish proposals regarding national autonomy, was sent to the Supreme Council: FRUS PPC, Volume V, pp. 398-399. Mack and Marshall saw House on April 30, and lobbied Sir Herbert Samuel, who met with Lloyd George on May 3.
91 Mack to House and Mack to Miller, May 1, 1919: Miller, My Diary, Volume IX, pp. 236-237.
Germany, we [must] make stipulations regarding Poland. We must demand guarantees for both national and religious minorities.  

Lloyd George readily agreed, stating that “these provisions must be imposed upon the Poles.” There was some confusion over why there was such bad feeling against the Jewish minority. Paderewski’s earlier protestations of ‘traditional’ Polish tolerance rather puzzled the Allied leaders. While minority rights were not within the remit of the territorial Commission on Polish Affairs, its chair, Jules Cambon, had raised the issue of minority rights within Poland, as the French government was worried by the anti-Polish influence of German and American Jews. Cambon wrote to the Supreme Council on March 15 “with a view to avoiding the recurrence of violence of which the population on several occasions had been the victim, to the existing necessity of considering measures such as to guarantee to those portions of the Polish population who are of different race and religion from the majority, the respect of their confessional rights.” It was decided that a Committee should be formed to draft the ‘minorities clauses’ and to consider the economic needs of the new states that would be required to be included in the Treaty of Peace with Germany. The Committee on New States and Protection of Minorities held sixty-four meetings between May 3 and 96
December 9 1919\textsuperscript{97} to consider “the international obligations to be accepted by Poland and other new states, as to protection of racial and religious minorities.”\textsuperscript{98} One of the factors that had held back the establishment of a committee to examine the question of minorities was that should a “general clause giving the League of Nations the right to protect minorities in all countries which were members of the League … it would give the League of Nations the right to interfere in the internal constitution of every country in the world.”\textsuperscript{99} Headlam-Morley argued that only “new or immature state[s] of Eastern Europe or Western Asia” should have “special treaties” imposed upon them, even if this meant that “the denial of the right elsewhere might lead to injustice and oppression, [since] that was better than to allow anything which would mean the negation of the sovereignty of every state in the world”.\textsuperscript{100} It would be Polish autonomy that would be sacrificed as a result of this compromise.

The British and American representatives were appointed on May 1: James Headlam-Morley (Britain) and David Hunter Miller (the United States), with a French representative to be nominated at a later date.\textsuperscript{101} E. H. Carr was made secretary to the Committee by Sir Charles Hardinge.\textsuperscript{102} As the French were not particularly interested, the Minorities Treaties were an essentially Anglo-Saxon contribution to the Peace Conference.\textsuperscript{103} French policy was cautious of international intervention in

\textsuperscript{97} The verbatim minutes of the meetings are contained in Miller, \textit{My Diary}, Volume XIII: \textit{New States (Minorities)}; Albert Geouffre de Lapradelle, \textit{La Paix de Versailles. La Conférence de la Paix et la Société des Nations (La Documentation internationale)} (Paris, 1936); the British record of the Committee on New States are located in TNA (London), FO 608/156 (correspondence) and 604/150 (reports); the minutes have recently been published as part of the Foreign Office Confidential Print series; Bourne and Watt (eds.), op. cit. \textit{British Documents on Foreign Affairs-Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Part II: From the First to the Second World War. Series I: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919} (Edited by Michael Dockrill). Volume 8: \textit{The United States and the Treaty, Minutes of the Committee on the New States and the Future of Danzig} (Frederick, Md., 1988).


\textsuperscript{99} Headlam-Morley, Diary, May 18, 1919: Headlam-Morley, \textit{Memoir}, p. 112.

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., p. 112.

\textsuperscript{101} The French representative on the New States Committee, Philippe Berthelot, the Acting Director of Political and Commercial Affairs at the Quai d’Orsay, was appointed on May 3, and therefore missed the initial discussions between Miller and Headlam-Morley. Albert Kammerer was appointed his assistant. In addition to the French members, Guglielmo di Martino and Colonel Marcus Castoldi of Italy and Baron Adatei of Japan became members of the Committee. Both Miller and House were surprised by Adatei’s appointment, with Miller himself not impressed by his new position: Miller, \textit{My Diary}, Volume I, p. 284.

\textsuperscript{102} Manley O. Hudson was appointed as Miller’s assistant. Allen W. Dulles from the United States joined the Committee at a later stage at the end of May as Hudson’s assistant.

\textsuperscript{103} Paul Kennedy, \textit{The Parliament of Man: The United Nations and the Quest for World Government} (London, 2006), p. 11. Before the Conference met both “the right of nations to self-determination together with … the right of ethical and religious minorities” were some of the “guiding principles” for the French Delegation. As the Conference drew on, and French gains were being eroded, the primacy
Professor E. Denis, an academic and expert on Polish affairs, advised the French government that “nations do not like others to be meddling in their affairs, even with the best of intentions” and continued, “the Allies would do well to avoid troublesome interventions.”

According to Professor Manly O. Hudson, Clemenceau “merely ‘sat,’ [on the question of minority rights] and that was all.”

Aside from French strategic considerations, whereby a strong and independent Poland was desired to counter-balance Germany, the Quai d’Orsay’s hostility to minority rights was merely a reflection of the AIU position on the issue, which argued that Jewish rights would only be guaranteed with full integration and assimilation of the Jewish community into Polish society.

Before the Committee met on May 2, the two principal members, Headlam-Morley and Miller, agreed that separate treaties would be required between each of the ‘Successor States’ and the principal Allied and Associated Powers. Headlam-Morley considered that the initial proposals were “insufficient from a Jewish point of view because what is really essential to the Jews is that there should be secured to

of French security squeezed out fringe interests that did not benefit France herself: André Tardieu, *The Truth About the Treaty* (London, 1921), pp. 88-89. Clemenceau’s only comment during the initial discussions on Minority Rights on May 1 and May 3 was that the Jews in France were good citizens: Meetings of the Council of Three, May 1, 3, 1919: *Mantoux*, Volume I, pp. 439-441, 472-473.

104 Quoted in Feinberg, op. cit., p. 40.

105 Hudson, op. cit., p. 473. After Miller left Paris to return to the United States to work for the League of Nations, Hudson became the American Delegate on the Committee. Clemenceau had earlier expressed an interest, calling for the forthcoming Peace to be based on “the great principles leading to justice, morality and liberty, which would be proclaimed at the very opening, right of self-determination of the peoples, [and] rights of minorities”: Churchill, *Aftermath*, pp. 115-116. Stephen Pichon had also indicated French support to “accord Jews the rights of citizenship in eastern Europe”, as France had been “the first in Europe” to emancipate her Jewish population: Alliance Israëlite Universelle, *La question juive devant la conference de la paix*, pp. 8-9. Clemenceau often complained that he had little to do with many aspects of the Peace, “Que voulez vous que je fasse? Je m’y trouve entre Jésus Christ d’un côté et Napoléon Bonaparte de l’autre”: Lord Hardinge, *Old Diplomacy: The Reminiscences of Lord Hardinge of Penshurst* (London, 1947), p. 242. Paul Cambon commented that Clemenceau was “indifferent” to almost all aspects of the conference not relating to French security and the clauses directly relating to Germany: David Stevenson, *French War Aims Against Germany, 1914-1919* (Oxford, 1982), p. 163.

106 Headlam-Morley’s account is contained in Headlam-Morley, *Memoir*, pp. 91-92; Miller’s in Miller, *My Diary*, Volume I, pp. 284-286; Miller to Wilson, May 2, 1919: ibid., Volume IX, *Documents*, p. 255; The First Report of the Committee on New States; PWW, Volume 58, April 23-May 9, 1919, p. 383. The report of the meeting stated that “the Committee then considered the question of the protection of Minorities. It was again agreed that the question, in particular so far as it affects the Jews in Poland, is so contentious and so difficult that it is impossible to come to precise conclusions about it in the short time available before the text of the Treaty with Germany is closed. It was agreed, therefore, that all the detailed clauses dealing with this matter should be placed in the separate Treaties. It was also agreed, however, that there must be inserted in the Treaty with Germany some general clause referring to the other Treaties, and that this should be made of a binding nature”: “The Committee on New States: Report to the Council of Three”, FRUS PPC, Volume V, pp. 440-442.
them in some precise manner the direct right of appeal to the League of Nations if the
Poles violate their engagements." It was agreed that the danger of Jews being
refused citizenship in Poland was to be solved by replacing the word ‘citizens’ with
the term “inhabitants of Poland” in the Polish Minorities Treaty. It was also agreed
that a separate Treaty was to be signed between Poland and the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers on the same day as the German Treaty, which would contain a
clause regarding Polish obligations to her minorities, a clause that would become
Article 93 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. The Article stated:

Poland accepts and agrees to embody in a Treaty with the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers such provisions as may be deemed necessary by the said
Powers to protect the interests of inhabitants of Poland who differ from the
majority of the population in race, language or religion.

The proposal was adopted at the meeting of the Council of Three on May 3. At that
meeting Wilson commented that “anti-Semitism in Poland is very sharp; on this
subject I remind you of the personal attitude of M. Dmowski.” When asked by the
President if he thought the Poles would sign such a treaty, Miller commented that
“you will make Poland sign what you want, on the condition that you ask her for it
before the signing of the treaty which grants to her border and international status.”
Headlam-Morley commented that the question of the Jews in Poland was of such a
complicated nature that the details of such should be included in a separate treaty, but
that a more general clause should still be included in the final terms of the German

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108 “Clauses for the Treaty of Peace concerning Protection of Minorities in Poland”, May 3, 1919:
Miller, My Diary, Volume XIII, p. 17.
109 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, The Protocol Annexed
thereto, the Agreement respecting the military occupation of the territories of the Rhine and the Treaty
between France and Great Britain respect Assistance to France in the event of unprovoked aggression by
earlier Draft, from May 21, is contained in Miller, My Diary, Volume XIII, p. 78.
110 Meeting of the Council of Three, May 3, 1919: Mantoux, Volume I, pp. 472-473; FRUS PPC,
Volume V, pp. 443-444; Miller, My Diary, Volume IX, p. 263. Miller’s draft proposals are printed in
PWW, Volume 58, pp. 388-390. Headlam-Morley recorded in his diary that “we were very lucky in
getting the new states matter taken, as there was an immense crowd waiting, consisting of financial and
reparations people. However, Hankey got us a quarter of an hour”: Headlam-Morley, Memoir, p. 115.
112 Ibid., Lloyd George added that “we have a hold on the Poles as long as the treaty with Germany is
not signed”: ibid., p. 473.
Peace Treaty, that was due to be presented to the German delegation on May 7.\textsuperscript{113} The result of the rushed deliberations was to ensure that the minority provisions to be signed by the Poles were to be the first such provisions to be included out with a territorial settlement in their own Treaty. This very fact heightened their importance and arguably made them more offensive to the Poles.\textsuperscript{114}

The establishment of the Committee was warmly welcomed by the Jewish delegates, even though it was supposed to be secret.\textsuperscript{115} Wolf commented that “the appointment … is a great coup for us … Instead of more or less banal Clauses in the Peace Treaty, we shall now have a detailed Statute on Minorities.”\textsuperscript{116} The lobbying of the Allied delegations had evidently worked. The Committee agreed that the “Jews are both a religious and a racial minority and special questions therefore arise in their case which do not arise in the case of other minorities.”\textsuperscript{117} Specifically it was the issue of anti-Jewish violence that made the provisions essential. The Committee reported that

\begin{quote}
[i]t is necessary to take into account the existence of the strong anti-Semitic feeling in Poland which is not denied even by the Poles themselves, and there is strong evidence of a deliberate purpose to submit them to a cruel and calculated moral and physical persecution; this throws upon the Allies an obligation to provide safeguards which it is hoped will not be necessary for the other minorities.\textsuperscript{118}
\end{quote}

British Policy was hostile to granting full Zionist demands for minority rights in Eastern Europe. Headlam-Morley exclaimed that if they received all they requested (such as demand for national rights and separate electoral curia in the \textit{Sejm}) then

\begin{footnotes}
\item[113] The specific details were to be contained in the Minorities Treaty, and the more general clause became Article 93 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, \textit{Sprawy polskie na Konferencji Pokojowej w Paryżu}, Volume III, p. 260.
\item[114] The Committee decided at its first full meeting, held on May 5, to impose Minorities Treaties not only on the ‘new states’ of Eastern Europe, but also those, such as Greece and Romania, that were receiving large additions in territory: Miller, \textit{My Diary}, Volume XIII, p. 26.
\item[116] Wolf Diary, May 6, 1919, p. 228.
\item[118] The report further noted that “it was in particular felt that it would not be for instance to the German citizens in Poland safe or just to Poland to give those special rights which seem clearly necessary for the Jews”: Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
“they will all be murdered!” The British journalist Dr E. J. Dillon referred to the “obnoxious clause protecting religious and ethnic minorities.” The focus on ‘religious liberties’ over national rights confirmed, in Namier’s opinion, the anti-Zionist leanings of the Committee. Headlam-Morley later noted that the recognition of national rights of the Jews of Poland would have been completely inconsistent with the territorial sovereignty of the state, which is the basis of our whole political system. The view taken by the British Delegation throughout and supported by the Plenipotentiaries was that if there was to be a Jewish nationality it was only to be by giving the Jews a local habitat and enabling them to found in Palestine a Jewish state. Any Jew who was, however, a national of the Jewish state would ipso facto cease to be a Polish citizen.

Not only was the Treaty to be applied to the successor states, but it was also to be used as a model for the admission of states into the League of Nations. This would have gone against British policy, as the British feared that such provisions would have to be implemented in the Empire as well.

Miller soon lost interest in the specifically Jewish aspects of the minority clauses, as he was more concerned with exporting certain aspects of the United States Constitution to the new states of Central Europe and was irritated by the constant demands made on his time by the Jewish delegates. Miller had changed his

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119 Wolf Diary, April 14, 1919, p. 188; Headlam-Morley thought that Zionist aims were “very dangerous”: Headlam-Morley to Zimmern, May 26, 1919: Headlam-Morley, Memoir, p. 126.
120 Dillon, op. cit., p. 82.
123 Lucien Wolf met Miller for the first time on May 11, followed the day after by Mack and Marshall: Wolf Diary, May 11, 1919, p. 240; Miller, My Diary, Volume I: Diary. Memoranda. Personnel, pp. 299. Miller noted in his Diary on May 2 that Colonel House “did not want to offend the Poles as he thought more of the Poles than he did of the Jews”. Miller readily agreed with his superior: Miller, My Diary, Volume I, p. 286. See also Miller to House, April 29, 1919: Miller, My Diary, Volume IX, p. 201. Mack and Marshall were almost daily badgering Miller for details on the progress of the Committee. The latter had also completely fallen out with Headlam-Morley, commenting that the meeting on May 20 was a “perfect waste of time … Headlam-Morley is daft on the subject of writing preambles which nobody else cares anything at all about”: ibid., Volume I, p. 323. Miller left Paris almost as soon as the draft of the Polish Minorities Treaty was completed on May 26. He was
position almost entirely. On April 29 the American delegate had supported Jewish claims for ‘national autonomy’, but by mid-May he even objected to provisions protecting the Jewish Sabbath.\textsuperscript{124} Despite House’s express order not to supply information to the Jewish representatives,\textsuperscript{125} he handed a draft copy of the Polish Minorities Treaty on May 15 to Marshall and Adler before it had been approved by the Council of Four.\textsuperscript{126} When Wolf asked Headlam-Morley for a copy, “he was startled at what he denounced as a serious incorrection on Miller’s part.”\textsuperscript{127} Headlam-Morley was angered by Miller’s action, commenting to Wolf that “if the fact got out, the whole success of the negotiations would be jeopardised. The Council of Four and the Polish and Roumanian Governments would all be very angry, as they themselves had not seen the Treaty.”\textsuperscript{128} Yet Headlam-Morley himself forwarded a “very confidential” copy of the report to the outspoken Lewis Namier on May 17.\textsuperscript{129} This was merely an indication that the delegates sympathised far more with the Jewish lobbyists than their Polish counterparts, although even with this advantage Wolf commented that the draft Treaty was “not at all what we wanted.”\textsuperscript{130} Mack and Marshall went as far as to write to Wilson, commenting that “we have had an opportunity to examine a draft of the treaty … we find in most respects admirable.”\textsuperscript{131} At the same stage the Polish delegation had no knowledge of the Committee on New States. On May 15 Michael Sokolnicki, the Secretary of the Polish Delegation in Paris, and significantly a supporter of Piłsudski, met Headlam-Morley, stating that “he had heard that there was a Committee appointed to deal with certain Polish questions … [Headlam-Morley] said that it was a matter that it was quite impossible for me to

\textsuperscript{124} Miller, \textit{My Diary}, Volume I, p. 288.

\textsuperscript{125} At the first formal meeting it was decided that “in order to save time the Committee should, in the first instance, attempt to reach its own conclusions, and if necessary discuss these subsequently with the parties interested”: Miller, \textit{My Diary}, Volume XIII, p. 27.

\textsuperscript{126} Wolf commented that “I was surprised to find him [Marshall] in possession of the document, as I understand it from Headlam-Morley that at this stage it is only to be shown to us, and then under the seal of the strictest confidence”: Wolf Diary, May 15, 1919, p. 251.

\textsuperscript{127} Wolf continued that “he had no business to let a copy of the Treaty out of his hand” and that he was “very upset about Miller’s action.” But when Wolf asked for a copy “he (Headlam-Morley) was quite ready to show me a copy, but it would be so unofficial and confidential that he could not authorise me to show it to any delegation”: Wolf Diary, May 16, 1919, p. 255; cf. Headlam-Morley, \textit{Memoir}, p. 111.

\textsuperscript{128} Wolf Diary, May 16, 1919, p. 256.


\textsuperscript{130} Wolf Diary, May 15, 1919, p. 253.

say anything at this moment. I refused to answer any question or even to receive any
semi-official suggestions on his part.”132 Quite clearly in the negotiations the Poles
were not playing on a level playing field, in contrast to the situation that had been the
case with the Polish Territorial Commission.133 Dmowski was aware that it would not
be advisable for himself or any of the other more nationalist members of the KNP to
approach either Miller or Headlam-Morley to try to ascertain whether the rumoured
‘Minorities Committee’ existed, leaving such tasks to what even he recognised as the
more reasonable face of the new Poland.134

Two assimilated Jewish delegates arrived from Warsaw in May, representing the
ZPWMWZP in Poland, namely Edward Natanson and Kazimierz Sterling, in order to
promote the idea that the Jews in Poland accepted the Polish offer of equal rights and
to balance the overwhelmingly Zionist-dominated Polish representation on the
Comité.135 Their programme stated that “we demand in the name of happiness and
successful development of our mother-country – Poland, that the Congress of Nations
should not enforce on Poland the duty of acknowledging national and political
autonomy to Jews, and that it should give back Palestine to those Jews who desire a
country of their own.”136 Herman Lieberman, a Jewish member of the PPS and
present in Paris at Piłsudski’s request, wrote to Paderewski on May 30, warning him
of the “Jewish designs” on Poland and spoke out against the prospect of minority
clauses being imposed on Poland.137 The Poles mobilised themselves for a struggle
against the Allies over minority rights, but they had to wait until the Allies were ready
to show their hand.138

132 “Memorandum of interview with Monsieur Sokolnicki”, May 15, 1919: Headlam-Morley, Memoir,
133 The Territorial Commission on Polish Affairs had allowed Poles but not representatives of
minorities to brief the Commission. The report of the Committee on New States of May 13 stated that
“the Committee have thought it best, especially in view of the short time at their disposal, not to give a
formal hearing to either Jews or Poles, through individually and informally, they have taken the
opportunity of ascertaining the views of person interested on either side”, but did concede that they
were “in particular, unwilling to communicate to the Poles”: TNA (London), FO 604/150.
134 Dmowski to Stanisław Grabski, May 27, 1919: Kułakowski, Roman Dmowski w świetle listów i
135 Lundgreen-Neilsen, Polish Problem at the Paris Peace Conference, p. 345.
136 Kurier Warszawski, June 20, 1919, p. 8.
137 Lieberman to Paderewski, May 30, 1919, AAN (Warsaw), Paderewski 608.
138 Indeed, it was not until June 26 that both Lieberman and Natanson managed to gain an interview
with Headlam-Morley, only two days before the Treaty was signed, and after it had been finalised:
Headlam-Morley that “the Deputation had been got up by the Polish Government from among the so-
called Assimilants. No importance was to be attached to if for that reason.” Headlam-Morley told
Headlam-Morley soon became the dominant member of the Committee on New States. He was the former Assistant Director of the Political Intelligence Department, and was a close friend of his recent colleague Lewis Namier and also of Lucien Wolf. Namier, who was present in Paris at the request of Paderewski, left on May 13, the day the draft of the Polish Treaty was finished. Headlam-Morley had considerable sympathy with the Jewish minority of Poland, stating that their demands were “first of all that they should not be murdered promiscuously and that they should have the full protection of the law; to this they are absolutely entitled”. Despite these friendships, or because of it in the case of Wolf, Headlam-Morley was not willing to accede to the Zionist demands for national autonomy. He had already criticised “what Mr. Miller … has done is simply to take in their crude form certain Jewish suggestions … and we have been trying to persuade the Jews to withdraw.”

