International migration is expanding rapidly, and the experience of aging is changing with it. The Spanish sociologist Manuel Castells describes our society as dominated by a ‘space of flows’ arising from the rapid interchange of information and ideas through new information systems; but the movement of people throughout what Castells calls ‘the space of places’ is an equally striking characteristic of life in modern societies (Castells 1996, 409-15). In 1960, an estimated 77 million people emigrated; by 2010, the number of migrants reached 214 million (OECD 2012b, 16). Overwhelmingly, these are people of working age; and nearly two thirds live in what the United Nations (UN) defines as the developed nations (UN 2010).

Migration and population aging are tightly bound together, with both developments having their origins in deeper processes of social and economic change, including such well-known features of modernity as economic globalisation, increasing material aspirations, the erosion of tradition and the transformation of family structures. From a policy perspective, labour migration represents an important way of replacing aging retirees as they leave the workforce, as well as ensuring a steady supply of fresh labour more generally. The right of free movement of labour was one of the founding objectives of the European Union, though at no stage has labour migration within the EU matched the levels of worker mobility found in North America. And in turn, the reality of population ageing and growing migration are influencing the course of social and economic development on a global basis, as well as occupying a central place in contemporary policy concerns. These have become contentious issues, as governments seek to balance economic requirements for immigrant labour against electoral demands for stronger border restrictions.

This chapter reviews recent research on migration and workforce aging, and examines the relationship between policy and practice in this contested area. It starts by looking at the general picture of migration and age. Although migrants are on average older than the rest of the world’s population, they tend to be younger than the average population of the country they are entering.
This reflects both the magnet effect of earnings in the richer nations, which tend to show high levels of population aging, and the consequences of policies designed to attract labour from other countries. In societies with high levels of emigration, by contrast, the effect of net migration is usually to create a bimodal population distribution, with large proportions of the young and the elderly, and governments sometimes seek to attract ‘diasporic’ returners. These patterns are well known, and will be summarised briefly. The rest of the chapter looks at older migrants, some of whom have ‘aged in place’ after migrating in their youth, while others have emigrated in later life. This is a less well-known story, and the chapter therefore pays considerable attention to this under-researched but important dimension of migration and workforce aging. It concludes with a few comments on aspects of policy towards older migrants.

**Demography and migration**

Workforce aging is common to all the advanced economies. Declining fertility rates and rising life expectancy rates are preoccupying academics, policymakers and managers across the globe. The ‘war for talent’ (surely a misleading phrase) has already led to notable increases in workforce participation rates. The proportion of women in the workforce has grown steadily, as has the proportion of older adults who are in work. In Australia, the share of all 55 to 64 year-olds who were in the workforce rose from 48% in 2000 to 56% a mere seven years later (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2007). In the USA, meanwhile, the number of over-65s in the workforce more than doubled between 1977 and 2007, a trend predicted to continue as the baby boomers join this group (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2008). Governments in a number of countries are extending the age of retirement; indeed, it is arguable whether, under current European employment law, it is possible in most occupations to stipulate a formal age of retirement. Again, this policy trend mirrors social trends that were already well-established, with a growing number of people in advanced countries electing to work beyond the statutory retirement age. And of course migration policy has been utilised, as one way of balancing labour supply with population ageing.

As a result, most of the advanced economies expect severe labour shortages, particularly of the highly-skilled. While governments have a range of policies to deal with labour shortages, including skills training and expanding employment rates, the selective encouragement of labour immigration has long been seen as a way of solving the most pressing problems. Migration can also result from other policy decisions, including most importantly humanitarian policies on the reunification of families or the acceptance of refugees. In some countries, such as Canada, Australia and the USA, immigration has historically provided the bulk of population growth, and continues to do so today. Labour mobility was, of course, one of the founding principles of the European Union, and remains an important policy goal, albeit a controversial one in many of the member states. At present, the tendency for people to move to another EU country or within their own country remains much lower than in the USA, and net immigration rates within the EU remain lower than in the USA (Gáková and Dijkstra, 2008). Nevertheless, in more recent years, immigration has also contributed more to population growth than the excess of births over deaths in a number of European countries, including Germany and – until the economic crisis of 2008 – Ireland (Coleman 2008, 454-5).
Most migrants are of prime working age. From the perspective of the receiving societies, this is primarily a question of demand. Income incentives are highest for skilled workers with experience in their profession and of prime working age; although even unskilled wages can be attractive for migrants from poor countries, most of those seeking unskilled work will be well below retirement age. As well as market factors, many governments also seek to attract immigrants who will make a sustained economic contribution. In many countries, immigration regulations are designed to ensure that immigrants do not become a drain on resources but possess the skills and abilities to contribute to the labour force. Many receiving nations have an age threshold for new immigrants, particularly if the country involved provides an age-related state pension. In Australia, for example, the upper age limit for skilled worker applicants stands at 50, while Canada’s points-based system currently awards 10 points to skilled applicants aged 21-49, and a diminishing number for the over-50s, reaching zero for applicants aged 54 and over. Of course, such countries make separate provisions for family members to move, but in general policies tend more or less deliberately to promote immigration by the highly skilled and highly qualified who are not approaching retirement. As a result, much low-skill migration occurs between countries with relatively open borders, as within the EU or in several African regions (Hatton and Williamson, 2003, 478). Market demand and policy do not always work hand-in-hand; in respect of skills, there is often a high demand for young unqualified workers, while immigration policies frequently seek to restrict immigration to workers with scarce skills; however, both function in such a way as to concentrate migration among those of prime working age.

