One or Many: Bergsonian Readings
of Katherine Mansfield's Modernism

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Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of
Doctor of Philosophy

English Studies
University of Stirling

August 2005
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Acknowledgements and Declaration

Firstly, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor Angela Smith, who was a genuinely enthusiastic and inspiring supervisor. It was such a privilege to study under the supervision of the scholar whose work I had read and appreciated so much that I decided to come to Scotland for my Ph.D. Without her kindness and patience, as well as academic advice, this thesis would never have been completed. Both Dr. Jane Goldman from the University of Dundee and Dr. Adrian Hunter were generous and insightful examiners. I also thank Professor Rory Watson, Professor Glennis Byron, Dr. James Procter, and Dr. Michelle Keown, for reading earlier versions of the chapters and giving me significant advice. I am indebted to other members of staff, secretaries, and friends in the Department of English Studies and the Centre of Commonwealth Studies at the University of Stirling for all their encouragement and help. Jenny Kinnear, arts officer with Perth and Kinross Council, was extremely helpful and shared her knowledge about J. D. Fergusson, which I gratefully acknowledge.

The Department of English Studies and the Faculty of Arts at Stirling University generously offered me support to attend conferences, including AULLA (Australasian Universities Language and Literature Association) Congress XXXII, 'Knowledge and Nation', which took place at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand in 2003. I am grateful to those in my audiences for giving me insightful comments and encouragement, Professor Rosa E. M. D. Penna of
Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina, in particular. Furthermore, during my visit to Wellington, I was truly honoured to meet Professor Vincent O’Sullivan and talk about his and my work on Mansfield in her hometown.

Among many scholars whom I first met before moving to Scotland and who have kept encouraging me and influencing my reading, I wish to mention just a few with special thanks, Professor Shunichi Takayanagi, Professor Mary Blish, Professor Francis J. Bosh, the late Professor Aiko Okada, Dr. Mikio Fuse, Misa Ohno, and Tomoko Kohno. Finally, I would like to thank my family and my fiancé, Dr. Shu-Ching Jeng, for ‘waiting’.

I declare that this thesis is my own work and that all critical and other sources (literary and electronic) have been specifically and properly acknowledged, as and when they occur in the body of my text.

Signed: Eiko Nakano

Date: 25/10/2005
List of Abbreviations

Works by Henri Bergson


Works by Katherine Mansfield


'Pearl Button' 1912. 'How Pearl Button Was Kidnapped', *Rhythm*, 2 (4), 136-39
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work</th>
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<tr>
<td>'Pension Seguin'</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>'Epilogue: Pension Seguin', <em>The Blue Review</em>, 1 (1), 37-42</td>
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<tr>
<td>'The Woman'</td>
<td>1912</td>
<td>'The Woman at the Store', <em>Rhythm</em>, 1 (4), 7-21</td>
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Introduction

Missing Link: Mansfield and Bergson

This is the first intensive study of Henri Bergson’s influence on Katherine Mansfield’s fiction. As I shall explore more fully in Chapter 1, it has frequently been mentioned that Bergson was a great influence on modernist writers and artists, and even on the public at that time. Although it has been at least acknowledged that Mansfield was also inspired by Bergson’s philosophy, with the exception of Angela Smith’s discussion in Katherine Mansfield: A Literary Life, no detailed account has been offered as to how much and in what ways Bergson’s philosophy influenced Mansfield’s writing. The lack of studies on this topic might seem surprising, given that Mansfield played some part in introducing the then new philosophy of Bergson to British literary society, with her colleagues, working on the Bergsonian magazine, Rhythm. Nevertheless, it is no wonder that the link between Mansfield and Bergson has not been dealt with in most studies in Mansfield’s fiction, considering that her writing does not show what commentators at present commonly know as ‘Bergsonian’ as obviously as works by some of her contemporaries do. It might seem easier to link Bergson and writers whose famous works are experimental such as James Joyce and Virginia Woolf. In this thesis, however, I argue that this view of the difference between Joyce and Woolf, who are ‘Bergsonian’, and Mansfield, who is not, results from basic misunderstandings and stereotypical ideas of Bergson’s philosophy and Modernism in present literary criticism.
Agreeing with other Mansfield critics,¹ I find it worth noting that her fiction has not been appreciated as much as work of some of her contemporary writers such as Woolf, who was jealous of Mansfield’s writing.² Just like Bergson, who was extremely popular in his lifetime but soon lost his fame posthumously, Mansfield has failed to attract as much critical attention as might have been expected, although it is significant that her work is popular with common readers, and has never gone out of print. Scholars of her work have studied her as a modernist, woman, and colonial writer, but she is seldom discussed in detail in extensive studies on Modernism; her work has not been a major focus for feminist or postcolonial critics either despite the fact that she is a female New Zealand writer. I argue that the ambiguity, or duality, of Mansfield’s writing in terms of nationality, gender, and class which often prevents us from reaching a lucid conclusion on these issues in her stories, is one of the causes of the difficulty of approaching Mansfield’s apparently simple writing. Although her well planned ambiguity, like Bergson’s, might cause her ideas to be wrongly interpreted as inconsistent at times, I see it as her crucial link with Bergson, or as a strong piece of evidence of her modernity. The aim of this thesis is to reassess Mansfield from multiple perspectives by closely examining her connections with Bergson.

Although Mansfield is not a ‘minor’ writer, it could be said that she is often treated in literary studies as though she did not belong to any part of the history of literature, or as though she were a literary mutant. It seems almost as if there needed to be extra explanation about who she was in order to understand her work: she was a New
Zealander working in Europe; she had a link with the Bloomsbury Group, but not as its member; she was a good short story writer but never wrote a novel; she was extremely ill when she wrote her most famous stories; she had an intriguing personality which her friends remembered and discussed after her death. Despite these different factors of her life which could seem to differentiate her from other writers, Mansfield shared with contemporary writers and artists Bergsonian ideas of ‘duration’ which were central and essential to the development of Modernism. My focus is to prove that there are recognizable artistic connections between the works of Mansfield and other modernist figures who shared an interest in Bergson’s thought and that, in spite of her position in the contemporary literary criticism, in her lifetime, she was not marginalized. In other words, Mansfield worked not only with her own talents or personal experiences but also with others in the intellectual and artistic network she was so closely attached to; she and other writers and artists produced modernity together.

It is rather unfortunate for this study that the name of Bergson is never mentioned in Mansfield’s extant writings, while the names of Bertrand Russell and George Santayana, who both criticized Bergson, are favourably referred to in some of her personal writings which have happened to survive. However, Mansfield destroyed substantial parts of her personal writings, and it is possible that there were notebooks and letters in which she wrote about Bergson, although nothing of this sort exists in the present. In Chapters 1 and 2, I will provide some pieces of evidence of her knowledge of Bergson such as the fact that she was assistant editor of the Bergsonian magazine *Rhythm*, but the most significant evidence which I confidently rely on is
that her work itself shows Bergsonian aspects.

Mansfield’s relationship with Russell and Santayana does not help me prove that she read Bergson enthusiastically but it does suggest that she was interested in philosophy, despite her self-image as non-intellectual. In a letter to Dorothy Brett of 12 May 1918, Mansfield writes about ‘Prelude’, ‘... won’t the “Intellectuals” just hate it. They’ll think it’s a New Primer for Infant Readers. Let ’em’ (CLKM II: 169). Though Mansfield (sarcastically) preferred to identify herself as non-intellectual, as opposed to the well-educated people around her who were obsessed with academic theories, such as her husband John Middleton Murry and some of those in the Bloomsbury Group, this does not mean she was not interested in intellectuals’ theories. On the contrary, as her personal writings show, Mansfield was keen to read anything that might give her a hint as to how to write. When she read, her reading was often meant to be a serious, professional training, as in the following example in her notebook in which Mansfield quotes from Anthony and Cleopatra and takes note: ‘Marvellous words! I can apply them. There is a short story’ (KMN II: 256). As well as classics such as Shakespeare, she carefully read contemporary writings, both fiction and criticism, as numbers of her journal entries and letters show. My textual study of Mansfield’s work will also reveal her as an intellectual who creates her stories, inspired by the newest philosophical idea of the time.

In the preface to her Bergson and Russian Modernism, 1900-1930, Hilary L. Fink admits that it is not clear whether all the Russian modernists she discusses in her book read Bergson in the original French as some of them did. She is not concerned
about it, partly because Bergsonian ideas were so popular in Russia between the 1920s and 1930s that ‘most Russian intellectuals were likely to be familiar with the basic themes of Bergson’s *Introduction to Metaphysics* and *Creative Evolution*’ and also because she is ‘considering the intertextuality of Russian modernism, or how Russian modernist works may be viewed through a Bergsonian prism, thus broadening our understanding of the period’ (Fink 1999: xiv). Therefore although Fink deals with such issues as influence and intertextuality, she does not see them as ‘A derives from B’ but instead focuses on the ‘parallels’ between Russian Modernism and Bergsonian philosophy.

My intention is also to find similar parallels between Mansfield and Bergson so as to show further sets of parallels between Mansfield and other modernists and understand her position in the period more precisely than has been suggested in the majority of the previous studies on Modernism, because, presumably, Mansfield’s absorption of Bergson’s notions was a result of conversations and correspondences with artist or writer friends and colleagues, reading their philosophical essays, literary works, and seeing their paintings, rather than reading Bergson’s original texts alone. Those works, chats, and letters could be considered to be intertwined together and play a part in Mansfield’s stories.

Although I read Mansfield’s attempts to write her versions of Bergsonian ideas as works which form a parallel with other modernists’ work, I do sometimes present differences between different writers of the era in relation to how they interpret Bergson. Regarding intertextuality, Margaret M. Jensen offers her readings of the
relationship between the private and published writings of five writers including Mansfield. Jensen questions Harold Bloom's theory of the anxiety of influence, often inapplicable to female writers, and Julia Kristeva's notion of sisterhood which fails to explain the relationship between Mansfield and Woolf, as it was jealousy that Woolf felt about Mansfield as well as other kinds of feeling. Instead of generalizing the nature of intertextuality, Jensen reads different types of writing by each writer from multiple perspectives. Unlike Jensen, I am not concerned with emotional aspects that played a part in creating the differences, but agree with Jensen that there are different ways in which one's texts and another's interact. I note therefore that Bergson's influence on modernist writers did not necessarily produce similar outcomes for the writers. Mansfield's writing is often closer to Bergson's than the works by other writers are. By this, I do not suggest that Mansfield produced 'better' work than they did. However, the fact that she noticed some particular aspects of Bergsonian philosophy which few paid attention to should emphatically be recognized as evidence that she did know Bergson's own work (rather than versions of 'Bergsonian' ideas by writers other than Bergson himself) in detail and react to it.

In relation to whether one's art represents Bergson's theory well or not, Leszek Kolakowski argues:

Bergson's philosophy has repeatedly been associated with Maeterlinck's dramas, with their hinting at mysterious forces which tragically and irresistibly shape human destinies; with Debussy's music; with Symbolist poetry; with Proust's novels, in their depiction of the indestructible persistence of memory. Such associations are notoriously imprecise, as are all attempts to grasp and to describe the leading trends in the mentality of an age; they are not useless, though, and not necessarily arbitrary. That the
striking popularity of a philosopher is never based on his own merit alone, seems even to be trivially true, however much analytically oriented thinkers might dislike the quest for the meaning of a philosophy in the cultural conditions of its emergence and influence ('philosophy is true or false, music is not'). (Kolakowski 1985: 10)

I agree that philosophy is different from art such as literature because I cannot deny Bergson’s influence on those whose representations of their versions of ‘Bergsonian’ notions are rather different from Bergson’s original ideas, such as Murry and, to some extent, D. H. Lawrence. Although, from a philosophical point of view, their understanding of Bergson might be ‘wrong’ or only partially correct, the significance of their works does not depend on how accurately or inaccurately they interpreted Bergson; their works might be different from Bergson’s in some respects, but it is undeniable that they were inspired by Bergson, and their ‘Bergsonian’ ideas played important roles in the development of literary Modernism. Although Kolakowski’s opinion quoted above is based on the conservative view that philosophy proper should clearly be distinguished from art, he admits the significance of the Zeitgeist. I also admit that different versions of ‘Bergsonian’ representations could be accepted as work of art or literature even if their differences from Bergson’s work are noticeable, but it is worth noting that Mansfield’s approaches to reality in her fiction are often more significantly comparable to Bergson’s in his philosophy than other modernist writers’ are, which shows her particularly deep understanding of the work of the philosopher. That is the reason why I assert that Mansfield’s fiction should be read in connection with Bergsonian theories.

Although I am concerned with a philosopher who represents a particular period in the
past, my study simultaneously deals with issues such as nationality and sexuality often (perhaps unreasonably) linked exclusively to cultural studies which is, according to Simon During, ‘the study of contemporary culture’ (During 1993: 1).

Rita Felski, who considers that cultural studies shares some similar concerns with modernist studies, notes that ‘when “modernity” appears at all in cultural studies, it is often there to be refuted, derided, or denounced, a handy catch phrase for conservative politics, old hat metaphysics, and snobbish aesthetics’ (Felski 2003: 501) and suggests that such an attitude in cultural studies is questionable: ‘Although cultural studies may pride itself on being postmodern, many of its assumptions are in fact quintessentially modern’ (Felski 2003: 502). Although neither Modernism nor Bergson is favourably commented on by scholars of cultural studies, or postmodernism in general, Modernism and Bergson could be said to have offered the origins of the essence of postmodernist ideas, more political and more to do with mass culture than Modernism and Bergson are usually supposed to be.

Some issues such as consciousness and evolution which were discussed emphatically in relation to Bergson’s theories in his lifetime are still treated as central subjects of studies in literature but at present, even in studies in Modernism, are more likely to be associated with other thinkers: Sigmund Freud for consciousness and Charles Darwin for evolution, even though the era of Darwin came some decades earlier than that of Bergson and the modernists. The elimination of Bergson is typical of the present discussion of the relationship between literature and other fields including philosophy during the modernist era; Bergson has been ignored not only in studies of Mansfield but also in works about other possibly Bergsonian writers such as
Lawrence. Bergson's work, on the other hand, is now often referred to in relation to what it does not deal with. Although he repeatedly insists that every living creature has both intuitive and intellectual characteristics, the present criticism in Modernism is apt to mention the name of Bergson to represent the kind of idea which values intuition, and negates or defies intellect.

As Chapter 1 shows, these present critical tendencies are results of the ways in which Bergson's philosophy was gaining recognition in the modernist period. In that opening chapter, I will examine the impact of Bergson on British society in the early twentieth century in relation to Mansfield's encounter with other writers and artists, which enabled her to acquire knowledge of Bergson's philosophy. Then, in Chapter 2, I discuss what 'Bergsonian' meant those days and how the interpretations and misunderstandings of Bergson at that time have influenced today's literary criticism on Modernism. Chapter 3 offers my readings of Mansfield's specific works written in her early years as a professional writer, *Maata*, 'The Woman at the Store', and 'How Pearl Button Was Kidnapped'. Chapters 4 and 5 are about what could perhaps be considered more recent concerns as well as so-called 'modernist' preoccupations: nationality (Chapter 4) and gender (Chapter 5). Both chapters attempt to reveal how Mansfield creates different moments represented in different stories, at which nationality or gender might or might not matter, by linking this closely to Bergson's notions of intellect and intuition. This leads to my discussions in Chapter 6 regarding the significance of genre difference, fiction and non-fiction, and short story and novel. Comparing and contrasting these different forms, I argue that Mansfield uses the short story effectively to deal with the Bergsonian notion of self.
In an attempt to show the links between Bergson's and Mansfield's work, this thesis suggests not only ways to approach Mansfield's fiction but also ways of reinterpreting Modernism from multiple perspectives.

Notes

1 See Roger Robinson, 'Introduction: In from the Margin', for example.

2 Woolf writes: 'I was jealous of her writing—the only writing I have ever been jealous of' (Woolf 1981: 227).

3 See Mark Antliff's discussion in Inventing Bergson on how differently artists interpreted Bergson. In Chapter 5 I will introduce his argument clarifying that the artists relate Bergsonian philosophy to their appreciation of female vitality.
Chapter 1

Mansfield’s Encounter with Bergson’s Philosophy

This chapter offers a general account of the impact of Bergson’s philosophy on early British Modernism, and of how Mansfield became familiar with it. It begins by showing the difference between Bergson and earlier scholars in order to clarify which aspects of his ideas were innovative and sensational to his contemporaries.

The Era of Bergson

(1) Reaction against Darwinism.

The basic theoretical stance of Bergson, who discusses evolution in his most influential book, Creative Evolution, is perhaps best understood by comparing his work with earlier versions of evolutionary theories, especially of Darwin. The most notable difference between Bergson and Darwin might be that Bergson’s view of evolution can be seen as more optimistic than Darwin’s. In Angelique Richardson’s words, Darwin’s idea of the ‘incessant construction of variety for survival is deterministic, but determined, itself, by chance’ (Richardson 2003: 11). When On the Origin of Species was published in 1859 (coincidentally the year of Bergson’s birth), Darwin’s was certainly a new concept, and arguably seemed more convincing than any of the previous explanations about the origin of life, whether religious or scientific, but Darwin’s theory which assumes life to depend on chance rather than divine authority or our own will was seen as pessimistic by contemporaries, as it
suggests there is no reasonable purpose or goal in the nature of life. ‘Darwin himself’, Richardson mentions, ‘found it difficult to adjust to a universe without meaning, and he retained residual hopes that evolution might in the end work for the good of living beings and community’ (Richardson 2003: 12). If Darwinism is pessimistic, Bergson’s evolutionary theory, with his innovative concept, \textit{élan vital}, that is, each life’s own vital impetus which is the source of evolution, might well be described as optimistic; the difference between the two theories is that Darwin totally negates any sort of power of each individual as a cause of evolution, while Bergson considers that the cause of evolution is what a life bears within itself.

These two concepts of evolution seem very different from each other, but in terms of the way the unforeseeability of life is explained, they are not as different as they may seem, because Bergson’s idea does not irresponsibly promise that we can be whatever we wish to be. In the Bergsonian sense of the word, inner life is ‘free’, but this means it is free even from our own expectation; it is beyond our control.

Bergson argues that the discussion of freedom depends on whether we are concerned with time which is currently flowing or time which has already passed. If we focus on time which is flowing, it is clear that we are always free in the sense that we do not know what will happen to us the next moment. However, if we retrospectively consider a particular time which has passed, ignoring time’s flow, we might argue that we did something because we had freedom to do so, but according to Bergson, this argument is about necessity, not about freedom. He suggests that ‘freedom’ can never be defined if it is really free; once it is defined, it is no longer free but a determinist concept: ‘Freedom is the relation of the concrete self to the act which it
perforins. This relation is indefinable, just because we are free (TFW 219).

In this context, Bergson rejects both mechanism, represented by Darwinism, which assumes accidents as the causes of evolution, and finalism, such as neo-Lamarckism, which argues that living beings' efforts to achieve their purposes lead to variation, because either of these views falsely presupposes that we know beforehand what specific changes will be brought to one species in the course of evolution. Bergson, on the other hand, pays attention to the basic fact that life is unforeseeable. Both mechanism and finalism would be possible only if we could go back to a certain point in the past, but in reality we cannot literally go back, because time in this sense is irreversible, as Bergson emphasizes; we can only look back at a particular time in the past and make an observation about it in retrospect. Like other theories of evolution, Bergson’s notion shows that the flow of time changes lives, but unlike Darwinism and neo-Lamarckism, it emphasizes that there is no end, or goal, in an evolutionary process; life keeps evolving unpredictably. With the significance of the reality of flowing time taken into account, no moment can be seen as the end, providing any ‘result’. In this sense, a discussion of whether a certain species emerges ‘accidentally’, let alone ‘purposefully’, is problematic according to Bergson, as it presupposes a certain end. That is, if one claims that a particular form of life is accidental, that means there is a predictable goal in the process of change, which denies the idea that evolution is free.

It is worth noting that Bergson was not the first to challenge Darwinism or other earlier theories of evolution. Although Bergson’s innovative theory was new and
shocking to many, before Bergson, some had shown their growing speculation that neither the Christian God nor Darwinian coincidence but our consciousness is central to our life. By the time Darwin's influence on literary writers became evident, namely a few decades after the publication of *The Origin of Species* in 1859, the idea that living creatures evolve was more widely accepted than earlier but not the idea that evolution is accidental. For example, as Gillian Beer’s study *Darwin’s Plots* clarifies, novels by George Eliot and Thomas Hardy show not only their understanding and appreciation of Darwinism but also their questions about it. Richard Lehan spells out the disagreement with Darwin expressed by Samuel Butler and George Bernard Shaw, who both certainly accept the idea of evolution but question Darwin’s theory which denies the possibility of design and purpose as the sources of evolution and treats nature as if it were a machine. The problem for Butler and Shaw is that Darwin ignores the mind of each individual living creature when he discusses natural selection. While Darwin became an inspiration to writers in this era, there was also intense reaction against him.

Considering the nature of the Bergsonian evolutionary theory, I find it pivotal to read Bergson, whose first book was published in 1889, as a contemporary of writers who were influenced by but also questioned Darwin, rather than of Darwin himself. To give a specific example of comparison, Bergson’s second book, *Matière et mémoire* (*Matter and Memory*), and H. G. Wells’s *The Island of Doctor Moreau*, both published in 1896, show, in spite of the significant difference in genre, the two authors’ profound interest in the significance of ‘real time’ which cannot be artificially shortened by a scientist and in that of the whole past of each living thing,
or ‘memory’, as Bergson calls it, whether it is actually remembered or not. From the perspective of the life of each animal, made into a (half) human by Doctor Moreau, its physical changes are brought ‘accidentally’ rather than naturally, but the accident does not give the animals an opportunity to evolve further. On the contrary, they go back to their original states. By describing the animals’ intense attachment to their past habits, Wells seems to suggest not only that animals evolve in the passage of time but also that the original force of evolution and degeneration resides inside the life of each animal. Though Bergson does not directly discuss evolution in *Matter and Memory*, it corresponds to what Wells implies in *The Island of Doctor Moreau* when Bergson explains that our memory remains and becomes part of our present; this will be introduced in detail in the third chapter of this thesis. Furthermore, throughout *The Island of Doctor Moreau*, there are hints that human beings are as brutal as beasts; this is also analogous to Bergson’s argument in *Matter and Memory* which does not place humans as the privileged ‘centre’ of the universe but suggests the link between humans and other lives.

Just as in the case of Wells, Darwinism’s impact on writers in this period, that is, Bergson’s contemporaries, can often be found in their interest in time. With regard to the modernist preoccupation with time, Rosemary Sumner suggests that it was started not only by Bergson but also by his contemporary writers such as Hardy, and she names Darwin as a cause of the enthusiasm; they became interested in the significance of time because ‘Darwin had stretched conceptions of time to lengths previously unimaginable’ (Sumner 2000: 84). Sumner also writes: ‘Time was being measured more by the clock and less by natural forces because of the development of
mechanization and factory work. So time was both stretched and chopped up in unfamiliar ways. As a result, clocks in modernist art tend to behave in strange and threatening ways’ (Sumner 2000: 84). This shared curiosity about time, beginning to emerge at the end of the nineteenth century partially owing to the influence of Darwin, was to be developed further by a number of writers, artists, and thinkers of different kinds in the next generation, so-called modernists, due to the enormous inspiration that Bergson’s works offer, as I will discuss later.

Although Bergson and Darwin differ in their arguments, there are some similarities in the way the two thinkers’ works were read and recognized by society when they were professionally active. Just as Darwin’s work inspired individuals with different intellectual occupations and caused religious, philosophical, and social ferment, Bergson’s writing was also read and either accepted or condemned by a wide range of people at the turn of the century and especially from 1910 onwards in the case of the United Kingdom. In Darwin’s Plots, Beer points out that Darwin was keen to ‘demonstrate as far as possible the accord between scientific usage and common speech’ and that his ‘language does not close itself off authoritatively nor describe its own circumference’ (Beer 2000: 49). As a result, his argument and terms started to be used by others in expanded contexts. In this respect, parallels between Darwin and Bergson are noticeable. Like Darwin, Bergson created his own vocabulary, and also like Darwin, he let others join in his argument rather than being exclusive. Bergson’s terms such as ‘élan vital’, just like Darwin’s such as ‘natural selection’, were used by contemporaries in a variety of situations (even when the usage was inappropriate), while Bergson himself repeatedly offered clear explanations of them.
Unlike Darwin, however, Bergson lost his fame and influence after the 1950s onwards. Many accounts of Bergson’s philosophy start with similar tones emphasizing how popular and sensational Bergson’s work was in the first half of the twentieth century, no matter how quickly the sensation ended. Kolakowski’s narrative is no exception:

> When we look at Bergson’s position—or rather lack of position—in today’s intellectual life, we find it hard to imagine that some decades ago he was not just a famous thinker and writer; in the eyes of Europe’s educated public he was clearly *the* philosopher, the intellectual spokesman *par excellence* of the era. (Kolakowski 1985: 1)

Bergson’s philosophy, which reflected the atmosphere of the new century, taking in cutting-edge theories from different fields of scholarly disciplines, was disregarded after World War II perhaps because Bergson was not only academically but also politically active before and after the First World War, but a more significant reason for Bergson’s rapid loss of reputation I note is that his theories were often misrepresented even at the peak of his fame. ‘In fact’, Sanford Schwartz writes, ‘Bergson provoked a variety of distinct and sometimes incompatible responses, and these conflicting responses are closely tied to the political, social, and intellectual conflicts among his readers’ (Schwartz 1992: 277). It might be said that Bergson’s quick fall to obscurity was caused by his readers’ (sometimes deliberate) misreading of his theories, rather than by any weakness of his own ideas, as I elaborate later. That Bergson’s fame did not last long (though he has attracted considerable critical attention again since the 1990s) does not prevent me from treating him as an
important figure in my study, as his rapid rise and fall could mean that his work reflected and was reflected by the characteristics of the particular era in which he lived, the most part of which is the modernist era that this thesis is concerned with. Bergson dealt with some of the most popular topics at that time such as evolution, time, and the relation between mind and body, and his work received varied reactions from different perspectives, philosophical, biological, religious, political to name some. I read him as a medium through which to grasp the nature of the period in cultural and intellectual terms and to analyze modernity in Mansfield’s writing which clearly reflects the influential concepts of the era.

(2) The reception of Bergson in 1910 Britain

Although the year 1922 has long been acknowledged as the year of the zenith of Modernism, as landmark works such as T. S. Eliot’s The Waste Land and Joyce’s Ulysses were published that year, some focus on earlier stages of Modernism when experimental techniques, forms, and themes start to emerge; these characteristics are retained and developed in the works published in 1922 or even later periods of the modernist era. Mary Ann Gillies argues that ‘the working out of a modernist aesthetic actually occurred well before 1922, with 1909-1914 being a crucial period’ (Gillies 1996: 5). Jane Goldman also emphasizes the importance of the year 1910 in her Modernism, 1910-1945: Image to Apocalypse. 1910 is remembered, of course, with regard to Woolf’s famous sentence on 1910 which she wrote in 1924: ‘on or about December 1910 human character changed’ (Woolf 1924: 4). It was the year when the first Post-Impressionist exhibition, Manet and the Post-Impressionists, took place at the Grafton Galleries in London and shocked the British public which
reacted to the exhibition in both positive and negative senses.

The year 1910 is also significant in terms of the influence of Bergson on British culture, as the English version of his first book *Time and Free Will* was first published in 1910. Though, as articles in English on Bergson published before 1910 prove, intellectuals could read Bergson in the original French, the translations enabled a wider public in Britain to become familiar with his theories. Although Bergson continued to publish his works until the 1930s and remained a celebrity until his death in 1941, his philosophical arguments seem to be encapsulated in his early works. His earliest and most famous books, *Time and Free Will, Matter and Memory,* and *Creative Evolution,* were published in French in 1889, 1896, and 1907 respectively; the English version of *Time and Free Will* translated by F. L. Pogson was published in 1910, that of *Matter and Memory* by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer in 1911, and of *Creative Evolution* by Arthur Mitchell in 1911. Although Bergson’s old and new works were still intensely influential even at the late stage of Modernism, it has to be emphasized that his impact was most significant in the early modernist period when new ideas originating in different academic and artistic fields were rapidly developing and being widely circulated.

As scholars such as Mark Antliff and Gillies elucidate, Bergson became a cultural phenomenon especially in Europe and North America in the early twentieth century. The apparent accessibility and the novelty of Bergsonian philosophy attracted a great number of people, including a general public. In Britain this reception started around 1910 to 1911 thanks to the publication of the translated books. In 1911 Bergson
visited Britain to give lectures which were immensely popular and well-attended. This ‘fashionable’ philosophy was introduced in numbers of articles and books published in the UK around this period, when Modernism was starting to flourish. Such articles were found in, for instance, the New Age, a magazine of politics, literature, and art, edited by A. R. Orage, in which Mansfield published her stories for the first time as a professional writer. At the time when Bergson’s translated works were widely read by those with some intellectual curiosity, the New Age offered a lively debate on the philosopher. An active advocate in this group was T. E. Hulme, who knew Bergson personally and translated An Introduction to Metaphysics in 1913. Hulme frequently wrote for the New Age to introduce Bergson and to promote better understanding of this philosopher who was so famous that many knew about him without properly understanding his theories.

(3) Bergson’s three major books

As I mentioned, Bergson’s early works can be read as the basis of all his central arguments. I shall introduce three of his early studies and some concepts used in them.

1 Time and Free Will

Time and Free Will, Bergson’s first work, introduces two ways of capturing reality: intellectual and intuitive. The former could be described as the way we chronologically conceive ‘the time’, and the latter, the way we psychologically perceive ‘time’, or what Bergson calls ‘duration’. The intellectual way tries to ‘spatialize’ time, that is, separate time according to such artificial units as hours and
minutes, while the intuitive one connects what could otherwise be recognized as different moments. The same thing can be said about the human understanding of places; a place could be divided as different 'spaces' by our intellect and, by our intuition, could be felt as inseparable 'extensity'. It can be said that the difference between spatialized time and duration, or between space and extensity, is that the former can be associated with quantity, homogeneity, separation, and elements which are external to ourselves, while the latter can be characterized by quality, heterogeneity, continuity, and our internal senses.

Bergson eloquently explains that duration is a multiplicity which is continuous and heterogeneous at the same time, by using his famous metaphor of melody. When Bergson states that, although different notes compose a tune, they '[melt] . . . into one another' (TFIV 100), not space but time (duration rather than spatialized time) is closely linked to quality; for perceiving the quality of a melody, we need to wait, no matter how short it is, to hear the melody moving. Therefore, the image of people waiting for a certain development is one of the most significant Bergsonian examples of the way we find the first phase of duration: continuity, or indivisibility. While continuity is associated with a waiting self, the second phase of duration, heterogeneity, or unpredictability, can be seen in a changing self, another representative image.

Bergson links his explanations of these two aspects of duration, continuity and heterogeneity, to his discussion of freedom, and criticizes both determinists and indeterminists as they deal with the time which has already passed, instead of the
time which is passing. By using the following figure, Bergson discusses a situation in which one hesitates, when reaching the point O, between two possible future actions X and Y.

![Diagram]

1. (adapted from *TFW* 176)

Bergson points out that the similarity between defenders and opponents of free will is that, for both of them, 'the action is preceded by a kind of mechanical oscillation between the two points X and Y' (*TWF* 179). If one chooses X, defenders of free will, indeterminists, will then judge that Y was also possible, as the person hesitated and deliberated. Opponents of free will, determinists, on the other hand, will decide that X was chosen, since it was determined so, and Y was not a possibility at all.

Bergson, however, denies both of these ideas:
Now, if I dig deeper underneath these two opposite solutions, I discover a common postulate: both take up their position after the action X has been performed, and represent the process of my voluntary activity by a path MO which branches off at the point O, the lines OX and OY symbolizing the two directions which abstraction distinguishes within the continuous activity of which X is the goal. . . . This figure does not show me the deed in the doing but the deed already done. (TFW 179-80)

As Bergson emphasizes, 'the free act takes place in time which is flowing and not in time which has already flown' (TFW 221); the idea that an action is determined or chosen from possibilities is what one is likely to formulate in looking back at a past action. For Bergson, an action in duration is neither of these. It is taken freely, without having any lines drawn to choose from. Even when only 'one action' is taken, it includes various unexpected changes, such as waiting, hesitating, or doing nothing. It is the heterogeneity of duration that enables us to be free, to keep changing unpredictably.

2 Matter and Memory

After introducing his idea of duration in Time and Free Will, Bergson published his second book, Matter and Memory, which is generally considered to be the most significant and the most complicated of all his works. What was most attractive about Time and Free Will was that Bergson articulated the difference between time and space, or quality and quantity. However, he did suggest, though rather modestly, that reality is not simply confined within the deep realm of time ('pure duration') but can also be spatialized or measured, which implies that the difference between the two elements could be considered as only superficial. In Matter and Memory, Bergson’s argument about the link between the two is continued and strengthened.
To explain that the two opposing elements are indivisible, Bergson invents a term, ‘images’, the definition of which is introduced in the opening of *Matter and Memory*. According to Bergson, one’s spirit or memory does not belong to his or her body, and each feeling or each body is equally called ‘an image’. He argues that all sorts of different images coexist, without any one of them becoming the centre or the end of the universe. Bergson writes:

> We will assume for the moment that we know nothing of theories of matter and theories of spirit, nothing of the discussions as to the reality or ideality of the external world. Here I am in the presence of images, in the vaguest sense of the word, images perceived when my senses are opened to them, unperceived when they are closed. All these images act and react upon one another . . . (MM 1)

By introducing this notion of ‘images’, Bergson suggests that both realists and idealists are wrong to maintain that objects exist only in themselves or only in our mind, respectively. In contrast, *Matter and Memory* attempts to prove that both objects and mind coexist: ‘This book affirms the reality of spirit and the reality of matter, and tries to determine the relation of the one to the other by the study of a definite example, that of memory’ (*MM* xi).

To ‘affirm the reality of spirit and the reality of matter’, Bergson gradually proves that those two are inseparable. Bergson asserts that the difference between matter (reality, body, and quantity) and memory (unreality, mind, and quality) is created by the degree of tension or relaxation of consciousness. When the consciousness is most tense, it is associated with the former only, and when it is most relaxed, the
latter only. In reality, however, it is impossible that our consciousness becomes either exclusively tense or exclusively relaxed, and it is also impossible that it should stay at the same degree of tension or relaxation. In other words, there are different rhythms of duration. Therefore, the key idea of Matter and Memory is that our consciousness is changeable in terms of the degree of its relation with matter and memory, respectively.

3 Creative Evolution

In Creative Evolution Bergson, who clearly accepts the idea of evolution but does not entirely agree with earlier theorists of evolution such as Darwin, posits that all sorts of different forms of life emerge from one single source as time progresses. This argument could be understood in relation to his earlier discussion of the continuous yet heterogeneous thus unforeseeable nature of duration; the totality of life is the whole of the memory of the universe: ‘The universe endures. The more we study the nature of time, the more we shall comprehend that duration means invention, the creation of forms, the continual elaboration of the absolutely new’ (CE 11). In that sense, different species which exist in the present are linked to earlier lives, and we, existing species, are not complete beings but are going to evolve further in duration, a current of life. Bergson argues that this evolutionary process is guided by the push of the élan vital, or vital impetus, which is the single source of life. Derived from the same flow of life, different species or different individuals share various faculties in common, but they are different ‘tendencies’; by choosing the word ‘tendencies’ instead of such a term as ‘species’, for instance, he emphasizes that what are usually considered different kinds of living things can be regarded as the same single life but
with different ‘tendencies’, and explains the relationship among different tendencies. According to Bergson, the evolutionary movement does not take a single direction but ‘proceeds rather like a shell, which suddenly burst into fragments, which fragments, being themselves shells, burst in their turn into fragments destined to burst again, and so on for a time incommensurably long’ (CE 103). Bergson explains that explosive division is caused by the impetus inside life itself: ‘the real and profound causes of division were those which life bore within its bosom. For life is tendency, and the essence of a tendency is to develop in the form of a sheaf, creating, by its very growth, divergent directions among which its impetus is divided’ (CE 104).

Bergson divides all the different tendencies into three broad tendencies which are variations of the totality of life which emerged in the course of evolution: plants, animals (instinct), and humans (intelligence). It is notable that throughout this discussion as to these divisions, consciousness is regarded as central to life: ‘Continuity of change, preservation of the past in the present, real duration—the living being seems, then, to share these attributes with consciousness’ (CE 24). From this perspective, the evolution of life is compared to the evolution of a consciousness: ‘the more we fix our attention on this continuity of life, the more we see that organic evolution resembles the evolution of a consciousness, in which the past presses against the present and causes the upspringing of a new form of consciousness, incommensurable with its antecedents’ (CE 29).