The influence of Wolf over the Committee was in direct contrast to the powerlessness of the far larger delegation of the Comité. The Comité offices, located at Rue Saint Lazare, churned out copious press reports and information pamphlets, but they lacked direction, and failed to influence those in a position to shape the Treaties.

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140 It is difficult to ascertain what influence Namier had on the Polish Treaty, save for what he did not manage to get included in the Treaty, namely cultural autonomy. Headlam-Morley did, however, comment that “it is very fortunate that Namier is here and I have kept him two or three days longer as he could give me lots of information about the matter, and I think he is doing really useful work here buzzing about between Poles and Jews”: Headlam-Morley to Koppel, May 8, 1919: Headlam-Morley, *Memoir*, p 99. On the completion of the Treaty Headlam-Morley wrote to Namier, commenting that “I gather that you are inclined to think that it is unsatisfactory in that it will do enough to annoy the Poles and not do enough to protect the Jews”: Headlam-Morley to Namier, June 30, 1919: ibid., p 175.

141 There were further demands regarding education and language: Headlam-Morley to Namier, March 24, 1919: Headlam-Morley, *Memoir*, p 55.

142 “I do not think that I quite agree with you about the Jews in Poland. It seems to me a mistake, certainly in tactics, to talk about national autonomy”: Headlam-Morley to Namier, March 24, 1919: Headlam-Morley, *Memoir*, p 55.


144 This was particularly the case with regard to Sunday Rest, as the Comité argued that for Jews “their festive day is Saturday. If they were forbidden from exercising their respective trades on Sundays, they
Significant disagreements between those charged with the task of drafting the Comité’s own memorandum145 ensured that it was not until June 9 that the Comité des Delegations Juifs finally submitted their demands to the Peace Conference, insisting on “national minority rights” for the Jewish populations of Eastern Europe. The more radical proposals, such as Jewish membership of the League of Nations, and a share of war indemnities for material damage from pogroms, had been discreetly dropped.146 Although the memorandum was dated May 10, this was more for window-dressing to give the impression that the Comité had had an influence over the first draft of the Polish Minorities Treaty.147 On May 22 Israel Cohen outlined the Zionist “Claim to Racial Representation” in The Times, which came in for much criticism,148 not least from Lucien Wolf in Paris.149 The American and East European

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145 The committee was headed by Leo Motzkin. As a result of threats from Louis Marshall, he withdrew proposals that Jews be recognised as a legitimate nationality in the League of Nations. Motzkin, however, refused to compromise on demands for national status for the Jews in the new states: Janowsky, op. cit., pp. 311-314. Cyrus Adler refused to sign the Memorandum, but was distressed to see that the American Jewish Committee was a signatory of the document. Adler wrote to Motzkin that “I emphatically declare that the [American Jewish] Committee has never given any authorization on behalf of its constituency in America … But I most emphatically repudiate the use of this phrase as applying generally to the Jewish people … May I conclude this letter with a word of advice, which may be doubly unwelcome because it is unasked? An honest effort was made to secure national minority rights for the Jews of Eastern Europe, but it has failed at the hands of their best friends—the representatives at the Peace Conference of the Great Western Powers”: Adler to Motzkin, June 23, 1919: Robinson (ed.), op. cit., pp. 375-376.

146 Leo Motzkin had argued that no pogrom had occurred without official connivance, and therefore Jews should receive compensation: Motzkin, “Les Revendications nationales des Juifs”, pp. 24-25. The Comité Memorandum was signed by an impressive number of Jewish organisations: “Memorandum of the Committee of Jewish Delegations at the Peace Conference”, Paris, May 10, 1919: Robinson, Karbach, Laserson, Robinson and Vichniak (eds.), op. cit., pp. 319-325. The only major Jewish organisations that refused to sign the Memorandum were the British JFC and the French AIU, who had earlier submitted their own memoranda to the Peace Conference in February.

147 While the most prominent signature on the Memorandum was that of Marshall, it was apparently issued without his knowledge. He insisted that the demand for ‘National Rights’ was “repealed”, as a condition of his succeeding Mack as the Comité’s President: Wolf Diary, June 30, 1919, pp. 421-422.

148 Cohen noted that “the Demand of the Jews in Poland is not for an imperium in imperio, as it is so often designated for the purpose of condemning it. It is not a demand for separation from the body-politic of the Polish State, or for the enjoyment of full self-Government”: Israel Cohen, “Polish Jewry – Claim to Racial Representation – The Scheme Explained”, The Times, May 22, 1919, p. 11a. Strangely the editorial that day in The Times commented that “the Jews have been abominably treated of late by the Poles … yet, Mr. Cohen is not wise in speaking as he does of a Jewish Nationality within Poland and basing a demand for limited autonomy on that ground. The Jews, when their State is founded in Palestine, will presently be a nation. The fact that they will be a distinct nationality should make them very careful of pressing national (as distinct from racial) claims in other countries”: “The Jews in Poland”, ibid., p. 13b. Michael Henry Dziewicki, an academic at the Jagellonian University in Cracow, wrote to The Times, commenting that “the present attitude of hatred is then, I am convinced, merely on
dominated Comité des Délégations Juives supported the claim for national rights, a claim which had no sympathy among the Council of Four. The conclusions of the Jewish National Council of December 1918 formed the basis of the Polish-Jewish delegates’ demands to be made. Wolf argued that even without full national autonomy the Polish Zionists “will have no real reason to complain, inasmuch as they will have the oysters while the Poles will only have the shells.”

Drafting Disagreements – The League Guarantee

The question as to how appeals relating to breaches of the Minorities Treaty were to be dealt with and who should have the right to appeal was one of the most thorny that the Committee had to deal with. Lloyd George strongly argued that “the Jews are very litigious, and, as we know all too well, unfortunately, the treaty will not make anti-Semitism disappear from Poland overnight. If the Jews of Poland could address the League of Nations directly, there would be ceaseless incidents.” Wolf decided to act. He met with Lord Robert Cecil on May 26, who commented that “without a clearly defined and effective Right of Appeal to the League, the Polish and other Treaties will be quite useless - mere sword thrusts in the water, like the similar provisions in the Treaty of Berlin.” Wolf and Cecil suggested additional clauses to account of the past political action of the Jew”: “The Jews in Poland – Reasons for their Present Unpopularity”, ibid., June 24, 1919, p. 8e.

149 Wolf commented that Cohen’s article “is clearly a last bid of the Eastern European Delegations to get their Nationalist formula inserted in the Treaties”: Wolf Diary, May 23, 1919, p. 273.
150 The Memorandum called for the “protection of the several national, religious, racial and linguistic minorities of … Poland … and earnestly pray for their incorporation in several treaties that shall be the outcome of your deliberations”: Feinberg, op. cit., p. 148.
151 The conference resolved to “decide on how to build Jewish life in Poland” and to gain international recognition for the “Jewish nation alongside other nations”: Halpern, “Polityka żydowska”, p. 32-34.
152 Wolf Diary, March 15, 1919, p. 121.
153 The proposed clause read as follows: “the provisions contained in the foregoing articles regarding the protection of racial, religious or linguistic minorities concluded between the High Contracting Parties shall be under the protection of the League of Nations, and consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification thereof”: PWW, Volume 59, p. 179. Mack and Miller had on April 20 tried to gain guarantees that any affected group could submit complaints directly to the League: Miller, My Diary, Volume IX, p. 424.
155 Wolf noted that “he is determined to do his best to make the Treaties a real living Charter of Liberties for the Jews”: Wolf Diary, May 28, 1919, p. 286. Lord Robert Cecil, whose father, Lord Salisbury, had been in part responsible for the drafting of the Treaty of Berlin, wished to go further and allow “an appeal to the League of Nations by any committee of Jews or by individual Jew or any individual member of any minority”: “The Protection of Minorities and Natives in Transferred Territories. February 4, 1921: Questions Answered by Manly O. Hudson, Legal Adviser to American Peace Commission”, in House and Seymour (eds.), op. cit., p. 473; Cecil commented that he “was
the Draft Treaty, the most important including a provision for “any citizen of Poland who considers that his legal rights, guaranteed by the present Convention, have been infringed, and who cannot obtain satisfactory redress from the Polish Courts of Law, shall have the right of appeal from the Supreme Court of Justice in Poland, to the Permanent Court of International Justice.”

Cecil attended the Fourteenth Meeting of the New States Committee on May 29, representing the League of Nations, to present his and Wolf’s proposals. But Wolf and Cecil found very little support at all. Headlam-Morley “insisted that there should be no appeal except by a state.” Marshall in particular reacted hysterically to Wolf’s proposal. His chief objection was that appeals should be made through the Polish Law Courts. He declared that “the scheme was unworkable … it would only make for delays … and declared that he would regard himself as a traitor if he agreed to it.”

Wolf responded, commenting that “it is only fair that the Polish State should itself have a chance of rectifying any injustice that had been committed before any appeal is made over the head to the League of Nations … surely we cannot deny to Poland, at any rate in the

determined to do his best to give effect to his Father’s intentions and wishes”: Wolf Diary, June 19, 1919, p. 384.

“Suggested Additions to the Draft Polish Treaty (Rights of Minorities)”, contained in Wolf Diary, pp. 293-294. Two further articles provided for: the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice should be put into effect by the Polish Government; and that the Council of the League would be empowered to act if it was brought to its attention that the Polish Government was breaking any of the Treaty provisions.

While Cecil’s proposals were “favourably received in principle”, there was “doubt as to whether the rights of appeal could be conferred unconditionally on all individuals”: Miller, My Diary, Volume XIII, pp. 96-98. Cecil’s proposal: ibid., p. 103; Berthelot to Cecil, June 1, 1919, ibid., pp. 103-105. Cecil attended a meeting unofficially on June 5. Manly O. Hudson, the American representative, as Miller had left Paris on May 27, commented to Wilson that “while I was unwilling to go so far as Lord Robert Cecil’s proposal, I think that we should not close the door against the possibility of proceedings in the Permanent Court by Minorities. The experience of the Supreme Court of the United States has proved the wisdom of leaving to the Court itself the framing of safeguards against any exercise of its jurisdiction which might provoke political uneasiness”: Hudson to Wilson, June 6, 1919: ibid., p. 142.

Cecil secured support in principle from the members of the Committee, but opposition by Headlam-Morley, Berthelot and Adatci, the Japanese representative, ensured that Cecil’s proposal was turned down: Report of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Committee, June 5, 1919: Miller, My Diary, Volume XIII, pp. 136-141. Cecil was, indeed, so out of touch that he asked Wolf “whether I could do anything to get the President to toe the line with him”: Wolf Diary, May 28, 1919, pp. 286-287. See Macartney, op. cit., pp. 229-231.

“He quite astonished me by his violence … he was evidently piqued by something – I suppose by the fact that he had not been consulted”: Wolf Diary, May 28, 1919, p. 289.

Wolf Diary, May 28, 1919, p. 289. Marshall’s counter proposal proposed that minorities “shall be under the protection of the League of Nations and the enforcement and effectuation thereof shall be under its jurisdiction or that of the Permanent Court of International Justice and may be invoked by any of the Signatories of this Convention, or, upon such conditions as the League of Nations may prescribe, but the authorised representatives of any racial, linguistic, or religious minority whose rights hereby secured shall in any way be infringed”: ibid., p. 295.
first instance, what all other independent States now enjoy.”¹⁶¹ Wolf was confused by Marshall’s rapid change of tune on the subject, which had only been apparent since he had been granted an audience with President Wilson on May 26, a considerable achievement for the Jewish representatives.¹⁶² The President had reconfirmed that he would not accede to Jewish demands for national rights, arguing that the Jews of Western Europe would “keep a close watch on the affairs of their brethren in Eastern Europe” and would inform their respective governments of infractions of the Minorities Treaty. The meeting achieved little of substance, but did show that both Wilson and the “gentlemen with whom he was associated” were engaged in attempts to stop the fighting in Eastern Europe and therefore “the excuses [used by the Poles] for the excesses could be removed.”¹⁶³ The President also commented that the “general demand for rights … would prevent such pogroms in the future.”¹⁶⁴ It was the clearest indication yet that the Big Three hoped to solve the problem of the ‘Polish pogroms’ through the Minorities Treaty.

The ineffectiveness of the ‘Jewish lobby’ was shown by the debate over the League of Nations Clauses. Wolf argued that the Minorities Treaty and therefore, the League itself, to be “of any practical use”, would require clauses that allowed for direct appeals to the League of Nations and furthermore, “the proposal to deprive the Minorities of a direct right of appeal was inexplicable.”¹⁶⁵ Headlam-Morley told Cecil that both Berthelot and di Martino were against the League of Nations Clauses. Cecil “wanted to know whether I [Wolf] could get any pressure to bear on Berthelot

¹⁶¹ Wolf to Marshall, May 29, 1919: Wolf Diary, p. 297. Miller condemned Wolf’s proposal as “utterly destructive of all that we have so laboriously wrought.” Marshall commented that “I have taken up this subject with the East European delegations who are now here, and they shudder at the very thought that they are first to resort to their local courts for redress … I am personally prepared to take the responsibility for declining a Greek gift of so fatal a character”: Marshall to Wolf, May 29, 1919: Wolf Diary, p. 309, 316-317.
¹⁶² Wilson accepted Marshall’s request for an invitation as a result of report of the mass protest meetings held in New York on May 21 about the ‘Polish pogroms’. Cyrus Adler noted that the President “could not bear hearing further details of these sufferings [at Płock and Wilno]”: Cyrus Adler, I Have Considered the Days (Philadelphia, N.J., 1941), pp. 312-316. Members of the Polish Delegation noted with interest that the meeting in New York coincided with the presentation of the Draft Peace Terms with Germany, commenting that this was more relevant than the stories of pogroms: Dłuski to Pilsudski, May 24, 1919: AAN (Warsaw), Paderewski, 549. Sobański, the Polish Minister in London, gave detailed reports of Jewish protest meetings in London: Sobanski to KNP [Paris], May 26 and 30, 1919: AAN (Warsaw), Komitet Narodowy [KN] 35.
¹⁶⁴ Adler, op. cit., p. 314.
¹⁶⁵ Wolf Diary, May 28, 1919, p. 290.
through the influence of eminent French Jews with Clemenceau."  

Wolf, who attempted to influence the French delegation through Sylvain Lévi of the AIU, achieved no success. It was decided that states and not the minorities themselves could appeal to the League. Article 12 of the Polish Minorities Treaty openly stated that “Poland agrees that the stipulations in the foregoing Articles, so far as they affect persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, constitute obligations of international concern, and shall be under the protection of the League of Nations.” Wolf commented that

> [t]o leave the initiative to the Powers is to revert to the old exploded system of the Treaty of Berlin. The Powers are moved, or are prevented from moving, by political motives only. They would intervene when it suited them, or they would not intervene if it were not in their interest to do so.

As it turned out Wolf was to be proved correct. Wilson argued that the Polish Jews could alert their “friends in other [Allied] countries” to draw attention to the League. The President commented that “in any case, however, the League of Nations could not change the mind of the people. Dislike of the Jews in Poland would continue in spite of everything.”

Headlam-Morley outlined the British position when he stated

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166 Cecil “suggested Klotz, the Finance Minister, and Clemenceau’s Private Secretary who is also a Jew”: Wolf Diary, May 28, 1919, p. 291. It is unlikely that Klotz would have held much influence over the French Premier, who described his Minister of Finance as the “only Jew in Paris who does not understand finance”: Viscount Cecil, *All the Way* (London, 1949), p. 155.


168 Text of the Polish Minorities Treaty in the Appendix. Headlam-Morley, who had initially been in favour of provisions allowing individuals the right of appeal to the League, commented on June 5 that “further discussion and investigation has convinced me that it would be difficult under any circumstances to do so, and in particular, I should feel very reluctant under present conditions, particularly in view of the discussion which took place at the Plenary Session last Saturday, to impose upon Poland, Romania and the other states the necessity of allowing individual citizens of groups or citizens of these states to appeal directly to the Court of the League of Nation, over the head of and against their own Government. This would be represented as a serious infraction of sovereignty”: Headlam-Morley, *Memoir*, p. 139.


170 FRUS PPC, Volume V, pp. 680-681. Hudson, now the American delegate on the Committee on New States, was in favour of expanding the League’s guarantees to minorities, but encountered resistance from Headlam-Morley. The latter commented that “what I have been trying to get is a real and effective guarantee, but after long consideration I did not feel that it was wise to ask that the minorities themselves should be given the right of appeal to the League … I went round to the rather strict legal view that the League of Nations was a compact between states and that only states should have immediate access”: Headlam-Morley to Namier, June 11, 1919: Headlam-Morley, *Memoir*, p.
that “if we once let it be supposed that anyone but states can appear before the Court, we should be opening the way to a very dangerous agitation for allowing minorities in other countries the same privilege.”

Opposition was also mounting in the United States over the prospect of America entering into binding agreements with an organisation, the League of Nations, a commitment which stood firmly against the Monroe Doctrine. Marshall, the staunch defender of the Jews, was himself an American isolationist who saw the League as a “danger to American interests.”

Gradually between mid-May and the Meeting of the Council of Four on June 17, when Lloyd George commented that “nothing could be more dangerous for the League” than allowing minorities the right of appeal, the Allied leaders decided that the sole responsibility for enforcing the Treaties rested with the members of the League of Nations Council. As a result of this decision the Jewish minority in Poland would still have to appeal to their co-religionists in the West. In this regard the provisions of the Minority Treaties were little more use than those that had been shown to be so inadequate in the Treaty of Berlin.

Two further provisions within the Polish Minorities Treaty dealt specifically with the Jewish minority, one regarding the Sabbath, the other education. Article 10 provided that:

[a] Scholastic Committee, appointed by all the Jewish communities of Poland, shall assure, under the general control of the State, the distribution of the

141. See the report of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Committee on New States, June 5, 1919: Miller, My Diary, Volume XIII, pp. 136-141.
172 Wolf noted that “Marshall, who is at heart a strong Tory … [and] is with great reluctance that he supports the association of the league with our [by which Wolf usually meant himself and Headlam-Morley] Minority Treaties. This is really why he has been trying all along to vest the guarantees of the Treaties more in the Signatory Powers than in the League”: Wolf Diary, June 16, 1919, p. 375.
173 The Council of Four had three discussions on the subject of the right of minorities to appeal to the League of Nations, on May 17, June 6 and June 17: Mantoux, Volume II, pp. 88-91, 331-332, 481-483. The decision on responsibility for enforcement of the Minorities Treaty is omitted from Mantoux’s record, but appears in FRUS PPC, Volume VI, p. 530. It is also interesting to note that the only member of the Committee on New States to attend the meeting on June 17 was the Italian delegate, di Martino.
174 Wolf commented that any such special Jewish provisions would be “unwise … It was an invidious decision, and would single out the Jews from other classes of Polish subjects as having special need of protection against their fellow citizens. I saw no need for this and it seemed to me that all the Minorities should have all the same rights”: Wolf Diary, May 14, 1919, p. 247; Miller, My Diary, Volume XIII, pp. 53-63.
proportional part of the public funds assigned to the Jewish schools and the organization and direction of these schools.\textsuperscript{175}

Miller commented that such a special provision, which was not extended to the other minorities within Poland, was due to “the close relations [for example in Yeshivot schools (of higher Talmudic study)] existing among Jews in Poland between education and religion.”\textsuperscript{176}

The deepest division among the Committee was over the question of protection of the Jewish Sabbath. While the Committee’s agreed draft had included no provision for special protection, Headlam-Morley, as a result of lobbying, principally by Wolf, attempted to add provisions within the Treaty, but was blocked by Miller, Berthelot and di Martino.\textsuperscript{177} As a result of this impasse the question was referred to the Council of Four to decide as a “separate recommendation by the British Delegation”\textsuperscript{178} and the report refused to provide any guarantees for the Sabbath. It appears that no one working on the Committee, or involved in lobbying, had noticed that the Sejm Ustawodawczy elections had indeed taken place on a Sunday, January 26, to the benefit of the Jewish population of Poland who would have been unable to vote had election taken place on their sabbat.