This pattern is also a matter of supply. The Gallup World Survey between 2008-2010 asked respondents about their interest in emigrating. Overall, almost one person in four of those aged 15-24 said that they would like to emigrate if they could, along with 15% of the 25-44 age group; by contrast, 9% of 45-64 year olds wished to migrate, and only 5% of the over-65s (OECD 2012b, 34). One study of 21 African countries found that emigration rates were particularly high in those nations with a high share of population aged 15-29, particularly if opportunities for the relatively well-educated are poor (Hatton and Williamson, 2003, 475-7).

This is not a new development. Most migrants, throughout modern history, have been relatively young adults, with males tending to outnumber females (Hatton and Williamson 1998, 39-42). In nineteenth century Ireland, contemporaries widely believed that the younger and more competent men were most likely to emigrate (O’Rourke, 1992, 324-5). One study suggests that even before the crisis of the 1840s, the Irish-born population in Britain were far more likely to be skilled artisans and males aged in their twenties than were those who remained at home; they also had noticeably higher literacy rates (Nicholas and Shergold, 1987, 162-7).

Broadly, this skewed pattern remains equally clear in modern times. The most significant change is an increasing propensity for young women to migrate; although they are still slightly outnumbered by their male counterparts at a global level, in some countries women are now a majority of the immigrant population, while in others they predominate among the emigrant population. By 2005, internationally the proportion of women and girls among international migrants stood at nearly 50%, and were a slight majority of immigrants into European countries (UN Population Division 2006, 2-5). In the USA, by contrast, in 2011 men accounted for 59.0% of the foreign-born labour force, compared with 52.3% of native-born workers. By age, the share of 25-54-year olds in the foreign-born labour force reached 75.4%, compared with 64.5% for their native-born counterparts.
(US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012). Moreover, because migrants are more likely to be of childbearing age than the host population, they frequently tend towards larger family sizes. In contemporary Germany, for example, foreigners are on average aged 39, while people of immigrant background have an average age of 35, while those of non-immigrant background are on average aged 46 (Baykara-Krumme 2012, 9). Similar patterns can be seen elsewhere (eg Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2008, 611-12).

While most migrants still tend to be better qualified than the populations they leave behind, human capital levels vary enormously. While demand may be highest for scarce skills, many receiving countries also find it difficult to fill poorly-paid low-skill jobs, such as cleaning (Wills, Datta, Evans, Herbert, May and McIlwaine, 2009). And while migrants may on average possess better qualifications than their compatriots, they do not necessarily find themselves more skilled than the populations they have joined. Data from the Adult Literacy and Life Skills Survey (ALLS), conducted between 2002 and 2007 in eight countries, suggest that in most nations immigrants on average have lower levels of literacy, numeracy and problem-solving skills than the native-born. In New Zealand and Norway, established immigrants outperformed more recent arrivals; but in Australia, Canada, Switzerland and the USA, recent immigrants outperformed established immigrants on most of the scores (Statistics Canada 2011, 55-6). Even where immigrants possess educational or vocational credentials, a number of studies have shown that they may not be recognised by employers and professional associations in receiving countries, in spite of a rather large number of pilot studies and formal policy statements favouring such recognition (Andersson, Fejes and Ahn, 2004; Schugurensky and Slade, 2008). Even following decades of efforts by the European Commission and its agencies, migrants within the EU still often face considerable barriers to recognition of their credentials (Brockmann, Clarke and Winch, 2009).

Much migration is short term, and has few, if any, lasting effects on the age structure of the population. In some cases – for example, international movement by students – it is designed to be short term, and indeed is widely understood to pose quite different issues. Throughout the 2000s in Britain, for example, short term migration – defined as lasting between one and twelve months - remained relatively constant, and was slightly below the number of short term emigrants who left the country during the same period. Most stayed for one to two months; for the earlier years of the decade, the largest group came from Poland, which formally joined the EU in 2004; by the end of the decade, the largest single group came from the USA. While the in-migrants were relatively young, and evenly divided between the genders, the out-migrants were more likely to be male, and were disproportionately bunched around older adults and young adults (Office for National Statistics, 2012). So these groups differ slightly from longer term migrants, and often move in order to study, or to undertake short periods of work – perhaps combined with the hope of improving one’s language skills. While some may decide to stay on, they are usually a small proportion of the total, so that their influence on population structures is inconsiderable.

More long term migration, by contrast, almost invariably impacts on the age structure of the population. In general, immigration tends to reduce the overall age structure of the population while emigration raises it. Typically, immigrants are relatively young adults, who not only swell the population in these age groups but are also likely to form families and have children. Characteristically, first generation young labour migrants who settle and raise children typically have
larger family sizes than the adopted country population, though smaller than among their peers in their country of origin (Warnes, Friedrich, Kellaher and Torres 2004, 316). The exceptions are relatively few. While it is common for immigrants to be joined by their families, it is rare for these to include older people, even if they might otherwise have been cared for by the young people who have left. And while some countries attract retiree settlers, and therefore experience accelerated population ageing as a result, the effects tend to be comparatively minor (Coleman 2008, 467).

For countries with an aging population, migration offers an obvious potential source of replacements. However, the fall in fertility rates is so steep in many countries that migrants are unlikely to compensate fully in the short to medium term, while in the long term immigrants will also get older (Banerjee and Robson, 2007, 141-2; Coleman, 2008, 459). According to one UN report, the European Union would have required 1.6 million immigrants every year up to 2050 simply to maintain existing population levels – a figure that has risen since the report was issued, because of the EU’s subsequent expansion (UN Population Division, 2001). Currently, it is highly unlikely that European citizens will find such levels of immigration acceptable. While attitudes vary widely by country, there is growing evidence that public opinion has become more hostile towards immigration (Eurobarometer, 2010, 51-63; Favell, 2010). Although it is often popular with lobbyists representing employer organisations, immigration tends to be politically controversial, particularly at times of economic crisis where the native-born are prone to resent newcomers (Wilkes 2011). Recruiting immigrants can, then, only ever be a partial solution to skills shortages; other policies are required to upskill the existing workforce, and to expand the economically active population through such measures as deferred retirement and inclusion of hitherto inactive groups such as women.