Consciousness is, therefore, a pivotal aspect in discussing the development of
different tendencies. Firstly, the most significant and obvious differences between plants and animals are in the degree of mobility and consciousness. The consciousness of plants, which do not need to be actively mobile and are confined to the present moment, can be described as extremely relaxed or paralyzed. In contrast, animals can move freely, and therefore can place themselves in various circumstances, which is linked to their active consciousness. Although Bergson does stress that plants and animals have similarities by mentioning that plants also have some consciousness and mobility, he also notes that the fact that animals acquired greater consciousness and mobility is a significant change in the course of evolution, which develops the living in quality from one tendency to another.

Bergson then turns to the differences between instinct and intelligence. While instinct and intelligence coexist in both animals and human beings, again, there is a difference in degree between these two tendencies. Bergson suggests that the difference is in the kind of tool each can manufacture; while making tools is a human, or intelligent, act, animals can do it to some extent, but not entirely in the same way as humans: ‘instinct perfected is a faculty of using and even of constructing organized instruments; intelligence perfected is the faculty of making and using unorganized instruments’ (CE 147, Bergson’s emphasis). This can be simplified to suggest that the kind of tools made by instinct are part of life and nature, such as branches of trees, while those by intelligence are made of ‘matter’ which is not living. Just as Bergson says ‘[i]nstinct is sympathy’ (CE 187), when an animal’s instinct makes tools, it is as if the animal took other organisms into its own life. In this process, the act of making instinctive tools is ‘acted’, not ‘thought’.
and intelligence both involve knowledge, this knowledge is rather *acted* and unconscious in the case of instinct, *thought* and conscious in the case of intelligence' (CE 153, Bergson’s emphasis). It can be said that the impetus which changes the living from instinctive to intelligent is found in that human beings have since gained an objective perspective which enables them to see things through the relations of those things to others, rather than through themselves; obviously language is an especially important tool of intelligence in this regard. Due to this outside perspective, (at least theoretically) intelligent beings are even more mobile and conscious than instinctive animals, and also more creative.

As can be seen in the fact that ‘intelligence’ is associated with mobility and changes (unlike ‘intellect’), it is considered to be the key with which we can approach duration; for that purpose it works well with intuition: it is ‘from intelligence that has come the push that has made [intuition] rise to the point it has reached’ (CE 187). Although Bergson regards human beings as the most developed living creature in the process of evolution, he also points out the limitation of intelligence. In spite of the fact that intelligence has given human beings greater mobility and creativeness, it is also intelligence that can paradoxically link humans with immobile and unconscious matter, the very reason being its ability to see connections between different objects (by means of language, most significantly).

The fact that Bergson shows intelligence’s advantages and disadvantages in *Creative Evolution*, however, does not mean he attempts to suggest any optimistic or pessimistic views of the future of evolution. Rather, his intention is to attract
attention to life as a flow of duration whose differentiated parts infinitely evolve with their consciousness and become more heterogeneously creative towards the future.

(4) Popular philosopher: Hulme on Bergson in the *New Age*

Gillies, who notes that Bergson’s own popularity caused him to be misunderstood, attracts particular attention to the fact that he promoted his views ‘in a very public forum’:

> his lectures were open to whoever wished to attend them. His approach to intellectual life was one of inclusion, rather than the more typical exclusion brought about because of the ever-increasing specialization of academia. His appeal to those who were actively involved in intellectual and aesthetic pursuits was great, but so was his appeal to the many who aspired to greater intellectual awareness but who had neither the training nor the time to acquire it. (Gillies 2003: 98-99)

Although Bergson’s philosophical investigations of life are difficult for amateurs to understand fully and the difficulty may potentially be linked to typical elitist exclusiveness, they are available to the kind of audience whom Hulme calls in one of his *New Age* articles ‘ordinary’ people (Hulme 1911b: 38, 39) who casually or irresponsibly use Bergson’s catch phrases such as *élan vital* without representing the meanings of Bergson’s notions correctly. Hulme’s comments in another article also published in the *New Age* describe the situation well. He suggests that it was reasonable that Bergson was known only to the few who could understand his arguments when the English version of *Creative Evolution* was published, but this situation which Hulme favours changed dramatically just some months after that:
Then suddenly, for no apparent reason, it seems a man’s reputation spreads all over Europe. Articles appear in newspapers about him, the propagandists of the different sects utilise him for their own purposes, and, finally, last stage of all, he penetrates to the drawing-rooms, he is welcomed and read by the ladies who have ambitions salon-wise; and, finally, chatter makes his name stink in the nostrils of everyone who cares seriously for philosophy. (Hulme 1911 a: 329)

Hulme, who deeply respects Bergson and is keen to criticize E. Belfort Bax’s misunderstanding of Bergson, seems to disapprove of the kind of audience whom Bergson would care about; Bergson’s words which open Chapter 1 in *Matter and Memory*, ‘We will assume for the moment that we know nothing of theories of matter and theories of spirit, nothing of the discussions as to the reality or ideality of the external world’ (*MM* 1), seem to show that he wishes to invite those who have no or little proper knowledge of philosophy, as well as ‘everyone who cares seriously for philosophy’, to the discussion.

This stance of Bergson is interesting when compared again to the view of his devoted supporter Hulme, who believes such books as *Creative Evolution* should not sell well: ‘Six months after the publication of “Evolution Créatrice” comparatively few copies had been sold. This is as it should be. A book on pure philosophy has no business to sell in large numbers’ (Hulme 1911 a: 329). Hulme’s resentment against the overpopularity of his favourite philosopher is intriguing when compared to the more mixed attitude of some modernist figures, literary elites, in the period, which is explored by Lawrence Rainey in *Institutions of Modernism*:

Modernism’s ambiguous achievement, I shall urge, was to probe the interstices dividing that variegated field and to forge within it a strange and
unprecedented space for cultural production, one that did indeed entail a
certain retreat from the domain of public culture, but one that also continued
to overlap and intersect with the public realm in a variety of contradictory
ways. (Rainey 1998: 3)

Rainey suggests that in Modernism a work of art is intended to be a 'commodity' but
a 'commodity of a special sort' (Rainey 1998: 3). Modernist writers' and artists' applications of Bergsonian philosophy, then, can precisely be seen as an example of a complicated blend of rejecting and accepting popular culture; on one hand, those writers and artists retreated from the field of popular culture by employing Bergson's academic theories which could have limited the nature of their audiences, but on the other hand, in fact they did not, because Bergson was a 'popular' writer whose books were sold in large numbers; his work was a commodity. This corresponds to what Michael Tratner argues: 'Modernism was not . . . a rejection of mass culture, but rather an effort to produce a mass culture, perhaps for the first time, to produce a culture distinctive to the twentieth century' (Tratner 1995: 2). It is important to note, therefore, that Bergson's theories became known through journals and lectures which were available to all; the *New Age* was one such popular means, playing some role in introducing Bergson.

(5) Mansfield before *Rhythm*

Interestingly, Shiv Kumar mentions in *Bergson and the Stream-of-Consciousness Novel* Mansfield's story 'The Tiredness of Rosabel' (1908), written in Wellington before she left for England, as the earliest example of the stream of consciousness in literature in English, since the story illustrates 'a constant interpenetration of different states of consciousness into one another' and shows that 'Katherine
Mansfield... feels... the necessity of breaking through the hard crust of outer experience in an attempt to represent the inner flow of thought' (Kumar 1962: 41), although no further discussion is offered in relation to Mansfield in Kumar’s study which primarily focuses on novels, not short stories. This comment by Kumar, not an expert on Mansfield, is notable because it points out the significance of one of the early stories which Mansfield scholars have long rejected or ignored. It is significant that Mansfield’s writing already showed what Kumar sees as expressions of inner flux prior to the first publication of the English translation of Bergson’s work, *Time and Free Will,* in 1910. This is not necessarily to say Mansfield knew Bergson’s work when she wrote the story, but it is worth noting that she was already interested in consciousness.

It might be said that Mansfield’s interest in consciousness and time developed when she began to contribute to the *New Age*; Hulme’s articles on Bergson started to appear in the *New Age* in July 1909, and on 24 February 1910 Mansfield’s first story ‘Bavarian Babies. The Child-Who-Was-Tired’ (later in *In a German Pension,* entitled ‘The Child-Who-Was-Tired’) was published. Mansfield’s Bergsonian traits have been discussed with a focus on her writings since she became involved with another magazine *Rhythm* in 1912, that is, after publishing some works in the *New Age,* and I will also discuss in Chapter 3 the significance of her association with *Rhythm* because by that period she had most probably read Bergson as one can see from the fact that she worked as assistant editor of *Rhythm* which was intended to be Bergsonian. It is possible, however, that Mansfield gained some knowledge of Bergson’s concepts by or at the time she began to write for the *New Age,* judging
from her stories published in the *New Age*.

Many characters in the stories Mansfield wrote in this period and published in her first collection of short stories *In a German Pension* in 1911, including those in the stories which did not appear in the *New Age*, are concerned with clocks or watches. There are quite a few small references such as that to the child Karl in ‘The Advanced Lady’, who is said to have picked out the works of his watch, which he denies, but the descriptions of Sabina in ‘At Lehmann’s’ are more significant; she ‘[c]ertainly . . . did not find life slow’ (*SKM* 37) and was concerned with Frau Lehmann’s giving birth until a moment ago but is now totally oblivious of such an event and, instead, conscious of the loud ticking of the clock. Her attention to the ticking seems to reveal her feelings in relation to what Bergson discusses: ‘the ticking of a watch seems louder at night because it easily monopolizes a consciousness almost empty of sensations and ideas’ (*TFW* 40). Although it might usually be considered that a clock suggests a regular and mechanical way in which time passes, Mansfield and Bergson imply that an act, or actual experience, of hearing the ticking of a clock involves irregular rhythms of the duration of the individual who hears it. It can be felt to be loud or quiet, fast or slow, depending on one’s present state, just as Mansfield shows in her descriptions of Sabina in ‘At Lehmann’s’.

‘A Birthday’ could also be read in connection with Bergson’s idea of consciousness and its changing rhythm; the husband thinks about his wife’s change over the years of their marriage and considers that she has been in a ‘groove’ from which he has to
take her away. This sounds as if he were concerned with the impact of lack of mobility of consciousness on life that Bergson discusses, but ironically his own consciousness also keeps changing during the time he waits for his wife to give birth to their child, and starts to have different feelings and ideas, caring not so much about his wife’s past and future any more. ‘The Luft Bad’ and ‘The Swing of the Pendulum’ are other examples in which Mansfield describes the characters’ changing consciousness. Although the stories in this period are less developed than her later stories published in *Rhythm*, it could be said that Mansfield was preoccupied with the idea of changing consciousness while working for the *New Age*, and when she met the Rhythm group just a little later, Bergson’s basic concepts were probably not totally new to her, whether or not she had read his books by then.7

**J. D. Fergusson and the Rhythmists**

(1) The launch of *Rhythm*

Bergson’s philosophy became a major inspiration for different literary and art styles which emerged in the modernist era, including Imagism, Vorticism, Fauvism, among others.8 The group which Mansfield was particularly associated with was ‘Rhythmist’, that is those who edited and published the magazine of literature and art, *Rhythm*, with their art editor J. D. Fergusson playing a crucial role. Fergusson was a Scottish artist who, along with other Rhythmist artists such as the American Anne Estelle Rice, expressed his Bergsonian themes in the Fauvist manner. Although Roger Fry did not include the Rhythmists’ works in his exhibition, as Anna Gruetzner Robins reports, some critics at the time suggested that the painters in the Rhythm group would deserve as much attention as more famous Post-Impressionist
painters. C. Lewis Hind writes: ‘Why was this branch of British Post-Impressionism
generated by the directors of the Grafton Gallery—this branch that is so fresh and
alive?’ (Hind 1912: 108); Walter Sickert, in writing of such painters as Fergusson and
S. J. Peploe in 1925, sarcastically suggests the difference between two groups of
Post-Impressionists: ‘Post-Impressionists licensed by Mr. Fry, and those unlicensed
by Mr. Fry’ (Sickert 1925: 108). For P. G. Konody, on the other hand, the difference
is that the group at the ‘Second Post-Impressionist Exhibition’ are colourless unlike
the Rhythm group he appreciates (Robins 1997: 108).

It was Fergusson’s oil painting *Rhythm* (Fig. 2) that inspired his younger friends and
co-founders of the magazine, Murry and Michael Sadler, and that became the title
and the cover of their new magazine (Fig. 3). Sharing an interest in Bergson’s
philosophy, the idea of ‘rhythm’ in particular, Murry, Sadler, and Fergusson started
*Rhythm* in the summer of 1911. The modernist integration of ‘high’ (or elitist) and
‘low’ (or popular) cultures of the period can be applied to *Rhythm*; as Faith Binckes
argues, by emphasizing the low price of the magazine, ‘one shilling, just over £2 in
today’s money’ (Binckes 1999: 28), *Rhythm* aimed to be affordable and available to
many, while also intending to be ‘modern’ at the same time. It was Fergusson who
insisted that their new magazine should be cheap:

> My [Fergusson’s] only condition was that it would be cheap, not a deluxe
> magazine. I wanted any herd boy to be able to have the latest information
> about modern painting from Paris, which was then undoubtedly the centre of
> modern painting. They agreed and Rhythm [sic] duly appeared at 1/-, well
> printed and presented. From all accounts it was a success. (Morris 1974:
> 64)
As Smith humorously points out, in *Rhythm* '[t]here were articles in French and English, and one of Murry's pieces contains a paragraph of untranslated Italian, so the herd boys would have required linguistic skills' (Smith 2000: 72). Considering the fact that there was a relatively large audience whom Hulme calls 'ordinary' people, enthusiastic about such intellectual subjects as Bergson's philosophy, *Rhythm*, though short-lived, can be regarded as precisely the type of magazine that reflected the characteristic of the era in which many, rather than a select few, were interested in getting information about cutting-edge thought and art.

Bergsonian theory was certainly the central subject that the Rhythmist wanted to offer to modern readers. Intriguingly, however, there are clear differences between Bergson's basic arguments and some of the ideas that the Rhythmists express in their journal; they might even seem to deny Bergson's theories at times. This is clear from the very first issue. In the opening essay, 'The New Thelema' Frederick Goodyear writes: 'Now liberty may be divided into two modes—one external, the other internal. . . . The external is but a shell where the internal liberty may inhabit. The true creators are the men who have to do with the latter. They are artists and philosophers, men not of action but of contemplation' (Goodyear 1911: 2). This is precisely the kind of argument Bergson constantly questions in his books. Firstly, according to Bergson's view, the internal and the external are the two essential elements of duration, and so any living creatures, 'the true creators' or not, humans or not, need both (*TFW* 97). Therefore, secondly, it is very important for Bergson that even 'artists and philosophers' are not only 'men of contemplation' but of 'action', if they are alive (*MM* 211-12). This leads to the third point; Bergson does
not believe that ‘artists’ are as special as Goodyear asserts, because every life is creative and takes part in ‘creative evolution’ (CE 24). Murry wrote ‘Aims and Ideals’, also for the first issue, which has a similar note to Goodyear’s essay:

“‘Before art can be human it must learn to be brutal.’ Our intention is to provide art, be it drawing, literature or criticism, which shall be vigorous, determined, which shall have its roots below the surface, and be the rhythmical echo of the life with which it is in touch’ (Murry 1911: 36). Quoting J. M. Synge’s words, Murry clearly shows his preference for human inner brutality, as if the ‘surface’ were insignificant. Murry uses the word ‘determined’ just as Goodyear does in his essay mentioned above: ‘The men and women of to-day are determined to build the abbey of Thelema’ (Goodyear 1911: 1). In Bergson’s philosophy, it is fluidity rather than determination that is crucial, whereas determination seems pivotal and valuable in Goodyear’s and Murry’s argument. In other words, the similarity between Goodyear and Murry, and the difference between the pair and Bergson, is that Goodyear and Murry sound throughout their essays as if ‘intuition’ were the only good quality that one’s will should choose, whereas Bergson insists that we have no such choice; Goodyear and Murry do not seem concerned so much with the unforeseeability and heterogeneity of duration that Bergson considers vital.

It is rather confusing and also mysterious that some of the Rhythmists were so distinctly contradictory to Bergson in their view of art and reality, but this does not really matter to us in evaluating Rhythm; perhaps it did not matter to them, either, because the journal suggests that they had other intellectual preoccupations as well as Bergsonian philosophy. Their enthusiasm for return to brutality, or ‘primitivism’,
represented, for example, in Rice's drawings of non-European women, should be interpreted in connection with their challenge to colonialism, not so much with Bergson's intuition (although some Rhythmists tended to use the term). It would be inappropriate to decide whether they were 'right' or 'wrong' in interpreting Bergsonian philosophy, because the aim of their journal was not to represent Bergson's concepts but to represent their own ideas by borrowing some ideas from and, if necessary, changing part of, the works by their contemporaries, Bergson included. As Murry recalls, they never tried to define the word 'rhythm' and were aware that it could be interpreted in various ways (Murry 1935: 156); different members of the Rhythm group show different ways of expressing the concept.

Although Murry's and Goodyear's preference for 'determination' seems to suggest that they were inspired by the word rhythm itself and created their own views out of it, rather than representing Bergson's whole idea of rhythm, other Rhythmists such as Fergusson, Mansfield, and Sadler tried to be more faithful to Bergson's original theory in approaching rhythm through their works of art, literature, or criticism, as I explore later.

Although I do not intend to criticize Murry and Goodyear for using Bergson's terms in significantly different ways from Bergson, in relation to my later argument in Chapter 2, I mention here briefly that it was common that Bergson's philosophy was interpreted or represented differently by others, even by those whom he fascinated. During his successful period, let alone after his fame faded, Bergson was often unreasonably considered anti-intellectual, and that caused both enthusiasm and contempt for him. Some admired Bergson because they interpreted his philosophy as
being far simpler than it actually was and that version of Bergsonism satisfied them, but others were not convinced by anti-intellectual concepts which they believed were Bergsonian. Murry perhaps experienced both; he first showed his appreciation of intuition, which caused him to start Rhythm with his friends in the summer of 1911, but had already dismissed it by the time he wrote in Rhythm’s successor, the Blue Review, in May 1913: “‘Instinct’ or ‘Intuition’ is no panacea for the realities of life. The intellect and the desires of the intellect are as potent and as valuable to their possessor as instinct and the blind impulses of instinct. It has not been given to M. Bergson in the twentieth century to solve the difficulties and quiet the groanings of St. Paul’ (Murry 1913: 60). It could perhaps be said that Murry had to reject his own earlier conception of intuition rather than Bergson’s.

Unlike Murry, Mansfield and some others in the Rhythm group reach the crucial point of the Bergsonian notion of the balance of intuition and intellect. Yone [or Yonejiro] Noguchi attempts, successfully or otherwise, to suggest what seems to be the link between intellect and intuition in his essay entitled ‘From a Japanese Ink-slab, Part II’, though the name of Bergson is never mentioned; he associates the West and the contemporary Japan with reason, knowledge, and hatred of freedom, and the old Japan with barbarous emotion and eccentricity, and somewhat proudly stresses that he himself has both Western and old Japanese elements. This rather emotional argument by Noguchi, which sounds as if it simplistically contrasted the West and Japan (in spite of the emphases on his belief that the two are not necessarily different from each other), might not be always convincing, but one can clearly see that he is preoccupied with the significance of changes and of the balance between intellect
and intuition.

A more successful example of the Rhythmist artists who understand and effectively represent Bergson's notions in art is Fergusson. His work, *Rhythm* (Fig. 2), an enigmatic painting of a female figure, is full of contrasting motifs: the figure's apparent femininity featured by her breast and legs versus her masculinity suggested by her arm and torso; curves and circles versus straight lines; calmness versus movement; as Smith notes, although the figure is seated, her 'feet are almost cloven, and certainly look as if she is on tip-toe, poised to move, not sedentary' (Smith 2000: 80). Although Elizabeth Cumming writes, 'There is a sense of calm, growth and conclusion to the work' (Cumming 1985: 9), the painting is not as harmonious as she suggests; there is a tension in it.

This tension, created with the sharp vertical line and the curves, is crucial in interpreting the painting in relation to Bergson's ideas. The following quotation from *Time and Free Will* offers a hint:

If curves are more graceful than broken lines, the reason is that, while a curved line changes its direction at every moment, every new direction is indicated in the preceding one. Thus the perception of ease in motion passes over into the pleasure of mastering the flow of time and of holding the future in the present. A third element comes in when the graceful movements submit to a rhythm and are accompanied by music. For the rhythm and measure, by allowing us to foresee to a still greater extent the movements of the dancer, make us believe that we now control them. (*TFW* 12)
As this passage suggests, although reality which is continuously changing in the flow of time cannot, in theory, be captured as it is, Bergson suggests that the regularity of rhythm, enabling us to foresee the movements, helps us communicate with the dancer and have sympathy; in other words, creating a rhythm allows artists to ‘express’ the internal. Fergusson’s curves, which suggest movements, also have such a rhythm (instead of being an inconceivably formless flux), as can be found in the transformed and yet repeated pattern of circles such as the figure’s breast and the fruits, and of curves such as her legs and the tree. In reality, that is, if the woman were a real, mobile person rather than a painted image of a person, we might not be able to foresee her next move quickly enough; at the very moment when we notice
that she is going to stand up, she might have been up already. In this painting containing a certain rhythm, however, the viewer is, though not in an obvious manner, invited to foresee movements, as Smith successfully does. In the sense that art is ‘artificial’, it may be more closely associated with intellect than with intuition, but that does not in the least mean it cannot deal with the intuitive or ‘real’; on the contrary, by means of spatializing the temporal, or expressing the internal, art helps one use intuition to sympathize with another living being that is real and ceaselessly moving. The significance of the moving feet of the seemingly static woman in relation to Bergson’s idea mentioned above can easily be understood when taking into account that many women in drawings in Rhythm are dancing, a favourite sort of expression of rhythm attempted by many artists in the era. While the drawings of the dancing women can explicitly show rhythm and movement, Fergusson’s painting Rhythm seems to suggest in its subtle way that inner rhythm is often unnoticed because it is hidden inside, but exists all the time, even when one does not appear to be dancing with it.

If one considers the above explanations by Bergson about the roles that rhythm plays in a work of art, the relation between the painting and the cover of Rhythm is suggestive. Although the painting and the drawing share some similarities, they are not exactly the same picture of different versions, a painting in colour and a black-and-white drawing; they seem to represent the same person but probably at different moments. In the painting, for example, the figure is seated on some sort of furniture covered with a piece of white cloth, whereas in the cover of the journal, she is on a circular object cut into half by a horizontal line of the ground. Though there are
more curves in the painting, none of them is a regular circle. In the cover, the regularity of the circle and the horizontal line and the tension between the two are striking. A similar tree stands behind the woman in both versions, but its flowers and leaves in the two works look different; in the painting they look as if they are moving in various directions and they are merging into each other so that it is not very clear what are flowers and what are leaves or anything else, while in the drawing, the two flowers and the group of leaves are more distinctive; they are regular, and look down on the ground, except the tiny flower at the bottom of the drawing. It is hard to clarify what each difference suggests, but it is clear that the same figure is repeated with some modifications to show the different rhythms and changes that involve life. That is, even this ‘same’ woman is not exactly the same at one moment and at another; she herself does look slightly different, as her chin is more pointed in the drawing than it is in the painting, for example.

The significance of rhythm is also related to another notable feature of Fergusson’s works, especially the painting; he draws striking outlines around the woman and objects around her. Although the painting suggests the unity of different lives by creating similar patterns in the picture, it also emphasizes, with these outlines, the diversity of life. In other words, each life, or each part of life such as a leaf on a fruit and the face of the woman, is clearly distinguished from and independent of anything else. In interpreting Fergusson’s strong outlines, Antliff argues the separation by those lines could be linked with Bergson’s separation of quantitative and qualitative differences which compose duration (Antliff 1993: 102). Though the different elements of duration such as what are usually considered the ‘different feelings’ of a
person or even ‘different people’ or ‘different things’ are connected with each other, and could be regarded as the heterogeneous factors of one single duration, we do need to ‘see’ the difference between one such factor and another in order to ‘act’ rather than ‘think’ in a physical or spatial sense: ‘The bodies we perceive are, so to speak, cut out of the stuff of nature by our perception, and the scissors follow, in some way, the marking of lines along which action might be taken’ (CE 12). 10

With these characteristics in mind, Fergusson’s painting can be seen as a work in which the opposing elements of reality that Bergson is concerned with, such as intuition and intellect, time and space, the internal and the external, heterogeneous and homogeneous, are intermingled with and rhythmically play with each other.

There is another notable characteristic of the paintings of Fergusson and others in the Rhythm group that stems from their enthusiasm for Bergson. As mentioned earlier, Konody regards the colourfulness of the works of the painters in the group as their own characteristic, differentiating them from those at the ‘Second Post-Impressionist Exhibition’. Although thanks to Fergusson’s thoughtful consideration for herd boys, the paintings and the drawings in this low-cost magazine were printed in black-and-white, the Rhythmist artists’ original paintings are colourful indeed. This can perhaps also be attributed to Bergson, as he repeatedly writes of our perception of colour. In Time and Free Will, for instance, Bergson suggests that the scientific idea that different colours (for example, yellow and green) only ‘look’ different to our eyes depending on the ‘amount’ of light lightening a certain space does not explain how we actually see the colours; we see them as different colours, not as a
We have grown accustomed, through the combined influence of our past experience and of physical theories, to regard black as the absence, or at least as the minimum, of luminous sensation, and the successive shades of grey as decreasing intensities of white light. But, in point of fact, black has just as much reality for our consciousness as white, and the decreasing intensities of white light illuminating a given surface would appear to an unprejudiced consciousness as so many different shades, not unlike the various colours of the spectrum. (TFW 53-54)

Bergson's suggestion that our perception, as opposed to science, does not give colours any numbers to categorize and place them in order but instead instantly sees them as different is also continued in *Matter and Memory* with yet another memorable explanation; he gives an example of how we perceive the colour red in comparison to how we understand it in the field of physics. He introduces a scientific fact that red light, which has the longest wavelength and vibrates the least frequently, has 400 billions of consecutive vibrations. This is scientifically correct, and Bergson does not deny the notion, but suggests that when he discusses how people perceive the red colour, the subject of his argument is different from that of the physicists who explain what red light is and how many times it vibrates:

If we would form some idea of this number, we should have to separate the vibrations sufficiently to allow our consciousness to count them, or at least to record explicitly their succession; and we should then have to enquire how many days or months or years this succession would occupy. . . . A very simple calculation shows that more than 25,000 years would elapse before the conclusion of the operation. Thus the sensation of red light, experienced by us in the course of a second, corresponds in itself to a succession of phenomena which, separately distinguished in our duration with the greatest possible economy of time, would occupy more than 250 centuries of our history. Is this conceivable? We must distinguish here between our own duration and time in general. In our duration,—the
duration which our consciousness perceives,—a given interval can only contain a limited number of phenomena of which we are aware. Do we conceive that this content can increase; and when we speak of an infinitely divisible time, is it our own duration that we are thinking of? (MM 272-73)

It may be true that even the red light, of which vibrations are the least frequent of all kinds of light, vibrates too often for us mortal beings to recognize, but it is also undeniably true that we can see the colour. As Bergson implies, we should not confuse two different kinds of discussion; in the case of the scientific investigation, researchers discuss what is outside our consciousness, whereas in the case of Bergson’s argument of duration, his focus is on the inside. As we can see from the discussion as to the number of the vibrations of red light, when reality is measured outside our consciousness instead of perceived, it is ‘spatialized’ (that is, treated as if it were fixed rather than flowing) and infinitely and evenly, or homogeneously, divisible, but when it is perceived inside ourselves, it remains duration, or one single, heterogeneous flux, and indivisible. Therefore, the metaphor of colours is also used to suggest human beings’ inability to notice our own slightest changes in the course of duration. In the following quotation, the different psychical states of a person are compared to beads of a necklace:

Instead of a flux of fleeting shades merging into each other, [our attention] perceives distinct and, so to speak, solid colours, set side by side like the beads of a necklace; it must perforce then suppose a thread, also itself solid, to hold the beads together. But if this colourless substratum is perpetually coloured by that which covers it, it is for us, in its indeterminateness, as if it did not exist, since we only perceive what is coloured, or, in other words, psychic states. (CE 3-4)

Though colours may well be considered connected, we do not actually see them as
connected; if we perceive them as connected with each other, we see only one colour. Just like this, Bergson argues, although we all are constantly changing, we do not notice each small change, which enables us to identify a person despite his or her fluidity.

This Bergsonian notion of the individual quality, rather than quantity, of each ‘solid’ colour which our consciousness notices seems to be emphasized in the strong colours in the works by the Fauvist painters in the Rhythm group. Indeed it could be said that the painters in the group, unlike their writer colleague, Murry, who did not see the point of life’s move between the intuitive and the intellect, were more closely concerned with Bergson’s concepts. As Sadler succinctly summarizes in the very first issue of *Rhythm*, the common aim of the Fauves reflects Bergson’s pivotal concepts:

> There is one fundamental desire [shared by the Fauves] with which all start—the desire for rhythm. Be it of line or colour, be it simple or intricate, in every true product of Fauvism it will be present. And this rhythm is of a piece with the use of strong flowing line, of strong massed colour, of continuity. The work must be strong, must be alive, and must be rhythmical. (Sadler 1911: 17)

(2) After *Rhythm*

The journal *Rhythm*, launched in 1911, suffered a financial problem and was ended in 1913 by which time Fergusson was no longer art editor. Its successor, the *Blue Review*, in which Fergusson’s old drawings in *Rhythm* were reused, took over in May 1913 only to close after three monthly issues. Although *Rhythm* and the *Blue Review*
did not survive long, Mansfield and Fergusson managed to maintain their friendship and shared interest in the Bergsonian notion of rhythm, which continued to play a prominent role in their works. The continuing friendship between Mansfield and Fergusson can be imagined through some of her letters at later periods. For example, on 12 May 1918 and again on 22 May, Mansfield suggests in her letters to Brett that Brett should see Fergusson’s show which Mansfield thought ‘wonderful’ (CLKM II 184). This solo exhibition of Fergusson’s works took place at the Connell Gallery in May 1918 and displayed his paintings and sculptures made between 1898 and 1918, including *The Rose Rhythm*, *Kathleen Dillon* (Fig. 4) and *Poise* (Fig. 5) both of which were painted in 1916. In the exhibition catalogue, Murry offers an introduction in which he writes: ‘By the compelling rhythm of his own progress he becomes more and more a vehicle of the spirit which is for ever wrestling with its own materiality. The poet listens in the tumult for the voice of Necessity; the painter waits upon the moment when her mighty outline is visible through the folds of her earthly garment’ (Murry 1918: no page number given). The June issue of *Colour Magazine* reviewed the exhibition and reproduced his paintings, *Summer*, which was used on the cover of the issue, and *Poise*. 
Fergusson’s paintings of this period, *The Rose Rhythm* and *Poise*, and Mansfield’s reaction to them offer important evidence that the idea of rhythm still attracted both artists. Of *The Rose Rhythm* Fergusson personally writes:

One day she [Kathleen Dillon] arrived with a remarkable hat... It was just like a rose, going from the centre convolution and continuing the ‘Rhythm’ idea developed in Paris and still with me. Looking at K I soon saw that the hat was not merely a hat, but a continuation of the girl’s character, her mouth, her nostril, the curl of her hair—her whole character—(feeling of her) like Burns’s ‘love is like a red red rose’. . . . nostril, lips, eyebrows, brooch, buttons, background cushions, right through. At last, this was my statement of a thing thoroughly Celtic. (Morris 1974: 103)

Although Fergusson links it especially to his Scottish roots, his favourite notion of
rhythm is communicated to his New Zealand friend; Mansfield mentions it in her letter to Fergusson on 24 January 1918, showing that her Bergsonian and Fauvist preoccupations still exist:

I have a vase of roses and buds before me on the table. I had a good look at them last night and your rose picture was vivid before me—I saw it in every curve of these beauties—the blouse like a great petal, the round brooch, the rings of hair like shavings of light. I thought how supremely you had 'brought it off'. (CLKAI 1135)

She clearly gets the point of the painting which is based on the Bergsonian idea of movements and rhythm, as can be seen in her mention of the repeated pattern of curves; she notices the significance of 'every curve', and rather than seeing different curves as a group of similar curves, points out each of them by using different similes. It is also notable that her similes such as 'the blouse like a great petal' and 'the rings of hair like shavings of light' seem to indicate that she sees some movements in each soft, flexible curve.

Mansfield's appraisals of Fergusson's works are made out of her serious, professional strictness about art, and she can be critical of Fergusson at times. According to her letter to Murry, she is not satisfied with the mouth of the woman in Poise, though she does admit that 'Poise [sic] is extraordinarily fine' (CLKM II 246).

Again she is concerned with movement in the Bergsonian sense, and lack of it is a major problem; she writes, '[Fergusson] really seems sometimes to fit women with mouths as a dentist might fit them with teeth' and 'the beautiful individual movement (mobility) of the face is gone' (CLKM II 246).
Considering the significance of her enduring pursuit of rhythm in viewing Fergusson's paintings, it is easy to imagine that she cared about rhythm just as much in creating her own stories; she really did, as a letter to Richard Murry on 17 January 1921 suggests:

In Miss Brill [sic] I chose not only the length of every sentence, but even the sound of every sentence—I chose the rise and fall of every paragraph to fit her—and to fit her on that day at that very moment. After I'd written it I read it aloud—numbers of times—just as one would play over a musical composition, trying to get it nearer and nearer to the expression of Miss Brill—until it fitted her. \(\text{CLKM IV 165, Mansfield's emphasis}\)

Mansfield, who had become familiar with Bergson's concept through her association with the New Age, was stimulated by getting acquainted with Fergusson and the Rhythm group, and produced her version of Bergsonian works in which she explored rhythm and movements; she continued to do so in her later fiction. Chapter 3 will examine some of her writings published in Rhythm and the Blue Review in relation to her understanding of Bergson.
This chapter offered an explanation of how Bergson's philosophy was circulated among modernists including 'ordinary people' and artists such as Mansfield and her colleagues. However, the fact that Bergson was popular did not mean that people understood his ideas correctly. The next chapter will show how Bergsonian concepts are misinterpreted by writers of different disciplines both then and now, with a view to suggesting that more precise understanding of Bergson's theory could help provide certain kinds of approaches to Mansfield which have not been fully explored so far.

Notes

1 Of the two, Shaw is closer to Bergson than Butler, who places more stress on the significance of instinct than Bergson and Shaw do. In 1921, in the Preface to *Back to Methuselah*, Shaw describes the contemporary evolutionary theory as the view of Evolution 'which is emerging, under the title of Creative Evolution, as the genuinely scientific religion for which all wise men are now anxiously looking' (Shaw 1921: xviii).

2 Bergson, who sometimes wrote on current topics during World War I, visited the US in 1917 to encourage the Administration and the President to join the war. After the war, he worked as first President of the Commission Internationale de Coopération Intellectuelle until 1925.

3 The *Cambridge Companion to Modernism* edited by Michael Levenson includes the years 1890 to 1939 in its chronology and *A Concise Companion to Modernism* edited by David Bradshaw provides a chronology of the period from 1880 to 1939, while Goldman deals with the years between 1910 and 1945 as the era of Modernism.

4 The French title of this book is *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience*, but this work has been known to an English-speaking audience as *Time and Free Will* (with *An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness* used as its subtitle) since its English version appeared in 1910.
For example, Kolakowski’s *Bergson* and F. C. T. Moore’s *Bergson: Thinking Backwards* introduce *Matter and Memory* as ‘the most difficult’ of Bergson’s works. (Kolakowski 1985: 37-38 and Moore 1996: 5)

Some stories Mansfield wrote in this period did not appear in the *New Age*, because according to Antony Alpers’s speculation (Alpers 1984: 549), Orage rejected them.

In addition, a very tiny but intriguing piece of information implies how much Mansfield might have been familiar with contemporary debates on Bergson; in her letter to Murry dated 1920, she writes about Bax, whom I mentioned earlier with regard to Hulme:

> Grant Richards said at his hotel at Cap Martin a man saw him reading the *Athenaeum* and said that’s the paper K. M. writes in. She’s very brilliant I know her well have known her for years . . . & so on. It was Belfort Bax whom I hardly know really & haven’t seen since the old original New Age [sic] days. What great cheek. He thought himself such a gun then & now he boasts about poor little K. M. (CLKM III 225)

It could be considered rather characteristic of Bax that he boasts about Mansfield claiming he knows her well, judging from what he was doing back in the *New Age*; he insisted that he had presented a similar view to Bergson’s and had done so earlier, which was how the debate between Bax and Hulme on Bergson started. Though it was apparent that Bax made such a claim without understanding Bergson, he was bold and persistent, and the debate went on. If one remembers anything about Bax from the *New Age*, it might well be his arguments on Bergson, and Mansfield seems to imply that in saying, ‘He thought himself such a gun then’. Although she writes she hardly knows him, this clearly sounds as if she knew Bax (for all the bad reasons) and thus most likely Bergson, too.