Matters reached a head as a result of the meeting of the Council of Four on May 17, which only Headlam-Morley attended.\textsuperscript{179} He commented that “after consultation with

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\textsuperscript{176} Minutes of the 5th Meeting of the New States Committee, May 9, 1919: Miller, My Diary; Volume XIII, p. 40.
\textsuperscript{177} “On the question of Sunday Trading the Commission have been unable to agree. Miller, the American Delegate, is against facilities for Sunday trading, and Berthelot … Headlam-Morley, on the other hand, is very keen for them”: Wolf Diary, May 14, 1919, pp. 246-247.
\textsuperscript{178} Second Report of the Committee on New States, May 13, 1919: Miller, My Diary, Volume XIII, p. 58; Wolf Diary, May 14, 1919, pp. 246-247. Headlam-Morley commented that “everyone who knows Poland, even including those who tend to be anti-Semitic, assures me that the matter is of real pressing importance, and I could not therefore give way on this point”: Headlam-Morley to Hankey, May 13, 1919: Headlam-Morley, Memoir, pp. 105-106.
\textsuperscript{179} The Council of Four approved that “the Jews shall not be compelled to perform any act which constitutes a violation of their Sabbath nor shall they be placed under any disability by reason of their refusal to attend courts of law or to perform any legal business on their Sabbath”, and secondly that “Poland hereby declared its intention to refrain from ordering or permitting elections, whether general or local to be held on a Saturday, nor will registration for electoral or other purposes be compelled to be performed on a Saturday.” Lloyd George commented that if the second proposal were accepted it would “make Saturday a more sacred day than Sunday”: PWW, Volume 59, pp. 179-180 (Miller used the same phrase in describing the Sabbath provision in a letter to Wilson: Miller, My Diary, Volume
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the representatives of Jews of moderate opinion, like Mr. Lucien Wolf, and with independent experts such as Mr. Namier, they all agree that this clause is extremely important for the Jews.\textsuperscript{180} Miller was “naturally extremely irritated at the practice pursued” by the British official, as was Berthelot.\textsuperscript{181} As a result of these tactics, Headlam-Morley was able to insert a clause protecting the Jewish Sabbath into the Polish Minorities Treaty.\textsuperscript{182} Colonel House commented on May 19 that Lloyd George “had sold out to the Jews”, to which Miller readily agreed, both arguing that this had put the whole treaty under threat, as the adoption of the Sabbath proposal would “endanger the Treaty in the Senate.”\textsuperscript{183} While it is not likely that the Minorities Treaty failed to be ratified by the United States Senate for this reason alone, this issue acted as a focus for opposition to the Treaty.

In the wake of the reports of the anti-Jewish violence in Wilno, news of which only reached Paris on May 13, the Council of Four approved the Second Report of the Committee on New States on May 17.\textsuperscript{184} Clemenceau stated that “the Council ought to hear what the Poles had to say on the matter.”\textsuperscript{185} Maurice Hankey, the Secretary to the British Delegation, informed the Committee that not only had the Council of Four approved its draft, but that it was to submit a copy to the Polish delegation and listen

\textsuperscript{180} Mantoux, Volume II, p. 89.
\textsuperscript{181} Miller commented that “I suppose [it] was not intentional on the part of the President but which was an affront to his own representative”: Miller, My Diary, Volume I, p. 320. He commented to Wilson that the British proposal was “contrary to the law of many of the States of the American Union”: Miller to Wilson, May 15, 1919: ibid., Volume IX, p. 322.
\textsuperscript{182} The clause in the final text of the Polish Minorities Treaty (Article 11) was almost identical to Headlam-Morley’s proposal. The final draft of June 23 read that “Jews shall not be compelled to perform any act which constitutes a violation of their Sabbath, nor shall they be placed under any disability by reason of their refusal to attend courts of law or perform any legal business on their Sabbath. This provision, however, shall not exempt Jews from such obligations as shall be imposed upon all other Polish citizens for the necessary purposes of military service, national defence or the preservation of public order. Poland declares her intention to refrain from ordering or permitting elections, where general or local, to be held on a Saturday, nor will registration for electoral or other purposes be compelled to be performed on a Saturday”: Miller, My Diary, Volume XIII, pp. 207-208. Earlier British draft contained in Annex B of the Second Report of the Committee on New States; Miller, My Diary, Volume XIII, p.63.
\textsuperscript{183} Miller, My Diary, Volume I, pp. 320-321.
\textsuperscript{184} Adler to Racie Adler, May 13, 14, 1919: David, “The Human Record”, pp. 480-481.
\textsuperscript{185} Headlam-Morley was helped by the fact that he alone was called to advise the Council of Four. Report contained in PWW, Volume 59, pp. 180-183; Draft of the Treaty contained in ibid., pp. 114-117; discussion of the Council of Four, May 17, 1919: Mantoux, Volume II, pp. 88-91; FRUS PPC, Volume V, pp. 678-681.
to any objections it might have.\textsuperscript{186} This was not an enviable task with only a little
over a month until the Treaty was due to be signed.

**Polish Reaction – the “Critical Moment”\textsuperscript{187}**

As early as March 14, E. H. Carr had noted that “such special [minority] provisions
would probably be more deeply resented by the Poles than general provisions
acceptable equally to other states in the same position.”\textsuperscript{188} He would be proved
absolutely correct. Count Ostorog commented to Wolf that “the aspect of the Jewish
Question which chiefly perturbed them [the Polish Delegation] was the Jewish
demand for National Autonomy.”\textsuperscript{189} Kojicki stressed that any such demands would
no-doubt lead to similar demands from Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Byelorussian
representatives. While Jewish autonomy was possibly acceptable to a ‘federalist’
such as Piłsudski, it was totally unacceptable to National Democrats, such as Kojicki,
Pilz and Ostorog. As the minority clauses were not included in the draft treaty, such
worries were to prove unfounded. Nevertheless, the Poles still fought bitterly against
the watered down draft Minorities Treaty. They were not alone in their opposition to
this Treaty, as all the ‘successor’ states in line to have minority clauses imposed upon
them were hostile.

The Polish delegation was not helped by the absence of Paderewski for a vital period
of the negotiations, and therefore, the return of Dmowski as the chief Polish delegate.
The latter’s close association with the French caused further annoyance to both the
British and American members on the Committee of New States.\textsuperscript{190} Paderewski was
forced to leave Paris on May 9 to return to Warsaw to deal with urgent issues,
principally over Polish military action in Lithuania and Eastern Galicia, only returning

\textsuperscript{186} This was discussed at the ninth Meeting at the New States Committee on May 19: Miller, *My Diary*,

\textsuperscript{187} Headlam-Morley commented that “a critical moment in the fortunes of our Treaties had arrived, and
that we should all have to make a strong effort to save them”: Wolf Diary, June 19, 1919, p. 380.

\textsuperscript{188} “Observations on Proposals Regarding Cultural Minorities as far as they affect Poland”, March 14,
1919, TNA (London), FO 608/61/129.

\textsuperscript{189} Wolf Diary, February 27, 1919, p. 86.

\textsuperscript{190} John Gregory, who had worked on the Poland Desk during the Foreign Office in the First World
War, commented that “Dmowski … began doing his unconscious best to ruin the prospects of Poland
at the Peace Conference, and had he continued alone in his vociferous demands for this and that we
might have ended by witnessing a Fourth Partition”: John D. Gregory, *On the Edge of Diplomacy:
on May 27, coinciding with the anti-Jewish riot in Częstochowa. Lloyd George’s dislike of Dmowski was again obvious, when he refused to send the draft of the Polish Minorities Treaty to the Polish Delegation in Paris as “it was clearly, they [The Council of Four] felt, that this was a matter on which the Polish Government should be consulted directly and not allowed to speak merely through the mouth of the first Polish Delegate in Paris.” As a result the final draft was sent to Paderewski in Warsaw on May 22. The usually sympathetic French were indifferent. Clemenceau commented that “they [Poles] are all reactionaries and anti-Semites, but they are going to get an ultimatum [the Minorities Treaties] from us.”

The question of the Minorities Treaties was discussed at a closed Plenary Session (the only such closed session) of the Peace Conference on May 31. No Jewish, German, Ukrainian, Lithuanian or Russian representatives or members of the press were allowed to attend. Despite the focus of the Treaty being on Poland it was the Romanian Prime Minister Ioan I. C. Brătianu who launched a scathing attack on the proposed Minority Clauses, arguing that Romania “would be unable to consent to stipulations of a nature to limit her rights as a sovereign State … history is there to

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191 Headlam-Morley to Namier, May 17, 1919: Headlam-Morley, Memoir, p. 112; Meeting of the Council of Four, May 17, 1919: Mantoux, Volume II, p. 90. Hankey recorded that Lloyd George “urged that the report should be communicated to the Poles in Poland, as the Polish representative in Paris, M. Dmowski, did not represent the democratic opinion in Poland”: FRUS PPC, Volume V, p. 680.

192 “The principal Allied and Associated Powers, taking into account the situation of Europe after a prolonged war, have considered it necessary to insert in the Treaties drawn with the new States, and especially with Poland, clauses concerning the protection of minorities of race, language or religion … the provisions summed up below, which you will communicate to the Polish Government, have been decided upon by the said Powers, who desire to know the sentiments of the Polish Government concerning these provisions, and request the latter to submit its observations as soon as possible”: Pichon to French Minister in Warsaw [Eugène Pralon], May 22, 1919: Miller, My Diary, Volume XIII, pp. 75-78; AAN (Warsaw), Paderewski 629; Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, Sprawy polskie na Konferencji Pokojowej w Paryżu, Volume III, pp. 270-274. Balfour commented to Percy Wyndham in his covering letter that “their assent to the principles involved is, under Article 93 of the German treaty, definitely required”: Balfour to Wyndham, May 24, 1919: TNA (London), FO 608/70.

193 Arnold D. Margolin, the Ukrainian representative at the Peace Conference (who came from a Jewish background), gave an account of his conversation with the French Prime Minister on May 22 when he met with Lucien Wolf on May 26: Wolf Diary, May 26, 1919, p. 280; cf. Margolin’s own, later, account of Clemenceau’s pro-Polish attitude: Margolin, From a Political Diary, p. 43.

194 The session was originally supposed to take place on May 29, but Brătianu, speaking for the Greek, Romanian, Polish, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav delegations, argued that they needed more time to examine the text of the proposed Austrian Treaty. These countries were given a further 48 hours by Clemenceau: FRUS PPC, Volume III, pp. 424-430. The details of the Draft Treaty had appeared in The Times on May 28: “Polish Minority Safeguards”, The Times, May 28, 1919, p. 14c.

195 Representatives from China, Cuba, Greece, Nicaragua, Panama and Siam were present as well as the representatives of the Allied Powers and the ‘Successor States.’ The account of the meeting is contained in FRUS PPC, Volume III, pp. 395-410.
prove that the protection of minorities, regarded from this point of view, had done more to disintegrate States than to consolidate them”.\(^{196}\) Clemenceau “at once lost his temper” and was “very rude” to Brătianu.\(^{197}\) After the Romanian Premier had finished Clemenceau called upon a hesitant Paderewski for his opinion. The latter made a short statement:

I state on behalf of the Polish Government, that Poland will grant to all minorities of race, language and religion, the same rights as she does to her other nationals. She will assure to those minorities all the liberties which have already been or may be granted to them by the great Nations and States of the West, and she will be ready to amplify those rights in the same degree as the League of Nations may consider desirable for the States which compose it.\(^{198}\)

Romania had a right to protest. It had been widely predicted that she, as well as Poland, would be a focus of anti-Semitic agitation in the immediate aftermath of the First World War, but this had not been the case. As it was Poland, alone among the ‘successor states’ present at the Plenary Session, that had witnessed wide-scale violence against its Jewish minority, this could help explain the Polish reaction. Dmowski remained silent. He had wanted a far stronger statement, stressing Polish reservations towards the Treaty and expressing support for Brătianu. Paderewski, however, favoured a more moderate approach.\(^{199}\) Wilson defended the Council of Four’s position in a long speech, stating “take the rights of minorities. Nothing, I venture to say, is more likely to disturb the peace of the world than the treatment of minorities.”

\(^{196}\) Brătianu also forwarded a letter to Berthelot, detailing his objection to the minority clauses: Ibid., pp. 396-397. For an account of Romania at the Paris Peace Conference see Hitchins, op. cit., pp. 287-290, Spector, op. cit. Brătianu was the son of Ion Brătianu, who had represented Romania at the Congress of Berlin.

\(^{197}\) Diary, June 1, 1919: Headlam-Morley, Memoir, p. 135.

\(^{198}\) Paderewski concluded his statement: “I am convinced that these guarantees when once incorporated in the fundamental laws of Poland by her Constituent diet, will be in absolute harmony with the noble and lofty spirit which animates the great labours of the Peace Conference. That is all I have to say”: Ibid., p. 401. Further opposition was made by Karel Kramář of Czechoslovakia and Ante Trumbić of Serbia.

\(^{199}\) Paderewski had apparently agreed to a position closer to Dmowski, but the Polish Premier left out the Polish Delegation’s reservations towards the Minority Clauses: Kozicki to Dmowski, n. d. [May, 1919]: Kułakowski, op. cit., Volume II, p. 154. Dmowski later commented that “Brătianu was dissatisfied with the Polish Delegation for being too ready to agree with the Minorities Clauses. I understood him and regretted that he did not find in us an ally. I considered the treaty as very obnoxious political nonsense; still I did not encourage our Premier to resist. At the time, the most important thing was to have the Versailles Treaty signed as quickly as possible”: Dmowski, Polityka Polska, pp. 391-392.
which might in certain circumstance be meted out to minorities. And therefore, if the Great Powers are to guarantee the peace of the world in any sense, is it unjust that they should be satisfied that the proper and necessary guarantees have been given?  Clemenceau and Lloyd George showed their support for Wilson’s position. Neither Paderewski nor Dmowski replied to the President’s speech. Paderewski, having only reluctantly addressed the Plenary Session, obviously wanted to delay the official Polish reply for as long a possible. Yet the result of the Plenary Session was that it had fully committed the Allied Powers to the minority provisions; they now could not back down from their position. This was further reinforced by the position of the German delegation that had arrived in Paris at the end of April. Instructed by the Auswärtiges Amt, it observed that Germany was “in favour of the protection of national minorities” and that “this protection could best be regulated within the framework of the League.” While these instructions were primarily drawn up with the German minorities in the new states in mind, the German counterproposals of May 29 stated:

[w]hat dangers threaten the national minorities in Poland is shown most clearly by the massacres practiced on the Jewish population since November 11. Reference is made to … the wholesale murders committed in Pinsk, which the local authorities favoured and the Government let go unpunished.

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200 Wilson further defended his position with regard to sovereignty, commenting that “I beg him [Brătianu] to observe that he is overlooking the fact that he is asking the sanction of the Allied and Associated Powers for great additions of territory … therefore, we are entitled to say: ‘If we agree to these additions of territory we have the right to insist upon certain guarantees of peace’”. Wilson’s speech is printed in Headlam-Morley, “The Protection of Minorities”, pp. 130-132; FRUS PPC, Volume III, pp. 406-408.

201 Clemenceau commented that “rectification of historical traditions which have been perpetuated in certain countries have been requested for a long time past, even in other Treaties, but it has been impossible to secure them. In these circumstances the text under criticism is rather in the nature of an encouragement and support”. FRUS PPC, Volume III, p. 400. Lloyd George and Balfour remained silent but “nodded approval” during Wilson’s speech: Diary, June 1, 1919: Headlam-Morley, Memoir, p. 136. See Lundgreen-Nielsen, Polish Problem, pp. 376-377.

202 In playing second fiddle to Brătianu at the Plenary Session of May 31 Paderewski allowed the focus of the Supreme Council’s anger to be directed towards the Romanian Delegation rather than the Polish. In reply to Wilson’s speech, Brătianu alone made further objections, much to the annoyance of Lloyd George who in a loud aside commented that “this damned fellow; he cannot even get coats for his soldiers without us!”. Diary, June 1, 1919: Headlam-Morley, Memoir, p. 136. See Lundgreen-Nielsen, Polish Problem, pp. 376-377.

203 Headlam-Morley commented that “the result of the meeting was to clear the air”: Headlam-Morley, “The Treaties for the Protection of Minorities”, p. 132.

Should the new Poland be formed according to the provision of the peace draft, without the necessary guarantees for the minority peoples being accurately established at the same time, it would mean the advancement of the pogrom limit far towards the west.\textsuperscript{205}

The Germans were determined to use the minorities issue to undermine the Allies. The \textit{Auswärtiges Amt} had already attempted to blacken the Poles through the use of exaggerated pogrom reports; they now wished to use the question of minority protection to their benefit.\textsuperscript{206}

The Jewish representatives, excluded from the proceedings of May 31, were forced to read about the closed session in the Paris press.\textsuperscript{207} Wolf, closely informed of proceedings by Headlam-Morley, was less worried.\textsuperscript{208} The inclusion of the minority provisions, despite the pressure from the Jewish delegations, was not guaranteed until the meeting of the Council of Four on June 6, 1919. It was also agreed by this body that the representatives of the new states should have a right to comment before the Treaty was signed, as they were in Clemenceau’s words “very touchy.”\textsuperscript{209} The outcome was that the new states would have to be placated with concessions before they would sign any such treaties, despite what pressure the Council of Four could bring to bear on them. The latter was not in an enviable position. It wished to impose upon reluctant and hostile states minority provision that its members themselves would not accept.

\textsuperscript{205} “Comments by the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace”, May 29, 1919: ibid., p. 338. The Allied reply of June16 commented that “the restoration of Poland is a great historic act which cannot be achieved without breaking many ties and causing temporary difficulty and distress to many individuals. But it has been the special concern of the Allied and Associated Powers to provide for the adequate protection of those Germans who will find themselves transferred to Poland, as well as of all other religious, racial, or linguistic minorities. There is in the treaty a clause by which there will be secured to them the enjoyment of religious liberty and also the right to use their own language … They will not be subjected to persecution similar to that which Poles had to endure from the Prussian State.” Ibid., pp. 430-431.


\textsuperscript{207} Adler to Racie Adler, June 1, 1919: David, op. cit., p. 488.

\textsuperscript{208} Wolf Diary, June 2, 1919, p. 325.

\textsuperscript{209} Meeting of the Council of Four, June 6, 1919: \textit{Mantoux}, Volume II, pp. 331-333.
Paderewski’s Reply

In both Paris and Warsaw Poles mobilised themselves to fight the imposition of the Minorities Treaty. On June 6 the Sejm unanimously passed a resolution on the protection of minorities in Poland in an attempt to undermine the Allies’ argument that a special treaty was required. It stated that

[i]n view of the information received by the Polish delegation at the Peace Conference that the Allied Powers will demand from Poland as a new country to sign a treaty on the protection of its national and religious minorities, in accordance with Article 93 of the Treaty with Germany - the Sejm declared that Poland is not a new country, but one of the oldest states in Europe, possessing an uninterrupted tradition of freedom and justice. Poland never opposed any nation and never annexed anyone’s territories. No religious persecution has ever been practiced in Poland … guarantees the rights of minorities above cited in conformance to the noble principles of the League of Nations … on the other hand, the Sejm of the Republic of Poland affirms that the tenor of Article 93 … [is] resented by the whole Polish nation.210

In Paris, the Polish delegation was the last to give its reply to the Supreme Council,211 only after receiving a curt note from Maurice Hankey on June 15, which rather tersely stated “you will remember that you undertook to send Mr. Lloyd George a letter containing your views. Mr. Lloyd George would be very much obliged if you would let him have a reply at once.”212 Paderewski replied the same day, expressing similar

210 While the Marshal, Wołciech Trąbczyński, announced that the resolution had been unanimously passed, there was one dissenting vote, that of the Zionist Maksymilian Hartglas, the only Jewish deputy present at the Parliament on June 6: SSSU, 47th Session, June 6, 1919, pp. 49-50; Hartglas, “Milchamot Yehudei Polin”, pp. 44-45. A similar resolution had been passed on May 22, which stated that “The [Polish] Republic aspires to reunite all Polish lands and guarantees to the national minorities equal rights and national and cultural autonomy in the territories where there is a mixed population”. The implication that this would only be the case in areas of “mixed population” was opposed by Grünbaum who attempted to have such rights included “in all the territories of the Polish Republic”. The rejection of the Zionist deputy’s proposed wording further reinforced the impression that Jews had to appeal to the Allies in Paris for safeguards: SSSU, 40th Session, May 22, 1919, p. 31; ibid., 41st Session, May 23, 1919, p. 61.

211 All the other delegations had replied by June 11.

212 Hankey to Paderewski, June 15, 1919, AAN (Warsaw), Paderewski 629. Hankey himself was not particularly enamoured of Poles, writing in his diary on December 29, 1919 that “personally I doubt if Poland is of much value, as her people is [are] unstable” and later that “I have both a dislike and a contempt for the Poles”: Stephen W. Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets. Volume II: 1919-1934 (London,
sentiments to the *Sejm* resolution.213 The Polish Premier commented on the “extremely serious” nature of the problem of imposing on Poland the Minorities Treaty.214 Paderewski opposed the provisions on a number of grounds. It was an affront to Polish sovereignty, and any such treaty should include provisions for the protection of all citizens.215 His reply continued:

> [t]he Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference appreciates the high importance of the confirmation of sovereignty and independence of the Polish State through a treaty between the Principal Powers and Poland. But precisely from the point of view of sovereign rights of Poland the delegation considers it to be a duty to present its objections to the introduction in the Treaty with Germany, of article 93, according to which Poland should admit the intervention of the Chief Powers in her internal affairs. Poland has already experienced the nefarious consequences which may result from the protection exercised by foreign Powers over ethnical and religious minorities. The Polish Nation has not forgotten that the dismemberment of Poland was the consequence of the intervention of foreign Powers in affairs concerning her

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213 The Memorial was jointly written by both Paderewski and Dmowski: Paderewski to Lloyd George, June 15, 1919, AAN (Warsaw), Paderewski 629; also printed as “Memorandum by M. Paderewski”, FRUS PPC, Volume VI, pp. 535-540; Miller, *My Diary*, Volume XIII, pp. 171-177.