Migration policy is also potentially divisive within countries that have historically exported significant numbers of their people. In Ireland, a country with a long and charged history of emigration as a solution to poverty, landlessness and conflict, the economic growth of the later twentieth century produced both a decline in emigration rates and a massive increase in the number of immigrants, at a time when the ‘natural change’ in population was virtually zero (Coleman, 2008, 455). With the sharp onset of economic crisis following the banking collapse of 2008, one daily newspaper opened an interactive blog under the heading ‘Generation Emigration’; many of the entries referred back to the historical role of emigration in Ireland’s history (http://www.irishtimes.com/blogs/generationemigration). Strong as emotions can run in European countries like Ireland, the contested nature of emigration is particularly sharp in developing countries, who stand to lose considerable numbers of highly skilled and professional workers. Recent research acknowledges that while this ‘brain and skills drain’ has potential benefits in terms of remittances and the acquisition of expertise, it can empty out critical parts of the workforce, particularly those whose skills have incurred significant investment, such as health professionals (Docquier, Lohest and Marfouk, 2007; Mill et al., 2008; Pellegrino, 2001; Zurn and Dumont, 2009).

In some occupations, demographic aging is itself a significant force that is fuelling demand for migrant labour. A number of studies have shown the importance of migrant workers – mainly female – for elder care (Di Rosa, Melchiorre, Luchetti, and Lamura, 2012; Mill et al., 2008). Some have suggested that the recruitment of immigrant women into elder care in rich nations like the USA has tended to reinforce the low status of elder care as a profession while disrupting family care traditions in the sending nations (Browne and Braun, 2008). One study of migrant elder care workers
in four affluent countries found that immigrants comprised around one third of nurses in Ireland and the UK and around one eighth in Canada and the USA, and a quarter of care assistants in Ireland and one fifth in the other three countries. The authors also noted that most of the lower-paid group entered as family members of existing immigrants or as refugees, while qualified nurses tended to enter under skilled worker schemes (Spencer, Martin, Bourgeault and O’Shea, 2010, 21-5). In all four nations, the Philippines ranked high as a source of both nurses and care assistants, along with other relatively poor nations. Thus the recruitment of elder care workers to service the aging populations of Europe, North America, Japan and Australasia is also contributing to the drain of human resources from developing countries.

In recent years, the ‘war for talent’ has encouraged governments in some emigrant nations to develop strategies for attracting highly skilled leavers to return. The OECD, which in general views migration as a positive solution to skills shortages, has argued that more work is needed in the reduction of barriers to return mobility, to encourage experienced emigrants to take their skills and knowledge home, which in turn improves the stock of human capital in their countries of origin. In practical terms, OECD suggested that much could be done to facilitate this, through measures such as providing financial support to municipalities that invite returnees and provide facilities such as housing, as happens in Poland; another is to provide tax concessions to highly-skilled returnees, as in Finland, Spain and New Zealand; Estonia, meanwhile, maintains a website for putting emigrants in touch with employers back home (OECD, 2012a, 51-2). There is also scope for publicity drives and other measures designed to construct a sense of diasporic group identity among emigrants, a strategy that has been very successfully exploited by recent Irish governments (Jones 2003). The Scottish Government has made the attraction of return migrants part of its immigration strategy since 2004, and in 2010 it published a Diaspora Plan that included measures to improve economic growth by ‘creating conditions for members of the Diaspora to live, learn, visit, work and return to Scotland’ (Scottish Government 2010, 2). Malaysia has also developed a number of programmes designed to persuade highly skilled Malaysian emigrants to return, as well as policies intended to stop them leaving in the first place (National Economic Advisory Council 2010, 125).

Whatever their economic merits, such interventions have the advantage for governments of being politically non-controversial. The return migrants are generally perceived as racial and cultural homecomers rather than as foreign immigrants competing for jobs, housing and other resources. Yet as OECD has pointed out, such strategies are not free from difficulty (OECD, 2012b, 16-17). The idea of a diaspora hard to define in practice, and indeed some emigrants may not embrace the identity associated with ideas of diaspora. Further, those who leave a country will have reasons for doing so that may dispose them against a permanent return (such as trauma, rejection or dislike of cultural norms). Alternatively, they may have developed a romanticised view of their ‘homeland’ that promotes short term tourism but can make integration a challenging and often unhappy experience. Moreover, the ability of a diaspora to contribute to social and economic development will depend on such factors as their skill mix, age composition and degree of integration into the destination country. As return migrants tend to be older than first-time migrants, their net contribution to the age structure will probably be neutral.

‘Aging in place’
In many societies, the elderly were until recently a relatively homogeneous group, culturally, ethnically, religiously and linguistically. Later life has changed in many ways, and its growing diversity and heterogeneity is among these. Yet patterns and experiences of migration among older people have largely been neglected in the recent debates over migration policy. They have also been accorded relatively little attention in the research community, where studies of older migrants are either largely concerned with social policy issues (such as the specific care needs of minority ethnic elders) or planning and commerce (such as the provision of services to retirement emigrants). And barely any attention at all has been paid to the challenges facing return migrants.