Their reception of Bergson’s theory is not necessarily straightforward, especially in the case of Vorticism. Though Wyndham Lewis is inspired by Bergson at first, he later changes his position and attacks Bergson in *Time and Western Man*. Nevertheless, critics agree that the principle of Vorticism shows that Lewis was indebted to Bergson. See Paul Edwards, *Wyndham Lewis: Painter and Writer* and Mary Ann Gillies, *Henri Bergson and British Modernism*. In Ezra Pound’s case, he had no interest in Bergson at the beginning, but after attending a lecture on Bergson by Hulme, he changed his mind. In 1913 when he pointed out Imagist concerns, he showed what could be his Bergsonian ideas such as ‘Direct treatment of the “thing” whether subjective or objective’ and ‘As regarding rhythm: to compose in sequence of the musical phrase, not in sequence of a metronome’ (Pound 1963: 3).

It is not clear whether the painting was produced earlier or later than the cover, as Fergusson’s account is not correct in terms of where and when Murry and Sadler saw the painting. Fergusson writes, ‘They had come, they said, because they had seen my picture in the Autumn Salon called “Rhythm”’ (Morris 1974: 64). However, the
exhibition at the Salon d’Automne which showed the painting *Rhythm* took place after the first issue of the journal was published. Therefore, unlike Fergusson’s recollection, Murry and Sadler might have seen the painting when they visited him before it was displayed at the exhibition, or he might have drawn the cover first and then worked on the painting.

10 Bergson explains the significance of the outlines of bodies which make the bodies individual as follows:

The distinct outlines which we see in an object, and which give it its individuality, are only the design of a certain kind of influence that we might exert on a certain point of space: it is the plan of our eventual actions that is sent back to our eyes, as though by a mirror, when we see the surfaces and edges of things. Suppress this action, and with it consequently those main directions which by perception are traced out for it in the entanglement of the real, and the individuality of the body is re-absorbed in the universal interaction which, without doubt, is reality itself. (*CE* 12)
Chapter 2

Bergson and Modernism

As I occasionally suggested in the first chapter, Bergson's work received both positive and negative responses, which would affect the evaluation of Bergson and Modernism in later literary studies. Chapter 2 analyzes the consequence of this mixed reception of Bergson by his contemporaries more fully by focusing on how his work has been read.

Reading Bergson

(1) Bergson's writing and view on writing

In reading Bergson's books, one can easily get the sense of why his work fascinated and inspired his contemporaries, especially artists; one of the most notable characteristics of Bergson's writing is that it offers vivid visual examples that his readers would find memorable. When Bergson was awarded a Nobel Prize in 1927, it was in Literature and 'in recognition of his rich and vitalizing ideas and the brilliant [sic] skill with which they have been presented' (The Nobel Foundation 2004).

Bergson's favourite type of metaphors, or images, is of music, art, and literature often in relation to the creative activities of artists, writers, viewers, readers, or indeed any individuals, since their unpredictable life keeps inventing something new, just as artists do. What is interesting about Bergson's artistic images is that he uses
them to explain the mechanism of evolution; he describes how nature works by comparing it with an artistic, or in other words, 'artificial' process: 'on the canvas which the ancestor passes on, and which his descendants possess in common, each puts his own original embroidery' (CE 24). Here the difference between Bergson and Darwin is clear; Bergson presents an image of living beings creating their own life rather than passively living their life which is given as a result of chance. Another similar example can be found in the part of his argument in which the subject is the varieties of bees:

We seem rather to be before a musical theme, which had first been transposed, the theme as a whole, into a certain number of tones, and on which, still the whole theme, different variations had been played, some very simple, others very skilful. As to the original theme, it is everywhere and nowhere. It is in vain that we try to express it in terms of any idea: it must have been, originally, felt rather than thought. (CE 181)

Noticing Bergson's comparison between nature and art reveals how unreasonable it is to categorize him as an anti-intellectual philosopher. Bergson does not discuss intellect as opposed to intuition. On the contrary, his own writing style and argument prove that he supports the power of such activities. Bergson's idea of the effectiveness of using images, for example, can be grasped by reading the following quotation: '[Life] must be compared to an impetus, because no image borrowed from the physical world can give more nearly the idea of it' (CE 271).

Bergson, however, does not simply trust images' capability of representing reality. Soon after the quotation above, he has to add, 'But it is only an image' (CE 271):
Is my own person, at a given moment, one or manifold? If I declare it one, inner voices arise and protest—those of the sensations, feelings, ideas, among which my individuality is distributed. But, if I make it distinctly manifold, my consciousness rebels quite as strongly; it affirms that my sensations, my feelings, my thoughts are abstractions which I effect on myself, and that each of my states implies all the others. I am then (we must adopt the language of the understanding, since only the understanding has a language) a unity that is multiple and a multiplicity that is one; but unity and multiplicity are only views of my personality taken by an understanding that directs its categories at me; I enter neither into one nor into the other nor into both at once, although both, united, may give a fair imitation of the mutual interpenetration and continuity that I find at the base of my own self. Such is my inner life, and such also is life in general. (CE 271-72)

To put it simply, here Bergson tells us two essential things. One is that we, or our duration, if we insist, can be called either one or many, because there are different feelings and emotions in one’s duration. The other is we, or our duration, if we insist in another way, can be neither one nor many; we are neither a number nor any other type of category that abstracts our life. Useful as they are, images, or any sort of symbols, have to fix life, failing to reflect its fluidity.

This is perhaps why music is given a rather special position in Bergson’s philosophy. Though there is a wide variety of art images including paintings and poems, music metaphors seem to be the most crucial, as the image of ‘rhythm’ might suggest. For example, Bergson speaks of the relation between one psychical state of a person at one moment and another state at the very next moment, the change which is very slight and often unnoticed: ‘Discontinuous though they appear, however, in point of fact they stand out against the continuity of a background on which they are designed, and to which indeed they owe the intervals that separate them; they are the beats of the drum which break forth here and there in the symphony’ (CE 3). Just as in this
example, Bergson frequently uses metaphors of music to represent the relation between one and many and how we perceive it.

The reason why musical analogies such as rhythm matter in Bergson’s philosophy can be better understood when they are compared with his other famous metaphor, the metaphor of water with sugar; to explain that a flow of time cannot be discussed as measurable, Bergson exemplifies the significance of the psychological factor in the situation in which one has to wait for sugar to melt when mixing it with water:

If I want to mix a glass of sugar and water, I must, willy-nilly, wait until the sugar melts. This little fact is big with meaning. For here the time I have to wait is not that mathematical time which would apply equally well to the entire history of the material world, even if that history were spread out instantaneously in space. It coincides with my impatience, that is to say, with a certain portion of my own duration, which I cannot protract or contract as I like. It is no longer something thought, it is something lived. It is no longer a relation, it is an absolute. What else can this mean than that the glass of water, the sugar, and the process of the sugar’s melting in the water are abstractions, and that the Whole within which they have been cut out by my senses and understanding progresses, it may be in the manner of a consciousness? (CE 10)

The glass of water, the sugar, and the process of the sugar’s melting in the water are only abstractions and cannot fully describe reality, because each of them keeps changing in the flow of time. They are not fixed; even the nearest future of each is neither determined nor predictable in the present, which is the very reason one has to wait, just as one has to ‘wait’ while hearing any piece of music. Due to the feelings of the person waiting, the significance (rather than the ‘length’) of waiting time, or duration, is never the same for one’s consciousness and for another’s or for one’s consciousness on one occasion and another; it is an ‘absolute’ which cannot be
measured mathematically.

It is in this sense that hearing (emphatically not reading the score of) music is associated with experience of the quality of duration. As can be seen from the fact that he reveals the limitation of images (‘But it is only an image’), Bergson regards language as something which artificially stops the current of duration. However, just like hearing or playing, that is, waiting for, music to flow, one can also experience duration through literature, while just like musical notes, words and alphabets are only symbols:

Consider the letters of the alphabet that enter into the composition of everything that has ever been written: we do not conceive that new letters spring up and come to join themselves to the others in order to make a new poem. But that the poet creates the poem and that human thought is thereby made richer, we understand very well: this creation is a simple act of the mind, and action has only to make a pause, instead of continuing into a new creation, in order that, of itself, it may break up into words which dissociate themselves into letters which are added to all the letters there are already in the world. (CE 253)

Though Bergson elucidates the artificiality created by language, he does find it necessary for human inner experience to be expressed with language so that it can be linked to the external world, and so he recognizes that the ability to relate the internal and the external is what makes a good writer:

The truth is that the writer’s art consists above everything in making us forget that he is using words. The harmony he seeks is a certain correspondence between the comings and goings of his mind and the phrasing of his speech, a correspondence so perfect that the waves of his thought, borne by the sentence, stir us sympathetically, and the words, taken individually, no longer count. (ME 46)
The key issue is, then, that literature would have to be musical, or rhythmical, if it aimed to represent duration. With rhythm and movement, language could approach the real, rather than work merely as a convenient means of spatializing reality; as ‘thought is directed towards action, although it does not end in a real action, it sketches out one or several virtual, simply possible, actions’ (ME 46). As this argument shows, Bergson does not only separate language or other artificial tools of ‘spatialization’ from natural, durational senses of reality but also clarifies how they actually work together in our life. In Patricia M. Rae’s summary,

Bergson represents the successful poem as a non-discursive structure that aims to suggest the intuition directly rather than to explain it... One technique he suggests to aid this process is the use of regular rhythm, which will, he maintains, put to sleep the alienating and divisive analytical powers of the reader and enable him to empathize with the intuition captured in the words before him. (Rae 1989: 87-88)

Although stress is often placed on the fact that Bergson is concerned with the artificiality of language, his argument on the potentiality of language and literature is more complicated than it seems, and not necessarily negative. Bergson even suggests that human experiences based on duration rather than chronological time could be explored in a new type of fiction:

Now, if some bold novelist, tearing aside the cleverly woven curtain of our conventional ego, shows us under this appearance of logic a fundamental absurdity, under this juxtaposition of simple states an infinite permeation of a thousand different impressions which have already ceased to exist the instant they are named, we commend him for having known us better than we knew ourselves. (TFW 133)
This famous passage from *Time and Free Will* might actually have inspired real
fiction writers of the time; it did not take long before such fiction started to appear.
Bergson’s hope for a new type of fiction also reflects his view of a role of art. Ruth
Lorand interprets and summarizes Bergson’s concept of art as follows: ‘as Bergson
argues, the endless flow of life constantly creates new vital orders, but its currents
carry new confusions and indeterminate elements as well. Art takes up the challenge
or else it is vacuous’ (Lorand 1999: 415).

(2) Misunderstanding of Bergson’s philosophy

As I have pointed out, even in his lifetime, Bergson’s philosophy was often
incompletely understood, partly due to its over-popularity. Fascinated by a new idea
of duration, intuition, and heterogeneous continuity, many simply failed to follow the
interrelationship of his philosophical formulations. To borrow Gillies’ terms, they
used ‘Bergsonisms’ unlike people she calls ‘Bergsonians’, who studied and
understood Bergson’s philosophy (Gillies 1996: 191, note 20).¹ The superficial
appreciation of Bergson’s philosophy helped its quick dissemination, but also caused
misunderstandings and negative critiques. Bergson’s idea that time is not only
internally and intuitively perceived but also intellectually externalized or spatialized,
was frequently ignored not just by casual admirers of ‘Bergsonisms’ but even by
other philosophers such as Russell, who condemned Bergson as anti-intellectual and
wrote that ‘in the main intellect is the misfortune of man, while instinct is seen at its
best in ants, bees, and Bergson’ (Russell 1912: 323). It is clear that he completely
misunderstands Bergson’s philosophy judging from the fact that he accuses Bergson
of dealing with ‘instinct as the good boy and intellect as the bad boy’ (Russell 1912:
Bergson does not regard either of them as good or bad. If anything ‘bad’ for life is mentioned by Bergson, it is to be exclusively intuitive or exclusive intellectual, to reach either of the extreme positions, because that happens only when a life ends.

Russell’s hostility and contempt for Bergson’s fashionable philosophy is more evident in the following passage:

[Bergson] relies on their inherent attractiveness, and on the charm of an excellent style. Like the advertisers of Oxo, he relies upon picturesque and varied statement, and an apparent explanation of many obscure facts. Analogies and similes, especially form a very large part of the whole process by which he recommends his views to the reader. The number of similes for life to be found in his works exceeds the number in any poet known to me. (Russell 1912: 332)

Russell further writes: ‘if I am not mistaken, . . . there is no reason whatever for accepting this view, either in the universe or in the writings of M. Bergson’ (Russell 1912: 333).

As Russell suggests, sceptics about Bergson tend to question his use of words. His writing style was indeed both his strength and weakness; although he attracts his readers not only by such striking terms as élant vital and by impressive metaphors but also by ordinary expressions, his choice of peculiarly accessible and colloquial words, describing time as ‘real’, language as ‘convenient’, and life as ‘free’, causes misunderstanding as well as popularity; although Bergson explains carefully and lengthily what he means by those words, many fail to pay attention to his particular contexts, and consequently misunderstand or only partially understand his theory.
It could be also puzzling, to give another example, that Bergson sounds as if he insisted there is no such thing as the ‘future’, which is widely known as a characteristic of his thought, but this means that the future is not ‘real’ in the sense that the future cannot be experienced yet. In a different sense, however, it is what is usually called the future that Bergson is concerned with in discussing freedom and duration’s continuity and unforeseeability. Unlike many, Gilles Deleuze notes the significance of Bergson’s argument on the future: ‘In a different way from Freud, but just as profoundly, Bergson saw that memory was a function of the future, that memory and will were but one and the same function, that only a being capable of memory could turn away from its past, detach itself, not repeat it, do something new’ (Deleuze 1999: 56). That is, the accumulation of our changing consciousness and life from the past through the present will become what is usually called our ‘future’; it is always ‘something new’ no matter how slight the change that each moment brings may be.

Influenced by Deleuze, who shed new light on Bergson from the 1960s onwards, attempts to restore his position have been made since the 1990s. Even so, it seems the bulk of research on Bergson still focus on his account of the qualitative aspect of time, which unites everything to form heterogeneous duration, perceptible by intuition, as if he rejected its counterpart, the quantitative element, which spatializes time so that it is measurable and understandable by intellect. What I emphasize in this study is that Bergson explains that these apparently opposite factors are inseparable in our consciousness. In other words, duration is one or many at will. I
suggest the very reasons why Mansfield has not been discussed in as much detail as Joyce or Woolf in relation to Bergson are that Bergson is still largely misunderstood and that Mansfield accurately comprehends the oft-misconstrued theories of Bergson. The later chapters will prove that, unlike many who used ‘Bergsonisms’ with such attractive terms as intuition, Mansfield understood and successfully expressed the indivisible relation between intuition and intellect. My Bergsonian readings of Mansfield’s work will offer, I hope, an explanation as to her apparent silence on social, political, and cultural topics in some of her famous stories.

**Modernist Studies and Bergson**

(1) Space and time

Michael Whitworth writes:

> Throughout her fiction and criticism, Woolf expresses a preference for a reality which is semi-transparent, combining the solidity of granite and the evanescence of rainbow. Though many critics have seen in modernism an irrationalist rejection of science in favour of myth, in the case of Woolf at least, the situation is more complex. (Whitworth 2000: 151)

It is not only in Woolf’s case that the situation is more complex. Many artists, writers, and thinkers of different disciplines, scientific or artistic, of the era shared a strong interest in various fields of science such as life science, eugenics, physics, psychoanalysis, and so on. Moreover, since Darwinism, as well as these fields of natural science proper, social issues had often been discussed as if they were scientific. Richardson quotes the biologist and popular writer Grant Allen’s remark in 1889 (‘everybody nowadays talks about evolution. Like electricity, the cholera...
germ, woman’s rights, the great mining boom, and the Eastern Question, it is “in the air” and points out: ‘Stringing together apparently unrelated concerns of the late nineteenth century, Allen could not have chosen a more consanguineous group.

Social and scientific progress, and questions of race, race failure, gender, and disease were converging under the umbrella of “evolution” (Richardson 2003: 6).

Although Bergson may be a scholar in the field of humanities according to the traditional academic categorization, his studies are also interdisciplinary and often scientific; it is unreasonable to describe him as anti-intellectual or anti-scientific, as science is clearly important to him:

How could there be disharmony between our intuitions and our science, how especially could our science make us renounce our intuitions, if these intuitions are something like instinct—an instinct conscious, refined, spiritualised—and if instinct is still nearer life than intellect and science? Intuition and intellect do not oppose each other, save where intuition refuses to become more precise by coming into touch with facts scientifically studied, and where intellect, instead of confining itself to science proper (that is, to what can be inferred from facts or proved by reasoning), combines with this an unconscious and inconsistent metaphysic which in vain lays claim to scientific pretensions. The future seems to belong to a philosophy which will take into account the whole of what is given . . . . (Bergson 1914: 127-28)

As we are physical, as well as mental, beings, we are closely linked to the physical or material, that is, spatial, aspects of reality, no matter how attractive the notion of the flux of duration may be. Bergson writes: ‘We are not the vital current itself; we are this current already loaded with matter, that is, with congealed parts of its own substance which it carries along its course’ (CE 252). Bergson is concerned with space as well as time, although Wyndham Lewis writes the thick book, Time and
*Western Man*, in which he criticizes the obsession with time that he finds in philosophers, mainly Bergson, and modernist writers such as Joyce, because Lewis thinks they disregard the significance of space. Contrary to what Lewis argues, for Bergson, time and space are two indispensable aspects of reality.

The kind of insight into dual reality that Whitworth notices in Woolf (and I in Bergson) attracts more critical attention in recent studies of Modernism, especially when the significance of such issues as science, politics, and contemporary culture are discussed in relation to modernist writings; it is pointed out that critics have long neglected the significance of space in modernist works of literature. In the past, it was more common for critics to focus on modernist writers’ obsession with time, consciousness, and unity, which they attributed to Bergson’s influence, while it was more or less automatically considered to be more ‘postmodern’ to be concerned with space, (consequences of) materialism, and multiplicity, which were regarded as strong reactions against Modernism. Scholars such as Goldman and Andrew Thacker, however, explain that modernist writers’ treatment of space as well as time is crucial in their literature. In *The Feminist Aesthetics of Virginia Woolf*, Goldman mentions that Woolf was concerned with external, material, and spatial factors, just as the title of her work, *A Room of One’s Own*, suggests. Thacker, in *Moving through Modernity*, also insists that space and place play a significant role in Modernism. What is intriguing about Goldman’s and Thacker’s discussions is that Bergson is considered a person who is responsible for critics’ inattention to spatial issues in modernist literature. It is regrettable but significantly typical that Thacker does not recognize that Bergson’s theories can be associated with, or could even be the
primary inspiration of, modernist writers' preoccupations with space which Thacker explores in his study. Instead, he relates Bergson to modernists' obsession with time: 'Stream of consciousness technique in modernist fiction has, quite rightly, long been associated with philosophical theories of time and history, such as that of Bergson' (Thacker 2003: 5).³

Goldman is more cautious, and writes: 'It is not my concern to establish the accuracy or otherwise of Woolf's, or of Woolf's criticism's, understanding of Bergson, but rather to comment on how the invocation of Bergson has more often tended to encourage readings of Woolf's work which neglect its feminist import' (Goldman 1998: 4). Interestingly, in claiming that Woolf's work shows her feminist concern which is clearly connected to the 'real world' despite the opposite view raised by some critics, Goldman carefully suggests the possibility that Woolf or Woolf's criticism might not have interpreted Bergson accurately. I totally agree that Woolf's past criticism frequently fails to pay as much attention to the political aspects of her writing as they deserve and also that the failure has much to do with the fact that the critics take it for granted that Woolf is a so-called 'Bergsonian' writer, preoccupied with an extraordinarily philosophical notion of time rather than with any worldly matters. I also agree, if this is what Goldman speculates, that this stereotypical idea about Woolf and Bergson is caused by the critics' (I do not think it is Woolf's) misunderstanding of Bergson's theories. The problems are that the name of Bergson is often instantly used as a symbol of the kind of concept focusing solely on the human mind and aesthetics, disregarding the 'real world' and that the writers who have been labelled as 'Bergsonian', such as Woolf, are also unreasonably considered
idealists, indifferent to politics.

Goldman’s and Thacker’s texts are interesting examples in which the name of Bergson is used at present to signify the kind of idea originally derived from Bergson’s contemporaries who misunderstood his conceptions. About a century later, the term ‘Bergson’ (rather than the ‘name’) has an established meaning: anti-scientific, anti-intellectual, and yet highly elitist and exclusive. The term is used to describe the type of modernist writer or scholar of Modernism who is obsessed by such abstract, academic things as the nature of time and intuition instead of more realistic issues such as the War which was the most topical of the era. This usage of the term is so common that Goldman has to use it for convenience in order to communicate with today’s readers of literary criticism, even though her choice of the term ‘Bergson’ does not mean she aims to criticize, or discuss in any way, Bergson himself.

(2) ‘Bergsonian’ or ‘non-Bergsonian’ writers

As it is my concern to establish the accuracy of modernist writers’ understanding of Bergson, I argue that Woolf’s representations of space as well as time have much in common with Bergson’s ideas. Although Woolf repeatedly denied having read Bergson, which might be true, her works clearly show that her deep understanding of the current argument of time and space is closer to Bergson’s ideas than some of her contemporaries who meant to be Bergsonian. Her favourite contrasting images such as granite and rainbow, solid and soft, and many selves and one connected self as suggested particularly well in The Waves certainly coincide with Bergson’s theory.
of heterogeneity and homogeneity, rather than showing typical preference for heterogeneous unity.

While Woolf is regarded as a Bergsonian writer probably without even reading Bergson, other writers are seldom read in relation to Bergson, even though they seem to have read his work. In Aldous Huxley's 1928 novel *Point Counter Point* in which he ironically represents literary figures in about 1920, it is pointed out that Burlap, whose model is said to be Murry, uses such words as 'intuition' and 'believe in Life' too simplistically:

'I liked your article on Rimbaud', Burlap declared, still pressing Walter's arm, still smiling up at him from his tilted swivel chair.

'I'm glad', said Walter, feeling uncomfortably that the remark wasn't really addressed to him, but to some part of Burlap's own mind which had whispered, 'You ought to say something nice about his article', and was having its demands duly satisfied by another part of Burlap's mind [sic: no punctuation]

'What a man!' exclaimed Burlap. 'That was someone who believed in Life, if you like!' Ever since Burlap had taken over the editorship, the leaders of the *Literary World* had almost weekly proclaimed the necessity of believing in Life. Burlap's belief in Life was one of the things Walter found most disturbing. What did the words mean? Even now he hadn't the faintest idea. Burlap had never explained. You had to understand intuitively; if you didn't, you were as good as damned. (Huxley 1947: 218)

'Intuitive' and 'believe in Life' are Burlap's favourite words, but ironically he represents precisely the kind of person who 'spatializes' human experiences without getting the point that the nature of such experiences cannot be expressed through words. His understanding of Bergson is very limited as a result of concentrating on the concept of intuition as what Russell calls 'the good boy' without following the
complex relation between intuition and intellect; despite his enthusiasm for
‘intuition’, his isolation of intuition from intellect is extremely ‘intellectual’ and
artificial. Walter, who admits that he does not understand what is meant by Burlap’s
words, is more like Bergson, noting that there is another self in Burlap, who
e ncourages himself to say nice words to Walter, and that words are artificial.
Huxley’s descriptions of Walter’s mind seem to embody Bergson’s idea about human
mobile consciousness which continuously travels between different points of the past.

The characters in the novel are preoccupied with ideas such as time, freedom, and
evolution. Some, like Sidney Quarles, whose excuse for not having finished writing
what he claims is to be a great work is lack of free time, might perhaps not have read
Bergson, but these characters clearly show the Bergsonian reality that our inner time
does not progress steadily and uniformly, as human beings wait, wonder, become
lazy and inefficient, or do nothing. Other characters, on the other hand, clearly know
Bergson and speak in a Bergsonian language; Philip Quarles, for instance, wonders
in his notebook whether it is possible to live ‘vegetably and intuitively’ (Huxley

Huxley, who mocks Burlap’s (or Murry’s) pretence, does not seem to make fun of
Bergson himself. On the contrary, judging from what he does in these quotations as
well as in the rest of the novel page after page, there is no doubt that he is deeply
interested in Bergson’s famous ideas such as time and space, one or many selves,
consciousness, and evolution, and his metaphors, the most significant of which are
musical as the title clearly shows, remind one of Bergson’s. Huxley’s short story
'The Gioconda Smile' (1922), a work with a similar touch, does indeed mention the name of Bergson. In the story, Janet Spence makes Mrs. Hutton, who has been ill for some time, feel better by talking and listening to her sympathetically, while also impressing Mr. Hutton by speaking of intelligent topics including Bergsonian philosophy: ‘She was a machine-gun riddling her hostess with sympathy. Mr. Hutton had undergone similar bombardments, mostly of a literary or philosophic character—bombardments of Maeterlinck, of Mrs. Besant, of Bergson, of William James. Today the missiles were medical’ (Huxley 1925: 18-19).

Reading *Point Counter Point* and 'The Gioconda Smile' in relation to Bergson, I consider two things. One is that they could be read as descriptions of the era of Bergson when some understood Bergson well and others did not, but in either way many were hugely interested. The other is that the fact that these works, which are so obvious in their implications of the characters’ reactions to Bergsonian philosophy, are not discussed with reference to Bergson might be due to misunderstanding and ignorance of this philosopher.6

One reason why critics do not associate *Point Counter Point* with Bergson could be that it has a simple, accessible form, or at least simpler and more accessible than representative novels of so-called ‘high Modernism’ such as *Ulysses*. Although the multiple perspective employed in the novel is recognizably ‘modernist’, *Point Counter Point* is not a difficult book to read. Bergson’s philosophy has long been discussed in order to explain the purpose of the complicated structures which characterize well-known works of high Modernism with an emphasis on the
significance of time and the stream-of-consciousness technique in such fiction. This is not wrong in itself but so superficial that it could be misleading, because Bergson claims not only that real time is continuous but also that it can be spatialized and cut into recognizable pieces.

The general critical attitude towards Lawrence, a contributor both to *Rhythm* and the *Blue Review*, is similar to the one towards Huxley, though Lawrence’s status as a writer has been considered more substantial; very few including Lehan and Smith notice Bergson’s influence on Lawrence. This could be linked to the fact that, in Michael Bell’s words, Lawrence ‘is usually seen as being at best marginal to . . . modernism’ (Bell 2001: 179). Bell, who claims, ‘once it is properly understood, his apparently marginal position becomes critically central’ (Bell 2001: 179), points out that ‘Lawrence also thematised time, along with modernists such as Thomas Mann, Joyce, Proust and Woolf, but less overtly than they’ (Bell 2001: 183). Lawrence’s thematization of time and related subjects such as evolution, in my opinion, is not less overt than that of the other modernist writers Bell mentions, but I argue it is largely because not of the theme but the form of his works, like that of Huxley’s *Point Counter Point*, that many overlook the theme of time in spite of Lawrence’s obvious and recurrent mention of it. Furthermore, I suggest Lawrence’s often unnoticed preoccupation with time should be explored in relation to his involvement with Rhythmists, which is also neglected by critics except for Smith, who argues, ‘[“The Soiled Rose” which appeared in the Blue Review] like *Lady Chatterley’s Lover*, has what could be described as Colourist as well as Fauvist elements with its stabs of colour’ (Smith 2000: 87). This is a precise but rare comment which notes
the significance of the link between his work and his collaboration with *Rhythm* and the *Blue Review*, the magazines which were intended to be Colourist, Fauvist, and Bergsonian. As well as colour and barbarism in the story mentioned by Smith, the story, again like *Lady Chatterley's Lover*, shows other aspects which are perhaps more directly associated with Bergson's original notions rather than the ideas of the different groups inspired by Bergson: time, the relation between intellect and intuition (between matter and memory, body and mind), freedom, evolution, and so forth.

The simple, chronological order of events adopted in 'The Soiled Rose' and *Lady Chatterley's Lover* might cause them to seem irrelevant to Bergson's conception, as critics often too simply associate Bergson with more complicated narrative methods in which the text seems to meander from one point of the past to another, or to the present, in an apparently random order. However, Lawrence's straightforward style does not mean his idea on time is incongruous with Bergson's. For example, the problem of lack of freedom or mobility of life is repeatedly mentioned throughout *Lady Chatterley's Lover*. The house of Connie and Clifford is characterized by its regularity, unchangeable rigidity, and, in short, lack of life:

> Of physical life they lived very little. [Connie] had to superintend the house. But the housekeeper had served Sir Geoffrey for many years .... All those endless rooms that nobody used, all the Midlands routine, the mechanical cleanliness and the mechanical order! .... Everything went on in pretty good order, strict cleanliness, and strict punctuality .... (Lawrence 1993: 16-17)

Also on another occasion, Lawrence is concerned with the kind of situation in which
we struggle mechanically, unforned, unbegotten, unborn, repeating some old process of life, unable to become ourselves, unable to produce anything new' (Lawrence 1985: 45). This is comparable to Bergson's basic argument about the significance of repetitions in life. He argues that even when we seem to repeat the 'same' thing, it can be felt quite differently, as we are not the same for a moment, but we might also feel it as the same or simply do it automatically without even feeling anything in particular, if it is repeated routinely. To give an example, he writes that the impression he receives in the morning hearing the strike of the hour at which he is used to getting up 'perhaps ... would not determine [him] to act':

But generally this impression, instead of disturbing my whole consciousness like a stone which falls into the water of a pond, merely stirs up an idea which is, so to speak, solidified on the surface, the idea of rising and attending to my usual occupations. This impression and this idea have in the end become tied up with one another, so that the act follows the impression without the self interfering with it. In this instance I am a conscious automaton, and I am so because I have everything to gain by being so. (TFW 168)

Even when we think we repeat the 'same' thing, it is not the case, since our past experiences accumulate and create our new self; as a slightly different person, one does not, and cannot, repeat exactly the same experience and the same feelings anymore in doing the same thing:

We are right when we say that habit is formed by the repetition of an effort; but what would be the use of repeating it, if the result were always to reproduce the same thing? The true effect of repetition is to decompose, and then to recompose, and thus appeal to the intelligence of the body. At each new attempt it separates movements which were interpenetrating; each time it calls the attention of the body to a new detail which had passed unperceived; it bids the body discriminate and classify; it teaches what is the
essential; it points out, one after another, within the total movement, the lines that mark off its internal structure. In this sense, a movement is learnt when the body has been made to understand it. (MM 137-38)

Until we are accustomed to doing something, each time we repeat that act it could be felt specially, but thanks to our memory we eventually learn to do it automatically. Even so, however, we are different every time we do the same old task, as we keep changing, or evolving. As we can learn to do it automatically, we can grow and evolve further instead of forgetting and having to relearn the same thing from the beginning. Although, compared to Bergson, Lawrence does have a recognizable tendency to regard repetition as negative, he shares with Bergson the notion that human activities, though repetitious, should produce something new. Connie’s problem in the unchanging house that Lawrence describes is precisely that the repetition does not help her move in any sense; the same things in the house are simply repeated meaninglessly: ‘Time went on. Whatever happened, nothing happened, because she was so beautifully out of contact’ (Lawrence 1993: 19). She lives ‘very little’ indeed, while she is staying at the house, though that does not last long; she ends up getting out of the old house.

As I have shown, there are some established ideas about which writers are ‘Bergsonian’ and which writers are not, even though these stereotypes are often unreliable. I argue that the situation of the criticism of Mansfield, who has not been analyzed in relation to Bergson a great deal, might also be comparable to that of Huxley or Lawrence, that is, those whose Bergsonian preoccupations have not been noticed by many.
(3) Bergsonian Mansfield

While writers such as Joyce and Woolf have been studied in detail in relation to Bergson (too often with a special emphasis on his idea of flux of time), Mansfield has not been explored from that angle by many critics, although quite a few do mention the name of the philosopher in arguing that time plays a profound role in Mansfield’s writing. In Katherine Mansfield and the Origins of Modernist Fiction (1991), however, Sydney Janet Kaplan, though briefly, notes the significance of the relationship between the New Age group and Mansfield linking it to Bergson’s influence on Mansfield’s writing. Kaplan sees what Bergson calls ‘sympathy’ in Mansfield, who believes that artists should try to ‘become’ apples in painting apples. Although hers is an insightful analysis, Kaplan does not go beyond hinting at how Mansfield’s writing could be linked to Bergson; the first work which explores Bergsonian philosophy’s role in Mansfield’s work more substantially is Katherine Mansfield: A Literary Life by Smith (2000). Smith, in her detailed account of the intellectual and literary network to which Mansfield belonged in her lifetime, articulates how Mansfield’s stories could be analyzed in connection to Bergson’s major philosophical conceptions, offering clear explanations as to how Mansfield and the artists around her such as Fergusson were connected through their Bergsonian pursuit of art and influenced each other. Though this book covers various other aspects of the development of Mansfield’s work throughout her life, rather than focusing only (like my thesis) on Bergson’s influence on Mansfield, it is the first book on Mansfield in which Bergson’s theory is actually taken into account to suggest Mansfield’s exploration of rhythm and movement and of the relationship
between heterogeneity and homogeneity.

That so few scholars have noted the link between Mansfield and Bergson is partly a result of critics' limited understanding of his theories that I mentioned earlier. For example, while modernist writers' interest in consciousness has attracted considerable critical attention, Bergson's writing in which the significance of consciousness is an essential topic is not consulted as often as it could be. One could argue that some of the characteristics of Modernism and of Mansfield discussed in this thesis are indebted to Freud's psychology rather than Bergson's philosophy. The descriptions of the morbid mother and the child in 'The Woman at the Store' and the characters in 'Psychology', for example, might well be analyzed through Freudian theory because Mansfield approaches the characters' hidden consciousness. Although I will show the link between Mansfield's and Bergson's writing throughout my argument because Mansfield's representations of unconsciousness could be sufficiently explained by referring to Bergson, without mentioning Freud, I am aware that those thinkers share some common ideas which seem to influence Mansfield. What I attempt to explain is that Mansfield shows her interest in contemporary scholarly topics and applies them to her fiction, which is a trenchant aspect of her modernity. I will discuss Mansfield's work with a focus on Bergson's influence on her partly because Bergson deals with similar issues to those explored by Freud (whose influence on Mansfield has already been explained by critics of Mansfield such as Kaplan), just as Peter Childs reminds us that Freud is only one of the thinkers who share an interest in the most popular subjects of the era:
Freud is the one figure who all reviews of Modernism privilege, and yet his work’s impact has to be understood within the general increased level of inquiry at the turn of the century into the workings of the mind and its relation to society by, among others, Carl Jung (1875-1961), Henri Bergson (1859-1941), William James (1842-1910)...

Apart from Freud, an important figure in discussions of Modernism’s borrowing from psychology and philosophy is... Bergson. (Childs 2000: 48-49)

Furthermore, I find it crucial to discuss Mansfield’s work with reference to Bergson because Mansfield seems to share more in common with Bergson than with Freud. Though both Bergson and Freud are concerned with mind as an important subject, Bergson does not see it as the only true part of the self, while Freud apparently does; for Bergson, the surface of the self is also essential. As later chapters will show, Mansfield is more like Bergson than Freud in the sense that she deals with the fact that reluctantly or otherwise, individuals, as social beings, have their surface statuses or roles on the basis of such things as nationality, gender, age, and class. Just like Bergson, Mansfield tends to question the propriety of such categorization and yet also to accept our need to sort out reality by giving Fergussonian ‘outlines’ as it were for better understanding of the otherwise incomprehensible world.

Another reason why Bergson’s influence on Mansfield has been neglected must be because Mansfield has also been misunderstood, or understood in a limited sort of ways. When Ann Blake summarizes the changes in trends of criticisms of Mansfield, she writes as if the subjects critics have discussed are unrelated to each other: ‘A longstanding judgment is that her best work derives from her Wellington childhood. ... In an alternative view, Mansfield is the international modernist, and, with Joyce or Lawrence, a traveller and exile ... Attention has now turned to
Mansfield's colonial context' (Blake 2001: 79). Indeed, critics tend to concentrate on only one of these factors of Mansfield (chosen largely on the basis of the current critical trend) without exploring much of the relationship between them. Whether these different focuses really offer 'alternatives' or 'turns' to their studies is a question which has to be considered here. Is it possible to discuss Mansfield's modernity without taking the colonial or political context of her writing into account? Can Mansfield as a modernist or colonial writer be clearly separated from her more personal self who cherishes her memories of her childhood in New Zealand?