214 The fact that Paderewski was able to furnish Lloyd George with a reply within the day, including a long memorandum containing Polish objections to the Treaty, would indicate that the Poles were deliberately delaying submitting their reply on the question of minorities provisions in order to force the Allies’ hands, as the Treaty had to be ready at the same time as the German Peace Treaty, due to be signed at the end of that month: ibid. It has also been suggested that the delay in the Polish reply was at the suggestion of some elements in the French Ministry of External Affairs who were hostile to Clemenceau. Headlam-Morley commented that “I have learned confidentially through a reliable source that it has been intimated to the Poles that they need not really trouble about the matter as the Quai d’Orsay do not intend the treaties to be signed and the suggestion that dilatory methods will be used”: Headlam-Morley to Hankey, June 15, 1919: Headlam-Morley, *Memoir*, p. 145; Lundgreen-Neilson, *Polish Problem at the Paris Peace Conference*, p. 378. Despite the delay in the Polish reply, E. H. Carr commented to Wolf that he thought the Poles “had something up their sleeves. He [Carr] was not, however, at all perturbed”: Wolf Diary, June 16, 1919, p. 374.

215 FRUS PPC, Volume VI, p. 529. The drafters of the Treaties were well aware of the question of sovereignty, arguing that the minorities problem was an international concern, as it constituted a danger to the internal stability of states through “unrest of peoples” and was therefore a “threat to world peace”. Hudson argued that of all the minorities the Jewish population of Poland was not merely a “domestic matter”: “Address by Prof. Manly O. Hudson”, in “The World Court and the Protection of Racial and Religious Minorities”, in *Judaean Addresses: Selected*, Volume III: 1918-1926 (New York, 1927), pp. 183-184.
religious minorities, and this painful memory makes Poland fear the external interference into internal matters of State more than anything.\textsuperscript{216}

The memorandum also addressed the issue of “relations between the Jewish and Christian population”, to which it was apparent that the Poles were adopting an inflexible stance. Paderewski commented that

the present discord is caused by the attitude adopted by the Jews who, considering the Polish cause as a being a lost one, on many occasions sided with Poland’s enemies. This policy of the Jews called forth a change of public opinion against them. However, the reconstruction of the Polish State must be admitted by the Jews as an established fact, will allow the Polish Nation, whose existence will no longer be imperilled by their hostility, to return to her ancient principles respecting the Jewish question … whereas protection granted to the Jewish population in Poland … transferred the question into international ground, can but create difficulties.\textsuperscript{217}

The Poles agreed to grant equal rights based “on the principles of freedom, to all citizens without distinction of origin, creed or language,” yet rejected “one sided obligations.”\textsuperscript{218} The anger of the Polish delegates was clear when they stated:

[t]o place one special part of the Polish Constitution under the protection of the League of Nations and demand the consent of its Council … is equivalent to regarding the Polish nation as a nation of inferior standard of civilization, incapable of ensuring to all its citizens the rights and civil liberties and ignorant of the conception of the duties of a modern State.\textsuperscript{219}

Provisions to safeguard the use of Yiddish in schools were attacked as they “may in future have a fatal influence on Polish internal relations”, as it would deepen religious

\textsuperscript{216} Paderewski to the Supreme Council, June 15, 1919, AAN (Warsaw), Paderewski 629; also printed in Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, \textit{Sprawy polskie na Konferencji Pokojowej w Paryżu}, Volume III, p. 293. Lloyd George called Paderewski’s reply “very able”: Lloyd George to Paderewski, \textit{ibid.}, 846.
\textsuperscript{217} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{219} Ibid.
division within the country. Paderewski concluded by warning that the “Great Powers may be preparing for themselves unwelcome surprises, for taking into consideration the migratory capacities of the Jewish population, which so readily transports itself from one State to another, it is certain that the Jews, basing themselves on precedent thus established, will claim elsewhere the national principles which they would enjoy in Poland.” Crucially the Polish reply was an uncompromising rejection of the Treaty, which left little room for negotiation. The Polish tactic of delaying a reply was undoubtedly intended to force the Allies’ hand, as the German Peace Treaty, which was the only real leverage the Allies had over Poland, was due to be signed only nine days after receipt of the Polish reply. Headlam-Morley commented that

speaking personally, my hope had always been that when we communicated the text of the treaty to the Poles, they would help us in regard to the details by discussing matters of this kind with us. This hope had been falsified owing to the unfortunate procedure which the Polish Delegation here had adopted. They let some weeks elapse, before they made any criticism on the treaty so that when Monsieur Paderewski’s letter was received, it was too late to go as thoroughly into these matters as we otherwise might have done.

He went on to note “the possibility that in the multiplicity of questions of vital importance by which the Council of Five was nearly overwhelmed they might not appreciate the gravity of the situation and might consent to a postponement of the Polish Treaty.” Wolf reacted energetically to this “crisis”, contacting both Sir Herbert and Sir Stuart Samuel in order for them to lobby the Prime Minister personally, and meeting Henry Morgenthau in order for him to make contact with Wilson.

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220 Ibid.
221 Ibid.
222 Headlam-Morley continued that “We had, as a matter of fact, modified the treaty in important matters to meet such criticism of detail as they had given us, and if we had not had the friendly discussions which might have led possibly to further modification, the responsibility rested entirely with them”: Note of Interview, June 26, 1919: Headlam-Morley, Memoir, p. 174.
223 Wolf Diary, June 19, 1919, p. 382.
224 Wolf Diary, June 20, 1919, pp. 387-388.
Paderewski’s reply was rejected by President Wilson who commented that it was a “fundamental challenge to the whole of the policy of the Allied and Associated Powers in regard to small States.” While the Polish Premier’s objections over the guarantee to Jewish schools were accepted, the Allied leaders felt that a full reply was required. Hankey observed that the matter “should be referred to the Committee on New States to consider the objections raised by M. Paderewski, and to seek whether some of the objections raised could not be met.” The response of the Committee was to repudiate Paderewski’s criticisms, principally on the Jewish clauses. The Committee replied to Hankey, under the signature of Berthelot in the chair, who correctly commented that “in reality, the entire memorandum of the Polish Prime Minister can be summed up as an opposition in principle to the conclusion of a special treaty containing the solemn undertaking of Poland to the Allies to guarantee the rights of racial, linguistic, and religious minorities … the difference is fundamental.”

Paderewski was reminded that there were precedents in recent European history and that unlike Greece, Romania and Serbia, Poland “can the less refuse to conform in that she owes her liberation entirely to the efforts and sacrifices of the Powers.” The key Polish objection to the intervention of the Great Powers in her internal affairs was refuted by pointing out that with the establishment of the League of Nations, of which Poland was a member, any interference in her internal affairs would be impartial and fair. Lloyd George showed he was in no mood to compromise when he remarked that Paderewski’s reply amounted to a fundamental challenge to the “entire order of things we had wanted to establish.”

The Allies took stock at the meeting of the Council of Four on June 17. Both Lloyd George and Wilson acknowledged that they might have gone too far in their
concessions to the minorities in the new Polish state.\textsuperscript{231} Any danger that the Allies would impose the Minority Treaty on Poland was now, as a result of Paderewski’s impassioned reply, highly unlikely. Before adjourning for three days the Council decided that it needed “to take time to examine” the Polish reply. It was referred to the Committee on New States which was instructed to draft the Council of Four’s reply.\textsuperscript{232}

Concessions had to be made to the Poles, principally over the use of the definition of Yiddish as an official language and over the right of appeal to the League of Nations.\textsuperscript{233} The final decision over the right of minorities to appeal was one area that the Council of Four felt could be easily compromised upon and was seen as an effective way of preserving the smaller states’ sovereignty.\textsuperscript{234} Paderewski had argued that not all Jews wished for the use of Yiddish in their schools; some, he claimed, wanted to revive Hebrew, others to learn Polish. The Supreme Council requested that “in all except the primary schools Jewish children should be instructed in the Polish, and not the Yiddish language, thereby avoiding the risk of encouraging the use of Yiddish as one of the national languages for a part for the population of Poland.”\textsuperscript{235} Lloyd George commented that the “Jewish schools of the East End in London are established on this principle.”\textsuperscript{236} Headlam-Morley argued that separate Jewish schools were required because of the bad treatment of Jews in Polish schools, but on the other hand, they did not want to encourage Jewish nationalism, which the teaching of Yiddish in schools above elementary education would do.\textsuperscript{237}

In response to Paderewski’s objections to the ‘Jewish Clauses’ Berthelot remarked that “it is for the Supreme Council to decide whether it is possible to go further and suppress the two Articles referring to the Jews who in that case would only get the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[231] Lloyd George warned that the Jewish clauses might allow for “German intrigues” to form. Wilson commented that the “treaty assures the protection of Germans in Poland much more completely than of Poles in Germany”: ibid., pp. 481-482.
\item[232] Lloyd George to Paderewski, June 18, 1919: AAN (Warsaw), Paderewski 429.
\item[235] “Extract from the Minutes of the meeting of the Supreme Council held on June 21, 1919”: Miller, \textit{My Diary}, Volume XIII, p. 198. The changed draft was accepted on June 23: Hankey to Dutasta, June 23, 1919, ibid., p. 200.
\item[236] Lloyd George claimed that Yiddish was “only corrupt German”: Meeting of the Council of Four on June 23, 1919: Mantoux, Volume II, pp. 524-527.
\item[237] Headlam-Morley urged that “everything must be avoided that could serve an aggressive nationalism, which has only too great a tendency to develop”: ibid., p. 527.
\end{footnotes}
benefits given by the more general guarantees to all minorities.” Berthelot’s proposals were accepted by the Supreme Council on June 21. The lack of an effective response by the Jewish delegates in Paris was illustrative of the relative impotence of the Jewish lobby. The Jewish representatives were divided and distracted by a number of issues. Marshall’s and Adler’s time was at this stage almost entirely taken up with their running battle with Hugh Gibson, whereas the Comité was focusing its attention again on the stalled question of Palestine and its anti-pogrom campaign in the West. The anxious Marshall, unable to gain a meeting with his President, wrote on behalf of the “ten millions of my brethren” to Wilson on June 20 and 21, pleading for the undiluted minority clauses as those whom he spoke for were “virtually still in bondage, regard the action about to be taken as their last hope of attaining for themselves and their children those human rights that for many weary and sorrow-laden centuries have been withheld from them … bring them solace.” The Allies stood firm. Hankey instructed the Committee on New States to draft a reply to Paderewski along with the final draft of the Treaty.

Headlam-Morley had already outlined the Committee’s repudiation of the Polish reply in a letter to Paderewski on June 22, stating that “the information at the disposal of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers as to the existing relations between the Jews

238 Ibid., p. 192. Initially, in reply to Paderewski, Berthelot “favoured an abandonment of the idea of a Treaty, and the substitution of a formal declaration by Poland voluntarily accepting certain obligations for the protection of minorities.” In this he was opposed by Headlam-Morley, Hudson, di Martino and Adatci, the Japanese delegate, as it would mean the Allies would have to withdraw from a “publicly announced” decision: Hudson to Wilson, June 19, 1919: PWW, Volume 61: June 18-July 25, 1919, pp. 26-27. The Committee recommended a number of small amendments in view of Paderewski’s reply: Berthelot to Hankey, June 19, 1919: Miller, My Diary, Volume XIII, pp. 192-193.

239 In the absence of Lloyd George, who was unwell, following a visit to Verdun the previous day, Balfour represented Great Britain: Meeting of the Council of Four, June 21, 1919: Mantoux, Volume II, p. 506; FRUS PPC, Volume VI, p. 569; Hankey to Dutasta, June 21, 1919: Miller, My Diary, Volume XIII, pp. 199-200. The reply of the Council was signed by Berthelot, as Chair of the Committee: Berthelot to Paderewski, June 19, 1919: PWW, Volume 61, pp. 47-50.


241 Tenenbaum, Tsvishn milhome un sholem, pp. 81-86.


243 Hankey to Dutasta, June 21, 1919: Miller, My Diary, Volume XIII, pp. 201-202. The final draft of the Treaty, and the Allied Reply to Paderewski were completed at the Twenty-Seventh Meeting of the Committee on June 23: ibid., pp. 200-223.
and other Polish citizens unfortunately compels them to recognise that special protection is necessary for the former … it is believed that they will not create any obstacle to the political unity of Poland. 244 Furthermore, he also reminded Paderewski that “they do not constitute any recognition of the Jews as a separate political community within the Polish state.” 245 The text of the letter was almost identical to the letter of transmission attached to the Minorities Treaty, signed by Clemenceau, which outlined why the Allies felt that the Minorities Treaty was necessary, and sent to Paderewski on June 24, 1919. 246

The Clemenceau Letter

As late as the meeting of the Supreme Council on June 23 the Allied leaders were still tinkering with the Minorities Treaty. Balfour especially thought that the Treaty’s provisions did not go far enough, arguing that “the Jewish problem will become one of the most serious in the future … we must not stipulate anything for Jews, but only for persons of the Jewish religion. It is dangerous to appear to legislate in favour of a single race.” 247 But it was the Jewish Foreign Minister of Italy, Baron Sidney Sonnino, who joined with Wilson in banning Yiddish from being used as the language of instruction in schools. 248 The final text of the ‘Treaty for the Protection of Minorities in Poland’ was sent to Paderewski on June 24. The Treaty stated that as a result of historical developments, the Jewish minority in Poland was a special case. Yet the point was also made that, in the opinion of the Allies, the Jewish minority was neither a separate political community within the Polish state, nor was she to attempt to form one. Wolf described the reply to the Polish protest as a “splendid

244 Headlam-Morley to Paderewski, June 22, 1919, NAS (Edinburgh), Lothian GD40/17/903/2.
245 Ibid.
246 The only significant difference between the two memorials (the former had been approved by the Committee on New States on June 23) was over a slightly less harshly worded sentence commenting on why the Treaty was to be imposed upon Poland. The former stated that “the existing relations between the Jews and the other Polish citizens unfortunately compels them to recognise that special protection is necessary for the former”. The final draft, signed by Clemenceau, read: “in view of the historical development of the Jewish question and the great animosity aroused by it, special protection is necessary for the Jews in Poland”: Clemenceau to Paderewski, June 24, 1919: AAN (Warsaw), Paderewski 629; Miller, My Diary, Volume XIII, pp. 215-222; Headlam-Morley to Paderewski, June 22, 1919, NAS (Edinburgh), Lothian GD40/17/903/2.
248 FRUS PPC, Volume VI, pp. 624-626.
perhaps because he had himself a significant influence on the drafting of it. The Allies hoped to be in a position to shape the new Poland, principally so that it would not be dominated by Dmowski. The Clemenceau letter was important in this regard. By flattering Paderewski, Headlam-Morley meant to support his moderate regime.

It was of great importance that the letter of transmission was signed by Clemenceau, the President of the Conference, as it accorded greater weight to the letter itself, although he himself had little to do with it save for signing it. It commented that “this Treaty does not constitute any fresh departure. It has for long been the established procedure of the public law of Europe that when a State is created … any formal recognition of the Great Powers should be accompanied by the requirement that such States should … undertake to comply with certain principles of Government” and furthermore, that the Treaty did not contain any provisions for Jewish autonomy. This comment underlined the anti-Zionist leanings of the Committee and the Council of Four, whose members felt that the Treaty did not demand an unreasonable infringement of Polish sovereignty.

Even at this late stage it was feared that Poland would refuse to sign the Treaty. Paderewski’s reply to the Letter of Transmission was received on June 26. As a result the Polish Premier was invited to speak to the Council of Four. Paderewski

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249 Wolf commented that “the letter is peculiarly gratifying to me because the line of argument it adopts is that embodied in my book on “The Diplomatic History of the Jewish Question.” Headlam-Morley and I went over this argument last Monday [June 23], and it has been reproduced almost as I outlined it to him”: Wolf Diary, June 25, 1919, p. 404. Marshall described it as “a valuable aid to the interpretation of the document … The covering letter of Clemenceau has been published. It is highly important that it should”: Marshall to Mack, June 30, 1919: Luzzatti, op. cit., p. 745.

250 It was alleged as such in Macartney, op. cit., p. 237. Wolf noted that “I compared the covering letter with the original draft. The changes are very few, and are of no real importance. The paragraph on National Rights remains unchanged”: Wolf Diary, June 30, 1919, p. 422.

251 Headlam-Morley observed that the letter to Paderewski was “further to discredit Dmowski” and “I hope, [will] be understood in this sense. I am told that Paderewski was very pleased with it”: Headlam-Morley to Namier, June 30, 1919: Headlam-Morley, Memoir, p. 176.

252 Hudson and Headlam-Morley were detailed with the task of drafting the letter, and relied heavily upon Lucien Wolf and his Diplomatic Notes on the Diplomatic History of the Jewish Question; Miller, My Diary, Volume XIII, p. 197.

253 The Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee recommended that the Polish delegation in Paris did not sign the Treaty: Skrzynski to KNP, June 26, 1919: AAN (Warsaw), KNP 169.

254 The Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee recommended that the Polish delegation in Paris did not sign the Treaty: Skrzynski to KNP, June 26, 1919: AAN (Warsaw), KNP 169.

attempted to gain modifications in the Treaty at even this late stage.\textsuperscript{256} Paderewski stated that “we have never persecuted any nation. I asked President Wilson to send a commission of inquiry to Poland. I don’t deny that there have been deeply regrettable acts of violence. But they took place at a time when the state of war had not truly ceased.”\textsuperscript{257} The Polish Premier raised legitimate and difficult issues, especially with regard to the unprotected Polish minority in Germany, but Maurice Hankey commented that despite Paderewski’s protests “it was too late for alterations” in the Peace Treaty.\textsuperscript{258} The Supreme Council made some concessions to the still unsatisfied Paderewski, principally the tacit recognition of Poland’s occupation of East Galicia, in order to guarantee his and Dmowski’s signatures on the Polish Minorities Treaty.\textsuperscript{259} The Polish Premier was then asked to refer any questions he still had to the League of Nations.\textsuperscript{260} Paderewski, only partially placated by the last-minute concessions over East Galicia, not only promised to sign the Treaty, but further assured the Council that the Sejm would ratify it.\textsuperscript{261}

The Letter of Transmission from Clemenceau was not the only message that the Allies passed to the Polish Premier on June 25. Arthur Balfour wrote to Paderewski, noting that “my attention has been drawn to the strong feeling which has been aroused in England and parts of the British Empire in consequence of reports which have been published in the press respecting the treatment of Jews in Poland”. He continued: “despite the fact that the press reports which have created this agitation would appear in many cases to have been exaggerated, I venture to ask Your Excellency once more

\textsuperscript{256} Paderewski proposed that “in the towns and districts where a considerable proposition of Polish subjects of Jewish faith reside, there shall be assured to this minority an equitable part of the division of the sums which shall be raised from public funds, municipal or otherwise, for the object of education, religion or charity. These sums shall be employed for the establishment, while under the control of the Polish State, of primary schools, in which the needs of the Jewish faith shall be duly respected and in which the popular Jewish language [Yiddish] should be considered as an alternative language”: PWW, Volume 61, pp. 272-273; FRUS PPC, Volume VI, p. 725.

\textsuperscript{257} Paderewski continued, stating that “Jews came to Poland from all sides - from Russia and the Ukraine; the proof that Poland wasn’t the country where they were the worst off”: \textit{Mantoux}, Volume II, p. 580.

\textsuperscript{258} Hankey, \textit{The Supreme Control}, p. 186.

\textsuperscript{259} FRUS PPC, Volume IV, pp. 847-856.

\textsuperscript{260} Clemenceau said that “I will remind M. Paderewski that the League of Nations are the countries and men who are before him today: we are the state. You will appeal to us in circumstances that don’t much differ from today’s”: \textit{Mantoux}, Volume II, p. 580.

\textsuperscript{261} The Council of Four’s French interpreter, Paul Mantoux, commented that even should the Poles fail to sign the Minorities Treaty, they would be obliged to protect their minorities under Article 93 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, which also recognised Poland’s independence: FRUS PPC, Volume VI, p. 727.
to consider the urgency of using every means of impressing on the Polish people and the Polish press the necessity of adopting a conciliatory attitude towards their Jewish fellow-citizens and of giving the strictest orders to officers of the army to refrain from any action which may be considered as showing an anti-Semitic bias." The British Foreign Secretary, now fully aware of details of the Polish Minorities Treaty, still felt the need to caution in the strongest possible terms the Poles with regard to their Jewish population. Paderewski’s reply, received two days later, stated that

the Polish Government and myself have taken all the necessary measures, referred to you by Your Excellency, to check anti-Jewish movements in Poland. Strict orders have been issued to the army, to the military and civil authorities to punish severely all acts of violence committed against Jews. At the same time the population has been warned to maintain peace and order and all anti-Jewish disorder have been severely condemned. Unfortunately, the majority of cases of racial conflicts are due to provocation, both from within and without the country. Foreign propaganda manifestly hostile to the Polish cause is particularly active. The Jewish population is being supplied with arms. In many cases the Polish army has been attacked by Jews, or provoked by means of the use of firearms. In some cases, even, foreign officers, serving in the Polish army have been victims of Jewish attacks … hostile propaganda … has been undertaken with the aim of fighting Poland’s territorial claims.263

Balfour’s rebuke was the only such letter issued by the Foreign Office during the course of the Peace Conference, yet Poland was far from the only country that was unable to boast an exemplary record of good treatment towards its Jewish population. This raises the fundamental question as to why Poland was treated as a special case.

