Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/803
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dc.contributor.authorBlochliger, Hansjorgen_UK
dc.contributor.authorKing, David Nen_UK
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-07T02:30:56Z-
dc.date.available2018-04-07T02:30:56Z-
dc.date.issued2007-09-06en_UK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/803-
dc.description.abstractOne of the most frequently used indicators to assess fiscal power of sub-central governments is the share of sub-central to total tax revenue. But this indicator says nothing about the true discretion sub-central jurisdictions have over tax rates and the tax base, and it skips revenue from intergovernmental grants entirely. The main purpose of this paper is to develop and analyse a set of more refined indicators that assess the true power sub-central governments have over fiscal resources. In sum, fiscal autonomy is considerably lower than simple ratios suggest: About 60 percent only of own tax revenue is under full or partial control of sub-central governments, and again 60 percent only of transfer revenue is unconditional. Moreover, much sub-central tax revenue emanates from mobile income taxes and is prone to tax erosion. Whether and how fiscal autonomy affects outcomes such as public sector efficiency, equity in access to public services or the long term fiscal stance remains yet open, but the new database can be used for more conclusive policy analysis.en_UK
dc.language.isoenen_UK
dc.publisherOECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Developmenten_UK
dc.relationBlochliger H & King DN (2007) Less than you thought: the fiscal autonomy of sub-central governments. OECD Economic Studies, 2006 (2), pp. 155-188. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/59/40507581.pdfen_UK
dc.rightsAcknowledgment of OECD as source and copyright owner is given. "Less than you thought: the fiscal autonomy of sub central governments" published in OECD Economic Studies, Volume 2006, Number 2, August 2007 © OECD 2006, pages: 193-235, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/59/40507581.pdf [OECD Rights and Permissions information: http://www.oecd.org/rights]en_UK
dc.subjectFiscal federalismen_UK
dc.subjectLocal taxationen_UK
dc.subjectIntergovernmental transfersen_UK
dc.subjectFiscal autonomyen_UK
dc.subjectFiscal autonomyen_UK
dc.subjectLocal Governmenten_UK
dc.subjectLocal taxationen_UK
dc.titleLess than you thought: the fiscal autonomy of sub-central governmentsen_UK
dc.typeJournal Articleen_UK
dc.citation.jtitleOECD Economic Studiesen_UK
dc.citation.issn1609-7491en_UK
dc.citation.issn0255-0822en_UK
dc.citation.volume2006en_UK
dc.citation.issue2en_UK
dc.citation.spage155en_UK
dc.citation.epage188en_UK
dc.citation.publicationstatusPublisheden_UK
dc.citation.peerreviewedRefereeden_UK
dc.type.statusAM - Accepted Manuscripten_UK
dc.identifier.urlhttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/59/40507581.pdfen_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationOECD Centre for Tax Policyen_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationEconomicsen_UK
dc.identifier.wtid827643en_UK
dcterms.dateAccepted2007-09-06en_UK
dc.date.filedepositdate2009-02-16en_UK
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_UK
rioxxterms.versionAMen_UK
local.rioxx.authorBlochliger, Hansjorg|en_UK
local.rioxx.authorKing, David N|en_UK
local.rioxx.projectInternal Project|University of Stirling|https://isni.org/isni/0000000122484331en_UK
local.rioxx.freetoreaddate2009-02-16en_UK
local.rioxx.licencehttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved|2009-02-16|en_UK
local.rioxx.filenameFiscalAutonomyES.pdfen_UK
local.rioxx.filecount1en_UK
local.rioxx.source0255-0822en_UK
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