Just as modernist studies is turning from 1922 to around 1910, the criticism of Mansfield is also changing its focus from her later works to earlier. The year 1922 was an important one for Mansfield as well as Joyce and T. S. Eliot, with some of her most successful stories being published in *The Garden Party and Other Stories*, and in the past, it was commonly considered that her later stories are far better than earlier ones which were too often neglected as if they were not worthy of serious criticism. More stress is now placed on the significance of her early stories in recent studies. This cannot be unrelated to the fact that some of Mansfield’s earlier works such as ‘The Woman at the Store’ are more apparently sociopolitical, or to be specific, more feminist or more postcolonial than such later stories as ‘The Garden Party’. Along with the interest of today’s literary criticism in gender and nationality, more attention is paid to the earlier works of Mansfield which seem to enable us to discuss this writer with less difficulty as a female New Zealander. Even before this preoccupation with politics (often considered as opposed to aesthetics) began, there
was a tendency in studies of Mansfield to assert that her early stories were linked to biographical facts with a particular emphasis on her nationality and that her later works were discussed in association with her modernist aesthetics and techniques such as her use of what seems to be a version of the stream-of-consciousness method. In other words, whichever way the critical fashion turns, Mansfield’s earlier stories are often read with attention to the content associated with the space where a particular character is located, and later ones, to the form which helps show Mansfield’s modernist interest in how a character experiences time. As my interpretations of her works in Chapters 3 to 6 will show, however, both political and aesthetic (and spatial and temporal) aspects can be found in Mansfield’s earlier and later stories. For example, although her early stories published in the New Age and Rhythm can easily be read as about particular countries or cultures and have actually been analyzed as such, they can also be read in association with modernist preoccupation with the flow of time. Likewise, the later stories are not merely modernist experimental products but also works with social or political aspects strongly connected to particular cultures. Though it may seem more elitist to be concerned with the ever-flowing time which can never be caught, and more accessible to grasp a specific individual in a specific space, it is important to note that the two seemingly opposite elements, aesthetic and political, and temporal and spatial, are both essential for Bergson and for his modernist followers, Mansfield included. Just as in Fergusson’s painting Rhythm, the two are intertwined with each other.

I agree with Goldman: ‘It is unhelpful, in any case, to think of writers as consistently
holding, and working from the same views about the relations between their aesthetics and politics throughout their lives or even during the creation of a particular work’ (Goldman 2004: 65). From this perspective (as well as the Bergsonian perspective), my study might seem at first blush as if I were unreasonably limiting the implications of Mansfield’s fiction by putting a label of ‘Bergsonian work’ on it. Conversely, the purpose of my use of Bergson’s theories for this study is, for one thing, precisely to show Mansfield’s abundant and complicated ways of representing her aesthetics and politics which are often unnoticed due to critics’ common misunderstandings of, and prejudice against, ‘modernist’ and ‘Bergsonian’ concepts.

Throughout, this thesis deals with contrasts between time and space, short fiction and novels, impersonal and personal, women and men, form and content, and aesthetic and political, and yet shows that both of the seemingly opposing aspects are evident and closely connected to each other in Mansfield’s writing. If I emphasize that both elements, not just time but space, not just form but content, are significant in her writing, some scholars who are not in favour of Modernism might summarize Mansfield’s work (and mine) as not modernist but feminist or postcolonialist. Scholars of Modernism, on the other hand, know that it is one of the characteristics of modernist literature to be concerned with political issues and spatialization as well as aesthetic matters and temporality. Some of the scholars of Modernism, who understand modernist artists’ preoccupation with this duality, however, might not realize that it could be attributed to Bergson; they might wrongly claim Mansfield’s work (and mine) to be not Bergsonian but rather anti-Bergsonian. However, neither
Modernism nor Bergson’s philosophy can be so simply defined.

Michael Hollington writes, ‘we do not have to prove that Mann read [Bergson] or Proust admired him to detect his importance for their art’ (Hollington 1991: 431). Although many agree that Bergson’s philosophy was so widely circulated in the modernist period that critics do not need to be concerned with whether a particular writer actually read Bergson or not, I would rather agree with Beer, who writes of the problem with treating any writers who show Darwinian characteristics as influenced by him: ‘although I do not believe that this would be an improper enterprise, it seems to me to be in one sense an insufficient one, because it does not take account of the act of reading and reaction’ (Beer 2000: 4, Beer’s emphasis). I suggest considering the effects of Bergson on Mansfield is significant because it involves analyzing how Bergson’s texts were actually read and reacted to. Though it is perfectly reasonable, in my opinion, to discuss the shadow of Bergson’s theories in the works of such writers as Woolf, who claimed she had never read Bergson, it is curious that Mansfield has very rarely been discussed in relation to Bergson, while Woolf frequently has. Reading Mansfield from Bergsonian perspectives should offer new interpretations not only of Mansfield’s work but of how Bergson contributed to Modernism. It will also give clues about what is implied by the lack of critical attention to the relation between Mansfield and Bergson. Although I use the theories of Bergson, Mansfield’s contemporary rather than mine, in doing so this thesis explores how Mansfield’s and Bergson’s texts, written about a century ago, can be reread today.
Notes

1 The distinction between the terms ‘Bergsonism’ and ‘Bergsonian’ that Gillies makes here is not what is widely applied. Many use the word ‘Bergsonism’ without any negative connotations, though they would agree with her in claiming that there were these two types of approaches to Bergson’s philosophy, whatever they are called.

2 Russell, who questioned Bergson’s frequent use of imagery, also received a Nobel Prize in Literature in 1950.

3 One should not forget, however, that Thacker can write his book on Modernism in terms of geography without referring to Bergson; it is not only Bergson but also later thinkers whom Thacker consults, Martin Heidegger, Henri Lefebvre, Michel de Certeau, and Michel Foucault, that offer accounts of space. Their discussions are not at all contradictory with Bergson’s, although the terms they use may be different. (It is as though they proved the appropriateness of what Bergson calls evolution and what T. S. Eliot calls tradition.)

4 James Hafley writes:

Virginia Woolf evidently never read Bergson: Leonard Woolf assured me in a letter, in 1949, that ‘Mrs. Woolf did not read a word of Bergson’, and that, in spite of the fact that her sister-in-law Mrs. Karin Stephen wrote a book on Bergson (The Misuse of Mind, 1922), ‘I very much doubt that she ever discussed Bergson with Mrs. Stephen.’ Mr. Woolf also wrote that ‘I do not think that she was influenced in the slightest degree by Bergson’s ideas’; but with this it is hard to agree. If she did not read Bergson himself, she must certainly have read Proust; and Bergson’s ideas were so popular as to be everywhere around her at second and third hand. (Hafley 1954: 174)


6 June Deery asserts that Huxley was influenced by Bergson, though she does not mention Point Counter Point or ‘The Gioconda Smile’: ‘[Eyeless in Gaza’s] exploration of memory most likely reflects Proust and Bergson rather than Einstein’ (Deery 1996: 33).

7 Morag Shiach in ‘Work and Selfhood in Lady Chatterley’s Lover’ provides a conscientious analysis of how Lawrence’s idea about ‘work’ (including repetition) changed over the years of his career.
Chapter 3

Becoming Bergsonian: Early Works

Although Bergson's influence might be said to play a more significant role in Mansfield's last and best-known stories, Bergsonian elements began to appear in her earlier work as she became increasingly familiar with his philosophical ideas. This chapter thus concentrates on Mansfield's early works, *Maata*, 'The Woman at the Store', and 'How Pearl Button Was Kidnapped' and each will be read in relation to one of Bergson's books, *Time and Free Will, Matter and Memory*, and *Creative Evolution*, respectively, since Mansfield wrote these works relatively soon after the three works by Bergson were translated into English. Firstly, I will discuss the relationship between Bergson's first and major work, *Time and Free Will*, and Mansfield's minor work, which ended up as an unfinished novel, *Maata*.

**Waiting for the Unexpected: Time and Free Will and Maata**

*Maata* is one of the few works which Mansfield planned to develop into a novel but discarded. She tried to work on *Maata* several times, but the manuscript was dispersed after her death and kept in different libraries, the Alexander Turnbull Library in Wellington and the Newberry Library in Chicago, until Margaret Scott, editor of *The Katherine Mansfield Notebooks*, united them. According to the plan which Mansfield finished writing in August 1913, there would have been thirty-five chapters in this novel. However, Mansfield only wrote the first two chapters which
follow her plan in the same notebook (in the Newberry Library), and three short parts of the novel which were to be found in unbound papers (in the Turnbull Library). It is clear that the first two chapters are (at least roughly) finished, since Mansfield put the date of the completion for each of them in her notebook. The first chapter was completed on 13 August, and the second, on 16 November 1913 (KMN I 237-61).

*Maata* has been largely ignored by the critics, and is usually only mentioned to demonstrate Mansfield planned to write novels or it is mined as a source of biographical information. Claire Tomalin and Kaplan provide somewhat more detailed arguments. Kaplan is the more critical of the two, and mainly discusses Mansfield’s inability to write a modernist experimental novel. She says:

> Although Mansfield’s short fiction already gave evidence of her preoccupation with new techniques for portraying states of consciousness, her projected new novel shows peculiarly little evidence of experimentation. ‘Maata’ is as conventional as ‘Juliet’ in its plot structure. (Kaplan 1991: 98)

Though Tomalin is more sympathetic, and notices some hints of Lawrence’s influence on *Maata* which makes this work different from any other work by Mansfield, she does not find anything else which is new in this project.

It is probably reasonable to say *Maata* is ‘no lost masterpiece’ (Tomalin 1988: 120), considering its conventional structure and plot, and the fact that most of the novel was never written. Nevertheless, it is rather surprising that these critics do not see any evidence of modernity in Mansfield’s treatment of time in *Maata*, for it is so apparently time-conscious. The extant drafts suggest that it would have been a novel about waiting, changing, remembering, about checking the time, and being too early.
The sound of rain woke Rhoda Bendall. It fell, quick and sharp, through the open window on to the polished floor. ‘Dear me’, she thought, ‘it’s raining’, and she lay still, mild and sleepy, listening to the quick patter. Every morning the effort to get up seemed greater and more dreadful. She dropped asleep like a tired beast dropping into a dark soft pit and her heart turned faint before the struggle to raise up this long, heavy body once again. ‘I must wake up. I must. It’s raining. The curtains will be quite wet, and so will the floor.’ She opened her eyes and stared into the dusky room. Her clothes lay in the middle of the floor, fan-shaped, white and grey. ‘They are like the plumage of some great bird’ she thought, staring at the untidy bundle. ‘I am going to get up now and shut the window.’ But she did not move. Nothing helped her. There was no sound from the house. Her room, at the very top, and overlooking garden strips and the backs of other houses, was remote as an empty nest in a bare tree. ‘I wonder what the time is. I ought to have a clock in this room: that would be a great help. It’s dark but I’m sure it’s late.’ A little puff of damp air blew in with the rain, making her shiver. She turned, sighed and sat up, shaking back <the loose mane of fair hair.>² (KMN 1255)
is revealed in how they are expressed. For example, the notion of spatialized time can be found in the three negative sentences in this paragraph: ‘But she did not move’, ‘Nothing helped her’, and ‘There was no sound from the house.’ All of the three sentences deny movements and the existence of life. Indeed, it can be said that ‘nothing’ happens in the opening paragraph, as far as space (spatialized time) is concerned. For instance, it is true that Rhoda does not show any significant physical movements which are measurable in the sense that how much space she occupies depends on how much she moves. In a totally different sense, however, there are many things, changes, movements and struggles, or life in short, to be described here, as the rest of the paragraph obviously shows.

In order to compare Mansfield’s representations of the two notions, it is important to analyze each of them more carefully. As for the three negative sentences, if one is to adopt Bergson’s notion of time, it can be said that statements such as ‘But she did not move’ and ‘Nothing helped her’ are based on time which has already flown. These words are uttered either from a determinist premise that it is pre-ordained that Rhoda cannot get up at this point or from a premise of advocates of freedom that there must be two possibilities: that Rhoda moves or that Rhoda does not move, and she ends up choosing the latter path at this point. As Bergson argues, however, both of these attitudes fail in capturing duration since they see the action from the viewpoint of the time when the action (or, no action) has already been finished. In other words, they focus on the result, not the process. This fact certainly gives these negative sentences another common characteristic, brevity. Unlike the longer sentences in this paragraph, which represent duration in a more faithful way (as will be discussed
soon), these short sentences only work as ‘symbolical representations’ (TFW 176).

The whole paragraph, however, is dominated by longer sentences. While short sentences merely offer quick summaries, longer sentences give the reader opportunities to experience what Rhoda experiences and to observe how she changes, showing her living self. The reader sees everything that Rhoda sees, and just as she takes time, the reader takes time in reading the long sentences without jumping to the simple conclusion that Rhoda does not move.

These longer sentences describe the way in which Rhoda struggles. She wishes to get up, and knows she must, but struggles, as if she proved that Bergson’s attack on determinists is reasonable; she reminds us that an act involves time to struggle and hesitate. Rhoda thinks she really must wake up to close the window because it is raining and she is afraid the curtains and the floor will be wet. However, she cannot get out of the bed. Unlike the claim of advocates of freedom, which is also denied by Bergson, it is not a ‘necessity’ that can wake her up. In reading this first paragraph, we can go through the continuous and heterogeneous process by which Rhoda gets up. As we are invited to see her struggle in this whole process, we can meet this character in duration. She does not even have a clock in the room, although this does not mean that she does not care about the time. It might be true that clocks could possibly (not definitely) help, not for experiencing time’s nature as duration but for recognizing spatialized time only for convenience. The feeling of being late as expressed by Rhoda here will be discussed later in this section.
It is noticeable that the sentence structure, which makes these sentences longer, is appropriately designed to let the reader experience duration. The most successful would be the use of present participles: ‘... she lay still, mild and sleepy, listening to the quick patter’; ‘... she thought, staring at the untidy bundle’; ‘Her room, at the very top, and overlooking garden strips and the backs of other houses, was remote as an empty nest in a bare tree’; ‘A little puff of damp air blew in with the rain, making her shiver’; ‘She turned, sighed and sat up, shaking back’.

There are two substantial effects in the use of these present participles here. For one thing, it gives the scene a sense of presence and continuity. It makes the reader conscious of the time which is passing right now, while Rhoda is listening to the rain and staring at her clothes. A similar effect is achieved also by the comparative form in the sentence, ‘Every morning the effort to get up seemed greater and more dreadful’. Although no present participle is used here, this use of the comparative form of the adjectives effectively emphasizes that Rhoda’s daily struggle has been continuing for a while.

Secondly, those present participles, with the adjectives used in the same sentences, are used to create a sense of heterogeneity. Just as in the sentence, ‘she lay still, mild and sleepy, listening to the quick patter’, the nouns in the longer sentences in this paragraph tend to be followed by more than one modifier, placed side by side emphatically at the end; another example is, ‘Her clothes lay in the middle of the floor, fan-shaped, white and grey.’ During the time when Rhoda is staring at her clothes, the reader can follow her line of sight and notice what she notices about the
clothes. In this way, the narrator keeps adding adjectives or present participles, as if making up for the limitation of language, since one modifier is not enough to describe a changing self. The similes (‘like a tired beast dropping into . . .’ and ‘like the plumage of some great bird’) work for the same purpose. As those modifiers are expected to make up for one another, it seems as if these accumulated words reveal the narrator’s concern that only a few words such as ‘she did not move’ are not enough, or they are not capable of describing every detail of heterogeneous duration. In this context, indeed, no matter how many words are spent, all language can do is summarize an experience or situation for the sake of convenience by selecting only some of the elements of duration, ignoring its heterogeneity. In cautiously making the sentences longer, the narrator paradoxically shows his or her awareness of the limitation of language. In this respect, the long sentences form a contrast with the short sentences in the paragraph, such as ‘she did not move’ which sound more decisive and confident, totally satisfied with ‘the greater convenience of language’ (*TFW* 176).

To add one more small linguistic aspect in the opening paragraph, prepositions such as ‘on to’ and ‘into’, suggesting the directions of moving, are used in this seemingly quiet scene (which could otherwise be associated with nothingness just as in the negative sentences I mentioned): ‘[The rain] fell, quick and sharp, *through* the open window *on to* the polished floor’; ‘She dropped asleep like a tired beast dropping *into* a dark soft pit and her heart turned faint before the struggle to raise up this long, heavy body once again’. What is implied is that there is continuous change in this scene, which is leading to the next scene, however dark and quiet the images are now.
As I have suggested, the first paragraph shows both of the two phases of duration I mentioned earlier, continuity and heterogeneity. Of the two, heterogeneity becomes even more evident in the second paragraph when Rhoda finally gets up:

At the moment of raising herself Rhoda Bendall remembered. She flung out of bed, her eyes dilated, her nostrils quivered. Stretching out her arms, smiling in ecstasy, she staggered forward. ‘Maata, my beloved, Maata, my adored one. It is your day—today we meet again.’ She leaned out of the window, feeling the rain whip up her sleepy blood. (KHN I 255)

At the moment when she remembers that Maata is coming, she finally starts to move both mentally and physically in a more obvious way. Everything turns into a positive direction, with the dark image of the rain and of the heavy beast, who is tired and sleepy, immediately going away. Some of the verbs, such ‘fling’, ‘dilate’, and ‘stretch’, suggest extending movements, and so does the frequent repetition of the adverb, ‘out’. She might be staggering, but ‘forward’, and is ‘smiling’. Even the rain which made her gloomy a few moments ago means something favourable now: ‘Maata! Maata! Can you hear me? My treasure, my beloved one, the day is beautiful with you. Your breath is in this <sweet> wind and the same rain falls on us both. On us both’ (KMN I 255).

All these changes could be described as unpredicted, since the first paragraph is at least seemingly very quiet. However, it should be emphasized once more that the opening paragraph also hints at the heterogeneity of duration, which will continuously change things. In this sense, there is no difference between the first two paragraphs, as the same writing style shared by them (for example, present
participles, put side by side) might suggest. However, even though it is not unpredictable that things change, how they change is unpredictable.

Another interesting example of unpredictable changes is found in the descriptions of Mrs Close when Maata is with the Closes, which appear in a later part of the novel written in unbound papers. Mrs Close is darning in the dining room where Maisie and Maata are roasting chestnuts: ‘Now and again she leant forward and opened her mouth for Maisie to pop in a “beautiful soft one”, but she was, for the most part, pale and tired’ (KMN I 241). However, as she goes on chatting with the girls and talks about when her sons were small boys, ‘Mrs Close put her darning on the table, settled herself, and rested her hands on Maata’s hair. The tired dragged look left her face—it sweetened and grew happy’ (KMN I 242). A little later, when Philip invites Maata to go for a walk, poor Mrs Close wishes Maata could stay with her, as she is happy about the change occasioned by Maata:

‘... Do you want to go for a walk, dearest?’ ‘No’ said Mrs Close, answering for her, ‘she’s not to be disturbed, she’s just got comfy. You go & talk to your brother, my son.’ She was eager with recollection—she had her little audience about her, sympathising—she did not want them to get up and leave her with the old man and that sock to be darned by gaslight. She was tired with a dragging tiredness of middle age, and the feeling of Maata pressed up so closely seemed to relieve some pain—no definite pain—just a sensation. (KMN I 243)

Although the change Mrs Close experiences here has positive effects on her tiredness, just like Rhoda’s change in the second paragraph, even this change has to change; Maata leaves with Philip: “‘Mother, I suppose it’s my duty to go out with this bad boy” [Maata] said, in her baby voice. And Mrs Close knew the spell was over, her
battle lost, drew away her knees & took up the torn sock' (KMN I 243). Mrs Close’s words, "she’s not to be disturbed", eloquently show the unexpectedness of changes. Whether or not she feels she has finished talking, the time to change comes suddenly.

In addition, a minor detail about Mrs Close in this scene attracts my attention. When she is sitting at the table, darning, feeling tired, and waiting for chestnuts, her 'skirt was turned back over her lap, her little slippered feet curled round the chair legs' (KMN I 241). Her curling feet remind me of the feet of the female figure in Fergusson’s painting Rhythm mentioned in Chapter 1. If that is the image Mansfield creates in Mrs Close, it would be very suggestive; as Smith points out, the ‘figure’s feet . . . certainly look as if she is on tip-toe, poised to move, not sedentary’ (Smith 2000: 80), and also this posture of Mrs Close may imply that a dynamic change might come at any moment, however tired and static she may be now. Whether or not the posture really comes from Fergusson’s painting, here, Mansfield surely presents a vivid image of heterogeneity.

This part of the novel contains not only the hints as to heterogeneity but also obvious links to continuity. For example, when Mrs Close recalls her two sons’ childhoods and explains that they cried very loudly when they had their photo taken, she tends to digress from the subject:

‘—and my boys being very famous. Well, thought I, as I tied the string of Hal’s white muslin hat—the one you had afterwards Maisie, with the lace frill—they’ve begun early enough, and a little too early for me.’ ‘Do you mean old Wrigglesworth the photographer’ asked Mr Close, not pausing in his work, speaking slowly and half to the rhythm of his work. ‘He went
bust he did—the same year and set fire to his own shop to get the insurance money, so they say. Had a fine bass voice in his time and sang ‘Vittoria’ in the Town Hall at a charity concert.’ ‘That’s the man. His wife was a flashy woman—she ruined him. I never saw another woman wear the clothes she put on her back on Sundays.’ (KMN I 243)

Although I described this as ‘digression from the subject’, that might be misleading. All the details mentioned by Mr and Mrs Close, Hal’s hat and its later owner, the photographer’s bankruptcy, his arson, his fine voice as a singer, and his wife, are related to one another and indivisible, and they all are ‘the subject’, if there is any. By hearing them speak about all this with Maata, instead of having the narrator’s summary, the reader can experience the time which is passing. If the narrator were responsible for telling this story, some parts of it might be omitted or told in a different order, and then time flowing would be lost, because such narration is based on time which has already flown, as explained earlier in relation to the first paragraph.

Although I have kept distinguishing the two phases of duration, continuity and heterogeneity, it is by now clear that they are inseparable just as the metaphor of melody suggests. This idea might be of help in discussing my next point. As mentioned earlier in this section, the image of an act of waiting plays a pivotal role in both Bergson’s and Mansfield’s works. Mansfield successfully describes waiting people in Maata as well as in many of her short stories. What seems significant is, by depicting the unpredictability of waiting time, Mansfield combines continuity and heterogeneity so that they are intertwined with each other just as they are in duration. As if they were listening to an unknown melody, the characters are surprised by a
change, or feel they have waited too long for a change or they are not allowed to wait as long as they wish.

For example, to Rhoda, waiting for Maata to arrive in London in the first chapter, it seems as if she must wait for an extremely long time. She says in her mind, 'Oh God, bring her quickly' (KMN 1255). The same thing can be said about Maisie, when she is waiting for Maata at Charing Cross Station. She cannot enjoy watching the smoke pointed out by her brother:

White smoke floated up from somewhere & hung below the station roof like misty fires, dissolved, came again in swaying wreaths. Wonderfully beautiful, thought Philip, & so full of life. He pointed it out to Maisie. 'Look, girlie, look at that smoke. <That is how the high note on a fiddle played pianissimo ought to sound.>’ But Maisie was tortured with impatience. ‘What’s the time, Philip, what’s the time. Why doesn’t that stupid old train come in...’ (KMN 1258)

As duration is not uniform, the same length of time can be felt differently by different individuals. While Philip can simply enjoy the time in which the smoke dissolving and coming again, Maisie is irritated and wants to know the time. 3 Although Mansfield deleted Philip’s words, “‘That is how the high note on a fiddle played pianissimo ought to sound’”, the idea that connects the smoke and the note played pianissimo with a fiddle could have effectively represented Bergson’s notion of duration as a tune. By contrast with Philip’s fascination, Maisie’s reaction to her experience of waiting is negative, but she is also experiencing, not measuring, time. The reason she wants to know the time is that she feels she has been waiting longer than she expects, obviously because she is so eager to meet Maata. Duration, which
is within each individual's consciousness, consists of qualitative sensations or experiences, not numerical aspects. In the continuous flow of duration, one minute could be felt as if it were longer than that because that particular minute has some sort of significance in one's duration. Maisie's irritation is an example of the way human beings differ from the time shown by clocks. The difference between Philip and Maisie here, therefore, is not that Philip is 'experiencing' duration, while Maisie is not, but that he is 'appreciating' duration, whereas she is not, and this very difference in how they feel about their waiting time shows the nature of duration, which is perceived intuitively, rather than measured uniformly. Bergson sees qualitative reality in an act of waiting, since duration is not perceived immediately but gradually. To make it simple, although we do not need to wait at all just to know that 1 o'clock comes one hour after 12 o'clock, we cannot find out if the hour passes quickly in a psychological sense before experiencing its flow. As if exemplifying Bergson's theory, Mansfield's novel describes the characters' acts of waiting in a suggestive manner; just like Maisie here, later in the novel, when she visits the Closes, Maata is jokingly condemned, by Maisie, and then by Mrs Close, for her late arrival.

Naturally, the unpredictability of duration does not always cause one to feel the waiting time is too long; it can be too short. An example can be found in Maata's feeling when visiting the Closes. While the Close ladies impatiently wait for Maata before she comes, she herself once wishes she had more time, as she hesitates to get in their house:
She arrived at the house at half past six. . . . She paused on the step, her hand touching the doorbell. Even then it was not [too] late to run away—yes it was too late. . . . How long had she been standing there. What was the use of this absurd litany? Had anybody seen her—had she spoken aloud? She rang the bell sharply. O believe me he does not care for you. You are nothing to him—now or ever. . . . (KMN I 237-38)

It is interesting that Maata’s hesitation in visiting Philip, who she thinks might not love her, is described in connection with time, which seems to her to flow more quickly than she wishes. This sense of lack of waiting time as expressed in ‘—yes it was too late’ is also Mansfield’s favourite, and as we will see later, this can often be found in her writing, both fictional and personal.

To summarize, in Maata, Mansfield shows two phases of duration, continuity (indivisibility) and heterogeneity (unpredictability) by describing characters who are waiting to change. In duration, continuity and heterogeneity are inseparable from each other, as the metaphor of a melody would explain. Mansfield’s attention to our sense of being too late or too early, in relation to the unpredictability of duration, is appropriate in dealing with this combination of continuity and heterogeneity. Although Mansfield failed in completing a longer work of fiction, it could be said that, in Maata, she did not fail in presenting her Bergsonian idea of duration, which was to remain as one of Mansfield’s key concepts in her later stories.

Travelling between the Actual and the Virtual: Matter and Memory and ‘The Woman at the Store’

‘The Woman at the Store’ (written in 1911, published in Rhythm in 1912) is the first work by Mansfield which appeared in Rhythm. The story was inspired by a camping
trip Mansfield made in New Zealand’s North Island in 1907. This is the story which enabled Mansfield to get involved with Rhythm; it was because the editor of Rhythm, Murry, liked this story that he first met her. Murry recalls, ‘The Woman at the Store [sic] realized my vague idea of what an appropriate story for Rhythm should be—the most definite of its “slogans” was a phrase picked up from J. M. Synge: “Before art can be human again it must learn to be brutal”’ (Murry 1935: 184). Therefore, it can be said that Murry’s acceptance of ‘The Woman at the Store’ means what Mansfield achieves in this ‘brutal’ story is well in line with Rhythm’s ideal. It is not only ‘brutality’ but some Bergsonian factors in the story that suggest ‘The Woman at the Store’ is a good example of the representative works of Rhythm.

Pamela Dunbar points out, ‘The Woman at the Store’ ‘deals with the consequences of a murder already committed, then moves towards a further killing’ (Dunbar 1997: 44). Though this is not necessarily the case, the story seems to focus on the continuity of duration by suggesting that one action cannot be separated from something else (or nothing). The unnamed female narrator,5 and her male friend Hin, and her brother Jo travel on horseback in a sparsely inhabited hinterland in New Zealand. They spend a night at a store in an isolated place whose owner is the wife of Hin’s friend. The woman at the store, who has lived alone with her child since her husband disappeared, spends the night with Jo. Meanwhile, the narrator and Hin share a room with the child, who likes drawing pictures and shows them one in which a woman shoots a man and digs a hole to bury him.

From the very beginning, the story is concerned with actions and reactions between
feelings and bodies, or rather what Bergson calls ‘images’:

All that day the heat was terrible. The wind blew close to the ground; it rooted among the tussock grass, slithered along the road, so that the white pumice dust swirled in our faces, settled and sifted over us and was like a dry-skin itching for growth on our bodies. The horses stumbled along, coughing and chuffing. The pack horse was sick—with a big open sore rubbed under the belly. Now and again she stopped short, threw back her head, looked at us as though she were going to cry, and whinnied. Hundreds of larks shrilled—the sky was slate colour, and the sound of the larks reminded me of slate pencils scraping over its surface. There was nothing to be seen but wave after wave of tussock grass, patched with purple orchids and manuka bushes covered with thick spider webs. (‘The Woman’ 7)

The heat, the wind, and the dust are ‘images perceived when [our] senses are opened to them, unperceived when they are closed’ (MMI), and so are the sight of the horses’ bodies, the sky and the tussock grass, and the sounds of the horses and the larks. These images are listed as if they represent the Bergsonian universe in which no image forms a centre. The use of anthropomorphism (the wind rooting and slithering, the horses stumbling, coughing, and looking almost as if they might cry) could also give the reader the sense that nature and animals are not marginalized but given the same status as that of human beings.

As Bergson points out, however, there is one image which is different from the others: ‘my body’. Although ‘my body’ is merely one of the images, acting and reacting with others, it is a special image which might react in some distinct ways such as waiting or doing nothing. ‘I [Bergson] call matter the aggregate of images, and perception of matter these same images referred to the eventual action of one particular image, my body’ (MM 8, Bergson’s emphasis). This special ‘image’,

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which makes an uncertain 'centre' in a sense, is also present in the story because it has the first-person narrator. On one hand, 'The Woman at the Store' is a story about 'matter', or about all the images, including the narrator's body. Although the narrator's body is simply one of the images in the universe, it simultaneously works as a kind of the centre in the story. In other words, it can also be said that 'The Woman at the Store' is a story about the images the narrator's body perceives during her stay at the store. On the other hand, however, the story is also about the narrator's 'memory'; as Bergson mentions, an actual act of perception always occurs in the flow of time, and therefore it involves one's memory, which adds subjective elements. In spite of the fact that the narrator or her body is one of the matters in the story, which exists differently at every present moment, the present existence of the narrator actually includes her whole life or whole memory of the past, which continuously accumulates. This is the connection Bergson finds between matter and memory.

One of the first significant images perceived by the narrator is the store where the story takes place. Approaching the store, the narrator says, "'Thank the Lord we're arriving somewhere'" ('The Woman' 8), but as she actually enters the store, it becomes clear that the store is an undesirable place. It can be described as a place which is dominated by the past. While the narrator is waiting for the woman to give her embrocation for one of the horses, she notices: 'It was a large room, the walls plastered with old pages of English periodicals. Queen Victoria's Jubilee appeared to be the most recent number' ('The Woman' 12). For the narrator, it is not a pleasant place to be at all: 'Sitting alone in the hideous room I grew afraid. The woman next
door was a long time finding that stuff. What was she doing in there?’ (‘The Woman’ 13). Just like some characters in *Maata*, the narrator experiences duration, feeling that she has been waiting too long.

The narrator cannot endure the room even for a while, whereas the woman lives there. This difference gives the narrator an idea about the woman: “‘Good Lord, what a life!’ I thought. ‘Imagine being here day in, day out, with that rat of a child and a mangy dog. Imagine bothering about ironing—*mad*, of course she’s mad! Wonder how long she’s been here . . .’” (‘The Woman’ 13). Just as in the narrator’s imagination here, when the woman’s morbid life is talked about, it is always remembered and described in association with time. For example, when the woman recalls her six years as a mother, she says, “‘I ’and’t any milk till a month after she was born and she sickened like a cow’” (‘The Woman’ 14). Again later, “‘it’s six years since I was married, and four miscarriages. . . . Over and over I tells ’im—you’ve broken my spirit and my looks, and wot for . . . . Oh, some days—an’ months of them—I ’ear them two words knockin’ inside me all the time—“Wot for”’ (‘The Woman’ 17-18). Hin also confirms that she has greatly changed since he saw her four years ago.

In this way, the store which is mysteriously associated with the past is perceived, by the narrator, as an image of insanity. Just as the narrator describes the woman as ‘mad’ here, throughout the story the narrator and Hin suggest the abnormality of the woman and her child. For example:

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‘What do you do all day?’ asked Hin.
She scraped out one ear with her little finger, looked at the result and said, ‘Draw.’
‘Huh! What do you draw?—leave your ears alone.’
‘Pictures.’
‘What on?’
‘Bits of butter paper an’ a pencil of my Mumma’s’
‘Boh! What a lot of words at one time!’ Hin rolled his eyes at her. (‘The Woman’ 16)

Hin’s last words in this quotation in particular clearly suggest his contempt for the child whom he does not regard as a normal six-year-old girl. Later in the story, the narrator more confidently and more seriously asserts that the child is mentally ill:

And those drawings of hers were extraordinary and repulsively vulgar. The creations of a lunatic with a lunatic’s cleverness. There was no doubt about it, the kid’s mind was diseased. While she showed them to us, she worked herself up into a mad excitement, laughing and trembling, and shooting out her arms. (‘The Woman’ 19)

Although the narrator and Hin find the mother and the daughter crazy (which suggests they are sure that they themselves are not), their connections with the insane pair are hinted at in the story. Hin is described as ‘white as a clown’ (‘The Woman’ 7), meaning that he shares the same colour with the child whose hair is whitish, which is described as if it is one of the symptoms of her physical abnormality: ‘A mean, undersized brat, with whitish hair, and weak eyes. She stood, legs wide apart and her stomach protruding’ (‘The Woman’ 16). The narrator could also be likened to the child because of her mother’s strong impact on her, which causes her to dream of being scolded by her mother:

I half fell asleep and had a sort of uneasy dream that the horses were not
moving forward at all—then that I was on a rocking-horse, and my old mother was scolding me for raising such a fearful dust from the drawing-room carpet. ‘You’ve entirely worn off the pattern of the carpet,’ I heard her saying, and she gave the reins a tug. I snivelled and woke to find Hin leaning over me, maliciously smiling. (‘The Woman’)

The narrator’s dream suggests the link between the narrator and the child not only because it shows that they share the similar fear of their mothers but also because ‘in every way dreams imitate insanity’ (MM 228). Bergson connects dreams and insanity by drawing attention to the fact that patients suffering from mental diseases feel a sensation of ‘unreality’ (MM 229). Similarly, the way the narrator’s present reality is replaced by her past could easily be compared with insanity. Instead of the present reality, which has become, as a patient of a mental disease would feel, ‘unreal’ in her sleep, the memory of her mother comes back as if it were part of the present reality. Bergson, by comparing a condition of mental illness with that of being asleep, describes this phenomenon in his explanation of the relaxation or tension of the nervous system:

[It] is impossible not to see in sleep a relaxing, even if only functional, of the tension of the nervous system, ever ready, during waking hours, to prolong by an appropriate reaction the stimulation received. Now the exaltation of the memory in certain dreams and in certain somnambulistic states is well known. Memories which we believed abolished then reappear with striking completeness; we live over again, in all their detail, forgotten scenes of childhood; we speak languages which we no longer even remember to have learnt. (MM 200)

In short, while people are asleep (just as while they are mentally ill), Bergson argues, their nervous system becomes relaxed, which could cause them totally to enter the realm of the past. This can be confirmed by the way the narrator’s dream is
described. The dream is described as reality, or what she ‘lives over again’. All the sentences about the dream (for instance, ‘I heard her saying’) are uttered in the past tense, the same tense used for the sentences describing what happens before and after she dreams, the time she is awake (‘I half fell asleep and had a sort of uneasy dream . . .’ and ‘I snivelled and woke to find Hin . . .’).

In this way, the similarities between the morbid and the healthy are implied in Mansfield’s descriptions of the narrator and Hin, as well as Bergson’s writing. However, both Mansfield and Bergson differentiate those two groups of people by showing how they relate themselves to the past and the present, and the virtual and the real.

