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|Appears in Collections:||Law and Philosophy Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status: ||Refereed|
|Title: ||What the disjunctivist is right about|
|Authors: ||Millar, Alan|
|Contact Email: ||firstname.lastname@example.org|
|Issue Date: ||Jan-2007|
|Citation: ||Millar A (2007) What the disjunctivist is right about, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74 (1), pp. 176-198.|
|Abstract: ||There is a traditional conception of sensory experience on which the experiences one has looking at, say, a cat could be had by someone merely hallucinating a cat. Disjunctivists take issue with this conception on the grounds that it does not enable us to understand how perceptual knowledge is possible. In particular, they think, it does not explain how it can be that experiences gained in perception enable us to be in ‘cognitive contact’ with objects and facts. I develop this chal- lenge to the traditional conception and then show that it is possible to accommo- date an adequate account of cognitive contact in keeping with the traditional conception. One upshot of the discussion is that experiences do not bear the explanatory burden placed upon them by disjunctivists.|
|DOI Link: ||http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00008.x|
|Rights: ||The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com|
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