|Appears in Collections:||Law and Philosophy Journal Articles|
|Peer Review Status:||Refereed|
|Title:||Transmission of warrant-failure and the notion of epistemic analyticity|
|Citation:||Ebert P (2005) Transmission of warrant-failure and the notion of epistemic analyticity, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83 (4), pp. 505-521.|
|Abstract:||In this paper I will argue that Boghossian’s explanation of how we can acquire a priori knowledge of logical principles through implicit deﬁnitions commits a transmission of warrant-failure. To this end, I will brieﬂy outline Boghossian’s account, followed by an explanation of what a transmission of warrant-failure consists in. I will also show that this charge is independent of the worry of rule- circularity which has been raised concerning the justiﬁcation of logical principles and of which Boghossian is fully aware. My argument comes in two steps: ﬁrstly, I will argue for the insuﬃciency of Boghossian’s template which is meant to explain how a subject can acquire a warrant for logical principles. I will show however that this insuﬃciency of his template can be remedied by adopting what I call the Disquotational Step. Secondly, I will argue that incorporating this further step makes his template subject to a transmission of warrant-failure, assuming that certain rather basic and individually motivated principles hold. Thus, Boghossian’s account faces a dilemma: either he adopts the Disquotational Step and subjects his account to the charge of a transmission of warrant-failure, or he drops this additional step leaving the account confronted with explaining the gap that has previously been highlighted. I will then suggest various rejoinders that Boghossian might adopt but none of which—I will argue—can resolve the dilemma. Lastly, I will raise and brieﬂy discuss the question whether this worry generalizes to other accounts, such as Hale and Wright’s that aim to explain our knowledge of logic and/or mathematics in vi|
|Rights:||Published by Taylor & Francis|
This item is protected by original copyright
Items in the Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
If you believe that any material held in STORRE infringes copyright, please contact firstname.lastname@example.org providing details and we will remove the Work from public display in STORRE and investigate your claim.