To discuss the way Mansfield and Bergson show the difference between the normal and the abnormal, it is essential to introduce Bergson’s idea of the relationship between the present and the past. The Bergsonian present and past are expressed as a figure of a cone like this:

![Cone Diagram](image)

6. (adapted from *MM 197*)
If I represent by a cone SAB the totality of the recollections accumulated in my memory, the base AB, situated in the past, remains motionless, while the summit S, which indicates at all times my present, moves forward unceasingly, and unceasingly also touches the moving plane P of my actual representation of the universe. At S the image of the body is concentrated; and, since it belongs to the plane P, this image does but receive and restore actions emanating from all the images of which the plane is composed. (MM 196)

As Bergson points out in *Matter and Memory*, when one thinks of a difference between matter and memory, between the present and the past, it is rather difficult to understand the idea that the past ‘exists’, not ‘used to exist’. It seems as if the past has ceased to exist, while the present exists. According to Bergson, however, it is not the present but the past that exists. The present has not come to exist yet; it is always only becoming, just like the point S of the cone. In other words, the present never is, but it acts or it is useful. On the other hand, the past does not act nor is it useful anymore, but it exists, just like the whole cone SAB which keeps growing. Therefore, as Deleuze explains in *Bergsonism*, it is reasonable that, when we speak of the past, we say it ‘is’, whereas of the present, it ‘was’ (Deleuze 1988: 55). When the present tense is used to describe the ‘present’ reality, it actually signifies the totality of the past, or the cone SAB, which has been endlessly absorbing the newest past, while the past tense signifies what ‘is’ happening only in this newest past, namely the present.

The only sentence with the present tense in the narration of ‘The Woman at the Store’ helps to realize this rather confusing paradox: ‘There is no twilight to our New Zealand days, but a curious half-hour when everything appears grotesque—it frightens—as though the savage spirit of the country walked abroad and sneered at what it saw’ (‘The Woman’ 13). The present tense of this sentence suggests that the
curious half-hour was repeated in the past, and so, no matter how frightening it is, it is expected to come, for the reason that it happened in the past. The tense is used to describe the curious half-hour as something which is no longer experienced for the first time in the present but as an acquired memory which ‘exists’ in the cone, or an unchanged ‘fact’ of New Zealand. Its nuance is different from that of the past tense of the sentence before this, ‘It was sunset’, which depicts exclusively the particular frightening time she is currently spending in the room at the store.

As the figure of the cone shows, the present and the past are united in the sense that human consciousness moves freely between them, that is, inside the cone. Although Bergson frequently mentions mental abnormality in *Matter and Memory*, his intention is to explain this mobility which human beings have, unless they are abnormal:

We tend to scatter ourselves over AB in the measure that we detach ourselves from our sensory and motor state to live in the life of dreams; we tend to concentrate ourselves in S in the measure that we attach ourselves more firmly to the present reality, responding by motor reactions to sensory stimulation. In point of fact, the normal self never stays in either of these extreme positions; it moves between them, adopts in turn the positions corresponding to the intermediate sections, or, in other words, gives to its representations just enough image and just enough idea for them to be able to lend useful aid to the present action. (*MM* 211-12)

In the story, the narrator is saved by her own ability to escape from the past appropriately: ‘I lay in the water and looked up at the trees that were still a moment, then quivered lightly, and again were still. The air smelt of rain. I forgot about the woman and the Kid until I came back to the tent’ (*The Woman* 14). The narrator feels so peaceful that she temporarily ‘forgets’ about the very recent past in which
she saw the madness of the woman and the child, suggesting the human capability of moving back and forth between the past and the present. She is just like the trees, which are still, then quiver, and become still again. (However, even this refreshing moment is to be remembered and represented in the child's vulgar drawing.) It could be said that this heterogeneous movement of different degrees of tension and relaxation of the narrator's consciousness shows different rhythms of duration, melting one another.

More significantly, the narrator's and Hin's difference from the woman and the child, or the difference between those with and without mobile consciousness, is shown at the end of the story. Seeing the child's drawing of the woman, shooting at the man, the narrator and Hin go away from the store next morning, leaving Jo. With the shocking discovery that the woman has killed her husband, the time for them to leave this insane place comes. The last sentence of the story is 'A bend in the road, and the whole place disappeared' ('The Woman' 21). This implies that, as soon as they leave the store, the experience they had at the store becomes their 'past'. Later on, it can still be talked about, just as she narrates the story, but it will only be expressed, not actually lived, by them. Even so, however, it might perhaps occasionally be dreamed about, as the past always exists, and the narrator can go back and forth between the two worlds: between the present and the past, between the actual and the virtual, and between matter and memory. This rather odd closing sentence, which suggests this may all have been an illusion, seems to make the readers experience the move from the past illusion back to the present reality to end this 'story'; now it is the readers' turn to change the degree of tension and relaxation of their consciousness.
While the narrator and Hin are so mobile, the woman and the child are confined within their place, and that seems to be the source of their problems. The woman complains that her husband has left her alone to keep the store. The child draws the forbidden picture to “‘spite Mumma for shutting me up ’ere with’” (‘The Woman’ 21) the narrator and Hin. Just as expressed earlier in the child’s words, ‘I’ll draw all of you when you’re gone’ (‘The Woman’ 16), the narrator and Hin are expected to leave, but she herself and her mother are to stay at the store, the world of the past. She dwells in there, drawing pictures of the past. In this respect, the title of the story can be read as more implicative than it seems. The ‘woman’ might have actually looked and lived more like a woman and a mother in the past but does not play the expected roles any more nor does the ‘store’ welcome its customers as it used to. In spite of all these changes, the brutal murderer who threatens her own child is still referred to as ‘the woman’ and her horrible place as ‘the store’ because of what they were in the past; after the woman’s so-called femininity and the place’s function as a store stopped being lived or acted, they are merely represented. She remains fixed as ‘the woman at the store’, without living a flowing life.

Then, the question is, what about Jo? Dunbar suggests that Jo whose red-spotted kerchief ‘looks as if it has already been spattered with blood’ is ‘a possible future victim’ (Dunbar 1997: 48) because, like the woman’s husband, he has a stereotypical idea of femininity.

In Bergsonian terms, one other implication that he is likely to remain in the
abnormality of the store resides in his act of singing:

Not once that day had he sung 'I don't care, for don't you see, My wife's mother was in front of me! . . .' It was the first day we had been without it for a month, and now there seemed something uncanny in his silence ('The Woman' 7).

However, Jo sings this song again when he first sees the woman at the store. What could his repetition mean? Bergson provides a detailed account of this kind of memory by taking an example of learning a lesson by heart. Before memorizing it perfectly, one has to repeat the lesson. When the person has learnt it, there are two forms of memory; one is the memory about each reading, and the other is the learnt lesson:

... the lesson once learnt bears upon it no mark which betrays its origin and classes it in the past; it is part of my present, exactly like my habit of walking or of writing; it is lived and acted, rather than represented: I might believe it innate, if I did not choose to recall at the same time, as so many representations, the successive readings by means of which I learnt it. (MM 91)

Clearly, Jo’s singing is this sort of memory, or ‘a habit’. While singing this ‘I don’t care’ song, he does not seem to remember the time he first heard the song, for instance, or associate the song with his past in any other possible sense. Bergson elucidates this kind of memory and its relation with time:

Spontaneous recollection is perfect from the outset; time can add nothing to its image without disfiguring it; it retains in memory its place and date. On the contrary, a learnt recollection passes out of time in the measure that the lesson is better known; it becomes more and more impersonal, more and more foreign to our past life. (MM 95)
To apply this comment to my interpretation of Jo’s song, it appears that Jo, simply concerned with his present desire, seems to have ceased to ‘care’ about his past, which is his whole life. The words ‘don’t care’ appear once again later in the story, uttered by the child this time, just before she shows that critical picture: “I done the one she told me I never ought to do. I done the one she told me she’d shoot me if I did. Don’t care! Don’t care!” (‘The Woman’ 21). Although the two characters share the same words, there is a difference in what they do not care about. While Jo does not think much of the past, the child does not seem to care about the present (that is what could otherwise be called the near future, which does not exist but is ‘becoming’), being so furious about having been put into the room where she did not want to be. Unlike Jo’s memory or habit of singing, the child’s memory that she was forced to stay in the room is not lived or acted, but represented; Jo’s singing is similar to Bergson’s example of the learnt lesson but the child’s memory of the past can be compared with the memory of each reading, which is recalled and represented later (in drawings or complaints, for example). While Jo is concerned with the physical ‘matter’, the child is deeply buried in ‘memory’. Whether staying in the present or the past, these two characters appear to have lost the mobility which the narrator and Hin enjoy.

It is therefore rather ironic that Jo notices the narrator and Hin leaving, and shouts, “I’ll pick you up later” (‘The Woman’ 21). Perhaps he can manage to escape from the place the narrator and Hin have left, but perhaps not.
In short, ‘The Woman at the Store’ represents Bergson’s discussion of matter and memory, especially with its narrative technique, which shows the narrator’s consciousness, moving as she perceives different images. Although the woman’s and the child’s insanity emphasize their isolation from the present or actual reality, the story on the whole suggests the unity of the present and the past, of the real and the virtual, and of matter and memory. Like Bergson, Mansfield finds normal human life in the balance of these two types of opposing spheres it deals with.

**Impetus Creating New Tendencies of Life: Creative Evolution and ‘How Pearl Button Was Kidnapped’**

‘How Pearl Button Was Kidnapped’ is another story that Mansfield wrote for *Rhythm*. It was first published under the pseudonym Lili Heron in *Rhythm*, no. 8 (September 1912). Firstly the story could be read as something more like Mansfield’s later works such as ‘The Garden Party’ rather than the brutal ‘The Woman at the Store’ since ‘Pearl Button’ deals with a girl from a well-to-do family in New Zealand. It is probably this aspect of the story that causes Joanna Woods to provide a rather simplistic view of the story that it is:

> very different from ‘The Woman at the Store.’ It bears no traces of the fashionable brutality and far from seeking to shock, it draws the reader into the sunlit world of a New Zealand childhood. Like ‘The Tiredness of Rosabel,’ the story of ‘How Pearl Button was Kidnapped’ is a rare example at this time of Katherine speaking with her own voice. (Woods 2001: 101)

Secondly, however, the story greatly differs from Mansfield’s later famous stories in the sense that it deals with New Zealandness in its treatment of a meeting of the Pakeha girl and the Maori people. (As for the lack of New Zealandness in
Mansfield's later stories, see Chapter 4.) The interaction of the Pakeha and the Maori in Mansfield's stories is extremely rare, despite her strong interest in Maori people and culture, and 'Pearl Button', for an early story, attracts considerable critical attention partly because of this theme.

Moreover, the story is not merely a comfortable picture of a happy childhood (and neither are the later New Zealand stories). As the title obviously suggests, the story could be linked with brutality and shock, but it ironically shows at the end, brutality may be found in not exotic and uncanny people but more familiar ones, who 'kidnap' and take Pearl away from the place where she enjoys herself; although the story seems to be about the Maori people's kidnapping of Pearl until a certain point, the child is never afraid of her 'kidnappers' but instead experiences extreme happiness in her adventure with the unfamiliar people. It is Pearl's own family and the police of her own community that (brutally, if you like) force her to return to the boring life in the 'House of Boxes' and prevent her from being free and mobile. Michelle Elleray also writes:

Mansfield's ridicule of the men through their miniaturization nevertheless leaves intact the violence of their shouts, their whistles, and Pearl's enforced return to conventional society. Thus the kidnapping indicated by the story's title, which at first appears to be Pearl's abduction by the Maori women, occurs instead through Pearl's removal from the New Zealand landscape of bush and sea to bourgeois, anglophilic settler society. (Elleray 2002: 25)

As this example shows, 'How Pearl Button Was Kidnapped' suggests the similarities and connections between different types of people, the Pakeha and the Maori, adults and children. Whether or not the story 'draws the reader into the sunlit world of a
New Zealand childhood, therefore, depends on the reader’s evaluation of the idiosyncratic ways in which contrasted values are linked and reversed, as I will attempt to show here.

First of all, Mansfield’s way of paragraphing this story is rather unusual. Even for this very short story, it looks peculiar that there are only three paragraphs; the story opens as follows:

Pearl Button swung on the little gate in front of the House of Boxes. It was the early afternoon of a sunshiny day with little winds playing hide-and-seek in it. They blew Pearl Button’s pinafore frill into her mouth and they blew the street dust all over the House of Boxes. Pearl watched it—like a cloud—like when mother peppered her fish and the top of the pepper-pot came off. She swung on the little gate, all alone, and she sang a small song. Two big women came walking down the street. One was dressed in red and the other was dressed in yellow and green. (‘Pearl Button’ 136)

This single paragraph goes further on until they ‘walk a long way’ after deciding to go together to a place where the women can show ‘beautiful things’ to Pearl. The reader would expect the paragraph to break, or at least to have a modifier or modifiers suggesting the chronological order of events, such as ‘then’, between the two sentences, ‘She swung on the little gate, all alone, and she sang a small song’ and ‘Two big women came walking down the street’. Contrary to such reasoning of the adult reader, these events, Pearl’s swinging on the gate, little winds blowing the street dust, Pearl’s singing, and the two big women walking towards her, happen in a continuous flow; even the moment of the sudden appearance of the ‘kidnappers’, which can be considered to be crucial in the story, is described as unmarked part of the whole. This infrequent paragraphing in the story suggests that, within Pearl’s
consciousness (in fact, just like any other person’s), there are no paragraphs that sort things out appropriately. In other words, the story is told through Pearl’s consciousness in which time is experienced as duration rather than measured or spatialized; in such a story, the idea that one scene is followed by another scene is not at work. Just like the long, continuous paragraphs, the similes, ‘like a cloud’ and ‘like when mother peppered her fish and the top of the pepper-pot came off’, also work for a similar purpose; those ‘different’ things are compared and linked to one another in Pearl’s consciousness.

The effect of the peculiar paragraphing of ‘How Pearl Button Was Kidnapped’ can be more easily appreciated if compared with another version of this story which appeared posthumously in 1924. Murry, who republishes it in Something Childish and Other Stories, ‘corrects’ what seem to him odd parts of Mansfield’s writing, as he always does in editing Mansfield’s writing after her death; he divides this story into more paragraphs. In Murry’s version, for instance, the scene in which the two women approach Pearl to start to speak marks a new paragraph. He obviously does not seem to think much of the significance of the effect of Mansfield’s infrequent paragraphing, but considering the significance of the depictions of Pearl’s point of view in relation to indivisible duration, his alterations turn out to be inappropriate. In Mansfield’s writing, details such as paragraphing and punctuation are more carefully designed than Murry realizes. A letter she wrote to him a little later (19 May 1913) about ‘Epilogue II’ shows her own strict writing policy which aims at perfection and thus which does not allow her stories to appear differently from what they originally are, when published:
To my knowledge there aren't any superfluous words: I mean every line of it. I don't 'just ramble on' you know . . . -you cant cut it without making an ugly mess somewhere . . . I'd rather it wasn't there at all than sitting in the Blue Review [sic] with a broken nose and one ear as though it had jumped into an editorial dog fight . . . I'm a powerful stickler for form in this style of work . . . I feel as fastidious as though I wrote with acid. (CLKH 1 124)

Her seemingly unreasonable paragraphing in 'How Pearl Button Was Kidnapped' must have been a result of her fastidiousness about form. Although Murry's version with more paragraphs might be more intelligible, it fails to describe the continuity of life. It is almost as if Mansfield's paragraphing aimed to demonstrate what Bergson writes about poetry in relation to life's continuity: '... through the words, lines and verses runs that simple inspiration which is the whole poem. So, among the dissociated individuals, one life goes on moving' (CE 272-73). Although Pearl changes, or evolves, all the time as she experiences new things, the past Pearl remains within her as an unseparated part, and furthermore, this whole Pearl is also a part of one large life: 'under these visible effects an inner cause lies hidden. The evolution of the living being, like that of the embryo, implies a continual recording of duration, a persistence of the past in the present, and so an appearance, at least, of organic memory' (CE 20). When the past is recorded as organic memory, it is unsorted, which is well represented in Mansfield's paragraphing.

W. H. New's analysis of the beginning of the story is not meant to be Bergsonian, but from a related but different perspective, he touches a crucial point:

[The opening of the story] (with 'Pearl' and 'early,' 'sunshiny,' and two
... seems a somewhat saccharine declarative passage—unless it is read as a deliberate construction of childlike sensibilities, evoking the way the child’s eye registers sensory details in a grand unsorted series. But that hierarchies exist that the child might not be aware of is something these sentences also convey; the seven *prepositional phrases*, in such a short compass, suggest a series of interlinked contingencies. To use the leading metaphor of the story, there will be ‘boxes within boxes,’ hinting that the story ought not to be taken at face value and that the illusory notion ‘the truth of a story’—in this case involving the so-called kidnapping of Pearl Button—depends on how far past appearances one reads the clues. (New 1999: 73)

As the way the story is told is based on the child’s duration, not only ‘appropriate’ paragraphs but also other common marks for categorization are eliminated from the story. For example, (1) the act of taking a young child away without the permission of her parent, (2) the race of the two big women, and (3) ‘a great big piece of blue water’ are left unidentified by Pearl (although the name of the last one is introduced by one of the women); the reader is invited to follow the child’s intuitive perception instead of the intellectual identifications, that is, (1) ‘kidnapping’, (2) ‘the Maori’, and (3) ‘sea’ respectively.

Although Pearl might not know that the women she enjoys being with are called Maori people, she shows her ability to give her own definition of what she is accustomed to; when asked by a Maori woman where her mother is, she answers: “In the kitching, ironing—because—it’s-Tuesday”’ (‘Pearl Button’ 136). Pearl’s immediate and automatic linking of ironing and Tuesday shows, however innocent it may sound, that she is also to some extent familiar with an adult, intellectual way of identifying what she knows. A similar moment comes when she has to sit down on the dusty floor: ‘She carefully pulled up her pinafore and dress and sat on her
petticoat as she had been taught to sit in dusty places’ (‘Pearl Button’ 137). As a result of her education, Pearl instantly reacts to dust and links it to the best way of sitting in such a place. Again, when she eats a peach which is offered by a Maori, she is worried about the juice she spills over her clothes.

The adults’ influence on Pearl’s ‘good’ behaviour is suggested by the mention of her mother who is preoccupied with the routine housework when Pearl is taken by the Maori women, her mother who needs to wash Pearl’s clothes. The predictable and immobile life style of the mother, implied in Pearl’s expression ‘ironing-because-it’s Tuesday’, is not based on the Bergsonian duration, because ‘our duration is irreversible. We could not live over again a single moment, for we should have to begin by effacing the memory of all that had followed. Even could we erase this memory from our intellect, we could not from our will’ and from ‘this survival of the past it follows that consciousness cannot go through the same state twice’ (CE 6).

Unlike in irreversible duration, in spatialized time, a homogeneously divided part of which is called Tuesday, it is almost as if one Tuesday was never more significant than another for Pearl’s mother who simply repeats ironing every Tuesday. She lives almost like a plant whose consciousness is paralyzed, ‘for a conscious being, to exist is to change, to change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating oneself endlessly’ (CE 8). She also tries to make her daughter Pearl live a similar life, giving rules which cause her to repeat the same actions.

Their house which is filled with routines and boredom is called the ‘House of Boxes’ by Pearl. Its meaning is never explained in the story, but it seems to imply that the
house, perfectly controlled by rules, promises its occupants security but not freedom; it confines them. Mansfield's usage of the word 'box' as a verb in a letter to Murry, which is introduced in the Dictionary of New Zealand English, might support this idea: 'It's a regular German stove with a flat top. . . . I should think it would box it—the cold I mean' (Letters to Murry 409, CLKM III 116). Murry's edition gives a note: 'To "box" something, in K. M.'s private language, was to settle it satisfactorily' (Letters to Murry 409), and the Dictionary which quotes both Mansfield's words and Murry's note defines the verb as 'To settle; to render innocuous' (Orsman, ed. 1997: 86). Although 'knocking it out' might have been what she meant in her letter to Murry rather than her 'private' meaning, the use of the word 'box' is evocative in the story; Pearl and her family are 'boxed' in their house, that is a 'space' from which the rhythm of one's life cannot burst out.

Pearl's 'tendency' to be careful and polite could be attributed to not only her family but her Pakeha origin. While she is familiar with the idea of spatialized time (Tuesday for ironing), her new friends from another culture do not seem to be concerned with it very much. There is no explanation about how long it will take to get to their place to which the Maori women invite the girl by saying: "'You coming with us, Pearl Button. We got beautiful things to show you'" ('Pearl Button' 136), and without knowing that it is so far, Pearl has to walk a long way. The Maori women ask her no question about what time Pearl wants to go home, either.

The tendency that Maori people do not manage the time in the same way as the Pakeha is commonly referred to in New Zealand. According to the Dictionary of
New Zealand English, 'Pakeha time' means 'rigorous “clock time”, as distinct from the more flexible “Maori time” measured by human self-interest, convenience or need.' It seems a relatively new expression, as the dictionary gives only two examples written in the 1980s, but Mansfield seems to show the difference between Pakeha time and Maori time in ‘How Pearl Button Was Kidnapped’.

That Mansfield describes this ‘tendency’ does not mean the story emphasizes any stereotypical ideas of the Maori, as I will show, but in relation to the discussion of the Bergsonian evolution, it can be observed that Mansfield describes what Pearl has inherited; Bergson writes:

What are we, in fact, what is our character, if not the condensation of the history that we have lived from our birth—nay, even before our birth, since we bring with us prenatal dispositions? Doubtless we think with only a small part of our past, but it is with our entire past, including the original bent of our soul, that we desire, will and act. Our past, then, as a whole, is made manifest to us in its impulse; it is felt in the form of tendency, although a small part of it only is known in the form of idea. (CE 5-6, Bergson’s emphasis)

Pearl’s character, which is clearly different from any other individual’s, is also part of the whole of the Pakeha past, which is continuously changing because of Pearl’s and other Pakeha people’s living consciousness and actions.

Even though Mansfield reveals the difference between the Maori and the Pakeha, she also clearly indicates some strong ties between the Maori and Pearl. They are similar in the sense that they are both instinctive and intelligent in Bergsonian terms. Firstly, they are clearly different from plants with no need to move. Their (especially
Pearl’s) mobility indicates their active consciousness and will for new experiences and changes. Secondly, they are linked to each other with sympathy, a characteristic of instinct. Thirdly, they are intelligent beings who communicate with each other successfully with a strong human tool, language.

These similarities between the Maori and Pearl can be elucidated by comparing them to the Pakeha adults mentioned in the story. They are obviously associated with intelligence, but their intelligence only suggests the exact kind of limitation that Bergson points out. Although Pearl’s mother has a very human, intelligent tool, an iron, it does not make her any more mobile nor conscious; this is a good example of the case in which intelligence links human beings with matter, as suggested by Bergson. It should also be mentioned that neither Pearl’s mother nor the police speak in the story. Although the police ‘shout’, that scares the Maori and Pearl, failing to communicate. The difference between these two types of intelligent beings, that is, Pearl and the Maori, and Pearl’s mother and the police, is that the former use not only intelligence but also intuition, while the latter focus on intelligence. Bergson sees the potential of human communication and consciousness as creative, linking them to the faculty of intuition; intuition is ‘instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely’ (CE 186). He further argues that intuition, ‘by the sympathetic communication which it establishes between us and the rest of the living, by the expansion of our consciousness which it brings about, . . . introduces us into life’s domain, which is reciprocal interpenetration, endlessly continued creation’ (CE 187). Pearl’s ability to communicate with and have an open mind towards the unfamiliar seems to show she
enjoys the active faculty of intuition.

Pearl’s forced return to the ‘House of Boxes’ might signal some unfavourable aspects of the future, but it can be argued that the fact that Pearl is a child suggests the possibility of some future changes in her (or perhaps later generations in New Zealand), although, as Bergson insists, it is impossible to predict how she (or they) will change in advance. From a postcolonial perspective, Elleray writes:

Pearl’s youthfulness underlines the newness of the settler in the New Zealand landscape, and insofar as Pearl is guided by indigenous women rather than elders from her biological or cultural community, Mansfield provides a space for a new generation of female settler to understand herself as local to New Zealand in this story. The supposed innocence of the child, however, also enables a rewriting of the historical violence of settler-indigene relations, which appears instead as inter-gender violence with the policemen’s forced return of Pearl to the House of Boxes. (Elleray 2002: 26)

Just as Elleray points out, Mansfield shows in a subtle way that change is possible but also that change will be gradual as a consequence of the history of the Pakeha and the Maori; any change is accompanied by duration, and our changing life always holds the totality of the past. This is comparable to Bergson, who states:

Doubtless we think with only a small part of our past, but it is with our entire past, including the original bent of our soul, that we desire, will and act. Our past, then, as a whole, is made manifest to us in its impulse; it is felt in the form of tendency, although a small part of it only is known in the form of idea. (CE 5-6)

Bergson, however, also stresses that there are unpredictable elements in life which science inevitably ignores. In his words, intellect ‘instinctively selects in a given
situation whatever is like something already known; it seeks this out, in order that it may apply its principle that "like produces like." In just this does the prevision of the future by common sense consist' (CE 31). While science only predicts that one life produces a similar life, philosophy, Bergson believes, can deal with the fact that life, or consciousness, changes in unforeseeable, heterogeneous ways.

In the framework of this story, it is at least implied that the thrust of *élan vital*, which creatively changes living beings by working on their consciousness, could come at any moment, just as the Maori women suddenly appear at the beginning of the story.

The descriptive title, 'How Pearl Button Was Kidnapped', might give the reader the initial impression that an intellectual, rather than intuitive, account of what happens to Pearl awaits. Conversely, as the example of Mansfield's infrequent paragraphing shows, the story itself is concerned more with intuitive duration which Pearl experiences and the reader is invited to join; the story is not about what happens and how but about how Pearl feels and lives. During her short adventure, she sees, hears, smells, touches, tastes, laughs, cries, and feels shy, happy, tired, hungry, scared, hot, and excited. All these ever-changing feelings are sprung from the inside of Pearl's own life, rather than, as the Darwinian theory suggests, caused mainly by external circumstances; Pearl's changing feelings are the rhythms of her life that are performed and heard throughout the story.

Due to its focus on intuition rather than intellect, the story might not be as reasonable and comprehensible as the title suggests, but precisely because of that, it offers a
strong sense of what Bergson calls ‘sympathy’ that links the reader and the characters; as Pearl sings a ‘small song’, we hear it; as she smells the Maori woman, or as she eats, we also smell or taste; and finally, when the Maori people are scared by hearing the shouting police, we are shocked as well. After experiencing all the different feelings and rhythms, or after ‘living creatively’, many readers must feel as if the story were far longer than it actually is; I always find it surprising how short this story really is in an ‘intellectual’ sense. The story might take only a short (spatialized) time, or a small space in a book, but the sense of heterogeneity the story offers through the whole series of Pearl’s feelings and consciousness allows the reader to find much in this physically ‘short’ story.

The title of the story, ‘How Pearl Button Was Kidnapped’, which represents the perspective of those whose lives are not highly mobile such as Pearl’s mother, then, illustrates the way they look back at and define what has already happened, that is flown time as opposed to flowing time. This idea has already been introduced in Time and Free Will as I mentioned earlier, but in Creative Evolution, it is explained with an intriguing metaphor of art which might perhaps have attracted attention of ‘Bergsonian’ artists of the era, including Mansfield and her friends:

The finished portrait is explained by the features of the model, by the nature of the artist, by the colours spread out on the palette; but, even with the knowledge of what explains it, no one, not even the artist, could have foreseen exactly what the portrait would be, for to predict it would have been to produce it before it was produced—an absurd hypothesis which is its own refutation. Even so with regard to the moments of our life, of which we are the artisans. Each of them is a kind of creation. And just as the talent of the painter is formed or deformed—in any case, is modified—under the very influence of the works he produces, so each of our states, at
the moment of its issue, modifies our personality, being indeed the new form that we are just assuming. It is then right to say that what we do depends on what we are; but it is necessary to add also that we are, to a certain extent, what we do, and that we are creating ourselves continually. This creation of self by self is the more complete, the more one reasons on what one does. (CE 7)

By showing the tricky title at the beginning, the story lets the readers predict something before they experience reading it. Mansfield is obviously the artist who wrote this story, but each reader is also an artist who takes part in creating lives by means of reading the story about them. The portraits of the fictional characters such as Pearl are produced in the reader’s consciousness, influencing and influenced by what he or she is; while different readers share the same story entitled ‘How Pearl Button Was Kidnapped’, as readers have different personalities and experiences in the past, each present reading experience of each reader (or ‘artist’) can create a new story about new lives.

Whether or not Mansfield actually read the above quotation about portraits and colours, we cannot know, but she was certainly influenced by her Rhythmist painter friends whose works were colourful, as I suggested in Chapter 1, and colours play significant roles in ‘How Pearl Button Was Kidnapped’ as well as other stories she wrote during this period. When Pearl encounters someone or something new, she might not know what it is called but notices what colours it has, which is indicated in the narration based on Pearl’s observations. When the two women first appear (without causing a new paragraph to open), they are introduced in relation to the colours of what they wear: ‘One was dressed in red and the other was dressed in yellow and green. They had pink handkerchiefs over their heads’ (‘Pearl Button’
All the other distinctive features of the women, having no shoes and stockings on and walking slowly because they are fat, come later. It is their white teeth that attract Pearl in their first conversation. Later in the story, it is implied that Pearl’s colours, that is her yellow curls and white neck, also impress Maori people. The frightening people who are coming to ‘rescue’ Pearl are not identified as the police but ‘little blue men’: ‘Little men in blue coats—little blue men came running, running towards her with shouts and whistlings—a crowd of little blue men to carry her back to the House of Boxes’ (‘Pearl Button’ 139). We could assume that different colours symbolize different aspects of life or different tendencies, as blue, for instance, being the colour of the sea, which first frightens Pearl, and of the police, has a negative connotation, but what seems more significant is that Pearl changes the colour of part of nature when she makes ‘a cup of her hands’ and catches some water of the sea: ‘... it stopped being blue in her hands. She was so excited that she rushed over to her woman and flung her little thin arms round the woman’s neck, hugging her, kissing’ (‘Pearl Button’ 139). Her natural, or ‘organic’, tool, that is the cup of her hands, enables her to make a change to the nature. Her extreme excitement after changing the colour of the water could be linked to the ‘mad excitement’ of the ‘lunatic’ girl in ‘The Woman at the Store’ which she expresses while showing her drawings to the narrator and Hin. Both girls are ‘creators’, although Pearl seems more innocent and mentally healthier than the other girl. Pearl is obviously part of nature but at the same time she herself takes part in creating nature.

The brief story ‘How Pearl Button Was Kidnapped’, despite its appearance, could be
read as a story with huge themes such as the significance of evolution and human history. In this sense as well, the story exemplifies a substantial Bergsonian idea that a part represents the whole.

Crucial Period: Overview of Mansfield’s Works between 1912 and 1913

Apart from the stories discussed already in this chapter, ‘The Woman at the Store’ and ‘How Pearl Button Was Kidnapped’, Mansfield published other stories between 1912 and 1913 while the short-lived magazines, *Rhythm* and its successor the *Blue Review*, lasted. To conclude this chapter, I will briefly mention the significance of some of the other stories which appeared in these two little magazines with reference to Bergson’s concepts.

First of all, a very short passage from ‘Epilogue I: Pension Seguin’ which was published in the *Blue Review* in May 1913 is of interest because it can be read as a piece of evidence that Mansfield was familiar with Bergson’s famous metaphor of music:

> All through the afternoon Mademoiselle Ambatielos and the piano warred with the Appassionata Sonata. They shattered it to bits and remade it to their heart’s desire—they unpicked it—and tried it in various styles. They added a little touch—caught up something. Finally they decided that the only thing of importance was the loud pedal. (‘Pension Seguin’ 40)

After their attempts to break the Appassionata Sonata into different parts and rearrange it, the pair, Mademoiselle Ambatielos and the piano, reach an extremely Bergsonian conclusion; to connect the parts together with the loud pedal is the most
important thing. Here, one could assume a direct link between this passage and Bergson’s account of duration in which, although different notes compose a tune, they melt into one another; it is easy to imagine that Mansfield wrote the scene based on Bergson’s metaphor, rather than coincidentally. Also, the idea that the performer and her instrument are in an inseparable relation in creating music can be also associated with Bergson’s theory of matter and memory (or body and mind).

For Mansfield, who once wished to be a professional cellist, musicality in her writing is a significant factor. Some critics mention it, but none as persuasively as New, who analyzes Mansfield’s writing with a special emphasis on rhythm which works in the course of time. He notices some drawings and marks Mansfield uses in the manuscripts such as drawings of plants and dancers and narrative-division markers of treble clefs. New suggests that they could be linked to ‘the repeated subjects: music and the seasonal cycle of nature—in other words, rhythmic movement’ (New 1999: 56).

... what seems ... important is the suggestion in these visual images that she intended language, too, to be performed. The scenes she was writing take their referential meaning from their depiction of characters and events, but achieve their effects (and hence suggest the consequences of meaning) at least in part through the conscious choice of prose rhythm. Music and spring, in this context, can be heard not as static symbols but rather as signs of the active playing of relationships in time. (New 1999: 56)

He further comments on how Mansfield creates rhythm to convey ‘meaning’ in his close analysis of Mansfield’s texts in which she repeats certain sentences.
Rhythm is obviously an important factor in Mansfield’s stories written in this period as well. Sounds in changing rhythm play a crucial role especially in the protagonists’ inner voices and heart beat (reflecting their life and consciousness) in ‘Ole Underwood’ and ‘Millie’, for example.

If noting these connections between stories, the structure and interrelationship of the whole of Mansfield’s stories in Rhythm and the Blue Review can be interpreted as Bergsonian. From the Bergsonian perspective, the short fiction form plays a significant role in the stories of this period, which could be divided into the following categories:

**Group 1: Brutality of colonial New Zealand**
- ‘The Woman at the Store’, Rhythm, spring 1912.
- ‘Ole Underwood’, Rhythm, January 1913.

**Group 2: Girls from middle-class New Zealand**
- ‘How Pearl Button Was Kidnapped’, Rhythm, September 1912.
- ‘The Little Girl’, Rhythm, October 1912.
- ‘New Dresses’, Rhythm, October 1912.

**Group 3: Geneva**

**Others**
- ‘Tales of a Courtyard’, Rhythm, August 1912.
- ‘Spring in a Dream’, Rhythm, September 1912.

The first group, to which ‘The Woman at the Store’ belongs, deals with raw colonial life in New Zealand, which is not based on what Mansfield was familiar with as a local New Zealander but only as a tourist. Another category, which includes ‘How
Pearl Button Was Kidnapped', is also a group of New Zealand stories, but they are more like her later stories in the sense that each of them is a story of a middle-class girl who is more or less like what Mansfield herself used to be. (As I have mentioned, 'Pearl Button' is not necessarily totally detached from any sort of brutality, nor are the other stories in this category.) The last one is a group of three stories entitled 'Epilogue' which is set in Geneva. In other words, each story which appeared in Rhythm or the Blue Review can be read either on its own or as part of a series, which is concerned with one particular place, separated from another place described in another series. It is very unlikely that Mansfield did not think about the relationship among different works she produced for these journals, as can be seen from the fact that she gives some hints as to the connections between seemingly unrelated stories and poems. For example, the words 'little blue' which appear in 'little blue men' in 'How Pearl Button Was Kidnapped' can also be found in her poems 'Very Early Spring' (Rhythm spring 1912) and 'Sea Child' (Rhythm June 1912). 'Very Early Spring' is one of her poems which Mansfield presents as the work of a fictional Russian poet Boris Petrovsky, 'translated' by herself. Mansfield, therefore, attempted to create the situation in which three different writers who wrote for Rhythm, that is, 'Katherine Mansfield', 'Boris Petrovsky', and 'Lili Heron', used the same image. Also images of fruits and seasons, changes in nature, are repeated in such stories as 'Spring in a Dream' and 'Tales of a Courtyard'. These examples in Mansfield's works for Rhythm can be recognized as her representations of rhythms of life which are repeated but arranged all the time to create new rhythms.

The fact that different stories are separated and yet connected to one another could be
linked with Bergson's idea of simultaneity, which he was always concerned with from his first work, *Time and Free Will*. To mention it briefly, he explains that when we say different things or people simultaneously exist in different places, however close they may be, this simultaneity can only be measured scientifically but cannot be experienced in a real, intuitive way, as this idea of simultaneity spatializes each existence, ignoring its flow of duration. Bearing this in mind, it can be said that due to the limitation of sight the reader experiences, a short story can effectively suggest the fact that what is thought to be true at one moment or in one situation or location might not be true in another. The flexible form, which enables a story to be read either as an independent piece or part of a larger unit, is suitable when representing Bergsonian time which can be experienced intuitively and also spatialized intellectually.

I will discuss the significance of Mansfield's choice of short fiction in relation to Bergson's notion of duration and simultaneity in more detail in Chapter 6, but it is worth mentioning here that at this early stage of Mansfield's career, she was beginning to explore the potential of the form as a medium of demonstrating her version of Bergsonian theories. Although, as I pointed out in Chapter 1, Mansfield's curiosity about Bergson might have started when she was writing her German stories before getting involved with *Rhythm*, they are more concerned with the consistency within the same German 'series'. In *Rhythm* and the *Blue Review*, Mansfield shows more variety, while also suggesting some links between separate stories.