Precise figures on migrant aging can be hard to come by. Most official statistics are based on the administration of immigration regulations, and these differ between countries, so that the results are rarely comparable. Even within the European Union, whose formation was based on the principle of promoting free movement of labour, goods and services across its member states, it can be very difficult to reach agreed and accurate estimates of migration (Coleman 2008, 453-4). But the broad trends are unmistakeable. To take Germany as an example once more, almost ten per cent of foreigners are aged 65 or over; while this is relatively low in comparison with the non-immigrant population, where 23.7% are aged 65 or over, it nevertheless represents a growth trend that is almost certainly unavoidable (Baykara-Krumme 2012, 9-10). In Europe, for example, post-War mass migration had led by the end of the 1970s to a large settled migrant population in a number of countries. At the time that they entered their European destinations, most immigrants were relatively young adults (White 2006, 1288). While some have since returned to their country of origin, or moved on to a third destination, in most countries the majority have remained in their new homes. In Germany, for example, the over-60s rose from 3.1% of the foreigner population in 1970 to 9.7% in 2002, while the number of over-60s rose from well under 100,000 to over 700,000 in the same period (White, 2006, 1289; Baykara-Krumme, 2012).

Of course, these tendencies affected different migrant groups, and different host countries, in different ways, depending on timing, scale, and the labour market characteristics of the migrant group itself, as well as on the possibilities for family reunification within the host country. And the decision to remain in place may be an incremental one, as vague aspirations are replaced by concrete plans. One interesting indicator of this is that remittance rates typically decline as retirement approaches. While his may be partly due to simple family economics, it is characteristic for remittance rates to be lower among those who have decided to settle in their country of migration than among those who plan to return to their country of origin (Makina 2012, 5-6).

For some groups, aging-in-place is a by-product of barriers to returning. Refugees are frequently unable to return to their home country, because of the very factors that drove them out in the first place. For example, the USA and some Western European countries experienced significant flows of refugees from central Europe following the Soviet occupation of 1944-5 and the periodic clampdowns that then drove dissenters – especially Jews – out of such countries as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Latvia. By the time that it was possible to return without fear of punishment, many of the emigrants were elderly, and had formed strong attachments in their new homes. Instead of returning, this cohort laid down an infrastructure of voluntary organisations, family ties and wider connections that were later used by new generations of immigrants (Kaczmarczyk and Okólski, 2008, 606-7).
As migrants age in place, so their understanding of family ties and their importance may begin to change. In purely economic terms, it is probably true that subsequent generations will tend to think of family ties increasingly in terms of their relations in the country of settlement. However, some researchers have drawn attention to the continuing cultural exchanges between country of origin and the ‘diaspora’ of people who are descended from migrants (Joseph 2010, 60). Moreover, migrants may have ties in more than one other country; one small scale study of South Asian elders in the UK reported that as well as the country of origin, respondents had children/siblings elsewhere in Europe, as well as sometimes quite extensive family connections around the UK; conversely, the death of parents had sometimes weakened ties with the country of origin (Victor, Martin and Zubair 2012, 87). Family dispersal may, in turn, have implications for elder care, particularly if people come from a group that values family care and views state provision as somehow a sign of weakness (Victor, Martin and Zubair 2012, 90).

As well as sustaining what some have called ‘transnational’ networks of ties between two or more societies, migrants, and especially the first generation, may return at regular intervals to their country of origin. Caribbeans who have settled in Britain, for example, shuttle back and forth between the two communities, sometimes establishing a second home in their country of origin (Goulbourne 1999; Joseph 2010, 63). Chris Phillipson has argued that these patterns are producing ‘a new kind of ageing in which the dynamics of family and social life may be stretched across different continents and different types of societies’ (Phillipson 2010, 21-2). In some cases, particularly among migrants with undocumented status, the capacity to maintain strong connections in their country of origin may be limited. In other cases, such as those who are immigrating into a country where there is already a well-established community of compatriots with a highly developed infrastructure of support, may find it much easier – and experience less of a sense of isolation. Nevertheless, the tendency to maintain transnational connections is a marked pattern of contemporary migration, with implications for intergenerational social support networks in both societies, as well as impacting on the self-identities of those who age-in-place.

Intergenerational ties seem to be particularly well developed among certain groups of migrants from Asian societies like China, Japan and Korea. A number of studies, usually conducted in the USA, show that Chinese and Japanese immigrants tend to preserve traditions of filial piety, and are likely to live with other family members – usually children – in older age (Kamo and Zhou, 1994; MacCallum et al., 2006, 30-31). However, some researchers argue that these patterns are starting to change, as family support networks among these migrant communities are starting to loosen, and elder care is handed over more to professional services – albeit that these are sometimes provided by individuals who are presented as family members (Lan, 2002; Wong, Yoo and Stewart, 2006). And we should not overstate Confucian exceptionalism: it is quite common for older migrants to live close to their children’s households, or even sometimes to share them (Warnes, Friedrich, Kellahe and Torres 2004, 316; White 2006, 1292).

Not all older migrants require care, of course. In the USA, for example, employment rates fall faster among the older native-born than among immigrants, though George Borjas’s work provides some evidence that part of this propensity to work into old age is connected to eligibility for retirement benefits (Borjas 2011). Similar factors may be at work in France, where one survey showed that
older migrants planned to retire at 60.3 years, compared with average retirement ages at the time of 58.5 for men and 59.5 for women (Vaillant and Wolff, 2012). On the other hand, older migrants tend to show worse health outcomes than the native-born, which may mean that intended retirement dates are brought forward. More generally, European studies suggest that migrants who ‘age in place’ tend to be a highly disadvantaged group, with poor outcomes in health, housing, education and leisure; older women migrants are particularly disadvantaged, especially in respect of post-retirement income (Tucci 2012, 13-14). They are also more likely to have experienced periods of unemployment during their previous working lives (Tucci 2012, 12).