Comparisons with other Delegations – Czechoslovak-Jewish Relations at Paris

In assessing the influence of the ‘Jewish lobby’ it is useful to examine the case of Czechoslovakia at Paris, by way of contrast with the treatment of the Polish

262 Balfour to Paderewski, June 25 1919, TNA (London), 608/67/12761; also contained in AAN (Warsaw), Paderewski 774.
263 Paderewski to Balfour, June 30, 1919, TNA (London), FO 608/67/14163; AAN (Warsaw), Paderewski 774.
delegation. The Czechs had consistently good relations with the ‘Big Four’ at the Peace Conference. Their leader, Professor Tomáš Masaryk, who, like Dmowski, had lobbied the Entente powers from London during the Great War, had made a far better impression on Allied statesmen. It was in his relations in particular with the Jewish communities both in Bohemia and Moravia and in the Allied countries that he stood in greatest contrast to the Polish leader.\textsuperscript{264} Masaryk had endeared himself to the Jewish community through his defence of Leopold Hilsner in what has become known as the Hilsner Affair of 1899.\textsuperscript{265} The benefit for both Masaryk and the Czech nationalist movement was that

[d]uring the War I saw how useful the affair had been to me: the Press of the world is largely managed or financed by Jews; they know me from the Hilsner case, and repaid me for what I had done for them by writing favourably about our cause – or at least not unfavourably. That helped us a great deal politically.\textsuperscript{266}

In their meeting with the President Wilson the leaders of the American Jewish Congress expressed their support for the new Czechoslovak state.\textsuperscript{267} Louis Brandeis, the new leader of the World Zionist Organisation (WZO), had no sympathy or even

\textsuperscript{264} Masaryk was \textit{Professor Extraordinarius} of Philosophy at the Czech University of Prague: Karel \v{C}apek, \textit{President Masaryk Tells His Story} (London, 1934), p. 202. The impression was confirmed by the recognition of Czechoslovakia as an “Allied Nation” by the British Government, with the Czech National Council effectively a government in waiting, in a declaration by Arthur J. Balfour on August 9, 1918, cited in Eduard Beneš, \textit{My War Memoirs} (London, 1928), p. 407. Clemenceau also commented on the favourable impression made by Beneš “who won general esteem and confidence by the decency of his speech and his fine intellect”: Clemenceau, op. cit., p. 140. One further advantage that the Czechoslovak cause had was the presence of the Czech legion in Siberia (Masaryk had played a prominent role in its organisation), and the role it played in the Allied intervention in Russia, in direct contrast to the Haller Army in France.

\textsuperscript{265} Hilsner was accused of the ‘ritual murder’ of Anežka Hrůzová (The ‘Blood libel,’ the idea that Jews sacrificed Gentile children to use their blood for ritual purposes (for example, to make matzos) had been common from the Middle Ages onwards, and was the pretext for pogroms and expulsions of Jews from Norwich in 1144 to the Kielce pogrom of 1946). Masaryk acknowledged that his defence was not motivated by pro-Jewish tendencies, but rather “only the realisation that the ritual-murder speculation is dangerous to our nation”. Only later, after 1915 when working for Czech independence, would Masaryk become a supporter of Zionism: Edward P. Newman, \textit{Masaryk} (London, 1960), p. 52; \v{C}apek, op. cit., p. 188.

\textsuperscript{266} Ibid., p. 189.

\textsuperscript{267} The Jewish memorial on Eastern Europe commented that “even in Czecho-Slovakia there have occurred, since November last, uprisings of the populace in various towns, which have culminated in attacks upon the Jews in efforts to drive them out of the country. To his credit be it said that, when appraised of these facts, President Masaryk took prompt action to quell the disturbances and to protect the Jews against mob violence”: American Jewish Congress, \textit{Memorials Submitted to President Wilson}, p. 4.
interest in Polish affairs, yet he had met with Masaryk. He openly supported the
Czech cause, on condition that the Czech National Council made a strong statement
“on behalf of Minority Rights.”

Czech opinion on the Minorities Treaties also differed from that of their Polish
neighbours. The ‘Big Four’ were far more willing to place non-Czech or Slovak
minorities within the borders of the new state. The three-million Sudeten Germans,
for example, were accommodated within the new state’s borders for purely strategic
reasons, to allow the Czechs a defensive border with their German neighbour. There
was a certain element of political expediency about Czech support for the Jewish
cause at Paris in the face of German and Magyar hostility. Support from the Jewish
minority was needed by the Czechs, because, as Masaryk observed, “political,
religious, racial or class intolerance, has, as history proves, wrought the downfall of
all states.”

Eduard Beneš, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, commented to
Sokolow that

[the two [Jewish] articles [of the Polish Minorities Treaty] represent a sort of
“Yellow badge” of which only Poland and Rumania were deserving. Unlike
these countries, Czechoslovakia was at the head of the Slavic nations and was
a Western State. Moreover, she was not anti-Semitic and suspicion must not
be allowed to rise in the world that she was.

Beneš further refused to accept any specifically Jewish clauses within the
Czechoslovak Minorities Treaty, the inclusion of which he “considered offensive.”
As a result, the Jewish clauses were not inserted into either the Czech Minorities
Treaty or any of the subsequent 12 Minorities Treaties. Indeed, the Jewish population
of the Czech lands was one of the best treated in Central and Eastern Europe

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268 Louis Brandeis to Alfred Brandeis, October 14, 1917 and Brandeis to Mack, August 16, 1918:
Urofsky and Levy (eds.), Letters of Louis D. Brandeis. Volume 4: 1916-1921, Mr. Justice Brandeis,
pp. 315-316, 351, 353.
p. 389.
270 Account of the meeting between Beneš and Sokolow on August 28, 1919: in Rabinowicz, “The
Jewish Minority”, p. 175.
271 Prager Presse, October 9, 1937; quoted in Johann W. Bruegel, Czechoslovakia Before Munich: The
throughout the inter-war period.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 232-236; Mendelsohn, \textit{The Jews of East Central Europe}, pp. 140-142} The Jewish minority of the new Czechoslovakia state, numbering some 354,342 according to the 1921 census, was only 2.42% of the total population. It was mostly concentrated in the capital, Prague, and the Eastern province of Subcarpathian Rus.\footnote{By way of comparison with Poland, there were no Jewish deputies in the Czech Diet until after the election of 1929, when two were elected out of a total of 300: Joseph S. Roucek, “Czechoslovakia and her Minorities”, in Robert J. Kern (ed.), \textit{Czechoslovakia} (Berkeley, Cal., 1949), p. 175. It should be noted that the Jews only constituted some 4.17% of the population of Prague, and were therefore significantly smaller than the urban concentrations in Poland: Mendelsohn, \textit{The Jews of East Central Europe}, p. 142.} As such Czechoslovakia had a far less pressing ‘Jewish question’ in the Czech lands, although Slovak leaders such as Vavro Šrobár were extremely hostile to the Jewish population.\footnote{Society for the History of Czechoslovak Jews, op. cit., pp. 226-227.}

As in Poland, anti-Jewish violence did occur in the Czech and Slovak lands soon after independence, including in the capital, Prague, principally among recently demobilised Czech units of the \textit{KuK Armee}. Between December 3-4, 1918 at the town of Holešov in Moravia two Jews were killed and extensive damage was done to the Jewish quarter of the town by units of the newly formed Czech army.\footnote{All but three Jewish-owned shops were destroyed in the Jewish quarter: \textit{Encyclopedia Judaica}, Volume 8, col. 820.} Further excesses occurred in the wake of Béla Kun’s invasion of Slovakia, which lasted from May 1 to June 23, 1919, with the Jewish population principally targeted by local Slovaks for their perceived Magyar, German or Bolshevik sympathies.\footnote{Rabinowitz, “The Jewish Minority”, pp. 223-226.} Finally, anti-German agitation in November 1920 led to rioting in Prague when prominent members of the Jewish community required police protection to save them from an angry mob.\footnote{Antony Polonsky and Michael Riff, “Poles, Czechoslovaks and the ‘Jewish Question’, 1914-1921: A Comparative Study”, in Volker R. Berghahn and Martin Kitchen, \textit{Germany in the Age of Total War} (London, 1981), p. 92.} Despite the violence in the Czech lands, there was virtually no negative backlash against the new Czechoslovak state.\footnote{The British Government in particular was satisfied with the impeccable attitude of the Czech authorities to their Jewish population, and compared their reaction favourably to the situation in Poland: “The Jews and the War”, TNA (London), FO 371/3139.}

Poland by no means stood out as the principal anti-Semitic state among the various ‘successor states’ and lands of the former Russian Empire. In traditionally tolerant Hungary alone there were estimated to be 50 pogroms that occurred as part of the
‘White Terror’ reaction to Béla Kun’s 133-day, and Jewish-dominated, Communist regime of March 21 to August 1, 1919.279 Yet no state approached the number of excesses perpetrated against the Jewish population of the Ukraine by virtually all sides during the Civil War in South Russia. The White forces of General Anton Ivanovich Denikin, born near Warsaw in the town of Wloclawek in 1872, are estimated to have been responsible for over half the pogroms. Significant numbers were also perpetrated by Symon Petlyura’s Ukrainian National Army, Peasant (Green) forces and even the Bolshevik Red Army, whose reputation among the Jewish population of the Kresy was far better than those of all other forces with the exception of the German Imperial Army.280 Yet it was overwhelmingly Poland and the ‘Polish pogroms’ that dominated the popular imagination. The Ukraine was in the midst of civil war, and not in the remit of the Peace Conference, yet Poland was. It was therefore her reputation that was more immediately damaged by reports of anti-Jewish violence in mid-1919.281

The debate over Paris – A “New Era”?282

William Howard Taft, President of the United States between 1908 and 1912, outlined the optimistic view that many held of the Polish Minorities Treaty shortly after it was signed:

279 It was calculated that twenty out of twenty-three ministers in Kun’s government were of Jewish origin, including Béla Kun himself.
280 See Peter Kenez, The Civil War in South Russia:1919-1920: The Defeat of the Whites (Berkeley, Cal., 1977), pp. 170-171. Cf. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who in his recent survey of Russian-Jewish relations, Dvesti let v mestse (2001), estimates that of some 900 pogroms in the Ukraine 40% were perpetrated by forces led by Petlyura; 25% by the Green Army and various nationalist and anarchist groups; 17% by Denikin’s White forces and 8.5% by the Red Army: Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, Dvesti let v mestse (1795-1995) (Moscow, 2001), p. 157. The figure of 8.6% is noted for the proportion of pogroms perpetrated by the Red Army in Gitelman, Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics, pp. 158-168. The number of excesses perpetrated by Polish troops during Piłsudski’s invasion of the Ukraine in April-May 1920 is as yet unsubstantiated.
282 Dr. Leon’ Reich on the Minorities Treaty on June 29, 1919: Mendelsohn, Zionism in Poland, p. 107.
It is be hoped that the securities exacted in these treaties will be of a character more effective than were the requirement of the Congress of Berlin in respect to Rumania. Indeed, we can be sure that they will. The prejudice against the Jews still remains in those countries and cannot of course be eliminated by mere legislation. But Jews can be given equal rights and be protected in those rights, and secure the equality of opportunity through such protection. The League of Nations … will have power enough to see to it that treaties of this character are performed by nations which the war has in fact created.  

The American Jewish leaders who had had a hand in the drafting of the Minorities Treaty were also fulsome in their praise of the final document. Marshall, Adler and Sokolov wrote a letter of transmission to their representative in Warsaw, Dr Boris D. Bogen, in which they wished to “earnestly counsel our brethren in Poland to accept this charter and to enter upon their new relations unhesitatingly and contented with what has been granted to them.”

Yet this did not stop the usually mild Adler from warning that

The Jews in Poland ought to be prepared to enter fully into the citizenship which has been conferred upon them by this treaty, always provided that the Poles hold up their hand and agree to loyally live up to it, which I assume that they will do … But on the other hand, if this sort of persecution is to be continued the Poles must count upon every ounce of influence which the Jews

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possess throughout the world being thrown against them. In other words, we are more than prepared to be friends if they are prepared to be friends.\textsuperscript{285}

While Taft and the American Jewish leaders were not the only voice extolling the Treaties’ virtue,\textsuperscript{286} the many opponents became more vocal. Lewis Namier commented that “in 1918 Poland re-arose in a void … after a century of non-existence, Poland was intensely jealous of her “sovereignty” and of any “encroachment” upon it; she claimed to be a Great Power, and as such would not play the part of satellite to France … the Poles loathed the Minority Treaties and League control, “an indignity” not imposed on any other Great Power, not even on Germany”.\textsuperscript{287}

Namier was correct; the reaction within Poland to the ‘Little Versailles’ Treaty was extremely hostile. Germany was not required to sign a Minorities Treaty, a cause of consternation in Poland, which had raised legitimate questions about the position of the Polish minority within Germany through the course of the Conference.\textsuperscript{288} E. H. Carr interpreted this as “almost the only respect in which the peace-makers of Versailles recognised Germany’s equality of status with the other Great Powers”.\textsuperscript{289}

Despite the last minute concessions, Poles were still incensed by the infringement of their sovereignty. A later Polish account described how “Poland was one of the countries discriminated against [at Paris]. Compelled to accept the obligations in

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\textsuperscript{285} Adler to Bogen, July 2, 1919, US National Archives, (Washington), file no. 860c/4016/101.
\textsuperscript{288} In conversation with the Council of Four Padurewski said that the Poles “beg of you to provide for the Polish population that will remain under German domination the same rights concerning their language that will be granted to the Germans becoming citizens of the Republic of Poland” and later raising the question of “how can the League of Nations act in Germany?” (since she was not made a member until 1926): Meeting of the Council of Four, June 27, 1919: \textit{Mantoux}, Volume II, pp. 578-579. Headlam-Morley argued that the principles of the protection of minorities was only applicable to new states, or those receiving additional territories as a result of the Treaty; therefore, Germany did not meet these conditions: Headlam-Morley, “The Protection of Minorities”, in Temperley, op. cit., Volume V, p. 141.
\end{flushleft}
question, she made it clear from the very outset that she considered the minority obligations in question imposed upon her as insulting to her history, to her national dignity, and to the prestige of the State." Dmowski publicly renounced all responsibility for the Treaty, calling it “very obnoxious political nonsense” and forced the Polish Prime Minister to return to Poland alone. Yet Dmowski faced criticism from Maciej Rataj, a member of the PSL-Wysswolenie and future Marshal of the Sejm, who criticized the delegation in Paris for having “sent as one of the delegates a man who was one of the inaugurators of the anti-Jewish boycott” On his return to Poland at the end of July, Paderewski was able to get the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Sejm to ratify the Minorities Treaty by a vote of seven-to-one. Opposition was, however, far more vocal in the Constituent Sejm to the “imposition” (nakaz zgory) of the hated ‘little’ Treaty of Versailles. The assimilated Jewish deputy Herman Lieberman, speaking for the PPS, commented that the Allies were infringing Polish sovereignty as “nobody has the right to interfere in Russia’s internal affairs”, while he called the Minorities Treaty a “disgrace to Poland”.

The Polish press reacted hysterically, arguing that the Minorities Treaty was “something more than tactlessness and even indecency, it is the gauntlet thrown to truth and to our national honour … Wilson forgot his principles of honour and decency under the pressure of “the Jewish milliards” … we are on the eve of a civil war with the Jews … Wilson is throwing a blazing torch into accumulated powder.” Paderewski attempted to show the Minorities Treaty in a positive light, writing to Władysław Skrzyński, the Polish Deputy Foreign Minister, that he considered the Minorities Treaty to be a “victory” and that it should be presented to the Sejm in these terms. In reply Skrzyński informed Paderewski of the hostile reaction by the

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290 Stanislaw J. Paprocki (ed.), Minority Affairs in Poland: An Informatory Outline (Warsaw, 1935), p. 17. See also Józef Kruszyński, Żydzi i kwestia żydowska (Wloclawek, 1920); Kazimierz Kierski, Ochrona praw mniejszości w Polsce (Poznań, 1933); Stanisław Tworkowski, Polska bez Żydów (Warsaw, 1939).
291 Dmowski, Polityka Polska, p. 391; Nowy Dziennik, July 24, 1919, p. 1. Dmowski did not escape all blame. Herman Lieberman, speaking for the PPS, also criticised the appointment of Dmowski, who he argued “encouraged pogroms”: SSSU, 81st Session, July 30, 1919, p. 58.
292 Drożdowski, op. cit., p. 164.
293 SSSU, 81st Session, July 30, 1919, p. 50.
294 Ibid., p. 84.
295 Ibid., p. 90.
296 Myśl Niepodległa, July 12, 1919, no. 455.
297 Paderewski to Skrzyński, July 1, 1919: AAN (Warsaw), Paderewski 779. On July 24 Paderewski, speaking to the Sejm Peace Commission, commented that he felt the Minorities Treaty to be
various Polish parliamentary clubs, and the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee. With the very real prospect of the Treaty being not being ratified by the Sejm, Paderewski opened the debate over the Treaty, in a speech on July 30. He made it clear that there was not an option of refusing the Minorities Treaty and accepting the Treaty of Versailles:

>[t]he Treaty between Poland and the Principal Allied and Associated Powers was the result of Article 93 of the Peace Treaty with Germany, is organically bound up with it, is placed in the same book and is one of the principal conditions of our independence. There could be no talk of our not signing it. The Polish delegates signed the Peace Treaty because they were obliged to do so. It is quite the same thing with the ratification of the Treaty. The sanctioning of the one without the other would not bring us any advantage. It would be, if you will permit me to say so, an apolitical act. It would not in any way better our really unexpectedly good situation. On the contrary, it would be considered as an intended offence and might do harm to Poland.

Paderewski had done enough. The Minorities Treaty was passed on July 31, 1919 (although it was not ratified until January 10, 1920). Both the ‘Little’ and main Treaties of Versailles were passed by 286 votes to 41, with those voting against including the Jewish deputies Ignacy Schipper and Herman Lieberman and many of the more ‘tolerant’ left-wing deputies. The vote was not a true indication of hostility felt by Poles for the Minorities Treaty. Jan Ciechanowski, a Polish

“unnecessary”, blaming the Jews for influencing the British and American delegations against Poland: Wyndham to Balfour, July 28, 1919: TNA (London), FO 608/70.

298 Skrzyński to Paderewski, July 10, 1919: ibid.

299 SSSU, 81st Session, July 30, 1919, pp. 30-31; The Times reported that Paderewski “had to shoulder the responsibility for the signature of the clauses of the Treaty respecting minorities, which has been a bitter blow for the country … it was M. Paderewski’s eloquence that triumphed. In the Diet, which bitterly resented the forming of minority clauses of the Treaty on Poland by the Allies, he evoked rousing cheers when he turned to the diplomatic box where the Allied Ministers were sitting, and thanked them for the help which had been given to Poland”: “Paderewski’s Personal Triumph – Settling a Cabinet Crisis – Cheers for the Allies”, The Times, August 2, 1919, p. 11a.

300 Those voting against the Treaty included members of the Chrześcijański Związek Jedności Narodowej (Christian Alliance of National Unity), the Narodowa Partia Robotnicza (National Workers’ Party) and the PSL ‘Piast’. Wincenty Witos argued that Jews were creating a “ghetto” for themselves in the new Poland, and that deputies should be allowed to vote on the two Treaties separately: SSSU, 82nd Session, July 31, 1919, p. 47.

301 The Treaty of Versailles and the Minorities Treaty were ratified at the same time. In the same spirit that Dmowski had signed the Treaty, the ZLN deputes also ratified the Treaty. The majority of those voting against were socialists: SSSU, 82nd Session, July 31, 1919, p. 51; Wyndham to Balfour, August
diplomat at the London Embassy, commented that “after all, pogroms and anti-Jewish excesses had taken place in Poland” and if Poland accepted the Treaty, it could only help to repair Poland’s damaged international reputation. The Zionist deputies were a lone voice in open support of the Minorities Treaty. Thon, Grünbaum and Hartglas made impassioned speeches in defence of the Treaty. Thon, speaking “on behalf of three million Jews”, commented that “I am not begging for pity nor am I asking for charity, but I demand equal rights for my people”, which the Zionist felt could only be achieved by the imposition of external obligations on the Polish State. Their claim to speak for all minorities, a position forced upon themselves until the arrival of German deputies in 1920, reinforced the impression that Jews were not only a hostile voice, but also the only one.

Headlam-Morley warned that they “are clearly intending to stretch the provisions of the Treaty in a way which it was drawn up definitely to avoid.” Sir Percy Wyndham, the British Minister in Warsaw, commented that the “Zionist Organisation in Poland are attempting to interpret the Treaty … as meaning that these [Allied] Powers intend to encourage the principle of national autonomy for the Jews in Poland.”