This chapter offers my Bergsonian interpretations of Mansfield's early works, those
published in *Rhythm and the Blue Review* in 1912 and 1913 and her unfinished novel *Maata*, which was being written in her notebook in 1913. Of particular relevance to her later writing is the fact that the works of this period hint at the inseparability of intuition and intellect (instead of merely focusing on the innovative and attractive notion of ‘intuition’) in their treatment of the characters’ continuously changing consciousnesses and that different stories (plus different groups of stories) can be read as independent of, and yet, linked to, one another.

As I have mentioned, in the opening of *Maata*, long sentences, which well express our intuitive perception of duration, work together with the short negative sentences, effectively inserted in order to describe human intellectual judgments. The novel also shows that even a single person, let alone different individuals, experiences duration differently every moment, since one’s consciousness unceasingly changes in unexpected ways. In ‘The Woman at the Store’, it is implied that the level of intuitive and intellectual aspects is always fluid, and therefore we can be more intuitive than intellectual, or vice versa, depending on the moment. ‘How Pearl Button Was Kidnapped’ also shows the changing rhythms of Pearl’s consciousness, or life, which are connected to other lives. Although the significance of quantitative or spatialized time tends to be neglected as the innovative idea of inner time is in favour, the notion that qualitative and quantitative elements of reality are indivisible is crucial in understanding Bergson’s philosophy. If we miss this link between these two apparently opposite elements, it is easy also to overlook the social and political aspects of Mansfield’s writing, as well as Bergson’s other philosophical theories, as I will discuss later. Although, as the following chapters will show, these Bergsonian
aspects are modified and developed in Mansfield’s later writing, it is undeniable that
the years 1912 and 1913, when she collaborated with the Rhythm group, were a
crucial period of her career which determined her Bergsonian traits.

Notes

1 Most detailed of this kind is P. A. Lawlor, The Mystery of Maata: A Katherine
Mansfield Novel. In addition, although Maata is the name of Mansfield’s New
Zealand friend, Maata in the novel is clearly based on Mansfield herself.

2 ‘Crossed-out words or passages that remain legible and may be of some interest are
given within angle brackets’ (KMN I xvi).

3 Unlike in some of Mansfield’s other stories, here, a man appreciates duration, and a
woman does not. As for gender and time, see Chapter 5.

4 See Mansfield, The Urewera Notebook, ed. by Ian A. Gordon.

5 Regarding the significance of how her gender is first hidden and then disclosed, see
Pamela Dunbar, Radical Mansfield: Double Discourse in Katherine Mansfield’s
Short Stories, and Smith, Katherine Mansfield and Virginia Woolf: A Public of Two.

6 As for the colonial aspects of the story, see the later discussion in Chapter 4.

7 According to The Dictionary of New Zealand English, a Pakeha is a ‘pale-skinned
non-Polynesian immigrant or foreigner as distinct from a Maori; thence, a non-
Polynesian New Zealand-born New Zealander esp. if pale-skinned’ (Orsman, ed.

8 Some years earlier (probably in 1908), Mansfield wrote in her notebook, ‘The Story
of Pearl Button’, where a girl also called Pearl Button starts schooling on her
birthday:

Here was an extraordinary state of affairs—a child who came to school all
by her own self—no Mother to promise her honey for tea if she’d stop
holding on like grim death to the gates of the schoolyard, no Father to give
you a bit of blue pencil if you walked in like a man hanging your hat on the
peg, first time. ‘What is your name?’ asked Teacher.
‘Pearl’
‘Pearl who? Speak up.’
‘Pearl Button.’ This time Teacher smiled.
‘What does Mother do?’
‘Mother washes.’
‘And Father?’
‘Father—she paused a moment—’Father doesn’t wash.’

(KMN 1113)

Here also, Pearl is not attended by either of her parents, and her mother is introduced in relation to the housework she is in charge of. (Her father, for whom only what he does not do is revealed, is never even mentioned in ‘How Pearl Button Was Kidnapped’.)

9 The edition by Vincent O’Sullivan and Margaret Scott does not give any notes on this word.

10 According to Dr. Michelle Keown at the University of Stirling who kindly answered my question about the actual use of these terms in New Zealand, the idea behind the distinction is that Maori time is contrasted to ‘Western’ or Pakeha ideas of compartmentalizing time strictly in order to fit to schedules in a ‘businesslike’ manner. For example, ‘Maori time’ is often used when a Maori person is late for an appointment.
Chapter 4

Extensity and Spaces: Nationality

As I discussed in Chapter 2, Bergson’s legacy has been emphatically connected by later critics with modernist writers’ development in treating time. Bergson, however, studies not only the nature of time, as many seem to believe, but also that of space. This chapter will explore how Mansfield represents our intuitive perception of ‘extensity’ and our intellectual knowledge about ‘spaces’ (such as ‘countries’), in terms of the Bergsonian notion of time and space. In doing so, it attempts to show what is implied by the lack of a sense of New Zealandness in Mansfield’s major stories and stresses the social and political elements of her writing which critics frequently neglect.

Silence on Nationality in Mansfield’s Later New Zealand Stories

(1) Difficulty in discussing Mansfield’s fiction in relation to nationality

Antony Alpers writes of ‘How Pearl Button Was Kidnapped’: ‘this is, regrettably, K. M.’s only portrayal of the Maori people in fiction’ (Alpers 1984: 552). Indeed, it seems rather confusing or perhaps even disappointing for some that Mansfield, who wrote in her notebook, ‘Give me the Maori and the tourist but nothing between’ (Urewera 61),¹ did not write a New Zealand version of Wide Sargasso Sea in which a Pakeha character who is neither Maori nor British experiences hardship because of his or her cultural identity just as Antoinette Cosway does. Nor did she create a New
Zealand character in Britain who is ashamed of his or her New Zealand accent like the Australian, Louis, in *The Waves* by Woolf. As a writer who was born in New Zealand and wrote in Europe, Mansfield could have explored more overtly such issues as the cultural differences between the Old and New Worlds and the impact of one’s national identity on his or her life. She spent about half her life in New Zealand, and the other half in Britain and other parts of Europe; about half of her stories are set in New Zealand and the other half in Europe. This might sound as if Mansfield is so conscious of the differences between the two parts of the world that her fiction also focuses on them. However, it is actually not always easy to discuss Mansfield’s fiction in relation to particular countries. This chapter aims to tackle this difficulty by providing a new interpretation of Mansfield’s descriptions of places with reference to Bergson’s philosophy which was an important influence throughout her writing career.

Although I call it a ‘difficulty’, for some readers of Mansfield, identifying issues associated with distinct countries in her fiction might not be problematic, as she offers enough material for that project. Indeed, Mansfield’s personal writing reveals much about her feelings and ideas about different countries. It is well-known, for instance, that after her brother’s death in World War I Mansfield became keen to let people know about New Zealand through her stories. In her journal she writes, ‘I want for one moment to make our undiscovered country leap into the eyes of the old world’ (*KMN* II 32). The famous New Zealand stories Mansfield wrote after this decision, however, hardly help foreigners ‘discover’ New Zealand, because the country in which the stories take place does not seem to play any particular role or
have any discernible identity. Those later New Zealand stories such as ‘The Doll’s House’ and ‘The Garden Party’ could be set anywhere in the sense that what they describe could happen in any country. For example, Laura Sheridan in ‘The Garden Party’ who confronts the death of a person for the first time in her life does not have to be a New Zealander. She offers no information about her country to overseas readers with little knowledge of it, including those of the ‘old world’ Mansfield hoped her stories would impress. It is true that the reader can learn the names of some New Zealand plants by reading Mansfield’s fiction, but this is only superficial. Precisely because Mansfield is eloquent about the cultural significance of her country in her journals and letters, the lack of discourse about it in her representative stories seems mysterious; critics have approached this silence in different ways.

(2) Critical responses

One response is to suggest that Mansfield’s stories are not particularly ‘New Zealand’ fiction or rather, they are almost ‘British’. For example, Clare Hanson writes: “‘The Doll’s House’ is set in New Zealand, but many have read it without realising that the setting is not English’ (Hanson 1985: 120), and she points out that the external setting in this story is not important. While Hanson regards this tendency for non-specific settings as the characteristic which differentiates Mansfield’s work from, for instance, Elizabeth Bowen’s, C.K. Stead is more negative about the lack of New Zealandness in stories such as ‘Prelude’ and ‘At the Bay’ which he thinks ‘civilize the colony’ (Stead 2002: 44); he writes that some characters in these stories ‘belong more to the comic underplots of nineteenth-century English fiction than to a New Zealand reality’ (Stead 2002: 45). Andrew Gurr, on the other
hand, emphasizes the fact that European New Zealanders’ society is very much like British society. In other words, unlike Hanson and Stead, Gurr suggests that Mansfield described at least Pakeha society, if not the whole of New Zealand.

Other critics such as Kaplan and Roger Robinson note that Mansfield, who lived in Europe as a foreigner, showed her special ability to depict various sorts of outsiders in both the New Zealand stories and the European stories. Clearly, many of the European stories, mostly those which are set on the continent, can be closely linked with the characters’ nationalities, as they deal directly with issues such as cultural difference, racial prejudice, and foreigners’ isolation. Although the later New Zealand stories are not literally associated with these issues, they are also full of outsiders or minorities who are more or less isolated because of their gender, age, class, or distinctive way of seeing things.

Another reaction to the silence about exact location is to show some hidden New Zealand aspects of the stories. Ian A. Gordon’s early work explains the distinctive use of a certain English vocabulary, then current in New Zealand, which appears in Mansfield’s stories. Educating the non-New Zealand readers by warning them that the word ‘bush’ actually signifies heavy forest, Gordon suggests that language is an important factor in Mansfield’s fiction (Gordon 1963: 27). Also, Gordon adds early New Zealand stories such as ‘The Woman at the Store’ to his edition of Mansfield’s New Zealand stories, Undiscovered Country, and puts them in the section called ‘Scenes from Colonial Life’. This was an influential editorial decision by Gordon as at that time the later New Zealand stories attracted more critical attention, partly due
to the influence of Mansfield’s husband, Murry, who stressed that Mansfield’s shift to New Zealand settings resulted from the loss of her brother. Vincent O’Sullivan in his edition, on the other hand, collects New Zealand stories by Mansfield in the order in which she wrote them and succeeds in illustrating the variety of theme and approach in stories which belong to this group.

Not every critic, however, appreciates the early, obviously ‘New Zealand’ stories. For example, E. H. McCormick writes of ‘The Woman at the Store’, ‘Millie’, and ‘Ole Underwood’ which were published in Rhythm, in response to the journal’s slogan about brutality:

The settings are primitive, the characters uncouth, the plots appropriately melodramatic. The men, like those of other sensitive women writers (Robin Hyde has several examples), are uncompromisingly male, their female counterparts are little more complex, while both sexes speak and think in a bucolic dialect which only an educated person could have conceived. This was an aspect of New Zealand she was ill equipped to treat and wisely abandoned. (McCormick 1959: 89)

On the contrary, Stead, who criticizes Mansfield’s ‘civilized’ New Zealand stories, appreciates these stories McCormick disapproves of, and neither Stead nor McCormick gives any specific reasons why a particular type of stories does not suit Mansfield. Unlike O’Sullivan, some including Stead and McCormick seem to fail to consider the thematic variety of her New Zealand fiction.

Recently, critics show their interest in Mansfield’s early New Zealand stories in relation to postcolonial readings of her fiction. They pay attention to the mixed
feelings of Mansfield towards New Zealand. While she was tired of the provinciality of colonial New Zealand and dreamed about London, she was also fascinated by the Maori, but even so, she had some stereotypical and romantic ideas about them as well as more sincere sympathy. On one hand, as Jane Stafford and Mark Williams explain: ‘[Mansfield] was aware that Maori had been caught in a romantic haze. Like [Joyce], she sees a highly self-conscious sense of literary style, not a romantic nationalism configured around a mythical landscape or past, as the solution to the problem of provincialism’ (Stafford and Williams 2002: 32). Distancing herself from others in New Zealand who were mythologizing Maori, she was more self-conscious than nationalistic:

Inescapably a part of her father’s privileged colonial world, Mansfield felt an exaggerated need to establish her distance from her family and from the colonial society of her childhood. . . . Like that of another young aesthete, Stephen Dedalus, also seeking escape from the nightmares of history into the static realm of art, Mansfield’s aestheticism is always one of self-conscious gesture. (Stafford and Williams 2002: 44)

While many critics such as Stafford and Williams who are interested in Mansfield’s attitude towards New Zealand concentrate on her reference to New Zealand, Woods argues that Mansfield’s feelings about her ‘provincial’ home gave her another direction; Mansfield became interested in other nations as the exotic: ‘The first seeds of Katherine’s attraction to Russia were sown by her desire to exchange her provincial background for something more exotic and by her propensity for powerful emotion’ (Woods 2001: 23).

On the other hand, as Mansfield’s mention (or implication) of the Maori in her
writing suggests, she had a positive feeling about them. She was attracted to her
female Maori friend (or lover), Maata Mahupuku. When in Britain Mansfield
dressed like a Maori at parties. Although these episodes from her own life show her
affection for the Maori, 'How Pearl Button Was Kidnapped' in which the Maori
appear is a rarity enabling critics to discuss Mansfield from a postcolonial
perspective. Elleray writes of the story: 'Insofar as the warmth and comfort of the
Maori woman is paralleled with an indigenous New Zealand and the incarcerated,
unseen mother with a British-aligned New Zealand, the story presents the local
(Maori) mother as a desirable replacement for 'Mother' England' (Elleray 2002: 22).
Elleray points out that Pearl, though Pakeha, is not described as someone who has
come to the Maori from the outside: 'Pearl's presence on the beach in the company
of Maori positions her as native to the location, rather than the new arrival who faces
the indigene across the beach, the contact zone of the Pacific' (Elleray 2002: 25).
Indeed, 'How Pearl Button Was Kidnapped' can be read as a story through which
Mansfield explores characteristics of New Zealand, though, as I discussed in Chapter
3, she does so without spatializing Pearl's intuitive perception of her experience of
the day.

Though Mansfield's writing on the Maori offers some interesting hints as to how she
saw the Maori and her own country, not much writing of this sort is available. 'How
Pearl Button Was Kidnapped' is the only story, written after Mansfield became a
professional writer, in which some characters are considered to be Maori, and as for
her private writing, she writes of the Maori in her notebook when she travels in the
Urewera district in New Zealand's North Island. The theories about Mansfield and
the Maori do not seem applicable to her later stories; most postcolonial scholars have to focus on Mansfield’s early stories such as ‘How Pearl Button Was Kidnapped’ and her notebooks.

Some suggest, however, that Mansfield’s later stories set in England could be read in relation to her isolated position as a colonial. Blake, for instance, analyzes Mansfield’s depictions of England by comparing them closely to her personal writing in which she reveals her hatred of England. Blake argues, ‘Mansfield ridicules affected alternatives to conventional middle-class manners, such as the self-conscious avantgarde’ (Blake 2001: 84), while Mansfield shows her sympathy with her characters who are servants or women without power. Just like critics discussing Mansfield’s attitude towards the Maori, Blake also totally depends on Mansfield’s personal writing in order to prove her hatred for England, which might be connected with the theme of the stories. For example, the following passage from her notebook, quoted by Blake, is suitable for this sort of discussion:

No, I don’t want England. England is of no use to me. What do I mean by that? I mean there never has been, there never will be any rapprochement between us—never. There is the inexplicable fact that I love my typical english husband for all the strangeness between us. I do lament that he is not warm, ardent, eager, full of quick response, careless, spendthrift of himself, vividly alive, high spirited. But it makes no difference to my love. But the lack of these qualities in his country I HATE—these & others—the lack of its appeal—that is what I chiefly hate. I would not care if I never saw the english country again. Even in its flowering I feel deeply antagonistic to it, & I will never change. (KMN II 167)

Although Blake is right to insist that Mansfield’s stories set in England reflect her negative feelings about it, this does not seem to mean her English stories have a
distinct sense of nation; while in the quotation above, Mansfield directly names the specific problems, which she hates, as English ones, she does not in the stories emphasize or even hint that the issues such as the hard life of servants could be attributable particularly to England. Though it is interesting to see the link between Mansfield’s strong opinions about England and her stories which are set in England, it is even more curious that she seldom writes as if she wrote ‘about’ England.

The same thing can be said about the New Zealand stories. Although Gordon, by explaining the difference between British English and New Zealand English, helps show that Mansfield’s New Zealand stories, even later ones, have a flavour of national identity, the question about lack of obvious reference to New Zealand still remains. As the same English words have different meanings when used in New Zealand English, it is not easy for the non-New Zealand reader even to realize that New Zealand English is included in the text, without being told so. What seems most significant is that the stories make sense, even if the reader either lacks knowledge of New Zealand English or completely ignores the setting. Indeed, it would not affect the story of ‘The Garden Party’ if the karaka tree were replaced by another kind of tree, whereas the mention of sauerkraut in ‘Germans at Meat’ sounds more relevant to both the specific setting and theme. Considering the apparent lack of significance of New Zealandness in those stories, a comment such as Hanson’s that ‘The Doll’s House’ seems as if it were set in England appears to be reasonable. Indeed, this impression is shared not only by non-New Zealanders like Hanson and myself but even by her fellow New Zealander Robin Hyde, who says, ‘We claimed Katherine as a New Zealander, because we knew she was’ (Hyde 1991: 217). In
other words, whether or not the reader is familiar with New Zealand, the lack of reference to its national characteristics in Mansfield's most celebrated stories is noticeable.

This silence about region in many of Mansfield stories is, nevertheless, one of the vital aspects of her representation of location and identity. I will explain this by offering an interpretation of Bergson's concepts of time and space. First, however, looking at different reactions to the silence on geographical location in some of Mansfield's works, I emphasize that both groups of stories, the New Zealand group and the European one, contain stories with a sense of nation and stories without this sense. Bearing this in mind, I turn to the influence of Bergson's philosophy on Mansfield's stories.

**Consciousness and Places**

(1) Bergson's notion of extensity and space

Bergson covers a wide range of topics which are all theorized in association with his primary concern: the nature of time. From his articulation of the difference between time and duration, between quantity and quality, Bergson develops his philosophical preoccupations with a range of topics such as freedom, memory, and evolution. Although he is better-known for his notion of time, he also gives a similar account of places, which is of particular relevance to the concern of this chapter. Bergson argues: 'We must . . . distinguish between the perception of extensity and the conception of space' (*TFW* 96). To make it simpler, he explains that there are two ways in which we know places. While we can see a place or direction as a
‘geometrical form’ (*TFW* 96), we can also sense it ‘by a natural feeling’ (*TFW* 97), just as animals know their destination when they return to a distant home. According to Bergson, perceiving extensity by this natural feeling or perceiving different *qualities* when we differentiate our right from our left, for instance, is more essential than defining it as a homogeneous and measurable space. Comparable to the difference between duration and time is the difference between extensity and space in that the former can be associated with quality, heterogeneity, continuity, and our internal senses, while the latter can be characterized by quantity, homogeneity, separation, and elements which are external to our consciousness. Although Bergson emphasizes the significance of the former, he also suggests the necessity of both:

What we must say is that we have to do with two different kinds of reality, the one heterogeneous, that of sensible qualities, the other homogeneous, namely space. This latter, clearly conceived by the human intellect, enables us to use clean-cut distinctions, to count, to abstract, and perhaps also to speak. (*TFW* 97)

Although Bergson contrasts intellect and intuition, his real intention is to assert that these are two indispensable and inseparable elements of duration; this he does by explaining that the difference between intellect and intuition is created by the degree of tension or relaxation of consciousness, as mentioned earlier. If consciousness were most tense, it would be attached to intellect only, and if most relaxed, to intuition only, but in reality, our consciousness neither gets to the extremes of either tension or relaxation nor stays at the same degree of tension or relaxation; there are different rhythms of duration, and our consciousness keeps changing as far as the degree of its relation to intellect and intuition is concerned.
Although Bergson’s straightforward comparisons between intuition and intellect might seem to make artificial categories, as Deleuze explains in detail (as well as Bergson himself), Bergson’s dualism aims to show the differences between the ‘differences in kind’ and the ‘differences in degree’ in order to suggest the nature of duration as ‘one and simple Virtual’ (Deleuze 1988: 96). In other words, by focusing on the crucial difference between quality and quantity (differences in kind), Bergson brings unity back to what are artificially divided but otherwise inseparable (differences in degree) such as differences between one minute and another, or between one space and another. I shall show that both emphases and rejections of obvious contrasts which are at work in Mansfield’s fiction, as in Bergson’s writing, shed light on a unity among what are commonly considered different people or values in different places.

(2) Contrast between extensity and space in Mansfield’s fiction

An example of Mansfield’s obvious contrasts between intuition and intellect can be found in ‘Life of Ma Parker’. Ma Parker, who was born in Stratford-upon-Avon, did not even know the name of Shakespeare until she saw it on display outside theatres, although people always asked her about him. For her, Stratford is a place where she used to see stars through the chimney. To follow the Bergsonian categorization, Ma Parker’s personal memory of the place could be described as intuitive, and other people’s association of it with Shakespeare, as intellectual. Although distinctions between extensity and space are often more implicitly suggested than this example, Mansfield’s writing approaches places in relation to the notion of the two kinds of
reality, captured by intuition and intellect respectively.

It can be noted, for instance, that the New Zealand characters in Mansfield’s later fiction do not ‘intellectually’ conceive their own home as a space called New Zealand, while many characters in the European stories are more than aware of their ‘country’ as a space which can be clearly distinguished from other countries in a world map; the characters in ‘The Doll’s House’ and some other typical New Zealand stories apprehend their own locations in a more natural way. It is therefore not surprising that there is very little information about the external setting in this type of story as they feel extensity through their internal senses. Even though some readers including Hanson and Stead might assume the characters’ lives to be simply an imitation of those of British people, the characters themselves do not need to be conscious of Britain or to attempt to show their New Zealandness, because it is the characters’ own lives, rather than New Zealand life, that the story is about. For instance, when the characters in ‘The Doll’s House’ say ‘school’ in their conversation, they understand which school is being referred to. As the characters do not notice that the outsiders called ‘readers’ are hearing their voices, they do not mention the name or the location of the school, nor does the narrator of ‘At the Bay’ worry about whether others could understand New Zealand English, in using the tricky word ‘bush’ without any explanations. My reading of this type of story is similar to the analysis by Lydia Wevers, who writes that such stories as ‘At the Bay’ and ‘Prelude’ are “about” New Zealand, the imagined community signified by the Burnell family and its surroundings, an idea of nation produced by a modernist aesthetic centred on temporality rather than historicity’ (Wever 1995: 38-39).
In that sense, these stories are different from the narrator of Mansfield’s early story, ‘The Woman at the Store’, who is conscious of the outside reader and explains, ‘There is no twilight to our New Zealand days, but a curious half-hour when everything appears grotesque—it frightens—as though the savage spirit of the country walked abroad and sneered at what it saw’ (‘The Woman’ 13). Looking at the characters in the later New Zealand stories who have no need to be concerned about their country in any intellectual way, one could read the silence about nationality as realistic.

By contrast to these stories in which the characters are at home, stories such as ‘Je ne parle pas français’ and ‘Germans at Meat’ focus on British people who realize that they are strangers to the French or German people, and therefore, are aware that they are supposed to explain themselves in a language which can be understood by others; their mobile consciousness responds to the situations in which they are ‘foreigners’. The external setting of those stories is more important than that of ‘The Doll’s House’ since the characters are more emphatically concerned with what Bergson calls ‘space’; that is, separating one space from another with the intellect, instead of feeling extensity by an internal sense, or intuition.

(3) Link between extensity and space in Mansfield’s fiction

It is important to remember here that both groups of fiction, one set in New Zealand and the other in Europe, contain stories which deal with characteristics of countries and others which do not. For example, in ‘The Young Girl’ where the setting is
probably Monte Carlo, cultural difference is not an issue, in spite of the fact that the main characters are located in a foreign country, because the story focuses on the protagonist’s youth and gender, not her nationality. As these different examples show, regardless of the nationality, or the story’s setting, the characters either do or do not find their identities in relation to their locations. In this respect, it does not seem appropriate simply to categorize Mansfield as a writer whose fiction belongs to either New Zealand or British literature, for she does not explicitly show anything in particular about New Zealand in her later fiction but instead depicts the inseparability of intuition and intellect which is associated with any human being from any country. To interpret it further in Bergsonian terms, differences between what could be conceived as different people from different places or countries are merely differences in degree, not in kind. Careful readings, for instance, will lead to an understanding that not only are Mansfield’s early New Zealand stories and some of her European stories concerned with intellectual differentiation of ‘spaces’ but so is her later New Zealand fiction which is not apparently related to regionality.

‘The Doll’s House’, not a story about the crisis over the characters’ national identity, clearly deals with ‘spaces’ as well as ‘extensity’, despite its apparent detachment from the issue of spatialization. Hanson responds to only one side of the dualism in the story:

\[\ldots\text{ in Katherine Mansfield's fiction there is no place for the kind of exact social reference and placing of atmosphere}\ldots\text{. The external setting of ‘The Doll’s House’ is unimportant}\ldots\text{. We learn much more about the miniature doll’s house than about its ‘real’ setting within the story}\ldots\text{.} (Hanson 1985: 120)\]
Conversely, considering how the weak are treated in 'The Doll’s House', social reference seems significant in the story. Although it is true that the characters are not at all conscious of the borders between countries at least within the framework of this story, that does not mean they only see their place intuitively as ‘extensity’; they intellectually draw some lines to differentiate ‘spaces’ if not countries. For example, by assuming the middle-class voice of the dominant parental social group, the narrator draws attention to the fact that there is a demarcation line within the school which children from different types of families attend: ‘all the children of the neighbourhood, the Judge’s little girls, the doctor’s daughters, the store-keeper’s children, the milkman’s, were forced to mix together... But the line had to be drawn somewhere. It was drawn at the Kelveys’ (SKM 501).

The main reason why these children discriminate against the poor Kelvey sisters is that the adults have forbidden them to speak to them:

Many of the children, including the Burnells, were not allowed even to speak to them... Even the teacher had a special voice for them, and a special smile for the other children when Lil Kelvey came up to her desk with a bunch of dreadfully common-looking flowers. (SKM 501)

It seems that the rule which forbids the children to be friendly with the Kelveys is a strict one, and they dare not disobey the adults. However, the brave Kezia asks her mother whether she can invite the Kelveys to their house to show them the doll’s house. The following brief dialogue between Kezia and her mother shows the adults’ overwhelming power over the children:
As this exchange shows, the children in the story, regardless of their class, are completely governed by the adults and therefore do not have their own language with which to express themselves. In this situation, the children’s expressions tend to be imitative of the adults. For example, when one of the children, Emmie Cole, gossips about Lil Kelvey, she ‘swallowed in a very meaning way and nodded to Isabel as she’d seen her mother do on those occasions’ (SKM 503). This tendency to imitate can also be found in Isabel when she tries to establish her power as the eldest sister. Hanson merely notices the characters’ intuitive meeting with ‘extensity’ where no social issues can be identified, but they do make intellectual distinctions as well between different ‘spaces’ on the basis of their class and age.

Similarly, separation between one space and another can also be found in ‘The Garden Party’, another story without a distinct sense of New Zealandness. The area, or the ‘space’, of the working class, which Laura was not allowed to enter when she was little, is clearly differentiated from the house of the wealthy Sheridans. However, Laura happens to have an opportunity to visit this area, as she is asked by her mother to take some leftovers from the party to the poor family of the dead person. The final part of the story shows Laura’s intuitive meeting with this particular place hitherto separated from her life, by depicting the change in psychological distance between the Sheridans’ house and the dead man’s.
house, we are repeatedly told that it is geographically very close to the Sheridans, but her route is described as if it were quite long. After two rather long paragraphs, Laura thinks her visit is not appropriate: ‘It was a mistake to have come; she knew all along it was a mistake. Should she go back even now?’ (SKM 497). This ‘even now’ reflects her feeling that she has come a long way, through which the reader has accompanied her, but even at this point, there is still further to travel or to read before Laura ends this visit. In contrast, returning home is much easier for both Laura and the reader. There are only three short sentences: ‘And this time she didn’t wait for Em’s sister. She found her way out of the door, down the path, past all those dark people. At the corner of the lane she met Laurie’ (SKM 499). It sounds as if the house were nearer this time. This change in Laura’s sense of distance explains the very nature of the heterogeneous, intuitive experience of quality as opposed to the homogeneous, intellectual knowledge of quantity; while the distance between the Sheridans’ and the dead person’s house is always the same in a quantitative sense, inside Laura’s consciousness where the quality of her experience matters, the distance is experienced, not measured, as if it were shorter or longer than it actually is. Laura’s experience of different rhythms of duration is well-expressed in the abridgement of the narrative as she goes back home.

By carefully describing Laura’s mobile consciousness, the closing part of ‘The Garden Party’ implies that our consciousness of a particular place is not fixed but changeable. This apparently illustrates Bergson’s argument that intuitive and intellectual aspects are indivisible; it is never possible at any moment that we should become exclusively intuitive in one situation and exclusively intellectual in another.
We are always both, but the activity of these two faculties is always fluid. In this respect, although stories such as ‘The Garden Party’ and ‘The Doll’s House’ are not concerned with New Zealandness, this does not mean they are stories of intuition only, any more than ‘Je ne parle pas français’ concentrates purely on intellect.

If the reader misses the link between these two opposing elements hinted at in Mansfield’s descriptions of human mobile consciousness, it is easy also to overlook the social and political aspects of her writing. The episode of the death of the working-class man in ‘The Garden Party’ surely concerns ‘social issues’, but it is not labelled as such nor placed on the outside of Laura’s duration, but instead is internalized by Laura. Such critics as Hanson, who believe that Mansfield’s literary texts are not concerned with social issues, seem to assume that a New Zealand writer would normally write differently from writers of their own countries and thus fail to discover how this mixture of intuition and intellect is related to ‘social issues’ in Mansfield’s writing.

What could parenthetically be added to my argument as to the link between intuition and intellect is that though it is not apparent, Mansfield’s stories, earlier or later, set in New Zealand or Europe, sometimes mention actual places, just as Joyce’s Ulysses does; Gordon reports on his excitement in finding the cake shop Godber, the shop which delivers the cream puffs to the Sheridans in ‘The Garden Party’, on Molesworth Street in Wellington (Gordon 1989: 15). Gordon had just moved from Edinburgh to Wellington: ‘From then [1937] on I knew I was in Katherine Mansfield country. . . . She was a writer who was writing about a time and a country that I was
actually living in’ (Gordon 1989: 16). Although the readers in the twenty-first century cannot actually share the same time with Mansfield any more, the country in which she lived and about which she wrote, what Gordon calls Katherine Mansfield country, is still identifiable. Just as today’s tourists can visit Dublin to trace Bloom’s journey on 16 June 1904 or go to London in search of Mrs. Dalloway’s shadow, the readers of Mansfield can actually find in Wellington what is depicted in her stories; for instance, although the house where what was reproduced in ‘The Garden Party’ took place has been demolished, tourists in Wellington can easily walk between where the house was and the area for the poor. Those later New Zealand stories are related to geographic spaces in this sense, but are concerned with how the characters actually walk around the places and move between them rather than how these places are represented on a map.

(4) Extensity and space in short stories

The genre Mansfield concentrates on, short fiction, is highly appropriate for representing her Bergsonian ideas. In ‘The Doll’s House’, the descriptions of the miniature doll’s house offer an interesting hint in this regard:

Pat prised it open with his penknife, and the whole house-front swung back, and—there you were, gazing at one and the same moment into the drawing-room and dining-room, the kitchen and two bedrooms. That is the way for a house to open! Why don’t all houses open like that? How much more exciting than peering through the slit of a door into a mean little hall with a hatstand and two umbrellas! That is—isn’t it?—what you long to know about a house when you put your hand on the knocker. (SKM 500)

Although it might be exciting if a house ‘opened’ to reveal different rooms at the
same time, a real house does not. When you are inside a real room, you cannot actually be in another room, and therefore it is not possible to see the inside of different rooms simultaneously. The same thing can be said about places in general. For example, it is possible to see different countries on a map at the same time, but we cannot be in different countries at the same time. In other words, an intellectual, external knowledge of spaces enables us simultaneously to conceive different places as distinguished from and contrasted to one another, while an intuitive, internal experience of extensity restricts us to a limited sight at a given moment.

This idea is useful in relation to the significance of the short fiction form in Mansfield’s works. Her stories are often read as if they were chapters of the same novel. Some, such as ‘Prelude’, ‘At the Bay’, and ‘The Doll’s House’, share the same characters and indeed are just like different chapters in a single novel. Even the stories which do not belong to any series seem to tempt the reader to read them as a continuous whole as similar characters appear in two or more separate stories, or similar themes are repeatedly explored in different situations provided by different stories. As both McCormick and O’Sullivan suggest, even the story ‘A Birthday’ can be read as being about the Burnell family of New Zealand, despite the German names used in the story (McCormick 1959: 88, O’Sullivan 1998: 2).

Even though Mansfield’s stories can be compared to the chapters of a novel, the reader can of course also read them as different stories. It should be noted that there is a clear difference between reading a piece as a short story and as a chapter. While the chapters of a novel are read in order from the first chapter, short stories do not
have such an order. The readers of a novel, as they go on reading, can broaden their
sight to some extent and become more knowledgeable about what the novel
describes, but the readers of a short story experience a limitation of sight, as other
stories are not placed in order, but work simultaneously, as Mansfield suggests in her
letter to the novelist William Gerhardi:

The diversity of life and how we try to fit in everything, Death included. That is bewildering for a person of Laura’s age. She feels things ought to happen differently. First one and then another. But life isn’t like that. We haven’t the ordering of it. Laura says, ‘But all these things must not happen at once.’ And Life answers, ‘Why not? How are they divided from each other.’ And they do all happen, it is inevitable. And it seems to me there is beauty in that inevitability. (Letters 196, Mansfield’s emphasis)

This indivisibility of duration, or life, might be better expressed through a short story than a novel. It can be said that reading a novel which contains different chapters is like seeing different rooms of a miniature house, enabling us to conceive one space (or ‘spatialized’ time) after another. For example, in novels by Mansfield’s contemporaries such as *Ulysses*, one chapter describes one character, while the following chapter reveals what another character was doing in another place at the same time. By contrast, reading a short story is just like the experience of being unable to see what is simultaneously taking place outside the room in which one is confined; when the reader faces the reality of ‘The Doll’s House’, the reality of a German story such as ‘Germans at Meat’, in which a British woman struggles because of her nationality and location, is not visible simultaneously. If, as Mansfield suggests, different things happen in different places at the same time, different events happening outside the room must be missed; we can only later hear
or read about them. Just like young Laura, even if readers feel unprepared to see certain things due to lack of information (about a particular country, for instance), they are suddenly shown part of reality or duration, whether or not that makes sense to them. In *Duration and Simultaneity* Bergson gives a similar account explaining the fact that when we insist that two people are in different places at the same time, this simultaneity can never be felt intuitively, even if their locations are close to each other, because this idea of simultaneity is based on spatialization. Mansfield’s short stories can represent the flow of each character’s duration in a particular situation, instead of the intellectual idea of simultaneity, since each story restricts readers to one room.

This distinction between a short story and a novel, however, is also a matter of degree. Both deal with the mixture of intuition and intellect, though with different degrees of each, since even a very short story continues to broaden our sight until its ending, and a very long novel does not continue to let us see everything. Whether it is a short story or novel, writing a literary work is after all very much like an intellectual act in the Bergsonian sense, because it artificially creates different spaces. Mansfield’s short fiction form, however, can unite the differences in degree between short stories and novels because it can place readers either on the inside or the outside of a particular story so that they can read it more intuitively rather than intellectually as an independent piece and also more intellectually rather than intuitively as part of a larger unit to be compared with other parts. The flexibility of the form allows Mansfield to show her interpretation of the Bergsonian concept of the inseparability of intuition and intellect by working with the reader’s mobile
consciousness.

Link between New Zealand and Europe, and Further

As I have noted, critics interested in the relationship between Mansfield's fiction and the countries in which she lived either suggest that her work belongs to the history of British literature, as Stead insists, or emphasize that it has some essential characteristics which are distinctive of New Zealand, as Gordon implies. Nonetheless, I wish to argue that it is not important to decide whether Mansfield's stories belong to British or New Zealand literature, although, as should be clear by now, this by no means suggests that they lack any social reference at all. It appears more reasonable to stress Mansfield's position as a Pakeha writer, neither Maori nor British, but even that would not fully explain the silence about setting in some of her stories. Rather than categorize Mansfield as one of those types, it may be more fruitful to observe that she writes stories both with and without the national characteristics, with both New Zealand and European settings to unite what are usually regarded as 'differences'. It can be concluded that, partly by choosing the short fiction form and partly by focusing on, or ignoring, the country of location, depending on the story, and also by dealing with social issues within what is thought to be 'one community', Mansfield seems to imply that we all have two ways of relating to places, by intuition and by intellect, and we use more of one way in one situation and more of the other in another situation.