**Migrating in later life**

Elder migration appears to have increased considerably since 1945 (Coleman 2008, 465; Flynn, Longino, Wiseman and Bigger 1985). The majority of older migrants in most societies consist of people who have ‘aged in place’ – that is, they migrated and became older. The other group, which is now rapidly expanding and relatively under-researched, is made up of people who migrate in later life, many of whom are comparatively prosperous and tend to enjoy relatively high standards of income, health, and other amenities. Most of this group fall into one of three main categories: those who move to benefit from kin support, migrant retirees and return migrants. Demographers, geographers and economists have tended to ignore the migration of the elderly, concentrating mainly on labour force mobility. Yet there are important theoretical and empirical dimensions to elder migration, particularly those concerned with retirement and dependency.

Kinship migration often involves movement to live near children. Some Northern European nations have a largely unrecognised group of older migrants, who move to live near or with relatives, in the hope of receiving care in later life (Blakemore, 1999, xxx766; Warnes, Friedrich, Kellaher and Torres, 2004). Conversely, some elders migrate in order to distance themselves from their children and grandchildren. One survey of residents in Sun City, Arizona, found that many found the settlement close enough to allow for regular visits, but not so close that they became involved in family squabbles or routine babysitting (Gober and Zonn, 1983, 289).

When it comes to return migration, there are relatively few reliable sets of data. While some migrants return, we are not certain whether they are a minority or a majority, and we do not really know who returns and why (Cassarino, 2004; Corcoran, 2002, 177-8). One Canadian study, benefiting from longitudinal data, showed that male immigrants, and highly skilled specialists and entrepreneurs in particular, can be highly mobile, with a significant proportion undertaking both return and onward migration (Aydemir and Robinson, 2008). Similarly, Ní Laoire reports that even before the introduction of the Single European Market, return migration rates within Europe were relatively high, at around 70 – 85%; whether this was still the subsequently is unclear (Ní Laoire, 2007, 336). Moreover, it is not clear whether this high rate of return and onward migration is confined to a small group of cosmopolitan knowledge workers, or is part of an emerging pattern within a highly flexible international labour market. Paul White, on the other hand, suggests that although many migrants cling to the belief that they will ‘go home’ at some stage, in practice return migration rates are relatively low, partly because some retired immigrants find that they can afford to ‘shuttle’ between their country of origin and their country of settlement, which is usually where their children are based (White, 2006, 1292). Even so, in traditional countries of emigration, return migrants sometimes make up a significant proportion of the elderly population. In Mexico, for
example, it is estimated that one in every six men aged over fifty is a former emigrant to the USA (Aguila and Zissimopoulos, 2009, 1).

Much return migration is inspired by deep beliefs in obligations to the maintenance of ties with kinship networks and communities of origin (Ni Laoire 2007, 336). In general, though, return migration is triggered by an exit from the labour market, and it tends to peak around the age of retirement (Aguila and Zissimopoulos 2009). A number of the elderly British Caribbeans interviewed by Ricky Joseph were considering returning in order to live with their retirement pensions on family land that they had inherited, and were planning to sell the homes that they owned in the UK (Joseph 2010, 65-7). Such plans imply a once-for-all return to the ‘homeland’, but an increasing number of migrants are making several returns in both directions. One study of Hong Kong citizens who had returned from Canada in early or mid-career found that a considerable proportion of those who enjoyed higher salaries in Hong Kong were thinking of moving back to Canada when they retired, usually for quality-of-life reasons (Ley and Kobayashi, 2005). As throughout this chapter, then, I should emphasise the heterogeneity of this group.

Migrant retirement has increased exponentially in recent years, fuelled partly by the affluence of the baby boomer generation and the spread of mass tourism associated with cheap air travel. In Germany, for example, the number of pensions paid to retirees overseas rose from around 115,000 in 1992 to 191,730 in 2009 (Schneider, 2010, 8). Retirement migration tends to focus on specific areas that are attractive for reasons of climate, lifestyle and price. Within the United States, Florida dominates the states as a destination for retirement migration. It attracted over a quarter of over-60 year old inter-state migrants between 1960 and 1980 (Flynn, Longino, Wiseman and Bigger, 1985, 294-5). Within Europe, southern Europe now has a large and growing population of Belgian, British, Danish, Dutch, Finnish, German, Irish, Norwegian and Swedish retirees. Migrant retirees also move between continents, with small but significant numbers of Northern Europeans retiring to the USA, Australia and Latin America, often moving to live near, or with, family members (King, Warnes and Williams, 2000; Warnes, Friedrich, Kellaher and Torres, 2004, 312-3).

North Americans and Northern Europeans who retire to ‘sunshine’ destinations typically move as part of a married or cohabiting couple (Gober and Zonn, 1983, 289). One intensive study of British migrant retirees reported that over half had previously worked in managerial or semi-professional occupations, and over a quarter in clerical or other white collar jobs; half had some and one fifth had considerable experience of international mobility and migration well before retiring to their current home (King, Warnes and Williams, 2000, 74-6, 85). The destinations, such as Florida or the Mediterranean, are overwhelmingly those that became popular during the international tourist boom that took off in the 1970s and 1980s, and typically the migrants have built up connections with the area for some time (Gober and Zonn, 1983, 293-4). In some cases, as the authors of one major study point out, local authorities in the destination areas deliberately marketed their resort as a retirement region after mass tourism moved on (King, Warnes and Williams, 2000, 81). Some communities, such as Sun City, in Arizona, are designed and developed from the outset as retirement destinations.