Paderewski had little support from his chief of state, Piłsudski, who commented in an interview with Henry Morgenthau that the “articles in the Peace Treaty containing guarantees for religious and ethnic minorities in Poland insisted upon the fact that the

2, 1919: TNA (London), FO 608/70. While the ‘big’ Treaty of Versailles was published in Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej on April 26, 1920, the Minorities Treaty was omitted, and therefore did not pass into law until it was finally published on December 6 as a result of the intervention of Leo Motzkin and Isaac Grünbaum, Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Warsaw, 1920), Numbers 35, 110; Korzec, “Polen und der Minderheitenschutzvertrag”, pp. 526-527.

302 Ibid., p. 526.

303 At the Fourth Zionist Conference in Poland, held between August 19-24 at the Bajka moving picture theatre in Warsaw, Isaac Grünbaum “proved the connection between the work for Palestine and the fight for national rights in the countries of the Diaspora.” While he argued that “although not all the Jewish national demands have been satisfied [by the Minorities Treaty] … in the Treaty a platform that will serve to create in Poland sound and brotherly relations between the Jewish and Polish peoples”: Zionist Organisation to Wyndham, September 14, 1919: TNA (London), FO 3904/137578.

304 The Orthodox representatives, Halpern and Perlmutter, had changed their initial position that Jews, as loyal members of the state, should oppose outside intervention in Polish affairs. By July they were arguing that the Treaty was the only way that Jewish interests could be guaranteed: Bacon, Agudath Israel in Poland, pp. 380-383.

305 SSSU, 82

306 Headlam-Morley Minute, October 10, 1919: TNA (London), FO 371/3904/137578.

307 Wyndham to Curzon, September 26, 1919: TNA (London), FO 371/3904/137578.
bad feeling created in the country by these articles was due to the circumstances that all parties in Poland … [were] unanimous in desiring to assure the Jews complete equality before the laws, these articles created specific privileges in their favour."\(^{308}\)

Morgenthau replied, stating that the guarantees made in the Minorities Treaty “conceded to the Jews very few positive rights and were for the most part of a negative character.”\(^{309}\) Piłsudski’s reply summarised the views of many moderate Poles when he stated:

> [h]owever small the rights actually conceded by them may be, they created an authority outside the laws of the country and its legitimate authorities to which a part of the citizens would have a right to appeal. This … would manifestly not be conducive to establishing a state of harmony and good understanding between the Jews and the Christians in Poland. Whoever … wished to create a quarrel between two men had only to appoint a judge between them. Where there was a judge the lawsuits would certainly spring up, and the Polish Government had to be prepared for being continually attacked and called upon to answer before an international tribunal for the sole reason that such a tribunal existed. This must produce a feeling of bitterness in the Poles who are perfectly conscious of never having deserved to be treated with such distrust and who would find it very difficult or impossible to completely forget that the Jews had recourse to international factors instead of appealing to the national authorities and trusting the instincts of the Polish people who had given the best account of themselves so many times in the past and this … will leave a feeling of bitterness against the Jews whatever may happen.\(^{310}\)

Yet Poland did not reject the Treaty. Horace Rumbold, the new British Minister in Warsaw from October 1919, noted in a letter to Lucien Wolf at the Board of Deputies of British Jews that “Poland, whilst not liking the Treaty, accepted it without objecting to signature as other countries have done. It would, therefore, be a

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\(^{308}\) "Notes of an interview between Henry Morgenthau and General Piłsudski, August 2, 1919, at Vilna": Library of Congress (Washington, DC), Morgenthau, Subject File: Poland (1919-22), Container No. 21.

\(^{309}\) Ibid. Morgenthau’s hostility to the Minorities Treaty was widely reported in the Polish press, which quoted the Ambassador as stating that “undoubtedly there are mistakes in the Peace treaty”: *Kurier Warszawski*, July 17, 1919, p. 5.

\(^{310}\) Ibid.
somewhat invidious task to make representations to this country on the strength of its alleged intention to evade its obligation”. Yet it was clear that enforcement of the Minorities Treaty would present a far more pressing problem during the interwar period.

The Treaty is Signed, June 28, 1919 – “The Long Fight is Over and Won”

On June 28, the fifth anniversary of the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife in Sarajevo that had ignited the Great War, Paderewski and Dmowski drove to the Palace of Versailles, past crowds twenty deep, and duly signed the Treaty of Peace with Germany (See Map 5.1). In a discreet ante-room, the two Polish delegates also signed the Polish Minorities Treaty. Hudson commented that “we weren’t absolutely sure that they were going to sign until it was over.” Lucien Wolf wrote to Paderewski on June 28 to offer the Polish Premier his “sincere congratulations … it will, I am sure, be accepted with gratitude by my Polish co-religionists not only as a charter of Civil and Religious Liberty for themselves.”

While the Western Jewish representatives patted themselves on the back, their Eastern co-religionists had failed to gain what they desired out of the Treaty. Headlam-Morley observed that their “extreme views and irreconcilable spirit … had made a bad impression and that, had he not kept steadily before himself the terrible suffering

311 BDBJ (London), ACC/3121/C11/12/066.
312 The Polish government, despite the obligations of the Polish Minorities Treaty, passed its own legislation for determining Polish citizenship on January 20, 1920. The bill contained far more rigorous limitations on potential citizens, whereby large numbers of Jews from the Kresy were unable to provide the sufficient level of proof of residence in the Polish lands. Jolanta Zydul, Państwo w Państwie: autonomia narodowo-kulturalna w Europie Środkowowschodniej w XX wieku (Warsaw, 2000), pp. 78-80.
313 Adler to Racie Adler, June 29, 1919: Davis, op. cit., p. 491.
314 Hudson to Miller, July 1, 1919: Miller, My Diary, Volume XIII, p. 223.
316 Wolf described the signing of the Treaty as “a great day for us as for the rest of the world.” Cyrus Adler commented that the Minorities Treaties were the aspect that “interested us most”. Louis Marshall hailed the Minority Treaty as “the most important contribution to human liberty in Modern History”: Wolf Diary, June 28, 1919, p. 415; Adler to Racie Adler, June 29, 1919: Davis, op. cit., p. 490; Marshall to Isaac W. Frank, June 3, 1921; quoted in Morton Rosenstock, Louis Marshall, Defender of Jewish Rights (Detroit, Mich, 1965), p. 53. Marshall also complimented the Treaty “which ranks among the greatest state papers in the world’s history”: “Address by Hon. Louis Marshall”, in “The World Court and the Protection of Racial and Religious Minorities”, in Judaean Addresses, Volume III, p. 170.
of the poor Jews in Poland he would have lost all enthusiasm for the Minority Treaties”, as Miller had done before him calling it “a great muddle”.

Map 5.1: The Peace Settlements, 1919-1923


While all 14 of the Minorities Treaties for the various ‘successor states’ were drafted as a direct result of the reports of pogroms in Poland, the final draft of the Minorities Treaty did not reflect the demands of the Jewish lobbyists (See Map 5.2). In the final days before the Polish Minorities Treaty was signed, the Poles had managed to gain important concessions out of the Allies. Firstly, the qualifying date for Polish citizenship was fixed, not from the outbreak of the War in August 1914, as the Jews had asked for, but from the date that the Treaty was ratified. This disadvantaged large numbers of wartime refugees who found that they could be denied Polish citizenship.

317 Wolf Diary, June 28, 1919, p. 417.
as a result of the vague terminology of the Treaty.\footnote{See especially Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the Polish Minorities Treaty.} Secondly, Yiddish was to be given no government-funded support as it was not recognised as an official language, even though it was spoken by up to ten percent of the population; furthermore, the attempt to guarantee public funds for Jewish charitable and religious purposes was badly drafted and according to Pablo Azcárate, later the Director of the League’s Minorities Bureau, “drawn up in language so confused and sibylline that we were never able to discover its real meaning nor the value of its practical application”.\footnote{Azcárate, op. cit., pp. 60-61. See Dariusz Jeziorny, “Sprawa ochrony praw mniejszości żydowskiej w Polsce w dobie konferencji pokojowej w Paryżu w 1919 roku”, in Pawel Samuż (ed.), Z dziejów Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej (Łódź, 1995), pp. 37-61.} Thirdly, the Sabbath clause made no mention of the problem of Sunday trading, an issue of great economic importance to the Orthodox Jewish population of Poland, and so remained a source of tension between the Jewish minority and the Polish majority through the course of the Second Republic.\footnote{See Golczewski, Polnisch-Jüdische Beziehungen, pp. 275-280; Marcus, Social and Political History of the Jews in Poland, pp. 213-215.}

Map 5.2: The ‘Belt of Minority States’
In the settlement of Polish affairs at the Peace Conference, the French played a less important role than the British. Although Poland was in the French ‘sphere of influence’, the French consistently failed to support their ally. Dmowski commented that, while “all that we realised at the Conference we owe primarily to France”, the Poles only received French backing on claims “to the extent they corresponded to French understanding of things.”

This was most clearly illustrated in the case of Clemenceau reversing French support for Polish claims to Marienwerder and Danzig, in return for the ultimately empty Anglo-American Guarantee of Security to France. E. J. Dillon summarised the opinions of the East European delegates when he stated that “henceforth the world will be governed by the Anglo-Saxon peoples, who in turn, are swayed by their Jewish elements”. Lloyd George pointed out that he was “not the least anti-Polish,” but observed that he was

\[\text{[f]ully alive to the fact that they have got large numbers of Germans, Jews, Russians and other non-Polish peoples already in their country. From the start, therefore [I have] held that the best friend of Poland was the man who set his face against the inclusion in Poland of non-Polish nationals.}\]

H. J. Paton remarked on “the weaknesses arising from the presence of too many nationalities within the Polish frontiers, and it may be added that the presence of so many Jews with their own language, religion, customs, and aspiration gave rise to many difficulties which are not always treated in the most reasonable way by either side.”

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323 Dillon, op. cit., p. 497.
324 Lloyd George to Rumbold, December 15, 1919, NAS (Edinburgh), Lothian GD40/17/911/2. In his reply Rumbold commented that “I think the Poles are perhaps the most difficult people I have ever had to deal with. They are real kittle–cattle, but of course that makes the place all the more interesting”: Rumbold to Kerr, December 29, 1919, NAS (Edinburgh), Lothian GD 40/17/911/3.
Conclusion

The slipshod method of drafting the League Covenant, and the subsequent imposition of the Minorities Treaties on the ‘Successor States’, immensely weakened the moral authority of the League as a guarantor of minority rights. Furthermore, while the League had the obligation to pursue infringements of the Treaties, it had no requirement to enforce the Treaties. There were weaknesses not only in the Treaties, but in the Peace Conference itself that undermined the Minority Treaties. Even at the Congress of Vienna a century earlier, the Great Powers had concluded a Peace Treaty with France before embarking on the Congress that would define the shape of Europe for a century. At Paris, with the fate of large portions of the world at stake, not only was the Peace Treaty with Germany to be finalised, but the very status of Russia, until 1917 still potentially the most powerful state in Europe, was undecided. These problems almost paralysed the Peace Conference from the start. The first two months of the Conference merely drifted, and only with the urgency felt at the impending signing did matters begin to move along more quickly. In this rush the problem of Minority Protection was almost forgotten. Provision for the protection of Minorities had been left out of the League Covenant, and the issue was only forced back on the international agenda by events in the Kresy. Poland had, to some extent, only had herself to blame for the imposition of the hated ‘Little’ Versailles Treaty. In the Ukraine and Russia, where anti-Jewish violence was undoubtedly far more extensive, there would have been more attention paid to the pogroms in the Ukraine, if Russia and/or the Ukraine had been present at the Conference. Allied experts and commissions moved all through Poland in the first months of Polish independence, sending copious material back to their respective governments. One problem that figured large was the Jewish one. In lieu of Russian participation at the Peace Conference, it was Poland that became the focus in the East. Reports by Cohen and

326 Professor Gilbert Murray, a British academic and co-founder of Oxfam, wrote that “it was an error of principle in the Peace Treaties to impose the clauses for the due protection of Minorities upon the new nations alone. The same obligations should have been accepted by the Great Powers, and made part of the common law of Europe”: Gilbert Murray, “Introduction”, in L. B. Mair, The Protection of Minorities: The Working Scope of the Minorities Treaties under the League of Nations (London, 1928), p. vii.

327 Many influential participants openly criticised the Conference soon after it had finished, and from all nations. Among the British: Lloyd George, op. cit.; Hankey, op. cit.; Keynes, op. cit.; Nicholson, op. cit.. American: Robert Lansing, The Big Four and Others of the Peace Conference (London, 1922); Haskins and Lord, op. cit.. And among the French, principally by Clemenceau: op. cit..
Brailsford, and to a lesser extent the largely discredited Zionist accounts, focussed Jewish and international attention on Poland.

Nor was the new Polish state served well by her representatives in Paris. Dmowski, always an unpopular figure with the British establishment, was the chief Polish delegate at vital times in the Conference. Minority provisions were not necessarily imposed to safeguard the Jewish population under the Paderewski-Piłsudski regime, but to protect against the prospect of an administration under Dmowski, who during the course of the War was widely acknowledged to be the Polish leader in waiting. Paderewski, who was generally liked and respected, was also to some extent a failure at the Conference principally due to his lack of political expertise. Yet it is difficult to see who among the Polish political elite could have been more successful at Paris. The moderate Zaleski was too young and did not command the support of the KNP, and all the figures of the right stood in Dmowski’s shadow.

Polish ‘failure’ at the Paris Peace Conference was not a direct result of the influence of the Jewish lobby. Most of the Polish reverses had occurred over the future western territories of the new state, such as the fate of the Free City of Danzig, the plebiscite for Upper Silesia, and the compromise over Teschin. Polish ‘imperialist’ policy in the East had considerably harmed Polish prestige in the eyes of the Allied leaders. General Louis Botha, the head of the Armistice Commission, commented that “the Bolshevik danger is nothing but a bogey” and then compared Polish actions in Galicia with German aggression against Belgium. Earlier Polish territorial gains, such as in Upper Silesia, were now under threat, Lloyd George insisted that a plebiscite was required before the economically important province was ceded to

329 Lucien Wolf wrote that “the Jewish delegations were not the final and decisive forces that were at work. These they had to seek in the high statesmanship and unwearingly good will of the Conference itself, of the Allied and Associated Powers and more particularly of the Commission of New States and on which the great altruistic traditions of British policy were so worthily and admirably represented by … Mr. Headlam-Morley” “Mr. Lucien Wolf – Guest of the Maccabees – Tribute to his Work”, Jewish Chronicle, June 11, 1920, p. 15.
330 On the Polish offensive in Eastern Galicia, Lloyd George commented that “the Poles are doing everything required to revive Bolshevism, just at the very time it is about to die.” Wilson commented that the “existence of Poland and the determination of her borders depend on us”: Meeting of the Council of Four, May 21, 1919: Mantoux, Volume II, p. 152.
331 Ibid., p. 150.
Poland. None of these issues were of any importance to the ‘Jewish lobby.’ Their interest lay squarely with their Jewish co-religionists, the majority of whom both lived and were mistreated in the Eastern Kresy. Arguably the question of the Kresy was not even settled in Paris. A later Allied attempt, such as with the ‘Curzon Line’, had little effect. It was the Polish-Soviet War of 1920-1921 that defined the Polish eastern borders until Poland was partitioned for a fourth time in 1939.

It is difficult to disagree with Headlam-Morley’s own conclusion that the Minority Treaties had “not really pleased either the Jews or the Poles.” It became apparent that the increasingly right-wing dominated Polish State would be unwilling to grant any rights that were not required by the Minorities Treaty. Ultimately by leaving the full responsibility for dealing with infringements of the Treaty to the as yet unborn League of Nations, the Great Powers were effectively washing their hands of the problems facing the Jewish population in Poland. In 1919 the full ineffectiveness of the League was still not yet apparent. It was not the fault of Jewish delegations that the League was unworkable, and little more than a talking shop. Eric Hobsbawm commented that the League “proved an almost total failure, except as an institution for collecting statistics.” As a body charged with upholding the Treaty provision, it was totally inadequate. Minority problems could have been eased if boundaries had been redrawn at the expense of economic considerations, but outwith massive population transfers, it is difficult to see what could have adequately solved the

332 Headlam-Morley argued that the conclusions of the Commission on Polish Affairs were “quite indefensible; we have assumed that because there is an ethnographic majority of Poles, the country ought to go to Poland without consulting the wishes of the population”: Diary, June 1, 1919: Headlam-Morley, Memoir, p. 135.
333 See Chapter I, n. 25.
334 Headlam-Morley to Koppel, June 30, 1919: Headlam-Morley, Memoir, p. 179. Wolf was more positive, arguing that despite “two kinds of mischief makers - on the one hand the violent anti-Semites, and on the other the extreme Jewish Nationalists. We have, however, in the Minorities Treaties so solid a basis to work upon that I think we can look forward to the future with a great deal of confidence”: Wolf Diary, September 16, 1919, p. 623. Subsequent historians disagreed with Headlam-Morley, asserting that the Minorities Treaty was a victory for the Jews: Janowsky, op. cit., Macartney, op. cit., Viefhaus, op. cit.
335 Margaret MacMillan commented that they were a “feeble gesture in the face of growing national chauvinism”: MacMillan, Peacemakers, p. 497.
problem. A. J. Balfour observed that “we should put the whole area in charge of a genius. We have no genius’s \(\textit{sic}\) available.”

Through the course of the inter-war years the British Government, for example, would happily ignore Wolf’s protests about the conditions of the Jewish population in Poland, by merely reminding the Secretary of the Joint Foreign Committee that such problems were the “responsibility of the League of Nations.” Alfred Cobban observed that “the League took effective action only when it was pushed into it by the championship of a state powerful enough to have intervened in defence of the minority had there been no League or minority treaties at all”. Of 525 petitions to the League between 1920 and 1931 claiming violations to the Minorities Treaties, signed by fourteen states, 155 were made against Poland. The majority of the 155, a total of 104, were made by German nationals, with only 33 submitted by Jews.

Wolf wrote to the Polish delegates to the League of Nations on November 29, 1920, commenting that “it would appear that the Jews of that country [Poland] are still the victims of a serious persecution … their political and civil rights as guaranteed to them by the Constitution and by international Treaty are frequently ignored by the

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338 In what is considered to be the first modern genocide, the ‘Armenian Horrors’, perpetrated by the Ottoman Turks against the Christian population of Asia Minor between 1915 and 1922 ‘ethnic cleansing’ effectively took place, but could hardly be said to have provided a solution.


343 Between 1931 and 1935 numerous complaints from Ukrainian nationals were made against the Polish state. Between 1920 and 1931, in addition to the petitions by German and Jews, there were: Ukrainian, 85; Lithuanian, 19; Belorussian, 6; ibid.
authorities and no redress has been obtainable from the [Polish] Government”.\(^{344}\) He had been reluctant to bring complaints directly before the Poles but was forced to do so as a result of the attitude of the British Government. He commented that by taking such a course he was making a “pledge of confidence in the wise patriotism and high sense of justice of the Polish Nation.”\(^{345}\) In reply, Wolf was assured by Professor Szymon Askenazy, the first Polish representative to the League of Nations, that “the minority rights guaranteed by the treaty of Versailles, accepted by the Government and ratified by the Diet of Poland, though not yet proclaimed … have become law in the country. No discrimination is officially made in regard to race or religion of the citizens, all of them enjoying the same political and civil rights. Any transgression of this principle, if brought to the knowledge of the Government, will not remain unpunished.”\(^{346}\)

The Jewish minority in Poland was the ultimate loser in the compromise over the right to appeal to the League of Nations. The Jews had neither effective protection under the Minorities Treaty, nor the prospect of better relations with the Polish majority to look forward to. The nature of the drafting of the Polish Minorities Treaty, which was widely perceived to be an insult to Polish honour, was effectively to poison Polish-Jewish relations throughout the history of the Second Republic, seemingly reinforcing the Jews’ position as outsiders, alien to the Polish majority, and unable to assimilate into Polish society. Yet, of the nations forced to sign the Minorities Treaties, Poland alone experienced anti-Jewish violence on a large scale up to mid-1919. Although it was not only in Poland that the Minorities Treaties were resented among the Successor States,\(^{347}\) the exclusive and divisive ‘Jewish clauses’ ensured that the Polish

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345 Ibid.
346 Professor Askenazy was an exception in the reborn Poland. From an Orthodox Jewish family in Zawichost, he became fully assimilated into Polish society and in 1902 was appointed Professor of History at the University of Lwów, later becoming a member of the Polska Akademia Umiejętności (Polish Academy of Sciences) in 1909. He was the first official Polish representative (with Paderewski) to the League of Nations between 1920 and 1923. The memorandum further noted that the “relations between the Jewish and Christian Nationals of Poland, though considerably improved, are not yet what they should be”: Askenazy to Wolf, December 5, 1920: BDBJ (London), ACC/3121/C11/12/67.
347 For example, Jews were only granted citizenship in Romania in March 1923, after long debate over the Peace Treaties in Romania, by which she had gained Hungarian Transylvania, Austrian Bukovina and Russian Bessarabia, including their significant Jewish populations: I. C. Butnaru, The Silent Holocaust: Romania and its Jews (New York, 1992), p. 34; Mendelsohn, Jews of East Central Europe, p. 184.
Minorities Treaty would be uniquely damaging to the relations between the majority Catholic population and its Jewish minority.
Conclusions

This thesis has sought to provide a new way to understand Polish-Jewish relations during the first months of Polish Independence, before the revived state was formally recognised by the Allied and Associated Powers at Versailles on June 28, 1919. Studies on this topic have tended to focus on dealings between the two groups either on an international or a domestic level, but have not sought to provide a synthesis of these two trends. In viewing these facets in isolation, previous studies have missed the crucial fact that they are integrally linked. The main theme of this thesis is the fundamental importance of the connection between Polish-Jewish relations at the international level and the domestic situation in Poland. During the crucial months between November 1918 and June 1919 the achievement of international recognition for the newly established Polish state was of such overriding significance to all strands of Polish politics and society that any challenge to Polish sovereignty from any threats, real or imagined, was magnified. The Poles believed that there were a number of obstacles and threats to their newly won independence: other national groups, the various strands in Russian politics struggling for power in the civil war, and the defeated Germans. Most of all, there was the perceived disloyalty of the country’s Jewish population and its co-religionists abroad who were both seen to be merely lukewarm at best, or more usually hostile, to Poland regaining her independence. Jews were regarded as supporters of other, rival, national groups, as well as adherents of hostile political doctrines, such as Zionism and Bolshevism. The apparent threat from ‘international Jewry’ to Polish interests that were to be decided by the victorious Allies at the Paris Peace Conference in the first six months of 1919 inevitably coloured Polish-Jewish relations thereafter.