Furthermore, it is intriguing that there are resemblances between characters who appear in otherwise unrelated stories by Mansfield, that is, stories with completely
different settings and locations; for example, in both New Zealand and European stories, some characters are shocked by the deaths of people, and others are nervous about giving birth. In other words, enquiring readers, who read Mansfield’s stories in an attempt to find something new in her foreign characters’ exotic lives, may most unexpectedly find themselves after all. It seems as if this subtle trick by Mansfield implicitly warns the readers of the risk in merely theorizing representations of a particular culture, which inevitably involves generalizing (and perhaps stereotyping), or to be Bergsonian, ‘spatializing’, them.

Although I insist that both New Zealand and European stories by Mansfield show how people deal with place in both intuitive and intellectual ways, I also find it notable that the characters in the late New Zealand stories, unlike those in the early German and New Zealand stories, are not conscious of their location in terms of nationality. Many, such as O’Sullivan (*Finding Pattern*), see the change as Mansfield’s shift from a colonial New Zealander to a European modernist. What could also be considered is that Mansfield concentrates on specific, or personal, subjects at an early stage of her career and later becomes more concerned with universal, impersonal issues. This progress is what Bergson experienced in his pursuit of duration, and Fergusson in art. This move between the specified to the unspecified will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.
Notes

1 In 1907, the young Mansfield went camping in the Ureweras, New Zealand’s North Island. She saw some British tourists during this trip, and wrote in her notebook, ‘it is splended [sic] to see once again real English people—I am so tired and sick of the third rate article—Give me the Maori and the tourist but nothing between’ (Urewera 61).

2 The Dictionary of New Zealand English defines ‘bush’ as ‘(Land covered with) native rainforest’ among other definitions (Orsman, ed. 1997: 106-14).

3 While Mansfield was still at Queen’s College in 1906, she wrote ‘Summer Idylle’ in which a girl seems to be Maori.
Chapter 5

Heterogeneity and Homogeneity: Gender

Although this is a chapter about gender, and although Bergson implies that females should be given equality with males in *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, this chapter is not about the book, the reason partly being that it was published in 1932 and translated into English in 1935, years after Mansfield’s death in 1923, but more importantly that her stories are never so straightforward as *The Two Sources*, as far as this particular topic is concerned. Rather like her way of dealing with nationality in the stories, her fictional approaches to issues associated with gender and sex are not always easy to generalize, and although Mansfield might not have disagreed with Bergson at all had she lived long enough to read *The Two Sources*, there is little in common between Bergson’s direct reference to gender in the book and Mansfield’s implications about it in her fiction. Nevertheless, I find Bergson’s influence on Mansfield in a number of aspects of her representations of the two genders, which this chapter attempts to explore.

**Heterogeneity of Men, Heterogeneity of Women, Homogeneity of Men and Women**

(1) Is Mansfield cruel to women?

Mansfield’s stories have been criticized by Elaine Showalter and Margaret Drabble due to what they see as Mansfield’s cruelty to her female characters:
In the short stories of Katherine Mansfield, the moment of self-awareness is also the moment of self-betrayal. Typically, a woman in her fiction who steps across the threshold into a new understanding of womanhood is humiliated, or destroyed. Mansfield’s fiction is cautionary and punitive; women are lured out onto the limbs of consciousness, which are then lopped off by the author. (Showalter 1977: 246)

Showalter mentions the story ‘Bliss’ as an example and adds that Drabble admits she was ‘horrified’ by the cruelty of another story, ‘Miss Brill’. Although it is true that some stories like ‘Bliss’ and ‘Miss Brill’ provide bitter conclusions (if not ‘the moment of self-betrayal’) for their female characters, that is not always the case. For example, in ‘The Stranger’, it is a man who feels ‘bliss’ until a certain point in the story and he is, at the end, ‘betrayed’ by his wife, or rather, his own expectation. It is not only those regarding Mansfield as cruel to women but also those appreciating her depictions of the female characters that treat Mansfield as if she categorized her characters into ‘typical’ women and men. Patricia Moran writes: ‘In general, Mansfield’s texts tend to dichotomize femininity and masculinity; to be autonomous, to be bounded is to be masculine: to be inchoate materiality is to be female’ (Moran 1996: 18). However, noting that there are as many various types of women as of men in Mansfield’s different stories, this chapter considers the propriety of categorizing all the independent characters in Mansfield’s different kinds of story into two groups, men and women. I consider that Mansfield rejects stereotypical ideas about male and female in two ways; one is to suggest similarities between men and women and the other is to emphasize differences between different individuals, whether men or women, or differences between one man or woman at one given time and the same person at another time. This can be explained by those theories of
Bergson which I have discussed so far such as his argument as to time and duration, body and mind, matter and memory, and homogeneity and heterogeneity.

It can be said that discussing Mansfield’s work from a feminist perspective is not as easy as in the cases of other writers such as Woolf. Ruth Parkin-Gounelas points out that except that Mansfield as a teenager wrote in a letter, ‘All this suffragist movement is excellent for our sex’ (CLKM I 47), she ‘made no overt commitment either to female solidarity or to a tradition of women’s writing, in the way, for example, Virginia Woolf did’ (Parkin-Gounelas 1994: 36). Parkin-Gounelas also notes that scholars and Mansfield herself have long named male writers, such as Anton Chekhov, as her literary models.

While Mansfield remains silent on feminism, she successfully explores women’s experiences by giving hints of sexuality. As Smith argues, ‘nowhere in Woolf’s writing is there anything like the physical desirability of Pearl Fulton in “Bliss”, or the erotic tension in “Psychology”’ (Smith 1999: 36). Rather than dealing with an ‘intellectual’ issue associated with women such as their social or literary status, as Woolf does, Mansfield observes and records the ‘intuitive’ sphere of each woman.

Although some of her own stories have ‘sexual’ implications, Mansfield’s letter dated 4 May 1916 reveals her dislike of the predominance of sex in Lawrence’s fiction: ‘I shall never see sex in trees, sex in the running brooks, sex in stones & sex in everything. The number of things that are really phallic from fountain pen fillers onwards!’ (CLKM I 261). Also on 3 December 1921, she writes of Lawrence: ‘in
fact when he gets on to the subject of maleness I lose all patience. What nonsense it all is—and he must know it is. His style changes; he can no longer write. He begs the question. I cant forgive him for that—it’s a sin’ (CLKM IV 330, Mansfield’s emphasis). Unlike Lawrence, Mansfield does not place sex or gender at the centre of everything, but she is apparently wrong when she writes, ‘I shall never see sex in trees’, because as any readers of Mansfield would notice without being helped by Mary Paul pointing it out: ‘In “Bliss”, though, Mansfield does see sex in trees’ (Paul 1999: 38).

I suggest that some characters’ femininity or masculinity is, to give a Bergsonian explanation, not necessarily ‘lived’ or ‘acted’ at a given moment described in a particular story, though it may be ‘represented’. In some cases, the similarities of female characters to male characters, rather than to other females, are implied in the stories, just as in Rhythmist paintings such as Fergusson’s Rhythm in which the apparently female figure has some male qualities suggested by her arms and torso as well as femaleness characterized by her breast and legs. This means not only that the characters have both femininity and masculinity regardless of their genders and of their sexual preferences but also that they can be neither feminine nor masculine; they are both one and many (for example, a woman can be either female only or both female and male), and yet neither one nor many (she belongs to neither of the categories, because she is an individual). In short, the characters’ genders play an important role in some ways, highlighted in some stories, but not in other ways or stories. In the former case, the characters’ selves are spatialized by our intellect, which prefers generalization and categorization, and in the latter, perceived by our
intuition, which is associated with heterogeneity. In many cases, or stories, however, both aspects are intermingled with each other in complicated ways, just as in Mansfield’s representations of different places, and just as Bergson claims the two elements of duration to be. With the help of Bergson’s notion of heterogeneous selves, the chapter attempts to show that, despite the claim of Showalter and Drabble, the variety of men and women in Mansfield’s different stories free them from the stereotypical idea of what men/women should be.

Mansfield challenges the idea of essentialism, or ‘homogeneity’, by depicting different types of males and females. In doing so, she seems deliberately to emphasize general similarities among men or among women in order to distinguish one character from the gender group that the character belongs to. As a result, the character might be more strongly connected with the other gender group. For example, while the women in ‘The Garden Party’, except Laura, are evidently unattractive in terms of their personality, the men in the story, young and old, rich and poor, and even dead and alive, are described as amiable. On the contrary, men are simply appalling in ‘Je ne parle pas français’. Ian French, a painter in ‘Feuille d’Album’, could be laughed at because of his triviality and shyness. Constantia and Josephine in ‘The Daughters of the Late Colonel’ are to some extent like him, although their story deals with a more serious theme. As a busy housewife, Pearl Button’s mother is confined to the House of Boxes, while in ‘The Fly’, it is a man, old Mr Woodifield, who is in that situation: ‘Since he had retired, since his . . . stroke, the wife and the girls kept him boxed up in the house every day of the week except Tuesday’ (SKM 529, Mansfield’s ellipsis).
Although I have compared and linked male and female characters from different stories, the similarities between men and women are often implicitly suggested within a single story even if it appears to show the contrasts between the two genders. As Dunbar points out, for example, Mansfield draws attention to the superficial distinction between the strong husband and the small and vulnerable wife at the beginning of the story ‘The Stranger’, and then reveals that they are not what they seem: ‘It is after all Hammond who is the vulnerable one’ (Dunbar 1997: 115).

Mansfield’s suggestions that men and women are linked with each other corresponds with Rhythmist artists’ concept of gender:

By associating the female reproductive processes with Bergson’s concept of the élan vital, these artists defined feminine creative capacities as synonymous with those found in nature, thereby denying women the power to realize that creative potential in spheres of cultural production, such as art. . . . The Bergsonists . . . were prepared to interrelate cultural production with productive forces in nature. . . . [T]hey identified women as the product of such forces, by declaring female fecundity an example of the élan vital’s productivity. Women were the product of this élan, but men, by virtue of their intuitive powers, were both product and producer of the élan vital. (Antliff 1993: 70)

As Antliff shows, Rhythmists emphasize the productive power of women, but this does not necessarily mean men are fundamentally different from women; they are the product of the élan vital. Similarly, Mansfield often unites men and women by describing them in connection with what has been associated mostly with women, for example continuous thought and difficulty in expressing themselves in language, as I will show below.
Dunbar explains that the attempts to convey the nature of female sexual desire were made more successfully by modernist writers than by earlier writers, as a result of the shared modernist tendency to connect the human consciousness and what has been believed to be ‘feminine’: ‘passivity, fluidity, receptivity, acute sensitivity, irrationality’ (Dunbar 1997: 104). Just as Dunbar does, many have associated mind time, or what Bergson calls duration, with females (and have named Molly Bloom as an example, whose monologue concluding Ulysses contains very few full stops). This link between mind time and femininity is often pointed out with regard to what Julia Kristeva calls ‘women’s time’ as opposed to linear time.

Mansfield’s unfinished story ‘A Married Man’s Story’ (as well as most parts of Ulysses), however, shows that a continuous stream goes on in a man’s consciousness as well as a woman’s. His stream starts with a look at his own writing table and then his wife’s sleepiness, and he notices the sound of the rain and imagines that it is raining everywhere in the world, which takes him, in his mind, to a ‘strange city’ (SKM 477). After the first-person narrative continues for a while to reveal what is going on in his mind, he considers: ‘But one could go on with such a catalogue for ever—on and on—until one lifted the single arum lily leaf and discovered the tiny snails clinging, until one counted . . . and what then?’ (SKM 477, Mansfield’s ellipsis). His mention of the snails seems to be an echo from Woolf’s snail in ‘The Mark on the Wall’ in which the protagonist starts to wonder what caused the mark on the wall, and imagines all the different possibilities (and many other things, not
directly related to the cause of the mark), but ends up finding that it was not a mark but a snail. Just as her train of thought is stopped by the revelation that it was actually a snail, the Married Man’s thinking is interrupted by his wife: ‘Suddenly my wife turns round quickly. She knows—how long has she known?—that I am not ‘working’! It is strange that with her full, open gaze, she should smile so timidly—and that she should say in such a hesitating voice: ‘What are you thinking?’” (SKM 477). As a general account of Mansfield’s treatment of mind time, Mark Williams remarks: ‘As these experiences [of time] are confined to female characters, Mansfield is developing a form of feminine symbolism, but she does so from a narrative perspective which reinforces the constraints placed on female consciousness’ (Williams 2001: 367), but in fact it is not difficult at all to find that these experiences are not confined to women in Mansfield’s stories; stories such as ‘Mr Reginald Peacock’s Day’, ‘Je ne parle pas français’, ‘The Man Without a Temperament’, ‘The Stranger’, and ‘Marriage à la Mode’, to give some other examples, explore the consciousnesses of their male characters which meander and are never linear.

The Married Man’s consciousness is not the only so-called ‘feminine’ element that is shared by Mansfield’s other characters, both female and male; the Married Man is not affectionate towards his own baby: ‘A queer thing is I can’t connect him with my wife and myself; I’ve never accepted him as ours. Each time when I come into the hall and see the perambulator, I catch myself thinking: “H’m, someone has brought a baby”’ (SKM 478). Although this could remind one of Stanley Burnell, who is notoriously keen on success in business and punctuality and does not seem to think
much about his children, the Married Man is essentially different from Stanley; he is arguably more like Stanley's wife, Linda, who is, in 'Prelude' and 'At the Bay' very tired and buried in thought rather than working actively as an affectionate mother. In 'Prelude' she refuses to go and see what her children are doing.

It would not be appropriate, therefore, to classify the Married Man and Stanley as 'typical, cold fathers' in Mansfield's fiction; besides, other fathers in other stories are different from the Married Man and from Stanley; William, the miserable husband in 'Marriage à la Mode' who is desperate to give the fruits he has bought to his children, not to his wife's friends, though he fails, cares about his children. In the case of 'the boss' in 'The Fly', who lost his son six years ago, Mansfield describes him from a different angle. Though he is probably remembered as one of the most evil characters in Mansfield's fiction as he kills a fly in a most cruel way, even he gets emotional when it comes to his dead son. The story ironically reveals how cruelly he can kill a fly only moments after he cries over his son; it shows the fluid consciousness of this character, who is more than just a 'typically' cold man. In other words, Mansfield's exploration of this character's consciousness suggests that the categorization of different kinds of fathers such as I attempted above is superficial.

The Married Man himself, however, is concerned with such categorization. Though the fact that he has never accepted the boy as his and his wife's son seems to be his own problem, he somehow considers this as if it had something to do with what kind of woman his wife is: 'The truth is, that though one might suspect her of strong
maternal feelings, my wife doesn’t seem to me the type of woman who bears children in her own body’ (SKM 478). He has a fixed idea of what ‘type’ of woman she is, which is clear in the following two quotations as well: ‘I believe that when she ties its bonnet she feels like an aunt and not a mother’ (SKM 478); ‘How can I reasonably expect my wife, a broken-hearted woman, to spend her time tossing the baby?’ (SKM 478, Mansfield’s emphasis). He sees her as a ‘broken-hearted woman’ rather than one independent person who should be different from other broken-hearted women. What can be noted here is that he actually knows that she is not broken-hearted all the time; immediately after the quotation above, he adds: ‘But that is beside the mark. She never even began to toss when her heart was whole’ (SKM 478).

The way the Married Man calls his wife a ‘broken-hearted woman’ and quickly denies that notion could be linked to another stereotypical idea about gender that is not supported by Mansfield’s fiction, about how men and women use language. In Western thought, as Moran elaborates (Moran 1996: 1-2), men are associated with mind and rationality, and women, with the body and lack of rationality. It is in this context that Moran writes: ‘Mansfield and Woolf shared the belief that what women experienced could not be translated directly into language; both believed that language and narrative conventions worked as forcefully as social customs to limit female self-definition and self-expression’ (Moran 1996: 15). It is true that Mansfield’s stories provide occasions on which the characters struggle with language and fail, but despite what Moran reports on, the difficulty with expressing themselves in language is experienced by both male and female characters in Mansfield’s fiction.
In the story ‘Bliss’, Bertha Young names her excitement ‘absolute bliss’ (*SKM* 305) without hesitation, while in ‘Mr Reginald Peacock’s Day’, it is a man who is not able to say what he wishes to say to his wife. Although a lot of thoughts and words come and go in his mind while she is sleeping, when she is awake, it is not easy for him to tell her: ‘he suddenly decided to have one more try to treat her as a friend, to tell her everything, to win her. Down he sat on the side of the bed, and seized one of her hands. But of all those splendid things he had to say, not one could he utter’ (*SKM* 266). Reginald, a singing teacher extremely popular among his female students, is capable of attracting his students with his musical expressions. His verbal expressions also seem impressive to his devoted students and help him communicate with them successfully. Through the narrator, the reader hears one of his students saying: ‘Why [aren’t] all men like Mr Peacock?’ (*SKM* 265). However, whenever he teaches and whomever he teaches, the same words are repeated routinely: ‘“Dear lady, I should be only too charmed”’ (*SKM* 263, 264, 265). At the end of the story, he again finds it difficult to talk to his wife about what he is eager to say, and finally, ‘[f]or some fiendish reason, the only words he could get out were: “Dear lady, I should be so charmed—so charmed!”’ (*SKM* 266).

In reading ‘Mr. Reginald Peacock’s Day’, just as in reading some other stories by Mansfield, the readers often come across the idea that some words are easy to find, or easy to utter actually, but others are not, or the idea that it is more difficult to find the right expression for what you really wish to describe than for other matters. In this sense, Bertha in ‘Bliss’ is more similar to Reginald than I suggested earlier. It is
not difficult for her, though through the narrator, to call her feeling 'bliss' but that expression does not seem to satisfy her:

Oh, is there no way you can express it without being 'drunk and disorderly'? How idiotic civilization is! Why be given a body if you have to keep it shut up in a case like a rare, rare fiddle?

'No, that about the fiddle is not quite what I mean,' she thought . . . . (SKM 305)

As is obvious from the last sentence of the quotation, she is keen to look for appropriate words. Later in the story when she gets a phone call from his husband Harry, she really cannot find words at the end of their conversation:

What had she to say? She'd nothing to say. She only wanted to get in touch with him for a moment. She couldn't absurdly cry: 'Hasn't it been a divine day!'

'What is it?' rapped out the little voice.

'Nothing. Entendu,' said Bertha, and hung up the receiver, thinking how more than idiotic civilization was. (SKM 307)

Her preoccupation with the right expressions might be connected to her to creative art. Although, unlike Reginald, she is not a professional artist but likes creating beauty; for example, she buys fruits for a party to display them tastefully:

'Shall I turn on the light, M'm?'

'No, thank you. I can see quite well.'

There were tangerines and apples stained with strawberry pink. Some yellow pears, smooth as silk; some white grapes covered with a silver bloom and a big cluster of purple ones. These last she had bought to tone in with the new dining-room carpet. Yes, that did sound rather far-fetched and absurd, but it was really why she had bought them. She had thought in the shop: 'I must have some purple ones to bring the carpet up to the table.' (SKM 305-6)
After making two pyramids of fruits, 'she stood away from the table to get the effect—and it really was most curious. For the dark table seemed to melt into the dusky light and the glass dish and the blue bowl to float in the air. This, of course in her present mood, was so incredibly beautiful' (SKM 306). This minute description of how she creates her work is more vivid and stronger than any single word such as 'bliss', because the depiction follows Bertha's process, or duration, of making pyramids as time passes, instead of summarizing it in retrospect after the time has passed. Through this durational description of Bertha, the reader finds out that, just as Reginald has his singing, Bertha has her way of expressing herself, if not with verbal language as she wishes.

It is perhaps all the more because Reginald and Bertha are able to express themselves in some situations that they strongly wish to say properly, using the right expressions, what they have to say to their spouses. Bertha is somewhat like Reginald also during the party when she plans ahead what she will tell her husband later; she decides that she is going to talk about Pearl Fulton with her husband later, and thinks: 'I shall try to tell you when we are in bed to-night what has been happening. What she and I have shared' (SKM 313).

Bertha's and Reginald's difficulty in finding the right words on the right occasions (despite their capability on other occasions and by other means) suggests the most significant link between 'Mr Reginald Peacock's Day' and 'Bliss'. That is, the readers cannot rely on the narrators. It is suggested that different perspectives and interpretations should make more sense than the explanations by the narrators. As
‘Mr Reginald Peacock’s Day’ is told from his point of view, it might sound as if his wife were unreasonable and not understanding, as Reginald claims, which could perhaps be true to some extent, but if the story were told from his wife’s perspective, he might be described as too selfish to understand his busy wife who does all the housework and childcare. Rather similarly, as is clear throughout the story of ‘Bliss’, ‘Bertha’s utter unreliability as a narrator makes this particular plot impossible to decipher: we can only know “what really happens” through her, and she doesn’t know’ (Moran 41). On one hand, ‘Bliss’ could be read as a little like ‘How Pearl Button Was Kidnapped’ which is told from the perspective of the little Pearl; as her surname Young implies, Bertha might be just like a child. If one reads the story in this way, it can be interpreted as follows: Bertha does not understand the single truth of the story, which is the fact that Harry and Pearl are having an affair, not that Bertha and Pearl are going to be close. On the other hand, one can assume that Bertha, who is not literally young, unlike Pearl Button, is not that ignorant. According to this interpretation, there is no single truth in the story; it is true that Harry and Pearl are in a close relationship, but it might be also true that there is some feeling between Bertha and Pearl, or it might be that Bertha has known about the affair between her husband and Pearl. In other words the story, just like ‘Mr Reginald Peacock’s Day’ but in a more complex way, shows that things could be interpreted in different ways, by inviting various interpretations.

These complicated ways in which stories are told show the difficulty in capturing the fluid nature of duration with language. Whether a character is female or male, words cannot reproduce the person’s mobile consciousness exactly as it is. It is in this
context that I turn to Mansfield’s attention to the fact that gender is not associated with the significance of time and duration. In ‘Mr Reginald Peacock’s Day’, Reginald is wakened by his wife’s voice saying, “It’s time to get up; it’s half-past eight” (SKM 259). He could be more easily associated with Rhoda in Maata, who cannot get up quickly, or the lethargic Linda, rather than her husband Stanley, in the Burnell family stories, because he wishes to take time before waking up: ‘One ought to wake exquisitely, reluctantly, he thought, slipping down in the warm bed’ (SKM 260). On the other hand, his wife is a quick person, and not only makes him hurry but hurries up herself to take their son to school. Although scholars have discussed how Mansfield’s different characters experience time differently with an emphasis on the contrast between men and women, just like Williams, Mansfield herself does not necessarily attribute one’s feeling about time to gender. Difficulty in verbal expressions and preference for life based on durational, or intuitive, time are only two of the characteristics which are, though seemingly feminine, shared by some male and female characters Mansfield creates. Issues concerning one’s age and appearance, which are usually expected in Western culture to be female preoccupations, are as critical for men as for women; Reginald has ‘a horror’ of getting fat, and ‘An Ideal Family’ reveals that ageing is an enemy of men as much as of the women in ‘Bliss’ and ‘Miss Brill’; the story starts as follows: ‘That evening for the first time in his life, as he pressed through the swing door and descended the three broad steps to the pavement, old Mr Neave felt he was too old for the spring’ (SKM 421). Getting fat, old, or other forms of ‘evolution’ are what human beings, male or female, experience over a certain period of time. Though natural, as we are not only ‘matter’ but also ‘memory’, change could be painful for both men and
women, as Mansfield shows in these stories.

Heterogeneous Self: Same People Behaving Differently

(1) Characters’ changes inside and outside the story

As I have shown, although particular issues such as the human experience of time
and language’s inability to capture one’s feelings are sometimes stereotypically
connected with femininity, those associations are not at work in Mansfield’s fiction.

Bergson writes on ‘one and many’ a number of times in different books, but the
following quotation from An Introduction to Metaphysics succinctly shows what has
to be taken into account in this part of my argument:

That personality has unity cannot be denied; but such an affirmation teaches
one nothing about the extraordinary nature of the particular unity presented
by personality. That our self is multiple I also agree, but then it must be
understood that it is a multiplicity which has nothing in common with any
other multiplicity. What is really important for philosophy is to know exactly
what unity, what multiplicity, and what reality superior both to abstract unity
and multiplicity the multiple unity of the self actually is. (IM 32-33)

Mansfield was also concerned with the relation between the unity and the
multiplicity of each of her characters, as is clear in this famous quotation from her
notebook:

True to oneself! which self? Which of my many—well, really, that's what it
looks like coming to—hundreds of selves. For what with complexes and
suppressions, and reactions and vibrations and reflections—there are
moments when I feel I am nothing but the small clerk of some hotel without a
proprietor who has all his work cut out to enter the names and hand the keys
to the wilful guests. (KMN II 204)

Although I have mainly discussed different characters focusing on their personality
in relation to their apprehension of time, their (lack of) affection for their children, and their ability or inability to express these with language, it is suggested in some stories by Mansfield that these factors are not rigidly set, and neither are the characters’ personalities; it is not so much who is quick and who is slow that is pivotal in the stories but who is quick in what situation. For example, the wife in ‘The Man without Temperament’ has a health problem, and is not very quick or active, but she is concerned with spatialized time. This happens when she and her husband go for a walk. At one point, she gets tired and suggests that he should go further while she waits for him and takes a rest to recover, although he is worried that she might mind being left. Though that is a kind suggestion from her, she is eager for him to return quickly, and has to ask him, ‘You won’t be gone long?’ and ‘How long will you be?’ (SKM 336). He promises that he will be back at a quarter past five and goes:

He turned away. Suddenly he was back again. ‘Look here, would you like my watch?’ And he dangled it before her.

‘Oh!’ She caught her breath. ‘Very, very much.’ And she clasped the watch, the watch, watch, the darling watch in her fingers. ‘Now go quickly.’ (SKM 336)

She is obviously happy to receive the watch, as seen in the narrator’s repetition of the word ‘watch’, but still has to ask him to ‘go quickly’ (so that he can come back quickly). When she welcomes her husband, who is hastily coming back and worrying about the time, she mentions the watch: "‘You’re late,’” she cried gaily. “‘You’re three minutes late. Here’s your watch, it’s been very good while you were away. . . .’” (SKM 338). Just like Maisie in Maata waiting for Maata at the station,
she was just hoping that he would return soon, which made the watch so important for her in this particular scene. As a person lives rhythmically, he or she is to some extent changeable.

Even Stanley Burnell can show his affection towards Kezia, which is usually hidden, in ‘The Little Girl’ when she is frightened by a nightmare. Earlier in the story, the girl, afraid of her father, sees the nice and friendly father of her neighbours playing with his children: ‘Then it was she decided there were different sorts of Fathers’ (SKM 123). Kezia, however, learns at the end of the story that her own father cares about her and can be lovable; he is usually frightening and big, but does not seem so big any more to the girl as the story ends. It is clever of the little Kezia to realize first of all that there is a multiplicity in the group of men who are called fathers (although this is of course not the way she puts it), but furthermore, she finds out that there is also a multiplicity in her father. The story shows a small part of the evolutionary process of Kezia and her father. His wife Linda, the reluctant mother in ‘Prelude’ and ‘At the Bay’, also changes dramatically in ‘The Doll’s House’ where she tells her daughter with a mother’s authority not to invite the Kelvey sisters to their house. Reacting to the necessity given under certain circumstances, a living person can behave flexibly, or heterogeneously, every moment, although each person has what Bergson calls ‘tendencies’.

(2) Lawrence’s rhythm, Fergusson’s rhythm, Mansfield’s rhythm

Lehan offers a detailed account of Bergsonian aspects of Lawrence’s novels such as *The Rainbow, Women in Love, and Lady Chatterley’s Lover*, in which the woman
'has lost touch with her inner realm of being and is renewed through sexual activity with a vitalized male' and '[life passes through the woman, who intuits such natural powers within her' (Lehan 1992: 319-20). He points out that Lawrence's descriptions of sexual acts are based on Bergsonian duration and argues:

There is universal, natural, organic time in Lawrence—a kind of Bergsonian realm that is tapped through the unconscious mind; and then there is a mechanical, historical, clock time, tapped through intellect and logical relationship. The two realms are separate—embody separate states of mind and lead to separate states of being. Like Bergson, Lawrence was never sanguine about where mechanical, historical time was taking us. (Lehan 1992: 323)

It does not necessarily seem that Bergson is concerned with 'where mechanical, historical time [is] taking us', but Lawrence is clearly negative about it, though in my opinion, Lawrence might not be so extremely predisposed towards intuition as Lehan suggests, nor for sex as Mansfield complains.³ Compared to Mansfield, for whom Bergson's rhythmic moves seem to mean the movements going back and forth between intuition and intellect, body and mind, that is, movements between the dynamic and the static, Lawrence has a tendency to regard rhythm as a series of constant, active moves, almost as if he treated intuition as 'the good boy' and intellect as 'the bad boy' to borrow Bertrand Russell's words. Mansfield's constructions of her Bergsonian thought are closer to what Fergusson does in painting; just as he paints dancing women in one picture and a seated woman in another, and a naked woman in one and a dressed woman in another,⁴ Mansfield also provides different frameworks for different characters, or characters in different situations, or more often than that she adds suggestively disparate qualities in one
single frame, just as Fergusson does in painting the feet of the woman about to move in *Rhythm* and the dynamics of the rose-shaped hat of a quietly seated woman in *The Rose Rhythm*. If the reader concentrates on one story, it is easier to find the unity of one gender or one character, and if reading different stories in comparison, the character’s multiplicity is clearer. Mansfield’s stance is clearly different from Lawrence’s since it seems important for her to focus on issues of sex and gender only when necessary, because, although these aspects are always included in our duration, they are not always ‘lived’ explicitly. As the rhythm of duration changes, the significance of the elements related to sex and gender is also fluid; they can be explicit for one moment but more implicit at another, though this does not mean they ever disappear. Some stories including ‘Bliss’ are explicitly concerned with sexuality, but others are not, and it is this separation, made emphatic because of the independence of each ‘story’ as opposed to a chapter, that represents the fact that the topic of sex or gender is essential from time to time but not always. Though Mansfield does ‘see sex in trees’ in ‘Bliss’, the point is that she knows that the degree of the significance of sex to our life changes every moment.

Antliff points out that although Fergusson seems to have had the same sitter for most of the series of paintings he painted around 1911 including *Rhythm*, ‘she is clearly presented as no woman in particular in the fiction of the paintings. By portraying her naked in abstract settings, he removes her from any modern-day or social context and suggests a mythological one’ (Antliff 1993: 83). He also suggests a parallel between Fergusson and Bergson in this respect because Bergson’s notion of duration, tied particularly to human consciousness, which he starts in *Time and Free Will*, develops
into a broader discussion in *Creative Evolution* on evolution and *élan vital* explaining the life of all the living species. This process can be found in Mansfield’s evolution as a writer; as I suggested in Chapters 4, it can be said that she started her career by creating particular characters such as a ‘German man’ and a ‘New Zealand woman’, but as she continues to write, she began to describe what Antliff calls ‘no woman’ who can be connected with men, as well as other women, and who keeps changing.

**Notes**

1 According to Alpers, ‘A Married Man’s Story’ was being written in 1921. ‘The Mark on the Wall’ was published in 1917.

2 Reginald’s claim is not persuasive to Saralyn R. Daly, who shows no sympathy towards him at all, and describes him as ‘a man hypersensitive to his own comfort’ (Daly 1994: 71).

3 Intellect and clock time are not always described as negative elements of human life in Lawrence’s fiction, as he often lets his characters, for example, complain intellectually rather than intuitively (because complaints are not ‘lived’ but ‘represented’) about such issues as class distinctions (though the topic again suggests that his fiction challenges intellectual categorizations). In this context, a detail that Oliver Mellors is a keen reader is suggestive.

4 Fergusson paints female nudes in a number of works, while when he paints a woman who is dressed, he often attracts attention to what the portrayed woman is wearing by giving the painting a title of clothes or accessories such as *The White Dress: Portrait of Jean* (1904), *The Hat with the Pink Scarf* (1907), *The Red Shawl* (1908), *The Blue Hat: Closerie des Lilas* (1909), *Blue Beads* (1910), and so on.
Chapter 6

How Many Selves?: Short Story, Biography, and Novel

In the last two chapters I introduced the ideas of those who criticize Mansfield, claiming that her fiction does not succeed in presenting any realistic representations of a particular group of people. Stead, whom I mentioned in Chapter 4, reads ‘Prelude’ and ‘At the Bay’ as ‘civilizing’ the colony, and Showalter, as I noted in Chapter 5, decisively states that Mansfield’s stories are ‘cautionary and punitive’ towards women. In both cases, I questioned such arguments which generalize Mansfield’s stories, by emphasizing that she provides various types of stories and that each story could be read as more ambiguous than these commentators suggest. The point is that the ambiguity of her stories often enables us to find links between what I have just called various ‘types’ of stories, or characters. It could be said that Mansfield’s work challenges any categorization by explicitly dealing with such issues as nationality, gender, class, and age in some stories and by being (at least seemingly) silent on them in others. Rigid categorization of her stories and characters is never possible, because she is concerned with the ‘hundreds of selves’ of each of her characters, as she writes in her notebook.

In this last chapter, I examine Mansfield’s delineation of the relationship between the unity and the multiplicity of self, which again forms parallels with Bergson’s idea of it, focusing on the significance of the choice of her genre, the short story.
Short Story and Novel

While Mansfield attracts critical attention as a successful short story writer and is mentioned ‘[e]verywhere in the world, whenever the short story is discussed’ (Allen 1981: 3), her inability to write longer fiction can be considered as a factor which posthumously gave her a lower status as a writer than some of her friends and colleagues, who wrote novels as well as short stories, achieved. As some such as Cherry Hankin argue, ‘As a genre, the short story has suffered from a certain critical neglect: it is the poor relation of poetry, on the one hand, and the novel, on the other’ (Hankin 1978: 465).

Although there is a wide-spread premise that novels are more significant as a form than short stories, I suggest that the short fiction genre deserves serious critical attention especially in modernist studies, since the short story, ‘the child of this [twentieth] century’ (Bowen 1950: 38), \(^1\) was dramatically developing at the turn of the century. Hanson, in her Short Stories and Short Fictions, 1880-1980, makes a clear distinction between traditional short ‘stories’ and modernist short ‘fictions’ in connection to the concept of the narrator: ‘The period 1880-1920 was marked by changes in the short story which profoundly affected the relation of the artist-as-narrator to the tale. The authority of the teller, usually a first-person “framing” narrator who guaranteed the authenticity of the tale, was questioned by many modernist writers’ (Hanson 1985: 1). Hanson mentions Joseph Conrad’s multiple and thus unauthoritative narrators in ‘Youth’ and Heart of Darkness, and Joyce’s and Mansfield’s indirect free style of narration, in which there is no boundary between a
third-person narrator’s voice and a character’s voice ‘so that the narrator appear[s] to merge into the text and to relinquish responsibility for it’ (Hanson 1985: 1). The modernist rejection of the ‘teller’ is linked with that of the ‘tale’. Without a teller who sums up an experience, a story does not have to, or cannot, be conclusive any more. Although Hanson does not particularly attribute this to Bergson, it corresponds to Bergson’s notion about the relation between the unity and the multiplicity of self.

Though it is true that Mansfield’s fiction is frequently analyzed in studies of short stories, short story theories cannot always explain her position as a short story writer, possibly because of lack of attention to the unity and the multiplicity of self. For example, the discussion that emphatically associates the short story genre with the background of writers from colonies might be irrelevant in dealing with some of her stories. The short story has been discussed in relation to the unstable condition of colonies, as opposed to the novel’s successful development in the history of British literature. Terry Eagleton, for instance, who distinguishes Irish fiction from the British novel in relation to the ‘bathetic gap between form and content’ evident in Irish fiction, taking *Ulysses* as ‘the supreme modern example’, argues that the short story is prominent in Irish fiction but the realist novel is not, because the realist novel is ‘the form of stability’ and ‘the home of totality’, and ‘[s]uch an Olympian standpoint is harder to come by in a divided society, where art, like the rest of intellectual life, is more directly bound to partisan ends’ (Eagleton 1996: 150).² Some of Mansfield’s short stories might be at least partially explained by this view, but as Chapter 4 argued, issues related to New Zealand as a colony are not always
significant even in her New Zealand stories.