Media narratives tend to focus on some of the disappointments and troubles of expatriate life. Empirical studies suggest that most expatriate retirees are able to settle relatively well in their new
country; for example, a survey of British retirees in four southern European sub-belt regions reported that many experienced improvements in health, well-being and social engagement after moving rather than the reverse (Warnes, King, Williams and Patterson 1999). While interest in returning to Britain is stronger among those whose health no longer permits independent living, a number of voluntary organisations provide services and information to members of this group, particularly those whose social and family ties to Britain have weakened (Hardill, Spradbery, Arnold-Boakes and Marrugat 2005). A study of elderly North Americans living in Mexico reported that women found it particularly hard to adjust to living away from their grandchildren; while men shared this sense of loss (though to a lesser extent), they also felt remote from their work and work-based ties. In both cases, the researcher noted that the expatriates adapted by holding open the opportunity of return migration at some unspecified time in the future (Banks 2009).

Retirement migrants’ adjustment to their new country is therefore often contingent, hedged around by qualifications and alternatives. Even though relatively few expatriates migrate back to their home country until forced to by severe incapacity or unforeseen financial circumstances, and many often vehemently deny that they wish to return to the country they have left, it seems that they value the existence of the opportunity to leave. Their adjustment is also shaped by a continuing interaction with fellow-nationals in the expatriate community, often strengthened by the choice to live in what is effectively an expatriate settlement (Banks 2009, 179). By and large, retirement migrants develop attachments in their new communities, develop new lifestyles that bridge their old and new identities and aspirations, and often adopt an explicitly critical stance towards the culture that they have left behind (Gustafson 2001).

This global movement has had a marked influence on the destination regions. Economically, the retirees are comparatively affluent, producing increased demand for a range of goods and services, from health to leisure products (Schneider, 2010 16-17). The extent to which this influence is a positive one is another matter. One study sketches a community in Spain where fewer than half of the permanent inhabitants are Spanish; during the summer season, the population triples as the permanent population is joined by holiday makers and ‘seabirds’ (Janoschka and Haas, 2011, 297). Other destinations include ‘gated communities’, where the immigrant retirees live protected lives, free from the intrusions and disturbances of everyday life in Mexico or Thailand (Banks 2009). While some of these retiree migrants are ‘seabirds’, who move seasonally between their ‘sunshine’ destination and their place of origin, many remain throughout the year (Gustafson, 2001; Janoschka and Haas, 2011, 297-8). Some research demonstrates that permanent retired migrants can often identify strongly with their host community, and indeed dis-identify equally strongly with their country of origin, becoming deeply involved in local life, and contributing through volunteering and self-help services (Haas 2012).

Policy challenges

Later life can all too easily be stigmatised as a period of woe. The dominant narrative of aging in Western societies in particular tends to present images of troubles and decline. Some may have assimilated or integrated to an extent where their situation and needs are much the same as those
of all older people. And if UK evidence is anything to go by, older people’s attitudes towards and experiences of age and ageing seem to depend more on generation, health and socio-economic status than ethnicity, as do their experiences of age-related discrimination (Sweiry and Willitts 2012, 22-8). Of course, there are often specific problems associated with the aging process, but the ‘third age’ can also be a period of opportunity and growth. Moving out of full-time work, or watching one’s children take responsibility for their own lives, represents for many people a liberation. The popularity of adult education movements such as the University of the Third Age, or travel holidays targeted at the retired, illustrates this neatly. Before discussing some of the problems facing older migrants, then, I will briefly examine ways in which older migrants make a positive contribution to their communities.

Probably the most important area where older adults play a distinctive and constructive role is in voluntary activity of various kinds. In Spain, for example, charitable and voluntary activities are said to be a distinctive and ubiquitous feature of the foreign retired community, with British retirees standing out in terms of the number and range of voluntary activities undertaken (Haas 2012, 3). Such activities often focused on self-help and philanthropic initiatives, often in fields such as health and caring, but by no means confined to these. Haas suggests that these activities have a marked integrating effect, building social capital not only within the immigrant community but also between immigrants and their hosts, and also conveying various social capital benefits on the volunteers themselves (Haas 2012, 18-20). On the other hand, levels of engagement may be far lower among those who have ‘aged in place’. In Germany, for example, one study showed that only ten per cent of older adults from a Turkish background are involved in voluntary activity, far lower than for people from non-migrant backgrounds; moreover, immigrants were more likely to be involved in movements that drew most of their members from their own ethnic, cultural or religious group (Huth 2012, 27).

Intergeneration practices, such as learning exchanges that bring generations together, can also provide older migrants with channels for contributing constructively to their community. The field of intergenerational practice is a new and diverse one (Springate, Atkinson and Martin 2008). Relations between the generations have become a growing focus of concern for researchers and policy-makers alike. As well as the effects of demographic change and globalising tendencies, both of which are said to influence relationships between generations, it is also sometimes argued that the social and cultural distance between generations is growing, both within families and more widely in society, not least as a result of the growing ethnic and cultural diversity that is experienced by different generations. Intergenerational practice has developed rapidly in many nations, and comprises a wide range of practices. Typical policy interventions include school-based programmes, community projects, health-related projects, learning and knowledge development, mentoring activities, and also professional development and knowledge exchange. At the level of the enterprise, there is a burgeoning interest in intergenerational management, reflecting widespread belief among managers and business specialists that employees’ work values and preferences – including possibly their orientations towards skills acquisition and knowledge development – are influenced by generational experiences as well as by individual employees’ age (Kunze, Böhm and

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1 Ethnicity is not, of course, coterminous with migration status, but UK social data typically do not report separate figures for migrants.
While this is an emerging field, and ethnicity and place are still underdeveloped aspects, intergenerational practice is increasingly attending to these dimensions (Mannion 2012).