In addition, the thesis seeks to explore a significant subsidiary theme: the longer-term causes and immediate consequences of the incidents of anti-Jewish violence occurring in the first months after the proclamation of the Second Polish Republic on November 11, 1918. The final figures of Jews killed during the first months of Polish Independence, at least 305 according to the author’s estimate, may seem insignificant in comparison to the
many thousands of Jews murdered in the Russian civil war (let alone the millions killed during the Shoah). Yet, the publicity generated in western Europe and North America around the ‘pogroms in Poland’ far exceeded that in relation to the contemporary Ukrainian pogroms. Due to the chaotic nature of the Russian civil war, whereby responsibility for actions against Jewish communities could not always be easily apportioned, and in the absence of western observers, news of the pogroms in the Ukraine only gradually filtered through to the west. The involvement of Poland as an ‘Allied belligerent nation’ at the Peace Conference focused western attention on Poland as never before. Furthermore, the election of Jewish deputies to the Sejm Ustawodawczy and the relative freedom of the press allowed Jewish representatives to voice their protests to the Polish authorities, as well as to the Allied and Jewish representatives in the west. Their complaints and the incidents of anti-Jewish violence were picked up by Jewish organisations abroad. In this way the issue of anti-Jewish violence metamorphosed into the minorities’ question that would prove to be one of the principal issues faced by the Paris Peace Conference. Despite the serious question of German and other national minorities being placed under Polish rule, it was the fate of the Jewish population of Poland which proved the more vexatious matter. As Jewish deputies were the only representatives of minorities elected to the new Sejm, the impression grew that Poland did not necessarily have a minorities problem, but rather a Jewish problem, and one that was not limited merely to the domestic sphere. Much to the Poles’ chagrin this issue was being played out on the world stage, with even their right of sovereignty being called into question.

At the start of the thesis an attempt was made to examine the background to Polish-Jewish relations in 1918/1919 by looking at the context of the poor footing in which Poles and Jews found themselves on the eve of Polish independence. After the failure of the Polish uprising in 1863 the ‘otherness’ or ‘alien’ nature of the principally Orthodox Jewish population had been reinforced by the failure of assimilation and the almost exclusively Catholic nature of ‘praca organiczna’ in the face of the anti-Polish programmes of the partitionist powers. The steady rise in national consciousness affected the lands of partitioned Poland as much as any other in nineteenth-century Europe. The
strand of nationalism that dominated Polish national feeling, that of ‘ethnic nationalism’, combined with the religious and linguistic definition of who made a Pole, naturally excluded unassimilated Polish Jews. The anti-Semitic nature of National Democrat ideology also effectively barred assimilated Polish Jews from the Endek concept of a Polish naród. This was arguably the result of the parallel rise of, and the perceived threat from, Zionism, the new political force of Jewish nationalism. Given a political significance far in excess of its relatively small support, many Polish nationalists saw in Zionism a new rival, one that they argued did not have a case. Economic rivalry, too, provided cause for tension between the two groups in the years before 1914, a period marked by rapid industrialisation within the Congress Kingdom. Conflict was increasingly coming into the open, shown most obviously with the commencement of the divisive economic boycott of Jewish businesses, in the wake of Dmowski’s humiliation in the elections for the Fourth State Duma in 1912. The First World War merely served to heighten these conflicts and divisions. Anti-Jewish violence, and indeed coercion against all non-combatant civilians, was normalised in much of the war zone of the Eastern Front. Both the anti-Jewish measures employed by the Imperial Russian Army and the appearance in Western Europe of Dmowski as the unpalatable face of Polish nationalism convinced Jewish leaders in the west that active political participation in Polish affairs by their co-religionists in Poland was essential. The perceived disloyalty of the mass of the Jewish population in the war further formed the idea among Polish nationalists that the Jews now constituted a hostile element in the diverse ethnic groups in the Kresy between the newly formed Polish state and the remnants of the former Tsarist Empire. On the eve of Polish independence Jews were seen as a threat by many Poles to the sovereignty and territorial ambitions of the new state.

Thus, the key to Polish-Jewish relations during the course of the Second Polish Republic has to be sought in the events that occurred during the first months of independence. It was in this atmosphere that the first instances of Polish anti-Jewish violence occurred at the very moment the Polish state was reborn. In the wake of the collapse of Austro-German military authority in late 1918 the Jewish population in Galicia attempted to form militia and self-defence units but were quickly disbanded in areas of firm Polish
control. With the failure of Jewish self-defence, Jewish communities were increasingly forced to appeal to the Allies for help against the wave of anti-Jewish violence. The declaration of Polish sovereignty on November 11 was both preceded and accompanied by violence, especially in the ethnically mixed and disputed territory of East Galicia. In particular, the Jewish minority was caught between the Poles and Ukrainians in the highly charged atmosphere surrounding the conflict over control of the city of Lwów, the provincial capital. The decision of the majority of the Jewish population to remain neutral was not only sensible, but was arguably the only possible conclusion that they could draw in the circumstances. Nevertheless, a Jewish militia was established in the city. The heightened tension that accompanied its formation, and the resentment felt by the Poles towards the Jewish population of Lwów for its declaration of neutrality (which was more readily seen as blatant treachery), helped create an atmosphere in which anti-Jewish violence was almost inevitable. Yet events in Przemyśl showed that firm action could have been taken by the Polish Command to avoid the ensuing bloodshed in Lwów. In Polish and some western historical accounts the impression is given that the destruction of the Jewish quarter of the city was the result of street fighting during the three weeks of Ukrainian control. This conclusion requires modification. It is clear that what occurred in Lwów was indeed a pogrom, although there were fewer Jewish victims than has been hitherto accepted. The fact that the Jewish quarter, itself situated away from the centre of the city, was only entered by Polish forces after the withdrawal of the Ukrainian troops would also imply that some form of ‘punitive military expedition’ was intended against the Jewish quarter.

Contemporary interpretations and debates over the events in Lwów were almost as damaging to Polish-Jewish relations as the actual pogrom itself. These spiralled downwards, exacerbating mutual suspicions. In an attempt to prompt Allied intervention in Poland Jewish organisations, sometimes understandably in the confused and chaotic circumstances they were working in, inflated Jewish casualty figures. This not only caused further indignation and outrage among Poles both in the new state and those working for Polish independence in the west but fundamentally undermined the
credibility of the Zionists in the eyes of the Allies when the true number of victims was ascertained.

The establishment of the pillars of the Polish state, principally the democratic institutions of the Sejm, as well as the growing importance given to building up the armed forces, contributed to a further decline in relations during the first six months of 1919. Disappointment over the poor performance of the Jewish parties in the first Polish parliamentary elections, as well as the increasing atmosphere of anti-Jewish discrimination (odżydzenie), combined with the return of anti-Jewish violence that accompanied Piłsudski’s Easter campaign in the disputed Polish-Byelorussian-Lithuanian borderlands and the arrival of General Haller’s Błękitna Armia in the already tense atmosphere in East Galicia, led Jews in Poland and abroad to look to the Allies at the Peace Conference to guarantee their and other minority rights throughout Eastern Europe. The anarchic violence of November 1918 had subsided, yet the larger pogroms, anti-Jewish riots and executions at Pińsk, Lida, Wilno, Częstochowa, Cracow and Warsaw occurred not only in the blurred war zones of the Kresy but in the very centre of ethnic Poland itself, hitherto exempt from anti-Jewish violence. To a certain extent it is irrelevant whether these incidents can indeed be classified as ‘pogroms’, especially given the emotive connotations associated with this word. Previous scholarship has sometimes stalled merely when asked to describe whether the events even took place. It is sufficient to conclude that there were significant acts of anti-Jewish violence perpetrated against the Jewish population of the Kresy by Polish units, yet they did not always conform to the traditional definition of a pogrom, namely the predetermined act of violence by a dominant group. Furthermore, in contrast to the earlier bloodshed associated with the declaration of Polish independence, these acts had occurred after the Polish state had been fully established. Despite the existence of parliamentary rule in Poland, the hostile and defensive nature of this institution, combined with the unsympathetic reaction of supposedly liberal and sympathetic figures such as the Prime Minister, Paderewski and the Head of State, Piłsudski, drove many Jewish political leaders in Poland to the conclusion that rights for the Jewish minority could only be guaranteed through international intervention. Polish anti-Semitism, viewed as all-pervasive by many in the
west and most Jews, and not merely as the preserve of the army, manifested itself in the
ambivalent attitude of the state towards employing Jews. Poles, for so long discriminated
against while under foreign rule when government appointed jobs were allocated, gave
the impression that now they had achieved independence they would merely continue the
practice but in favour of the Polish population.

At the Paris Peace Conference the Allies had to come to a view both on the boundaries of
the new Polish State and on the contentious issue of Jewish minority rights. The vague
idea of national self-determination advocated by Wilson and accepted by all of the Allies
to a greater or lesser extent came to dominate territorial questions at the Peace
Conference. The Poles, who generally gained less than the exaggerated claims they made
to the peacemakers, tended to blame the influence of the ‘Jewish lobby’ for their relative
failure at Paris. This was emphatically not the case. There was no single ‘Jewish lobby’,
as the divisions between the Zionist and Assimilationist factions were too deep to
surmount. The attempt to speak with one voice, through the Comité des Delegations
Juifs auprès la Conférence de la Paix, failed miserably. Arguments over whether a
‘Palestinian solution’ or a ‘Polish solution’ should solve the Jewish question in Poland
were not effectively resolved. The Zionists, who were experiencing their first real
exposure on the world stage, primarily hoped for the former, and inevitably harmed the
latter. The Jewish populations, concentrated in the major Polish cities and the Shtetlekh
of the eastern borderlands, were the primary concern of the Jewish representatives at
Paris. Questions over the Polish-German border were of little or no interest to Jewish
lobbyists, whether Zionist or Assimilationist. Polish reverses over Danzig, Upper Silesia
and Marienwerder were the result of the wrangles between the national interests of the
Allied and Associated Powers at Paris, not as a result of lobbying from Jewish
representatives, as has often been alleged. Divisions among the Polish political elite,
combined with their aggressive (often cited as ‘imperialist’) military programme in the
Kresy, did more harm to their interests than the isolated voices of a few Jewish lobbyists.

Minority problems at the Paris Peace Conference, highlighted most prominently by the
‘Jewish question’ in Poland, were ‘resolved’ by the Allies through the imposition of the
Polish Minorities Treaty which served as a model for the subsequent treaties imposed upon the other ‘successor states’. In the making of this treaty the ‘Jewish lobby’ was not as effective or influential as has been argued by many Polish historians, despite the imposition of the ‘Jewish clauses’ exclusive to the Polish Minorities Treaty that the Allies felt were not required in any of the other treaties. The special conditions in Poland had not only dictated that minority protection was required, but that the Jewish population was especially in need of protection from the Polish majority. Although the potential for genocide was not present in the Polish borderlands, a hostile, and in some cases anti-Semitic, Polish army proved increasingly difficult to control, even when Piłsudski himself was at the head of his troops, as he was in Wilno. The incident at Pińsk, while arguably not a pogrom, was a horrific act fuelled by a potent mixture of anti-Semitism and paranoia. As a regrettable incident in the Polish-Byelorussian borderlands occurring during the first months of the growing Polish-Bolshevik War, it would have remained obscure had it not been for the timing, occurring as it did at a crucial juncture of the Peace Conference. With the German Peace terms at last somewhere near their complete form, the Conference could turn towards other pressing matters, one of which was the minorities’ question. The most fundamental determinant in the imposition of the Minorities Treaties upon the ‘successor states’ was the Polish anti-Jewish violence in the Kresy. A combination of Jewish pressure and Allied concern over the minorities question allowed for the eventual solution that the Peace Conference came up with. Yet the failure both to include a universal system of minority protection in the Covenant of the League of Nations and to allow minorities a direct right of appeal to the Council of the League inevitably harmed both the integrity of the Minority Treaties and their effectiveness. Even with the sympathy of Wilson and Lloyd George, none of the Jewish lobbyists could exercise effective control over the Allied peacemakers gathered at Paris. The Committee on New States, under the direction of Sir James Headlam-Moley, was influenced by his friendship with Lucien Wolf, the most moderate of the Jewish lobbyists. Yet Wolf did not get his way over the right of appeal to the League, even with the considerable support of Lord Robert Cecil. Finally a comparison between Polish attempts to modify the text of the Polish Minorities Treaty and that of the Treaty later imposed upon the Czechoslovak
state further highlights the inept performance of the various Poles who represented their state’s interests at the Paris Peace Conference.

Polish-Jewish relations were irrevocably harmed by the Polish Minorities Treaty. While widely welcomed in 1919 by both Jewish and minority leaders, the gains and concessions granted to the Jewish minority in Poland remained rather illusory. The damage was wrought not through the guarantees given by the Treaty, but more through the impression that ‘international Jewry’ was working against the interests of the Polish state, and that by association the Jewish population at home was itself also disloyal to the Polish cause, much as they had been seen through the course of the First World War. As Polish patriots saw their newly regained sovereignty as of supreme importance, the greatest threat was perceived to come from the Jewish population, whether through their supposed support for Bolshevism (Żydokomuna), or their attempts to motivate Allied opinion against Polish interests at Paris. The foremost focus of Polish opposition was to the Minorities Treaty, which did more to poison relations between the two groups during the interwar period than almost any other issue, through to September 1934 when the Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel Józef Beck, renounced Polish obligations that had been undertaken in the summer of 1919. Yet the Polish Minorities Treaty did not gestate in a vacuum. The Treaty was a direct result of the violent outpouring of anti-Jewish sentiment, present right from the birth of the new Polish state. The ill feeling caused on both sides by this was the most important factor in determining the course of Polish-Jewish relations between the wars.

The history of Polish-Jewish relations between November 1918 and June 1919 left a legacy which deeply affected the whole history of the Second Polish Republic and beyond. On one level Polish-Jewish relations moved onto a new level, as previously interaction between the two groups had been between two subservient peoples. The situation had much changed with the declaration of Polish independence. Their relationship, which had been strained increasingly since the 1860s, declined rapidly in the wake of anti-Jewish violence in Galicia and the Kresy during those first few months of independence in 1918-1919. These factors immeasurably strengthened Polish-Jewish
suspicion and were the basis for hostility between the two groups during the interwar period. The country’s Jewish question was emphatically not answered during this period of 1918 to 1919, and arguably widened into a more complicated ‘minorities question’ after the Polish ‘successor wars’ were finally resolved by 1922 with the acquisition of large numbers of non-Polish nationals. Jewish groups emerged from the first year of independence with little to show for their efforts. Parliamentary representation and a treaty to protect minorities were offset by the bitter resentment of the Polish majority and the nagging doubt that the Jewish population of Poland would not be able to take advantage of the Minorities Treaty. The conclusion must be that Polish-Jewish relations fundamentally never fully recovered from the shock of the events of November 1918.

To date certain assumptions have characterised all analyses of Polish-Jewish relations during this period. Although the conclusions of the many historians that have studied this topic are varied, a single thread has run through them, namely their failure both to look at the incidents in sufficient detail or with sufficient detachment and consequently fully integrate the analysis of the ‘Polish pogroms’ into the historiography of the larger question of Polish-Jewish relations. In attempting to assess the influence of the ‘Polish pogroms’ on the wider question of Polish-Jewish interaction, the historian has to examine the widest possible selection of published and archival sources in several languages. This study has attempted to form a clearer picture of the dramatic events of late 1918 and early 1919, based upon a wide array of published and archival sources, with the exception of the Zionist archives held in Jerusalem. As a result historians should be able to appreciate more fully the position of the Jews in the Second Polish Republic, while the divisive role played by the ‘Polish pogroms’ can now be more integrally woven into the historiography of Polish-Jewish relations. In addition, the grievances of the Jewish population against the Polish majority after 1919 can be more fully appreciated. The role played by the ‘Jewish lobby’, in particular the Zionists, in promoting the anti-Polish attitude of the Anglo-Saxon representatives in Paris has long been the matter of partisan controversy. Many pro-Polish historians, concentrating on Polish claims at Paris, have tended to portray the Zionist movement as achieving high influence. This was certainly not the case. Jewish scholars have tended to concentrate on Jewish claims to Palestine,
and have lost sight of the divergent claims made regarding the Polish lands in the wake of the Great War. There had always existed a bewildering variety of Jewish political parties and groups, who even in the face of what many Jewish leaders saw to be a potential genocide against the Jewish population of Eastern Europe, could not agree on unified action. As a result of the events of 1918-1919 new internal divisions arose in Jewish politics out of their intellectual leaders’ response to the growing challenges faced by their co-religionists in the disputed lands of the Kresy. The example of the Jewish minority in Poland served as an example to the Allied peacemakers of the potential dangers of leaving exposed ethnic and religious minority populations without sufficient protection, yet there was little that they could do save the imposition of the bitterly resented Polish Minorites Treaty.

While hopefully this thesis has cast more light on what became the key period of Polish-Jewish relations in the new Republic much still needs to be done. It was the original intention of this study to examine Polish-Jewish relations during the entire period from the establishment of Polish independence up to and including the subsequent Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1921. This conflict, often seen as the defining moment in Polish independence, bound up with the ‘Miracle on the Vistula’, and the Jewish contribution, or lack of it, to the Polish effort, is in need of deeper investigation, in particular its impact on Polish-Jewish relations. The larger question of Jewish diplomacy during the interwar period with relation to minority rights has been recently undertaken by the American scholar Carole Fink, but a wider historical study of the Minorities Treaties, despite a flurry of interest in the 1930s and 1940s when they were crumbling, is required, as almost all recent examination of the Treaties dwell upon their impact on international law alone.
Appendix I: The Polish Minorities Treaty

TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE, ITALY AND JAPAN, AND POLAND

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, the BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE, ITALY and JAPAN, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, on the one hand;

And POLAND, on the other hand;

WHEREAS the Allied and Associated Powers have by the success of their arms restored to the Polish nation the independence of which it had been unjustly deprived; and

WHEREAS by the proclamation of 30 March 1917 the Government of Russia assented to the re-establishment of an independent Polish State; and

WHEREAS the Polish State, which now in fact exercises sovereignty over those portions of the former Russian Empire which are inhabited by a majority of Poles, has already been recognised as a sovereign and independent State by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers; and

WHEREAS under the Treaty of Peace concluded with Germany by the Allied and Associated Powers, a Treaty of which Poland is a signatory, certain portions of the former German Empire will be incorporated in the territory of Poland; and

WHEREAS under the terms of the said Treaty of Peace, the boundaries of Poland not already laid down are to be subsequently determined by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers;

The United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, on the one hand, confirming their recognition of the Polish State, constituted within the said limits as a sovereign and independent member of the family of nations, and being anxious to ensure the execution of the provisions of Article 93 of the said Treaty of Peace with Germany;
Poland, on the other hand, desiring to conform her institutions to the principles of liberty and justice, and to give a sure guarantee to the inhabitants of the territory over which she has assumed sovereignty;

For this purpose the HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES represented as follows:

[Names of plenipotentiaries not listed here.]

After having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

CHAPTER I

Article 1

Poland undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 2 to 8 of this Chapter shall be recognised as fundamental laws, and that no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.

Article 2

Poland undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Poland without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

All inhabitants of Poland shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals.

Article 3

Poland admits and declares to be Polish nationals *ipso facto* and without requirement of any formality German, Austrian, Hungarian or Russian nationals habitually resident at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty in territory which is or may be recognised as forming part of Poland, but subject to any provisions in the Treaty of Peace.
with Germany or Austria respectively relating to persons who became resident in such territory after a specified date.

Nevertheless, the persons referred to above who are over eighteen years of age will be entitled under the conditions contained in the said Treaties to opt for any other nationality which may be open to them. Option by a husband will cover his wife and option by parents will cover their children under eighteen years of age.