Another issue about the short story which is not totally applicable to Mansfield is the idea that the short story is a genre which creates ‘unity’. Edgar Allan Poe’s famous essay on Nathaniel Hawthorne’s *Twice Told Tales*, which is still mentioned in a majority of today’s studies in the short story,\(^3\) emphasizes ‘the unity of effect or impression’ produced in a story which can be read ‘at one sitting’ (Poe 1965: 106). Dominic Head, on the other hand, challenges critics’ dependence on Poe’s idea of unity of effects in short stories by suggesting that it is *disunifying effects of ellipsis and ambiguity* (Head 1992: 2, Head’s emphasis) that should be noted in modernist short stories. Agreeing with this notion, I examine Mansfield’s short fiction form in terms of her expressions of fissured self as well as unified self.

Mansfield’s choice of the short fiction form was not unrelated to the decisions on the form made by her contemporaries who explored other literary genres. With their focus on the significance of time and on writing about what takes place during a very short period of time such as one day, other forms were becoming more like the short story. Mansfield once remarked that ‘The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock’ was ‘after all a short story’ (*CLKM* II 318). Clare Hanson and Andrew Gurr suggest (Hanson and Gurr 1981: 18) that *Mrs. Dalloway* and *Ulysses* can be likened to short stories in the sense that each of these novels deals with a time which is as short as one single day. A close relation between the form and the theme, especially of time, can be found in some modernist, and Bergsonian, works. Mansfield’s short fiction is a good example.
Mansfield’s stories, each of which can be read either independently or in relation to other stories as if it were part of a series or novel, can be closely linked with Bergson’s idea of simultaneity, which I mentioned in Chapter 4; he explains that we cannot simultaneously experience what is happening in different places, no matter how close to each other those places may be. Due to the restriction of perception available at a given moment (linked to the lack of length of each story) which is experienced by the reader, a short story can effectively suggest the fact that a certain kind of reality we can directly face at one moment is limited; if we wish to know about what is going on simultaneously in different places, we need to wait until we hear or read about it retrospectively, just as we read novels.

On one hand, Mansfield’s work could be associated with the sense of unity because some of her stories such as ‘Prelude’, ‘At the Bay’, and ‘The Doll’s House’ can be read as part of a series. Therefore, the readers of Mansfield’s fiction can borrow some information from other stories when they are curious about what is kept untold since each story does not seem to provide sufficient information. Heather Murray (Murray 1990: 124), for instance, points out that Mrs. Fairfield, Kezia’s grandmother in the Burnell stories, does not appear in ‘The Doll’s House’ after Linda accepts the role as a mother in ‘At the Bay’. Furthermore, even the stories which do not belong to any series might cause the reader to connect them, because of the similarities between stories in terms of their characters, scenes, and themes. On the other hand, it is often multiplicity rather than unity that dominates Mansfield’s short fiction. Even though it is possible to read Mansfield’s different stories in connection with one
another, they are still separate stories with individual titles. Even those stories in the same series do not have to be read continuously, since each of them is complete in itself. The ultimate difference between short stories and the chapters of a novel is that the readers can read short stories in any order, but they have to read a novel in a given order. Even if one reads the stories in the series as if they were different chapters of a novel, there is no definite order in which the stories should be read; judging from the characters’ age, for instance, the reader can decide to read the Burnell family stories in a chronological order of events, that is ‘Prelude’, ‘At the Bay’, and ‘The Doll’s House’, but any different order is possible.

Mansfield’s fiction, which enables a story to be read as an independent piece or a part of a larger unit, is appropriate when representing Bergsonian time which can be experienced intuitively and also spatialized intellectually. The flexibility of Mansfield’s short stories can be explained with regard to the relation between the form and the theme in the works of other writers influenced by Bergson. In ‘The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock’, the self of one single person, Prufrock, is fissured, while in novels such as Ulysses and Mrs. Dalloway, the links between different characters, and different scenes, are suggested. For The Waves, Woolf needs two forms, that of the main text and of the interludes, to describe both separated and united self, although the difference between the role of each form becomes unclear as the six characters’ selves, which are emphatically distinguished from each other at the beginning of the novel, eventually become unified even in the main text: ‘what I call “my life,” it is not one life that I look back upon; I am not one person; I am many people; I do not altogether know who I am—Jinny, Susan, Neville, Rhoda, or Louis;
or how to distinguish my life from theirs' (Woolf 1933: 196). It can be said that Mansfield managed to describe both types of self by making the most of the flexible form with which the reader can either create a frame around each story or remove it.

Although Mansfield wrote some ‘series’, it is notable that she explored the short story genre’s capability to represent multiplicity as well as unity. This becomes clear when comparing her stories to, for example, Joyce’s *Dubliners*, a collection which emphasizes the unity of different stories written for the same single purpose. In 1906, eight years before the publication of *Dubliners*, in a letter to the publisher Grant Richards, Joyce writes of this work:

> My intention was to write a chapter of the moral history of my country and I chose Dublin for the scene because that city seemed to me the centre of paralysis. I have tried to present it to the indifferent public under four of its aspects: childhood, adolescence, maturity and public life. The stories are arranged in this order. (Joyce 1966: 134)

By contrast, as this thesis has shown in earlier chapters, Mansfield uses the short fiction form to write about different people in different countries or situations even in her early stories published in *Rhythm* and the *Blue Review*. Even though the readers can read her stories as series just like *Dubliners*, in reading each story they can also experience (rather than ‘read about’) the particularity of a moment or a place or situation which they happen to see only because they read the particular story. As far as her explorations of unity and multiplicity are concerned, the effects of Mansfield’s tiny and accessible stories are more comparable to that of Joyce’s huge novels such as *Ulysses*, in which the different selves of different people are connected and a
single person’s self is divided, than to that of his stories in Dubliners which primarily focus on unity.

Perhaps due to the common misunderstanding of Bergson’s philosophy which I elaborated in Chapters 1 and 2, some focus on unity in representative modernist writers’ works and overlook their multiplicity. Kate Fullbrook, for instance, finds Mansfield different from other modernist writers in respect of her attitude towards the idea of a continuous self. She argues that while other modernist writers such as Joyce and Woolf accepted a unified self, Mansfield hesitated to believe in it: ‘And it is this hesitation, this honest uncertainty . . . that finally makes Katherine Mansfield, at times, one of the toughest and darkest of modernists’ (Fullbrook 1986: 17). It is true that Mansfield did not believe in one single self, as she writes in her notebook, but it is neither likely to be because of, as Fullbrook says, Mansfield’s hesitation in believing a unified self nor that this hesitation or negation means Mansfield’s attitude towards self is the opposite of that of her contemporaries. Joyce and Woolf also value multiplicity as well as unity.

Although Bergson’s notion of duration, with an emphasis on its indivisibility and unity, is attractive, it is equally important that he discusses the significance of divisions which make us recognize the nature of things or our experiences by cutting them into identifiable units. As Deleuze repeatedly reminds us, Bergson is keen to make appropriate differences between different types of arguments or concepts. Even when Bergson explains qualitative elements such as duration and rhythm, he admits they could be recognized as plural. For example, in Duration and
Simultaneity Bergson writes:

When we are seated on the bank of a river, the flowing of the water, the gliding of a boat or the flight of a bird, the ceaseless murmur in our life's deeps are for us three separate things or only one, as we choose. We can interiorize the whole, dealing with a single perception that carries along the three flows, mingled, in its course; or we can leave the first two outside and then divide our attention between the inner and the outer; or, better yet, we can do both at one and the same time, our attention uniting and yet differentiating the three flows, thanks to its singular privilege of being one and several. (DS 36)

It is possible to say that there is only one single duration in this situation because everything is connected within the duration of the person sitting on the bank of the river. However, we can also say that there are more ‘durations’. As Deleuze explains (Deleuze 1988: 76), here, Bergson is talking about a plurality of rhythms of duration, and each rhythm is itself a duration, so there are some different durations within one duration. Again in the next quotation, Bergson is concerned with ‘many’ rhythms: ‘In reality there is no one rhythm of duration; it is possible to imagine many different rhythms which, slower or faster, measure the degree of tension or relaxation of different kinds of consciousness, and thereby fix their respective places on the scale of being’ (MM 275).

This can be more easily understood when read in connection with the following passage from Mansfield, which is similar to but more accessible than Bergson’s argument:

It is true that Life is sometimes very swift and breathless, but not always. If we are to be truly alive there are large pauses in which we creep away into
our caves of contemplation. And then it is, in the silence, that Memory mounts his throne and judges all that is in our minds—appointing each his separate place, high or low, rejecting this, selecting that—putting this one to shine in the light and throwing that one into the darkness. . . . [W]e feel that until these things are judged and given each its appointed place in the whole scheme, they have no meaning in the world of art. (NN 6)

Mansfield sees this act of appointing each separate place affirmatively. Though modernists writers' fascination with what Bergson calls 'intuition' is more commonly acknowledged in literary criticism as I have mentioned in earlier chapters, Mansfield finds significance in judgement, selection, and separation as well as intuition and unity. To compare it with the last quotation from *Matter and Memory*, Bergson also suggests things become clearer when they are measured and given respective places. Although Bergson does emphasize the importance of duration, or heterogeneous unity of time, he does not underestimate separable time or the act of separation, or intellectual analysis as opposed to 'intuition'. Mansfield's choice of form could be linked to Bergson's explanation of different rhythms, for she seems to imply different rhythms in relation to different kinds of consciousness by writing short stories rather than novels, that is, by drawing distinctive outlines around each independent story and by painting them with colours which are distinguishable from each other.

**Different Techniques for Different Rhythms**

As I mentioned in Chapter 3, Mansfield often describes the way people have to come to a conclusion even when they do not think they have had enough time to make the right decision. For example, in the 'The Garden Party', Laura is hurried along and made to decide things suddenly, before she is ready for that. Workmen talk to her about where in the garden they should have the marquee for the garden party:
'Look here, miss, that's the place. Against those trees. Over there. That'll do fine.'
Against the karakas. Then the karaka-trees would be hidden. And they were so lovely, with their broad, gleaming leaves, and their clusters of yellow fruit. They were like trees you imagined growing on a desert island, proud, solitary, lifting their leaves and fruits to the sun in a kind of silent splendour. Must they be hidden by a marquee?
They must. Already the men had shouldered their staves and were making for the place. (SKM 488)

While Laura thinks about whether putting a marquee against the karaka trees is a good idea, admiring the trees' beauty, the workmen start to put it there, not allowing her to take time before she makes her own decision. Just as Mansfield writes that things do not happen in a reasonable order, 'first one and then another', things happen without waiting for us to make the decision according to our priority. Throughout the story, Laura's thoughts and feelings keep being interrupted, for example, by a telephone call from a friend and by the arrivals of the florist and the cake shop. Every time she is interrupted, the idea which preoccupied her consciousness before the interruption immediately goes away and is taken over by another idea. The feeling of hurry and restlessness also dominates a later part of the story when Laura visits the Scotts to condole with them over the death of a member of their family:

Laura bent her head and hurried on. She wished now she had put on a coat. How her frock shone! And the big hat with the velvet streamer—if only it was another hat! Were the people looking at her? They must be. It was a mistake to have come; she knew all along it was a mistake. Should she go back even now?
No, too late. This was the house. It must be. (SKM 497)
Mansfield depicts not only speed but also slowness in other stories, indicating the heterogeneity of duration as opposed to the homogeneity of clock time. In other words, she describes different rhythms of duration in different stories. For example, in contrast to stories such as ‘The Garden Party’ which show the way the characters need to hurry, ‘At the Bay’ describes time as if it passes more slowly in some parts of the story than in other parts.

‘At the Bay’, which is concerned with different rhythms of duration, is apparently different from almost all of her other works in terms of the length of the story and the number of the characters. Its opening is also distinctive. ‘At the Bay’ begins as follows: ‘Very early morning. The sun was not yet risen, and the whole of Crescent Bay was hidden under a white sea-mist. The big bush-covered hills at the back were smothered. You could not see where they ended and the paddocks and bungalows began’ (SKM 441). In writing this story, Mansfield did not adopt her famous in medias res opening. What is described here is the time before the story really begins; the time before the sun rises; the time before you could see where things begin and end. Mansfield chooses not to draw the reader into the story immediately as she does in other works, but instead, makes the reader wait for the characters to wake up and move. Indeed, it is not until Section II that main characters of the story appear. This slow opening is in striking contrast to the beginning of ‘Prelude’, which ‘At the Bay’ is the sequel to. In spite of the fact that ‘Prelude’, which is even longer than ‘At the Bay’, could have spared room for an introductory part, the reader is rushed into the story from the first sentence: ‘There was not an inch of room for Lottie and Kezia in the buggy. When Pat swung them on top of the luggage they
wobbled; the grandmother’s lap was full and Linda Burnell could not possibly have held a lump of a child on hers for any distance’ (SKU 223). The opening is not the only thing that makes ‘At the Bay’ distinctive from most other stories by Mansfield; the close is also crucial: ‘A cloud, small, serene, floated across the moon. In that moment of darkness the sea sounded deep, troubled. Then the cloud sailed away, and the sound of the sea was a vague murmur, as though it waked out of a dark dream. All was still’ (SKU 469).^5

A day appears to begin with the morning and end with night, but the division is artificial and arbitrary. So is Mansfield’s inclusion of the day’s events between morning and night. The in medias res beginning and the open ending (a rejection of both the beginning and the ending) in many of her short stories seem to show that a story is a fragment in the never-ending flow of duration. Although ‘At the Bay’ is different from more typical stories by Mansfield in the way in which it opens and ends, it also suggests the discrepancy between spatialized duration, describable in words in a ‘story’, and ‘real’ duration by showing that the ending of the story is the opening of something else. In other words, life goes on, unlike a story which begins and ends at a given point.

This ending, which might remind one of that of Ulysses, implies the link between the short story ‘At the Bay’ and modernist novels which deal with a short period of time. Although Mansfield concentrated on the short fiction form, some of her stories are comparable to other genres, and her stories suggest the flexibility of the form. Hanson and Gurr discuss an advantage of the short fiction form in relation to the
modernist interest in art (Hanson and Gurr 1981: 36). They argue that the novel is inevitably a temporal art, and different from the visual arts which are spatial, even though modernist literature was preoccupied with 'spatial form'. However, they suggest that a short story is closer to a painting because it takes place over a short period of time. While each of Mansfield’s stories has its own framework, it could also work as part of a larger unit. As the brevity of short stories makes the reader particularly conscious of their beginnings and endings, the outline bounding each story is more emphatic and more recognizable than that of a novel, and in this respect, is more like Fergusson’s strong outlines. After comparing Mansfield’s short stories with novels and paintings, it is perhaps reasonable to suggest that visual arts are more appropriate in depicting a plurality of duration, or many durations within one duration, and novels can more easily express the unity of duration, since they can pursue a flow of duration. If so, Mansfield’s short stories, which can be compared to both visual arts and novels, are closely linked with Bergsonian durations, which are one or many at will.

Short Story and Biography
Mansfield’s writings did not stop their creative evolution even after their author’s life ended. By this I mean, for one thing, that they have been read by different people carrying different ‘cones’ of the past, which makes it possible that her works are constantly read and interpreted from new perspectives, but I also refer to the process before that; that is, her writings, fictional or personal, posthumously appeared in books edited and re-edited by different individuals with different editorial purposes, which has affected the readers’ interpretations of Mansfield’s fiction.
Mansfield kept writing everything, from diary entries and drafts of stories and poems to shopping lists, in her numbers of notebooks, which she brought to her new home every time she had to move in search of better climate for her health, and finally the number of such notebooks amounted to 53. After her death Murry edited and published her notebooks in many different compilations which are notorious because of his numerous alterations and the way in which he selected passages in an attempt to create an ideal image of the writer. In spite of the original mass of writing on everything, Murry re-arranged it and published books such as *Journal of Katherine Mansfield* (1927) and *The Scrapbook of Katherine Mansfield* (1939), which give the impression that Mansfield kept a journal and a scrapbook. The same thing can be said about other works edited by Murry such as *The Letters of Katherine Mansfield* (1928) and two collections of her hitherto unpublished stories, *The Dove's Nest and Other Stories* (1923) and *Something Childish and Other Stories* (1924) in which Murry often altered the original punctuation and paragraphing.

Recent years have seen the publications of more reliable editions of Mansfield's personal writing. *The Collected Letters of Katherine Mansfield* (vol. 1, 1984, vol. 2, 1987, vol. 3, 1993, vol. 4, 1996) edited by O'Sullivan and Scott are, with four of the projected five already published, to be completed shortly. In 1997 *The Katherine Mansfield Notebooks* edited by Scott appeared, reproducing the original notebooks with notes, and enabling a wide audience to read what was previously either unavailable in a book form or different from the original.
While many praise the 1997 publication of *The Katherine Mansfield Notebooks* edited by Scott (unlike previous publications of some of Mansfield’s writing from her notebooks by Murry), Anna Jackson questions the authority of this edition, as it has lost the ‘moment of writing’ of the individual entries in Mansfield’s original notebooks and papers. Although I appreciate Scott’s work which has made much of Mansfield’s unpublished writing available to a larger audience, having seen some of her manuscripts in the Alexander Turnbull Library in Wellington, I agree with Jackson on the point that there is a huge difference between manuscripts, which are many separate notebooks and pieces of paper, and the *Notebooks*, which contain all the materials that have survived coincidentally, put in order in two volumes. Although inevitable, the act of editing or reading different pieces in an order creates fictional ‘homogeneity’ which ignores the flow of duration.

The new publications of Mansfield’s private writing have, it seems, also stimulated a contemporary writer of fiction as well as literary criticism, Janice Kulyk Keefer. Her recently published novel about Mansfield and her later readers entitled *Thieves* touches on this point by creating a fictional letter from Garnet Trowell to Mansfield sent after they had been separated. A woman who has stolen the letter insists in her amateur paper she wishes to publish that it was Trowell not Mansfield who was deeply hurt by his lover in this relationship, which opposes what biographers and critics have assumed to be the case. The novel in its entertaining way suggests the possibility that only one letter can change the whole story of the early (and perhaps the rest of the) life of Mansfield. In this sense the novel can be read as another reaction to the type of criticism of Mansfield’s fiction which depends too much on
her personal writing, and Kulyk Keefer's irony works effectively because she has
chosen the form of fiction rather than literary criticism; it is ironically shown that,
although Mansfield's biographies are supposed to be non-fiction, they could be
almost as fictional as this 'novel' by Kulyk Keefer. Although the publication of the
complete edition of Mansfield's notebooks and that of her letters, four of five
volumes of which have been published, may give one the impression that every piece
of Mansfield's writing is finally available, that is not the case and never will be.

Although it is not at all unusual that biographies or autobiographies are referred to in
a critical study of a writer, it could be said that biographical writings about Mansfield
(including biographies written by scholars, and notebooks and letters by Mansfield
herself) have attracted considerable attention. With the long-held view of Hankin
that Mansfield 'belongs in a long line of confessional writers stretching from
Rousseau to Proust' (Hankin 1983: ix), many have attempted to see Mansfield's life
through her stories. This is not simply because of Mansfield's rather unconventional
personality and life but also because of the nature of her fiction. As the brevity of
each individual story by Mansfield makes the reader curious about many untold
details (the characters' future, for instance), biographies of her as well as different
stories by her have often been used to compensate for the lack of information within
one single story. In other words, this way of reading has connected different short
stories by Mansfield (or/and different scenes in her actual life) to create one single
'biography' of one single person, Katherine Mansfield. For example, affectionate
grandmothers who appear in different stories such as the Burnell stories are read as
Mansfield's reproduction of her own grandmother (Tomalin 1988: 31), while strict
fathers such as Stanley Burnell are that of her father (Dunbar 1997: 28, 138). As I suggested in earlier chapters, the readers’ sight is restricted within the ‘frame’ of each of Mansfield’s stories; that is, the characters’ or the reader’s inability to face simultaneously all the different phases of life. This can be linked to Bergson’s notion of duration, and the lack of information in each story should be recognized as a successful representation of the Bergsonian theory, rather than as a fatal defect.

From this point of view, I argue that biographical aspects can be used not only to fill in the mysterious blanks in a story (or between stories) to create ‘homogeneity’ but also as evidence of the ‘heterogeneity’ of reality that Mansfield has shown. Although the reader’s curiosity encourages one to look for more information about what is not presented in stories, it is important to pay attention to Mansfield’s use of frames which effectively limits our sight for the past and the future, just as in reality in which the past is no longer lived or acted but represented, and the future is unforeseeable. Mansfield’s short stories let us experience the present moment (represented by the tip of the cone) with a special focus.

Mansfield’s method of letting her audience experience the present is explained well in connection with the letter to Richard Murry I quoted earlier in which she writes about the writing process of ‘Miss Brill’; she writes that after she finished writing the story, she ‘read it aloud—numbers of times—just as one would play over a musical composition’ (CLKM IV 165, Mansfield’s emphasis). Her analogy between her story and a musical composition and the fact that she reads the story aloud might suggest that the short length of her fiction is one of the results of its musicality, ‘rhythm’ in a literal sense; she might be trying to write something like a drama the performance of
which the audience can see, to borrow Poe's words, 'at one sitting', or to use more Bergsonian expressions, Mansfield seems to try to enable her readers to experience the duration of the story, rather than to 'represent' and 'spatialize' it.

Self and Writing

In 1927, Woolf published an essay entitled 'A Terribly Sensitive Mind' in New York Herald Tribune (published in Granite and Rainbow in 1958). In this essay on Journal of Katherine Mansfield edited and published by Murry in the same year, she writes that the interesting thing about Mansfield's diary is 'the spectacle of a mind—a terribly sensitive mind—receiving one after another the haphazard impressions of eight years of life' (Woolf 1958: 73). What is notable in the essay is that Woolf attracts particular attention to the fact that Mansfield's mind 'divide[s] into two and talk[s] to itself. Katherine Mansfield about Katherine Mansfield' (Woolf 1958: 73). The chapter concludes by examining how Mansfield dealt with 'self' by means of writing in order to understand more fully the significance of the short fiction form comparable to, and yet distinguished from, novel and biography.

Woolf, who recognizes Mansfield's divided selves in her journal, also notices that Mansfield's writing self is 'a queer self; sometimes nothing would induce it to write' (Woolf 1958: 74). She quotes from a journal entry of 13 July 1921: 'There is so much to do and I do so little. Life would be almost perfect here if only when I was pretending to work I always was working. Look at the stories that wait and wait just at the threshold' (Woolf 1958: 74, KMN II 280, Mansfield's emphasis). Mansfield's description of her own unproductive time reminds one of Rhoda's struggle to get out
of the bed when she continues to think, 'I must wake up' in *Maata*, and even more of
the Married Man 'not working' though at the desk. In both situations, Mansfield
spends many sentences describing what could be called 'nothingness' if spatializing
duration, and one self notices and suggests something must be done, but the other
does not respond in the spatialized sense. As often happens to Mansfield's artist
characters, including 'artists' such as Bertha Young, the Married Man struggles to
find the right expression of what is in his mind:

You know those stories of little children who are suckled by wolves and
accepted by the tribe, and how for ever after they move freely among their
fleat grey brothers? Something like that has happened to me. But wait—that
about the wolves won't do. Curious! Before I wrote it down, while it was
still in my head, I was delighted with it. It seemed to express, and more, to
suggest, just what I wanted to say. But written, I can smell the falseness
immediately .... (*SKM* 480-81)

Just as Mansfield's self speaks to her other self in the journal entry that Woolf
mentions, the Married Man's mind talks to his second self, concerned with the choice
of words. His self, who has to stop the other self who has written the sentences
which 'smell' with 'falseness', eloquently shows the tension between ever-flowing
duration and the human necessity of spatializing it by means of language, when he
explains the difficulty of expressing what seemed to work before it was written,
'while it was still in the head'. Although it sounds ironic and negative when he says
that he wishes to write 'the plain truth, as only a liar can tell it' (*SKM* 481), it is true
that to write simply, or to write at all, inevitably leads to altering the quality of what
is real when it is in the head; to some extent, to write is to lie. The Married Man
seems to have no problem with writing 'the plain truth, as only a liar can tell it',

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judging from the way he tries to associate his unhappy marriage of the present
simply with his past memory about how his mother died. As the ambiguity of the
title suggests, the story is a story told by the Married Man, his 'lie'. Although the
Married Man might be described as an unreliable liar, there is truth in what he says
about writing or language.

The 'falseness' seen in the Married Man’s attempt to attribute his present state to his
past experience is comparable with that of the scientific explanation of the continuity
of different colours discussed by Bergson; even if scientists and the Married Man
present some truth, we cannot actually see it with our own eye. His autobiography,
just like Raoul Duquette’s in 'Je ne parle pas français', seems to suggest Mansfield’s
'rage for confession, autobiography' expressed in the following quotation from her
notebook:

Nevertheless, there are signs that we are intent as never before on trying to
puzzle out, to live by, our own particular self. Der mensch muss frei sein—
free, disentangled, single. Is it not possible that the rage for confession,
autobiography, especially for memories of earliest childhood is explained by
our persistent yet mysterious belief in a self which is continuous and
permanent, which, untouched by all we acquire and all we shed, pushes a
green spear through the leaves and through the mould, thrusts a sealed bud
through years of darkness until, one day, the light discovers it and shakes the
flower free and—are alive—we are flowering for our moment upon the earth.
This is the moment which, after all, we live for, the moment of direct feeling
when we are most ourselves and least personal. (KMN II 204)

This passage follows immediately the earlier one I have quoted in which Mansfield
claims that she has 'hundreds of selves'. To translate this into Bergsonian language,
Mansfield values the tip of the cone continuing to proceed freely and unforeseeably
without stopping, that is, the present 'active' self, not the rest of the cone of
'represented' selves. Mansfield sounds more positive than Bergson when stating
'Der mensch muss frei sein' and seems to wish to 'believe' that childhood memories
do not affect one's later life, but Bergson is not too different from her, because he
also emphasizes the unforeseeability of the future, as well as explaining the
relationship between one's memory of the past and its consequences, just as Freud
does. While Bergson regards the numeric explanation of colours as one scientific, or
'convenient', way to understand reality, he is concerned with the fact that different
colours actually look different rather than continuous, and we see outlines between
them. In this sense, Mansfield's suggestion here is clear; although one's past self and
present self might be connected, we do not necessarily feel them as one, as the
present self is alive and visible, while the past self (as a child, for instance) can only
be represented, or remembered. This 'our own particular self' could be read as the
self with a body at the 'moment of direct feeling', or what Bergson calls 'my body',
mentioned in Chapter 3, that is 'one of [all the images in the universe] which is
distinct from all the others, in that I do not know it only from without by perceptions,
but from within by affections' (MM 1, Bergson's emphasis). Like Bergson,
Mansfield finds the individuality of each self highlighted by distinguishable outlines
and colours. Her way of showing the Married Man's unified and yet separated self is
subtle and complex, as she lets the character himself say that his different selves at
different stages of his life are related to each other, but suggests that they are
necessarily not. The Married Man in his own far-fetched way connects the different
events and situations at various stages of his life and sees them only as homogeneous,
instead of noticing each individual 'colour'.
It is of course possible and appropriate to try to find the link between Mansfield's writings and her life, and between one story and another, but this method of reading approaches only one of the two essential factors of reality that both Bergson and Mansfield were concerned with all the time; reality can be seen as multiplicity as well as unity. The act of writing, which involves spatialization, allows the writer and the reader to face only one of the 'hundreds of selves' at a time, but this is not necessarily to be seen as a disadvantage. On the contrary it is this limitation of sight, created by the act of writing, that Mansfield effectively uses with the choice of the short story genre in reproducing reality through which we see distinct colours and outlines of individuality. In short, it is what I call the 'limitation' of sight that makes the sight more vivid to the reader/seer.

Notes

1 The short story is a slightly older genre, although Bowen stresses that it developed significantly in the twentieth century. The 1880s and 1890s are most commonly mentioned in connection to the birth of modern short story. See Head 1992: 1 and 206 (note 1).

2 See also O'Connor 1963, The Lonely Voice and Bardolph, ed. 2001, Telling Stories, for example.


4 The following sentences are some of the examples of the in medias res openings to Mansfield’s works:
Certainly Sabina did not find life slow. (‘At “Lehmann’s”’, SKM 37)

And then, after six years, she saw him again. (‘A Dill Pickle’, SKM 271)

The week after was one of the busiest weeks of their lives. (‘The Daughters of the Late Colonel’, SKM 386)

Exactly when the ball began Leila would have found it hard to say. (‘Her First Ball’, SKM 426)

And after all the weather was ideal. They could not have had a more perfect day for a garden party if they had ordered it. (‘The Garden Party’, SKM 487)

5 Suzanne Ferguson reports on how her students read ‘At the Bay’: ‘The long set piece with which it opens . . . seems to most of my student readers very novelistic, and, for a short story, “excessive”’ (Ferguson 2003: 30).

6 Mansfield’s handwriting is very difficult to read. Although Murry made numerous alterations to her writing even when unnecessary, some of the differences between her original texts and his versions could be results of his failure to decipher what is written. To S. S. Kotelianski, Mansfield has to write: ‘I would write you a long letter but I am afraid you cannot read my handwriting’ (CLKM I 163). O’Sullivan, who edits Mansfield’s letters with Scott, writes: ‘Although one may attain a working familiarity with her hand, one can never assume final consistency in the shaping of her letters, the manner of contractions, or the outcome of recurrent puzzles’ (CLKM I xxiv).

7 According to The Katherine Mansfield Notebooks there is a sentence (‘But that is surely not too hard?’) between the sentences ‘Life would be almost perfect . . . I always was working’ and ‘Look at the stories that wait and wait just at the threshold’, which is omitted in Woolf’s quotation here.
Conclusion

Bergson and Mansfield

In writing this thesis, instead of focusing strictly on the topic allocated to each chapter, I often had to mention different topics within a single chapter. For example, it seemed impossible for me to write my chapter on nationality without also mentioning the significance of the short fiction genre, although I had an independent chapter on genre. This is because these different factors of Mansfield’s writing are strongly correlated just as in the evolutionary movement presupposed by Bergson; according to him, the evolutionary process does not take a single direction but ‘proceeds rather like a shell, which suddenly burst into fragments, which fragments, being themselves shells, burst in their turn into fragments destined to burst again, and so on for a time incommensurably long’ (CE 103). It seemed as if one aspect of Mansfield’s work burst into fragments which burst into further fragments, and they all correlated.

On 16 November 1919, Mansfield writes, ‘I can’t imagine how after the war these men can pick up the old threads as though it had never been’, but she says she will do so without writing explicitly about the war: ‘I might write about a boy eating strawberries or a woman combing her hair on a windy morning, and that is the only way I can ever mention [‘deserts of vast eternity’]. But they must be there. Nothing less will do’ (CLKM III 97-98). This passage offers a crucial hint about the
relationship between the political and the non-political, between the personal and the impersonal, between the specific and the unspecific, and unity and multiplicity in Mansfield’s writing that the thesis has been concerned with in connection with Bergson’s work. As I have shown, Mansfield might describe individuals affected by a particular time or a particular nation which they inhabit, but does so by depicting the changing rhythms in their consciousnesses rather than explicitly mentioning these exterior factors surrounding them.

While Mansfield is the only New Zealand writer who is mentioned in Harold Bloom’s list of the Western Canon (despite Bloom’s infamous preference for male authors), she seems to be considered as a rather minor modernist. My analysis of Bergsonian aspects of her stories reassesses Mansfield with a particular stress on the importance, not the drawback, of the lack of direct mention of political issues in her stories, which has not been addressed seriously enough by other methods of criticism.

In this respect, my study might seem to have something in common with *Radical Mansfield* by Dunbar, which attempts to show ‘radical’ aspects of Mansfield’s fiction, opposing the accepted view that her stories are lyrical and peaceful, and have little to do with the social and political problems of her time. Dunbar writes: ‘two aspects of Mansfield’s writing, the lyrical and the subversive, are in some of the best-known stories presented in a layered or contrapuntal manner, with the surface lyricism serving as a cloak for more subversive themes and attitudes’ (Dunbar 1997: ix). Although I entirely agree that it is important to note that political (but not necessarily radical) aspects of Mansfield’s early and later stories should not be overlooked, I find
it problematic to categorize her stories as ‘radical’ and see the ‘lyrical’ aspect of her work as superficial, since the silence on big, political issues in some of her stories is equally vital, considered from the Bergsonian perspective. I go further and draw attention to the significance of the fact that many of Mansfield’s stories seem detached from social, political, or cultural issues.

It is notable that some of her early stories can easily be linked to issues related to particular social categories, such as gender and the countries the characters belong to, whereas many of her later stories reveal that such categories are not always at work in the consciousness of each character which never stops its vigorous, unpredictable changes. Although the fact that Mansfield and her characters do not always seem clearly concerned with political issues might often have prevented critics from valuing her work, it should be acknowledged that the limitation of sight, or the intentional rejection of the idea of perfect vision given to each individual each moment, is positively required, with the effective use of the short fiction form, in Mansfield’s stories for her own representations of Bergson’s notion of intuition and intellect. In this respect, there is not much difference between Mansfield’s early and late stories. I agree with New, suggesting that her so-called early satirical stories and her later stories ‘do not radically differ in theme’ but ‘differ markedly in formal technique’ (New 1987: 130).

Another thing I wished to question in this thesis was how critics had consulted Mansfield’s personal writings. As I emphasized, one should not forget that the extant letters and notebooks have coincidentally survived and many are lost. It seems that
the influence of Chekhov on Mansfield attracts much critical attention because it is
evident from her letters and diaries that she admires his work, while the impact of
Bergson on her has unsurprisingly not been much discussed, as the philosopher is
never overtly mentioned in her extant writings.¹

The lack of studies of Bergson’s influence on such writers as Mansfield, Lawrence,
and Huxley is due to the fact that Bergson’s work is often mentioned in literary
criticism without the critic offering a careful reading of his texts. Misunderstanding
of Bergson started, as I showed, in his lifetime. Frederick Burwick and Paul
Douglass argue that Bergson became ‘the scapegoat’ during the unstable period in
the early twentieth century:

As this reinterpretation [of the vitalist tradition of the West which had been
powerful at the turn of the century] proceeded, it built inexorably toward a
crisis. That crisis, it would appear, centered on Bergson. . . . It was a
period of rant and rhetoric, during which Bergson was called a phony and a
fake by many who had adopted aspects of his philosophical method—like
Maritain, Russell, Jung, and Santayana. . . . Clearly, Santayana himself
worked the bellows. He helped to fire a new mode of Western thought—
one which required sacrificial figures. Bergson became the scapegoat . . .
(Burwick and Douglass 1992: 2)

Although it does not matter, and rather it is interesting (though unfortunate for
Bergson personally), that some writers in the early twentieth century misrepresented
Bergson’s philosophy in their own works, which as a result contributed to literary
Modernism, it is problematic that many literary critics of the early twenty-first
century, who take it for granted that Bergson rejected the significance of clock time,
have yet to notice the gap between the works by so-called ‘Bergsonian’ writers such
as Murry and the theories by Bergson. John Mullarkey says in the introduction to

*The New Bergson* that Bergson’s concepts can be interpreted in various ways but
‘this is not to argue for relativism or that one reading of Bergson is as good as
another’:

Though we might agree with [Bergson’s] own view that each philosophy
involves only one insight at its origin, that is not also to say that one cannot
see certain patterns in the repeated formulations of that philosophical idea.
Bergsonism is not a chaotic mess; just as his own philosophy replaces the
idea of an absolute and original disorder with a theory of different types of
order, so there are varieties of order that are recognisably Bergsonian. It is
these patterns or orders one thinks of when referring to ‘his philosophy’.
(Mullarkey 1999: 4)

As Mullarkey maintains, it is important to recognize what ‘Bergson’s philosophy’ is
and what it is not, even though different interpretations may be acceptable, especially
when represented in literature or art, rather than in a philosophical study. By relating
Mansfield to Bergson, I emphasize that both time (which Bergson calls ‘duration’)
and space (which he calls ‘spatialized time’) are significant for Bergson, and for
modernist writers, contrary to what critics of Bergson and Modernism suggest.

As Murry and Fergusson were aware, the Bergsonian idea of rhythm can be
interpreted in various ways, and was applied to various kinds of modernist arts such
as the Russian Ballet, Fauvist paintings, Imagist poems, and so on. This widespread
interest in Bergson united different arts to form the great movement of Modernism.
When we think of this relationship among different art forms, the position of
Mansfield’s short fiction is significant. It can be seen flexibly as either one form or
another, that is to say, either short fiction or novel, and either literature or paintings,
depending on whether or not the reader reads one story in connection with another.

In spite of the fact that Mansfield concentrated on short fiction, the number of the art forms Mansfield attempted to explore can also be seen as one or many.

Notes

¹ Storm Jameson argues that Chekhov is influenced by Bergson in an article published in *Egoist* in March 1914, ‘[Chekhov’s] drama stands with the philosophy of Bergson, with the whole movement of the scattered Art Theatres of Europe, as a revolt against the determinate philosophy that weakened even the drama of Ibsen, and the promise of as noble a dramatic rhythm as the world has known’ (Jameson 1981: 122).
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