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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/508
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dc.contributor.authorBecker, Saschaen_UK
dc.contributor.authorEgger, Peter Hen_UK
dc.contributor.authorSeidel, Tobiasen_UK
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-23T00:11:23Z-
dc.date.available2017-06-23T00:11:23Z-
dc.date.issued2008-06-01en_UK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/508-
dc.description.abstractWhen estimating the determinants of perceived corruption, economists assumed that there is full independence across countries. In the presence of peer-group or learning effects through cross-border economic activity (such as trade or labor migration), this assumption might be violated. We provide evidence that this is the case. Using a cross-section of 123 economies for the year 2000, we illustrate that corruption in one country spills over to adjacent economies. This finding implies that institutional changes reducing corruption in one country lead to smaller but qualitatively similar effects in neighboring countries.en_UK
dc.language.isoenen_UK
dc.relationBecker S, Egger PH & Seidel T (2008) Corruption Epidemics. Stirling Economics Discussion Paper, 2008-09.en_UK
dc.relation.ispartofseriesStirling Economics Discussion Paper, 2008-09en_UK
dc.subjectPerceived corruptionen_UK
dc.subjectInstitutionsen_UK
dc.subjectSpatial econometricsen_UK
dc.subjectPolitical corruption Economic aspectsen_UK
dc.subjectCorruption Economic aspectsen_UK
dc.titleCorruption Epidemicsen_UK
dc.typeWorking Paperen_UK
dc.citation.publicationstatusUnpublisheden_UK
dc.citation.peerreviewedUnrefereeden_UK
dc.type.statusAM - Accepted Manuscripten_UK
dc.author.emailsascha.becker@stir.ac.uken_UK
dc.citation.date01/06/2008en_UK
dc.subject.jelD72: Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavioren_UK
dc.subject.jelD73: Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruptionen_UK
dc.subject.jelK42: Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Lawen_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationEconomicsen_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationIfo Institute, Germanyen_UK
dc.contributor.affiliationCESifo, Germanyen_UK
dc.identifier.wtid839497en_UK
dcterms.dateAccepted2008-06-01en_UK
dc.date.filedepositdate2008-10-31en_UK
rioxxterms.typeWorking paperen_UK
rioxxterms.versionAMen_UK
local.rioxx.authorBecker, Sascha|en_UK
local.rioxx.authorEgger, Peter H|en_UK
local.rioxx.authorSeidel, Tobias|en_UK
local.rioxx.projectInternal Project|University of Stirling|https://isni.org/isni/0000000122484331en_UK
local.rioxx.freetoreaddate2008-10-31en_UK
local.rioxx.licencehttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved|2008-10-31|en_UK
local.rioxx.filenameSEDP-2008-09-Becker-Egger-Seidel.pdfen_UK
local.rioxx.filecount1en_UK
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