Persons who have exercised the above right to opt must, except where it is otherwise provided in the Treaty of Peace with Germany, transfer within the succeeding twelve months their place of residence to the State for which they have opted. They will be entitled to retain their immovable property in Polish territory. They may carry with them their movable property of every description. No export duties may be imposed upon them in connection with the removal of such property.

Article 4

Poland admits and declares to be Polish nationals ipso facto and without requirement of any formality persons of German, Austrian, Hungarian or Russian nationality who were born in the said territory of parents habitually resident there, even if at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty they are not themselves habitually resident there.

Nevertheless, within two years after the coming into force of the present Treaty, these persons may make a declaration before the competent Polish authorities in the country in which they are resident, stating that they abandon Polish nationality, and they will then cease to be considered as Polish nationals. In this connection a declaration by a husband will cover his wife, and a declaration by parents will cover their children under eighteen years of age.

Article 5

Poland undertakes to put no hindrance in the way of the exercise of the right which the persons concerned have, under the Treaties concluded or to be concluded by the Allied
and Associated Powers with Germany, Austria, Hungary or Russia, to choose whether or not they will acquire Polish nationality.

Article 6

All persons born in Polish territory who are not born nationals of another State shall ipso facto become Polish nationals.

Article 7

All Polish nationals shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language or religion.

Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Polish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as for instance admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions and industries.

No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any Polish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

Notwithstanding any establishment by the Polish Government of any official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Polish nationals of non-Polish speech for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, before the courts.

Article 8

Polish nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as the other Polish nationals. In particular they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense charitable, religious and social institutions, schools and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein.

Article 9
Poland will provide in the public educational system in towns and districts in which a considerable proportion of Polish nationals of other than Polish speech are residents adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Polish nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision shall not prevent the Polish Government from making the teaching of the Polish language obligatory in the said schools.

In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Polish nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budget, for educational, religious or charitable purposes.

The provisions of this Article shall apply to Polish citizens of German speech only in that part of Poland which was German territory on 1 August 1914.

Article 10

Educational Committees appointed locally by the Jewish communities of Poland will, subject to the general control of the State, provide for the distribution of the proportional share of public funds allocated to Jewish schools in accordance with Article 9, and for the organisation and management of these schools.

The provisions of Article 9 concerning the use of languages in schools shall apply to these schools.

Article 11

Jews shall not be compelled to perform any act which constitutes a violation of their Sabbath, nor shall they be placed under any disability by reason of their refusal to attend courts of law or to perform any legal business on their Sabbath. This provision however shall not exempt Jews from such obligations as shall be imposed upon all other Polish
citizens for the necessary purposes of military service, national defence or the preservation of public order.

Poland declares her intention to refrain from ordering or permitting elections, whether general or local, to be held on a Saturday, nor will registration for electoral or other purposes be compelled to be performed on a Saturday.

Article 12

Poland agrees that the stipulations in the foregoing Articles, so far as they affect persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent from any modification in these Articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

Poland agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction, or any danger of infraction, of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

Poland further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of these Articles between the Polish Government and any one of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers or any other Power, a Member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Polish Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.

CHAPTER II

Article 13
Each of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the one part and Poland on the other shall be at liberty to appoint diplomatic representatives to reside in their respective capitals, as well as Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls and Consular agents to reside in the towns and ports of their respective territories.

Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls and Consular agents, however, shall not enter upon their duties until they have been admitted in the usual manner by the Government in the territory of which they are stationed.

Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls and Consular agents shall enjoy all the facilities, privileges, exemptions and immunities of every kind which are or shall be granted to consular officers of the most favoured nation.

Article 14

Pending the establishment of an import tariff by the Polish Government, goods originating in the Allied and Associated States shall not be subject to any higher duties on importation into Poland than the most favourable rates of duty applicable to goods of the same kind under either the German, Austro-Hungarian or Russian Customs Tariffs on 1 July 1914.

Article 15

Poland undertakes to make no treaty, convention or arrangement and to take no other action which will prevent her from joining in any general agreement for the equitable treatment of the commerce of other States that may be concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations within five years from the coming into force of the present Treaty.

Poland also undertakes to extend to all the Allied and Associated States any favours or privileges in customs matters which she may grant during the same period of five years to any State with which since August 1914 the Allies have been at war, or to any State which may have concluded with Austria special customs arrangements as provided for in the Treaty of Peace to be concluded with Austria.
Article 16

Pending the conclusion of the general agreement referred to above, Poland undertakes to treat on the same footing as national vessels or vessels of the most favoured nation the vessels of all the Allied and Associated States which accord similar treatment to Polish vessels.

By way of exception from this provision, the right of Poland or of any other Allied or Associated State to confine her maritime coasting trade to national vessels is expressly reserved.

Article 17

Pending the conclusion under the auspices of the League of Nations of a general Convention to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit, Poland undertakes to accord freedom of transit to persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons and mails in transit to or from any Allied or Associated State over Polish territory, including territorial waters, and to treat them at least as favourable as the persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons and mails respectively of Polish or of any other more favoured nationality, origin, importation or ownership, as regards facilities, charges, restrictions, and all other matters.

All charges imposed in Poland on such traffic in transit shall be reasonable having regard to the conditions of the traffic. Goods in transit shall be exempt from all customs or other duties. Tariffs for transit traffic across Poland and tariffs between Poland and any Allied or Associated Power involving through tickets or waybills shall be established at the request of that Allied or Associated Power.

Freedom of transit will extend to postal, telegraphic and telephonic services.

It is agreed that no Allied or Associated Power can claim the benefit of these provisions on behalf of any part of its territory in which reciprocal treatment is not accorded in respect of the same subject matter.
If within a period of five years from the coming into force of the present Treaty no general Convention as aforesaid shall have been concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations, Poland shall be at liberty at any time thereafter to give twelve months notice to the Secretary General of the League of Nations to terminate the obligations of this Article.

Article 18

Pending the conclusion of a general Convention on the international regime of waterways, Poland undertakes to apply to the river system of the Vistula (including the Bug and the Narev) the regime applicable to international waterways set out in Articles 332 to 337 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

Article 19

Poland undertakes to adhere within twelve months of the coming into force of the present Treaty to the international Conventions specified in Annex I.

Poland undertakes to adhere to any new convention, concluded with the approval of the Council of the League of Nations within five years of the coming into force of the present Treaty, to replace any of the international instruments specified in Annex I.

The Polish Government undertakes within twelve months to notify the Secretary General of the League of Nations whether or not Poland desires to adhere to either or both of the international Conventions specified in Annex II.

Until Poland has adhered to the two Conventions last specified in Annex I, she agrees, on condition of reciprocity, to protect by effective measures the industrial, literary and artistic property of nationals of the Allied and Associated States. In the case of any Allied or Associated State not adhering to the said Conventions Poland agrees to continue to afford such effective protection on the same conditions until the conclusion of a special bilateral treaty or agreement for that purpose with such Allied or Associated State.
Pending her adhesion to the other Conventions specified in Annex I, Poland will secure to the nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers the advantages to which they would be entitled under the said Conventions.

Poland further agrees, on condition of reciprocity, to recognise and protect all rights in any industrial, literary or artistic property belonging to the nationals of the Allied and Associated States in force, or which but for the war would have been in force, in any part of her territories before transfer to Poland. For such purpose she will accord the extensions of time agreed to in Articles 307 and 308 of the Treaty with Germany.

ANNEX I [to Article 19]

TELEGRAPHIC AND RADIO-TELEGRAPHIC CONVENTIONS

International Telegraphic Convention signed at St Petersburg, 10/22 July 1875.

Regulations and Tariffs drawn up by the International Telegraphic Conference, signed at Lisbon, 11 June 1908.

International Radio-Telegraphic Convention, 5 July 1912.

RAILWAY CONVENTIONS

Conventions and arrangements signed at Berne on 14 October 1890, 20 September 1893, 16 July 1895, 16 June 1898 and 19 September 1906, and the current supplementary provisions made under those Conventions.

Agreement of 15 May 1886 regarding the Sealing of Railway Trucks subject to Customs Inspection, and Protocol of 18 May 1907.

Agreement of 15 May 1886 regarding the Technical Standardisation of Railways, as modified on 18 May 1907.

SANITARY CONVENTION
Convention of 3 December 1903.

OTHER CONVENTIONS

Convention of 26 September 1906 for the Suppression of Night Work for Women.

Convention of 26 September 1906 for the Suppression of the Use of White Phosphorus in the Manufacture of Matches.

Convention of 18 May 1904 and 4 May 1910 regarding the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic.

Convention of 4 May 1910 regarding the Suppression of Obscene Publications.

International Convention of Paris of 20 March 1883, as revised at Washington in 1911, for the Protection of Industrial Property.

International Convention of Berne of 9 September 1886, revised at Berlin on 13 November 1908, and completed by the Additional Protocol signed at Berne on 20 March 1914, for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Work.

ANNEX II [to Article 19]

Agreement of Madrid of 14 April 1891 for the Prevention of False Indications of Origin on Goods, revised at Washington in 1911, and

Agreement of Madrid of 14 April 1891 for the International Registration of Trademarks, revised at Washington in 1911.

Article 20

All rights and privileges accorded by the foregoing Articles to the Allied and Associated States shall be accorded equally to all States members of the League of Nations.

Article 21

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Poland agrees to assume responsibility for such proportion of the Russian public debt and other Russian public liabilities of any kind as may be assigned to her under a special convention between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the one hand and Poland on the other, to be prepared by a Commission appointed by the above States. In the event of the Commission not arriving at an agreement the point at issue shall be referred for immediate arbitration to the League of Nations.

THE PRESENT TREATY, of which the French and English texts are both authentic, shall be ratified. It shall come into force at the same time as the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

The deposit of ratifications shall be made at Paris.

Powers of which the seat of the Government is outside Europe will be entitled merely to inform the Government of the French Republic through their diplomatic representative at Paris that their ratification has been given; in that case they must transmit the instrument of ratification as soon as possible.

A procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications will be drawn up.

The French Government will transmit to all the signatory Powers a certified copy of the procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the above named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

DONE at Versailles, the twenty-eighth day of June, one thousand nine hundred and nineteen, in a single copy which will remain deposited in the archives of the French Republic, and of which authenticated copies will be transmitted to each of the Signatory Powers.

[Signatures not reproduced here.]
Appendix II: Letter addressed to M. Paderewski by the President of the Conference transmitting to him the Treaty to be signed by Poland under Article 93 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany

Paris

24 June 1919

Sir

On behalf of the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, I have the honour to communicate to you herewith in its final form the text of the Treaty which, in accordance with Article 93 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, Poland will be asked to sign on the occasion of the confirmation of her recognition as an independent State and of the transference to her of the territories included in the former German Empire which are assigned to her by the said Treaty. The principal provisions were communicated to the Polish Delegation in Paris in May last, and were subsequently communicated direct to the Polish Government through the French Minister at Warsaw. The Council have since had the advantage of the suggestions which you were good enough to convey to them in your memorandum of 16 June, and as the result of a study of these suggestions modifications have been introduced in the text of the Treaty. The Council believe that it will be found that by these modifications the principal points to which attention was drawn in your memorandum have, in so far as they relate to specific provisions of the Treaty, been adequately covered.

In formally communicating to you the final decision of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in this matter, I should desire to take this opportunity of explaining in a more formal manner than has hitherto been done the considerations by which the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have been guided in dealing with the question.

1. In the first place, I would point out that this Treaty does not constitute any fresh departure. It has for long been the established procedure of the public law of Europe that when a State is created, or even when large accessions of territory are made to an
established State, the joint and formal recognition by the Great Powers should be accompanied by the requirement that such State should, in the form of a binding international convention, undertake to comply with certain principles of government. This principle, for which there are numerous other precedents, received the most explicit sanction when, at the last great assembly of European Powers - the Congress of Berlin - the sovereignty and independence of Serbia, Montenegro and Roumania were recognised. It is desirable to recall the words used on this occasion by the British, French, Italian, and German Plenipotentiaries, as recorded in the Protocol of 28 June 1878:

"Lord Salisbury recognises the independence of Serbia, but is of opinion that it would be desirable to stipulate in the Principality the great principle of religious liberty."

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"Mr Waddington believes that it is important to take advantage of this solemn opportunity to cause the principles of religious liberty to be affirmed by the representatives of Europe. His Excellency adds that Serbia, who claims to enter the European family on the same basis as other States, must previously recognise the principles which are the basis of social organisation in all States of Europe and accept them as a necessary condition of the favour which she asks for."

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"Prince Bismarck, associating himself with the French proposal, declares that the assent of Germany is always assured to any motion favourable to religious liberty."

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"Count de Launay says that, in the name of Italy, he desires to adhere to the principle of religious liberty, which forms one of the essential bases of the institutions in his country, and that he associates himself with the declarations made on this subject by Germany, France and Great Britain."
"Count Andrassy expresses himself to the same effect, and the Ottoman Plenipotentiaries raise no objection."

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"Prince Bismarck, after having summed up the results of the vote, declares that Germany admits the independence of Serbia, but on condition that religious liberty will be recognised in the Principality. His Serene Highness adds that the Drafting Committee, when they formulate this decision, will affirm the connection established by the Conference between the proclamation of Serbian independence and the recognition of religious liberty."

2. The Principal Allied and Associated Powers are of opinion that they would be false to the responsibility which rests upon them if on this occasion they departed from what has become an established tradition. In this connection I must also recall to your consideration the fact that it is to the endeavours and sacrifices of the Powers in whose name I am addressing you that the Polish nation owes the recovery of its independence. It is by their decision that Polish sovereignty is being re-established over the territories in question and that the inhabitants of these territories are being incorporated in the Polish nation. It is on the support which the resources of these Powers will afford to the League of Nations that for the future Poland will to a large extent depend for the secure possession of these territories. There rests, therefore, upon these Powers an obligation, which they cannot evade, to secure in the most permanent and solemn form guarantees for certain essential rights which will afford to the inhabitants the necessary protection whatever changes may take place in the internal constitution of the Polish State.

It is in accordance with this obligation that Clause 93 was inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Germany. This clause relates only to Poland, but a similar clause applies the same principles to Czechoslovakia, and other clauses have been inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Austria and will be inserted in those with Hungary and with Bulgaria, under which similar obligations will be undertaken by other States, which under those treaties receive large accessions of territory.
The consideration of these facts will be sufficient to show that by the requirement addressed to Poland at the time when it receives in the most solemn manner the joint recognition of the re-establishment of its sovereignty and independence and when large accessions of territory are being assigned to it, no doubt is thrown upon the sincerity of the desire of the Polish Government and the Polish nation to maintain the general principles of justice and liberty. Any such doubt would be far from the intention of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

3. It is indeed true that the new Treaty differs in form from earlier Conventions dealing with similar matters. The change of form is a necessary consequence and an essential part of the new system of international relations which is now being built up by the establishment of the League of Nations. Under the older system the guarantee for the execution of similar provisions was vested in the Great Powers. Experience has shown that this was in practice ineffective, and it was also open to the criticism that it might give to the Great Powers, either individually or in combination, a right to interfere in the internal constitution of the States affected which could be used for political purposes. Under the new system the guarantee is entrusted to the League of Nations. The clauses dealing with this guarantee have been carefully drafted so as to make it clear that Poland will not be in any way under the tutelage of those Powers who are signatories to the Treaty.

I should desire, moreover, to point out to you that provision has been inserted in the Treaty by which disputes arising out of its provisions may be brought before the Court of the League of Nations. In this way differences which might arise will be removed from the political sphere and placed in the hands of a judicial court, and it is hoped that thereby an impartial decision will be facilitated, while at the same time any danger of political interference by the Powers in the internal affairs of Poland will be avoided.

4. The particular provisions to which Poland and the other States will be asked to adhere differ to some extent from those which were imposed on the new States at the Congress of Berlin. But the obligations imposed upon new States seeking recognition have at all times varied with the particular circumstances. The Kingdom of the United Netherlands
in 1814 formally undertook precise obligations with regard to the Belgian provinces at
that time annexed to the kingdom which formed an important restriction on the unlimited
exercise of its sovereignty. It was determined at the establishment of the Kingdom of
Greece that the Government of that State should take a particular form, viz, it should be
both monarchical and constitutional; when Thessaly was annexed to Greece, it was
stipulated that lives, property, honour, religion and customs of those of the inhabitants of
the localities ceded to Greece, who remained under the Hellenic administration should be
scrupulously respected, and that they should enjoy exactly the same civil and political
rights as Hellenic subjects of origin. In addition, very precise stipulations were inserted
safeguarding the interests of the Mohammedan population of these territories.

The situation with which the Powers have now to deal is new, and experience has shown
that new provisions are necessary. The territories now being transferred both to Poland
and to other States inevitably include a large population speaking languages and
belonging to races different from that of the people with whom they will be incorporated.
Unfortunately, the races have been estranged by long years of bitter hostility. It is
believed that these populations will be more easily reconciled to their new position if they
know that from the very beginning they have assured protection and adequate guarantees
against any danger of unjust treatment or oppression. The very knowledge that these
 guarantees exist will, it is hoped, materially help the reconciliation which all desire, and
will indeed do much to prevent the necessity of its enforcement.

5. To turn to the individual clauses of the present Treaty. Article 2 guarantees to all
inhabitants those elementary rights, which are, as a matter of fact, secured in every
civilised State. Clauses 3 to 6 are designed to insure that all the genuine residents in the
territories now transferred to Polish sovereignty shall in fact be assured of the full
privileges of citizenship. Articles 7 and 8, which are in accordance with precedent,
provide against any discrimination against those Polish citizens who by their religion,
their language, or their race, differ from the large mass of the Polish population. It is
understood that, far from raising any objection to the matter of these Articles, the Polish
Government have already, of their own accord, declared their firm intention of basing
their institutions on the cardinal principles enunciated therein.
The following Articles are of rather a different nature in that they provide more special privileges to certain groups of these minorities. In the final revision of these latter Articles, the Powers have been impressed by the suggestions made in your memorandum of 16 June, and the Articles have in consequence been subjected to some material modifications. In the final text of the Treaty it has been made clear that the special privileges accorded in Article 9 are extended to Polish citizens of German speech only in such parts of Poland as are, by the Treaty with Germany, transferred from Germany to Poland. Germans in other parts of Poland will be unable under this Article to claim to avail themselves of these privileges. They will therefore in this matter be dependent solely on the generosity of the Polish Government, and will in fact be in the same position as German citizens of Polish speech in Germany.

6. Clauses 10 and 12 deal specifically with the Jewish citizens of Poland. The information at the disposal of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers as to the existing relations between the Jews and the other Polish citizens had led them to the conclusion that, in view of the historical development of the Jewish question and the great animosity aroused by it, special protection is necessary for the Jews in Poland. These clauses have been limited to the minimum which seems necessary under the circumstances of the present day, viz, the maintenance of Jewish schools and the protection of the Jews in the religious observance of their Sabbath. It is believed that these stipulations will not create any obstacle to the political unity of Poland. They do not constitute any recognition of the Jews as a separate political community within the Polish State. The educational provisions contain nothing beyond what is in fact provided in the educational institutions of many highly organised modern States. There is nothing inconsistent with the sovereignty of the State in recognising and supporting schools in which children shall be brought up in the religious influences to which they are accustomed in their home. Ample safeguards against any use of non-Polish languages to encourage a spirit of national separation have been provided in the express acknowledgment that the provisions of this Treaty do not prevent the Polish State from making the Polish language obligatory in all its schools and educational institutions.
7. The economic clauses contained in Chapter II of the Treaty have been drafted with the view of facilitating the establishment of equitable commercial relations between independent Poland and the other Allied and Associated Powers. They include provisions for reciprocal diplomatic and consular representation, for freedom of transit, and for the adhesion of the Polish Government to certain international conventions.

In these clauses the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have not been actuated by any desire to secure for themselves special commercial advantages. It will be observed that the rights accorded to them by these clauses are extended equally to all States who are members of the League of Nations. Some of the provisions are of a transitional character, and have been introduced only with the necessary object of bridging over the short interval which must elapse before general regulations can be established by Poland herself or by commercial treaties or general conventions approved by the League of Nations.

In conclusion, I am to express to you on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers the very sincere satisfaction which they feel at the re-establishment of Poland as an independent State. They cordially welcome the Polish nation on its re-entry into the family of nations. They recall the great services which the ancient Kingdom of Poland rendered to Europe both in public affairs and by its contributions to the progress of mankind which is the common work of all civilised nations. They believe that the voice of Poland will add to the wisdom of their common deliberations in the cause of peace and harmony, that its influence will be used to further the spirit of liberty and justice, both in internal and external affairs, and that thereby it will help in the work of reconciliation between the nations which, with the conclusion of peace, will be the common task of humanity.

The Treaty by which Poland solemnly declares before the world here determination to maintain the principles of justice, liberty and toleration, which were the guiding spirit of the ancient Kingdom of Poland, and also receives in its most explicit and binding form the confirmation of her restoration to the family of independent nations, will be signed by
Poland and by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the occasion of, and at the same time as, the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

I have, etc.

[Signed:]

CLEMENCEAU
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