Not all elderly immigrants, then, have particular, identifiably distinctive needs. However, there are undoubtedly some distinctive challenges and needs that are characteristically shared by some, if not all, migrants. And because of the increasing scale of global migration, as well growing policy debate over both immigration and emigration, there has been developing recognition over time of the scale, situations and needs of elderly immigrant populations. Some of these needs are shared, if not by all migrant groups, at least by a number of them. For example, many elderly primary migrants do not possess the linguistic, cultural, educational and material resources that are taken for granted by the dominant groups, and they are therefore likely to depend disproportionately on kinship networks and ethnically-specific voluntary organisations for support (White, 2006, 1297; Gordo 2012, 18). Even this option can be restricted by generational changes within immigrant communities, particularly where older migrants’ adult children are reluctant to provide support because they have themselves overcome the linguistic and other constraints that are limiting their parents’ well-being (Ip, Lui and Chu, 2007).

In many contexts, it is common for immigrant populations to experience higher than average levels of poverty as they age (White 2006, 1284). Within the European Union, poverty and other forms of exclusion are most likely to be experienced by older non-European migrants (Reijneveld 1998; Warnes, Friedrich, Kellaher and Torres 2004, 315-6). Even within the European Union, welfare entitlements are not necessarily universal nor easily transportable between member states. Those who migrate after retirement are usually treated very differently from those migrants who work in the country before retiring; one study suggests that while the educated and linguistically competent may be able to negotiate transfers of benefits between member states, these abilities to maximise well-being are unevenly distributed across the older migrant population (Ackers and Dwyer, 2004). And migrants who age in place may not be eligible for benefits as they age. In some cases, this may be because their working lives have been spent in the illicit economy, but even within the European Union, there are continuing practices of withholding full citizenship rights from legal immigrants (Warnes, Friedrich, Kellaher and Torres 2004, 321). They may also incur ill-will as a result of perceptions that some post-retirement migrants are involved in ‘welfare tourism’ (Timonen, 1999).

Language can be problematic for a range of migrant groups. In the USA, Ikels found that many elderly immigrants are not only non-English speakers, but may also be illiterate in their native language, and therefore are not easily contacted through conventional outreach methods (Ikels, 1998, 488). A number of UK studies also confirm that competence in English is relatively low among some older migrant groups, including older Asians, particularly among women (Tackey et al 2006). Those who arrive as dependents in later life may come from a background where little or no language is spoken other than the native tongue (Blakemore, 1999, 768). More generally, women migrants are less likely to encounter situations where their competence in the host language is developed; in some cases, this is intensified by constrains on women’s participation in adult education (Ehrlich 1997). In cases where the primary migrants were characterised by low levels of education, their children’s generation may not only have English as their main language, but may
also have limited proficiency in their parent’s first language (Rasinger 2012, 7-8). Some older migrants experience a diminished ability to use their native language, as a result of adaptation to the language of the host nation (Schmid and Keijzer 2009). In Israel, older Russian immigrants compensate for a lack of Hebrew competence by developing intense social ties with other Russian speakers (Remennick 2003). Some researchers recommend that second language provision should be tailored to the age-specific needs of migrant groups, particularly where older migrants have low levels of literacy and have had little or no schooling as children (Baynham et al 2007, 30-32).

Older migrants are reportedly more likely to suffer from ill health than the host population – a pattern that appears to be explained largely by socio-economic disadvantage, sometimes reinforced by cultural and lifestyle factors (Reijneveld, 1998). In general, they are more likely to report general ill health than the native-born population. In the USA, immigrants as a whole are slightly less likely to be obese than the native-born, but have lower levels of general health; however, many of these differences decline or disappear once other factors, such as education and socio-economic status, are taken into account (Heron, Schoeli and Morales 2003, 4-6). Similarly, analysis of the European survey on ageing, health and retirement has shown that migrants are more likely to suffer from debilitating illnesses and disabilities, and are also slightly more likely to be smokers than the native-born (Solé-Auró and Crimmons 2008, 870).

Older migrants can also be more likely to experience mental health problems. For example, European survey data suggest a notably higher level of depression among first-generation migrants aged 50 years or older, even after controlling for other factors that are known to cause depression in older age (Aichberger et al 2010). UK research has also shown a greater propensity to suffer from poor mental health, including a higher incidence of dementia than can be explained by genetic risk factors (Livingston et al., 2001; Livingston and Sembhi, 2003). Refugees are particularly prone to mental health problems, particularly if they have experience severe trauma in their country of origin (Briggs, 2011). Of course, these overall patterns may conceal significant variations between groups. Highly skilled migrants or affluent retirees, for example, may demonstrate better average health than their comparators among the native population. In general, though, migrant populations are more likely to experience problems with their health, physical and mental, and with support services.

Worse health standards may in turn be compounded by difficulties in accessing appropriate care. Even in societies with developed welfare states, migrants may experience difficulties in accessing health and social care. The barriers facing older migrants may include unfamiliarity with services, insufficient information about entitlements, language difficulties, and unhelpful cultural stereotypes that influence the attitudes and behaviour of service providers (Anand and Cochrane 2005). Stereotypes and popular beliefs can also limit the willingness of older migrants themselves to use public services; South Asian women, for example, may be reluctant to allow another female, however professional and well-qualified, to care for an elderly spouse (Victor, Martin and Zubair 2012, 90-91). In a multilingual and multicultural society, care providers need to develop appropriate strategies for engaging with the health and social needs of a diverse population (Brotman, 2003).

To some extent, disadvantaged groups can and do draw on informal support mechanisms to complement and compensate for failings in public services. Yet although in-group support and
Kinship networks are often important, access to informal social support may be problematic for some groups of older migrants. Those with the lowest levels of social support are migrants whose life histories are characterised by low rates of marriage and family formation. In the UK, older male migrants from Hong Kong have often worked long and anti-social hours, with relatively low incomes, and with little exposure to the English language, allowing them to create only very weak social networks; in some cases exposure to the illicit economy has also left them with low levels of public social protection (Warnes, Friedrich, Kellaher and Torres 2004, 317). Even among those with strong family ties, some older migrants reportedly find that their children’s aspirations and values diverge from their own, leading to conflict and stress (Warnes, Friedrich, Kellaher and Torres 2004, 316). Projects to engage immigrants in voluntary activities are said to improve levels of integration and provide access to social support, particularly when such initiatives are directed towards the individual situations of elderly immigrants (Huth 2012, 29-30).

Older migrants are also more likely to face social isolation (Barrett and Mosca 2012; Saito, Kai and Takizawa 2012). One study of social capital and migration in eleven European countries, for example, found that although levels of civic association among older migrants mirrored those of the native-born, with the highest levels for both groups being in the Nordic nations, in general the migrant populations were less active than the native-born (Berchet and Sirven 2012, 10-11). However, the longer the time spent in the host country, the more likely the individual is to become involved in civic activity; levels of social trust, on the other hand, do not vary by length of residence (Berchet and Sirven 2012, 15). Social capital, then, is not equally distributed within the immigrant population. Nevertheless, we should not rush to generalise, for in some cases, isolation is countered by other factors. Elderly Russians who emigrated to Israel in the 1990s describe the transition as difficult but positive; while they felt increasing isolation from younger generations, they had developed strong social ties within the Russian immigrant community (Remennick 2003).

Even return migrants can experience social and cultural isolation. A number of studies explore experiences of alienation and disappointment among migrants returning to their home country (Corcoran, 2002; Long and Oxfeld, 2004). Studies of foreign students re-entering their home country often report a process of reverse culture shock, ranging from a lack of comfort with the home society’s values and norms to fairly severe problems of psychological adjustment (Pritchard, 2011). These studies, of course, involve relatively young people returning home after a relatively short period of study, but many older adult migrants return after a considerable period abroad, and the tensions and challenges can be considerably more severe. A number of studies of return migrants in Ireland have explored these issues. An analysis of longitudinal data for over-50-year olds suggested that return migrants are more likely to experience social isolation than ‘stayers’, particularly if they had returned after more than ten years away; but surprisingly, there was no evidence that they felt more lonely as a result (Barrett and Mosca 2012, 17). This contrast between people’s positioning in relation to ‘objective’ measures of social isolation and their ‘subjective’ reporting of loneliness may be due to adaptation among return migrants, who have grown accustomed to a life with relatively few close ties or strong associational commitments (Barrett and Mosca 2012, 23).

In some respects, though, return migrants may be more socially isolated than they had been before returning. In her study of return migrants in rural Ireland, Catriona Ni Laoire reported that the people in her sample often reported difficulties in making friends, in contrast to the often open and
cosmopolitan networks that they had entered as immigrants elsewhere; and they were both disappointed by what they saw as the materialism and individualism of Irish society, and resented local expectations that they conform to family and community norms that they regarded as socially conservative and oppressive (Ní Laoire 2007, 339-42). Admittedly, some of these responses may appear deeply contradictory, but they should serve to remind us that even – perhaps especially – return migrants may face difficulties of integration into the host society. In its report on diaspora populations, the OECD recommended that ‘home’ nations can maximise the gains from return migrants by developing reintegration programmes and counselling before and after return, as well as by promoting self-help support networks (OECD 2012b, 24). Support of this nature can help returnees make best use of their knowledge, skills and social capital, as well as avoid difficulties with financial transactions, transfer of welfare entitlements and information of employment and other opportunities.

Conclusions
This chapter has examined the nature of migration in an ageing society, at a time of accelerating global exchange and influence. High levels of personal mobility are an important feature of wider tendencies towards globalisation, and indeed are a very common reaction to the pressures and opportunities that global economic and cultural trends present. In aging societies, attracting immigrant labour is a natural and obvious way of seeking to maintain skills levels and rise to the challenges of global competition. In affluent societies, emigration for retirement can be highly attractive for lifestyle reasons (and sometimes to avoid taxation in the originating nation). Yet if these patterns of mobility share some common causes, like globalisation itself they are complex and multi-facted in their working.

Above all, this chapter suggests that it is dangerous to lump all migrants into a single category, even when they share a common (if somewhat broad and poorly-defined) characteristic such as age. Rather than grouping older migrants into a single category, we need to distinguish between them. They command different linguistic, educational and material resources, and their experiences vary enormously. A world of difference separates wealthy Europeans and Americans retiring to the sunbelt and the homeless refugee in sub-Saharan Africa – and between them are just about every possible permutation of circumstances and trajectories. Moreover, this chapter has barely touched on the question of gender, which shapes experiences of migration as much as it does other social and cultural aspects of our lives.

Researchers have addressed these issues from a number of standpoints. In disciplinary terms, the topic brings together scholars from sociology, social policy, economics and history, as well as from demographics and population studies. At present, most attention has focused on the extent to which migrant labour can replenish labour stocks in aging societies, and to a lesser extent on the impact of emigration on the countries that export significant proportions of their population. There has until recently been much less focus on the experiences of older migrants, though this now appears to be changing. In part this reflects the availability of evidence. First, in most countries, migrants form a minority of the population, and they are therefore represented in survey data in relatively small numbers. They are therefore less likely to provide a simple and reliable category for analysis of longitudinal survey data, which in many other respects offer exciting prospects for
research into the elderly. Second, qualitative researchers face many of the barriers of language and culture in exploring and understanding migrants’ experiences that older migrants may themselves face in engaging with individuals and agencies from the host society. Nevertheless, we have an emerging body of research into the experience of migration at different stages of the life course, and we can expect that this field of research will continue to flourish and develop as public bodies, policy makers and others come to grips with the longer term effects of human mobility in modern societies.

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